SPACE 

ACQUISITIONS

DOD Is Overcoming 

Long-Standing 

Problems, but Faces 

Challenges to 

Ensuring Its 

Investments Are 

Optimized

Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain, Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT 

Wednesday, April 24, 2013 

GAO-13-508T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-508T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate 

April 24, 2013

SPACE ACQUISITIONS

DOD Is Overcoming Long-Standing Problems, but 

Faces Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments Are 

Optimized 

Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, DOD spends billions of 

dollars to acquire space-based 

capabilities that support military and 

other government operations. Just a 

few years ago, the majority of DOD’s 

space programs were characterized by 

significant cost and schedule growth. 

In 2012, GAO reported that the worst 

of those space acquisition problems 

now appear to be behind the 

department. While new major satellite

acquisitions are facing potential cost 

growth and schedule slips, they are not 

as widespread and significant as they 

were several years ago. However, the 

department still faces serious 

challenges, such as the high cost of 

launching satellites, fragmented 

satellite control operations, as well as 

disconnects between fielding satellites 

and synchronizing ground systems.

To address the progress DOD has 

made this year, this testimony focuses 

on (1) the current status and cost of 

DOD space systems acquisitions, (2) 

the results of GAO’s space systemrelated reviews this past year, and (3) 

recent actions taken to address 

acquisition problems. This testimony is 

based on previously issued GAO 

products over the past 5 years, 

interviews with DOD officials, and an 

analysis of DOD funding estimates. 

GAO is not making recommendations 

in this testimony. However, in previous 

reports, GAO has generally 

recommended that DOD adopt best 

practices for developing space 

systems. DOD agreed and is in the 

process of implementing such 

practices. DOD agreed with GAO’s

characterization of recent actions it has 

taken to improve space acquisitions.

What GAO Found

Most of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) major satellite programs are in 

mature phases of development, that is, the initial satellites have been designed, 

fabricated, and launched into orbit while additional satellites of the same design 

are being produced. For the portfolio of major satellite programs, new cost and 

schedule growth is not as widespread as it was in prior years, but DOD is still 

experiencing problems. For example, total program costs have increased 

approximately $180 million from a baseline of $4.1 billion for one of two satellite

programs that are in the earlier phases of acquisition. Though satellite programs 

are not experiencing problems as widespread as in years past, ground control 

systems and user terminals in most of DOD’s major space system acquisitions 

are not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized satellites and limited capability 

provided to the warfighter. For example, the development and fielding of user 

terminals for a Navy communications satellite program lag behind the launch of 

new satellites by more than a year. Additionally, the development of ground 

software needed to extract capabilities of new missile warning satellites is not 

expected to be complete until at least 2018, even though satellites are being 

launched. Another acquisition challenge facing DOD is the cost of launching 

satellites into space, which range from around $100 million to over $200 million

per launch. 

Recent GAO space system-related reviews highlight other difficulties facing the 

space community as it has sought to mitigate rising costs and deliver modernized 

capabilities. For instance, in July 2012 GAO reported that DOD had numerous 

efforts in progress to address knowledge gaps and data deficiencies in its 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle acquisition strategy. However, GAO also 

reported that more action was needed to identify opportunities to leverage the 

government’s buying power through increased efficiencies in launch acquisitions. 

In April 2013 GAO reported that satellite control networks are fragmented and 

potentially duplicative. Moreover, GAO found that DOD faced barriers—such as 

lacking long-term plans and reliable cost data—that complicate its ability to make 

improvements to its satellite control networks and adopt commercial practices. 

GAO recommendations included determining business cases for proceeding with 

either dedicated or shared satellite control networks for future satellite programs

and implementing commercial practices to improve DOD satellite control 

networks. 

Congress and DOD continue to take steps towards reforming the defense 

acquisition system to increase the likelihood that acquisition programs will 

succeed in meeting planned cost and schedule objectives. For instance, in 

response to legislation passed in 2009, DOD has taken steps that should help 

improve the department’s acquisition process and create more executable 

programs, such as developing performance measures to assess acquisition 

program activities. DOD has also undertaken actions such as chartering seniorlevel reviews of space programs and participating in governmentwide space 

councils. The changes DOD has been making to leadership and oversight 

appear to be increasing senior management attention on space programs, but it 

is unclear whether the changes will overcome the problems GAO has identified 

with fragmented leadership in the past. 

View GAO-13-508T. For more information, 

contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov. 
Page 1 GAO-13-508T 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) space systems acquisitions.1

Over the last decade, the majority of DOD’s space acquisition programs 

were characterized by significant cost and schedule growth; new 

programs were canceled in the face of affordability concerns and other 

problems. In 2012, GAO reported that the worst of those space systems 

acquisition problems now appear to be behind the department.

Each year, DOD spends billions of 

dollars to acquire space-related capabilities that support military and other 

government operations—such as intelligence, reconnaissance and 

surveillance; communications; and homeland security—and to enable 

transformation of the way DOD collects and disseminates information. A 

single military satellite can cost more than $3 billion to acquire and more 

than $100 million to launch into orbit. Complementary systems, such as 

ground control software, can also cost billions. Given the expensive 

nature of space systems and today’s fiscal environment, it is essential 

that DOD carefully manage these programs, apply best practices, and 

continually assess ways to reduce costs while maintaining a high degree 

of reliability and innovation.

2

 

1 DOD space systems include space-based systems (satellites); ground based systems 

(command and control (C2), launch C2, processing stations, space surveillance stations); 

satellite launch vehicle systems (boosters, upper-stages, payload processing facilities, 

space launch facilities, ground support equipment), and user equipment (hand-held user 

terminals, data reception terminals, user terminals).

