DEFENSE 

INFRASTRUCTURE

DOD's Excess 

Capacity Estimating 

Methods Have 

Limitations

Report to Congressional Committees

June 2013

GAO-13-535

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-535, a report to 

congressional committees

June 2013

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

DOD's Excess Capacity Estimating Methods Have 

Limitations 

Why GAO Did This Study

Due in part to challenges DOD faces in 

reducing excess infrastructure, DOD’s 

Support Infrastructure Management is 

on GAO’s High Risk List of program 

areas vulnerable to fraud, waste, 

abuse, and mismanagement, or are 

most in need of transformation. Since 

1988, DOD has relied on the BRAC 

process as a primary means of 

reducing excess infrastructure or 

capacity and realigning bases to meet 

changes in the size and structure of its 

forces. In 1998 and 2004, Congress 

required DOD to submit reports that, 

among other things, estimated the 

amount of DOD’s excess capacity at 

that time. Also, in March 2012, DOD 

testified that it had about 20 percent 

excess capacity. The methods used to 

develop such preliminary excess 

capacity estimates differ from the dataintensive process—supplemented by 

military judgment—that DOD has used 

to formulate specific base closure and 

realignment recommendations. 

A Senate Armed Services Committee 

report directed GAO to review how 

DOD identifies bases or facilities 

excess to needs. The objective of this 

report is to discuss how DOD has 

estimated its excess capacity, outside 

of the BRAC process. To do so, GAO 

reviewed excess capacity estimates 

from 1998, 2004, and 2012; analyzed 

DOD’s data; reviewed supporting 

documentation; assessed assumptions 

and limitations of DOD’s analysis; and 

interviewed DOD officials. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, 

DOD stated that GAO had properly 

highlighted the limitations of its 

approach to estimating excess 

capacity and contrasted it with the 

method used to develop BRAC 

recommendations. 

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) methods for estimating excess capacity 

outside of a congressionally-authorized Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

process have limitations. DOD used similar processes in its excess capacity 

analyses conducted in 1998 and 2004. This process included three major steps: 

(1) categorizing bases according to their primary missions and defining indicators 

of capacity; (2) developing ratios of capacity-to-force structure for DOD’s 

baseline year of 1989; and (3) aggregating the analysis from the installation level 

across the military services and department-wide. 

In both its 1998 and 2004 reports, DOD recognized some limitations with its 

methods for estimating excess capacity and stated that its analyses lacked the 

precision necessary to identify specific installations or functional configurations 

for realignment or closure. In addition, GAO’s review of DOD’s methods for 

estimating excess capacity outside of a congressionally-authorized BRAC 

process identified a number of limitations. First, DOD’s approach assigns each 

installation to only one mission category, even though most installations support 

more than one mission. This approach effectively excluded significant portions of 

some bases’ infrastructure from the analysis. Second, the services measured 

capacity for some similar functions differently such as test and evaluation 

facilities, which makes it difficult for DOD to evaluate excess capacity across the 

department. Third, DOD did not attempt to identify any excess capacity or 

capacity shortfall that existed in 1989; hence it is uncertain to what extent DOD’s 

estimates of excess capacity may be overstated or understated. Finally, in 

instances where DOD’s analysis indicated that projected capacity was less than 

needed capacity—indicating a capacity shortage—within an installation category, 

DOD treated these cases as having zero or no excess capacity when 

aggregating the results of its analysis. If DOD had treated those installation 

categories as having a capacity shortages, DOD’s method would have calculated 

a lower number of bases and consequently a lower percentage of excess 

capacity across the department than DOD reported to Congress. 

