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ISLAMIST EXTREMISM IN CHECHNYA:

A THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND?

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 26, 2013

Serial No. 113–24

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Paul Goble, professor, Institute of World Politics .......................................... 6

Craig Douglas Albert, Ph.D., assistant professor, Department of Political 

Science, Georgia Regents University Augusta ................................................... 9

Andranik Migranyan, Ph.D., director, Institute for Democracy and Cooperation ........................................................................................................................ 18

Sabine Freizer, Ph.D., director, Europe Program International Crisis Group ... 24

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Craig Douglas Albert, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................ 11

Andranik Migranyan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................ 20

Sabine Freizer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 26

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 42

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 43

Sabine Freizer, Ph.D.: Material submitted for the record .................................... 44

Question submitted for the record by the Honorable Paul Cook, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and responses from Andranik 

Migranyan, Ph.D., and Sabine Freizer, Ph.D. ................................................... 46

(1)

ISLAMIST EXTREMISM IN CHECHNYA: A 

THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND? 

FRIDAY, APRIL 26, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:34 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging 

Threats) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I call to order this joint hearing of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging 

Threats, as well as Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 

and Trade. Today’s topic is Islamic Extremism in Chechnya: A 

Threat to the U.S. Homeland? After Chairman Poe and I and the 

ranking members of two subcommittees, each of us will have 5 

minutes to make opening statements. Each member then will have 

1 minute to make an opening statement, alternating between majority and minority members. And without objection, all members 

may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous 

material for the record. Hearing no objection, so ordered. The origins of the terrorist attack in Boston have drawn attention to a region that has not received the study that it deserves. The terrorist 

brothers had roots in Chechnya, even though they grew up in 

America, and had sought U.S. citizenship. Chechnya is part of the 

Northern Caucasus, which also includes Dagestan, where the father of the two brothers live. 

Two major wars have been fought in Chechnya in the 1990s, as 

the province sought independence from Russia. Many Chechens 

fled to other parts of the region, and into Central Asia. Dagestan 

was not directly involved in the wars, but has certainly been affected by them, and is now a hotbed of radical Islamic activity. 

There are reports of Chechens fighting in Afghanistan against the 

United States and NATO troops, and Chechen networks in Europe. 

Al-Qaeda has made recruitment of Chechens a priority, and they 

are thought to have been trained in Pakistan. 

The appearance of Chechen fighters outside the Northern 

Caucasus is ominous. The original Chechen uprising against Russia was secular and nationalist. Within this context, there would 

be no motive for Chechen exiles to attack the United States, especially after we had given them sanctuary. In the world view of 

2

some Chechens, there has been—obviously, some Chechens have 

had their world view radicalized, as was the case of the two Boston 

terrorists, who have turned from young people being raised here 

into a jihadist mentality of global war against infidels, which includes us. 

Is this happening on a regional basis, this radicalization that we 

saw with these two young men? And why is it happening? What 

outside forces have sought to transform the Northern Caucasus 

and Central Asia into a region of Muslim extremism which did not 

exist before? In particular, what impact is Saudi Arabia playing 

and other Islamic states played in sending money and missionaries 

to the region to build mosques and schools to impact the minds of 

young people who make up such a large portion of the population 

in Central Asia? Greater cooperation with Russia and the governments of Central Asia should be explored in order to properly understand and respond to this emerging threat. This part of the 

world is critical to the future of the human race. 

If it becomes dominated by a radical version of Islam, it will 

change the course of history in an extremely negative way. Muslims deserve freedom and progress, but the jihadist mind-set hates 

freedom, and will drown progress in a sea of blood. Even as a minority viewpoint, the radicals have done great damage throughout 

the Muslim societies, from Pakistan to Afghanistan through the 

Caucasus. And they have attacked the United States as well as 

Russia. 

Pardon me, I have a cold today, obviously. We must find ways 

to expand our long friendship with Muslims in order to build a better future. That future should be of peace and prosperity for all 

people, especially the people of Central Asia, because all of us deserve to live in such a positive world. We want to find positive 

ways of moving forward with these people, and thus we have gathered a panel of experts to give us their advice today. And now the 

ranking member, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today we are examining a region of the world that up until a week ago most people 

did not know a great deal about. But the Boston Marathon bombings in my home State changed that. I would like to take a moment 

to acknowledge the victims and their families that were forever 

changed by this senseless act, and thank those in Boston who 

worked around the clock to save lives and prevent other tragedies 

from occurring that week. For many, their view of the world has 

become much smaller as the scope of this investigation grows. 

Whether there is any connectivity, what happened and began in 

Boston and Watertown, Massachusetts, has now extended into the 

North Caucasus. And this committee has a responsibility to gather 

information about possible threats at home, and improve our counterterrorism cooperation with other nations. Although I wish that 

a discussion of the North Caucasus could have taken place under 

different circumstances, this is a discussion worth having, as it 

highlights why many so of us, particularly on this committee, have 

concerned ourselves with security, rule of law, and human rights 

issues abroad. 

According to the 2012 report from the International Crisis Group, 

armed conflict in the North Caucasus is the most violent in Europe 

3

today. Insurgents seeking a regional political unit founded in 

sharia attacked Russian officials and security forces whose main 

responsibility until recently has been a tough focus on eradicating 

the insurgency with a massive security presence. While this policy 

has had successes, some 574 insurgents, security forces, and civilians have died through September 2012 in Russia, and there are 

almost daily attacks in the region, and occasionally as far afield as 

Moscow. 

It is important to understand that the description of terrorism 

within Russia and some of the contributing factors, as like the 

April 15 attack, applies back here at home as well. Simply put, 

what began as an epic struggle in a faraway land decades ago has 

fueled into an insurgency, an insurgency that presents a threat to 

our homeland. Our world is more interconnected than ever. And 

while we see great strides in bringing together international business groups and communication networks, we have yet to see at 

the same time the cooperation in international security matters 

and information sharing apparatuses. 

There is undoubtedly a delicate balance between cooperation 

with Russia on counterterrorism and concern over Russia’s human 

rights abuses, but in no way should this hinder working together 

to protect the lives of innocent people. At the end of the day, that 

is all we want. As the investigation of the Boston Marathon incident continues, I hope that this hearing will be insightful as we 

move to strengthen our international information sharing and security mechanisms. I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses, and am particularly excited to have Dr. Freizer, the Europe 

director of the International Crisis Group, here with us, who happened to be visiting here. So I want to thank you all for being here, 

and I look forward to your testimony. With that, Mr. Chairman, I 

yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for that very thoughtful opening statement. And the people who were hurt and killed up 

in Boston, they are all part of our American family. Just like everyone who died in 9/11, we are all part of this American family. We 

grieve with you, and we are committed to make sure that these 

things don’t happen to other members of the American family. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And now I recognize Mr. Poe, who is chairman of a subcommittee of his own which focuses on such threats 

of terrorism, as well as nonproliferation and trade. Judge Poe? 

Mr. POE. First, I do want to express my sympathies to the victims of the Boston Marathon, but also praise the first responders 

and the citizens of Boston on Patriot’s Day for their united effort 

to capture these bad guys. There is still much that we don’t know 

about the Tsarnaev brothers, but I am confident that we will get 

to the bottom of this as the investigation unfolds. 

Yesterday, we learned that the perpetrators had planned to travel to Times Square in New York after the Boston attack to unleash 

more mayhem and bombs. They apparently had pipe bombs and 

another pressure cooker bomb. American people want answers, and 

so do I. I do want to thank the witnesses for being here. It is unfortunate that no one from the Federal Government is here, even 

though they were invited to send at least one person. A lot of quesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:31 Jun 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\042613\80551 HFA PsN: SHIRL
4

tions revolve around the older brother’s trip to Russia. The Russians were so worried about him they asked us to look into him. 

Less than 3 months before he left for Russia in January 2012, the 

CIA successfully pushed to have him put on the U.S. counterterrorism watchlist called TIDE. But for some unknown reason, between the time he left for Russia and came back his name was not 

a concern of the U.S. Government, so U.S. authorities did not flag 

him. That meant U.S. Customs did not stop and question him, nor 

did they let the FBI know he was back so the FBI could talk to 

him. I am not sure, and I don’t know why U.S. authorities would 

decide the older brother was not a concern while in a foreign country, under really suspicious circumstances, where known terrorist 

groups operate. Even the Russians were worried about this. 

It looks like we may have the same old problem of information 

sharing, or lack of it. In fact, The Washington Post reports this 

morning that a single U.S. Customs and Border Protection official 

assigned to the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force received a 

warning that the older brother, a suspected militant, had returned 

from a lengthy trip to Russia. Officials said there is no indication 

the unidentified Customs official provided that information to anybody or any other members of the task force, including the FBI, 

who had previously interviewed the militant. 

So 10 years later after 9/11 we should not be struggling with this 

same issue of information sharing among American agencies, and 

also communication with foreign governments who are concerned 

about terrorism as well. We don’t know if the attackers had ties directly to al-Qaeda or affiliates, but the evidence so far suggests a 

link to al-Qaeda’s Inspire Magazine produced by al-Qaeda’s group 

in Yemen. The magazine provides a step-by-step instruction for 

anyone wanting to build a device like the ones detonated in Boston. 

The older brother traveled to Russia, then went to Dagestan for 6 

months between 2011 and 2012. He might have been radicalized 

there. We are not yet certain if that is true or by whom. 

Both brothers were Chechens, and it now seems clear the older 

brother was the ringleader. Chechnya knows conflict and controversy. They have been dealing with it for the last 20 years. We 

can be sure there is no shortage of bad guys in places like Dagestan just waiting to get their hands on young wannabe jihadists. 

Bin Laden encouraged Saudis to go to Chechnya to fight Russia. 

Yet another outlet for extremists is against the United States and 

coalition forces on the battlefields of Afghanistan. Elsewhere, if a 

Chechen jihadist cannot attack a Russian target, then a soft target 

in his own city in America or Europe is the next best option. In 

fact, al-Qaeda has been encouraging those types of attacks for 

years, according to terrorism expert Bruce Riedel from the Brookings Institute. Al-Qaeda says Islam is under attack from every direction, and the jihadist answer is to strike back in New York, Madrid, London, Toulouse, and possibly Boston now. In fact, just days 

after the Boston attack, authorities in Canada arrested two men 

for allegedly plotting to blow up a train. Initial reports suggest alQaeda elements in Iran had provided the two men with direction, 

guidance, and information. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates’ call to global 

jihad is alive and well and lives in jihadist forums, social media 

outlets, and the like. 

5

So we have many questions that we need answers from. The 

threat from terrorist attacks around the world did not die with bin 

Laden. We must be realistic and understand that, and find out specifically what is taking place in Chechnya, and how that affects the 

United States. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for that very thoughtful and forceful opening statement. Does anyone else have a desire 

for an opening statement? If not, let me note that we did try to get 

a State Department representative here with us today. We wanted 

them to send a witness to tell us what they thought was going on 

in Central Asia, and Chechnya, and the Caucasus region. But they 

declined. And they are too busy to send someone here to the United 

States Congress and to speak with the American people through 

public hearings like this. They are just too busy on other matters. 

That may well be part of the problem in that this region has not 

gotten the attention that it deserves. There is a map of the region 

over there. But let us just note that Central Asia, as we are describing, and the Caucasus, represent a huge chunk of the planet. 

And if that area comes under the domination of radical Islam that 

makes it its job to attack the United States, or to attack other 

countries, not just the United States, but other non-Muslim people, 

that will be a disaster for every person on this planet. That will 

usher us into an era of violence and mayhem that will be hard to 

get out of. 

So we need to pay attention to the Caucasus, and we need to 

work with those people who will work with us to see that that does 

not happen. And I don’t believe that we have, number one, paid attention here until it stung us, as it did in Boston, and as it did on 

9/11. And we also have not been cooperating and working as hard 

as we can with those other countries, and I would put my finger 

on Russia, where we could have well worked a lot closer with Russia than we have been. And as the judge pointed out, and as the 

ranking member pointed out, we can do so without giving up our 

commitment to human rights, and not complain if the Russians are 

doing something wrong. They can accept some criticism, as we can 

when we do things that are wrong. But that should not prevent us 

from joining forces against radical Islam, which threatens to kill 

our children in order to terrorize the world. 

If they take over and dominate an area the size of Central Asia, 

everybody in the world is in for trouble. With that said, we have 

got some very fine witnesses. Paul Goble is a professor at the Institute of World Politics. He was director of research and publications 

at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice 

dean of the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University 

in Estonia, and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege at 

the University of Tartu, which is also in Estonia. 

