alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
6886

#### STATE *OF*SOUTH CAROLINA *EX REL.*J. FRASER LYON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, v. GERMAN RIFLE CULB OF CHARLESTON.

*Buled by case of State of South Carolina ex rel. J. Eraser Lyon, Attorney General,*v. *New Charleston Hotel Co., ante,*120.

Petition in the original jurisdiction! of this Court by J. Fraser Lyon, attorney-general, in behalf of the State of South Carolina, against German Rifle Club of -Charleston and G. Munzenimiaire to restrain themi from keeping a place where persons are accustomed to resort to drink alcoholic liquors and beverages.

*Attorney-General, J. Fraser Lyon,*for petitioner.

*Messrs. Simons, Seigling*and *Capplemann,*contra.

April 21, 1908.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Gary.

¡The facts in the case are similar to those set out in the opinion just filed, in the case of the State of South 'Carolina *ex relatione*J. Fraser Lyon, as- attorney-general, against the New Charleston Hotel Co. *et*al., as to the names of the respondents, dates and places where the nuisance is maintained.

It is, therefore, unnecessary to reiterate the reasons why the prayer of the -petition should be granted.

It is the judgment of -this Court, that the respondents be perpetually enjoined from- tnlainfaining, using and keeping *127said place, where persons are permitted to resort, for the purpose of drinking alcoholic liquors and beverages, and from permitting persons to resort to the said premises for the purpose of drinking alcoholic liquors and beverages.
cphi10kex104123114.htm


Exhibit 10.4


 


Loans Extension Confirmation Letter


 


Reference is made to the loans from Ms. Heung Mei Tsui to China Pharma Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”), the principal and accumulated interest totaled USD1,354,567 and USD44,213 respectively as of December 31, 2014. Due to the fact the Company temporarily did not have enough balance in its oversea account to repay the loans, both Ms. Tsui and the Company agreed to extend the loans to December 31, 2015, by which date the Company shall repay the principal and accumulated interest.


 


 




 



	 	 
Creditor:/s/ Heung Mei Tsui


 


Debtor:China Pharma Holdings, Inc.


 


                 By: Zhilin Lin
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joseph Jackson, Also Known as Joseph E. Jackson, Appellant.

[634 NYS2d 50]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ira Globerman, J.), rendered December 14, 1993, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 8 1⁄3 to 25 years, unanimously affirmed.

The fact that defendant was apprehended while incarcerated on another matter was an integral part of both the prosecution and defense cases. When a detective inadvertently violated a ruling in limine on the subject, the court gave prompt curative instructions.

The prosecutor violated the *Sandoval*ruling, but the prior crime elicited, robbery, did not go farther in suggesting a propensity to commit the homicide charged in this case than did the properly elicited fact of defendant’s incarceration. Any prejudice was therefore minor, making reversal on this basis unwarranted.

Although there were inappropriate delays in providing *Rosario*material, the materials were disclosed at a time when they were useful to the defense, defense counsel did not articulate specific prejudice arising therefrom, and, we find no specific prejudice warranting reversal upon our own review of the record (P*eople v Jones,*200 AD2d 451, *lv denied*83 NY2d 854; *People v Forrest,*163 AD2d 213, *affd*78 NY2d 886).

*230We perceive no abuse of sentencing discretion.

We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions which are largely unpreserved and in any event do not require reversal. Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Rubin, Kupferman, Asch and Mazzarelli, JJ.
No. 47431.

#### Petition 6183-R of New York Merchandise Co., Inc. (Los Angeles).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

From the testimony of the petitioner’s buyer at the trial it appeared that he had various means of keeping in touch with the price situation; that he consulted with the appraiser as to the value of the merchandise and that he was of the opinion that the entered value represented the value of same on the date of shipment; and that he had supplied the appraiser with all information available and made no attempt to deceive him as to the value. From the *390evidence presented the courtwas of’the opinion that the petitioner was diligent in endeavoring to determine the proper value of the merchandise and made his entry in all good faith. The petition was therefore granted.
# C_2007134EN.01000501.xml

| 16.6.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 134/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 134/5

---

Commission communication concerning the prolongation of the application of the Communication on the follow-up to the Commission communication on certain legal aspects relating to cinematographic and other audiovisual works (cinema communication) of 26 September 2001

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2007/C 134/03)

Point 2.5 of the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on certain legal aspects relating to cinematographic and other audiovisual works (1) states that ‘The specific compatibility criteria for aid to cinema and TV programme production, set out above, will remain valid until June 2004, the time limit set in the decisions adopted so far’. In 2004 the Commission extended the validity of the specific compatibility criteria for aid to cinema and TV programme production until 30 June 2007 (2).

1

2

The Commission announced that ‘In advance of the next review of the Communication, the Commission intends, in addition to further analysing the arguments of the sector, to carry out an extensive study on the effects of the existing State aid systems. The study should examine in particular the economic and cultural impact of the territorialisation requirements imposed by Member States, in particular taking into account their impact on co-productions’.