DOD’s testimony in March 2012 and again in March 2013, that it had about 20 

percent excess capacity remaining after the end of BRAC 2005, relied on earlier 

calculations that the department made in 2004 and 2005. Specifically, these 

estimates were reached by subtracting DOD’s estimate of the amount of capacity 

that would be eliminated by the approved recommendations from BRAC 2005—3 

to 5 percent of plant replacement value—from DOD’s 2004 estimate that it had 

24 percent excess capacity. However, pre-BRAC estimates of the percentage of 

bases that may be excess to needed capacity, which is expressed as a 

percentage of bases, and plant replacement value, which is measured in dollars, 

are not comparable measures. In March 2013, the Acting Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) testified that the method 

upon which DOD’s current estimate is based is helpful in determining whether an 

additional BRAC round is justified, but only through the BRAC process is the 

Department able to determine specifically which installations or facilities are 

excess. View GAO-13-535. For more information, 

contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov
Page i GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

Letter 1 

Background 4

DOD’s Methods for Calculating Pre-BRAC Estimates of Excess 

Capacity Have Limitations 7

Agency Comments 15

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 18

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 19

Related GAO Products 20

Figures

Figure 1. Installation Categories for the Military Services and the 

Defense Logistics Agency. 9

Figure 2. Selected Examples of How DOD Calculated Its Capacityto-Force Structure Ratios 10

Figure 3: Example of How DOD Estimated the Administrative 

Space the Army Would Need in 2009 11

Figure 4: Example of How DOD Estimated the Number of Excess 

Army Administrative Bases in 2009 12

Figure 5: Example of How DOD Aggregated the Estimated Excess 

Capacity for the Army 12

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

Abbreviations 

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

DOD Department of Defense

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Page 1 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 20, 2013

Congressional Committees

Due in part to challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in 

reducing excess and obsolete infrastructure, DOD’s Support 

Infrastructure Management is on GAO’s High Risk List of program areas 

that are vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are 

most in need of transformation. Since 1988, DOD has relied on the Base 

Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process as one of the primary means 

of reducing excess infrastructure or facilities1

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,

and realigning bases to 

meet changes in the size and structure of its forces.

2 as amended, 

has governed the BRAC process since 1990. The law established the 

procedures for making recommendations for base closures and 

realignments and originally required DOD to submit a 6-year force 

structure plan and to base its closure and realignment decisions on that 

plan, as well as on selection criteria proposed and established for the 

round by DOD. For the 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC rounds, DOD 

performed a detailed capacity analysis based on extensive data collection 

efforts to identify specific bases capable of accommodating additional 

forces in order to develop its proposed list of closures and realignments. 

In 1997, after DOD requested another BRAC round, Congress required 

DOD to submit a report on, among other things, the need for any 

additional BRAC rounds and an estimate of the amount of DOD’s excess 

capacity at the time.3

 

1 Facilities and/or infrastructure that DOD determines are underused or unused are 

referred to as “excess capacity.” (From DOD BRAC 2005 FAQs).

In 2001, when Congress authorized a BRAC round 

2 Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX (1990)(10 U.S.C. 2687 note). Throughout this report, we 

will refer to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (as amended) as “the 

1990 BRAC statute.” 

3 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 

2824 (1997). The act also required DOD to report on costs and savings from the prior 

BRAC rounds. Congress chose not to authorize a BRAC round at that time. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

to begin in 2005,4

In its required 1998 report, DOD reported that it had 23 percent excess 

base capacity.

it required DOD to submit a force structure plan to 

cover a 20-year period and an infrastructure inventory with its budget 

justification documents for fiscal year 2005 before proceeding with the 

extensive data gathering efforts and analysis associated with the BRAC 

process. The submission was also to discuss categories of excess 

infrastructure and infrastructure capacity.

5 Congress directed us to review that report, and in 

November 1998, we concluded that DOD’s report provided a rough 

indication of excess capacity, and we made no recommendations.6

Similarly, in certifying the need for another round of BRAC to begin in 

2005, DOD reported in 2004 that it had 24 percent excess capacity at that 

time.7 Additionally, in March 2012, six months after BRAC 2005 

concluded,8 the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 

Environment) testified before the House Armed Services Committee 

during a hearing on the Department’s request for two more rounds of 

BRAC in 2013 and 2015.9

 

4 Congress authorized BRAC 2005 with the passage of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX (2001). The law 

reauthorized the BRAC process by amending the 1990 BRAC statute. Among other 

things, the law added several new sections to the 1990 BRAC statute, including sections 

2912 through 2914, which established or revised various requirements for DOD to 

address in order for the 2005 round to continue.

