have stationed their missile fleets along the Fukien coast, the Nationalist
ships go on "Battle Readiness One" as soon as they get within 30 nautical
miles from the coast, with the assumption that a missile attack can come at
any time. On the other hand, the Communists, fearing the powerful National-
ist anti-submarine capabilities, have tried to steer their submarines clear
of the Taiwan Straits. A superficial calm has settled on the Straits, but
the danger of naval conflicts is stalking the waters. Heavy fighting can
flare up at any time.

[Mar 77, pp 76-84]

[Text] Part II The Chinese Nationalist and Communist Naval Strength and
Their Ships' Characteristics

If one is to assess the Chinese Nationalist and Communist Naval strength
at present and to predict trends for the future, one must have a complete
understanding of the capabilities of the ships and their weapon systems of
the two navies. He will be greatly mistaken if he makes a judgement purely
on the basis of the number and tonnage of the ships alone.

It goes without saying that different ships in the Nationalist and Commu-
nist navies will have different equipment. Even ships in the same category
will have different weapon systems, depending on which side they are on.

To make it easier to understand a very complicated matter, the writer
wishes to go into the weapon systems of the respective navies in detail
first. After that, he will attempt an analysis of the characteristics of
the ships on either side.

Weapon Systems

The weapons of the Chinese Nationalist and Communist naval ships fall into
four main categories: anti-submarine weapons; sea-to-sea and sea-to-air
missiles; ship battery; and sea mines and torpedoes. Let us deal with them
one at a time:

1. Anti-Submarine Weapons:

The most effective instrument to detect the presence of a diving submarine
is sonar. This piece of special equipment sensitive to supersonic vibra-
tions can pick up the sounds of submarine propellers, thus determining the
presence of submarines. It can also pick up reverberations from sound
vibrations, thereby determining the distance, location and speed of subs.
By the same token, it can also establish the direction and speed of attack-
ing torpedoes. Both the Nationalist and Communist anti-submarine ships are
equipped with sonar with an effective range of 3 nautical miles. In the
last 2 or 3 years, the Americans furnished the Nationalist navy with an
improved sonar (VDS-type sonar), extending its submarine detection range
to 14 nautical miles. Another submarine detection method used by the Na-
tionalists is by dropping sonar buoys from anti-submarine airplanes into
intended waters. These submerged sonar buoys coupled with frequent anti-
submarine patrols provide the Nationalists with an accurate picture of

16



missile units. The Chinese Communists are not expected to develop solid
fuel for such missiles and reliable delivery systems in a short time.
According to a prediction in the 1976 issue of the Jane's Yearbook, the
Chinese Communists will not launch their first strategic nuclear-powered
missile submarine having capabilities equal to those of the superpowers
until the early 1980's. Even if such a submarine comes into being, it may
not be much of a help in establishing the command of the sea in the Taiwan
Straits.

Apart from the 22 obsolete submarines made jointly by Russians and Chinese,
the Chinese Communist submarine fleet is made up of 36 "liberation" class
attack submarines (copies of Russian R-class submarines). These extremely
noisy submarines, each carrying eight conventional torpedoes, seem rather
vulnerable to modern anti-submarine operations. This notwithstanding, the
Chinese Communists are still churning them out at the rate of six each
year. As a step forward toward building the advanced "silent submarines,"
the Chinese Communists began trial production of "Ming" class attack sub-
marines (with a tonnage and fire power similar to "Liberation" class sub-
marines) in 1967 and have been beset with one technical problem after
another. Even today they still own two experimental models of "Ming" class
submarines.

They appear to be facing similar technical problems in building up their
ocean-going surface fleet--ships that can engage in combat thousands of
miles away from home and support remote amphibious operations. Telltale
signs can be detected from their progress in building large naval ships.
Their shipbuilding program got off to a roaring start in 1962, slowed
down after 1972, and ground to a complete stop after 1973. The reasons
are as follows:

1. Technological problems in shipbuilding are looming large: To build
small speedboats and merchant ships is one thing. To build large and fast
battle ships is another matter. From 1965 to 1973, the Chinese Communists
puilt 10 (escort) destroyers in the 1,000-ton class. Afterwards, the ship-
building program came to a standstill due to faulty designs and manufacture
(today four battleships are still sitting unfinished on shipyards’ assembly
lines. To make up for the slowdown in production, they renovated and re-
modeled 21 overaged large ships to beef up the strength of their ocean-
going fleet.

2. Ship-launched missiles are not working well on large naval ships: The
Chinese Communists have put missiles on half of the 10 large ships they
puilt and on eight of the 21 overage ships they remodeled. Why didn't they
put missiles on all their ships? In a previous installment of this article
it was pointed out that the sway of the ship's body would affect the per-
formance of ship's missiles. Therefore, how could the missiles work
properly on ocean-going ships of faulty design that must sail in rough
sea?

37



combat duties. Some of them can strafe and bomb enemy ships with their
machine guns and rockets. Some of them can attack enemy ships with their
torpedo bombs. Some can lay mines from the air. These naval planes are
subordinate to the three fleet headquarters and are under their command
in time of war.

The Chinese Communist naval militia units control 5,000 armed sampans and
motor junks and over 1 million regular and irregular militiamen. In time
of peace, the militiamen help the naval regulars with their coastal patrol,
transportation and sentry duties. In time of war, they are combat forces
to be reckoned with. In combat, they can count on the support from innum-
erable (at least more than 200,000) fishing boats and sampans which can
serve as mobile coastal machine-gun positions or coastal freighters.

Apart from the submarines, the Chinese Communist navy also owns eight
destroyers, 10 escort destroyers, 54 patrol boats, 22 minesweepers, 800
speedboats, 58 amphibious boats, and 72 auxiliary boats at present. These
boats are regimented into 60 detachments (each detachment has from 12 to
22 ships) according to their characteristics, commanded by the three fleet
headquarters (see Table 7). It must be stressed that more than 100 of
these ships can launch sea-to-sea missiles. They form the navy main force
on the first line.4

On the other side of the Taiwan Straits, the Nationalist navy has 67,100
men in uniform, representing 13.6 percent of the total strength of the
Nationalist armed forces. Of this number, 35,000 men work on the ships
and 9,000 are marines. The Nationalist navy owns 140 ships of over 25 tons
in weight and 30 helicopters and anti-submarine airplanes. Its administra—
tive and organizational system is shown in Table 813. Apart from staff
units, the Nationalist Navy General Headquarters commands two first-echelon
operational units, namely the fleet headquarters and the submarine head-
quarters.

The fleet headquarters is the operational nerve center of the Nationalist
navy. It has two arms, namely the amphibious units and the destroyer-
patrol boats units. The former include two landing craft fleets, one
independent ship detachment, two small-craft brigades, one demolition
brigade, and one beach duty brigade. They are responsible for amphibious
operations and supplying the civilian and military populations on Matsu
Islands (19 islands), Chinmen Islands (14 islands), Tungyin and Wuchiu
(0.52 square kilometer), Penghu Islands (64 islands), Tungsha Island

(11 square kilometers) in the Tungsha islands, and Taiping Island (0.43
square kilometer) in the Nansha group of islands. The latter include two
destroyer fleets, two patrol boat fleets, one minesweeper and minelayer
fleet, one auxiliary fleet, one speedboat detachment, and one submarine
detachment. They are charged with patrol and sentry duties in waters
surrounding Taiwan. They are also responsible for rescue missions on
international beaches in the Far East. The Nationalist naval ships in-
clude five submarines, 18 destroyers, 10 escort destroyers, 16 minesweep-
ers, 23 battleships, 51 amphibious boats, and 18 auxiliary boats. The

33



Then they began to purchase high-speed engines from overseas. Now they
have relegated the F-9's to naval duties. All these developments support
the Nationalist intelligence reports. The fact that the Chinese Communists
are unable to make good ships and aircraft on their own is ample proof that
in this age of rapid scientific and technical advances it is not necessarily
a convenient and economical shortcut to shut oneself up and to do everything
oneself.

An Appraisal of the Chinese Nationalist Naval Equipment

Two things that are immediately noticed about the Nationalist navy is that
the Nationalists rarely build naval ships of their own and that they are
overly dependent on U.S. aid.

The only commendable achievement of the Nationalist navy is its ability
to maintain its ships. Ever since their evacuation to Taiwan, the Na-
tionalists have looked upon their amphibious forces (including marines)

as the ace of their assault troops and have given top priorities to equip-
ping them and keeping them in good shape. Moreover, the need to supply
the troops stationed on 109 islands outside of Taiwan also makes it neces-
sary for the Nationalists to keep their amphibious fleets and amphibious
forces strong. Unfortunately, all the U.S.-made amphibious ships in the
Nationalist naval service are of World War II vintage. They are overaged,
worn out, and no longer efficient. There is no way the Nationalists can
get modern landing ships from overseas, build their own, or even receive
replacement parts from the United States (the United States stopped making
them after the war). Caught in such a dilemma, the Nationalists embarked
on the "Modernizing Chung" and "Modernizing Mei" Programs in 1967. Under
such programs, the 24 LSTs in the "Chung" series and the dozen or so LSMs
in the "Mei" series were sent to the Naval Shipyard in Kaohsiung by turn,
each ship to stay at the shipyard for a year, during which it was over-
hauled from top to bottom, with new motors, new weapons, new communica-
tions equipment, new facilities, and new ship's hull put in. Thus "re-
juvenated," the relaunched landing ship was to achieve greater speed,
greater fuel economy, greater firepower, and greater efficiency. In
short, they are as good as new. The "Modernizing Chung" Program gave the
Nationalists 24 completely renewed landing ships tank and the "Modernizing
Mei" Program made available another four rebuilt landing ships medium.

The star of the 8-year renewal program was the "Synchrco Lift Dock," the
largest of its kind in the world, of the Kaohsiung Naval Shipyard. It can
lift simultaneously several ships of 4,000 tons or less not under load
out of the water and into the shipyard. Because of this lift dock, the
Nationalist navy is believed to have the largest and best ship maintenance
and ship repair facilities in east AsiaTM°.

Besides, what can be regarded as Nationalist-made are the scores of 30-ton
superspeed patrol boats. Most of them are assigned to garrison and coastal
defense duties. The few that remain with the Nationalist navy are used
only in training for anti-speedboat combat. All the other ships in the

42



to churn out large numbers of speedboats (mainly Shanghai class superspeed
gunboats and Shantou class torpedo speedboats) which "offer small targets,
possess strong firepower, and move at high speed," but also designed large
ships. In those years, the Chiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai built a 1,800-
ton Chiangnan class escort destroyer; Wusung Shipyard in Shanghai built a
500-ton Wusung class minesweeper; and Hutung Shipyard in Shanghai built a
300-ton submarine chaser, all following Russian blueprints. These large
ships were new blood for the Chinese Communist navy. At the same time,
Talien Shipyard put together 21 W-type submarines from equipment left be-
hind by Russians. Huangpu Shipyard also got busy puilding 500-ton Hainan
class patrol boats to be used against the Nationalist navy.

In the years following the "23 August Gun Battle," the Nationalist navy
had the command of the sea firmly in its hands. With American aid, they
modernized their ships' gunnery. They also set up naval repair yards at
Keelung, Makung, Tsoyin and Kaohsiung to increase their maintenance
capabilities. From 1959 to 1964, the Nationalist and Communist navies
had a number of skirmishes in the Taiwan Straits. The Nationalists still
had the upper hand (see Table 4). However, the three major sea engage—
ments in 1965 were to cause the morale of the Nationalist navy to sink to
its lowest ebb. Perhaps the old Chinese proverb "armies drunk with vic-
tory will eventually lose; armies in humiliation will eventually win" is
still true for today's naval warfare.

The Battles in Minhai Sea--On 1 May 1965, a patrol boat named "Tungchiang”
of the Nationalist navy went on night patrol duties around Tungyin and
Matsu Islands. Due to the negligence of the officers on night watch, the
ship blundered into Shansha Bay--a Chinese Communist naval port. A still
worse blunder was that when the radar operator saw on his radar screen a
large unidentified object charging toward his ship he did not notify the
officers on night watch. The ship did not sound its alert siren until the
first enemy shell fell on its pilot house. For the Nationalists, this sea
battle was joined in error and concluded in confusion. Because all the
men on the ship's deck were killed, there was no telling how many enemy
ships and what types took part in the combat. When “"Tungchiang" was hit
scores of times by enemy barrage, she managed to get away and headed toward
Penghu. She finally ran out of steam and had to be towed to Tsoyin Naval
Base by other ships. Afterwards the Nationalists released the news that
"Tungchiang" sank four Shanghai class enemy gunboats and two other gunboats
during the engagement. It was an exaggeration which people find hard to
believe.

In the early morning of 6 August, a Nationalist patrol boat named "Chang-
chiang," under the convoy of "Chienmen," the flagship of the Nationalist
No 2 Cruising Fleet, sailed toward the Fukien coast with the purpose of
landing special forces for penetration into the Liangshan area in Fukien
Province. As the mission was very important, the commander of the No 2
Cruising Fleet, who had the rank of rear admiral, was riding on the flag-
ship to supervise the operation. The Nationalists made one big military
blunder--failing to keep the mission a secret. More than 10 Communist

10



15.

16.
17.
18.

9055
cso:

Director of FAS, "AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE R.O.C." U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1969.

China News on 30 March 1974, China News Agency, P.O. Box 64, Peking.
Union Research Institute, "WHO'S WHO IN COMMUNIST CHINA," H.K. 1969.

Chinese Information, "CHINA YEARBOOK," China Publishing Co, 1976.

8111/1454

50



the Northward Expedition, Long March to Yenan, War of Resistance Against
Japan, and the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists.
He was the first commander of the Chinese Communist navy when it was
founded in 1950 and has held that position ever since. He became an ad-
miral in 1955. He retained his position when military titles were
abolished in 1965. His wife is Russian.

