[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-10043

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

BYRON JAMAAL BROWN, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Respondents-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cv-00465-TPB-SPF

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-10043

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Byron Brown, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of 

his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus as timebarred by the one-year statute of limitations established by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”). He argues that his § 2254 petition was timely.

1

 After 

review, we vacate the district court’s opinion and remand the case 

for further proceedings.

1

We granted Brown a certificate of appealability on the following issue:

Whether the district court erred in determining that Brown’s 

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a) motion, filed on March 1, [2012], did 

not toll the limitation period under [AEDPA], 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1), because it was not “properly filed” within the 

meaning of the AEDPA. 

We are limited to the issues specified in the certificate of appealability. See 

McClain v. Hall, 552 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008) (“In an appeal brought 

by an unsuccessful habeas petitioner, appellate review is limited to the issues 

specified in the certificate of appealability.” (alteration adopted) (quotation 

omitted)). We thus do not consider Brown’s arguments that relate to the 

merits of the substantive claim that he sought to litigate in his § 2254 

petition, as that issue is beyond the scope of the certificate of appealability. 

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20-10043 Opinion of the Court 3

I. Background 

In June 2010, Brown pleaded guilty to Florida robbery with 

possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 25 years’ 

imprisonment followed by 15 years’ probation. Florida’s Second 

District Court of Appeal summarily affirmed Brown’s conviction 

and sentence on direct appeal on October 7, 2011. Brown v. 

State, 75 So. 3d 1252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (table).2

On March 1, 2012, Brown filed a motion to correct illegal 

sentence, under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a),

3 in the trial court. On 

May 14, 2012, the trial court dismissed the motion without 

prejudice, concluding it was facially insufficient because it “failed 

to affirmatively allege that the error appear[ed] on the face of the 

2 Following issuance of the DCA’s opinion in his direct appeal, Brown filed a 

“motion for rehearing, clarification, and request for written opinion,” but 

Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal struck the motion as untimely. It 

is undisputed that this filing did not toll the federal limitations period. See 

Chavers v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 468 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006)

(The 90-day period for seeking certiorari review of a conviction “runs from 

the date of entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, not from 

the issuance of the mandate (or its equivalent under local practice).” (quoting 

Sup. Ct. R. 13.3)); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) 

(“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end 

of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” (quotations omitted)).

3 Under Rule 3.800(a), “[a] court may at any time correct an illegal sentence 

imposed by it . . . when it is affirmatively alleged that the court records 

demonstrate on their face an entitlement to that relief . . . .” Fla. R. Crim. P. 

3.800(a)(1).

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4 Opinion of the Court 20-10043

record, and how and where the record demonstrate[d] 

entitlement to relief.”4

 

On May 30, 2012, Brown filed a second Rule 3.800(a) 

motion in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion on 

the merits on November 27, 2012. Brown appealed, the state 

appellate court affirmed, and the mandate issued on December 

26, 2013. 

On April 4, 2014, Brown filed a third Rule 3.800(a) motion 

in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion as successive, 

the state appellate court affirmed that denial, and the mandate 

issued on January 22, 2016. 

Meanwhile, on January 20, 2016, while the appeal from the 

denial of his third Rule 3.800(a) motion was pending, Brown filed 

a fourth Rule 3.800(a) motion in the trial court. The trial court 

denied the motion, the state appellate court affirmed, and the 

mandate issued on August 8, 2016. 

Subsequently, on February 22, 2017, Brown filed a federal 

habeas petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The State moved

to dismiss the § 2254 petition as time-barred, asserting that 

Brown’s first Rule 3.800(a) motion did not toll the federal statute 

of limitations period because it was not “properly filed” as it failed 

to “affirmatively allege[] that the court records demonstrate[d] on 

4 The state court held in the alternative that Brown was not entitled to relief 

on the merits of the motion. 

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20-10043 Opinion of the Court 5

their face an entitlement to relief.” (quotation omitted). 

Therefore, Brown’s instant § 2254 petition was untimely because 

it was filed outside AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations after 

accounting for all of the applicable tolled periods during the state 

proceedings. The district court determined without further 

explanation that the State “correctly calculate[d] the limitation, 

which show[ed] that the [§ 2254 petition] [was] untimely.” The 

district court denied a certificate of appealability, but Brown 

obtained one on the timeliness issue from this Court. This appeal 

followed. 

II. Discussion 

Liberally construing Brown’s pro se brief,5 he argues that 

his § 2254 petition was timely, and the district court erred in 

concluding otherwise. 

“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas 

petition as untimely.” Chavers v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 468 

F.3d 1273, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Under AEDPA, § 2254 petitions are governed by a one-year 

statute of limitations period that begins to run on, as relevant 

here, “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). A state 

5 “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted 

by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 

350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).

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6 Opinion of the Court 20-10043

prisoner’s conviction generally becomes final when the Supreme 

Court denies certiorari or issues a decision on the merits, or when 

the 90-day period in which to file a certiorari petition expires. Nix 

v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 393 F.3d 1235, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 

2004). The 90-day period for seeking certiorari review of a 

conviction runs from the date of entry of the judgment sought to 

be reviewed, not from the issuance of the mandate. Chavers, 468 

F.3d at 1275. 

 Additionally, the one-year federal limitations period is 

statutorily tolled during times in which a “properly filed 

application” for state post-conviction relief is pending. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2). A state post-conviction motion remains pending for 

the time during which the petitioner could have appealed from 

the trial court’s ruling, even if the petitioner does not seek 

appellate review.6

 Cramer v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 461 F.3d 1380, 

1383 (11th Cir. 2006). If an appeal is taken, a post-conviction 

motion remains pending until issuance of the mandate by the 

state appellate court. Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th 

Cir. 2000). 