He served in various capacities in the United States State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Voice of America, 

and Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. 

Next we have Andranik Migranyan. I hope I pronounced that 

correctly. And let me just note that I took this upon myself to reach 

out to the Russian Embassy and to our Russian counterparts and 

see if they could maybe recommend someone who could come here 

6

and discuss this very important issue and how it is important to 

both of us. We appreciate you being with us today. And I am sorry 

that the Russian Embassy can send people but the State Department can’t. 

He is a director of the New York City branch of the Institute for 

Democracy and Cooperation. He was a member of the Presidential 

Council of the Russian Federation between 1993 and 2000, vice 

president of the Reforma Foundation. And among his many publications are the books Russia: From Chaos to Order, a Russian 

Search for Identity; and Democracy and Morality. He was awarded 

with the Russian Medal of Honor by a presidential decree in 2009. 

We also have with us Dr. Craig Douglas Albert. He is a professor 

of political science at Georgia Regents University in Augusta, 

where he specializes in the study of ethnic group identity. His research has concentrated on the Chechens and the Kurds—that is 

very interesting—and recently working on papers entitled Things 

Fall Apart: A Political Opportunity Model for the Chechen Resistance. He holds an MA and a Ph.D. from the University of Connecticut. 

And finally we have Dr. Sabine Freizer—is it Freizer or Freizer? 

Ms. FREIZER. Freizer. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Freizer. Who joined the International Crisis 

Group in 2004. She currently serves as the Istanbul-based director 

of the European Program. In this role, Sabine oversees projects covering the Caucasus, both North and South, Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, 

Turkey, and Cyprus. Before joining the Crisis Group, she served as 

political officer in the OSCE Election Observation Missions in Azerbaijan and Georgia from 2003 to 2004. She has a Ph.D. from the 

London School of Economics and a master’s from the College of Europe in Belgium, which she obtained as a Fulbright scholar. 

So we welcome our witnesses today, and we would ask if you 

could try to keep your testimony to 5 minutes. And anything can 

be submitted for the record. But then we will come back and ask 

questions once everyone has testified. If there is a vote, it is the 

intention of this chair to recess, if we have not had our time to ask 

the questions, and then come back immediately after the last vote. 

And I understand there is only going to be two or three votes, so 

it should not be more than 20 minutes or 1⁄2 hour. So we will start 

with Mr. Goble. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL GOBLE, PROFESSOR, INSTITUTE OF 

WORLD POLITICS 

Mr. GOBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting 

me, and thank you for holding a hearing on such an important 

topic. Allow me to begin by associating myself with what you and 

other members of the committee have said about our common horror at what happened in Boston and about the enormous respect 

we have for the people of Boston and the way they responded. It 

was quite impressive. I must say that I also want to associate myself with the chairman’s remarks about the Department of State’s 

representation. As late as the summer of 1989, I was the only person employed in the U.S. Government working on the non-Russian 

peoples of the Soviet Union. That was quite amazing given everything that was happening. And it was certainly my hope that after 

7

the Soviet Union came apart, the number of people who would be 

working in those areas and have expertise on it would grow, and 

we would all benefit from it. 

It is probably inevitable whenever something that we know little 

about, a place or a people, comes into our consciousness, that we 

jump rather quickly to oversimplifications based on our knowledge 

from elsewhere. That is certainly what has happened in the response to the horror in Boston. We have had people use terminology which has been imported without much thought about what 

it means. And I think it is terribly important to unpack some of 

this oversimplistic language and to understand what is really going 

on lest we be in a position to fight it, and also even more, and more 

immediately anyway, lest we be manipulated in a way that is 

against American national interests. 

In my remarks I would like to focus on three elements of this 

oversimplification. The first has to do with Islam, the second has 

to do with ethnicity, specifically, in the North Caucasus, and third 

has the do with the experience of emigration among peoples of the 

North Caucasus, not only in this country, but in western Europe. 

Islam in the North Caucasus is among the most varied phenomenon in the world. It came in three different ways beginning 

in the 8th century in Dagestan, and not until the 18th century in 

Chechnya. Dagestan is a vastly more Islamic place. I am much 

more worried about the 6 months in Dagestan than I am the 

Chechen background. It is also very differently in how tightly it is 

held by people there, and how much it motivates actions. Many of 

the people who are called Muslims, or call themselves Muslims in 

this part of the world know nothing about their faith. They are 

what the Soviet calls ethnic Muslims. They know they are Muslims, they don’t know what it means. 

President Dzhokhar Dudayev of Chechnya once told me that he 

was a good Muslim, he prayed three times a day. As a good Muslim 

would know that you pray five times a day, but he had been a 

member of the Communist Party since the age of 18, and major 

general in the Soviet Air Force, so he did not know. Unfortunately, 

we use the term Muslim without always an appreciation of the fact 

that what happened has happened in the North Caucasus, and 

even more in Central Asia, since 1991 reflects the experiences of 

a community that had an identity but had no content for that identity. And suddenly there were people available to provide that content. Prior to 1991, very few of these people could have told you 

the difference between one sura of the Koran or another. The 

Koran was published only twice in Soviet times for people there. 

So they didn’t know very much. 

I believe that the opening of the southern border of what had 

been the USSR may prove ultimately more fateful for the United 

States than the opening of the western border to Europe. First, and 

I want to give you four statistics, pairs of statistics. In 1991 in the 

Russian Federation there were 150 mosques. Today there are 

8,800. In 1991, there were 40 people who went on the hajj, people 

who traveled to Mecca. This past year, there were 40,000, a factor 

of 1,000 increase. The number of missionaries coming in from the 

Middle East, Turkey, and Saudi, and the Turks are quite heavily 

involved, went from zero in 1991 to a high of about 2,500 in the 

8

late 1990s, and it is now somewhere between 1,200 and 1,500. And 

the number of Muslims studying abroad in madrasas and Islamic 

universities went from four in 1991, at least three of whom were 

working for the KGB, and now to a figure of probably about 1,200, 

again, down from the numbers of 2,000-plus at the end of the 

1990s. 

Those numbers are even more dramatic in Central Asia. I hope 

we can come back to that, but I think that is important. Second, 

with respect to ethnicity. Ethnicity was constructed. These people 

have various experiences with what it means. Most of the 

Chechens were, in fact, committed ethno-nationalists. The idea that 

they are Islamist nationalists is simply untrue. There are some 

who are, but overwhelmingly, it is not the case. If you look at Central Asia, you will see that that is also true. And the experience 

of emigration means that people are in extremis because they are 

up against very difficult situations. And one thing that has not 

been focused on in the discussion of Boston is that many Chechens 

feel they are about to be returned to the Russian Federation or to 

Chechnya because of what has been happening, thanks to Russian 

pressure in Austria, Germany, Belgium, and elsewhere in Western 

Europe. People who fear they have no good options may do really 

bad things. 

Three quick conclusions: First, I think we are learning that if we 

are going to compete in this kind of ideological contest, and it is 

an ideological contest, police power must be used, but it will never 

be sufficient to solve the problem. Second, we need to recognize 

that many of the problems we face now, both with regard to Islam 

in North Caucasus and Central Asia, and with regard no ethnicity 

in North Caucasus and in Central Asia, are a reflection of the actions of Moscow both before 1991 and after that time. We have to 

cooperate with the Russians in certain respects, but we have to recognize that they are part of the problem, too. And that has to be 

insisted upon. 

And third, we need to understand that some of the things that 

are coming out in the coverage of the two terrorists shows that 

there are some optimistic reasons for looking at Islam, that more 

and more Muslims are learning the details of their faith. Forty 

years ago, when I started studying it, you couldn’t get a translation 

of the Koran in English that didn’t say an interpretation. Now 

there are discussions of what is canonical, what translations are 

canonical. We know what happened when the Bible was translated 

into German and English in the 15th century. It led to the Reformation, the Renaissance, and modernity. It is entirely possible 

that we will see the same kind of thing happen in the world of 

Islam, and we will see the same kind of troubles over the next 

three or four generations that the people of Western Europe understood. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That last point you made is very interesting. 

I never thought of that before. And thank you. 

[Mr. Goble did not submit a prepared statement.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Dr. Albert. 

9

STATEMENT OF CRAIG DOUGLAS ALBERT, PH.D., ASSISTANT 

PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, GEORGIA REGENTS UNIVERSITY AUGUSTA 

Mr. ALBERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, fellow panelists, for having me here today. I appreciate the 

opportunity to speak about Islamic extremism in Chechnya. I 

would also like to remark my comments are directed mostly at the 

Islamic extremists inside Chechnya and Dagestan, and don’t reflect 

the general population of Chechnya as well, that is more an ethnonationalist approach, as Professor Goble said. So this pertains directly to the Islamist threat inside the area. There are some 

Islamist elements inside Chechnya and the surrounding Caucasus 

regions, although their connection to any larger global jihadist network is a question for debate. It is this author’s opinion that although there is an Islamist presence in the Chechen region, it possesses little strategic threat to the United States, although it may 

pose a modest threat to the United States’ forces worldwide. 

The largest contemporary Islamist threat in Chechnya and Dagestan is the Caucasus Emirate founded in 2007. The CE is currently 

led by Doku Umarov, and was officially created to replace the failing separatist government of the region, the Chechen Republic of 

Ichkeria. While the former wanted an independent Chechnya, the 

CE wants to create an Islamic caliphate that extends beyond the 

Caucasus region. In fact, it appears the CE has embarked upon a 

philosophically grand vision of territorial expansion in the past couple of years. The CE has some reported connections to al-Qaeda, including third-party financing, mainly based in Saudi Arabia. Although there are arguments whether there are larger connections 

between the CE and al-Qaeda, there appears to be evidence that 

the two are connected, if only in a minor way. It is well documented that al-Qaeda is currently more of a leaderless organization, and thus has resulted to organizing and coordinating its efforts and networks via the Internet, which is probably the relationship it has with Chechen jihadists. 

Therefore, it is more difficult to establish a clear connection between the two, but there is a connection, however small it may be. 

Although there are some historical links with Chechnya and alQaeda, there is no convincing evidence that Doku Umarov is a 

member of al-Qaeda, but he certainly sympathizes with its larger 

causes. This can perhaps be demonstrated by the Caucasus Emirate Web sites that post links to al-Qaeda documents and al-Qaeda 

affiliates, including links to the al-Qaeda magazine Inspire, which 

may have helped the Boston bombers develop and deploy their 

bombs. 

It must also be mentioned that the tactics and bombs used in 

Boston resemble the attacks carried out in Chechnya, including delayed multiple explosions, although the bombs are made slightly 

differently. The greater jihadist threat in the Caucasus Mountains 

is not a nationalistic Chechen movement, and doesn’t involve most 

of the Chechens—probably less than 1 percent of the population at 

all sympathize with this type of movement—but it is a larger network of jihadists connected and networked to the global jihad. It 

is also more of a Caucasian threat than a Chechen threat, emanating mostly from individuals of Dagestan. 

10

It is important to emphasize that an attack on the United States’ 

mainland from the Caucasus Emirate or other Chechen/Caucasian 

groups is highly unlikely. The Chechens are generally not preoccupied with the United States. However, one has to consider if 

the Chechens do become more involved with the larger global jihadi 

network, whether they may consider attacking the U.S. homeland. 

With that considered, one would still conclude that an attack in the 

U.S. is highly unlikely by these individuals. In fact, CE commanders have recently stated that the larger confederated network 

had nothing to do with the planning, coordinating, or financing of 

the attacks in Boston. Doku Umarov has also recently ordered his 

units and all jihadist elements inside the Caucasus not to attack 

civilians at all, anywhere. And he has emphasized that his organization has no conflict with the United States. 

The CE and nationalist groups inside Chechnya direct most of 

their concerns toward combating the Russian Federation. Especially with the 2014 Winter Olympics approaching, it can be hypothesized that their efforts are being solely directed at targeting 

those sporting events or planning other attacks inside and around 

Russia, especially inside Dagestan. It is likely, however, that U.S. 

military, security, and perhaps government forces that are combating jihadist elements worldwide will face a continued threat 

from individuals from the Chechen area. The U.S. has already 

faced these foes from the Caucasus in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and we can also safely predict that where there is a jihadist foothold or where there is a chance of gaining ground for Islamist 

forces, some Chechens will be found there, as is recently reported 

in the Syrian civil war. 

