U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space

July 1985

NTIS order #PB86-114578
Recommended Citation:

U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-TM-STI-27, July 1985).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600561

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
Foreword

Space holds a fascination for all of us. For many, it represents a final physical frontier—a place to explore the very essence of knowledge, to experiment with new technology, and to seek new levels of human adaptation and change. As the major spacefaring

nation on our planet, the United States has taken special pride in our achievements in

space.

Discoveries in space science have already added immensely to our fund of

knowledge. U.S. scientists have moved quickly to take advantage of new opportunities

for learning, and the future of scientific work in space is virtually unlimited.

Given the promise of space, an additional issue comes to the fore. How can the

United States proceed in space in relation to the other principal spacefaring nation and

superpower—the Soviet Union? What is to be gained or lost by working together in

space? With regard to science in particular, can the two countries benefit from joint

efforts? Can the two countries cooperate as well as compete?

Since the beginning of the space age, the two countries have been examining these

questions. This study was requested by Senators Matsunaga, Mathias, and Pen as a

means to shed light on the subject at the time of the I0th anniversary of the major U. S.-

Soviet cooperative endeavor, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.

OTA is pleased to be able to provide this technical memorandum, outlining the

principal issues of the debate, the history of cooperation, and the experience of France,

another country involved in space cooperation with the U.S.S.R. Additional OTA documents that may be of interest include Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in

Space, Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward Human Presence in Space, and International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, OTA studies in the areas of technology transfer are cited in the text.

JOHN H. GIBBONS

Director

.,. ///
Related OTA Reports

Civilian Space

● International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities.

OTA-ISC-239, July 1985. GPO stock #052-003-00958-7.

● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space.

OTA-STI-241, November 1984. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0969-2.

● Civilian Space Policy and Applications.

OTA-STI-177, June 1982. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0878-5.

Ž Radio frequency Use and Management: Impacts From the World Administrative Radio

Conference of 1979. OTA-CIT-163, January 1982. GPO stock #052-O03-O0863-7.

● Solar Power Satellite Systems and Issues.

OTA-E-144, August 1981. NTIS order #PB 82-108846.

Technical Memoranda

● Remote Sensing and the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion.

OTA-TM-ISC-20, March 1984. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0945-5.

Ž Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space.

OTA-TM-STI-14, December 1983. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0937-4.

● UNISPA CE ’82: A Context for International Cooperation and Competition.

OTA-T’IM-lSC-26, March 1983. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0962-5.

● Space Science Research in the United States.

OTA-TM-STI-19, September 1982. NTIS order #PB 83-166512.

Military Space

 “Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control” (scheduled for publication

summer 1985)

 “Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies” (scheduled for publication summer 1985).

● Arms Control in Space— Workshop Proceedings.

OTA-BP-ISC-28, May 1984. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0952-8.

● Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space —Background Paper.

OTA-BP-ISC-26, April 1984. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0948-0.

Technology Transfer

● Technology and East-West Trade: An Update.

OTA-I!X-209, May 1983. GPO stock #052-003-00908-l.

● Technology and Soviet Energy Availability.

OTA-ISC-153, November 1981. NTIS order #PB 82-133455.

● Technology and East-West Trade.

OTA-ISC-1O1, November 1979. NTIS order #PB 80-119381.

NOTE: Reports are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20402, (202)

783-3238; and the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161, (703) 487-4650.

iv
OTA Project Staff for U. S.= Soviet Cooperation in Space

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Nancy C. Naismith, Science, Transportation, and innovation Program Manager

Nancy Lubin, Project Director

Betty Jo Tatum, Research Assistant

Philip P. Chandler, II* Courtland Lewis** Michael McFaul

Michael Strong Kate Tomlinson *

Administrative Staff

Marsha Fenn, Administrative Assistant

Gala Adams, Clerical Assistant

‘*Workshop Director 

““C[)ntrartor
Contributors and Reviewers

During the course of this study, a large number of individuals assisted the OTA staff by providing

information from their own research and experience, reviewing draft documents, arranging interviews,

providing photographs, and giving their time and energy in many ways. The project staff deeply appreciates this willing and thoughtful help from our colleagues. All responsibility for the document itself rests with OTA.

Reviewers

Richard Barnes, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Francis Cevasco, Department of Defense

Jennifer Clapp, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Hubert Curien, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, France

Richard DalBello, Office of Technology Assessment

Merton Davies, Rand Corp.

Daniel Deudney, Consultant

Sidney Drell, Stanford University

Eileen Galloway, International Institute of Space Law of the International Astronautical Federation

Ronnie Goldberg, New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Loren Graham, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Alan Greenberg, Department of State

Jerry Grey, Consultant

John Hardt, Congressional Research Service

James Head, Brown University

Benjamin Huberman, Consultant

Douglas Jenkins, American Embassy, France

Francis Kapper, Department of Defense

Saunders Kramer, Consultant

Louis Laidet, French Embassy, Washington, DC

Louis Lanzerotti, AT&T Bell Laboratories

Gordon Law, Office of Technology Assessment

John Logsdon, George Washington University

Edward McGaffigan, Office of Senator Bingaman

George Ojalehto, Department of State

Kenneth Pederson, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Theodore Postol, Stanford University

Diane Rausch, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Victor Reis, Science Applications International Corp.

Harold Relyea, Congressional Research Service

Peter Sharfman, Office of Technology Assessment

Eugene Skolnikoff, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Marcia Smith, Congressional Research Service

Pete Smith, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Paul Uhlir, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Charles Vick, Consultant

Mitchell Wallerstein, National Academy of Sciences

Ray Williamson, Office of Technology Assessment

John Zimmerman, Department of State

Contributors

M. Amigues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Jean Arets, European Space Agency

Harry Atkinson, Science and Engineering Research Council, Great Britain

Vt
David Blatherwick, Energy, Space, and Science Division, Foreign and

Great Britain

H. Bourlakoff, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, France

Dina Braverman, French Embassy, Washington, DC

Sir Arnold Burgen, The Royal Society, Great Britain

James Burke, Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Odile Burton, French Embassy, Washington, DC

Anthony Cox, British Embassy, Washington, DC

Rosemarie Crisostomo, Rand Corp.

Robert Cronin, Science Applications International Corp.

Harriet Crosby, Institute for Soviet-American Relations

Genevieve Debouzy, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, France

Chris Dodge, Congressional Research Service

Murray Feshbach, Georgetown University

Louis Friedman, The Planetary Society

Sue Fruchter, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Donna Gold, Congressional Research Service

Ambassador A. Hartman, U.S. Embassy, Moscow

Arnold Horelick, Rand Corp.

Robert Kelley, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Lee Love, Consultant

Jack Matlock, National Security Council

Barbara McKenney, Science Applications International Corp.

Cheryl Mendonsa, Office of Congressman Brown

Commonwealth Office,

A. C.- Nicholas, Space Branch, Department of Trade and Industry, Great Britain

David Peary, Foreign and Commonwealth, Office, Great Britain

Paul Poujade, Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale, France

Ian Pryke, European Space Agency

David Roberts, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Great Britain

R. Roberts, Department of Trade and Industry, Great Britain

Peter Roland, a-rid associates, Soviet Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Great Britain

Joseph Rowe, Library of Congress

Tamara Sherman, Linguatronics

John Sopko, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Senate

M. Stuyck-Taillandier, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Sir Iain Sutherland, British Embassy, Moscow

Lady Jeanne Sutherland, British Embassy, Moscow

Marvin Tatum, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center Library

John Thomas, Department of State

Kip Thorn, California Institute of Technology

Didier Unman, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, France

Asa Wember, Consultant

Peter Warren, The Royal Society, Great Britain

Sir Frederick Warren, The Royal Society, Great Britain

Claude Wachtel, Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale, France

Interviews were also conducted with Soviet scientists and foreign policy experts at the following

institutions: Interkosmos; Institute of Medical and Biological Problems, Ministry of Health; Institute

of Space Research, Soviet Academy of Sciences; State Committee for Science and Technology; and

Institute for the Study of the U.S. and Canada.

vii
Contents

Chapte r Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. HISTORY OF U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN SPACE, . . . . . . . . . .

Background: From the Cold War “Missile GapH to a Cooperative

Space Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Early U.S. Interest in Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Early 1960s: Unfulfilled Promise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Late 1960s: The United States Lands a Man on the Moon.. ., ..., ...,

The 1970s: Moves Toward Broader Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rendezvous and Docking for Space Rescue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., .

Initiation of Cooperative Space Science and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The 1972 Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Post ASTP: Changing U.S. Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The 1980s: Promise for the Future?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. COOPERATION IN THE SPACE SCIENCES: THE SCIENTIFIC VIEW . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Past U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in the Space Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., .

Scientific Basis for Future Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Soviet Cooperative Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. THE VIEW FROM FRANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . .

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Solar Terrestrial Physics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . .

Life Sciences and Materials Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...,

Planetary Exploration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Space Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Evaluation of French-Soviet Projects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Key Issues and Policy Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Scientific and Economic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Foreign Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Technology Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Implications for U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5. U.S. POLICY ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Scientific and Practical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Foreign Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reduce Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Symbolism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“Linkage” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Maintaining Channels of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Technology Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Defining Military Sensitivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

9

15

15

15

17

19

23

23

24

25

25

32

33

39

39

40

45

48

48

53

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59

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61

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71

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ix
Contents—continued

Delineating Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Utilization of Sensitive Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

The Soviet Approach.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Appendixes Page

A. U.S. Cooperative Projects in ‘Space Science and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

B. Text of Public Law 98-562, Originally Senate Joint Resolution 236,

and Presidential Statement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

C. COSPAS/SARSAT: A Briefcase Study... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Tables

Table No. Page

3-1.

3-2.

4-1.

4-2.

4-3,

Potential U.S./U.S.S.R. Collaborative Activities:

From OTA Workshop, May 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Participants in May 8 Workshop on Possible Future U.S.-Soviet

Space Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Budget of the French Space Agency: Breakdown offending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Breakdown offending for Bilateral Cooperative Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

French Space Program: Main Scientific Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Figures

Figure No). Page

2-1.

2-2.

2-3.

2-4.

2-5.

2-6.

2-7.

2-8.

3-1.

4-1.

c-1 .

c-2 .

c-3 .

Soviet Type G Booster, and U.S. Saturn V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Conceptual Illustration, Soviet Manned Lunar Landing Program, 1967-73. . . . . 21

Apollo Command Module and Soviet Soyuz Counterpart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Docking Mechanism Developed for Use in ASTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

ASTP Mission Profile and Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Trajectories of the Various Halley Spacecraft Relative to a Fixed Sun-Earth Line 3.5

Primary Operational Soviet Launch Vehicle Family, and Canceled Type-A,

A-1, B-1, and Type G-l-e Boosters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Artist’s Depiction of Direction of the Soviet Space Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Photographic Coverage of the U.S. Apollo and Soviet Zond Spacecraft . . . . . . 46

Soviet Proton Launch Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Soviet COSPAS Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Basic Operational Configuration of the COSPAS/SARSAT System

Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11O

Through a Network of Satellite-to-Ground and Ground-to-Ground

Communications Linkages, COSPAS/SARSAT Affords Coverage of the

Entire Globe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ill
xecutive Summarv
Executive Summary

On October 30, 1984, President Reagan signed

a Joint Resolution of Congress, now Public Law

98-562, in support of renewing cooperation in

space with the U.S.S.R. Since then, a number of

specific proposals have been put forward for prospective U.S.-Soviet joint projects—including a

congressional resolution introduced by Senator

Matsunaga in February 1985 in support of U. S.-

Soviet cooperation on Mars exploration missions.

Public Law 98-562 marks the outcome of several years of debate on the merits of cooperation

with the U.S.S.R. in space and other activities.

This technical memorandum, written at the request of Senators Matsunaga, Mathias, and Pen,

is intended to sort out the issues of implementing

Public Law 98-562 as they apply to debates in

Congress today. It is not intended to determine

whether cooperation should be pursued, nor to

prescribe optimal methods for doing so. Instead,

it is intended to sketch out the broad issues surrounding the implementation of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, and to provide a basis for discussing guidelines and specific policy approaches

in the future.

U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space comprises a

combination of scientific, foreign policy, and national security issues. It is influenced by a background of strained, unpredictable, and ambiguous

relations between the two countries overall, and

by the fact that international scientific and technological cooperation and the civilian and military uses of space have become more complex and

contentious issues in their own right.

In light of conflicting currents in U.S.-Soviet

relations, therefore, balancing competing objectives and different perceptions of the U.S.S.R. will

be a major challenge in determining the shape and

magnitude of future U.S.-Soviet cooperation in

space. Four issues are central:

• the scientific and practical benefits that can

be gained from space cooperation,

● the potential transfer of militarily sensitive

technology or know-how between the two

countries,

• the effect of space cooperation on foreign policy, and

● perceptions about Soviet motivations and behavior and the course of U.S.-Soviet relations

overall.

From a scientific and practical point of view,

past experience has shown that cooperation in

space can lead to substantive gains in some areas

of space research and applications, and can provide the United States with improved insight into

the Soviet space program and Soviet society as

a whole. As discussed in chapter 3, scientists in

OTA’S workshop concluded that the scientific return from U.S. space exploration activities could

be expanded significantly by cooperation with the

Soviet Union. The scientists also suggested that

cooperation be initiated with modest exchanges

of solid scientific substance in relatively wellbounded areas, and that the possibility of a largescale mission might be held out as a long-term

goal, provided that it, too, offered rewards of solid scientific substance.

Past experience also suggests that technology

transfer from the United States to the U.S.S.R.

will remain a major countervailing concern in any

future space cooperation. Should cooperation be

renewed or expanded, the challenge facing U.S.

planners will be to minimize these concerns; but

concerns will continue to arise regardless of the

scale or level of cooperation. Most people agree

that precautions must be taken to prevent transferring militarily sensitive technology and knowhow to the U.S.S.R. The difficulties will lie in determining what should be considered militarily

sensitive, who should be authorized to make such

decisions, and the extent to which potentially sensitive technology or know-how can be protected

in any particular exercise.

Past experience, both in low-level cooperation

with the U.S.S.R. and in more extensive cooperation with our allies, suggests that this will be a

difficult and controversial challenge. The Soviets

have no doubt been pursuing an aggressive campaign to acquire Western technology and knowhow, particularly in the area of space systems and

technology; severely limiting cooperation in space

is one way of protecting Western security against

such efforts. But Soviet scientists are also conduct3
4

ing innovative and high caliber work in certain

areas of space research and applications. Overly

stringent controls could threaten the free interchange of scientific and technical ideas and information in areas complementary to, but not always

addressed in, the U.S. space program. In addition, since the Soviets are already cooperating

with other Western countries in space research

and applications, the United States could find it

increasingly difficult to control the flow of information to the U.S.S.R. without isolating itself

from the rest of the world space community. A

key challenge, then, will be to craft cooperative

arrangements that diminish the possibility of aiding Soviet military capabilities but that keep space

cooperation substantive and viable.

Perhaps the most difficult challenge will be to

assess how space cooperation can be effectively

used to support U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Space cooperation, on both low and high levels,

is inherently symbolic. The main areas of controversy concern whether space cooperation can alter

Soviet behavior, and so ease U.S.-Soviet conflicts;

and whether starting and/or stopping space cooperation is an appropriate political symbol to underscore other U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The extent to which space cooperation can alter

Soviet behavior, and in that way reduce tension

in U.S.-Soviet relations overall, is hard to predict. One viewpoint suggests that this is entirely

plausible, and cooperation should be pursued toward this end. An opposing viewpoint suggests

that there is no reason to believe the Soviets would

alter their behavior as a result of U.S.-Soviet

cooperation in space and that cooperation might

even be dangerous: from this perspective, any reduction in tension would be superficial, and

would only lead the United States to lower its

guard against an adversary that uses cooperation

solely for its own purposes. In between are a range

of views, including the belief that a low level of

interchange among scientists at a working level,

removed from the realm of superpower politics,

can be the most effective way for keeping channels of communication open and reducing tensions

between the two countries in the long run. Another belief is that space cooperation has no fundamental positive or negative effect on U.S.-Soviet relations, and must be weighed simply on its

own merit. Although there is no evidence from

past experience that space cooperation can affect

foreign policy in any far-reaching way, many believe the future can be different.

Regardless of whether space cooperation can

alter Soviet behavior, another question is whether

it is smart to exploit its symbolic value to achieve

other U.S. interests. Symbolic value has always

been a key component in both the U.S. and Soviet space programs, on low as well as high levels

of cooperation. The question of whether cooperation should be initiated or terminated primarily

to pursue symbolic goals has generated a controversy of its own. Creating a large-scale cooperative effort in space, for example, could bring positive benefit to the United States, by illustrating

to other countries the U.S. desire to work with

our adversaries to promote peace. But it could

also bring risks: 1) it may provide the U.S.S.R.

with a great deal of symbolic benefit by casting

them as technological equals; and 2) should a

large-scale joint project fail, the symbolic cost

could be damaging to U, S. interests. The symbolic benefits and risks from U.S.-Soviet cooperation

in space would increase with the size, scale, and

visibility of any cooperative effort.

Similarly, severely curbing or terminating cooperation may be an appropriate symbolic measure

to show displeasure with egregious Soviet behavior, but it also carries risks. U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space inevitably occurs in the context of

U.S.-Soviet relations overall, and the tendency

of U.S. policy in the past has been to utilize space

cooperation for foreign policy ends. The assumption has been that an abrupt reduction in space

cooperation can be an effective means of protesting Soviet behavior: when the Soviets do something morally reprehensible at home or abroad,

some believe the United States has a moral responsibility to respond, and space cooperation is an

effective way of doing so. But as this will generally result in scientific and practical losses, many

question this approach, preferring other methods

of protest that show displeasure at less cost, They

believe that curtailing or terminating space cooperation with the U.S.S.R. brings little benefit, and

in fact may harm scientific inquiry and/or U. S.-

Soviet relations overall. There is a notable lack

of agreement on how past experience might clar-
5

ify these debates, and the degree to which past

experience may be useful in assessing potential future cooperation.

Underlying all of these viewpoints are different assumptions about Soviet objectives and behavior. The Soviet approach to cooperation has

tended to mirror its overall approach to U. S.-

Soviet relations, reflecting both an official commitment to cooperation in space, and a basic competition between the two superpowers. Soviet

leaders have consistently used their space program

not only to enhance cooperation, but also to pursue other foreign policy objectives more competitive and confrontational in nature (such as weakening the prestige and influence of the United

States while enhancing that of the U. S. S. R., and

developing a strong militarily related space capability of their own). This has led to vastly different interpretations of Soviet motivations and

actions among U.S. observers, and different interpretations of the lessons of past U.S.-Soviet cooperation. A central U.S. foreign policy challenge,

therefore, will be to assess how U.S. objectives

may be attained independent of Soviet intentions.

Other countries with space programs of their

own are grappling with these same issues. Many

of these countries have developed different approaches to cooperating with the U.S.S.R. that

may be instructive for U.S. planners, and that will

certainly have an impact on the effectiveness of

U.S. policy choices in the future. OTA reviewed

the issues in French-Soviet space cooperation—the

most continuous and extensive East-West cooperation in space science research—to examine

whether they might offer insights for U.S. policy.

French-Soviet space cooperation was begun

with political aims paramount. As the political

climate has become less opportune for promoting such cooperative efforts, however, and as the

scientific base of the French space program has

grown, scientific and economic aspects have been

increasingly emphasized.

In the 1980s, therefore, French policy reflects

the view that the scientific and economic benefits, and the political advantages gained from

keeping lines of communication open with the

U.S.S.R. through space cooperative efforts, offset any benefits that may be attained by terminating cooperation in symbolic protest. Accordingly,

space cooperation has not been dramatically interrupted in response to broader political events.

While believing that no area of cooperation with

the U.S.S.R. can be totally depoliticized, French

planners argue that it is important to seek an area

for cooperation where political considerations are

reduced as much as possible, but where scientific

benefit can be substantial and continuous. In

terms of technology transfer, the French believe

they have effective mechanisms in place to control the transfer of militarily sensitive technology

to the U. S. S. R., and they provide briefings to

French scientists who work with Soviet scientists

to better control the flow of sensitive information.

But the French differ markedly from the United

States in defining “militarily sensitive” technologies as only those with direct military application—as opposed to more extensive U.S. definitions—and by tending to be more confident about

special “packaging” and other ways in which sensitive technology can be protected.

Because of several factors, then—the conflicts

between the gains of cooperation and the risks of

technology transfer; disagreement over the relative importance of scientific and practical benefits and foreign policy goals; and possible inconsistencies among foreign policy objectives —there

will always be a multiplicity of views about EastWest cooperation in space. The ways in which

these viewpoints are reflected in policy will determine the size, shape, scope, and effectiveness

of any potential space cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

It would clearly be useful to further examine

the costs and benefits of past cooperation, as a

basis for considering the establishment, cancellation or continuation of cooperative arrangements in the future. At the same time, however,

it is important to remember that views on how

much cooperation to pursue will necessarily reflect judgments about broader issues of world tensions, Soviet objectives, and the overall course

of U.S.-Soviet relations at least as much as they

will reflect judgments about the costs and benefits of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation itself.
Chapter 1

Introduction
Chapter 1

Introduction

The issue of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space

has been the subject of congressional and other

debate since the beginning of the space age in the

1950s. For the most part the two countries have

developed extensive space programs in almost

complete isolation from each other, with space

programs heavily military and strategic in nature.

But in light of overall world tensions, U.S.-Soviet

cooperation in space has been viewed by both

countries as a mechanism for enhancing national

prestige, sending peaceful symbolic messages to

the rest of the world, pooling important scientific

and technical information and insights, and perhaps leading to a genuine reduction of tensions

on Earth. In U.S. congressional debates U.S.-Soviet space cooperation has characteristically been

promoted as a means of reducing tensions and

promoting world peace.

The development of U.S.-Soviet cooperation

in space has occurred as part of a growth in U. S.-

Soviet scientific and technical (S&T) cooperation

overall. Formal cooperation in S&T began between the two countries on a bilateral basis in

1959, with the signing of agreements for scientific

exchange programs between the National Academy of Sciences of the United States and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. It continued with

a variety of inter-institutional agreements between

the Soviet Academy of Sciences and such U.S.

Government agencies as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA), the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the

Department of Agriculture (USDA). In the early

1970s this cooperation culminated in the signing of

a broad U.S.-Soviet intergovernmental agreement

to cooperate bilaterally in 11 areas of science and

technology.

U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space has occurred on

a number of levels: on a bilateral intergovernmental basis, in multilateral forums, and through more

informal scientist-to-scientist exchange. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union have

signed broad agreements to cooperate in space on

four occasions, the first two at the interagency level

(1962 and 1971, between NASA and the Soviet

Academy of Sciences), and the latter two at the intergovernmental level, when an intergovernmental

“Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes” was signed in 1972 and renewed in 1977. In

the multilateral context U.S.-Soviet space cooperation has expanded through international projects

and organizations such as the World Weather Watch

conducted by the WorId Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) system; the United States and

the U.S.S.R. have also signed and ratified four U.N.

treaties and agreements concerning the peaceful use

of outer space.1 And U, S.-Soviet interaction and discussions without governmentaI-level recognition

have also taken place in such forums as the International Astronautical Federation (IAF) and the

Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), organized in 1958 as a coordinating body of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).

Despite these various types of cooperative efforts,

the history of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation has

been an uneven one, marked by intermittent hopes,

occasional accomplishments, and many disappointments. The high level of secrecy surrounding Soviet space activities (due to the absence of a separation between Soviet military and civilian space

programs) has impeded the interchange of information and ideas. And it has proved to be exceedingly

difficult, in the U.S.S.R. as well as in the United

States, to separate the issues of U.S.-Soviet military

and political competition on Earth from the pursuit

of cooperation in space.

‘These are: I ) the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Act]vltles

of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the

Moon and Other Celestial lk>dies” (1967) (TIAS b3~7; 18 UST 2410:

610 UNTS 205): 2 ) an “Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts,

the Return of Astronauts, and the Return ot Objects Launched In

Outer Space” (1968) (TIAS 6599; 19 UST 7570; bi’2 UNTS 2051

3) the “Convention on International Liability for IIamage Caused

b} Space Objects” ~ 1Q72 ) (TIAS 7762; 24 UST 238Q: 961 UNTS 187):

and ~ ) the “(-

(~ nvention cln Registration of Objects I.aunched Intc~

Outer Spare” ( 1974) (TIAS 8480 28 UST oQ5; 1023 UNTS 151 A

IItth treaty, ~n “Agreement G(~vernlng the Actl\ritles CIt Statei ~~n

the hl{~(~n an~i Other (’ele~tial Hoci]e+’ ( 1 Q7Q I, ha~ entereci Into I (w( e

l>~]t neither the IIn]teci Statt\ nor the [1 S .S R has >i~ned it.

9
10

on are also being voiced

Photo credit National Air and Space Museum

Vanguard I

Thus, notwithstanding a stated desire on the

part of both countries to pursue such cooperation,

U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in practice has

tended to follow the course of U.S.-Soviet relations overall. After more than a decade of frustrated attempts to establish space cooperation during the late 1950s and the 1960s, cooperation

reached its high point in the mid-1970s, at the

height of detente, with the Apollo-Soyuz Test

Project (ASTP), before declining to a very low

level in the late 1970s and to the lapsing of the

1972 Agreement in 1982. Now, 10 years after

ASTP, the renewal of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation on an intergovernmental basis is once

again being actively proposed, but many of the

same concerns and issues which characterized

early efforts at cooperat

today.

**   **  **

The signing of Public Law 98-562 in October

1984 in support of renewing space cooperation

with the U. S. S. R., and subsequent proposals for

prospective U.S.-Soviet joint projects, have again

brought fundamental questions to the fore. What

should specific U.S. objectives be, and how should

these objectives be reconciled with each other? Is

U.S.-Soviet space cooperation primarily a political or scientific endeavor? Does it in fact promote

peace or reduce tensions? What should take precedence when scientific and foreign policy objectives conflict? How much “technology transfer”

to the U.S.S.R. should the United States permit

so as not to jeopardize real scientific and foreign

policy benefits? And to what degree should space

cooperation fluctuate depending on broader political events?

These and other questions have triggered a great

deal of public debate in the United States. One

viewpoint, for example, argues that renewed U. S.-

Soviet cooperation in space should be vigorously

pursued for political, economic, and scientific reasons. At a time when the “weaponization” of

space has become a major concern in the United

States and abroad, some observers argue that

cooperation in space represents a feasible means

for altering this trend. At a time when U.S.-Soviet

relations are at one of their lowest points of the

last few decades, space cooperation is viewed as

a means of reducing tensions. And in more quantifiable terms, the potential scientific and economic benefits of renewed cooperation are considered substantive enough in their own right to

merit renewed cooperation. Proponents of these

views tend to support a relatively large-scale joint

U.S.-Soviet cooperative endeavor in space, insulated from the ups and downs of U.S.-Soviet relations and world politics.

Others, however, are more wary of renewed

U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, placing more emphasis on the possible negative foreign policy and

national security implications. In terms qf potential political benefits, for example, these observers

argue that U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space should
not be viewed as the antithesis of militarization

of space: one can compete militarily and cooperate at the same time. They argue that space cooperation cannot be insulated from, nor greatly

change, broader political events, and may result

in Soviet rather than U.S. political advantage.

And the scientific and economic benefits, some

argue—although real, and at times substantial—

are not great enough to offset the technology

transfer and national security concerns which

would accompany any cooperative venture in

space. Proponents of these views tend to oppose

renewing cooperation in space, or support pursuing space cooperation on a very low level, perhaps using it as a foreign policy tool when appropriate.

This technical memorandum is designed to sort

out these issues as a basis for discussing guidelines and more specific policy approaches in the

future. It is not intended to determine whether cooperation should be pursued, nor to prescribe optimal methods for doing so. Instead, it is designed

only to clarify the pros and cons of each set of

policy issues and highlight the potential conflicts

among them.

Following this brief introduction, chapter 2 outlines the history of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in

space, and the policy debates which have taken

place in the United States since the beginning of

the space age. It focuses on bilateral intergovernmental U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, as a background to analyzing policy issues facing Congress

today and the kinds of questions these may suggest for the future.

Chapter 3 identifies some potential areas for expanded U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the space sciPhoto credit National Air and Space Museum

The world’s first cosmonaut —Laika

ences. Based on a workshop of space scientists

held at OTA in May 1984, the chapter presents

a scientific evaluation of past U.S.-Soviet cooperative efforts in the planetary and space life

sciences, and enumerates potential projects for the

future which could have substantial scientific

merit.

Chapters 4 and 5 combine this historical and

scientific background with the complex array of

foreign policy and national security issues which

lie at the heart of any U.S.-Soviet cooperative activity in space. Chapter 4 focuses on French policies since, of all the Western countries, France

has had the most extensive and long-term space

cooperation with the U. S. S. R., and has tended

to approach space cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

in terms quite different from those in the United

States. Chapter 5 examines all of these issues as

they face U.S. policy makers today.
Chapter 2

..-—

... .—--- - ---—- ---

Y

t

History of U. S.- Soviet

Cooperation in Space

---- - ~--.” . — - — . - —.

1

, . A .— ‘

Photo credit National Air and Space Museum

Eleventh century tapestry showing the Comet Halley
Chapter 2

History of U.S.-Soviet

Cooperation in Space

BACKGROUND: FROM THE COLD WAR “MISSILE GAP”

TO A COOPERATIVE SPACE AGREEMENT

The history of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space

has been marked by a number of overarching

themes. In both countries, space cooperation has

ostensibly been viewed as one means to achieve

a greater degree of understanding and diminish

conflict on Earth; a stated objective of both countries has been to encourage space cooperation for

the benefit of mankind. But efforts to establish

bilateral U.S.-Soviet cooperation have been

marked by certain inherent tensions difficult to

resolve: tensions in cooperating in space while

competing on Earth; in simultaneously competing and cooperating in space, where, in both countries, military activities have been a prominent,

if not driving force; in reconciling U.S,-Soviet

space cooperation with the broader U.S.-Soviet

political relationship; and tensions within both

countries among various interests and bureaucratic perspectives in formulating national policy.

United States and U.S.S.R. policies traditionally

have reflected different viewpoints regarding what

cooperation means and how it fits into the broader

U.S.-Soviet relationship. All of these issues have

colored the history of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, and continue to shape the direction in

which such cooperation may move in the future.

Early U.S. Interest in Cooperation

work cooperatively, 1 and by a strong concern for

secrecy in virtually all of its space activities. The

United States, on the other hand, was more favorably disposed towards cooperation with the

U. S. S. R., viewing it not only as a means to promote peace, but as a means of pooling technical

knowledge, placing the use of space under some

degree of control, and of increasing U.S. prestige

internationally. 2 Although Soviet planners gradually warmed toward space cooperation in the

1970s, the 1950s and 1960s were characterized by

U.S. overtures for space cooperation which were,

for the most part, rejected or ignored. They were

marked by only sporadic and low-level cooperation, against a background of strident competition.

