[Cite as State v. Shalash, 2021-Ohio-1034.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 19AP-757 

 (C.P.C. No. 19CR-2092)

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Belal M. Shalash, : 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on March 30, 2021 

 

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. 

Gilbert, for appellant. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert.

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

LUPER SCHUSTER, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, State of Ohio, appeals from a decision and entry of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to suppress of defendantappellee, Belal M. Shalash. For the following reasons, we reverse.

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} By indictment filed May 8, 2019, the state charged Shalash with two counts 

of aggravated menacing in violation of R.C. 2903.21, both first-degree misdemeanors; and 

one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16, 

a fourth-degree felony. The indictment related to conduct occurring on or about April 23, 

2019. Shalash entered a plea of not guilty. 

{¶ 3} On August 6, 2019, Shalash filed two separate motions to suppress: one 

sought suppression of Shalash's identification and the other sought suppression of the 

evidence seized following the warrantless search of Shalash's vehicle. The state filed a 
No. 19AP-757 2 

memorandum contra to both of Shalash's motions to suppress. At the outset of the 

suppression hearing conducted October 11, 2019, Shalash withdrew his motion to suppress 

identification, and the matter proceeded as to Shalash's motion to suppress the evidence 

seized following the search of his vehicle. 

{¶ 4} During the suppression hearing, Kurt Chapman, an officer with the 

Columbus Division of Police, testified that at 3:05 p.m. on April 23, 2019 he responded to 

a dispatch of a "gun run," where it was reported a male had threatened a female with a 

handgun. (Tr. at 7.) When he arrived at the residence on South Harris Avenue, Officer 

Chapman said he spoke with Pamela Rock, the victim of the incident and the 911 caller. 

Officer Chapman testified that Rock told him that a Hispanic man "showed up to her door, 

pointed a firearm and left the scene in a white BMW," and that there was a woman in the 

vehicle with him. (Tr. at 34.) Additionally, Officer Chapman testified that Rock told him 

the man had a black or silver handgun. Rock's neighbor, Dillon Coal, told Officer Chapman 

he had a surveillance camera on his vehicle and he was able to obtain a partial license plate 

number from the white BMW. Officer Chapman said that Rock informed him they would 

be able to find the man at the Wedgewood apartment complex. 

{¶ 5} Officer Chapman testified that after speaking to Rock and her neighbors, he 

drove to the Wedgewood apartment complex and observed a vehicle matching the 

description the neighbors provided at the north side of the apartment complex. As he 

approached the vehicle, Officer Chapman said he was able to match the dealer tag on the 

car with the partial license plate obtained from the surveillance video. Officer Chapman 

testified he then approached the vehicle and had a brief conversation with Shalash, and 

there was also a woman in the vehicle with Shalash. Shalash denied having been on South 

Harris Avenue. Officer Chapman then asked Shalash to step out of the vehicle, and Shalash 

cooperated. Once he was out of the vehicle, Officer Chapman testified Shalash did not try 

to run and did not act in a furtive manner. By that time, there were four officers on the 

scene. While Officer Chapman conducted a warrant check of Shalash's personal 

information, his partner conducted a pat-down of Shalash's person. 

{¶ 6} After the warrant check indicated Shalash did not have any outstanding 

warrants, Officer Chapman testified he planned to take a report of the incident and refer 

Rock to the prosecutor's office. However, before placing Shalash back in the vehicle, Officer 
No. 19AP-757 3 

Chapman testified his partner "conducted a protective sweep of the vehicle for any 

weapons," and during that sweep Officer Chapman's partner located a gun. (Tr. at 13.) 

After police found the gun in the vehicle, the officers placed Shalash in handcuffs. Officer 

Chapman testified that police officers sometimes use handcuffs for officer safety even if 

they do not ultimately arrest the person. 

{¶ 7} Jacob Pawlowski, an officer with the Columbus Division of Police, also 

testified at the suppression hearing. Officer Pawlowski stated he also responded to the gun 

run on April 23, 2019 and encountered Shalash in the white BMW. It was Officer Pawlowski 

who conducted the pat-down of Shalash's person when Shalash first exited his vehicle. 

Officer Pawlowski testified he talked with Officer Chapman and they "both agreed that 

[they] had enough for a protective sweep" of the vehicle. (Tr. at 48.) 

{¶ 8} After conducting a protective sweep of the vehicle, Officer Pawlowski testified 

he found a handgun located underneath the front passenger seat. Officer Pawlowski 

testified he found the handgun first and then Shalash was detained in handcuffs while he 

finished the protective sweep of the vehicle which he said could have revealed additional 

firearms. After Shalash was placed in handcuffs, Shalash asked whether he was under 

arrest and Officer Pawlowski told him he was not yet under arrest but was being "detained." 