Chou Chien--presently commander-in-chief of the Chinese Nationalist navy.
Born in 1921, a native of Chienou County in Fukien Province. Graduated
from the Chinese Nationalist Navy Academy in 1940. Graduated from the
senior class of the British Royal Navy School. He saw action in the civil
war and in various battles in the Taiwan Straits. He has commanded a
number of ships. He has served as navy attache to Washington, commandant
of the Navy Technical School, commander of the destroyer fleet, commander
of the patrolboat fleet, commander of fleet headquarters, commander of the
62 Detachment, and deputy commander-in-chief of the navy. In July 1976,
he was promoted to admiral and appointed the commander-in-chief of the
navy, the eighth commander-in-chief since V-J day 18

Conclusion on the Chinese Communist and Nationalist Naval Capabilities

In terms of manpower, number of submarines and number of naval aircraft,
the Chinese Communist navy ranks the third in the world. In terms of
capabilities, it is probably a match for some advanced countries (such

as Japan's navy for self-defense and Italy's navy) but is no rival for
such sea powers as the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain,

and France. For example, it would take only one American attack fleet
headed by an aircraft carrier--with its nuclear-powered engines, heavy
armor, high speed, ship-carried supersonic fighters, electronic-controlled
missiles, including sea-to-sea, sea-to-land, sea-to-air, and anti-submarine
missiles—-to annihilate the entire fleet of the Chinese Communist navy.

The Chinese Communists still have a long way to go to become a superpower
of the sea. Nevertheless, there is no question that the Chinese Communists
are now a stronger sea power than the Nationalists.

The following factors, nonetheless, are evening the scores for the Chinese
Communist and Nationalist navies:

1. The Communists have a long coastline and face quite a number of poten-
tial enemies. They are spread thin.

2. The Nationalists have no quarrels with other nations and can concen-
trate on defending the Taiwan Straits.

3. As far as ship's weapon system is concerned, the Communists hold
numerical superiority while the Nationalists hold qualitative superiority.

4. The Communists lead in shipbuilding capacities while the Nationalists
lead in ship maintenance and repairing capacities.

48



"antelope" (SA-N-1) sea-to-air missiles on their "Chiangtung" class convoy
ships as early as 1971. No more has been heard about them since. Appar-
ently the Communists are facing very serious design and construction prob-
lems. On the other hand, the Nationalists have bought Chaparral sea-to-air
missiles® from Israel and planned to put them on all their destroyers to
augment their anti-aircraft firepower. Besides, the Nationalists are bar-
gaining with British, French and South African arms merchants for purchase
of more advanced sea-to-air missiles. It is very likely that in 2 or 3
years the sea-to-air missiles will be standard equipment for both the Na-
tionalist and the Communist navies.

Up to now, neither the Nationalists nor the Communists have "electronic
anti-missile" system in their arsenals. For now, both the Nationalist
and Communist naval ships must rely on their ineffective artillery as
their only anti-missile weapons.

As the sea-to-sea missiles have the speed of only 530 nautical miles an
hour (comparable to the speed of the old MiG-15 fighters), they may be de-
tected by radar gun control apparatus installed on both Nationalist and
Communist ships. The point is that even if it is spotted, it needs only
2 more minutes to fly into the firing range of the ship's battery. In
those 2 short minutes, it will be very difficult first to determine
whether it is an enemy missile and then to make firing preparations.
Once it is within the firing range of the ship's battery, there is only
30 seconds in which to shoot it down. Therefore, it may be said that
the anti-aircraft artillery, at its present speed and accuracy, of both
the Nationalist and Communist ships still offers no defense against the
sea-to-sea missiles.

3. Ship's Battery

The main battery of the Chinese Communist navy consists of the following:
a. Four 5.l-inch flat-fire guns emplaced on each destroyer. These
director-guided pieces have an effective range of 27,000 yards. b. Two
to six 3.9-inch guns emplaced on each escort destroyer and patrol boat.
Also director-guided, these guns have an effective range of about 20,000
yards. c. 57-mm and 37-mm semi-automatic anti-aircraft guns and anti-
aircraft machine guns of different caliber installed on various ships.
These weapons are all copies of Russian prototypes. It is also known that
the Communists have made little improvement on their gun directors. Hence,
the accuracy of the Communist ships' battery depends largely on weather
conditions and gunners’ experience.

The Nationalist ships' battery includes 5-inch and 3-inch guns, with ranges
of, 18,000 and 14,000 yards respectively, installed on the destroyers (4 to
6 pieces each) and the escort destroyers (2 pieces each). Even though the
Nationalist main battery is inferior in caliber and range, it is superior
in accuracy to Communist guns. As soon as the director-radar is fixed on
a target enemy ship, a computer in charge of directing the guns begins

20



In order to counter-balance the ever growing Nationalist fleet of missile
destroyers and to extend their coastal defense periphery by at least a
thousand miles, the Chinese Communists have turned their attention away
from the problem-laden large ocean-going ships to the 500-ton “Chiangnan"
class patrol ships that are easier to make (they are naturally inferior
to the large naval ships in speed, firepower and effective combat radius).
At present, the Chinese Communists are turning out this type of ships at
the rate of four a year.

Small gunboats, torpedo boats and missile speedboats make up Chinese Com
munist Coastal defense units. Their total number at present makes it
possible to put one of them at every 5-mile interval all along the China
coastline. These small craft suitable for coast guerrilla warfare form
the Chinese Communists' last line of defense against possible enemy in-
vaders from the sea. That is why the Chinese Communists are doing their
best to increase the number of these craft. The production rate is as
follows:

"Hola" class missile speedboats: 10 are built each year
"Hoku" class missile speedboats: 10 are built each year
"Shanghai-4" superspeed gunboats: 20 are built each year
“Huchuan" class hydrofoil speedboats: 10 are built each year

In addition, the Chinese Communists still keep a number of old gunboats
and torpedo boats, the majority of which were made before 1960 by the
Communists themselves. At the present rate of production, they will have
over 1,000 speedboats of various descriptions in the 1980's.

Table 10 shows the number of naval ships the Chinese Communists handed
out in foreign military aid in the past 10 years. The ships involved in
the aid were, for the most part, small craft for coastal defense. The aid
takes two forms: 1) an outright grant--involving mostly old and wornout
craft which the Chinese Communists want to get rid of (like the 50 "Shantou"
class superspeed gunboats which they handed over to the North Vietnamese
and which were, without exception, sunk later by American bombers) and

2) sale at high price--involving more advanced speedboats (like those
"Huchuan" class hydrofoil speedboats sold to Romania.) These small craft
may seem all right in calm waters but will malfunction as soon as winds
become strong and waves become high. Sri Lanka complained long ago that
the five "Shanghai-4" type superspeed gunboats it received from Communist
China in military aid were practically useless in the turbulent waters of
the Indian Ocean--another proof of the defective design of Chinese-made
ships. In other words, the boats covered in Table 10 are sub-standard
ships or ships that in the eye of the Chinese Communists are losing their
tactical value.

The number of Chinese Communist auxiliary ships has tripled in the past
20 years (see Table 2 in the 134th issue of the MING PAO Monthly). The
Communists also produce their own fuel, ammunition, machinery and equip-
ment themselves. These supplies are quickly transferred from assembly
lines to the naval ships through efficient logistical units.

38



MILITARY. _

COMMUNIST, NATIONALIST NAVAL STRENGTH ASSESSED
Hong Kong MING PAO in Chinese Vol 12, Nos 2-4, Feb, Mar, Apr 77

[Article by Ti Tsung-heng [3695 4912 2897]: "Who Will Control the Taiwan
Straits in the Future?"]

[Feb 77, pp 20-27]

[Text] Part I A Review of the Chinese Nationalist and Communist Naval
Strength In Case of War Over the Taiwan Straits

For the past two decades, the Taiwan Straits which is 220 nautical miles
long and averages 100 nautical miles in width, has separated China into two
completely different worlds. The Nationalist withdrawal from Tachen Is-
lands, the Gun Battle over Chinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu Islands, and a dozen
or so other major air and sea battles during these two decades have all
left their decisive marks on the continuing struggle between the National-
ists and the Communists. Penghu, Matsu, Tungyin, Wuchiu, Chinmen and
Liaolo Bay have imprinted their names in the pages of modern Chinese his-
tory as familiar battlegrounds. The names of these islands in the Taiwan
Straits might become household words if hostilities between the National-
ists and the Communists should flare up again in the future.

So far, command of the sea over the Taiwan Straits has rested in the hands
of the Chinese Nationalists. However, the last group of American military
advisers left Chinmen and Matsu on 15 June 1976. Their evacuation marked
the near end of the American presence in Taiwan. Now with the Americans
out of the mutual defense picture, can the Nationalists maintain its firm
control over the Taiwan Straits like before? This is a question which can
not be answered with any certainty even by the top military brass, be they
Nationalists or Communists. The departure of the Yankees left the National-
ists out on a limb. On the other hand, it also created a delicate balance
over the Taiwan Straits.

As far as Taiwan, an island that is extremely poor in natural resources and
overly dependent on foreign trade for its economic well-being, is concerned,
command of the sea over the Taiwan Straits is vital to its survival. As



The three fleet headquarters form the regional tactical command centers
of the Chinese Communist navy. They are: The North Sea Fleet Headquarters
(its jurisdiction extending from the mouth of the Yalu River to Lienyun-
kang), East Sea Fleet Headquarters (its jurisdiction extending from Lien-
yunkang to the southern tip of the Taiwan Strait), and South Sea Fleet
Headquarters (its jurisdiction extending from the border between Fukien
and Kwangtung Provinces to Hsisha Islands). These three fleet headquarters
exercise operational controls over all the naval units as well as support
units of other arms of service in their respective jurisdictions. Of the
three, the East Sea Fleet Headquarters understandably controls nearly half
of the Chinese Communist battleships because its jurisdiction happens to
include the Taiwan Straits.

The main bases of these fleets are as follows:
North Sea Fleet--Lushun, Tsingtao, Taku, Yentai
East Sea Fleet--Shanghai, Choushan, Foochow, Amoy
South Sea Fleet--Huangpu, Chanchiang, Shantou, Yulin

In addition to these main bases, there are 17 lesser naval bases along the
China coast.

The 64 submarines and one submarine supply ship come under the Submarine
Headquarters. They are grouped into five submarine detachments. The main
bases are Lushun, Tsingtao and Choushan, where training for underwater
combat in coastal shallow waters is conducted. When Americans started
pulling out of Vietnam in 1973, the Communists moved some of their sub-
marines south to Yulin Harbor and began training for deep-sea diving and
combat in the South China Sea. Though the Submarine Headquarters is
responsible for training programs, logistics and administration, it does
not command the submarines. The submarines are under the command of the
three fleet headquarters in time of war.

The Marine Headquarters is in command of three marine divisions (each divi-
sion has an artillery regiment, three infantry regiments, and other sup-
porting units) and four armored amphibious regiments. The bulk of these
marine forces is deployed along the east and south China coast. Amphibious
exercises are frequently conducted.

The Coastal Artillery Headquarters commands 12 coastal artillery regiments
deployed along the coast and approximately 500 coastal guns.

The Naval Aviation Headquarters controls nearly 100 old-fashioned IL-28
torpedo bombers, 400 F-9, F-6 and F-4 fighter bombers, and a little more
than 100 auxiliary airplanes. These aircraft are organized into six mixed
Air Attack Divisions and an Auxiliary Aviation Regiment directly commanded
by Headquarters. They are stationed at air bases along the coast. Unlike
the aircraft in the air force, these naval airplanes are remodeled for sea

31



what is going on under the water in the Taiwan Straits. For instance, it
takes only six sonar buoys placed at equal distance to cover the "sea
corridor" from Chinmen to Taiwan. It takes another two anti-submarine
ships to patrol the same stretch of waters. This will be a sufficient
deterrent to any enemy submarine for that area.

The most primitive and the best known anti-submarine weapon is the depth
charge. Depth charges carried by naval ships are launched at the proper
time based on the information provided by sonar. Unfortunately, while
sonar can determine the location and distance of an enemy submarine, it
cannot pinpoint its depth. Therefore, timing the detonation of a depth
charge is a difficult job (depth charge does not explode on impact).
Timing the detonation for too soon or too late will make a depth charge
harmless even if it should roll over the body of an enemy submarine.
Furthermore, when an enemy sub comes close to within 200 yards, the re-
peated reverberations of the same sound vibration will confuse a sonar

to render it ineffective. In other words, at the most crucial moment,

the question of when to drop a depth charge becomes a matter of guessing
and luck. Because of this fault, a new breed of anti-submarine weapons
found its way onboard both the Nationalist and Communist naval ships in
the later 1960's, namely, the hedgehogs (ASW Ahead-Thrown Weapons) for
the Nationalists and the anti-submarine rockets for the Communists. They
work on the same principle. Before the sonar is to lose its effectiveness
(when an enemy submarine is still more than 200 yards away), a number of
these weapons (24 hedgehogs or 12 anti-submarine rockets in every single
shot) are discharged in the direction of the enemy submarine for the right
distance. They are spaced evenly so that if any one of them in their
sinking comes into contact with the enemy submarine, it will detonate all
the others released in the same shot to blow the sub to pieces. For the
Communists, the depth charges and anti-submarine rockets are the only
weapons currently in their possession. But for the Nationalists, two more
lethal weapons--acoustic torpedoes and anti-submarine missiles--have been
introduced into their anti-submarine arsenal since 1970.

A submarine during its underwater navigation must make some noise. It may
stop its propeller. It may shut down its pumps. But it cannot turn off
the air-conditioning system giving air to its crew. That little noise it
makes is good enough for an acoustic torpedo. The acoustic torpedo is
itself a complicated computer. It has a warhead, a propeller, a sonar,

and electronic computer, an auto-pilot, and a target detector. It needs
to be launched only in the general direction, determined by a ship's sonar,
of an enemy submarine, and it will take care of the rest. The Nationalist
navy is now in possession of "Mark-46" acoustic torpedoes. They can travel
for 13 minutes in the water at 30 knots.

