United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3530

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Thomas Cahalan, *

*

 Plaintiff-Appellant, *

*

v. *

* Appeals From the United States

Donald Michael Rohan, * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

 Defendant-Appellee, *

*

Daniel Joseph VonRuden, *

United Parcel Service, *

*

 Defendants. *

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04-3533

 

Thomas Cahalan, *

*

 Plaintiff-Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Donald Michael Rohan, *

*

Defendant-Appellant, *

*

Daniel Joseph VonRuden, *

United Parcel Service, *
1

The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

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*

 Defendants. *

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Submitted: June 20, 2005

Filed: September 9, 2005

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Before MELLOY, HEANEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Cahalan, the injured passenger in a motor vehicle accident, appeals the

district court’s1

 dismissal of his claim, arguing that the court erred in finding the suit

barred by the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act (NJWCA). Donald Michael

Rohan, the driver of the vehicle, cross-appeals, claiming that the court abused its

discretion by not dismissing Cahalan’s claim with prejudice. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Rohan and Cahalan were both employed by the New Jersey law firm McCarter

and English. In October of 1999, the firm was helping to administer a nationwide

class action settlement. Cahalan and Rohan were sent to Minnesota to instruct and

supervise telephone operators answering settlement-related questions. They were

scheduled to remain in Fairbault, Minnesota, supervising the call center from

October 25th through October 29th and had no specific work responsibility outside

of the call center. On October 25, 1999, Rohan and Cahalan were driving back to

their hotel in the evening in Rohan’s rented vehicle. Rohan attempted to make a left

turn when his view of oncoming traffic was partially obscured by a semi-tractor
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trailer in the oncoming left turn lane. Rohan pulled out into the path of a United

Parcel Service (UPS) van, which struck the passenger side of Rohan’s vehicle,

severely injuring Cahalan. 

Following the accident, Cahalan sued UPS, the driver of the van, and Rohan,

alleging that UPS and the driver of the van were directly and vicariously liable for his

injuries, and that Rohan was negligent or grossly negligent in turning without

observing approaching traffic. The district court granted UPS and the van driver’s

motion for summary judgment, holding that Cahalan failed as a matter of law to show

that the van driver was negligent, and dismissed without prejudice the complaint

against Rohan, finding that it was barred by the NJWCA. Cahalan appeals the

dismissal of his claim against Rohan, asserting that the district court incorrectly

interpreted New Jersey law. Rohan cross appeals, contending that the dismissal

should have been with prejudice. 

ANALYSIS

In this diversity case, we review the district court’s interpretation of New

Jersey law de novo. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991); Gosnell

v. Mullenix, 11 F.3d 780, 781 (8th Cir. 1993). Workers’ compensation provides an

employee the exclusive remedy against an employer for injuries arising out of and

during the course of employment. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-8. If an injury is

compensable under workers’ compensation in New Jersey, the injured employee may

only recover from a fellow employee for intentional torts. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-8.

New Jersey defines employment in its workers’ compensation statute and addresses

the scope of employment outside of the usual workplace: 

[W]hen the employee is required by the employer to be away from the

employer's place of employment, the employee shall be deemed to be in

the course of employment when the employee is engaged in the direct

performance of duties assigned or directed by the employer; but the
2

While the travel time and automobile exceptions may also apply, the record

is not entirely clear regarding the firm’s reimbursement policy and the control of the

rented automobile. The issue on appeal is sufficiently resolved without determining

whether these exceptions are applicable. 

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employment of employee paid travel time by an employer for time spent

traveling to and from a job site or of any employee who utilizes an

employer authorized vehicle shall commence and terminate with the

time spent traveling to and from a job site or the authorized operation of

a vehicle on business authorized by the employer.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-36. The statute therefore creates three possible exceptions to

the general rule that off-site injuries are not covered by workers’ compensation: the

“special mission,” “travel time,” and authorized vehicle exceptions. Zelasko v.

Refrigerated Food Exp., 608 A.2d 231, 234 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1992). We focus our

attention on the special mission exception.2

The “special mission” exception applies to an employee required to work away

from the normal place of employment and engaged in direct performance of the duties

assigned by the employer. Id. Travel to and from a remote job site is “direct

performance” of the job duties when the travel is an indispensable part of the mission.

Id.; Ehrgott v. Jones, 506 A.2d 40, 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (holding that

travel to an out-of-state professional meeting was integral to attending the meeting

itself; thus travel to the airport was in the course of employment); Nemchick v.

Thatcher Glass Mfg. Co., 495 A.2d 1372, 1375 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)

(employee’s return home after overnight emergency assignment was an integral part

of the assignment). Employees are not engaged in direct performance of their

assigned duties, however, when they engage in personal errands in a remote location.

E.g., Walsh v. Ultimate Corp., 555 A.2d 731 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)

(employee, injured on personal day trip while on assignment in Australia, was not

engaged in direct performance of assignment, though he brought work that he

intended to complete when he reached his destination); Mangigian v. Franz Warner
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Assoc., Inc., 501 A.2d 179, 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (employee on

temporary assignment to another city was not performing job duties when leaving her

motel to get dinner).

