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HEZBOLLAH’S STRATEGIC SHIFT:

A GLOBAL TERRORIST THREAT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 20, 2013

Serial No. 113–6

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Will Fulton, Iran analyst, Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise 

Institute ................................................................................................................ 10

Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and 

Intelligence, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy .......................... 21

The Honorable Roger Noriega, founder and managing director, Vision Americas LLC (former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere 

Affairs and Former Ambassador to the Organization of American States) .... 39

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: 

Material submitted for the record ...................................................................... 2

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 6

Mr. Will Fulton: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 13

Matthew Levitt, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 24

The Honorable Roger Noriega: Prepared statement ............................................. 41

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 64

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 65

(1)

HEZBOLLAH’S STRATEGIC SHIFT:

A GLOBAL TERRORIST THREAT 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The TNT Subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length 

limitation and the rules. 

Recent focus on Iran has centered on Tehran’s quest for nuclear 

weapons, but the Iranians and their proxy Hezbollah also use terrorism to threaten global stability. Hezbollah enjoys the full backing of the Iranian regime. The Supreme Leader and the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps direct Hezbollah’s global terror campaign. 

Years ago, Hezbollah was a limited regional threat. Today, it is an 

international movement conducting terrorist and criminal acts in 

several parts of the world. 

Your attention can be directed to the poster on the right here 

showing some of Hezbollah’s activities since 2010. 

[The information referred to follows:]

2


80122d-1.eps

I 

.11 , \; H0- _____ I _ 

, 

80122d-2.eps

Global Terror Campaign I 2010-2013 

October 2 010; Nigerian authorities seize Quds Force weapons shipment hound lor Gambia. October ll. 201.1.: u.s. Department 01 Justice reveals QudS Force plot 10 assar.sinale SalJdi ambassadO< In mass-<:asualtyatta.ck in Washington

November 14, 2011.: 8<lhraini autllorities arrest sl> men with linkS to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRaC) lor plotting attacks 

against targets in Bahrain. 

January 16, 2012: Hezbollah member leads authorities In Bangkok, Thailand to warehouse stocked with 8,800 pounds of urea fenilizer 

and seve",1 gallons o/Iiquid ammonium nitrate meant \0 be shipped out of country. 

January 25, 2012: Azerbaijani authorities arrest two men linked to Iranian intelligence plotting to attack Israeli ambassador in Azerbaijan. 

February 13, 2012; Individuals linked to tRaC attack lS(aeli diplomatic personnel In New Deihl, India. February 13, 2012; attempt of Israeli diplomat in Tbmsl, Georgia fal ls. February 14, 2012: Thalaulhorities arrest two oflhree Iranians pklttingto attack Israeli targets in Thailand after \hey accidentally detonate 

explosive device In Bangkok apartment 

June 19, 2012: Kenyan alJlhOrities arrest two plotting 10 attack U.S .. Israeli, SaLJdi, or British targets in Kenya, leading authorities 10 33-paoo

of explosives. 

July 7, 2012: Cypriot authorities arrest l etlanese man with links to Hezbollah for plOlting to attack Israeli targets in Cyprus. 

July 18, 2012: Hezbollah suicide bombing targeting Israeli tourists In Burgas. kll lss;. people. 

Oe<:ember 17, 2012: Nigerian authorities arrest three men links to Iranians In "high profile terrorist network' for to attack U.S. 

and Israeli interests. 

January 23, 2013: U,S. Naill' Intercepts Iranian ship carrying forty IOns of arms. shells. and explosives destined for al Houthl rebels In Yemen. 

Vessel also carnes ten Chinese-made QW·1M heat-seeklng antiaircraft missiles. ten SA·] 

shoulder·flred antiaircraft missiles. 63.000 cartridges lot Pi'\ machine guns or Dragun"" sniper riftes, and 17.000 blocks of lranlan·made C4 plastic explosives. 

G,aphlc C,O<!II: "op. TO<! PorI (TlI.Q2) 0"" All's Critical ",,,,.to p,,,,,"", 
4

Mr. POE. Hezbollah is responsible for plots and activities 

throughout the world: Attempted assassination of Israeli diplomats 

in New Delhi and India, February 2012; potential involvement in 

the bombing of an Israeli diplomat in Tbilisi, Georgia, February 

2012; storing over 8,000 pounds of explosive material in a warehouse in Thailand, uncovered in January of this year; attempted 

assassination of Israeli targets in Bangkok in February of this 

year; attempted laundering of approximately $70 million from Venezuela to Germany in January 2013; running training camps and 

international narcotics smuggling operations in Venezuela, Bolivia, 

Honduras, Nicaragua, and even Mexico; suicide bombing of a bus 

of Israeli tourists in Bulgaria in July 2012. 

In addition to these attacks, Hezbollah may have had a hand in 

the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force plots such as 

the attempted assassination of the Saudi Ambassador to the 

United States in Washington, DC, in October 2011. 

The uptick of Hezbollah’s activity in recent years is a direct result of Iran. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, 

recently described the Iran-Hezbollah relationship as ‘‘a partnership agreement, with the Iranians as the senior partner.’’ The Iranian agents running Hezbollah are the Iranian Revolutionary 

Guard Corps and the Quds Force. 

General Qassim Suleimani is the leader of the Quds Force. In his 

role, he serves as the de facto director of Hezbollah. Now major 

general, which is the highest rank in the Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps, he has been the mastermind behind key Iranian foreign policy moves. He helped Iran grow its influence in Iraq and 

continues to support the murderous Assad regime in Syria. American and British intelligence officials draw comparisons between 

the real life Iranian general and the fictional Soviet spymaster 

Karla of John le Carre’s Cold War novels. Only Suleimani is real 

and his war with the United States is real. 

Hezbollah is using social media to spread its propaganda and get 

new terrorist recruits. As of August, Hezbollah had tweeted an average of 250 tweets a day and had 18,000-plus followers. Clearly, 

Hezbollah understands the value of Twitter when it comes to 

spreading its propaganda. Too bad Twitter and our own Government don’t recognize it, too, and prohibit the advertising of 

Hezbollah terrorism. 

Hezbollah is also getting information via apps and smartphones. 

BlackBerry and iPhone users who download an app called 

WhatsApp can get daily updates from Hezbollah. WhatsApp is one 

of the top overall paid apps, and the company is based in Dallas. 

The IRGC, Quds Force, and Hezbollah don’t have to go it alone. 

They maintain lots of friends and allies in the world. The Venezuelans under the Chavez regime serve as one of the Iranians’ 

closest allies. Hezbollah has used the Venezuelan banking sector to 

launder hundreds of millions of dollars a year and smuggle narcotics to the United States and even European markets. Hezbollah 

has also conducted terror training on Margarita Island for recruits 

from Venezuela and other Latin American countries. Hezbollah 

operatives and their co-conspirators hold senior positions in the 

Venezuelan Government. They provide travel documents, weapons, 

5

and logistics support to terrorist operations and cocaine smugglers 

as our witnesses will explain further. 

In Afghanistan, the Iranians provide arms and training to 

Taliban fighters to kill United States and Afghan forces. In Africa, 

Iran and Hezbollah are expanding their terrorist and criminal networks in places like Senegal and Gambia. In Asia—be China, 

North Korea or smaller countries like Malaysia—the IranianHezbollah conspirators are outpacing our ability to constrain them. 

So far, U.S. efforts to combat the expanding threat have fallen 

short. Sanctions are necessary but they are not enough to counter 

the expanding activities of Hezbollah and the IRGC. Despite several international pressures, the EU has flat out refused to declare 

Hezbollah a terrorist group. This is too bad. This would pave the 

way for additional sanctions. If Western leaders continue to allow 

these actors to engage in a global campaign of terror without some 

repercussion, a dangerous precedent will be set. 

Hezbollah is not going away. It is even more troubling to imagine 

what the Iranians might be empowered to do if they are allowed 

to develop nuclear weapons. The United States and its allies must 

understand this threat and develop a comprehensive strategy of 

their own to confront these activities of Hezbollah and Iran. 

I will now yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Mr. Brad 

Sherman from California, for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Poe follows:]

6


80122e-1.eps

Recent focus on Iran has centered on Tehran's quest for nuclear weapons but the Iranians and 

their proxy Hezbollah also use terrorism to threaten global stability. Hezbollah enjoys the full 

backing of the Iranian regime and the Supreme Leader and the IRGC direct Hezbol1ah's global 

terror campaign. 

Years ago Hezbol1ah was a limited, regional threat. Today, it is an international movement 

conducting terrorist and criminal acts all over the world. Recent notable activity includes: 

o Attempted assassination of Israeli diplomats in New Delhi, India in February 

2012. 

o Potential involvement in the bombing of an Israeli diplomat in Tiblisi, Georgia in 

February 2012. 

o Storing over 8,000 pounds of explosive material in a warehouse in Thailand, 

uncovered in January 2013. 

o Attempted assassination ofIsraeli targets in Bangkok in February 2013. 

o Attempted laundering of approximately $70 million dollars from Venezuela to 

Germany in January 2013. 

o Running training camps and international narcotics smuggling operations in 

Venezuela, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicarat,'ua, and Mexico. 

o Suicide bombing of a bus ofIsraeli tourists in Bulgaria in July 2012. 

In addition to these attacks, Hezbollah may have had a hand in Iranian Revolutionary Guard 

Corps' and Quds Force plots such as the attempted assassination of the Saudi Ambassador to the 

US. in Washington, DC in October 2011. 

This dangerous uptick in Hezbollah activity in recent years is a direct result of Iranian 

prodding. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, recently described the IranHezbollah relationship as "a partnership agreement, with the Iranians as the senior partner." 

The Iranian agents running Hezbollah are the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 

Quds Force. General Qassim Suleimani is the leader of the Quds Force. In this role, he serves as 

the de-facto Director of Hezbollah. Now a major general- the highest rank in the Islamic 

Revolutionary Guards Corps -he has been the mastermind behind key Iranian foreign policy 

moves. He helped Iran grow its influence in Iraq and continues to support the murderous Assad 

regime in Syria. American and British intelligence ofIicials have drawn comparisons between the 
7


80122e-2.eps

real-life Iranian general and the fictional Soviet spymaster Karla, of John Ie Carre's Cold War 

novels. Only Suleimani is real and he is at war with the US. 

Hezbollah is also using social media to spread its propaganda and get new recruits. As oflast 

August, Hezbollah had tweeted an average of 250 tweets per day and had 18,903 followers. 

Clearly Hezbollah understands the value of Twitter when it comes to spreading its propaganda. 

Too bad Twitter and our government don't recognize it too 

Hezbollah is also getting information out via apps on smartphones. Blackberry and iPhone 

users who download an app called "WhatsApp" can get daily updates from Hezbollah. 

WhatsApp is one of the top overall paid apps and the company is based out of Dallas. 

The IRGC, Quds Force, and Hezbollah also don't have to go it alone. They maintain lots of 

friends and allies around the world. The Venezuelans, under the Chavez regime, serves as one of 

the Iranians' closest allies. Hezbollah is currently using the Venezuelan banking sector to launder 

hundreds of millions of dollars a year and smuggle narcotics to US and European markets and 

has also conducted terror training on Margarita Island for recruits from Venezuela and other 

Latin American countries. Hezbollah operatives and their co-conspirators hold senior positions in 

the Venezuelan government. They provide travel documents, weapons and logistical support to 

terrorist operatives and cocaine smugglers, as our witnesses will explain. 

Hezbollah is active in other regions, as well. In Afghanistan, the Iranians provide anns and 

training to Taliban fighters to kill U.S. and Afghan forces. In Africa, Iran and Hezbollah are 

expanding their terrorist and criminal networks in places like Nigeria, Senegal, and Gambia. In 

Asia, be it China, North Korea, or smaller countries like Malaysia, the Iranian-Hezbollah 

conspirators are outpacing our ability to constrain them. 

So far, U.S. efforts to combat the expanding threat have fallen short. Sanctions are necessary, 

but they are not enough, to counter the expanding acti vities of Hezbollah and the IRGC. Despite 

severe international pressure, the EU has flat-out refused to declare Hezbollah a terrorist group. 

This is too bad. This would pave the way for additional sanctions. 

If Western leaders continue to allow these actors to engage in a global campaign of terror 

without some repercussion, a dangerous precedent will be set. Hezbollah is not going away and it 

is even more troubling to imagine what the Iranians might be empowered to do if they are 

allowed to develop nuclear weapons. The United States and its allies must correctly understand 

this threat and develop a coherent, comprehensive strategy of their own to confront these 

activities ofHezbollah and Iran. 

2 
8

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

Iran, indeed, presents a global challenge to the United States, 

and Hezbollah is a major part of that challenge. The United States 

is building a coalition of countries that are confronting Iran in 

meaningful ways. Unfortunately, what we are doing now is exactly 

what we should have been doing in roughly 2001. That doesn’t 

mean we are doing the wrong thing, it just means we have to do 

more and we have to do it quicker. 

The Europeans, or elements in Europe, have asked us not to take 

military action against Iran and to use our good offices to persuade 

Israel not to do so as well. That being the case, you would think 

that Europe would do everything possible to assist us in using nonlethal methods to control Hezbollah, and more importantly, to stop 

the Iran nuclear program. One important step that European countries could take would be to list Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. They are on the spear of Iran’s efforts to influence the world 

and to carry out terrorism in virtually every continent. 

As to Latin America, the United Nations Security Council approved the first round of U.N. sanctions in 2006. Ahmadinejad embarked on a tour of Latin America to try to emerge as a leader of 

anti-Americanism not only in Venezuela, but also Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. Hezbollah and Iran have expanded their operations in Latin America, especially fund-raising for illicit activities. 

This subcommittee and others, and the full committee, have focused on how Hezbollah has been involved in the tri-border region 

where Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina come together. An extensive smuggling network there run by Hezbollah funnels large sums 

of money and there have been reports of training camps in the region. 

They have been able to cultivate ties to narcotraffickers and 

other criminal enterprises and even the government officials. And 

as they engage in narcotics activity, they are able to combine the 

true believer dedication of some of their operatives with the lucrative opportunities provided by the drug trade. 

We should point out that Hezbollah and Iran, working together, 

blew up the Buenos Aires Jewish community center late last century. That illustrates that Iran and its ally Hezbollah, or proxy, 

pose a greater danger perhaps than North Korea. Although Iran 

doesn’t have nuclear weapons, Iran’s desire to influence the world 

go all the way to Buenos Aires, which is as far from Tehran as you 

can get, I believe, on this planet. In contrast, the thugs who run 

North Korea seem mostly focused on maintaining their power in 

North Korea. 

The presence of Hezbollah in the region could very well serve as 

an important part of Iran’s campaign to retaliate for efforts to curtail its nuclear program. One need look no further than the Quds 

Force sponsors’ efforts to kill the Saudi Ambassador in Washington 

and the attack on Israeli interests in Europe and Asia to see examples of what we could see in the future. 

To that end, I worked, along with Chairman Poe and the author 

of the bill, Mr. Duncan, on the Countering Iran in the Western 

Hemisphere Act of 2012, which raised the profile of this problem 

and hopefully provided the Obama administration with tools that 

9

it will use to combat it. This legislation, of course, was signed into 

law last December. 

As to Syria, Hezbollah has an active part in the defense of the 

criminal Assad regime. Tehran has been sending commanders and 

fighters from Hezbollah and from the Revolutionary Guard Corps 

to Syria, as well as providing aid in arms. For those who question 

whether we should provide spare parts to Iran’s supposedly civilian 

aircraft as ‘‘the humanitarian thing to do,’’ I would say those 

planes should be grounded until Iran grounds its nuclear program. 

Those planes right now are carrying those who would kill thousands of Syrians, and humanitarianism requires that we not provide spare parts to make sure those planes can do even more damage to the people of Syria. 

It appears that Hezbollah has a force of up to 50,000 rockets 

trained on Israel. Before Iran develops a nuclear weapon, those 

rockets are a way of trying to threaten Israel into not doing something militarily. After Iran, if God forbid, has a nuclear weapon, we 

will see terrorism with impunity, and Iran’s nuclear umbrella may 

allow Hezbollah to fire those rockets and also have defense. 

I see my time has more than expired. Let me just add that the 

transfer of chemical weapons to Hezbollah needs to be the reddest 

of red lines for the Assad regime. And I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I recognize members for a 1-minute opening statement. 

Mr. Yoho from Florida, you are recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Berman, for holding this hearing today. Today’s topic is an——

Mr. SHERMAN. Point of personal privilege. That would be Sherman. 

Mr. YOHO. I am sorry, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Quite a difference between the two. 

Mr. YOHO. My apologies. 

We cannot hope to effectively deal with Iran until we understand 

the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, and as Iran’s de facto 

enforcer, Hezbollah has and will continue to be a large threat to 

not only peace in the region, but the world at large. 

I look forward to your testimony. And I have never seen this 

kind of involvement in the Western Hemisphere when you see 

Hezbollah going into South America in the reaches and the tentacles it has. I look forward to what you say about it and how we, 

on a foreign policy side, can help stop that. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back. Without objection, all the 

witnesses’ prepared statements will be made part of the record. I 

ask that each witness keep your presentation to no more than 5 

minutes. I will now introduce the three witnesses that we have before they give their testimony. 

Mr. Will Fulton is an Iran analyst with the Critical Threats 

Project at the American Enterprise Institute. His research focuses 

on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force, and Iran’s 

Global Force Protection Network. 

Dr. Matthew Levitt is the director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy. He previously served as a deputy assistant secretary 

for intelligence and analysis at the Department of the Treasury 

and as a State Department counterterrorism advisor to the Special 

10

Envoy for Middle East Regional Security. He is also the author of 

the forthcoming book, ‘‘Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God.’’

Ambassador Roger Noriega is the founder and managing director 

of Vision Americas, which advises the United States and foreign 

clients on international business issues. He is also a visiting fellow 

at the American Enterprise Institute. Prior to these roles, he was 

the United States Ambassador to the Organization of American 

States and Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs. 

Mr. Fulton, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. WILL FULTON, IRAN ANALYST, CRITICAL 

THREATS PROJECT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. FULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and 

members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify today 

alongside my esteemed colleagues. 

The Islamic Republic of Iran is first and foremost concerned with 

regime preservation. So when we talk about Iran’s global terror 

campaign and Iran’s relationship with Lebanese Hezbollah, we 

must think about it in that context. Iran has established a substantial global force projection network that includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC, and the Quds Force, Hezbollah, 

and proxies in Iraq and Gaza. And although these groups may justify their activities in religious and ideological terms, at the end of 

the day they are a power projection, deterrent, and retaliatory 

force. 

The regime’s vulnerability and relative military weakness demand an aggressive and far-reaching asymmetric capability. As a 

result, Iran’s leaders have crafted a national security policy designed to protect the regime from external threats by demonstrating a capability to strike U.S. and Israeli interests anywhere in the world, and this strategy dates back to the regime’s 

earliest years. 

Ultimately, Mr. Chairman, the IRGC is responsible for Iran’s 

global force projection. The IRGC’s mission is regime preservation 

and is responsible for every related internal and external security 

task required to accomplish this mission. 

The IRGC is a highly structured organization led by a small core 

network of individuals. This group fought side by side during the 

Iran-Iraq War, where they developed professional military experience, as well as enduring personal relationships. They are battletested commanders who played key roles early on, leading to increasingly important roles later, including within the Quds Force. 

The commander of the IRGC, Major General Mohammad Ali 

Jafari, reports to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Each of the IRGC’s five 

combat service commanders report directly to Jafari, except one. 

Quds Force Commander, Major General Qassim Suleimani, also reports directly to the Supreme Leader. Suleimani has the trust and 

confidence of the Supreme Leader and has had it for over 15 years. 

Any Quds Force activity has tacit, if not explicit approval of the Supreme Leader. 

I think that is one of the most important points to understand 

when we think about the complicity of Iran’s top leadership and 

the global activities of the Quds Force, its partners and proxies. 

11

The notion that Quds Force operations are undertaken by rogue 

elements is implausible and not supported by any available information. 

Iran has provided continuous substantial support to Hezbollah 

since the 1980s, and their partnership has materialized in the form 

of multiple terrorist attacks around the globe, targeted assassinations, and military operations in wartime environments. During the 

Iraq war, the Quds Force worked closely with Hezbollah to train, 

fund, and arm Iraqi Shia militant groups, and plan and execute attacks against U.S. and coalition forces. I would like to pick out just 

a couple of examples where Quds Force commanders involved in 

Iraq have resurfaced recently. 

In 2007, Senior Quds Force Commander Abdul Reza Shahlai, 

along with a senior Hezbollah commander, planned the infamous 

attack in Karbala, Iraq, that resulted in the deaths of five U.S. soldiers. Shahlai later went on to help plan and facilitate the failed 

2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. here in 

Washington, DC. 

The Quds Force’s number three in command was also active in 

Iraq. Mohsen Chizari, the head of Quds Force operations and training, was arrested in Baghdad in 2006 by U.S. forces, but was 

quickly released at the insistence of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki, who cited diplomatic immunity. Now Chizari is considered 

one of the key members of the Quds Force’s training and advising 

mission fighting to keep Bashar al-Assad in power in Syria. 

Syria is enormously important to Iran. It has long been Iran’s 

closest state ally. It has provided Iran access to its proxies and 

partners. Iran has invested in Syria as a strategic ally as part of 

its deterrence against Israel. Iran’s primary goal, then, has been to 

preserve Assad for as long as possible. But Iran is also working aggressively to establish a militant network that will enable them to 

retain a certain level of capability in post-Assad Syria. 