(Tr. at 52.) The officers then placed Shalash in the rear of a prisoner transport vehicle, and 

Officer Pawlowski found the magazine to the handgun. 

{¶ 9} Officer Pawlowski also described Shalash as cooperative during the 

encounter. He further testified that had Shalash been able to get back in his vehicle, he 

would have been able to access the handgun. 

{¶ 10} Following the hearing, the trial court granted Shalash's motion to suppress. 

The trial court determined the protective sweep of the vehicle violated Shalash's Fourth 

Amendment rights, concluding there was no objective or subjective evidence that any of the 

officers involved believed Shalash to be dangerous before or during the stop. Thus, the trial 

court found that suspicion of the presence of a weapon was an insufficient basis to justify 

the search of the vehicle. The trial court journalized its decision granting the motion to 

suppress in an October 29, 2019 decision and entry. The state timely appeals. 
No. 19AP-757 4 

II. Assignment of Error 

{¶ 11} The state assigns the following error for our review: 

The trial court erred in erred in granting Shalash's motion to 

suppress evidence. 

III. Standard of Review and Applicable Law 

{¶ 12} In its sole assignment of error, the state argues the trial court erred in 

granting Shalash's motion to suppress. More specifically, the state asserts surrounding 

facts and circumstances justified the protective sweep of Shalash's vehicle. 

{¶ 13} " 'Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law 

and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier 

of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the 

credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court's 

findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Accepting these facts 

as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the 

conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.' " 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 100, quoting 

State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. 

{¶ 14} As the state notes, the material facts here are not in dispute. The trial court 

summarized the testimony of Officers Chapman and Pawlowski and did not make a finding 

or otherwise indicate that either witness lacked credibility. Instead, the sole question 

before us is whether the facts presented at the suppression hearing satisfy the applicable 

legal standard for the protective sweep of Shalash's vehicle. 

{¶ 15} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the 

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 

Constitution, prohibits the government from conducting warrantless searches and seizures, 

rendering them per se unreasonable unless an exception applies. State v. Mendoza, 10th 

Dist. No. 08AP-645, 2009-Ohio-1182, ¶ 11, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 

(1967), superseded by statute on other grounds. There is no dispute here that police 

officers opened and searched Shalash's vehicle without a warrant. The issue is whether any 

of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement apply.
No. 19AP-757 5 

{¶ 16} One of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is an 

investigatory detention, commonly referred to as the Terry stop. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1 (1968), a police officer may stop or detain an individual without probable cause when 

the officer has reasonable suspicion, based on specific, articulable facts, that criminal 

activity is afoot. Mendoza at ¶ 11, citing Terry at 21. Accordingly, "[a]n investigative stop 

does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution if the police have 

reasonable suspicion that 'the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal 

activity.' " State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 35, superseded by statute 

on other grounds, quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 

{¶ 17} In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the United States Supreme Court 

expanded the Terry warrantless search exception to protective searches of automobiles. In 

Long, the Supreme Court held that officers could undertake a protective sweep or search of 

"the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon 

may be placed or hidden, * * * if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 

'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those 

facts, reasonably warrant' the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the 

suspect may gain immediate control of weapons." Long at 1049, quoting Terry at 21. The 

test for reasonableness of the search of the vehicle is " 'whether a reasonably prudent man 

in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was 

in danger.' " Id. at 1050, quoting Terry at 27. See also State v. Cordell, 10th Dist. No. 12AP42, 2013-Ohio-3009, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 18} When determining whether a protective search is justified, courts apply an 

objective standard to determine if the " 'facts available to the officer at the moment of the 

seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action 

taken was appropriate.' " State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178-79 (1988), quoting Terry at 

21-22. Applying this objective standard, courts review the totality of the circumstances 

"through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react 

to events as they unfold." State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991), citing United 

States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir.1976). 

{¶ 19} Here, the facts presented at the hearing established that when the officers 

initially approached Shalash and detained him, they had a reasonable suspicion based on 
No. 19AP-757 6 

specific, articulable facts that Shalash was engaged in criminal activity. The officers were 

responding to a dispatch of a "gun run," where a woman reported a man had threatened 

her with a gun. The officers had a physical description of the man with the gun, a 

description of his vehicle, a partial license plate number, and a report of a location in which 

he could be found, all of which matched Shalash and his white BMW when the officers 

approached him in the Wedgewood apartment complex. Based on the information from 

the 911 call and the people at the scene when they responded, the officers' reasonable 

suspicion was that Shalash was dangerous and had a gun. That reasonable suspicion would 

not have disappeared once Shalash was out of the vehicle. And the fact that Shalash was 

cooperative during the length of his detention does not vitiate the reasonable suspicion the 

officers already had, and continued to have, both when they initially approached him and 

as long as they held him there.