In that hearing, the Deputy Under Secretary 

stated that BRAC 2005 eliminated roughly 3 to 5 percent of DOD’s 

excess capacity, leaving roughly 20 percent excess. Congress, however, 

has thus far declined to authorize additional BRAC rounds. In March 

5 Department of Defense, The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment 

and Closure, April 1998.

6 GAO, Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and Closure,

GAO/NSIAD-99-17 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 1998).

7 Department of Defense, Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Mar. 2004.

8 The BRAC statute required DOD to complete recommendations for closing or realigning 

bases made in BRAC 2005 by September 15, 2011—6 years from the date the President 

submitted his certification of approval of the recommendations to Congress.

9 The Request for Authorization of Another BRAC Round and Additional Reductions in 

Overseas Bases, Before the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed 

Services, 112th Cong. 38 (Mar. 8, 2012) (statement of Under Secretary of Defense 

(Installations and Environment) Dr. Dorothy Robyn). 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

2013, the Acting Deputy Under Secretary again testified that BRAC 2005 

reduced capacity only by about 3 percent and that excess capacity 

remains.10

Such preliminary estimates of excess infrastructure capacity, which DOD 

has developed outside the BRAC process primarily to support the need 

for future BRAC rounds, differ from the data-intensive process, 

supplemented by the use of military judgment that DOD has used to 

formulate the recommendations for specific base closures and 

realignments that it has proposed to the BRAC Commission within the 

BRAC process. For example, to develop recommendations for the 2005 

BRAC round, DOD collected an estimated 25 million pieces of capacity 

and military value data from DOD databases and from hundreds of 

defense installations. These data were certified as to their accuracy by 

hundreds of persons in senior leadership positions across the country. 

The DOD Inspector General and the services’ audit agencies also played 

an important role in ensuring that the data used in the BRAC analyses 

were accurate. In our March 2013 report, Military Bases: Opportunities 

Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment and Closure Rounds, we 

provide a detailed assessment of that process.11

In Senate Report 112-173 accompanying the Senate Armed Services 

Committee’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2013, we were directed to review the systems and processes that 

DOD uses to identify the extent to which bases or facilities are excess to 

needs.12

To determine how DOD developed its preliminary estimates of excess 

capacity, we reviewed excess capacity estimates for the military services, 

The objective of this report is to discuss how DOD has estimated 

the amount of its excess infrastructure or capacity, outside of the BRAC 

process.

 

10 At the March 2013 hearing, the Acting Deputy Under Secretary testified that whether 

DOD would request additional BRAC rounds was “pre-decisional.” Is Base Realignment 

and Closure (BRAC) Appropriate at this Time? Before the Readiness Subcommittee of the 

House Committee on Armed Services, 113th Cong. 5 (Mar. 14, 2013) (statement of Acting 

Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) John Conger).

11 GAO, Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment and 

Closure Rounds, GAO-13-149 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2013).

12 S. Rpt. No. 112-173, at 272-273 (2012).
 

Page 4 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

the Defense Logistics Agency, and DOD as a whole. Specifically, we 

obtained and reviewed (1) the written March 14, 2013 testimony by the 

Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 

Environment) and transcript from the hearing, and (2) the written March 8, 

2012, testimony by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations 

and Environment) and the transcript from that hearing, to identify 

applicable estimates of excess capacity. We also reviewed DOD’s 1998 

and 2004 reports to Congress on excess capacity and we analyzed the 

data used in DOD’s analyses, along with other supporting documentation, 

and we assessed the underlying assumptions and limitations, if any, of 

DOD’s analysis to identify the basis upon which DOD made those excess 

capacity estimates. Based on our review of the documentation provided, 

we determined that the data was sufficiently reliable to facilitate our 

analysis of the assumptions and potential limitations within DOD’s method 

for estimating excess capacity. We also interviewed officials in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense to determine the basis for and the 

relationship between different excess capacity estimates. We conducted 

this performance audit from July 2012 to June 2013 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives.