As you might expect, the Quds Force has been leading Iran’s efforts in Syria. Just last month, a brigadier general in the Quds 

Force, with substantial ties to Hezbollah by the name of Hassan 

Shateri, was killed near Damascus after having been in Aleppo. We 

don’t know exactly what Shateri was doing in Syria, but we suspect 

that he was on a mission related to the Al-Safir chemical weapons 

and missile storage facility near Aleppo. Shateri was important 

enough that Qassim Suleimani personally delivered the news of his 

death to Shateri’s family and wept openly at his funeral. Senior 

Hezbollah officials also traveled to Iran to attend Shateri’s funeral. 

Hezbollah has been integral to Iran’s efforts in Syria, which has 

collaborated with the Quds Force in several areas, including training, advising, and arming pro-Assad forces. Iran, along with 

Hezbollah, may achieve some success with its strategy in Syria. 

But Iran’s efforts offer only a temporary solution to Tehran. A 

rump Alawite state or a militant network cannot provide Iran with 

the same level of deterrence or political and economic support as 

Assad’s Syria. This is why I think the fall of Assad has serious implications for Iran’s global force projection strategy, and I will conclude on this point. 

As the conflict in Syria stretches on and Iran sees its strategic 

depth continually eroded, they are likely to seek to expand their 

12

operational territory. The interception in January of an Iranian 

weapons shipment containing sophisticated Chinese-made anti-aircraft missiles and large quantities of light arms, ammunition, and 

explosive material destined for al Houthi rebels in Yemen suggests 

that Iran has already ramped up its support for militants in at 

least one area. We should look for similar behavior in other areas 

where Iran has a presence. 

And finally, if you are wondering what a more active Iranian 

global force projection network might look like, consider the past 

2 years where we have seen a plot to conduct a mass casualty attack here in Washington and plots in Georgia, India, Azerbaijan, 

Bahrain, Kenya, and Nigeria. We have seen Iran become more risk 

prone in its behavior and we are likely to see this trend continue. 

Thank you. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Fulton. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fulton follows:]

13


80122a-1.eps

Statement before the House Committee on r;'oreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

TTearing on "TTezbollah's Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat" 

Iran's Global Force Projection Network: 

IRGC Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah 

Will r;'ulton 

Critical Threats Project Iran Analyst and IRGC Project I >ead 

American Enterprise Institute 

March 20, 2013 

'J De lie)).')' e:>opreJJeli ill thiI teItimoll), (lit thoIe of the rlllthor aiolle rlIld do not lIeteJJr11iiy repreJeI!t thoIe offhe 

(1me;Yrall tollterpli,'e Tmtitute. 
14


80122a-2.eps

The Islatnic Republic of Iran is first and foretnost concetlled with reginle preservation, and its 

strategic calculus imd behavior itre deeply int1uenced by this concenl. It is therefore essentiill that 

Iran's global terror canlpaign is considered within this context. Iran's global force projection 

ne~vork, to include the Islamic RevolutionOlry euards Corps (IRee:) and the Quds [lorce, Lebanese 

IIeLbollah, and Iran's proxies in Iraq and Ga"a, is pnmarily a deterrence and retaliatory force, nested 

within a strategy designed to protect the regime from extemal threats, Dy demonstrating a capahility 

to strike C.S. and Tsraeli interests anywhere in the world, or creating a perception of this capability, 

ILin's leaders hope to s'tlve off a nlilitary strike, or at least make it extremely costly for their foes. 

This h~ls been rl component of IGU1's str~ltegic thinking since the e~lrliest ye~lrs of the IranirU1 

RevolutIon. Tn 1080, while the regime was still in its infancy and oftlcials were debating the direction 

of Iran's foreign policy, the ofticial organ of the IRGC published an editorial describing why km's 

global terrorist network is fundamental to regime survival. Tt reads 1t1 part: 

In order to achieve ideological, political, secunty and econornic self-reliance we have no 

other choice hut to mobilize all forces loyal to the Islamic Revolution, and through this 

mobili7,ation, plant such a terror in the hearts of the enemies that they abandon the thought 

of an offensive il11d ilnnihilation of our revolution .... If our revolution does not have iU1 

offensiye and internationalist dinlension, the cncrnies of Islatn will again enslave us 

culturOllly, politically, Olnd the like, and they will not abst"lin from plunder and looting. j 

This, in my vie\v, is ,ill ilcLuLite ret1ection of Ir,lnil11 strategic thinking still today. In order to 

understand the Iranian global terrorist activity that \ve see currently, it is itnportant to bear in tnind 

the strtltegic thinking out of \vhich this behavior hrlS enlergeJ.. 

It is noteworthy that this sentiment was articulated by the IRGC, as this is the organization that is 

primanly responsible for managing Tran's global force projection network. 

The IRGC is a revolutionary~ ideological tnilitary organization and an econotnic and political 

po\verhouse \vithin Iran. 'fhe IRCC's self-described prinnry mission is to defend Iran's Islanlic 

Revolution; in other \vords, to preserve the regirne.: To accornplish this rnisslOfl, the IRGC is tasked 

with intenul security, conventional deterrence ;;u1d defense, inten1al and external intelligence 

collection, and ~-oreign military operations. 

The IRGC's senior leadership consists of a core network of indiyiduals who developed professional 

rnilitary experience ;;uld enduring personal relationships during Iran's eight-year war with Iraq (1980-

1988).3 The commander of the TRGC, Major General 'V!ohammad '\Ii Jafari, reports to Tran's 

Supreme Leader and each of the IReC's Eve combat seryice comm;tnders report directly to JOlbri, 

\vith the exception of one. (.2.uds Force Cotntnander T'vfajor General (.2.assetn Suleimani also reports 

directly to tl1e Supreme Leader' 

This point is cxtrerncly inlportant to understanding the extent to which Iran's senior leadership is 

complicit in the global activities of the Quds Force, its partners, and proxies. There IS no 

2 
15


80122a-3.eps

intennediary betv,,'Cen the Supretne Leader and (-:{uds Force COtnrnander (-:{assern Su1cinuni. /\ny 

(.Luds Force tlctivity has, at a minilllulll, tlCit tipproyal of the Suprellle Leader. 

The notion that Quds Porce operations - such as the 2011 plot to ;,ssassinate the S;,udi amb;,ssador 

to the U.S. in a mass-casualty attack in \\'ashington, D.C. - is undertaken by rogue elements of the 

Quds Force vvithout the approval of Qassem Suleimani and the Supreme Leader is anathema to the 

TRGCs command structureS 

The IRGC and Lebanese 1 Iezbollah have a well-known historical relationship that continues to this 

day. '111e IRCC deployed one of its brig;,des to southern Lebanon in the e;\rly 19HOs to create and 

stand up TTe/'bollah.6 Since that tirne Iran has provided continuous ttnancial and rnateriel support to 

Hezbollah, ;md their parmership has materi;,lized in the fonn of multiple mass-casmllty terrorist 

attacks around the globe~ targeted assassinations~ and military operations in \Nartitne environments. 

This last element of collaboration is well-documented and provides insight into the depth of 

cooperation between the Quds Force and I Iczbollal1 in their operations. 'v[oreover, the Quds Force 

personnel known to h;,ve heen involved in these operations continue to pby senior roles in Iron's 

global Force projection network today. 

During the Iraq War, the Quds Force teamed with Lebanese llezbollah to train, fund and arm Iraqi 

Shia militant groups, (lnd plan (111d execute (ltt.-lCks ag(llnst u.s. ~111d CO(llition l,'orces. In one such 

example, Deputy Commander of the Quds Force External Special Operations Cnit, Abdul Re~a 

Shahl;u, ;,longwith senior Hezboll;J1 operative l\li 'v[usa Daqduq, pbnned a sophisticated attack in 

2007 that resulted in the death of five U.S. soldiers 111 Karbala, Traq.' 

Shahlai later went on to help plan and facilitate the failed 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi 

;1t11bassador to rl1e U.S. in Washington, D.C.' Da'ldu'l, who had been appointed in 2005 by 

He7,bollah to coordinate train1l1g For Traqi militants inside Tran w1th the Quds Force, was detained by 

Coalition rorces in 2007.10 He w;,s rele;\sed by the Iraqi government in 2012.11 Reports indicate that 

Daqduq fled Baghdad For Lebanon after his release. 12 

The thmi highest-ranking commander of the Quds Force, Operations and Training Deputy Vfohsen 

ChiLari, was also active in Iraq. Chizari was detained by U.S. forces in Baghdad in 2006 along wirll 

another unnatned (.,2uds Force o~Ticer and detailed infonnation on the itnport of sophisticated 

\Ve(lponry fronl1LlI1 to 1ra4.13 'l'he lrtlqi governnlent l1uickly relerlseo Chizrlri (1110 his co-conspirator, 

citing diplomatic immunity.! 1 Five years later, in May 2011, the C.S. Department of the Treasury 

designated Chizari, along with (.:!uds l"orce COrnnlallder (.:2assern Sulelrnani, for their role in 

supporting Bashar al I\ssad's regime in Syria. lS 

Iran's invo\vetnent in Syria is not surprising. Iran tnaintains a nutnber of strategic interests that haye 

been affected by the ongoing crisis, and rl1e centrality of Syria to Iun's regional objectives has 

necessitated an integrated effort. Syria has long been Tran's closest state ally and provided cmeial 

access to 1 Ie"bollah in Lebanon, as well as llamas in GaLa, and IsLunic Jihad in ri,e West Bank. Iran 

has used Syria as a hub to ~tnance and transport personnel and \,veapons to these groups. 

liurthermore, lrtl11 h(lS invested in Syri;-l {IS a str(ltegic partl1er as rart of its deterrence stDltegy vls-;l3 
16


80122a-4.eps

vis Tsracl and as an Arab ally in its rivalry with Turkey and the Persian Gulf states. Tran is, therefore, 

impletnenting a hvo-track strategy in Syria, undertaking efforts to both preserye the j\ssad reg-itne 

for as long as possible while working to create a pennissiye operational environnlent in post Assad 

Syrlrl. 16 

This effort Ius he en led primarily by the Quds Force, which has deployed senior personnel into 

Syria 111 order to arm, train, and advise clctncnts of :\ssad's security t-orccs.17 The assassination of 

senior C2uds Poree C0111111,lnder Brigadier Ceneral H(lssan Sh;lteri in Syri'l last month is evidence of 

ongoing Quds Force activity directed at the highest lcvcls. 1H Iran's efforts have also increasingly 

involved Lehanese HezholLth. '1'he Quds I,'orce and Hezholhh have cooperated in ensuring the 

passage of Tranian anns shiprncnts to Syria since at least 2012. 19 They have also cooperated to train 

pro-.l\ssad forces inside Syria. 2I1 

Hezbollah has recently incre;lsed its direct combat role in Syria. Hezbollah forces bunched ;U1 attack 

in Febnlary 2013 in coordination with Assad's forces against rebel-held villages ncar al Qusayr, 

Syria.'l The January 2013 Israeli strike on a Hezbolbh military convoy transporting S;\-17 antiaircraFt missiles revealed that the organi7.ation ,-vas '-'lorking to tnove tnore sophisticated "\veaponry 

out of Syria into Lebanon," The emergence of the Abu al-radl aI-Abbas Brigade in Syria, a 

conglomerate of Syrian and foreign Shia fighters, including members of llezbollah and Iraqi militia 

grours \vhich purrorts to protect the Shia Sayyech Leinab shrine and surrounding neighborhood in 

Darnascus, could provide Iran and the (-::2.uds Force another avenue to both assist Assad rnilitarily 

and intluence the cont1ict ,Itter regime collapse. 

The extent of 1r;lnian and Hezholbd1 involvement in Syria reflects the centr;llity of Syria to both. The 

loss of Syna as a state ally will significantly impact Iran's ability to deter Israel, project power in the 

Levant, and supply its proxies. 

IL1n nuy achieve son1e success \vith this t\vo-tfrtck strateh'Y, rrolonging the cont1ict ,1nd creating 

conditions \vhereby it can retain sotne o~- its operational capacity in the I,evant. The loss of Syria as a 

state ally, however, will signiiicantly limit Iran's strategic depth. A mmp Alawite state cannot provide 

Iran \:l/ith the sarne level of deterrence, or political and econornic support as .''\ssad's Syria. T\-{oreover, 

a rump A!awite state cannot be sustained indeiinitely. Iran's efforts in ci,is regard offer only a 

tetnporary solution to a much greater probletn. 

Tran is certainly aware that the loss of Syria Will significantly degrade its ability to project power in 

the Levant and has planned for sLich a contingency. In order to cornpensate for this loss and 

continue to present an effective deterrence t-orce~ Iran may look to expand its activities in other 

countries and regions. The intercertion earlier this month of an Iranian \vertpons shipn1ent 

containing sophisticated Chinese-made antiaircra~-t tnissiles, and large quantities of anTIS, 

amn1unition, and explosive nuterial destined for al Houthi rebels in Yenlen suggests that, in at least 

one area, Iran has ratnped up its support for militants c1sc"\vhcrc.25 

The (.?uds Force's recent escalation ot- global activity over the past two years, including a plot to 

conduct ,1 nl,lss-casualty ,1tt-lCk in \X':ashington D.C., rt nuxed b,tg of failure and success in its terrorist 

4 
17


80122a-5.eps

plots against Israeli intercsts in Georgia, India, and A./;crbaijan, and plans to carry out attacks in 

13(lhr(lin, Kenya, and Kigeria, indicate that Iran is gro\-x,"'ing and operationalizing its global force 

projection network."" '1his is likely an effort on Iran's part to demonstrate that it, indeed, has a 

robust deterrent and retaliatory force in phce. As the cont1ict in Syria stretches on, Dan1,lSCUS slips 

from Assad's control, and Iran sees its strategic depth continually eroded, we arc likely to see not 

just increasing Iranian military activity in Syria hut a more risk-prone Iranian regional and glohal 

strategy. 

5 
18


80122a-6.eps

Notes 

1 "tahlili bar Larourat-e tashkil-e scpah dar seh bod-c ideolwhi, siyasi, neLami" [An Analysis of the 

:'\ecessity of Establishing the (;mlrds in the Three Dimensions of Ideology, Politics, 'l11d Military], 

Payam-e Dnqdab (l'elmll1), ,\larch 19, 19HO, p. 32. Translation from: Ali Alfoneh. Inm Um.'"i/"d: I lim 

the Kew/!lti07l(lIY CllardJ iJ 'Jllrnil,g 'J'heom;h), illto Military IJitfatOll'hlp (Washington, D.C.: ,\FT Press, 

forthcoming). 

2 "da~a' {l7: enghebb-e eslami tnohemtarin tnamuriyat-e sepah" rod-ending the Islamic Revolution is 

the Sepah's Most Import,l11t 'eusionl, Bu/lan, December 13, 2012. "\y,tilable in Persian: 

http://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/ 114985/ooD8°'oAP'oD9°o81 %D8°'oA7°oD8%B9-

(;:oD8(; loA 7(; 'oD8(~ 'oB2-(~'oD8()/OA 7(~/OD9(~'o86(; 'oD9(~ 'o82(~'oD9(~:o8.t (~/oD8(~/OA 7(; 'oD8° /oA8-

0, (IDBo, (I A7°, oD8°, oB3°, oD9°, 084 °1 ;)DSo.;) A. 7°· ;)D9°· ()85°· (,DBo. ;)8C-

°0 D9°'o85%D9°~87°'o D9°'o85°~ D8°0;\ ,\ °'0 D8°'on 1 °0 Dno'~8Co'oD9%86-

o/·oD9°,'o85°/oD8~··oA7~·'oD9°,/o85°/·oD9°,'o88°,/oD8~·'oB1 ~·'oDBo,'08C~··oD8°/·o-L~\­

°0 D8°'oB3°'o D9"'oBF °0 D8°'0;\ 7°'oD9°087 

.; Will Fulton, "IRGC Command Network: Fonnal Structures and Infonnallnt1uence," AEI elitica! 

Timots Projed, October 10,2012. ,"'-vailablc: http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/fulton-irgccommand-network -october-l 0-20 12 

·1 "baraye hezf-e Tsrael yek bahaneh va 24 sa'at vaght lazem darim" [We only need an excuse and 24 

hours to destroy Israel], Jaftan Nell'J, September 29, 2012.llxailable in Persian: 

http://jahannews.com/vdcbgzb5grbba8p.uiur.htrnl 

5 "Two 'V[en Charged in ;\lleged Plot to .'\ssassinate Saudi ,\rabian ;\mbassador to the United 

States," l.S. Department of Justice, October 11, 2011. Available: 

http://wvv-w.justice.gov / opa/pr/2011/Uctober/ll-ag-1339.html 

, "filrmandeh-ye jedid-e sepah-e mohammad rasoubll'lh kisto" [\Vho is the new IRCC 'e[oh'1111mad 

Rasoul Allah Commander?], Tabllak, November 12, 2009. Available in Persian: 

http://,,",'1'-'. tabmk.ir / b/ news /726R3 /"'oD9"oR 1 %DR%B 1 "'oD9"'oR5'~oDR%,"'-7"oD9'~oR6'~ 'oDR'~'oA 

FO/oD<)o/oS7-o.;)Dso:()Aco.;)Dso/().A.Fo.;)D9°:()SAo:;)Dso:().'A.F-o,;)Dso:()B3°:;)D<)o,;)BE%Ds%A7%D9°/oS7-

u·oD9u'oS5u/oDsu·o/\DU/oD9u/OS5u·oDsu·o/\F0,·~D80,'uB 1 0,'uD8°, 'uB3°, 'uD9°,'u88°, 'uD9~· ·u84 0,'uE2°, lu80~· ·~8co,'oD8°, 'uA7°I'uD9°, lu84~· ·~D9°,·~84°, luD9~·/U87-

~oD9~'o83°'oD9°08;\ ° oD8°'oB3°'oDSoo '\;\ °oD8~09F 

"lliLbullah," National Counterterrorism Center: Counterterrorism 2013 Calendar. Available: 

http://www.nctc.gov / site/ groups/hizballah.html 

8 "Trertsury Designates Individu;ds rl11d Entities Fueling V-iolence in Ielq,n U.S. Dep;lrtn1ent of the 

Treasury, September 16, 2008. Available: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressrele;,ses/I';'ges/hpl1~l.aspx 

"Iran Amling, Training, Directing Terror Groups in Iraq, L:.S. lJfficial Says,n U.S. Departrnent of 

Defense, July 2,2007. ;\vailable: http://www.defense.goy /News/News;\rtic1e.aspx?TD=46606 

9 "Treasury Sanctions bhe Individuals 'lied to Iranian Plot to -L'\ssassinate the Saudi Arabian 

Amhassador to the Cnited States," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Octoher 11, 2011. "\yoilahle: 

http://,,",'1w. treasury.goy / press-center / press-rele,ses / pages / tg1320.aspx 

"Tran Anning, Trainmg, Directing Terror Groups in Traq. C.S. Official Says," U.S. Department of 

Defense, July 2, 2007. Available: http://,,",,",v.defense.goy /News/NewsArticle.aspx?lD=46606 

11 "Traq releases suspected He7,bollah operatIve Daqduq," ReltterJ, "Iovember 16, 21112. ,\vailable: 

http://w.-.1w.reuters.com/artic1e/2012/11/16/us-iraq-daqduq-release-idUSBRES;\FOS:;20121116 

6 
19


80122a-7.eps

12 "Iraqi P_'v! cites lack of evidence in release of man wanted by lS in killings of soldiers," CJ'vN, 

:'\ovember 19, 2012, Av~il~ble: http://www.c1111.Com/2012/11/17 /world/meast/imq-us-milit~ntcharges 

SudarS<l11 Raghavan and Robin \Vright, "Iraq Expels 2 Ir:lilians Detained by US,," 'He IVa,hil(glo/l 

Po,f, December 29, 2012. Available: http://w\vw.washinb.i.onpost.com/wpdyn/ content/article/2006/12/29/ ,\R2006 I 2290 1510_pf.html 

U Ibid. 

"Treasury Designates Tranian Ministry of Tntelligence and Security tor Human Rights ;\buses and 

Support for Terrorism," U.S. Depmtment of the Tre~sury, Febm~ry 1(', 2012. Av",l~ble: 

http://www.treasury.gov /press-center/press-rcleases/Pages/tg!424.aspx 

16 Joseph Holliday, \Vill Fulton, S:un \Vyer, "Iranian Strategy in Syria," Institute t"r the Study of\Var 

and AEI Critical Threats Project, forthcoming. 

Joseph Holliday and Flizabeth O'Tlagy of the Tnstihlte for the Study of\\'ar have done considerable 

\vork on the Syri~ln conflict. Uor more infornlation on the current operational environnlent in Syri~l, 

including Iran's involvement in that conflict, see: 

Joseph Holliday, "'rhe Assad Regime: hom Counterinsurgency '1'0 Civil War," Institute for the 

Study of War, March 6, 2013. Available: http://www.understandingwar.org/report/assad-regime 

Elizabeth O'Dagy, "Jihad in Syria," Institute for the Study of War, September 17, 2012. Anilable: 

llttp: / / www.understandingwar.org/report/jihad-syria 

17 "Adnlinistftltion Takes -L\dditiollal Steps to Hold the Covernnlent of Syria Account(lble for 

V iolent Repression ~'"gainst the Syrian People," U.S. Department of the Treasury, May 18,2011. 

;\vailable: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl18l.aspx 

lS Will liulton, "The Assassination of Iranian Quds I'orce General Hassan Shateri in Syria," AIi] 

Ciiticr1!'J'hrer1ts, Febmary 28, 2013. ,\vailable: http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/li.dtonass(lssinati()l1 -irtmian -quds -t()rce-g eneral-hass;m-sha teri -s\'Yia -fe l )ru(lry -28-2013 

19 "Treasury Targets Iranian Arm: Shipments," U.S. Dep'artment of the Treasury, Mmch 27, 2012. 