Apart from acoustic torpedoes, the Nationalists have also received from
the Americans another deadly weapon--anti-submarine missiles. Now the
anti-submarine missiles, with interchangeable nuclear warheads, are

standard equipment on all Nationalist destroyers. They are just as ef-
fective against submarines as against enemy ships. They are similar to

17



"pressure mines," "combined influence mines" and “electronic mines" are

hard nuts to crack. At present, both the Nationalists and the Communists
own dozens of minesweepers, but their minesweeping abilities are very
limited. Such limitations are not confined to the Chinese Nationalists or
Communists. They are worldwide. If one opens any sea chart of small scales,
one will see markings such as "danger! Uncleared Mines" at scores of spots.
This is proof that mines are very hard to clear away.

Torpedoes remain a conventional but effective weapon after several decades
of use. An ordinary torpedo has a propeller, a fuel chamber, a control
system, and a warhead. It can be launched from an airplane, a ship, or a
submarine against an enemy surface or underwater target. The torpedoes
(except acoustic torpedoes) in the Nationalist and Communist arsenals are
the conventional type--battery-driven, 21 inches in diameter, with a speed
of 30 knots. Because of the limitations of their detonation devices (timer,
or contact fuse, or magnetic fuse), these torpedoes must be accurately aimed
at the target. At present, the torpedoes (weighing 2 and a half tons) de-
ployed on both the Nationalist and Communist submarines have an effective
range of between 2,000 and 5,000 yards. Those deployed on Communist bombers
and torpedo speedboats (weighing 1 ton each) have an effective range of be-
tween 400 and 800 yards.

Types of Ships

Now that we have covered the naval weapon systems, we will get on with our
discussion of the various types of naval ships. Generally speaking, the
Chinese Nationalist and Communist naval ships fall into six main categories:
(1) submarines of various types, (2) destroyers of various types, (3) battle
ships of various types, (4) speedboats of various types, (5) amphibious
boats, and (6) auxiliary boats. The first four types are used in sea bat-
tles while the last two for logistic support. Let us deal with them one at
a time:

1. Submarines of Various Types

Since World War I, the submarines have emerged as the backbone of naval
forces competing for the dominance of the sea. They are effective strike
weapons against a numerically superior enemy surface force. The Chinese
Nationalist and Communist submarines are propelled by diesel combustion
engines when they are moving on the surface and by batteries when they are
diving. Due to technological breakthroughs, the Nationalist and Communist
submarines, fashioned after the German No 21 Submarine Prototype, can stay
submerged for a long time. They are no longer like the World War II models
which had to surface to recharge their batteries frequently. The present
deep-sea submarines (carrying approximately 20 torpedoes) weigh over 1,500
tons and have an operational radius of 15,000 nautical miles. Coastal sub-
marines (carrying 6 torpedoes) weigh approximately 1,000 tons or less.
Their surface and diving speed averages between 15 and 20 knots. They can
dive to depths of around 400 feet. Their crew size runs up to 90 members.

23



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19



Office

Military aff.
confidential

Logistical div.

Sail & rope
Administration
Automotive mgr,
Maintenance
Fuel
Transportation
Finance

Quartermaster

Political div.

Court martial
Propaganda
Security
Youth movt.
Culture
Organization

Cadre mgr.

Chinese Communist Naval Administrative System

[Naval hospitals

Shipyards

lavy academies

Submarine |_| Submarine de-
rihgqr. tachments
Naval Naval
laviation ,4 aviation |--7
har. divisions i
i
Naval
-aviation units

Fleet

Table 6.
State
council]
Ly Ministry; | PLA
of navy}
Defense | Lhgr.
CCPCC
military Research
comm. committed

Navig. survey
School mgr.

Navig. guarantee

‘{hqr.

Repair & mfg. Navy Coastal artil-
Health Llcoastal } 4 lery regiments
artiller:

Engineering

[Marine divisions ]
Staff div. | flaring |_| (Armored regi-
Training are {ments
Communications
Intelligence
Operation
Planning

32



After the battles in the Minhai Sea, the Nationalist navy took the follow-
ing five steps to beef up its capabilities:

1. Gradually retire old battleships, replace them with escort destroyers
obtained through American aid;

2. purchase a number of destroyers from the United States in order to
upgrade its firepower and speed;

3. purchase new anti-submarine equipment and precision weapons from the
United States and Japan;

4, purchase one squadron of anti-submarine airplanes to make its anti-
submarine capabilities three-dimensional;

5, completely recondition over-age amphibious boats to keep up its ability
to supply offshore islands under Nationalist occupation.

Table 2. Decade-by-Decade Comparison of Nationalist and Communist Maritime

Forces*
Decade End of 1956 End of 1966 End of 1976
Total tonnage of merchant ships
(1,000) ** unknown: 661 669:770 1871:1450
Total number of merchant ships unknown: 324 231:166 36!
Average tonnage of merchant ships unknown: 2040 _2900:4600 5200:3390
Number of naval troops (1,000) 25:31 92:35 114:35
Average tonnage of naval ships 850:1190  680:1620 47532050
Total tonnage of naval ships (1,000) 205:125 293:278 515:289
Total number of naval ships 241:105 4293172
Submarines 8:0 33:0
Destroyers 2:3 4:5
Convoy ships 2:5 6:16 10:10
Type | Missile speedboats 0:0 8:0 120:0
Speedboats and Gunboats 50:0 192:6 675:20
Other battleships 84:47 91:37 79:19
Amphibious boats 70:32 60:86 58:51
Auxiliary ships 25:18 35:22 72:18

*Communist figures are on the left, Nationalist figures on the right
**Figures do not include privately owned boats or boats under 25 tons in
weight

The respective strength of the Nationalist and Communist navies as it stands
at the end of 1966 can be seen from Table 2. In the recent decade, the
Communists have concentrated on designing and building large naval ships:

1. The first "Han" class nuclear-powered submarine carrying traditional

torpedoes was put on the drawing board at Talian Shipyard in 1965. The
submarine was launched in 1972;

14



their organized resistance for 3 more days. At midnight of 20 January, the
Nationalists sent several battleships to the island to attempt an evacua~
tion of survivors but could not get past the sniping fire of Communist
patrol boats. As the night wore on, the Nationalists sank two Communist
patrol boats but also lost a battleship themselves. The Battle of Tachen
Islands was thus reaching its height.

As soon as the Chinese Communists took Ichiangshan, they turned their eyes
to Shangtachen and Hsiatachen Islands defended by Nationalist main forces.
After 20 January, the nearby waters became the bloody battleground for the
two opposing navies. The Nationalists succeeded in sinking four Communist
ships and 17 motor junks and could not prevent the Communists from putting
together an amphibious assault force. The newly built runway for fighter
planes on Shangtachen Island lay useless under constant bombardment from
Communist coastal battery only 6 nautical miles away. Lacking local air
superiority and unable to establish total control of the sea, the National-
ists faced grave danger on and around Tachen Islands. Fortunately, the
“gino-American Mutual Defense Treaty" came into effect on 10 February. The
U.S. Seventh Fleet stepped in to contain the worsening situation. A Sino-
American joint task force composed of 159 vessels of various types (includ-
ing 27 National naval ships) managed to evacuate 25,000 soldiers and civil-
ians from Tachen Islands to Taiwan in 5 days.

Once the Tachen Islands were lost to the Communists, the Nanchishan Islands
75 nautical miles to the south became indefensible. On 18 February, the
Nationalists took on the evacuation mission all by themselves. The evacua-
tion was to be marred by sea battles around Taishan Islands. Nanchishan
Islands, totaling 15 square kilometers in area, were surrounded by Taishan
Islands which were in Communist hands. Naturally the 8-day evacuation had
to be carried out amid hourly bitter engagements between the Nationalist
and Communist navies. On 25 February, the Nationalists completed the evac-
uation of 5,000 troops and 2,000 civilians. The Nationalists came out of
the sea battles with the sinking of one Communist patrol boat, four gun-
boats, and five armed motor junks to their credit. With the conclusion

of the Battles of Tachen Islands, the Nationalists gave up their last
stronghold off Chekiang province's shores.

When the Chinese Communist navy was taking shape in the early 1950's, its
fleet consisted of American-made, Russian-made, Japanese-made, British-
made, Canadian-made and German-made ships. Such wide variety created prob-
lems in maintenance and getting supplies. As Russian aid started pouring
in, the Chinese Communist navy achieved standardization gradually. First,
the Soviets gave the Chinese Communists large numbers of naval ships to
make up for losses suffered during various sea engagements with the Na-
tionalists. In 1955 alone, for instance, the Russian "buddies," having
bled Manchuria white and finally having decided to remove their Far Eastern
fleets from Lushun (Port Arthur), turned over to the Chinese Communists all
the naval facilities in Lushun and 44 ships of various types (including
two escort destroyers and five submarines). Second, the Soviets began to



Supply Ships (AS): They are so constructed as to be able to carry ammuni-
tion, torpedoes, mines, and other supplies. They bring supplies to naval
ships on sea duties. At present, the Chinese Communists have six torpedo
speedboat supply ships and submarine supply ships, thus greatly expanding
the operational radius of their speedboats and submarines. The National-
ists have none.

Transport Ships (AK): Their mission is to transport military materiel and
personnel. The Nationalists own three transport ships at present. They
displace 3,000 tons of water and can attain a speed of 23 knots. They are
the cream of all auxiliary ships. The Communists own 20 transport ships
(including some ice-breakers).

Tugs (AT): Their duty is to tow stalled or damaged ships back to home
bases. They weigh between 500 and 2,000 tons and can operate far away from
home bases. Right now the Nationalists own six and the Communists 21.

Survey Ships (AGS): Their duty is to survey territorial waters and ship-
ping routes regularly and to provide the latest data on sea currents, ter-
rain at the sea bottom, and oceanographical characteristics to their navy.
At present, both the Nationalists and the Communists own several of these
survey ships.

Floating Drydock (ARD): They are supplements to repair yards at the home
bases. They may also be towed to the battle zone to provide maintenance
and repair facilities on the spot. Right now the Nationalists own five
floating drydocks capable of handling ships with 3,000 tons or less of
displacement not under load. The Communists launched a floating drydock
in 1974 that can service ships of up to 25,000 tons of displacement not
under load.

Intelligence Ships (AGM): They are equipped with special electronic and
radar guidance systems and can serve as a midway guiding station for
ballistic missiles. Today the Chinese Communists own four such ships,
with undetermined capabilities and efficiency.

The abovementioned auxiliary ships are armed with antiaircraft cannons

and machineguns. However, due to their heavy weight, thin armor, and slow
speed, they must be escorted by other battleships or they will be sitting
ducks in the face of underwater, surface and air attacks. Besides, both
the Nationalists and the Communists have hundreds of merchant ships. With
the addition of several naval signal officers to the crew and some re-
structuring of the ships, the merchant ships can quickly be converted into
military transport ships and oilers. (The only difference between a naval
ship and a merchant ship is armament.)

The submarines, destroyers, battleships, speedboats, amphibious ships and
auxiliary ships described above, plus a small number of gunboats for harbor
and river defense, make up the bulk of the Nationalist and Communist naval
forces. Besides, the Communists also have about 5,000 armed sampans and

29



convoys and support amphibious operations. Chinese Communist escort
destroyers can also lay mines. A number of Nationalist escort destroyers
can hold four landing craft vehicle personnel (LCVP) and a 160-man amphib-
ious reconnaissance company to conduct pre-landing reconnaissance. Chinese
Communist patrol boats can be grouped into at least five types. Their
tonnage ranges from 200 to 1,300. Their speed varies between 11 and 27
knots. Their crew numbers less than 100 men. Relying on their main guns
and antiaircraft guns, they are responsible for coastal patrol and coastal
defense. Nationalist patrol boats are armed with acoustic torpedoes, depth
charges and sonar. They are highly effective anti-submarine war vessels.

Mine sweeping and laying ships are, of course, responsible for sweeping or
laying mines. At present, Chinese Nationalist and Communist minesweepers
and minelayers weigh between 300 and 800 tons, move at under 18 knots, and
call for a crew size of about 50 men. Right now, these minesweepers are
helpless against "combined influence mines" and “pressure mines."

4, Speedboats of Various Types

These include various types of torpedo speedboats, superspeed gunboats and
missile speedboats. Their water displacements are--torpedo speedboats:
between 25 and 80 tons; superspeed gunboats: between 40 and 160 tons;
missile speedboats: between 100 and 200 tons. Their speed is usually
over 30 knots (hydrofoil gunboats and hydrofoil torpedo boats can speed

to 55 knots). Their crew runs up to 20 men. Being small in size, these
boats cannot take rough sea too well. Being fast in speed, they are real
gas guzzlers. Therefore they cannot fight too far away from their bases.
They are, however, very well suited to working in shallow waters and among
islands, like the waters along the rugged coasts of Chekiang, Fukien and
Kwangtung Provinces.

Superspeed gunboats rely on high-angle fire artillery as their main weapons.
Torpedo speedboats each carry from two to four torpedoes. Besides, they
also carry a number of machine guns. What they do is that they will close
in on enemy ships at high speed, pour converging fire or launch torpedoes
against the targets, and then speed away from the fight. The trouble is
that they must attack at close range and, being thinly built, stand a good
chance of being destroyed themselves by enemy automatic fire during the
combat.

Missile speedboats are exclusive to the Chinese Communist navy. "Hola"
class missile speedboats each carry four sea-to-sea missiles. Those of
the "Hoku" class each carry two. As the missiles have a longer range and
a higher hit average, missile speedboats have become the star of the Chi-
nese Communist surface fleet. The trouble with them is that they are also
thin in build and expose their radar and missiles in the open--an inviting
target for enemy fire. They are not very seaworthy or durable and there-
fore must stay close to home bases.

26



to man the 160 ships of various types brought over by Nationalist defectors
and the 50 Russian ships given to them in Russian military aid. The next
year, the General Headquarters of the PLA Navy was formally inaugurated in
Peking. A large number of officers plucked from the Third Field Army com-
manded by Chen I were sent to North Korean naval bases for amphibious train-
ing under Russian advisors. At the same time, 300,000 men of the Third
Field Army who had undergone amphibious training, 15,000 paratroopers, and
6,000 motorized junks and sampans were amassed along the Fukien sea coast,
ready to cross the Taiwan Straits in June 1950 to "give Taiwan a bloodbath."

