REVISED MAY 12, 2016

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-40358

DANIEL MARTINEZ; RITA MARTINEZ; JOSE MARTINEZ, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

EDWARD F. DAY, II; NATE PEREZ; JOHN ESPARZA; I. ROSALES, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No: 2:13-CV-178

Before JONES, WIENER, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellants Daniel Martinez, Rita Martinez, and José Martinez 

appeal the dismissal of their warrantless entry and excessive force claims 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the Defendant-Appellees’ motion for summary 

judgment. We affirm.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 6, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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The summary judgment evidence showed that the Defendant-Appellees, 

Nueces County Sheriff’s Deputy Ian Rosales and Nueces County Deputy 

Constables Nate Perez, John Esparza, and Edward Day, II, responded to an 

ongoing assault just after midnight on June 19, 2011, in Robstown, Texas. 

They encountered an injured man who provided a description of three 

attackers at a nearby party at 1404 Canales Street. That house is owned by 

the Plaintiffs. When they arrived at the house, the officers observed a suspect

outside matching the victim’s description. It is undisputed that the suspect ran 

into the Plaintiffs’ house to evade the officers. At this point, the parties’ 

accounts of the subsequent events diverge. It remains undisputed, however, 

that Daniel and José initially prevented the Defendants from entering the 

home. José also admits that he attempted to prevent the Defendants from

arresting Daniel.

The Defendants eventually arrested Daniel, Rita, and José. The 

Defendants used varying degrees of force in executing the arrests. Daniel’s 

declaration states that the officers pepper sprayed, tased, and beat him while 

he was handcuffed. Rita’s declaration states that she was handcuffed. José’s 

declaration states that officers pepper sprayed him and that at least four 

officers sat on him and jumped on him while he was handcuffed. Nevertheless, 

the Plaintiffs adduced no evidence of any injuries. The only pertinent summary 

judgment evidence showed that emergency medical personnel “checked and 

cleared” the Plaintiffs.1 The Defendants justified their use of force with 

evidence that the Plaintiffs were combative and resisted arrest.

 

1 In their motion for reconsideration in the district court, the Plaintiffs submitted 

photographs allegedly depicting injuries sustained by Daniel Martinez and inflicted by the 

Defendants. Because the district court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration in a 

minute entry, it is not clear whether the district court relied on those photographs. 

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Relevantly, the district court granted the Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ claims of warrantless entry and excessive 

force. The district court first held that the claims of warrantless entry should 

be dismissed because the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. That 

court held that the entry was constitutional, and, in the alternative, even if it 

was not, it was not clearly established that such action was unconstitutional. 

The district court also granted summary judgment on the excessive force 

claims, concluding that the Plaintiffs had failed to show that they sustained 

any injuries sufficient to support their claim.

We initially hold that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity 

on the Plaintiffs’ warrantless entry claims. A public official will be granted 

qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows “(1) that the official violated a 

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ 

at the time of the challenged conduct.”2 The Defendants entered the home in 

hot pursuit of a suspect who had committed two jailable misdemeanors: assault

and evading arrest. Applying our precedent and that of the Supreme Court in 

Stanton v. Sims, we agree with the district court that the law was not clearly 

established as to “whether an officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect 

for a misdemeanor may enter a home without a warrant while in hot pursuit 

of that suspect.”3 The Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity 

 

Regardless, the Plaintiffs failed to authenticate these photographs, see FED. R. EVID. 901,

and they are therefore entitled to no consideration.

2 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 3 Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (per curiam); see also Carroll v. Ellington, 800 

F.3d 154, 173 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing the Supreme Court’s holding in Stanton “that an 

officer who entered a home in 2008 in hot pursuit of a suspected misdemeanant was therefore 

entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time of the 

officer’s conduct”).

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on the Plaintiffs’ warrantless entry claims. We need not and therefore do not 

express a view on the constitutionality of the Defendants’ warrantless entry.4

We further hold that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 

on the Plaintiffs’ excessive force claims. To establish their excessive force 

claims, the Plaintiffs had to show that they suffered “(1) an injury that (2) 

resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need 

and that (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.”5 The Plaintiffs failed 

to adduce any evidence showing that they suffered any cognizable injuries as 

a result of the force allegedly used by the Defendants, and “[a] plaintiff alleging 

an excessive force violation must show that she has suffered ‘at least some 

injury.’”6

AFFIRMED.

 

4 See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (instructing that courts may decide cases on either 

prong of qualified immunity and “should think carefully before expending scarce judicial 

resources to resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation 

that will have no effect on the outcome of the case” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 

also Carroll, 800 F.3d at 173 (holding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on 

the second prong and “express[ing] no view on whether [his] entry into [the] home was 

constitutional”).

5 Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 846 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 2006)).

6 Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson v. R.E. 

Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 

(5th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e do require a plaintiff asserting an excessive force claim to have ‘suffered 

at least some form of injury.’” (quoting Jackson, 984 F.2d at 700)); Garza v. Traditional 

Kickapoo Tribe of Tex., 79 F. App’x 10, 11 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (“We further hold 

that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Garza’s Fourth Amendment 

excessive force claim, because he has not provided sufficient evidence to show that he suffered 

an injury, even an insignificant one.” (citing Knight v. Caldwell, 970 F.2d 1430, 1432 (5th 

Cir. 1992))).

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