The study was launched on 24 August 2006 (3). The results of the study will be an essential input for taking a decision about the future compatibility criteria.

3

In order to allow time for completion of the study and the subsequent review of the Communication, the Commission has decided to continue to apply the current criteria until such time as new rules on State aid to cinematographic and other audiovisual works come into effect, or, at the latest, until 31 December 2009.

---

(1)  OJ C 43, 16.2.2002, p. 6.

1

(2)  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the follow-up of the Commission communication on certain legal aspects relating to cinematographic and other audiovisual works of 26 September 2001OJ C 123, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

2

(3)  OJ S 173, 12.9.2006, reference 2006/S 173-183834.

3

---
#### BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JERSEY CITY, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. WILLIAM CUFF, *ET AL.,*DEFENDANTS RESPONDENTS.

*Mr. John J. Withowshi*for the petitioner

*Mr. Max A. Boxer*for the respondent.

March 12, 1962.
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Inconnection with the quarterly report of East Coast Diversified Corporation (the“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended July 31, 2009 (the“Report”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof, I, Frank Rovito, CEO and CFO of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ Frank Rovito

Frank RovitoCEO and CFODated: September 21, 2009

A signed original of this writtenstatement required by Section 906 has been provided to East Coast Diversified Corporationand will be retained by East Coast Diversified Corporation and furnished to the Securitiesand Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 15

- 575V

Filed: August 25, 2015

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

CAMERON MOORE and *

LAURA MOORE, on behalf of minor *

Child, L.M., *

*

Petitioners, * Order Concluding Proceedings, Vaccine

* Rule 21(a).

v. *

*

SECRETARY OF HEALTH *

AND HUMAN SERVICES, *

*

Respondent. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ORDER CONCLUDING PROCEEDINGS 1

Gowen, Special Master:

On August 20, 2015, petitioner filed a motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to

Vaccine Rule 21 (a). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa

- 21(a), this case is hereby

dismissed without prejudice

. The Clerk of the Court is instructed that a judgment

shall not enter in the instant case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa

- 21(a)(3)

.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Thomas L. Gowen

Thomas L. Gowen

Special Master

1 Because this unpublished order contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I intend to

post it to the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with the E

- Government Act of

2002, Pu b. L. No. 107

- 347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note

(2006)). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to delete

medical or other information, that satisfies the criteria in § 300aa

- 12(d)(4)(B). Further, consistent with the

rule requirement, a motion for redaction must include a proposed redacted decision. If, upon review, I

agree that the identified material fits within the requirements of that provision, I will delete such m aterial

from public access.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8225 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8225

   To require income from the first year of an apprenticeship to be 
disregarded in determining eligibility for assistance under the program 
 of block grants to States for temporary assistance for needy families.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 2, 2024

  Ms. DelBene (for herself and Ms. Sanchez) introduced the following 
      bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To require income from the first year of an apprenticeship to be 
disregarded in determining eligibility for assistance under the program 
 of block grants to States for temporary assistance for needy families.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Apprenticeship Opportunity Act''.

SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT TO DISREGARD INCOME FROM FIRST YEAR OF AN 
              APPRENTICESHIP IN DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE 
              UNDER THE TANF PROGRAM.

    (a) Requirement.--Section 408(a) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 608(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(13) Requirement to disregard income from 1st year of an 
        apprenticeship in determining eligibility for assistance.--A 
        State to which a grant is made under section 403 shall 
        disregard all income received on account of the 1st year of an 
        apprenticeship registered under the Act of August 16, 1937 
        (commonly known as the `National Apprenticeship Act'; 50 Stat. 
        664, chapter 663; 29 U.S.C. 50 et seq.), in determining the 
        eligibility of the recipient for assistance under the State 
        program funded under this part.''.
    (b) Penalty for Violation.--Section 409(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
609(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
            ``(17) Penalty for not disregarding income from 1st year of 
        an apprenticeship in determining eligibility for assistance.--
        If the Secretary determines that a State to which a grant is 
        made under section 403 in a fiscal year has violated section 
        408(a)(13) during the fiscal year, the Secretary shall reduce 
        the grant payable to the State under section 403(a)(1) for the 
        immediately succeeding fiscal year by an amount equal to 1 
        percent of the State family assistance grant.''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect on the 1st day of the 1st Federal fiscal year that begins after 
the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.2
 CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Interchange Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with
respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the
periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The small business issuer other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure
that material information relating to the small business issuer, is made known to
us by others within the small business issuer, particularly during the period in
which this quarterly report is being prepared;b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andc)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuers
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business
issuers most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably
likely to materially affect, the small business issuers internal control over
financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The small business issuers other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business
issuers auditors and the audit committee of small business issuers board of directors (or
persons performing the equivalent functions):
 a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely
to adversely affect the small business issuers ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial data; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuers internal
control over financial reporting.
 Date: November 11, 2005
    
    /s/ Douglas S. NormanDouglas S. NormanChief Financial Officer and Secretary(Principal Financial Officer)
#### In the Matter of the Application of the East River Bridge and Coney Island Steam Transit Company.