In June 1950, the Korean War broke out. Subsequently the U.S. Seventh
Fleet was stationed in the Taiwan Straits. This turn of events thwarted
the Communists’ attempt to take Taiwan by force and enabled the Nationalists
to firmly establish themselves on Taiwan. In May 1951, 700 American ad-
visors formed the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAC) in Taiwan.

They provided the Nationalist navy with ammunition, fuel and supplies and
helped it to set up comprehensive personnel, intelligence, operation, train-
ing and logistical systems. Thus the Nationalist navy embarked on its path
to becoming a "regular and modernized force." From 1950 to 1954, the Na-
tionalist navy, with the help of the Americans, performed the following
duties:

1. Mining Pohai Sea, mouth of the Yangtze River, and eastern and southern
Chinese coastal waters so as to close off the Chinese Communists’ maritime
outlets;

2. Searching all foreign merchant ships sailing toward mainland China,
seizing three Russian ships carrying jet fuel and one Polish oil tanker;

3. Supplying offshore islands such as Tachen, Nanchishan, Matsu, Tangyin,
Wuchiu, Chinmen, Penghu, Tungsha and Paracel Islands, and patrolling the
Taiwan Straits;

4. Supporting assaults of the Nationalist troops on the sea.

The mining operation was called off as the Korean War ended. The search-
ing of foreign ships was suspended as international criticism rose. The
patrolling andsupplying missions were kept up, resulting in frequent
skirmishes with the Communist navy and air force. In those early years,
the superior performance of the American-made naval ships gave the Nation-
alists a definite edge over the Communists’ infant navy and air force and
made them winners in most sea battles with the Communists. However, the
Nationalist air force's propeller fighter planes were no match for the
Communist jet fighters. Therefore, whenever the Nationalist fighters got
in trouble with MiG jets, they would dive to within the firing range of
the Nationalist naval ships for protection. In those years, the MiGs
also made frequent bombing and strafing runs over the Nationalist vessels
but inflicted little damage. On the contrary, they were often shot down
in flame by the latter's accurate anti-aircraft artillery.



for the Chinese Communists, who have insisted that "Taiwan must be lib-
erated," the seizure of command of the sea is a pre-requisite to such
liberation, regardless of whether it is to be achieved through "peaceful
means" or by force. Therefore, both the Chinese Nationalists and the
Communists can be expected to exert their utmost to seize command of the
sea in the foreseeable future in order to achieve their strategic objec-
tives. Such a tinderbox situation will make the rekindling of battles in
the Taiwan Straits inevitable.

Whoever Controls the Taiwan Straits Will Control Taiwan's Fate
Historical Background

The navy is instrumental to the command of the sea and the protection of
territorial waters. Both the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists have
done their best in the past in developing their naval forces. They are
expected to continue to do so at present and in the future. To help us
predict with more accuracy what will happen in the future, the writer con-
siders it necessary to recount major naval conflicts between the National-
ists and the Communists in the past 30 years and to chronicle the growth
or losses of their respective navies.

Formative Years--The Chinese Navy grew up almost overnight after the V-J
day. From 1945 to 1948, the Nationalists received 271 ships (the prepon-
derance of them are patrol boats and amphibious boats) from the Americans,
33 patrol boats from the Japanese, and 15 battleships from the British and
Canadians. At the time, the Nationalist Navy experienced grave difficul-
ties in training, equipment maintenance and recruitment. At the same time,
the civil war raged on, leaving the Nationalist Navy no breathing spell to
beef up its capabilities. The role that the navy played during those years
was one of "giving artillery support to Nationalist troops on the shore"
and “assisting in the evacuation of Nationalist troops." Thus the Nation-
alist naval forces retreated from Manchuria to northern China, then to cen-
tral China, then to Choushan Islands, then to Hainan Island, and finally to
Taiwan. In the course of such a hasty retreat, the Nationalist navy (with
the help of military air transport units and the merchant fleet of the
China Merchants Steam Navigation Company) managed to evacuate 600,000
troops and 2 million civilians to Taiwan. In the early 1950's, the Na-
tionalists lost two-thirds of their naval ships to either defection or
disrepair. Morale was low, supplies were short, ships were in disrepair,
and the tide of the civil war was entirely against the Nationalists. It
can be said that at this junction in history the Nationalist navy was in
the worst shape ever.

The Chinese Communists also founded their navy right after the V-J day

when the Soviets handed over to them 30 river gunboats captured from the
Japanese. The Communist navy, however, did not grow much in strength un-
til 1949. In that year, the Communists set up two navy academies, one in
Antung city and the other in Nanking city, to train lower-level officers



2. the first submarine carrying G-class missiles (or no missiles) was
launched at Talien Port in 1967;

3. the first "Ming" class attack submarine was completed and launched
at Talien Port in 1967;

4. the first "Luta" class missile destroyer was built by Talien Shipyard
and was launched in 1972;

5. the first "Chiangtung" class-missile escort destroyer was built by
Shanghai Shipyard and launched in 1973.

In addition, Communist shipbuilding yards have churned out more and more
“Chiangnan" class escort destroyers, faster "Huchuan" class hydrofoil
torpedo speedboats, and more powerful "New Shanghai" class superspeed gun-
boats. At the same time, the Communists have retired the motley of naval
ships captured earlier from the Nationalists. As a result, the Communist
weaponry and ammunition have become standardized, making it simpler for

logistic support, repair and maintenance.

In 1971, the Americans dropped the 72nd Taiwan Strait Patrol Detachment.
In other words, the U.S. Seventh Fleet discontinued its patrol duties in
the Taiwan Straits. Thereupon, the responsibility for the security in the
Taiwan Straits fell entirely on the shoulders of the Nationalists. To
fill the defense vacuum left by American pullout, the Americans have gone
to great lengths to help the Nationalists put together a modernized de-
stroyer fleet. The objective is to insure that the Nationalists will con-
tinue to hold the command of the sea. This destroyer fleet equipped with
computers and nuclear missiles can entirely offset the local superiority
of the Communist submarine fleet, which the Communists boast of being able
to "dive deep, travel far, and stay underwater long." The rapid growth
of the Nationalist destroyer fleet in the recent decade can be seen from
Table 2.

In January 1965, the’ Chinese Communists obtained as "Osa" class missile
speedboat from the Russians in an exchange. Soon they became keenly inter-
ested in the superior sea-to-sea missiles carried by that ship. After
several years of research and development, the Communists began to produce
sea-to-sea missiles in large quantities in 1972. Apart from copying Rus-
sian "Osa'' and "Koma" classes missile speedboats, the Communists have also
installed the missile systems on "Luta" class destroyers and "Chiangtung"
class convoy ships, thus bringing their maritime firepower into a new era.
In addition, they have put a number of small tactical nuclear warheads on
their missile ships. The Communists' rapid expansion of their naval forces
can be seen from Table 2. Such expansion is accentuated by phenomenal
growth of their submarine and speedboat units.

Though the command of the sea still belongs to the Nationalists today, the

Taiwan Straits is seething with tension and explosiveness from the con-
frontation between the Nationalists and the Communists. As the Communists

15



On 18 September 1954, a Nationalist propeller plane shot down a Communist
MiG fighter in a dog fight over Tachen Islands, thus raising the curtain on
the Battle of Tachen Islands2. First, the Communists started shelling
Chinmen and Matsu to divert the Nationalists’ attention, disguising their
real intention of wanting to take the Tachen Islands. In the weeks that
followed, the Nationalist and Communist navies had some encounters in the
waters near Chinmen and Matsu. The Nationalists still had the upper hand,
sinking six Communist speedboats, one oil tanker, and 30 armed motor junks.
Then came the incident of the Taiping destroyer in November. This was when
the Communist navy dealt the Nationalist navy a resounding blow for the
first time. In the early morning of 14 November, the destroyer "Taiping"
was patrolling the waters near Tachen Islands by itself. The ship's radar
screen showed a cluster of mainland Chinese fishing boats working in the
area. Then, all of a sudden, out of the cluster came several Communist
torpedo speedboats heading straight toward the destroyer, shooting tor-
pedoes. Two torpedoes hit the "Taiping." Even though she managed to get
away, she sank not far from the Tachen Islands 17 hours after she was hit.
In firepower and tonnage, she ranked seventh in the Nationalist navy's
fleet. Her sinking was naturally a great loss for the Nationalists. While
the civilians in Taiwan took part in the popular movement of “buying a new
ship, avenging the lost one," the Nationalist military brass reviewed their
anti-speedboat tactics and reassessed Communist naval capabilities. One
week after the incident of the Taiping destroyer, the Nationalists and
Americans signed in Washington the "Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty."
This may be regarded as a coincidence.

On 10 January 1955, more than a hundred Chinese Communist bombers and
fighters bombed and strafed Tachen Islands. Two bombers were shot down by
anti-aircraft guns of Nationalist naval vessels. That night, Nationalist
and Communist naval ships fought tooth and nail in a fierce meeting en-
gagement, in which the Nationalists lost a patrol boat and the Communists
lost two torpedo speedboats. As the week wore on, the Communists assembled
two Marine divisions, 154 ships and motor junks of various types, and 230
fighter planes along the coast facing Tachen Islands, girding themselves
for an attack on Tachen Islands. The "Engagement of Ichiangshan Island"
was to be the opening round.

In the early morning of 18 January, a Communist flotilla composed of two
destroyers and four patrol boats set up a blockade to isolate Ichiangshan
from other islands in the Tachen group. It also kept Nationalist rein-
forcements from both the air and the sea miles away by a blanket of artil-
lery fire. At noon, 60 Communist IL-28 bombers, with an escort of MiG
fighters, made saturation bombing of Ichiangshan Island which is only 1.3
square kilometers in area. At 2:00 in the afternoon, a regiment of Commu-
nist Marines boarded some 100 armed motor junks at Tungmen Island and
sailed the 5 nautical miles to Ichiangshan. Under cover of coastal and
naval artillery fire and fighter planes, they landed on the island. The
700 Nationalist guerrillas stationed there were obviously no match for the
Communist invaders. After 3 hours of heavy fighting, the island fell into
the Communist hands, even though the Nationalist defenders were to continue



processing data such as the speed of both the enemy ship and its own ship,
wind velocity, the sway of its own ship, etc. and then adjusts the guns
for the right azimuth and angle of elevation. The Nationalist computer—
directed guns attain an accuracy rate of 95 percent. Since 1969, such
radar control system has been installed on Nationalist ships one after
another to direct artillery fire. The 5-inch and 3-inch guns can also be
used against aircraft. However, the standard anti-aircraft weapon is the
semi-automatic 40-mm anti-aircraft gun. It fires "magnetic" shells, which
differ from ordinary shells. Magnetic shells have both contact detonator
and time fuse, while ordinary shells have either one or the other, but not
both. Therefore, even if the magnetic shell does not score a direct hit,
it will explode at a point nearest to the enemy airplane as a result of
magnetic reaction. With such magnetic shells, a radar-directed anti-
aircraft gun.has a hitting average of 0.03 against supersonic aircraft.
This compares with the hitting average of 0.0005 (namely only 1 hit in
every 2,000 rounds fired) of conventional semi+automatic anti-aircraft
guns. Apart from the guns, the Nationalists also have smaller caliber
weapons such as 20-mm automatic anti-aircraft cannons and half-inch heavy
machine-guns on their naval ships. Table 5 shows the types and charac-
teristics of the ships' battery of both the Nationalists and the Commu-
nists.

While the ships' guns are used mainly against enemy shipping and enemy
aircraft, they are often called into action during shelling of the coastal
areas, especially during saturation bombing of the beaches before amphib-
ious troops are to land.

4, Mines and Torpedoes

The Taiwan Straits, for its depth and for the topography of its shores,

is an ideal place for both the Nationalists and the Communists to lay mines.
All that is needed to stop enemy naval ships and submarines is to put a
cluster of mines in all the harbors and bays and along all sea lanes and
shipping routes where the water is not more than 600 feet deep. Each mine
contains several hundred pounds of high explosive encased in a steel ball.
Any ship that strikes a mine will either sink or be severely damaged.

The mine of the longest standing is the "contact mine." It has many horns
on its surface. It is submerged in water at a depth of between 10 and 20
feet. Anything that touches one of its horn will detonate it. The
"acoustic Mine" and the "Magnetic Mine" were introduced during World War IT.
They are usually submerged at the depth of 30 feet. The "acoustic mine"
has a special “eardrum fuse." When a ship passes by above it, the noise
from the ship's propeller will affect the "eardrum fuse" and detonate it.
The "magnetic fuse" has a "magnetic fuse." A ship passing above will
trigger the magnetic mechanism to detonate it. After the war, "pressure
mines" and "combined influence mines" were developed to frustrate mine—
sweeping efforts. The "pressure mine" has a pressure fuse which can only
be set off by substantial water pressure created by large naval ships of

21



JPRS 71527

24 July 1978

TRANSLATIONS ON PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
No. 445

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Approved for Public Release
Disiribution Unlimited

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Table 11. Average Age and Countries of Origin of Nationalist Naval Ships

Average i
Quan- Age
Types of Ships tity (years) Countries of Origin
Missile destroyers 9 12% U.S.A.
Ordinary destroyers 9 12* U.S.A.
Escort destroyers 10 33 U.S.A.
Combat Patrol ships 3 33 U.S.A.
Units Minesweepers 16 19 U.S.A.
Torpedo boats 9 14 U.S.A., Japan
Speedboats 11 3 Nationalists
Submarines 5 13 U.S.A., Italy
Landing ships dock 2 32 U.S.A. -
Auxiliary Landing ships tank 23 8* U.S.A., Nationalists
Units Landing ships medium 4 6* U.S.A., Nationalists
Landing ships general 22 30 U.S.A., Japan
Auxiliary ships 18 28 U.S.A., Japan

Total 141 ships, at average age of 18.5 years

*Note: They have been remodeled

In addition to the ships now in active service, there are a number of ships
in the Navy reserve. In case of total mobilization, they can be quickly
refitted for naval duties. They include:

one destroyer one repair ship

three escort destroyers one tug

five patrol ships one oiler

20 speedboats two transport ships :

At present, these 30 or so ships are either on loan to other arms of the
armed forces or being mothballed for use in time of total mobilization.
They should be counted as part of the Nationalist navy in case of war over
the Taiwan Straits.

