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ELEVEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 CAN TSA EVOLVE 

TO MEET THE NEXT TERRORIST THREAT? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 

Serial No. 112–114 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois, Vice Chair 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

AMANDA PARIKH, Staff Director 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

VACANT, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security ......... 1 

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security ................................................................................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. Geoff Freeman, Chief Operating Officer, U.S. Travel Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

Mr. James J. Carafano, Ph.D., Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center 

for Foreign Policy Studies, Deputy Director, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom 

Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

Mr. Sam Gilliland, Chief Executive Officer, Sabre Holdings: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

PANEL II 

Mr. John W. Halinski, Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 39 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 41 

Mr. Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 45 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 46 

(1) 

ELEVEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 CAN TSA EVOLVE 

TO MEET THE NEXT TERRORIST THREAT? 

Tuesday, September 11, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Rogers, Lungren, Turner, Jackson Lee, 

Richmond, and Barber. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order. The committee is meeting today to discuss what steps TSA can take in 

order to meet the evolving terrorist threat. 

I want to let you all know if you hear the buzzer, we are going 

to be called for votes in a few minutes. So what I want to do is 

go ahead and hopefully try to get all of our opening statements in 

before we have to recess for the votes then we will be over about 

30 minutes then I will come back and we will kick right back up. 

I want to thank all the witnesses for being here, the time it took 

to prepare for this is very valuable to us but also I recognize that 

it takes a lot time and energy on your part, so thank you very 

much. 

Today marks the 11th anniversary of the September 11 terrorist 

attacks that took nearly 3,000 innocent lives. 

Before I begin my opening remarks, I would like to ask everyone 

to join me in a moment of silence to honor the lives of those that 

were lost on that tragic day. 

Thank you. I know anybody that has watched TV this morning 

shares my sentiments. It is a tough day when you think about all 

those lives and those families who are remembering their loved 

ones today that they lost on that tragic day. 

Since TSA’s creation after 9/11, the agency has gone down to a 

troubling path of overspending, limiting private sector engagement, 

and failing to sufficiently protect passenger privacy. 

Based on vigorous oversight by the Subcommittee on Transportation Security, the Majority staff issued a report this week that 

we believe shines a bright light on TSA and lays the groundwork 

for meaningful reform. 
2 

* The information has been retained in committee files. 

Without objection I would like to insert a copy of that report into 

the hearing record at this time; hearing none, so ordered.* 

Our report highlights key findings from the subcommittee’s oversight and makes several recommendations to TSA. 

Based on our findings, I believe we can advance risk-based security by prioritizing the harmonization of aviation security standards worldwide, adopting a comprehensive plan to mitigate evolving threats, and expanding the use of canine explosive detection assets. 

I believe we can strengthen privacy protections by enlisting the 

private sector to modernize and automate the path of your screening process to reduce pat-downs, implementing privacy software on 

all AIT machines and sponsoring an independent analysis of the 

potential health impact of AIT machines. 

I believe we can limit spending by reducing the size of TSA’s 

workforce, conducting cost-benefit analyses for all major programs 

and purchases and communicating with industry to avoid setting 

technology requirements that are just not attainable. 

I believe we can create jobs by contracting with the private sector 

to perform screening and establishing a 5-year procurement plan to 

guide future investments in aviation security technology, research, 

and development and I believe we can cut red tape by working with 

stakeholders to streamline existing security regulations, issuing 

final rules for long overdue security programs and reforming the 

prohibited items list to better reflect evolving threats. 

Here is the bottom line—it takes time to reform TSA. In fact, it 

has been a long time coming. I am eager to hear the inside perspective from our witnesses today as this subcommittee continues to examine ways in which TSA can become a leaner, smarter organization. 

With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, my friend, the gentle lady from Texas, for 5 minutes for 

her opening statement. 

Welcome. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. For most of America, this is a very solemn day 

and certainly a day of remembrances. I think it is appropriate, as 

the Chairman has already done to acknowledge this—for this room 

for a moment of silence which has occurred. But I also think it is 

important to acknowledge the families that still mourn, communities that are still traumatized by the loss of so many of their 

neighbors. 

I believe that all of us can remember where we were and I know 

that for most of the committee Members, if they were not here in 

the United States Capitol, they were somewhere in America. 

So I believe it is important to hold a hearing that reflects upon 

the concerted and unified effort of Members of Congress to respond 

to the horrific attack on the United States of America. 

Over the course of the years, we have lost soldiers on battlefields 

in faraway places where there have been who have been willing to 

sacrifice for this country. 

I do want to acknowledge families—in particular, children—for 

many of us remember the term ‘‘latchkey children’’ when many in 
3 

the New York and surrounding areas went home to empty places; 

for their family members, mothers and fathers, had been lost already earlier that day and the tragedy of 9/11. 

Remember the brave and heroic members who detoured a plane 

that landed in a field in Pennsylvania. 

For those of us who were here who were evacuated from the 

United States Capitol, remember running without information, remember looking to the sky and the building smoke of the Pentagon 

and wondering what was next—The White House, The State Department, or the United States Capitol? 

So this hearing is important for hopefully its unity as well, for 

we can say that with the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, although we did not have years and months and 

weeks to deliberate, we created a buffer, a barrier, of security for 

the United States. 

With that in mind, although there have been attempts, we have 

not had a tragic event on this soil. 

So although it is sadness, I have a sense of accomplishment—not 

for any personal accomplishment—but what we have been able to 

do together. In the midst of tragedy and trauma, America has come 

together. American public demonstrated a resilient character filled 

with valor and dedication to reveal our strength and ensure that 

aviation security will become a priority for the Federal Government. 

Let me thank the families who pushed for the establishment of 

the 9/11 Commission to conduct a thoughtful evaluation and identify vulnerabilities across our security policies. 

I don’t know if they can hear my voice, but it was my honor to 

get to know so many of them as they walk the hallways in the 

midst of their tragedy. They were willing to put their burdens 

down and fight to make America better, and I think we have done 

so. 

This is the Transportation Security Committee and we have not 

had a tragic catastrophic incident through the Nation’s airlines, 

though we know that it is still the most attractive target for a franchise terrorist or organized terrorism. 

So, we thank the American public for willingness to have its 

cargo and baggage screened, individual screening. We thank the 

former men and women of the United States military and law enforcement who have joined the transportation security administration, making up the TSA as TSO officers. 

I look forward to the oversight that is important to be able to address questions that have been raised. But again, with all the loss 

and all that has gone before us, we recognize that TSA has been 

in the front lines, not perfect, but ready for work because they 

show up every day. 

I look forward, Mr. Chairman, that we can again look to a markup of the TSA Authorization bill at the full committee level. This 

will continue to ensure that we integrate key findings and lessons 

learned from various audits. 

But 11 years later, the American public has not forgotten why 

we are here today and neither have I. I urge my colleagues on both 

sides of the aisles and on the other side of the aisles to recognize 

that the 9/11 hijackers of that day have not shown up at our door-
4 

steps again. We must give tribute and recognition to those who 

died, those who mourn, those who yet live in pain; for those serve 

every single day trying to do better on behalf of the United States 

of America. 

I am grateful for that. For that I say God bless this Nation. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlelady for that very thoughtful illustration of how important this day of remembrance is. I would 

also point out to the members of the audience that, when you look 

around the room at the photos we have, it is specifically to be a 

reminder to everybody in this chamber that this committee exists 

solely for the purpose of preventing that from ever happening 

again. 

We are pleased to have several distinguished witnesses before us 

today on this important topic. Let me remind the witnesses, their 

entire statements will appear in the record. Also, remind Members 

of the committee that if they have opening statements they can 

submit those for the record. 

Our first witness is Mr. Geoff Freeman—currently serves as chief 

operating officer of the U.S. Travel Association. 

Thank you for being here, Mr. Freeman. You are recognized for 

5 minutes to summarize your statement. 

STATEMENT OF GEOFF FREEMAN, CHIEF OPERATING 

OFFICER, U.S. TRAVEL ASSOCIATION 

Mr. FREEMAN. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Lee, and 

Members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the invitation to testify today. I am pleased to offer my viewpoints on behalf of the U.S. 

Travel Association, which represents the entirety of the travel industry, with the goal of increasing travel to and within the United 

States. 

The most critical elements to increasing travel are safety and efficiency in the travel experience. Since the tragic events of 9/11, 

TSA has stood as the gateway to air travel. To TSA’s immense 

credit, no further acts of terrorism have taken place. 

My testimony today challenges Congress and TSA to match its 

immense security successes with equal improvements in the facilitation of travel. Improvements in facilitation will lead to dramatic 

increases in travel. Dramatic increases in travel mean more jobs, 

stronger local communities, and a more vibrant American economy. 

Anyone who claims that world-class security prevents efficient and 

friendly processing of travelers is creating a Hobson’s Choice that 

you must reject. 

TSA faces three significant challenges today. The first is embracing risk management. The threats we face are infinite. Demanding 

perfection, rather than encouraging risk management, will cause 

TSA to be inefficient, wasteful, and ultimately less effective. 

The second challenge TSA faces is growing inefficiency within security screening that is frustrating millions of travelers. A 2010 

survey found that travelers would take two to three more flights 

per year if the hassles in security screening were reduced. These 

increased flights would lead to $85 billion in more spending and 

help to create nearly 1 million American jobs. 
5 

The third challenge that TSA faces is sharp budgetary growth. 

In fact, the cost of screening per passenger rose by over 400 percent since 2001. Over the past 7 years, TSA’s budget increased by 

68 percent while the number of travelers essentially stayed flat. 

In 2010, U.S. Travel commissioned a bipartisan panel of aviation 

security experts to propose innovative solutions to these challenges. 

I am pleased that Sam Gilliland of Sabre is here today to discuss 

these recommendations. 

One of the panel’s most important recommendations was creating 

a Trusted Traveler program that enabled TSA to manage risk, 

rather than embrace the one-size-fits-all approach of the past. 

To its credit, TSA has taken several steps to become a more riskbased organization, most notably with the launch of PreCheck. Unfortunately, there are several fundamental flaws to PreCheck that 

will prevent the program from having a meaningful impact on sufficiency and security. 

The foundation of PreCheck is based on airline frequent-flier 

data, or a Customs and Border Protection program, Global Entry, 

designed for frequent international travelers. Global Entry is an 

excellent program, and has many traits that should be included in 

PreCheck, but it is also known for a cumbersome process. 

After navigating a poor enrollment website, a person living in 

Montgomery, Alabama would have to travel more than 300 miles 

to Atlanta, Georgia in order to conduct their interview. If the traveler wishes to join through an airline, U.S. Travel estimates that 

it would cost roughly $10,000 in airfare paid to a single carrier in 

order to qualify for PreCheck. Even at that, they are only eligible 

for a single airline. 

The other shortcomings of PreCheck include low rates of utilization and high rates of unpredictability and randomized screening. 

For PreCheck to benefit travelers, there must be some element of 

predictability. Although I am a member of the Global Entry program, have passed the background check and paid $100, I have 

been rejected for PreCheck on five out of seven occasions. 

There are several solutions to these problems. The first is that 

TSA can leverage private-sector innovation and technology to expand PreCheck to the average traveler. For example, the company 

Clear currently has the technology and capability to provide passengers with secure biometric identification and robust background 

checks. Clear is already at four airports across the country. 

Second, any PreCheck passengers should be able to use the program, no matter which airline they are flying or how they enrolled. 

The system should be based on risk and efficiency, not customer 

loyalty. 

Last, TSA can increase predictability by using in-depth background checks and secure identification, which will allow TSA to 

lower its rates of randomized screening. 

Congress must also embrace that it has an important role here 

in helping TSA solve its long-term problems. There are at least 

three things that you can do to help TSA speed up their efforts. 

The first is to continue to take an aggressive line on hearings 

and oversight, and the reports like that which you issued this 

week. TSA often changes its behavior or makes better decisions 

based on the questions and guidance that you provide. 
6 

Second, we need to see a TSA reauthorization bill. Finally, in everything that you do, remember that security and efficiency are 

equal and obtainable goals. Continue to challenge TSA to achieve 

both. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Freeman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEOFF FREEMAN

SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to offer testimony on behalf of the U.S. Travel Association 

(U.S. Travel), the National, non-profit organization representing all sectors of America’s travel industry. U.S. Travel’s mission is to increase travel to and within the 

United States. 

The travel industry provides good, domestic jobs that cannot be outsourced. In 

2011, travel spending in the United States totaled $813 billion, which generated a 

total of $1.9 trillion in total economic output. The travel industry also supported 

14.4 million jobs and was among the top 10 employers in 48 U.S. States and the 

District of Columbia. For example, travel directly employs more than 10,000 

Alabamans in the 3rd Congressional District and contributes over $1 billion annually to the local economy. Similarly, travel directly employs more than 16,000 Texans in the 18th Congressional District and contributes more than $1.4 billion to the 

local economy. 

Travel is not only a vital economic engine—it is a hallmark of our free, open, and 

democratic society, and its various components are essential to our daily lives. Unfortunately, these same attributes make travel an attractive target for acts of terrorism. From the tragic attacks of September 11, to the hotel bombings in Jakarta, 

to train bombings in London and Madrid, the global travel industry has suffered 

heavily from these senseless acts of violence. 

After each tragedy, our industry has emerged stronger and more secure. Hotels 

around the globe have increased on-site security and strengthened cooperation with 

emergency responders and law enforcement. Canine and explosive detection teams 

are now common sights on metro cars and trains. After September 11, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) to protect America’s aviation system and all other modes of 

transportation. 

Thanks to the hardworking and dedicated men and women of TSA, and so many 

others from our defense and homeland security agencies, there is no doubt that the 

United States—and travel itself—is safer today than it was before 9/11. Although 

there has not been a successful terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11, terrorism remains a serious and ever-changing threat. 

I applaud the subcommittee for holding this important hearing on how the TSA 

can evolve to meet the next terrorist threat. My testimony today will focus in three 

areas. First, I will provide an overview of what I believe to be the long-term challenges facing TSA and their implications for the travel industry. Second, I will discuss TSA’s successes and shortcomings in addressing these challenges. Last, I will 

provide U.S. Travel’s recommendations for how TSA, Congress, and the private sector can expand and improve upon TSA’s current efforts. 

LONG-TERM CHALLENGES IN AVIATION SECURITY

Commercial aviation is the gateway to travel and tourism. Since 9/11, TSA has 

stood as the gateway to commercial aviation. The safety of travelers, the strength 

of our homeland security, and the economic success of the travel industry are all 

dependent on TSA’s ability to complete its mission. But if TSA is to be successful, 

it must resolve three major challenges. 

The first challenge—and a top priority for the travel industry—is achieving the 

highest level of security in the face of numerous and shifting threats. I am confident 

that Administrator Pistole, Members of this committee, and almost all Americans 

are in agreement on this point. However, the paramount importance of security 

must be coupled with a realization that TSA will never achieve 100 percent security. 

Therefore, the real challenge for TSA lies in achieving the highest level of security 

by devoting scarce resource to the most pressing and dangerous threats. 

The second major challenge facing TSA is the growing inefficiency of the passenger screening process. Repeated studies show that TSA’s security checkpoints are 
7 

1 U.S. Travel Association, ‘‘A Better Way: Building a World-Class System for Aviation Security.’’ http://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/page/2011/03/AlBetterlWayl032011.pdf 2http://www.ustravel.org/news/press-releases/american-traveling-public-says-there-has-bebetter-way-conduct-air-travel-secu.[sic] 

time-consuming, frustrating, and deterring millions of people from traveling each 

year. A 2010 survey conducted by Consensus Research found that travelers would 

take two to three more flights per year if the hassles in security screening were reduced. These additional flights would add nearly $85 billion in consumer spending 

back into local hotels, restaurants, convention centers and other travel business, 

and help support 900,000 jobs. A similar survey conducted in 2011 found that four 

of the top five passenger frustrations relate directly to the TSA checkpoint. 

The third challenge facing TSA is the rapid cost increase of screening per passenger. In its fiscal year 2012 budget request, DHS acknowledged that the cost of 

screening per passenger rose by over 400 percent between 2001 and 2011. From 

2004 to 2011, the TSA’s budget increased by 68 percent, while the number of passengers screened remained almost flat.1 After just 11 years, TSA’s budget is now 

roughly equal to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

Unfortunately, without major and forward-thinking changes, all three of the 

major challenges facing TSA are likely to get worse over time. 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) forecasts that, over the next 20 years, 

passenger levels will almost double to 1.2 billion passengers per year. At the same 

time, Congress and Federal agencies are entering a new period of flat budgets and 

fiscal austerity, and the amount of airport space that can be devoted to passenger 

screening is already nearing capacity. Such rapid passenger growth will likely lead 

to longer lines and wait-times at security checkpoints, sharper increases in the cost 

of security screening per passenger, and dampened demand for travel in the United 

States. 

These problems, therefore, are not TSA’s alone. In fact, the real threat of terrorism, the economic consequences of inefficient screening, and increase in screening 

costs, add up to create one of the biggest problems facing the travel industry today. 

Therefore, U.S. Travel and the entire travel industry is fully committed to assisting 

TSA in finding workable and lasting solutions to the problems in aviation security. 

That is why, in 2010, U.S. Travel commissioned a bipartisan panel of aviation security experts to propose innovative solutions could increase both security and efficiency. The panel, title the Blue-Ribbon Panel for Aviation Security (BRP), was 

chaired by former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, former Ranking 

Member of the House Homeland Security Committee Jim Turner, and President and 

CEO of Sabre Holdings Sam Gilliland. 

I am pleased that Sam Gilliland is here today to discuss the recommendations of 

the BRP and provide an update on TSA’s progress in implementing some of their 

proposals. 

However, I want to briefly highlight what I believe are the two most important 

findings of the BRP. First and foremost, the BRP challenged TSA, Congress and all 

aviation security stakeholders to set aside the notion that security and efficiency are 

mutually exclusive goals. Specifically, the final BRP report states: 

‘‘Some in Congress appear to have calculated that there are no political consequences to an inefficient and costly system, but great political consequences to a 

successful terrorist attack. This is a classic Hobson’s Choice that the American traveling public repudiates. The debate Congress must engage in is not strong security 

versus weak security, but rather how to create a world-class aviation security system that effectively manages risk, increases efficiency, and embraces the freedom 

to travel.’’ 

This same notion is also strongly held by the American traveling public. A 2010 

Consensus Research survey found that nearly 9 in 10 travelers believe it is possible 

to achieve an air travel screening system that is both secure and efficient. The same 

number of travelers believe that if we can put a man on the moon, we can create 

a passenger security system that doesn’t frighten or inconvenience travelers.2

The second major finding of the BRP was that TSA could build a more efficient 

and secure screening process, and address its three long-term challenges, by implementing a true, risk-based trusted traveler program. The BRP recommended that 

a true trusted traveler program should include four major elements: 

1. A voluntary and accessible enrollment process; 

2. Background checks and security threat assessments to determine risk; 

3. Biometric credentialing to increase identity verification; and 

4. A separate and expedited screening process for passengers enrolled in the 

program. 
8 

3TSA considers enrollment criteria for PreCheck to be Security Sensitive Information. The 

U.S. Travel Association calculated an estimate of the cost to join PreCheck by multiplying the 

average 2010 passenger yield (the average fare paid by domestic passengers per mile flown) of 

13.49 cents by 75,000 (the number of miles needed to become Platinum customer on Delta airlines). 

SUCCESSES AND SHORTCOMING IN ADDRESSING TSA’S LONG-TERM CHALLENGES

To TSA’s credit, it is taking several steps to reform the agency into a more riskbased and intelligence-driven organization. 

Last year, TSA restarted the Aviation Security Advisory Committee and increased 

its interaction with the private sector. I am honored that TSA and the ASAC selected me to co-chair the Passenger Advocacy Subcommittee—and I look forward to 

working with TSA on that important group. 

In 2011, TSA launched PreCheck, a trusted traveler pilot program that provides 

expedited screening for passengers willing to volunteer more personal information. 

PreCheck is an essential first step in creating a more efficient and secure screening 

process, and I applaud Administrator Pistole for his leadership in creating this program. 

Today, over 500,000 Americans are enrolled in PreCheck and the program has 

screened over 2.5 million passengers. PreCheck lanes are currently available at 23 

airports and, by the end of 2012, TSA expects PreCheck to be operational at an additional 12 airports across the country. 

Although PreCheck is a positive first step, the current program has several shortcomings that will prevent TSA from ultimately addressing its long-term challenges. 

The shortcomings include limited and cumbersome enrollment opportunities, low 

utilization rates, and high levels of unpredictability for PreCheck passengers hoping 

to receive expedited screening. 

There are several barriers preventing a large number of ordinary travelers from 

joining and using PreCheck. One way to join the program is to be a member of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP’s) Global Entry program. Unfortunately, 

Global Entry’s on-line enrollment process is cumbersome and confusing, and is a 

prime example of the difficulty a Government agency can have in creating streamlined and customer-friendly services. 

Moreover, to be a part of Global Entry, CBP requires an in-person interview but 

only offers these interviews at 25 permanent locations. If a person living in Montgomery, Alabama, wishes to join Global Entry, the closest CBP interview location 

is in Atlanta, Georgia, and requires a 5-hour, 300-mile round-trip drive. 

There are also many difficulties associated with the airline PreCheck enrollment 

process. Perhaps the most significant shortfall is the cost of joining PreCheck 

through an airline frequent flier program. If the same person wishes to qualify for 

PreCheck through a sponsoring carrier, U.S. Travel estimates that it would cost 

roughly $10,000 in airfare paid to a single airline in order to accrue enough frequent 

flier miles to qualify for PreCheck.3

The exclusive and inaccessible PreCheck enrollment options contribute to the second shortcoming—low utilization rates. After almost 1 year of operation, TSA has 

screened 2.5 million passengers through PreCheck. But this number is miniscule 

when compared with the roughly 2 million people who fly each day in the United 

States and the roughly 700 million passengers who fly each year. 

Additionally, low PreCheck utilization rates also stem from the structure of the 

airline enrollment process. Once a traveler is enrolled in PreCheck through a frequent flier program, they can only use the expedited screening lanes when flying 

with that particular airline. For example, an American Airlines PreCheck customer 

who buys an American Airlines ticket for travel from JFK airport to Miami International would have access to the PreCheck lane. If that same customer decides to 

fly Delta Airlines on the return flight home, he or she would not have access to the 

PreCheck lane, simply because they are not flying with American Airlines. In our 

opinion, risk should not be determined by your loyalty to any one airline. 

The true value of PreCheck lies in the potential for TSA to devote less resources 

and time to screening passengers they already know more about. The more passengers TSA can screen through PreCheck, the shorter lines and wait times for regular passengers undergoing the normal TSA screening process. This will help TSA 

become more efficient and lower the cost of screening per passenger. 

The final shortcoming of PreCheck is that the overall level of randomized screening could be lowered if passengers could offer more personal information for a security threat assessment and used biometric credentialing to verify their identity. TSA 

acknowledges that there is a direct relationship between the amount of background 

data shared by a PreCheck passenger and the level of randomized screening that 
9 

4http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/business/29bags.html. 

passenger is subjected to. In other words, the more background information available, the more predictable the expedited screening process will be. 

But the airline PreCheck enrollment process uses flying history as the only element of additional background data. This leads to higher randomization rates for 

the airline PreCheck passengers and contributes to the overall inefficiency of the 

current PreCheck system. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AVIATION SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY

Fortunately, there are many innovative ways to bolster the PreCheck program 

and address its initial shortcomings. 

First, TSA and DHS can increase participation in PreCheck by expanding CBP’s 

trusted traveler programs and allowing travelers to qualify by aggregating their frequent flier miles across multiple airlines. Additionally, once a passenger is enrolled 

in the program—through either CBP, an airline, or any future enrollment platform—those passengers should be immediately granted access to any PreCheck 

lane. 