The first BRAC Commission was chartered by the Secretary of Defense 

in 1988, and operated in accordance with processes later established by 

the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and 

Realignment Act of 1988.13

 

13 Pub. L. No. 100-526 (1988).

Since that time, the BRAC process has 

changed in many ways, with a variety of requirements and procedures 

mandated by subsequent BRAC statutes or adopted by DOD. Among 

these is the requirement that the Secretary of Defense develop a current 

force structure plan. DOD’s force structure plan is designed to identify the 

number and type of forces that DOD needs to combat the anticipated 

threats to the security of the United States. As specified in DOD’s force 

structure plan in support of BRAC 2005, the President’s National Security 

Strategy and the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy

Background 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

provide the focus for the military forces. DOD then analyzes current and 

future threats, challenges, and opportunities to develop the force structure 

plan. DOD’s planning framework helps determine the capabilities required 

to respond to a range of scenarios. The Department then analyzes the 

force requirements for the most likely, the most dangerous, and the most 

demanding circumstances.

One of the objectives of the first BRAC Commission was to review the 

current and planned military base structure in light of force structure 

assumptions and, using the process and the criteria the Commission 

developed, to identify which bases should be realigned or closed. To 

accomplish this, the Commission used a two-phase approach. Phase I 

grouped bases into 22 overall categories, such as training bases and 

administrative headquarters, and then focused on determining the military 

value of bases within each category, each base’s capacity to absorb 

additional missions and forces, and the overall excess capacity within the 

category. The Commission then ranked the bases to identify those 

warranting review in phase II, which focused on assessing the cost and 

savings of base realignment and closure options.

The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990 substantially 

revised the process for DOD base closure and realignment actions within 

the United States, establishing an independent Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Commission and providing for BRAC rounds in 1991, 

1993, and 1995. One of the key elements of the 1990 BRAC statute was 

the requirement that DOD submit a force structure plan and that closure 

and realignment decisions be based on that force structure plan and on 

the final selection criteria established for the BRAC round. As part of the 

BRAC process for 1991, 1993, and 1995, an important step in the military 

services’ approach for identifying bases to close or realign was 

determining whether excess capacity existed at their bases. The starting 

point for this step was comparing changes in the force structure plan to 

the base structure of the military services. After applying military value 

criteria14 and other specific BRAC criteria,15

 

14 The military value criteria included considerations such as current and future mission 

requirements, operational readiness, availability of land, ability to accommodate force 

requirements, and cost and manpower implications.

each of the services 

15 Other criteria included factors such as the extent and timing of costs and savings, 

economic impact on communities, community infrastructure, and environmental impact.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

developed their recommendations for closures and realignments for 

submission to the BRAC Commission.

In May 1997, the Secretary of Defense announced his intention to ask 

Congress to authorize two additional BRAC rounds. Later that year, 

Congress enacted section 2824 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 1998, which required that the Secretary of Defense 

provide the congressional defense committees with a comprehensive 

report on a range of BRAC issues, including the need for any additional 

BRAC rounds and an estimate of the amount of DOD’s excess capacity.16

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 amended 

the 1990 BRAC statute by authorizing a BRAC round for 2005, and 

required DOD to report to Congress on several BRAC-related issues in 

2004 in order for the 2005 round to proceed. The statute directed, among 

other things, that the Secretary of Defense provide Congress with a 20-

year force structure plan and a worldwide inventory of military installations 

and facilities as part of DOD’s fiscal year 2005 budget justification 

documents. In addition, as part of the force structure plan and inventory 

submission, the Secretary was to prepare (1) a description of the 

infrastructure necessary to support the force structure described in the 

force-structure plan, (2) a discussion of categories of excess 

infrastructure and infrastructure capacity, and (3) an economic analysis of 

the effect of the closure or realignment of military installations to reduce 

excess infrastructure. DOD provided the required report, which estimated 

that the department had 24 percent excess capacity, on March 23, 2004. 

In that report, the Secretary of Defense also certified that an additional 

round of BRAC was needed and that the round would result in savings by 

fiscal year 2011.