Satellites 

long plagued by serious cost and schedule overruns are being launched. 

And while new space systems acquisition programs are facing potential 

cost growth and schedule slips, they are not as widespread and 

significant as they were several years ago. Also, to its credit, DOD has 

taken an array of actions to reduce risks and strengthen leadership. 

However, the Department still faces serious challenges, such as the high 

cost of launching satellites, fragmented satellite control operations, as 

well as disconnects between fielding satellites and synchronizing ground 

systems. 

2 GAO, DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of Satellite Acquisition 

Improvements, GAO-12-563T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 2012).

 
Page 2 GAO-13-508T 

My testimony today will focus on (1) the current status and cost of DOD 

space systems acquisitions, (2) the results of GAO’s space systemrelated reviews this past year, and (3) recent actions taken to address 

acquisition problems. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued 

over the past 5 years on space programs and weapon system acquisition 

best practices.3 It is also based on work performed in support of our 

annual weapon system assessments, as well as space-related work in 

support of our reports on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation across 

the federal government.4 Finally, this statement is based on updates on 

cost increases and investment trends and improvement actions taken 

since last year. To conduct these updates, we analyzed DOD funding 

estimates for selected major space systems acquisition programs from 

fiscal years 2012 through 2017 and interviewed officials from the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense. More information on our scope and 

methodology is available in our previously-issued reports. The work that 

supports this statement was performed in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives.

DOD has a long history of troubled space systems acquisitions. Over the 

past decade, most of the large DOD space systems acquisition programs 

collectively experienced billions of dollars in cost increases and delayed 

schedules. In particular, a long-standing problem in DOD space systems 

acquisitions is that program costs have tended to go up significantly from 

initial cost estimates. As shown in figure 1, estimated costs for selected 

major space systems acquisition programs have increased by about 

$22.6 billion—nearly 230 percent—from fiscal years 2012 through 2017.

 

3 See GAO related reports at the end of this statement. 

4 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,

GAO-13-294SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2013); 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed 

to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits,

GAO-13-279SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2013); and 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities 

to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance 

Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012).

Background 
Page 3 GAO-13-508T 

Figure 1: Comparison between Original Cost Estimates and Current Cost Estimates 

for Selected Major Space Systems Acquisition Programs for Fiscal Years 2012 

through 2017

Note: Includes estimates for acquisition programs related to Advanced Extremely High Frequency, 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, Global Broadcast System, Global Positioning System II and III, 

Global Positioning System Operational Control System, Mobile User Objective System, Space Based 

Infrared System, and Wideband Global SATCOM. This chart does not include estimates for planned 

new space systems acquisition efforts such as Weather Satellite Follow-on, Joint Space Operations 

Center Mission System, Precision Tracking Space System, Space Based Space Surveillance Followon, and Space Fence for which total cost data were unavailable.

The gap between original and current estimates shows that DOD has 

fewer dollars available to invest in new programs or add to existing ones. 

DOD’s overall level of investment over the five year period decreases 

until fiscal year 2014, at which point it levels off. The declining investment 

in the later years is the result of mature programs that have planned lower 

out-year funding, cancellation of a major space system acquisition 

program and several development efforts, and the exclusion of several 

space systems acquisition efforts for which total cost data were 

unavailable. These efforts include the Joint Space Operations Center 

Mission System (JMS), Space Fence, Space Based Space Surveillance 

(SBSS) Follow-on, Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS), and 

Weather Satellite Follow-on.
Page 4 GAO-13-508T 

We have previously reported that programs have experienced cost 

increases and schedule delays that have resulted in potential capability 

gaps in missile warning, military communications, and weather 

monitoring.5

Our past work has identified a number of causes of acquisition problems, 

but several consistently stand out. At a higher level, DOD tended to start 

more weapon programs than was affordable, creating a competition for 

funding that focused on advocacy at the expense of realism and sound 

management. DOD also tended to start its space systems programs 

before it had the assurance that the capabilities it was pursuing could be 

achieved within available resources and time constraints. For example, 

when critical technologies planned for a satellite system are still in 

relatively early stages of discovery and invention, there is no way to 

accurately estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build 

the system. Finally, programs typically attempted to satisfy all 

requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenges or the 

maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability. 

DOD’s preference to make larger, complex satellites that perform a 

multitude of missions stretched technology challenges beyond current 

For instance, unit costs for one of the most troubled 

programs, the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) have climbed about 

230 percent to over $3 billion per satellite, with the launch of the first 

satellite about 9 years later than predicted. Similarly, 8 years after a 

development contract for the National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program was awarded in 

2002, the cost estimate had more than doubled—to about $15 billion, 

launch dates had been delayed by over 5 years, significant functionality 

had been removed from the program, and the program’s tri-agency 

management structure had proven to be ineffective. In February 2010, it 

was announced that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency 

(NOAA) and DOD would no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite 

system and, instead, each agency would undertake separate acquisitions. 

Consequently, the risks of gaps in weather satellite monitoring data have 

increased. Other programs, such as the Transformational Satellite 

Communications System, were canceled several years earlier because 

they were found to be too ambitious and not affordable at a time when the 

DOD was struggling to address critical acquisition problems elsewhere in 

the space systems portfolio.

 

5 GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities but, Persistent 

Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems, GAO-10-447T (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 10, 2010).
Page 5 GAO-13-508T 

capabilities in some cases. In the past, funding instability, poor contractor 

oversight, and relaxed quality standards have also contributed to 

acquisition problems.