In this case, Brown’s conviction and sentence became final 

on January 5, 2012, when the 90-day window for filing a certiorari

petition in the United States Supreme Court from the Second 

Circuit’s decision in his direct appeal expired. Nix, 393 F.3d at 

6 Under Florida law, a state prisoner has 30 days to appeal an order 

dismissing or denying a Rule 3.800(a) motion. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)(4).

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20-10043 Opinion of the Court 7

1236–37. At that time, the federal one-year statute of limitations 

for filing a timely § 2254 petition started running. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). Fifty-six days later, Brown filed his first Rule 

3.800(a) motion on March 1, 2012, which the trial court dismissed

on May 14, 2012. The timeliness of Brown’s § 2254 petition turns 

on whether the first Rule 3.800(a) motion was “properly filed” 

within the meaning of AEDPA, and thus tolled the federal 

limitations period. If it was “properly filed,” then Brown’s § 2254 

petition was timely. On the other hand, if it was not properly 

filed, then Brown’s § 2254 petition was untimely.

The State maintains that the first Rule 3.800(a) motion was 

not “properly filed” and therefore did not toll the federal 

limitations period because Rule 3.800(a) contains a pleading 

requirement that the motion “affirmatively allege[] that the court 

records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to that relief,” 

see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a). The State contends that the pleading 

requirement is a condition for filing. 

In Artuz v. Bennett, the Supreme Court rejected an 

argument that “an application for state postconviction or other 

collateral review is not ‘properly filed’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) 

unless it complies with all mandatory state-law procedural 

requirements that would bar review of the merits of the 

application.” 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). The Supreme Court explained 

that 

[a]n application is “filed,” as that term is commonly 

understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, 

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8 Opinion of the Court 20-10043

the appropriate court officer for placement into the 

official record. And an application is “properly filed” 

when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance 

with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. 

These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the 

document, the time limits upon its delivery, the 

court and office in which it must be lodged, and the 

requisite filing fee. . . . But in common usage, the 

question whether an application has been “properly 

filed” is quite separate from the question whether 

the claims contained in the application are 

meritorious and free of procedural bar. 

Id. at 8 (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted) (footnote and 

internal citations omitted). Applying this definition, the Supreme 

Court held that an application for state post-conviction relief was 

properly filed even though it contained claims that were 

procedurally barred by statute. Id. at 8-11. The Court explained 

that the motion was properly filed because the procedural bar set 

forth a condition for obtaining relief, rather than a condition for 

filing, and while a motion that violated the statutory provisions 

would not succeed, it would be considered “properly delivered 

and accepted so long as the filing conditions have been met.” Id. 

at 11.

Under Artuz, “properly filed” means delivered to the 

proper person, at the proper time, with the required filing fees, in 

a form that enables the court to initiate consideration of the 

motion. See id. at 8; Gorby v. McNeil, 530 F.3d 1363, 1366 (11th 

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20-10043 Opinion of the Court 9

Cir. 2008) (explaining that a state postconviction motion “is 

‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in 

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings, 

which typically include the form of the document, the time limits 

upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, 

and the requisite filing fee” (quotation omitted)). 

Applying Artuz, we have rejected the argument that a 

motion was “not ‘properly filed’ because it was not sufficiently 

specific and thus facially invalid.” Brown v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of 

Corr., 530 F.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008). And we emphasized 

that “[f]acial invalidity . . . [of a pleading] is not determinative of 

‘proper filing’” for purposes of AEDPA. Id. 

Like the argument advanced in Brown, the State’s 

argument here hinges on the sufficiency and facial validity of the

Rule 3.800(a) motion, which are not the typical “filing conditions” 

that “go to the very initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to 

consider that petition.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 

(2005) (explaining that “[f]or purposes of determining what are 

“filing” conditions, there is an obvious distinction between time 

limits, which go to the very initiation of a petition and a court’s 

ability to consider that petition, and the type of “rule of decision” 

procedural bars at issue in Artuz, which go to the ability to obtain 

relief”). Here, the state court dismissed the Rule 3.800(a) motion 

as facially insufficient, and alternatively denied it on the merits. 

There was no allegation that the motion did not meet any filing 

requirements. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred in 

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10 Opinion of the Court 20-10043

determining that the first Rule 3.800(a) motion was not properly 

filed within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).7 See Brown, 

530 F.3d at 1337. Therefore, because the first Rule 3.800(a) 

motion was properly filed, it tolled the federal statute of 

limitations under § 2244(d)(2), which means that Brown’s § 2254 

petition was timely. 

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s opinion and 

remand the case for further proceedings. 

VACATED AND REMANDED. 

7 The State argues that our unpublished decision in Price v. Secretary 

Department of Corrections, 489 F. App’x 354 (11th Cir. 2012), compels the 

conclusion that Brown’s first Rule 3.800(a) motion was not properly filed. 

The State’s argument is unpersuasive. As we have emphasized repeatedly, 

“[u]npublished decisions are not binding authority and they are persuasive 

only to the extent that a subsequent panel finds the rationale expressed in 

that opinion to be persuasive after an independent consideration of the legal 

issue.” Collado v. J.&G. Transp., Inc., 820 F.3d 1256, 1259 n.3 (11th Cir. 

2016). To the extent there is any conflict between Brown and Price, Price is 

not binding and cannot overrule our earlier decision in Brown that the facial 

sufficiency or validity of a pleading is not determinative of whether the 

motion is properly filed for purposes of § 2244(d)(2). 

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