alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Hugo Orellano, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 545]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Paño Z. Patsalos, J.), rendered September 19, 1994, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Orange County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (5).

At a hearing conducted pursuant to *People v Hinton*(31 NY2d 71), the undercover officer testified that she planned to return to the area of the defendant’s arrest, feared testifying in the presence of the defendant’s friends and his mother, with whom she had contact during the investigation, and feared that revealing her identity would endanger herself and the integrity of her cases. She further testified that she had received threats in the past, and took steps to prevent being revealed as a police officer. We find that this testimony justified closure of the courtroom during the undercover officer’s testimony *(see, People v Martinez,*82 NY2d 436; *People v Forman,*215 AD2d 582; *People v Crowder,*207 AD2d 559; *People v Hosien,*204 AD2d 658).

Contrary to the defendant’s claim, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it is legally sufficient to establish that the defendant had knowledge that the cocaine he pos*480sessed weighed at least 500 milligrams. The defendant negotiated a price for the cocaine, was aware that the aggregate weight of the substance he obtained approached one-eighth of an ounce, and told the undercover officer that the cocaine was very good because his dealer was reliable. Moreover, the defendant testified that he was very familiar with known drug purchasing locations, had purchased and used cocaine on prior occasions, and was familiar with packaging methods for cocaine. Under these circumstances, a jury could have inferred that the defendant knew that the substance, which weighed in the aggregate over 3,400 milligrams and contained 2,600 milligrams of cocaine, contained at least 500 milligrams of cocaine *(see, People v Ryan,*82 NY2d 497, 505; *People v Hill,*85 NY2d 256; *People v Paul,*212 AD2d 1020). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The court instructed the jury that the People were required to prove that the cocaine the defendant possessed weighed at least 500 milligrams "to the knowledge of the defendant”, and that the cocaine was "known to the defendant to weigh 500 milligrams or more”. These instructions clearly conveyed to the jury that knowledge of the weight was an element the People were required to establish to find the defendant guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. Balletta, J. P., Miller, O’Brien and Copertino, JJ., concur.
No. 56473.

protests 142892-K, etc. (New York).

#### Ambassador Textile Corp. et al. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Ford, J.

It was stipulated that certain items of the merchandise consist of woven fabrics in the piece, wholly of silk, bleached, and valued at more *426than $5.50 per pound, the same in all material respects as those passed upon in *Walter Strassburger & Co., Inc., et al.*v. *United States*(26 Cust. Ct. 210, C. D. 1326). Accepting the stipulation as a statement of fact and following the cited authority, it was held that the merchandise imported or withdrawn from warehouse prior to January 1, 1948, is dutiable at 45 percent under paragraph 1205,. as modified by T. D. 48316, and that which was imported or withdrawn from warehouse subsequent to said date is dutiable at 25 percent under said paragraph, as modified by T. D. 51802.
Before the Third Division,

October 10, 1949

No. 53619.

protests 139005-K, etc. (Norfolk).

#### Monsanto Chemical Company et al. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Cline, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of cocoa residue, defatted cocoa residue, or cocoa expeller cake similar in all material respects to the cocoa residue the subject of *Maywood Chemical Works et al.*v. *United States*(22 Cust. Ct. 87, C. D. 1165), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 815 

AN ACT 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to make certain 

improvements relating to the eligibility of veterans to 

receive reimbursement for emergency treatment furnished 

through the Veterans Community Care program, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 815 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Removing Extraneous 

3 Loopholes Insuring Every Veteran Emergency Act’’ or the 

4 ‘‘RELIEVE Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR REIMBURSE6 MENT FOR EMERGENCY TREATMENT FUR7 NISHED TO VETERANS. 

8 (a) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—Section 

9 1725(b)(2)(B) of title 38, United States Code, is amended 

10 by inserting ‘‘, unless such emergency treatment was fur11 nished during the 60-day period following the date on 

12 which the veteran enrolled in the health care system speci13 fied in subparagraph (A), in which case no requirement 

14 for prior receipt of care shall apply’’ before the period. 