We have also reported that fragmented leadership and lack of a single 

authority in overseeing the acquisition of space programs have created 

challenges for optimally acquiring, developing, and deploying new space 

systems.6

Over the past 5 years, our work has recommended numerous actions that 

can be taken to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have 

recommended that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, 

follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources 

and requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and 

demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We 

have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program 

manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array of 

other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit 

space programs.

Past studies and reviews have found that responsibilities for 

acquiring space systems are diffused across various DOD organizations, 

even though many of the larger programs, such as the Global Positioning 

System (GPS) and those to acquire imagery and environmental satellites, 

are integral to the execution of multiple agencies’ missions. We reported 

that with multiagency space programs, success is often only possible with 

cooperation and coordination; however, successful and productive 

coordination appears to be the exception and not the rule. This 

fragmentation is problematic not only because of a lack of coordination 

that has led to delays in fielding systems, but also because no one person 

or organization is held accountable for balancing governmentwide needs 

against wants, resolving conflicts and ensuring coordination among the 

many organizations involved with space systems acquisitions, and 

ensuring that resources are directed where they are most needed.

DOD has generally concurred with our recommendations, and has 

undertaken a number of actions to establish a better foundation for 

acquisition success. For newer satellite acquisition efforts, DOD has 

attempted to incorporate lessons learned from its experiences with earlier 

 

6 GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); and Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space 

Capabilities but, Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems, 

GAO-10-447T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2010).
Page 6 GAO-13-508T 

efforts. For example, the GPS III program, which began product 

development in 2008, is using a “back to basics” approach, emphasizing 

rigorous systems engineering, use of military specifications and 

standards, and an incremental approach to providing capability. Thus far, 

the work performed on the development of the first two satellites is 

costing more than expected—but not on the scale of earlier programs—

and its schedule remains on track.7

Our prior testimonies have cited an array of actions as well.8 For instance, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense created a new office under the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to 

oversee all major DOD space and intelligence related acquisitions and it 

began applying its broader weapon system acquisition policy (DOD 

Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 

8, 2008)) to space systems, instead of allowing a tailored policy for space 

that enabled DOD to commit to major investments before knowing what 

resources will be required to deliver promised capability.9 Among other 

initiatives, the Air Force undertook efforts to improve cost estimating and 

revitalize its acquisition workforce and program management assistance 

programs. Further, in 2009, for major weapons programs, Congress 

enacted the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, which 

required greater emphasis on front-end planning and, for example, 

refining concepts through early systems engineering, strengthening cost 

estimating, building prototypes, holding early milestone reviews, and 

developing preliminary designs before starting system development.

Most of DOD’s major satellite programs are in mature phases of 

acquisition and cost and schedule growth is not as widespread as it was 

in prior years. However, the satellites, ground systems, and user 

terminals are not optimally aligned and the cost of launching satellites 

continues to be expensive.

 

7 Air Force officials recently stated that, although GPS III is still maintaining an April 2014 

“available for launch” date for the first satellite, the Air Force delayed the launch of the first 

GPS III space vehicle by a year in order to synchronize it with the availability of the GPS 

Operational Control Segment (OCX) Block 0, without which the satellites cannot be 

launched and checked out. 

8 GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of Satellite 

Acquisition Improvements, GAO-12-563T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 2012); and Space 

Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but Space System 

Acquisition Challenges Remain, GAO-11-590T (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011).

9 DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (2008). 

The Current Status 

and Cost of Space 

Systems Acquisitions
Page 7 GAO-13-508T 

Most of DOD’s major satellite programs are in mature phases of 

acquisition, that is, the initial satellites have been designed, fabricated 

and launched into orbit while additional satellites of the same design are 

being produced. Only two major satellite programs are in earlier phases 

of acquisition—the GPS III program and the PTSS program. For the 

portfolio of major satellite programs, new cost and schedule growth is not 

as widespread as it was in prior years, but DOD is still experiencing 

problems in these programs. For example, though the first two SBIRS 

satellites have launched, program officials are predicting a 14 month 

delay on the production of the third and fourth geosynchronous earth orbit 

(GEO) satellites due in part to technical challenges, parts obsolescence, 

and test failures. As we reported in March 2013, program officials are 

predicting about a $440 million cost overrun for these satellites.10 Also, 

the work performed to date for development of the first two GPS III 

satellites continues to cost more than DOD expected. Since the program 

entered system development, total program costs have increased 

approximately $180 million. The GPS III program office has attributed this 

to a variety of factors, such as inefficiencies in the development of the 

satellite bus and the navigation payload.11

Table 1 describes the status of the satellite programs we have been 

tracking in more detail.

Program officials stated that 

the cost growth was partially due to the program’s use of a back to basics 

approach, which they stated shifted costs to earlier in the acquisition as a 

result of more stringent parts and materials requirements. They anticipate 

these requirements will result in fewer problems later in the acquisition.

 

10 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,

GAO-13-294SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2013).

11 Every satellite has a bus and payload. The bus is the body of the satellite. It carries the 

payload and is composed of a number of subsystems, like the power supply, antennas, 

telemetry and tracking command, and mechanical and thermal control subsystems. The 

bus also provides electrical power, stability, and propulsion for the entire satellite. The 

payload—carried by the bus—includes all the devices a satellite needs to perform its 

mission, which differs for every type of satellite.
Page 8 GAO-13-508T 

Table 1: Status and Cost of Selected Satellite Programs

Program (mission) Program details

Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

(AEHF) 

(satellite communications)

Original total program cost: $6.3 billion

Current total program cost: $14.1 billion

Original quantity: 5

Current quantity: 6

Schedule: First launch occurred in August 2010, 6 years later than initially planned, and 

the second launch occurred May 2012. The third launch is scheduled for fall of 2013, and 

the fourth satellite, currently in production, is scheduled to be launched in 2017.