Available: http://www.treasury.gov / press-center/ press-releases/Pages/tgl S06.aspx 

"Treasury Designates Syrian Entity, Others Tnvolvcd in Amls and CODununicat1ons ProcurCDlcnt 

'\'etworks and Tdentifies Blocked Tranian ,\ircraft," U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 19, 

2012. Available: http://w\vw. treasury.gov / press-center/ press-releases /Pages/ tg 1714.aspx 

"Treasury Sanctions ;\l-Nusrah Front Leadership in Syria and '.>filitias Supporting the ,\sad 

Regime," U.S. Department of the 'rreasury, December 11, 2012. Available: 

http://www.treasury.gov /press-center/press-rcleases/Pages/tgI797.aspx 

" Kluled Yacoub Oweis, Laila Bassam, "Hezbolhh fighter, tlve Syrian rebels killed on border," 

ReI!tm, Fcbmary 17,2013. Available: http://www.rcuters.com/arric1c/2013/02/17 /us-syria-crisishezbolbh-idUSBRE91 (;0(::\:20130217 

Patrick McDonnell, Nabih Bulos, "Hezbollah fighters reported killed in clashes wid1 Syrian rebels," 

File I ,as Allgeier 'limes, Febmary 18,2013. ;\vailable: 

http://www.latimes.com/news / world/ worldllow /la-fg-wn-he~bollah-fighters-reported-killed201302 18,0,79 54864.s tory 

"Whte House W,lens Syria over 'weapons to Hezboll,J1'," BBe Nen's, January 31, 2013. Available: 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/ncws/world-middlc-east-21281923 

" Nichobs Bbnford, "Video appears to show Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiites fighting in Syria," (Jlll,flan 

J,len!? Monitor; January 18,2013. Available: http://www.csmonitor.com/\\·orld/..>!idd1cEas t/ 20 13/0118 /Video-appears-to-show-H e7,bollah-and-T raqi-Shii tes-ftghting -in-Syria 

7 
20


80122a-8.eps

Statement #1 by Abu al-badl aI-Abbas Brigade posted on Facebook, JmlUary 2013. 'l'ranslated from 

Ar~bic. 

Suadad al-Salhy, "Iraqi Shi'ite militants fight for Syria's Assad," Reuters, October 16,2012. 

http://w\vw.reuters.com/article/2012/10/1(./us-syriil-crisis-iraq-militiasidliSBREH9 1101'2\.20121 016 

21 "Sen. Carl Levin Holds .\ Hearing On U.S. Central Command i\nd U.S. Special Operations 

Command," CQ 'lranscriptiotlS, March S, 2013 .. ""vailable on Le.xis-'\exis. 

25 Robert F. \'('orth and C-J. Chivers, "Se1eed Chinese \Veapons Raise Concerns on Tran," The 7\JeIJ' 

York 'lime.!", lvhrch 2, 2013, i\vail~ble: 

http://www.nytimes.com/20 1 3 / 03 / 03 / world/ middleeast/ seized-amls-off-yemcn-raise-alaml-overiran,html 

" "Bahram convicts six of plotting with Irml," Relftm, May 27,2012. Available: 

http://w\vw.reuters.com/articlc/20 12/05/27 /us-bahrain-plot-trial-idUSDRE84Q08P20 120527 

"Azerbaijan arrests plot suspects, cites Iran link," Rat/en; January 25, 2012 .. ""vailable: 

http://w\vw.reuters.com/article/20 12/01 /25/azerbaijan-israel-plot-idUST .5E8CP3J ,D20nO 125 

Lthan Bronner, "Israel Savs Iran Is Behind Bombs," llebruary 13, 2012. Available: 

llttp: / / www.nytimes.com/20 12/02/14/ world/ middleeast/israeli-embassy-officials-attacked-ininditl-and-georgi;l.httnl 

Dan \Villiams, "Israel blames Iran after attacks on embassv staff," Rel/tm, Febnlarv 13,2012. 

Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/~.s-isrilel-security-embass'iesidllS'l'REHICOQL20120213 

Jason Strniuso, Tom Odula "Tranians in Kenya planned Tsraeli, US attacks," AJJotlrlted PmJ, July 2, 

2012. Available: http://news.vahoo.com/ ap-iranians-kenya -planned-israeli-us-attacksI 72250609.h trnl 

Cunilius Eboh, "Kigeria says arrests him-linked cell targeting C,S" Israel," Re!lier:>, Februirr 21,2013, 

Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/20 1 3/02/21 / us-nigeria-iranidUSBRE91 K09420130221?irpc=932 

8 
21

Mr. POE. Dr. Levitt. 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW LEVITT, PH.D., DIRECTOR, STEIN 

PROGRAM ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, 

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. LEVITT. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you again this morning to discuss the nature of the 

global terrorist threat posed by Iran’s strategic partner and principal terrorist proxy, Hezbollah. The nature of this threat has indeed increased dramatically over the past few years. 

Today’s hearing on Hezbollah’s strategic shift is extremely timely. This week marks the 21st anniversary of the 1992 Israeli Embassy bombing in Buenos Aires. Failure to respond to that attack 

emboldened Hezbollah, which incurred no cost for that attack. Two 

years later, Hezbollah struck again, this time escalating from a 

diplomatic to a civilian target and blowing up the AMIA Jewish 

community center, also in Buenos Aires. Hezbollah is watching Europe and the West closely right now, much as it watched Argentina 

21 years ago this week, to see if there will be any consequence to 

its recent escalation of terrorist activity around the world. 

Today’s hearing is also well timed because tomorrow is a critical 

day for Hezbollah, the West, and Europe in particular. This is because a verdict is expected tomorrow in the case of Hossam 

Yaacoub, a self-confessed Hezbollah operative now on trial in Cyprus. 

You have the flier from my book, and in there I get into in great 

detail Hezbollah’s global footprint, its activities in North America, 

South America, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. I won’t 

go into that right now. But as Director of National Intelligence 

James Clapper testified just last week before the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence, and I quote, ‘‘We . . . face uncertainty 

about potential threats from Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, which 

see the United States and Israel as their principal enemies.’’ He 

continued, ‘‘We continue to assess that Hezbollah maintains a 

strong anti-U.S. agenda but is reluctant to confront the United 

States directly outside the Middle East.’’

But Hezbollah is certainly active well beyond the Middle East, 

and that uncertainty about these potential threats stems from 

Hezbollah’s recently increased global terrorist activities. Hezbollah 

today has two distinct operational trends. One involves its intent 

to avenge the death of Imad Mughniyah killed in Damascus in February 2008. Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah, promised at 

the time ‘‘open war,’’ which is a quote, against Israel. They intend 

to target a current or former Israeli official in response and they 

have tried several times since and they have failed. 

The second operational trend is their effort to target Israeli tourists internationally as part of Iran’s shadow war with the West, 

and here again we see Hezbollah acting outside the Lebanese interest, completely and only in the interest of its strategic partnership 

with Iran. There are two key dates to understand this latter threat. 

The first is September 2009, where after several failed attempts to 

conduct an attack against the Israelis to avenge Mughniyah’s 

death, they tried again in Turkey, in September 2009, targeting a 

22

consul-general in Istanbul. They failed, despite extensive and increased Quds Force logistical support for that attack, leading 

Hezbollah and Iran to yell at each other, you are not good enough 

anymore, you are not providing as much support as you used to. 

As they are arguing with each in January 2010, someone assassinates Professor Mohammedi in Tehran with a sticky bomb. Professor Mohammedi was a particularly important person in Iran’s 

nuclear program, and at that point Iran decides that two things 

will happen. The one is that the Quds Force will create a new unit, 

Quds Force Unit 400, specifically to target Western diplomats 

abroad, and also targets reflecting Israel, that is to say, Jewish targets, for example, the plot in Baku targeting two Jewish rabbis and 

a Jewish school. And the second is that Hezbollah will get its act 

together, would reenergize itself, rejuvenate the Islamic Jihad Organization, recruit people with foreign passports who could travel 

abroad, and begin to target Israeli tourists worldwide, and this 

happened. 

Hezbollah has been recruiting people with foreign passports from 

Sweden, from Canada, and Australia, just to give some examples. 

They have returned to old school tradecraft, and they have presented threats in Azerbaijan, Thailand, Cyprus, Bulgaria, kidnapping plots in Africa, delivering weapons to Houthi rebels in Yemen, 

and more. 

According to Bulgarian authorities, two of the three suspects 

from the July attack there last year were foreigners. One had an 

Australian passport, one had a Canadian passport. One returned 

back to Lebanon through Poland and one through Romania. 

But while that attack killed several people, the one that is going 

to have a bigger impact on Europe is the one that doesn’t involve 

intelligence and information that won’t be shared publicly, but the 

one that happened and was thwarted 2 weeks earlier in Cyprus, 

where that information is now not classified but being presented in 

open court, in a European court, undergoing complete European judicial review, including cross-examination by defense, and that verdict is expected tomorrow. 

Hossam Taleb Yaacoub has described himself as a Hezbollah operative. In an eerily similar plot to the one in Bulgaria, he was conducting surveillance of Israeli tourists arriving there. At one point 

he said, I am not Hezbollah. Later he said, I didn’t tell the whole 

truth, something weird was going on and when Hezbollah told me 

to conduct surveillance of an airplane, maybe they were plotting to 

bring down an airplane. I don’t know. I am just speculating, he 

said. Later he said he was not part of a terrorist plot in Cyprus 

at all. Instead, he said, and I quote, ‘‘It was just collecting information about the Jews, and this is what my organization does all over 

the world.’’

Hossam Yaacoub is a European citizen. He is a Swede. He grew 

up in Sweden. His father still lives there. The rest of his family is 

in Beirut. Before being sent to Cyprus to carry out this attack, he 

was sent on missions—he described them as missions, I am not describing them as missions, this is his word—as a courier, first to 

Turkey, then to Lyons, France, to meet some Hezbollah operative 

there, then to Amsterdam to meet some Hezbollah operative there. 

Taken together, the Bulgarian and Cypriot cases present compelVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:29 Apr 15, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\_TNT\032013\80122 HFA PsN: SHIRL
23

ling evidence of Hezbollah’s continued operational activity, specifically in Europe. 

Hezbollah is watching Europe and the rest of the international 

community closely, much as it watched Argentina 21 years ago this 

week. Argentina failed to respond to Hezbollah’s challenge then 

and suffered the repercussions 2 years later. Europe has an opportunity now to avoid that same mistake and should designate 

Hezbollah in whole or even just in part as a terrorist group for executing terrorist plots on the continent. History suggests that failure 

to do so could result in still more attacks by even still more 

emboldened Hezbollah. 

Thank you. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Levitt. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:]

24


80122b-2.eps

T eslimony by Dr. Matthew Levit! 

Direclor, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence 

The Washington Institute for Nea, East Policy 

Hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives Committe" on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade 

March 20, 2013' 

Chairman POt, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you 

this morning to discuss the namre of the global terrorist threat posted by Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp 

(iRGe) and its Quds Furce (QF), dnd Iran's strJtegic partner and principle terrurist proxy, HezbollJh. The nature ufthis 

threat has incre,lsed dranutiully uver the P,lst few years, alluw me to e.xptlin why ,11H.1 how, 

In January 2010, the Qods Force-the elite unit of Iran's Islamic Revolucionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-decided dut it 

and Hizballah, irs primary rerrorisr proxy, would embark on a new campaign of violence aimed ar Israel, rhe Unired Srares, 

dIld or her \X/esrern targets. Since then, the urganizations have cuuperated-and competed-to launch attacks glubally. Although targets have been poorly chosen and assaults carried out with gross incompetence, this sloppy tradecraft could quickly 

be replaced by operational succes~ as the groups professionalize their operations. Indeed, one particularly odd cHon might 

have succeeded were it nor For rhe Fortuitons placemenr of an undercover U.S. governmem inFormanr: rhe case of an Iranian-American used-car salesman who pleaded gUilty in October 2012 to conspiring \\'ith Iranian agent~ to a~sa,,~inate the 

Saudi ambassador to the United States. 

Nevertheless, in some ·ways Mansour Arbabsiar's guilty plea raised more questions than it answered. The plea closed rhe 

C,lse, but the C,S, ,uH.l British governments had 'llre'ldy traced the conspiracy back to Tehran and Iud bLlCklisted Qods Force 

commander Qa'>em Soleimani for his role,' Not only had Arbab~iar tried to hire an as~assin who was actually a ·C,S, Drug 

Enforcement Administration (D f.A) informant, but once arrested Arbabsiar quickly confessed to his role in the plot and, at 

the direction oflaw enfurcement, placed a call tu his cousin, a Qods }urce handler, Gen, Gholam Shakuri, \",\/ith agents listening, Shakuri cunfirmed that the plut shulJld go forw,ud and as soon ,1S pussible, "Just do it quickly, It's late,"l 

But why was the Qods rorce, which had earned a reputation for operational prowess even among its enemie~, so eager to 

move Fonvard \\'ith an obviously f1awed operation? Arbabsiar, For his parr, appears to have been a weak characrerwho "wams 

to be important," as a government-retained psychi<ltrist determined, and who was drawn into the plot by his comin,; 'fhe 

real question is, \Xlhat \vas the Qods force thinking? 

According to the director of national imelligence, the plot "shows rhar some Iranian ofFicials-probably including Su 

preme Leader Ali Khamenei-have changed rheir calculus and are now more willing to conduct an artack in rhe United States 

I'llc \XTashing,ton 

Institute t()r :\ ear Fa ,t Policy. January 2013. http://www. wa~hi ngton in stitute.org/poli cy-analy~i~/ view /hi A)dllah-and-the-{l{)(l~- t()rce-i nirans-shadnw-\\Tar-with-the-west 
25


80122b-3.eps

in response ro real or perceived u.s. acrions rhar rhrearen the regime."-l Intelligence oHkials believe that this new caleulus 

dates back to january 2010 when the Quds Furce decided that it and Hi:.rballah would embark un a ne\vcampaign of violence 

fucused un Israel alung with U,S, and other \~restern targets 

Hi:rllallah's anti-\'Vestern militancy began in 1983 with attacks against \Xlestern targets in Lebanon, then expalH~ed tu include attacks abruad intended to exact revenge fur actiuns threatening its or Inn's interests, ur to press foreign governments 

to release captured operative~. At til11e~, such as the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Argcmina, Hizballah's own interests in 

carrying out atracks abroad were magnified by Iran's interests in rhe same. These coincident imerests led to joim opcrarions-sueh as the 1996 bumbing of the KlIobar Tuwers in Saudi Arabia-tlldt leveraged each party's strengths and maximized their combined capabilities. 

OVCI the course of the always imimate relationship between Iran and Hizballall, the head of the Qods Force or other 

senior Iranian leaders might have told Hizballah to jump and the response would have been "How high?" In parr, this has 

been a function of the close alignment benveen Hizballah's senior leadership and Iran's clerical regime, Yet how firmly do 

Hizballah leaders believe in velayat-e faqih, the Islamic Republic's principle of rule of the jurisprudent? According to Hizhallah sccretary general Hassan X asrallah, "the subject of the vclayat c faqih and the Imamate is at the heart of our religiuus doctrine, and ,my offense to it is an offense to our religion,"" But the cluse relatiunship ,liso persists bec.llIse uf Hizballah's dependence on Iran for financial, material, and political support, [or years, Hizballah rdied almost exclusively on 

Iranian largesse, which hovered around $100 to $200 million a year or more.c, Such generous state sponsorship, however, 

came with strings attached that Hizballah, as 'l'ehran's primary pan-Shiite militant pruxy group, cuuld nut easily ignore. 

\X7hile it kept up its relentless catnp<lign of military and terrorist activities targeting Isreld, and despite lUubated tensiuns 

with the \X;Test, Hizballah had not carried out a successful spectacular attack targeting \XTestern interests since the Khobar 

'i'o,yers bombing. Moreover, Hi7.ballah worked hard under Former milirary commander Imad l'vlughniyah to esrablish a 

measure ufindependence frum Iran. In mid-2008, four munths a-fi-er Mughniyah's assassinatiun, an Israeli intelligence uffiCi<11 concluded thelt "Hezbullah dues not <llways do what Iran wants,"! But under the le<ldership of1...fughniyah's successurs, 

Mustafa I3adreddine and Talal Hamiyeh, Iran's role seems to have hardened again.8 In February 2012, Director of National 

Intelligence james Clapper characterized the rciarionship behyeen Hizballah and Iran as "a partnership arrangement, with 

the Iranians as the senior partner."'> 'i'his "strategic partnership," as ;'\arional Counterterrorism Center (NCl'C) director 

Matthe\v Olsen put it, is the product of a long evolution from the 19ROs, 'when Hizballah was just a pro.:\."y ofIran. Together, 

Olsen added, the two emitics pursue their ~hared "aims againsc Israel and the United Staces."II' 

1'0 be sure, Hi7ballah has engaged in militant, terrorist, criminal, and other activities over the years, rrom bombings in 

Argentina and Saudi Arabia to plots in Solltheast Asia and Africa, II Its ability to continue to do so at pace, however, was 

severely constrained by an act of terrorism not of its OVln making. Ironically, al· Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 20(H, 

prm'ed to be a turningpoim for Hizballah, the terrorist group previously responsible for the most American deaths. De~­

peute not to be uught in the crussJuirs of\~!ashington's "war on terror," Hizbalt1h <lppears tu have decided consciously 

to roll back its international operations and keep its efforts to strike at Israeli targets as focused and limited as possible, 

But while spectacular embassy bombings were put on ice, Hizballah continued to tarb>et Israeli interests, infllrrate opera 

tives intu Israel tu collect intelligence and carry out operations, and suppurt Iranian interests such as training Iraqi Shiite 

militMlts elher the f<l11 uf the Saddam Hussein regime,l2 

But the february 2008 assassination of Imad lvfughniyah led to the resurgence of Hizhallah's international operations 

arm, which will no donbt regain its Former potency----cspecially when paired with Iranian intelligence and Qods ~orce operatives. But as the Islamic Jihad Organil',atiull (IjO)~nuw under the command of Bad red dine and HalIliyeh~first set out to 

avenge Mughniyah's death, Opeutiun Rldwan (named fur MughniY<lh, whu \.,..as alsu known <lS Hajj KH.lwan) e.xperienced <1 

series of setbacks. Thcse nltimatdy led Iran and Hizballah to reassess how rhey would prosecute, barh separately and rogeth 

er, a thrce-ticred shadmvwar rargeting Isracii,jewish, American, and somctimcs Brirish interesrsworldwide. 
26


80122b-4.eps

Arsena/ 

\'(lhen NJsrallah promised an "upen \var" to avenge }vfughniyah's assJssination, Israeli ufficials quiekly rook preventive action-from issuing specific travel w<unings tu cuvert disruptive measures-against what they deemed the three most hkely 

scenarios, These included (1) an attack on current or fanner seniur Israeli offici,lls traveling abro,1\.1; (2) an attack on ,lll Israeli diplomatic mission abroad; or (3) an arrack targeting a location afTiliated \vith a je\vish community abroad, such as in 

the 1994 bombing of the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) in Buenus Aires.n 'l'hey knew better than ro ignure Nasrall.lh's warning. 

Neyenhdess, however committed Hizballah was to carrying out such attacks, the IJO was ~imply not up (() the task. 

~or one thing, Hi7.ballah leaders had actively pared dovm the IJO's global networks of operatives fOllowing the 9/11 attdcks. And the "strategic partnership" it Iud shared with IrJn for the past decade appears to have focused on funding, 

training, and arming Hizballah's increasingly etttuive standing militia, not on its cadre of international terrorists. And 

so, Hizhallah not only lacked the resources and capability to carry out a successful operation abroad, it also no longer had 

Mughniyah around to quarterback operations. 

Tightened security in the post-9/11 world also meant Hizballah opted to operate in nations 'with comparatively lax security rather than vigilant \'\' estern nations. But even then, in places like Azerbaijan, [b'Tpt, and Turkey, and even vlith signifIcant support from Qods Force agents, Hizballah suffered a series of embarrassing failures, scarting with the i\:fay 200R fla~co 

in B.l.k.ll, when a series uf spectacular actions, including the planned bombing of the C,S, and Israeli embassies, was diswpted, 

The event led to the quiet release of Qods Torce personnel but the public prosecution of two Hizballah operatives, Operations were soon f()iled in [b'TPt and Turkey too, as well as attempts (() kidnap Israelis in Furope and Africa. 