DOD submitted the required report in April 1998 and estimated that DOD 

had 23 percent excess capacity. In the report, DOD also stated that its 

method for estimating excess capacity determined the extent to which 

reductions in base structure had kept pace with reductions in force 

structure since 1989.

Subsequently, an initial part of DOD’s BRAC recommendations 

development process for the 2005 round involved an overall capacity 

 

16 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 

2824 (1997). The act also required DOD to report on costs and savings from the prior 

BRAC rounds. Congress chose not to authorize a BRAC round at that time. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

analysis of specific locations or functions and subfunctions at specific 

locations. The analysis relied on data calls to obtain certified data to 

assess such factors as maximum potential capacity, current capacity, 

current usage, excess capacity, and capacity needed to meet surge 

requirements. This capacity analysis—in conjunction with the 

department’s 20-year force structure plan, military value analysis, and 

transformational options; applicable guiding principles, objectives, or 

policy imperatives identified by individual military services or joint crossservice groups; and military judgment—was used to identify realignment 

and closure scenarios for further analysis, ultimately leading to finalized 

recommendations for base realignments and closures.

Our review of DOD’s pre-BRAC estimates of excess capacity found that 

the methods DOD has used and the resulting estimates have limitations. 

DOD used similar methods in 1998 and 2004 to calculate its pre-BRAC 

estimates of excess capacity. However, our current review identified a 

number of additional limitations with DOD’s methods. For example, 

DOD’s approach assigns each installation to only one mission category, 

even though most installations support more than one mission. In 

addition, to arrive at the excess capacity estimate it provided to Congress 

in 2012 and repeated in 2013, DOD subtracted an estimate of excess 

capacity that it expected would be disposed of during the 2005 BRAC 

round from the amount of excess capacity estimated to exist immediately 

before that BRAC round to arrive at the current excess capacity estimate 

of about 20 percent. However, because DOD’s pre-BRAC excess 

capacity estimate, expressed as a percentage of bases, and plant 

replacement value, expressed in dollars, are not measured in the same 

units, they are not comparable measures.

DOD based its 1998 and 2004 estimates of 23 percent and 24 percent 

excess capacity, respectively, on a method that compared measures of 

force structure projected to be in place at the end of the 5-year Future 

Years Defense Programs that were current at the time of each estimate, 

to associated indicators of capacity.17

 

17 The Future Years Defense Program that was current when the 1998 analysis was 

performed projected force structure through 2003, and the Future Years Defense Program 

that was current when the 2004 analysis was performed projected force structure through 

2009. 

DOD’s 1998 and 2004 technique 

DOD’s Methods for 

Calculating Pre-BRAC 

Estimates of Excess 

Capacity Have 

Limitations 

DOD’s Method for 

Estimating Excess 

Capacity in 1998 and 2004
 

Page 8 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

consisted of three major steps: (1) categorizing bases according to their 

primary missions and defining indicators of capacity, (2) developing ratios 

of capacity-to-force structure for DOD’s baseline year of 1989, and (3) 

aggregating these various excess capacity indicators that were calculated 

at the installation level to the military service level and then departmentwide.

To begin DOD’s analysis, each of the military services identified 

categories for their bases, identified bases that the services considered 

major installations,18

 

18 Prior to the 2005 BRAC round, DOD did not have a consistent definition of what 

constituted a major base. For BRAC 2005, DOD defined major bases as those that had a 

plant replacement value exceeding $100 million.

and categorized their bases according to their 

primary missions—such as depots, training, or administration—so that 

each installation was included in only one category. Figure 1 shows the 

installation categories used by each military service and the Defense 

Logistics Agency.

Categorizing Bases and 

Defining Indicators 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 1. Installation Categories for the Military Services and the Defense Logistics Agency.

The services then defined various indicators of capacity—such as 

maneuver base acres or facility square feet—for each installation 

category.