15 (b) APPLICABILITY.—The amendment made by sub16 section (a) shall apply with respect to emergency treat17 ment furnished on or after the date that is one year after 

18 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

19 SEC. 3. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN HOUSING LOAN FEES. 

20 The loan fee table in section 3729(b)(2) of title 38, 

21 United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘November 
3 

•HR 815 EH

1 14, 2031’’ each place it appears and inserting ‘‘December 

2 28, 2031’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives March 7, 

2023. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 815 

AN ACT 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to make 

munity Care program, and for other purposes. treatment furnished through the Veterans Comveterans to receive reimbursement for emergency certain improvements relating to the eligibility of
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4994 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4994

 To modify the boundary of the Vicksburg National Military Park in the 
             State of Mississippi, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 9, 2024

  Mr. Wicker introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To modify the boundary of the Vicksburg National Military Park in the 
             State of Mississippi, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Vicksburg National Military Park 
Boundary Modification Act''.

SEC. 2. VICKSBURG NATIONAL MILITARY PARK CONVEYANCE AND BOUNDARY 
              MODIFICATION.

    (a) Conveyance.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of the Interior (referred to 
        in this Act as the ``Secretary'') shall convey to the State of 
        Mississippi (referred to in this Act as the ``State'') without 
        consideration subject to any terms and conditions that the 
        Secretary determines to be appropriate, the Federal land 
        described in subsection (b).
            (2) Description of federal land.--The Federal land referred 
        to in subsection (a) is the following:
                    (A) The parcel of approximately 3.66 acres of 
                National Park Service land within the boundary of 
                Vicksburg National Military Park, as depicted on the 
                map entitled ``VICK-2024-01'', to be used by the State 
                as a welcome center or other public use.
                    (B) The approximately 6.48 acres of National Park 
                Service land within the boundary of Vicksburg National 
                Mark Park, as depicted on the map entitled ``VICK-2024-
                02'', to be used by the State an interpretive center or 
                a museum or other public use.
    (b) Boundary Modification.--On conveyance of a parcel of Federal 
land under subsection (a), the Secretary shall modify the boundary of 
the Vicksburg National Military Park to reflect the conveyance of the 
parcel of Federal land.
                                 <all>
```
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without **

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NED/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANAHIT HOVHANISYAN,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 07-71518

Agency No. A095-183-894

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 17, 2009** 

Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.

Anahit Hovhanisyan, a native and citizen of Armenia, petitions for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of

FILED

NOV 30 2009

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
NED/Research 2 07-71518

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our

jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence an

adverse credibility determination, Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2002), 

and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination

because Hovhanisyan’s asylum application was materially inconsistent with her

testimony concerning the identity and motive of her attackers, Hovhanisyan failed

to provide a reasonable explanation for these inconsistencies, and the

inconsistencies goes to the heart of her claim. See Ceballos-Castillo v. INS, 904

F.2d 519, 520 (9th Cir. 1990). In the absence of credible testimony,

Hovhanisyan’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See Farah v.

Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

We lack jurisdiction to review Hovhanisyan’s CAT claim because she failed

to raise it to the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
No. 48574.

#### Protest 91947-K of C. J. Tower & Sons (Buffalo).

Opinion by

Cole, J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise consists of salted •cod, not packed in oil or in oil and other substances, and not packed in airtight containers, weighing with their contents not more than 15 pounds each, and would now be classified and assessed at 1)4 cents per pound under said paragraph 719 (3), as modified by said trade agreement. The protest was therefore sustained to this extent.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 818 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 818

To expand labor representation on State and local workforce development 
 boards, to provide a definition of labor organization, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 2, 2023

Ms. Sherrill (for herself, Mr. Fitzpatrick, and Mrs. Hayes) introduced 
 the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education 
                           and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To expand labor representation on State and local workforce development 
 boards, to provide a definition of labor organization, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Expanding Labor Representation in 
the Workforce System Act''.

SEC. 2. STATE WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT BOARDS.

    Section 101(b)(1)(C)(ii) of the Workforce Innovation and 
Opportunity Act (29 U.S.C. 3111(b)(1)(C)(ii)) is amended by striking 
``20 percent'' and inserting ``30 percent''.

SEC. 3. LOCAL WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT BOARDS.

    Section 107(b)(2)(B) of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity 
Act (29 U.S.C. 3122(b)(2)(B)) is amended by striking ``20'' and 