Judging by the pace of development of shipbuilding and related heavy
industries in Taiwan, the Nationalists should have no difficulty churning
out naval ships in large numbers. Why have they not done so yet? The
problem is not with shipbuilding technology. It is with how to make
sophisticated weapon and communications systems. At present, the Nation-
alists still cannot mass-produce an integrated system composed of search
radar, data-processing computer, and fully automated ship's battery and
missiles. Therefore, even if the Nationalists could puild the bodies
for a hundred destroyers a year, they would be of no use if there were
no sophisticated weapons and communications equipment to go with them.
Nevertheless, the Nationalists are sparing no effort in developing their
ability to make naval ships on their own.

4b



the next move which the Communists decided on was to try to choke Chinmen
off from its maritime and aerial sources of reinforcements and supplies,
hoping to attempt the landing as soon as the island defenders ran out of
their ammunition and provisions. The next day, the Communist navy and air
force entered the Liaolo Bay for bombing and strafing runs, but were re-
pelled by island defenders.

The dawn of 25 August saw a Nationalist convoy of five landing craft and
some merchant ships sailing into Liaolo Bay to drop off provisions, ammuni-
tion and supplies on the beach. They immediately attracted scores of Com-
munist torpedo speedboats, covered by coastal gun fire, into the area,
launching one torpedo after another in their direction. In the melee that
followed, Communist torpedoes hit one Nationalist landing craft loaded with
tanks and an unarmed merchant ship of the China Merchants Steam Navigation
Company. The impact set off the ammunition carried in the two ships into a
series of loud explosions. The two ships sank quickly (see Table 1). The
flames from the ships lit up the whole Liaolo Bay. The toll for the Commu-
nists was two torpedo speedboats sunk when they tried to get away from the
scene of the battle.

After 25 August, the Nationalist navy made several attempts to enter Liaolo
Bay under cover of night with supplies, but was stopped by Communist naval
ships and coastal guns. On 2 September, a Nationalist supply convoy con-
sisting of two patrol boats, one mine sweeper, and three landing craft put
out to sea at Makung port of Penghu and sailed into Liaolo Bay with the
objective of dropping supplies on the beach of the besieged Chinmen at mid-
night. Meanwhile, more than 20 Communist torpedo speedboats and gunboats
were waiting at Amoy port to intercept this convoy. At 11:00 that night,
the two adversaries met in Liaolo Bay 6 nautical miles southeast of Chinmen.
The ensuing 4-hour battle would go down in history as the "2 September Sea
Battle in Liaolo Bay." During the engagement, the Communist speedboats
were helpless in trying to stop the Nationalist landing eraft from unloading
their cargo and were powerless against the screening fire of the National-
ist patrol boats. The battle ended with a score of 12 to nothing in favor
of the Nationalists. The Nationalists won hands down! The highlight of
the combat was that the Nationalist patrol boat named "Tochiang" (PC-104)
charged single-handedly into the Communist formation of torpedo speedboats
and sank a total of nine one after another. As the combat progressed, the
"2 September Sea Battle in Liaolo Bay" brought more than 30 ships from
each adversary navy into the fray. It was a sea battle of the largest
scale in years between the Nationalists and the Communists. The toll was
also the highest. It was to change the course of the Gun Battle over
Chinmen and Matsu. The Chinese Communists, having suffered irreparable
losses in this conflict, were no longer able to block the Nationalist sup-
ply routes.

To supply provisions and ammunition to the 150,000 military and civilian
population on Chinmen Island (consumption at 700 tons per day), the Na-
tionalists sent an amphibious convoy with mixed Chinese and American escort
ships every day after 3 September into Liaolo Bay to drop supplies. The



provide submarine training facilities to help Chinese Communists develop
submarine forces. Third, the Soviets made all-out efforts to help the
Communists with mine sweeping, thus quickly reopening mainland Chinese
ports for international traffic. Lastly and most importantly, the Soviets
helped the Communists set up five naval shipyards in Talien, Shanghai and
Huangpu (Whampao) to build naval ships of Russian designs.

During the same period, the Nationalist navy also received some new ships
through American aid, offsetting the Communist advantage achieved through
Russian aid. The balance of naval forces between the Nationalists and the
Communists is shown in Table II.

The loss of Tachen Islands was actually a blessing for the Nationalists.
It was like the discard of a dead weight. Now the Nationalists could con-
centrate on defending Taiwan, Penghu (Pescadores) , Chinmen and Matsu. The
72nd Patrol Detachment of the U.S. Seventh Fleet cruised the Taiwan Strait
all year round. The Nationalist air force, now an all-jet force upgraded
by American aid, provided air cover for naval patrols. As a result, the
Nationalist navy was patrolling a long stretch of waters extending along
Kwangtung, Fukien and Chekiang provinces’ sea coasts. From 1955 to 1957,
the Nationalist and Communist navies ran into each other time and again
and battled each other fiercely, with the Nationalist navy coming out of
each engagement always a victor. The Nationalist navy was to reach its
heyday during the Gun Battle Over Chinmen and Matsu, to win worldwide recog-
nition.

Though the Communists were thwarted in 1950 in their attempt to cross
Taiwan Strait and to give "Taiwan a bloodbath" at the height of their
sweeping victory on the mainland, they refused to abandon their estab-
lished policy of "liberating Taiwan by force of arms." In 1958, both the
international and the domestic situation seemed to favor a second try.
Preparations got underway to assemble along the Fukien coast 13 infantry
divisions, three artillery divisions, two anti-artillery divisions, 298
fighter planes of various types, and 262 naval ships and armed motor junks
of various kinds. The plan was to take Chinmen and Matsu by storm first,
and then to liberate Penghu and Taiwan the following spring’. In this
coming battle, the Communists were to throw in all their naval vessels.

A little prior to the battle, the Communist navy had several encounters
with the Nationalists along the Fukien coast and lost 18 ships of various
types and 45 motor junks while trying to get away from the Nationalist
hot pursuits.

The Gun Battle Over Chinmen and Matsu--At 6:00 in the afternoon of 23 Au-
gust, the 342 Chinese Communist guns emplaced along the coast began carpet-
bombing of nearby Chinmen Island, thus raising the curtain on the "23 Au-
gust Gun Battle" which was to shock the world. During the first 2 hours,
these guns hurled a total of 57,500 rounds of shells across the waters onto
Chinmen. The shelling failed to make enough of a dent on the steely forti-
fications on the island (defended by more than 100,000 Nationalist troops)
to encourage an attempt to land assault troops on the island. Therefore,



The amphibious boats have always been and remain today the weakest links
in the Chinese Communist navy. They were all captured from the hands of
the Nationalists during the civil war period. Without replacement parts,
these American-made boats are hard to keep in good repair. Furthermore,
they are all overaged--any ship that has been in service for 30 years with-
out being overhauled is regarded as being "overaged." In the past 2 or 3
years, the Chinese Communists have found it necessary to break down ships
in a poorer condition in order to yield replacement parts for ships in
better condition. Such a method of scrapping one ship in order to keep
another ship afloat is temporarily relieving the shortage of parts and
keeping some of their overaged ships from deteriorating still further.
Old ships never die, they just "move more slowly and need repairs more
often."

Now the shocker! The Chinese Communists began secretly building "Yulin"
class landing ships medium in 1971. The news threw the Nationalists into
consternation and even caused deep concern in Washington and Moscow. These
new LSMs in the 1,500-ton class can carry three companies of fully equipped
landing troops. Their presence is an indication of the Chinese Communists"
intention to expand their amphibious fleets. As the entire Far East falls
within the cruising radius of these ships, they pose a direct threat to

the Chinese Nationalists and put the Asian balance of power in jeopardy.

At this very moment, the Chinese Communists are puilding four of these
LSMs a year. However, the overaged American-made amphibious ships are ex-
pected to remain the backbone of the Chinese Communist naval amphibious
units in the next 3 to 5 years.

For more than 20 years, the Chinese Communist marine corps maintained its
strength at the level of 28,000 men. Suddenly in the recent 2 years, they
have boosted its strength by 35 percent. In addition, they have been buy-
ing large numbers of amphibious transports (mot the armored transport
vehicles that can move on land and in the water) which they cannot make
themselves. These are indications that they are going all out to expand
their amphibious forces. Besides, half of the Chinese Communist naval
reserves are marines. Once they are mobilized, the Chinese Communist
marines will play a decisive role in any conflict.

During air strikes against enemy ships, the aircraft's bomb-carrying
ability and maneuverability are more important than anything else. That
is why the supersonic fighters are not effective for naval services. The
old fashioned IL-28, F-6 and F-4 fighters that belong to the Chinese Com-
munist naval air service are better suited to air-to-sea combat duties.
Now, the intriguing question is why did the Chinese Communists take their
F-9 fighters (supposedly their fastest fighters at twice the speed of
sound) out of the Air Force and put them in Naval Air Service? According
to the Nationalist intelligence information, the engines of the F-9's were
of faulty design. As a result, the fighters would lose half its designed
speed after a while. The Communists stopped making F-9's 2 years ago.

40



cannons, heavy and light machineguns, they can neutralize enemy fire on

the beachheads. They are carried to the landing zone by any of the above-
described landing ships. Then they are lined up and move one abreast of the
other toward the beach, firing as they move to provide cover for landing
forces. They are indispensable in amphibious battles. At present, the
Nationalists own several dozen American-made LVIA-5 amphibious tanks (nick-
named duckie), each equipped with a 3~inch cannon. The Communists boast
several hundred Chinese-made T-60 amphibious tanks, each equipped with a
76-mm cannon.

Amphibious Transport Vehicles: When landing is attempted on a stretch of
hazardous coastline (rocks on shore and coral reefs in water), amphibious
transport vehicles are used to drop assault troops on the enemy shore.
These vehicles have thick armor to protect their passengers and are armed
with several light and heavy machineguns for suppression of enemy fire.
They can quickly bring the landing forces dozens of miles inland. At
present, the Communists do not yet have a single amphibious transport but
the Nationalists own hundreds of LVIP-5 amphibious transports. Each trans-
port can carry one marine platoon and 2.5 tons of supplies.

Small Landing Craft: They include the 20-ton landing crafts machinery (LCM)
and the 9-ton landing crafts vehicle personnel. They can each land one
marine platoon on the beachhead. In addition, they can also carry tanks,
vehicles and supplies unloaded from transport ships to the beachhead.
Generally speaking, the second wave of assault forces to make an opposed
landing are either carried by amphibious transport vehicles or carried by
small landing craft. Both the Nationalists and the Communists can make
these craft themselves. At present, the Communists own 450 small landing
craft while the Nationalists, 200.

Any type of amphibious ships is armed with antiaircraft cannons and machine-
guns so that they can fend off air strikes. However, they cannot attack
submarines or large surface ships. Because of their vulnerability, they
are generally escorted by convoy ships.

6. Auxiliary Ships

Unlike battleships or amphibious ships, auxiliary ships do not engage in
combat. They fall into the following eight categories:

Repair Ships (AR): The entire ship is like a small repair yard. It is
often anchored in waters frequented by other naval ships in order to make
small repairs on the sea. Both the Nationalists and the Communists own
one repair ship, weighing over 4,000 tons.

Oiler (AO): They are similar in structure to oil tankers. They have mid-
sea refueling facilities and their mission is to refuel naval ships at

sea, saving them a trip back to home bases. The oilers can also bring
gasoline and oil to territorial islands. At present, poth the Nationalists
and the Communists own several oilers.

28



The Second and Third Institutes of the Dr Sun Yat-sen Academy of Sciences
are successfully working on ship-launched missiles. The Nationalist navy
is designing and building its first superspeed battleship. The first
Nationalist-built modern battleship is expected to make its debut in the
1980's. The Nationalist navy is already making most of its fuel, ammuni-
tion, ship's spare parts, and instruments. It also keeps a large inventory
of the few items which it cannot make for the eventuality of war. The
computer-controlled aval logistical apparatus is sending supplies directly
to all destinations and is indirectly contributing to the usage rate of the
naval ships. The Nationalists' close concern for naval logistics is evi-
dent from the fact that the "Logistical Headquarters" is equal to the all-
important "fleet headquarters" in status as units of the first echelon
right under the Navy General Headquarters (see Table 8).

The Nationalist marines, who boast of "being ready for combat every minute
of the hour," are well known for their gallantry. Counting the marine
reserves, the Nationalists have a total of 60,000 (four marine divisions)
marines under arms. In the last 2 years, the marines have been moderniz-
ing their equipment and have acquired several hundred LVTA-5 amphibious
tanks and LVIP-5 amphibious transport vehicles, the best of their kinds.

In addition, they also have in their service a large number of Nationalist-
made UH-1H helicopters. Predictably, the Nationalist amphibious operations
in the future will be more like "three-dimensional" operations.

The usage of a naval ship is about the same for both the Chinese Communists
and Nationalists. Let us use the Nationalist navy for an example. The
ships are on a rotation of duties. During the first third of the rota-
tional cycle, a ship returns to the naval shipyard for periodic maintenance
and repairs. During the second third of the cycle, the ship goes on train-
ing and exercises, while at the same time is on standby for combat duties.
During the last third, the ship goes on patrol duties. After that, the
cycle begins again. It is easy to see from this example that in time of
peace the usage rate is 67 percent (or two-thirds) for any ship. In time
of war, such usage rate may be boosted to 85 percent for newer ships. At
present, the Communists have a large number of ships in active service

but none in reserve. For the Nationalists, it is the other way around.
Nevertheless, both sides are hoping to increase the usage rate of their
naval ships.