One of the earliest forums for encouraging

space cooperation in the 1950s was the International Geophysical Year (IGY). The IGY—actually a period of 18 months from July 1957 to

December 1958—was established by the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) to pool

international efforts in studying our physical environment: the Earth, the oceans, the atmosphere,

and outer space. Although the IGY’s program initially did not include the launching of artificial

satellites, American scientists proposed such an

Since the beginning of the “space age, ” in the

early 1950s, both the United States and the

U.S.S.R. have been committed in principle to the

idea of international cooperation in space. But

against a background of the Cold War and substantial military competition, initial efforts to

establish U.S.-Soviet space cooperation met with

little success. The Soviet approach to space was

characterized by efforts to “score propaganda

points against the capitalist West” rather than

‘Joseph G, Whelan, “Soviet Attitude Toward Cooperation In

Space’, ” in Congressiona] Research Service .%)~’iet Spdc(J 17rogrc]n7.5

197&&?0, prepare~~ [Or the senate C[}rnmil t~~ [m c(~mmerc(>, Scienc(’

and Transport atlon ( Wash i n~ti(}n, 1X: L]. S. G(}vernment I’rinting

office, 1982), p. 207,

‘See Marcia Smith, ‘International C(><~p~’r~t i<~n in Space, ” Urr~tec/

Stdtes CiLri/jdn Sp<3ce I’rograms JQ.581~78 d report prepared t(~r

the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Appl lc.]ti<lnt, C-c~mmlttee on Science and Technology, Q7th C[~ng, ( ~~’dshingt(~n, ~>C’.

L]. S. G[]vernrnent Printing Ott ice, ]981 ), pp. 834$37 and r>(~dd

1,. Harvey and Linda C. Cicconttl, [‘ S,-Sotjet Cm)peratjon jn Spacr

( Nl]dmi: Center for Ach’anced International Studies, Uni\’er\ity ot

hliami, IQ741, pp. 1-22.

15
16

effort at the planning conference in Rome in 1954

of the committee established to coordinate the

IGY effort, the Comite' Special de L’Annee Geophysique International (CSAGI). 3 With tens of

thousands of scientists from 69 countries participating, the IGY involved investigations in many

areas, both in space and on Earth, including those

directed at the physics of the upper atmosphere,

the Earth’s heat and water regimen, and the

Earth’s structure and shape. Both the United States

and the Soviet Union participated in the IGY, and

both planned to launch a satellite in conjunction

with it.

Largely because of Soviet reluctance to engage

in extensive information exchange, however, cooperation in space activities both in planning for

the IGY and during the IGY itself remained on

a token level. Although the Soviet Union did participate in the IGY, it applied restrictions to IGY

agreements for exchange of information in space,

and Soviet compliance with IGY requirements in

space science was poor.4 This was due at least in

part to the high level of secrecy and the lack of

a clear distinction—unchanged to this day—between the Soviet military and civilian space efforts, which inhibited the Soviets in sharing in-

—

‘For a more in-depth look at this early part of space history see:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Walter Sullivan, Assault on the Uriknown: The International

Geophysical Year (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

Arnold W. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard:

A History (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, 1970).

Michael Collins, Carrying the Fire, An Astronaut’s Journeys

(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1974).

Harvey and Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space, op.

cit.

Congressional Research Service, Science Policy Research Division, WorL+Wide Space Activities, a report prepared for the

Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1977).

Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years in Space

Science (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, 1980).

Walter A. McDouXall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Poiitica)

History of the S&-ce Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

4

See Frutk in, International Cooperation in Space, op. cit., pp.

19-20:

The %vlet Union provided virtually no advance information of a

substantive character regard]ng either its satellite or sounding rocket

programs, restricted agreements prescribing types of information to

be exchanged, and released only Ilmited quantities of digested sclent]fic findings such as normally appear in conventional publications (p.

20)

Photo credit” Nat/onal Air and Space Museum

Sputnik 1

formation and data. The Soviet approach was

different from that in the United States, which

stressed a separation between civilian and military space efforts.

Both the promise and problems of this space

cooperation were highlighted with the Soviets’

launching of Sputnik 1 in October 1957. The U.S.

public and the Congress were caught by surprise,

and the launch was viewed both as a humiliating

defeat for U.S. prestige and as a deep national

security concern. In the words of one specialist:

The Soviet Union had demonstrated by its satellite program its capacity for launching intercontinental ballistic missiles, and its intention of exploring the space environment whose control

could affect methods of maintaining peace and

waging wars

The immediate effect of Sputnik, therefore, was

to inspire competition. The United States increased funding for its space program, viewing

expanded capabilities in space as critical to U.S.

prestige and strategic defense. b At the same time,

however, it also underlined the importance of en-

‘Eilene Galloway, “Congress and International Space Cooperation, ” International Cooperation in Outer Space: A Symposium,

prepared for the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971 ), p. 4.

bJohn Logsdon, The Decision to go to the Moon: Project Apollo

and the National Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970).
77

couraging international cooperation as a means

of promoting peaceful rather than military uses

of outer space. As stated by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed

Services Committee in 1958:

. . . the same forces, the same knowledge, and the

same technology which are producing ballisti c

missiles can also produce instruments of peace and

universal cooperation . . . the truly worthwhile

goal is a world of peace—the only world in which

there will also be security.7

A total of eight successful satellite launches were

accomplished during the IGY: The U.S.S.R.

launched Sputnik I, 11 and 111; the United States

launched Explorer I, II, and IV, Vanguard I, and

Pioneer III. But despite some exchange of information, space cooperation was the most disappointing part of the IGY, and efforts outside of

the IGY to engage Moscow in space cooperation

remained unanswered or were refused.

Thus, the late 1950s highlighted the twin themes

of competition and cooperation which would

characterize all subsequent U.S.-Soviet efforts

towards cooperation in space. The IGY marked

the beginning of efforts of space scientists throughout the world to work together despite political

differences. But especially with the launching of

Sputnik 1, it also showed the difficulties of cooperating, and revealed the Soviets as strong competitors with the United States in space technology and possessors of a military capability with

startling implications.

‘Inquiry into Satel/ite and Lfissile I’rograms, hearings before the

Preparedness\ Investi&ating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 85th Cong,, 1st and 2d sess., Part 3 (Washington, DC-: U.S. Government Printing office, 1958), pp. 2429-2430.

Photo credit Nat/onal Air and Space Museurr

Explorer 1

One result for the United States was the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) to address both the competitive and cooperative sides of space. NASA

was created by the National Aeronautics and

Space Act of 1958, whose declaration of policy—

that space activities be conducted for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind—included

specific goals for encouraging both peaceful competition and cooperation with foreign countries,

East and West. For example, the Act calls for “the

preservation of the role of the United States as

a leader in aeronautical and space science and

technology”8

and for “cooperation by the United

States with other nations and groups of nations. . .“9

in the conduct and peaceful application of spacerelated activities.

The Early 1960s: Unfulfilled Promise

Although the goal of international cooperation

had been included in NASA’s charter—and although the 1960s saw expanded U.S. cooperation

with countries other than the U. S. S. R., and Soviet cooperation with countries other than the

United States—U.S.-Soviet relations regarding

space during the decade of the 1960s were characterized primarily by competition. The Kennedy

Administration accelerated the pace of U.S. space

efforts soon after entering office, and on May 25,

1961, during an address to a joint session of the

88th Congress, President Kennedy called on the

country to commit itself to landing a man on the

Moon by the end of the decade. ’O Although the

idea had been discussed among scientists and in

Congress in the late 1950s, this official statement

of policy became part of another round of the

“space race, “ not “won” until 1969. The first half

of the 1960s was marked by major achievements

in the Soviet Vostok and Voskhod programs, in

the U.S. Mercury and Gemini programs, and the

first “space walk, ” conducted by the Soviet cos-

‘National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1Q58, Public Law. 85-5d8,

Section 102(c)(5).

*Ibid , Section 102(c)(7) Section 205 of the act provides forma]

authorization for international cooperation in space.

“’John F. Kennedy, Special Nlessage to the C{~ngres\ on [Jr~ent

National Needs, ” May 25, IQ61, Public- [>apers of the presidents of

the United States: /ohn F. R’ennedjr, J%l ( Washington, DC: L] .S.

Cotrernrnent [>r]nting office, 1 Qb2 ), pp. 3Q7-407.
18

But despite the commitment to devote more resources towards the “space race, ” the idea of cooperation with the U.S.S.R. was not abandoned.

President Kennedy explicitly underlined this in his

State of the Union message in 1961:

Finally, this Administration intends to explore

promptly all possible areas of cooperation with

the Soviet Union and other nations “to invoke the

wonders of science instead of its terrors. ”Specifically, I now invite all nations—including the Soviet Union—to join with us in developing a

weather prediction program, in a new communications satellite program, and in preparation for

probing the distant planets of Mars and Venus,

probes which may someday unlock the deepest

secrets of the universe.

Today, this country is ahead in the science and

technology of space, while the Soviet Union is

ahead in the capacity to lift large vehicles into orbit. Both nations would help themselves as well

as other nations by removing these endeavors

from the bitter and wasteful competition of the

Cold War. The United States would be willing to

join with the Soviet Union and the scientists of

all nations in a greater effort to make the fruits

of this new knowledge available to all .. .11

Soon after taking office President Kennedy formed

a special panel—a Joint NASA-President’s Science

Advisory Committee-Department of State Panel,

directed by Jerome Wiesner—to study the possibilities for international cooperation in space activities and related fields. Focusing its attention

primarily on collaboration between the United

States and the U. S. S. R., the Panel made a series

of concrete proposals for cooperative activities.

Again Soviet interest, however, was not forthcoming on any of these proposals.

Part of the reason for the lack of agreement was

the relation of cooperation in space to broader

issues of U.S.-Soviet relations. While the United

States hoped to isolate cooperation in space as a

separate area of negotiation, the U.S.S.R. tended

to view it as inextricably intertwined with broader

foreign policy issues. Whereas U.S. statements reflected the hope that cooperation in space might

lead to more understanding and cooperation in

other areas, Soviet statements declared that issues

in those other areas—especially disarmament—

had to be settled first.

Soviet planners, therefore, declined to discuss

issues of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space until

the political situation changed in 1961, when issues such as the Berlin crisis and the break with

the Chinese Communist Party led to a fundamental shift in the Soviet stance toward the United

States overall. This shift in attitude was reflected

in October 1961 at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), when

Soviet party and government officials began discussing a policy of cooperation with other nations

in the fields of trade, cultural relations, science,

and technology. In December 1961, after years

of relative intransigence over other U.N. resolutions, the Soviet Union for the first time gave its

support to the passage of a U.N. Resolution stressing “the urgent need to strengthen international

cooperation . . . for the betterment of mankind

. . . . “12 And Soviet leaders gradually moderated

their position toward cooperation in space with

the United States. The following February, Khrushchev sent a letter to President Kennedy congratulating the American people on John Glenn’s

three-orbit flight and suggesting that there be

closer cooperation in space activities between the

two powers .13

“John F, Kennedy, “Annual Message to the Congrvss on the State

of the Union, ” Jan. 30, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of the

United States: Iohn F. Kennedy, 1%1, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
79

This response led to a series of talks between

Hugh Dryden of NASA and Anatoliy Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. These

talks, which were suspended temporarily during

the Cuban missile crisis, led in turn to the signing of an interagency agreement in December

1962. Generally referred to as the Dryden-Blagonravov agreement of 1962, the agreement stipulated

coordinated national efforts in the fields of meteorology, geomagnetism, and satellite communications experimentation. In addition, a 24-hour

communications link—the so-called “cold line”*

—was established for the real time exchange of

satellite meteorological data between Washington

and Moscow. An additional formal agreement

concerned the joint publication of a study on

space biology and medicine. Dryden believed that

the Soviet concern for secrecy prevented further

cooperation. 14

While some useful data were exchanged, however, the results of the agreements were disappointing. Part of this was undoubtedly due to

inadequate Soviet technical capabilities for processing data as well as to Soviet intransigence. The

meteorological data received by U.S. scientists

were late and of poorer quality than had been anticipated; no satellite data were exchanged concerning the magnetosphere; the Soviets received

experimental satellite communications but declined to transmit; and the space biology and medicine study was not published until 1975, largely

because of delays of up to 2 years in Soviet responses. Despite “frequent and repeated efforts

to persuade the Soviets to enter new space projects, “lb U.S.-Soviet relations generally remained

(continued)

For a description of the Soviet change In attitude at this time see

Joseph G. Whelan, “Soviet Attitude Toward International Cooperation in Space, ” Soviet Space Programs, 1962-65 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 427-430.

For a discussion of the events in the U.N. concerning East-West

cooperation in space at this time see Eilene Galloway, “Part 111: The

United Nations, ” International Cooperation and Organization for

Outer .s~ace (Washington, DC U.S. Government Printing Office,

19651, pp. 163-227.

● Terminated in 1984.

l~Eze]] and Eze]], The Partnership, op. cit., P P. 58-59.

*’U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space

Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), especially pp. 635-636.

“Ibid., p. 636.

cold, and the level of cooperation in space seemed

to follow suit.

The Late 1960s: The United States

Lands a Man on the Moon

During the mid to late 1960s, efforts to expand

U.S.-Soviet space cooperation became more modest. Despite previous disappointments, the Johnson Administration continued to pursue such cooperation. But now studies on potential areas for

U.S. cooperation in space—such as the Webb Report17 —stressed caution, urging that sights for

cooperation be lowered, the serious limitations

of cooperating with the U.S.S.R. be recognized,

and a “measured approach” with respect to highlevel initiatives vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. be adopted.

While the Kennedy Administration had hoped for

big projects—extending even to a proposed joint

lunar landing–the Johnson Administration shifted

back to an emphasis on small “first steps” which

might be a basis for broadening cooperation in

the future. ’g Cooperation was left primarily for

the established NASA-Soviet Academy channels,

with few overtures for cooperation coming directly from the President himself. Soviet planners, for

their part, seemed less inclined to cooperate, given

the greater belligerence in foreign and domestic

affairs of the new Brezhnev /Kosygin leadership,

the escalation of the war in South Vietnam and,

as before, the fact that relationships with respect

to space activities were very much determined by

the nature of the broader political relationship.

Thus, cooperation in space continued on a very

low level. The Soviets began furnishing meteorological data via the long inactive “cold line”; perhaps most importantly, final agreement was

reached on a U.N. Outer Space Treaty in 1967,

which was implemented by four subsequent international treaties on space law. 19 But proposals for

more substantive bilateral cooperation in space

were consistently rejected, ignored, or sidestepped

— 17 James E. Webb, “Report on Possible Projects [or Substantive

Cooperation With the Soviet Union in the Field of Outer Space, ’

Lnown as the Webb Report (letter of transmittal dated Jan. 31, 19~41

cited in Harvey and Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space,

op. cit., pp. 138-139.

I ~ Harvey and C iccorit t i, U. .$-soviet Cooperation in Space. ~P.

cit., pp. 135-139.

‘“See ch. 1,
2 0

Figure2-l .—Soviet Type G Booster, and U.S. Saturn V

I

2-16M

FIGURE- N

110.64M—A —

LET

LM

.

S-IVB I I II I

5-II

.

D-1 G-i-e

PROTON TYPE-G

HEAVYSOYUZ CONCEPT

CONCEPT

APOLLO/SATURN-V

SKYLAB-1

The Type-G booster has never been placed on display, and the U.S.S.R. has never released any

data on its characteristics. The design shown here was developed from deductions about the

probable Soviet manned lunar mission profile and from a line drawing of its possible service

gantry.

SOURCE: Charles P Vlck, 198244
Figure 2-2.–Conceptual Illustration, Soviet Manned Lunar Landing Program, 1967-73

● LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION

Soviet manned Lunar landing program from 1967 to 1973 when the p(ogram was abandoned. Commentary from Soviet sources, plus the requirements for

a manned lunar mission, indicate that the U.S.S.R. had planned to conduct an Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR)/Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR) flight profile.

A manned craft would meet the huge unmanned payload in Earth orbit before being propelled off to the Moon. At the completion of the lunar phase of the

mission, the crew would return to Earth in a variant of their Soyuz spacecraft. All necessary hardware had been developed. The repeated failure of the G-1-e

booster blocked the mission.

SOURCE Charles P Vlck, 1983
22

by Soviet officials. Simultaneously, efforts were

intensified to gain the advantage in the new leg

of the space race: placing a man on the Moon.

One of the key elements of the Moon race was

the ability to launch heavy payloads. The Soviets

were testing their Type-G series launchers, but encountered a series of failures. The development

of the Saturn V was largely responsible for the

United States’ success in landing a man on the

Moon .20

 of U.S. launch vehicles at

this time see Charles S. Sheldon 11, “Launch Vehicles and Propulsion, ” United States Civilian Space Programs 1958-1978, prepared

for the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of

the Committee on Science and Technology (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, January 1981 ), pp. 210-217.

For a discussion of the development of U.S.S.R. launch vehicles

at this time see Charles P. “The Soviet G-1-e Manned Lunar

Landing Programme Booster, ” Journal of British 

 Society, No. 1 (January 1985), 11-18.

With the end of the 1960s, many congressional

and other U.S. observers believed that the beginning of the Nixon Administration and the landing of an American on the Moon in 1969 would

trigger more U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space.

With the United States having “won the space

race, ” many believed that American “superiority”

would provide incentive for the U.S.S.R. to cooperate rather than fall farther behind in a costly

competition. The new Administration had stated

a desire to move from an “era of confrontation

to an era of negotiation” in relations with the Soviet Union; the new NASA administrator, Thomas Paine, had renewed efforts to interest the Soviet Academy of Sciences in cooperative projects.

The successful landing of the U.S. Apollo 11

manned spacecraft on the Moon encouraged

many observers to believe that the Soviets would

now accept these offers. A number of congressional addresses and resolutions introduced in the

Photo credit: National Alr and Space Museum

U.S. Apollo Astronauts: The First Moon Walk
23

House and Senate urged that the lunar landing

be viewed as a catalyst for changing the direction

of the U.S. program to place more emphasis on

U.S.-Soviet cooperation rather than competition. 2

’

———

“SW tor exam~le:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

U.S. Congre;s, Houser Representative Hechler Speaking on

Apollo and World Peace, 91st Cong., 1st sess., July 21 ~ 196Q,

L’ong,ewonal Rec[)rcf, H~l ltJ.

L’. S. Congress House, Representative Keith Commenting on

Introducing H. Con. Res 305 Regarding Future Space Explcw

ration Jointly by U.S. and Other Nations, Q 1 \t Cong., 1st wss.,

JUII 24, 1969, Congress~ond/ Record, H~2W.

U.S. Congres\, Senate, Senator Gravel Commenting on and

Introducing Senate Resolution 221 to Internationalize the U.S.

Space I’rograrn, Q 1 ~[ ~on~,, 1st sess., Ju]y 22, 196Q, Con&~re\-

wonai Rec>orcl, S8385.

U ,S. Congress, Senate, Senator Proxmire Introducing Senate

Resolution 285–Resolution Authorizing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to Undertake a Comprehensive Study of All

I’oss]bi]]ties tt~r Internatlona] Cooperation in Space, Qlst Cong.,

1st w~s,, No\, 18, 1Q69, Corr,gressiona) Record, S14593.

U.S Congress, Ht~use, Representative Nliller Commenting on

the Possibllit> of U.S.-U, S. S. R. Future Exploration of Space,

91 St ~ong., 1st ws,, Aug. 11, 1 Q6Q, Congressional” Record,

S47251,

U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Fulbright Commenting on U. S.-

Soviet Competition ]n Space and Possibility ot Future Cooperation, Q 1st Cong., 1st sess,, Aug. 11, 1~69, Congressional

Record, S~b31.

U.S Congress, Senate, Senator Percy Commenting on U.S.-SO

Jfiet Cot]peratlon in Space, cv st con~,, 1st sess., Aug. 12, IQ@.

~’ongressi(~na] Record SQ828.

But instead of acknowledging “defeat,” American technological superiority, and a new willingness to cooperate, Soviet officials asserted that

there never had been a “space race” to the Moon,

and simply congratulated the United States on

matching the significant technological achievements already attained by the U. S. S. R.:

Man’s walk on the Moon will go down in the

chronicles of the twentieth century as an important event, along with such related significant

achievements as the launching of the first artificial satellite, the first space flight by Iurii Gagarin, Aleksey Leonov’s first walk in space, and the

first launchings of automatic spacecraft towards

the Moon, Venus, and Mars.22

After Apollo 11 the Soviets continued until 1976

to launch unmanned probes for exploration of the

Moon. Their manned space program was directed

more towards Earth-orbit operations, leading to

the successful Salyut program of the 1970s. But

at the time of the Moon landing extensive U. S.-

Soviet cooperation in space appeared to remain

elusive.

“I., Sedov, “CheloveL na lune” [A hlan on the Lloon ], T2-a\’&,

]U]y 23, 1969.

THE 1970s: MOVES TOWARD BROADER COOPERATION

Rendezvous and Docking

for Space Rescue

A major shift towards broader cooperation

came with the 1970s. The end of the 1960s saw

a relaxation of tensions on a number of fronts,

including the signing of the Non-Proliferation

Treaty in 1968 and the beginning of the Strategic

Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1969. In the

period following the lunar landing, one relatively

large-scale U.S. proposal for a U.S.-Soviet cooperative space project received a positive response:

the idea of astronaut safety and reciprocal rescue

capability as a basis for cooperation. In May 1970,

a U.S. proposal to develop a common docking

mechanism for manned spacecraft and space stations was accepted by the U.S.S.R.

It is unclear why the Soviets became interested

in space cooperation with the United States at this

time. Some observers argue that Soviet acceptance was based primarily on Soviet technological requirements. Despite some docking successes,

the repetition of docking difficulties in the Soviet

space program was considered by some to provide a technical incentive for their acceptance of

cooperation with the United States. For example,

in 1968 the manned Soyuz 3 approached the unmanned Soyuz 2 in orbit with the apparent intention of docking, but no docking occurred. In

October of 1969a tandem flight of three manned

spacecraft took place; two of these were expected

to dock, but did not do so—presumably a failed

mission.
2 4

Other observers, however, argue that the Soviet shift was motivated more by political considerations. Following the beginning of a general

relaxation of tensions, these observers suggest, the

U.S.S.R. viewed a joint U.S.-Soviet venture in

space as a means to enhance its image around the

world and at home.

The Soviets, for their part, have described the

shift almost entirely as an outgrowth of changes

in their broader political relation with the United

States:

The atmosphere of the “Cold War” of the 1950s

to 1960s precluded giving U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space the character of a constantly expanding process. It is not accidental that cooperative

activity in the 1960s was limited to an exchange

of information, contact between scientists, and individual experiments. Efforts on the part of the

U.S. military industrial complex to direct American aeronautics towards military channels, and

considerations of prestige and competition . . .

created the impression for a wide American public that any Soviet success in space was to the

detriment of the “national interests” of the United

States.

Changes in the character of Soviet-American

relations, and positive results of discussions on

the highest level in Moscow and Washington, allowed for a significant expansion of U.S.-Soviet

cooperation in the research on and use of space .23

Discussions were begun in 1970 for joint development of a common docking mechanism. The

United States, however, had not intended to establish cooperation on one isolated topic; since

before the days of the Dryden-Blagonravov talks,

the U.S. thrust had always been toward a broad

range of cooperative space activities .24 After the

meeting on docking was successful, therefore, discussions of other forms of cooperation were held

in Moscow in January 1971, and an agreement

was signed between NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences involving coordination of space

activities, data exchanges, and a lunar sample exchange. This agency-to-agency agreement established the framework for what would evolve into

the 1972 intergovernmental agreement.

“G. S. Khozin, S. S. S. R.-S. Sh.A.: Orbity kosmicheskogo sotrudnichestva [U. S. S. R.-U. S. A.: Orbits of Space Cooperation] (Moscow:

Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia, 1976), p. 6.

‘iHaWey and Ciccoritti, U.S.-soviet Cooperation in Space, op.

cit., pp. 220-221, 229.

Initiation of Cooperative Space

Science and Applications

The text of the agreement of 1971 between

NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences sets

forth a fairly specific plan for cooperation in a

number of applications and science areas:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

In the field of meteorological satellites, to

work jointly to make improvements in the

current exchange of data and to consider alternative possibilities for coordinating satellite systems of both countries so as to

achieve the economic and other advantages

of complementary systems.

In the field of meteorological rocket soundings, to formulate provisions for a program

of soundings along selected meridional lines

in cooperation with other countries.

In the field of the natural environment, to

study the possibility of conducting coordinated surface, air, and space research over

specified international waters and to exchange results of measurements made by

each country over similar land sites in their

respective territories so as to achieve the potential applications of space and conventional survey techniques for investigating the natural environment in the common interests.

In the field of exploration of near-Earth

space, the Moon, and the planets, to work

jointly to define the most important scientific objectives in each area, to exchange information on the scientific objectives and results of their national programs in these

fields, to consider the possibilities for coordination of certain lunar explorations, and, in

particular, to initiate an exchange of lunar

surface samples by performing an agreed exchange of samples already obtained in the

Apollo and Luna programs.

In the field of space biology and medicine,

to develop appropriate procedures and recommendations to assure a more detailed and

regular exchange of information including

biomedical data obtained in manned space

flights .25

“NASA News Release, HQ, 71-57, “U.S.-Soviet Agreement, ”

Mar. 31, 1971; NASA News Release, HQ, 71-9, “U.S./U.S.S.R.

Space Meeting,” Jan. 21, 1971.
2 5

Soviet officials favored signing a more general set

of agreements, but NASA negotiators, recalling

the disappointing experience of the Dryden-Blagonravov agreements, argued for a set of goals

as specific as possible. Under the framework of

this agreement, five Joint Working Groups were

established to determine means by which these

projects would be implemented: the Joint Working Group on Meteorological Satellites; Joint

Working Group on Meteorological Rocket Soundings; Joint Working Group on the Natural Environment; Joint Working Group on the Exploration of near-Earth, the Moon, and the Planets;

and the Joint Working Group on Space Biology

and Medicine.

Informal discussions of a joint docking proposal

took place at the time the 1971 agreement was

signed; it remained for a 1972 intergovernmental

agreement to incorporate the joint docking project into a formal cooperative project between the

two countries.

The 1972 Agreement

The intergovernmental Agreement Concerning

Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer

Space for Peaceful Purposes (see below) was

drafted and signed with the dawning of “detente”

in U.S.-Soviet relations overall. The Summit

meeting between President Nixon and Soviet Premier Brezhnev in Moscow in May 1972—the first

time a U.S. President had officially visited the SoPhoto credlf National Aeronautics and Space Administration

President Richard Nixon and Premier Alexei N. Kosygin

signing the 1972 Agreement in Moscow

viet capital—triggered hopes that better relations

and increased interaction in scientific, economic,

and cultural affairs would usher in a new era of

peace and cooperation. This summit meeting set

the stage for the signing of a total of 11 bilateral

agreements for scientific and technical cooperation between 1972-74. In addition to the agreement for cooperation in space, three other bilateral agreements were signed in 1972, for cooperation in science and technology, environmental

protection, and medical science and public health.

In 1973 four additional agreements were signed,

in agriculture, studies of the world’s oceans, transportation, and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Three final agreements were signed in 1974 on

housing and other construction, energy, and artificial heart research. The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) was to be among the most ambitious

and most spectacular joint efforts between the two

countries.

ASTP was specifically described in the points

of agreement shown in box 2A, relating to Article 3 of the 1972 Agreement.

The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP)

Details of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP)

are already well known. As a contribution not

only towards detente, but towards the development of a universal, androgynous docking system, the United States and the Soviet Union jointly developed and conducted a flight where the

U.S. Apollo spacecraft, carrying a special docking module, rendezvoused and docked with a

modified Soviet Soyuz. Soyuz 19 was sent up

from Tiuratam (Tyuratam), in the Kazakh Republic of the U. S. S. R., with two cosmonauts on

board: Colonel Alexei Arkhipovich Leonov and

Valerii Nikolaievich Kubasov. The Apollo was

launched from the Kennedy Space Center, with

three astronauts: Brigadier-General Thomas P.

Stafford, Major Donald K. Slayton, and Major

Vance D. Brand.

On July 17, 1975, Apollo and Soyuz docked

in orbit 225 kilometers above the Earth, and for

2 days the two crews paid exchange visits and conducted five joint experiments. Figure 2-5 depicts

the ASTP mission profile and timeline. Live television coverage of the event was broadcast to rnil-
26
27

ARTICLE 5.—The Parties may by mutual agreement determine other areas of cooperation in the

exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE 6.—This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for

five years. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

Done at Moscow this 24th day of May 1972 in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages both

equally authentic.

For the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Richard Nixon A. N. Kosygin

President of the United States of America Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

Z7TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; 610 ~TS 205.

z6TIAS 6599; 19 UST 7570; 672 UNT’S 119.

Z9T1AS 7343; 23 UST 7~.

lions around the world with enthusiastic commentary and dramatic pictures. The astronauts and

cosmonauts on board emphasized ASTP’S importance as a symbol of the peaceful intentions of

both countries. And on an official level, the hope

was expressed that ASTP would lead to wider and

more extensive U.S.-Soviet cooperative efforts in

the future. Upon the landing of Apollo and Soyuz

spacecraft, L. 1. Brezhnev stated:

A relaxation of tensions and improvements in

Soviet-American relations have created the conditions for carrying out the first international

space flight. They are opening new possibilities

for wide, fruitful development of scientific links

between countries and peoples in the interests of

peace and progress of all mankind .30

Amid the generally enthusiastic response over the

success of ASTP, however, many observers began to express criticism of the project as a primarily symbolic, empty, and wasteful use of U.S.

space dollars.3 I

‘“G, S. Khc)zln, S. S. S. R-S,Sh,A : Orbit} Losmiche.+ogf) sotrud

nlchest!d, op. cit., p. 7

‘]lt is difficult to determine the precise cost of ASTI’ tor the United

State’ .~rrd US S.1<. According to ,’Y’ASA Pocket Statistics-)anuary

IGI&~ /washingtc)n, DC: office Of Nlanagernentr NASA, 1985), p.

C-5, ASTP cost a total of S214.2 millmn. The existing Apollo Command Space hlodule and Saturn 1 B launch vehicle, valued at $100

m I IIic)n, were transferred to the project at no cost from the completed Apollo program. ( Similar Iett<)ver Apollo hardware was dw

nated t[~ the N’ational Air and Space hluseum. ) Substantial addtic)rral +upp(~rt co~t~ may ha~’e been incurred b}’ NASA for ASTP

whl~h did not show up as a direct charge to the project. Soviet planners dId not pu blic[m the ir ASTP bud~et, which precl ucies J do] la rDespite the dramatic hopes it represented, the

ASTP gradually became the most visible and controversial product of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in

space. It became symbolic of cooperation in the

minds of most, and for many it was the only

memorable product of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. It has also received the sharpest criticism.

Critics argued that it was a “costly space circus, ”

a “250 million dollar handshake, “32 and that funds

allocated to ASTP should have been used for

more fruitful projects. They also argued that the

United States financed a chance for the Soviet Union to present itself as technologically equal to the

United States, and asserted that such a joint technological undertaking inevitably involved a transfer of American space technology to the Soviet

space program. Finally, they argued that the development of an androgynous docking system itself was unjustified, since the ASTP was to be the

last time that the U.S. Apollo spacecraft would

be used. Supporters of ASTF’ countered that no

significant technology transfer occurred, and that

the joint mission was valuable as a symbol of

world peace—”a dramatic demonstration to both

nations” and to the world of the potential “prac-
[page omitted]

This page was originally printed on a dark gray background.