AEHF satellites will replenish the existing Milstar system with higher-capacity, survivable, 

jam-resistant, worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and tactical 

warfighters. 

Global Positioning System (GPS) III

(positioning, navigation, and timing)

Original total program cost: $4.1 billion

Current total program cost: $4.2 billion

Quantity: 8

Schedule: First launch is anticipated in 2015.

GPS is a constellation of multiple generations of GPS satellites that provide global 

positioning, navigation, and timing capability to both military and civil users worldwide. 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)

(satellite communications)

Original total program cost: $6.9 billion

Current total program cost: $7.3 billion

Quantity: 6

Schedule: The first satellite was launched in February 2012—26 months later than 

planned at development start. The second satellite is scheduled to be launched in July 

2013.

MUOS is expected to provide a worldwide, multiservice population of mobile and fixed-site 

terminal users with increased narrowband communications capacity and improved 

availability for small terminal users. 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)

(infrared intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance)

Original total program cost: $4.7 billion

Current total program cost: $18.8 billion

Original quantity: 5

Current quantity: 6

Schedule: The first SBIRS satellite launched in May 2011— roughly 9 years later than 

estimated at program start. The second satellite launched in March 2013.

SBIRS is being developed to replace the Defense Support Program and perform a range 

of missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battle space awareness 

missions. SBIRS will consist of four GEO satellites, two sensors on host satellites in highly 

elliptical orbit, two replenishment satellites and sensors, and fixed and mobile ground 

stations. 
Page 9 GAO-13-508T 

Precision Tracking Space System 

(PTSS) 

(ballistic missile defense)

Total program cost: Cost baseline not established.

Quantity: 9

Schedule: The program planned to first launch two laboratory-built developmental 

satellites in March 2018 and then launch industry-built satellites, achieving the full satellite 

constellation no sooner than 2023.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing PTSS as an operational component of 

its Ballistic Missile Defense System to track ballistic missiles after boost and through the 

middle part of their flight. PTSS was recently proposed for termination in the President’s 

2014 budget submission based on schedule risk and cost associated with the concurrent 

acquisition strategy.

Weather Satellite Follow-on (WSF)

(climate and weather monitoring)

Total program cost: Cost baseline not established.

Quantity: Not established.

Schedule: Schedule baseline not established.

WSF is to replace the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, which the Air Force uses 

to obtain environmental data that are processed to provide graphical weather images and 

specialized weather products.

Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS)

(satellite communications)

Original program cost: $980 million

Current total program cost: $3.9 billion

Original quantity: 3

Current quantity: 10

Schedule: The first satellite was launched in October 2007, over 3 years later than 

estimated at program start. Currently, four satellites are in orbit and the fifth satellite is 

estimated to launch in May 2013.

WGS is intended to provide essential communications services to U.S. warfighters, allies, 

and coalition partners during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data and previous GAO reports.

Though satellite programs are not experiencing cost and schedule 

problems as widespread as in years past, we have reported that ground 

control systems and user terminals in most of DOD’s major space 

systems acquisitions are not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized 

on-orbit satellite resources and limited capability provided to the 

warfighter.

12

• Over 90 percent of the MUOS’s planned capability is dependent on 

the development of compatible user terminals. Although the first 

MUOS satellite was launched over a year ago, operational testing of 

For example:

 

12 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System Components,

GAO-10-55 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2009); Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to 

Enhance Space Capabilities but, Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space 

Systems, GAO-10-447T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2010); and GAO, Defense 

Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-294SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 28, 2013).
Page 10 GAO-13-508T 

MUOS with production-representative user terminals is not expected 

to occur until the second quarter of fiscal year 2014.

• The SBIRS program revised its delivery schedule of ground 

capabilities to add increments that will provide the warfighter some 

capabilities sooner than 2018, but complete and usable data from a 

critical sensor will not be available until about 7 years after the 

satellite is on orbit.

• The Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) 

program, which is developing user terminals intended to communicate 

with AEHF satellites, has experienced numerous cost and schedule 

delays and is currently not synchronized with the AEHF program, 

which launched its second satellite last year while the FAB-T program 

has yet to deliver any capabilities. Current estimates show that FAB-T 

will reach initial operational capability for some requirements in 2019, 

about 5 years after AEHF is scheduled to reach its initial operational 

capability.

• GPS OCX is required for the launch of the first GPS III satellite 

because the existing ground control software is not compatible with 

the new GPS satellites. Realizing that the new ground control system 

would not be delivered in time to launch the first GPS III satellite, the 

Air Force added funding to the contract to accelerate development of 

the software that can launch and checkout the GPS III satellite, 

leaving the other capabilities—like the ability to command and control 

the satellite—to be delivered in late 2016. Subsequently, the launch of 

the first GPS III satellite has been delayed to May 2015 to better 

synchronize with the availability of the launch software.

Though there are inherent difficulties in aligning delivery of satellites, 

ground control systems, and user terminals, we reported in 2009 that the 

lack of synchronization between segments of space acquisition programs 

is largely the result of the same core issues that hamper acquisitions in 

general—requirements instability, funding instability, insufficient 

technology maturity, underestimation of complexity, and poor contractor 

oversight, among other issues.13

 

13 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System Components,

In addition, user terminals are not 

optimally aligned because of a lack of coordination and effective oversight 

over the many military organizations that either develop user terminals or 

GAO-10-55 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2009).
Page 11 GAO-13-508T 

have some hand in development. We recommended that the Secretary of 

Defense take a variety of actions to help ensure that DOD space systems 

provide more capability to the warfighter through better alignment and 

increased commonality, and to provide increased insight into ground 

asset costs. DOD generally agreed with these recommendations. 