Morale and Leadership

Morale and leadership are two main pillars of the intangible capabilities
of any military force. The various systems adopted by the Chinese Commu-
nist and Nationalist navies are the best mirror of their morale and leader-

ship qualities.

There is a jungle of systems within the Chinese Communist navy. Only the
personnel system and the political commissar system have a direct bearing
on morale and deserve a closer look here. Before 1955, the Chinese Com-
munist navy was too young to have much of any system. On 11 February 1955,

45



5. Amphibious Boats

To make an opposing landing, only amphibious boats can bring landing troops,
reinforcements and supplies to the enemy shore amid enemy fire. The major-
ity of both Chinese Nationalist and Communist landing craft are American
made (The Communists took over the American made craft from the Nationalist
hands during the course of the civil war). They can be classified.as fol-
lows:

Landing Ship Dock (LSD): The Nationalists own two of them. They displace
9,400 tons of water, have a speed of 16 knots, and are manned by a crew of
330. Each of them can carry 40 amphibious transport vehicles, or 32 landing
craft vehicle personnel, and 10 companies of landing troops. Besides, with
its helicopter deck, each of them can carry two attack helicopters. They
are the heaviest ships owned by the Nationalists.

Landing Ship Tank (LST): At present, both the Nationalists and the Communists
own several dozen of them. They make up the backbone of the respective
amphibious fleets. Each LST displaces 4,100 tons of water, has a speed of

11 knots, and requires a crew of 120 men. It can carry six landing craft
vehicle personnel. In addition, it can hold 17 amphibious transport vehi-
cles (or tanks) and 6 companies of landing troops. Being large and slow,

it is nicknamed jokingly as a "Large Slow target "10

Land Ship Medium (LSM): Both the Nationalists and the Communists own a num-
ber of them. These vessels displace 1,100 tons of water, move at 12 knots,
and require a crew of 60 men. Each of them can hold eight amphibious trans~
port vehicles and two companies of landing troops. Because of their low
drafts, they can land on shallow water beaches. At present, the National-
ists are using four LSMs to supply troops stationed on Tungsha and Nansha
Islands. The Communists, on the other hand, have converted some of their
LSMs into minelayers.

Infantry Landing Craft (LSIL): The Nationalists have dropped this type of
vessel while the Communists still keep a dozen or so of them in service.
When fully loaded, these crafts displace 285 tons of water, can achieve a
speed of 10 knots. They require a crew of 10. They can carry one infantry

- company or three light tanks (or trucks). They are especially suited to

operating among island groups and coastal areas. During amphibious as-
saults, these vessels will beach to unload landing forces and vehicles on
beachheads.

While on the subject of amphibious operations, tools for the "ship-to-shore
movement" merit mention here. It is obvious that if the above-mentioned
landing ships are to beach on their own amid enemy fire, it is like walking
right into the jaws of death. Therefore, the "ship-to-shore movement" must
be achieved with the help of the following tools:

Amphibious Tanks: Amphibious tanks can move both in the sea (being dif-
ferent from those tanks that can cross rivers) and on land. With their

27



With naval support, the Nationalist version of "green berets" made frequent
assaults and penetrations along the Chekiang, Fukien and Kwangtung coast.
Two major battles stood out in those days:

1. Assault on Nanji Island (facing Wuchiu Island): On 10 October 1952,
two amphibious detachments formed from two battalions of Nationalist naval
and special forces attempted a surprise attack on Nanji Island. Foul
weather delayed the landing again and again and took away the surprise
element. As a result, the assault turned into a fight to the bitter end.
On the morning of 11 October, two Nationalist amphibious ships landed more
reinforcements amid enemy fire and despite blockage of Communist torpedo
boats. At sundown, the Nationalist invaders declared their occupation of
the island. The Nationalist navy also repelled several counterattacks from
Communist speedboats. Three days later, the Nationalist assault troops
withdrew from the island under naval and air cover. In that battle, both
sides lost over 1,000 men. The Communists also lost several torpedo boats.
The Nationalists lost no ships and suffered little damages.

2. Assault on Tungshan Island (at the Fukien-Kwangtung border): The Na-
tionalists were not entirely happy with the assault on Nanji Island. On

16 July 1953, they mounted another assault of similar troop strength. In
addition, they threw in paratroopers. Unfortunately, they were in for a
greater disappointment. First of all, bad weather forced most paratroopers
(about the size of a battalion) to turn back (three of the airplanes reached
the vicinity of Hong Kong without finding a place to land). Heavy sniping
fire from the Communist gunboats and inaccurate tide movement information
caused a delay in the beaching of Nationalist marines. As a result, the
few advance paratroopers who had been dropped on the island and had taken
up position waiting for reinforcements were annihilated. A bloody battle
then took place. In 3 days, the county seat of Tungshan County changed
hands several times in the seesaw between the Nationalists and the Commu-
nists. On the afternoon of 18 July, the Nationalists, after suffering
heavy casualties, beat a retreat. During this engagement, the Nationalist
navy fared well--itself suffered no casualties but sank three Communist
gunboats and five motorized junks.

The Battle of Tachen Islands--The battle over Tachen Islands afforded the
first opportunity for a true match between the Nationalist and Communist
navies. The outcome was that the Nationalists did not do as well as they
had expected while the Communists showed that their navy was now something
to be reckoned with.

Tachen Islands lie 15 nautical miles off the coast from Wen Mountains in
Chekiang Province and are within firing range of the Chinese Communist
coastal guns. They are also not far from a Communist air base of fighter
planes yet are more than 200 nautical miles away from Taiwan. Their geo-
logical location made it obvious that the Nationalists would have a hard
time defending them. Nevertheless, the Nationalists still had one infantry
division (the 46th Division) stationed on five major islands. The arduous
task of supply these islands and guarding the waters around them fell on
the Nationalist navy.



acoustic torpedoes in structure except that they are moved by rocket
propellers. They are first guided by their parent ship's electronic
remote control system and sonar. When they get to within half a mile of
the enemy submarine, they will dive headlong into the water. They will
complete the rest of their mission on their own.

When faced with an attack from depth charges, or hedgehogs, or anti-
submarine rockets (the three types of weapons have a range of less than
400 yards), a submarine still has time to counterattack with its torpedoes
or to escape. When faced with acoustic torpedoes, it becomes a sitting
duck. If faced with anti-submarine missiles, its fate is sealed. There
is no escape from the jaws of death. At the moment, even the most tech-
nically advanced countries have not yet come up with a device to fend off
anti-submarine missile attacks, not to mention the Chinese Nationalists
or Communists. Table 3 shows the capabilities of various anti-submarine
weapons./

2. Sea-to-Sea and Sea-to-Air Missiles

Sea-to-sea missiles are the most important weapons for the Chinese Commu-
nist navy and are causing the greatest concern among the Nationalists.

The Communists have copied the Russian Styx (SS-N-2) sea-to-sea missiles
and have installed them on all their missile speedboats, missile destroyers,
and missile escort destroyers. Their ballistics work like this: The mis-
sile-carrier ship will "lock" in on the target enemy ship with its hori-
zontal radar and then launch the missile according to the target's speed
and course. The "synchronized radar" in the missile will start itself
when the missile gets within 5 nautical miles from its target. This radar
system equipped with ultra-red heat-chaser, will guide the missile toward
its target.

However, Styx missiles cannot stand turbulence. Take speedboats for in-
stance. When they sail in winds of gale force 4 or above, the sway of their
bodies will make the launching of such missiles totally inaccurate. In
spite of this drawback, these 800-pound missiles are deadly accurate if

the wind is still and the sea is calm. For example, during the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war, an Egyptian missile speedboat fired Styx missiles from the
quiet sea within Port Said against an Israeli destroyer patrolling 15 nau-
tical miles away. It took only three missiles to send a 2,500-ton destroyer
to the bottom of the sea. What destructive power!

The Nationalist navy also entered the missile era in 1975. The Nationalists
equipped all their destroyers with Israeli-made Gabriel-II sea-to-sea mis-
siles to counter-balance the expanding capabilities of the Communist sur-
face fleet. Gabriel-IIs are similar to Styx's in capabilities, as can be
seen from Table 4.

For both the Nationalists and the Communists, their sea-to-air missiles are
embryonic. The Chinese Communists installed the first generation of their

18



An Appraisal of the Chinese Communist Naval Equipment

In merely 27 years, the Chinese Communist navy has developed from nothing
into an all-round force. This is no mean feat. It is true that during
the 1950's the Russians rendered considerable assistance and should take
some credit. However, after the Russian aid stopped coming, the Chinese
Communists have gone all out on their own to build their navy. Their hard
work has put them where they are today--a sea power in the Far East. They
make every piece of naval equipment themselves. They refine their own
fuel; make their own ammunition; build, repair and maintain their own
ships; develop and produce their own radar, communications systems, engines
and missiles!4. It is clear from Table 9 that the average age of the 1,086
ships in the Chinese Communist navy is only 14 years and that the majority
of their ships are made in China. Nevertheless, such impressive statistics
do not necessarily imply that the Chinese Communists have had an easy time
advancing their shipbuilding technology and their naval capabilities. The
Chinese Communists launched their one and only nuclear-powered "Han" class
submarine, using the conventional torpedoes as its weapons, in 1972. Five
years has now elapsed but they have not yet put together a nuclear-powered
submarine fleet using strategic missiles as their weapons, with a range
that can reach every corner of the world. This is because they have been
beset with technical problems and are not expected to solve their problems
in the next 3 to 5 years. The technical problems are as follows:

1. The atomic reactor used on the nuclear-powered submarine is not sound
enough: the Chinese Communists built (more aptly a copying job) five atomic
reactors in the late 1960's. However, those reactors are firmly planted

on land. An atomic reactor used for nuclear-power submarines must be sea-
worthy when the submarines are cruising, pressure-proof when the submarines
are diving, and shock-proof when the submarines are engaged in combat.
Therefore, it is not the same as a land-based reactor. After its launch-
ing, the one and only nuclear powered submarine of the Chinese Communists
was good only in developing one malfunction after another and had to undergo
frequent repairs. It did not conduct its first diving test until as late

as 1974. Since then, it has been in and out of the repair yard-all the
time.

2. The most advanced "silent submarines" are still out of their reach:
Due to the superiority of today's anti-submarine weapons, only the most
advanced "silent submarines"--submarines that keep their noises to them-
selves and thus can elude enemy acoustic weapons--can survive the cruel
test of an anti-submarine offensive. Naturally the Chinese Communists
are not so foolish as to build noisy nuclear-powered missile submarines
at the cost of millions of dollars each to make them easy prey of the
enemy.

3. The submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) are still far from

becoming a reality: SLBMs with a range of over 1,000 miles cannot be
propelled by liquid fuel now commonly used by Chinese Communist strategic

35



Table 8. Chinese Nationalist Naval Administrative System

Navy
ospitals Train—
jing
Maritime Train-+ centers
rjsurvey rjing 17 Wy
ja
bureau har. L.. eelemi esl
L state
college _[Supply —
Planning [command Air force pari
dept. Ship- joperation-|
Logis lyards jal hqr. [rine
Logistic L} tic tr] wing
T
dept. hqr. | |Supply H
lopera- dept. |
Research] tional d
& devel-| | |dept- !
opment Intelli- | Battid
office gence | Destroyer ships
dept. i jpatrol- P
| boat
Personnel u command [Train4
Execu-+ |Minis-| | Navy dept. Fleet ling
tive Fotry off gen. = har
yuan lde- hqr. Ship admin-| . |Amphibi- Landing
fense istration lous force crafts
dept. lcommans —
; Ships T Train-
-_ Public land-} 7 4 jing
Liaison works . kampEIbL
office dept ing P ‘ous
7 . dept. reconnaissance}
+ t
! | Piedicat | [Amphibious
U.S. ept. i ttransporta—
taiwan lCommunica- tion
ldefense tions Marine Siavine divi
command dept. har. sions vig
Comptrol- [Marine air
ler dept. service
Supervi- Marine
isory dept. academy
Navy gen.
Naval Navy
LPotiticat L} dis- |——lgarrison
jwartare tricts| dept.
dept
[Judge advo-|
[ Icate dept. ——— command channel
------ coordination channel
|_jSuperviso-
iry office

36



The Chinese Communists have one nuclear-powered submarine (carrying 17
torpedoes) which, of course, can dive deeper and longer and move faster.

A submarine's mission is related to the weapons it carries. It can fire
torpedoes against enemy shipping. If outfitted with special equipment,
it can lay mines. If equipped with anti-submarine sonar, it can hunt for
enemy subs. If equipped with sea-to-land missiles, it can strike at land
targets. Apart from being an offensive weapon against enemy ships, a
submarine can also carry special force troops to make coastal penetra—
tions. Submarines have both advantages and disadvantages. First of all,
submarines are incapable of fulfilling a number of naval duties, such as
search and sentry duties, escorting convoys, shelling coastal targets,

or supporting amphibious operations. Furthermore, submarines have no de-
fense against air strikes. They are sitting ducks when they run into
aerial attacks (especially from anti-submarine aircraft). Lastly, con-
sidering the present capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist and Communist
submarines, they are defenseless against latest sophisticated anti-sub-
marine weapons and can hardly survive an enemy anti-submarine offensive.