The scanned version of the page was almost entirely black and not usable.
2 9

Figure 2-3.—Apollo Command Module and Soviet Soyuz Counterpart

/

SOURCE NASA ASTP press release

Photo credit National Aeronauttcs and Space Administration

< DOCK ING MODUL E

ticality and benefits of detente. ” In more practical terms, they believed that the result was “a

more open [Soviet] space program, “33 and that

the establishment of U.S.-Soviet working procedures for joint manned missions was potentially

useful for the future. Disagreements over the benefits and liabilities of ASTP continue today (see

chapter 5).

33Preceding quotes from a lettter to Senator Matsunaga from Dr.

Thomas O. Paine, dated Sept. 6, 1984, in East-West Cooperation

in Outer Space, hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations, Sept. 13, 1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office( 1984), p. 65.

Astronaut Donald K. Slayton and Cosmonaut Aleksei A.

Leonov in the Orbital Module during the ASTP
3 0

Figure 2-4.— Docking Mechanism Developed for Use in ASTP

1. Initial contact 2. Guide ring mate and capture

I

3. Mutual alignment and retraction 4. Hard and pressure-tight coupling

5. Cosmonauts’ transfer

SOURCE Soviet ASTP press klt
31

c

o
32

POST ASTP: CHANGING U.S. POSITION

Whatever the ultimate assessment of the project, the aftermath of ASTP was marked by high

hopes for future cooperation which gradually

eroded towards the end of the 1970s. Discussions

on forms of future cooperation were begun almost

immediately after the ASTP was completed. In

May 1977, the 1972 agreement was renewed for

5 more years, largely emphasizing the same directions as established in the 1972 agreement: delivery of Soviet lunar samples; mutual briefings on

Venera 9 and 10 and Viking landers on Mars; U.S.

participation in Soviet experiments aboard their

biological satellites; continuation of the joint

project for remote sensing of crops and vegetation; and tests to cross-calibrate NASA and Soviet meteorological rockets. 34

In addition, the agreement called for looking

into another large-scale joint project, a joint Shuttle/Salyut mission, and the possibility of developing an international space platform—activities

designed to use complementary areas of the

United States and Soviet space programs to provide solid scientific and technical benefits. The

long orbital staytime of the Salyut, for example,

coupled with the greater flexibility of the Shuttle—its ability to ferry people and large quantities of supplies in a reusable craft—were regarded

as especially complementary for joint scientific

and applied experiments and for further developing the two countries’ rendezvous and docking capabilities. 35 An agreement was signed between

NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences establishing two joint working groups to study “the objectives, feasibility and means of carrying out a

joint experimental program using the Soyuz/Salyut and Shuttle spacecraft"36—one working group

for basic and applied scientific experiments, and

one for operations. A third working group was

established “for preliminary consideration of the

feasibility of developing an International Space

34NASAAuthorjzatjon for Fiscal Year 1978, hearings beforethe

Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space for the Committee

on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, 95th

Cong., 1st sess., on S36.5, Feb. 25, Mar. 1 and 3, 1977, Part 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19’77), p. 815.

“Whelan, “Soviet Attitude Toward International Cooperation in

Space, ” op. cit., pp. 214-221.

JbAgreement Between the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the USA on Cooperation in the Area of Manned Space Flight, May 11, 1977, p. 2.

Platform on a bilateral or multilateral basis in the

future. ”37

The working groups began to meet soon after

the agreement was signed to discuss planning for

the mission—its feasibility, potential, and possible operating modes for conducting experiments.

The working groups were to proceed on the assumption that the first Shuttle/ Salyut flight would

take place in 1981, but no further commitments

were made.

Cooperation in space, however, again became

prey to a broader U.S.-Soviet political relationship. By 1978 the human rights issue had already

created severe strains in U.S.-Soviet relations.

These strains were further aggravated by the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and China on January 1,

1979, and the granting of most favored nation status to China, but not the U. S. S. R., in the same

year; by delays in concluding the SALT II agreement, and then its failure to gain ratification in

Washington; by the publication of official evidence alleging the presence of a Soviet brigade in

Cuba; by the NATO decision in December 1979

to deploy Pershing II and ground-launched cruise

missiles in Europe; and, ultimately, by the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan in the same month. These

strains were severely exacerbated by the exile of

Andrei Sakharov to Gorkii in January 1979; by

U.S. charges in April 1980 of a Soviet violation

of the Biological Weapons Convention in an incident in Sverdlovsk 1 year before; and by the

cutback in Jewish emigration starting in January

1979 and continuing at least through the first half

of the 1980s.

Along with other measures intended to show

displeasure with Soviet actions, the United States

severely curtailed cooperation in space with the

U.S.S.R. By 1978, the White House was questioning whether it was in the interest of the United

States to be seen as a cooperative partner in

another spectacular and costly manned mission

with the U. S. S. R., and the Shuttle/Salyut project

was gradually set aside. By the end of the decade, the United States had greatly curtailed cooperation in other areas of space cooperation as well.

371 bid., p. 4,
3 3

The 1980s: Promise for the Future?

The early years of the 1980s were not promising for further U.S.-Soviet space cooperation.

With U.S.-Soviet cooperation already at an exceedingly low level, declaration of martial law in

Poland exacerbated the rift in U.S.-Soviet relations and further reduced initiative for cooperation in space. As part of U.S. sanctions against

the U. S. S. R., the 1972/77 Agreement for cooperation in space was allowed to expire when it

came up for renewal in 1982.

The level of U.S.-Soviet cooperative space activity since the agreement lapsed has decreased

substantially. The joint working groups are no

longer constituted, and no new projects have been

started.

Despite the lapse of formal cooperation, however, several projects begun under the 1972/77

agreement have continued, and there has been a

degree of continuing low-level scientist-to-scientist

cooperative activity in certain areas. These ongoing projects include the following areas:

Space biology and medicine: In 1983, for example, Cosmos 1514, a primate mission, carried four U.S. medical research devices; other

Cosmos biosatellite flights carrying American experiments included Cosmos 782 (1975),

Cosmos 936 (1977), and Cosmos 1129 (1979).

This collaboration had been planned before

the expiration of the 1977 Agreement, and

was allowed to be carried out under agreements between NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. CAT-scan bone data from

Salyut missions are still being supplied to

NASA, also under continuation from the previous agreement. Some exchanges continue

between individual working group members

on an informal basis, especially through attendance at professional conferences and

meetings. 38

Near-Earth Space, Moon, and Planets: Leading Soviet scientists recently presented radar

data from Venera 15 and 16, both currently

in orbit about Venus, at a number of U.S.

-.

‘“See IYorrnan L’, Llartello, Biomedical Rmearch Di\’ision Significant Accomplishments tor FY 1 Q84, 1VAS,4 Technical fklernoran -

(Ium 86692 ( Moffett Field, CA: Biomedical R=earch Division, Ames

Research Center, NASA, February 1Q851, p. 119.

conferences and academic institutions. U.S.

and Soviet scientists also continue to exchange Pioneer-Venus radar altimetry data

and Venera gas chromatographic and mass

spectrometric data. Recent collaborations in

studies of solar wind interactions with Venus, landing sites for a forthcoming Venera

mission, and Venus lightning have involved

exchange and subsequent interpretation of

data. Such exchanges are of considerable interest to U.S. scientists in the absence of published data on these topics.

Venus Halley (VEGA) Mission: The present

missions to the planet Venus and to Halley’s

Comet do not involve official U.S.-Soviet cooperation, but coordination among the various countries calls for U. S .-Soviet interaction on different levels. The Soviet Union,

the European Space Agency (ESA), and Japan are sending spacecraft to the vicinity of

the comet, with the United States playing a

supporting role both in preparing for the mission and in subsequent data analysis. To facilitate this cooperation and coordination, an

informal multilateral body known as the Interagency Consultative Group (IACG)—an

international working group comprised of

representatives from NASA, the European

Space Agency (ESA), Japan’s National Space

Development Agency, and the Soviet Interkosmos—was created in 1981. In addition,

three experiments designed and built in the

United States are flying aboard the two Russian space probes: a comet dust counter, developed by John Simpson, University of Chicago; a Venus nephelometer, by Boris Ragent

of NASA Ames Research Center; and a Comet Neutral Mass Spectrometer, by John

Hsieh, University of Arizona .39 Other U.S.

scientists will be involved in analysis and

processing as data are received on Earth.

“See Colin Norman, “U.S. Instruments Fly on Soviet Spacecraft, ”

Science, CCXXVII, No. 4684 (Jan. 18, 1985), pp. 274-275; and Louis

D, Friedman and Carl Sagan, L~. S. U.S.S.R. Coo~ration in ~~-

ploring the Solar Svstem, an internal report of The Planetary Society (Pasadena, CA: The Planetary Society, 1985 ), At least four other

scientists from the United States are part icipating as theoretician

co-investigators: Bradford Smith, Andrew Nagy, Thomas Cravens,

and Asoka hlendis.
●

Photo credit National Air and Space Museum

View of Comet Halley, taken in May 1910

The present VEGA mission, however, cannot be viewed as an example of official U. S.-

Soviet cooperation in space. The interagency

agreements governing Halley are bilateral, so

that, for example, the United States and ESA

have an agreement, but there is no NASA-Interkosmos agreement. Indeed, at present the

Soviet Union does not officially recognize the

U.S. role in the IACG, and has not recognized U.S. participation in the Venus/Halley’s Comet mission; the U.S. experiments are

being carried on Soviet spacecraft via thirdparty agreements. 40 But in light of the American experiment on board the Soviet spacecraft, and the role of the United States in data

analysis and tracking, some observers believe

that U.S.-Soviet cooperation will expand as

data from the mission are received.

Pathfinder and International Halley Watch:

The IACG has identified a number of cooperative activities that will enhance the overall science return from these missions. The

most significant of these is “Pathfinder,” an

i~The Comet Duster designed by John Simpson, to measure the

density and mass distribution of dust particles in the comet’s tail,

was incorporated in a German package, through the Max Planck

Institute in West Germany. The other two experiments were included

via Hungarian participation.

effort which utilizes the U.S.S.R.'s VEGA

spacecraft to improve the targetting accuracy

of ESA’s Giotto spacecraft during the latter’s

encounter with Halley’s Comet. One week

later NASA will assist in the Pathfinder activity by providing tracking support from its

Deep Space Network antennas in California,

Spain, and Australia. Also, several years ago

U.S. scientists established the International

Halley Watch (IHW), an activity to coordinate ground-based astronomical observations

of Halley’s Comet. The IHW has become

truly international in character, with participation by astronomers all over the world, including the Soviet Union. And some cooperation continues in related areas as well. For

example, United States, ESA, Japanese, and

Soviet scientists are scheduled to be at

NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center when

the U.S. International Cometary Explorer

(ICE) spacecraft flies by the comet GiacobiniZinner in September 1985.4

’

● Space Applications: In the area of space applications, there are at present no ongoing

projects begun under the 1972 agreement, al41’’ First Space Probe to Comet Now Halfway to Target, ” Goddard News, XXXI, No. 3 (March 1985), pp. 1-2 .
35

Figure 2-6.—Trajectories of the Various Halley Spacecraft Relative to a Fixed Sun. Earth Line

SUN

SOURCE European Space Agency
36

●

✎

though some level of discussion has continued in forums outside of the now lapsed

space agreement. In one of the working

groups under the 1972 Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, for example, which is still in force

today—in Working Group VIII, on the Influence of the Environment on Climate and

Environmental Protection—some U.S.-Soviet discussion has taken place since 1982 on

possibilities for expanding cooperative work

in climatic applications of space. The tenth

meeting of the working group, for example,

in January and February 1985, discussed the

possibility of using satellite data for joint

cloud, hurricane, and/or surface radiation research, in either this or some other forum .42

The key joint applications projects currently in operation, however, are multilateral in

nature, such as the COSPAS/SARSAT search

and rescue agreement, As discussed in appendix C, the COSPAS/SARSAT system is the

result of two multilateral agreements signed

separately: the SARSAT agreement among

Canada, France, and the United States; and

the COSPAS/SARSAT agreement among

the United States, Canada, France, and the

U.S.S.R. But the project continues, and in

October 1984 the parties signed a new agreement covering extension of the program from

its experimental phase to initial operations

over the next 5 to 7 years.

Nongovernmental U.S.-Soviet Telecommunications: As a sidelight to U.S.-Soviet intergovernmental or interagency cooperation

in space, recent years have also seen instances

of more indirect “space cooperation” outside

of the auspices of official agreement. These

have taken the form of satellite telecommunications link-ups, both video and audio, between U.S. and Soviet scientists (and in one

case a U.S. Congressman) for discussion of

a variety of current scientific and other

topics.

The first of these recent “space applications” projects, organized by the Esalen So42see u.s,.u.s,s,R, Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of

Environmental Protection: Protocol, Tenth Joint Meeting of Working

Group VIII, on the Influence of Environmental Changes on Climate,

Jan. 24-Feb. 7, 1985 (unpublished typescript),

viet-American Exchange Program, took place

in September 1982 and May 1983. In the second session, U.S. Congressman George

Brown and Soviet Academician E. P. Velikhov discussed the value of satellite telecommunications as a vehicle for scientific and cultural exchange, and proposed that a permanent satellite communication project be

established between the United States and the

U.S.S.R. Two more exchanges occurred later

in 1983, with the second one involving a colloquy between Soviet and American scientists. And in September 1984 a similar satellite teleconference hosted four American and

three Soviet scientists (including Dr. Roald

Sagdeyev, Director of the Institute of Space

Research) in discussions of cooperation in

various fields of science: 1) fusion research,

2) astrophysics, 3) seismology, and 4) biophysics.

Whether politically or scientifically motivated,

however, cooperation in all of these areas has remained on a very low level. By 1984, Soviet officials were stating that space cooperation, even on

the level of scientist-to-scientist exchange, could

not be sustained without the framework of a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Soviet

governments.

The mid-1980s, therefore, have brought increased debate concerning the merits and demerits

of official, bilateral U.S.-Soviet cooperation in

space. These debates have yet to be resolved, and

are discussed in chapter 5. In contrast to 1982,

however, the mid-1980s have seen a sharp rise in

congressional and Administration interest in expanding U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, on a

scale perhaps larger than ever before. In a speech

at the White House in June 1984, President Reagan explicitly called for renewing U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space as well as other areas. Hearings on this topic were held by the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations in September

1984. This was followed by the enactment of Public Law 98-562, which calls for “energetically” pursuing a renewal of the 1972/77 agreement on space

cooperation and “exploring further opportunities

for cooperative East-West ventures in space. ”

Specific projects have also been proposed. The

most prominent of these is the revival of the no-
3 7

tion of a Shuttle /Salyut mission, or a joint simulated space rescue mission as specified in the Public Law. In this project, “marooned” astronauts

and cosmonauts would simulate a rescue between

the U.S. Shuttle and the Soviet Salyut space station. As currently envisioned, the shuttle would

pull up near the Soviet Salyut, and an astronaut

wearing a jetpack would fly from the shuttle to

the Soviet station, perhaps ferrying a cosmonaut

back and forth between the two craft.

On February 6, 1985, Senator Matsunaga introduced S, J. Res. 46 in support of U, S.-Soviet

cooperation on Mars exploration missions .43 Initially cosponsored by Senators Proxmire and Simon, the resolution calls for exploring opportunities for cooperation with the Soviet Union on

specified Mars exploration missions and examining opportunities for joint East-West Mars-related

activities. According to Matsunaga, these missions

could be pursued on a manned or unmanned basis. Since both countries are presently planning

unmanned missions to Mars, for exampIe—the

United States with its scheduled launch of a Mars

orbiting mapper in 1990, and the Soviets with a

planned launch of a mission to the Mars moon

known as Phobos in 1988—he suggests that ways

be sought to coordinate missions to best share

data and information. A manned mission to Mars,

he suggests, could well become “history’s most

stirring undertaking. ”44 Other proposals include

a joint unmanned mission to Venus; joint unmanned exploration of the moon; a joint manned

lunar base; and joint study of asteroids and defense against a possible asteroid collision with

Earth .45

‘3S. J. Res. 46; A joint resolution relating to NASA and cooperative Mars exploration, referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced by Senator Matsunaga with cosponsors Senator-s Gorton, Proxmire, Kassebaum, Pen, Stafford, Simon, Mathias,

Kerry, and Cranston. Initially introduced in Jan. 21, 1985, as S.

J. Res 18 by Senator Matsunaga( with cosponsors Senators Proxmire and Simon. As of June 6, 1985, there were 11 cosponsors,

“See Spark M. Matsunagat “Needed: Cooperation, Not War, in

Space, ” Newsda,v, Apr. 9, 1984.

‘

5 For a discussion of these and other suggestions see:

● Craig Covault, “U.S. Plans Soviet Talks on Joint Manned MisThese proposals, however, remain controversial, and as of this writing, Soviet officials have

not responded to any of these overtures for renewing cooperation on a bilateral basis. Several

prominent Soviet scientists have emphasized their

own desire to expand cooperative projects in

space, and have underlined the difficulties in doing so without an overarching bilateral intergovernmental agreement. News stories from a meeting in Houston refer to possible “hints” that the

Soviets may be interested in expanding space cooperation overall .46 But Soviet officials have also

stated that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

would be a serious obstacle to any major cooperation in space, and that more important military and strategic issues will have to be resolved

before serious discussions on renewing any largescale bilateral cooperation in space can be initiated. Soviet officials so far have not responded

to any U.S. overtures on an official basis.

Thus, the same twin issues which surrounded

U.S.-Soviet space cooperation more than 30 years

ago—competition and cooperation in space, and

the relation of space cooperation to broader political relations—are facing proponents and opponents of space cooperation today. Cooperation,

however limited, has illustrated the scientific benefits which can be gained from pooling efforts of

the two superpowers, particularly in certain areas

of space research and applications. But the past

30 years have also highlighted the difficulties in

reconciling space cooperation with broader political realities, and shaping and implementing

mutually beneficial projects fairly and effectively.
38

I

Chapter 3

Cooperation in the Space

Sciences: The Scientific View

Photo credit: National Air and Space Museum

Halley’s Comet, 1910
Chapter 3

Cooperation in the Space Sciences:

The Scientific View

INTRODUCTION

As the preceding chapter illustrates, U.S.-Soviet

cooperation in space involves a complex, often

conflicting mixture of political, scientific, and military issues. These all have a bearing on whether

one believes that U.S.-Soviet space cooperation

should be pursued and, if so, on the types of projects most appropriate for such activity. These issues and the trade-offs among them are discussed

in chapter 5.

In order to clarify some of the specifically scientific and technical issues surrounding cooperation,

OTA held a workshop in May 1984 on potential

areas for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the space

sciences. Since planetary research and the life

sciences are considered the most successful areas

of past space cooperation, 13 scientists previously

and/or presently involved in cooperative programs with the U.S.S.R. discussed the costs and

benefits of past U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the

planetary and life sciences and potential areas of

such cooperation for the future.

This chapter presents the findings of this workshop in evaluating past and potential U.S.-Soviet

space cooperation from a scientific point of view.

As illustrated in chapter 2, congressional testimony and other forums have provided evaluations of individual U.S.-Soviet cooperative projects in the past, 1

and several areas outside of the

‘See, for example, Joseph G. Whelan, “Soviet Attitude Toward

International Cooperation in Space, ” in Congressional Research

Service, Sot’iet Space Programs: 1976 -IQ80, prepared for the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Washspace sciences have been suggested as potentially

promising for U, S.-Soviet cooperation for the future, These range from the joint simulated space

rescue mission called for in Public Law 98-562 to

joint efforts in near-Earth scientific stations, lunar bases, and trips to asteroids, Mars, or the

moons of Jupiter. In the area of space applications,

COSPAS/SARSAT has been viewed as a successful paradigm which could be used for other types

of activities, such as improvements in meteorological coverage, disaster warning systems, and

educational satellite telecommunications. OTA

discussions with representatives from Third World

countries to the United Nations in May 1984 suggested that U, S.-Soviet cooperative efforts, especially in such areas as developing a worldwide disaster warning system, would have some modicum

of international support.

The purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate

these or other potential cooperative projects, nor

is it to make specific recommendations. Instead,

the workshop was intended to focus on one area—

space science—which has been regarded as a viable area for cooperation in the past, and may well

be among the most valuable for the future. By

focusing on one broad area, the workshop was

designed to highlight the scientific advantages and

disadvantages of cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

which may be applicable to other areas as well.

ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 221 -260:

East-West Cooperation in Outer Space, hearings before the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations, Sept. 13, 1~84 (l~rashington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Otfice, 1Q84).

3 9
4 0

PAST U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN THE SPACE SCIENCES

Two primary areas of scientific cooperation under the 1972/77 agreement2 examined in OTA’S

workshop were in: 1) space biology and medicine,

and 2) near-Earth space, the Moon, and the planets. Both of these areas of cooperation were regarded as having contributed to scientific knowledge in a way U.S. scientists could not have done

alone, although the interchange was not without

problems.

Participants viewed the life sciences area as the

more substantive and successful, especially in

three areas. First was the exchange of flight experimental data regarding human response to

spaceflight conditions. Because of the emphasis

on extended manned spaceflight in the Soviet

space program, of greatest value here were Soviet data on the effects of long-duration flight on

bone loss and cardiovascular deconditioning—

problems that continue to be of significant concern for manned spaceflight. Data exchanges in

this area were particularly valued by U.S. scientists because the Soviets had, in Salyut, the opportunity to conduct an extensive program of repeatable experiments on the response of human

beings to long-term stays in space. The U.S. space

‘The Agreement Between the United States of America and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the

Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, signed

in May 1972 and renewed in May 1977.

program had no manned spaceflight from the

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) in 1975 to the

first Shuttle launch in 1981.

The second area of especially fruitful cooperation was considered to be joint ground-based simulations of spaceflight conditions. For example,

participants cited the long-term bed rest studies

as a useful example of such joint simulations, and

noted that useful joint symposia were held on vestibular problems (1980) and on cardiovascular

changes resulting from spaceflight (1981).

Finally, U.S.-Soviet space cooperation has also

involved a good deal of animal (biological) research. The joint U.S.-Soviet three-volume work

on space biology and medicine,3 in progress for

more than a decade, was published in 1975, and

scientific experiments conducted aboard ASTP

provided interesting biological data. Perhaps most

importantly, the Soviet Cosmos series biosatellites have provided U.S. investigators with a number of opportunities to fly experiments designed

to investigate basic biological processes in space,

and to exchange information on a range of problems in space biology. The first of several such

flight opportunities came in 1975 when the Soviet Union launched Cosmos 782, a “biosatellite”

mission carrying 11 U.S. space biology experiments. Subsequently, in 1977, Cosmos 936 was

launched carrying 7 U.S. biological experiments;

in 1978, Cosmos 1129 carried 14 U.S. biological

experiments; and in 1983, Cosmos 1514 was

launched carrying 4 additional U.S. biological experiments. According to workshop participants,

American experiments have generally been selfcontained and delivered to Moscow by U.S. specialists who provide information on how to care

for the package until the time of launch. U.S. experimenters have not been allowed at launch or

recovery sites, but according to workshop participants, the Soviets have sometimes been quite

helpful in other ways, such as in one case allowing an American experiment to fly overweight.

3Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, edited by Melvin

Calvin (U. S. A.) and Oleg G. Gazenko (U.S.S.R.), a joint U. S.-

U.S.S.R. publication in three volumes (Washington, DC: Scientific

and Technical Information Office, National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, 197s).
The workshop scientists involved in these and ●

other exchanges believe that the overall success

of the collaboration in life sciences can be attributed to several factors: ●

●

●

●

a focus on well-defined and specific scientific

objectives;

an institutional organization that granted officials on both sides the autonomy to decide

on the implementation of plans; and

the development of mutual confidence, knowledge, and goals among working groups over

a long period of cooperation.

the selection of areas of complementary ca- In the planetary category, workshop participability, providing strong motivation to co- pants identified the strongest areas of cooperation

operate; as lunar studies, the exploration of Venus, and

the fact that required instrumentation was solar-terrestrial physics. The exchange of lunar

not generally of a type raising concerns of samples and cartographic data provided both

technology transfer; sides with a range of information unobtainable
by either program on its own. Although the Soviets shared few significant data from their Mars

missions in the early 1970s (possibly due to failures of spacecraft, resulting in little data to be exchanged), the cooperation in the late 1970s and

early 1980s between Soviet scientists in the Venera

program and U.S. investigators in the Pioneer Venus program was substantial; it extended to the

use of Pioneer Venus data to select Venera landing sites and to attempts to intercalibrate instruments. Soviet data from the 1975 Venera landings on Venus were transmitted promptly, providing several surprises regarding the nature of

the Venusian surface. The U.S. Pioneer mission

to Venus in 1978 profited from details about the

Soviet program that would not have been available without the agreement.4

 Transfer and Scientific Cooperation Between the

 and A Review, prepared for U.S.

Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 117-118.

In other areas, data were exchanged on solarwind phenomena and magnetospheric plasma

physics. In the solar-terrestrial area, for example,

exchanges of solar wind data obtained by Soviet

Prognoz and the International Sun-Earth Explorer

(ISEE) spacecraft, developed jointly by the United

States and ESA, have been valuable because of

differing spacecraft design characteristics. U.S.

magnetospheric plasma physics research in space

has benefited from cooperation between the two

countries in controlled thermonuclear research.

Overall, workshop participants noted an evolution toward greater openness in the Soviet planetary program over the past decade.

Finally, workshop participants noted a significant amount of cooperation in astrophysics experiments utilizing detectors mounted on a variety of spacecraft, including Venera and Pioneer

Venus, Prognoz, and ISEE. The objective of these

experiments was the precise location of gammaray bursts by means of simultaneous observations

from widely separated spacecraft, with cooperative analysis of resulting data.
43

Photo credit National Aeronautics and Space Adrninistration

Panoramic views of surface of Mars, from the American Viking spacecraft, and of surface of Venus, from the

Soviet Venera spacecraft
44

The workshop scientists involved in these exchanges believe that cooperation started out slowly but eventually became quite fruitful. Particularly with regard to Venus, the United States

gained at least as much information as it provided.

However, the interaction in the planetary and solar-terrestrial areas was not as consistently smooth

as in the life sciences. There were significant difficulties in acquiring information on mission

plans, and in obtaining accurate and complete scientific data. These problems varied in severity

through time and across different fields. But workshop scientists believed that the situation was improving noticeably, with regard to both openness

and data quality, when the intergovernmental

agreement expired in 1982. At that time, U.S. scientists were for the first time being taken into Soviet laboratories and shown instruments, performance data, etc.
4 5

SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION

Workshop discussions resulted in a number of

general observations and specific recommendations regarding the content and possible mechanisms for future U. S .-Soviet cooperation in space,

One point of consensus was that such cooperation must be scientifically substantive, with clear

scientific objectives, in order to be successful. The

Soviet Union has enough to offer scientifically,

participants argued, that cooperation for purely

political reasons is not, in their view, an adequate

rationale for U.S. participation. Areas of complementarily, they stressed—such as that represented

by American orbital capability and Soviet lander

capability—must be found so that cooperation

will be mutually beneficial on a scientific and technical level.

Participants agreed that the simplest levels of

exchange—joint discussions, cooperative data

analyses, and joint planning of separate missions—would be the most workable. Hosted U.S.

experiments on Soviet spacecraft (as well as the

reverse) were also viewed as practicable, although

it was emphasized that official U, S. concerns

about technology transfer have introduced considerable complexity into some of these interactions. Participants agreed that the introduction~

of hardware into the exchange would invariably

be a complicating factor. The difficulty of working together would reach its highest point, they

said, in the case of full-scale joint missions, where

both hardware and many layers of official participation would be involved.

Based on past successes in planetary, solar-terrestrial, and astrophysics areas of cooperation,

it was suggested that should future cooperation

be pursued, the concept of coordination and

tracking of separate spacecraft be added to joint

mission planning. The advantage of this would

be to maximize scientific return while minimizing problems of hardware exchange and technology transfer. A second recommendation was to

include U.S.-Soviet co-investigators within the

framework of cooperation.

Finally, participants also addressed the question of which new areas of scientific exchange currently hold promise for U. S .-Soviet cooperation.

The workshop itself represented a somewhat different breakdown of disciplines than the categories included under the previous agreement. Most

notably, astrophysics and heliospheric studies

were broken out as separate disciplinary groups.

One promising new area was regarded as the field

of “global habitability, ” which includes a wide

range of integrated Earth environmental observations. The vast size of the Soviet Union makes

that country’s participation in this field especially

important.

In the life sciences area, the field of exobiology

(i.e., nonterrestrial biology and biochemistry) was

viewed as one promising area for future cooperation. Workshop participants believed that studies

in this area might include search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI), or joint collection and

analysis of Antarctic meteorites. Global biology

would be an important aspect of the global habitability studies just described. Another suggestion

was the joint demonstration and testing of advanced life support systems, including those of

the “closed,” or bioregenerative, type.

In solar-terrestrial physics, workshop participants noted a complementarily in American and

Soviet research plans, suggesting that mission coordination and data exchange would yield substantial scientific benefits for both countries. Integration of Soviet data into the online data

processing and exchange program now being developed for the International Solar-Terrestrial

Physics Program, they believed, would be especially valuable.

Astrophysics, the participants also noted, offers

several promising opportunities for complementary and mutually advantageous cooperation. In

the radio area, they believed that joint missions

in very long baseline interferometry (VLBI) could

be undertaken using independent U.S. and Soviet

spacecraft, with collaborative planning for the orbits and frequencies to be used. They suggested

that U,S, Spacelab experiments involving largescale equipment such as X-ray detectors of large

collecting area could be reflown on the Salyut for

long-term exposure. In the first example, two essentially free-standing missions enhance one an-
4 6

Figure 3-1 .—Photographic Coverage of the U.S. Apollo and Soviet Zond Spacecraft

(example of informal information exchange between U.S. and Soviet scientists)

Coverage of Apoflo and Zond Mapping Pictures

Note Base map courtesy of National Geographic Society

SOURCE Merton Dawes

Photo credit National Aeronautics and Space Adrninistration

The Moon

other by proper coordination and planning; in the

second, the scientific potential of expensive experiments is realized more fully by a longer time

for making observations in orbit.

Possibilities for cooperative ventures in the

planetary field, participants underlined, are numerous, including: lunar geochemical orbiters,

continued lunar sample exchange, joint Venus

missions (studies of the atmosphere as well as

long-lived surface missions); coordination of separate Mars missions or even a joint Mars sample

return mission; comet rendezvous and sample return; and outer planet exploration.

A final concern was the relative merit of continuing low-level exchange, as against initiating

a high-visibility “spectacular,” such as a joint Mars

sample return or a joint “Starprobe” mission to

the Sun. Workshop participants stressed that

large-scale missions would have little lasting sig-
4 7

Box 3B.—Nongovernmental Initiatives for U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation

Quite apart from other issues affecting U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, the scientific benefits of

such cooperation have been viewed as positive in many disciplines. Despite the lapsing of the bilateral

U.S.-Soviet agreement in 1982, a number of initiatives have been taken by U.S. scientists and nongovernmental institutions to sustain or expand certain U.S.-Soviet cooperative efforts.