Motion denied upon the former opinion. Opinions by Barnard, P. J.; Dye-man, J., dissenting.
#### Albert Hemstreet, Respondent, *v.*Harvey Little, *Appellant.*

Judgment of'County Court affirmed. Opinion by Hardtn, J.
#### In the Matter of Malinda V., a Child Alleged to be Abused. Hugh V., Sr., Appellant; Commissioner of Social Services, Respondent, et al., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Mary Alice V., a Child Alleged to be Abused. Hugh V., Sr., Appellant; Commissioner of Social Services, Respondent, et al., Respondent. (Proceeding No. 2.)

[633 NYS2d 396]

—In two child protective proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, Hugh V., Sr., appeals, as limited by his brief, from stated portions of (1) a dispositional order of the Family Court, Queens County (Fitzmaurice, J.), dated March 30, 1994, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court, dated February 9, 1993, *inter alia,*directed him to enroll in and complete a program for sex offenders, and (2) a dispositional order of the same court, dated March 30, 1994, which, upon the fact-finding order of the same court, dated January 10, 1994, *inter alia,*directed him to enroll in and complete a program for sex offenders. The appeals bring up for review the fact-finding orders dated February 9, 1993, and January 10, 1994.

Ordered that the dispositional orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

Absent a legal disqualification pursuant to Judiciary Law § 14, a Trial Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal *(see, People v Moreno,*70 NY2d 403; *Matter of Johnson v Hornblass,*93 AD2d 732). Here, the appellant failed to demonstrate that the court’s *550ultimate decisions were based upon any bias. Therefore the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in failing to recuse itself from the case.

The court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in requiring the appellant to enter a sex offenders program *(see, Matter of Abby Gail E.,*191 AD2d 696) nor in requiring him to enter therapy before he could have any form of visitation with his children *(see, Matter of Esther CC.,*194 AD2d 949, 951; *Matter of Nassau County Dept, of Social Servs. [Kimberly S.],*173 AD2d 830).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are either not properly before this Court or without merit. O’Brien, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Krausman, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Wayne Washington, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 358]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Mastro, J.), rendered March 22, 1994, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree and burglary in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the People failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because of the unreliability of the People’s main witness. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v Duuvon,*77 NY2d 541). Moreover, the resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses *(see, People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see, People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

*392The defendant further contends that the trial court improperly precluded the admission of allegedly relevant medical records concerning a psychiatric evaluation of the People’s main witness approximately three months after the crime. However, the defendant admitted that the psychiatrist could not testify with any degree of scientific medical certainty that the witness suffered from alcoholism on May 4th, 1993, the day of the incident. The court properly sustained the People’s objection on the grounds of relevancy, noting that the witness’s alcoholism was not in dispute and that the psychiatrist’s testimony and the medical records would force the jury to engage in gross speculation as to whether or not the witness suffered from this condition on the day of the incident *(see, People v Ashford,*190 AD2d 886; *People v Pike,*131 AD2d 890; *People v Aulet,*111 AD2d 822).

In addition, the defendant’s challenges to the court’s charge are unpreserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]) and we decline to review them in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.

The sentence imposed was neither harsh nor excessive under the circumstances *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Ritter, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Krausman, JJ., concur.
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**
**THOMAS M. REED, Petitioner**  **: :**  **: :**  **: :**  **: :**  **: :**  **: No. 557 WAL 2014**  **Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

P ER CURIAM AND NOW **, this 22 nd**  **day of April, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is** GRANTED **. The issues, rephrased for clarity, are:**

**1) Are the recent SORNA statutes (42 Pa.C.S. §§9799.10, 9799.13 and 9799.14 and related provisions) punitive in nature and do they**  **violate the** ex post facto **provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution?**  **2) Do the SORNA statutes violate fundamental due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and**  **Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution? 3) Do the SORNA statutes violate the separation of powers doctrine**  **under the Pennsylvania Constitution? 4) Was lifetime Megan’s Law registration not part of petitioner’s**  **original guilty plea, and therefore, should petitioner’s original plea, which only called for a ten-year Megan’s Law requirement, be**  **enforced? [557 WAL 2014] - 2** 

T **he Prothonotary is directed to schedule briefing and argument in this matter** together **with the following matters presenting related issues:** Commonwealth v. Gilbert **,** 181 MAL **2015 and** Commonwealth v. Muniz **, 684 MAL 2015.**
Exhibit 99



CERTIFICATION



PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



(Subsections (a) and (b) of § 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)



Pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of § 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States
Code), each of the undersigned officers of Mobile PET Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:



The Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended June 30, 2002 (the Form 10-KSB) of the Company fully complies with the
requirements of § 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information contained in the Form 10-KSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of the Company.



|                           | 
|-------------------------- | 
|Dated:  September 26, 2002 | 
|                           | 
|                           | 
|Dated:  September 26, 2002 | 
|                           | 



The foregoing certification is being
furnished solely pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Subsections (a) and (b) of § 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-KSB or as a separate disclosure document.