Unless some more details are made available about the Boston 

bombers’ possible training in the Caucasus, however, and Dagestan, I think it is highly unlikely that there is any reasonable strategic threat planned against the United States by the Chechens. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. We will have some 

questions for you later. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albert follows:]

11


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Statement before the Joint Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats 

& 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation ffild Trade 

Hearing on "Tslamist Extremism in Chechnya: A Threat to the U.S. Homeland?" 

Does Chechnya Represent a Strategic Terrorist Threat to the lJnited States? 

A General Assessment 

Craig Douglas Albert, Ph.D 

Assistant Professor of Political Science 

Georgia Regents University 

April 26, 2013 

The \'iCl1'S expressed in this testimon:v are those afthe author alone and do not necessarily represent those oj 

Georgia Regents University. 
12


80551a-2.eps

A Brief Description of Islamists in Chechnya 

There are Islamist elements inside Chechnya and the surrounding Caucasus region although their 

connection to any larger, global jihadist network is a question up for debate. It is this author's 

opinion that although there is an Islamist presence in the Chechen region, it poses little strategic 

threat to the United States (US) although it may pose a modest threat to US forces worldwide 

This report will demonstrate exactly the nature of Chechen Islamists, how they developed, and 

what threat they pose to the US. 

The largest contemporary Islamist threat in Chechnya and Dagestan is the Caucasus Emirate 

(CE), founded in 2007. The CE is currently lead by Doku Umarov and was officially created to 

replace the failing, separatist government of the region, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. While 

the Chechen Republic of Tchkeria wanted an independent Chechnya, the CE wants to create an Islamic 

Caliphate (world-state) that cxtends beyond the Caucasus region. In fact, it appears that CE has 

embarked upon a philosophically grand vision of territorial expansion.' The CE has reported 

connections to AI-Qaeda (AQ)", including third party financing, mainly based in Saudi Arabia. 

Although there are arguments whether there are larger connections between the CE and AQ, 

there appears to be evidence that the two are connected on more than just a superficial level 111 It 

is well documented that AQ is currently more of a leaderless organization and thus has resulted 

to organizing and coordinating its efforts and networks via the Internet. 1v Therefore, it is more 

difficult to establish a clear connection between the two, but there is a connection, however 

tenuous it may be 

There are reports, however, of Os am a bin Laden's chieflieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, going to 

Chechnya with the intent of forming a base of operations there, but was unsuccessful and 

detained, and later released. V It is also well known that chief Chechen rebel and terrorist Shamil 

Basayev had links to AQ as well, mainly through his chief lieutenant, Ibn al-Khattab (born Amir 

Saleh Abdullah AI-Suwailem).vl There is no convincing evidence that Doku Umarov is a 

member of AQ, but certainly sympathizes with its larger causes. This can perhaps be 

demonstrated by CE websites that post links to AQ documents and AQ affiliates, including links 

to the AQ magazine, inspire, which may have helped the Boston Bombers develop and deploy 

their bombs. It must also be mentioned that the tactics and bombs used in Boston resemble 

attacks carried out in Chechnya including delayed, multiple explosions, although the bombs are 

made slightly ditTerent. vlI 

Additionally, in Dagestan the organization known as Shariat Jammat poses a considerable threat, 

and is linked or a part of the larger CEo Its goal, allied with CE, is to establish a greater Islamic 
13


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Caliphate in the Caucasus and Shariat Jammat aligns itself with jihadistlsalafist movements and 

motivations."" Together, the greater jihadist threat in the Caucasus Mountains is indeed not a 

nationalistic Chechen movement, but a larger network of jihadist connected and networked to the 

global jihad. It is also more of a Caucasian threat, than a Chechen threat, emanating mostly from 

individuals trom Dagestan. 

A Brief Historical Accouut of the Crisis iu Chechuya 

Chechnya's contemporary history becomes important to world history with the demise of the 

Soviet Union. As the Soviet Republics were declaring independence, forming their own states 

free from the control of Moscow, Chechnya too decided to declare its independence from Russia. 

However, since it did not have the same type of autonomous status as did the other republics (for 

instance, Ukraine and Latvia), Russia did not recognize their right to independence. Russia 

eventually invaded Chechnya's autonomous district, with deadly, but surprising results. Tens of 

thousands of civilians were murdered: hundreds of thousands were displaced and went missing: 

and more so, the Russian military suffered its most humiliating defeat since its tragic war with 

Afghanistan. More importantly, Chechnya received quasi-independence, the right to govern itself 

until a full treaty could be arranged on a later date. However, that later treaty never developed. 

During the inter-war era of the Russo-Chechen Wars, chaos was ripe within the Republic 

The Republic's government was a failing government; corruption was rife: political murders and 

extrajudicial killings were rampant; and more troubling was the arrival ofWahhabism,lx a form 

of Islam thai can be very deadly. Wahhabist Islam was a surprise addition to Chcchen culture. 

Chechnya traditionally celebrates a form of Sufi Islam, which allows for more indigenous 

representations of Islamic principles (for instance, it allows the celebration of ancestral ~'saints") 

and is considered one of Islam's more mystical representations. Sufism is not generally 

recognized by the more traditional sects. When Wahhabism made its appearance, it clashed 

greatly w'ith many Chechens. An attempt was made to establish Shari'a Law, but this was met 

with great opposition from many ordinary Chechcns. The two sides settled with all uneasy 

tension until 1999, when the second Russo-Chechcn War began. This period is important 

however, because it marks the appearance of Islamic extremism within Chechnya and some of 

the worst terrorist acts carried out in Russia resulted from Wahhabist arrival. 

The second Russo-Chechen War resulted from a group of Chechen Wahhabist terrorists invading 

a neighboring semi-autonomous district to Chechnya, Dagestan. Dagestan was fully under 

Moscow's control at this time. In combination with well-timed terrorist hlasts in Russia that 

destroyed several apartments and killed scores, which the Russia government blamed on 

Chechen tenorists, Moscow invaded Chechnya for the second time. This time it resulted in 

thousands dead, and tens of thousands displaced and missing. However, Russia made little 

The \'iCl1'S expressed in this testimon:v are those afthe author alone and do not necessarily represent those oj 

Georgia Regents University. 
14


80551a-4.eps

mistakes militarily and bombarded Chechnya from the air and devastated and demolished its 

infrastructure before allowing its ground forces inside the republic (a mistake it made in the t1rst 

war that contributed to its joss). This war lasted for several more years, with tenons! operations 

and "clean-ups" that were not officially ended until April 15, 2009, an interesting date 

considering the date of the Boston Bombings. Russia has been denounced worldwide by 

govemments, NGOs, IGOs, and the United States for its human nghts atrocities during this time. 

It must also be noted that Chechen rebels were also guilty of grave abuses. 

A Chechen Threat to the United States? 

It is important to emphasize that an attack on the United States' mainland from the Caucasus 

Emirate or other Chechen/Caucasian groups is highly unlikely. The Chechens are generally not 

preoccupied with the United States. However, one has to consider if the Chechens do become 

more involved with the larger global jihadi network, whether they may consider attacking the US 

homeland. With that considered, one would still conclude that an attack in the US homeland is 

highly unlikely and would probably be very unpopular inside Chechnya. In fact, CE's command 

has recently stated that the larger confederated network did not have anything to do with 

planning, coordinating, or financing the attacks in Boston X Doku Umarov has also recently 

ordered his units and all jihadist elements inside the Caucasus not to attack civiliansXl and he has 

emphasized that his organization has no contlict with the United States."'1 Additionally, 

Chechnya's Moscow backed president, Ramzan Kadyrov has commented on the Boston attacks 

stating that there is no link with the suspects to Chechnya and that these actions must be blamed 

on American intluences."'11 The CE, however, has reports on its website claiming that Russia is to 

blame for these attacks, and that Ramzan Kadyrov himself may have ordered the terrorist 

strike.X1v 

Although the CE has stated that it has no contlict with the US, and will not hann any civilians, 

including Russians, this has not always been the case." Thus, these statements should not be 

trusted fully, though their implications may last at least temporarily. Soon after the establishment 

of the CE, Doku Umarov is noted for having stated: 

"Today in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somali and Palestine our brothers are fighting. Those who 

attack Muslims, whoever or wherever they are, are our enemy. Our enemy is not just 

Russia but also America, England, Israel, for all of them are the enemy of Islam and 

Muslims."wl 

The US has continually condemned Russia for its human rights abuses inside Chechnya. Further, 

Chechens have a closer and far more worrisome matter on its hands than the United States. The 

CE and nationalist groups inside Chechnya direct most of their concerns towards combating the 

Russian Federation. Especially with the 2014 Winter Olympics approaching, it can be 

hypothesized that their efforts are being solely directed at targeting those sporting events, or 

planning other attacks inside and around Russia."11 It is likely, however, that US military, 
15


80551a-5.eps

security, and perhaps government forces that are combating jihadist elements worldwide will 

face a continued threat from individuals from the Chechen area; wherever the US goes, so too 

will some elements from regions of the world with jihadist connections. The US has already 

faced these foes from the Caucasus in both Iraq and Afghanistan, l<Vlll and will perhaps continue to 

see so as well. We can also safely predict that where there is ajihadist foothold, or where there is 

a chance of gaining ground for Islamist forces, some Chechens will be found there as is recentl y 

reported in the Syrian Civil WarX1X 

The larger threat emanating from Chechnya is not against the US, but Russia itself. Chechnya is 

currently under the control of Moscow, \vhich has given authoritarian powers and total control to 

rule Chechnya as a ruthless \varlord to President Rarnz3n Kadyrov. He is a brutal leader and 

bribery, mass killings, missing persons, kid napping, narco-tramcking, sex trafficking, and 

Wahhabist Islam are rampant within Chechnya. Moscow keeps Kadyrov in pOV\ier because he 

eliminates, with almost no provocation needed, any threats to Russia, which of course \vould be 

threats to his power. It is understood that any threats made to Moscmv, will be mirrored by 

Moscow's threats to remove Kadyrov from power To keep personal power, President Kadyrov 

keeps an authoritarian lid on Chcchnya to prevent any attacks, and with few exceptions, he is 

largely successful. However, Kadyrov has his challenges, mainly from Chechens who still 

envision an independent country, and from more radical jihadists that believe Kadyrov is the 

pawn of Russian infidels. There is a greater emerging threat of an ethnic Chechen civil war 

yvhere the Kadyrov regime faces otf against the jihadists'" His continued leadership cannot be 

counted to last much longer. He may also evolve more toward the Islamists vision if he believes 

he is losing power; if this occurs, he could turn his forces against Russia and other states. This is 

only a conjecture, however 

To back up this authoritarian control, Moscow pumps billions of dollars annually into Chechnya, 

hoping to provide a materialist and consumerist culture that will make it seem futile to attack the 

hand that provides food. Russia seems to hope that by buying Chechnya off and making its 

economy appear booming, the lure of Wahhabist intluence "ill not he so appealing. In short, 

Russia is trying to make Chechnya the Abu-Dhahi of the Caucasus. However, Rnssia is 

mistaken: you cannot buyout those individuals that want to be a part of the Chechen Jihadist 

Network Their ultimate goals are to establish a worldwide Islamic Caliphate, dominated by 

Islam under a theocratic-authoritarian government, where Shari'a law is the law of the land. 

These are the Chechens the US should be concemed about and tbese are the Chechens that 

cannot be bought out by any amount of money. Jf the Boston Bombers are connected to any 

larger group conceming Chechnya, this is the group; and if they have set their eyes on America, 

then we should be concerned. However, this connection is unlikely. 

If the United States has any potential threat from the Caucasus, that percent is perhaps less than 

1 % of the total population. What is concerning to US security about this 1% is that it is not just 

The \'iCl1'S expressed in this testimon:v are those afthe author alone and do not necessarily represent those oj 

Georgia Regents University. 
16


80551a-6.eps

men who have become violently radicalized, but women (and perhaps children) too. We must not 

forget about the infamous black widows (women relatives of dead Chechens rebels who struck 

against Russia with deadly suicide ten'orism.) Secondly, and very importantly, there is a 

centuries-long culture of personal vendetta in Chechnya. It is culturally accepted and actually 

even encouraged in some regions that if someone harms your [amil y, you will hanTI them back. 