But TSA must also offer enrollment opportunities beyond CBP trusted travelers 

and elite frequent fliers if the program is going to succeed. One way TSA can expand PreCheck is by leveraging the technological capabilities and innovation of the 

private sector. For example, the company CLEAR heightens security through its 

verified identity platform, while also expediting travel document checker throughput 

using advanced automated biometric scanners. It’s the equivalent of replacing the 

bank teller with an ATM. Each of the 200,000-plus CLEAR members has a secure 

biometric identification card and has opted in to sharing personal information for 

a security threat assessment. Through an innovative public/private partnership with 

TSA, companies such as CLEAR could quickly help the agency boast enrollment and 

utilization rates for PreCheck, increase security through the use of biometric identity verification and robust background checks, and reduce TSA’s budget by shifting 

operational costs from TSA to the private sector. These types of partnerships also 

provide new, important revenue streams to local airport authorities, an added benefit in tight budgetary times. 

In short, CLEAR is just one example of how TSA can alleviate all three long-term 

challenges—security, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness—by partnering with the private sector and addressing the shortcoming of the current PreCheck program. As 

TSA expands PreCheck enrollment opportunities, it must also make interoperability 

a central pillar of the program. PreCheck passenger should be able to use the program no matter which airline they’re flying or how they enrolled. The system should 

be based on risk and efficiency—not customer loyalty. 

Last, TSA can increase predictability through better line management, the use of 

biometric credentialing, and more in-depth background checks. In-depth background 

checks and secure forms of identification enable TSA to know more about a passenger and lower rates of random screening. TSA can also increase efficiency by allowing PreCheck passengers selected for randomize screening to move immediately 

to the standard screening lane, rather than the back of the waiting line before the 

travel document checker. 

OTHER AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

PreCheck is not the only and final solution to the challenges facing TSA. The New 

York Times recently reported that TSA screened an estimated 59 million more 

carry-on bags in 2010 than in 2009.4 TSA also estimates that carry-on bags processed at the checkpoints will have increased by about 87 million from fiscal year 

2010 through fiscal year 2011 and continue to increase by about 29 million more 

in fiscal year 2012. This is an issue that should be examined and addressed. 

TSA must also improve its communication and interaction with the passenger. 

This includes tracking and distributing wait-time information and using customer 

feedback to inform its standard operating procedures. 

THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF CONGRESS

Finally, Congress must take the lead in helping TSA solve its long-term problems. 

I strongly urge this committee to relentlessly engage in three areas. 

First, Congress must continue to conduct aggressive hearings and oversight. TSA 

often changes its behavior or makes better decisions based on the questions and 

guidance they receive through committee hearings. 
10 

Second, Congress must improve TSA through legislation. A TSA reauthorization 

bill has not been enacted in over a decade—while similar agencies, like the FAA, 

are reauthorized on a multi-year and reoccurring basis. 

Third—and perhaps most importantly—Congress must keep in mind that security 

and efficiency are equal and obtainable goals. TSA is vital to security but the agency 

also impacts travel businesses, jobs, and our quality-of-life. 

The country that put a man on the moon, and has led the world for centuries in 

innovation and technology, can have a world-class, efficient, and secure aviation system. 

Again, thank you Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and all Members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you for that statement. Right on time, 

5 minutes. Good job. 

We are going to recess now for approximately 30 minutes. We 

should be back at about 2:45 and reconvene the hearing. 

Dr. Carafano will be waiting with anxious anticipation for your 

comments. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. Thank you all very much for your patience and we look forward to getting back to it. 

Dr. Carafano, now that we have built up the anticipation, don’t 

let us down. You are recognized for 5 minutes. Thanks for being 

here. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES J. CARAFANO, PH.D., DIRECTOR, DOUGLAS AND SARAH ALLISON CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY 

STUDIES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, KATHRYN AND SHELBY 

CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. CARAFANO. Thank you, sir. 

I would like to thank the committee for this opportunity and 

begin by saying it is not difficult to exercise leadership in the wake 

of a crisis. 

Real leadership is demonstrating courage and caring on very 

unremarkable days and there has actually been nothing more 

unremarkable than the year of transportation security we have had 

last year. 

So I really do want to commend the committee for focusing on 

this issue when it is not a crisis. In that spirit, I particularly want 

to commend what I think is very thoughtful. 

An interesting report, done by the committee staff, which I think 

is exactly what we need not in the spirit of attacking the agency 

itself and being very respectful of the men and women in the agency and the work they are trying to do, but pointing out, I think, 

some legitimate areas of concern and creating some interesting 

questions about our local frameworks that I think are very worthwhile. 

So I do think it is an excellent report and a great starting point 

for going forward. I must say it is in that spirit that the Heritage 

Foundation, in our research, has looked at the issue of homeland 

security. 

Particularly, what we have really focused and emphasized is 

really lessons learned. We have over a decade of experience at dealing with the issue of transnational terrorism. We have learned a 

lot. By our count and our records, we have thwarted at least 51 
11 

Islamist-inspired terrorism plots aimed at the United States since 

9/11. 

The vast majority of those thwarted attempts weren’t stopped by 

accident. There is a lot that we can learn from that and surveying 

what we have done. 

I think that we are in the place in history where we can do an 

awful lot to distinguish between what really represents sensible security and what represents checkbook security or feel-good security 

and make that distinction between them. 

It is in that spirit that I offer my testimony today where I focused on what I think and believe are really the three critical areas 

where the difference can be made in really making TSA make the 

most valuable contributions not to just safety and security, but also 

ensuring the freedoms and prosperity of the American people. 

The first of those is remaining mission-focused. By that I mean 

remaining on the focus on thwarting attacks against critical transportation U.S. infrastructure or its exploitation. 

There, I think, the real key is those TSA programs that are the 

most valuable are the ones that really integrate and leverage off 

our most effective counterterrorism programs. 

Practically going out there and stopping the plots long before 

they get to the airport or long before they get on an airplane and 

so I would highlight, for example, Secure Flight, which I think is 

probably the best example of what TSA should be doing; integrating the knowledge and capability and information from the 

larger CT effort and using that in an operational role to try to keep 

bad people and bad things away from the transportation aviation 

system. 

So, in that context, if that is the strategy, then the second area, 

which becomes equally vital, is getting the most efficiency from the 

operations that we are conducting. 

When we think of efficiencies of operations, it is very, very important that we think in the context of not only, ‘‘What are all the 

government programs that we are doing to protect critical transportation infrastructure?’’ and how TSA fits in that, but also how 

TSA fits in the efforts of the industry and the airports and their 

efforts so we are getting the best balance or the best combination 

between efforts that ensure security, prosperity, and individual 

freedoms. 

I think efficiency is clearly an issue where we can have a lot of 

I think fruitful discussion. I will just offer, as an example of something I highlighted on my testimony, is the distinction between the 

Federal Flight Deck Officer program and the Surface Transportation Inspector program. 

On the one hand, with the Federal Flight Deck Officer program, 

you have a very low-cost capability to bring real operational capability to protect the airplane in a proven way, in a way that has 

been proven very, very cost-effective and provides a real operational capability. Yes, we saw the administration this year wanted 

to cut that modest program by 50 percent. 

On the other hand, we see in the Surface Transportation Inspector program really kind of a reliance on the regulatory model, 

which is, again, the least effective way to be proactive and a very 
12 

high cost, twice the cost of the FFDO program, and really delivering no operational capability. 

So when I see things like that in the same department, it really 

questions me whether we really are operating off a true risk-based 

framework in terms of implementing a strategy which focuses on 

getting the terrorists before they get to the plane. 

The third area I would definitely focus on is managing TSA’s 

workforce. We often forget in Washington, you know, whether we 

all often give it platitudes, the most single valuable thing the U.S. 

Government has is its human capital—not only its citizens and its 

people, but the people working for the U.S. Government and getting the most out of the talent and skills of those people, I think, 

is absolutely vital. 

I don’t think it is a debatable question that the Screening Partnership program is a valuable component and that balancing what 

we do with privatization and what we do with the TSA workforce 

is going to be greatly beneficial. 

I mean if we look at the work that was done in analyzing, for 

example, what was going on at the San Francisco airport and L.A. 

airport as we saw in the last year report from the Transportation 

Committee, we clearly see that there are ways of privatization to 

both gain efficiencies, in some respects, and not sacrifice on security whatsoever. 

You look at the European experience where we know at least 

half of the European airports used privatized screening, and yet 

their security and safety record is comparable to the United States. 

So, there is no question that this can be done, the problem is 

with the implementation of the program itself. I think getting that 

program where it is workable, but better for the airports and the 

industry and for TSA, I think is key to really getting the right balance in the work force that we need. 

So, with that, I greatly look forward to this hearing and your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carafano follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES J. CARAFANO

SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 

My name is James Jay Carafano. I am deputy director of the Kathryn and Shelby 

Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and director of the Douglas and 

Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The 

views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today to address 

this vital subject. It is certainly fitting that we pause to reflect on the state of transportation security on the anniversary of the terrorist attacks on New York and 

Washington, DC, but it is even more appropriate that this hearing is taking place 

during what has been a fairly unremarkable year in terms of transportation security. For it was on a quiet, unremarkable autumn morning that America was attacked. The best way to prevent more days like 9/11 is to spend our unremarkable 

days preparing—doing what we can to continue to keep this Nation safe, free, and 

prosperous. 

In my testimony today, I would like to focus on what I believe are the key challenges ahead for transportation security, including: (1) Remaining mission-focused; 

(2) gaining greater efficiency in operations; and (3) managing the Transportation Security Administration workforce. 

My responsibilities at The Heritage Foundation comprise supervising all of the 

foundation’s research on public policy concerning foreign policy and National security. Homeland security has been a particular Heritage research priority as we pro-
13 

1L. Paul Bremer III and Edwin Meese III, Defending the American Homeland: A Report of 

the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security Task Force (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2002). 2Thomas R. Eldridge et al., ‘‘9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,’’ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States, August 21, 2004, preface, at http://www.9-11commission.gov/ 

stafflstatements/911lTerrTravlMonograph.pdf. 3Steven Bucci and Jessica Zuckerman, ‘‘51st Terrorist Plot Against the United States: Continued Threat of al-Qaeda and Affiliates,’’ Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 3598, May 8, 2012, 

at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/51st-bomb-terror-plot-proves-continuedthreat-of-al-qaeda. See also James Jay Carafano, et al., ‘‘Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: 

The Homegrown Threat and the Long War on Terrorism,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 

No. 2682, April 25, 2012, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/fifty-terrorplots-foiled-since-9-11-the-homegrown-threat-and-the-long-war-on-terrorism. This report provides 

a summary of each thwarted attack and subsequent investigation and prosecution. 4Peter L. Bergen, Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad 

(New York: Crown, 2012), pp. 140–141. 

duced the first major assessment of domestic security after 9/11.1 Over the past decade, we have assembled a robust, talented, and dedicated research team and I have 

the honor and privilege of leading that team. 

Heritage analysts have studied and written authoritatively on virtually every aspect of homeland security and homeland defense. The results of all our research are 

publicly available on the Heritage website at www.heritage.org. We collaborate frequently with the homeland security research community, including the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Aspen Institute, the Center for National Policy, the Hudson Institute, the George Washington University Homeland 

Security Policy Institute, and the Strategic Studies Institute and Center for Strategic Leadership at the Army War College. Heritage analysts also serve on a variety 

of Government advisory efforts, including the Homeland Security Advisory Council 

and the Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil 

Authorities. Our research programs are nonpartisan, dedicated to developing policy 

proposals that will keep the Nation safe, free, and prosperous. 

I am particularly proud of The Heritage Foundation’s long and substantive record 

of research on transportation security. This effort reflects the foundation’s commitment to advancing public policies that enhance our security by thwarting terrorist 

travel; encouraging economic growth by promoting the legitimate exchange of goods, 

peoples, services, and ideas among free nations; and fostering a free and open civil 

society—all at the same time. 

MISSION FOCUS

In my mind, the 9/11 Commission’s staff study on terrorist travel was in many 

ways more vital to understanding the transnational threat and how to impact its 

operational capabilities than the commission’s best best-selling report. The August 

2004 staff study documented the poor state of our preparedness to prevent exploitation of U.S. transportation systems. The study pointed out that the 9/11 hijackers 

had known affiliation to extremist groups, broke the law, committed fraud, lied on 

visa applications, had at least 68 contacts with State Department and Immigration 

and Customs officials, and yet managed to pass through aviation and border checkpoints here and abroad. According to the study, together the group ‘‘successfully entered the United States 33 times over 21 months, through nine airports of entry.’’2

Without that ease of movement, the 9/11 attacks would not have been possible. 

There are few capabilities more essential to terrorist operations than the ability 

to freely move and communicate. Restricting either of these ‘‘centers of gravity’’ is 

key to containing the transnational operational threats. 

After 9/11 America became a much harder target. The United States has thwarted 

at least 51 Islamist-inspired terror plots since the attacks on New York and Washington, DC.3 Increasingly, we find that these plots are ‘‘homegrown,’’ in part because 

it has been more difficult for transnational terrorist groups to organize operations 

overseas and dispatch operatives to the United States. 

The post-9/11 efforts at thwarting terrorist travel and access to transportation 

systems, however, offer no cause for complacency. Transportation systems continue 

to rank high on the list of potential targets. For example, to the end Osama bin 

Laden continued to extol the virtue of aiming attacks on cities and transportation 

infrastructure.4 Further, in recent years in two plots, preemptive efforts failed to 

thwart attacks. In 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to donate explo-
14 

5 Carafano, ‘‘Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11.’’ 

6The administration’s strategy is primarily limited to attacking the leadership of al-Qaeda 

and its affiliates. It does not pay sufficient attention to global insurgency threat presented by 

the group, which makes the terrorist network more resilient than the U.S. Strategy appreciates. 

See, The Heritage Foundation Counterterrorism Task Force, ‘‘A Counterterrorism Strategy for 

the ‘Next Wave,’ ’’ Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 98, August 24, 2011, at http:// 

www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/a-counterterrorism-strategy-for-the-next-wave. 7 Aaron Y. Zelin, ‘‘Dodging the Drones: How Militants Have Responded to the Covert U.S. 

Campaign,’’ Foreign Policy, August 31, 2012 at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/ 

31/dodgingltheldroneslhowlmilitantslhavelrespondedltolthelcovertluslcampaign. 8The Transportation Security Administration website describes Secure Flight as a ‘‘behindthe-scenes program that enhances the security of domestic and international commercial air 

travel through the use of improved watch list matching. By collecting additional passenger data, 

it improves the travel experience for all airline passengers, including those who have been 

misidentified in the past. The airline submits this information to Secure Flight, which uses it 

to perform watch list matching. This serves to prevent individuals on the No Fly List from 

boarding an aircraft and to identify individuals on the Selectee List for enhanced screening.’’ 

See, http://www.tsa.gov/whatlweldo/layers/secureflight. 9 ‘‘What to Do? A Global Strategy,’’ Chapter 12 in National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/ 

report/911ReportlCh12.htm. 10For discussion of the role of risk management in homeland security, see James Jay 

Carafano, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure 

Protection, Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, June 25, 

2008, at http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/risk-and-resiliency-developing-the-righthomeland-security-public-policies-for-the-post-bush-era. 

sives on a Detroit-bound international flight. In 2010, Faisal Shahzad attempted to 

detonate explosives in an SUV that he drove into and left parked in Times Square.5

Our successes and shortfalls since 9/11 are instructive. The best way to prevent 

terrorists from exploiting or threatening our infrastructure is to disrupt their networks and operations before they are implemented. In this respect, effective U.S. 

counterterrorism programs are the first and most critical component of our defenses. 

Without question, overseas operations to identify and dismantle the leadership of 

al-Qaeda and its affiliates have degraded their operational capabilities. 

Yet, the current U.S. strategy is inadequate to prevent a resurgence of al-Qaeda.6

Indeed, there are already signs that al-Qaeda and its affiliates are attempting to 

improve their operational security so that their operatives are less vulnerable to direct attack.7 Therefore, the United States must remain vigilant. 

The most indispensible role for transportation security is to remain integrated 

with U.S. counterterrorism operations so that their security measures, oversight responsibilities, and capacity to act against active threats are synchronized in the 

most effective manner. No example of what must be done is more illustrative than 

the apprehension of Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, who was placed on 

a terrorist watch list, identified, and arrested attempting to flee the country on an 

international flight less than 2 days after the aborted attack. Programs that link 

directly to the larger counterterrorism effort, such as the Secure Flight initiative, 

must be the TSA’s top priority.8 I would be greatly skeptical of any allocation of resources that did not fully fund these priorities first to the exclusion of anti-terrorism 

measures or other agency responsibilities. 

MAKING EFFICIENCY A PRIORITY

One of the key findings of the 9/11 Commission emphasized a risk-based approach 

to managing transportation security. The commission concluded, ‘‘[h]ard choices 

must be made in allocating limited resources. The U.S. Government should identify 

and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them, select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing 

so, and then develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement the effort. The plan 

should assign roles and missions to the relevant authorities (Federal, State, regional, and local) and to private stakeholders.’’9 The commission recommendation offered the best strategy—appropriate for the threat and the vast, complex, and interrelated transportation infrastructure that TSA must oversee. 

A risk-based approach requires evaluating risk, threat, and criticality and adopting the most judicious means to reduce risk to an acceptable level at an acceptable 

cost.10 It is not clear that the agency consistently applies that approach in managing its programs and initiatives. 

From the onset, TSA has had difficulty truly adopting a risk-based approach. 

‘‘TSA’s original strategies were largely grafted from the Federal Aviation Administration’s pre-9/11 aviation security measures,’’ noted the former administrator of 

TSA, Kip Hawley. ‘‘Since the FAA’s primary role is ensuring aviation safety, which 
15 

11Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, Permanent Emergency: Inside the TSA and the Fight for 

the Future of American Security (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 228. 12The Transportation Security Administration website describes the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program where ‘‘eligible flight crewmembers are authorized by the Transportation Security 

Administration Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service to use firearms to defend against an act of criminal violence or air piracy attempting to gain control of an aircraft. 

A flight crew member may be a pilot, flight engineer, or navigator assigned to the flight.’’ See, 

http://www.tsa.gov/lawenforcement/programs/ffdo.shtm. 13See, Jessica Zuckerman, ‘‘Federal Flight Deck Officer Program: First Line of Deterrence, 

Last Line of Defense,’’ Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 3544, March 20, 2012, at http:// 

www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/impact-of-cutting-the-budget-of-the-federal-flightdeck-officer-program. 14Surface Transportation Security Inspectors ‘‘assist surface transportation carriers, operators, owners, entities, and facilities to enhance their security against terrorist attack and other 

security threats and to assist the Secretary in enforcing applicable surface transportation security regulations and directives.’’ See, 6 USC 1113. 15See, for example, Howard R. Elliot, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on Homeland Security, United States House 

of Representatives, May 31, 2012, at http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/ 

files/Testimony%20Elliott.pdf. 

has unbending parameters based on the laws of physics, its regulatory nature 

makes sense. But using regulation as the primary tool to stop adaptive terrorists 

does not.’’11 TSA still struggles with finding the right balance of regulation, but it 

has struggled even more implementing the right balance of operational capabilities 

to put real obstacles rather than just rules in the path of terrorist travel and exploitation of transportation infrastructure. Two examples—the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) and the Surface Transportation Inspector Program—are illustrative. 

The Federal Flight Deck Officer Program.12 In his fiscal year fiscal year 2013 

budget proposal for the Department of Homeland Security, President Obama called 

for a 50 percent cut in funding for the FFDO program. This decision made no sense. 

The FFDO program costs very little (fiscal year 2012 enacted: $25.5 million). To put 

total program costs in perspective: The FDDO costs approximately $15 per officer 

per flight; the Federal Air Marshal program, although also an important added 

layer of security, in comparison costs an estimated $3,300 per air marshal per flight. 

Further, at present, FFDOs are estimated to be able to cover five times as many 

flights as Federal Air Marshals, providing a strong added layer of defense and deterrence against the threat of terrorism and air piracy. Since the FFDO program’s 

inception in 2003, its budget has not changed, despite an estimated 100-fold increase in members.13

Surface Transportation Inspector Program.14 In contrast to the FFDO initiative, 

the Surface Transportation Inspector program costs nearly four times as much (fiscal year 2012 enacted: $96.2 million) but appears to lack significant utility. The program has been criticized for lacking clear and consistent standards and focusing on 

regulatory requirements that are only marginally relevant to diminishing terrorist 

threats.15 Given the massive size, scope, and diversity of surface transportation 

within the United States, in contrast to aviation security it is difficult to see how 

any Federal program of this scope could have significant impact on reducing National vulnerabilities. 

Attention should also be given to the programs that provide the context for transportation security, particularly as it affects international travel. Contrasting examples are the Federal requirement for biometric exit and the Visa Waiver Program 

(VWP). 

Biometric Exit.—The directive for implementing biometric exit—recording of a 

uniquely identifiable intrinsic physical characteristic (most often fingerprints) at the 

point of departure from the United States at land, sea, or airport point of entry— 

predates 9/11. After almost two decades, the Federal Government has failed to implement this Congressional mandate. Regardless of what benefits the framers of the 

requirement believed biometric exit would bring, either as an immigration management tool, a criminal enforcement measure, or a counterterrorism initiative, the 

need for this program needs to be reassessed in light of current requirements. From 

a counterterrorism perspective, it is difficult to justify the expense of biometric exit. 

When this program was originally conceived, there were few effective tools for tracking terrorist travel. Even where we have seen the requirement for tracking suspects 

trying to exit the United States in ‘‘real time,’’ we have seen where these tasks can 

be conducted effectively using existing enforcement tools. 

From the enforcement perspective, biometric exit would be a very limited tool. 

Federal authorities lack the resources to investigate every lead such a system might 

produce. Furthermore, by itself, a report that an individual had failed to register 

an exit and potentially was unlawfully present in the United States would have 
16 

16 James Jay Carafano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives, December 7, 2011, 

at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Carafano%2012072011.pdf. 

17The Visa Waiver Program allows for visa-free travel—for leisure or business—for up to 90 

days among member states. See, Department of State, at http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/ 

without/withoutl1990.html. 18 Carafano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement. 19 James Sherk, ‘‘Unionizing Airline Screeners Endangers National Security,’’ Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 3142, February 9, 2011 at http://thflmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/ 

pdf/wm3142.pdf. 20Decision of M. David Vaughn in Federal arbitration between the Bureau of Customs and 

Border Protection and National Treasury Employees Union, November 15, 2006. 21 CBC News, ‘‘Luggage Security Lax During Pearson Labour Dispute: Report,’’ December 20, 

2006. 22 According to the Transportation Security Administration website ‘‘[i]n accordance with the 

Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, TSA conducted a pilot program to evaluate the performance of a private contract screening workforce under Federal oversight. The pilot 

was conducted from 2002 to 2004 with five airports. ATSA required contract screeners to meet 

all the requirements applicable to Federally employed screeners. At the conclusion of the pilot, 

TSA created the Screening Partnership Program (SPP). The five pilot airports transitioned to 

SPP. Currently, 11 additional airports are participating in the program, for a total of 16.’’ See, 

http://www.tsa.gov/whatlweldo/optout/index.shtm. 

scant utility in prioritizing law enforcement resources. Such a report might simply 

be a false positive—the individual’s status might have changed. The report alone 

would provide no assessment of risk. 

Biographical data (name, date of birth, and country of origin) provide suitable 

data for most enforcement activities. Given the costs of implementing comprehensive biometric exit, the fiscal constraints that will likely be imposed on the Department of Homeland Security in the years ahead, and the Department’s many priorities, the biometric exit mandate can no longer be justified. It is past time to repeal 

the requirement.16

Visa Waiver Program.—In contrast to biometric exit, the Visa Waiver Program 

provides a cost-effective and efficient means to capture more useful data on travelers in real time.17 Thirty-six countries participate in VWP (in contrast, U.S. citizens can travel to over eight times as many countries visa-free or obtain a visa on 

arrival). Only one country has been added to the VWP under the current administration. 