{¶ 20} Thus, the facts available to the officers at the moment they approached 

Shalash's vehicle, asked him to exit the vehicle, and conducted a pat-down of his person 

were sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that it was necessary 

to conduct a Terry stop. Once the officers had Shalash out of the vehicle and the pat-down 

revealed he did not have a gun on his person, it was reasonable for them to believe the gun 

was in the vehicle, and they were therefore justified in doing a protective sweep of the 

vehicle before allowing Shalash to get back in the vehicle. 

{¶ 21} In reaching the opposite conclusion, the trial court focused its analysis 

entirely on Shalash's conduct during the stop. The trial court noted that Shalash did not 

act furtively, that he was cooperative, and that he never attempted to flee. However, 

Shalash's generally compliant behavior once he was out of his vehicle does not render the 

officers unable to rely on the information they had received regarding Shalash's pre-stop 

conduct in determining whether it was necessary for them to conduct a protective sweep of 

the vehicle. See State v. Cook, 2d Dist. No. 2019-CA-28, 2019-Ohio-3918, ¶ 15 (an 

informant's report that a man was "waving a handgun inside a vehicle" just prior to police 

stopping the vehicle created reasonable suspicion to justify both the stop of the vehicle and 

the protective sweep of the vehicle based on "the reasonable, prudent belief that [the man] 

was dangerous and a handgun was within the vehicle"). Here, the officers had credible 

information that Shalash had a gun inside the vehicle and that he had just threatened 
No. 19AP-757 7 

someone with that gun. That information supported their reasonable belief, despite 

Shalash's cooperation with police, that a protective sweep was necessary.

{¶ 22} While the trial court stated it would be inappropriate for police to conduct a 

protective sweep of a vehicle based solely on "mere suspicion" that there may be a weapon 

in the vehicle, the officers here had far more than a mere suspicion. (Decision & Entry at 

4.) Based on the report from the 911 caller, the officers had a reasonable belief both that 

Shalash was armed and that he was possibly dangerous. Again, the trial court's analysis 

fails because it does not account for the information the officers had regarding Shalash's 

conduct just prior to their encounter with him. See State v. Broughton, 10th Dist. No. 

11AP-620, 2012-Ohio-2526, ¶ 19 (noting courts considering the totality of the 

circumstances to determine whether a warrantless search or seizure is appropriate consider 

factors including the defendant's suspicious activities "both before and during the stop") 

(emphasis added), citing Bobo at 179. The trial court's decision presumes that the officers' 

reasonable suspicion dissipated at some point during the detention before they conducted 

the search of the vehicle. The facts simply do not support that presumption. 

{¶ 23} Moreover, to the extent the trial court concluded that the officers could no 

longer have had a reasonable belief that they were in danger once they decided to issue 

Shalash a citation and return him to his vehicle, neither the facts of this case nor the case 

law support such a conclusion. Had police returned Shalash to his vehicle without 

conducting the protective sweep, he would have had immediate access to the weapon at the 

conclusion of the stop. Cook at ¶ 15 (search of the vehicle at the conclusion of the stop prior 

to allowing the defendant to re-enter his vehicle was a valid protective weapons search that 

did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the defendant "would have had immediate 

access to such a handgun upon the stop's completion and his return to the vehicle"). See 

also State v. Atchley, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-412, 2007-Ohio-7009, ¶ 19 (officer's belief that 

the defendant might be allowed to return to the vehicle necessitated a protective search of 

any part of the vehicle to which the defendant could have quick and easy access to retrieve 

a weapon). 

{¶ 24} Thus, based on these facts, we conclude the officers' search of the vehicle's 

passenger compartment prior to allowing Shalash to return to the vehicle was a proper 

protective search under Terry and Long and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The 
No. 19AP-757 8 

trial court erred, therefore, in granting Shalash's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we 

sustain the state's sole assignment of error. 

IV. Disposition 

{¶ 25} Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in granting Shalash's 

motion to suppress as the officers' search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle was 

a proper protective search. Having sustained the state's sole assignment of error, we 

reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and we remand the 

matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 

Judgment reversed; 

cause remanded. 

BROWN and BROGAN, JJ., concur. 

BROGAN, J., retired, formerly of the Second Appellate District, 

assigned to active duty under authority of the Ohio 

Constitution, Article IV, Section 6(C).