Because of the complementarily of lunar data from the Soviet Zond and U.S. Apollo missions, for

example, one scientist has received lunar data and photographs from Moscow, and is pursuing the possibility of joint U.S.-Soviet analysis to determine the geodetic control network of the Moon—creating

a selenographic coordinates system encircling the Moon, and building a unified photogrammetric grid

based on pictures from Apollo 15, 16, and 17, and Zond 6 and 8 (see figure 3-l). Photographs from

the Soviet Venera 15 and 16—mapping high latitude regions of Venus not well covered by the U.S. Venus Radar Mapper mission—have been shared with American scientists, and U.S. scientists have continued to participate in data analysis and some aspects of planning for Soviet planetary missions; working

largely through third-party agreements, several American scientists are now collaborating on the Soviet

VEGA mission, in data analysis, image processing, and other areas.

On the institutional side, an agreement between California Institute of Technology and Moscow

State University, signed in the late 1970s, has allowed for continued joint theoretical work in gravitational physics, 30 to 40 percent of which is directly space-related (such as the recent design of a gravitational wave detector). The Planetary Society—an independent organization, with Roald Sagdeyev, Director of the Soviet Institute for Space Research, on its Board of Advisors—has been sponsoring

conferences and other forums among Soviet, American, and European space scientists, and is encouraging formal cooperation in areas such as Venus radar data exchange, a joint mission to Mars, and scientist exchanges on forthcoming missions.

The experiences of all of these individuals and groups have varied markedly. Many have noted a

decisive shift in Soviet openness since approximately 1983. Despite the lapsing of the bilateral agreement, they note that the Soviets have been sharing data and photographs with Westerners, and have

tended to be more open in discussing plans for future missions, whether to Venus, the Moon, or Mars.

While recognizing more openness on the Soviet side, other scientists stress the still essentially closed

nature of Soviet scientific and technical programs, and the difficulties Soviet scientists may have working through their own political bureaucracies. For tracking the data of the upcoming VEGA missions,

for example, both Soviet and American scientists organized a world wide network of tracking stations;

but according to scientists involved, Soviet security has precluded Soviet scientists from sharing the exact location of their tracking stations, limiting the utility of the Soviet data for mathematical calculations. Both American and Soviet scientists, however, have stated that they are limited in the extent to

which they can cooperate without a U.S.-Soviet bilateral agreement.

Few Americans truly understand the role of different Soviet people or organizations in establishing

and maintaining cooperation in space with the United States, or the Soviet decisionmaking process and

mechanisms to deal with space-related issues. Few American scientists have been immune to the difficulties of working with Moscow, in terms of difficulties in making arrangements, obtaining visas, corresponding with Soviet counterparts, and dealing with a high level of government secrecy.

But continuing efforts on the part of both American and Soviet scientists to share research and knowledge are testimony to the scientific value which both communities place on such interchange. Both scientific

communities believe that such interchange would be greatly eased with the signing of another bilateral

agreement. But both communities must deal with broader government apparatuses where other calculations have become the subject of debate, and where science is but one concern.
48

nificance if they did not include substantial scientific content. The consensus was that, given the .

difficulties inherent in large-scale joint missions,

it would be wise to begin with simpler exchanges

SOVIET COOPERATIVE PRIORITIES

Shortly after the space science workshop, OTA

discussed the workshop results with leading scientists in the U.S.S.R. These interviews, conducted

in the Soviet Union, indicated a high degree of

commonality with U.S. scientists concerning the

most promising areas for future cooperation in

space science. The Soviet scientists interviewed

by OTA not only listed areas of study, but enumerated projects within fields in order of cooperative appeal. Levels of cooperation, however,

were not specified.5

Briefly, their suggestions were as follows. (Asterisks indicate projects not mentioned by U.S.

scientists at the OTA workshop. )

‘N. Lubin, OTA, interviews in Moscow, June 1984.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Participants in OTA’S workshop underlined

that past interactions with the Soviet Union in

space science have benefited U.S. scientific programs, and believed that such interactions would

again be fruitful, given an appropriate official

framework.

According to workshop participants, Soviet capabilities now present an opportunity for a substantive, broad-based exchange that is equally balanced on both sides. In addition to renewing

previous areas of scientific exchange, future cooperation could include new areas of joint work

(e.g., astrophysics and global studies) that take

advantage of our respective strengths and meet

mutual needs. A dramatic joint mission to Mars

or the Sun could be considered as a long-term

goal, to be reached through successive cooperative steps. Types of cooperation, they noted,

should be flexible. For example, joint coordination of separate missions could be an effective way

to maximize scientific return while minimizing

of the type now underway, perhaps holding the

possibility of such a large-scale mission as a longterm goal.

● Planetary:

—Study of asteroids, * comets, and interplanetary dust

—Study of Mars, including sample return

—Continuation of Venus study

—Study of planetary moons and Saturn’s

rings,

• Life sciences:

—Human and animal responses to spaceflight factors

—Standardization of research methods and

data collection techniques*

—Further ground-based simulation studies.

. Solar-terrestrial physics/astrophysics:

—General interest in cooperating in these

fields.

problems of technology transfer and mission management.

This is not to suggest, participants stressed, that

cooperation should offset the development of our

independent space capabilities. A key point of the

workshop was that the United States must continue to have a strong, active space program of

its own in order to be viable as a cooperative partner—whether with the Soviet Union or others. But

such cooperation, they argued, can in turn greatly

enhance U.S. knowledge and capabilities, and

should therefore be carefully designed to assure

maximum scientific benefit.

The early scientific rationale for cooperation

in space activities, following the spirit of the 1957-

58 International Geophysical Year (IGY), was that

space exploration was too vast and expensive an

area of exploration for any one country to under-
49

Table 3-1 .—Potential U.S./U.S.S.R. Collaborative Activities: From OTA Workshop, May 1984

Sun-Earth (Heliospheric):

●

●

●

●

●

Joint meetings to develop space plasma theory

Joint coordination and data exchange in solar terrestrial

physics—specifically for International Solar-Terrestrial

Program (U.S./ESAlJapan)

Exchange of co-investigators

Hosted instruments (detectors)

Joint Starprobe mission to the Sun (very long range)

Astrophysics:

● Joint planning for:

— Gamma-ray burst studies using Gamma Ray Observatory and other spacecraft

— Very long baseline interferometry (complementary orbits of spacecraft)

● Data exchange regarding contamination of cooled surfaces

(infrared telescopes) and plasma glow problems (ultraviolet

telescopes)

● Co-investigators on Space Telescope, Gamma Ray Observatory, and Advanced Astronomical X-ray Facility

● Mounting of Spacelab experiments on Salyut for long-term

exposure

Planetary:

Venus:

● Joint planning or joint missions as part of a sequence to

investigate the properties of the atmosphere of Venus

Ž Joint planning/missions for “long-lived” Venus surface

studies

Mars:

● Coordinated planning for Mars missions ca. 1990 (Phobos

lander and Mars Geochemical Climatological Orbiter

(MGCO))

• Joint planning/missions for Mars sample analysis or return

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

—

Table 3-2.—Participants in May 8 Workshop

on Possible Future U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation

Bernard Burke, Workshop

Chairman

Department of Physics

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

Donald De Vincenzi

NASA Headquarters

Thomas M. Donahue

Department of

Atmospheric and

Oceanic Sciences

University of Michigan

Paul Gorenstein

Center for Astrophysics

Harvard University

James W. Head

Department of Geological

Sciences

Brown University

Martin Israel

Department of Physics and

McDonnell Center for

the Space Sciences

Washington University at

St. Louis

Charles Kennel

Department of Physics

University of California at

Los Angeles

Eugene Levy

Lunar Planetary Lab

University of Arizona

Harold Masursky

U.S. Geological Survey

David Morrison

University of Hawaii

Tobias Owen

Earth and Space Sciences

Department

State University of New

York at Stony Brook

Fred Scarf

Space and Technology

Group

TRW

Gerald Wasserburg

California Institute of

Technology

Moon:

• Lunar geochemical orbiters

• Continued lunar sample exchange

Comets:

● Soviet contribution to instrument design for U.S. mission

to Comet Kopf (1990) [possibly a hosted experiment]

● Coordinated or joint cometary sample return missions

Outer Planets:

• Joint orbiter/probe missions to Saturn, Uranus, or Neptune

[after the NASA/ESA Cassini mission to Saturn and Titan,

Uranus is the next cooperative opportunity here]

Life Sciences:

Effects of long-duration spaceflight:

Ž Data exchange and joint or hosted flight experiments, especially on problems of (human) bone loss, radiation effects, life support, and countermeasures

● Joint ground-based simulations (e. g., long-duration bed

rest)

● Joint (or hosted) biological experiments aboard Cosmos

biosatellites and/or Spacelab, using various animal and

plant species

Exobiology:

Ž Joint unmanned missions or data exchange to further investigate the question of life on Mars

. Joint meetings and/or data exchange regarding search for

extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI)

• Joint collection and analysis of Antarctic meteorites

Global biology:

. Earth observations data exchange

Life support systems:

. Joint ground-based demonstration and flight testing of Iife

support systems (including bioregenerative type)

take alone. According to the scientists at OTA’S

workshop, 25 years of independent space efforts

have not discredited that rationale.

OTA’S workshop highlighted the belief that cooperation with the U.S.S.R. has been, and can

continue to be, mutually beneficial in many areas

of scientific research. The following two chapters

discuss how the scientific and technical concerns

must be integrated with other issues in making

decisions today—first, as illustrated in another

Western country, and then in the context of issues facing policy makers in the United States.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
Chapter 4

The View From France:

An Alternative Perspective

Display module of Venera type landing craft of VEGA I and II, carrying experiments from France,

the United States, and other countries.
Chapter 4

The View From France:

An Alternative Perspective

U.S,-Soviet cooperation in space does not occur in a vacuum. Other Western countries have

entered into cooperative arrangements with the

U.S.S.R. and have faced serious issues and debates of their own. Although these countries are

grappling with the same basic issues as U.S. planners, their approaches to cooperation with the

U.S.S.R. have been quite different.

Before discussing issues facing U.S. planners,

therefore, this chapter examines the approach of

another country towards cooperation in space

with the U. S. S. R., with an eye towards assessing:

● possible alternative approaches to the policy issues associated with U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space; and

● the potential impact of renewed U. S .-Soviet

cooperation on our allies.

France was selected as a focus of study, since of

all Western countries, it has had the most continuous and most extensive cooperation with the

U.S.S.R. in space science research. Although our

BACKGROUND

French-Soviet cooperation in space dates back

to 1966, with the visit of Charles de Gaulle to

Moscow and the signing on June 30 of an openended ended Inter-governmental Accord on Scientific/

Technical and Economic Cooperation. The inclusion in this agreement of a large segment on

French-Soviet cooperation in “the exploration and

peaceful uses of outer space” provided the framework for formal cooperation in space activities

generally. An umbrella agreement with no specific time frame of its own, the accord provided

an institutional framework within which further

agreements could be negotiated. The agreement

created a Grande Commission, comprised of the

focus is on France, it should be kept in mind that

cooperation with the U.S.S.R. is a relatively controversial issue in other Western countries involved in space programs of their own.

The following discussion is based largely on interviews conducted by OTA in France in July

1984, and subsequently in the United States, with

representatives from a number of scientific, foreign policy, and defense agencies, including the

Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), the

French Ministry of External Relations, the Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale (SGDN),

and the European Space Agency (ESA). * After a

brief discussion of the background of French-Soviet cooperation in space, this chapter examines

the policy issues associated with potential future

cooperative projects, how the French approach

these issues, and the implications this may hold

for U.S. policy.

‘Unfootnoted quotations have been taken from these interviews.

President of CNES, I the President of the Advisory Board to the U.S.S.R.'s Interkosmos, and

working groups in four key areas of space reI Created in 1962, CNES is charged with five pri mar}’ missions.

As described by CNES officials, these are: 1 ) to assist French gow

ernmental services in the establishment of French space pollcy; 2)

to take the requisite actions to implement this policy and manage

the associated programs: 3) to create the appropriate facilities and

develop the necessary know-how: 4) to orient the French space industry in order to make use, especially on foreign markets, of the

experience and competence acquired and the resources set up over

a period of 20 years; and .s) to develop international cooperation

on both bilateral and multilateral bases, and to promote scientific

and commercial utilization of space technology. CNES is comprised

of four main centers: the Paris head office: the Evry Center concerned with launch vehicles: the Toulouse Space Center: and the

Guiana Space Center in Kourou, French Guiana. Today, CNES

boasts a staff of over 2,OOO people, located in four centers, more

than half of whom are engineers.

5 3
54

search: scientific studies of space; spatial and aeronomic meteorology; space medicine and biology;

and space telecommunications. Annual meetings

of the commission were to provide a forum for

assessing ongoing programs and initiating new

ones. z By the early 1980s, one-third of the more

than 2,000 space researchers and technicians in

France was working in some way with French-Soviet cooperation in space.

Today space research has grown to a considerable level in France, and cooperation with the

U.S.S.R. has grown commensurately, As the main

agency in France responsible for national space

policy and programs, CNES is in charge of developing international cooperation on both bilateral and multilateral bases. As table 4-1 illustrates, in 1984 CNES’S budget was almost $600

million (4, 763 million francs), of which almost

half was designated for bilateral and multilateral

cooperation. While most of the funds budgeted

for such cooperation are directed towards ESA,

approximately 51 million francs each year, or

about 10 percent of the bilateral budget, is budgeted for cooperation with the U.S.S.R. By comparison, about 83 million francs per year are

budgeted for cooperation with the United States.

If cooperation with the U.S.S.R. is significant,

however, it is concentrated in a relatively small

number of areas. Table 4-2 shows the breakdown

of funding for French bilateral cooperative projects by country and category in 1984. The level

of French-Soviet cooperation in space is not far

below that of French-U. S. cooperation. But while

French cooperation with the United States is more

diffuse—spread out in Earth observation data collection, scientific experiments, and manned flights–

French-Soviet cooperation is largely concentrated

in the area of scientific experiments. Indeed, cooperative efforts with the U.S.S.R. account for over

60 percent of the total budget allocated for French

cooperative space science experiments generally.

‘The presidents of CNES and Interkosmos meet annually, alternately in France and the U. S. S. R., to examine the progress of FrenchSoviet cooperation in space and to decide on new projects for the

following year. The results of such work are presented by the two

presidents to the Grande Commission which oversees French-Soviet

scientific ~technical and economic cooperation.

Forms of cooperation between France and the

U.S.S.R. have ranged from exchange of data and

information to a joint manned flight in 1982. The

lion’s share of cooperation has fallen in data exchange and Soviet hosting of French experiments.

But the first manned space flight is also viewed as

a valuable landmark in French-Soviet cooperation.

While the next flight of a French spationaute on a

foreign spacecraft was on the U.S. Shuttle, when

Patrick Baudry joined U.S. astronauts in June 1985,

French planners envision another French-Soviet

manned space flight if feasible.

Table 4-3 outlines the main scientific programs

being undertaken by CNES as of late 1984. According to CNES, projects with the U.S.S.R. are now

emphasizing four areas:

● astronomy;

. solar system exploration, including:

—plasma physics, mainly in the ionosphere

and the magnetosphere; and

—planetary exploration, primarily of Venus

and the Comets;

. materials processing in space; and

● life sciences.

While most of these projects are listed in appendix

A, some of the major research areas and projects

are as follows.

Astronomy

Space observatories provide French scientists

with the means to pursue research in modern astronomy and astrophysics from a point beyond

the interference of the Earth’s atmosphere. Along

with ESA, the U.S.S.R. is one of France’s chief

partners in these endeavors.

One of the key projects in cooperation with the

U.S.S.R. is the gamma-ray astronomy project Sigma. The Sigma program (Systeme d’imagerie

gamma a masque aleatoire), representing a new

French-Soviet Gamma Ray and X-ray Space Observatory, calls for the joint French-Soviet manufacturing and placing into orbit of an astronomy

satellite which will study the universe with X-ray

and gamma-ray telescopes. The French Sigma telescope will utilize a Soviet platform, Astron II,

which will be a modified version of the Venera
Table 4-1 .— Budget of

(State subsidies

By program category

Amount Percent Percent

1984 1984 1983

—

the French Space Agency: Breakdown of Funding

and Centre’s own resources)a (in million francs)

European prograrr 1, 901. 200 39.91 36.12 Launch vehicles

Bllater,il programs 540.450 11.35 122 6 Satellites

National programs 984.130 20.66 24.32 SPACE LAB

Proqram support 641.050 13.46 11.12 Balloons

General operating costs 69647 5 14.62 16.18 Scientific experiments

Appllcations systems

and experlments

R&D

Program support

Total 4,763,305 1000 0 100.00 —

dSums taxes exclude d

B Y type of system

Amount Percent Percent

I 1984 1984 1983

847.900

1,654.930

90.300

18.200

1,32 500

66.100

132.500

1,820.875

4,763.305

1.39 1 1.77

2 7 8 3 5 0

382 3 37 00

100.00 100.00

Sciences

Applications

Telecommunications

Earth observation and

data collection

Launch facilities

R&D

Program support
56

Table 4-’2.— Breakdown of Funding for Bilateral Cooperative Projects

Table 4-3.— French Space Program: Main

Scientific Programs

Astronomy:

Hipparcos (Astrometrical Satellite)– ESA

ISO (IR Astronomical Observatory )-ESA

Space Telescope–U.S.A. /ESA

French Astronomy Program on SPACELAB 1 with:

• Telescope UV Fause — Program in cooperation with

Us.

. Very Wide Field Camera— ESA

Sigma (Gamma Ray Astronomy Project) in cooperation

with Soviet Union

A program of balloon-borne equipment in IR and UV

astronomy

Planetary exploration:

VEGA—Mission to Venus which will also fly by Halley’s

Comet in cooperation with the Soviet Union

Giotto– European mission to Halley’s Comet– ESA

Plasma physics:

Arcad launched in September 1981 in cooperation with

the Soviet Union

Interball —a new project in cooperation with the Soviet

Union

Oceanography—meteorology:

Poseidon (Oceanographic satellite using an altimeter for

the study of the general circulation of the ocean) either

on SPOT 3 or in cooperation on TOPEX (U. S. A.)

Design and development of a passive microwave

radiometer to be placed on board the European ERS-1

Earth Resources Satellite.

SOURCE OTA briefing at CNES, July 1984

type adapted for astronomy.3 Scheduled to be

launched at the end of 1987, the satellite will be

equipped with a French-made gamma telescope,

a Soviet-developed X-ray telescope package to be

mounted on the side of the gamma-ray telescope

3

The satellite will be placed in a very elliptical orbit of 2,000 km

perigee and 200,000 km apogee, inclined between 51” and 60”, depending on whether the satellite is launched from Baikonur or Kapustin-Yar. See Pierre Langereux, “Pro jet franco-sovietique de satellite d’astronomic SIGMA, ” Espace, Oct. 12, 1983; and “French,

Soviets Define Observation Platform, ” Aviation Week and Space

Technology, Feb. 20, 1984, p. 55.

Major

Scientlflc

programs

(in million francs)

Export

actions

—

—

—

320 0

3200

Manne d

flights

10.000

2.700

6.400

3.100—

—

—

22.200

Total

83.200

50.550

15.300

361.500

1.100

3.200

25600

540.450

tube, and X-ray and gamma-ray burst detectors.

The Sigma mission will permit gamma-ray emitting objects to be located with a far greater degree of precision (in the range of about a 2 minute arc) than is presently attainable. Sigma was

originally conceived as a French project; the

French then proposed joint conduct with the

U.S.S.R.

The Sigma program is an outgrowth of several

cooperative efforts in astronomy in the past. For

example Signe 3, a French Earth satellite launched

by a Soviet rocket on June 17, 1977, was accorded

a great deal of acclaim for its mission to detect

and locate the sources of “gamma flashes, ” a type

of cosmic radiation seldom studied. 4 A joint

French-Soviet launch of the astronomy satellite

Gamma 1 is scheduled for 1986 to carry three

scientific experiments: a large Gamma telescope,

Gamma 1; an X-ray telescope, Spectre II; and a

smaller Gamma telescope. Gamma 1 is a highenergy gamma radiation study designed to determine the structure of the galaxy and the origin

and distribution of gamma sources. Mounted on

the same satellite as Gamma 1, Spectre II will examine galactic and extra galactic X-ray and gamma sources, as well as “burster” sources in these

wavelengths. The study of gamma ray bursts is

a key area of cooperation between France and the

U. S. S. R., and the collaborative program in this

area is recognized worldwide as one of the leading ongoing initiatives in high-energy astrophysics.

4Joseph G. Whelan, “Soviet Attitude Toward International Cooperation in Space, “ in Congressional Research Service, Soviet Space

Programs; 1976-80, prepared for the Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science and Transportation, CXX, No. 8Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 286.
57

Photo credit Charles P Vick

Oreol 3 as displayed at French Pavillion, Paris Air

Show, 1985, with Salyut Solar Panel and gravity

gradient boom

In the area of optical astronomy, the U.F.T.

project in ultraviolet astronomy is another key

French-Soviet joint effort. The project consists of

a French ultraviolet spectrometer placed in the focal plane of a Soviet telescope to study the ultraviolet spectrum of the stars. The U.F.T. was

launched on a Soviet craft on March 24, 1983,

to examine the stellar atmospheres in ultraviolet

(wavelengths ranging from 1200 to 2500-A). It

was designed for coordinated ground-based measurements of the interstellar medium to be made

through an 80 cm, telescope located at an observatory in the Soviet Crimea, and from a high-resolution spectrometer in the Laboratoire d’Astronomic

Spatiale (L. A. S., or space astronomy laboratory)

in Marseille, France.

Solar Terrestrial Physics

Solar terrestrial physics is an important area of

cooperation between France and the U.S.S.R. Particular areas of emphasis are the terrestrial magnetosphere and ionosphere and the interplanetary

environment. A key joint effort in this area was

the launching on September 21, 1981, of the

French Arcad 3 satellite by a Soviet launch vehicle. The purpose of this project was to study the

physical parameters (especially wave characteristics) of the lower magnetosphere at high latitudes. The project was an outgrowth of the

launchings of Oreol 1 and Oreol 2 in 1971 and

1973, which carried scientific equipment to explore physical phenomena in the Earth’s upper atmosphere. At present, the operational phase of

Arcad 3 is continuing, using the French Tromsoe

ground station for receipt of data. Results of Arcad 3 are scheduled to be discussed at an international symposium to be held in Toulouse, France,

in May 1986.

Araks and lnterball are two other significant

joint French-Soviet efforts in the area of solar terrestrial physics. In the Araks project a French

rocket placed a Soviet electron accelerator into

orbit to study the nature of the aurora borealis,

or Polar lights, by injecting electrons into the Polar region of the ionosphere. ]nterball is a new

project in French-Soviet cooperation to study the

solar wind, and the terrestrial magnetosphere-ionosphere relationship.

Life Sciences and Materials

Processing

The first French-Soviet manned fright of a

French spationaute, Jean-Loup Chretien, on a Soviet spacecraft from June 24-July 2, 1982, was

hailed as a great step forward in French research

in the fields of the life sciences, and especially in

the area of human physiology. Four key experiments were conducted: Echographic, Posture,

Cytos 2, and Biobloc 3. Echographic experiments

provided information on blood circulation and

blood volume distribution, as well as a visual representation of heart pumping characteristics. Information of this type is necessary for understand-
58

ing the way liquid is pumped through the body

in a weightless environment. The Posture experiment involved the use of French-designed neurophysiological measurement equipment to collect data relating to the influence of gravity on

movements and equilibrium. Spationaute JeanLoup Chretien participated actively in all of these

experiments.

In addition to furthering research in the life

sciences, the joint flight also provided valuable

information for materials processing in space. Materials processing is viewed as an important area

for future development in France, a key part of

what the French see as the future economic value

of space applications for a broad-based, hightechnology economy. One of the key tasks of the

Chretien mission was to produce certain metal alloys unobtainable on Earth. This was a followup to other experiments, such as the Kristall experiment, which had been conducted with French

hardware by Soviet cosmonauts aboard the Salyut

6 space station.

Analysis of the results of experiments conducted

in both areas during the joint manned flight have

continued well into 1985. In addition, cooperative experiments in the material and life sciences

continue within the framework of later flights

aboard Soviet spacecraft. In addition to the experiments conducted during Chretien’s flight, for

example, CNES has also been cooperating in biological research with the U.S.S.R. both on CosPhoIo credlt Centre Nationale d'Etudes Spatiales

Salyut 7: Echography experiment

rnos satellites and Salyut 7, examining such questions as the influence of cosmic rays on biological

organisms, and the effect of microgravity on cell

growth. One program, Biocosmos, has been

studying the behavior of a primate under weightless conditions aboard a Soviet biosatellite. Using

French-supplied equipment, Soviet cosmonauts on

Salyut 7 have continued to conduct experiments

begun by French principal investigators in conjunction with Chretien’s flight.

Overtures have been made to conduct another

joint manned flight in the near future. One year

after Chretien’s flight, French officials are quoted

as having stated: “We still are in favour of this

idea, especially for long duration flight which will

permit us to carry out further biomedical research. ”5

Following the meeting of the Grande Commission

in Samarkand, U.S.S.R,, in October 1984,

Frederic d’Allest, Director General of CNES, was

quoted as stating “the French delegation reaffirmed its great interest in conducting a long duration flight of a French spationaute , . . on board

a Soviet orbital station.”~ He stated that the flight

was envisioned to last about 4 weeks, to take place

around 1987-88. And OTA interviews with French

‘Jean-Paul Cr(~i.ze, “Un satcllit( d astronomic” et kpro]ets ~mbitieux ver> I’enus et la Lune: L’e>paw tr.]nco-so~ietique,”” J!.e }:i+iro,

Ckt 5, 1Q83,

“See P]erre I.dngcreuk, Id Franc{’ Intercw’>e par un vO1 dc’ longue

dur~,e a~,ec 1’LJ 1-/ S. S , .4ir et ~-()~rn()s N,) 1018 (0< t. 13, 1484) ,

p 55 .

French “spationaute, ” Jean Loup Chretien on board

Salyut 7
59

officials in July and December 1984 suggest that

this desire has not changed.

As of late 1984, however, while a number of

projects have been adopted for joint French-Soviet

cooperation in the near future, there has not been

a commitment from the U.S.S.R. to the prospect

of hosting another spationaute on a Soviet flight.

This suggests that an agreement for another joint

manned flight may be less a French decision than

one determined in Moscow.

Planetary Exploration

Undoubtedly one of the largest cooperative

ventures in planetary exploration between France

and the U.S.S.R. is the VEGA, or Venus-Halley

Mission. This project represents a multilateral

venture with extensive French-Soviet cooperation.

The mission involves two Venus landers and atmospheric balloons, as well as a probe toward

Halley’s Comet. Launched from the U.S.S.R. in

December 1984, the mission rendezvoused with

Venus in June 1985, and is scheduled to flyby Halley’s comet in 1986. The study of Venus involves

bilateral cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and

France, while the mission to Halley’s Comet is an

international program in which Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and West Germany are also officially participating. Experiments being flown on the

balloons, landers, and the Halley probe fall

mainly in the following areas:

●

●

●

●

●

●

study of the Venus atmosphere (pressure,

speed, temperature, chemical and isotopic

composition, study of the constituents);

study of the chemical and isotopic composition of Venus soil;

study of the nucleus and environment of Halley’s Comet (physical characteristics, temperature of the molecules, and gas composition);

observation of solar wind plasma waves;

study of the interplanetary environment and

the intensity of the Lyman emission of hydrogen and deuterium from comets, with the

help of an absorption cell multiphotometer;

and

examination /determination of the composition of the gas which comprises the coma and

the tail of the comet.

Several French experiments will also be carried

out by the Giotto probe, to be launched by the

European Space Agency to rendezvous with Halley’s Comet in 1986.

In addition to VEGA, the meeting of the Grande

Commission in October 1984 highlighted some

potential future areas of French-Soviet cooperation in planetary research. According to one report, the Commission discussed a potential new

mission of an interplanetary probe, Venera 91,

envisioned to be launched in 1991 to study the

planet Venus and asteroids. ’ According to another, the Soviet Union has proposed to France to

participate in its “Planet F“ project to launch a

Soviet probe to Mars and the Mars moon Phobos

in 1988.8

Space Applications

In the area of space applications, a key cooperative effort is illustrated by Sargos, the French

contribution to the France-American-Canadian

SARSAT system which works in conjunction with

the Soviet COSPAS system for the search and rescue of ships and aircraft in distress. France is presently supplying three Sargos detector units to

SARSAT for the reception of 406 MHz signals,

to be placed onboard NOAA satellites. As one

of the SARSAT member parties, France participated in the joint demonstration phase, just concluded, which involved an extended checkout of

the interoperability of SARSAT with the Soviet

COSPAS system. France is also party to the new

agreements which continue the system through

1990.

Evaluation of French= Soviet Projects

The French tend to stress the relative strong

points of previous space cooperation with the

U.S.S.R, and generally support continued cooperative efforts. French scientists appear to have

run up against less in the way of harassment, visa

problems, time delays, or other logistical problems which have frequently confronted their Amer-

‘Ibid,

‘See Pierre Langereux and Serge Berg, “Planet F, pro jet trancm

sovietique de survol de Mars et Phobos, ” Air et Cosmos, NO. 1019

(Oct. 20, 1984), p. 80.
60

Figure 4-1 .—Soviet Proton

● VENERA

—

Launch Vehicle

● ZOND

D-l- e

4, 15 M

● BASE VIEW OF

FIRST STAGk

(CONCEPT ONLY)

ENGINE

SOURCE Charles P Vick, 1982-85
ican counterparts. Access to data and information also appears to have been better than for

other Western countries. And French planners believe that the informal contact established between

the two scientific communities is also beneficial

for the longer term.

Nonetheless, French cooperation with the

U.S.S.R. has not escaped other problems which

challenge other Western countries cooperating

with the U. S. S. R., and substantial difficulties remain in implementing cooperative agreements.

Chief among these are the many barriers in gaining access to people and information. The French

stress, however, that these barriers are not only

an outgrowth of Soviet politics and the closed nature of Soviet society, but are also a function of

bureaucratic problems endemic to the Soviet system. For example, whereas scientists in the West

tend to see all aspects of a scientific problem, they

underscore that Soviet scientists, by virtue of a

more compartmentalized scientific establishment,

are often confined to a more limited view. The

French therefore do not see access problems as primarily political issues, and feel it is worth the effort to keep cooperation alive with hopes that the

U.S.S.R. will become increasingly easier to work

with.

KEY ISSUES AND POLICY APPROACHES

Because of a somewhat different approach towards cooperation with the U. S. S. R., the issues

concerning France-Soviet space cooperation today

are quite different from those facing U.S. planners. Whereas in response to the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan and the declaration of martial law

in Poland U.S. planners allowed space cooperation with the U.S.S.R. to lapse, French planners

decided that such cooperation should be sustained. Whereas the key issue in the United States

today, therefore, is whether space cooperation

should be reestablished, the key issue in France

has concerned the degree to which space cooperation with the U.S. S. R. should be maintained.

Perhaps because of this, the issue of France-Soviet

space cooperation has not been as much a focus

of public debate in France as it has been in the

United States.

This is not to suggest that France-Soviet cooperation in space has been without controversy.