The principal obstacles to adding more countries are the unrealistic legislative requirement to implement biometric exit and the manner in which current legislation 

requires calculating visa overstay rates. Revising the legislative limitations and 

pressing the administration to add more qualifying countries would be a very costeffective means to both facilitate international travel and strengthen the U.S. capacity to identify terrorist travel and high-risk passengers.18

MANAGING THE WORKFORCE

The administration’s decision to engage in limited collective bargaining with airline security screeners could well reduce the agency’s effectiveness over time. Collective bargaining impairs the agency’s ability to reward merit and raises the likelihood of illegal labor disputes, finds The Heritage Foundation’s labor expert, James 

Sherk, who has followed closely the shift in administration policy.19

There have already been other instances within the Department of Homeland Security of union interference with operational activities. For example, the National 

Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) brought the Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) before an arbitrator after the CBP changed policies. The arbitrator found that 

the CBP should have provided the NTEU with notice and the opportunity to bargain 

before the CBP made its changes, such as the Port of Houston reassigning officers 

to Bush International Airport and the Port of New Orleans. In short, CBP was cited 

for making decisions necessary to ensure the effective continuity of its operations.20

The United States should have also learned a lesson from Canada. In 2006, union 

baggage screeners undertook an intentional work slowdown during the Thanksgiving day travel rush. In response, managers allowed 250,000 passengers to board 

without screening. In the words of one Canadian security expert, ‘‘If terrorists had 

known that in those 3 days that their baggage wasn’t going to be searched, that 

would have been bad.’’21

Screening Partnership Program22.—Privatization of screening makes sense from 

both an economic and security perspective. As transportation security expert Robert 

Poole notes, ‘‘in nearly all of Europe, screening is the responsibility of the airport, 

under national government oversight and regulation, and in most cases airports can 

either provide the screening themselves or outsource it to approved security 
17 

23 Robert Poole, Testimony to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 

Transportation Security, July 10, 2012, http://reason.org/news/show/improving-airport-security-testimon. 24Mark Rockwell, ‘‘TSA Halts Secure Partnership Program for Airports,’’ Government Security 

News, January 31, 2011, at http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/22349?c=airport- laviationlsecurity; Jena Baker McNeil, ‘‘Aviation Security: Policy Responses to Address Terrorism Threats,’’ testimony before the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Committee on 

State Government, March 30, 2011, at http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2011/03/ 

aviation-security-policy-responses-to-address-terrorism-threats. 25Government Accountability Office, letter, Subject: Aviation Security: TSA’s Revised Cost 

Comparison Provides a More Reasonable Basis for Comparing the Costs of Private-Sector and 

TSA Screeners, dated March 4, 2011 at http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/ 

112th/Aviation/2011-03-04-GAOlLetterlScreeninglCosts.pdf. 

firms.’’23 The benefits of privatization also go beyond issues of security and cost-effectiveness—including providing a workforce that not only meets appropriate standards but can respond to the needs of the airport’s customers, improving the travel 

experience. 

Moving toward a mixed, non-union Federal workforce and greater reliance on private-sector screening companies would likely provide the United States in the near 

term with a balanced and responsive workforce at a responsible cost. Despite the 

utility of this approach, in January 2011, the administration announced that it 

would no longer allow airports that wanted to privatize their TSA screening workforce to do so, claiming that privatization was not cost-effective.24 This was contradictory to statutory law, specifically the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

of 2001, which grants airports the ability to ‘‘opt out’’ of having Federal TSA screeners as long as their private workforce submits to TSA oversight. In March, the Government Accountability Office noted that the TSA method of determining that privatization of screening was not cost-effective was flawed.25 In recent months, however, additional airports have applied and been given tentative approval to join the 

SPP. 

The administration’s whipsaw and over-centralized approach to SPP serves neither the agency’s workforce, nor the airports, nor their customers well. Clear, consistent, and dependable processes should be established to govern SPP so airports 

and the agency can undertake thoughtful human capital strategies. In particular, 

airports should be given the authority to select their own contractors based on best 

value from a list of TSA-certified screeners and the airport should have full authority to manage the contract within the guidelines established by TSA regulatory policies. 

NEXT STEPS

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on this important issue. I urge this 

committee and the Congress to: Press TSA to sharpen its mission focus on fully integrating with other National counterterrorism efforts to thwart terrorist travel and 

exploitation of transportation infrastructure; concentrate its resources more on the 

most cost-effective operational initiatives; and rethink the management of its workforce, establishing a more judicious mix of Federal and private-sector screeners. I 

look forward to your questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great, thank you—very good job. 

I am glad you mentioned the report. I do want to thank our Majority staff, Amanda Parikh, Nicole Smith, Krista Powers, and 

April Corbett. All of them have been very dedicated—put a lot of 

time and energy—as well as Chris Brinson on my staff, in putting 

that report together—and they are the reason why this committee 

has had success this cycle in providing some pretty aggressive oversight. 

Also I want to say that Nicole Smith is getting married this Friday. We will miss her while she is on her honeymoon—but she will 

be back pretty soon. 

All right; our third witness is Mr. Sam Gilliland. Mr. Gilliland 

was co-chair of U.S. Travel Association’s Blue-Ribbon Panel on 

Aviation Security 2 years ago. He serves as a chief executive officer 

of Sabre Holdings. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Gilliland for 5 minutes. 
18 

STATEMENT OF SAM GILLILAND, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

SABRE HOLDINGS 

Mr. GILLILAND. All right, thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking 

Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee. Thanks 

very much for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

First and foremost, on the 11th anniversary of the horrible tragedy of September 11, we must pay tribute to all the families who 

lost loved ones, friends, and relatives. We must also honor those 

who assisted in the immediate aftermath as well as all who helped 

get our country back on its feet economically. 

This afternoon, I am pleased to provide an update on the recommendations released last year by the U.S. Travel Association’s 

Blue-Ribbon Panel on Aviation Security. Our panel set out to develop recommendations that would improve the TSA checkpoint, 

generate greater Governmental efficiency and cooperation, and encourage broader use of risk management. 

Overall, TSA has made significant progress. TSA’s risk-based 

management screening initiative implements one of the major goals 

of our panel and demonstrates a new willingness by the Government to provide low-risk travelers with an improved screening experience. 

At the same time, there are millions of low-risk travelers who 

could and should be enjoying expedited access through our Nation’s 

airports, PreCheck must be expanded in several ways, including facilitating interoperability among carriers, increasing enrollment opportunities, and offering PreCheck eligibility to international members of global entry. 

Travel industry stakeholders and TSA must also collaborate so 

that travelers know what to expect at airport security. While the 

role out of both TSA PreCheck and the TSA smartphone app demonstrate progress in this area, travelers continue to be frustrated 

by the lack of clear instructions on screening protocols. 

Improving Government efficiency and cooperation is also critical. 

While the Aviation Security Advisory Committee was implemented 

last November, TSA needs to recognize the valuable perspective of 

passenger advocacy groups and include them in full ASAC membership. 

TSA must develop a comprehensive multi-year plan for acquiring 

and implementing checkpoint technology, and Congress must provide multi-year funding authorization for the agency. 

Unfortunately, TSA has yet to issue a legislatively required longterm acquisition plan. Also collaboration with the technology development community remains uneven. 

Regarding streamlining international arrivals, DHS has taken no 

action on duplicative TSA’s screening. Fortunately, the fiscal year 

2012, DHS appropriations bill established a pilot program to look 

at this issue. 

Other legislative alternatives being considered including the No 

Hassle Flying Act are also consistent with the panel’s recommendations. In terms of facilitating international travel, while CVP has 

expanded access to global entry and Congress has authorized the 

APEC business travel card, more must be done. 

CVP should aggressively expand global entry, an excellent example of risk management in practice. Issue APEC business travel 
19 

cards and offer foreign members of global entry access to TSA 

PreCheck. 

Also, in the international arena, DHS has worked to build security-screening capacity abroad. Last November concluded negotiations with the European Union on a revised passenger name record 

treaty. Recently, the United States and the European Union agreed 

to work together to harmonize the checkpoint screening of liquids, 

aerosols, and gels. 

Going forward, DHS should continue expanding global entry, and 

Congress should pass legislation to add more countries to the visa 

waiver program related to liquids, aerosols, and gels. The United 

States and European Union should make public their time lines 

and multi-year budgets for technology deployment. 

In conclusion, since the issuance of the Blue-Ribbon Panel report, 

and clearly since September 11, much has been done to improve 

aviation security. At the same time, we are just beginning, as a Nation, to look at the other side of TSA’s mission, travel facilitation. 

Many Members of this committee are leading that effort, and we 

thank you for that commitment. 

In honor of those who lost their lives, and for the sake of the continued well-being of our Nation, we must do all we can to protect 

ourselves from future attacks, while not deterring law abiding, 

freedom-loving citizens from traveling. 

Thanks for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilliland follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SAM GILLILAND

SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 

A. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before you on this solemn anniversary day. My name is Sam Gilliland, and I serve as chairman and chief executive 

officer of Sabre Holdings, one of the Nation’s and the world’s leading travel technology companies. First and foremost, on the 11th anniversary of the horrible tragedy of September 11, we must pay tribute to all families who lost loved ones, 

friends, and relatives. We must also honor the first responders, good Samaritans, 

and others who helped in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the United 

States, as well as those who helped get our country back on its feet economically. 

In their honor and for the sake of the continued well-being of our Nation, we must 

do all we reasonably can to protect ourselves from future attacks, while not deterring law-abiding, freedom-loving citizens from traveling. 

Our country is becoming stronger, more secure, and more resilient through our 

dedication to creating the best aviation security system in the world. And it’s frankly most encouraging that the TSA and private-sector leaders are striving and increasingly working together to create a system that strikes the right balance between security and facilitation. So in that spirit, I’m pleased to provide an update 

on the recommendations of the U.S. Travel Association’s blue-ribbon panel on aviation security released last year. I had the honor of co-chairing this panel with 

former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and the former 

Ranking Member of this Committee, Representative Jim Turner. The panel included 

over a dozen experts with significant expertise in aviation, security, economics, and 

privacy. 

Our report, entitled ‘‘A Better Way: Building a World-Class System for Aviation 

Security,’’ was released on March 16, 2011. The goals of our panel were simple— 

we set out to develop recommendations that would: 

1. Improve the TSA checkpoint by increasing efficiency, decreasing passenger wait 

times, and screening passengers based on risk; 
20 

1 According to TSA’s website, PreCheckTM exists at specific terminals in the following airports: 

Charlotte Douglas, Chicago O’Hare, Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Detroit, 

Dulles, George Bush Intercontinental, Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta, Indianapolis, John F. Kennedy, LaGuardia, Lambert-St. Louis, Las Vegas McCarran, Logan, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Newark, Orlando, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland, Ronald Reagan, Salt Lake, 

Seattle-Tacoma, and Tampa. The 5 airlines participating in PreCheckTM at these locations are: 

Alaska, American, Delta, United, and U.S. Airways. 2Global Entry is a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) program that allows expedited 

clearance for pre-approved, low-risk travelers upon arrival in the United States. 

2. Generate greater Governmental efficiency and cooperation in executing its security responsibilities; and 

3. Restructure America’s National approach to aviation security by developing and 

using risk management methods and tools. 

With these three goals in mind, the panel set forth a series of detailed recommendations. Today, I will provide an overview of those recommendations, an assessment of progress made on the key recommendations, and thoughts on the path 

forward for those that remain works in progress. 

Overall, TSA has made good progress on a number of the recommendations by the 

blue-ribbon panel. TSA’s risk-based security initiative, for example, implements one 

of the major goals of our panel and demonstrates a new willingness by the Government to identify low-risk populations and provide them with an improved screening 

experience. The re-establishment of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee is 

also a positive step toward engaging a broader community of experts to advise TSA 

on issues critical to the traveling public. At the same time, there is much work to 

be done in areas like long-term budgeting and planning, utilization of secure identity documents, and elimination of redundancy with other Government agencies. 

B. REVIEW OF TSA PROGRESS AGAINST BLUE-RIBBON PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Improve the TSA Checkpoint by Increasing Efficiency, Decreasing Passenger Wait Times, and Screening Passengers Based on Risk 

Implement a risk-based Trusted Traveler program. Congress should authorize 

TSA to implement a new, voluntary, Trusted Traveler program that utilizes a risk-based approach to checkpoint screening, with the goal of refocusing resources on the highest-risk passengers. 

Progress.—On this first recommendation, TSA has made its most visible progress 

through implementation of a trusted traveler program. Six months after the publication of our report, TSA launched the TSA PreCheckTM program on a pilot basis on 

October 4, 2011. The pilot has expanded from an initial limited partnership with 

two carriers within specific terminals in four airports to a full network of specific 

terminals at 22 airports and five airlines partners.1 Dulles Airport here in the 

Washington area is scheduled to significantly expand PreCheckTM on September 25; 

I am hopeful that many of the Members of this committee will have the opportunity 

to visit the airport and see how travelers move through the security checkpoint with 

laptops and liquids in their bags; shoes, belts, and jackets on; and hands by their 

sides instead of over their heads. Customers are extremely supportive of the program, as they have used PreCheckTM over 2 million times to date, according to data 

from TSA. The pilot program now underway includes many elements of the blueribbon panel proposal, including the offering of PreCheckTM benefits to U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Global Entry international trusted traveler program 2

members, airline frequent flyer program members, and other vetted populations 

such as active-duty military. 

Next Steps.—While clearly PreCheckTM is a major step forward, and one that deserves high praise from all industry stakeholders, we believe there are millions 

more low-risk travelers who could and should be enjoying expedited access through 

our Nation’s aviation security system if TSA and the broader travel and tourism 

community purposefully worked together to expand it. 

To achieve this, we believe that TSA and the travel community must work together to improve and expand PreCheckTM in a number of ways, including: 

1. Facilitating interoperability among carriers so that a traveler identified as 

‘‘low-risk’’ by one airline can also be recognized as a low-risk traveler on all 

other airlines. Interoperability was a key requirement of the private-sector-run 

registered traveler program that existed at 19 airports until July of 2009 and 

should be a core part of an expanded PreCheckTM effort. 

2. Increasing enrollment opportunities through partnerships with a range of organizations that can bring massive numbers of low-risk travelers into the program. Today, TSA follows two paths to enroll members in PreCheckTM. The 
21 

most well-known approach is one where TSA teams with specific airlines to enroll their most frequent travelers. TSA is also continuing to identify communities of other low-risk individuals—most recently Federal judges and members 

of the intelligence community with security clearances—to enroll in 

PreCheckTM. However, enrolling these limited populations will not rapidly grow 

this program to the size it should be. The number of low-risk travelers who 

would be willing to voluntarily provide additional information for a better aviation security experience, is, we believe, quite large. Opening up alternative enrollment mechanisms through new TSA agreements with hotel loyalty programs, frequent car rental programs, travel agencies, and companies like the 

reorganized Clear (which offers private-sector run biometric enrollment for travelers who seek an expedited security checkpoint experience), are all examples 

of how we might enroll low-risk travelers in PreCheckTM. These are also all 

ideas that would significantly increase the size of this program within TSA’s 

risk-based screening framework. 

3. Improving PreCheckTM promotional materials by bringing private-sector marketing and communications expertise to bear. Today’s PreCheckTM materials are 

sufficient for the limited populations now being offered access to this program. 

However, if TSA opens up the program along the lines we have outlined above, 

then it should engage marketing and communications experts at some of our 

Nation’s leading travel and tourism companies to improve the materials in existence today. As a member of the President’s Management Advisory Board, I 

have been part of numerous discussions on how the public and private sectors 

can join forces to achieve shared goals. This effort is a prime example of an area 

where the private-sector’s marketing skills could be used for the Government’s 

benefit. 

4. Improving communication with the traveling public to provide clear 

PreCheckTM usage requirements. TSA and the travel community would both 

benefit from stronger partnerships to make sure travelers understand how to 

use PreCheckTM. Again, assuming that the growth recommendations outlined 

above would be adopted, communication with travelers would need to be substantially improved so that individuals understand what to expect when entering a PreCheckTM lane at a PreCheckTM airport terminal. Clearly communicating all of the requirements beforehand would also prevent confusion and 

frustration when a traveler is denied PreCheckTM benefits. 

5. Working with airlines to standardize PreCheckTM verbiage. Today’s airlinecentric PreCheckTM model does not provide that all participating airlines communicate with customers on program benefits or eligibility in a standardized 

manner. As a result, there is significant potential for traveler confusion when 

traveling on different airlines. Providing consistent and predictable communication among all airlines would help eliminate any potential confusion within the 

traveling public. 

6. Working with airlines to create a consistent level of PreCheckTM training. 

Given that so much of the current PreCheckTM program is in the hands of the 

airlines, it would be useful for TSA to expect that all participating airlines provide appropriate employees with a standard level of training on the program so 

that they consistently communicate the program’s attributes, offer enrollment 

to the eligible population of travelers, and can adequately address PreCheckTM

related questions from the traveling public. 

7. Working with Online Travel Agents (OTAs) to accept Global Entry PASS ID 

numbers during the booking process. Currently, Global Entry members who use 

OTA’s to book flights may not have their CBP-issued PASS ID included in their 

reservation that is forwarded to the carrier, and thus may not be able to utilize 

PreCheckTM for flights booked in this manner. 

8. Expanding PreCheckTM usage beyond domestic flights and allowing international participation in the program. Today, PreCheckTM is only offered to individuals travelling purely domestically, not to those on outbound international 

flights or taking a domestic connection after an international flight. A low-risk 

traveler should have the opportunity to utilize PreCheckTM for flights originating in the United States. 

9. Offering PreCheckTM eligibility to international members of Global Entry. 

Through the CBP Global Entry program, the United States has identified lowrisk travelers from other countries. Because these individuals are low-risk from 

a CBP perspective, they should also be eligible to benefit from PreCheckTM

when travelling within the United States. 
22 

10. Ensuring efficient use of dedicated lines and lanes as traffic increases. While 

no one would say that today’s PreCheckTM lanes are overcrowded, implementation of any of the program growth initiatives outlined above would change that 

significantly. Therefore, planning should begin now so that as the PreCheckTM

population grows, it grows along with TSA’s capability of handling a larger 

number of participants in the program. 

Improve preparation of travelers. Industry stakeholders, including airlines, hotels, resort owners and operators, cruise lines, rental car agencies, travel 

agents and the like should work with TSA to improve their education and 

communication on security rules and regulations, targeting locations and 

sources that travelers are likely to review as they book or prepare for a 

trip. 

Progress.—TSA has improved communications with industry sources to provide 

them with more information on programs such as TSA PreCheckTM. Of note, TSA 

has developed promotional materials and worked with Government partners, notably CBP and the Department of State, to disseminate information to the traveling 

public. Additionally, their roll-out of a TSA-dedicated smartphone app allows travelers find answers to TSA-related questions during the travel process. 

Next Steps.—Despite this progress, more improvement is necessary, as travelers 

continue to be frustrated by: 

1. The lack of clear instructions on the regular (as opposed to PreCheckTM) 

screening protocols (e.g., sometimes consumers are asked to put their shoes on 

the conveyor belt, other times in a bin; sometimes tablet computers are treated 

like laptops, other times like mobile phones; sometimes laptops are put in a bin 

alone, other times it is all right to include other items in that bin; occasionally 

consumers are asked to have a boarding pass in hand, other times they are not; 

and the on-going confusion over whether or not duty-free liquids of more than 

3 ounces acquired abroad when connecting to a domestic flight are permitted 

in a carry-on); and 

2. The lack of easy-to-find and -use contacts that consumers can reach for immediate answers to their travel security questions, including airport-specific information, airport-specific phone lines or customer service agents at an airport. 

TSA, airports and the airlines must continually collaborate to provide travelers 

with clear, concise, and consistent guidance on aviation security, including processes 

and procedures at the airport from curbside to boarding. A November 2011 survey 

by the U.S. Travel Association found that four out of five travelers are frustrated 

with the checkpoint process. While there are clearly a range of reasons for the frustration—long lines, travelers unsure of how to use the advanced imaging technology, 

families with lots of unwieldy gear—not understanding the aviation security process 

should not be one of the reasons once all parties in the security process are communicating effectively. 

Additionally, commercial aviation stakeholders—hoteliers, cruise lines, and rental 

car agencies, for example—should look for opportunities to provide their customers, 

members, and affiliates with information on enrollment for programs like 

PreCheckTM and Customs and Border Protection’s international travel facilitation 

program called Global Entry in order to add more low-risk travelers to the programs, and allow TSA to focus its resources on higher-risk travelers. In addition, 

as new programs or screening protocols are unveiled, organizations that can reach 

out to significant numbers of travelers should work with the appropriate Government agency to communicate the new processes to the traveling public. 

Recommendation 2: Improve Governmental Efficiency and Cooperation in the Execution of its Security Responsibilities 

Reinstitute the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. DHS should immediately reinstate and appoint the Aviation Security Advisory Committee 

(ASAC) to provide effective private-sector input to DHS on aviation security within 180 days. DHS should also convene airport-specific working 

groups to identify and resolve problems affecting travelers at particular locations. 

Progress.—On November 7, 2011, TSA officially reconstituted the ASAC and 

named 24 members to the committee. Since that time, the ASAC has held several 

full committee meetings, formed five subcommittees to examine specific issues, and 

will consider subcommittee recommendations in the near future. I am especially 

pleased that TSA named my friend and fellow panelist Geoff Freeman, executive 

vice president and chief operating officer of the U.S. Travel Association, as chair of 

the ASAC Subcommittee on Passenger Advocacy. 
23 

Next Steps.—Now that passenger advocacy groups, including the U.S. Travel Association, have been brought into the ASAC process at the working group level, it is 

time to recognize the importance of such organizations and add them to the full 

membership of this Federal Advisory Committee. Adding U.S. Travel and others, 

such as the Consumer Travel Alliance, for example, would give the travel community a greater voice in the advisory committee. CBP and TSA also need to create 

a broader group of local airport-specific stakeholder groups, including relevant destination marketing organizations, to develop innovative solutions that can improve 

passenger processing and customer service at their airports. 

Facilitate non-partisan leadership of TSA. The TSA Administrator should be 

converted to a 5-year position extending across Presidential administrations to be filled by a non-partisan official with expertise in both security 

and facilitation. 

Progress.—While the underlying statute creating the TSA envisions the administrator position holding a 5-year term, there has not yet been effective implementation of this term appointment during a transition of Presidential leadership: at the 

end of the Bush administration, former administrator Kip Hawley resigned rather 

than continue into the Obama administration. We understand that this issue has 

arisen recently before this committee, and that there has been discussion between 

the Chairman and the Ranking Member on the subject. We hope that bipartisan 

support for the TSA Administrator fulfilling a 5-year term appointment will remain 

strong so that this critical organization can transition from administration to administration without the disruption of a confirmation process. 

Next Steps.—Aviation security and travel facilitation should not be partisan 

issues, and TSA can ill afford not having a confirmed head following a Presidential 

election as happened in 2009. Thus, aviation stakeholders should encourage the incumbent or new administration to commit to having TSA Administrator Pistole fulfill his 5-year term. Additionally, Congressional leaders should, on a bipartisan 

basis, consider whether a longer term, such as that held by the FBI Director, would 

provide necessary continuity at TSA. 

Develop a comprehensive technology procurement strategy. TSA, in collaboration with technology vendors and the travel community, should develop a 

comprehensive strategy for implementing necessary checkpoint technology 

capabilities. Congress should provide multi-year funding plans for TSA to 

execute this strategy. 

