[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-14141

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:03-cr-00249-SCB-EAJ-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

DAVID O. EDWARDS,

a.k.a. Dre,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(November 18, 2013)

Before HULL, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

David O. Edwards, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of 

his motion for reconsideration of an order granting in part his motion to reduce his 

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sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Edwards raises two issues in his appeal. 

First, Edwards argues that the district court failed to consider his post-sentencing 

rehabilitation at his § 3582(c) proceeding, which could have led to a sentence 

below the advisory guideline range. Second, Edwards argues that the district court 

should have ordered the Bureau of Prisons to credit him for time served in pretrial 

detention. After careful review, we affirm.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). Pro 

se pleadings are construed liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 

1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

Edwards’s first argument is that the district court failed to consider his postsentencing rehabilitation during his § 3582(c)(2) proceeding because it was too 

focused on selecting a sentence that “mirrored” his original sentence. Edwards 

suggests that if the district court had considered his rehabilitation, he would have 

received a sentence below the amended guideline range. 

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides that a district court may modify a term 

of imprisonment that was based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 

lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission. A § 3582(c)(2) proceeding 

does not constitute a de novo resentencing, and “all original sentencing 

determinations remain unchanged with the sole exception of the guideline range 

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that has been amended since the original sentencing.” United States v. Bravo, 203 

F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis omitted); see also United States 

Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 1B1.10(b)(1) (providing that all other guidelines

determinations remain unaffected). In reducing a sentence under § 3582(c)(2), “a 

district court may lower a defendant’s sentence below the amended guidelines 

range only if the original sentence was below the original guidelines range because 

the defendant provided substantial assistance to the government.” United States v. 

Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2012); see also USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Edwards’s motion 

for reconsideration. First, the district court explicitly considered Edwards’s postsentencing rehabilitation in reducing his sentence. Indeed, the district court’s order 

stated that the court had “considered public safety as well as post-sentencing 

information in imposing this sentence.” Second, the district court was not 

authorized to reduce Edwards’s sentence below his minimum amended guidelines

range. Section 1B1.10(b)(2) states that a court shall not reduce a defendant’s 

sentence below the amended guideline range in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding unless it 

reflects a defendant’s substantial assistance to authorities. See also Glover, 686 

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F.3d at 1207. That being the case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Edwards’s motion for reconsideration.1

Edwards’s second argument is that the district court should have granted his 

motion for reconsideration because it failed to order the Bureau of Prisons to credit

him for time served in pretrial detention. This argument fails because a claim for 

time-served credit is properly brought under § 2241 after the exhaustion of 

administrative remedies. See United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th 

Cir. 2000). Because there is no indication that Edwards has exhausted his 

administrative remedies, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining 

to grant a motion for reconsideration. See United States v. Flanagan, 868 F.2d 

1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (observing that “the granting of credit for time served 

is in the first instance an administrative, not a judicial, function”).

Based on the above, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

 1 Edwards argues that the district court could have reduced his sentence under Pepper v. United 

States, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011). In Pepper, the Supreme Court held that when a 

defendant’s sentence has been vacated on appeal, a district court at resentencing may consider 

and impose a below-guidelines-range sentence based on evidence of the defendant’s postsentencing rehabilitation. Id. at 1241. Pepper does not apply here, however, because Edwards’s 

sentence was not set aside on direct appeal. Edwards instead sought a reduction in his sentence 

in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. Therefore, Pepper does not apply to this case.

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