Some joint projects have been the target of opposition in the past, and others are the focus of

French internal debate today. Probably the greatest controversy, for example, surrounded the

flight of Jean-Loup Chretien in 1982, when a large

segment of the French scientific community opposed the flight of a French spationaute on a Soviet spacecraft at the same time that the Soviets

were flagrantly violating human rights at home

and abroad. As illustrated above, French scientists or other communities may well oppose

another potential joint flight in the future. And

at present, there is also evidence that some scientists may be declining to travel to the U. S. S. R.,

and may be withholding from Soviet scientists invitations to their own laboratories.

Opposition to cooperation has generally stemmed

from humanitarian concerns, i.e., expressing support for Sakharov, opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. Opponents of joint

manned missions, for example, have argued that

the implicit acquiescence of French scientists to

Soviet violations of scientific integrity and human

rights at home, and the political profits which the

U.S.S.R. inevitably accrues on the international

stage more than offset any possible benefits of

such projects. Others contend, however, that the

scientific and economic benefits of such missions

far outweigh the political costs, and that France

should pursue as many joint manned missions as

possible, regardless of whom the partner may be,

Europeans in general, these proponents argue, are

looking forward to several joint manned missions

before the end of the century, not only with the

U. S. S. R., but with the United States and potentially with the European space station Columbus.

The French are also looking forward to their own

manned vehicle called Hermes, a small space plane

which could be used in association with satellite

deployment or space station maintenance and

operation. The more exposure French scientists

can get to manned space flights and training, these
62

proponents argue, the more they can apply that

to the development of their own programs.

Despite these working level debates, however,

a fairly consistent policy approach has been pursued in France regarding interaction with the

U.S.S.R. in space activities in particular, and in

scientific and technical cooperation generally. Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. was begun essentially

with political aims paramount. French planners

viewed scientific and technical cooperation generally, and space cooperation in particular, as a

means of broadening relations with the U.S.S.R.

and offsetting political tensions in other areas.

As the political climate has become less opportune for promoting such cooperative efforts, however, and as the scientific requirements of the

French space program have grown, scientific and

economic aspects have been increasingly emphasized. Today, the scientific and economic benefits of cooperation in space are stressed as the central reason for continued cooperation, although

French planners agree that it is impossible to ignore the political background against which cooperation occurs.

Current French policy decisions, therefore, represent a mixture of political, scientific, and economic aims, which have varied in relative importance, but together have created a mainly stable

and consistent policy approach. Today, French

planners are attempting to maintain the political

will for cooperation in spite of political differences, but are trying to keep cooperation itself on

a scientific level.

Scientific and Economic Issues

In light of the existing structure and present level of funding of the French space program, French

planners assert that their space research requires

cooperation with other countries, and that the

U.S.S.R. is a good partner for answering those

needs. The force of this argument was intensified

with the cutbacks in NASA’s budget in the early

1980s and the consequent curtailing of NASA’s

participation in some international projects. The

French—interpreting the cutback in U.S. participation in the International Solar Polar Mission

(ISPM)’ in political rather than budgetar y

terms—reasserted their view of the U.S.S.R. as

a viable partner for many areas of space cooperation. Regarding a possible joint France-Soviet

mission to }’enus, for example, one French scientist stated:

This has been the only possibility for French

scientists to go into the planetary programs. There

are some individuals like me who have had instruments on U.S. spacecraft but we’d like to have

a larger constituency and the only way for our

scientists to go to the planets is through this cooperation with the Soviets. 10

Although Chretien’s flight was politically controversial, it was viewed as an important step for

the French space science program: France did not

have its own craft for sending a man into space,

so required a joint mission with another country

which did. The mission was considered beneficial

for developing the life sciences in France, and provided new data for further space research unavailable elsewhere.

From cooperation with the U.S.S.R. today,

France continues to obtain payload opportunities

that it might not otherwise be able to acquire. And

even though, as mentioned above, French scientists have sometimes opposed cooperation with

the U.S.S.R. on humanitarian grounds, they have

generally favored cooperative efforts such as the

present mission to Halley’s comet, where French

participation has been on a low level and the potential scientific benefits are large.

The economic benefits of cooperation with the

U.S.S.R. have also been substantial. Being able

to place experiments on another country’s spacecraft, and sharing costs in joint ventures have reduced French expenditures considerably. According to Le Figaro (Oct. 5, 1983), for example, the

Sigma project, if conducted by France alone,

would have cost the French at least 400 million

French francs, or about $5o million. In cooperation with the Soviets, who will be mainly respon9

See Robert Reinhold, “U.S. Dismays Allies by Slashing Funds

for Joint Science Projects, ” The New York Times, May 10, 1981, p. 1.

IOThomas O’Toole, “France and Soviets Will Aim Wind Balloons

at Venus, ” Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1978, p. A 31,
63

Photo credit Charles P Vick. Paris Air Show. 1985

French Atmospheric Balloon carried on Soviet VenusHalley Mission

sible for the launching operations, it is now expected to cost France only about 80 million French

francs, or about $10 million for the first 5 years

until 1987 or 1988 when the satellite is projected

to be placed into orbit.

Foreign Policy Issues

Although France today emphasizes scientific

and economic benefits as the basis for cooperation with the U. S. S. R., French-Soviet cooperation in space has consistently been buttressed by

the foreign policy community. Decisions have

consistently been made at the higher political

levels for cooperation to continue, emphasizing

the conviction that such cooperation can be useful in attaining certain foreign policy goals as well

as scientific ones, and that little would be gained

from curbing or terminating it.

A key goal of French-Soviet cooperation in space,

for example, concerns the position of France on

the international stage., i.e., maintaining and reinforcing French independence. 11

’ As the French

space program grows and becomes more sophisticated, cooperation with both superpowers allows France to avoid the dependency which French

planners fear could result from relying on just one

or the other for payload capabilities and expertise, By maintaining a balance between the U.S.S.R.

and the United States, or by playing one superpower off against the other, the French believe

that they occupy a better bargaining position in

determining the shape of future cooperative

ventures.

French planners also view France-Soviet cooperation in space as important in working towards

a number of more elusive objectives, such as reducing tensions worldwide, and keeping communication open with the U.S. S. R. As in other areas

of France-Soviet relations, they have found it difficult to evaluate just how effective space cooperation may be in achieving these ends. But even

if cooperation does not minimize tensions, they

argue, the alternative—curtailing or terminating

dialog–would isolate the U.S.S.R. from the world

community, force it to expand its own indigenous

capabilities, and ultimately increase tensions

worldwide. In the French view, therefore, cooperation is a means of keeping channels of communication open, perhaps of most importance

when the overall political climate is so dismal.

Another French objective of cooperation in

space is the opportunity to learn more about the

U.S.S.R. A key example is the intimate view the

two French spationautes, Jean-Loup Chretien and

Patrick Baudry, believe they acquired of both the

Soviet space program and of Soviet society while

training with Soviet cosmonauts in preparation

for the joint manned mission in 1982.

If cooperation in space is indeed beneficial in

these ways, then in a certain sense cooperation

I I see for ~xamp]e testimony ot Hubert Curieu, I>rmident. CNTES,

[n hearings betore the House Science and Technology Comm]ttee,

international Space Activities, May lb, 17, 18, 1978 [No. 74] (Washington, DC L], S, Government Printing Office, 1Q79), pp. 2-3:

It I. a pol]cy which strltes to en~ure our ]ndqcncience to tht, full

exttmt nec e+sar~ and (() estahl l~h t lt’~ ()! ctfec t IV(’ c (l(~perat Ion wlt h

~he space power~ tu,peLIJll Y tht, Llnltd States
64

with the U.S.S.R. is also viewed as a means of

simply sustaining the mechanisms for cooperation

itself. Bureaucratic and political constraints have

impeded all areas of France-Soviet cooperation—

selecting areas for cooperation, negotiating agreements, and implementing them efficiently and effectively. Because it was so difficult for France and

the U.S.S.R. to reach the present level of cooperation, French planners assert that it would be

counterproductive to destroy the fruits of these

efforts—especially if the French were to want to

rebuild to this level sometime in the future when

the climate may be more opportune. Some degree

of consistency is regarded as important, if only

to ensure that the window for cooperative activities remains open.

“Every country, ” one French planner stated,

“must find areas for cooperation. ” The French,

he added, “through prudent and determined effort” have decided on space as an area of cooperation which can be kept insulated from the dangers of technology transfer (see below), but which

can offer mutual benefit to the countries involved.

Despite this overarching commitment to continuing cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in space

science research, concern over two issues was expressed by some in the French foreign policy community. One of these issues concerns the degree

to which such cooperation may affect French relations with other Western countries. Although

the French believe that France-Soviet cooperation

so far has not affected relations with other countries in any lasting way, there was some concern

expressed that it could affect relations in the future, especially with the United States. This view

was buttressed by the belief expressed by several

French planners that NASA’s curtailed participation in the International Solar Polar Mission

(ISPM) was motivated more by political than

budgetary concerns. But French planners hope

that continued cooperation with the U.S.S.R. will

not affect their relations with the United States—

and argue that it should not.

A second issue concerns the degree to which

France-Soviet cooperation in space should be

“linked” to other foreign policy considerations,

either to affect or to protest Soviet behavior which

they may consider politically or morally egregious. French planners discussed the moral attractiveness of using cooperation as a lever to effect

change in Soviet society, or to send a moral message to protest Soviet actions which might have

some bearing on Soviet behavior in the future.

But scientific and technical cooperation, they believe, can only have an impact if the cooperative

project is something which the U.S.S.R. perceives

as important to its own interests, and the majority

of French programs in space cooperation do not

fall into this category. According to one French

official, some scientific and technical cooperative

programs with the U. S. S. R., such as in nuclear

physics, were curtailed or stopped in response to

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the exile

of Andrei Sakharov, and other potential future

areas of cooperation have been “put on the back

burner. ” But whether the intent is to affect Soviet behavior or to protest, they argue that curtailment or termination of cooperative projects

in space would have little impact on Soviet policy at large while having a large negative impact

on the French space program. They therefore believe that space cooperation should not be held

hostage to Soviet actions in other areas, and that

any displeasure with Soviet actions should be

shown in other ways.

Indeed, some planners asserted that cooperation may even make it easier for France to protest Soviet actions, by providing a mechanism

through which displeasure can be conveyed. Just

as French President Mitterrand, when visiting

Moscow in the spring of 1984, was provided more
6 5

of an opportunity than many other Western leaders for voicing his concern over the persecution

of Andrei Sakharov, some French scientists argue that by being involved in cooperative projects,

they may find it easier to discuss questions of political and humanitarian concern than if there were

no interchange at all. There is no evidence, however, to indicate whether this approach may have

been any more successful in affecting Soviet behavior than that of others in the West who terminated cooperative ventures.

In short, although the link between scientific

cooperation and political relations with the

U.S.S.R. cannot be ignored, French planners are

attempting to “de-link” the two by downplaying

the use of science for political ends, While no area

of cooperation with the U.S.S.R. can be totally

de-politicized, French planners argue that it is important to seek an area for cooperation where political considerations are reduced as much as possible, but where mutual scientific benefit can be

substantial.

Military Technology Issues

In light of the overall policy to pursue substantive cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in space research, questions of the potential transfer of militarily sensitive technology loom large. While

France enjoys many scientific, economic, and political benefits from cooperation, the French agree

that the Soviets are vigorously pursuing an aggressive campaign to gain access to Western technology and know-how, and that they are undoubtedly acquiring technical capabilities from

space cooperation with France beyond those

which they already possess. This was highlighted

by the expulsion of 47 Soviet technological spies

in 1983, and by the 1985 “leak” by French intelligence services of secret Soviet documents which

illustrate the breadth and scope of Soviet industrial espionage activities in the West, especially

in the aeronautic sector. 12 In interviews with

OTA, French planners stated that the Soviets may

gain some technical know-how via space coopI ZThese \\, ere pub] ished in part in two editions of the French newspaper Le Monde, See Edwy Plenel and Christian Batifoulier, “Un

document secret sovietique, ” Le Mond~, Mar. 30, 1985, p, 8; and

Edwy Plenel, “L’ Espionage sovi~tique a l’ouest: Les mysteres de la

VPK, ” Le ,tlonde, Apr. 2, 1985, p. 7.

eration —e. g., from French data processing—and

are also able to use French instrumentation that

they otherwise might not have had.

The key question for French poIicymakers, however, is the actual value of these new capabilities

to the U. S. S. R., and it is here where they differ

markedly from present U.S. policy. Defining “militarily sensitive” technologies as only those with

direct military application—as opposed to more

extensive U.S. definitions* —they argue that stringent controls are in place to avoid their transfer

into Soviet hands, As in the United States, a list

of sensitive technologies—the Missile Technology

Control List—governs technology exports from

France, and an inter-ministerial group of specialists

is assigned to examine every new project proposal—in the space field as well as in others—to ensure that no violations of the list occur. With input from the Secretariat General de la Defense

Nationale (SGDN) and various ministries, this interministerial committee, the Commission 1nterministeriel d’Examen des Exportations du Mate'

riels de Guerre (CIEEMG), reviews technology

transfer possibilities in space-related areas and is

charged with the final approval of proposed projects. Thus, each project proposal in France is evaluated for its technology transfer potential, and

depending on the ultimate assessment, access to

people, techniques, and/or equipment may be

curtailed.

Once a project has been accepted, moreover,

French planners argue that still other systems of

verification remain in place. According to officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “certain

procedures guarantee that any potentially sensitive equipment is protected, and information flow

is carefully monitored. ” For example, protective

packaging may be used to prevent the Soviets

from gaining access to particular items that may

be sensitive. And French scientists and partici-

● The United States is the only OECD country that defines strategic goods as including products and technologies with only indirect

military implications, that views the weakening of the Soviet economy as an appropriate factor in determining policy, and that includes “foreign policy criteria” in export licensing or the imposition

of embargoes and sanctions. See John P, Hardt and Donna L. Gold,

“Trade Sanctions and Controls, ” in East-West Technolo&T~’ Transfer: A Congressional Dialog Ij’ith the Reagan Administration, a dialog prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Committee (Washington, DC: U.S. Go\’ernment Printing Oftice, 1984), p. Q9.
6 6

pants in cooperative projects are generally briefed

before a project begins on the “myth” of the separation of the Soviet civilian and military space

programs, and on precautions to be taken in cooperative projects to counteract Soviet efforts to acquire Western technology and know-how. “If international cooperation, ” one such briefing

concludes, “presents numerous advantages (rather

inexpensive access to sophisticated space equipment, knowledge of Soviet technology), it also

presents risks. It is necessary to recognize these

risks of transferring sensitive know-how, so as to

take the precautions that are necessary in exchanges with the U. S. S. R.”

Key criticisms from supporters of a more stringent U.S. policy are that the French definition of

what may be “militarily sensitive” is not extensive enough —i. e., it does not include dual-use

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

French planners emphasize that their approach

to cooperation with the U.S.S.R. cannot and

should not be perceived as a model for U, S. planners. They believe that French policies would not

be appropriate for another country with more financial and human resources invested in an already sophisticated space program of its own, and

with superpower status. U.S. space requirements

and political relationships are too different from

technologies but is limited to technologies with

direct military applications—and that French

mechanisms for limiting Soviet access to Western technologies, such as protective packaging,

are not always effective. But French planners

stated strongly, if not defensively, that “while

there will always be some transfer, we do not believe the Soviets are acquiring any militarily significant technology as a result of this cooperation. ” Especially in the realm of space, French

planners assert that France has not aided Soviet

military capabilities “because of their [Soviet] advanced state of development” in certain of these

areas, and because of French “vigilance” in others.

Disagreements with the United States over technology transfer, the French believe, do not stem

from a fundamental difference of opinion, but

only of degree. In the grey area of technology

where the degree of military sensitivity is in question, these disagreements stem from the fact that

the French yardstick tends to be more liberal, often guiding French planners to draw the “technology transfer line” in a different place from their

American counterparts. These “yardsticks” have

been the subject of considerable discussion, both

within COCOM and in other forums. But the

French feel certain that their yardstick is an appropriate one and, as in the area of commercial trade,

question the wisdom of American planners in

evaluating the technology transfer potential of individual French-Soviet projects more harshly.13

“For a discussion of these issues in the commercial realm, and

debates within COCOM, see OTA’S Technology and East West

Trade: An Update (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, OTA-ISC-209, May 1983), esp. pp. 63-72.

France’s for French policies to work for the United

States. Scientifically, the American space program

does not have the same needs as the French space

program, which is newer, less extensive, and operates on a smaller scale. The U.S. space program

does not face the same financial limits as the

French program. The United States at present does

not have the same governmental communications

mechanisms in place for sharing information with
6 7

the U.S.S.R. on a steady basis, as illustrated by

the direct lines for transmitting data between the

Toulouse Space Center and Moscow. And from

a political vantage point, the French believe that

whatever the project, it is by nature easier for

France to cooperate with the U.S.S.R. than the

United States: U.S.-Soviet cooperation, they believe, automatically has a much higher political

significance attached to it simply by virtue of the

two countries’ competitive status as world superpowers.

But even though individual French planners

were reluctant to draw lessons from their own experience for U.S. planners, a few common views

emerged during discussions there. These include

the view that, while U.S.-Soviet space cooperation is potentially beneficial, it should be approached soberly and with lower expectations

than in the past; the United States should not focus on large-scale joint projects, which both countries would want to use for political ends, but

should focus on small-scale projects where scientific and/or economic concerns are paramount;

and that space cooperation should be de-linked

from politics as much as possible, so that regardless of what happens in the political arena, cooperation and channels of communication can be

sustained. Some suggestions included more joint

projects in the area of planetary research and compatibility between space stations and transportation systems—areas in which there have already

been some preliminary discussions. “The more scientific you are, the more successful you’ll be, ” one

planner noted. They also stressed the importance

of being involved in the planning stages at the

very beginning of any particular cooperative mission; the importance of keeping joint efforts stable, without disruptions due to unrelated events;

and the importance of diminishing the drama

which has sometimes accompanied U. S.-Soviet

exchanges,

French planners would look with favor on renewed U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, for the

broad reasons of promoting world peace. In addition, some suggested that increased U.S.-Soviet

space cooperation might also be in France’s own

interest, in that it would allow France to cooperate with the Soviet bloc in a freer atmosphere,

and reap the benefits of both the U.S. and Soviet

space programs more easily. Some concern was

expressed on the part of some French officials that

there could be drawbacks to U.S.-Soviet cooperation: Some feared that U.S.-Soviet cooperation

might carve out space as a superpower domain;

others, that further French-Soviet cooperation in

space could hurt French-U. S. relations. But neither of these ideas appears to be widespread.

The official French point of view expressed most

often is that there is always some uncertainty in

relations with the U.S.S.R. The lesson for any

country to learn from this, however, is not to terminate cooperation. Instead, it should be to approach cooperation soberly, with caution, without grandiose expectations, but still with the hope

that it will contribute to the pursuit of space research in a positive manner, and perhaps to

achieving broader objectives as well.

Chapter 5

U.S. Policy Issues

On October 30, 1984, President Reagan signed

a Joint Resolution of Congress (S. J. Res. 236) in

support of renewing cooperation in space with the

U.S.S.R. Introduced by Senator Matsunaga and

initially cosponsored by Senators Mathias and

pen,’ the resolution, now Public Law No. 98-562,

states that “the President should: 1) endeavor, at

the earliest practicable date, to renew the 1972/77

agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on space cooperation for peaceful purposes; 2) continue energetically to gain Soviet

agreement to the recent U.S. proposal for a joint

simulated space rescue mission; and 3) seek to initiate talks with the Government of the Soviet Union, and with other governments interested in

space activities, to explore further opportunities

for cooperative East-West ventures in space. ”2

This Public Law is one of a number of overtures made by both this Administration and Congress towards cooperation with the U.S.S.R. A

speech delivered by President Reagan in June 1984

announced a renewed U.S. effort to revive or

strengthen economic, cultural, and consular as

well as scientific contact with the U. S. S. R., and

called for efforts to renew U.S.-Soviet cooperation in areas other than space—for example, in

the areas of environmental protection, fishing,

housing, health, agriculture, and in discussions

of maritime problems and joint oceanographic researche s An amendment sponsored by Senator

Nunn to the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985 (signed into law on October 19,

1984, as Public Law 98-525), calls for expanding

confidence-building measures between the United

‘After the resolution was introduced in February 1984, an additional 13 senators became cosponsors: Senators Cranston, Hart, Inouye, Tsongas, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Stafford, Leahy, Bumpers, and Hatfield. The House version of the resolution was introduced

i n March 1984 by Representative Mel Levine with 75 cosponsors.

‘For a copy ot the tull text, see app. B.

‘See President Reaganrs speech, “Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, ” White House, June 27, 1984, and proceedings of the Conference on U.S,-Soviet Exchange, Kennan Institute of Advanced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center, June 1984. See also President

Reagan’s “Address Before the 39th Session of the General Assembly, ” United Nations, Sept. 24, 1984, in i+’eekl~’ Compi~ation of Presicientia] Documents, Sept. 24, 1984, especially pp. 1357-1359.

States and the U. S. S. R., including the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers in Washington and Moscow linked with modern communications. And as of May 1985, the 99th Congress

has before it several bills directed towards increasing U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space as well as

in other areas. In February 1985, for example,

Senator Matsunaga introduced S. Res. 46 calling

for coordinating already scheduled Soviet and

U.S. missions to Mars (for 1988 and 1990, respectively), and for examining ways to coordinate future Mars-related activities, Bills are presently

pending in both the House and the Senate (sponsored by Congressman Huckaby in the House and

Senator Proxmire in the Senate) calling for a joint

U.S.-Soviet study of the long-term climatic effects

of nuclear war. A House resolution sponsored by

Congresswoman Schneider calls for an exchange

of travel between leaders of the United States and

the U.S.S.R. And a joint resolution of both

houses, sponsored by Senator Warner and cosponsored by Senator Nunn, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide equipment and services necessary for an improved U. S .-Soviet “Hot

Line. ”

Public Law 98-562 marks the outcome of several years of debate on the merits and demerits

of cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in other areas

as well as in space. As it is primarily a statement

of intent rather than a plan for resuming cooperation, however, the law has not resolved the policy issues surrounding its implementation. Instead, it has raised more questions, which must

now become the subject of intense scrutiny.

The purpose of this chapter is neither to determine whether cooperation should be pursued, nor

to prescribe optimal methods for crafting an

agreement to achieve any particular set of goals.

Instead, it is intended only to sketch out the broad

issues surrounding the implementation of U. S.-

Soviet cooperation in space, and to clarify the

different viewpoints as a basis for discussing

guidelines and specific policy approaches in the

future.

71
72

Photo credit’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The issue of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space has been

a subject of congressional hearings since the beginning

of the Space Age in the 1950s. Here Astronaut Thomas

P. Stafford, Commander for ASTP, addresses the Members

of the Senate Space Committee during the 1973 hearings

on the NASA budget. Seated at the table are; left to

right; Astronaut Charles Conrad, Jr., James C. Fletcher,

George M. Low, and Astronaut Stafford

BACKGROUND

The signing of Public Law 98-562 and the debate concerning renewed U.S.-Soviet cooperation

in space is occurring against a background of

strained, unpredictable, and ambiguous relations

between the two superpowers. Increased tension

since the detente of the 1970s reflects such factors as: the imposition of martial law in Poland;

the shooting-down of KAL 007; the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan; the slaying of an

American officer in East Germany in March 1985;

the internal exile and uncertain condition of Soviet Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov; the Soviet

Union’s continued persecution of dissidents at

home; expressed Soviet concern over “aggressive”

“imperialist” policies of the Reagan Administration in Nicaragua and elsewhere; and a continued

military buildup in both countries. The beginning

of 1985 produced accusations by the Reagan Administration of Soviet violations of almost every

arms control treaty signed in the past quarter cenChapter 3 lists several potential areas and levels

for cooperation, primarily from a scientific point

of view. But as in France, the issue of U.S.-Soviet

space cooperation is not only—or even primarily—a scientific one. These scientific considerations

must be considered along with political messages

the United States may or may not want to send,

and the potential technological benefits and losses

such cooperation might entail. After a brief background discussion of the policy questions as a

whole, this chapter examines the scientific, foreign policy, and national security issues surrounding U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, Soviet perceptions and behavior, and key challenges which

will face U.S. planners in shaping any future U. S.-

Soviet cooperation in space.

tury,4 and hostile invective on the part of Soviet

officials towards the United States, especially concerning the U.S. “Strategic Defense Initiative. ” On

the other hand, this hostile atmosphere has been

imbued with cautious optimism by the resumption of the stalled U.S.-Soviet negotiations on

arms reductions, the first high-level SovietAmerican trade and economic talks in 5 years,

and explicit U.S. overtures for renewing overall

U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

The debate is also occurring at a time when

U.S.-Soviet scientific and technical cooperation

and the various uses of space are raising more

complex and contentious issues in their own right.

‘For a detailed listing of these accusations of Soviet treaty violations see A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under

Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983 (Washington, DC: General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, October 1984). These accusations remain controversial.
73

The U.S. scientific community has shown renewed

interest in international scientific and technical cooperation in the 1980s, in areas outside of space

research per se. “The constraints on domestic resources and growing scientific excellence abroad

suggest strongly the need for the United States to

enter into cooperative arrangements with other

technicall y advanced nations. ”5 This increased interest in international cooperation, however, has

been countered by opposing, and sometimes irreconcilable factors, including two key concerns:

1) science and technology have become increasingly important instruments of foreign policy, so

that foreign policy interests have led to the reshaping, termination, and/or curtailing of scientific

and technical cooperation; and 2) growing sensitivity of technology transfer questions has led to

greater concern over the potential dissemination

of “militarily sensitive” hardware or information

through cooperative projects in the 1980s. ’

Controversy in international and bilateral forums over both civilian and military space activities have also made space a particularly sensitive

arena in which to encourage cooperative activity. In both the United States and the U. S. S. R.,

the high budgets directed towards uses of space

essential to military programs—for satellite reconnaissance, communications, predicting weather,

verification of arms control, and even for protection of these satellites—underline that space is,

and will remain, an area of sensitive militarily related activities. Each country has consistently accused the other of pursuing policies which will

“militarize” or “weaponize” space to an unacceptably dangerous level. U.S. press and government

reports are filled with information regarding a

possible “massive” Soviet buildup of militarily

oriented space systems, including space weapons

and an already operational ASAT capability,7

‘Mitchell B. Wallerstein, “U.S. Participation in International S&T

Cooperation: A Framework for Analysis, ” Scientific and Technological Cooperation Among Industrialized Countries, Mitchell B.

Wallerstein (cd, ) (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1984),

p. 6.

‘For detailed discussions of the growing debate on S&T cooperation generally, see two recent reports by the National Academy of

Sciences and National Research Council: Scientific Communication

and Nationa] Security (Washington, DC: National Academy Press,

1982 ), commonly known as the “Corson Report” after its panel chairman, Dale Corson; and Wallerstein, op. cit.

‘See, for example, “Soviets Develop Heavy Boosters Amid Massive Military Space Buildup, ” Aviation Week and Space TechnolOnly tacitly admitting that they have a military

space program of their own, s Soviet officials have

decried the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

and have consistently stated that the U.S. SDI will

be a serious, if not insurmountable, obstacle to

any major U, S.-Soviet cooperation in space.9 In

civilian areas of space as well, international disputes over such issues as controlling radio frequency and orbital slot allocations have highlighted how difficult it can be to reach agreement

even with our allies. Space by nature is an environment which extends beyond any one country’s

borders, making disputes likely.

Given all of these conflicts, the question of what

type of bilateral U.S.-Soviet space cooperation

should be pursued has created a good deal of

controversy. Some believe that the United States

should pursue a large-scale joint mission largely

insulated from the ups and downs of U.S.-Soviet

relations and world politics. Others support pursuing space cooperation only on a very low and

strictly scientific level, if at all. And others hold

different views, including pursuing scientifically

valuable cooperation (such as joint data exchange

and analysis, or hosted experiments on one another’s spacecraft) that is insulated from the ups

and downs of world politics; pursuing cooperation on any level, but linking it to politics, so that

such cooperation would be turned on and off in

protest to any egregious Soviet behavior; or purogy, CCXXII, No. 11 (Mar. 18, 1985), pp. 120-121; Soviet Military

Space Doctrine (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency,

1984), p. 31; and annual issues of the U.S. Department of Defense,

Soviet Military Power, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

printing Office, 1985).

8

For a discussion of Soviet positions on the “roil i tarization ” of

space, see “Appendix A: The ‘Militarization’ Issue at Unispace ’82,

in Unispace ’82: A Context for ]rtternationa] Cooperation and competition—A Technical Memorandum (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, OTA-TM-ISC-26, March 1983), For a discussion of evidence that the Soviets have a “Star Wars” program

of their own, see “Soviet Directed Energy Weapons— Perspectives

on Strategic Defense” (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency,

March 1985).

9See, for example, “U.S.-Soviet Mission in Space is Sough t,” New’

York Times, Jan. 8, 1985; Walter Pincus, “Soviet Scholar Warns

Against Space Arms, ” Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1984; and interviews ccmducted by OTA in Moscow, June-July 1984. See also V.S,

Avduievskii, “Space Should Be Peaceful, ” in Russian in Zeml~a I

Vselennaia, No. 5 (September-October 1984), pp. 6-11, translated

in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), U.S.S.R. Daily Report, May 6, 1985, pp. 94-100; and “Academician on Cooperation, ”

TASS in English, Moscow, May 20, 1985, reprinted in FBIS, U.S.S.R.

National Affairs, May 22, 1985, p. U3.
74

suing a series of relatively low-level cooperative

efforts of gradually increasing complexity, to lead

to larger joint projects and commitment in the

future.

A related issue concerns the renewal of an intergovernmental bilateral agreement for cooperation in space, regardless of the level of cooperation. Soviet leaders have made it clear that

cooperation in space on any level is exceedingly

difficult without an overarching agreement which

would provide a formal framework for cooperation. But the signing of an agreement itself would

be a major event in U.S.-Soviet relations overall, even if it were to call for only low levels of

exchange.

Each of the viewpoints on how to cooperate involves a combination of scientific, foreign policy,

and national security concerns. Each also involves

subjective judgments about broader issues of

world tensions, Soviet objectives and the course

of U.S.-Soviet relations. U.S. planners and the

public have demonstrated a multiplicity of views

concerning the goals of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, and it is unlikely that U.S. policy as a

whole will pursue a consistent, unified set of objectives. But the objectives the policy reflects, and

the way inconsistencies among them are reconciled, will shape any U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in the future—or determine whether such cooperation will be possible.

SCIENTIFIC AND PRACTICAL ISSUES

One key issue in U.S.-Soviet cooperation in

space is whether it is valuable to the United

States—either from the standpoint of gaining access to data and information, or from a costsavings perspective—and whether these benefits

offset the costs. Does cooperation with the

U.S.S.R, in space research and applications open

more research opportunities than we would be

able to gain from our programs alone? Can it provide opportunities for cost-savings through reduced duplications of missions and/or shared

costs of cooperative missions? And do the Soviets

gain far in excess of what the United States does?

The scientific issues in U.S.-Soviet space cooperation are discussed extensively in chapter 3,

based on the proceedings of a workshop held at

OTA in May 1984 on U.S.-Soviet cooperation in

the space sciences. The workshop and the record

of past experience suggest that scientific gains can

indeed be substantial from cooperation with the

U.S.S.R. in many areas of space research.l0 I n

brief, OTA’S workshop suggested that:

● Past U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the space life

sciences area has been substantive and valuable, especially in: 1) the exchange of flight

‘“’’U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation, ” proceedings of workshop held

at OTA on May 8, 1984, staff paper compiled by the staff of the

Science, Transportation, and Innovation Program, OTA.

experimental data regarding human response

to spaceflight conditions; 2) joint groundbased simulations of spaceflight conditions;

and 3) animal (biological) research.