Another acquisition challenge facing DOD is the cost of launching 

satellites into space. DOD has benefited from a long string of successful 

launches, including three military and four intelligence community 

satellites this year. However, each launch can range from $100 million to 

over $200 million. Additional money is spent to support launch 

infrastructure. An analysis we performed this year showed that from fiscal 

years 2013 through 2017, the government can expect to spend 

approximately $46 billion on launch activities.14 Meanwhile, we reported in 

prior years that too little was known about the factors that were behind 

cost and price increases.15 The Air Force has developed a new launch 

acquisition strategy which includes a block buy approach for future 

launches. At the same time, it is implementing an effort to introduce new 

launch providers. Both efforts are designed to help lower costs for launch, 

but they face challenges, which are discussed further in the next section. 

Over the past year, we have reported on DOD’s progress in closing 

knowledge gaps in its new Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) 

acquisition strategy, DOD’s efforts to introduce new launch providers, 

opportunities to help reduce satellite program costs, and the Air Force’s 

satellite control operations and modernization efforts with comparisons to 

commercial practices. These reports further highlight the successes and 

challenges that have faced the space community as it has sought to 

mitigate rising costs and deliver modernized capabilities.

 

14 The $46 billion is based on the President’s budget submission for fiscal year 2013. In 

June 2012, DOD estimated the total cost of the EELV program to be nearly $70 billion 

through 2030. This represents the costs incurred since the inception of the program in 

1995. The EELV program is negotiating prices for an upcoming contract award that will 

consider lower contract prices resulting from future competition in the program. 

15 GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge Gaps in Its 

New Acquisition Strategy, GAO-12-822 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012); and Evolved 

Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New Acquisition Strategy Is Based on 

Sufficient Information, GAO-11-641 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2011).

Recent GAO Findings 

Related to Space 

Systems Acquisitions

EELV Acquisition Strategy
Page 12 GAO-13-508T 

We reported in September 2011 that DOD needed to ensure the new 

acquisition strategy was based on sufficient information, as there were 

significant uncertainties relating to the health of the launch industrial 

base, contractor cost or pricing data, mission assurance costs and 

activities, numbers of launch vehicles needed, and future engine prices 

which were expected to double or triple in the near term.16 As a result, 

DOD was at risk of committing to an acquisition strategy—including an 

expensive, multi-billion dollar block buy of launch vehicle booster cores—

before it had information essential to ensuring business decisions 

contained in the strategy were sound.17 Among other things, we 

recommended DOD assess engine costs and mission assurance 

activities, reassess the length of the proposed block buy, and consider 

how to address broader launch acquisition and technology development 

issues. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations. The Air 

Force issued its new EELV acquisition strategy in November 2011. 

Following our review, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2012 required that DOD report to congressional committees a 

description of how it implemented the recommendations contained in our 

report and for GAO to assess that information.18

We reported in July 2012 that DOD had numerous efforts in progress to 

address the knowledge gaps and data deficiencies identified in our 

September 2011 report, such as completing or obtaining independent 

cost estimates for two EELV engines and completing a study of the liquid 

rocket engine industrial base.19

 

16 GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New Acquisition 

Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information, 

We reported that officials from DOD, 

NASA, and NRO had initiated several assessments to obtain needed 

information, and had worked closely to finalize new launch provider 

certification criteria for national security space launches. However, we 

found that more action was needed to ensure that launch mission 

assurance activities were not excessive, to identify opportunities to 

leverage the government’s buying power through increased efficiencies in 

GAO-11-641 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 

2011).

17 The booster core is the main body of a launch vehicle. In the EELV program, common 

booster cores are used to build all of the Atlas V and Delta IV launch vehicles. Medium 

and intermediate launch vehicles use one core each, while the Delta IV Heavy launch 

vehicle requires three. 

18 Pub. L No 112-81, § 839 (2011).

19 GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, DOD Is Addressing Knowledge Gaps in 

Its New Acquisition Strategy, GAO-12-822 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012).
Page 13 GAO-13-508T 

launch acquisitions, and to strategically address longer-term technology 

investments. We reported that some information DOD was gathering 

could set the stage for longer-term strategic planning for the program, 

especially in critical launch technology research and development 

decisions and that investing in a longer-term perspective for launch 

acquisitions was important to fully leverage the government’s buying 

power and maintain a healthy industrial base.

In 2011, the Air Force, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA), and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) began implementing 

a coordinated strategy—called the Air Force Launch Services New 

Entrant Certification Guide (Guide)—to certify new entrants to provide 

launch capability on EELV-class launch vehicles. New entrants are 

launch companies that are working toward certifying their launch vehicle 

capabilities so that they may be allowed to compete with the current solesource contractor for government launches. Launch vehicle certification is 

necessary to ensure that only proven, reliable launch vehicles will be 

used to launch government satellites. The House Armed Services 

Committee Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2013 directed GAO to review and analyze the 

implementation of the Guide.20

In February 2013, we reported that the Air Force based its Guide on 

existing NASA policy and procedures with respect to payload risk 

classification and launch vehicle certification.21

We reported that while potential new entrants stated that they were 

generally satisfied with the Air Force’s efforts to implement the Guide, 

they identified several challenges to certification, as well as perceived 

advantages afforded to the incumbent launch provider. For example, new 

entrants stated that they faced difficulty in securing enough launch 

We found that the Air 

Force, NASA, and NRO were working to coordinate and share 

information to facilitate launch vehicle certification efforts, but that each 

agency would determine for itself when certification had been achieved. 

As a result, some duplication and overlap of efforts could occur. We also 

found that the Air Force had added other prerequisites to certification for 

new entrants that were not captured within the Guide.