Progress.—As this committee and others have noted in oversight hearings over 

the last several years, TSA has a checkered history in terms of deploying security 

technology. TSA priorities change with little notice, leaving frustrated vendors on 

the hook for time and resources spent in technology development. For example, deploying biometric card readers for the TSA Transportation Worker Identity Credential (TWIC) program, which provides biometrically-enabled cards to qualified individuals who need unescorted access to the secure areas of ports, vessels, and facilities, has been unresolved for years, with vendors having technology approved but 

left waiting for the formal rulemaking process to conclude. At the request of TSA, 

vendors prioritized the development of bottled liquid scanners in response to a specific threat only to see the organization pull back from the broad deployment originally envisioned. The current Credential Authentication Technology-Boarding Pass 

Scanning System (CATBPSS) has been through multiple procurements over several 

years, and support for this program is still questioned by some. Meanwhile, travelers are left with little understanding of what technologies do, what the future 

looks like, and how security will be enhanced over time. Knowing all of this, in the 

fiscal year 2012 DHS appropriations bill, Congress has established a requirement 

that all DHS components, including TSA, issue a Five-Year Homeland Security Acquisition Plan. Unfortunately, TSA has yet to do so, and there are some indications 

are that the agency does not plan to comply with the mandate, citing ever-changing 

threat circumstances as factor that limits the organization’s ability to plan for the 

long-term. 

Next Steps.—As any business leader knows, budgeting and planning are a necessary disciplines to set priorities and establish resource requirements. Uncertainty 

about the future is a given and changing priorities—and budget allocations—is in 

fact part of every manager’s responsibility. Government budget experts also know 

this, and have, in departments including the Department of Defense, issued 5-year 

plans that signal what the agency believes the future holds so that others, including 

partners in the private sector, can plan accordingly. The homeland security apparatus of the Government should similarly have the capability to issue 5-year plans. 

Indeed, I would argue that, given this tight budget environment, TSA’s planning ca-
24 

pabilities must improve, and the organization must more routinely and deeply engage technology vendors and travel community representatives. Engaging vendors 

before issuance of a request for proposals to discuss a security requirement, and possible solutions, should be the norm, not the exception. An open and transparent 

process to establish requirements and specifications should also be standard operating procedure—as opposed to the erratic, often opaque, process in place today. 

Through better planning and more thorough engagement, TSA can better ensure 

that the industry develops and deploys more effective and traveler-accepted technology that addresses well-articulated requirements. Stronger collaboration between 

the Government and private sector on acquisition-related issues will drastically improve traveler facilitation and security, while providing significant cost savings. 

Encourage wider use of secure identification documents. Federal and State 

governments should embrace programs that build and deploy secure identification documents in order to provide higher-quality identity documents 

to the traveling public that meet Government security requirements. 

Progress.—A critical step in securing our country’s commercial aviation system is 

ensuring the identity of individuals who travel on it. Today, the percentage of Americans holding a passport has reached an all-time high of 35%, according to the State 

Department. In addition, nearly all States have made significant improvements to 

the security of their identity documents in recent years, enhancing confidence that 

individuals holding an identity document are who they purport to be. Furthermore, 

U.S. Travel and several other stakeholders have submitted a proposal to TSA to leverage private-sector investment in secure identification as an alternative enrollment mechanism for TSA PreCheckTM. 

Next Steps.—Expanding the existence of secure identity documents should be a 

TSA priority. To that end, TSA should approve the use of secure private-sector enrollment technologies for TSA PreCheckTM to leverage the biometric identity management systems in use today within the private sector. The new Clear company, 

with its biometric identity card, is one good example, particularly given that a security threat assessment is conducted in conjunction with card issuance. 

Reduce duplicative TSA screening for international arrivals. DHS should enable certain low-risk passengers who are traveling through a U.S. gateway 

to another domestic airport to forego checked baggage and passenger 

screening upon landing in the United States. 

Progress.—The fiscal year 2012 DHS appropriations bill directed DHS to establish 

a pilot program to allow connecting passengers and their baggage to bypass baggage 

screening. In addition, the U.S.-Canada bilateral ‘‘Beyond the Border’’ action plan 

outlined a series of travel facilitation steps, including the end of rescreening of baggage from Canada under most circumstances by 2015 as Canada deploys baggage 

explosive detection systems. 

Next Steps.—CBP and TSA should complete the pilot described above and look to 

expand it to additional locations and populations. Furthermore, commercial aviation 

and travel interests should work with U.S. and Canadian authorities to move the 

‘‘Beyond the Border’’ agenda forward, including the goal of baggage screening harmonization. Finally, legislative alternatives, including the No Hassle Flying Act, 

H.R. 6028, which streamlines baggage security processing measures for international flights, should also be viewed as options to achieve this same goal. This 

bill is on the House suspension calendar this week. 

Expand trusted traveler programs to qualified international passengers. DHS 

should expand access to trusted traveler programs for international passengers entering the United States, as well as lead efforts to establish a 

multinational network of streamlined entry procedures for low-risk travelers. 

Progress.—CBP has made some progress in expanding access to Global Entry by 

launching pilot programs with the United Kingdom and Germany, and announcing 

agreements with South Korea and Singapore. Congress has supported Global Entry 

with funding and authorizing language, including requests to broaden enrollment to 

members of international organizations. In addition, Congress enacted legislation to 

allow the United States to participate in the APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC) 

program, which facilitates travel for business leaders in the 21 economies that make 

up the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. 

Next Steps.—CBP should accelerate negotiations with foreign governments to expand access to Global Entry, work to reduce interview delays in enrollment locations, and implement the ABTC legislation by beginning to issue APEC Business 

Travel Cards to qualified business travelers. In addition, foreign members of Global 
25 

Entry—such as those in the U.S.-Canada NEXUS program—should be offered access 

to TSA PreCheckTM. 

Eliminate duplication between TSA and Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP). DHS should streamline its operations at U.S. international airports to reduce unnecessary duplication and leverage CBP and TSA resources, authorities, and capabilities. 

Progress.—Unfortunately, there has been no progress on this recommendation, despite the potential cost savings that could be realized from elimination of duplication between TSA and CBP. 

Next Steps.—Reducing unnecessary duplication and cutting Government spending 

are two goals that every department and agency should be pursing with all due 

haste in this time of fiscal discipline. However, as TSA and CBP have not yet tackled this recommendation, we would hope that perhaps this committee could review 

programs in CBP and TSA that are duplicative, or might benefit from consolidation. 

This should start with both agencies jointly reviewing their staffing levels and 

schedules at international arrival airports. Unifying schedules so that there is optimal staffing based on flight arrivals should be the first priority, followed by an assessment of where cross-training of TSA and CBP officers might benefit the travelling public. Of course, in cases where programs seem duplicative but in fact a legitimate law enforcement or National security purpose is served through separation, we 

would not object. However, in this case, we believe a fresh set of eyes on the roles 

and responsibilities of CBP and TSA personnel at airports is merited, and we hope 

this committee would conduct such oversight. 

Push for international cooperation with U.S. security standards. The Federal 

Government must continue to push for international cooperation in the development of international aviation security, including both bilateral and 

multilateral approaches, as well as with organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to strengthen aviation security efforts while promoting travel and protecting travelers’ rights. 

Progress.—Following a 2010 agreement by the International Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen aviation security, DHS has continued to work on a bilateral 

basis with countries such as Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and 

Qatar to build capacity in the international aviation system for more consistent levels of screening and more standardized deployment of technology. In addition, in November 2011, DHS and the European Union concluded negotiations on a revised 

Passenger Name Record treaty to allow for continued vetting of in-bound passengers 

from the European Union. And recently, the United States and the European Union 

agreed to work together to harmonize the currently disparate approaches to the 

checkpoint screening of screening of liquids, aerosols, and gels. 

Next Steps.—Two DHS programs that are global in nature—the Global Entry program and the Visa Waiver Program—merit expansion immediately, assuming the 

foreign partners commit to implementing the required improvements in security and 

law enforcement information sharing. In the House, the expansion of VWP is codified in the Jobs Originated through Launching Travel Act (JOLT Act), H.R. 5741 

(S. 3199 in the Senate). We hope that Members of this subcommittee, and the full 

committee, will take a look at this legislation and consider signing on as co-sponsors, and also encourage subcommittee Chair Miller to hold a hearing. In the liquids, aerosols, and gels area inspection area, the United States and European Union 

should make public their time lines and multi-year budgets for harmonizing the deployment of technology that will meet the new U.S.-E.U. requirements so that technology vendors are ready with equipment once the governments harmonize policy. 

Recommendation 3: Restructure Our National Approach to Aviation Security by Developing and Utilizing Real Risk Management Methods and Tools 

Implement well-defined risk management processes. The administration 

should convene an external panel of experts with appropriate security 

clearances to review TSA aviation security programs, assess the risk each 

is designed to mitigate and develop metrics for measuring progress to lessen that risk. 

Progress.—While an external panel of risk management experts has not been convened by TSA, we do believe that the Risk-Based Screening Initiative, which includes PreCheckTM, is consistent with the spirit of this recommendation, which encouraged broader use risk management processes. 

Next Steps.—TSA’s Risk-Based Screening Initiative and the revitalization of the 

Aviation Security Advisory Committee are hopeful signs that TSA is not only expanding its use of risk management, but also is more thoroughly engaging external 
26 

travel and aviation experts from the private sector. We will watch the evolution of 

the various streams of on-going aviation security and facilitation work to insure 

they stay grounded in solid risk management principles, and that external experts 

remain actively involved. Assuming that is the case, we will withhold seeking the 

explicit creation of a risk management experts group. 

C. CONCLUSION

Since the issuance of the blue-ribbon panel report—and clearly, since September 

11, 2001—much has been done to improve aviation security. A new Government 

agency, new technologies, and new approaches to security have all been brought to 

bear to employ all reasonable steps to insure that such a tragedy never strikes our 

country again. At the same time, we are just beginning, as a Nation, to look at the 

other side of TSA’s mission—travel facilitation. Many Members of this committee 

are leading that effort, and we thank you for your commitment. The twin goals of 

security and facilitation must be effectively balanced to ensure that our country is 

both safe and prosperous. 

In our estimation, TSA has made tremendous progress since its establishment, 

and recent efforts—including TSA’s Risk-Based Screening Initiative—hold much 

promise for the country and for the traveling public. We look forward to continuing 

our long-standing bipartisan work with this subcommittee to ensure we highlight 

opportunities for TSA to do more to facilitate commercial air travel, while maintaining security for all Americans. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great, Mr. Gilliland. 

I appreciate you mentioning the No Hassle Flying Act. That will 

be on the floor this afternoon and the suspension calendar. So we 

are excited about that. 

The Chairman now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions. Each witness, I am a recovering attorney, as you all probably 

know, so I am going ask a leading question. I want you to answer 

with the one letter. 

What grade would you give TSA on efficiency, efficiency after 11 

years? 

Mr. Freeman. 

Mr. FREEMAN. TSA has made progress, but the grade is clearly 

incomplete as you look at what the opportunities are with 

PreCheck. 

Mr. ROGERS. You have been watching the convention, haven’t 

you? 

Mr. FREEMAN. It works well. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. FREEMAN. There is progress that has been made. It is a step 

in the right direction, but as for all the reasons we outlined earlier 

today with PreCheck, we have got to work on that model; we have 

got to work on our inter-operability, and we have got to find better 

ways to get people enrolled and provide more predictability to those 

that are enrolled. 

Mr. ROGERS. Doctor Carafano. 

Mr. CARAFANO. With all due respect sir, it is the wrong question. 

Your grades are subjective, particularly looking across the complexity of the TSA mission. To give them a grade in this sense 

would be to do what they are doing wrong now, which is we are 

don’t have the strong quantitative and qualitative analytical basis 

for decision making. 

Rather than give them a grade, I would say we have got—the 

structural inability to do the kind of tradeoffs that need to be done, 

and that is something that needs to be fixed. 
27 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Gilliland. 

Mr. GILLILAND. Well, are we grading at a curve? 

Mr. ROGERS. No. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GILLILAND. No. 

I guess I would say, specific to efficiency, there are clearly frustrations, particularly during peak travel times when somebody 

shows up at an airport. 

So if I think about it, specifically from a checkpoint perspective, 

you could say there are improvements to be made. There is a lot 

of work being done to move those trusted or known travelers out 

of those lines, so that they can process the other travelers more 

quickly. 

I will say from experience, I was in Frankfurt, transmitting 

through Frankfurt here just in the last couple of days, and certainly noted that the checkpoint process there is much slower than 

our own. 

So, if you are grading on a curve, they are certainly doing better 

than certainly some international checkpoint processes that I have 

seen; but lots of opportunity here ahead with TSA PreCheck, with 

global entry too, to reduce the size of a haystack. You know, we are 

looking for a needle in the haystack. 

Reduce the size of the haystack—get those known travelers, 

trusted travelers out of those lines and push people through much 

more efficiently. 

Mr. ROGERS. As a follow-up to that, let me ask, do you believe 

that TSA has implemented security measures in a proactive or reactive way? 

We will start with Mr. Gilliland. 

Mr. GILLILAND. Well, I think certainly there has been reaction to 

numerous incidents that have occurred in the last 11 years. So you 

see them being reactive in a number of situations. I suppose there 

is no other way to manage through that. 

On the proactive front, and I mention this in my testimony, I 

think we really need to have a multi-year plan. I think TSA needs 

to have a multi-year plan, and you need to provide—this committee 

needs to provide them with multi-year funding authorization so 

that they can look forward. 

To your points, Chairman Rogers, you know the threats are 

evolving. They are looking forward; they are looking at those 

threats. They need to build a proactive plan, technology and otherwise, to address that. I think that is what gets them fully forward 

from a proactive perspective. 

Mr. ROGERS. Doctor Carafano. 

Mr. CARAFANO. I think the simple answer is we have seen both. 

We have seen them do both. 

You know, I look back at the reaction to the liquid bomb plot, 

which in many ways, seems like a reaction, but was actually very 

proactive, because the agency had actually done a lot to think 

through that threat and when they had to respond to it, they actually did so, I thought, in a fairly thoughtful way. 

We don’t always see that. So it is this lack of consistent pattern 

of behavior throughout all the programs that I think is the greatest 

cause for concern. 
28 

Mr. ROGERS. How about you, Mr. Freeman? 

Mr. FREEMAN. I would add two things. 

I think the point Jim made earlier is that we have all been a bit 

too reactive with things from Congress, to the public, to TSA looking in bad times to see what needs to be done, as opposed to doing 

what you are doing today, which is when times are—when there 

isn’t a crisis situation, ‘‘How do we make some improvements 

here?’’ So, I think we are all guilty of being a bit reactive, in that 

sense. 

I think where we suffer the most though from a travel perspective is we continue to look at this too much only from the security 

lens, rather from that balance of security and facilitation. 

If we bring that model to it of ‘‘How do we get as many people 

through America’s airports as we possibly can?’’ as a means of promoting commerce, it is going to give us a different perspective, it 

is going to lead us to some different ideas as to policies that will 

increase travel and, in so doing, create new jobs. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Gilliland, given your role in the private sector, 

can you discuss what challenges you have encountered with TSA’s 

procurement process? 

Mr. GILLILAND. I think the challenges that I have observed—and 

they aren’t necessarily specific to our company—but I think from 

private-sector perspective—I think that there are numerous starts 

and stops. 

So some of that can come from either a policy change—but technology companies can get started on a project-based on a view of 

where we are going to be a couple years from now, only to have 

policy stop that. So we saw that, in some respects, with liquids, 

aerosols, and gels and the technology that was going to be deployed 

in that regard. 

I think it is really important—and my prior point that we understand that technology companies are included early in the process 

understanding what problem we are trying to solve. They will then 

forecast forward and plan along with TSA to get at the solution. 

Mr. ROGERS. I completely agree. That is across DHS. That is not 

unique to TSA. 

I thank you very much. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member for any 

questions she may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for, 

again, this hearing. 

I guess I am a little taken aback on the criticism on a day that 

we are mourning those who are lost, that we haven’t had one tragic 

incident since 9/11. 

So let me try to understand—I think it is Mr. Freeman? Where 

did you get this data that you are talking about that people are not 

traveling? Is this your own research? 

Mr. FREEMAN. Yes, Ranking Member Jackson Lee. There have 

been several studies done. We funded one study through Consensus 

Research. There have been other studies which speak to travelers’ 

frustration with the air-travel process. 

In fact, four out of five of the top frustrations deal with the security-screening process. It does discourage travel. It does discourage 

people from going to various destinations around the country. 
29 

As I said earlier, our challenge is to match our immense success 

on the security side with similar successes in facilitating travel. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. But you indicate in your statement that 

the research you are indicating your statement said travelers 

would take two or three more flights if the hassles in security 

screening were reduced. 

What are you suggesting? Reduced in what? 

Mr. FREEMAN. Well, when it comes to the hassle factor, as you 

talk to travelers there are various things, from the length of lines 

to the unpredictability of what you are going to face one day versus 

the next, to removing shoes. 

What travelers are most frustrated with is the one-size-fits-all 

approach. Many travelers, particularly those that are business 

travelers—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you want us to hire more TSO officers, because you say there are lines? 

Mr. FREEMAN. Yes. 

What travelers would like to do is provide more information 

about themselves. Provide that background information about 

themselves—prove with whatever measure Congress would like to 

set—that they are not a threat, so that they can face a different 

experience—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you see anything positive about what has 

occurred since 9/11? 

Mr. FREEMAN. As I said in my statement, TSA has done a fabulous job of protecting America, of assuring that we haven’t had any 

future or any additional terrorism acts. Our challenge is to match 

that success with similar successes on facilitation. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think part of what we have to do is to listen 

to you. You obviously have expertise. But I think the other part of 

what we have to do is to explain to America that they have safe 

travel partly because of some of the technology and techniques that 

have been utilized. Maybe a little bit of explanation might aid in 

the understanding. 

I am looking at the language that says nearly two in every three 

travelers, 54 percent, said they would fly more if the procedures remain as effective. So they believe that the procedures are effective. 

I guess that the issue of being intrusive and time-consuming, don’t 

you think that in addition to maybe looking at ways of expediting, 

that a greater explanation and information to travelers might also 

be helpful? 

Mr. FREEMAN. I think travelers are the customers. Travelers 

have the right to demand speedy process while also being secure. 

We can find a way to do that. We are the country that put a man 

on the moon, we can figure out how to—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. One of the things that I am certainly interested in is that—or that I might join with you on—is that we want 

to ensure that the civil liberties of all passengers are certainly protected; that there is no racial profiling, that there is no discrimination on the basis of one’s religious attire. I think that we can come 

together on that. 

But I also believe that we have seen over the last 2 weeks two 

very conspicuous large conventions. As I have had reports provided 

for me on both of those in Tampa and Charlotte, and having seen 
30 

the one in Charlotte, and even stopped at the airport and watched 

the screening process—large population of individuals, large numbers of individuals—and it looks as they went through without a 

hitch. 

I also think we can focus on information. I am not sure whether 

we can focus on reduction, and I think that if you are aware that 

TSA continuously looks at ways to eliminate some of the—let me 

not use the terminology—procedures that they use, including taking off shoes. 

So would that please you if TSA would move more expeditiously 

on some aspects of the screening process? 

Mr. FREEMAN. I think if we can move expeditiously to look at the 

reforms, it would be an excellent step in the right direction. You 

know, we have that here in the Cannon House Office Building. We 

have it across Capitol Hill right now, where Members of Congress 

go through a different screening procedure than I go through when 

coming into this building. 

That is because they have more information about Members of 

Congress. They are trusted. It is using risk-based screening. We 

need to bring that same effort to America’s airports. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. With all due respect, I am not going to adhere 

to the screening here to protect Members of Congress. I think protecting the various visitors that we have might be a little bit more 

important. But it certainly doesn’t equate to someone getting on an 

airplane and being airborne and that particular, if you will, aircraft 

becoming a flying missile, as it did on 9/11. 

I just want to say that I think we live in a completely different 

world, and it is not all about vacationers and others. I do want 

grandma and grandchild to be able to get to their destination to 

visit each other without having an intrusive and frightening process. 

But I believe that one of the responsibilities we have as a Member of Congress is to ensure that we educate not only you and the 

traveling public, because I think we have done a lot for the travel 

industry and I want to do more. I like to do more for however I 

can create processes to help you. 

But I do not want us to be lax—and I am ending, Mr. Chairman, 

thank you for the gavel—I do not want to be lax, if you will, on 

procedures that have provided a safe passage for a Nation’s millions of travelers since 9/11. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Lungren, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

At the outset I want to say that I do think we are safer as a result of the actions that have been taken. I do think there has been 

some improvement in terms of the rapidity with which we can go 

through. 

At least, I have seen that. I have only traveled 2.5 million miles 

on commercial air, and unfortunately I did two different airlines, 

and so you don’t get the same benefits at 1 million as you do with 

2, but what the heck? 
31 

But I have noticed an improvement. I happen to think the fullbody scanners have helped, particularly since I have been one of 

those who have the opportunity to have a hip replacement, a knee 

replacement. I would much rather go through that way than have 

their hands put on me. 

But there is a lot of improvement that needs to be done. I don’t 

think there is any doubt about that. 

Dr. Carafano, I would like to ask you this: Do we run into the 

problem of sort of two different impulses—egalitarianism, meaning 

that everyone is treated the same, versus risk-based activity? It 

just strikes me that we have had the reluctance on the part of TSA 

in both administrations to go to pre-screened lines, because it is 

going to treat people differently. 

We had a reluctance by prior operations for the flight-deck operation. I mean, that was imposed by Congress. It was because they 

would be treated differently than everybody else. It just seems to 

me that smacks of frankly silliness in not getting us to a risk-based 

scenario. 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, Congressman, I think you ask a really 

great question. I have real problems with the risk-based initiative, 

because it implies something is exactly wrong. Most people that 

travel are low-risk. So the notion that we have distinguish a few 

low-risk categories, that is really much of an achievement. That 

just means that we have singled out a few out of all of us who are 

very, very low-risk. 

So I really don’t applaud the department for these initiatives, because we have got the real challenge is to distinguish the vast majority of travelers that are low-risk from the very few that we know 

are a real problem. Which is, again, my emphasis on linking TSA 

on the operational capabilities, the things that are proactive, the 

things that link with CT, the things that stop people before they 

get near our critical infrastructure, that are really the most costeffective. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Let us presume that—because in tough budget 

times that TSA is going to continue with the current budget or 

maybe even slightly less. How would you make changes with the 

same budget and why? 

Mr. Freemen, do you have any suggestions? 

Mr. FREEMAN. Well, I think one of the great opportunities here 

is the many travelers who are willing to pay for a better experience. Quite frankly, when you look at it, upwards of 80 percent of 

travelers would be willing to pay to be part of a trusted-traveler 

program, where in exchange for providing information about themselves and paying a modest fee to cover TSA’s cost for the FBI 

background check or whatever else they may have—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Have you ever heard anybody argue that having 

more information that would go to the question of whether they are 

a risk or not risk does not give you a better benefit than idly looking at everybody that goes through? 

Mr. FREEMAN. No. No one has made that argument. In fact, the 

model for the Global Entry program that Customs and Border Protection is already using is based on getting information about people in advance. As the 9/11 Commission says, it is all about intel-
32 

ligence gathering. Gathering that information in advance is the 

best that we can do, and processing people through there. 

I think when you look at tight budgetary time, that is one approach; working with private vendors who can also cooperate here. 

I mentioned Clear earlier as one example of an entity that can help 

on background checks and in other areas that are opportunities 

here to achieve the security that Ranking Member Jackson Lee 

rightfully demands will also streamline the process. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Gilliland, do you have any suggestions how 

they can improve without having an increased budget if they have 

to deal with that situation, as most Government agencies are going 

to have to? 

Mr. GILLILAND. Well, I think the very programs that have been 

mentioned here are opportunities to use the same number of people 

to screen more. What I mean by that is that you see PreCheck, you 

see Global Entry—it allows people to move through the process 

more quickly. It allows TSA to focus on people they don’t know. 

However, we do need to—as Dr. Carafano pointed out, we need 

to get more people into the program. So it can’t simply be about 

frequent travelers, although they are the highest volume of entry 

and exit into and out of airports. It can’t just be about frequent fliers. 

We have got to get the programs like Clear, other programs that 

can get more and more people into that process. If you do that, you 

can process more people with fewer TSA agents or—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Dr. Carafano, any other suggestions? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, you know, I think that they are both correct. If you reduce your screener requirement you are going to save 

a ton of money. The question is—even if you vastly spend, the 

number of people that are low-risk, and the getting people into— 

wind up into the low-risk category, is just like getting people to use 

Twitter. 