The possibility of vendetta killings against United States officials and civilians in retaliation for 

the death of Tamerlan Tsamae and the capture of Dzhokhar cannot be ruled out. Even if the 

individuals who committed the terrorist acts in Boston were not connected with the larger 

Jihadist network in Chechnya, people that knew these two individuals in Boston may want 

revenge. This is something the Wahhabist element in Chechnya could take advantage of 

Next, there are two potential groups of violent actors in Chechnya right nO\v: the Chechen 

nationalist movement, and the Chechen Jihadist movement. The Chechen nationalist movement 

is, for all intent and purposes, diminished. Even the maj Olity of the Chechen population that 

once supp0l1ed this cause are worn out trom tvventy years of violence, and now, only want the 

appearance of peace and some stability and prosperity. The Religious Wahhabist element does 

not want peace and security or stability and prosperity. They want an independent Chechnya to 

create an Islamic Caliphate that extends to all areas the Prophet ever had any interest in These 

people are the real threat and they are the ones nsually found on foreign battlefields. 

What the US should really fear is the "perfect storm": some event causing the two sides to join 

forces. CI11Tently, they fight against one another and Chechnya has always been on the verge of 

an "ethnic civil war." Russia knows this, which is why they give so much power to Kadyrov and 

tolerate his rule. This will not last; he will eventuall y be overthrown, and violence vvill relum as 

is usually the case when ethnic tensions are checked with totalitarian powers. There is a very 

small percentage of Chechens that ought to concern the U.s., who they are can be predicted 

based on certain indicators. They are brutally fierce warriors that usually do not back down from 

a fight. They do not traditionally like to use suicide bombings (though this has been changing in 

the last decade) because they believe that is cowardly and does not bring as much honor to their 

ethno-natiol1 as does standing their ground until the last possible moment. Chechnya is a culture 

where honor and family name are crucially important. It is also a culture where military and 

martial arts are highl y prized, recognized and rewarded. It is a culture where boys at'e taught to 

remember how and by whose hands their male ancestors were killed. And if necessary and 

opportune, they might remember these facts for sinister purposes. 

The US should not fear nor be frightened hy Chechnya, nor the average Chcchcn. However, it 

must not be overlooked that the Chechens are some of the fiercest warriors and if they set their 

targets on the United States, it must be concerned. They are not your typical terrorists, and as 

previously stated, they will not back down. The likelihood that the region poses a strategic 

terrorist threat to the United States however, is minimal if existent at all 
17


80551a-7.eps

, See Gordon M. Halne "Islam. Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER).·· No. GG. 28. March 2013. 

n Sec for instance. Ambassador Mmc Ginsberg. "A Field Guide to Jilmdi Dagestan and Chcclmya.'· Huffington Post. 

April 22, 2013: 1111Q://'i,"'\vw.hllffingJQ!!lli2S!&m}1Iamb-lT!.g..ls..:gill'hcrg/3-fi~d:gl1ide-to-ilhilili:!:i b :~ 1}!8jLhrmL 

Accessed onApri12~. 20B. 

,n See Hahn. Gordon M. 2011 (August). "Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right: A Report of the CSTS Russia and 

EUrdsia Progmm." Washington, D.C.. Center for Strategic and Intematioml Studies. 

U Ibid. 

, "U nderstanding Chechnya. Jihad, and the Region's Deep Tics with AI-Qaeda: Q&A with Leon Arcn . 

.hUuJ1v,'w·,,y .ae!.:~dea~.gI1lil.Ql.1!04hH~rstaJ\d.l11g:£1~~lm.yJ!:.iil1kll)..i!!l4.:lJE.:J~~mus-deep-ties-\ythltill::ilit~lli.t:9g:1TIJll..: 

le9J'--:i.rQlli. Accessed on April 24. 2013. 

,-I Both now deceased. 

'ill See, lillQljne\YS,llSni org/20 1.3/04/ ~ 9lbo mbinK:mtlt!Q.QQlQ~entical::tQ::£hech~n-reQels-motiTI!llilll:1UlCk;ill:. 

Assessed April 25. 2013 

,m Ginsbcrg. "A Field Guide:' 

U For an lUlderstanding of Chechen Wahhabism, see. Speckhard and Aldnnedova, 2006. "The New Chechen Jihad: 

Militant Wahlmbism as a &1dical Movemcnt and a Source of Suicide Terrorism in Post-War Chechen Society:' 

Democracy and Security, 2: 103-155. 

A. See, llttp:!lH\Y,,,.k~lYkazceHteI.COl~coIltentl2013!O-f.!21J17G79.shtml. Accessed April 24. 2013 . 

• '-.1 Sec. Imp://\\ \\ \\ .kavkHl:ccn.lcLcom/cngiconlcn1./2012/02/Ul/) :"7'15.shlml. Accessed April 24, 2013. 

XII Tn a statement posted on a "'ebsite loynl to the CE, a commander states that "The Command of the Province of 

Dagestan indicates in this regard that the Caucasian Mujahideen are not fighting against the United States of 

America. We are at war with Russia. which is not only responsible for the occupation of Ule Caucasus. but also [or 

heinous crimes against Muslims. See, httn1LlY}D:.y.ki1vkaz:£Q~L...9lD.lGl1gL£fmtcn.ta.QJ}/O-t!2 !l! 7679.shtm.l.. Accessed 

on April 24. 2013 

.'-.Ill See. hH:rr:/; !\j"\-"-'v~ hulD )lg.lQIID.O ~t&QJna. ()J V().-.f/J _9L1ill~h L.Q\: :.GJ}.~Q jl~n:-p.I~mrt~HL-PQ~~Q ~l·i!.Q.mpjl~~ (.LJ J ! Q0}t~Ul1ruj. 

Accessed April 2-1. lOB. 

"" See. 11ll.JL;f!"\\'\y"\y,km:ka?:cellteLcomieng/contcnt/2013/i)4!2 31176()..J.shtml. Accessed April 24. 2013. 

XI' Tn fact. there may be a larger connection to Caucasianjihadist in the United States. and Boston more specifically. 

Sec lM. Berger. "Boston's Jilmdi Past." Foreign Policy, April 22, 2013: 

.b!m.Jh,V1nv.fCil\;j o-npol icY, co mhlITifles/20 I VQJ/22.milltons jiJmillst past. Accessed on April 2"k 201 J. 

'-\,1 It should be noted that there are many more examples of American threats spoken by CE leaders. See. Dmitry 

Shlapentokll201O. "Thc Rise of the Russian Khalifat: The Vicw from the Jilmdist Sidc." iran and 'he Caucasus. 

1-1 120 . 

. '-.Yll 1 am not alone in thinking U13t these will be particularly dangerolls games: 

hlliU:'Q.!]li~lI.\J.&Qlnl;l'1l£lG1S.ill 0001424 I 27R87:12:i 7JS!ill457S429J253(ilL42g.16s.html. Accessed April 24. 2011. 

'~m See Halm. GordonM. 2011 (August). "Getting the Caucasus Emirdle Right: A Report of the CSIS Russia and 

~urasiaProgram.'· Washington. D.C.: Center for Strategic and iIllenk1tiOlk11 Studies. 

XL'- Sec. h1m.://,Y}}·,y,hnffi!Hrt0nJ2~.tsomi20! ]!t)3/i2(l!5..yri3-'v3r-rcbcis-chG..~hnya-islamic-milit<llit'Ln lS21197.html. 

Assessed April 24. 2013. See also Gordon M. Halm "Islam, Islamism and Politics in E'lrdsia Report (lIPER)." No 

66. 28. March 2013. 

= Tn fact. this is already occurring in Chcchnya's mountains as TIe\v operations ha\'e started \"ith Moscovl"-backed 

Chechen forces attacking j ihadist camps: htlD:!!www.refworlcl.ol"gJdogdi5i-l6e91£:ldllml. Accessed on April M. 

2013 
18

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And sir, and again, Mr. Migranyan. 

STATEMENT OF ANDRANIK MIGRANYAN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, 

INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND COOPERATION 

Mr. MIGRANYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But you have to punch your button there. 

Thank you for joining us today. And we really appreciate hearing 

from a point of view that we wouldn’t hear otherwise. And I think 

we should. So you may proceed. 

Mr. MIGRANYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege for 

me to be here and to share some views concerning Russia’s perception concerning all these events which happened in Boston. First 

of all, I would like to emphasize that these attacks in Boston have 

provoked feelings of solidarity with the American people, and especially with the citizens of Boston among the Russian people and the 

Russian leadership. And this is the second time when President 

Putin, after 9/11, expressed his readiness immediately to cooperate 

with American authorities in order to find out what happened and 

how we can eradicate the reasons and causes which brought these 

tragedies. But what is in Russia, you know, in Russia there was, 

of course, a kind of, you know, uneasiness during these previous 

two decades when Russia was fighting against Chechen terrorists, 

and Russia didn’t get enough understanding, empathy, and support 

from its western partners. And this is something which really is in 

the public opinion, and in the mood of politicians. And by the way, 

yesterday Putin, in his direct line with the people, for 5 hours he 

was talking to the people, he talked a lot about this event in Boston and terrorism. 

And he said that Russia was the victim of international terrorism in Russia from Middle Eastern countries, from other places, 

Muslim radicals and terrorists were coming and supporting 

Chechen terrorists, and unfortunately, our western partners were 

very, you know, reserved in order to express their support. 

And this is, I think, one of the reasons is that even now when 

you look at the coverage of the events in Boston, a lot of people are 

talking about Stalin’s deportations, about psychological problems 

concerning these people who grew up, and about these injustices 

which Russian authorities executed against the people indirectly 

trying to justify some motives. But you know, I think America now 

is faced with this home-grown terrorism, I think it is becoming 

more and more aware that without—you know, no motives can justify the terrorism and mass killings of innocent civilians independently, because no retaliation can be justified if some governments 

are acting in some places like the Tsarnaev brothers were talking 

about America’s war in Iraq or Afghanistan, and maybe that is the 

reason why they acted this way. 

And another important problem is that, of course, Russia wanted 

to get back and have extradited some leaders of Chechen terrorists 

from the UK and from the United States. For example, Akhmed 

Zakayev was in United Kingdom, and now still is there. He is selfproclaimed prime minister of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Or 

Ilyas Akhmadov, by the way, who is the former Minister of Foreign 

Affairs of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, by the way he got asylum 

in Boston when he left Russia. And unfortunately, neither AmerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:31 Jun 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\042613\80551 HFA PsN: SHIRL
19

ican nor British sides, you know, cooperated with Russia in order 

to extradite those terrorists who are considered in Russia as terrorists. But the problem is that, I would like to say, that Chechen terrorists cross the border of Russia, and now we have information in 

the Russian Secret Services and Russian media that Chechens are 

fighting in Afghanistan, and they are fighting against Americans. 

They are fighting against NATO. 

You mentioned that they are members of some groups in Europe. 

