Filed 6/25/24 P. v. Lane CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TALAL HANSEAN LANE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D083331

 (Super. Ct. No. SCN423383)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Daniel F. Link and James E. Simmons Jr., Judges. Affirmed.

Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, 

Daniel Rogers and Vincent P. LaPietra, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Talal Hansean Lane guilty of driving under the influence 

of drugs causing injury. During a pre-trial hearing, the trial court denied
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Lane’s motion under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) to 

substitute appointed counsel. We resolve this matter by memorandum 

opinion and affirm. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002) 

97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851-854.) 

We review the denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of discretion. (See 

People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696 (Smith).) “[T]he decision whether 

to permit a defendant to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute 

another attorney during the trial is within the discretion of the trial court, 

and a defendant has no absolute right to more than one appointed attorney.”

(Marsden, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) Relief is available when appointed counsel 

fails to provide “adequate representation” or defendant and counsel have 

“such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to 

result.” (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 854.)

We discern four arguments by Lane.

First, at the Marsden hearing Lane contended counsel did not 

communicate with him until two weeks before trial. Lane and counsel agreed 

they had steady communication during the two weeks preceding trial, but 

disagreed about the level of communication in the months prior. Lane 

claimed counsel would not return his calls. However, counsel informed the 

court that he made himself “very accessible” to Lane by regularly answering

his calls or calling him back the same day, and “responding to his emails.”

The court explained to Lane that he could expect adequate legal 

representation whether or not he received individualized attention from his 

appointed counsel.

Although Lane interprets the court’s comment to mean that he could 

not expect “real representation” because his attorney was appointed rather 

than retained, we disagree. Rather, the court accurately indicated that an 
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attorney’s conduct does not fall below the standard of care by not 

immediately addressing each of the defendant’s concerns or walking the 

defendant through each step of the process. (See People v. Ferenz (2024) 

99 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1040-1041 (Ferenz).) Indeed, a defendant’s complaint of

not being “able to speak with counsel as often as [defendant] would have 

liked” does not sufficiently establish incompetence. (People v. Valdez (2004) 

32 Cal.4th 73, 96.) Under the circumstances here, the court did not abuse its 

discretion in concluding that Lane’s perceived lack of communication did not

indicate irreconcilable conflict.

Second, Lane contended his disagreement with counsel’s trial tactics 

warranted substitution of counsel. Specifically, he was dissatisfied with

counsel’s unwillingness to assist in (1) expunging a prior conviction to 

eliminate a strike offense and (2) amending a police report.

“[A] disagreement between a defendant and appointed counsel 

concerning trial tactics [does not] necessarily compel the appointment of 

another attorney.” (People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905.) “When a 

defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is 

‘captain of the ship’ and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the 

defendant.” (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 376.)

Here, counsel had explained to Lane that his request to seek 

expungement was not “‘a viable request [then]’ because he ha[d] open cases,” 

and generally expungement would not eliminate strike offenses. (See People 

v. Daniels (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 520, 525-526; Pen. Code, § 1203.4.) Counsel

also explained he had never heard of a police report being successfully

amended to reflect trial testimony. He instead focused on defending Lane in

the upcoming jury trial. We need not discuss whether any of Lane’s collateral 

requests would have been successful because counsel’s explanation for his
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tactical decision to focus on trial preparation sufficiently demonstrated that 

Lane received adequate representation. (See People v. Orey (2021) 

63 Cal.App.5th 529, 568-569.) We agree with the People that while counsel 

did not do everything Lane wanted from a tactical standpoint, their 

disagreements did not create an irreconcilable conflict. 

Third, Lane contended counsel’s use of “heated words” the “first time” 

they spoke on the phone signaled a complete breakdown in the relationship.

Lane described a phone call in which counsel “yelled at me and he told me, 

‘[d]idn’t I tell you I’ll call you when it’s time for me to talk to you?’” However,

“heated words . . . alone do[ ] not require a substitution of counsel absent an 

irreconcilable conflict.” (Smith, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696.) After this initial phone 

call, Lane and counsel continued communicating over the phone and email;

counsel further asserted he did not have a problem with Lane and was 

competently ready for trial.

Finally, while Lane contends all three of his specific complaints 

collectively signal a complete breakdown in relationship, we disagree. The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lane’s Marsden motion

because his meritless complaints collectively do not amount to an 

irreconcilable conflict. (See Ferenz, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1041.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.