I mean, the rules are exactly the same. It has to be simple. It 

has to be vigorous, and the traveler has to see value in that. So 

unless you create a system that has those three attributes, you are 

not going to get the numbers of people into the system at the level 

you do to significantly reduce costs. 

I don’t see how you get to that kind of system with just a Government-run program. I do think you are going to have to have a 

program which has greater input from industry and travelers and 

stakeholders to shape the kind of programs that are suitable and 

flexible to their needs. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Davis is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank the witnesses for being here. 

Mr. Freeman, in your testimony, you discuss the economic impact travel has on our Nation’s economic health and the many jobs 

that are dependent upon the travel industry. 

Is it accurate to say that when TSA does its job effectively and 

prevents terrorist attacks from occurring, it is helping to ensure 

the health of a critical part of our economy? 
33 

Mr. FREEMAN. The most important things to increase travel are 

safety and efficiency, so both of those things have to work handin-hand. 

Unfortunately, we have the same number of air travelers today 

that we had in 2000. So I think we have to ask ourselves, ‘‘What 

is it going to take to get more people traveling?’’ What is it going 

to take to get more people in the air so that we can go into these 

local communities and not just stay in hotels and rent cars, but go 

to the local drugstores, go to the dry cleaners, spend that money 

throughout those local communities to strengthen them? 

Right now, we are static. 

Mr. DAVIS. You also cite in your testimony studies that suggest 

individuals do not fly oftentimes due to hassles related to the 

checkpoint screening. 

What would you suggest TSA and the travel industry do collaboratively to ensure that individuals are not deterred from flying because of security hassles? 

Mr. FREEMAN. Yes, the travelers that most often avoid trips are 

those travelers who travel most, the frequent business travelers. 

The single biggest thing those travelers want is predictability. They 

want a sense of, if it is an hour wait 1 day and 1 minute or 5 minutes the next day, why is that? Why are things changing constantly? 

If we can work together to provide that predictability, we will be 

much better off. One thing we have been discussing with TSA is 

the ability of travelers if TSA would be willing to provide the information to check from an offsite location as to the length of wait 

times at various airports so they can know before they depart for 

the airport. 

That is one example, I think, would help business travelers in 

particular. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Also in your testimony, you referenced that TSA restarted the 

Aviation Security Advisory Committee and has increased its interaction with the private sector. 

I know that Mr. Thompson, our Ranking Member Thompson, has 

legislation H.R. 1447 which would codify the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. Do you support that kind of approach or Mr. 

Thompson’s legislation? 

Mr. FREEMAN. The Aviation Security Advisory Council is critical. 

Sam’s Blue-Ribbon Panel recommended putting that into full gear. 

I need to look at Mr. Thompson’s bill. I am not familiar with it, 

but we absolutely support councils like that to ensure that TSA can 

get the outside council that it needs. 

Mr. DAVIS. In your testimony, you also state that TSA’s 

PreCheck program is an essential first step to creating a more efficient and secure screening process. 

What would you recommend that the next step be in an effort to 

expand that activity? 

Mr. FREEMAN. Well, I think two important next steps. 

One is working with outside entities who can help direct more 

travelers to that so that Global Entry is not the only model for 

coming into the program, as well as working to create some interoperability with the airlines. 
34 

One of the biggest shortcomings today is that if you have 100,000 

miles with one airline and you fly on that airline, you may be in 

PreCheck. The next day you fly with a different airline, you are the 

same person, you are the same security threat, and yet you have 

a different experience. 

We have got to address that issue. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Gilliland, let me ask you, the Blue-Ribbon Panel’s report 

states that TSA should develop a comprehensive technology procurement strategy. 

How many years would you suggest the strategy cover, and do 

we ensure TSA retains the flexibility to adapt to new threats that 

may have not been envisioned at the time the strategy was developed? 

Mr. GILLILAND. Well, first of all, if I were to apply private-sector 

approaches to a forward-looking view on technology planning, I 

would say 3 to 5 years would be a good time horizon to think about 

in terms of a technology plan. 

I think, though, going along with that, it is going to be really important for this subcommittee to provide a multi-year authorization 

for that type of plan. 

Sir, I am sorry, the second part of your question? 

Mr. DAVIS. The second part would be—let us see, what did I ask 

here? The second part was what kind of flexibilities, I guess, would 

one project the need for over that period of time? 

Mr. GILLILAND. Well I think, and again, this comes back to the 

challenge of the budget process around here. But often you can 

plan in the private sector to purchase something a year out and 

your plan won’t change. 

In the budgetary process here, you are often forecasting out several years. By the time you get there to implement the technology 

has passed you by and you need to procure new—so I think the 

flexibility that is needed is both an ability to purchase soon after 

the decisions are made and also than to have a budgeting process 

that allows you think forward a couple of years and purchase at 

the time of need as opposed to having to forecast so far out that 

the technology has become obsolete by that time. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Turner, for any questions he may have. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A question for Dr. Carafano—you mentioned the international 

studies and comparisons with some of the European operations in 

airports. Could you elaborate a little bit on what has been learned 

that is positive that could translate here? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, I think if you look at the European experience—with the last data I looked at from the Reason Institute was 

about—I think they said 48 percent of European countries either 

use contractor airport security—Government security—their compliance with ICAO—their safety records have been comparable 

with the United States. 

That raises—— 
35 

Mr. TURNER. Cost? 

Mr. CARAFANO. I am not sure on the European costs. The most 

interesting data I have seen on cost comparisons was the work that 

the House Transportation Committee did in 2011 where they 

looked at LAX, which is a completely TSA airport, vis-a ́-vis San 

Francisco, which was in the screening partnership program—San 

Francisco had lower costs and equal efficiency; and actually some 

cases better efficiency, but equal levels of security. 

The question of Government versus private screeners in terms of 

the level of security they provide—I think the answer is, with the 

appropriate oversight and requirements on them, they can provide 

equal security. Then the question of cost efficiency gets a little 

more complicated as to the size of the airport, how it is structured 

and everything. 

But clearly we have seen there is potential for airports with private security screening to deliver equal services at lower cost. 

Mr. TURNER. Sure, all right, thank you. 

Mr. Freeman, I can only agree with you, as a frequent flyer and 

roughly 2.5 million miles as well over many years. If I can avoid 

flying, I do. 

Just the operations at the airport are—it is off-putting and some 

days it is belts-on. Some days it is belts-off, shoes-off, don’t quite 

know why. Just the last time I flew, I had my Congressional identity challenged—‘‘No, we can’t use that. We can only use State driver’s license.’’ I said, ‘‘Really?’’ 

But, I let that one go because by the time you get a supervisor 

over, just—I can drive in 5 hours down here as opposed to getting 

to the airport an hour early and going through that hassle and 

waiting on the tarmac another 40 minutes on. What you say is very 

true. 

I have a dozen friends who now drive from New York to Myrtle 

Beach. They have had it with the airport process. They will take 

a day-and-a-half drive rather than two airline trips. 

So I am sure it is affecting the commerce and the business of airline travel, and it is not positive. 

Now I don’t think this is that difficult to find who the frequent 

travelers are, identify them and move them through. I think that 

can be a very big and broad list. But if you have anything to add, 

I would like to hear it. 

Mr. FREEMAN. I am sorry your experience mimics that of so 

many others. We can do better. I think that is the essence of what 

the Blue-Ribbon Panel chaired by Sam, Tom Ridge, former Congressman Jim Turner, everyone looking at this issue is saying we 

can do better. 

Security is absolutely job No. 1. As Americans, let us find a way 

to achieve that security with world-class efficiency, with a worldclass customer service and letting people know that we want to 

help you move around this country. That is the challenge we face, 

and we can do it. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

You all are probably aware that this committee has held a series 

of hearings on procurement and acquisition and the problems that 
36 

alluded to Dr. Carafano’s opening statement as being accurate, but 

it is accurate across the whole Department. This has been real 

frustrating to me. 

Mr. Gilliland, has TSA requested the assistance of the private 

sector, to your knowledge, to help in establishing a truly risk-based 

screening process at checkpoints? 

Mr. GILLILAND. Well, I think the ASAC is an example of the type 

of collaboration that can occur if we bring public and private sector 

together. So I think there is certainly that collaboration. 

I think the other collaboration that has occurred here more recently is less related to technology and more related to communications and process. 

Certainly, there has been a lot of collaboration around: How do 

we get the word out about Global Entry? How do we get more people signed up? How do we get more people into TSA PreCheck and 

help them understand? Can you be helpful if it relates—can private 

sector be helpful as it relates to technology on our website—and 

the clarity of that information, the flow of the website so that we 

can be a lot more helpful to travelers with the information they 

would really like to get out to them? 

Mr. ROGERS. You heard Mr. Freeman talk about being qualified 

for Global Entry and being denied for PreCheck and made the reference to the fact that, just like I am, I am PreCheck for Delta, but 

US Air, I am not, which is—— 

Mr. GILLILAND. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not the 

technology exists and whether it would be prohibitively difficult or 

expensive to put in a central database of people who are qualified 

for PreCheck or Global Entry or whatever so that each airline 

would be able to ping off that database somebody that has bought 

a ticket? 

Mr. GILLILAND. Certainly, from a technology perspective, it is doable. I think, from a policy perspective and just as you think about 

the passengers themselves and their willingness to opt in, which I 

think many would be happy to opt in, to provide their information 

and data more freely. 

I think it is clearly possible, from a tech perspective. There are 

probably some processes and maybe even some policy that you need 

to apply to it though as well. 

Mr. ROGERS. I am interested—do you all have any thoughts on 

that point? Since you brought it up, Mr. Freeman, the Global Entry 

thing I think, is just amazing—that after having that done you 

can’t qualify for PreCheck. 

Tell me more about the general—I don’t know your particulars, 

but why you think that happens? 

Mr. FREEMAN. My understanding is, in talking with TSA, that it 

deals with different entry codes in the various airline systems as 

well as TSA’s systems whether your middle initial is entered in one 

system and your full middle name in another. 

These systems are having difficulty talking to one another. That 

certainly needs to get addressed. It can be done, as Sam said, from 

a technology standpoint. We just have to place greater emphasis on 

it. 
37 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Carafano, what would you suggest we do to try 

to enhance or facilitate more public-private conversation between 

the Department and the private sector? 

Mr. CARAFANO. That is a great question. I think it is all an interesting kind of academic debate. We don’t get to the fundamental 

problem, which is the Department, overall, lacks an organized, coherent acquisition process and we need that. Without that everything else around is just kind of window dressing. 

There are some great initiatives. For example, the Homeland Security Policy Institute runs a program for DHS on technology review where they bring in stakeholders and they say, ‘‘Hey, here is 

the technology, what do you guys think?’’ 

They get a variety of stakeholders from industry and private sector and they comment on it. The idea is to understand how the 

public and how customers would react to this technology if the Department rolled it out or if they tried to, you know, hand it over 

to industry. 

It is a great initiative, but it is a great initiative absent the context of a structured acquisition program for the Department. 

Mr. ROGERS. Frustrating. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman recognizes the Ranking Member for any additional questions she may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much. 

I want to make sure that the panelists know how much I appreciate the insight is crucial. It is good for us to have a give-and-take. 

I want Mr. Turner to be able to not have to drive 5 hours and do 

other things. 

I, most of all, want to make sure that TSO officers understand 

what a Government ID is and that a Congressional ID is a Government-issued ID and it should not be question not because we are 

Members of Congress, but because it is a Government ID. 

So I hope that those who are in the sound of my voice can hear 

that, Mr. Chairman, because that is an embarrassment. 

But I do want Mr. Freeman, who I want to welcome in particular, to at least give me the moment that a lot of other things 

impact traveling such as—a $150 travel fee, baggage fees, waiting 

on tarmacs, canceled flights are part of it. But I think we can come 

together and I want to just raise this question with you which I 

think is important. 

The U.S. Travel Association’s Blue-Ribbon Panel Report recommends that Congress act immediately to clear up confusion over 

ownership of commercial aviation security and authorize TSA to 

control the entire security checkpoint starting at the beginning of 

the security lines and ending as the traveler exits the screening 

area. 

I would almost make the argument about the area right outside 

the airplane and the place of entry onto the plane. But, in any 

event, would implementation of this recommendation enhance both 

efficiency and security and, also, do what I think you said is the 

integration of the PreCheck and the Global Entry and to expedite 

that processing even if we have moved to the point where we have 

it integrated? I think it would be important to integrate that system to make it one so that you could do that in a more expeditious 

way. 
38 

Let me just finish by saying you also recommend the Department 

of Transportation issue regulations requiring airlines to allow passengers one checked bag as part of their base airfare. 

So why don’t I let you answer that with the focus being how 

TSA, by getting more control over areas, put on the onus and burden of them being efficient. 

I do want to acknowledge Mr. Richmond and Mr. Davis’ presence 

here for the record, even though Mr. Davis has already spoken. 

I yield to you. 

Mr. FREEMAN. I appreciate that. Let me take those questions in 

reverse order. The panel did look at the issue of increased bags 

coming through the security checkpoint. 

According to Secretary Napolitano, they have picked up—DHS has—in excess of $300 million in new costs since the implementation of baggage fees and the increased bags coming through the security checkpoint. 

Administrator Pistole has told folks in the industry, they have 

seen a 50 percent increase in bags coming through the TSA checkpoint. We think that is an issue that needs to be investigated, that, 

absolutely, it would play a significant role in the inefficiency of that 

process and it is something that needs to be explored, No. 1. 

With regard to Global Entry integration, we completely agree. 

Global Entry is a good model for what PreCheck can look like. It 

includes a background check. It includes a personal interview. It 

includes a lot of the things that speak to risk management. So we 

agree on the integration. 

On your last point regarding the whole checkpoint, I think one 

thing that many people are unfamiliar with is that the airlines control the security checkpoint up until you reach the Travel Document Checker. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Right. 

Mr. FREEMAN. So that whole line process is controlled by the airlines, and we understand why they see value in that. Certain travelers get a different, perhaps better experience, than other travelers. 

It would be our opinion that the security checkpoint is about security and the way to get a better security experience is to provide 

more information about yourself. The more information you provide, the more information that speaks to security—the better experience you get based less on your frequency of flying or how 

much money you have paid someone and much more on the security information you have provided. 

Having control of that entire checkpoint will increase efficiency 

and will get us to a system that is more risk-based than dollarbased. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. There lies a very conspicuous place of agreement and a place where we can include and engage the U.S. Travel 

Association and airlines, which, Mr. Chairman, I think are very important to come into this discussion because Mr. Freeman is right. 

If you look at the lines, you will see a slow process, long lines 

based upon ticket structure. But, more importantly, you will see, 

as a frequent traveler—and you are I know—the huge numbers of 

bags that individuals—I am amazed at how many bags they can 

pack under their arm or on their backpack or in between their 
39 

shoulders, et cetera, in order to avoid what is expensive baggage 

fees. 

I am not criticizing travelers at all, but we have got to find a 

common ground because I believe that America has been made secure because we have had a process in place. Now, we have to refine and define and make better the process. 

So let me thank you. That is the only question I wanted to follow-up with is about the control of the security area and how we 

can expedite and make better security and expedite travelers. 

Thank you very much for our testimony. 

Mr. FREEMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentlelady. 

That concludes our question period. We do have one brief statement that the gentleman from California wanted to make. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I just wanted to say, Mr. Chairman, I join my colleagues in wondering why the identification card for Members of 

Congress, which is a Government-issued document, which has a 

picture on it, is not accepted. 

It certainly seems to me that has a higher level of security than 

a driver’s license. Twice at Los Angeles Airport, I have been told 

by the person ‘‘Well, I don’t recognize that. That is not one of the 

usual ones and if you wait here for 5 or 10 minutes, we can get 

the supervisor to come.’’ 

If the purpose is security, the manner in which it is used just 

goes upside-down. So maybe they will hear today from this hearing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, that is demonstrative of a larger problem. 

Thank all of you all for your very thoughtful comments and answers to our questions. It has been very helpful and I appreciate 

it. 

With that, this panel is dismissed, and we will call up the second 

panel. 

The Chairman now recognizes the second panel. 

We are pleased to have two additional witnesses for us today on 

this important topic—both of them very familiar figures when it 

comes to this subcommittee. 

Let me remind the witnesses their entire written statements will 

appear in the record. 

Our first witness, Mr. John Halinski, currently serves as deputy 

administrator for TSA. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Halinski for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN W. HALINSKI, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HALINSKI. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, 

distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

None of us needs to be reminded of the significance of this day. 

Few dates in our history carry the weight associated with the numbers 9/11. Like today, September 11, 2001 was a Tuesday. The attacks occurred from 8:46 to 10:03. When it was over, 2,977 people 

had been killed, and more than 3,000 children lost a parent. 

As the wreckage of the World Trade Center smoldered, the 

United States Congress passed ATSA, the Aviation and Transpor-
40 

tation Security Act, authorizing the creation of the Transportation 

Security Administration. 

We were built to strengthen the security of the Nation’s transportation systems while ensuring the freedom of movement for people in commerce. We were built to coordinate and collaborate security efforts with the public and private-sector stakeholders across 

all modes of transportation. We were built to ensure that no other 

date is ever as deeply and permanently scarred as this one. 

Everywhere we work, our actions are guided by the promise that 

we will never forget. Every year, more than 9 billion passengers 

use mass transit, while another 750 million people travel on overthe-road buses. Additionally, nearly 800,000 shipments of hazardous material are transported every day, 95 percent of them by 

truck. Transportation security officers perform security screening 

for approximately 640 million passengers each year. 

Our commitment to never forget the significance of this day includes an understanding that commercial aviation continues to be 

a priority target for terrorists who continue developing and adapting threats against the global aviation system. This is why intelligence is a key driver for all we do. 

Continuing our efforts to strengthen global aviation this week, 

TSA administrator John Pistole will meet with leaders from around 

the world. This high-level conference, which is a culmination of 2 

years’ worth of work on aviation security, is sponsored by the international civil aviation organization and will address key aviation 

security principles. Agenda items vary from risk-based security, to 

cargo, to combating the insider threat. 

As you know, we are taking a number of steps to achieve our primary goal of providing the most effective security in the most efficient way for passengers as well. These include modified screening 

procedures for passengers 12 and younger and 75 and older, the 

launch of TSA PreCheck, the Known Crewmember program, and 

the expedited screening for members of the U.S. armed forces. 

The success of these risk-based security initiatives depend upon 

our most valuable resource, our people. Maintaining and enhancing 

the capabilities of our employees through training is a priority. The 

nature of our work and advances in technology require our work 

force to adapt and develop new specialized skills as threats evolve. 

It is not enough to train and engage our work force. We must 

hold everyone accountable in the success for our mission, and remove people who do not meet the high standards of integrity that 

our mission requires. 

To honor our commitment to never forget, we must also engage 

our work force, shaping them for success and driving efficiencies 

across the organization, so that all who travel can do so securely, 

as exemplified by recent TSA support to the Olympics and the conventions in Tampa and Charlotte. 

Eleven years ago, we—all Americans—stood united to defeat a 

diabolical threat that attacked our Nation. TSA was born from this 

tragedy, and lives this event every day. We do this with honor, integrity, and professionalism. Our mission appears simple to many, 

but its complexity and variety makes it a difficult task for anyone 

to accomplish. 
41 

As the memories of 9/11 slip by for many, we at TSA cannot afford to forget what our job is. We cannot be distracted by critics 

and others who forget we face a threat, that just this spring rose 

again and attempted to attack our transportation system. 

We will never forget and not let it happen on our watch. I am 

proud of our employees who come to work each day and every day 

to serve and protect the traveling public. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you on this important anniversary. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Halinski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN W. HALINSKI

SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of 

the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on the 

anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks against our Nation. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created in the wake of 

9/11 to strengthen the security of the Nation’s transportation systems while ensuring the freedom of movement for people and commerce. TSA functions as a critical 

component of our Nation’s counterterrorism efforts with a highly dedicated workforce working around the clock and across the globe to execute our transportation 

security responsibilities. Every day we work closely with public and private-sector 

stakeholders in the aviation, rail, mass transit, highway, and pipeline sectors to employ an intelligence-driven, risk-based security approach across all modes of transportation. 

The vast nature of the Nation’s transportation systems as well as its impact on 

our Nation’s economy requires that our personnel continually adjust and adapt security practices and procedures to best address evolving threats and vulnerabilities. 

Every year, passengers make more than 9 billion mass transit trips while over 750 

million over-the-road bus trips are completed. Additionally, nearly 800,000 shipments of hazardous materials are transported every day, of which 95 percent are 

shipped by truck. Within the commercial aviation environment, Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) perform security approximately 640 million passenger 

screenings each year. This volume is roughly equivalent to screening every person 

residing in the United States, Mexico, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and 

Italy. 

TSA’s security measures create a multi-layered system of transportation security 

that mitigates risk. We continue to evolve our security approach by examining the 

procedures and technologies we use, how specific security procedures are carried 

out, and how screening is conducted. As we carry out our mission, TSA is focused 

on providing the most effective transportation security in the most efficient way possible. 

MAINTAIN FOCUS ON GLOBAL STRATEGY

We are committed to maintaining our focus on global strategies in order to mitigate the likelihood of a successful attack that originates from beyond our borders. 

To accomplish our mission, TSA has a globally-deployed outreach and engagement 

workforce comprising TSA representatives (TSAR) who coordinate closely with foreign government counterparts and international industry representatives who serve 

as the direct liaison to regulated foreign airlines. Also, TSA has a cadre of aviation 

security instructors who focus on capacity development and provide formal training 

to international counterparts when capacity development and training are deemed 

a viable solution for vulnerabilities. Through these interactions, TSA is able to synchronize our approach with the entities affected by our security decisions while promoting both international security and commerce. 

We believe that good, thoughtful, sensible security by its very nature facilitates 

lawful travel and legitimate commerce. Tomorrow, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano 

and TSA Administrator John Pistole will meet with leaders from around the world 

at a High-Level Conference on Aviation Security of the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) to address, among other things, key principles of air cargo and 

mail security developed by an ICAO working group in May of this year. These principles recognize that strong, sustainable, and resilient air cargo security is essential 
42 

and recommend the adoption of the total supply chain approach to security that has 

already been incorporated by the United States to secure domestic cargo. The principles also emphasize the importance of oversight, quality control, and international 

cooperation and coordination of security measures for the global air cargo supply 

chain. 

TSA has worked closely with its international and private-sector partners to increase the security of air cargo without restricting the movement of goods and products. By December 3, 2012, TSA will require 100 percent physical screening of all 

air cargo transported on passenger aircraft bound for the United States. This important step not only builds on the current practice of 100 percent screening of identified high-risk international cargo, but also adds TSA’s risk-based, intelligence-driven procedures into the prescreening process by determining appropriate screening 

protocols on a per-shipment basis. This process requires enhanced screening for any 

shipment designated as higher-risk based on a review of information about the shipper and the shipment itself, which must undergo the most stringent screening protocols prior to transport on both passenger and all-cargo aircraft bound for the United 

States. In addition, TSA continues to pursue bilateral efforts with appropriate foreign government partners through its National Cargo Security Program (NCSP) recognition program. Under this program, an air carrier can choose to implement the 

security program of the country from which it is operating once TSA has determined 

that such programs provide a level of security commensurate with current U.S. air 

cargo security requirements. 

RISK-BASED SECURITY IMPROVES MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

Risk-based screening strengthens security while significantly enhancing the travel 

experience for passengers whenever possible. By learning more about travelers 

through information they voluntarily provide, and combining that information with 

our other layers of security, DHS can focus more resources on higher-risk and unknown passengers. DHS will continue to incorporate random security steps as well 

as other measures both seen and unseen in order to maintain the safest and most 

efficient system possible for the traveling public. Since the fall of 2011, TSA has offered modified screening procedures to a variety of low-risk populations including 

passengers 12 and younger and 75 and older. 