A fuiled Jttdck in 'l'urkey in September 2009 was J watershed event for Hi:r.ballJh uperatiunal planners and their Iranian 

sponsors, Despite the Ilussive logistical support Qods Furce oper,uives provided fur that plut, Hizballah uper,ltives still 

failed to execute the attack successfully, I I 1\{eanwhile by late 2009, Iran's interest in Hizballah's operational provless focused 

less on local issues like avenging Ivfughniyah's death and more on the much larger issue of combating threats ro its nascent 

nuclear program.l\:fJlfunctioning components ruined Iranian centrifuges:F IRGC ufficers defected;16 Jnd then in January 

2010 ,1 bomb killed Iuni,m physics professor Masoud Ali Mulumnudi uutside his T ehun hume,c 

According to Israeli imelligence offIcials, furious Iranian leaders reached tvlO conclusions after Mohammadi's death: (1) 

Hi7.ballah's IJO had to rcvitali7.e its operational capabilities and (2) the IRGC would no longcr rely solely on Hi7.ballah to carry 

out terrorist attJcks abroad. It '.vuuld nuw deploy Qods Force operatives to do su un their own, nut just JS lugisticidl1s suppurting Hizballah hit men.1il Fven more than the loss ofits scientists, Tehran sought to address its damab>ed prestige-the image of 

an Iran so \veak it could not eyen protect its O\V11 sciemists at home could not stand. 

l'vluch Finger·pointing ensued between Hi7.ballah and the Qods Force regarding where the blame lay for the t\VO years 

of failed operations, culminating in the botched attack in Turkey and then another failed plot in Jordan in January 2010, 

Under Nasrallah's instructions, Badreddine and Hamiyeh "undertook a massive operational reevaluation in January 

2010, which led to hig changes within the IJO over a period of a little oyer six months." During this period, IJO opera 

tiuns were put on huld and major persunnel changes made, Nev,,' operatives were recruited from the elite of Hizballah's 

military wing for intelligence and operational training, while existing IJO operatives Vlere moved into new positions, At 

the ~ame time, the IJO invested in the development of capabilities and tradecraft that had withered on the vine ~ince the 

2001 decision to rein in operations. 19 

As part of its IJO shake-up, Hizbalhh engaged in deuiled ulks with IranicUl officials tu hy out Hizbalhh's role in 

Iran's larger plan for a coordinated shadow war targeting Israeli, American, British, and Gulf States' interests, The coordinatcd plan, it was decided, \vould include operations intended to achicye several different goals, including taking 

revenge fur l\:lughniyah's JssassinJtiun, retaliating for Jttacks on Iran's nuclear prugram, and convincing \Xfestern powers that an atuck un Iran \vould result in-among uther things-asymmetric terrorist ,1ttack.s wurldwide,~0 

To this end, Iranian decisionmakers serried on a campaign of violence based on a three· tiered threat stream targeting the 

following: Israeli tourists, government Figures (diplomats, retired oH1cials), and targets broadly representative ofIsrael or the 
27


80122b-5.eps

je"\Yish community (eomnlll11ity leaders, prominent Israeli companies). It assigned the task of targeting Israeli tourists-a 

soft target-to HLr,ballah and maintained for the Qods Force operatiuns targeting Israeli, American, British, ur Gulf States' 

interests, The latter wuuld be carried out by a new Special External Operations Unit knuwn as Unit 400,11 

At first, Iran's new terrorism strategy, and the IjO's uverhaul, seemed to have little ettect. In l\'iarch and September 2010, 

authorities disrupted undisclused Quds Force pluts in Azerbaij<Ul and Turkey, respeetivdy.~l In May 2010, Kuwaiti authurities arrested Kuwaiti, lebanese, and other individuals on suspicion of spying, monitoring C.S. military interests, and pmsessing explosives for anacks.D 

Meanwhile, Hizballah fared nu better. Itching tu prove their rejuvenated uperatiunal capabilities, IjO leaders repurtedly 

pres~ed Nasral1ah to allow them co carry out an attack ahroad.11 In April 2011, the Israeli Counterterrorism Bureau issued an 

advisory f(H Passover holiday travel co cowltries in the Mediterranean Basin and the Far East, \varning ofIranian and Hizballah 

plots.2-'5 In faer, the ·warning was a planned leak by Israeli intelligence aimed at exposing and therefore frustrating a budding Hiz 

ballah plot to target Israeli tourists in Cyprus,26 Israeli officials told the press that under instmctiom from Xasrallah and Qods 

rorce leader Qasem Soleimani, Hizhal1ah IJO chiefT alaI Hamiyeh was plotting the attacks \vith a small group of trusted lieutenants. These included Hamiyeh's "right-hand man and bodyguard, Ahmed Faid," as \\'Cll as "explosives engineer lui X ajam alDin and bumb assembly expert Malik OV<lyad," False documents were repurtellly produced by 1·fajd al-Zakm, ala "'the Forger," 

while lOgistics support GUIle from lebanese <md Turkish bminesspersom,r 

Given HizhaUah's role in the new three-tiered arrangement, N asral1ah was dearly uncomf(lrtable with the notion that 

people might mistake Hi:rballah attacks agJinst Israeli tourists as the best the gruup could muster to avenge !'vlughniyah's 

de,lth, A few d,lYs ,1her media reports expused the Cyprus plot, Xasr,lit1h g,lve an interview to a Kuwaiti newspaper underscoring Hizballah's continued commitment to carry out an operation of equal severity to avenge the death of the IJO commander. 'l'he poinr was nor retaliation for rctaliation's sake, he stressed: "Had we wanred to, we could have retaliated by 

killing Israeli tourists in this ur that cuuntry."2~ But that was not Hi:rballah's calculus. Attacks un Israeli tourists ,,,,ere something different-the IJO's part in Ir,m's shadow w,u-a thre,l( stream of its own, distinct frum Operatiun Rc1dwan, 

In 1\:fay 2011, Iranian agents ~hot and hUed a Saudi diplomat in Karachi, Pakistan, foreshadowing the plot already wlder 

\vay targeting the Saudi ambassador to \'{lashington, D.C. 2

'" Tcn days after-ward, Qods ~orce and Hizballah oper-ariYes car 

ried out a f.1r more cumplex operation targeting an Israeli diplomat in 'l'urkey. 'l'urkish authorities originally assumed the 

attack was the work of the Kurdistan \'{lorkers Party (PKK), intended to have an impact on upcoming Turkish parliamentalT elections.3\' \'{lithin weeks, howevcr, investigators would determine the attack was a botched Hizballah-Qods Force 

assassination attempt targeting rhe 'l'tukish-born Israeli consul-general to Istanbul, Moshe Kimhi, intended as retribution 

for the assassination of !vlohammadi, the Iranian physicist. According to Corriere della Sera, the Italian paper that broke the 

story, Qods force operatives cased the area, recording Kimhi's routine, hef(lfe Hizballah operatives were called in to place 

the explosive along a route the diplomat was known to take. \Xlithin weeks of the bombing, the Special Tribunal for lebanun (STL)-the body charged with investigating the February 2005 assassination of fortner Lebanese prime minister Rclfig 

Hariri-"\vould indict four Hizballah operatives, including !vlustafa Badreddine, for their roles in the murder. Closer to 

home, Hizballah operatives carried out two attacks that wounded french peacekeepers-~i'{ civilians and three soldiersassigned to the United Natiuns Interim ~urce in LebJnon (UNI~IL) missiun in suuthern Lebanon, according to the State 

Department,:\] But the plot t,ugeting the S,wdi ,unbass,ldur to \"{r,lshington was the most br,lzen uf all. 

On Octobcr 11, 2011, C.S. attorney general Eric Holder announced that charges had been flled in Nevl York against dual 

U,S,-Ir,Ulian citizen Mansour Arb,lbsiar ,Ulel. ,1 Qods Force commander for their alleged rules in ,1 plot tu murder the Saudi 

ambassador, Adel al-Jubeir. The plot had developed qUickly over just a few months, starting in spring 2011 and culminating 

with the arrest ofArbabsiar in September. According to the Jmtice Department, Arbab~iar told a DrA confIdential source 
28


80122b-6.eps

posing as an associate of a ~'1cxican drug cartel thar "his associates in Iran had discussed a number of violent missions for lthe 

source l and his assuciates to perform, including the murder ofthe Ambassador."'2 

The plot Iud fallen into the lap ufQods Furce planners just as they decided to unleash Unit 400 to attack the \"\!est, facilitatcd by an encomltcr bct\vcen the dejected Iranian-American and his cousin while the former visited family in Iran. 

Arbabsiar sent about:;; 1 00,000 in "\yirc transfers as a down payment for the assassination, and the money was deposited in an 

~BI undercuver account he thuught belonged to the assassin. In October 2012, Arbabsiar pleaded guilty to charges related to 

murder-f(lr-hire and conspiring to commit an act ofinternational terrorism.3~ 

Signaling that U.S. authorities had traced the plot to senior Iranian decisionmakers, the Treasury Department designatcd 

IRGC Qods ~orce commander Qasem Sokimani as a global terrorist for his role overseeing the officers involved in the 

plot,3+ British officials agreed, designating Soleimani and others inyolved in the plot themselves as wel1.35 At the U~ General 

Assembly, member states passed a resolution by an overwhelming majority deploring the plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador and calling on Iran to "cooperate with States seeking to bring to justiee all those who participated in the 

planning, sponsoring, organization ,md ,1ttempted execution uf the plot,:;6 This plot ,1gainst the S,lUlli diplom'lt, directorgeneral of MI'5 Jonathan Ev,ms explained in June 2012, was the work of the IRGC, to 'which he added, "and of course the 

IRCC leads straight back to the Iranian leadership."3~ Iranian leaders, U.S. intelligence concluded, now appeared willing to 

attack the United States in respunse to actiuns, real ur perceived, that Iranian ufficials thought 'oNere threatening the regime,o,g 

Indeed, Irem correctly perceived it was the target of a string of actions against its nuclear program, although Iranian leaders 

\vere \vrang to suspect the actions were part of a plot aimed at promoting regimc change. In September 2010, Iranian computer 

netwurks linked to uranium enrichment at the NatJllz facility were intected with the Stuxnet virus, leading tu the destruction 

of sume une thous,uH.l centrifuges, repurtellly part of ,1 U,S,-Israeli effurt code-turned Olympic Games,:;9 The next month, an 

explosion at an IRGC missile base leyeled most of the buildings and hUed seyentecn people, including Gen. Has~an Tehrani 

iVloghaddam, a Foundcr otIran's ballistic missile program.--10 

The Arbabsiar plot also underscorcd Qods Force leaders' willingness to work with criminal elements to further operational 

planning, perhaps as a means of countering enhanced law enForcement and intelligence eFForts. \Xlestern officials saw the 

same trend several mure times, perhaps must tellingl), in Baku. In Octuber 2011, signals intelligence intercepted emails suggesting Azeri criminal elements \1,'ith knov:n ties to Iranian intelligence and militant groups were planning to transfer weapons and explosives into Azerbaijan from Iran.+ ' OYer the next few weeb, weapons and operativcs-including at least ten 

Iranian recruits-"\yel'C smuggled into Azcrbaijan, where they met up "\yith other A7eri criminal recruits. 'l'he Azeris were 

strictly in it for the money and used their knowledge of the area to conduct sunreillance of a Jev..i.sh school, an Americanowned fd.st-food joint, the offlce of an oil company, the U.S. embassy, and specific C.S. diplomats. "They were going after 

individuals," a State Department oHlcial familiar with the ilwcstigation con£lnned. "They had names [ofemployce~J. And 

they were interested in family members, tuu ," j~ 

Over several months, the operatives planned what one investigator described as a "jumble of overlapping plots," including 

a~sassinating U.S. diplomats and a local rabbi or strilung other Jev..i.sh targets:13 One subplot involved snipers using rifles 

'.vith silencers; in another, a car bumb wuuld target U.S. embassy employees or their families. One plot was planned fur December 2011, anuther fur Febnl,uy 2012, Tugether, these \vere intended tu avenge the assassinatiuns of Iranian scientists, 

the captured leader of the network would later tell investigators,-t .. Some two dozen accomplices were arrested byamhorities 

in a series ot raids in A7erbaijan in early 2012, most of \vhom were local criminal recruits.'!) U.S. officials concluded the plots 

were uverseen by the Qods ~orce, 'with possible suppurt from H izballah, as part of a cuurdinated thirteen-month campaign 

targeting fureign diplumats in at least seven countries, 16 Accurding tu ,1 C,S, lenv enforcement official, Hizb,l11ah paid criminal gang members $150,000 each to target the Jewish school in nalm.--1~ 

!'v1canwhile, Hi7.ballah operativcs were busy planning operations to Fulfill their end ot the three-tiered plan: rargeting Is-
29


80122b-7.eps

raeli tourists abroad. Around the same time that authorities Foiled a January 2012 plot targeting Israeli vacationers in Bulgaria-just weeks ahead uf the anniversary uf i\:lughniyah's assassinatiun-another Hi:r,ballah plot was disrupted in Greeee. ls 

But it was halfway aeross the wurld, in Bangkok, where Israe1 and lucal authorities broke up a far mure ambitiuus Hizbalbh 

bid co targce Israe1 tourist~. 

On January 12, 2012, acting on a tip From Israeli intelligence, 'l'hai police arrested Hussein An'is-a Lebanese national 

who also carried a Swedish passport-at Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi Airport as he attempted to flee the country. Another 

suspect, whme police composite portrait scrongly resembled X aim Haris, a Hizballah recruiting agent whose phoco Israe1 

oHlciah had publicized a year earlier, escaped. \'(Tithin days, police \vould i~sue an arrese \varram for Atris's roomma[e, a leb 

anese man who went by the name "James Sammy Paolo."-l9 

Questioned over the vleekend of January 12, Atris led police to a three-story bUilding on the oU[skirts of Bangkok 

where he and his housemaee had stockpiled some 8,800 pounds of chemicals used to make explosives. The maeerials v;:ere 

already distillcd into crystal form, a seep in building bomb~.50 Information on internaeional shipping forms found at [he 

scene indicated <It least sume of the explosives-which were stured in b<lgs marked <lS cat 1tter-were intended to be 

shipped abroad, Intelligence officials surmised [hat Hizballah had been using Thailand as an explosives hub-Anis had 

renced the ~pace a year earlier-and decided to me its on-hand operatives and material [() target Israeli tourists. The con 

elusiun should nut have been a surprise: C.S. officials had already determined that Hi:rballah was knuwn to use Bangkok 

as a logistics and transportatiun hub, describing the city <lS "a center fur <1 rHizballahl couine <Uld money-laundering 

network."5 1 

At the SMIle time that Hizb<dlah operatives were nmning sloppy uperatiuns <uound the world, the Qods Furce was doing the 

same ,u1<.l worse. \XThile coumerterrorism officials worried aboU[ [he increased operational tempo ofIranian-sponsored [errorism, including both operations carried out by Hi7.ballah and the Qods Force's ne\v Unit 400, their concern Focused on 

'l'ehran's aggressive pusture md intent to h;:mll \Vestern interests. 'l'he fact that Iran's intentions were not yet coupled with 

the c<lp<lbility to act effectively un them gave \X;'estern ufficials unly so much cumfurt. In time, they feared, both Hizb<lllah 

and ehe Qods Force \yould be capable of carrying Out deadly attacks targeting \'{T estern interests. The pace of Unit 400' s 

planned attacks underscored just ho"\y determined Iran was to attack \,(lestern interests. Yet the Failure of all these plots 

pointed tu the new unit's still-limited capabilities. 

The American ambassador to Baku may have breathed a sigh of relief \vhen the plot targeting him and his staff was dis 

rupted in February 2012, bm ocher diplomatic missions across ehe globe would endure their own close calls at the hands of 

the Qods Force. 52 Five attacks targeting \Vcstern diplomats were scheduled to be carried om as close to the February 12 an 

niversary of !vlughniyah's assassination as possible. The plot in Baku was foiled; another in Turkey was delayed; others 

would play out in India, Georgia, 

and Thailand.53 

On February 13, twin bumbings t<ugeted personnel from the Isueli embassies in Nev,,- Delhi, Indi<l, <Uld Tbilisi, Geurgi<l. 

In both cases, Qods force operatives encountered more sophisticated security arrangements than <mticipated and so they 

settled for modest strikes. In India, an assailant on a moton.:yde attached a magnetized "sticky bomb" to a car taking the 

Israeli defense attache's wife tu pick up her children at school; the blast injured the '.vuman, her driver, and a few bystanders. 

About three hours later, in Geurgi<l, a similar sticky-bomb attack targeted <1 local citizen empluyed by the embassy, but was 

discovered and defused before doing any harm.s", Just a month earlier, the deputy director of Iran's uranium enrichment 

Facility at Natanz, iVlostaFa Ahmadi Roshan, was killed in a nearly identical sticky-bomb attack. Roshan was the firth Iranian 

scientist to be assassinated, and the use of sticky bumbs to target Israeli diplumats was a nut-so-subtle message uf retaliatiun 

fromIr<ul.~) 

The next day, February 14, in central Bangkok, police rushed to the scene of an explosion in the early afternoon at a 

home rented by a gronp of Iranians. Two bareFoot 111en fled the house, bm a third was injured and tried to hail a taxi to es-
30


80122b-8.eps

capc. \X1hcn the taxi rcruscd to stop, the injured man thrC\\' a bomb at thc car, dcstroying haIr thc vchiclc and injuring the 

driver and four bystanders. Police soon cornered the injured suspect, whu tried tu throw another explusive at them but \vas 

tau weak; the reslJiting explusion blew uffbuth his legs, The other twu men were soon eallght-one was detained at the airport as he tricd [0 catch a Hight to i\:falaysia; the othcr managed [0 cscapc to .!v'lalaysia, whcre hc was arrcstcd boarding a 

Right to Iran. A Malaysian COUrt ruled hc would be extraditcd to 'l'hailand. A fourth SUSpCct, an Iranian \voman who rcntcd 

the huuse, was believed to have tled tu Irdll.,,6 

Cnlike the Hizballah plot foiled just v;:eeks earlier in Thailand, in this plot Qods force operatives were targeting Israeli 

diplomats, Thai invcstigators dctcrmincd. At the sccnc of thc explosion, authoritics found sevcral undctonatcd dcyiccs, all 

homemadc magnctic sticky bombs of thc same t)'PC uscd in India and Gcorgia. 57 In timc, inycstigators would tie the thrce 

attacks together not only based on the explosives used but through phone records, travel documents, and money transfers, 

About a dozen Qods force operatives coordinated their preparations for the attacks, \vhich begd.n ten months earlier in April 

20ll-not long after press reports tied the Sruxnet virus [0 Israel and the United States and the assassination ofIranian nu 

clear scientist IvL1jid ShahriHi tu Israel. Th,lt month, Iunian opeutives traveled tu Inlh,l and Thailand tu scope uut targets, 

followed by more trips in the summer and tl11 of 2011 to rent apartments, hire local help, arrange finances, and conduct surveillance. During his 20 11 reconnais~ance yisits to India, Houshang Afshar Irani, identifIed by Indian police as the assailant 

who attached the bomb to the Israeli diplomatic vehicle in New Delhi, used a cell phune number that was also used in June 

2011 in Tbilisi,'i8 According to Isueli officials, cell phune ulls ,Uld text messages between oper,ltives in Thailand, India, ,111\.1 

Azerbaijan also link the att<lcks,5'" Based on these findings and more, U,S, counterterrorism officials concluded that Iran was 

tied to the terrorist plots in Azcrbaijan, Georgia, India, and 'l'hailand.60 

In the case uf the Thailand plut, seniur Qods Force cummander Majid Alavi reportedly arrived un the scene on January 

19,2012, ,lher tr,lveling through Mat1ysia un ,1 diplumatic passpurt bearing a fictitious name, Responsible for Qods Force 

Cnit 400, Alavi previously tracked Iranian dissidents in places as varied as London and Los Angeles. It was Alavi who ordered the attacks on Israeli diplomats to occur as closc to the anniversary ofl'vlughniyah's dcath as possible.61 

Yet despite the direct oversight of seniur Qods Furce officers, the attacks not unly failed but also demunstrated pathetic 

tradecraft and operational security-the vcry strengths for which the Qods force is usually knov,'1l. Aside from reusing 

phone numbers and SIM cards across multiple operations, operatives traveled on Iranian pa~sports, checked in to hotels as 

Iranians, carried Iranian currency in their \vallcts, and in at least one instance took oH- timc from their surveillance to party 

with prostitutes. A group photo on one of the women'~ cell phones helped identify accomplice~ who fled the country.(,.!- In 

the words of one flabbergasted analyst, "It's as iftherc's a systematic policy of Iran recruiting low rent, downright kooky 

teITorists."63 

Inste,ld uf restoring Iun's dmuged prestige, the attacks unly further underscured Iun's operatiolullimitatiuns, Following the 2009 ereen Revolution in Iran, the Qods force gained prominence at the expense of the Ministry of Intelligence 

and Security (MOIS) over the latter's perceiyed soft· handed approach to suppressing political protests. \,\lithin the Qods 

Force, qUick promutiuns of mediucre managers diluted the group's professional capabilities at the management level.61 Desperate tu qUickly implement its new uffensive strategy md e.x:act revenge for cuvert attacks against Ir,Ul'S nuclear program, 

the Qod~ force traded speed for tradecraft and cut corners-compounding the problem. Qods force planner~ \vere 

stretched thin by the rapid tempo of their ne\v attack plan, and were forced to throw together random teams of operatives 

who had nut trained together.6'i 

\X;' urse, despite Iran's preference for signature attKks ,1gainst emb,lssies, diplum,lts, or uther uffici,ll targets-,Uld despite 

concerns by U.S. intelligcnce that Iran was developing contingency plans for such attacks targeting the United States and its 

allies-Iranian planners found their chosen targets too \vell protected and settled for less-hardened targets.D6 In the end, not 

one of the nve planned attacks could be considered.1n uperatiunal success. Ever since, lsueli ottlcials say, the frustrated iranian operatives have been "trying harder than eyer" co execute successful attacks.c'-

Indecd, the operational tempo \vould continuc apacc. In l\.'farch 2012, thc Israeli :'\ational Security Council's Counterterrorism Bureau warned of terrorist threats against je\vish and Israeli targets in 'l'urkey. According to the Turkish press, the 

warning came less than a week after Israeli intelligence tipped off Turkish authorities about a Qods force plot to be carried 
31


80122b-9.eps

out by at least four individuals ·who crossed the border from Iran armed with \yeapons and materials.68 'l'he plm, again targeting Israeli diplumats, had uriginally been timed tu coincide with the other plots in February but was pustponed.69 In May, 

yet anuther Hizballah attack targeting Israeli tourists was thw,uted, this time at the Johannesburg airpurt in Suuth Africa,7o 

Also in ~:farch, forty-year- old Hamid Kashkouli, an Iranian PhD studem at the Cniyersity ofPune in India, wa~ deported for spying on Israeli narionals, a Jc-wish center, and a synagogue. According to Indian police, Kashkouli, who worked as a 

paid undercover agent uf the iranian government, traveled regularly tu the Iranian cunsulate in lvfumbai, where Ir~lllian guvernment offIcials met him, according to his driver. Intercepted emails revealed he \vas providing Iranian offlcials ¥lith pictures ofJewish people in the area and reponing on their business dealings.'l 