They are now fighting in Syria. And American politicians and the 

American media are supportive of some groups of these rebels who 

are fighting against a legitimate government in that country, which 

means that we heard that some fighters over there, they are putting the signs that we are fighting today here, and if we win, then 

we are going to fight in Russia, returning back to Russia. But summing up what I said, in Russia, the general mood is that we have 

to understand that we Russians have a common interest and overlapping interests with the United States. And we have disagreements, and after Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib not everyone in 

Russia believes that the American Secret Services consist of 

knights on white horses. But our imperfections should not prevent 

us from realizing that we are facing a common enemy, and to cooperate against it is both common sense and inherently moral. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for that testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Migranyan follows:]

20


80551b-1.eps

Andranik Migranyan 

Director of the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, New Yark 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

04.26.2013. Joint Subcommittee Hearing: lslamist Extremism in Chechnya: A Threat to the U.S 

Homeland? 
21


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Testimony on Rnssian-American Relations on the Qnestion of Chechnya 

Before the lJ.S. Congress 

A. Migranyan 

U.S.-Russian relations on Chechnya have a complicated history. And, unfortunately, for a long time, 

there has been a common lack of understanding of the events in Chechnya. By contrast, immediately 

following 9/11, the Russian side expressed readiness for active cooperation with the Bush 

Administration against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other Tslamist terrorist groups 

America has failed to understand Chechen terrorism until it faced homegrown terrorism on its own 

soil: over the years, the media and political circles invoked the activities of Russian and Soviet 

authorities from decades past to explain Chechen acts of terrorism against Russia as retaliation for 

injustice. American homegrown terrorists also claim to retaliate against the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, or alleged U.S. war against Islam, but no American would buy this excuse to justify 

the slaughter of civilians. The point of departure in our cooperation should be that terrorism against 

innocent civilians cannot be justified, no malter what 

The Russian side has never received full understanding on the part of its American partners of its 

fight against Chechen terrorism. Russian actions in Chechnya were primarily criticized in the 

Western media, and in Western political circles, as they were seen through the prism of human 

rights violations and the excessive use of force. There was a potent attempt to separate the American 

fight against lslamist terrorism from the Russian fight against Chechen terrorism that took place 

within Russia's borders 

In addition, Russian efforts to get extradition orders for some Chechen terrorist leaders that moved 

to the UK, such as Akhmed Zakayev, self-proclaimed Prime Minister of the Chechen Republic of 

Ichkeria (Chechen separatists call Chechnya "Ichkeria"), or to the US., such as llyas Akhmadov, 

Foreign Minister of the Chechen Republic ofIchkeria, who, by the way, was granted asylum in 

Boston, received neither understanding nor support by the American and British sides. As if that 
22


80551b-3.eps

were not enough, sadly, many Western countries preferred to call the terrorists and cut-throats 

"freedom fighters" oppressed by the Russian authorities 

This last point was articulated by President Putin in his annual direct line with the public on April 

25th He was translated by the Russian media as having said, "[ was always appalled when our 

Western partners and the Western media called the terrorists, who did bloody crimes in our country, 

'insurgents', and almost never 'terrorists.' They [the terrorists] were receiving help, informational, 

financial and political support. Sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly. And we were saying 

that we must do the job and not be content with declarations proclaiming terrorism a common threat 

Those two have proved our position all too well" 

The attacks by the Tsarnaev brothers in Boston, as well as the 9111 attacks, have provoked feelings 

of solidarity with the American people and especially with the citizens of Boston among the Russian 

people and Kremlin leadership. Just as he did in 200 1, President Putin expressed his readiness to 

cooperate with the U.S. government to uncover all the details that led to the tragedy in Boston and, 

as far as I know, the secret services of both countries are now actively working together on this. 

It is crucial to point out that the Russian side and Russian secret services tracked the contacts of the 

Tsarnaevs and turned to the American authorities so that they could investigate them. Unfortunately, 

the evident remaining distrust between the two countries and the doubts of the American side that 

Russia is indeed combating Chechen terrorism in the Caucasus must have caused the authorities to 

not take the warning seriously enough. Today, we no longer need to strive to convince anyone that 

Chechen terrorism has crossed the borders of Russia. The people of Boston felt it for themselves. 

The Russian media and Russian secret services have infonnation of Chechen Islamists and Islamists 

from other regions of the North Caucasus havingjoined the ranks ofjihadists in various parts of the 

world. There is even information that they fight in Syria on the side of the opposition and against the 

legitimate government 

I would like to believe that after the tragedy in Boston, the two countries and their secret services 

will be able to overcome, even if only a little, the distrust between them when it comes to evaluating 

terrorist threats, and that there will no longer be a dividing ofterrarists into "good" and "bad," 

"ours" and "theirs" 1 would also like to believe that our secret services will work together even 
23


80551b-4.eps

more closely in the light against the terrorist threat, which, like a tumor, metastasizes around much 

of the globe. 

We have to understand that Russia and the US have overlapping interests, but also disagreements 

After Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, not everyone in Russia believes that American secret services 

consist of knights on white horses. But our imperfections should not prevent us from realizing that 

we are facing a common enemy, and to cooperate against it is both common sense and inherently 

moral 
24

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we recognize the frustration of someone 

who sees acts of terrorism being committed against his own people 

that are very clear, and not the outrage and attitude here that we 

would expect, that he would expect from a decent people such as 

the people of the United States. We will go into that in the question and answer section. Mr. Royce? We are very pleased to have 

the chairman of the full committee, Ed Royce. Ed, would you like 

to make a statement? 

Mr. ROYCE. You know, I appreciate that opportunity, Mr. Chairman, but I think I will defer and allow the witnesses each to testify. And then if I might, I might ask a question. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will put you up front. And finally, Dr. 

Freizer. 

STATEMENT OF SABINE FREIZER, PH.D., DIRECTOR, EUROPE 

PROGRAM INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 

Ms. FREIZER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and ranking 

members, for the opportunity to present today. I want to commend 

the subcommittee for focusing their attention on the North 

Caucasus during such a critical time. A few words about Crisis 

Group. Crisis Group is an independent, nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization that provides field-based analysis, policy advice, and recommendations to governments, the United Nations, 

the European Union, and other multilateral organizations on the 

prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Ambassador Thomas 

Pickering is our current chairman, and Louise Arbour, former chief 

prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and 

the former Yugoslavia, and also the former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights is our current president. 

Crisis Group began a North Caucasus project in 2012, and has 

written two background reports that were published in October. 

The first report is called ‘‘The North Caucasus: The Challenges of 

Integration, Ethnicity and Conflict.’’ And the second report is called 

‘‘The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration, Islam, the Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency.’’ I would respectfully ask that 

these reports be incorporated into the committee record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Without objection.i 

Ms. FREIZER. Thank you. A third report, which will come out 

early this summer, will look at the institutional causes of conflict 

in the North Caucasus. And that report will also have a series of 

recommendations on how to deal with the violence in the North 

Caucasus. I should say that our staff travels frequently to the 

North Caucasus, throughout the region, talking to a very large of 

different interlocutors. I understand that these hearings take place 

in the aftermath of the Boston bombings, and I would like to also 

express the condolences of International Crisis Group, of all our 

staff working around the world, for these events. 

There are two primary causes for conflict in the North Caucasus. 

It is ethnic conflict and the Islamic insurgency. Let me discuss a 

little bit by talking about the ethnic conflict. During the early 

1990s, separatists sought full independence for Chechnya, but the 

failure of their state-building project and their expanded use of 

armed force, including of terrorism, brought a massive, and at 

25

times, indiscriminate Russian response during two wars in 

Chechnya. Since 2003, the situation in Chechnya has largely stabilized, with a process of Chechenisation by the Russian Government, which means handing over most economic and political 

power to local Chechen authorities. But having said that, several 

interethnic conflicts continue to exist in the region. Sometimes 

these do lead to violence. Very often they are about land and they 

are about control of power, local power and economic resources. But 

we also see some conflicts between some of the republics, for example, between Chechnya and Ingushetia, between Ingushetia and 

North Ossetia. So you still see tensions at the local level which are 

primarily ethnic-based. 

The other main source of conflict, which is the one that I think 

is the main issue of today, is the insurgency. Now, what we should 

say is that the insurgency feeds off the ethnic conflicts. So a lot of 

young people who in the past 20 years ago might have joined ethnic movements or nationalist movements now choose instead to join 

the insurgency. The main organization that is mobilizing the insurgency is the Caucasus Emirates, the Imarat Kavkaz, which was 

proclaimed in 2007 as a final step of the transformation of the 

Chechen separatist movement into a regional-wide Islamist project. 

It is recognized as a terrorist organization by Russia and by the 

United States and by many others. It operates across the North 

Caucasus, attracting youth of all different types of ethnicities. Predominantly, it attacks Federal forces and local police, but also civil 

servants and religious leaders. It has a unified force, a unified 

cause, a very strong structure with a leadership. Predominantly it 

is local. Predominantly it is local funded. And it has predominantly 

local aspirations. 

Today, rarely a day goes by without an attack in Russia. Some 

750 people were killed in 2011, and almost the same number were 

killed in 2012. So far this year, just in the Republic of Dagestan, 

67 people were killed. We will all remember, of course, the bombing 

of the Domodedovo Airport in Moscow in January 2011 that killed 

37. The vast majority of attacks are against security services, local 

officials, and traditional clergy. In February 2012, the head of the 

Caucasus Emirates said that he will no longer be targeting civilians. However, of course, in attacks against officials and security 

services, there are important civilian casualties. 

The government’s main response until now has been a very 

tough focus on eradicating the insurgency with a massive security 

presence. For example, just a few days ago, between the 11th and 

21st of April, there was a major security operation in Dagestan in 

the village of Guimudih, which resulted in the displacement of 

5,000 people. But the Russian Government has also began to open 

some room, and started applying a longer term comprehensive approach to counterterrorism. And I believe that it is this approach 

that should be supported. 

Finally, the North Caucasus integration into the rest of Russia 

is essential for security and for healthy ethnic relations in the 

country. The spread of violence from Chechnya to neighboring republics, high losses among civilians, military, and the insurgents, 

and deteriorating ethnic relations countrywide indicate more effecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:31 Jun 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\042613\80551 HFA PsN: SHIRL
26

tive and comprehensive approaches are needed to deal with these 

very complex root causes of the conflict. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Freizer follows:]


80551c-1.eps
27


80551c-2.eps

Committee record. A third report will look at the institutional cases of conflict and will be 

published in early summer and include recommendations. Our staff has carried out field research 

throughout the North Caucasus region. 

I understand that these hearings take place in the aftennath of the horrendous bombing that 

occurred in Boston on April 15 and Crisis Group joins with others to express our condolences to 

the many victims. 

There are two primary threats to peace and security in the North Caucus: ethnic conflict and 

Islamist insurgency. The first involves the challenge of ethnic nationalism, most evident in 

Chechnya where two bloody wars caused tens of thousands of deaths in the 1990s-early 2000s. 

The second is the insurgency linked to fundamentalist Tslam, in particular Salafism, which has 

been growing in the region since the end of the Soviet Union, and which is the dominant cause of 

violence we see today in Dagestan. Taken together, these twin threats produce deadly violence 

and made the North Caucasus the most dangerous region in Europe with some 700 killed in 

2012. In many ways, the two conflict causes also feed off one another to complicate Moscow's 

effort to secure a lasting end to violent attacks and terrorism. 

Let me begin by discussing the threat of ethnic conflict: During the early 1990s, separatists 

sought full independence for Chechnya, but the failure of their state-building project and their 

expanded use of armed force brought a massive and at times indiscriminate Russian response 

during the first Chechen war in 1994-1996. During the fight and its aftermath the Chechen 

nationalist cause largely transformed into an Tslamist one, with a jihadi component. Skirmishes 

between federal forces and Chechen fighters continued after 1996 until several major acts of 

terror helped push Russian forces back into Chechnya and a new war that lasted from 1999-2000. 

After 2003, Moscow adopted a policy of Checheni sati on, transferring significant political, 

administrative and security functions to ethnic Chechens. Today the republic has gone through a 

major reconstruction and loss of life has been significantly reduced. 

Several inter-ethnic cont1icts that developed at the end of the Soviet Union remain unresolved, 

continuing to fuel tensions. The Ingush-Ossetian cont1ict led to full-t1edged war in 1992, as both 

groups asserted claims over the Prigorodny district. Though Russia invested large sums to return 

displaced persons and rehabilitate their communities, many Ingush in Prigorodny remain 

unintegrated in the rest of North Ossetia and want to be part of Tngushetia. Exclusionary 

historical narratives and competition over land and decision-making have fueled cont1icts in 

other multi-ethnic republics, especially Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Stavropol Krai. Some 

of the groups maintain maximalist aspirations, wanting to change Russia's internal borders and 

establish new ethnically-identified entities. 

Inter-ethnic tensions do not today threaten major violence, but they may grow with the recent 

revival of national movements that were particularly strong in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 

Though political parties based on national or religious identity are prohibited, a new law 

simplifying registration is likely to make it easier for politicians with nationalist agendas to 

infiltrate small parties. Already groups such as the Nogays, Kumyks, and Lezgins in Dagestan, 

the Circassians and the Cossacks are sharpening their organizational capacities. Their political 

demands largely focus on rehabilitation and justice, state support for native language and culture, 

greater support for economic development, greater autonomy and access to land. Tensions are 

2 
28


80551c-3.eps

beginning to appear where the legal framework is not sufficient to address complaints, existing 

laws are not implemented, and police and local administrative capacity are perceived as 

ethnically biased and corrupt. 

Many of these disputes and tensions feed into the Islamist insurgency. Some members of the 

younger generation -- who twenty years ago would have joined nationalist movements to address 

their grievances -- have become disenchanted with those movements and are insteadjoining the 

lslamist insurgency. 

The second threat ofIslamist insurgency: The Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz) was 

proclaimed in 2007 as a final step of the transformation of the Chechen separatist movement into 

a region-wide radical Islamist proj ect. It is recognized as a terrorist organization by Russia and 

the U.S. among others. It operates across the North Caucasus, attracting youth of all ethnicities, 

and attacking not only federal forces and local police, but also civil servants and elites who 

disagree with its fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. This unified force, with its own cause, 

modes of operation and communication, funding sources, leadership and cadre is behind most of 

the anned clashes and terrorist acts that haunt local communities. 