In October 2011, TSA launched the TSA PreCheckTM program to build on our intelligence-driven, risk-based initiatives helping TSA move away from a one-size-fitsall model and closer to its goal of providing the most effective security in the most 

efficient way. To date, more than 2 million passengers have experienced TSA 

PreCheckTM. TSA PreCheckTM is now available in 23 airports for Alaska Airlines, 

American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, United Airlines, and US Airways frequent flyers. A total of 35 airports are scheduled to be on-line by the end of this year. As 

participating airlines and airports become operationally ready, TSA will announce 

the implementation of TSA PreCheckTM at additional locations. 

TSA PreCheckTM enables TSA to focus our efforts on the passengers we know little about and high-risk passengers, while providing expedited screening and a better 

experience for those travelers TSA knows the most about. Airports with TSA 

PreCheckTM provide expedited screening to U.S. citizens flying domestically, who 

are members of existing U.S. Custom and Border Protection (CBP) Trusted Traveler 

programs (Global Entry, NEXUS, and SENTRI), or eligible airline frequent flyers 

who have opted in. 

TSA continues to take steps to further enhance our layered approach to security 

through state-of-the-art technologies, better passenger identification techniques, and 

other developments that strengthen our capabilities to keep terrorists off commercial aircraft. However, TSA will always incorporate random and unpredictable security measures throughout the airport and no individual will be guaranteed expedited or modified screening. Airport security checkpoints are only one part of a 

multi-layered system for aviation security. Other parts, both seen and unseen by the 

public, include analysis of intelligence, explosives detection, canine teams, Federal 

Air Marshals, and closed-circuit television monitoring. With the tools that exist 

today, if we can confirm a person’s identity and learn more about them through information they voluntarily provide, and combine that information with our other 

layers of security, we can expedite the physical screening for many people. 

As part of the continued expansion of RBS initiatives, TSA will include flight attendants from U.S.-based airlines and traveling from U.S. airports into the Known 

Crew Member (KCM) program that already includes pilots. KCM provides positive 

identity verification of the airline crewmember, enabling expedited screening. TSA 

anticipates that it may take 6 to 12 months for the air carriers and their service 

providers to make the necessary system modifications to incorporate flight attend-
43 

ants into the expedited screening process already in place for U.S. airline pilots and 

fully develop, test, and implement the program. As of August 2012, KCM has been 

deployed at 18 airports, with 13 additional sites scheduled to come on-line by the 

end of the calendar year. 

TSA also recognizes that members of the U.S. Armed Forces, who are trusted to 

protect the security and values of America with their lives, pose a lower risk to aviation security. In fact, TSA is proud to count many uniformed service members 

among our employees. At airport checkpoints Nation-wide, U.S. service personnel in 

uniform with proper identification, whether traveling on official orders or not, are 

not required to remove their shoes or boots unless they alarm our technology. Other 

screening courtesies that we extend to U.S. military personnel traveling in uniform 

significantly reduce the likelihood that they will receive a pat-down or other additional screening. In addition, family members may obtain gate passes to accompany 

departing troops or meet their loved ones when they come home. TSA also expedites 

screening for honor flight veterans, and partners with the Department of Defense 

to expedite screening of wounded warriors. Additionally, as part of our intelligencedriven, risk-based approach to security, TSA now offers TSA PreCheckTM expedited 

screening benefits to active-duty service members at Ronald Reagan Washington 

National Airport and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport as part of an initial 

proof of concept. 

WORKFORCE ENGAGEMENT INITIATIVES

The success of RBS and initiatives like TSA PreCheckTM depend upon people. A 

dedicated TSA workforce assures the traveling public that they are protected by a 

multi-layered system of transportation security that mitigates risk. An effective 

workforce must be properly trained. We are currently engaged in a transformation 

of TSA that is designed to increase efficiencies and more prudently allocate resources. An important part of this effort is the creation of the Office of Training and 

Workforce Engagement (OTWE), which centralizes technical and leadership training, as well as workforce engagement programs that were previously dispersed 

throughout TSA. Maintaining and enhancing the capabilities of our employees, and 

particularly our TSOs, is a priority. Both the nature of our work and advances in 

technology have required our workforce to adapt and develop new, specialized skills 

as threats continue to evolve. As part of this strategic alignment, OTWE developed 

and implemented a new TSA training program at the Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA in April 2012. 

In addition to technical training, on-going programs support the professional development of TSOs to continually improve their overall effectiveness and efficiency. 

For example, since last summer TSA has been delivering a tactical communications 

course for all managers, supervisors, and TSOs. The course, which expands upon the 

concepts and principles introduced during earlier engagement training, teaches officers how to effectively interact with passengers and co-workers. The course is designed to prepare TSOs for all types of human interactions by giving them tools and 

techniques to de-escalate difficult situations. At the checkpoint, these skills enable 

TSOs to more effectively complete the screening process. 

We are also expanding supervisory training as we implement the Department of 

Homeland Security Cornerstone program, a unified approach to the development of 

essential skills for new and seasoned TSA supervisors. This program includes instructor-led classroom training, mentoring, and on-going development opportunities. 

Over the next 18 months all of our Supervisory Transportation Security Officers 

(STSO) will complete a course on the essentials of supervising screening operations. 

This training will build upon the basic leadership and technical skills of front-line 

supervisors, including effective communications, coaching, mentoring, and problem 

solving, and will enhance technical skills needed for effectively implementing security procedures. One of the key course objectives is to encourage STSOs to take ownership of their role in facilitating and contributing to the development of a responsible and professional workforce by establishing a high standard for performance, 

accountability, and integrity that their team members will strive to emulate. 

Workforce development is further enhanced by the TSA Associates Program, 

which continues to provide TSA’s front-line workforce the opportunity to receive a 

TSA Certificate of Achievement in Homeland Security upon the completion of three 

core courses offered at community colleges across the country. More than 2,500 officers have enrolled since the program’s inception. Today, the program is represented 

by employees in all 50 States with more than 70 airports and 60 community colleges 

participating in the program. TSA has also implemented employee development initiatives like the Leaders at Every Level (LEL), through which TSA identifies highperforming employees and fosters commitments to excellence and teamwork. The 
44 

implementation of a new four-tier performance management program for non-TSOs 

enables the workforce to actively engage in developing their annual performance 

goals in collaboration with their supervisors, while promoting two-way communication between employees and their supervisors throughout the performance year. 

Providing a mechanism to proactively identify opportunities to improve their performance has increased employee morale. 

It is not enough to train and engage our workforce—we must hold everyone accountable in the success of our mission. Administrator Pistole, shortly after coming 

to TSA, established the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) to ensure that 

allegations of misconduct are thoroughly investigated and that discipline is appropriate and fair across the agency. OPR ensures that our workforce is treated fairly 

by removing people that do not meet the high standards of integrity that our mission requires. 

EFFICIENCIES IMPROVE ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT

Over the past year, TSA has announced several enhancements to its headquarters 

functions to improve the agency’s overall security posture. For example, to support 

a more effective means of vetting functions with the operational use of intelligence 

information, we merged the Office of Intelligence with Secure Flight and the Office 

of Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing. This change allows TSA to 

more effectively identify potential threats posed by airline passengers and transportation workers across all vetted populations. 

Restructuring efforts have allowed TSA to gain efficiencies with many support 

functions including training and information technology (IT) management. For example, as discussed above, we have placed all security training programs under a 

single Assistant Administrator, which eliminated multiple levels of supervision in 

several offices and reduced processing times and redundant review functions. In addition, by combining IT management activities under a single functional area, TSA 

has ensured IT strategies are in accordance with the consolidated DHS IT architecture. 

In addition, combining the technology deployment and integration groups under 

the Office of Security Capabilities has improved coordination and deployment of new 

equipment while eliminating redundant management structures. These changes 

have enabled TSA to better address recommendations for improvements provided by 

Congress, the Government Accountability Office, the DHS Inspector General, and 

our own workforce. 

Finally, to improve field coordination, TSA has reduced the number of field regions within the Office of Security Operations (OSO) from 12 to 6 and has developed 

a scorecard to evaluate operational effectiveness and efficiency at the National, regional, and local levels. OSO has further enhanced its ability to measure effectiveness by formalizing its Presence, Advisements, Communication, and Execution 

(PACE) program, which tracks performance metrics. The PACE program establishes 

and measures the level of standardization that exists across airports in areas not 

traditionally set or measured by other programs. This includes such things as evaluating to what extent TSOs exhibit command presence and how effective their interaction is with passengers, as well as adherence to other Management Directives and 

Standard Operating Procedures. 

CONCLUSION

Our Nation’s transportation systems continue to face evolving threats. To achieve 

its mission, TSA will continue to effectively implement an intelligence-driven and 

risk-based security system across all transportation modes while increasing the level 

of engagement with our workforce to shape them for success and drive operational 

and management efficiencies across the organization. TSA strives to achieve these 

goals as it continues to protect the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. We appreciate your continued support 

as we strive to ensure that our workforce is well-prepared and given the proper tools 

to meet the challenges of securing our aviation transportation system. Thank you, 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Halinski, for your testimony. We 

appreciate your many years of service, in the military and now 

with the Department. 
45 

Our second witness is Mr. Steve Lord—currently serves as director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues for Government Accountability Office. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Lord. 

Welcome back. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. LORD. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, other Members of the committee. I am truly honored to 

be here today to testify on the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. 

These attacks underscore the importance of implementing effective screening systems, not only for airline passengers, but air 

cargo, and checked baggage, as well as preventing foreign nationals 

coming to this country to take flight school training. 

I would first like to note that DHS and TSA have made some notable achievements and deserve to be commended for enhancing security since these attacks. At the same time, as our reports have 

demonstrated, they faced a number of challenges along the way. 

Today, just to give you a flavor for some of the progress and challenges, I would like to briefly highlight three key TSA programs of 

which we have reported on. 

The first is its behavior detection program called SPOT, its program for screening air cargo, and its program for screening foreign 

nationals coming to this country to take flight school training. 

First, regarding TSA’s behavior-detection program—we have 

done a lot of work in this area, and we have highlighted the fact 

that DHS and TSA need to take additional actions to ensure the 

science underpinning this program has been validated by outside 

experts. 

The good news is DHS did complete a validation study in April 

2011, but the report itself raised a number of issues that remain 

to be addressed and our view is this additional research could take 

several more years to complete. 

Our 2010 report on the program also recommended that TSA 

standardize the process by which the behavior-detection officers deployed to across the Nation, standardize the process by which they 

collect and share information internally to help TSA connect the 

dots on potential terrorist activity. As you know, connecting the 

dots was one of the major failures of 9/11. 

The good news, also, is we are conducting a follow-on review of 

this program. We have made several recommendations to strengthen the program, which TSA has agreed with, and we will be giving 

you a status update in the spring of next year. 

Regarding air cargo, again, the good news is TSA has taken some 

important actions to enhance the security of air cargo. Again, that 

is cargo that goes in the belly of the aircraft. 

They have tightened existing screening requirements. They have 

entered in a security regime, so—with other countries such as the 

European Union, Switzerland, and Canada. This alleviates air carriers of having to respond to different sets of security requirements. 

However, again, they face some challenges in this area that could 

hinder their efforts to fully meet the Congressional mandate to 
46 

screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft. These challenges 

include logistical issues, as well as verifying the accuracy of screening data submitted by the carriers. 

It is important to note contextually, there is no equivalent reporting requirement for all cargo carriers that ship air cargo. This 

is important because they actually ship the highest percentage of 

the cargo coming into this country. Thus, TSA does not really know 

the extent to which these off-cargo carriers are compliant with the 

new screening requirements implemented after the 2010 Yemen incident. 

Finally, regarding TSA’s Alien Flight School program—I testified 

before this committee in July, highlighted a number of weaknesses 

in their vetting process. TSA and ICE agreed to move out smartly 

to implement our recommendations. Yet as of today, these recommendations are still open, these weaknesses still exist. I know 

there was some confusion at the last time I testified on this point. 

In closing, over a decade after the 9/11 attacks, DHS has implemented a broad range of programs in concert with TSA to help secure, not only the homeland, but the U.S. aviation system. However, as highlighted in our extensive reporting, more work needs to 

be done to strengthen these systems. 

I look forward to helping this committee do future oversight on 

these issues. I think we all share the common goal of ensuring 

these programs are risk-based, cost-effective, and best serve the 

traveling public. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD

SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–12–1024T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Securing commercial aviation operations remains a daunting task, with hundreds 

of airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying millions 

of passengers and pieces of carry-on and checked baggage. The attempted terrorist 

bombing of Northwest flight 253 on December 25, 2009, and the October 2010 discovery of explosive devices in air cargo packages on an all-cargo aircraft bound for 

the United States from Yemen highlight the continuing need for effective passenger, 

cargo, and baggage screening. This statement discusses actions TSA has taken to: 

(1) Validate the scientific basis of its behavior-based passenger screening program 

(the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT); (2) strengthen 

the security of inbound air cargo (3) acquire checked baggage screening technology 

in accordance with established guidance; and (4) vet foreign nationals training at 

U.S. flight schools. This statement is based on GAO’s work issued from September 

2009 through July 2012, and includes selected updates on air cargo screening conducted from July through September 2012. For the selected updates, GAO interviewed TSA officials. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO is not making any new recommendations. GAO has previously recommended 

that TSA take actions to improve aviation security. In general, TSA concurred with 

the recommendations, and is taking actions to address them. 
47 

AVIATION SECURITY.—9/11 ANNIVERSARY OBSERVATIONS ON TSA’S PROGRESS AND

CHALLENGES IN STRENGTHENING AVIATION SECURITY

What GAO Found 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken actions to validate 

the science underlying its behavior-based passenger screening program, the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT, program, but more work remains. GAO reported in May 2010 that: (1) TSA deployed SPOT before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators to reliably identify passengers who may pose a risk; and (2) it is unknown if the SPOT program has ever resulted in the arrest of anyone who is a terrorist, or who was planning to engage in terrorist-related activity, although there 

is other evidence that terrorists have transited through SPOT airports. GAO recommended in May 2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) convene 

an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the on-going validation study on the SPOT program to determine whether it is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the program. DHS concurred and subsequently revised its validation 

study to include an independent expert review. DHS’s study, completed in April 

2011, found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees; however, DHS noted limitations to the study, such as that it was not designed to comprehensively validate whether SPOT can be used to reliably identify 

individuals who pose a security risk. GAO is currently reviewing the program and 

will issue our report next year. 

TSA has taken actions to enhance the security of cargo on in-bound aircraft, but 

challenges remain. For example, TSA issued new screening requirements aimed at 

enhancing the security of cargo on aircraft, such as prohibiting the transport of air 

cargo on passenger aircraft from Yemen. In June 2010, GAO recommended that 

TSA develop a mechanism to verify the accuracy of all screening data. TSA concurred in part and required air carriers to report inbound cargo screening data, but 

has not yet fully addressed the recommendation. In June 2012, TSA required air 

carriers to screen 100 percent of inbound air cargo transported on passenger aircraft 

by December 3, 2012. However, air carriers and TSA face challenges in implementing this requirement and in providing reasonable assurance that screening is 

being conducted at reported levels. 

DHS and TSA have experienced difficulties establishing acquisition program baselines, schedules, and cost estimates for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program 

(EBSP). For example, GAO reported in July 2011 that TSA had established a schedule for the acquisition of the explosives detection systems (EDS) TSA deploys to 

screen checked baggage, but it did not fully comply with leading practices. GAO recommended that DHS develop and maintain a schedule for the EBSP in accordance 

with leading practices. DHS concurred. 

GAO reported in July 2012 that TSA has worked to enhance general aviation security, such as through issuing regulations, but there are weaknesses in its process 

for vetting foreign flight school student applicants, and in DHS’s process for identifying flight school students who may be in the country illegally. For example, TSA’s 

program to help determine whether flight school students pose a security threat 

does not determine whether they entered the country legally. GAO recommended actions that DHS and TSA could take to address these concerns, with which DHS and 

TSA have concurred, and are starting to take actions. 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on the anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to discuss our work examining key layers of aviation security: (1) The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) behavior-based passenger screening program; (2) the security of air 

cargo on flights bound for the United States from foreign countries (known as inbound air cargo); (3) the deployment of checked baggage screening technology; and 

(4) the Federal Government’s vetting process for individuals training at U.S. flight 

schools. This work may help inform future deliberations about any potential challenges and corrective actions regarding U.S. aviation security. 

In the years that have passed since TSA assumed responsibility for aviation security, TSA has spent billions of dollars and implemented a wide range of initiatives 

to strengthen aviation security. Our work has shown that TSA has enhanced aviation security with respect to passenger, checked baggage, and air cargo screening, 

among other areas. Securing commercial aviation operations, however, remains a 

daunting task—with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of 

flights daily carrying millions of passengers and their property, as well as cargo. 

The attempted terrorist bombing of Northwest flight 253 on December 25, 2009, and 

the October 2010 discovery of explosive devices in air cargo packages on an all-cargo 
48 

1 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, (Washington, DC: June 28, 2011). 2Flight schools fall within the general aviation community, which also includes non-scheduled 

aircraft operations such as air medical-ambulance, corporate aviation, and privately-owned aircraft—generally, aircraft not available to the general public for transport. 3See GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, GAO–10–763 (Washington, DC: May 20, 2010); Aviation Security: TSA Has 

Deployed Optimal Systems at the Majority of TSA-Regulated Airports, but Could Strengthen Cost 

Estimates, GAO–12–266 (Washington, DC: Apr. 27, 2012); Aviation Security: Actions Needed to 

Address Challenges and Potential Vulnerabilities Related to Securing Inbound Air Cargo, GAO– 

12–632 (Washington, DC: May 10, 2012); and General Aviation Security: Weaknesses Exist in 

TSA’s Process for Ensuring Foreign Flight Students Do Not Pose a Security Threat, GAO–12– 

875 (Washington, DC: July 18, 2012). 4See Pub. L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). For purposes of this testimony, ‘‘commercial 

passenger aircraft’’ refers to U.S. or foreign-flagged air carriers operating under TSA-approved 

security programs with regularly scheduled passenger operations to or from a U.S. airport. 5TSA designed SPOT to provide BDOs with a means of identifying persons who may pose a 

potential security risk at TSA-regulated airports by focusing on behaviors and appearances that 

deviate from an established baseline and that may be indicative of stress, fear, or deception. 6 Advanced Imaging Technology screens passengers for metallic and non-metallic threats including weapons, explosives, and other objects concealed under layers of clothing. At airports 

participating in TSA’s Screening Partnership Program, screeners employed by private-sector entities under contract to and overseen by TSA, and not TSOs, perform the passenger and checked 

baggage screening function in accordance with TSA requirements. See 49 U.S.C. § 44920. 7See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g). 

aircraft bound for the United States from Yemen provides a vivid reminder that 

civil aviation remains an attractive terrorist target and highlights the continuing 

need for effective passenger, cargo, and baggage screening. According to the President’s National Counterterrorism Strategy, released in June 2011, aviation security 

and screening is an essential tool in our ability to detect, disrupt, and defeat plots 

to attack the homeland.1

My statement today discusses actions TSA has taken to: (1) Validate the scientific 

basis of its behavior-based passenger screening program (known as the Screening 

of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT program), (2) strengthen the security and screening of inbound air cargo, (3) acquire checked baggage screening 

technology in accordance with established guidance, and (4) vet foreign nationals 

seeking to undertake flight training at U.S. flight schools,2 as well as the challenges 

associated with implementing these actions. 

This statement is based on our prior work issued from May 2010 through July 

2012, and includes selected updates conducted from July 2012 through September 

2012 on TSA’s efforts to improve security of in-bound air cargo.3 Our previously 

published products contain additional details on the scope and methodology, including data reliability, for these reviews. For the updated information on air cargo 

screening, we obtained TSA views on our findings and incorporated technical comments where appropriate. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. 

BACKGROUND

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA as the Federal 

agency with primary responsibility for securing the Nation’s civil aviation system, 

which includes the screening of all passenger and property transported by commercial passenger aircraft.4 At the more than 450 TSA-regulated airports in the United 

States, prior to boarding an aircraft, all passengers, their accessible property, and 

their checked baggage are screened pursuant to TSA-established procedures. TSA 

relies upon multiple layers of security to deter, detect, and disrupt persons posing 

a potential risk to aviation security. These layers include behavior detection officers 

(BDOs), who examine passenger behaviors and appearances to identify passengers 

who might pose a potential security risk at TSA-regulated airports;5 travel document checkers, who examine tickets, passports, and other forms of identification; 

transportation security officers (TSO), who are responsible for screening passengers 

and their carry-on baggage at passenger checkpoints using X-ray equipment, 

magnetometers, Advanced Imaging Technology, and other devices, as well as for 

screening checked baggage; random employee screening; and checked baggage 

screening systems.6 The Implementing Recommendations of 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007 further mandates that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish a system 

to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft, and defines screening for purposes of meeting this mandate, in general, as a physical examination or 

the use of nonintrusive methods to assess whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security.7 Such cargo ranges in size from 1 pound to several tons and ranges 
49 

8 Based on 2011 TSA data. 

9See 49 C.F.R. pt. 1552, subpt. A. 

10See GAO–10–763. 11See GAO–10–763. 12These percents add to more than 100 percent (specifically, 105 percent) because some of the 

passengers were arrested for multiple offenses. 13 National Research Council, Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists: 

A Framework for Assessment (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008). We reviewed 

the approach used and the information provided in this study and found the study and its results to be reliable for the purposes for which we used it in this report. 14 A study performed by the JASON Program Office raised similar concerns. The JASON Program Office is an independent scientific advisory group that provides consulting services to the 

U.S. Government on matters of defense science and technology. 15See GAO–10–763. 

in type from perishable commodities to machinery. In 2011, all-cargo carriers transported approximately 66 percent (6.9 billion pounds) of the total cargo (10.4 billion 

pounds) transported to the United States.8 Additionally, TSA has responsibilities for 

general aviation security, and developed the Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP) 

to help determine whether foreign students enrolling at flight schools pose a security threat.9 U.S. Government threat assessments have discussed plans by terrorists 

to use general aviation aircraft to conduct attacks. Further, analysis conducted on 

behalf of TSA has indicated that larger general aviation aircraft may be able to 

cause significant damage to buildings and other structures. 

TSA HAS TAKEN ACTIONS TO VALIDATE THE SCIENCE UNDERLYING ITS BEHAVIOR

DETECTION PROGRAM, BUT MORE WORK REMAINS

We reported in May 2010 that TSA deployed SPOT Nation-wide before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying passengers who may pose a risk 

to the U.S. aviation system.10

According to TSA, SPOT was deployed before a scientific validation of the program was completed to help address potential threats to the aviation system, such 

as those posed by suicide bombers. TSA also stated that the program was based 

upon scientific research available at the time regarding human behaviors. We reported in May 2010 that approximately 14,000 passengers were referred to law enforcement officers under SPOT from May 2004 through August 2008.11 Of these passengers, 1,083 were arrested for various reasons, including being illegal aliens (39 

percent), having outstanding warrants (19 percent), and possessing fraudulent documents (15 percent). The remaining 27 percent were arrested for other reasons such 

as intoxication, unruly behavior, theft, domestic violence, and possession of prohibited items. As noted in our May 2010 report, SPOT officials told us that it is not 

known if the SPOT program has ever resulted in the arrest of anyone who is a terrorist, or who was planning to engage in terrorist-related activity. More recent TSA 

data covering the period from November 1, 2010, to April 18, 2012, indicates that 

SPOT referred 60,717 passengers for additional screening, which resulted in 3,803 

referrals to law enforcement officers and 353 arrests. Of these 353 arrests, 23 percent were related to immigration status, 23 percent were drug-related, 9 percent 

were related to fraudulent documents, 22 percent were related to outstanding warrants, and 28 percent were for other offenses.12

A 2008 report issued by the National Research Council of the National Academy 

of Sciences stated that the scientific evidence for behavioral monitoring is preliminary in nature.13 The report also noted that an information-based program, such as 

a behavior detection program, should first determine if a scientific foundation exists 

and use scientifically valid criteria to evaluate its effectiveness before deployment. 