In June 2012, anthoritks in ::\ airobi, Kenya, arrested twO Iranian nationals, both of them purportedly Qods Force operatiyes,~~ Prior to the two men's arrest, Kenyan police reported, they had scouted out the Israeli embassy, the British 

High Commission, and other sites, leading authorities to conclude the pair were planning attacks targeting Israeli, U.S., 

British, or Saudi Arabian interests in Kenya or elsewhere in Africa.~3 The day after their arrest, one of the two operatives 

led ,1lIthorities to thirty-three pounds of RDX explusives hidden under ,1 bllSh ,It the 1-fombas,1 Golf Club, uverluoking 

the Indian Ocean,!""' In a seeming effort to deflect attention from Iran, the Iranian operatives had apparently partnered 

\yith al- Shabab, the al- Qaeda -afflliated terrorist group in Somalia. This tie underscored how desperate Tehran was to see 

successful attacks carried uut. Indeed, that interest has only grO\vn more acute, as efforts to disrupt Iran's nuelear prugram-from s,Ulctions to assassilutions to covert s'lbuuge of equipment-cuntinue to g,lin mumentum, 

On July 7, a month after the Kenya plot was exposed, Cypriot authorities raided the hotel room of a twenty-four-yearold Lebanese-Swedish man traveling on a foreign passport. The suspect had in his possession photographs of Israeli targets 

in Cyprus, alung with infurmation on buses carrying Israeli tuurists and Israeli flights tu and from the island natiun, Accurding to press reports, the suspect initially denied ties tu terrorist ,lCtivity but Llter ,H.1mitted to being ,1 Hizballah 

operatiye.75 

l'ragically, Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria, were less fortunate. On July 18, 2012, at the height of the summer tourist 

season, a bomb destroyed one of seven tour buses in a caraVJIl, killing the Bulgarian bus driver and five Israelis and wounding 

some thirty morc.7

(, [rom the outset, Israeli officials publicly insisted-and anonymous American and British ofHciah conflrmed-that lebanese Hizballah was behind [he attack~~ "\""\le arc confldem withom any doubt," Israeli defense minister 

Ehud Barak rold CN::\, "about the responsibiliry of He7.bollah lfor] the actual execution of the operation-preparation, 

planning md execurion."7g ::--Jor, officials added, \"laS the attack the \llork of rogLle Hizballah gLlnmen. "Nobody pmhes the 

button in Burgas without ::--Jasrallah's approyal," explained an Israeli official close to the investigation.~~ 

In the months that followed, more threats arose, prompting Israeli travel advisories covering countries hom Cyprus and 

Greece to Thailand, Bulg,uia, ,11H.1 Ckuine.8o All tuld, more th,Ul twenty terror attacks by Hizballah ur Quds Force operatives ,vere th,varted over the fifteen-month period betvleen May 2011 and July 2012: by another count, nine plots were Llncovered over the flrst nine months of 20 12. ,~1 The key to all these attacks, however, whether carried out by Hizballah or the 

Quds .borce, was deniability. Buth Hizballah and 'l'ehran '.yanted attacks carried out, but neither \''<Ulted to invite ,1 fullfledged military response t,ugeting them b,lCk in Leb,Ulun or Iun, Indeed, ever since the July 2006 \V,U between Israel MId 

Hizballah, Na~rallah has reportedly refmed to approve any attacks along the I~rael-Lebanon border for fear of ~parking another full-scale war.~E 

Contrary tu cunventiun,tl wisdum, however, while Hizballah ,md the Qods Force have worked tugether un sume plotsBaku in 2008, Istanblll in 2009, MllOng uthers-in other C,lses they f,liled tu decunflict their operational activities and found 

themselves engaged in completely disparate operations in the same place. \Vhen Hi7.ballah operatives laid the groundwork 

for a bombing in late 201 I-early 2012 in Bangkok, they were apparently unaware that the Qods Force was also preparing 

for an attack in the same city. \Xlhether the Quds Force was, in turn, ignorant of Hizbalbh's .lCtivities there is unclear, but 

the Iranians appear not to have known Hizballah was using Bangkok as an explosives distribution hub. And L'yen once Hizballah operative Hussein Atris was arrested in January 2012, the Qods Force operation there was not suspended. Similarly, 

within days after rhe explosion in Burgas-while the investigation into the bombing and the search for accomplices \vas at its 

height-Bulgarian authorities reportedly caught a Qods force operative scoping out a synagogue in the capital, So£af3 
32


80122b-10.eps

Even as HLr,ballah remains committed to exacting revenge fur Mughniyah's death, IjO leaders grudgingly have begun tu appreciate the difFiculty ufhitting ,1 high-level Israeli abro,ld, Such targets are typically well protected, su while Hizballah oper-

<ltional planners have cuntinued to search for viable urgets <lbroad, they have initiated pafdilelptms for attKks targeting 

Israeli oHkials inside IsraeL,';'! By leveraging networks of criminal associates who rypically trade intelligence for drugs, and 

sometimes recruiting Israeli Arabs thruugh ideologiCdI appeals to spy for the group, Hi;,ballah pursued at least t\vu plots 

targeting ISfdeh officials 'within the country 'within a three-munth periud in 2012, buth of which were dnvarted,S'i 

!vkam.vhile, Iran has leveraged Hizballah's operational capabilities to actiYcly support the regime ofllashar aI-Assad 

in Syria. Hizballah, the Treasury Department reyealed in August 2012, had been providing "training, advice and exten 

sive logistical support to the Guvernment of Syria's increasingly rurhless efforts" against the uppusitiotl.~6 Must funerals 

t(H those killed in the fighting were quiet affairs, a~ Hizballah tried to keep a lid on the eA'tent of its activities in Syria, 

but news began to leak.s7 Hizballah's "resistance" rhetoric notwithstanding, U.S. oHlcials inf(lIllled the UN Security 

Council in October 2012, "the truth is plain to sec: :\"asrallah's fighters arc now part of Assad's killing machine."88 '1\yo 

months later, a UN report confirmed Hizballah members were in Syria fighting on behalf of the Assad government.~9 

By that time, reports had already emerged that Hizballah had set up small training camps near Syrian chemical weapons 

depots in Noyember 2012. According to one senior U.S. oHlcial, "The fear these weapons could fall into the wrong 

hands is uur greatest cuncern,"90 

'l'he net efFect ufIran's shado'.\' war against the \'\fest is that Hizballah and the Quds ~urce have climbed back up the list of 

inunedi<lte thre,lts f'King the Cnited St<ltes and its <lilies, In July 2012, 1\·CTC directur 1-Lltthew Olsen warned dut while 

Iran and Hizballah had not yet hit targets in the United States, U,S, officials vlorry that could soon change, "\X-T e're seeing a 

general uptick in the level of acrivity around the world," he noted, adding that "both HC7.bollah and the Qods Force have 

demonstrated an ability tu operate essentially glubally." In fact, the Hizballah-Quds ~urce threat has sometimes eclipsed 

dut of <ll-Q<leda, Olsen continued: "There are times when we <ue briehng the \"{!hite House run terror threats andl at the 

top of the list arc Hezbollah or Iran.">'] 

l'hese threats are quite real, despite the failure of Hizballah and the Qods Force to register many successes in their recent 

operational blitz. In the case ufHil',ballah, this poor track recurd has much to do with the atrophying ufthe gruup's uperational capabilities after 9111. [or the Qods force, it reflects Tehran's desperate desire to exact quick revenge t(H covert at 

tacks against its nuclear program. Hizballah and the Qods Force traded speed for tradecraft and reaped what they sowed. In 

some cases, Iranian agenrs employed laughable operational security: in others, Iran dispatched bungling agents, like the Iranian-.. American car salesman 1'iansour Arbabsiar. But the recent failures of Hizbailah and the Qods force give \X-Testern 

counterterrorism offlcials little comf(lrt. As: the attack in Burgas demonstrated, terrorists learn from their mistakes, evolve, 

and adapt, and with sufHciem determination they may carry out successful attaclcs even after a long string offailures. 

Indeed, officials fear dBt both Hizbalt-lh <uH.l the Qods Force are lik.ely to recover from their operatiulBI sluppiness, 

Tme, the world in general and the \'\'est in particular have become far more Vigilant over the past several years, making it 

more diffkult than bef()re t(H terrori~t groups to execute successful attacks. But Iranian leaders appear committed to a policy 

of targeting \"\/estern interests, not unly in places where countermeasures may be cumparatively underdeveloped (e.g., AI',erbaijan, Bulgari<l, India, Georgi<l, Thailand) but, if uppurtllnities present themselves, even in wurld capitals like \1Vashingtun, 

D ,C, To be sure, .Arbabsiar's gUilty plea ends one chapter in Iran's shadow war against the \'Vest, but authorities must remain 

watchful for rhe plots yet to come. 

1. 
33


80122b-11.eps

October 10,2012, hITP:! !",-\,.,\-,hm-tl'Ct~llry.g()"1. lik.',-::fin_):u,,-__ rCrn1r1<'ln __ nc,ricc_J 0] OlLpdf. 

2. C.S. l)'p"'tnKntc,fju"i,-,., c.m,-,- of l'ul,li,-'\ff"i",~T\'i'O Iv1en Charged in .:\lkgcd Plot toAssa~~inatc Saudi Arabian lunbas3. Benjamin \\rei~er, "P •• ,,,h, ... ,,,, n .. , .. ']. Bomb Plot," Kew York Time, OLtober4, 2012, 

4. Jame~ Clapper, "Statement for the Record on the \'<7orldwide Threat A~~emnent of the u.s. Intelligence Community for the 

Ii0lls<O' Permant Select Committee on 

6. U.S. Department ofDetense, "C[)A--/"II;]i""T lPow'e>' "th"n," Cnd",ifl"d R.ep"n on lvfilit"TPm"e",n,·an.Apdi 

brach intelligcllce official, intt'Tvi .... v by author, TdAviv,JlU1C 3, 2008. 

8. 

9. James R. Clapper, "Unclassified Statement for the Record 011 the \\i'orldwide Threat Assessment of the u.s. Intelligence 

Community tOr the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence." January 31. 2012. 

htt;,P",,".v.t,w'-S!;'·p.'oo"g'N!2')12_h,-'iJl)11~chrp('r.pdf 

10 I'"Lmhe\\' C. Olsen, 

11 "I IeI.bollah." in \Xlorld Almanac ot'hlami'iIn 201 L chid·ed. nan ilerman (l.anham, :vfI): Rowman & Littlefield, 20111-

httf';/.I <llm8 nJCJrpcorg/hc7bollah. 

12. Matthew Leyitt. ~lran 's Support tOr T errori~m in the 1'Gddk Ea~t," te~timony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rdatiom. Suh.:ormnittee on Kear Fa~tern and Central A~ian At+air~,July 25, 2012. http://\\u/\\ wa~hingwnin\tit·ut('.ori4/poli,;y 

<In,lly~i~ hri('T,v/ir<l11$-S,lrrOl·t·j:or-tf>rrorism-in·the-m:,--llic-ca$t 

1"1 Israeli counterterrorism ofHcial, interview by author, Tel Aviv, !vlarch 17, 200g 

14. Isradi ~-OlJlltcrtcrrorhm offid.al, interview by ,111 thor, d ;\.V<V, ''l>t>'B,l,,-, 13, :W 1 :'; l),mklEdkhe,n, "Hczbollah Plans Attack~ 

IS. 

16 I\{uh:umnadSahirni, "Report: Iranian 

17. Alan Cowell. ~Blast Kills Physic~ Professor in Tehran," Kew York Time~,January 12. 2010, 

;,ytimc .. Lolf)/201 \l/O 1,.' 13/1\ orld.'mi!idlt,t'a',t/l jiun htrnl 

18 Israeli intelligence officials, interview hy author, September 11,2012 

19. Ibid. 

20. Ibid. 

21. Ibid. Sebastian Rotella, 'Before Deadly Bulgaria Bombing, T rack~ of a Resurgcll t Iran-Hezhollah Threat," Foreign Policy, July 

30,2012, 

22. hraeli intelligence offi..:iah. interview by author, September U. 2012. 

10 
34


80122b-12.eps

2.l Alexandra Sandd~, ",,,,,ut, M,,,"«J5.,,·,,,,,,, remn K"pmctm,g on, j\JJcgc,' l,an "py IKmg, 

24. hradi intdligen..:e oHkials. interview by author, September 13. 2012. 

25 Attila Somfalvi 

26. Isradi intdligcnce oHlcials. in terview by author, September 13. 2012. 

10,2011 

27. Yaakov Lappin, "Hezbollah Terror Attack on lsradisAbroad 'Is Imminent',' JcrllSakm Pmt, April 21, 2011, 

28 Abdullah Povian, «Ka~rallah: All Who Referred to the 'Scud' Did So without Providing Fvidence, but \X,Te Are Able to IVfeet 

Defense Commitments," al-Rai al-Aam (Ktr1.vait), April 30, 2010; see aho "Na~rallah to RaiAam: No EvidelKe \X'a~ Presented 

::~u~~c;Y~;i:,~~~~::~p~:~,::~ra~~~~.~~,~~:'~'~!~':';':::::~~~,~:i~:,:~:~,~~~;~Y~~~~~(~~(~:Jn5/lJ2"'U.2%f,O~';c,::,,w,,J],,lHo "i 

29. David Ignatius, "'lntelligencE' llllk:s Iran to Saudi Diplomat's .!vlurdeI," Washington Post, October 13, 2011, 

30. 

:n. U.). Department of)rate, Bllre:'lll ofCountertcrrorism, COllllrry Reporb on T~Trorism 2011 (July 2012), pp. n5-2.~6, 

32 U.S. Department ofJustice, Oftlce of Public Affairs, «Two i\fen Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambas-

~ador to the Unired Starn," press release, October 11, 2011, hrtp::, h"n,-.jl1stkc.g,)l'iop,1ipr/20t 1/Cktcbnii1-ag-J 339.htl1J1. 

Jj. U.s. Department ofJu~tice, Ott-lce of Public Attairs, "'lv[an Plead~ Guilty in :-re\Y York to Conspiring \vith Iranian Military Of· 

fkials to A~~a~~inate Saudi Arabian Arnba'isd(iof to the United State~," pre~~ relea~e, October 17, 2012, 

http://v.'T\'\,;.jnstk(,.~''7/op;1 ipr/2(lJ 2/0ctor.crl 12-ag-l 2.'51.htmL 

34. u.s. Department of the Treasury. "'Tr-casury Sanctions Fivc Individuals Tied to Iranian Plot toAs~agginate the Saudi Arabian 

Amba~~ador to the Cnited State~," press release. O,,1:ober 11,2011, hup:/,'w"\ ·., .. Lnc,tmn.gm/pn-,,< n:nkf/'rrc,,' 

rdca$\'~/p;Jg(':;/ tf."l ;20.~,~px. 

,\ II,,· ~L,k"ty',T"e,,","V IJ'eoactment."'Ceneral Notice: I{elle,\'al ot Final Designations, Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 201 0," 

36. 

37. Jon,,,,",,n tva"" 'Address ar rhe Lord !vlayor'~Anllllal Defence and Seolriry Le~·ture," London,June 25, 2012, 

38 

Sd,xt (:onuni,ttcconlnt<.u;g"ncc.112th Congo 2dScs~ .. JallUary 31,2012. 

39 Ell,'n l':ab,hi,naacndjob:y W'aHick "Stuxnet \'<7a~ \'<7ork oflI.S. and Israeli Experb, Otllciah Say." \XTa~hington Pmt.June 1. 

40. Ken Dilanian, Myvtnioo,dlL,,(v, Sb:yinF:' S"gg,·,t l:ov<at l'fTm,,, i,n hem, L,,, i\ngckv .Lim,·" I.leo"m!,,"' 'f, 2(JI I, 

41 

4'> lbid. 

43 Tbid 

44. Ibid. 

Of\;dab a,nongtl« Ta'·g<"",fjcan.l.ink"d .A"""i''"ti"n P1",," W"hinM"n Post, May 27. 2012, 

4'5. "Azerbaijan Arrest~ Twenty-Two Smpect~ in AllegeJ Iran Spy Plot,' BBC.lvfar..:h 14, 2012, 

http:,' /'lI'l.,'"\~'.blx.,-"o.l1k;1H·"\yc/"\\-ofld-('umpc-l ;1(,8')76. 

46. Joby \Varridc, "U.S. Officials affiongthe Targets oflran-Linked Assassination Plots," \\'ashington Post, May 27, 2012, 

11 
35


80122b-13.eps

4"'" Judith Miller. "Bageh and Plot~: Kote~ on the :-.J\rpD's IIigh I Ioly Days Threat Briefing," City Journal (:-.Jew York), September 

7,2012. httl'" w\,\ w.cit, jOUIu"Lorg/2(!l2/t;'uuOI)C7pfl.honL 

48, brae1 official, intervic>v by author, T cl A...-iy, Scptember 13, 2012. 

49 

50 

51. lwhti"glcmot C:,,,c, Ihai Poli~'e Seize Chemicah," Nnv York Times, January 16, 2012, 

52 "W",I~;n'",," Pmt, !vIay 27, 2012. 

53, brae1 intelligence officials. intervil.. ..... v by author, Septcmber 13. 2012, 

54, Ethan Bronner, "Israel .)ay~ Iran is Behind Bomb~," Nnv York Times, }<'ebruary 13, 2012, 

http:,' \nnv.nytimes tOlT.f20 1 :::/02/ 14/'1mrlc1 / mldrllee:1;t I i. ~radi-emhassy-othd81 -8tta( kCr1-in-ind b-aw 1-

55, Rick Clad stone, 

56 "Bangkok Bla~t SmpITt'i 'Targeting Israeli Diplomat~'," nBC. February 16, 2012, llctp:,I/~\,\~\\ .blK.c(!.uk/llew\,'"odd-a<,i.lJ7(55)(C 

57, 

58 Ja~on Burke, ~Tran \,las behind Bomb Plo' 'g"i"" h,diDir,loo,"", 1" ,,,"iig""" lfi",\," (;u,,-,li," (I.ondon),June 17, 2012, 

59, NidlObsKlili~h and.lodi Rudorm, "PlorsAre Tied to Shadow \'(:ar oflsrad and lran: l\C\V York Tilne~, August S, 2012, 

hlf"; ;"",'w,n-,li<e,,,,,_om:2012!08:0'i/wmlc!!,nid,.Ucc,<t'·-m,_,,kyrlotHcd ,<t,.",",ti,']-to,],a.J,·" ':,\df ,~,f iLm ,md 

60, 

and Goyernmental Affairs, September 

19'+(;202012,ty.;L(ISfR,p,1i. 

I Iomeland Security 

61. Seba~tian Rotella, «Before Deadly Bulgaria Bombing, Tra..:ks ofa Remrgent Tran-He/bollah Threat," f.oreign Policy, July 30, 

2012. 

62. Thomas r:uller and Rick (~lad~tone, 'B\c""i" F~an~~kok, A,ld t<, Su'pi,;o""boutl,,,,," I"" yo,k l[i",,, 

17,2012, 

64, "Iran: IRGC Ri~e lncrease~ the Influence of RaJi":dh," OX±ordAnalyti..:a, ;\ovember 5. 200~. 

httr://'.v\'-'''"'.o,,an.cc·rn/di'rhy,,'~p\:rItemTD-=-. DB 1 5 )404. 

12 
36


80122b-14.eps

65. Judith Miller, "llagch<HKil'!,,,,,l\o,a'H'" tl>e ~nr'l)', Hillh 110!)1 D"p ',['1,"1<" !J,ic'finp,," CritL/ow"",! (",,'w '(0,1,), ;;cptunlw, 

7, 2012. hap: .'w\\'v .. <:itv ,,,,o',ulmg/20W,,o;,<]')C"!i",J,u,", 

66. Statement ofDenni~ C. Blair, Annual Threat A~~e~sment ofthe Intelligence Community Hearing before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "''''',on:g" Ln" ,'m" "<,oma,yo, LU 'U, 

67. brae1 intelligcllcc officials. in tervicw by author, September 13. 2012. 

69 Israeli intelligence ot'Hcials. intervie\\' hyauthor, September 13.2012 

70. hamar Eichnn, Tlvl Reveals: SouthAfrka Attack against lsradh 'l'lnvarted;' Ynetnews.com,july 20, 2012, 

71 Citesh Shelke, 'han;a" Sp, \1(7a, PhDStu,c!,nt atUoP 

73. Danid Ho\\Jen. Im,ian Agent>' A,mt,d in Keny" W",'lo,aki"g I,,, I"""ign 

74. 

~mpcdnl-of-tc:"r:)f-pbr.ht~nl. 

76, 

Nichola~ Kuli~h and Eric S<:hmitt, 'He/hollah Is Blamed for Attack on 1"",;1'"",;«,;n ]>"',,,,;,," l',1"" 

78. \X; olf Blitzer. ~Intcrview with hradi Defen~e 1\'fini~tcr Ehuu Barak,' The Situation Room, CNN, J nIl' 30, 2012, 

hrtp://tr:ln~crirts ,-nn.com.'TRAl'-iSCRTPT5/1 2()7/?1(l/sirl'~om.()2.hcmL 

79. israe1 offkial, intervk"\y by author, 'l'clAviv, September 1.), 2012. 

19, 

~O. Gili Cohen, "'israeli Counterterrorism Bure:lu \X-'arns of Attach on isr:ldis during lligh_llolidays;' 1 baretz, September 6, 

~l. hamar Eichner, "PM Reveals: South Afdca Attack against Israelis Thwarted;' Ynctnews.com,july 20, 2012, 

~2. brae1 intelligence offidals, interview by ,HI thor, September 13, 2012. 