 

20 H.R. Rep. No. 112-479, at 186 (2012); Pub. L. No 112-239 (2013).

21 GAO, Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide, GAO-13-317R 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2013).

Launch Services New 

Entrant Certification 

Guide 
Page 14 GAO-13-508T 

opportunities to become certified. In November 2012, the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed 

the Air Force to make available up to 14 launches for competition to new 

entrants, provided they demonstrate the required number of successful 

launches and provide the associated data in time to compete. If new 

entrants had not completed their final certification launch in time to 

compete, the newly-available launches would likely be awarded to the 

incumbent provider. New entrants stated they must also respond to 

changes in Air Force requirements that could impact their launch vehicle 

design and certification schedules, and considered some Air Force 

requirements to be overly restrictive; for example, they must be able to 

launch a minimum of 20,000 pounds to low earth orbit from specific Air 

Force launch facilities (versus facilities the new entrants currently use). 

The Air Force stated that 20,000 pounds represented the low end of 

current EELV lift requirements, and that alternate launch sites were not 

equipped for the Air Force’s national security launches. Further, new 

entrants noted that the incumbent provider received ongoing 

infrastructure and development funding from the government, an 

advantage not afforded to the new entrants, and that historical criteria for 

competition in the EELV program were more lenient. The Air Force 

acknowledged that criteria for competition are different, reflective of 

differences in the acquisition environment

In our April 2013 report on reducing duplication, overlap, and 

fragmentation within the federal government, we found that government 

agencies, including DOD, could achieve considerable cost savings on 

some missions by leveraging commercial spacecraft through innovative 

mechanisms.22

We reported that DOD is among the agencies that are actively using or 

beginning to look at these approaches in order to save costs. For 

instance, DOD has two ongoing hosted payload pilot missions and has 

These mechanisms include hosted payload arrangements 

where government instruments are placed on commercial satellites, and 

ride sharing arrangements where multiple satellites share the same 

launch vehicle.

 

22 GAO, 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and 

Duplication, and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO-13-279SP (Washington, D.C: 

Apr. 9, 2013).

Opportunities to Help 

Reduce Government 

Satellite Program Costs
Page 15 GAO-13-508T 

taken preliminary steps to develop a follow-on effort.23

While hosted payloads and ride sharing hold promise for providing lowercost access to space in the future, we found that there are a variety of 

challenges. For instance, government agencies that have traditionally 

managed their own space missions face cultural challenges in using 

hosted payload arrangements and in November 2010, we found that the 

DOD space community is highly risk averse to adopting technologies from 

commercial providers that are new to DOD.

DOD estimated 

that the Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload Flight Demonstration 

Program answered the majority of the government’s technical questions 

through its commercial partnership, while saving it over $200 million over 

a dedicated technical demonstration mission. In addition, DOD is 

investigating ride sharing to launch GPS satellites beginning in fiscal year 

2017, which could save well over $60 million per launch.

24

We reported that using hosted payloads and ride sharing are likely to 

reduce government launch costs and savings estimates reported to date 

are in the hundreds of millions of dollars over the life of the projects. 

However, we were unable to quantify the potential for further financial 

benefits because there is too limited a pool of available data. Once the 

government has collected more data and gained more experience in 

collaborating with commercial satellite vendors on ride sharing and 

In addition, agency officials 

expressed concerns about using a commercial host for their payloads, 

noting that they would lose some control over their missions. DOD 

officials noted that their security and mission assurance requirements and 

processes may make integrating hosted payloads on commercial 

satellites more complicated to manage. Further, agency officials 

expressed concerns about scheduling launches and noted that 

commercial providers may not be flexible about changing launch dates if 

the instruments or satellites experience delays.

 

23 The missions are the Internet Protocol Routing in Space Joint Capability Technology 

Demonstration, which is to provide Internet routing onboard the satellite in order to provide 

users with increased speed and direct access to the Internet, eliminating the need for a 

ground-based teleport; and the Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload Flight 

Demonstration Program, which is an experiment designed to support next-generation 

infrared sensor development by placing a wide field of view infrared sensor on a 

commercial communications satellite.

24 See GAO, Space Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing Technologies Developed 

under the Small Business Innovation Research Program, GAO-11-21 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 10, 2010).
Page 16 GAO-13-508T 

hosted payloads, actual data on cost savings and cost avoidances should 

be more readily available.

DOD manages the nation’s defense satellites, which are worth at least 

$13.7 billion, via ground stations located around the world. These ground 

stations and supporting infrastructure perform, in part, the function of 

maintaining the health of the satellite and ensuring it stays in its proper 

orbit (activities collectively known as satellite control operations). Some of 

DOD’s ground stations are linked together to form networks. The Air 

Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) is the largest of these networks. 

Based on the direction in a House Armed Services Committee Report for 

our review and discussions with defense committee staff, we reviewed 

the Air Force’s satellite control operations and modernization efforts.25

We reported this month that DOD’s satellite control networks are 

fragmented and potentially duplicative.26

 

25 House of Representatives Armed Services Committee Report No. 112-78, at 117 

(2011), accompanying H.R. 1540, the bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. No. 112-81 (2011)), directed GAO to assess DOD satellite 

operations modernization efforts and identify potential best practices and efficiencies. To 

fulfill this mandate, we delivered an oral briefing to the House and Senate Armed Services 

committees on February 6, 2012.