The report added that such programs should have a sound experimental basis and 

that the documentation on the program’s effectiveness should be reviewed by an 

independent entity capable of evaluating the supporting scientific evidence.14

As we reported in May 2010, an independent panel of experts could help DHS determine if the SPOT program is based on valid scientific principles that can be effectively applied in an airport environment for counterterrorism purposes. Thus, we 

recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security convene an independent 

panel of experts to review the methodology of DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate’s on-going validation study on the SPOT program being conducted to determine whether the study’s methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the 

SPOT program. We also recommended that this assessment include appropriate 

input from other Federal agencies with expertise in behavior detection and relevant 

subject matter experts.15 DHS concurred and stated that its validation study, com-
50 

16See DHS, SPOT Referral Report Validation Study Final Report Volume I: Technical Report, 

(Washington, DC: Apr. 5, 2011). DHS’s study was conducted to determine the extent to which 

SPOT was more effective than random screening at identifying security threats and how the 

program’s behaviors correlate to identifying high-risk travelers. The study defines high-risk passengers as travelers that knowingly and intentionally try to defeat the security process including 

those carrying serious prohibited or illegal items, such as weapons, drugs, or fraudulent documents; or those that were ultimately arrested by law enforcement. 17The extent to which SPOT is more effective than random screening at identifying fraudulent 

documents and individuals ultimately arrested by law enforcement officers is deemed sensitive 

security information by TSA. 18DHS officials stated that this historical SPOT data was not used in their analysis to determine whether SPOT was more effective than random screening. 19The study made recommendations related to SPOT in three areas: (1) Future validation efforts, (2) comparing SPOT with other screening programs, and (3) broader program evaluation 

issues. TSA designated the specific details of these recommendations sensitive security information. 20See GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax 

Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO–11–318SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 1, 2011). 

pleted in April 2011, included input from a broad range of Federal agencies and relevant experts, including those from academia.16 DHS’s validation study found that 

SPOT was more effective than random screening to varying degrees. For example, 

the study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening at identifying 

individuals who possessed fraudulent documents and identifying individuals who 

law enforcement officers ultimately arrested.17

According to DHS’s study, no other counterterrorism or screening program incorporating behavior and appearance-based indicators is known to have been subjected 

to such a rigorous, systematic evaluation of its screening accuracy. However, DHS 

noted that the identification of high-risk passengers was rare in both the SPOT and 

random tests. DHS’s study also noted that the assessment was an initial validation 

step, and was not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used 

to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. 

According to DHS, further research will be needed to comprehensively validate the 

program. 

In addition, DHS determined that the base rate, or frequency, of SPOT behavioral 

indicators observed by TSA to detect suspicious passengers was very low and that 

these observed indicators were highly varied across the traveling public. Although 

details about DHS’s findings related to these indicators are sensitive security information, the low base rate and high variability of traveler behaviors highlights the 

challenge that TSA faces in effectively implementing a standardized list of SPOT 

behavioral indicators. In addition, DHS outlined several limitations to the study. 

For example, the study noted that BDOs were aware of whether individuals they 

were screening were selected as the result of identified SPOT indicators or random 

selection. DHS stated that this had the potential to introduce bias into the assessment. DHS also noted that SPOT data from January 2006 through October 2010 

were used in its analysis of behavioral indicators even though questions about the 

reliability of the data exist.18

The study also noted that it was not designed to comprehensively validate whether SPOT can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who 

pose a security risk. The DHS study also made several additional recommendations 

related to strengthening the program and conducting a more comprehensive validation of whether the science can be used for counterterrorism purposes in the aviation environment.19 Some of these recommendations, such as the need for a comprehensive program evaluation including a cost-benefit analysis, reiterate recommendations made in our prior work. In March 2011, we reported that Congress 

may wish to consider the study’s results in making future funding decisions regarding the program.20 TSA is reviewing the study’s findings and assessing the steps 

needed to address DHS’s recommendations. If TSA decides to implement the recommendations in the April 2011 DHS validation study, it may be years away from 

knowing whether there is a scientifically valid basis for using behavior detection 

techniques to help secure the aviation system against terrorist threats given that 

the initial study took about 4 years to complete. We are conducting a follow-on review of TSA’s behavior detection program, and its related variant, the so-called ‘‘Assessor Program,’’ which incorporates more extensive verbal interactions (‘‘chat 

downs’’) with the traveling public. The Assessor program is currently being test piloted in Boston and Detroit. Our follow-on report on this program will be issued 

early next year. 
51 

21TSA imposed requirements on both U.S. and foreign-flagged passenger and all-cargo carriers. All-cargo carriers are generally aircraft configured solely for the transport of cargo (e.g., 

FedEx and United Parcel Service). 22DHS’s Air Cargo Security Working Group consists of four subgroups: (1) Information subgroup, whose objective is to, among other things, enhance intelligence and information sharing 

among Federal stakeholders and between the U.S. Government and private-sector entities; (2) 

technology- and capacity-building subgroup, whose objective is to review technology standards 

and develop suggestions for addressing technology limitations; (3) global cargo programs subgroup, whose objective is to review and explore opportunities for enhanced public-private coordination as DHS works to address statutory requirements for screening 100 percent of inbound 

air cargo; and (4) global mail subgroup, whose objective is to, among other things, identify potential vulnerabilities for global mail and propose alternative processes and procedures to ensure 

the safety of mail transported by air. 23 All-cargo express carriers and companies focus on transporting cargo under quick time 

frames. 24See 19 C.F.R. § 122.48a(b). 25TSA had previously recognized France and the United Kingdom as providing a level of security commensurate with U.S. air cargo security standards. 

DHS AND TSA HAVE TAKEN ACTIONS TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF CARGO ON INBOUND

AIRCRAFT, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN

DHS and TSA have taken four primary actions to enhance the security of inbound cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft following the October 2010 bomb 

attempt originating in Yemen. 

TSA issued new screening requirements aimed at enhancing the security of cargo 

on passenger and all-cargo aircraft.—Beginning in October 2010, TSA imposed new 

risk-based security procedures on passenger and all-cargo aircraft aimed at focusing 

more detailed screening measures on high-risk shipments and, among other things, 

prohibited the transport of cargo on passenger aircraft from Yemen and Somalia due 

to threats stemming from those areas.21

DHS instituted working groups with air cargo industry stakeholders to identify 

ways to enhance air cargo security.—In January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security established an Air Cargo Security Working Group to obtain advice and consultations from air cargo security stakeholders on ways to enhance the security of 

the air cargo system.22 The Air Cargo Security Working Group briefed the Secretary 

of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), and the TSA Administrator in April 2011 on proposed solutions, and recommended that TSA reevaluate the agency’s implementation plan, time line, and resources related to TSA’s program to recognize the security programs of foreign countries, known as the National Cargo Security Program (NCSP). According to TSA officials, participants of this working group have reconvened as part of the Aviation 

Security Advisory Committee, which held its first meeting in May 2012, and the 

committee will meet again in mid-September 2012 to discuss the implementation of 

the recommendations. 

DHS initiated an Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot to identify high-risk 

cargo for screening prior to transport to the United States.—The aim of the pilot, 

which is on-going, is to determine whether it is feasible for air carriers to submit 

air cargo manifest data to CBP prior to departure from all foreign last point of departure airports to allow CBP to analyze, target, and, if needed, issue instructions 

to air carriers to provide additional cargo information or take additional security 

measures before such cargo is loaded onto aircraft. DHS initially focused on allcargo express carriers and companies due to the elevated risk highlighted by the 

October 2010 incident.23 As of August 2012, the ACAS pilot included 3 passenger 

air carriers and 4 all-cargo carriers that service the United States and is focused 

on about 189 geographic locations. Under existing CBP requirements, CBP must receive manifest data for air cargo shipments from air carriers no later than 4 hours 

prior to the flight’s arrival in the United States or no later than the time of departure (that is, ‘‘wheels up’’ and en route directly to the United States) from locations 

in North America.24 Under the pilot program, however, participants provide manifest data prior to loading cargo aboard aircraft. 

TSA developed a program to recognize foreign air cargo security programs.—TSA 

has developed the NCSP recognition program to review and recognize the air cargo 

security programs of foreign countries if TSA deems those programs as providing 

a level of security commensurate with TSA’s air cargo security standards. In May 

2012, TSA recognized Canada as providing a level of security commensurate with 

U.S. air cargo security standards, and in June 2012, the agency recognized the European Union and Switzerland as also providing this same level of security based 

on the principle of ‘‘mutual recognition.’’25 TSA officials stated that the NCSP rec-
52 

26See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g). 27Details on TSA’s screening requirements are deemed sensitive security information and not 

included in this statement. 28GAO–10–446. 

ognition program is a key effort in meeting the 100 percent screening mandate because it will eliminate the need for air carriers to comply with two countries’ security programs. 

Despite these actions, air carriers and TSA face three key challenges that, among 

other things, could limit TSA’s ability to meet the 9/11 Commission Act mandate 

to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft as it applies to inbound air cargo and to provide reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at reported levels.26 All-cargo carriers subject to TSA regulation also reported facing challenges in implementing new TSA screening requirements established after the October 2010 Yemen incident. 

Passenger air carriers reported logistical challenges implementing proposed screening requirements.—In January 2011, TSA proposed changes to passenger aircraft security requirements outlined in the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program 

and the Model Security Program to further enhance the security of air cargo departing foreign locations by requiring 100 percent screening of inbound cargo previously 

exempt from screening. TSA requirements currently call for air carriers to screen 

a certain percentage of all cargo.27 TSA proposed changes that would require passenger air carriers to screen 100 percent of cargo as part of its efforts to meet the 

9/11 Commission Act mandate. Passenger air carriers expressed concerns about 

being able to meet the 100 percent screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo 

stating that it would cause significant disruptions in the air cargo supply chain, 

among other issues. In response to these concerns, TSA officials stated that they revised the proposed requirements and issued new passenger security requirements 

in June 2012. Agency officials said they plan to require air carriers to screen 100 

percent of inbound air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by December 3, 2012. 

TSA faces challenges verifying screening data on inbound passenger cargo.—TSA 

relies on data submitted to the agency by air carriers to determine the amount of 

inbound air cargo screened in accordance with TSA screening requirements. As of 

September 2011, TSA officials stated that air carrier-reported screening percentages—which they estimate to be about 80 percent—are based on actual data reported by air carriers, but agreed that it is difficult to verify the accuracy of the 

screening data reported by air carriers with reasonable assurance. According to 

TSA, as of August 2012, the air carrier data have not been independently verified 

for accuracy since TSA has not developed a mechanism to cross-reference local 

screening logs with screening reports submitted by air carriers to TSA that do not 

contain such information. To more accurately identify the level of screening being 

conducted on inbound air cargo, we recommended in June 2010 that TSA develop 

a mechanism to verify the accuracy of all screening data through random checks or 

other practical means.28 TSA concurred in part and stated that as of May 1, 2010, 

they had issued changes to air carriers’ standard security programs that require air 

carriers to report inbound cargo screening data to TSA. Specifically, TSA officials 

told us that in May 2010 the agency created a reporting requirement for air carriers 

to provide screening data on a monthly basis. TSA also stated that inspectors review 

screening data, among other things, when inspecting air carriers as part of the 

agency’s air carrier compliance inspections. However, since TSA still has not developed a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the data reported by air carriers, the 

agency has not yet fully met the intent of the recommendation. It will be important 

for TSA to continue to work towards ensuring verification of inbound air cargo 

screening data submitted by air carriers and that inbound air cargo is screened in 

accordance with the mandate. 

Reporting screening data could facilitate oversight of all-cargo carrier compliance 

requirements.—TSA relies on data submitted by passenger carriers to determine the 

amount of air cargo screened on inbound passenger aircraft but there is no requirement for all-cargo carriers to report comparable screening data to TSA, even though 

most of the cargo shipped from abroad into the United States is shipped on all-cargo 

carriers. Thus, TSA does not know the extent to which all-cargo carriers are screening cargo or meeting the enhanced screening requirements introduced after the October 2010 incident in Yemen. Officials from two global all-cargo carriers said that 

submitting such information to TSA would be feasible because they are already collecting this data internally, but officials from two other all-cargo carriers stated that 

reporting screening data to TSA would be challenging because of staffing limitations 

or because such data may not be available. TSA officials said that TSA does not require that all-cargo carriers submit screening data because it has focused its efforts 
53 

29See GAO–12–632. 30GAO–10–588SP. 31Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD’s Weapon Programs Requires Starting 

with Realistic Baselines, GAO–09–543T (Washington, DC: April 1, 2009). 32GAO–12–266. 

on collecting data from passenger air carriers in support of meeting the 100 percent 

mandate. TSA officials stated that TSA may consider opportunities to capture additional inbound air cargo information, but has not yet weighed the costs and benefits 

of doing so because it has focused its efforts on establishing the ACAS pilot program, which DHS established to more readily indentify high-risk cargo. The pilot 

program is a key effort to identify high-risk cargo prior to aircraft departing from 

foreign airports, but is not intended to provide TSA with screening data, which if 

collected and verified, could provide additional assurance that all-cargo carriers are 

complying with TSA’s enhanced screening requirements. To help TSA better determine what actions are needed, if any, to ensure that all-cargo carriers are complying 

with the agency’s enhanced screening requirements, we recommended in May 2012 

that DHS assess the costs and benefits of requiring all-cargo carriers to report data 

on screening conducted.29 DHS concurred with the recommendation and is taking 

actions to address it. 

DHS AND TSA HAVE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES ESTABLISHING ACQUISITION PROGRAM

BASELINES, SCHEDULES, AND COST ESTIMATES FOR CHECKED BAGGAGE SCREENING

SYSTEMS

TSA’s Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) reports that 76 percent of 

the airports (337 of 446) the agency regulates for security have a mix of in-line and 

stand-alone baggage screening configurations that best meet airport needs (i.e., optimal systems). Our prior work on TSA’s checked baggage screening program— 

EBSP—identified a number of shortcomings in DHS and TSA’s process for establishing program baselines, program schedules, and cost estimates. 

Acquisition program baselines.—We found that realistic acquisition program baselines with stable requirements for cost, schedule, and performance are among the 

factors that are important to successful acquisitions delivering capabilities within 

cost and schedule.30 Further, we reported in April 2009 that program performance 

metrics for cost and schedule can provide useful indicators of the health of acquisition programs and, when assessed regularly for changes and the reasons that cause 

changes, such indicators can be valuable tools for improving insight and oversight 

of individual programs as well as the total portfolio of major acquisitions.31 According to DHS’s acquisition guidance, the program baseline is the contract between the 

program and departmental oversight officials and must be established at program 

start to document the program’s expected cost, deployment schedule, and technical 

performance. By tracking and measuring actual program performance against this 

baseline, management can be alerted to potential problems, such as cost growth or 

changing requirements, and has the ability to take corrective action. 

We reported in April 2012 that TSA has not had a DHS-approved acquisition program baseline for EBSP since the program’s inception more than 8 years ago.32 Further, DHS did not require TSA to complete an acquisition program baseline until 

November 2008. TSA officials said they have twice submitted an acquisition program baseline to DHS for approval—first in November 2009 and again February 

2011. However, according to DHS officials TSA did not have a fully developed lifecycle cost estimate. In November 2011, DHS told TSA that it needed to revise the 

life-cycle cost estimates as well as its procurement and deployment schedules to reflect budget constraints. DHS officials told us that they could not approve the acquisition program baseline as written because TSA’s estimates were significantly over 

budget. An approved baseline will provide DHS with additional assurances that 

TSA’s approach is appropriate and that the capabilities being pursued are worth the 

expected costs. TSA officials stated that TSA is working with DHS to amend the 

draft program baseline and plans to resubmit a revised life-cycle cost estimates with 

a revised acquisition program baseline by December 31, 2012. As we reported, establishing and approving a program baseline, as DHS and TSA plan to do for the 

EBSP, could help DHS assess the program’s progress in meeting its goals and 

achieve better program outcomes. 

Schedules.—In July 2011, we reported that TSA had established a schedule for 

the acquisition of the explosives detection systems (EDS) TSA deploys to screen 

checked baggage, but it did not fully comply with leading practices, and TSA had 

not developed a plan to upgrade its EDS fleet to meet the 2010 explosives detection 
54 

33GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection Requirements for 

Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions Are Needed, GAO–11–740, (Washington, DC: 

July 11, 2011). 34The specific number of EDS operating at particular detection levels is considered sensitive 

security information. 35See GAO–12–266. 36GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing 

Capital Program Costs. (Supersedes GAO–07–1134SP). GAO–09–3SP, (Washington, DC: Mar. 2, 

2009). 37Specifically, we found their life-cycle cost estimate to be partially comprehensive, partially 

documented, partially accurate, and minimally credible: (1) Partially comprehensive because the 

cost estimate does not incorporate costs associated with all security threats, lacks a detailed 

scope of work, and lacks a single technical baseline; (2) partially documented because TSA did 

not adequately document many assumptions or methodologies underlying its cost model, and 

provided little or no evidence that the assumptions and methodologies underlying the cost estimate were approved by management; (3) partially accurate because differences between planned 

and actual costs are not fully documented, explained, or reviewed; and (4) minimally credible 

because TSA did not complete relevant activities, such as an independent cost estimate—to ensure that the estimate accounts for bias and uncertainty. See GAO–12–875. 38 Information in the Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated database of known or suspected terrorists—the Terrorist Screening Database—is used for security-related screening of 

foreign nationals applying to AFSP, among other purposes. TECS, an updated and modified 

version of the former Treasury Enforcement Communications System, is an information-sharing 

requirements.33 We noted that some of TSA’s approximately 2,200 deployed systems 

met 2005 explosive requirements while the remainder met 1998 explosive detection 

requirements.34 Leading practices state that the success of a large-scale system acquisition, such as TSA’s EDS acquisition, depends in part on having a reliable 

schedule that identifies when the program’s set of work activities and milestone 

events will occur, amongst other things. We reported that the schedule for the EDS 

acquisition is not reliable because it does not include a timeline to deploy EDS or 

plans to procure EDS to meet subsequent phases of explosive detection requirements. We stated that developing a reliable schedule would help TSA better monitor 

and oversee the progress of the EDS acquisition. DHS concurred with the recommendation to develop and maintain a schedule for the entire EBSP in accordance 

with the leading practices we identified for preparing a schedule. DHS commented 

that TSA had already begun working with key stakeholders to develop and define 

requirements for a schedule and to ensure that the schedule aligns with the leading 

practices. In April 2012, TSA stated that it had secured contractor resources to support development of an integrated master schedule in accordance with our and industry best practices, and that it anticipated completion of this schedule by September 2013. 

Cost estimates.—In April 2012, we reported that TSA’s methods for developing 

life-cycle cost estimates for the EBSP did not fully adhere to best practices for developing these estimates.35 We reported in March 2009 that a high-quality, reliable 

cost estimation process provides a sound basis for making accurate and well-informed decisions about resource investments, budgets, assessments of progress, and 

accountability for results and thus is critical to the success of a program.36 We reported that TSA’s estimates partially met three characteristics and minimally met 

one characteristic of a reliable cost estimate.37 DHS concurred with the recommendation that TSA ensure that its life-cycle cost estimates conform to cost estimating best practices, and identified efforts underway to address it. 

TSA ESTABLISHED A PROCESS FOR VETTING FOREIGN FLIGHT STUDENTS BUT

WEAKNESSES REMAIN

As we reported in July 2012, TSA has worked with industry and other stakeholders to enhance general aviation security, such as issuing regulations and enhancing outreach and awareness, but there are weaknesses in the agency’s process 

for vetting foreign flight student applicants and in DHS’s process for identifying 

flight students who may be in the country illegally. We recommended two actions 

that DHS and TSA could take to address these concerns, with which DHS concurred. 

Vetting foreign flight student applicants.—Under AFSP, foreign nationals seeking 

flight training in the United States undergo a TSA security threat assessment before receiving flight training to determine whether each applicant is a security 

threat to the United States. According to TSA officials, when a foreign national applies to AFSP to obtain flight training, TSA uses information submitted by the foreign national—such as name, date of birth, and passport information—to conduct 

a criminal history records check, a review of the Terrorist Screening Database, and 

a review of the Department of Homeland Security’s TECS system.38 According to 
55 

platform that allows users to access different databases relevant to the antiterrorism and law 

enforcement mission of numerous other Federal agencies. 39The exact number is considered to be sensitive security information. 40TSA likewise does not vet flight student applicants claiming U.S. citizenship. H.R. 6159— 

the Flight School Security Act of 2012, introduced in July 2012—would require, among other 

things, a determination by TSA that the individual seeking training is a non-threat to aviation 

prior to beginning flight training. See H.R. 6159, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012). The bill, sponsored by Representative Bennie G. Thompson, was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security. 

TSA officials, most foreign nationals taking training from a U.S. flight training provider will apply for a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman certificate (pilot’s license) once their flight training is completed. Information obtained by FAA 

as part of this application for certification is placed in the airmen registry. From 

January 2006 through September 2011, 25,599 foreign nationals had applied for 

FAA airman certificates, indicating they had completed flight training. However, 

TSA computerized matching of FAA data determined that some known number of 

foreign nationals did not match with those in TSA’s database, raising questions as 

to whether they had been vetted.39

Since 2009, TSA has vetted all new and existing FAA airman certificate holders 

against the Terrorist Screening Database on an on-going basis, which would include 

the foreign nationals identified through TSA’s analysis. However, this vetting does 

not occur until after the foreign national has obtained flight training. Thus, foreign 

nationals obtaining flight training with the intent to do harm—such as three of the 

pilots and leaders of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks—could have already 

obtained the training needed to operate an aircraft before they received any type 

of vetting.40 We recommended that TSA take steps to identify any instances where 

foreign nationals receive FAA airman certificates without first undergoing a TSA security threat assessment and examine those instances so that TSA can identify the 

reasons for these occurrences and strengthen controls to prevent future occurrences. 

DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that TSA signed a memorandum of understanding with FAA in February 2012 to help address this issue. 

The memorandum outlines a process for FAA to provide certain data from its airmen registry on a monthly basis and authorizes TSA to use the data to ensure flight 

training providers are providing TSA with information to conduct background 

checks prior to flight instruction. This is an important step toward addressing the 

first part of our recommendation, provided that TSA uses the data to identify instances where foreign nationals receive FAA airman certificates without first undergoing a TSA security threat assessment, identifies reasons for these occurrences, 

and strengthens controls to prevent future occurrences, as we recommended. 

Identifying flight students entering the country illegally.—We also reported that 

AFSP is not designed to determine whether a foreign flight student entered the 

country legally; thus, a foreign national can be approved for training through AFSP 

after entering the country illegally. A March 2010 U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) investigation of a flight school led to the arrest of six such foreign nationals, including one who had a commercial pilot’s license. As a result, TSA 

and ICE jointly worked on vetting names of foreign students against immigration 

databases, but had not specified desired outcomes and time frames, or assigned individuals with responsibility for fully instituting the program as of July 2012. Thus, 

this weakness still exists today. Having a road map, with steps and time frames, 

and assigning individuals the responsibility for fully instituting a pilot program 

could help TSA and ICE better identify and prevent potential risk. We recommended that TSA and ICE develop a plan, with time frames, and assign individuals with responsibility and accountability for assessing the results of their pilot 

program to check TSA AFSP data against information DHS has on applicants’ admissibility status to help detect and identify violations by foreign flight students, 

and institute that pilot program if it is found to be effective. DHS concurred and 

stated that TSA will prepare a plan by December 2012 to assess the results of the 

pilot program with ICE to determine the lawful status of the active AFSP population. We believe that these are positive actions that could help TSA address the 

weaknesses identified in our report. We will continue to monitor TSA’s progress on 

the proposed solutions as the agency proceeds. 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to responding to 

any questions that you may have. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 
56 

Mr. Halinski, you have had a chance to review the report of this 

committee as Majority staff has issued yesterday? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I received this yesterday afternoon—our headquarters received the report. I have people looking at the report. 