Next, DOD divided each services’ indicators of capacity by a measure of 

force structure—such as the number of military and civilian personnel 

authorized, authorized end strength, or the size of the acquisition 

workforce—to develop ratios of capacity-to-projected force structure and

compared them to ratios from 1989, which was used as a baseline. For its 

1998 analysis DOD projected force structure through 2003, and for its 

2004 analysis DOD projected force structure through 2009 because these 

dates marked the end of DOD’s Future Year’s Defense Program 

projections that were current at the time the analyses were performed. 

Developing Ratios of Capacityto-Projected Force Structure 

and Comparing to a Baseline
 

Page 10 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

For example, as illustrated in Figure 2, in its 1998 capacity analysis, DOD 

projected, that in 2003, there would be 6.575 million square feet of 

administrative space on Army administrative bases, and DOD projected 

that there would be 65,516 military and civilian personnel assigned to 

those bases, resulting in a capacity-to-force structure ratio of 100.4. 

Similarly, according to its 2004 capacity analysis, DOD projected that, in 

2009, there would be 6.121 million square feet of administrative space on 

Army administrative bases, and DOD projected that there would be 

64,598 military and civilian personnel assigned to those bases, resulting 

in a capacity-to-force structure ratio of 94.8.

Figure 2. Selected Examples of How DOD Calculated Its Capacity-to-Force Structure 

Ratios

DOD then calculated the extent to which the ratio of capacity-to-force 

structure for each base category differed from the ratio in 1989, which 

was used as a baseline. To do this, DOD first calculated an estimate of 

capacity it would need for the year in question for each of its various 

indicators of capacity. For instance, to continue with the second example 

above, DOD calculated an estimate of administrative capacity the Army 

would need for 2009. As illustrated in Figure 3, DOD calculated its 

needed capacity indicators by multiplying the projected 2009 force 

structure measure (64,598 military and civilian personnel in this case) by 

the 1989 capacity-to-force ratio (81.3 for Army administrative bases), 

which in this case resulted in an estimated needed capacity of 5.25 

million square feet of Army administrative space.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 3: Example of How DOD Estimated the Administrative Space the Army 

Would Need in 2009

To calculate the projected excess capacity for 2009, DOD subtracted a 

base category’s estimated needed capacity from its projected 2009 

capacity. In our Army administrative base example, DOD subtracted its 

estimated needed capacity for 2009 of 5.25 million square feet from its 

estimated existing capacity in 2009 of 6.12 million square feet, which 

resulted in DOD’s estimate of 0.87 million square feet of excess Army 

administrative space or 14 percent of the Army’s existing administrative 

space in 2009.

After computing these indicators of excess capacity for each category of 

installation for each military service and the Defense Logistics Agency, 

DOD then aggregated these indicators departmentwide. Specifically, 

DOD first multiplied the number of bases in a category by the percentage 

of excess for that category, which resulted in DOD’s estimate of the 

number of excess bases in each category. Continuing our Army 

administrative capacity example above, as illustrated in Figure 4, the 

percentage of excess capacity (in this case, the Army’s estimated 14-

percent excess of projected administrative space in 2009) would be 

multiplied by the number bases in the category (12 in the case of Army 

administrative bases), resulting in an estimated number of excess 

administrative bases (1.7 in this case).19

 

19 Because DOD’s method used various indicators of capacity and various measures of 

force structure, DOD computed the estimated number of excess bases in each category 

so that a department-wide excess could be aggregated. 

Aggregating the Analysis 

across the Military Services 

and Department-wide
 

Page 12 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 4: Example of How DOD Estimated the Number of Excess Army 

Administrative Bases in 2009

As illustrated in Figure 5, to calculate an overall indication of excess 

capacity for each DOD component, DOD summed the estimated number 

of excess bases for each installation category within a component (22.3 in 

the case of the Army) and divided this by the sum of the number of all 

bases in all categories for that component (78 in the case of the Army), 

which resulted in a percentage of excess bases for the component. In our 

example, DOD estimated that 29 percent of the Army’s bases were in 

excess to its estimated needed capacity.