Over the past decade, DOD has 

increasingly deployed standalone satellite control operations networks, 

which are designed to operate a single satellite system, as opposed to 

shared systems that can operate multiple kinds of satellites. Dedicated 

networks can offer many benefits to programs, including possible lower 

risks and customization for a particular program’s needs. However, they 

can also be more costly and have led to a fragmented, and potentially 

duplicative, approach which requires more infrastructure and personnel 

than shared operations. We reported that, according to Air Force officials, 

DOD has not worked to move its current dedicated operations towards a 

shared satellite control network, which could better leverage DOD 

investments. We also reported that the AFSCN was undergoing 

modernization efforts, but these would not increase the network’s 

capabilities. The efforts—budgeted at about $400 million over the next 5 

years—primarily focus on sustaining the network at its current level of 

capability and do not apply a decade of research recommending more 

significant improvements to the AFSCN that would increase its 

capabilities.

26 GAO, Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial Practices 

Could Improve DOD’s Operations, GAO-13-315 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2013).

Satellite Control 

Operations 
Page 17 GAO-13-508T 

Additionally, we found that commercial practices like network 

interoperability, automation, and use of commercial off-the-shelf products 

have the potential to increase the efficiency and decrease costs of DOD 

satellite control operations. Both DOD and commercial officials we spoke 

to agreed that there were opportunities for DOD to increase efficiencies 

and lower costs through these practices. Numerous studies by DOD and 

other government groups have recommended implementing or 

considering these practices, but DOD has generally not incorporated 

them into DOD satellite control operations networks.

Finally, we found that DOD faced barriers that complicate its ability to 

make improvements to its satellite control networks and adopt 

commercial practices. For example, DOD did not have a long-term plan 

for satellite control operations; DOD lacked reliable data on the costs of 

its current control networks and was unable to isolate satellite control 

costs from other expenses; there was no requirement for satellite 

programs to establish a business case for their chosen satellite control 

operations approach; and even if program managers wanted to make 

satellite control operations improvements, they did not have the autonomy 

to implement changes at the program level. We concluded that until DOD 

begins addressing these barriers, the department’s ability to achieve 

significant improvements in satellite control operations capabilities would 

be hindered. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct 

future DOD satellite acquisition programs to determine a business case 

for proceeding with either a dedicated or shared network for that 

program’s satellite control operations and develop a department-wide 

long-term plan for modernizing its AFSCN and any future shared 

networks and implementing commercial practices to improve DOD 

satellite control networks. DOD agreed with our recommendations.

Congress and DOD continue to take steps towards reforming the defense 

acquisition system to increase the likelihood that acquisition programs will 

succeed in meeting planned cost and schedule objectives. For example, 

in December 2012, we reported that the DOD had taken steps to 

implement fundamental Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 

(the Reform Act) provisions, including those for approving acquisition 

strategies and better monitoring weapon acquisition programs.27, 28

 

27 GAO, Weapons Acquisition Reform: Reform Act Is Helping DOD Acquisition Programs 

Reduce Risk, but Implementation Challenges Remain, 

The 

GAO-13-103, (Washington D.C.: 

Dec. 14, 2012). 

Recent Actions Taken 

to Address Space 

Systems Acquisition 

Problems 
Page 18 GAO-13-508T 

offices established by the Reform Act are in the process of developing, 

issuing, and implementing policies in response to the Reform Act’s 

provisions. We reported that DOD has taken steps to:

• develop policy and guidance to the military services for conducting 

work in their respective areas,

• approve acquisition documents prior to milestone reviews,

• monitor and assess weapon acquisition program activities on a 

consistent basis, and

• develop performance measures to assess acquisition program 

activities.

Fundamentally, these Reform Act provisions should help (1) programs 

replace cost and schedule risk with knowledge and (2) set up more 

executable programs. Additionally, as part of its Better Buying Power 

initiative, DOD in November 2012 issued descriptions of 36 initiatives 

aimed at increasing productivity and efficiency in DOD acquisitions.29

Further, in January 2013, the Congress passed the National Defense 

Authorization Act of 2013, which required that DOD’s Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics submit a report on 

schedule integration and funding for each major satellite acquisition 

program.

DOD plans to solicit industry and stakeholder comments on these 

initiatives and plans to ultimately provide detailed requirements on 

implementing these initiatives to the acquisition workforce.

30

 

28 Pub. L. No. 111-23, as amended by the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383 §§ 813 and 1075, and the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81 §§ 819 and 837; as 

implemented by DOD Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027, “Implementation of 

Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009” (Dec. 4, 2009, incorporating Change 4, 

Jan. 11, 2013). The Act, among other things: established high-level acquisition oversight 

offices and positions (including Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Program 

Assessment and Root Cause Analyses, Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation, 

and Director of Systems Engineering); required competitive prototyping as part of the 

technology development phase; required preliminary design review before the start of 

development; required competition throughout the acquisition lifecycle; and encouraged 

trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives at Milestone B to ensure 

affordability.

The report must include information on the segments of the 

29 DOD Memorandum, Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater 

Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending, Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2012.

30 Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 911 (2013). 
Page 19 GAO-13-508T 

programs; the amount of funding approved for the program and for each 

segment that is necessary for full operational capability of the program; 

and the dates by which the program and each segment are anticipated to 

reach initial and full operational capability, among other items. If the 

program is considered to be non-integrated, DOD must submit the 

required report to Congress annually. Tracking the schedules of major 

satellite programs and the ground systems and user equipment 

necessary to utilize the satellites may help DOD synchronize its systems.