83, Ibid, 

84, Ibid, 

IluringflS Yaakov Kat!" Yaakov Lappin. dnd Ben Hartman, "Sh;n F~,tl\ab, F'pio,;",S,"uggiing" hd;,A,ak"jIT",ai,,"Po;t, Aug"" 9, 

86. C.S. Department ofthe T reasmy, "T reamry De~igI1ate~ HiLballah Le--.adership," pre~~ rdea~e. September 13, 2012. 

http: '/',-,,'-,Y.rrc;l.mr:,.,Q:o'+!r(('s~-cent('r/rreg~-rdn~c~/P:lg(''' q;17' lS'.asp>:. 

87. Inu,a,'" S,uppoctf<,,' "Sy,;an Regime, U.S. and l.ebanese Oftlciab Say," \Xla~hingt()n Post, 

S'p",n,b" 26, 201.2. ['''P': i"cli"b."""',ingtu"p,s'.,o",,,2'Oi2 G~)- 26/\\ orlu/ 3)"1'-.J'd28_ l_Jt"ba!1e~,- g0V(~mmt'nt he .. dJoliah 

13 
37


80122b-15.eps

g~L Edith !vL Lederer, "U.S. Says Hezbolbh Is Parr of Assad's \,\-'ar !vladline," A~sodarcd Pre~s, O~·tober 15,2012, 

~9. United l\arions, Office of the lligh Commissioner for 1 ruman Rights, Indt:>pendent Intt:>rnarional Commission oflnquiryon 

the 5yrianl\rab Rcpub1c cstabli~hcd pursuant to Unitcd:.Jations Human Rights COlUlCil Resolutions 5-17/1, 1')/22 and 

21/26. DeLelnber 20, 2012, http:'/\~\,,\-v"iJIKhT,org-.·DcLllrnult.',/C>)UntT;L~/SY/C:)lSyri,tDccelnber2012 pdt: 

90 

91. Noah Shachtman. "'Hot ~('a;' En"p,;,'gw;thl,an To], T,nm-W."ch", '\'Va,·n."W;,,,ljluiy2('.2012, 

14 
38


80122b-1.eps
39

Mr. POE. Ambassador Noriega. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROGER NORIEGA, FOUNDER 

AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, VISION AMERICAS LLC 

(FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE 

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES) 

Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I applaud 

you and other members of the subcommittee for focusing attention 

on the global threat posed by Hezbollah, and I thank you for inviting me to share insights about that terrorist organization’s growing 

network in the Americas that carries that threat to our doorstep. 

Mr. Sherman and Dr. Levitt referred to the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Buenos Aires for which Hezbollah is considered responsible, 

and Iran. This is Hezbollah’s despicable legacy in the Americas, 

and that terrorist group, along with Iran, has returned to the scene 

of the crime. During the last decade, Hezbollah has extended its 

reach quickly and substantially in dozens of countries in the Americas. 

This surge can be attributed to two key facts. Hezbollah counts 

on the direct political, diplomatic, material, and logistical support 

of governments, including one in this region, Venezuela, which has 

little in common with Iran but its hostility to the United States. 

Also, to facilitate its smuggling, money laundering, training, and 

fund-raising activities, Hezbollah collaborates with well-financed 

drug traffickers and narco-guerrilla groups with deep roots in the 

region and sophisticated smuggling and money laundering networks worldwide. 

I believe this challenge must be understood as the product of a 

conscious strategy of rogue regimes, Iran and Venezuela, to wage 

asymmetrical warfare against the United States’ security interests 

and allies close to the homeland. This unconventional challenge in 

each of its political, criminal, and terrorist components requires a 

much more robust and comprehensive response. Allow me to share 

some of the details that explain the breadth and the depth of what 

Hezbollah is up to in our hemisphere. 

Two terrorist networks proselytize, fund-raise, recruit and train 

operatives on behalf of Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas. One of these parallel networks is operated by the Lebaneseborn Ghazi Atef Nassereddine Abu Ali. That Nassereddine clan is 

based in Venezuela. And another is managed by Mohsen Rabbani, 

a former Iranian diplomat and Muslim cleric who is wanted for his 

role in those 1992 and 1994 bombings. 

Hezbollah operatives and their radical anti-Semite allies, anti-Semitic allies, use their senior positions in the Venezuelan Government to provide logistical, material, and even diplomatic and political support to help Hezbollah and other terrorist groups grow 

stronger very close to our homeland. In recent years, the Chavez 

regime has sent weapons to Hezbollah and it has shipped refined 

fuel to Hezbollah’s allies in Iran and Syria. Venezuela’s Margarita 

Island has become a safe haven for terrorists and drug smugglers. 

Hezbollah operates numerous businesses and safe houses in Venezuela and it has provided terror training in that country for reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:29 Apr 15, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\_TNT\032013\80122 HFA PsN: SHIRL
40

cruits from that country as well as from other countries in Latin 

America. 

Numerous Latin American governments have detained Iranian 

and Lebanese and other persons carrying authentic Venezuelan 

passports among the thousands of Venezuelan passports and other 

documents that were issued to people of Middle Eastern background in the last dozen years. The state-owned airline of Venezuela, Conviasa, provides Iran, Hezbollah, and associated 

narcotraffickers a surreptitious means to move personnel, weapons, 

contraband, and other material in and out of this hemisphere. The 

Lebanese drug lord, Ayman Joumaa, was indicted in the United 

States in November 2011 for running cocaine-smuggling and 

money-laundering schemes that benefitted Hezbollah. His network, 

which laundered as much as $200 million a month, involved criminal associates and corrupt businesses in Colombia, the United 

States, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, as well as Lebanon. Also, in 

recent years, Mexico has arrested numerous individuals associated 

with Hezbollah engaging in various criminal activities, including 

smuggling of persons across the U.S. southwest border. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the foregoing discussion about the 

facts on the ground would lead most reasonable observers to conclude that Hezbollah is a problem in the Americas that can no 

longer be ignored, and I will highlight just a few recommendations 

on how we ought to respond. 

First, congressional leadership is absolutely essential, and pressure from this body is really important to get executive branch 

agencies to act more decisively. Legislation that Mr. Sherman referred to, I think the chairman referred to as well, passed by this 

Congress with strong bipartisan support late last year requires the 

State Department to report to Congress on Iran’s activities in the 

region and to provide a strategy for countering this threat. This 

committee must insist on a whole-of-government response from the 

State Department. In some cases, you might decide that more resources are needed by the intelligence or law enforcement organizations responding to the threat, but also political will is just as important, and that requires pressure and oversight to ensure that 

the executive branch acts responsibly and rigorously. 

The links between Venezuelan officials and state-run agencies 

with drug trafficking, terrorism, Iran, and Hezbollah must be on 

the table as the State Department presents tough conditions for 

normalizing bilateral relations with Venezuela in a post-Chavez 

era. In the meantime, this criminal activity must be publicized and 

punished in the form of Federal indictments. Administrative sanctions are good interim measures; however, the Department of Justice should be asked, where are the indictments? 

And finally, the narcoterrorism on our doorstep advanced by 

Hezbollah with Iranian and Venezuelan support demands a response from those whose job it is to keep us safe. Our Government 

must take effective measures to disrupt and dismantle illicit operations and neutralize unacceptable threats before it is too late. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. The rest of 

their testimony will be made part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Noriega follows:]

41


80122c-1.eps

TESTIMONY OF 

AMBASSADOR ROGER F. NORIEGA 

BEFORE THE 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NON-PROLIFERATION AND TRADE 

"Hezbollal1's Stl'ategic Shift: A Global Terrorist TlIl'eat" 

[:30 PM, Wednesday, March 20, 2012 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building 

Washington, DC 

Mr. Chairman, I applaud you and other members of the Subcommittee for 

focusing attention on the global threat posed by the terrorist group Hezbollah and for 

inviting me to share my insights on that organization's growing network in the Americas 

that carries this threat to our doorstep. 

z.l}.t 

This past weekend marked th~t anniversary of the 1992 bombing of the Israeli 

Embassy in Buenos Aires, which murdered 29 people and injured about 250 others. Two 

years after that attack, the Jewish Community Center in Argentina's capital city was 

leveled by another car bomb, leaving 85 persons murdered and hundreds more wounded. 

Mr. Chainnan, this is HezboIlah's despicable legacy in the Americas. And that terrorist 

group - along with its sponsor, Iran - has retnmed to the scene of the crime. 

As a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 

Research, I head a project to examine and expose the dangerous alliance between the 

Venezuelan regime of Hugo Chavez and Iran. To date, we have conducted dozens of 

interviews with experts and eyewitnesses on the ground - including some foreign 

government officials - from throughout the world and in the region. We also have 

obtained reams of official Venezuelan and Iranian documents from our sources inside 

these regimes, only a fraction of which we have pUblished to support our conclusions. 

Our principal conclusions reveal why and how Hezbollah has extended its reach 

in the Americas so substantially and so quickly: 

Hezbollah is not a lone wolf. In this Hemisphere it counts on the political, 

diplomatic, material and logistical support of governments - principally 

Venezuela and Iran - that have little in common but their hostility to the United 

States. 

Rogel' F. Noriega was u.s. Ambassador to Ihe Organization oj American Statesji-om 2001-03 

and u.s. Assistant SecrelmJ' ojSlatefi'olll 2003-05. He is a visitingjelloll' al the Americal1 

Ellterprise Instilllte/or PI!bfis;J'elin'_ReseCJI'ck mal/aging directol' of Vision Americas LLC, 

which represents U.S. aml/oreign clients, alld contributor to 

\Vn'1\'. inlel'Cll1lerical1secliritl'Wafch. COlli. 
42


80122c-2.eps

To facilitate its activities in our neighborhood - including smuggling, money 

laundering, training and fund-raising - Hezbollah operatives collaborate with 

well-financed narcotraffickers and guelTilla groups with sophisticated societal, 

smuggling and money laundering networks in the region. 

Hezbollah networks have extended their reach into at least a dozen countries 

throughout Latin America. 

Some may assess this cooperation between "narcos" and terrorists as a marriage 

of convenience between different criminal elements or just another modus operandi of 

powerful international dlUg syndicates that can be tackled by law enforcement. Instead, 

this criminal activity is the product of a conscious strategy of rogue regimes in Iran and 

Venezuela to wage asymmetrical warfare against U.S. security, interests and allies close 

to the homeland. As such, it requires a much more robust analysis and coordinated 

response - from exposing terrorist groups working within Venezuela, identifying 

narcoterrorist activities in Central America, imposing sanctions against state-lUn entities 

being used to conceal criminal transactions, to dismantling transnational money 

laundering schemes. 

2 

Under bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in December, the Department of 

State was given six months to provide you with an analysis of and strategy for dealing 

with Irau's activities in the Americas. Until now, the State Department has eamed a 

reputation within the U.S. government of minimizing this threat. This Subcommittc;e will 

have to press the Department to conduct a thorough and rigorous review of the Iranian 

and Hezbollah activities in our region and to expose the extraordinaty role that is played 

by Venezuela in this regard. U.S. diplomats will then have to inform our neighbors about 

this problem and lay the groundwork for a coordinated strategy for dealing with this 

phenomenon in our Hemisphere. 

Mr. Chairman, ] fear that these narcotelTorist activities will exact an increasingly 

tenible price from our neighbors and our nation until our national security establishment 

recognizes the nature ofthe threat and fashions an effective response. 

KEY OBSERVATIONS 

Allow me to describe some of the elements of this narcoterrorist network, 

followed by a fuller discussion to provide the necessary context to understand why this 

threat is exh'aordinarily dangerous. 

Two terrorist networl{s proselytize, fund-raise, recruit and train operatives 

on behalf of Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas. 

o One of these parallel networks is operated by a Lebanese-Venezuelan 

clan, and another is managed by Mohsen Rabbani, a former Iranian 

diplomat and Muslim cleric who is wanted for his role in the 1992 and 
43


80122c-3.eps

1994 Buenos Aires bombings against the Israeli Embassy and Jewish 

community center, respectively. 

o Hezbollah operatives and their radical anti-Semitic allies hold 

important senior positions in the Venezuelan govel'llment and run a 

network that provides logistical and material support to terrorist 

operatives. 

o In recent years, the Chavez regime has sent weapons to Hezbollah 

(ammunition, grenades, rockets, etc., intercepted in 2009 by Israeli 

commandos)i and shipped refined fuel to Iran and Syriaii. 

o Thousands of authentic Venezuelan travel documents have been 

provided to persons of Middle Eastel'll descent in the last decade, and 

numerous Latin American governments have detained many Iranian and 

Lebanese persons canying Venezuelan passports.iii 

o The Venezuelan state-owned airline, Conviasa, operates regular service 

fi'om Caracas to Damascus and Teheran ~ providing Iran, Hezbollah, and 

associated narcotraffickers a surreptitious means to move personnel, 

weapons, contraband and othel" materiel. 

Hezbollah conspires with drug-traffic\ung networks in Mexico and Central 

3 

and South America as a means of raising and laundering funds, sharing tactics and 

"reaching out and touching" U.S. tell'itOl'Y. 

o Venezuela's Margarita Island, best known as a Caribbean tourist 

destination, has become a safe Itaven for terrorists and dmg smugglers. 

We have published documentaty evidence that Hezbollah agents operate 

numerous businesses and safe houses on the island and elsewhere in 

Venezuela. In addition to fund-raising activities, Hezbollah has provided 

ten'or training in Venezuela for recruits from that countly and others in the 

region. 

o The "Lebanese Cartel" (Cartel Liba/lI!s) was formed by the Lebanese-born 

Venezuelan businessman, Walid Makled Garcia, to transport cocaine from 

Venezuela in complicity with the militalY and the Colombian terrorist 

group known as the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 

Co!ombial1as). Makled also brokered corrupt deals with the Shiite 

Muslim communities in Venezuela with close ties to Hezbollah. iv Makled 

is wanted in the United States for cocaine smuggling and has been 

detained by Venezuelan authorities, 

o The criminal case against Lebanese dmg lord Ayman Jouma is velY 

instructive. Jouma was indicted in November 2011 for a sophisticated 

cocaine smuggling and money-laundering scheme benefiting HezbolIah. v 

His network involves criminal associates and conupt businesses in 

Colombia, the United States, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Lebanon. 

In June 2012, Venezuelan-Lebanese dual citizens Abbas Hussein Barb, 

Ali Houssein Harb (sic), and Kassem Mohamad Saleh and several 

Venezuelan and Colombian companies were sanctioned by the U.S. 

Treasury Department for their role in Jouma's narcotelTOrist operation,vi 
44


80122c-4.eps

4 

o In recent years, Mexico has art'ested numerous individuals associated 

with Hezbollah engaging in criminal activities - including smuggling of 

persons across the U.S. southwest bordervii For example, in September 

2012, a Lebanese-born U.S. citizen, convicted in 2010 for a credit card 

scheme that raised $100,000 for Hezbollah, was arrested in Merida by 

Mexican authorities. Rafic Mohammad Labboun Allaboun, all imam from 

a mosque in San Jose, California, was traveling with a falsified passport 

issued by Belize. He was extradited to the United States.viii 

The regime of the late Hugo Chavez was able to broker ties between 

Hezbollah and narcott'affickers, because it is a nal'costate, 

o U.S. officials have fresh, compelling information implicating the late 

leader, the president of the National Assembly (Diosdado Cabello 

Rond6n), the former Minister of Defense (Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva), 

the current army chief (Cliver Alcala COl'dones), and the newly appointed 

deputy Minister ofInterior (Hugo Carvajal), and dozens of other senior 

militaIy officials in trafficking in cocaine. 

o These politicians and active duty and retired military officers are 

responsible for transporting tons of cocaine to Central America, Mexico, 

the Caribbean, the United States, west Afhca, and Europe. The velY 

conservative estimates released by the State Department say the amount of 

cocaine transiting Venezuela since Chavez took power in 1998 has more 

than dOllbled.ix 

o Om' sources also report that representatives of the Mexican Sinaloa 

cartel operate in key cocaine transit corridors in Venezuela in close 

coordination with Venezuelan officials. It is a little known fact that the 

world's most powerful cocaine smuggler and head of the Sinaloa cartel, 

.Joaquin Archivaldo "EI Chapo" Guzman conducted his business fl'Om 

Venezuela for much of 2010, living in a suburb of Caracas and on 

Margarita Islaud until early 20lllmder the protection of Venezuelan 

security officials working for Chavez. 

o Senior chavista officials engage routinely jnlucrative schemes involving 

Hezbollah front companies, Colombian terrorist groups, narcotraffickers, 

Venezuelan financial institutions and even powerful state-run entities. 

Today, Venezuela is a key ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is 

cal'l'ying its asymmetrical battle to OUl' doorstep. Since Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad paid his first visit to Caracas in September 2006, Venezuela has 

become one of Iran's most important allies in the world - certainly Teheran's 

closest partner in our neighborhood. 

o Venezuela has helped Iran launder at least $30 billion to evade 

international sanctions. Seventy Iranian companies - many of them fronts 

for the IRGC that have been sanctioned by Western governments for their 

support for Iran's illicit nuclear progra1l1- operate suspicious industrial 

facilities in Venezuela. The two govcrnmcnts also cooperate in nuclear 

technology and the exploration for uranium, despite UN sanctions. 
45


80122c-5.eps

5 

DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND 

VENEZUELA'S HEZBOLLAH-NARCO NEXUS 

It is said that wherever Iran goes, Hezbollah is not far behind. In the case of 

Vcnezuela, Hezbollah blazed the trail in Venezuela, establishing a network of 

commercial enterprises meant to raise and channel funds and hide its financial tracks. 

These activities have exploded in the last seven years, as Hezbollah's activities in the 

region gained the active complicity of the Venezuelan government, the backing oflranian 

security forces and notorious Muslim radicals, and the cooperation of powerful Mexican 

and narcotmfficking syndicates that reach onto U.S. soil. 

Research from open sources, subject-matter experts, and sensitive sources within 

various governments has identified at least two parallel, collaborative terrorist networks 

growing at an alarming rate in Latin America. One of these networks is operated by 

Venezuelan collaborators, and the other is managed by a f01111er Iranian diplomat and 

infamous Muslim cleric. These networks encompass more than 80 operatives in at least 

12 countries throughout the region (with their greatest areas of focus being Brazil, 

Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile). 

The Nassereddine Network. Ghazi Atef Nassereddine Abu Ali, a native of 

Lebanon who became a Venezuelan citizen about 12 years ago, is Venezuela's secondranking diplomat in Syria. Nassereddine is a key Hezbollah asset because of his close 

personal relationship to Chavez's Justice and Interior Minister, Tarik El Aissami, and 

because of his diplomatic assignment in Damascus. Along with at least two of his 

brothers, Nassereddine manages a network to expand Hezbollah's influence in Venezuela 

and throughout Latin America. 

Nassereddine's brother Abdallah, a former member of the Venezuelan congress, 

uses his position as the former vice president of the Federation of Arab and American 

Entities in Latin America and the president of its local chapter in Venezuela to maintain 

ties with Islamic communities throughout the region x He Cll\1'ently resides on Margarita 

Island, where he rullS various money-laundering operations and manages commercial 

enterprises associated with Hezbollah in Latin America. Younger hrothel' Oday is 

responsible for establishing paramilitmy training centers on Margarita Island. He is 

actively recruiting Venezuelans throllgh local circlilos bolivarianos (neighborhood watch 

committees made up of the most radical Chavez followers) and sending them to Iran for 

follow-on training. 

The Rabbani Network. Hojjat al-Eslam Mohsen Rabbani, who was the cultural 

attache at the Embassy of the Islamic Republic ofTran in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 

oversees a parallel Hezbollah recruitment network.xi Rabbani is currently the 

intemational affairs advisor to the Al-Mostafa Al-Alam Cultural Institnte in Qom, which 

is tasked with propagation of Shia Islam outside Iran:ii Rabbani, refelTed to by the 
46


80122c-6.eps

important Brazilian magazine Veja as "the Terrorist Professor,,,xiii is a die· hard defender 

of the Iranian revolution and the mastermind behind the two notorious terrorist attacks 

against Jewish targets in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 that killed 144 people.xiV 

At the time, Rabbani was credentialed as Iran's cultural attache in the Argentine 

capital, which he used as a platform for extremist propaganda, recruitment and training 

that culminated in the attacks in the 1990s. In fact, he continues to exploit that network 

of Argentine converts today to expand Iran's and Hezbollah' s reach-identii'ying and 

recruiting operatives throughout the region for radicalization and terrorist training in 

Venezuela and Iran (specifically, the city of Qom). 

At least two mosques in Buenos Aires-Al Imam and At· Tauhid-are operated 

by Rabbani disciples. Sheik Abdallah Madani leads the Al Imam mosque, which also 

serves as the headquarters for the Islamic-Argentine Association, one of the most 

prominent Islamic cultural centers in Latin America. 

6 

Some ofRabbani's disciples have taken what they have learned from their mentor 

in Argentina and replicated it elsewhere in the region. Sheik Karim Abdul Paz, an 

Argentine convert to Shiite Islam, studied under Rabbani in Qom for five years and 

succeeded him at the At·Tauhid mosque in Buenos Aires in 1993.xV Abdul Paz is now 

the. imam of a cultural center in Santiago, Chile, the Centro Chileno Islamico de Cultura 

de Puerto Mont!. Another Argentine convert to radical Islam and Rabbani disciple is 

Sheik Suhail Assad, who lectures at universities throughout the region and recruits young 

followers to the cause.xvi 

A key target of the Rabbani network-and Hezbollah in general-is Brazil, home 

to some one million Muslims. Rabbani travels to Brazil regularly to visit his brother, 

Mohammad Baquer Rabbani Razavi, founder of the Iranian Association in Brazil.xvii 

Another of his principal collaborators is Sheik Khaled Taki Eldyn, a Sutlni radical hom 

the Sao Paulo Guarulhos mosque. Taki Eldyn, who is active in ecumenical activities with 

the Shia mosques, also serves as the secretmy general of the Council of the Leaders of the 

Societies and Islamic Affairs ofBrazil.xviii A sensitive source linked that mosque to a 

THA network cited by the US Treasury Department as providing major t1nancial and 

logistical support to Hezbollah.xix As far back as 1995, Taki Eldyn hosted al Qaeda 

leader Osama bin Laden and 9/ll mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed in the TBA 

region. 