A day rarely goes by without an attack on a Russian security official or the killing of an alleged 

insurgent in a counter-terrorist operation. Some 750 people were killed in 2011, and almost the 

same number again in 2012. Much of the original Islamist insurgency leadership has been killed 

by security forces and replaced with a much younger, less experienced and unitied cadre. The 

insurgency is less able to carry out large, spectacular acts of terror or engage in lengthy battles 

with Russian military forces. But since 1996 at least 26 major attacks have been committed in 

Moscow with at least 627 killed and 934 injured in Moscow alone. As recently as January 2011 a 

suicide bomber killed 37 at Moscow's Domodedovo airport. In May 2012 a double bombing in 

Dagestan's capital Makhachkala killed thirteen civilians and injured over 100. 

The vast majority of attacks now occur in the North Caucasus and are against security services, 

local officials and traditional clergy. They tend to involve improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 

shootings and, at times, suicide bombers. Tn February 2012 the head of the Caucasus Emirate, 

Doku Umarov, said that his movement would no longer target civilians. Nevertheless, many 

attacks against officials and security services also result in civilian casualties. 

Government Response: The government's main response until recently has been a tough focus 

on eradicating the insurgency with a massive security presence, but recently has opened some 

room for dialogue. While this policy has had successes, the continuing numbers of attacks and 

loss of life clearly demonstrate that something more is required. 

To succeed in conflict resolution, Russia needs to design and implement a long-term 

comprehensive approach joining ethnic policies, intra-confessional dialogue between traditional 

Muslims and non-violent Salafis, efforts to engage and provide opportunities for young people 

and non-discriminatory access to services, and support the work of committees to reintegrate exfighters. For those who break the law through violence, intimidation and terrorism, strengthening 

the capacities ofthe police, prosecutors and judiciary also remains essential. 
29


80551c-4.eps

Some in the Russian government have come to understand the limitations of a counterinsurgency policy based solely on hard security measures. Local authorities in Dagestan have 

been testing a novel approach that includes dialogue with and more tolerance of moderate Salafis 

and negotiations to encourage insurgents to lay down their weapons and reintegrate into peaceful 

life. A similar approach in Ingushetia has significantly improved the situation since 2009. 

The North Caucasus's authentic integration with the rest of Russia is essential for security and 

healthy ethnic relations in the country. The spread of violence from Chechnya to neighboring 

republics; high losses among civilians, military and the insurgents; and deteriorating ethnic 

relations countrywide indicate that more etTective and comprehensive approaches are needed to 

deal with the root causes of deadly contlict. 

Thank you for this opportunity and T look forward to your questions. 

4 
30

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we appreciate all of our witnesses today. 

And I am going to recognize now the chairman of the full committee for a statement or questions, whichever he chooses, and 

what time he would like to consume. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. One of 

the observations I would make is that in my conversations with 

Duma members from southern Russia, two physicians that I can 

think of, both Muslims from Dagestan, they shared with me the 

way in which this Chechen al-Qaeda-linked organization was going 

house to house in their state, which neighbors Chechnya, and giving young men an option of either joining the movement, the jihad, 

as they called it, or killing them. 

And as they related to me, this was much more than just a movement for Chechen independence, indeed it was much more ambitious, because the idea was a caliphate for the whole region, right? 

A caliphate—well, you see Chechens are now fighting in Afghanistan; you see them carrying out assassinations in Pakistan, certainly all over Central Asia. 

And in terms of the violence in all of this, the al-Qaeda-linked 

groups have developed really a methodology with the use of suicide 

bombings that they have carried to quite an extent. You have 

talked about the attack on the school, where you have over 500 casualties or dead, most of them children. But this is a fairly regular 

occurrence in southern Russia today. Even in Moscow, when these 

Chechen al-Qaeda-linked fighters get into the city, it is pretty horrific what they do on the subways or in government buildings, the 

number of people killed. 

The question going forward is with this commitment now to a 

wider caliphate, and given that it encompasses such a large geographical area, the attempt to convert moderate Muslims I think 

is a major challenge. I talked to a village leader who was Kyrgyz, 

and he told me about the situation in his village, where 12 young 

men were receiving instruction in jihad, they had agreed to go to 

a madrasa to get an education, but all 12 were decapitated. And 

he said this is not a local Kyrgyz custom in Kyrgyzstan. This is the 

importation or the change of a culture. 

And gradually we are changing our culture to this al-Qaeda, you 

know, psychology, and that it is a Gulf state culture, in his mind. 

That is what he said. It is a Gulf state culture in terms of decapitation. But with that and with the kinds of mass killings that we are 

doing, we are changing culture. 

I was going to ask you about that, because it is really a struggle 

within these societies. And the two physicians that I knew serving 

in the Duma felt they were losing that struggle. Just your insights. 

Mr. MIGRANYAN. You know, thank you for raising this question. 

I would like to say that Dr. Goble was absolutely right. The situation is now much worse in Dagestan rather than in Chechnya. The 

problem is that Dagestan is multiethnic. There is serious strained 

relationships between different ethnics groups. It is more prone to 

Wahhabism. And Wahhabism is coming from Saudi Arabia. And 

the money is coming, the people are coming from there. And the 

power is very weak. And this is the problem which you, I think, 

can understand. You have a strong man in Chechnya, Akhmad 

Kadyrov, and no terrorist acts, or at least almost no terrorist acts. 

31

And you have weak institutions with power in Dagestan, and you 

have a lot of them every day practically, and a lot of losses. Which 

means this is the problem of security and democracy. 

Mr. ROYCE. I think it might be a little more complicated than 

that. Because we are looking at terrorist attacks not just in these 

two states, but in many states across southern Russia, and in Moscow as well. And with all the security in Moscow, they are not able 

to protect the subways, they are not able to protect—you had an 

observation. 

Mr. GOBLE. I just want to say that what we are seeing——

Mr. ROYCE. Push your button. 

Mr. GOBLE. Excuse me. What we are seeing is an effort to recruit 

people who identify themselves as Muslims. But the effort to recruit people who are committed Muslims, that is people who really 

know about Islam, has failed, even in Dagestan. That where the 

Saudi missionaries have been most successful is in areas where 

people don’t know very much about Islam. They identify as Islam, 

but someone else is telling them what it means. This is a huge 

problem, because if you see people acquire more Islamic knowledge—there is a view here in this country that as people learn 

more about a religion, they will tend to become more fundamentalist. The fact is as people learn more about a religion, they become more committed to whatever the religion teaches, and they 

become protected against efforts to change their direction. 

In the case of the people of the North Caucasus and Central 

Asia, and the something between 15 and 18 million Muslim population elsewhere in the Russian Federation, what we have are people who do not have that kind of training, and therefore are more 

susceptible for recruitment. I think it is very important to understand that, that there is a process of immunization. I know many, 

many Muslims in Tatarstan in the Middle Volga. Those who know 

a very great deal about Islam are able to say absolutely no to the 

missionaries coming from Saudi Arabia. The people who know 

much less about Islam are far more likely to be recruited because 

they are waiting for someone to tell them what it means. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Goble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. And we now recognize Mr. Brad Sherman, ranking member on the Terrorism Subcommittee, for his 

opening statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Those who have seen me on this committee have seen me use my 

question time to pontificate. When I am just filled with so many 

questions, I am going to lay some out now using my pontification 

time to lay out some questions, and I will invite the panel to respond later. 

One relates to the history of the area where we are told that Stalin deported the entire Chechen population, but this raises the 

question how many people were deported, how many returned, and 

who in the heck was living in Chechnya in the meantime, and how 

were they persuaded to leave? 

We see an over 200-year alliance between the bin Saud family 

and Wahhabi Islam. And I think it may go beyond this hearing, I 

mean, but this is both an alliance and very dangerous to the Saudi 

royal family since most of those who want to kill the leaders of 

32

Saudi Arabia are motivated by an Islam that seems also indistinguishable, to me, to the Islam that is being funded by and propagated by money that comes from the gulf and either with the permission of or out of the pockets of the Saudi royal family. 

I am going to be asking what are the training facilities in 

Chechnya and Dagestan? We all knew that al-Qaeda was operating 

in Afghanistan, taking in people from all over the world, training 

thousands of them. Is there anything even on a smaller scale in 

Chechnya, Dagestan? We saw these brothers be, unfortunately, effective in the bombing and incredibly amateurish after the bombing, and so it would be interesting so see whether they got any 

training beyond what they saw on the Internet for the bombing. 

And we won’t know that in these hearings, but perhaps we will 

know whether there is a mini al-Qaeda, which means the base—

is there a training base for extremist Islam in the Chechen region. 

I am—I think I will save the rest of my questions for question 

time and yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And we will now proceed to our questions and dialogue. Let me 

begin by saying that years ago—and just to relay the story, years 

ago, I think it was in 2004, the Chechen terrorists took over a 

school—is it Beslan, is that how you pronounce it—in Russia, 

Chechnya—is that city part of Chechnya, or is it just part of Russia? It is a Russian city, a Russia school. And the terrorists there 

murdered—in the end 180 children lost their lives, children. 

And I remember calling the White House personally, and I talked 

directly to Condoleezza Rice and told her, now is the time that we 

can establish a close, and new, and positive relationship with Russia and recruit them to work with us in areas of mutual interest 

that we couldn’t do before; now is the time for us to stand with 

these folks. And I said, send President Bush over there to stand 

next to Putin and say that Americans stand shoulder to shoulder 

with the people of Russia and, yes, the Government of Russia in 

opposing and defeating those who had murdered children in order 

to obtain their political ends. As we have seen in Boston, the young 

man who put the bomb down did so right behind an 8-year-old boy. 

Now, the answer was evident that, no, the President didn’t go 

there. Let us also note that how many people here know that the 

Russians have built a monument in memory of the people who 

were killed, the Americans killed in 9/11—how many know that 

right across from where the World Trade Center was looking across 

the bay there is beautiful monument that was built by the Russian 

people and the Russian Government expressing solidarity, and the 

sorrow and heartache of seeing their people, ordinary people, 

Americans and citizens, old people and young people losing their 

lives like this to a terrorist attack? 

Well, today I would hope that what happened in Boston and the 

fact that it related directly back to Russia and Chechnya in terms 

of there is a line we can draw, that I hope that that will motivate 

us to work with Russia in order to defeat those who would murder 

children in order to obtain their goals. 

Now, the Chechen independence movement was originally secular and nationalist. What I am talking about is I do not understand how radical Islam talking about God and Allah, as they say, 

33

that they seem to be the ones who justify acts and make legitimate 

acts of murdering innocent people who are noncombatants and targeting noncombatants; not targeting the army of someone, but targeting noncombatants. That is being done to terrorize us into submitting to some of their radical religious thought, I guess. But in 

the beginning the Chechen independence movement was secular 

and nationalist. Now it appears that radical Islamists’ ideology is 

pretty much dominating that independence movement. 

These are people who now this radical Islamic ideology makes a 

common jihad against Christians, Jews and Hindus throughout the 

world. Where did that come from? How did that happen? I am asking the panel. And was this—the financing of Wahhabi extremism 

and financing of these mosques, did that have something to do with 

this? And what kind of threat in the future? 

And also let me note they didn’t permit in Uzbekistan the Saudis 

to come in and build their mosques. They were criticized here as 

that is a violation of their human rights. But we know that the 

Saudi purpose of doing this was to develop a brand of Islam that 

will target and kill children. 

So, number one, how did it become this radical ideology, and is 

there a way to counter that? And is Uzbekistan wrong, and are we 

right to condemn Uzbekistan for not allowing them to build their 

mosques? 

Mr. Goble is really anxious here. Go right ahead. 

Mr. GOBLE. As someone who was quite involved with Dzhokhar 

Dudayev, who, after all, prevented the killing of Boris Yeltsin in 

January 1991 and also prevented the killing—extension killings 

from Vilnius and Riga to go to Tallinn at that time, I can testify 

that the Chechen national movement was completely secular. 

The process by which you saw a change is not that the entire 

movement changed, but the part that got attention changed. It was 

a product of, I believe, three different factors. The first was that 

the Chechen national movement, as articulated by Dzhokhar 

Dudayev, believed that Chechens as a nation had a right to independence, the same way the Estonians or the Latvians or anyone 

else. That was his personal belief. When the Chechens did not get 

any support for their position in the West, they began looking for 

support elsewhere. Disappointed in our not having supported us, 

they turned to look at the people—the only people who were prepared to say they were supporting them. 