Figure 5: Example of How DOD Aggregated the Estimated Excess Capacity for the 

Army

Finally, the departmentwide excess was calculated by summing the 

estimated number of excess bases for each military service and the 

Defense Logistics Agency (65.2), summing the number of bases included 

in the analysis (276), then dividing the sum of the excess bases by the 

total number of bases in the analysis, resulting in estimated departmentwide excess of 24 percent.

DOD recognized some limitations within its method for estimating excess 

capacity, stating in both its 1998 and 2004 reports to Congress that the 

analysis it performed provided an indication of the type and amount of 

excess capacity within the department, but recognizing that the analyses 

lacked the precision to identify specific installations or functional 

The Methods DOD Used 

to Estimate Excess 

Capacity in 1998 and 2004 

Have Limitations
 

Page 13 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

configurations for realignment or closure. In addition, our current review of 

DOD’s method for estimating excess capacity outside of a 

congressionally-authorized BRAC process identified a number of 

limitations.

First, DOD assigned each base to only one installation category, even 

though most bases support more than one mission. This approach 

effectively excluded significant portions of a base’s infrastructure from the 

analysis. For example, in the case of Army maneuver bases, using base 

acres as the indicator of capacity does not include about 204 million 

square feet of buildings located on the 12 Army maneuver bases in 

DOD’s analysis. Another limitation associated with DOD’s method is that 

the services measured capacity for some similar functions differently. For 

example, the Army and Air Force measured capacity for test and 

evaluation facilities in terms of physical total square feet of space, while 

the Navy measured its capacity for these facilities in terms of work years. 

These differences make it difficult for DOD to assess excess capacity 

across the department. A third limitation is that, in using 1989 as a 

baseline, DOD assumed that the bases and facilities as they existed in 

1989 were appropriately sized to support missions, and DOD did not 

identify any excess capacity or capacity shortfall that may have existed at 

that time. This approach, in essence, transfers any excesses and 

shortfalls that existed in 1989 into DOD’s estimates of future capacity 

needs because, as illustrated in Figure 3 above, the capacity-to-force 

structure ratio from 1989 was used to calculate the needed capacity for 

2009. It is therefore uncertain to what extent DOD’s estimates of excess 

capacity are overstated or understated. Finally, in both the 1998 and 2004 

analyses, in instances where DOD’s analysis indicated that projected 

capacity was less than needed capacity—indicating a capacity 

shortage—within a specific installation category, DOD treated these 

cases as having zero or no excess capacity. Despite the data showing 

capacity shortages, DOD used this data to aggregate the results of its 

analysis across the department. If DOD had treated those installation 

categories as having capacity shortages, DOD’s estimates would have 

resulted in a lower number of excess bases and consequently a lower 

percentage of excess capacity across the department than DOD reported 

to Congress.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

DOD’s testimony in March 2012 and March 2013,20 that by its estimates 

DOD had about 20 percent excess capacity remaining after the end of 

BRAC 2005, relied on earlier calculations that the department made in 

2004 and 2005. First, in 2004, using the method described above, the 

department estimated that it had 24 percent excess capacity. Then, in 

2005, DOD’s report transmitting its recommendations to the BRAC 

Commission21 stated that, while it is difficult to measure the full extent of 

the improvements in effectiveness and efficiency of the BRAC 2005 

recommendations, four statistics would illustrate the breadth and depth of 

the effect of its proposed actions. One of those statistics was the 

department’s projection that DOD’s plant-replacement value would be 

reduced by 5 percent.22 After the BRAC Commission reviewed DOD’s 

recommendations and made some changes, including reducing the 

number of closures at major installations,23

In March 2013, the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Installations and Environment) testified that the method upon which 

DOD’s current estimate of 20 percent excess capacity is based is helpful 

DOD revised its estimate of 

the expected percentage reduction in plant-replacement value and 

projected that it would likely be around 3 percent. In 2012, the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) said that 

these estimates from 2004 and 2005 suggested that roughly 20 percent 

excess capacity remained. However, because DOD’s pre-BRAC excess 

capacity estimate, which is expressed as a percentage of bases, and 

plant replacement value, which is expressed in dollars, are not measured 

in the same units, they are not comparable measures.