Table 5. Capabilities of Nationalist and Communist Naval Guns*

Speed Firing Firing Shell
(round range height weight

Type Quantity per min) (yard) (feet) (1bs) Special features
5.1" guns 11 ships 10 27,250 -- 59.5 Wasphead gun direc-
38 pes tor, semi-auto, flat
fire
3.9" guns 15 ships 20 19,620 39,360 35.3 Sun-visor gun direc—
PRC 43 pes tor, semi-auto, dual
purpose
57-mm aaa 164 ships 120 9,810 16,000 6.2 Skinhead gun direc~
305 pes tor, semi-auto, dual
purpose
37-mm aaa 572 ships 180 4,360 4,920 1.6 ditto
1888 pcs
5" guns 34 ships 22 18,000 37,400 55.1 MK-37 gun director,
129 pes semi-auto, dual
purpose
3" guns 33 ships 50 14,170 29,520 13.3 MK-37 gun director,
ROC| 66 pcs automatic, dual
purpose
40-mm aaa 79 ships 160 5,000 13,450 2.1 MK-37 gun director,
389 pes” semi-auto, dual
purpose

‘not included are small guns with caliber less than 30 minimeters or non-
naval guns (like 75-mm howitzer)

24



JPRS 71527
24 July 1978

TRANSLATIONS ON PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

No. 445

CoNTENTS Pace
MILITARY

Communist, Nationalist Naval Strength Assessed
(Ti Tsung-heng; MING PAO, Feb, Mar, Apr 77) ........ 1

-a- [III - cC - 80S & T]



Nationalist navy have either been obtained through U.S. aid or been pur-
chased from overseas. Their average age and their countries of origin are
shown in Table 11.

The 18 "Yang" class destroyers which the Nationalists bought from the
United States were American destroyers launched between 1943 and 1947.
Under the U.S. "Fleet Rearmament and Modernization" Program of the mid-
1960's, each of these destroyers underwent an 8-month overhaul, during
which it received 8 million dollars worth of new weapon and communications
systems, new engines, and a new keel. In the years from 1969 and 1974,
these destroyers were sold, one after another, to the Nationalists. Of
these ships, Destroyer "Tanyang" and seven of her sister ships have spe-
cial platforms for helicopters to take off and land as well as hangars.
They will come in handy if the Nationalists decide to add one more dimen-
sion to their navy by increasing their ship-based airplanes at some point
in the future. Destroyer "Liaoyang" and three other sister ships are armed
with anti-submarine missiles. Destroyer "Hsiangyang" and four others are
armed with sea-to-sea missiles. As to sea-to-air missiles, plans are afoot
to install them on all the 18 Nationalist destroyers. The coming months
will see these destroyers completely equipped with sea-to-air, sea-to-sea,
and anti-submarine missiles through direct or indirect U.S. aid. These
ships form the main force of the Nationalist surface fleets.

The Nationalists also own 16 minesweepers made in the United States dur-
ing the early years of the Vietnam War. These minesweepers, naturally,
will be central figures in any minesweeping operation. The Nationalists
also own nine Japanese-made and American-made superspeed torpedo boats.
They are now patrolling the waters around Penghu islands. Besides, there
are some "senile" naval ships, including 10 escort destroyers and three
patrol boats. They are candidates for the mothballs unless they are to
be rebuilt and armed with missiles in the near future.

The Chinese Nationalist submarine fleet consists of two ocean-going at—
tack submarines and three spy submarines. The former were purchased from
the United States in 1973 for use in anti-submarine combat training for
the naval aviators. The latter, "mini-submarines" that require only an
8-man crew and displace 70 tons, were purchased from Italy in 1969 for
special combat assignments. The small submarines will not play any deci-
sive role in the contention for command of the sea.

In the past 10 years, the Chinese Nationalists have pressed on with their
program of retiring old ships and acquiring new ships in order to keep
their fleets in top shape. Table 12 shows the ships’ turnover. Generally
speaking, the Nationalists retire nine ships and acquire the same number
of new ships each year. The figure represents 10 percent of the total
number of ships in the Nationalist navy. It is a big turnover. Under
such a vigorous renewal program, the "Yung" class and the "Chiang" class
patrol boats, once the pride of the Nationalist navy, are all gone by
now.

43



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41



destroyers, gunboats and torpedo speedboats were waiting in Shaoan Bay to
knock them out. At dawn, "Changchiang" and "Chienmen" sailed into Shaoan
Bay, 3,000 yards apart from each other. As they approached land, their
radar lost its effectiveness due to reflections from surrounding land fea-
tures. At that very moment, flashes of white light exploded on the deck
of "Changchiang." She was being hit by a barrage of fire from Communist
ships' fast and accurate gunnery and the next moment she was sunk. "Chien-
men" also found herself under a rain of artillery fire and immediately
tried to get away. At the same time she also radioed for help from Na-
tionalist air force fighters. Badly wounded, "Chienmen" also went down
10 minutes later near Tungshan Island before air support could arrive at
the scene, carrying with her a Nationalist rear admiral to the bottom of
the sea. Shortly after the two ships sank, a dozen or so destroyers of
the Nationalist navy and the Taiwan Strait patrol detachment of the U.S.
Seventh Fleet steamed into the area to search for survivors. In 7 days,
they could only pick up five survivors--all deep-water demolition experts
of the navy and good swimmers. In this battle, the Communists handed a
resounding defeat to the Nationalists.

Late on the night of 13 November, a Nationalist patrol boat named "Yungtai"
(see Table 5) and a minesweeper named "Yungchang" were on guard in the
waters southwest to Wuchiu Island, covering some Nationalist amphibious
boats which were unloading supplies to the defenders on Wuchiu. As soon

as midnight struck, three Communist escort destroyers of the "Chiangnan"
class and five gunboats of the "Shanghai" class swooped out of Chuanchou
port toward Wuchiu for a massacre. The Nationalist "yungtai" and "Yung-
chang" bore the brunt of the initial encounter. A bloody pattle took place.
As the two Nationalist guard boats were outgunned, outmaneuvered and out-
numbered, "Yungchang" soon lapsed into radio silence, its fate unknown.
"yungtai" carried on a desperate fight with the Communists, hoping to buy
time for the beached Nationalist landing craft to get away and somehow to
attempt a rescue of her sister ship "Yungchang." The battle raged on for
the better part of an hour. "Yungtai," after sinking four Communist gun-
boats and herself being covered with holes from Communist artillery fire,
managed to pull out of the fight under cover of night-flying Nationalist
fighters. Fifteen crew members survived the ill-fated "Yungchang." They
later confirmed that their ship was sunk by Communist escort destroyers

at the very outset of the battle. Even "Yungtai" had to be scrapped later
because of excessive damage. |

The battles in the Minhai Sea caused nearly equal casualties for the two |
adversary navies. Yet for the Communists, who had endured defeat after

defeat for more than 10 years up to that point in history, these battles

marked the beginning of an era in which the Communists could fight the
Nationalists as tactical equals. These three major sea engagements brought

home to the Communists the message that it would be futile to use the

speedboats and gunboats against the better--equipped Nationalist ships

with superior firepower and that the only way to offset the Nationalist

advantage was to use large ships and speedboats at the same time.

11



On the Nationalist side, the sinking of three ships and the wounding of two
caused the commanders-in-general of the Nationalist Navy and Air Force to
lose their jobs and all the Nationalist naval ships to display the slogan:
"Let us never forget the lesson of the three sea battles." The use of
large ships of over 1,000 tons in weight by the Communists in the three
sea engagements convinced the Nationalists that their navy of medium-sized
patrol boats and minesweepers was vulnerable. This may be the reason why
the Americans began granting large escort destroyers to the Nationalists
to replace their obsolete patrol boats after the Minhai battles.

At the end of 1965, Nationalist troops spotted at night a Communist W-type
submarine near Hsinchu coast of Taiwan and quickly reported their discovery
to the navy. In no time more than 10 destroyers and escort destroyers
equipped with anti-submarine weapons sailed out from both Makung and Keelung
ports toward the scene of sighting. Thus began the first anti-submarine
battle in the Taiwan Strait. The Communist submarine became the target of
more than 100 depth charges. Though badly wounded, the submarine still
managed to sneak back to Chekiang coast to safety. This was quite a blow
to the Nationalist navy equipped with such anti-submarine weapons as sonar
and depth charges. This embarrassing battle brought to an end the disas-
trous year of 1965 for the Nationalists.

As the Communists never announce their naval losses to the world and the
Nationalists sometimes tend to exaggerate battle results,” it is very
difficult to correctly tabulate the Communist losses for each sea battle.
It is generally assumed that in the 100 or so sea battles, both large and
small, the Communists lost 50 to 70 ships of various types (more than a
half were torpedo speedboats and gunboats) and 100 to 150 motor junks to
artillery fire of Nationalist ships. The Nationalist losses©® can be seen
from Table 1: Six ships were sunk in sea combat, two others wounded and
then scrapped; two others wounded but later returned to service after re-
pair; and two others destroyed by ground and air fire. If the losses of
the Communists during sea battles (combat between adversary ships) are
compared with those of the Nationalists, the score on ships sunk or
destroyed by the enemy should be 60 to 8 in favor of the Nationalists.
Obviously the Communists were no match for the Nationalists. However,

it does not mean that the score will repeat itself in future battles. In
the recent decade, the quality of naval troops and naval ships of both
the Communists and the Nationalists has greatly improved. It will be
possible to predict what will happen in future sea battles between the
two adversaries. The only valid prediction will be that the Communists
and the Nationalists will employ different tactics, use more ships, and
conduct the battles differently in the future.

Ceasefire Period--After 1965, the Nationalists stopped their assault and
infiltration operations against the Communists, thus reducing the chances
for direct confrontation between the two navies. As the political tension
between the Nationalists and the Communists eased, their ships began to
avoid each other on purpose. As a result, the recent decade has not wit-
nessed any major sea battle.

13



IBLIOGRAPHIC DATA || Report No.
SHEET . JPRS 71527

3. Recipient's Accession No.

4, Title and Subtitle

TRANSLATIONS ON PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, No.

445

3. Report Date
24 July 1978

6.

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Arlington, Virginia 22201

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As above

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and technological information on China.

The report contains political, sociological, economic, government, scientific

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Table 7. Chinese Communist Naval Tactical Units

North Sea East Sea South Sea Sub-

Type of Detachment Fleet Fleet Fleet total
Escort and patrol detachments 2 1 5
Submarine detachments 3 1 1 5
Mine sweeping and laying

detachments 2 2 1 5
Missile speedboat detachments 2 3 1 6
Torpedo speedboat detachments 4 5 3 12
Gunboat detachments 7 9 5 21
Landing troop detachments 1 2 1 4
Logistical detachments 1 2 1 4
Total number of detachments 22 26 14 62

main naval bases are Tsoying, Makung and Keelung. The lesser bases are
Kaohsiung, Hualien and Tachung.

The marine headquarters commands two marine divisions, whose organizational
structure and method of training are patterned after those of the American
marines. The Nationalist marines also use heavy weapons and have high
mobility. Recently an aviation wing has been added to the marine command,
using Nationalist-made assault helicopters. The air marines add an extra
dimension to the marines' amphibious capabilities. The Nationalist marines
are based throughout southern Taiwan, plus Tungsha islands, Nansha islands,
and Wuchiu Island. They are so well equipped and trained that they are
rated by Western military experts as among the best in the world.

The "62 Task Force" is a tactical unit of the Nationalist armed forces for
the defense of the Taiwan Straits. Its commander is usually also the
commander of the fleet headquarters of the Nationalist Navy. The task
force controls North Patrol Detachment, South Patrol Detachment, Matsu
Transportation Detachment, Chinmen Transportation Detachment, and Nanwei
Detachment, each detachment consisting of a mixture of naval ships suited
to its mission. The task force also controls fighter planes and anti-
submarine aircraft assigned to Straits defense duties by the Nationalist
air force.

The U.S. Taiwan Defense Command plays a different role. It is a tactical
coordination unit composed of 150 U.S. military officers and men. It can
call in American troops in the Far East to come to the Nationalist aid in
times of need according to the stipulations of the Sino-American Mutual
Defense Treaty. However, USTDC discontinued its patrol duties in the
Taiwan Strait as of November 1969 and disbanded its "72 Taiwan Strait
Patrol Detachment" as of February 1971. Thereupon, the Nationalist navy
has assumed responsibilities for the security in the Taiwan Strait single-
handedly. As the United States has tried to improve her relations with
Communist China in recent years, the Nationalists no longer place much
faith in USTDC.

34



Table 4. The Nationalist and Communist Naval Sea-to-sea and Sea-to-air

Missiles
No of
Rounds Firing Firing Shell Shell Propelling-
per range Height length Weight control
Type Q'ty firing (mile) (feet) (feet) (Ibs) system
Gabriel-II 5 ships 10 22 -- 11.0 400 solid fuel,
ROC {S-to-S 25 pes radar-guided,
Missile* semi-automatic
. chasing visually
Chaparral 2 45 9 50,000 9.5 25 solid fuel,
S-to-A 2 ultrared
Missile* heat chasing
Styx SS- 132 ships 1 25 -—- 15.0 800 solid fuel,
PRC|N-2 S-to- 400 pcs radar-guided,
S Missile semi-auto
ultrared chasing
Goa SA-N-1 1 ship 2 17 40,000 19.3 45 Solid fuel,
S-to-A 4 pes radar-guided
Missile semi-automatic
chasing

*Note: the Nationalists are putting these two types of missiles on all
naval ships.

'
considerable tonnage passing over the mine. Its fuse will not react to
small ships or minesweeping equipment. The "combined influence mine" has
all three types of fuses--"eardrum," "magnetic," and "pressure" and is
therefore the most reliable.

Any kind of mine, except the "contact mine," will pose a greater threat if
it is outfitted with a "timer." For instance, if the "timer" is set to 10,
the mine will blow up only when the 10th ship passes over it. It means
that any minesweeping equipment passing over it 9 times will still be un-
able to clear it away. Another lethal type is the "electronic mine" which
is detonated by remote control and cannot be swept away at all. In short,
mining operation is getting more and more complicated each day. For the
present, both the Nationalists and the Communists are in possession of all
six types of mines described above. As to the methods of mining, mines

can be dropped from airplanes or laid by ships, submarines, or even sampans.