According to Brazilian intelligence sources cited by the magazine Veja, at least 20 

operatives from Hezbollah, al Qaeda and the Islamic Jihad are using Brazil as a hub for 

terrorist activity. xx The fact that Brazil is set to host the FIFA World Cup tournament in 

2014 and the Summer Olympics in 2016 makes it an inviting target for international 

terrorism. U.S. officials should be approaching Brazilian officials to discuss the potential 

threat of Venezuelan· Iranian support for narcotenorism. Unfortunately, most u.s. 

diplomats are as indifferent to this reality as their Brazilian counterparts. 
47


80122c-7.eps

7 

IRAN'S DANGEROUS GAMBIT IN OUR NEIGHBORHOOD 

To comprehend what Iran is up to, we must set aside conventional wisdom about 

its ambitions, strategies and tactics and follow the evidence where it leads. For example, 

in the aftel1l1ath of a brazen plot discovered in October 2011 in which Iranian agents 

conspired with supposed Mexican drug cartel leaders to commit a terrorist bombing in 

the heart of our Nation's capital:xi Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, 

revealed that "Iranian officials" at the highest levels "are now more willing to conduct an 

attack in the United States .... " General Clapper also reported that Iran's so-called 

"supreme leader" Ali Khamenei was probably aware of this planning.xxii 

Iranian officials have made no secret of the regime's intention to callY its 

asymmetrical stl1lggle to the streets of the United States. For example, in a May 2011 

speech in Bolivia, Iran's Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi promised a "tough and 

crushing response" to any U.S. offensive against Iran.xxiii At the same time that Iran 

caught the world's attention by threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad announced a five-nation swing through Latin America aimed at advancing 

its influence and operational capabilities on the U.s. doorstep.xxiv 

The intelligence community's fi·esh assessment ofIran's willingness to wage an 

attack on our soil leads to the inescapable conclusion that Teheran's activities near our 

homeland constitute a velY real threat that can no longer be ignored. 

Bracing for a potential showdown over its illicit nuclear program and emboldened 

by inattention from Washington in Latin America, Iran has sought strategic advantage in 

our neighborhood. It also is preparing to play the narcoterrorism card-exploiting its 

partnership with Venezuelan operatives, reaching into Mexico, and activating a decadesold network in Argentina, Brazil and elsewhere in the region. 

Today, a shadowy network of embassies, Islamic centers, financial institutions, 

and commercial and industrial enterprises in seveml countries affords Iran a physical 

presence in relatively close proximity to the United States. Iran is well-positioned to use 

its relationships with these countries to pose a direct threat to U.S. territOlY, strategic 

waterways and American allies. Iran also has provided the Venezuelan militmy with 

weapon systems that gave Venezuela unprecedented capabilities to threaten its neighbors 

and the United States. . 

Notably, a half-dozen Iranian companies sanctioned by U.N., U.S. or European 

authorities have built suspicious industrial installations at various sites in Venezuela. xxv 

These facilities were important enough to attract secret visits by Iranian Major General 

Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the RevolutionalY Guard Corps aerospace commander who 

previously headed Iran's missile program, ltiJuiy 2009 and November 2011. 
48


80122c-8.eps

8 

VENEZUELA'S PIVOTAL ROLE SUPPORTING IRAN AND TERRORISM 

In recent congressional testimony, investigative journalist Doug Farah describes 

"the merging of [Hugo Chavez's] Bolivarian Revolution's eriminal-tetTorist pipeline 

aetivitics and those of the criminal-ten-orist pipeline of radical extremist groups 

(Hezbollah in particular) supported by the Iranian regime."xxvi Such ties are invaluable to 

groups like Hezbollah, as they afford them protection, safe havens in which to operate, 

and evcn diplomatic status and immunity. In short, Venezuela plays a singular role as a 

platform for the Hezbollah threat in the Americas. 

It is important to bear in mind that Venezuela is not just another developing 

eountly that is unable to control its territory. Venezuela is an oil-rich state that has 

collected about $1.1 trillion in oil revenue in the last decade. It also is not just an isolated 

hostile state: Venezuela has collected $28 billion in loans from China in the last two 

years, and has purchased at least $9 billion in anns from the Russians in the last 

decade. xxvii 

With the success of the U.S.-backed Plan Colombia, about six or seven years ago, 

South American narcotraffickers had to adjust their smuggling routes. They had to look 

no farther than Caracas. Chavez doled out lucrative drug trafficking deals as a means to 

secure the loyalty of militalY subordinates and to generate billions in revenue and make . 

them complicit in his corrupt regime. As described above, dozens of senior military 

officials closely associated with Chavez have been implicated in narcotrafficking crimes. 

The defacto head of the Venezuelan Cartel del Sol is Diosdado Cabello, National 

Assembly president and ruling party chief. 

That military syndicate operates parallel to a civilian network known as the Cartel 

Libanes, which was formed by the Lebanese-bom Walid Makled Garcia. According to 

journalist and narcoterror expert, Douglas Farah, "The supplier of the cocaine [to the 

Makled cartel] was the FARC in Colombia .. ,," Farab's sources also reported that 

Makled was a key link between various criminal groups and Venezuela's Shiite Muslim 

communities that have a strong financial relationship with Hezbollah."xxviii Makled is 

wanted in the United States for cocaine smuggling; after being detained in Colombia, he 

gave a series of media interviews implicating dozens of Venezuela officials in cocaine 

smuggling. Colombia surprised many ohservers by extraditing Makled to Venezuela, 

where his closed-door h"ial began in April 20 12.xxi< 

Even before Chavez won power in 1998, he established intimate links to the 

Colombian guerrilla group FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas)-

which wages a terrorist war against a democratic government and ally of the United 

State~. For many years, FARC commanders and troops have operated in and out of 

Venezuela with the complicity of the Clu\vez regime. A principal activity of the FARC 

today is the transportation of cocaine to safe havens operated by the Venezuelalllllilitary 

for transport to the United States and other countries. 

In September 2012, pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the Foreign Relations 
49


80122c-9.eps

9 

Authorization Act of 2003, President Obama determined that Venezuela was one of three 

countries in the world (along with Bolivia and BUl1l1a) that "failed demonstrably during 

the previous 12 months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics 

agreements .... "xxx 

Venezuela's internal security apparatus has been organized and directed by Cuba, 

a countlY designated by the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of ten·orism. That 

same report cited Venezuela's "economic, financial and diplomatic cooperation with 

Iran .... ",,,xi Chavez's aides make no secret of ongoing oil shipments to a third terrorist 

state, Syria. Just as Hezbollah, Cuba, Syria and Iran are considered terrorist threats to 

U.S. national security interests, Venezuela's cmcial support for each of them should be, 

too. Although this support may not pose a classical conventional threat, it is precisely the 

kind of asymmetrical tactics that our enemies favor today. 

The clwvista regime also has served as the principal interlocutor on Iran's behalf 

with other like-minded heads of state in the region, primarily Rafael Correa (of Ecuador) 

and Evo Morales (of Bolivia), both members of the Chavez-sponsored Bolivarian 

Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and both 'of whom have established 

dubious networks with criminal transnational groups."",ii 

CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP REQUIRED 

Mr. Chainnan, our project has shared substantial infol1nation about these 

aforementioned threats with U.S. govel11ment officials-either directly or through 

Members of Congress. Too often the attitude we have encountered in the executive 

branch has been one of skepticism or indifference. Apparently, this indifference has left 

senior U.S. officials uninformed on the subject. For example, President Obama told a 

Miami journalist in July 2012, "[M)y sense is that what Mr. Chavez has done over the 

last several years has not had a serious national security impact on us." U.S. General 

Douglas Fraser (USAF), the fonner regional commander of U.S. Southern Command, 

subsequently supported the appraisal that Venezuela does not represent atht'eat to U.S. 

national security.xxxiii "As I look at Iran and their connection with Venezuela," said 

Fraser, "I see that still primarily as a diplomatic and economic relationship." 

1\1r. Chairman, I believe the foregoing discussion of the facts 011 the ground will 

lead most reasonable observers to a very different conclusion. Important exceptions to 

executive branch neglect is the work of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and 

the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OPAC) of the Department o[the Treasury to 

sanctiollnumerous Venezuelan officials and entities for their complicity with and support 

for Iran and international terrorism; in addition, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of 

New York, Preet Bharara, has investigated and prosecuted key cases to attack this 

intcl'llatiollal conspiracy. Inexplicably, according to law enforccment sources, State 

Department officers systematically resist the application of sanctions against Venezuelan 

officials and entities, despite the fact that these suspects are playing an increasingly 

important role in Iran's operational capabilities near U.S. territOlY. 
50


80122c-10.eps

10 

Mr. Chairman, r am convinced that Congressional attention, such as this hearing, 

is essential to encourage Executive branch agencies to act. For example, sanctions 

against Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company for transactions with Iran were the 

direct result of pressure by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, acting in part on 

information uncovered by AEI's pl'Oject. 

As I mentioned earlier, the "Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 

2012," authored by Representative Jeff Duncan (R-SC), passed with strong bipartisan 

support, require the Executive branch to report to Congress on Iran's activities in a host 

of areas and to provide a strategy for countering this threat. 

I believe that such a thorough, Congressionally-mandated review will require the 

Executive branch to apply additional needed intelligence resources to collect on subject 

matters in Venezuela, Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, Central America and beyond. Once 

national security officials study the scope and depth of the problem, I hope for a wholeof-government response to protect our security, our interests and our allies against the 

threat posed by a narcoterrorist network in the Americas. Once Congress receives this 

report, perhaps this challenge will be treated as a budgetary priority so that law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies have the resources to respond urgently and 

effectively. Of course, our project at AEI is prepared to cooperate with this policy review 

by providing the Subcommittee documents and analysis regarding suspicious transactions 

and installations operated by Iran in Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia and elsewhere 

in the region. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

The involvement of Venezuelan officials and state-l1ln entitites in dl1lg 

trafficking, terrorism and/or Iran must be 011 the table as the State Department 

presents conditions for normalizing bilateral relations with Chavez's successor. 

In the mean time, this involvement must be publicized and punished in the form 

of federal indictments. Sanctions by the Department of the Treasury's Office of 

Foreign Assets Control are good interim measures. However, in the case of 

Venezuelan officials and state-run entities, indictments are much more 

meaningful. The Department of Justice headquarters should be asked to explain 

why such prosecutorial actions have failed to meet this extraordinalY lawlessness. 

Congress should demand U.S. diplomats be more cooperative with law 

enforcement and intelligence efforts aimed at exposing and punishing criminal 

behavior and terrorist activities in the region. Specifically, the Department of 

State must be more cooperative in raising this phenomenon with our neighbors. 

We also must find a way to talk about this problem with our friends in a way that 

it is not misunderstood as an accusation against those governments as they work 

with us to confront the problem. 
51


80122c-11.eps

11 

Congress should give U.S. intelligence and security agencies the resources 

required to expand their capabilities to confront extra-regional threats and crossborder criminality. 

U.S. national security agencies, led by the Department of State, should increase 

the dialogue and cooperation with regional and European military, intelligence, 

and security agencies on the common threat posed by the Hezbollah-IranianVenezuelan alliance. 

Congress should use its oversight functions to determine if U.S. Northern and 

Southem Commands, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Drug Enforcement 

Administration have adequate programs and funding to support U.S. anti-drug 

cooperation with Mexico and Central America. 

CONCLUSION 

As I stated before another Congressional subcommittee nearly two years ago, the 

"Hezbollab!Iranian presence in Latin America constitutes a clear threat to the security of 

the U.S. homeland .... In addition to operational terrorist activity, Hezbollah also is 

immersed in criminal activity throughout the region- from trafficking in weapons, dmgs, 

and persons .... If our government and responsible partners in Latin America fail to act, I 

believe there will be an attack on U.S. personnel, installations or interests in the 

Americas ... " as a result of this dangerous conspiracy. 

The narcoterrorism on our doorstep, perpetrated by Hezbollah with Iranian and 

Venezuelan support, demands a response fi'Om those whose joh it is to keep us safe. Our 

government must take effective measures-unilaterally and with willing partners-to 

disrupt and dismantle illicit operations and neutralize unacceptable threats. 

i http://articles.latimes.com/2 DOg/nov 10 5/wor IdJfg -israe l-arms-boa t5 

;; http://www .llytil11es. C 0111/20 12/02/2 3/wor Jd/americas/ chavez-a ppears-to· use-venezuelan-fuel-tohelp-syrias-assad.html 

iii Qne ofthe 9111 attackers had ties to a man traveling on an authentic Venezuelan passport 

bearing the name "Hakim Mohamed Ali Diab Fattah." Diab Fattah was detained by the FBI and 

deported to Venezuela; when the FBI asked the Venezuelan government for access to this man, 

authorities there claimed that he never entered the country. 

tv "The Further Narco-Terrorist Ties of the Chavez Government," by Douglas Farah, November 

l2, 2010. h tlp:/ /www.dougJasfarah.com/articie/54 3/the-further-narco-terrorist -ties-of-the-chavezgovernment 

v "Ties Between Hezbollah and Mexican Drug Cartels Revealed," by Rebecca Anna Stoil, The 

Jel'llsalem Post, December 15, 2011. http://www.jpost.comlinternatiunal/ Article.aspx?id~249684 

vi "Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network Linked to Drug Trafficker Ayman 

Joumaa and a Key Hizballah Supporter in South America," U.S. Department of the Treasury 
52


80122c-12.eps

press release, June 27, 2012. http://www.treasury.govlpress-center/pressreJeases/PagesftgI624.aspx 

12 

vii "Exclusive: Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into the U.S.," Washington Times, March 

27,2009. 

vIIi "Mexico Extradites Suspected Hezbollah Member," September 11,2012. 

http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/20 12/09/11/mexico -extrad ites-sllspected -hezbo 11 ahmemberf 

ix International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2013, U.S. Department of State, March 3, 

2013. http://www.state.gov/j/inllr1s/nrcrpt/2013/voll/204052.htm#Venezuela 

x This organization was founded in Argentina in 1972 to unite Muslims, namely the Syrian and 

Lebanese communities, in Latin America and has spread rapidly throughout Latin America, with 

offices in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Guadalupe Island, Antigua, and Uruguay. It 

is overtly anti-Israel; supportive of anti-American regimes in the Middle East and Latin America; 

and used as a platform for Hezbollah to raise money, recruit suppOlie.rs, and solicit illegal visas. 

xi "Reis-Jomhour-e Arzhantin Dar Sazeman-e. Melal: Tehran Ba Mohakemeh-ye Maqamatash Dar 

Keshvar-e Sales Movafeqat Konad" [The President of Argentina: Tehran Should Accept Trial of 

Its Authorities in a Third Country], Asr-e Iran (Tehran), September 25, 2010, WWIV.asriran.com 

(available in Persian, accessed September 29,2011). 

x" "Din va Siasat Dar Amrika-ye Latin Dar Goftegou Ea Ostad Mobsen Rabbani" [Religion and 

Politics in Latin America in Conversation with Professor Mohsen Rabbani], Book Room 

(Tehran), May 3, 2010. 

xiii "The Terrorist 'Professor,''' Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011. 

xiv Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nissman, Office of Criminal Investigations: AMIA 

Case (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Investigations Unit ofthe Office of the Attorney General, 2006), 

www.peaceandtolerance.orgldocs/nismanindict.pdf (accessed September 27,2011). Eight Iranian 

officials are considered fugitives by Interpol for their role in the Argentina attacks, including 

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (former Iranian president); Ali Fallahijan (former Intelligence 

minister); Ali Akbar Velayati (fonner Foreign Affairs minister); Mohsen Rezai (former head of 

the Revolutionary Guards Pasdaran)"; current Defense minister Ahll1a([ Vahidi; Mohsen Rabbani 

(former Cultural affairs officer at the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires); Ahmad Reza Asghari 

(fortner tbird secretary at the Iran embassy in Buenos Aires); and Hadi Soleimanpour (former 

Ambassador in Argentina). http://en.mercoprcss.comI20 12/06/19/jcwish-ccntrc-asks-for-arrcs tof-iranian-terrorist-suspects-if-they-attend-rio-20 

xv "Goftegou Ba Sarkar-e Khanom-e Ma'soumeh As'ad Paz Az Keshvar-e Arzhantin" 

[Conversation with Lade Ma'soumeh As'ad Paz From Argentina], Ahlulbayt (Tehran), June 13, 

20[1. 

"i Marielos Marquez, "'EI Islam es una forma de vida': Sheij Suhail Assad," DiarioCoLatillo, 

August 27,2007. 

xvii "Sourat-e Jalaseh" [Agenda], Iranianbrazil (Brazil), March 17,2010. 

xviii "Aein-ha-ye Ramezani Dar Berezil" [Ramadan Traditions in Brazil], Taghrib News (Qom), 

September 5,2010. 

xix US Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Designates Islamic Extremist, Two Companies 

Supporting Hizballah in Tri-Border Area," news release, June 1O,2()04. 

" "The Terrorist 'Professor, '" Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011. 

xxi "Notorious Iranian Militant has a Connection to Alleged Assassination Plot Against Saudi 

Envoy, by Peter Finn, The Washington Post, October 14,2011. 

xxii 

xxiii "Sanction sbows US weakness, says Iran minister," Iranian Students' News Agency, June I, 

2011; "Iran Wams of Street War in Tel Aviv If Attacked," Fars News Agency, November 8, 
53


80122c-13.eps

2011. 

~iY "Iran Seeking to Expand Influence in Latin America," by Joby Warrick, The Washington 

Post, JanualY I, 2012. 

13 

xxv Iranian companies sanctioned on repeated occasions by the U.S Treasury, the Office of 

Foreign Assets Control, the U.N. Security Coullcil (United Nations Security Council Resolutions 

1747,1803,1929), the European Union (2008, 2010, 2011), the United Kingdom (2007,2008), 

Germany (2005), and Japan. 

xxvi Douglas Farah, "Hezbollah in Latin America: Implications for U.S. Security," Testimony 

before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and 

Intelligence, July 7,201 J, wWIV.homeland.house.gov/sites 

Ihomeland.house.govffiles/Testimony%20Farah.pdf(accessed September 27,2011) . 

. xxvii In the last four years, the Russians have sold at least $9 billion in arms to Venezuela and has 

constructed a factory in Maracay, Venezuela, that can produce about 25,000 assault rifles per 

year. The latest $4 billion Russian line of credit announced in June 2012 will go toward arming 

chavista militias - shock troops loyal to the regime and meant to intimidate the opposition. 

xxviii "The Further Namo-Terrorist Ties of the Chavez Government," by Douglas Farah, 

November 12, 20 I O. http://www.douglasfarah.comlarticlef543/the-further-narco-ten·orist-ties·ofthe-chavez-government 

xxIx "5 Things to Watch for in Venezuelan Kingpin Walid Makled's Trial," by Iilyssa Pachico, 

Latin America Monitor, July 31, 2012. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/AmericasiLatinAmerica-Mollitorl20 1210731/5-things-to-watch-for-in-Venezuelan-kingpin-Walid-Makled-s-trial 

xxx See the September 14,2012, Presidential Memorandum at this site: 

http://www . wh itellou se.gov/t he-press-office/20 12/09/141presidential-memorandu III 'pres ide ntialdetermination-annual-presidential-d. 

xxxi http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crtl2011/195546.htm 

xuli Jose R. Cardenas, "The Chavez Model Threatens Ecuador," AEI Latin American Outlook 

(March 2011), www.aei.orgfoutlookl101037;DouglasFarah.Intothe Abyss: Bolivia under Eva 

Morales and the MAS (Alexandria. VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2009), 

www.strategycenter.net/files/201111 0/06f20090618IASClntoTheAbyss06l709.pdf (accessed 

September 27, 2011). 

xxxiii "Top U.S. General: Venezuela not a Threat," by Frank Bajak, The Associated Press, July 

31, 2012. http://bigstory.ap.org/articJeftop-us-general-venezuela-llot-threat 
54

Mr. POE. Some observations. We had a map of some of the activities of Iran and where their tentacles of terrorism through 

Hezbollah have moved throughout the world. I suspect that if we 

come back a year from now and we have a similar hearing, we will 

have more red lines throughout the world instead of fewer red 

lines. Hezbollah is moving throughout the world, and I think the 

situation, based on your testimonies, is getting worse. 

Ambassador Noriega, you mentioned in your testimony that 

Hezbollah, working in the Americas directly in the south and 

southwest, is smuggling into the United States. Would you care to 

elaborate on that? Smuggling what? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, smuggling people and smuggling drugs and 

other things. They involve themselves in various criminal activities 

and collaborate with narcotraffickers on techniques in terms of 

smuggling. There is anecdotal information that Hezbollah provided 

Mexican narcotraffickers with training in how to make car bombs, 

which soon became a tactic used by the Mexican narcotraffickers 

in that country. You have a significant number of cases of individuals who were associated with Hezbollah in Venezuela also having 

contact with Mexican narcotraffickers. It is a little known fact that 

the Mexican cocaine smuggler, Chapo Guzman, who is the biggest——

Mr. POE. Public enemy number one. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, absolutely. He spent most of the year 2010 in 

Venezuela, including part of that time on Margarita Island, and we 

believe that it is there that some of the very highest links with 

Hezbollah and with some of the Venezuelan generals who are also 

involved in narcotrafficking took place, and some of that collaboration took place. 