● While somewhat more problematic, cooperation in planetary science has also been valuable, especially in the exchange of data in

lunar studies, the exploration of Venus, and

solar terrestrial physics.

● The success or failure of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the space sciences may depend on

such factors as: 1) a focus on well-defined and

specific scientific objectives; 2) selection of

areas of complementary capability; 3) the selection of projects where the required instrumentation is generally not of a type raising

technology transfer concerns.

● The future offers numerous possibilities for

U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space which should

be scientifically valuable in areas including:

“global habitability;” exobiology; the joint

demonstration and testing of advanced life

support systems; integration of Soviet data

into the International Solar-Terrestrial Physics Program (now being developed); joint

missions in very long baseline interferometry (VLBI); and cooperative ventures in the

planetary field relating to the Moon, Venus,

Mars, the comets and outer planet exploration.
75

ments against renewing space cooperation with

the U.S.S.R. based on its scientific and technical

aspects alone are threefold. One is the belief that

the United States is so far ahead of Soviet efforts

that the U.S. space program as a whole has little

to gain from renewed cooperation. * A second belief is that—while cooperation may provide benefits in specific areas of space research—whatever

the U.S. might gain from such cooperative efforts

is hardly worth the enormous amount of time,

money, energy, and frustration involved in acquiring it, and that cooperation might draw funds

away from other, more scientifically important

projects.

A third argument against cooperation is that

what we learn may be out of balance with what

Soviet scientists gain, and, therefore, it may be

in our best interests to severely restrict space cooperation. Scientifically and technically, some believe, cooperation provides a greater boost to the

Soviet space program overall than to our own;

thus, Soviet scientists may learn more about the

U.S. space program from interaction with U.S.

scientists than the reverse, and may gain access

to potentially sensitive technology or technical

know-how in the process. They also argue that

in light of the U.S. technological edge, the Soviets

should not be “subsidized” to improve their space

program and related military capabilities at the

United States’ expense.

Despite the Iapslng of the intergovernmental agreement, some exchange of data and information continues today.

This Soviet photo of Venus, taken from Venera 16, was shared with OTA during a recent visit with members of the

Soviet Academy of Sciences
76

Supporters of cooperation for scientific reasons,

however, believe that U.S.-Soviet space cooperation is important not only in specific areas of

space research and applications, but in enhancing our insight into the Soviet space program and

scientific knowledge generally. Because of the high

level of secrecy in the U. S. S. R., cooperation provides the United States greater access to information not only in one specific area of space research,

but in the Soviet space program as a whole. Because of the poor mechanisms for communication

among people and institutes within the U. S. S. R.,

cooperation provides the United States a fuller picture of what Soviet scientists and researchers are

working on—often a fuller picture than Soviet

scientists themselves have. And since certain

aspects of the Soviet space program have been

different from those in the United States, cooperation also provides U.S. scientists with the opportunity to learn from different technological

roots. Soviet scientists have different experiences

to share and a range of scientific experience that

the United States does not have, and from which

the United States can draw valuable information.

In economic terms, U.S.-Soviet space cooperation

is viewed as an opportunity for significant cost

savings (although there is no assurance that a joint

project would be less costly to the United States

than a separately funded project) and perhaps as

a catalyst for the United States to initiate certain

projects or programs which would not otherwise

be undertaken. Indeed, several scientists have

commented that such cooperation is also beneficial because it works to garner more funding and

public support and interest for particular

programs.

In terms of the balance of what American and

Soviet scientists may gain from such cooperation,

proponents of space cooperation assert that the

question should not be phrased in terms of “who

gets more, ” but rather “who gets more of whatever they wouldn’t have gotten otherwise. ” Since

so much more information about U.S. space programs than about Soviet space programs is available in the open literature, Soviet planners are assumed to have ready access to enormous amounts

of information whether or not cooperation takes

place. Yet scientific and technical cooperation is

one of the few mechanisms available for the

United States to assess what the U.S.S.R. is doing in certain areas.12 In this sense, many observers argue, the United States may actually

“gain more” than the U.S.S.R. A State Department study submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1982 described space cooperation as one of four agreements where the

United States was seen as benefiting more than

the U. S. S.R.13

What emerges from these arguments is twofold:

It is clear that scientific and practical benefit can

be gained from U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space.

But the degree to which the “gains” may be offset by scientific or technical “losses” is still a matter

of debate. The possibility of scientific and technical “losses” is not necessarily a factor of the type

or level of the project. Depending on the nature

of the project, a low-level effort (on joint data

analysis, for example) could present greater risks

than a larger effort carefully crafted to minimize

them. A key challenge, therefore, will be to select areas for cooperation that prove beneficial

from a scientific and/or practical point of view,

but minimize the risks of transferring sensitive information or technology to the U.S.S.R. Specific

scientific issues are discussed in chapter 3. Technology transfer issues are discussed below.

121t has been estimated that about 90 percent of the science and

technology information the United States receives from the Soviets

occurs via official exchange agreements. See Genevieve Knezo,

“American-Soviet Science and Technology Agreements, ” East- hVest

Technology Transfer: A Congressional Dialog With the Reagan

Administration, prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 117-120.

“See U.S. Department of State, “Report to Congress: Scientific

Exchange Activities With the Soviet Union, Fiscal Year 1981 and

Fiscal Year 1982, ” Department of State Authorization Act, Sec. 126

(a) and (b).
77

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

The issue of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation is

fundamentally one of foreign policy. Administration statements and annual reports of the President to Congress illustrate how extensively scientific and technical cooperation as a whole has

come to be viewed as a component of U.S. foreign policy. 14 High visibility and drama make this

especially true in the space arena. 15 Congress has

consistently viewed U.S.-Soviet cooperation in

space as a means for improving relations in general and for enhancing U.S. prestige. The primary

objective of present U.S. overtures for a joint

U.S.-Soviet space rescue mission is explicitly one

of foreign policy: to act as a focal point for renewed dialog and cooperation between the two

superpowers. Issues of foreign policy have been

the motivation sustaining space cooperation with

the U.S.S.R. —and also the chief impediment to

its successful implementation. It was for foreign

policy reasons that cooperation in space with the

U.S.S.R. was begun, and for foreign policy reasons—to express U.S. abhorrence of the declaration of martial law in Poland—that the space

cooperative agreement was allowed to lapse in

1982.

Controversy arises, however, in determining

precisely what our foreign policy objectives are,

and on the appropriateness of using cooperation

in space to meet political goals at the expense of

scientific or technical objectives. Foreign policy

concerns related to U.S.-Soviet cooperation in

space embrace many different elements. Some of

these objectives are mutually contradictory;

others are contentious in themselves. These objectives include using cooperation in space as a

mechanism to: reduce tensions between the two

countries; reverse a perceived trend towards the

“weaponization” of outer space; send positive

“See, for example, the annual “Title V“ reports entitled Science,

Techno~ogy, and American Diplomacy, submitted to Congress by

the President Pursuant to Sec. 503(b) of Title V of Public Law 95-

426, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1979,

which requires the President to provide annual reports to Congress

on the U, S. Government’s international activities in the fields of

science and technology.

I Ssee, for example, Harry R, Marshall, Jr., U. .S. Space Programs:

Cooperation and Competition From Europe, Current Policy No.

695 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 1985), esp.

pp. 2 and 5.

symbolic messages to the rest of the world; alter

Soviet behavior in a way which would be favorable for U.S. or Western interests; manifest displeasure with any reprehensible Soviet behavior;

and keep lines of communication open with the

U.S.S.R. even—or perhaps especially—when relations are strained.

Reduce Tensions

The driving force behind efforts to renew U. S.-

Soviet cooperation in space—and the area of most

controversy—is the belief that space cooperation

can reduce tensions between the two superpowers

and contribute to world peace. With a fundamentally adversarial relationship, few expect that

U.S.-Soviet conflicts can somehow be “solved.”

But the spirit of Public Law 98-562 is the belief

that space cooperation can reduce the danger of

superpower confrontation, perhaps eventually allowing each country to divert some of its resources from military to civilian purposes. This

belief was expressed in the resolution’s original

title: “A Joint Resolution Relating to Cooperative

East-West Ventures in Space as an Alternative to

a Space Arms Race. ” The belief that cooperation
78

can reduce tensions has been buttressed by the reports of several visitors to the U. S. S. R,, including that of a delegation of eight senators, led by

Senator Pen, to the Soviet Union in September

1983. These senators recommended that:

scientific and technical agreements which

have been allowed to languish or expire should

eventually be returned to a full level of cooperative activity. It is not only self-defeating, but a

failure of world responsibility to forego the humanitarian and ecological achievements that can

emanate from such superpower cooperation. 16

Proponents of this view see significant benefits in

encouraging greater dialog and understanding between the two superpowers, perhaps creating a

“web” of interactions—as stressed during the

period of detente—which could make U.S.-Soviet

relations more stable and interdependent.

Others have taken this issue further. In the press

and in congressional testimony, some have asserted that such cooperation can offset the momentum of “Star Wars, ” whose attraction, they

believe, lies largely in the exciting, futuristic, and

technologically challenging image it presents of

man’s future in space, as well as in the high level

of funding and number of people employed. Some

view a large-scale, equally spectacular and challenging cooperative U.S.-Soviet effort in space as

providing an alternative means for utilizing the

high levels of funding and manpower which the

SDI requires. 17

From a directly opposing vantage point are arguments that such beliefs may not only be misleading, but counterproductive. Some observers

are deeply skeptical of efforts to reduce tensions

with the U. S. S. R., as they believe that any apparent reduction in tension will be illusory. They believe it is unlikely that cooperation in space—on

any level—will lead to any genuine concessions

1 bs~~ D~~gerOus stalemate: Superpower Relations in Autumn

1983, A Report of a Delegation of Eight Senators to the Soviet Union, to the United States Senate, September 1983 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 3, The eight Senators

were Senators Pen (Delegation Chairman), Long, Bumpersr Leahy,

Metzenbaum, Riegle, Sarbanes, and Sasser.

“See, for example, Daniel Deudney, “Forging Missiles Into Spaceships, ” World Policy Journal, spring 1985, pp. 271-303, and prepared Statement of Dr. Carol S, Rosin, “East-West Cooperation in

Outer Space, ” Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations of the 98th Congress on S.J, Res. 236 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), pp. 43-50.
79

reduction in tension and in the military buildup

of both sides was one of the hopes behind the initiation of space cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s

and the Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1976. 20 Yet the

decade of the 1970s was characterized not only

by U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, but by Soviet

belligerence abroad and severe U.S.-Soviet strains

in other areas. And during the same decade, both

countries were still placing a great deal of strategic and tactical importance on military space systems, and exhibited significant growth in militarily

related space capabilities. The mid-1970s saw not

only the launching of the joint U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz mission, but also the beginning of the

Soviets’ second phase of testing of their antisatellite weapons and the development of Soviet

nuclear-reactor powered radar ocean reconnaissance satellites (RORSATS); and the number of

Soviet space launches which were exclusively militar y or joint military~’civilian missions remained

“’See, for example, lack hlanno, Arming the’ Fied\ens (New York:

Dc~dd, ?dedd, 1Q84 ). At the time of ASTP, he notes, it wds hoped

that “Soviet-Amerl( an cooperation in space might just be the first

step t[lward internat iona] cooperation on earth” ( h!anno, p. 1 Sb ),

A ~’Ve\t Y(Jr-L T)rne> editorial also expressed the hope that “So\iet

American detente i~ (~nly the beginning toward more broadly based

cooperation in space etforts involving the personnel and talents of

every nd t ion for the benefit of al 1 human ity. ‘‘Meeting i n Space, ‘

,’Vew Yt)rh Times, June 15, 1Q75, p. 32.

While the United States and U.S.S.R, both share stated

policies that space should be a peaceful domain, military

uses of space also absorb high budgets in both

countries. The above artist’s conception depicts a

Soviet Operational Antisatellite Interceptor

high.21 In the United States as well, there was little linkage between a large-scale cooperative effort with the U.S.S.R. in space and U.S. military

space programs. Military space programs in both

countries have gained their own technological

momentum. But there is little agreement on

whether U.S.-Soviet relations might have been

worse without such cooperation, or, alternatively,

whether the United States may have become too

conciliatory during past cooperative efforts. There

is also little agreement on whether the future might

provide a more or less promising context for cooperation than the past.

Two questions lie at the heart of these debates.

The first concerns how foreign policy and space

cooperation affect each other. Deep conflicts of

interest form the foundation of U.S.-Soviet relations; it is a subjective judgment as to whether

space cooperation can significantly change that

level of conflict, and lead each superpower to

redefine its relation to the other. Foreign policy

has generally affected the direction of U.S.-Soviet

cooperation, in space as elsewhere. Cooperation

in space has usually been an outgrowth of good

relations. There is little evidence, however, that

space cooperation can lead to detente, or can improve overall U.S.-Soviet relations in any substantial way,

A second question is whether space cooperation may be viewed in either/or terms. At the time

of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, for example,

it was assumed that space would become either

more internationalized, or an arena of greater

competition and eventual conflict .22 History has

proved otherwise: countries can and do cooperate and compete simultaneously. Thus, while

‘*See Marcia Smith, “O\rer\riew’ (lt Unmanned Space I’rograrns:

1957 -83,” Soviet Space programs: 1Q7b-80, Part 3, L~nmanned Space

Actit’ities, prepared for the use of U, S. Cc~ngress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Sciencer and Transportation (Washington, DC:

U S. Government Printing Office, May 19851, pp. 7bl-7b6; and S(Iviet hfilitarJ~ Space Doctrine, op cit. RORSATS are the only So\ri -

et military space system for which there is no U. S, equivalent.

For a discussion of the heavy military orientation of the present

Soviet space program, see, for example, Craig Covault, “Spaceplane

Called a Weapons Platform, ” A\ridtion 11’eeh and Space TrchnolOg}r, CXX1, No. 4 (July 23, 1984), pp. 70, 75; Craig Covault,

“U.S.S.R’S Reusable Orbiter Nears Approach, Landing Tests, ” Atriation l~~eek and Space Technolog}r, CXXI, No. 23 (Dee, 3, 1984),

pp. 18-19: and %viet .~fi~itary Space Doctrine, O p , Cit,

“See for example, Jack Manno, Arrnin~ the Heavens, op. cit.,

p. 136.
80

cooperation may provide an alternative vision of

the future or a more positive backdrop for negotiations—in arms control, space weapons, or

other areas—it may represent only a complement

to efforts to improve relations generally.

Symbolism

Symbolic value has always been a principal

characteristic of the U.S. and Soviet space programs. Both countries have used their space programs to increase national prestige, project national influence, display technological leadership,

and enhance the image of each country’s respective governmental system—the United States,

through emphasizing the openness of democratic

systems; the U. S. S. R., by linking its space

achievements with the superiority of the socialist

system over capitalism. The U.S.S.R. has dispatched cosmonauts to other countries to link

their celebrity with particular political ideas and

policy lines, or with historic Communist traditions; and both countries have invited foreign

“visitors” to fly on their spacecraft to strengthen

international ties.23 The idea of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space has also played a symbolic role

to offset any aggressive image of either superpower, and to demonstrate each country’s goals of

using space for peaceful scientific purposes.

The symbolic value of any prospective U.S.-Soviet cooperative mission today would be equally

central. Renewed U.S.-Soviet space cooperation

on any level would send to the world a symbolic

message of the willingness of the two countries

to attempt to work together to reduce tensions

or achieve common goals. Even on lower levels

of cooperation, joint efforts can carry with them

positive symbolic benefits and significant psychological value. The concept of “peace” in space is

especially appealing to those who view peaceful

use as an alternative to, rather than a spin-off

from, the military use of space.

While the symbolic value of renewed U.S.-Soviet space cooperation could be positive, however,

“James E. bberg, “Window for Space Detente, ” Aerospace America, XXII, No. 11 (November 1984), pp. 86-87; exerpted from The

New Race for Space (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1984), and

Harry R. Marshall, Jr., U.S. Space Programs, Cooperation and Competition From Europe.

some U.S. observers point to more negative messages. They believe that if cooperation were to

break down, the positive symbolic benefits would

be negated, and the United States might appear

more belligerent than before. They also believe

that U.S.-Soviet space cooperation on any level

appears to cast the two superpowers as equals,

a status which they feel the Soviets would abuse;

the more visible the level of cooperation, the more

negative the symbolic message. The launch of the

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project is cited as a case in

point. Despite the fact that U.S. reports described
81

the Soyuz spacecraft as technically primitive, Soviet media nonetheless reported that U.S. specialists spoke of “the high technical qualities of the

Soyuz. ” The Soviet press consistently implied that

the U.S.S.R. led the United States in space flight,

attributing its lead to Marxist ideology .24 Along

with strong, positive, symbolic messages, then,

renewed U.S.-Soviet cooperation could give Soviet planners another opportunity to assert technical parity with the United States.

The potential positive and negative symbolic

messages from U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space

would increase with the size, scale, and visibility

of the cooperative effort. On a low-level of exchange, both the risks and benefits are small, As

the level of exchange, and thus the potential risks

and benefits increase, however, the cooperation

becomes more controversial. While some emphasize that a joint “spectacular” would provide substantial symbolic benefit for the United States,

others emphasize that the risks are also great:

should the project “fail,” or should the United

States find it in its interest to withdraw, the losses

to U.S. prestige could be damaging.

“Linkage”

Another foreign policy issue associated with

U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space is the question

of “linking” such cooperation to other aspects of

Soviet behavior. For example, some observers

question the wisdom of having allowed U. S.-

Soviet space cooperation to lapse in 1982 in response to an unrelated event, the declaration of

martial law in Poland. Others argue that that was

an appropriate action and, further, that such

cooperation should not be reinstituted before the

Soviets demonstrate a willingness to make concessions on other fronts—in policies regarding

emigration abroad, human rights at home, or concessions in arms control negotiations.

The use of scientific and technical (S&T) cooperation as a lever for altering Soviet behavior has

become the subject of debate similar to that of

U,S,-Soviet trade. The theory and practice of

trade leverage are discussed in detail in previous

‘“See issues [)1 ]’ra~’cfa before and during the ASTP, especlall}r trom

Iuly 13, 17, and 21, 1975,

OTA reports .25 The conclusions of these reports

is that trade leverage can work only under very

limited conditions, and that past experiences have

demonstrated its weakness when used against the

Soviet Union. Assessments of the potential impact of S&T cooperation in altering Soviet behavior have been no more positive, A recent study

by the National Academy of Sciences states:

While there is little doubt that S&T agreements

have helped on some occasions to move relations

onto a more positive basis, and on others to signal United States displeasure regarding certain behavior, there would appear to be little conclusive

evidence that the signing or termination of an

agreement has been very influential in persuading another nation to pursue or desist from a particular policy position .2”

The effect may be further diluted as, based on past

behavior, the Soviets generally expect the United

States to seek renewed cooperation after a relatively short amount of time.

The real question is whether S&T cooperation,

including space cooperation, is an appropriate

mechanism for showing displeasure with Soviet

actions, regardless of whether it alters Soviet behavior. One set of opinions argues that in the absence of other foreign policy levers, S&T cooperation is one of the most effective means for

protesting egregious Soviet actions and demonstrating U.S. resolve. According to this view,

when a superpower does something which the

other views as fundamentally “’abhorrent or inimical to our interests, “27 there is pressure to respond. In these cases, “Soviet activity sometimes

demands responses stronger than rhetoric but

more prudent than military action, “28 In the absence of other measures, canceling an ongoing cooperative program has been viewed as an appropriate response; the financial costs are hard to

identify and in any case are deferred, the effect

25Techno~og} and East- 14’est Trade (\\’a\hlngton, DC: LT. S, Gc~\’-

ernment Printing Office, OTA-ISC-I 01, No\’ember I Q7Q ); Technology and SO viet Energy A vailabiiit}r ( Wash i ngt c)n, IIc. LT,s Co\r -

ernment Printing Office, OTA-ISC-153, NTo\rember ] Q8 I ), and

Technology’ and East- b$rest Trade: An Upd~te (\ JTashinXt{)n, DC

U S. Covernrnent printin~ Office, OTA-ISC-209, hla} IQ83 ).

‘OWallerstein, op. clt , p, 19,

‘“See George P. Shultz, “New Realities and New lkra}r~ t>t Thlnkin~, ” Fc)re~gn Affairs, LXIII, No. 4 (spring 1985), p, 707

“\trilliam Root, Trade Controls That Work, ” Fc~re~gn ~’olic~,

N’o. 59 (fall 1984), pp.61-80.
82

is immediate, and the intended moral message is

sent. Moreover, proponents of this view argue

that “business as usual” in S&T exchange would

be immoral under these circumstances anyway.

As stated in the President’s Title V report to Congress, 1984:

Science and technology exchanges between the

United States and the Soviet Union . . . are of

critical concern to this Administration. We must

respond adequately to Soviet actions adverse to

our own interests and contrary to the basic principles of civilized behavior within the community

of nations. For example, during 1983 the United

States, among other actions, stopped discussions

on extension of a Transportation S&T Agreement

with the Soviets as a result of their deliberate destruction of Korean Airlines flight 007.29

Few people argue that the threat to cancel, or actual cancellation of a cooperative program in

space, would really affect Soviet behavior on a

matter of substance. The idea is to protest, not

to deter.

Opponents of this view assert that little is accomplished by terminating S&T cooperation as

a mechanism of protest, while the benefits from

cooperation are diluted or lost. Canceling cooperative efforts already underway entails some human and dollar costs, and may give the United

States a reputation as an unreliable partner. And

some observers argue that more can be achieved

through cooperation than without it. In the words

of one historian of science involved in cooperative projects with the U. S. S. R.:

Personal links to Soviet scientists lead Americans to learn more about who is being arrested

or persecuted and to more readily react against

it than in the past . . . Almost all Soviet scientists have favored the improvement of communication, and the dissidents in particular have

stressed that their security is greater because of

their links to the West , . . It seems clear that the

worst fate for unorthodox Soviet scientists would

be to lose their contacts with the West. 30

—

‘*LJ .S, C{lngress, Hc)use Committee on F[~reign Affairs and C(~mmittw on Science and Techno]og}’, L%jence( Techn<]log>’l ~n~i AmerJ( ,;n [lpl(~mac}’ z 484, 5th Ann ua 1 Report Submitted to t hc’ Cc>m

gres~ b} the I’rtjsicfent Pursuant to %cti(~n S03 (tI ) of Title V of Public

Law 45-420. (\$’ashington, DC. U.S. (jovernrnent 1’rinting Office,

1Q84), p. 3.

‘

{

’ Lc~ren R. Graham, “How Valuable Are Scientific Exchanges With

th(’ S(,\’let IIn[on?” .%it>nce, CCII, N(J, 4366 (Oct 27, 1Q78), p. 38 7

Proponents of this view argue that S&T cooperation comprises a relatively minor tool in foreign

policy, and that terminating scientific and technical cooperation is no more an effective means

of showing displeasure than other symbolic gestures (such as speeches of condemnation at international forums, or termination of cultural visits)

which carry fewer negative and long-lasting consequences.

The difficulty in reconciling these viewpoints

has consistently been expressed by the Reagan Administration in annual reports to Congress:

We must respond adequately to Soviet actions

adverse to our own interests and contrary to the

basic principles of civilized behavior within the

community of nations . . . At the same time, we

do not want to jeopardize joint S&T efforts which

may be of substantial benefit. We will continue

to observe Soviet behavior carefully and to adjust our S&T cooperative agreements accordingly.

The effect of not reconciling these issues, however, was perhaps best expressed in the congressional testimony of James Morrison, Deputy Director of International Affairs, NASA, who

suggested guidelines for future U.S.-Soviet cooperative efforts in space. Noting that any such

guidelines must be applied in a political context,

but also stressing the costs of terminating cooperative efforts once they are underway, Morrison

stated:

Obviously, guidelines such as these will be applied in a political context, because of the high

visibility of this type of cooperation. Nevertheless, there should be an appreciation that if a major project should be interrupted while in progress, it is likely that the human and dollar

resources would have been utilized better in other

space endeavors, i.e., once undertaken, there are

good reasons why a project should be allowed to

proceed to completion, barring some major disruption in relations between the two countries.

—

“science, Techn(j][)g}, ancf Amvr]can [>ip](~m~c~ IQ84, ~~p. clt

pp 3-4. See a]w Shultz, {~p. c it., for a dtscusslon of the Is\ Lie’\ c ~)mplexitles in a broader contc’xt: “Whether important negotl~t ions ought

to be interrupted after s(~mc So\’iet outrage w]]] alwa>’> be a complex calculation “

“Statement ()( James R. kl~~rriwln, IIeputy Director, Intt’rnati(~nal

Atfair> Divisi<~n, National Aeronautics and Space Admlnistratlon

before the U.S. Senate C(~mrnittee on F(~reign l<elation~, Sept. ] ~,

1Q84, p. 8,
83

Maintaining Channels of

Communication

Perhaps the simplest foreign policy objective

of renewed U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space is to

keep channels of communication open, even—

or especially—during times of increased tensions.

At a time when overall U.S.-Soviet relations are

poor, some believe that cooperation on any level

can provide an important conduit for communication. Aside from its value as a way of learning

about the U. S. S. R., cooperation provides a mechanism for making U.S. views more widely known

in the U.S.S.R. While acting as a kind of barometer for U.S.-Soviet relations generally, it maintains a continuing dialog on a governmental level

when other avenues may not be as active. And

some level of cooperation also keeps alive the possibility of expanded cooperation in the future.

These objectives, however, run counter to the

policy of linkage described above. The tension between the two objectives is illustrated by the Reagan Administration’s stated emphasis on “maintaining the framework” of the agreements “so that

beneficial exchanges can be expanded if the political situation improves” while at the same time

Photo credit National Aeronautics and Space Administration

East-West Cooperative Effort—Soviet Cosmonaut

Filipchenko and U.S. Astronaut Slayton on the banks

of the Little Blanco River in central Texas as a break

from training for ASTP

choosing to severely reduce S&T exchange with

the U.S.S.R. and allow the space, science and

technology, and energy agreements to lapse.ss The

1984 Presidential report to Congress also underlined the importance of keeping lines of communication open, but stressed the need to respond

to “Soviet actions adverse to our own interests. ”

A key question, then, is whether the option for

renewing cooperative activities can in fact be exercised once an agreement has been abrogated or

allowed to lapse. Past experience suggests another

basic asymmetry: it is easier to kill cooperation

than to restart it. Several observers-from NASA

and elsewhere—have commented that it is difficult, once ties are broken, to keep them in a state

where they can be repaired.

It is difficult to assess the degree to which the

framework of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation has

been maintained since 1982. The institutional

apparatus remains in place and has not been dismantled, and one could argue that the low level

of cooperation which continues to occur has left

a door open. But events themselves have changed

and complicated the context in which cooperation occurs. Administration statements in 1984

suggest some questions as to whether the framework for renewed space cooperation is still viable. 34

Foreign policy objectives form the foundation

for decisions on U.S.-Soviet space cooperation.

One main challenge is to define more precisely

and soberly what U.S. foreign policy objectives

from space cooperation actually are, address internal inconsistencies among them, and establish

criteria to evaluate the ways in which coopera3 3See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs and

Committee on Science and Technology, Science, Technology, and

American Diplomacy 1981, 2nd Annual Report Submitted to the

Congress by the President Pursuant to Section 503(b) of Title V of

Public Law 94-426 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1981), p. 180. “Despite the sharp curtailment in exchange

activity, the framework of the agreements is being maintained so

that beneficial exchanges can be expanded it the political situation

improves. ”

34See Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy 1984, op.

cit., pp. 33-34; and “Committee Questions and Administration Responses, ” East- West Technology Transfer: A Congressional Dialog

With the Reagan Administration, op. cit., p. 29.
84

tion in space maybe helpful in achieving broader

foreign policy goals.35

A second major foreign policy challenge concerns the relationship of foreign policy to scientific and technical objectives in cases where pur-

~sThe difficulties of Spe]]ing out specific foreign policy objectives,

and of then establishing criteria to evaluate the effects of S&T cooperation on foreign policy, are highlighted in the Title V Report for

1984 and the subsequent critique by the Congressional Research Service. See G. J. Knezo, “Congressional Research Service Critique of

the 1984 Title V Report, ” Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy 1984, op. cit., pp. 165-167.

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ISSUES

A final set of issues concerns the extent to which

the U.S.S.R. may gain access to militarily sensitive technology and technical know-how through

U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, and thus the extent to which cooperation should be controlled

or limited. These “technology transfer” concerns

are part of a much larger debate concerning all

commercial and cooperative relations with the

U.S.S.R. At the heart of the debate is the tradeoff between two important national interests: the

importance of minimizing the use of American

scientific and technological expertise in the buildup of Soviet military strength; and the importance

of maintaining and promoting open communication in science and technology, both within the

borders of the United States and across international boundaries. The highly technical and sensitive nature of space research and technology

makes the question of renewed or expanded U. S.-

Soviet cooperation in space especially controversial .37

Few would argue against caution in U.S.-Soviet

cooperation in space. Rather, the main areas of

contention are the limits and mechanisms of control, i.e., determining what should be controlled,

when, by whom, under what circumstances, how

it should be controlled, and finally, how the effects of controls can be evaluated .38

~pFor a brief discussion of the problems associated with transferring potentially sensitive space technology even to U.S. allies, see

Stuart Auerbach, “Great Britain Joins U.S. in Space Station Effort, ”

Washington Post, Jan. 18, 1985, and William Drozdiak, “Bonn Joins

in U.S. Led Space Base, ” Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1985.

JaFor a discussion of these Issues especially as related to Cc3rnrnercial exports, see OTA’S Technology and East-West Trade: An Upsuing the former may be detrimental to the latter.

The issue of “how to effectively integrate science

and technology concerns into the overall development of American foreign policy’”36 has become

a fundamental issue in all aspects of international

scientific and technical cooperation. The history

of U.S.-Soviet cooperation suggests this will remain a central issue in any future cooperative endeavors in space.

Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy 1984, op. cit.,

p. 6.

Some observers argue in favor of severe restrictions on all levels of cooperative space activity

with the U.S.S.R. The underlying assumptions of

this view are that the U. S. S. R., while extremely

strong militarily, is making important military

gains through the acquisition of Western technology; that cooperation is an important mechanism

through which these gains occur;39 that space is

a particularly sensitive area of S&T cooperation;

and hence, that renewed cooperation will doubtlessly enhance Soviet capabilities to gain even

more militarily sensitive technology and knowhow from the West. Reports on Soviet acquisition of Western technology have singled out space

as a key “target” of Soviet acquisition efforts in
8 5

the West, especially in this country. 40 These observers fear that cooperation may only facilitate

an extensive Soviet effort to obtain space-related

technology and technical know-how, and will

contribute to sophisticated Soviet military capabilities. They believe the dangers are greatest in

large-scale cooperative projects, but that even

lower levels of cooperation—data exchange, joint

data analysis, coordination of missions, etc.—

may result in transfer of sensitive technical information.