Second, I mentioned some numbers about the people, the number 

of people going on the haj. This is a good indication of how intense 

you have. Over the last 22 years, Chechens have formed roughly 

40 percent of hajis coming from the Russian Federation, even 

though the Chechens form less than 1 percent of population of the 

Russian Federation. So you have a lot of people being exposed. 

And third thing is there has been money, real money, coming in 

from the Saudis, and not just the Saudis, a number of other people, 

too, to build various kinds of things. 

I would argue that there is still a Chechen national movement 

which is committed to a secular and free Chechnya. Unfortunately, 

it gets very little attention, and it gets very little attention in 

Chechnya because it has been so unsuccessful. When people are 

unsuccessful, when the people they hope will be their allies don’t 

34

turn out to be, it is not surprising that they turn to other people 

who were willing to support them. And, unfortunately, some of the 

people they turn to in this instance have, as you have quite properly pointed out, truly criminal and immoral agendas. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just note, and then I will go to the 

ranking member, just say I can’t imagine if a number of Western 

countries where people would be so committed to their national 

independence, and they were so frustrated that they weren’t getting outside support, that they would go to ally themselves with 

those who want them and help them murder large numbers of children. I don’t—you know, this is not an excuse. Them not getting 

supports from the United States or from people who believe in democracy is no excuse to help people who are willing to murder—

to target children. 

Mr. GOBLE. Mr. Chairman, I was not seeking to find an excuse. 

I am just trying to provide and explanation, an answer, because it 

is absolutely true. What was tragic is that those people who recognized what was going on were almost entirely ignored, and that 

there was a lot that could have been done and should have been 

done and wasn’t done. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Mr. GOBLE. I certainly do not believe that we are—we bear responsibility, either then or now, for what happened. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Migranyan, given your familiarity actually with the Russian 

Government, I have a question. The FBI investigating the Boston 

Marathon bombing received information from Russia, but then they 

sought additional information after their investigation. Can you 

speak or shed some light on maybe the culture that exists with law 

enforcement and with security officials in both countries? And can 

you comment on how it could be improved perhaps?

Mr. MIGRANYAN. My opinion is that—but this is my guess—when 

I called to Moscow yesterday to talk to some high-ranking people 

over there because CNN wanted me to comment about these contacts between security forces, they said, no, no, they are working 

now, they are cooperating, and we are not going to make any comments on this. 

But my personal guess is that this is the problem of distrust between our countries and our security forces. I am afraid that when 

Russian security and law enforcement agencies asked FBI to look 

at these guys, by inertia, you know, in this country and in the West 

still is the dominant idea that the Russian authorities are oppressing them; this is some Russian plot; this is not terrorism, it is 

something else. That is why I am afraid that they just didn’t pay 

enough attention to these warnings on behalf of Russia. As a result 

of this—as I said in my preliminary statement, there is a kind of 

among Russian law enforcement authorities and especially the political circles—and I know them very well, being in Presidential 

Council and working with all this administration—since 2001, 

there is a deep feeling of betrayal, you know, because Putin was 

the first to talk to Bush. Putin offered every opportunity which 

Russia had and very strongly cooperated in fighting against 

Taliban and al-Qaeda, and in response Russia—I remember the 

35

spirit showed the situation in Russia at that time. Everybody was 

thinking that at least we are finishing it and putting back this 

Cold War, all our distrust, and we are going to cooperate. 

Mr. KEATING. I understand. One of the things we want to perhaps come of this is a better opportunity to have security advisors 

and law enforcement work more closely despite our differences, as 

difficult as they can be at times, because on both—in both countries lives could be lost in the homeland as well, particularly with 

groups like the Caucasus Emirates, they are terrorist groups. 

I had a quick question, though, for Dr. Freizer if I could, too. We 

are getting reports that—you know, there are posters coming up in 

the North Caucasus area and actual support or support for the terrorists that conducted the Boston Marathon bombings. I don’t know 

what information you might have in those reports, but this is unusual that there is so much attention focused on the U.S., negative 

attention. Can you comment on what you might think, in your 

opinion, in your work with your group; is there a different viewpoint now toward the United States? 

Ms. FREIZER. In our reporting so far, we have not really looked 

at the Russian-United States relationship as relates to the North 

Caucasus, so I can only answer this question partially. 

What I can say is that in its statement of last week, what the 

Caucasus Emirates clearly said is that they are not at war with the 

United States. So it is not the ambition of the North Caucasus insurgency and terrorist organization Caucasus Emirates to extend 

its war to the United States, or really to extend it beyond the region of the Caucasus, including perhaps Central Asia. 

I think that the posters that you are seeing today are, of course, 

very troubling, very disturbing to see that there are people in this 

region who are taking pleasure of what happened in Boston. Some 

of this might just be kind of local—local pride in terms of just family links, but, of course, this is highly unfortunate, and I don’t 

think it really reflects on the feelings of the general population in 

the region. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

Just in closing I do appreciate Mr. Goble’s efforts to distinguish 

Muslim religious individuals from some of these extremist groups. 

It is an important thing to do. 

With that I will turn it back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And now Judge Poe, chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation. 

Mr. POE. Thank you again for being here. I am a little irritated 

that the State Department is not here, this is an important topic. 

I am sure they don’t have all the information yet, but they should 

at least show up. And it is ironic that the Russian Government 

helped us get a witness here to help us from that perspective. Mr. 

Goble, you may be the last person in the State Department that 

worked on this issue. Maybe that is why you are the only one here 

today. 

But I do have some concerns. I think we have learned that radical Islamic jihadists do not come from one area in the world. They 

come from all over the world, and some are homegrown. Chechnya 

is one of those areas that we need to focus on. And we need to work 

with the Russian Government on what has taken place there, beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:31 Jun 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\042613\80551 HFA PsN: SHIRL
36

cause what takes place there obviously has been taking place here 

as well, with the influence and a red line from Dagestan to the 

United States as far as what criminal activity, terrorist activity is 

taking place in our own country. 

It is interesting that if Dagestan is a place where it is known it 

is a haven for jihadist philosophy, and it is growing, why we would 

not be concerned about someone that is in the United States going 

to that area for 6 months. I mean, what was he doing for 6 

months? Who would this person—the older brother, let us call 

him—who could he have been meeting with to get influenced by alQaeda or from al-Qaeda jihadist movements? Enlighten me on that. 

I can tell, Mr. Goble, you want to start. 

Mr. GOBLE. Well, I just want to suggest that one of the insights 

that Americans have brought to the appearance of terrorism is that 

it often—it is often bred in failed states, where there are no political institutions to run things. 

It is worth noting that a week ago the new Acting President of 

Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, described his Republic as a failed 

state, as a state where political and legal institutions did not work 

and where he could not control the situation. This gives—this 

opens the door to the kinds of things we have seen elsewhere. 

failed states, states that cannot control their own population, that 

cannot operate as a state normally does, inevitably open spaces 

which are exploited by radicals of various kinds, and there are 

places, I am absolutely sure, in highland Dagestan where no outside official has ever been. It is that kind of a place, both topographically and demographically. So the possibility of someone 

going there for 6 months and not being exposed to radicals in one 

way or another strikes me as slim to none, and that is why——

Mr. POE. It is not the place you would go fishing or take a fishing 

trip? 

Mr. GOBLE. Among other things, that is right. And it is also a 

place where you would expect that someone who went—that had 

the troubled biography this gentleman did would end up being an 

object of interest of not the right kind of people were he there. I 

am much more concerned about the 6 months in Dagestan than the 

fact that the man is an ethnic Chechen. 

Mr. POE. Let me reclaim my time, because I don’t have but 11⁄2

minutes. 

Would you think that maybe we ought to be concerned about 

that, especially if the Russian Government tells us two times that 

this is somebody that we ought to be concerned about, and all of 

a sudden he comes back to the United States; maybe a Customs 

official knew it, maybe he didn’t. But wouldn’t you think in the 

area of intelligence that ought to raise a red flag? This is not something that should have slipped under the rug, just snuck in. 

Dr. Albert, I will just let you just weigh in on that question. 

Mr. ALBERT. It definitely poses a concern if we didn’t communicate properly that he was visiting the area to Dagestan. 

I want to address the original point also of who could this person 

have been meeting with in Dagestan that would pose a threat, and 

this is particularly the organization known Shariat Jamaat, which 

could be a subset——

Mr. POE. How large is that organization? 

37

Mr. ALBERT. It is not very large, but it is probably the most——

Mr. POE. How large? Give me some numbers. 

Mr. ALBERT. Maybe less than 1,000 individuals, but that is just 

reasonable conjecture. I don’t have much evidence of that, but probably around 1,000 individuals. They are actively recruiting 

throughout the area as well. It could be larger because it is attached to the Caucasus Emirate, as well it is a confederation of alliances around there. 

Mr. POE. I am sorry, Dr. Albert, I need to interrupt you for one 

last question. 

Is the influence of the radical jihadist movement, let us just use 

that phrase, in Dagestan on the increase, or is it decreasing? I 

know that it is something that the Russian Government is concerned about. Is it something we should be concerned about as 

well? Is it on the increase? That is my last question. 

Mr. ALBERT. Yes, it is on the increase in Dagestan, and it is 

something we should be concerned about. 

Mr. POE. All right. I am out of time. Sorry, Doctor. 

Mr. MIGRANYAN. Not a problem. 

Mr. POE. I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us just note that I don’t believe that any 

Americans are concerned if a country decides to have leadership 

that is religious, and they decide to have groups of people. What 

we need to be concerned about is if it happens to be a religion that 

convinces people that part of their faith is to go off and murder 

other people’s children. So if they were taking over that part of 

that country, and they were just people who wanted to exercise 

their religion and worship God as they see fit, nobody here would 

have any objection to that at all, or their independence and their 

right to vote, et cetera. 

Now Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Perhaps they could reset the clock. 

Does anyone have a little quick history lesson for us as to the 

Chechen deportations? Dr. Albert, how many people were kicked 

out, et cetera? 

Mr. ALBERT. The entire population in 1944 was deported by Stalin. I think the numbers would be around 800,000. I believe a quarter of those died in transit, or they were deported to Central Asia. 

They were allowed to return—who occupied their homes earlier, I 

think, was a question. Russia resettled some people from the Russian mainland to their homes inside Chechnya at that time. Khrushchev eventually allowed the Chechens to come back. Some of 

them, for obvious reasons, chose to stay where they were. Many of 

them came back. 

There were issues and ethnic tensions within Chechnya with the 

people that had resettled in their homes, as you could imagine. 

This is known as a great trauma or great tragedy to the ethnic 

identity of Chechens that this event occurred. It is something very 

strong in their historical memory. 

Mr. SHERMAN. In 1944, there were Russians living in these 

homes in an area that had supported 800,000 people. Today in 

Chechnya how many of those Russians are still there? 

Mr. MIGRANYAN. It is a good question. You know, after all these 

wars, there was huge propaganda comparing that the Russians are 

38

killing and massacring all the Chechens; now practically no Russians left in Chechnya. They terrorized all of them and kicked 

them out. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So there were tens or hundreds of thousands of 

Russians in Chechnya——

Mr. MIGRANYAN. 300,000 Russians lived in Chechnya. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. Cleansed by this. 

I want to join Mr. Rohrabacher in his call for better relations between the United States and Moscow, and point out that we granted refugee status to this family. That is something we would do 

only if we are claiming that they are oppressed by the Russian 

Government, and we see the outcome. 

Who can answer the question as to what level of—you know, 

what are the training bases for extremist Islam in the Dagestan, 

Chechnya area? Is there, like, a particular site where they have 

hundreds of people getting military training? 

Mr. MIGRANYAN. Short answer is that in 1990s, they were training over there in Chechnya, in Ingushetia, in other places because 

the central government was very weak. Now they are limited because practically in Chechnya—Chechnya totally is under the control of Kadyrov, and this Sufi Islam is over there traditional, which 

means that are limiting. 

Russia’s central government is trying to strengthen local presidents and local authorities, putting the security guys in Ingushetia, 

and now Ramazan Abdulatipov, whom I know very well. But this 

is a long-lasting process. 

Mr. SHERMAN. One thing the Russian Government told us to 

watch Tamerlan. He spent 6 months in the Russian Federation. 