I personally have not had a chance to review the report. I plan to 

do that over the next couple of days, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. I would very much like to have you share 

your thoughts with me on what you agree with and disagree with 

in our findings and put those back to me in writing. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. I look forward to receiving that. 

I want to ask, Mr. Halinski, do you know—and you know I have 

been hot on this procurement and acquisition concern within the 

Department of Homeland Security, but also within TSA. Do you 

know if TSA has recently requested the private sector to help them 

in developing a more risk-based screening process at its checkpoints? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. We have, sir, quite frankly. One of the 

issues that we want to do with risk-based security, as we have 

done with liquids, aerosols, and gels, is we understand that this 

has got to be a joint effort. It is not just the Government, quite 

frankly. It has to be the private industry. 

I would point to the recreation of the Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee, which is a regular committee that meets. Within that 

committee, we have created a Risk-Based Security subcommittee. 

Since May, it has met three times. This is both private industry 

and stakeholders and TSA. 

Mr. ROGERS. It is comprised of—— 

Mr. HALINSKI. Stakeholders, sir? Industry—— 

Mr. ROGERS. What industry? I mean, what groups did you reach 

out to? 

Mr. HALINSKI. I will have to get you the names of the board 

members, but typically who we deal with is the stakeholders at the 

airport, stakeholders for the air carrier, A4A, IATA. They are all 

represented on the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. 

Mr. HALINSKI. This is a subcommittee of that. 

As I said, it meets three times. It actually will meet tomorrow. 

The goal of this is—and we have pushed this with RBS. Now, we 

recognize that for risk-based security to be successful we have to 

have buy-in from everybody. They know the industry. We want to 

work with them on how to make this successful, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are you working with them or even discussing with 

them improvements that you can make on the regulatory processes 

that they have to adhere to? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I would tell you we are. 

You know, one of the things—as I am with you always, sir, I am 

going to be right up front. We can’t look through the world with 

just one lens. 

I believe that what we have to do with risk-based security, because it is, I think, the way to go in the future, is to be able to 

take advice—take advice from industry, take advice from here, take 

advice from Mr. Lord. 
57 

Quite frankly, I have had two meetings with Mr. Lord since July 

when I came in as the deputy, because we need that and we use 

that as a tool. We don’t have all answers—readily admit that. We 

are willing to take advice and look at it, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Well, I hope you will be aggressive, particularly on the regulatory front, because I get a lot of feedback about 

how burdensome and cumbersome—and some of it is antiquated. 

So we need to stay on top of that. 

Mr. Lord, do you think TSA has sufficiently addressed privacy 

concerns of its passengers, yes or no? 

Mr. LORD. I believe that they have made a concerted effort in the 

last year or two to address privacy concerns, most notably in the 

privacy software incorporated in their whole-body imaging equipment—advance imaging technology. 

Obviously, they can continue to work on that, but that was, I believe, a major step in the right direction. They also have a privacy 

officer employed full-time at the agency, and they have done some 

outreach with industry to see how they could better address these 

issues. 

Obviously, it is a delicate balancing act. They are concerned with 

security. At the same time, you want to respect passengers’ privacy 

and not impede commerce. So I always present this policy triangle. 

Where do you draw the line within the triangle in making policy? 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Halinski, what is the status of the Foreign Airport Repair Station Security rule and the Large Aircraft Security 

Program rule? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. Sir, we are following the rulemaking 

process. I will say right off the bat I understand your frustration 

with that process. 

The process as we work through it is guided by OMB, and they 

fall under the statutes from Congress. We are working toward getting the rule finalized. The rule is in review right now. I know, sir, 

it has been a long process, one that has frustrated many on this 

committee. 

Mr. ROGERS. Many years. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir—absolutely understand that, sir. We are 

pushing that forward. 

I will tell you, though, just because the rule isn’t complete 

doesn’t mean we are not taking action. We have looked at the most 

critical foreign repair stations and conducted surveys and visits to 

those to ensure that they do not pose a security threat. 

We have found that of those 170—what we consider critical airports—all of them have security plans. All of them will meet, when 

the rule is final, the regulatory responsibility. 

Mr. ROGERS. So it is going to have to wait for certification? Those 

repair stations can’t be certified until the rule is complete, is that 

correct? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, under the rulemaking process, I don’t believe 

we can do that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Last question I have got is—Mr. Halinski, the Alien Flight Student program—you know, we talked about the No-Fly list at least 

being adhered to. Can you talk to me about what has happened 

since then? 
58 

** The information has been retained in committee files. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. 

After the testimony of our TSA representative here, and working 

with the recommendations from Mr. Lord, we have pursued trying 

to close the vulnerabilities in the system and we are working at 

them very aggressively. 

We appreciate that there is legislation—it appears forthcoming— 

which will help clarify the Congressional intent, particularly when 

it comes to U.S. persons that are flying. 

If you were to ask me, ‘‘Do we have the authority to do that?’’ 

Sir, yes, we do. But if we do it, we know that it will end up in a 

rulemaking process, sir. 

We estimate there is about 350,000 people a year who start— 

U.S. citizens who start the flight process. We are trying to work 

with FAA. 

On the alien side sir, we are trying to clean up the recommendations that we got from GAO with ICE and also with FAA. 

We are pursuing it, sir. We welcome the support of your committee on this. I will tell you, we are pushing it, sir. I hope we can 

close the gap here quickly, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. I hope so too. That is one of the more ugly shortcomings that we have discovered, so I really hope you could fix 

that. 

With that I want to ask for unanimous consent to submit a letter 

by GAMA, General Aviation Manufacturers, to Secretary Napolitano on these issues. 

Without objection, so ordered.** 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member for any 

questions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman very much. 

I thank the witnesses who have come, both Mr. Halinski and, of 

course, Mr. Lord who has been diligent in his review. 

Just a quick question to you, Mr. Lord—and I think you said in 

your testimony you have seen cooperation and improvement in the 

assessments that GAO has made and how TSA has responded? 

Mr. LORD. Yes, ma’am, we have. We meet at the very high level 

on a regular basis to go over our open recommendations, and I 

think that is really facilitated a process, ensure we are not talking 

past each other and leads to an expedited closeout process. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank you for that. 

Mr. Halinski, I have a series of questions, and you can be pointed 

and brief. 

We have had 11 years—and Homeland Security was created in 

the shadow and the tragedy of 9/11, and therefore Transportation 

Security Administration. 

What would you view as the agency’s greatest accomplishment? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. 

I would tell you that I think the greatest accomplishment that 

we have is being able to take a very simple mission, which is to 

protect the traveling public, and try to make that work, because it 

is a very complex mission. It ranges from screening in the airports 

to protection of our surface systems, mass transit systems, our 
59 

pipeline systems, and then the myriad of other things that we have 

talked about here—general aviation, insider threat, cargo. 

We are addressing them. We are trying to work towards them 

and accomplish them because we understand the vulnerability and 

risk. 

I believe to be able to do that as an organization in 10 years is 

an accomplishment, but it is due mainly to the people that we have 

in the organization. 

I know sometimes people think that we are a very large organization. But we screen 1.7 million people a day. We look at 2.2 million checked bags and over 2 million hand-carry bags a day in the 

airports in the 450 airports that we are in. 

I think that is a major accomplishment when you look at the peo- ple that are there, most of them earning about $34,000 a year. 

They are doing this service for the American public. It is not because they are doing it for the money. They are not doing it for the 

glory. But, quite frankly, they are doing it because they believe in 

this mission. 

Anytime you have a team that can believe in a mission like that, 

I want to be on that team. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, I want to thank them. But I also want 

to acknowledge that as public servants and workers of the Federal 

Government, we all want to do our very best. We want to do it, as 

you have indicated, not matter what our salary range is. Because 

we have Americans who are waitresses and nurses’ aides and bus 

drivers and others whose salaries don’t equate, and we want them 

to do their very best. 

So I am glad that you are saying that without regard to salary 

you feel that the TSO officers, the Transportation Security Administration—that the TSOs are doing their very best. Is that what 

you are telling me? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am, I am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank you. Americans had an episode 

of democracy over the last 2 weeks—one in Tampa, one on Charlotte. 

How do you think that went? They were, I understand, thousands going through different airports, Tampa and then Charlotte. 

How did you see that with respect to TSA’s responsibility? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. I think that from a TSA perspective, 

it went very well. But it was also a very collegial effort among all 

of the Department of Homeland Security, Secret Service, Customs 

and Border Protection. 

All the folks that were there, quite frankly, did a good job, as 

well as local law enforcement and State law enforcement, primarily 

because of planning. The planning process for an event like that 

takes almost a year or more, and it takes a lot of communication 

and collaboration. I think that is why it was successful. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. When I was able to view in Charlotte, I did 

not see long lines. I did not see stalled lines. I think that was very 

good. 

Let me just raise these two questions, and I will—let me raise 

the questions of SPOT. There are several investigations going on, 

and there is representation that SPOT has been discriminatory and 

has done racial profiling. 
60 

*** The information has been retained in committee files. 

How do you respond to that? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Ma’am, we train our officers that if racial profiling 

is conducted you are failing the program. We don’t believe it. We 

train our officers not to do that. 

We want to ensure that our officers don’t do that, so we try to 

ensure quality control. I believe that the SPOT program is a program that is essential to a layered effect. 

I think when you look at security from an airport—and we look 

at the layered effect because I don’t believe there is one single piece 

of technology or process—human process or other process—that can 

stand alone and by itself. It has to be interwoven; it has to be redundant and not duplicative. I believe that the SPOT program is 

successful. 

Quite frankly, I had very good conversations with Mr. Lord. We 

have talked to our DHS I.G. about this program. There is always 

a way to improve programs, and we are looking at that. I think 

that is what is important—is to continually improve the program 

based on threat, based on perceived vulnerabilities, and based on 

recommendations from our partners in GAO, at DHS, and in other 

agencies. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me ask these series of questions. 

I would like to ask unanimous consent to put into the record a 

letter to Ranking Member Thompson from Mr. Pistole dated January 30, 2012, that says TSA uses a standardized interview process 

for promotions in the SPOT program as well as new management 

positions, the SPOT referral interview rate is not factored into 

these decisions. 

I would like unanimous consent to put this into the record. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to put this into 

the record. 

Mr. WALBERG [presiding]. No objection.*** 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I am just finishing my questions. 

Can you answer these rather quickly, please? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. One, there are several individuals who are involved in investigations regarding the SPOT program. Can you give 

me assurance that those individuals—let me just ask my questions 

and then if you can answer them—can you give me your assurance 

that those individuals who have spoken with investigators will not 

be subjected to any punishment or other adverse personnel actions 

because of their participation in these investigations? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. They will not be. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Will you issue a public statement to the TSA 

workforce pledging that those who come forward with information 

about racial or ethnic profiling will not be subject to punishments 

or adverse personnel actions because of their participation in these 

investigations? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. In fact, we put that in our training 

for all of our personnel. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That you will announce it. 
61 

Then, there was a report in Houston indicating that you had wasted $800 million in the SPOT program. Can you respond to 

that? 

Let me just finish with this final question. I have long been concerned—and you mentioned in your testimony, Mr. Halinski—and 

I think also Mr. Lord—about surface transportations. While our 

focus has been on aviation security, it is certainly warranted, it is 

critical that we not take our eye off the ball when it comes to the 

security of our rail, subway, and bus systems. 

That is why I introduced a bill, H.R. 1900, the Surface Transportation and Mass Transit Security Act of 2011, earlier this Congress, 

to enhance surface transportation. 

What steps are being taken by TSA to ensure sufficient resources 

are being allocated to surface transportation and mass transportation? 

Will you answer the SPOT question about $800 million in expenditures versus what you may have expended, and whether or 

not you are vetting SPOT to ensure the validity of the science? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. The—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. SPOT is BDO, right? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. It is one of the subsets of BDO? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am, it is. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you please? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am—$800 million, ma’am. 

The program was started. I have an accounting of all the money 

that was spent for that particular program. The majority of that 

money was spent on pay and benefits for the identified behavior 

detection officers that are in the program. 

We have approximately 3,000 personnel in that program. The 

program has been in existence since, I believe, about 2005. The 

money that has been allocated is—the recording is through 2007, 

I am sorry. That money was spent on pay and benefits for those 

particular officers—payroll, ma’am. There is some money that has 

been spent—approximately $5 million on training for these officers, 

and some on travel—for instructors and participants, roughly about 

the same on that, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you will be able to submit that to the 

record for this committee? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am, I should be able to. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. So the question of the $800 million— 

you believe you spent $800 million or you believe you spent less 

than that? 

Mr. HALINSKI. No, we spent $800 million, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You can document what you spent it on? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am, I can. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay—and the transportation for transit? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, ma’am. As far as transit goes, we have an entire division in TSA that is oriented toward surface security. 

Part of our program is to recognize the fact that in the surface 

security world, we deal both with private industry, with local authorities and State authorities. I believe we have allocated the 
62 

right amount of assets at this time to that, with the idea that we 

have to work in unison and collaboratively with our local and State 

authorities, as well as private industry. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. You didn’t answer, but let me just 

make sure you put it in the record. You are going to continue to 

validate the SPOT technology? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, yes, ma’am. I will give you my word on that, 

ma’am—that we will continue to validate that program and ensure 

that it is meeting our expectations and has a solid quality-assurance-and-metrics program. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very 

much. I yield back. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank the gentlelady. 

I will recognize myself for a round of questioning, and apologize 

for being delayed in getting over here. 

But you may have answered the question, Mr. Halinski, already, 

about the time line for the foreign repair stations being up and 

running, the decision being made. I just met with a major foreign 

repair station entity in my district, with concerns around the 

world, and great concern that that is still so delayed. 

Is there any time, a date certain, where we will have this in 

place? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir, I am going to be frank with you. I would love 

to give you a date when this is going to be done. I can’t give you 

a date, sir, because I don’t know. 

I will tell you that we are aggressively pursuing this. We understand the frustration on the—— 

Mr. WALBERG. Aggressive for me—versus what I am hearing 

here seems awful slow to be aggressive. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. I fully recognize this one has been a long 

time in coming. We are trying to work through the process. We are 

moving it forward. We are pushing it as fast as we can, sir. We will 

push it as fast as we can. 

I don’t have a date, sir. I would hope by the end of the year, but 

I can’t guarantee that, sir, and I don’t want to give you a guarantee 

I can’t give. 

Mr. WALBERG. Do we have a set of factors that are causing this 

restriction, this delay to take place? I don’t know whether it was 

shared with the committee before I got here, but I guess my concern is, while we talk about being aggressive, what at this point 

in time, after this length of time, continues to hold us up and 

short-circuit the process? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. I would tell you, sir, that this particular 

issue has gone back and forth, back and forth. It is in the process. 

It has left TSA. It is moving through the process. We believe that 

it should work its way through shortly. If you ask me what shortly 

is, sir, I am going to be honest with you again. I can’t give you 

what that is. 

We are pushing it, sir. We understand it. As I said before you 

came here, though, we are not holding up the security vulnerability 

piece. Realizing that the rule isn’t in place, we have actively gone 

out to outside of the United States, to foreign repair stations, to 

look at what we consider to be the most critical 170 of those foreign 
63 

repair stations, to ensure that they have security plans, to ensure 

they meet the intent of the future rule. 

We have done that, sir, and we will continue to push it as hard 

as we can. I understand your frustration. I also understand the fact 

that I would love to have that rule done as well, sir. 

Mr. WALBERG. Well, we will continue to wait. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Lord, what do you make of the fact that TSA 

doesn’t do any cost-benefit analysis? 

Mr. LORD. Well, that has been a consistent theme of some of our 

reporting. In some cases, we urge them to conduct a cost-benefit 

analysis before deciding to go forward with a program. A related 

issue is their life-cycle cost estimates. When senior managers are 

making a decision about a program, we think it is important to 

know, ‘‘How much is this program going to cost over the life of the 

program?’’ 

So we have made—— 

Mr. WALBERG. It seems logical, doesn’t it? 

Mr. LORD. Yes, now, so we have—I mean, it is not that they don’t 

have any, but they can obviously be refined and improved, giving 

better granularity on—you know, these are big programs, technology programs we are referring to. 

But the good news is TSA has agreed. I think in some cases they 

didn’t have the in-house expertise to really develop a good one, but 

they have recently taken some steps to address that. So hopefully, 

over the future, we will be seeing better cost estimates, better costbenefit analysis, et cetera. 

Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Halinski, what is the process, if you could describe it for us, for coordinating with other agencies such as the 

DOD on evaluating and incorporating new technologies for use in 

security screening? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. 

I would say that one of the things we are trying to do with technology—and we have taken on-board recommendations from GAO. 

We have taken on-board recommendations from DHS and other entities—is to look at the way we approach technology. We have done 

this in the last, I would say, year. 

What we are trying to do is approach it from the perspective that 

instead of you have technology drive operations, requirements and 

threat drives technology. That is what we are looking for. 

What we want to try to do is work with industry. We have industry days. We work with the Washington Homeland Security group 

that deals with technology. We are looking at putting together a 

strategic plan—a 5-year plan, which at times can be a little bit difficult because the budget cycles go in 1 and 2 years, particularly 

2 years for acquisition of technology. 

But we believe that a 5-year plan, listening to our counterparts 

in GAO, would be very productive to us. That is one of the things 

that DOD does. 

Having come from DOD—spent 25 years there—I know the way 

their process works, and the way their process works with technology. I think it is a good model. 

We have done outreach to DOD on a consistent basis when it 

comes to technology. We have talked to other departments when it 
64 

comes to technology. We have an entire division—our Office of Security Capabilities—that deals with that kind of outreach to other 

departments, as well as to private industry. 

We recognize the fact that we could probably take a different approach, be a little bit more strategic in our planning as far as technology goes, and ensure that requirements and ensure that threat 

is driving technology and not a single piece of technology is driving 

operations. 

Mr. WALBERG. Okay. Thank you. 

My time is expired. 

I recognize Mr. Richmond. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you. 

We touched for a second on PreCheck. It appears from testimony 

and my experience that airlines, they run PreCheck on the outside 

of the security gate. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Sir—— 

Mr. RICHMOND. Here is my question. 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RICHMOND. If I am PreChecked with US Air—— 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RICHMOND But I am not PreChecked with Delta—so that 

means in the D.C. airport I am PreChecked, but in the Atlanta airport I am not. Why does that happen? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Okay, sir. Under the PreCheck concept—and we 

are still piloting PreCheck, sir, right now. We are in 23 airports in 

the United States. We will be in 35 by the end of this year. 

We are continuing to grow PreCheck. Some of it has to do, quite 

frankly, with the physical setups of the PreCheck areas vice the 

screening area. 

Some of it is logistics. We have to work with an airport. We have 

to ensure that it is going to meet the right requirements and the 

right configuration. That is one way. 

The other area that I heard earlier, sir, has to deal with, ‘‘If I 

am a frequent-flyer program in one airline, why can’t I go to another one?’’ It is not as easy as having computers talk to each 

other. Quite frankly, we do that with Secure Flight every day. So 

that is not the issue. 

I would say it is a proprietary issue among air carriers. I am giving out your best customer list and there are some concerns on how 

that will be protected. 

We are working with industry to try to say that we will protect 

and we will ensure that there is cross-pollination there. We would 

like nothing more than to increase the amount of people that are 

going through PreCheck. We have 12 and under, 75 and older, 

armed forces of the military, we are looking at new populations 

every single day. 

One of the reasons we have asked industry to help us is to drive 

towards these new populations because we understand very clearly 

now, we have evolved. I will tell you we have evolved from one-sizefits-all to, ‘‘Let us look at the traveling public and see who poses 

the highest threat and the rest we screen, but we screen to a 

standard that is acceptable to the level of risk.’’ 
65 

Mr. RICHMOND. Has anyone come up with a formula for what 

they believe passenger traffic through a security point to the proportionate number of TSA agents? Do we have a ratio on that? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Well, yes sir, and that is one of the models we are 

looking at. To make PreCheck successful, we need to ensure that 

the amount of people that are using the PreCheck lanes are substantial enough and right now. That is why we are in the pilot 

stage. 

We don’t—— 

Mr. RICHMOND. Well actually I am talking about just the regular 

checkpoints, not PreCheck, just your regular checkpoints, do you 

have best practices on how many agents per—— 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes sir, we do. We have an entire model. It is not 

only based on the number of flights during a specific time, down 

periods—the airline industry uses banks when there are higher 

numbers of flights coming in and out of that airport. 

So we have a very good model, we think, optimizing and effectively using the number of TSOs at the checkpoint based on configuration, based on operations, and based on the type of technology that is there. 

Mr. RICHMOND. I will just add, the last meeting we had or committee hearing that we had on TSA and basically that was a meeting on your approval rating. But when I left that meeting and they 

talked about the number of TSO officers in airports, I noticed that 

in the District of Columbia, the line now was substantially larger. 

In the conversation with the airport people, they said that they 

added flights and they said, ‘‘We added a good number of flights 

at the D.C. airport.’’ I said, ‘‘Did you get anymore TSA agents?’’ 

They said ‘‘No,’’ hence the long line. 

So that is why I am asking if there is a formula you use, if you 

use it, and how long after they add flights or make adjustments do 

you adjust to make sure you don’t have those long waiting periods 

at the airport? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes, sir. The key to success in security operations, 

we believe is not just the security screening process itself. It is the 

communication that exists between the airport authority, the law 

enforcement, and all the other vendors that are in the airport. 

Let me use the example of DCA, was there a blockage there for 

probably about a week or 2—yes, there was. When we went back 

and looked at that process, what we found is that two different air 

carriers had moved into one of the terminals. They had changed 

the type of aircraft. They had gone from a smaller aircraft to 757s, 

which means that you are going to have more people going 

through. 

What was needed was more communication from everybody involved—TSA, Airport Authority. I think that communication hit 

them real hard and real fast and I believe that when you go there 

now, you will see that they are at the right level. 

‘‘Communication, collaboration, cooperation’’—that is a motto 

that we have that we think works if we follow it. 

Mr. RICHMOND. My time has expired. 

If the Chairman will, I just have one last question. 

My experience with Government entities, especially the Corps of 

Engineers, which did all the levee protection around New Orle-
66 

ans—and one thing we advocated for was third-party independent 

review of their engineering plans and practices to give the general 

public more confidence. 

I guess my question is, do you all do an individual—I mean and 

independent of technology and evaluations of some of your security 

either technology or procedures or things of that nature? 

Mr. HALINSKI. Yes sir, in fact I am sitting next to Mr. Lord who 

probably is our greatest quality control person that we have right 

now. 

We also use the Department’s inspector general and we have in 

the past used outside contractors to validate some of our processes. 

It is a great tool to have, sir, and I think it is important to conduct 

the analysis and look inward at your processes. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you. 

Mr. WALBERG. I thank the gentleman. 

You could have more time to ask questions if you would commit 

to not pitching the first four innings of the Congressional ballgame 

next year that—we will let that go. 

Just to make one final comment, my experience with PreCheck 

in Detroit, where I go through coming here, has just been excellent—works so well. It is not crowded, and I think it is doing what 

it was intended to do. 

At DCA, it is still pretty crowded at this point where it probably 

encourages some of us not to go through PreCheck, it is faster to 

go through the regular line. I know that is something that has to 

be worked out over time. 

But I do want to say that where it is working, it is working and 

we appreciate that and trust that as the days go on and you work 

out the arrangements with the airlines itself. I appreciate that testimony, because that is not something that I thought about. It is 

proprietary in getting lists of people understanding the process or 

the numbers that are coming through, that is just an added point 

of your consideration. So I appreciate that. 

I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, the Members 

for their questions. The Members of the committee may have some 

additional questions for the witnesses that we will ask you to respond to in writing. 

The hearing record will be held open for 10 days. So without objection the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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