A discussion of mine-laying naturally leads to a discussion of minesweeping.
Sonar, a device that can detect the presence of submarines, can also detect
the presence of mines. Sonar search may be coupled with aerial visual
search of shallow waters. However, locating the mines is only the begin-—
ning. The difficult task is to safely detonate the mines. “Contact mines,"
“acoustic mines" and "magnetic mines" are easy to get rid of. All it takes
is cut rope, noise makers and magnets to set them off respectively. But

22



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Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
{] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

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Table 12. Turnover of Nationalist Naval Ships

Retired ships Newly acquired ships
Year Battle ships Auxiliary ships Battle ships Auxiliary ships
1966 2 (0) 7 1
1967 0 1 3 0
1968 3 0 5 0
1969 6 3 13 2
1970 8 4 2 2
1971 1 8 5 3
1972 20 8 4 4
1973 13 7 9 1
1974 0 3 6 3
1975 4 2 2 0
1976 1 6 3 1
Total 58 42 59 17

Note: Retired ships include all those taken off active duties, scrapped,
sold, mothballed, or handed over to the Customs offices and research
institutes.

Newly acquired ships include all those made by the Nationalists
themselves, purchased from overseas (Japan, Italy, United States),
and received in U.S. Aid.

the State Council made public the regulations governing military service.
The regulations followed the Soviet system of military ranks and divided
the naval rank and file into five classes and 18 grades, from admirals
through captains, lieutenants, petty officers down to seamen. Thereafter,
a complete system regarding ranks, uniforms, conditions of service, promo-
tion and discharge, discipline, and pension gradually took shape. On

30 July 1955, the Statute on Military Service was promulgated, requiring
all men 18 years or older to serve. In time of peace, the length of ser-
vice is 4 years with land-based naval units and 5 years onboard naval
ships. In time of war, the length of service will be prolonged. Naval
reserves are to report for combat duties immediately if war breaks out.
Coinciding with the promulgation of the new statute on military service
was the change from a system paying the serviceman in kind to a system

of paying him a salary. In January 1965, the Communists further extended
the length of military service by 1 year. On 1 June 1965, the Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee adopted a resolution of the Ninth Na-
tional People's Congress to abolish all military ranks and titles and to
do away with all insignia and emblems as a means of boosting morale and
promoting unity. This system has remained unchanged to this day because
of favorable response.

The system of political commissars is most important for the Chinese Com
munist navy. It is through such a system that the Chinese Communist Party
exercises its absolute control over the armed forces. The Chinese Commu-
nist navy, understandably, is also a product of the philosophy that "the

46



motor junks that do not deserve any further classification. Their dis-
placement is under 20 tons. They are not fit to take up combat duties on
the open sea far away from the coast and will not contribute much to the
contention for the command of the sea in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore,
they do not merit any further elaboration.

Worth mentioning in the last paragraph are the ship's planes. Presently
neither the Nationalists nor the Communists own any ship's planes. Never-
theless, the Nationalists own 18 large ships that can carry one or two
helicopters. Helicopters can perform such duties as long-distance trans-
portation and rescue. ‘Furthermore, they can be equipped with suspension—
type sonar and acoustic torpedoes and thus become long-range anti-submarine
weapons. During amphibious operations, these helicopters can serve as
aerial observation posts and communications centers to guide ships' artil-
lery. With their rockets and machineguns, they can also provide cover fire
for marines taking a beachhead. The introduction of helicopters into the
navy has taken modern naval warfare a giant step forward.11

{Apr 77, pp 24-33]

[Text] Part III The Chinese Nationalist and Communist Naval Organization
and Capabilities

Military capabilities express themselves in both tangible and intangible
forms. The various types of naval ships and their weapons will definitely
contribute to tangible capabilities. Nevertheless, they must be backed
up by "supply, repair and maintenance operations" and "combat training,"
two other indispensable components of the tangibles. Then, how to bring
the tangible capabilities into the fullest play? That is where the in-
tangible capabilities--morale and leadership--come into the picture.

The administrative and tactical organization will serve as a catalyst in
the fusing of the intangibles with the tangibles. In other words, naval
organization and naval capabilities are really two sides of a coin. They
are not independent of each other.

The Chinese Nationalist and Communist Naval Organization

The Chinese Communist navy has a total of 170,000 men, representing 5.2
percent of the strength of the People's Liberation Army. Of these men,
110,000 belong to naval forces, 20,000 belong to the naval air service,
and 38,000 belong to the marine corps. The Chinese Communist navy owns
1,100 ships and 650 airplanes. Its organization is shown in Table 6.12
The Navy General Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army is at the
top of the chain of command. Its staff units are responsible for setting
up naval forces and then keeping them going. It has its seat in Peking.
Its first echelon operational units include the coastal artillery head-
quarters, the marine headquarters, naval aviation headquarters, and, most
importantly, the submarine headquarters and the three fleet headquarters.

30



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39



2. Destroyers of Various Types

In today's navies, the destroyer has completely taken the place of capital
ship and cruiser to become an “all-round battleship." As destroyers are
seaworthy, durable, fast, and equipped with a complete range of weapons,
they can perform any sea duty under any weather condition. The Nationalist
and Communist destroyers weigh from 2,000 to 3,800 tons, have a maximum
speed of 36 knots, are manned by a crew of approximately 300 members, and
have an operational radius of 7,000 nautical miles. They are now the king
of the sea. They can attack enemy ships with guns, missiles or torpedoes;
enemy aircraft with antiaircraft guns; and enemy submarines with various
types of anti-submarine weapons. They can shell coastal targets with their
main battery. With radar, they can search the sky and the sea and serve
as early warning systems. They can, with special equipment, seed the sea
with mines. Some Nationalist destroyers even carry with them helicopters
which extend their reach even further in performing any of the above des-
cribed duties. Besides, destroyers can also perform deep-sea rescue and
towing missions. In short, they can do anything at sea.

For defensive purposes, a destroyer can repel attacks from the air, the sea
and from under the water with its three-dimensional fire. It can serve as
an escort and sentry ship for convoys. It can provide supporting fire for
amphibious operations with its main battery. Should the sea-to-sea mis-
siles deployed on Communist destroyers and the anti-submarine missiles de-
ployed on Nationalist destroyers be outfitted with small tactical warheads,
the respective destroyers could mount a nuclear strike and inflict greater
damage and loss of lives on the enemy.

In the past two decades, the Chinese Nationalists and Communists have made
little improvement on the structure and power unit of their respective
destroyers and yet have made amazing progress in upgrading their weapon
systems. The missiles, computers and nuclear power have increased the of-
fensive capabilities of modern destroyers by 100 fold from 20 years ago.
Take the Nationalist "Hanyang" Missile Destroyer for example. It boasts
anti-submarine missiles, acoustic torpedoes, helicopters, and radar-guided
artillery. The entire ship is covered by closed-circuit air-conditioning
system. Its immunity to nuclear attacks makes it a unique ship in the
Chinese Nationalist and Communist navies. In fact, it is the only ship

in the world that can survive in a nuclear holocaust.

3. Battleships of Various Types

These include escort destroyers, patrol boats, minesweepers and minelayers
(excluding submarines, naval vessels weighing less than 300 tons are called
boats; those weighing over 300 tons are called ships). In tonnage, fire-
power, speed and capabilities, these ships are inferior to destroyers.

Escort destroyers weigh between 1,500 and 2,300 tons, have a speed of

around 25 knots, and call for a 200-man crew. They can attack enemy air-
craft, surface ships and submarines. They can serve as escort for ship

25



Nationalist air force would cover the Nationalist convoys from the air.

On 18 September, the Nationalists formed a transport flotilla out of scores
of ships of various types to ship scores of 155-centimeter and 203-centi-
meter cannons (with a firing range of 15 miles) to Chinmen. As the £1lo-
tilla entered Liaolo Bay, hordes of Communist torpedo speedboats, relying
on a "tactic of numerical superiority," came out in a swarm to block the
way, but to no avail. During the sea battle in broad daylight, the Commu-
nists suffered casualties of three boats sunk and four damaged while the
Nationalists were unscathed. Six days later, the same Nationalist flotilla
returned with full loads, again heading into a fight. This time the fight
took place in the air, not at sea. As 32 Nationalist Sabre jet fighters
escorted the flotilla into Liaolo Bay, more than 100 Communist MiG fighters
closed in on them from the south, the north and the west. A 4-hour bitter
aerial battle took place. The Nationalist and Communist fighters chased
one another in fierce dog fights in an air space 100 miles long and 50 miles
wide above the Fukien coast. The final score: 10 to nothing. The Nation-
alist air force won a smashing victory!

On 15 October, the Communists, after expending 475,000 rounds of artillery
ammunition on Chinmen, realized the futility of their effort in spite of
their immense losses. They decided to call it quits. Thereupon the Gun
Battle Over Chinmen and Matsu petered out with the Communist declaration
of "firing on odd days and ceasefire on even days." According to Nation—
alist statistics, the Nationalists had two ships sunk and three damaged
in the 18 sea battles in the course of the Gun Battle over Chinmen and
Matsu. The Communist casualties, on the other hand, ran to 22 ships and
86 motor junks destroyed. The score for the 10 major air battles was 32
to 3 in favor of the Nationalists. For this period, victory clearly be-
longed to the Nationalists.

After the incident of the Taiping destroyer, the Nationalists attached
great importance to developing and improving on their anti-speedboat tac-
tics. Their work proved its value during the Gun Battle over Chinmen and
Matsu. As for the Communists, they began to see the great disadvantage
of pitting their "numerical superiority" against the accuracy of the
automated battery of the Nationalist naval ships. Therefore, for both
the Nationalists and the Communists, the Gun Battle over Chinmen and Matsu
marked an important milestone in their respective naval development. The
Nationalist navy was to continue to improve on its firepower and tactical
maneuvers while the Communist navy was to turn its attention to building
larger naval ships and submarine units and to phase out its obsolete tor-
pedo-boat tactics.

With massive Russian aid, the Chinese Communists began copying various
types of Russian ships in 1956. Their large-scale shipbuilding program
was suspended for a while in 1960 when Russian aid stopped. Then they
picked up again. Relying on rich natural resources and their teamwork,
they overcame one obstacle after another, embarked on research and devel-
opment on their own, made innovations, and puilt a navy from their own
resources. In the early 1960's, the Chinese Communists not only continued



party must control the armed forces and political objectives override
military objectives." Generally speaking, the Chinese Communist naval
officers and men are at a low educational level but have a high political
awareness. Their training is low on military skills but high on political
indoctrination. The hallmarks of the political commissar system in the
Chinese Communist navy are "large organization, rigid control, separation
of political authority from military authority, and involvement of every
officer and man in political activity."

The Chinese Nationalist naval officers and men, on an average, are of a
higher caliber than their Communist counterparts. The career officers
are all well trained in naval sciences and technology. Reserve officers
who serve for 2 years are all college graduates. The seamen, who serve
3 years, are all high school graduates. There are also political depart-
ments in the Nationalist navy. However, the rank and file have far less
political awareness than their Communist counterparts.

Generally speaking, morale is high in both the Communist and Nationalist
navies. The performance of their men in the various sea engagements is
good proof of such high morale. Defections are rare. Since 1950, only
one incident involving "defection" has occurred for each side:

1. At 3 a.m. on 9 January 1966, a landing craft machine (LCM-119) of the
Chinese Communist navy sailed from Communist China toward Nankan Island
in the Matsu group under the Nationalist control. Seven seamen of Fukien
Province with defection on their minds put up a fight with three Communist
cadres on the craft. Only three seamen survived the fight and steered
their craft to Nankan Island. Later on, when the three defectors were
flying to Taipei aboard a hydroplane, they ran into an ambush of Chinese
Communist MIG fighters and were killed. It was a tragic ending.

2. In the early morning of 20 March 1974, a Nationalist naval officer
left his station on Wuchiu Island for Communist-controlled Nanjih Island
in a rubber speedboat. His name was Wu Miao-huo, a lieutenant and platoon
leader of an amphibious reconnaissance battalion of the Second Marine
Division, also a graduate of the Nationalist Navy Academy., He defected
because he could not get along with his superior officers.

These two incidents are merely freakish occurrences and do not reflect

any internal problems that may exist within the Communist or Nationalist
navies. If these incidents are irrelevant, the background of the top
commanding officers of the two navies may offer some clues to their charac—
ter and potential problems:

Hsiao Chin-kuang--presently the commander of the Chinese Communist navy.
Born in 1904, a native of Changsha city in Hunan Province, graduated from
Dr Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1924, graduated from Soviet Red
Army University and University of Political Science in 1930. He has
served as commander and chief of staff at various levels, and has headed
a number of special districts and military districts. He saw action in

47



5.

All the Communist ships are in active service while the Nationalists

have some ships in reserves.

A subsequent installment of this article to be published in the next issue
of the same magazine will deal with the question of just how evenly matched
the two adversary navies are.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14,

FOOTNOTES

J. Gittings, "The Role of the Chinese Army," Oxford University Press,
N.Y., 1967.

"Time" Magazine, from July 1954 to April 1955.

P.Y. Hu, "A Brief History of the Chinese National Revolutionary
Forces," Chung Wu Publishing Co, Taiwan, 1971.

U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, "Action Reports on Chinese Navy," USTDC,
Taiwan, 1965.

Chinese Information, "China Yearbook," Annual Issues from 1950 to
1975, China Publishing Co, Taiwan.

R. Blackman, "Jane's Fighting Ships," Jane's Yearbooks Co, 1966.

Weyers, "FLOTTEN-TASCHEN-BUCH, 1976-1977," Lehmanns Verlag, Germany,
1977.

News from "The Christian Science Monitor" on 6 January 1977.

R. Blackman, "Jane's Fighting Ships 1976-1977," Jane's Yearbooks Co,
1976.

S. E. Morrison, "History of USN Operations," Atlantic Monthly Press
Book, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1959.

E. Luttwak, "A Dictionary of Modern War," Harper and Row Publishers,
N.Y. 1971.

J. R. Dewenter, "THE EAST CHINA AND YELLOW SEA" in U.S.N. Institute
Proceeding, March 1975.

W. H. Powers, "UNDERWAY WITH CHIANG'S NAVY" in U.S.N. Institute
Proceeding, January 1975.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "MILITARY BALANCE,
1975-1976," IISS, London, 1975.

49



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