Other observers—while recognizing the enormous Soviet military strength and significant advances the U.S.S.R. has made in the military uses

of space—believe that space cooperation, like

other areas of scientific and technical cooperation,

is a relatively ineffective way for the Soviets to

gain access to Western technology and knowhow; 41 that little militarily sensitive technology

has been transferred through past cooperative

projects; that other Western countries with sophisticated space programs of their own are cooperating with the U.S. S. R., providing the Soviets

with much of the same technology and knowhow; and that controls are difficult to enforce

without sacrificing the free interchange of ideas

which is at the heart of scientific and technological progress in this country. Consequently, they

believe the imposition of increasingly stringent

controls will unnecessarily offset the real scientific, economic, humanitarian, and potential foreign policy gains which can follow from cooperation with the U.S.S.R. “A national strategy of

‘security by secrecy, ’ “ the Corson panel con40See, for example, Assessing the Effect of Technology Transfer

on U.S.-Western Security (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, February

1985 ), which cites the expansion of the Soviet space program as one

of six major ~oals in present and future Soviet weapons programs

(pp. 1-4),

41 The report prepared by the National Academy of Sciences under the chairmanship of Dale Corson, and OTA’S Update on East

West trade reach two conclusions regarding scientific and technical

cooperation generally. First, it has not been demonstrated that the

potential security danger to the United States of exchange programs

outweighs the benefits of maintaining open channels of communications with the U.S.S.R. Second, it is generally believed that such

passive mechanisms of technology transfer are less likely to result

in Soviet ability to absorb, diffuse, and improve on technological

acquisitions than are more active commercial channels. No study,

however, has been prepared specifically on U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space. See Scientific Communication and National SecuritJ,

op. cit.; and Technology and East- West Trade; An Update, op. cit,

Photo credit National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Visiting Soviet aerospace engineers discuss a docking

mechanism with a member of the ASTP space team

in Houston, Texas

eluded regarding international scientific and technical cooperation generally, “would weaken

American technological capabilities, because there

is no practical way to restrict international scientific communication without disrupting domestic scientific communication. ”42 These observers

believe that technology transfer concerns may be

especially exaggerated with regard to lower levels

of cooperation, where Soviet access to data,

equipment, and information can be carefully monitored. But they believe that even large-scale projects could be crafted to make technology transfer a minor concern as well.
8 6

The debate concerning the potential transfer of

militarily sensitive technology and technological

know-how so far has not been a highly visible issue in U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, because so

little interchange has been occurring, because cooperation has been on a very low level, and because technology transfer concerns have led to significant internal review and self-censorship on the

part of individual scientists and government agencies prior to formal review. Since the expiration

of the cooperative agreement in 1982, there have

been few cooperative space proposals submitted

for review, as official State Department policy is

to complete ongoing projects but not initiate new

ones. As illustrated in chapter 3, most instances

of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation to date have

consisted of exchanges of scientific data gathered

through experiments by one country or through

separate but related missions. Any expansion of

U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space will inevitably

lead to greater controversy, and technology transfer issues may be the most difficult issues to

resolve.

In space, as in many other areas of U.S.-Soviet

interchange, three issues are central to the technology transfer debates: determining how “military sensitivity” should be defined in the first

place; assigning jurisdiction among people and

agencies for making and implementing decisions;

and determining the ways sensitive technology

may or may not be used in any given cooperative exercise.

Defining Military Sensitivity

The nature of scientific or technical cooperation means that some technology transfer will always be involved in bilateral S&T exchange. But

defining what precisely may be “militarily sensitive” has proved to be an exceedingly ambiguous

exercise. As shown in the box, a number of regulatory mechanisms have been established to control the transfer of militarily sensitive technology

or information abroad. These mechanisms and

lists which specify what is “militarily critical, ”

especially in the category of “dual use” technology, have themselves become the subject of enormous controversy.
8 7

Technology Transfer Controls

Three main pieces of legislation have marked the Federal Government’s efforts to slow, if not prevent the loss of militarily sensitive technology and information since the 1940s. First, the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, as amended by the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, establishes procedures for the export of nuclear facilities, equipment, materials and technology, and deals with criteria for controlling

U.S. nuclear exports domestically and abroad. Second, the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979

is intended to limit the release of a much wider range of products, processes, and technical data to potentially adversary nations. Implemented through the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and

through a comprehensive list of products and processes known as the Commodity Control List (CCL),

the EAA remains the principal legislative instrument for controlling the flow of sensitive technology and

technical data across borders. The EAA also mandates that a “Militarily Critical Technologies List” (MCTL)

be drawn up by DOD, to assist in identifying items which maybe of significant value to potential adversaries and should be controlled. Since its expiration in 1983, however, the EAA has continued to be

administered through a Presidential Executive Order, and the MCTL remains controversial.

Finally, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 is implemented by the Department of State through

the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). These regulations control the export of military

systems and information on the basis of the Munitions Control List (MCL) maintained by the Department of State in conjunction with the Department of Defense (DOD). A revised ITAR was formally

released in January 1985. All of these regulations govern not only the export of goods or technical data

from the United States abroad, but also the access of foreign nationals to such materials and information

within the United States. A multinational committee to control the movement of militarily sensitive goods

at the international level, the Coordinating Committee for multinational export controls (CoCom), was

also established by informal agreement in 1949, and meets periodically in Paris.

In the 1980s, a number of regulations and directives have also been instituted specifically to control

the flow of data and other scientific and technical information beyond U.S. borders. Executive Order

12356, signed by President Reagan in April 1982, introduced greater stringency into the government

classification procedure, including the introduction of policies which expand the number of categories

of potentially classifiable information, allow for imposing restrictions where reasonable doubt exists,

and allow for reclassifying information previously made public. National Security Decision Directive

84 (NSDD 84), a Presidential order announced in 1983, requires, among other things, that government

employees and contractors sign lifetime nondisclosure agreements with prepublication review clauses

as a condition for access to certain categories of information. Although exceedingly controversial and

not yet issued as official policy, as of June 1985 the directive appeared to constitute unofficial policy

for the control of classified information in many areas. The 1984 Defense Authorization Act assigns

the Secretary of Defense greater authority to withhold certain kinds of unclassified technical data in

the possession or under the control of DOD. And additional proposals have been circulated within DOD

to seek broader authority to protect sensitive technical data produced by other Federal agencies (including NASA) by facilitating their transfer to DOD control. Further actions have also been taken on the

issuance of visas, other kinds of prepublication reviews, etc.

The increasing number of controls placed on scientific and technical interchange has triggered a

great deal of controversy among those who believe that increased communication in science and technology can and should be promoted without compromising U.S. national security interests. The essentially sensitive and strategic nature of both countries’ space programs suggest this will be a serious concern in determining potential areas for joint U.S.-Soviet projects in space.
88

In addition, a number of other regulations and

directives govern the transfer of space-related information to foreign nationals. On December 24,

1984, NASA issued such a “NASA Management

Instruction” to control the availability of NASA

developed or supported scientific and technical

information. The Instruction, The NASA Scientific and Technical Document Availability Authorization, provides discretionary authority for

the Administrator of NASA to protect certain unclassified data and information, parallel to authorities granted the Secretary of Defense in the 1984

Defense Authorization Act. The Instruction “establishes policies, procedures, and responsibilities

for the authorization process to assure the appropriate distribution, bibliographic processing and

announcement of availability of NASA sponsored

or authorized information, “45 to be implemented

in accordance with existing Management Instructions concerning the production and distribution

of information. It is intended to be “responsive

to administration directives to develop plans and

procedures to help stem the flow of advanced

Western space technology to the Soviet Union and

other countries. ”46

The exceedingly broad and comprehensive

range of definitions of what may be proprietary

and/or militarily sensitive technology or information has become quite controversial, often

leaving wide room for interpretation in any given

assessment. Efforts to make more precise definitions have been reflected in such exercises as the

design of a Militarily Critical Technologies List

(MCTL) by the Department of Defense to assist

in identifying items which may be of significant

value to potential adversaries and which should

be controlled. But the MCTL has been criticized

on several counts—many believe it is too long,

overly broad and comprehensive, and that it lacks

sufficient clarity and specificity to be usefull

y

applied47—and remains controversial today. More

“’’NASA Management Instruction, ” op. cit., p. 1.

4bIbid.

tpFor example,a 1982 report by the National Academy of Sciences

and the National Research Council recommended “a drastic streamlining of the MCTL by reducing its overall size to concentrate on

technologies that are trul y critical to national security, ” In, Scientific Communication and National Security, op. cit., p. 67. T he

MCTL was mandated by the Export Administration Act of 1979.

For a description of the MCTL and the controversy surroundin

g

it, see Technolog y and East- West Trade: An Update, op. cit. The

MCTL was declassified in 1984.
89

than 2 years of efforts to renew the Export Administration Act—with no agreement thus far in Congress and no coordinated Administration position—highlight the lack of consensus on how

technology exports should be controlled. This

same lack of consensus is reflected in international

cooperative programs.

Evaluating technology transfer from past cooperative efforts in space is also controversial. Experts differ over the significance of technology or

technical know-how that may have been transferred during past cooperative projects, perhaps

especially during the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.

Some observers believe that despite the low level

of interchange, the Soviets gained access to valuable command and control information and U.S.

management techniques, such as experimental

data relay systems (employed for the safety of the

astronauts), and insight into U.S. management of

highly complex systems. Others believe that the

Soviets gained little from Apollo-Soyuz that could

have been detrimental to U.S. interests. A 1980

report by the Congressional Research Service, for

example, states that there was “no evidence to date

of any harmful effects from any technological

giveaway to either side from these joint space

efforts. “48

The central role of the technology transfer issue in U.S. cooperation today with Western European allies on the space station shows how difficult an issue it could become if space cooperation

with the U.S.S.R. were to be expanded. The secretary of the backbench parliamentary space technology committee of the British House of Commons, Spencer Batiste, stated in February 1985

that the European Space Agency (ESA) views the

Pentagon’s fear of technology “leaks” to the Soviet bloc as one of the biggest problems in joint

U.S.-ESA work on the space station project.” According to Batiste, strict U.S. export controls

greatly restrict the transfer of American knowhow to its partners in the project, and could

greatly hamper European and Japanese collaboration in the project. According to press reports,

4UCRS Report to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations, GPO Report 87-389 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980).

“See Christian Tyler, “U.S. Warned on Hi-Tech Controls, ” Financial Times, Feb. 15, 1985, p. 5.

Photo credit U S Department of Defense

The extent to which space cooperation may enhance

Soviet military programs in space is the subject of

debate and presently, stringent control. The above

represents an artist’s concept of a possible Soviet

space complex with significant military applications

a recent internal West German government report

suggests that U.S. restrictions on space-related as

well as other high technology areas comprise “one

of the prickliest thorns in transatlantic relations

at the moment. ”50 The paper reportedly documents two instances of a German company being denied access to important U.S. space findings, and suggests that the whole idea of cooperation can work only if the United States eases

its restrictions. And recent disputes in the U.K.

over the possibility of using the Soviet Proton

rocket as a satellite launch vehicle for INMARSAT–

an international organization that operates communications links between ships—have highlighted the sensitivity in the West towards allowing Soviet engineers to work closely with Western

engineers involved in other militarily-sensitive

projects sharpening the definition of what may

be militarily sensitive in space without stifling

scientific inquiry will be a major challenge if U. S.-

Soviet bilateral space cooperation is expanded.
90

Delineating Responsibilities

Because of the murkiness of the definition of

sensitive space hardware and information, deciding the level of control for a particular item or

body of information is a question of judgment.

A second key issue, therefore, concerns not

only the criteria for determining what may be militarily critical, but who should make these judgment calls for instituting and implementing technology transfer controls. This question has proved

to be a very difficult one throughout the area of

export control, one which Congress has yet to

fully resolve. At a May 1985 Roundtable on National Security and Scientific Inquiry at the National Press Club, Assistant Secretary of Defense

Richard Perle suggested that much of the criticism

concerning technology transfer has little to do

with the principle of export controls, or with the

substance of those controls, but with the “scandalously inept administration of those controls

that has been characteristic of a succession of administrations.” Hearings conducted between 1982

and 1984 by Senator Nunn, Ranking Minority

Member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental

Affairs, and general debates over renewing the Export Administration Act of 1979, highlighted the

intra- and inter-agency jurisdictional disputes over

responsibility for making technology transfer determinations in various areas of commercial exports, and the particular difficulties involved in

instituting and implementing a set of controls in

the area of commercial exports to the U. S. S.R.52

Similar disagreements have occurred between

government agencies and the scientific and technical communities.

It is likely that expanded U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space would create similar conflicts, As

space activities are usually multidisciplinary, U. S.-

Soviet space cooperation inevitably creates coordination problems for various offices within the

Department of State, within and among other

agencies, and individual experts. The process for

evaluating projects is often an informal one.

52 See U.S. Congress, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Transfer of Technology (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984).

Project proposals are evaluated to assess the degree to which they may involve the transfer of

equipment, production/operational know-how,

and/or sensitive technical data or information,

first within the sponsoring agency, * and then in

formal or informal interagency meetings. Knowing the unease surrounding the subject, both scientists and individual agencies engage in a considerable degree of self-censorship before the

interagency review process begins .53 Objections

to the transfer of particular pieces of equipment

or areas of technology are sometimes resolved by

downgrading the equipment’s technical specifications or by substituting different equipment. This

informal process largely reflects the personalities

involved.

Recent experience in exceedingly low-level space

cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. space

program itself highlights the importance of clarifying procedures and responsibilities should U. S.-

Soviet space cooperation be expanded. For example, all of the participants in the VEGA mission

with whom OTA spoke underlined the enormous

problems they had working through the “maze”

of people and conflicting agencies responsible for

evaluating their proposed activities—despite the

fact that all of their proposals carried few possibilities for technology transfer and all were ultimately accepted, The overlap between military

and civilian space activities, and between NASA

and DOD responsibilities, has begun to fuel

greater tension among the defense and scientific

communities. 54 And serious concern has been expressed on the part of the scientific community

over the extent to which DOD has exercised seem-

*The overwhelming proportion of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in

space occurs through NASA. Other cooperative efforts occur, however, with the participation of other U.S. Government agencies and

individuals, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the National Science Foundation, the National Academy of Sciences (through their interacademy exchange program), and other agencies, universities, and on

an individual basis depending upon the nature of the cooperation.

NASA is the implementing agency for the intergovernmental bilateral agreement for cooperation in space.

“See, for example, Robert L. Park, “Intimidation Leads to SelfCensorship in Science, “ Bulfetin of Atomic Scientists, XLI, No. 3,

March 1985, and OTA interviews.

5dFor example, see Craig COVaUlt, “Shuttle Earth Imagery Spurs

Censorship Debate,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, CXXII,

No. 17 (Oct. 22, 1984), pp. 18-21. The literature on space cooperation has been weak in addressing the extent to which U.S. military

capabilities and responsibilities have been associated with NASA.
9?

ingly unilateral control on the communication of

certain types of scientific information. Many U.S.

participants in past space cooperation with the

U.S.S.R. have noted that proposals for larger efforts would have met with possibly “insurmountable” resistance from some parties in charge of

evaluating technology transfer concerns. This suggests that if space cooperation were to occur on

a larger or more substantive scale, these disputes

might only be magnified.

Utilization of Sensitive Technology

A third issue involves determining how sensitive technology or information can actually be

used in cooperative projects with the U.S.S.R.

Some have argued, for example, that at certain

times it may be in the U.S. interest to allow some

potentially sensitive technical know-how to be utilized. They believe that the U.S.S.R. has limited

capability for absorbing Western technology and

gaining production know-how, and they believe

that the United States may acquire valuable information in return .55 Others argue that however

limited they may be, we cannot afford to underestimate Soviet capabilities in absorbing technical information, copying U.S. technology, and incorporating particular items of technology into

their military effort even without the ability to

reproduce them. 56

Similarly, there are major differences of opinion on the issue of how well sensitive technology

necessary for particular missions can be “protected. ” As discussed in chapter 4, United States

and French planners differ regarding how effectively “black boxes” or other types of packaging

may protect potentially sensitive instrumentation

or devices. On a more individual basis, there is

also disagreement over whether briefing the Western participants prior to international symposia

or other cooperative efforts is an effective mech-

—

‘ The degree to which the U.S.S.R, can successfully assimilate

Western techn[>lt)gy has been the subject of widespread debate See

1. Hardt and 11. Gold, “The Eastern Economies, ” East- \Vest Techn(dog~’ Trander: ,4 Congrewonal Dialog Jt’ith the Reagan Adm]nisfraf](ln op cit , p. 8 3 .

“See, I(lr example, Oftice O( the Undersecretary of Defense for

Policy, Asse~sjng the Effect of Technology’ Transfer on 14~estcrn .ScJcur]t}’ -.4 Defense I’erspectj\’e, (\4’ashlngton, DC: U .S. Department

of Defense, Februam, 1985); and So\,iet Acquisitjort of 14’estern Technc~iog~” (\\’ash]ngtonrX: Central Intelligence Agency, April 1982),

anism for reducing the transfer of sensitive knowhow to the Soviet bloc. These, too, will be important considerations should U.S.-Soviet space

cooperation be significantly expanded,

In the area of national security concerns, three

issues will remain central should U. S .-Soviet cooperation in space be greatly expanded. First, it

will not be possible to gloss over concerns about

the potential transfer of militarily sensitive technology or technical know-how. Such concerns

will remain central and controversial on any level

of cooperative activity, so that U.S. policymakers

will have to address the trade-off between the potential scientific and/or foreign policy gains that

may be attained from U. S .-Soviet space cooperation, and the questions that such an interchange

might pose for national security. Any project proposal will require intense scrutiny and review, and

will undoubtedly generate controversy.

Second, any large-scale U.S.-Soviet cooperative space project could provoke reevaluation of

the ideological thrust behind the present U.S.

trend towards increased controls over exports and

the flow of information, technical data, and ideas,

The Reagan Administration has imposed more

controls over international interchange in science

and technology than its predecessors. The spirit

of openness and cooperation in which a joint projPhoto credlt OTA .Naff

OTA staff member meets with leading Soviet officials

and Academicians in Moscow during research

for this study
92

ect with the U.S.S.R. might be undertaken could

lead to calls for a re-evaluation of the line between

what is considered militarily sensitive and what

is made widely available. It could also make it

more difficult to pressure U.S. allies to be more

stringent in the area of export controls if U. S.-

Soviet cooperation is so prominent.

Finally, the mechanics of dealing with technology transfer decisions will have to be addressed.

This might require a more effective delineation

THE SOVIET APPROACH

Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in any endeavor

is a two-sided affair, and U.S. planners cannot

unilaterally make decisions concerning the

amount, type, and scope of cooperation which

should take place. Although Soviet designs and

objectives are themselves a matter of widespread

controversy in the West, OTA’S interviews in the

United States and in Moscow suggest that Soviet

perspectives on prospects for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space are generally quite different from

our own.57

Soviet official policy has always expressed, and

continues to express, a commitment to cooperation in space:

The potential value of I Soviet-American cooperation in space] seems very significant on the economic, scientific and technical plane, since the

U.S. and U.S.S.R. space programs are mutually

complementary in many of their parameters. The

significance of this cooperation would also be

great on the political psychological plane—from

the point of improving the entire atmosphere of

Soviet-American relations and ensuring trust between the people and leaders of the two great

powers .58

While there are certainly differences among Soviet scientists and planners, Soviet scientists have

shown great interest in expanding cooperative efforts with the United States, pooling knowledge

and sharing in outer space discovery. Like their

570TA interviews in Moscow, June-July 1984.

58A KokoShin, “Space-BaSed Anti-lvfissile Defense: Illusions and

Dangers, ” Moscow News, No. 23 (1984), P. 5.

of responsibilities among individuals and agencies for determining and implementing controls,

utilizing personnel with sound knowledge in both

technical and foreign policy areas to conduct such

deliberations. It might also involve a more indepth assessment of possible technology transfer

through past cooperative projects in space, the criteria used to assess such technology transfer, and

a clearer evaluation of the ways in which technology can be protected or used to U.S. advantage,

political counterparts, they emphasize that the

goals of such cooperative efforts are not only, or

even mainly, scientific, but rather are to enhance

prospects for “peaceful coexistence” on Earth and

to keep outer space as a peaceful domain.

The issue of space cooperation, however, is an

integral part of Soviet foreign policy, and its objectives extend beyond a desire for peace to competition as well.

International cooperation in the study of space

is inextricably linked with the foreign policy of

governments, and it depends on the general state

of political relations between them , . .59

The Soviet view of U.S.-Soviet relations is overshadowed by a basic competitiveness not only between two space or military programs, but between two political and social systems.

Marxist-Leninist doctrine—the ideological foundation of the U.S.S.R.—expresses an irreconcilable conflict of interest between the Socialist and

non-Socialist worlds; today, the Soviet concept

of “peaceful coexistence” represents more of a continuing struggle than a state of equilibrium, as it

is generally defined in the West. bo

Thus, Soviet political leaders have consistently

used their space program not only to enhance cooperation, but to pursue other foreign policy objectives more competitive or confrontational in

nature: using space as a propaganda tool to en59s vPetruninSovetsko-frantsuzskoe sotrudnichestvo v kos - . .

mose ( MOSCOW: “Znanie,” 1980), p. 7.

‘“See Paul H. Nitze, “Living With the Soviets, ” Foreign Affairs,

LXIII, No. 2 (winter 1984), pp. 368-369.
93

\

(n zc

(un
94

.

hance national prestige and influence; weakening

the prestige and influence of the United States by

portraying it as a threat to international peace and

security; belittling the impact of U.S. space accomplishments; and deflecting attention from the

military character of the Soviet space program

onto that of the United States.

Today, therefore, tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations are reflected in an official Soviet hard-line,

albeit somewhat ambiguous, approach towards

space cooperation with the United States. Soviet

officials consistently stress the viewpoint that past

U.S.-Soviet cooperation was beneficial, and lay

the blame for its termination squarely on the

shoulders of the United States; and yet they have

not responded officially to any recent overtures

to renew such cooperation. Despite publicity in

the United States surrounding American experiments on VEGA, the Soviet press has either

avoided mentioning or denied that there is any

U.S. participation in this mission. ” The Soviets

have consistently decried the U.S. policy of “linking” the issue of cooperation to other political

events; but they have also politicized the issue by

emphasizing the severe, if not insurmountable

constraints the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

places on initiating or renewing U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space. Official Soviet policy on space

cooperation tends to follow the overall state of

U.S.-Soviet relations.

The political dimensions of Soviet participation

in space cooperation extend to implementing the

agreements as well. Access to people and information in the U.S.S.R. is closely monitored and

controlled by the government. This has resulted

in a high level of secrecy surrounding many areas

of research and other activities, a highly compartmentalized bureaucracy, and a high degree of control placed over its citizens and scientists in all

of their interactions with foreigners.

All of these factors inevitably constrain the implementation of a U.S.-Soviet cooperative agreement in space. The high level of secrecy in the

*] See, for example, the report of a Moscow television broadcast,

“Obvious But Incredible, ” by Professor S. P. Kapitsa on the VEGA

probes, Jan. 12, 1985, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information

Service, U.S.S.R. Daily Report, Jan. 16, 1985, pp. U1-3; “Soviet

Denies U.S. Participation in Soviet Halley Mission, ” Soviet Aerospace, Jan. 7, 1985, p. 8; and Defense Daily, Jan. 8, 1985, p. 39.

U.S.S.R. is compounded in space matters by mil-

,itary domination of Soviet space activities. The

Soviet space program is run primarily by the military-the Air Force is responsible for cosmonaut

training and vehicle recovery, the Strategic Rocket

Force for conducting all space launches—and most

of the known high officials in Soviet space organizations have strong military or defense industry backgrounds and exercise dual responsibilities in civilian and military space activities. The

thoroughgoing compartmentalization of the Soviet bureaucracy, and the difficulties Soviet scientists face in meeting with foreigners—from being

allowed to travel and mix at international scientific meetings, to gaining permission to mail technical letters and papers—also greatly constrain

substantive interchange. At the same time, space

cooperation is viewed (at least as much as it is

in the United States) as an effective means for intelligence gathering and gaining insight into the

U.S. space program and Western technology.

The experience of U.S. scientists involved in

cooperation in space research has varied enormously. Some have registered surprise at the

frankness and openness with which particular Soviet institutes and individuals have shared data

and information. Others have complained that the

Soviets bring little data or information to meetings and conferences, do not send their best scientists, do not provide their papers in advance, and

often treat results as state secrets, making them

available only to a select few. Sometimes the disparity in the success or failure of individual experiences has been affected by knowledge or lack

of knowledge of the Russian language among U.S.

scientists, sometimes by personal style. More

often it has been affected by Soviet decisions or

behavior patterns which extend beyond the cooperative arrangement itself to broader aspects of

Soviet domestic or foreign policies.

In the U. S. S. R., then, the issue of U.S.-Soviet

cooperation in space is tied up with both domestic and foreign policy concerns in ways often unfamiliar to the Western observer. In a society

where ideas and contacts are tightly controlled,

foreign cooperation always implies some loss of

control, however limited, for the Soviet regime.

For this reason the Soviets tend to set the criteria

for judging the merits of cooperation very high.
95

Soviet planners seriously calculate the potential

foreign policy and technological benefits and costs

of any particular endeavor, and act accordingly.

Should U.S.-Soviet space cooperation be expanded or renewed, then, this will place upon

U.S. planners a special burden of having to be

alert to factors and attitudes affecting cooperation that are quite different from those of other

foreign partners.

. . . Soviet-American relations over the years

have been plagued by the tendency, especially on

the American side, of public and even official

opinion and expectations to fluctuate between

naive euphoria and angered disillusionment . . .

We must understand realistically, what was done,

what was not done . . .62

In pursuing renewed U.S.-Soviet cooperation in

space, the United States will be dealing not only

with an adversarial partner, but with one whose

framework for judging the gains and costs of cooperation is quite different from our own. In the

words of two participants in U.S.-Soviet cooperative efforts in space:

“See Foy D. Kohler, “An Overview of U.S.-Soviet Space Relations, ” in Dodd L. Harvey and Linda C. Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet

Cooperation in Space (Miami: Center for Advanced International

Studies, University of Miami, 1974), p. xv.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In light of conflicting currents in U.S.-Soviet

relations, balancing competing objectives and different perceptions of the U.S.S.R. will be a major challenge in determining the shape and magnitude of future U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space,

Four issues are central:

the scientific and practical benefits that can

be gained from space cooperation,

the potential transfer of militarily sensitive

technology or know-how between the two

countries,

the effect of space cooperation on foreign policy, and

perceptions about Soviet motivations and behavior and the course of U.S.

overall.

From a scientific and practical

past experience has shown that

Soviet relations

point of view,

cooperation in

When all is said and done, however, Soviet attitudes and performance, and, indeed, personal

relationships with their representatives, all have

come a long way since the early days of the International Geophysical Year . . . The prescription for the future can only be patience and persistence on both sides. b3

At the same time, we should not overlook the

vast difficulties of space cooperation in the past,

difficulties which must arise from the contrasting

roles and duties of citizens in the U.S.S.R. compared to in the United States. b4

More than in other cooperative ventures with foreign partners, U.S. policy makers will have to reconcile Soviet decisions and behavior with the

United States’ own objectives. And this will make

it all the more important for U.S. planners to sort

out precisely what U.S. objectives are. In the

words of yet another observer, “Policy, like charity, begins at home. ”65

63 Arnold W. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 120.

~~From a letter to OTA from L.J. Lanzerotti, NOV. .5, 1984.

~SJameS Cracraft, “U, S .-Sov iet Relations, ” ~u]]etin Of the Atomic

Scientists, XLI, No. 1 (January 1984), p. 8.

space can lead to substantive gains in some areas

of space research and applications, and can provide insight into the Soviet space program and

Soviet society as a whole. As discussed in chapter 3, scientists in OTA’S workshop concluded that

the scientific return from U.S. space exploration

activities could be expanded significantly by cooperation with the Soviet Union. The scientists also

suggested that cooperation be initiated with modest exchanges of solid scientific substance and that

the possibility of a large-scale mission might be

held out as a long-term goal, provided that it, too,

offered solid scientific rewards.

Past experience also suggests that technology

transfer will remain a major countervailing concern in any future space cooperation with the

U.S.S.R. Should cooperation be renewed or expanded, the challenge facing U.S. planners will
9 6

be to minimize these concerns; but concerns will

continue to arise regardless of the scale or level

of cooperation. Most people agree that caution

should be exercised against transferring militarily sensitive technology and know-how to the

U.S.S.R. The difficulties will lie in determining

what should be considered militarily sensitive,

who should be authorized to make such decisions,

and the extent to which potentially sensitive technology or know-how can be protected in any particular exercise.

Past experience, both in low level cooperation

with the U.S.S.R. and more extensive cooperation with our allies, suggests that this will be a

difficult and controversial challenge. The Soviets

have no doubt been pursuing an aggressive campaign to acquire Western technology and knowhow, particularly in the area of space systems and

technology; severely limiting cooperation in space

is one way of protecting Western security against

such efforts. But Soviet scientists are also conducting innovative and high caliber work in certain

areas of space research and applications. Overly

stringent controls could threaten the free interchange of scientific and technical ideas and information in areas complemental to, but not always

addressed in, the U.S. space program; and since

the Soviets are already cooperating with other

Western countries in space research and applications, the United States could find it increasingly

difficult to control the flow of information to the

U.S.S.R. without isolating itself from the rest of

the world space community. A key challenge,

then, will be to craft cooperative arrangements

that diminish the possibility of aiding Soviet military capabilities but that keep space cooperation

substantive and viable.

Perhaps the most difficult challenge will be to

assess how space cooperation can be effectively

used to support or further U.S. foreign policy objectives. Space cooperation, on both low and high

levels, is inherently symbolic. The main areas of

controversy concern whether space cooperation

can alter Soviet behavior, and so ease U.S.-Soviet

conflicts; and whether starting and/or stopping

space cooperation is an appropriate political symbol to underscore other U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The extent to which space cooperation can alter

Soviet behavior, and in that way reduce tension

in U.S.-Soviet relations overall, is hard to predict. One viewpoint suggests that this is entirely

plausible, and cooperation should be pursued toward this end. An opposing viewpoint suggests

that there is no reason to believe the Soviets would

alter their behavior as a result of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space and that cooperation might

even be dangerous: from this perspective, any reduction in tension would be superficial, and

would only lead the United States to lower its

guard against an adversary that uses cooperation

solely for its own purposes. In between are a range

of views, including the belief that a low level of

interchange among scientists at a working level,

removed from the realm of superpower politics,

can be the most effective way for keeping channels of communication open and reducing tensions

between the two countries in the long run. Another belief is that space cooperation has no fundamental positive or negative effect on U. S.-

Soviet relations, and must be weighed simply on

its own merit. Although there is no evidence from

past experience that space cooperation can affect

foreign policy in any far reaching way, many believe the future can be different.

Regardless of whether space cooperation can

alter Soviet behavior, another question is whether

it is smart to exploit its symbolic value to achieve

other U.S. interests. Symbolic value has always

been a key component in both the U.S. and Soviet space programs, on low as well as high levels

of cooperation. The question of whether cooperation should be initiated or terminated primarily

to pursue symbolic goals has generated a controversy of its own.