inserting ``30''.

SEC. 4. DEFINITION OF LABOR ORGANIZATION.

    Section 3 of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (29 
U.S.C. 3102) is amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(72) Labor organization.--The term `labor organization' 
        has the meaning given the term in section 2(5) of the National 
        Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 152(5)), except that such term 
        shall also include--
                    ``(A) any organization composed of labor 
                organizations, such as a labor union federation or a 
                State or municipal labor body; and
                    ``(B) any organization which would be included in 
                the definition for such term under such section 2(5) 
                but for the fact that the organization represents--
                            ``(i) individuals employed by the United 
                        States, any wholly owned Government 
                        corporation, any Federal Reserve Bank, or any 
                        State or political subdivision thereof;
                            ``(ii) individuals employed by persons 
                        subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 151 
                        et seq.); or
                            ``(iii) individuals employed as 
                        agricultural laborers.''.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-7326

ROBERT D. WHITED, JR., Petitioner - Appellant,

versus WARDEN, Lawrenceville Correctional Center, Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, Chief District Judge. (CA-02-1141-7) Submitted: December 18, 2003 Decided: January 15, 2004 Before LUTTIG, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Marvin David Miller, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael Thomas Judge, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Robert D. Whited, Jr., a Virginia inmate, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. An appeal may not be taken to this court from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state court unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue with respect to claims dismissed by a district court solely on procedural grounds unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Whited has not made the requisite showing. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Seifi Ghasemi, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Rockwood SpecialtiesGroup, Inc. for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2004 fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Qfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of Rockwood Specialties Group, Inc..

 

 
| Date: August 16, 2004                |   |
|--------------------------------------|--------|
| /s/ SEIFI GHASEMI                    |   |
| Seifi Ghasemi                        |
| Chairman and Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

SELECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY OF

SC

 v.

BUREAU OF WORKERS'

COMPENSATION FEE REVIEW

HEARING OFFICE (THE PHYSICAL

THERAPY INSTITUTE)

PETITION OF: THE PHYSICAL

THERAPY INSTITUTE

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 136 WAL 2014

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 30th day of July, 2014, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-2000
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,643
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            33
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    7,779
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 461
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (8,240)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (8,240)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (8,240)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (.25)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.25)



</TABLE>
#### Michael Moloughney, Jr., *Respondent, v.*John C. Kavanagh, *Appellant.*

Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. Opinion by Davis, P. J. .
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF WORLD WIDE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.  AMOUNTS IN THOUSANDS
(EXCEPT LOSS PER SHARE).
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                         3,111
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    750
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               4,765
<PP&E>                                         2,983
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (176)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 9,704
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          2,304
<BONDS>                                        5,228
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       86
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,913
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   9,704
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               524
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  (337)
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (8,566)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (71)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (8,396)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (8,396)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (8,396)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.10)


</TABLE>
#### *In the*Matter *of*Ann C., Respondent, v Debra S., Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 363]

—In a custody proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Friedman, J.), dated September 10, 1993, which granted, without a hearing, the custodial grandmother’s motion to dismiss the petition.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Contrary to the mother’s contention, the Family Court did not err in dismissing her petition for a change of custody without first conducting a hearing. The mother did not make a sufficient evidentiary showing to warrant a hearing *(see, Matter of Lynette L. v Richard K. A.,*210 AD2d 1005; *Matter of Wolfer v Dame,*207 AD2d 898, 899; *Matter of Farmer v Dervay,*203 AD2d 795, 796; *Matter of Acevedo v Commissioner of Social Servs.,*184 AD2d 219; *Alessandro v Alessandro,*172 AD2d 1078; *David W. v Julia W.,*158 AD2d 1). Joy, J. P., Hart, Goldstein and Florio, JJ., concur.