How robust is the Russian intelligence and law enforcement system 

in the Dagestan town where the parents live? Would we expect the 

Russians to keep track of this individual during those 6 months, 

or is this an area where the writ of the government doesn’t——

Mr. MIGRANYAN. The fact that almost 2 months ago that the 

President of Dagestan was changed proves that really this is a 

failed state. Institutions are very weak. Bribery is very high, and 

ethnic alliance are too, too many, because too many ethnic groups, 

it is very hard to get lost in that mountainous places where from 

village to village different languages and different ethnic groups 

are living. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Goble. 

Mr. GOBLE. There are within Dagestan 30 different mutually 

nonintelligible language groups. In an area of——

Mr. SHERMAN. Just in Dagestan? Not the Caucasus. 

Mr. GOBLE. No, this is just in Dagestan. There are 30 different 

nations speaking not mutually intelligible languages. Most 

Dagestanis are tri- or quadrilingual as a result, because it is the 

only way you can function. But what that means is that in many 

areas it is very, very difficult from someone from the center, be it 

Moscow or locally from Makhachkala, to penetrate those language 

communities, and so a lot goes on that, quite frankly, I think no 

one either in Makhachkala or Moscow knows. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Meeks, you have time for a 1-minute 

statement on your part, and then we are going to be adjourning 

this hearing. 

39

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was paying attention closely to the testimony in my office and 

trying to multitask, but I felt compelled to come. 

I had a question for Mr. Goble, because the issue is—I was listening to a lot—when you talk about the wipe open territory and 

the terrain that is not manageable reminded me somewhat of what 

was taking place in the Western Hemisphere in Colombia at a 

time, and where we tried to demil—bring some of those individuals 

back into society again, whether or not there was something that 

was being done, or, you know, my issue, in the middle, so that 

those who are being taken toward terrorists and terrorist actions, 

to bring them back into society so that they can reassimilate into 

culture. 

Mr. Goble, real quick. 

Mr. GOBLE. The single best predictor of when you get terrorism 

is the unemployment rate among 18-year-old males around the 

world. Everything else, that trumps everything. 

In parts of the North Caucasus, unemployment rates overall are 

ranging from 50 to 70 percent, and among young people they are, 

in many cases, 100 percent in terms of the officially recognized 

economy. 

What is the best thing that can be done, and the Russian Government is doing some of this, and it is also being helped by Azerbaijan, is trying to build factories to give people jobs. People who 

are employed and who are integrated into society in that way are 

far less likely to listen to any missionary from al-Qaeda. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I am sorry, we have 

3 minutes left, and it will be 1⁄2 hour before—30 seconds. 

Ms. FREIZER. Thank you. In the 30 seconds I just want to say 

that the mention of these committees in Colombia, in Russia they 

have started setting up similar committees for the rehabilitation of 

former fighters, and this is something that I would say would be 

an area where the U.S. Government and Russia would be able to 

share experiences. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Thank you very much. We appreciate 

all of the witnesses. 

And let us just note at the end, during the Cold War, I was the 

Soviet Union’s worst enemy and nemesis because I believe that free 

people need to determine who their number one enemies are and 

work to try to defeat them. That doesn’t mean that the people you 

work with are perfect, et cetera. And we did bring down the Soviet 

Union. We worked with a lot of people who have had a lot of faults. 

Today radical Islam, radical Islam and China appear to be the 

main adversaries of people in the free world and the main threat 

to the free world. I hope we all work together against a religion 

that will motivate people to murder children and other threats to 

us and to civilization. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(41)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHlNGTON, D.C. 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats 

Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Chairman 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

April 25. 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing 01' the Committee on Foreign Amti,., 

to be held jointly by the Subcommittee on Europe. Eurasia. and Emerging Threats and the Subcommittee 

on 'l'crrorism, Nonproliferation, and 'f11lde in Room 2172 of the RaybulU IIouse Olliee Building (and 

available 011 the Committee website at \vww.foreignaffairsJlOuse.gov): 

DATE: Friday, Apri126, 2013 

TIME: 10:30 a.111. 

SUIJ.mCT: Islamist Extremism in Checlmya: A TIll'eat to the U.S, Homeland? 

WITNESSES: Mr. Paul Goble 

Professor 

institute of World Politics 

Craig Douglas AlbeIt, PhD. 

A"istant Professor 

Deparlment o[Political Science 

Georgia Regents University Augusta 

Andranik Migranyan, Ph.D. 

Director 

Inslilule for Democracy and Couperatiun 

Sabine Freizer, Ph.D. 

Director 

Ellrope Program 

Inlernalional Crisis Gwup 

By Direction of the Chairman 

'jl!e COIl1/!/iflce. 011 rareign Affail·.~ sp.ek~ 10 mr71w. i!sj(ICilitip..~ (1(:r.f'.~sihlr. t() persmJ.\'lI'ifh rii.Wihiii!ie.\', {fY{JI/ are in need oj.<;pecial QCC011JI1IOt!aliol1S, please caR 

202/225-5021 at leastfou}' bllsiness days in advance of the event, )I'JJe11€l'eI'practicabJe. Qlles.!iol1s with rexard lospeciaJ accollllllodaliolls in general 

(induding amilab,lityojCommirfe.e materials in a/te/'/wlil'ejorIJw(s (md assi:J'live lislellinKdevk'ej~ II!C(I' be directed (I) the CommWee. 
43

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINU1'ES 01" S U13COMlvll'{TEE ON nllru,!~1 Em'osia, (II'" EmeFf~i~K.:'~/~er/IS & Terrorism, Tra.rlellllfl N()IlpTolljcrafhm HEAIUNG 

Day_----'F'-',J"'·;"'rfa"'v'--_J)"le, ___ ..:c4"'r2"'6"'1"'-13"-___ .Jl.onm, ___ -"2cc1,,,72,,-__ 

Stal'Hug Tjnle TO'14 1m' ElldingTimc 12:001WOll 

Pre.<j,ling Memll.'·(s) 

C/udnmm DltIw Rollrabachel' 

Check ([/I of the foT/aw/llg tital ([ppl)': 

Ol)en S.ssion [2] 

F,xecntiV(1 (dma~d) Se;l;sion U Televised. [2] 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Riectmllicolly It,corded (lopcd) [2] 

S(e)Logl'apllic Rcco;'d [{] 

Isla1l1M E.Y/J·em;"m ill G'llec!mya: A 11ll'e(l1 '1'0 11w U.S. Home/fllId? 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

C/ut/J'l1Jai) RohJ'(IbllclteJ~ Cfwb1JUIn Tell Poe, Ranking MembeJ' ICe{/ting, RtlJlkiJlg Member She/'lI/wl, Nejl. 

Meeks, Rep. I(ellller{v, Rejl. WilSOIl, Rep. Cook, Rep. Yoho, Rejl. LOJventlutf, alld Rep. Killzingel'. 

NON-SURCOMMlTT.EE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with ~;,-'* if they are not 1IIembe,'s <{((iIIl commltlee.) 

CIUJiI'JlIIIII Ed Royce 

HEARING WITNESSES: Santo n. llleeting noH .. attached? V", [2J No 0 . 

(if fino I!, please list below arid ,'nolude tille, agency, departmenf; OJ' organlzaffon.) 

STATEMF,NTS FOR THI<: RE<;:ORD: (List a"ystatemen!s sllbmilfedjoJ' the record.) 

PJ'ep(ll'ea statemenf o!f,l,: PlInl Gr;ble 

heptlrelf.,ll/le"'"J/! ofM" Craig Dong/usA/bert, PI •. D. 

Prepare.d slfltemellf ol}'l/~ Am/muiA Migl'{Inywl, Ph.D. 

Pl'ej1(f1<ed .'iitutr.menf of~f..'f{. Sabine Freizer, Pit.», 

Qllest/oll fal' the Reconlji·oI1l1iep. Cook 

"The North CrIllC((,'"S: The Chal/enges oj'In/egmtioll (1), Et/mici(v am' COllflict" submitted by C/mil'llum Rol1mb"cher 

"The NOl'fh Caucasus: l1w Chaffenges ofJ;nter:ratioI1 (II),1.s/am, fheIllSlIJ'gel1cy and CormteJ .... IlIs(fJ'geltcy" ,wll)mifled 

by G'lwiJ'JlUlill/oltmhacfwJ' 

TIME SCmWULED TO RECONVENE __ ~~ 

or 

TIME ADJOURN)!',]) 12:00110011 
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SABINE FREIZER, PH.D., DIRECTOR, 

EUROPE PROGRAM INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

[NOTE: The above report is not reprinted here in its entirety but is available in committee records or may be accessed on the Internet at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/

regions/europe/north-caucasus/220-the-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integrationi-ethnicity-and-conflict.aspx (accessed 6/5/13).] 


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[NOTE: The above report is not reprinted here in its entirety but is available in committee records or may be accessed on the Internet at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/

regions/europe/north-caucasus/221-the-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integrationii-islam-the-insurgency-and-counter-insurgency.aspx (accessed 6/5/13).]

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QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE PAUL COOK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND RESPONSES FROM

ANDRANIK MIGRANYAN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND COOPERATION, AND SABINE FREIZER, PH.D., DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP


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Institute for Democracy and Cooperation 

655 Ttlird Avenue Suite 2010-19 

NewYof'k, NY WOil 

Phohe: (212) 922 0030 

Fax: (?1?) 9::>7 1555 

Andranik Migranyan 

Answer to Congressman Paul Cook's Question on the Olympic Games: 

Dear Congressman Cook, 

The Russian side is feeling utterly confident that no one, lslamist or separatist, will attack the 

Sochi Olympic games. 

first of all, there are no ongoing conflicts in the Caucasus. From time to time the terrorist acts 

take place in that region. The most restive region is located far from Socili: it is in Dagestan, 

located all the way on the Caspian Sea, while Sochi is on the Black Sea. 

Second, the Russian authorities are taking allmeasUl'es possible to secure the entire city of Sochi, 

not just the locations ofthe games, and harden any potential targets. As you might understand, 

however, most of the measures are classified: it is considered imprudent to trumpet them and 

allow potential terrorists any loophole ideas. The Russian side is working with international 

partners on that issue, including with the United States, amI has the ulmost confidence in its 

surveillance and protection effOlts. 

Additionally, the Olympic., Committee regularly sends a Commission to inspect the progress on 

the build-up of the Olympic sites, and those inspections also include monitoring security. So far, 

the Commission has heen completely satisfied with the progress of Russia's preparation, 

including with security measures. 

Russia has a very good record of imposing tight security measures on mass events, so I would like 

to assUl'e you and the American people that every precaution is being taken with regard to the 

Sochi Olympics. 

Web Site: www.indemco.org 

E·mail. info@indemco.org 
48

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Rcply to QI'R from Rep. Puul Cook from Ms. Sabine I'reizer 

Considering the extreme violence undermining security in Russia's North Cal.lCUSLLS thel'e are 

good reasons to be concerned about secmily at the Sochi Olympics. 'fhe Russian government has 

pledged that it will guarantee securc games, and has apparently dedicated significant resources to 

this effect, but it would be useful for US security services and those of othcr countries to get a 

full a briefing from Russian partners on the measures being applied. 

While security is a key part ofthe Olympics, the Russian government ~hould ensure that its 

approach prioritizes law enforcement mther than military means. Auy preventive counter 

ten-orist operations launched before the Games should also consider the rights and security ofthe 

local populalion -- forced displaecment of large numbers of villagers near Olympics 

intl'astrudure in the run up to the Games would for example be morc likely to 

exacerbate tensions lh,m errectively deal with any securjty threat. 

The Caucasus Emirate -- the main Salail inspired insurgency group in the North Caucasus --

does not however make claims to a shuria governed Caliphate in Krasnodar Krai where Sochi is 

located, The leader ufllie Emirate Doku Omarov also stated in early 2013 that his group will no 

longer be altacking civilian targets. This suggests thaI the Caucasus Emirate is not planning to 

attack sport facilities, alhle(e~ or ohservers of the Games. 

The main cthnie group with claims on Sochi are the Circassian. Some oftheir activists, mainly 

outside Russia, are seeking recognition oItheir 1864-1867 depOltation ii'om the Russian to the 

Ottoman Empire as genoeiJc, especially as the Sochi Olympics arc occurring on or near their 

historical homeland. Kmsnaya Pnlyana, where the opening lOeremony will be held, was the 1864 

site nfthe final battle between Russian imperial and Cireassian fighters. While the Circassians 

may organize protests at the Games, it is highly unlikely that they will COllstitllte a hard security 

threat. .