New Jersey has not addressed the precise situation presented by Cahalan:

whether an employee’s return trip from a remote work site to his hotel is covered by

workers’ compensation. Cahalan concedes that travel to an airport and flight to

another city are indispensable to the assignment and therefore direct performance, but

argues that the daily travel from a hotel to a remote location is more akin to a daily

commute. We are not persuaded that the New Jersey legislature and New Jersey

courts would apply a version of the general “coming and going” rule to situations in

which an employee is temporarily assigned to a remote location. Rather, the special

mission exception applies any time an employee is engaged in the direct performance

of an assignment at a remote location. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-36. In our view, this

includes the trip to and from their temporary homes. Accord Nemchick, 495 A.2d at

1375. 

When leaving the call center, Cahalan argues that he and Rohan would have

been free to travel elsewhere in the city for dinner or entertainment after leaving the

call center; their return to the hotel, while foreseeable, was not integral to their

assignment. This argument might be persuasive in the absence of contrary authority,

but it is inconsistent with the New Jersey court’s conclusion that the return home

from a special mission is sufficiently inconvenient, disruptive, and substantial “to be

viewed as an integral part” of the mission for the employer. Nemchick, 495 A.2d at

1375 (citation omitted) (noting that the disruption and inconvenience inherent in

traveling unfamiliar routes in a remote location appears integral to the out-of-state

mission); See also Mangigian, 501 A.2d at 182 (concluding that employee was not

engaged in direct performance of her duties when leaving to get dinner after she had

“fully completed her work assignment and was safely ensconced in the motel”).

Rohan and Cahalan had not yet returned to their hotel, and although they were free
3

The court did not make any ruling determining whether New Jersey or

Minnesota law applied to Cahalan’s claim; the parties apparently proceeded on the

assumption that New Jersey law applied. 

4

Minnesota recognizes that 

an injured employee may secure workmen’s compensation benefits in

one of several forums, including the state . . . where the employment

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to pursue other activities, they did not choose to do so. We conclude that Cahalan

and Rohan were still engaged in the direct performance of their duties under New

Jersey law at the time of the accident. Therefore, the accident, and Cahalan’s injuries,

are covered by the NJWCA and Cahalan’s suit is barred. 

The district court dismissed Cahalan’s claims without prejudice, apparently to

allow him to pursue a claim based on the theory that the Minnesota Workers’

Compensation Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 176.001- .86, applies to his injuries. The decision

to grant a voluntary dismissal is left to the discretion of the district court, Bodecker

v. Local Union No. P-46, 640 F.2d 182, 186 n.5 (8th Cir. 1981), based on its

evaluation of factors such as the reasons for seeking the dismissal, whether the result

would be a waste of judicial time and effort, and whether the dismissal will prejudice

the defendants. A party may not dismiss simply to avoid an adverse decision or seek

a more favorable forum. Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 187 F.3d 941,

950 (8th Cir. 1999). In this case, Cahalan is not seeking to avoid an adverse

judgment or bring the same claim in a more favorable forum; he is attempting to

preserve a similar, but distinct claim under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation

Act.3

Cahalan has received benefits under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation

Act; however, Minnesota law provides Cahalan the option of filing claim for benefits

under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Act even after he has received benefits

pursuant to the laws of another state.4

 Cahalan’s claim is not barred by the applicable
relation existed by reason of localization of the employer’s business, and

the state where the contract was made, since any of these states has a

sufficient interest in the work injury to justify application of its own law.

 Houle v. Stearns-Rogers Mfg. Co., 157 N.W.2d 362, 365 (Minn. 1968) (holding that

employee injured in South Dakota while employed by a Minnesota company could

claim Minnesota workers’ compensation benefits, even though he had collected

benefits in South Dakota and signed an agreement releasing the company from all

future claims). Under current Minnesota law, an employee who is normally employed

out of state by an out-of-state employer will be covered by Minnesota workers’

compensation if he is injured within the state and “chooses to forgo any workers’

compensation claim resulting from the injury” that the employee might be entitled to

in another state. Minn. Stat. § 176.041, subd. 4. The Minnesota Supreme Court,

interpreting this language, held that “[m]ere acceptance of the [other state’s] benefits

is not equivalent to a choice of that law on the part of the employee or to his pursuing

a claim for benefits in that state.” Stolpa v. Swanson Heavy Moving Co., 315

N.W.2d 615, 617 (Minn. 1982). The court held that the statute “permits an injured

employee, in spite of his acceptance of compensation voluntarily paid . . . pursuant

to the laws of another state, to make an affirmative election of Minnesota coverage

by filing a claim petition in this state after obtaining legal advice concerning his

rights.” Id. An employee will not obtain an excessive recovery because “any benefits

voluntarily paid him pursuant to the laws of another state can be deducted from the

compensation awarded in a proceeding in Minnesota.” Id. at 618. 

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time limitations within the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 176.151. Because Cahalan

retains the option of electing Minnesota workers’ compensation benefits, and because

the district court did not reach a judgment on the merits or decide the choice of law

question, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the

claim against Rohan without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

We find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Cahalan’s claim was

barred by the NJWCA. As to the defendant’s cross appeal, claiming that the court
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should have dismissed Cahalan’s claim with prejudice, the court was within its

discretion in allowing Cahalan to pursue his theory that Minnesota, rather than New

Jersey Workers’ Compensation law applied to the case. Therefore, we affirm. 

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