Additionally, officials from the Space and Intelligence Office, within the 

Office of Secretary of Defense, told us that DOD has undertaken 

additional actions to improve space systems acquisitions since we last 

reported on its efforts in March 2012.31 These actions include chartering 

Defense Space Council architecture reviews in key space mission areas 

that are ongoing or completed, such as resilient protected, narrowband, 

and wideband satellite communications; environmental monitoring; 

overhead persistent infrared; and space control, according to these 

officials.32

 

31 GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of 

Satellite Acquisition Improvements,

The architecture reviews are to inform DOD’s programming, 

budgeting, and prioritization for the space mission area. According to the 

officials, the Defense Space Council has brought a high-level focus on 

space issues through active senior-level participation in monthly 

meetings. DOD also participates in the newly re-formed Space Industrial 

Base Council, which is made up of senior level personnel at agencies 

across the federal government that develop space systems. The purpose 

of the council is to understand how DOD’s and other agencies’ acquisition 

strategies impact the space industrial base. Additionally, according to the 

officials, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics completed a major study on space acquisition 

reform to assess the root causes of poor performance in the space 

acquisition enterprise, focusing on the largest areas of cost growth. 

Furthermore, the officials stated that they are continuing efforts to buy 

blocks of AEHF and SBIRS satellites to realize savings that will be 

reinvested in high-priority research and development for space programs 

to mitigate the challenges associated with planned use of critical 

technologies when a satellite system is in the early stages of 

development. The officials stated that these block buys will also 

GAO-12-563T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 2012).

32 In November 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the creation of a Defense 

Space Council —chaired by the DOD Executive Agent for Space (currently the 

Undersecretary of the Air Force) and with representatives from across DOD—to inform, 

coordinate, and resolve space issues for DOD.
Page 20 GAO-13-508T 

encourage stable production and help to achieve affordability targets 

DOD has set for the majority of the large, critical space programs. While 

these actions are encouraging, we have not evaluated their effectiveness.

The changes DOD has been making to leadership and oversight appear 

to be increasing senior management attention on space programs, but it 

is unclear whether the changes will be enough to overcome the problems 

we identified with fragmented leadership in the past. We have 

consistently found that the lack of a single authority for cross cutting 

missions, such as GPS or space situational awareness, has contributed 

to disconnects in the delivery of related systems as well as delays in the 

development of architectures and other tools important to balancing 

wants versus needs. Fragmented leadership has also been a contributing 

factor to other challenges we have noted in this statement—increasing 

launch service costs, synchronizing ground and satellite systems, and 

improving satellite operations. This condition persists. As part of our April 

2013 annual report on reducing duplication, overlap, and fragmentation 

within the federal government, we reported that the administration has 

taken an initial step to improve interagency coordination, but has not fully 

addressed the issues of fragmented leadership and a lack of a single 

authority in overseeing the acquisition of space programs.33

Lastly, the Air Force and other offices within DOD are also considering 

different acquisition models for the future, including the use of hosted 

payloads as well as developing larger constellations of smaller, lesscomplex satellites that would require small, less-costly launch vehicles 

and offer more resilience in the face of growing threats to space assets. 

However, such a transition could also have risk and require significant 

changes in acquisition processes, requirements setting, organizational 

structures, and culture. The long-standing condition of fragmented 

leadership and the risk-averse culture of space could stand in the way of 

making such a change.

In conclusion, DOD has made credible progress in stabilizing space 

programs. However, there are challenges still to be dealt with, such as 

disconnects between the delivery of satellites and their corresponding 

ground control systems and user equipment and the rising cost of launch. 

The ultimate challenge, however, will be preparing for the future, as 

 

33 GAO, 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and 

Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO-13-279SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 9, 2013). 
Page 21 GAO-13-508T 

budget constraints will require DOD to make tough tradeoff decisions in 

an environment where leadership is fragmented. We look forward to 

continuing to work with the Congress and DOD in assessing both today 

and tomorrow’s challenges in space acquisition and identifying actions 

that can be taken to help meet these challenges.

Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, this completes my prepared 

statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you and 

Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.

For further information about this statement, please contact Cristina 

Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to 

this statement include Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Erin Cohen; Rich 

Horiuchi; Jeff Sanders; Roxanna Sun; Bob Swierczek; and Marie Ahearn.

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 
Page 22 GAO-13-508T 

Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial 

Practices Could Improve DOD’s Operations. GAO-13-315. 

(Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2013).

2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, 

and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-13-279SP. 

(Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2013).

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-13-294SP. (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2013).

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. (Washington, D.C.: 

February 2013).

Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide. GAO-13-317R. 

(Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2013).

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge 

Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy. GAO-12-822. (Washington, D.C.: 

July 26, 2012).

Environmental Satellites: Focused Attention Needed to Mitigate Program 

Risks. GAO-12-841T. (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2012).

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Changing Requirements, 

Technical Issues, and Looming Data Gaps Require Focused Attention. 

GAO-12-604. (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2012). 

Missile Defense: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Acquisitions by 

Reducing Concurrency and Improving Parts Quality. GAO-12-600T. 

(Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2012).

Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by 

Reducing Concurrency. GAO-12-486. (Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2012).

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.

GAO-12-400SP. (Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2012).

Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of 

Satellite Acquisition Improvements. GAO-12-563T. (Washington, D.C.: 

March 21, 2012).

Related GAO Products 
Page 23 GAO-13-508T 

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. 

GAO-12-342SP. (Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012).

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New 

Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information. GAO-11-641. 

(Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2011).

Space Research: Content and Coordination of Space Science and 

Technology Strategy Need to Be More Robust. GAO-11-722. 

(Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2011).

Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to 

Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs. GAO-11-404. 

(Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2011).

Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but 

Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain. GAO-11-590T. 

(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011).

Space Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing Technologies 

Developed under the Small Business Innovation Research Program. 

GAO-11-21. (Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2010).

Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading 

Capabilities Persist. GAO-10-636. (Washington, D.C.: September 15, 

2010).

Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities but, 

Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems. 

GAO-10-447T. (Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2010).

Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System 

Components. GAO-10-55. (Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2009).

Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges. 

GAO-08-1039. (Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2008).

(121133)
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