Creating a large-scale cooperative effort in

space, for example, could bring positive benefit

to the United States, by illustrating to other countries the U.S. desire to work with our adversaries

to promote peace. But it could also bring risks:

1) it may provide the U.S.S.R. with a great deal

of symbolic benefit by casting them as technological equals; and 2) should a large-scale joint project

fail, the symbolic cost could be damaging to U.S.

interests. The symbolic benefits and risks from

U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space would increase

with the size, scale, and visibility of any cooperative effort.
9 7

Similarly, severely curbing or terminating cooperation may be an appropriate symbolic measure

to show displeasure with egregious Soviet behavior, but also carries risks. U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space inevitably occurs in the context of

U.S.-Soviet relations overall, and the tendency

of U.S. policy in the past has been to utilize space

cooperation for foreign policy ends. The assumption has been that an abrupt reduction in space

cooperation can be an effective means of protesting Soviet behavior: when the Soviets do something morally reprehensible at home or abroad,

some believe the United States has a moral responsibility to respond and space cooperation is an effective way of doing so. But as this will generally result in scientific and practical losses, many

have questioned this approach, preferring other

methods of protest that show displeasure at less

cost. They believe that curtailing or terminating

space cooperation with the U.S.S.R, brings little

benefit, and in fact may harm scientific inquiry

and/or U.S.-Soviet relations overall. There is a

notable lack of agreement on how past experience

might clarify these debates, and the degree to

which past experience may be useful in assessing

potential future cooperation.

Underlying all of these viewpoints are different assumptions about Soviet objectives and behavior. The Soviet approach to cooperation has

tended to mirror its overall approach to U. S.-

Soviet relations, reflecting both an official commitment to cooperation in space, and a basic competition between the two superpowers. Soviet

leaders have consistently used their space program

not only to enhance cooperation, but also to pursue other foreign policy objectives more competitive and confrontational in nature (such as weakening the prestige and influence of the United

States while enhancing that of the U. S. S. R., and

developing a strong militarily related space capability of their own). This has led to vastly different interpretations of Soviet motivations and actions

among U.S. observers, and different interpretations of the lessons of past U.S.-Soviet cooperation. A central U.S. foreign policy challenge,

therefore, will be to assess how U.S. objectives

may be attained independent of Soviet intentions.

Because of several factors then—the conflicts

between the gains of cooperation and the risks of

technology transfer; disagreement over the relative importance of scientific and practical benefits and foreign policy goals; and possible inconsistencies among foreign policy objectives—there

will always be a multiplicity of views about EastWest cooperation in space. The ways in which

these viewpoints are reflected in policy will determine the size, shape, scope, and effectiveness

of any potential space cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

It would clearly be useful to further examine

the costs and benefits of past cooperation, as a

basis for considering the establishment, cancellation or continuation of cooperative arrangements in the future. At the same time, however,

it is important to recognize that views on how

much cooperation to pursue will necessarily reflect judgments about broader issues of world tensions, Soviet objectives, and the overall course

of U.S.-Soviet relations at least as much as they

will reflect judgments about the costs and benefits of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation itself.
Appendixes
Appendix A

U.S. Cooperative Projects in

Space Science and Applications

Launch Mission Cooperating Science/

year name countries applications Objectives

Part 1: Joint Development

1962 Airel- I

1962 Ariel-11

1978 Int’l Ultraviolet Explore r

(IUE)

1982 COSPAS/SARSAT

1983 Infrared Astronomical

Satellite (IRAS)

1984 Active Magnetospheric

Particle Tracer Explorer

(AMPTE)

1985 Space Telescope

1986 Galile o

Part 2: Hosted Experiments

1964

1965

1965

1965

1967

1967

1968

1969

1969

1969

1969

1969

1969

1971

1971

1971

1971

1971

1971

Explorer-20

Explorer-31

Alouette-II

Orbiting Geophysical

Observatory-2 11(OGO-2)

OGO-4

Orbiting Solar Observatory-4

(0S0-4)

Orbiting Geophysical

Observatory-5 (OGO-5)

OGO-6

International Satellite for

Ionospheric Studies (ISIS-I)

0S0- 5

0S0- 6

Apollo-II

Apollo-12

Ariel-IV

Barium Ion Cloud Probe

Apollo-14

Apollo-15

Ariel-IV

ISIS-II

US/UK

US/UK

USESA/UK

US/Can/Fr/USSR

Neth/US/UK

US/FRG

US/ESA

US /FRG

UKa

UKa

Can

h

Fra

Fra

UKa

U K ,

a

F r,

aNet ha

Fra

Canb

UK, a F r

a

UK, a It a

Switza

Switza

U K

b

FRGb

Switza

Switza

U K

h

Canh

s

s

s

A

s

s

s

s

A

A

A

A

A

s

s

A

A

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

A

A

Measure energy spectrum of cosmic rays,

solar x-rays

Measure galactic radio noise,

micrometeoroid flux

UV spectroscopy

Satellite-aided global search and rescue

system

Conduct IR sky survey

Study solar wind, identify particle entry

windows, energization and transport

processes into magnetosphere

High-resolution coverage of optical and UV

wavelengths

Broad investigation of Jupiter environment

Measure ion mass composition and

temperature

Measure ion mass composition and

temperature

Measure electron densities and VLF noise

Measure airglow

Measure airglow

Measure solar x-ray distribution, He

emission

Determine direction of incidence of primary

cosmic rays, density, and temp. of H in

geocorona, and CR, flux/energy spectrum

Spectrometry in airglow and aurora;

atmospheric temperature and excitation

Ionospheric sounders

Measure solar x-ray flux and self-reversal of

Lyman-Alpha line

Study solar He resonance, x-ray and gamma

radiation

Measure composition of solar wind

Measure composition of solar wind

Measure low energy proton and electron

intensities

Barium release to stimulate action of solar

wind on comet tail

Measure composition of solar wind

Measure composition of solar wind

Proton and electron densities

Ionospheric sounders

101
102

Cooperating Science/

countries applications Objectives

Launch Mission

year name

Itb

FRGa

Switza

U K

a

FRGb

FRG, a F r

a

FRG, a F r

a

U K

a

Bela

Fr, a Switz, a J ap

a

A

A

s

s

s

s

s

A

A

s

s

s

s

A

A

s

s

s

s

A

A

A

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

A

A

Density of elements in equatorial upper

atmosphere

Stratospheric height and temperature

measurements using UV

Measure composition of solar wind

Study stellar ultraviolet and x-ray emissions

(project also known as Copernicus)

Measure solar extreme UV and correlate

with upper atmosphere components

BIOSTACK I (effects of CR on selected

biosystems)

BIOSTACK II (effects of CR on selected

biosystems)

Water vapor, cloud, and atmospheric

temperature soundings

Smelting silver in space

Sky survey, distribution of galaxies and

ionized hydrogen; solar wind analysis;

and manufacturing of composite metals in

space

UV photometry and x-ray emissions

Conduct x-ray sky survey and locate sources

Measure micrometeoroid flux, study solar

x-rays and mass, and planetary orbits

Measure composition and temperature of

equatorial thermosphere

Neutral atmosphere temperature experiment

Rendezvous and docking test included joint

biological studies

BIOSTACK-111 (CR effects on biosystems),

blood electrophoresis

Eleven U.S. experiments aboard (including

centrifugation)

Spectrographic study of solar chromosphere

Applications technology satellite experiment

to measure electron content and

scintillation phenomena

Upper atmosphere temperature sounding

Broadcast experiments

Measure micrometeroid flux, study solar xrays and mass, and planetary orbits

1971 San Marcos-III

1971 Nimbus-4

1972

1972

Apollo-16

Orbiting Astronomical

Observatory-3 (OAO-3)

1972 AEROS

1972 Apollo-16

1972 Apollo-17

1972 Nimbus-5

1973

1973

Skylab

Skylab

Nethb

U K

b

FRGb

Itb

FRGb

US/USSR

FRGa

USSRb

Fra

Indiaa

1974 Astronomical Netherlands

Satellite (ANS)

Ariel-V

Helios-1

1974

1974

1974 San Marcos-III-2

AEROS-B

Apollo-Soyuz Test Project

(ASTP)

Apollo-18 (U.S. ASTP Craft)

1974

1975

1975

1975 Cosmos 782

0S0- 8

Radio Beacon

1975

1975

1975 Nimbus- 6

1976 Communications Technology

Satellite (CTS)

1976 Helios-2

UKa

Can

b

FRGb

ESA,

a Fr,a FRG, a

Switz, a U K

a

ESAb

1977 Int’1 Sun-Earth Explorer-1

(ISEE-1)

Coordinated spacecraft studiedmagnetosphere, interplanetary

their interaction

Coordinated spacecraft studied

magnetosphere, interplanetary

their interaction

Seven US biological experiments

space, and

space, and

1977 ISEE-2

1977 Cosmos 936

1978 ISEE-3 (NASA Heliocentric

Mission)

1978 Pioneer Venus-2

1978 Cosmos 1129

1978 TIROS- N

USSRb

FRG,

a Fr,a Neth,a U KC1

FRG, a F r

a

USSRb

Fra

UKa

Solar wind composition, behavior and

mapping; comet flyby

Atmospheric and cloud studies of Venus

Fourteen U.S. biological experiments

Demonstrate Satellite Data Collection

System (ARGOS)

1978 Nimbus-7 Stratospheric and mesospheric sounding
703

Launch Mission Cooperating Science/

countries applications Objectives

Fr,

a D kd

Japanh

US-Neth-UK a

Japa,Itb

USSRb

year

1979

name

s

s

s

s

s

s

A

A

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

A

A

A

A

s

A

A

A

A

A

High Energy Astronomical Study galactic CR composition

Observatory-3 (HEAO-3)

Hakucho

Solar Maximum Mission

(SMM)

Spacelab-l

San Marco-D/L

Optical and radio observations of x-ray stars

Solar hard x-ray imaging spectrometry

1979

1980

1983

1983 Effects of solar activity on meteorological

processes

U.S. providing medical research devices for

primate mission; U.S. biological

experiments

Atmosphere/ ionosphere electrodynamics

Demonstrate emergency signal receiver

Shuttle mid-deck study of hemoagglutination

under microgravity

Galactic x-ray imaging and determination of

He abundance in solar corona

Investigations of space environment and

effects

Multi-parameter characterization of

cometary environment

Study solar/galactic CR ionization states

“Space Sled” to conduct neurophysiology

research

Observations of sun and interplanetary

medium out of the ecliptic plane

X-ray sky survey and sources study

Wide-range gamma ray detection

1983 Cosmos-1514

Itb

Can ,

a F ra

Aus a

UKa

FRG,

a US-Ire-ESA; a

Switz, a UK; Fra

ESAa

India’

US/Canb

ESAb

FRG-US-UK~

FRGa

1983

1983

1984

San Marcus-D/ L

SARSAT

Blood Rheology Experiment

1984 Spacelab-2

1984 Long-Duration-Exposure

Facility (LDEF)

1985 Giotto

Spacelab-3

Spacelab-D-l

1985

1985

1986 Int’1 Solar Polar Mission

(ISPM)

Roentgen-Satellite (ROSAT)

Gamma Ray Observatory

(GRO)

1987

1988

Venus gravity and atmospheric tides

I-m optical /UV telescope for deployment on

Shuttle or free flying platform

Venus Radar Mapper (VRM) Fr a

Starlab US-Aus-Cana

1988

1989

Part 3: Collaborative data collection analysis

1961 Compare weather photographs and ground

observations

Experiments using US passive

communications satellite, antennas at

Soviet facility

Laser and optical observation of US and

French satellites

Analyze data obtained by laser tracking of

US and French satellites

Analyze lunar materials returned by Apollo

missions

Coordinate sea, air, and space collection of

microwave measurement data

Determine feasibility of aircraft and satellite

operation in L-band

TIROS

Echo-2

US/(42 others)

1962 US / USSR

Int’1. Satellite Geodesy

Experiment (ISAGEX)

GEOS/PAGEOS

US/COSPAR

US/Fr

US (21 others)

US/USSR

US /Can/ ESA

1964

1966

1969

1972

1974

Lunar sample studies

Bering Sea Experiment

Position Location and

Communication Experiment

(PLACE)

Large Area Crop Inventory

Experiment (LACIE)

ARGOS

US Can USSR

US Fr

Collect ‘compare agricultural remote sensing

and ground truth data

Collect environmental data from surface

platforms via satellites equipped with

French detectors

Stage search and rescue incident using ATS6 satellite

1974

1974

1975 Search and Rescue US/Can/FRG/ESA
104

Launch Mission

—

year name

1975

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1979

1980

1980

1980

1980

1981

1981

1982

1982

1982

1982

1983

1983

1985

1985

Satellite Instructional

Television Experiment

(SITE)

Advanced Satellite for

Interdisciplinary

Communications (SACI)

Int’1 Applications

Demonstration (AIDSAT)

ISEE

Applications Explorer

Mission-A

Ocean Dynamics Study

Project

Cloud Height Study Project

Winds and Waves Study

Project

Snow Properties Study

Project

Evaporation Study Project

SMM/Astro-A Collaborative

Observations Program

Agronomic Radiometry

Research Project

Shuttle multispectral infrared

radiometer (SMIRR)

Agronomic Remote Sensing

Activities

Satellite laser tracking data

project

Crustal Dynamics Study

COSPAS/SARSAT

Int’1. Satellite Cloud

Climatology Project

(ISCCP)

Spacelab-1

Halley Missions

VEGA

Cooperating Science/

countries applications Objectives

US/India

US/Bra

US/(27 others)

US/ESA

US/ESA

US/Jap

US/Jap

US/Jap

US/Jap

US/Jap

US/Jap

US/Mex

US/ Mex/Sp/Egy

US/Aus

US/Jap

US/ Fr/It/FRG/Neth/Isr

US/ Can/Fr/USSR/UK/

Nor/ Swe/Bul/Fin

US/Jap/ India

ESA/US

ESA/USSR/Japan/US

US/Fr

A

A

A

s

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

s

s

s

Broadcast of programs to remote Indian

villages via ATS-6 satellite

Broadcast of educational programs to

Brazilian students via ATS-6

Broadcast programs to 27 developing

countries

Coordinated spacecraft studied

magnetosphere, interplanetary space, and

their interaction

Study earth surface/subsurface phenomena

Relate Seasat data regarding ocean surface

features to measured subsurface features

Stereographic measurements of cloud height

by US and Japanese satellites

Correlation of Seasat data with sea surface

truth data

Using satellite and surface truth data,

explore use of satellites in determining

snow characteristics

Using satellite and surface truth data,

explore use of satellites in estimating

evaporation

Coordinated observation/data analysis of

solar flares from 2 spacecraft

Study electromagnetic radiation

characteristics of grains via satellite and

ground truth data

Verify SMIRR data with ground truth data

Estimate crop production via satellite and

ground truth data

Joint laser tracking

Satellite laser ranging (US and French

satellites) to determine plate tectonics,

polar motion, and earth rotation

Demonstrate global search and rescue

system

Collect cloud climatology data via global

satellite coverage

Multinational experiments include biology,

medicine, botany, astronomy, and solar

physics

Spacecraft and mission design are being

coordinated for ESA’s Giotto, USSR’s

Vega (2), and Japan’s Planet-A. US

providing tracking and coordinating

ground-based and near-Earth observations

Track French balloons in Venus’ atmosphere

and determine position/velocity using

very long baseline interferometry
105

Launch Mission Cooperating Science /

year name countries applications Objectives

1985 Int’1 Halley Watch US/ (8 others) s Coordinate ground-based observations of

Halley’s Comet

1988 Mobile Satellite (MSAT) US/Can A Two-way voice data communication with

mobile users

1989 Int’1. Solar-Terrestrial Physics USA/ESA/Jap s Coordinated solar-terrestrial physics

(ISTP) Program measurement using 9 spacecraft

‘F(>relgn experiment [ t(~retgn [) 1 ) on L] S m lssl(~n

bu s ~xperlment c~n }tJre18n spacecraft

NOTES ~ 1 ) Table Includes ~lnly pr<jjec ti lnvolv]ng spacecraft It d(les not Include cot~peratlve v~uncilng r(~ckct, ballm~n, and gr(~uncibc]w,cl prt))ect5, al~~~ ex[ Iucieci

are Inc ]cien ts [)1 data exchange ot launch services t~nly

f z I Tab]e ,nc lucie~ , n the ‘a~e ~J} fu [ure m]s\l(~n5 (~nl} th(~w (~lf lcla]]>, approved .

t 3 I klul t]lateral ](~lnt ~entures amt~ng F,SA member countries are cons] ciered as ESA missions Hc~we\er, nat lona] pr~>lec t ac t]\,]t IL+ In i( ~1~.lng ESA members

w!th n{~n ESA c (~un trle+ drc c onslciereci a5 national cm~perat lie ventures

(LI ) l-r = France, L’K = Llnlted Klngdt~m, It = Italy Swltz = Switzerland , I-R(; = Federal Republic (~t German), Neth = ~etherlanti~

Aus = Au\tral]a [IL = Denmark lre = Ireland, Bet = Belglum Nlcx = Nlex]ct), Spa = SpaIn. Eg> = Egvpt Bra = Bra711 N(>r = X(>rm dl

Sme = $v~ecltn Bul = [3ul~arla, F]n = F]nlancl Iw = Israel, C“OS1’iAR = C(~mmlttee on Space Rc+earc h
Appendix B

Text of Public Law 98-562,

Originally Senate Joint Resolution 236,

and Presidential Statement

Ninety-eighth Congrcss of the United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the twenty-third day of January,

one thousand nine hundred and eighty-four

Joint Resolution

Relating to cooperative East-West ventures in space.

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union could soon find

themselves in an arms race in space, which is in the interest of no

one;

Whereas the prospect of an arms race in space between the United

States and the Soviet Union has aroused worldwide concern

expressed publicly by the governments of many countries;

Whereas the 1972-1975 Apoll0-Soyuz project involving the United

States and the Soviet Union and culminatin g with a joint docking

in space was successful, thus proving the practicability of a joint

space effort;

Whereas, shortly after the completion of the Apollo-Soyuz project,

and intended as a followup to it the United States and the Soviet

Union signed an agreement to examine the feasibility of a Shuttle-Salyut program and an international space platform program,

but that initiative was allowed to lapse;

Whereas the United States signed a five-year space cooperation

agreement with the Soviet Union in 1972, renewed it in 1977, then

chose not to renew it in 1982;

Whereas the United States recently proposed to the Soviet Union

that the two Nations conduct a joint simulated space rescue

mission;

Whereas the Soviet Union has not yet responded to the subs-cc of

this proposal; and

Whereas the opportunities offered by space for prodigious achievements in virtually every field of human endeavor, leading ultimately to the colonization of space in the cause of advancing

human civilization, would probably be lost irretrievably were

space to be made into yet another East-West battleground: Now,

therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representutives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled That the President should—

(1) endeavor, at the earliest practicable date, to renew the

1972-1977 agreement between the United States and the Soviet

Union on space cooperation for peaceful purposes;

(2) continue energetically to gain Soviet agreement to the

recent United States proposal for a joint simulated space rescue

mission; and

106
107

(3) seek to initiate talks with the Government of the Soviet

Union, and with other governments interested in space activities, to explore further opportunities for cooperative East-West

ventures in space including cooperative ventures in such areas

as space medicine and space biology, planetary science, manned

and unmanned space exploration.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate
108

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 30, 1984

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I am today signing Senate Joint Resolution 236, relating to cooperative East-West

ventures in space.

Space represents a challenging opportunity for the United States and for ail of

mankind; a challenge that, I am determined, we will meet. We stand today on the

threshold of a great adventure. Beyond are vast opportunities — for the production of

new materials, new medicines, and the expansion of our knowledge of the universe and of

ourselves.

This must be a cooperative effort. We have worked with many other nations in our

own space program and this cooperation will strengthen and grow. Many countries have

taken part in the successful spacelab program, and I have invited other nations to take

part in the development of a space station.

I find portions of the language contained in the preamble to the Joint Resolution

very speculative. However, I have stated several times our desire to increase contacts

with the Soviet Union, and we are prepared to work with the Soviets on cooperation in

space in programs which are mutually beneficial and productive. As part of this effort,

the United States has offered to carry out with the Soviet Union a joint simulated space

rescue mission. We believe this and similar cooperative programs offer practical

benefits for all mankind. It is in that spirit that I today sign this Joint Resolution.
Appendix C

COSPAS/SARSAT: A Brief Case Study

Description of the

COSPAS/SARSAT System

COSPAS/SARSAT is an international cooperative

program to demonstrate the use of satellite technology to detect and locate aircraft or vessels in distress.

The United States, Canada, France, and the U.S.S.R.

developed the system, based on a “Memorandum of

Understanding” which was signed in 1979 and entered

into effect in 1980. * Since that time five more countries—Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, and Bulgaria—have become participants. Brazil and Denmark are expected to join in the near future.

There are four participating U.S. agencies: the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

administers the system; the Coast Guard and Air Force

are referred to as “user agencies;” and the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts technical evaluation and support. COSPAS is

administered by the Soviet Merchant Marine

(MORFLOT).

The acronym COSPAS refers to the Soviet component of the system (from the Russian for “Space System for the Search of Vessels in Distress”), SARSAT

is the joint U. S .-Canadian-French component (from

Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking). The

project involves the use of multiple satellites to detect

distress signals emitted on the ground by emergency

transmitters aboard ships and aircraft in distress. The

signals received by a satellite are relayed to a network

of dedicated ground stations where the location of the

emergency is determined by measuring the Doppler

shift of the signal as received by the satellite. This information is then relayed to the appropriate search and

rescue forces in the country nearest the emergency

location.

The system thus consists of a number of separate

but

●

●

●

linked components:

Transmitters: Emergency Locator Transmitters

(ELTs) aboard aircraft in distress, and Emergency

Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs)

aboard marine craft.

Satellites: Detectors are mounted on U.S. NOAA

and Soviet Cosmos satellites occupying mediumaltitude, near-polar orbits to maximize coverage

and detection sensitivity of the system.

Local User Terminal (LUT): Dedicated ground

stations within each participating country that re-

‘The agencle< that ~lxned the ‘hlemt~rancium t>f Llnderstandlng wer e

(Jnlted State\ NASA, Canada I)epartment ot Communlcatl(,n. (DOC ~;

France Centre National d Etucies Spat]ale\ (CNES 1, and the Sov]et LJnl(~n

Mln]stry ot Nlerchant Llarlne ( FvIORFI.OT ) A COSI’AS SARSAT Coordlnatlng Group ( CSCC ) was established to manage the ] [)mt eftort+

●

●

r..

ceive satellite signals and perform initial processing.

Mission Control Center (MCC): Data are relayed

by the LUTS to the MCC, which is responsible

for system control within that country as well as

for coordination with MCCS of other nations.

Rescue Coordination Center (RCC): The RCC is

alerted by the MCC, and is responsible for coordinating the actions of local search and rescue

forces.

Figure C-1 illustrates a COSPAS satellite. Figure C-2

depicts the various components of the COSPAS/

SARSAT system and their interrelationships.

Within this general system, two experiments are being performed. The first is directed at aircraft and vessels equipped with commercially available emergency

transmitters operating at 121.5 and 243 MHz. Signals

emitted by these transmitters are relatively weak, and

their frequency and modulation characteristics are not

ideal for detection by spacecraft. The transmitters,

however, are widely used and therefore offer the opportunity to test the concept in actual emergency situations.

The second experiment uses transmitters designed

especially for satellite detection and operating at 406

MHz. These systems have been used successfully in

meteorological data collection for many years, and in

a number of SAR-type experiments. The 406 M H z

transmitters have higher power and better frequency

stability than current off-the-shelf emergency transmitters, and the frequency itself was designated at the

Figure C-1 .—Soviet COSPAS Satellite

Soviet COSPAS satellite, as displayed at 1985 Paris Air Show

SOURCE Charles P Vick, 1985

109
110

Figure C-2.— Basic Operational Configuration of the COSPAS/SARSAT System Components

EP

Distressed Unit s

SOURCE NOAA

Emergency Locator Transmitter

Emergency Position Indicating

Radio Beacon

Local User Terminal

Mission Control Center \

World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) of

1979 for use in satellite-aided emergency communication worldwide.

Unlike the 121.5/243 units, these 406 MHz transmitters can include in their data message information on

the type of aircraft or vessel, its identification and

country of origin, the nature of the emergency or

elapsed time since an accident, and even the location

of the emergency. In addition, some of the signal processing can be performed by an onboard processor and

either relayed to the LUT in real-time or stored for later

transmission. This feature not only simplifies the

ground operations but also eliminates the requirement

for simultaneous visibility to the satellite of both the

emergency signal source and the LUT while a signal

is being relayed. As a result, full global coverage can

be achieved with a smaller number of lower cost LUTS.

To accommodate both experiments simultaneously,

two data systems and two coverage models are employed in COSPAS/SARSAT. A “repeater data system” relays received signals directly to the LUT for

processing, while a “processed data system” is utilized

to process and relay, as well as store and later transmit, the 406 MHz data. The first type of system permits regional (line-of-sight) coverage. The latter system provides a global coverage capability, since signals

received when no LUT is in view can be stored until

the satellite can transmit directly to an LUT.

The key to the effectiveness of the repeater system—especially in remote regions—is the number of

LUTS. There are currently three of these stations in

the United States, three in the U. S. S. R., and one each

in Canada, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom.

Each participating country has one MCC, with the
111

m

iA

I
112

U.S. MCC acting as the single point of contact for all

SARSAT parties in coordinating system operations

with the COSPAS MCC. Figure C-3 depicts the geographical layout of COSPAS/SARSAT ground components.

Demonstration and Evaluation

The first COSPAS satellite (Cosmos 1383) was

placed in orbit in June 1982, followed in March 1983

by the first SARSAT satellite (NOAA-8) and a second Soviet satellite (Cosmos 1447). In June 1984

NOAA-8 prematurely failed; in the same month the

Soviets added a third satellite, Cosmos 1574, to the

system, NOAA-9, the newest U.S. addition, was

placed in orbit in December 1984. Thus, the SARSAT

system has relied heavily (and often exclusively) on

Soviet satellites. The next four NOAA satellites will

be equipped with SARSAT instruments, and two additional COSPAS satellites have already been built.

The goal is to provide four-satellite coverage throughout the 1980s.

When system effectiveness had been adequately

demonstrated, COSPAS/SARSAT began initial operational status; a new Memorandum of Understanding

to that effect was signed by the participating nations

in October 1984. This agreement establishes a commitment to provide operational services on the basis

of the actual operating capability of the system

through 1990. Authority for U.S. leadership in the program was transferred from NASA to NOAA at that

time.

As a new initiative, the United States is now planning to put SARSAT equipment on future U.S. geostationary meteorological satellites. These satellites will

provide instant alert capability for 406 MHz beacons

in the Western hemisphere. The polar-orbiting NOAA

satellites will continue to provide location of incidents

and alert for 121.5 and 243 MHz beacons, as well as

406 MHz beacons not in the line of sight of the geostationary satellites.

Performance and Prospects

Thus far, the performance of the combined satellite/

ground system has been effective. NASA officials report that “target” levels of locating accuracy have been

achieved at both experimental wavelengths (i.e., 20 km

at 121 MHz, and 2.5 km at 406 MHz), and sensitivity

of reception is good. For example, even though the

ELTs and EPIRBs transmit a signal no stronger than

that of a garage-door opener, about 85 percent of the

transmissions are detected on the first pass of the satellite.

Technical problems remain, but these generally have

not stemmed from the COSPAS/SARSAT system itself. For example, illegal interference on the 406 MHz

frequency (mostly in Europe) has been a continual

problem, but strict enforcement is now reducing this

interference. A 98 percent false alarm rate on the

121.5/243 MHz frequency—the result of faulty or

damaged transmitters that operate intermittently without being turned on—has also been a major problem.

Improved unit designs, however, are beginning to reduce false alarms. In the meantime, the strategy has

been to wait until a signal is received on two successive passes and, if possible, to verify the information

with Coast Guard, Civil Air Patrol, or other reports.

As of April 1985, approximately 374 people have been

saved from both aircraft and ships by rescue operations facilitated by the COSPAS/SARSAT system. Table C-1 shows a breakdown of rescues by country and

category through October 17, 1984.

The COSPAS/SARSAT system has been successful because it consists of two separate projects joined

because of their common objectives. SARSAT was

originally a cooperative project involving the United

States, Canada, and France. COSPAS reflects a Soviet interest to develop a system compatible with

SARSAT, especially for use in the maritime fleet. The

systems are not dependent on one another, yet they

are mutually supportive in providing wider and more

frequent coverage, and permitting a faster response

time for emergencies. The coordination of spacecraft

characteristics permits interoperability among the various satellites and ground stations, while coordinating launch dates and orbital parameters provides optimal coverage across time. The recent failure of

NOAA-8 demonstrated the importance of the backup

provided by satellites of other countries.

At the same time, security concerns seem to be minimized by the nature of the COSPAS/SARSAT operation. However sensitive the technology involved may

Table C-1 .—Total Rescues to Oct. 17, 1984

Incidents Persons

United States:

Aeronautical incidents . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Maritime incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Canada:

Aeronautical incidents . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Maritime incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Europe:

Aeronautical incidents . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Maritime incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

85

71

47

7

22

77

312a

aTotal includes three hikers, not reflected In “incidents” column

SOURCE NOAA data.
113

be, z the fact that COSPAS and SARSAT are two separate systems has led to little, if any, direct interaction with the U.S.S.R. other than the communication

between MCCs and the periodic planning meetings.

Agreements have been made concerning broadcast frequencies, but no U.S. assistance has been provided,

for example, in the development of non-U. S. ground

stations, and no technology has been exchanged between the two systems.

While the COSPAS/SARSAT system boasts a significant number of rescues, it should be pointed out that

none of those rescued have been Soviet or East bloc

citizens. This is due to the fact that the Soviet Union

does not routinely carry operational ELTs/EPIRBs on

its own aircraft/ships at this time. By contrast, the

United States alone has emergency locator transmitters on more than 200,000 civilian aircraft and 6,000

ships.

Regarding the cooperative interaction itself, however, participants report that there has been a “spe2

Technlcal areas of potential mllltary sens]tlv]ty include such areas as information on signal frequencies and formats; satellite-mounted receivers, processors, and transmitters, ground-based data processing and communications

capabilltles, and spaceaaft orblta] ephemeris and general performance data

cial spirit” in the project. Due largely to its humanitarian and multilateral nature, interaction between the

SARSAT and COSPAS elements of the system has

gone smoothly despite some ups and downs in launchings and funding, and despite negative events in U. S.-

Soviet relations which have resulted in the termination of other space activities. For example, although

the number of U.S. SARSAT satellites has fallen below the number planned–the U.S.S.R. has launched

three satellites to the United States’ two, and for a considerable period of time the system relied entirely on

the Soviet satellites-cooperative activity has not appeared to suffer, even in light of the recent highly publicized debate in the United States over whether one

or two (SARSAT-equipped) polar satellites should be

funded. 3 Many observers have construed the COSPAS/

SARSAT experience as an indication that U.S.-Soviet

cooperation can be useful and viable in space activities with a practical purpose, equitable sharing of costs,

and for the benefit of many people and countries.

‘See, for example, “US WIII Negotiate With %lvlets on Search and Rescue Satellite, ” Awatlon L$’eek and Space Technologjr, VOI CXXI, No 13 (Sept

24, 1984), p. 22

0