Mr. POE. Just for the record, he is the leader of the Sinaloa drug 

cartel that operates in Mexico and other places. And is your testimony that he has been trained or works with Hezbollah as well to 

bring drugs into the United States? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, I think it is pretty clear that Hezbollah cooperates with narcotraffickers all along that chain, not only smuggling but in the money laundering part of it. 

Now, whether Guzman was operational there, I don’t have proof 

of that, but my sense of it is that that is where he had contact, regular contact while he was in Venezuela on Margarita Island with 

Hezbollah elements, and they cooperate up and down the chain, 

smuggling, money laundering, training in tactics to confront law 

enforcement, and all of those issues. 

Mr. POE. Two more questions, one for Mr. Fulton and one for Dr. 

Levitt. 

You mentioned that Hezbollah really is under the auspices and 

control, not just of Iran, but of the Supreme Leader in Iran. Would 

you elaborate on that some? 

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know that I would say that 

Hezbollah is completely and utterly under the control of Iran. In 

recent history, we have seen Hezbollah emerge as somewhat of an 

independent actor. However, Iran obviously still maintains significant control over Hezbollah operationally. And when I say the Supreme Leader, what I mean by that is that, based on all of the information I have seen, there is nothing to indicate that there are 

55

rogue elements in the IRGC or other elements of the Iranian regime that are working with Hezbollah to undertake operations or 

to undertake any of the activity that they are involved in. So, if 

there is activity that the Iranian Government and Hezbollah are 

collaborating in, then that is undertaken with, at a minimum, tacit 

approval of the Supreme Leader. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

Dr. Levitt, what is going to happen next with Hezbollah? I mean, 

where are they going next? Back to you and Ambassador Noriega’s 

comments about some of the things that we can do, and also, in 

your opinion, why hasn’t Europe labeled this group as a foreign terrorist organization? So, where are we headed? What about the Europeans? 

Mr. LEVITT. You can’t put a clock on me for that, sir. 

Mr. POE. I will have to. 

Mr. LEVITT. Where we are going is more of the same. Hezbollah 

has multiple interests and identities. It is Lebanese and it is interested in its position in Lebanon. It is pan-Shia and it is in partnership with Iran. What we are seeing is that the identity of its partnership with Iran is trumping the others. It is willing to do things 

now, whether it is targeting tourists in Bulgaria or Cyprus or flying a drone over southern Israel last fall that are completely in the 

Iranian interest, even explicitly against Lebanese interests. That 

makes Hezbollah very, very dangerous. 

Why are some European countries uninclined to designate 

Hezbollah? For a variety of reasons, from concern about what 

might happened to the UNIFIL soldiers, many of whom are European, Italian, and French, in particular in southern Lebanon, to 

what this means for the stability of Lebanon, which is politically 

quite unstable right now, to concern about retaliatory attacks at 

home. There are answers to all of those questions. There is no evidence that Hezbollah has ever retaliated with attacks against the 

entity that has designated it. Let’s be honest, a designation is just 

calling it a name, saying that blowing things up is terrorism. 

There is no one that does more to undermine stability in Lebanon today than Hezbollah, which dragged Israel and Lebanon 

both into a war neither country wanted in 2006, took over downtown Beirut by force of arms leading to the deaths of fellow Lebanese in 2008, and raided the Chouf Mountains. It has been accused 

by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the U.N. Tribunal, with the 

assassination of Rafiq Hariri and other political assassinations, and 

of course now what is happening in Syria, which is going right 

across the border into Lebanon. 

We have to be, and I assure you that U.S. and foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies are quite aware of the need 

to be very on top of these two threats, Iran, Hezbollah, which operate together and sometimes in competition, especially as we are 

concerned about Iran’s nuclear program. If the diplomatic track 

doesn’t produce results, the theory is that eventually there might 

have to be a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities and that Iran would, 

without a question, respond with asymmetric terrorist attacks 

worldwide. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Levitt. 

56

Yield 5 minutes to the ranking member from California, Mr. 

Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Levitt, Mr. Fulton, if Israel did take military 

action, obviously, Iran would want Hezbollah to open up with all 

the rockets it has got in southern Lebanon. Is there any doubt that 

Hezbollah would be willing to do that? 

Mr. FULTON. Sir, I would say on the Iranian side we have seen 

senior IRGC commanders state explicitly that Hezbollah would respond were Iran to be attacked by Israel. But I will defer to Dr. 

Levitt on the internal Hezbollah politics. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And who in Hezbollah has said that? 

Mr. LEVITT. Thrown under the bus. 

My assessment is a little bit different. My assessment is that if 

Iran is attacked by Israel or someone else, that there will definitely 

be rockets fired at Israel from Lebanon, probably from Gaza, but 

that, depending on who attacks and how they attack and what the 

damage is and what the collateral damage is, will have a big impact on how many rockets, what types of rockets, because at the 

end of the day, you shoot a rocket into Israel, Israel can respond 

back. The only thing that there is no question is that there will 

also be reasonably deniable asymmetric terrorist attacks as well. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Turning to Syria, Mr. Levitt, what is the status 

of Iran and Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, what specifically are 

they doing to help the Assad regime, and what have Iran and 

Hezbollah done to prepare for a possible transfer of chemical weapons to Hezbollah if the Assad regime is likely to fall or at least lose 

Damascus and other key parts of Syria? 

Mr. LEVITT. Iran and Hezbollah are deeply committed to the 

Assad regime even today, even though it is clear that the Assad regime will in time fall. The question is how it falls and when it falls. 

Is Assad killed, does he flee, do they establish an Alawi statelet 

along the coast? I think that is something that Hezbollah, in particular, is very eager to see happen. It is trying to help the Syrian 

regime establish territorial contiguity in Syria between Damascus 

and the Alawi areas. Failure to do that, it will provide that contiguity through the Bekaa Valley. One of the reasons——

Mr. SHERMAN. Continuity between Damascus, which is in south 

Syria, and the Alawite region, which is in north Syria. 

Mr. LEVITT. Curving along the Lebanese border where the Syrian 

FSA and others maintain control of some of the area in between. 

The reason Hezbollah is so keen for this is because one of the 

things that Hezbollah is most worried about, aside from losing the 

state sponsorship and all that, which it clearly sees it is going to 

lose, is the ability to get resupply of rockets and other things from 

Iran. If it can’t get those resupplies, it will be much more constrained in shelling Israel indiscriminately for fear that it won’t be 

able to restock. But if it has access to places like Latakia, which 

has an airport and which has a seaport that Hezbollah has long, 

long used for its international criminal arms proliferation purposes, 

something that has come up in several FBI investigations of 

Hezbollah here in this country, I think they feel that would give 

them some hope. 

In terms of the chemical weapons, we have a lot of questions. We 

are very concerned. But in particular we were concerned when we 

57

saw Hezbollah setting up small, little movable training camps right 

next to chemical weapon depots. Did they do that because they felt 

that was a good place where they could set up camp and people 

probably wouldn’t shell them for fear of hitting the chemical weapon depots? Did they set that camp up because it is a good place to 

be to raid the storage site in the event that the regime falls? Both? 

We don’t know. But as you, sir, said, and I couldn’t say it better, 

that has to be the reddest of the red lines. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And I assume Hezbollah has the technical capacity to use these chemical weapons in the event that they get their 

hands on them? Does anyone disagree? 

Mr. LEVITT. I think the biggest concern is that they get them. 

Once you have them, you can get the capability to use them, especially since you are so close to Iran. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And you are right there with the Assad regime, 

so you only need a few of their people to help you out. 

Mr. LEVITT. Exactly. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You have talked about Europe not designating 

Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. What can the United States 

do to push Europe in the right direction on that? I will take an answer from any one of the three of you. 

Mr. LEVITT. I just came back yesterday from a trip to Europe, 

Rome, Paris, and Berlin. The good news is I saw more movement 

in those three countries on this issue than I have in a long time, 

including since I was last in several of those countries. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I mean, this is a terrorist organization that carries out terrorism on European soil. 

Mr. LEVITT. Europeans often see things in big dialectics. For 

them, there is no longer a debate is Hezbollah engaged in these activities, which there long was. Now the debate is, is this the right 

policy? What would it mean for stability in Lebanon? What would 

it mean for UNIFIL? I believe those are all answerable questions, 

and I made what I thought was a forceful argument to them that 

they need to do this not as a favor to the United States, not as a 

favor to Israel, but as a responsibility that they have to their constituents. Hezbollah has challenged them. Hezbollah is active in 

Europe, again operationally. And let’s be clear, there was never a 

point when it was not active in Europe in terms of logistics, finance, arms procurement, or for sending people into Israel or elsewhere to carry attacks through Europe. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And finally, the Europeans care a lot about overflowing Assad. They may or may not want to provide weapons, but 

here is a chance to help the free Syrian forces. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Cook, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Judge. 

It is kind of ironic, I guess. Many years ago I was a company 

commander, spent a long time, as I said, as a leader of troops and 

marines, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, which happened to be the unit 

that was blown up by Hezbollah in 1983, and we are perhaps going 

full circle. 

I appreciate the ranking member asking the question about 

chemical weapons. That is what I was going to ask. But I am also 

58

concerned about the Strait of Hormuz from a military standpoint. 

If you have got an organization that are almost, if you described 

it correctly, if I understood it correctly, that are almost like the 

Spetsnaz, to a certain degree, of Iran, and they have issues right 

now as to what is their international border, can they stretch it 

out. And it is that chokepoint which is very, very inflammatory and 

which many people think, you know, if a shooting engagement 

starts, it could very well be. 

And I was surprised that there has been no activity against 

Qatar or the United Arab Emirates because of their support for the 

United States and other more moderate regimes, and I just wanted 

to see if you would comment on the possibility that this agency 

that has been at the forefront of Iranian policy might be involved 

in that area in the future. 

Mr. FULTON. Sir, the IRGC has said time and time again, as has 

the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff that they intend to 

close the Strait of Hormuz if they were struck or if their interests 

were threatened otherwise. Now, my expertise does not lie in Iran’s 

conventional military power. My understanding, from assessments 

that I have seen, is that they could close the Strait of Hormuz, but 

it would be for a very limited period of time. But absolutely, if that 

were to happen, the IRGC would be in the lead of those operations. 

Similarly, if there were to be any type of flash point conflict in 

the Persian Gulf in the Strait of Hormuz, it would very much likely 

be the IRGC and its navy at the forefront of that, sir. 

Mr. LEVITT. I will just add two quick comments. The first on the 

1983 Beirut bombings. The relevance to today is that in the book 

I was able to find, for the book, a significant amount of declassified 

intelligence, declassified CIA reports, FBI reports, done a lot of 

interviews with current and former officials, and it is quite clear 

across the board that the assessment after the fact was that our 

failure to respond to those attacks in a way that was meaningful 

to Iran and to Hezbollah, again after the Khobar Towers bombing 

in 1996, emboldened both Iran’s Quds Force, the IRGC more generally, and Hezbollah. We are at that type of a precipice again 

right now. 

In terms of the Gulf regimes, I think there are lots of parts of 

the book that will surprise people, maybe nothing more so than the 

fat chapter on Hezbollah in Southeast Asia. But I think some people will be surprised by how extensive the two chapters are on 

Hezbollah in the Gulf. One chapter more historically oriented leading up to Khobar Towers bombing, regarding some of the earlier 

history, and the second one, getting much closer to today, 

Hezbollah established a dedicated unit to target coalition forces in 

Iraq, Unit 3800, and if you talk to our allies and friends in the Gulf 

area, of course they are concerned about Iran’s nuclear capabilities, 

power projection in the region. They are no less concerned about 

Hezbollah’s activities in the region. Iran, I believe, not only is interested in regime preservation, but also it remains today as it was 

at its founding, interested in exploiting the revolution, and that 

starts, for them, in the Gulf. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

59

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho, for 

5 minutes. We are going to try to finish before votes. Votes have 

already started, but we will try to finish the hearing so you all 

don’t have to come back. 

Go ahead. Gentleman from Florida. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate you guys’ testimony. And the big thing I see, you 

know, that concerns me probably more than anything is the infiltration into the Western Hemisphere of Hezbollah. My question is 

for all three of you, how much effect do the sanctions on Iran for 

funding to Hezbollah, how much effect do they have, our sanctions, 

and what can we do to make them stronger? And also how much 

funding is Hezbollah maybe getting out of Venezuela that we may 

not know about. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, as a matter of fact, for our sanctions on Iran 

to be more effective, we should be going after Venezuelan institutions. 

Mr. YOHO. That is what I was thinking. 

Mr. NORIEGA. The Saderat Bank of Iran, which is involved in all 

of these illegal activities and rogue nuclear programs, et cetera, 

wholly owns a bank called the Banco Internacional de Desarollo in 

Venezuela. They also have tens or probably hundreds of millions of 

dollars in every bank in Venezuela today, the Iranians do. And 

Hezbollah also is able to skim some money out of some of the fundraising activities that they do in their own right, but also in some 

of these criminal activities with narcoterrorist organizations, so 

they are able to skim money off of that. My sense of it is they probably take hundreds of millions of dollars because of the foothold 

that they have and the complicity they have in Venezuela. 

Mr. YOHO. Before we go on, Dr. Levitt, what is your opinion with 

the changing of guards in Venezuela? 

Mr. NORIEGA. It bodes very ill, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. Yeah. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Because Chavez, for all of his bombast and everything, was a strong character who could modulate some of these extreme influences that he comes under. Maduro, on the other hand, 

is demonstrating that he is very weak and he seems to be following 

a script that the Cubans have laid out for him. And the Iranians 

and Hezbollah have every intention of keeping ahold of that, that 

platform that they have in Venezuela, and I am afraid that without 

a strong hand, that whatever regime or whatever government 

takes over for Chavez will not be able to manage this, what 

Hezbollah and Iran are up to in their territory. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Thank you. 

Dr. Levitt. 

Mr. LEVITT. Briefly, the issue of Western infiltration, infiltrating 

into the United States in particular, is one that is mostly one of, 

when it comes to hard facts, of vulnerability. There is no question, 

Roger is right, there is a lot of overlap in terms of smuggling 

routes, but there is only one known instance of a Hezbollah operative entering the United States from crossing the border illegally. 

You should take no comfort from that. He was one of the most dangerous Hezbollah people ever to be in this country. I refer to him 

as kind of Hezbollah’s 007. And the person, the Lebanese Mexican 

60

who smuggled him in, admitted that he has smuggled, I think it 

was something like 1,500 other people in the country, and there is 

vulnerability. We don’t know. I can’t tell you that any of them were 

Hezbollah, I can’t tell you none of them were Hezbollah. But that 

one individual was a pretty scary guy. 

In terms of the sanctions and the impact on Hezbollah, the good 

news is we have done some very, very good work there. There is 

always more to be done because our adversaries don’t just capitulate. It is like squeezing a balloon, so they move someplace else. 

One of the ways Hezbollah has tried to respond not only to the 

sanctions against itself, against Hezbollah, but against our sanctions on Iran, which have made it more difficult for Iran to be able 

to be as generous in funding to Hezbollah, is to expand ever more 

so into crime, especially into narcotics trafficking, moving the product, especially from South America across the 10th parallel, which 

law enforcement refers to as Highway 10, to Africa, northward into 

Europe. 

Another point that we raise when we talk to the Europeans, 

Hezbollah, aside from its terrorist activity, is deeply engaged in 

criminal activity in the continent, in particular and including moving drugs into Europe. This gives us a whole nother set of tools 

that we can use. Roger said we should see more indictments. I expect that you will. I know that you will. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back because I have got to go 

do my duty and vote. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

I have one last question. Your testimony mentioned not only 

Hezbollah and Iran, but the Quds Force and Iran working together. 

Can you explain to me briefly the relationship, if any, between 

Hezbollah, the Quds Force, and Iran working with the other two, 

those two organizations together? Whoever wants to? Mr. Fulton, 

go ahead? Whoever wants to weigh in on that. That will be the last 

question. 

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, I would just add that, again, that 

the Quds Force, it is a component of the IRGC. The IRGC is first 

and foremost concerned with regime preservation and is led fundamentally by the Supreme Leader in that the commander of the 

IRGC and the Quds Force both report directly to the Supreme 

Leader. The Quds Force is the organization in Iran that takes the 

lead in its cooperation with Hezbollah. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Levitt? 

Mr. LEVITT. Hezbollah is Iran’s creation, and the Quds Force is 

the primary interlocutor with Lebanese Hezbollah. My written 

statement goes into great detail about the nature of the relationship between them, as does our institute report on Hezbollah and 

the Quds Force, and Iran’s shadow war with the West. 

I want to make two points that are maybe contrary to conventional wisdom, however, as we look at this recent trend of events 

and threats. One, as I alluded to earlier, is that we see these two 

groups engaging in significant operational cooperation together as 

they always have, but we also see them a little bit in competition. 

Right now from the Quds Force’s perspective, it is Hezbollah 1, 

Quds Force nothing. Unfortunately, that means Hezbollah has carVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:29 Apr 15, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\_TNT\032013\80122 HFA PsN: SHIRL
61

ried out one successful terrorist attack, Burgas, Bulgaria, and the 

Quds Force has not. 

On the flip side, we also see an element of a lack of deconfliction. 

So in January of last year, when Hussein Atris, a Swedish 

Hezbollah operative, was arrested there in a case that has ties 

back to South America, explosives that he was sending there, just 

a couple of weeks later an IRGC Quds Force cell that was putting 

together sticky bombs was discovered there, not through any of our 

activities but because the bomb they were putting together exploded in their hands. It appears that there was not enough 

deconfliction. You would think that the Quds Force would have 

stopped its activities in Thailand at a time when Thai, U.S., Israeli, 

all international law enforcement and intelligence agencies were 

supremely focused on Thailand. 

We have seen it in another case that has gotten basically no 

press, and that is Bulgaria. Not only was the attack in Burgas, 

Bulgaria, the second Hezbollah attempt to carry out an attack 

there, but just about a week or two later authorities found an 

IRGC official conducting surveillance of a synagogue in Sofia. So, 

again, it is unclear why there is this level of deconfliction, but 

there is. 

Mr. POE. Last word, Ambassador Noriega, briefly. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Twenty seconds. 

IRGC has a presence, a foothold in Venezuela. There are about 

70 Iranian companies, many of them sanctioned by the U.N., EU, 

U.S., for involvement in the ballistic missile program or the illicit 

nuclear program, that have industrial footprints in the United 

States and obviously accounts there, too. And IRGC Major General 

Amir Ali Hajizadeh, of the Revolutionary Guard Corps’ aerospace 

program, has visited Venezuela on two occasions in the last 3 years 

to sites nearby of nitroglycerin and nitrocellulose plants associated 

with the Venezuelan petroleum industry. So there is something 

going on, on the chemical side there, too, that needs to be looked 

into. 

Mr. POE. I want to thank all three of our witnesses for being 

here today and your expertise. Without objection, the chart, page 

1 and 2, of the global map and the detailed back page, will be made 

part of the record. And this committee hearing is adjourned. Thank 

you once again. 

[Whereupon, at 2:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(63)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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80122n.eps

SlJBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Snbcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

March 19,2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office 

Building (and available live on the Committee website at viviw.foreignaffairs.house.!wy): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, March 20, 2013 

1:30p.m. 

Hezbollah's Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat 

Mr. Will Fulton 

Iran Analyst, Critical Threats Project 

American Enterprise Institute 

Matthew Levitt, Ph.D. 

Director 

Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence 

The Washinb>ton Institute for Near East Policy 

The Honorable Roger Noriega 

Founder and Managing Director 

Vision Americas LLC 

(Former Assistant SecretalJi oiStateior Western Hemisphere Affairs and 

f()rmer Amhassador to the Organization 'if American States) 
65

Æ


80122m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ____ ---=T,c::e:cn"w"i,:c""-C" NouproiifemlioJl, 1I/U1-=r:~m"d,,-e _____ IIEARTN(1 

Day Wet/llesda)' Dalc, __ ---=O"'3"-!"'7"'O/.'-'£"'O-'T,,3 ___ Roolll, __ R=Ho'-'O"'B~2"'1'"7_"2'____ 

Starting Tinle __ --'Zc.:,.L1LZ __ ,Ending Time __ 2"",-,'2",3,-_ 

Recesses ~I L-to __ ) L-to __ ) L-to ___) ( to ) (_to __ ) L-to __ ) 

Pl'eshUng Melllbel'(s) 

Clur/r.",all Ted Poe 

Check aI/ of tile followlllg Iltal apply: 

Open S",ion [{] 

F,:,ocujive (closed) Sessioll D Televised [{] 

Electronically Rccorded (taped) [{] 

Stellogl'.phie Record [Z] 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

HezhnlTah '" Strategic Shift: A Global Tel'I'{)}'i..t Threat 

STJHCOMMITTEE MEMIlERS PRESRNT: 

Reps, Bl'Ooks, Cook, COtlOll, KenlletT)" KiIlZillgeJ', PeI'lY, Poe, Shel'lnall, alld YOllO 

NON~SUBCOMMITTEE J\lIEMBERS PRESENT: (lv/ark wUh an :;. if they are nor memhel's of Ifill commWee.j 

Rep, Weber 

HEARING WTTNF.SSF.S: Same as meeting lIutice attached? Yes m No D 

(if "no ", please list below and include tWe, GRenc),! department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submiltedfor Ihe ,'e.col'd.) 

Prl'plll'ed Statellle1ll of MI', Will FIIltoll 

Prepared Statemelll of D,', M.allhew Levill 

Prepared Statemel1t u.fThe HOlluJ't/ble Rogel' Nodega 

TIME SCITF,DUL1W TO RECONVENE ____ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 2"":.::'2",3 __ 

Subcommittee Start edor