 

20 The Request for Authorization of Another BRAC Round and Additional Reductions in 

Overseas Bases, Before the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed 

Services, 112th Cong. 38 (Mar. 8, 2012) (statement of Under Secretary of Defense 

(Installations and Environment) Dr. Dorothy Robyn); Is Base Realignment and Closure 

(BRAC) Appropriate at this Time? Before the Readiness Subcommittee of the House 

Committee on Armed Services, 113th Cong. 5 (Mar. 14, 2013) (statement of Acting Under 

Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) John Conger).

21 Department of Defense, Base Closure and Realignment Report (May 2005).

22 The other three statistics included eliminating about 18,000 civilian support positions; 

net annual savings of over $5 billion per year from BRAC 2005 actions, in addition to 

about $7 billion from previous BRAC rounds; and vacating about 12 million square feet of 

leased space. 

23 While DOD recommended closures at 33 major installations, the BRAC Commission 

recommended closures at 24 major installations.

DOD’s Statements about 

Remaining Excess 

Capacity in 2012 and 2013 

Relied on Two Earlier 

Calculations 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

in making a broad assessment in determining whether an additional 

BRAC round is justified, but it cannot identify specific installations or 

functional configurations for realignment or closure. The Acting Deputy 

Under Secretary further stated that the specific capacity analysis that is 

an integral part of the BRAC process is preferable to aggregate metrics 

used in DOD’s pre-BRAC estimates. He further stated that only through 

the BRAC process is the Department able to determine excess capacity 

by installation and by mission or function in a process that is thorough 

and fair.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written 

comments, which are reproduced in appendix I, DOD stated that we 

properly highlighted the limitations of its approach used to estimate 

excess capacity. In addition, DOD stated that our report provides proper 

context for its methodology by contrasting it with the extensive and 

detailed data collection and analysis that DOD has used to develop 

BRAC recommendations. DOD concluded that only through the BRAC 

process is it able to determine excess capacity by installation and mission 

or function in a fair and thorough way. DOD also provided a technical 

comment which we incorporated into our report. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget. This report is also available 

at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix II.

Brian J. Lepore

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

Agency Comments
 

Page 16 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tim Johnson

Chairman

The Honorable Mark Kirk

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Military Construction,

Veteran Affairs and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate 

The Honorable Howard McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. “Bill” Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
 

Page 17 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

The Honorable John Culberson

Chairman

The Honorable Sanford Bishop

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Military Construction,

Veteran Affairs and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Comments from the 

Department of Defense

Page 18 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix I: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 19 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above, Harold Reich (Assistant Director), 

Ronald Bergman, Timothy Burke, Susan Ditto, Gregory Marchand, Carol 

Petersen, Amie Steele, Laura Talbott, John Van Schaik, and John Wren 

made significant contributions to the report.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 20 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment 

and Closure Rounds. GAO-13-149. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2013.

GAO’s 2013 High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. Washington, 

D.C.: February 2013.

DOD Joint Bases: Management Improvements Needed to Achieve 

Greater Efficiencies. GAO-13-134. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 

2012.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: The National GeospatialIntelligence Agency’s Technology Center Construction Project. 

GAO-12-770R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and Savings 

Estimates from BRAC 2005. GAO-12-709R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2012.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Key Factors Contributing to 

BRAC 2005 Results. GAO-12-513T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2012.

Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy 

to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.: 

September 19, 2011.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan 

Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 

2011.

GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 17, 2011.

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is 

Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the 

Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.: 

January 26, 2011.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to 

Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs. 

GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 21 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning 

Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth. 

GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 

Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year 

2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of 

Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are 

Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings 

Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating SupplyRelated Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703. 

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009.

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support 

Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of 

Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.: 

March 30, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in 

Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently 

Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: January 

30, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to 

Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R. 

Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 

Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. 

GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road 

Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.
Related GAO Products

Page 22 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower 

Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC 

Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations 

Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R. 

Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 

Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T. 

Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have 

Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159. 

Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating, 

Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of 

Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, 

and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics 

Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 

Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 

2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor 

Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve 

Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 

2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers 

Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and 

Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2007.
Related GAO Products

Page 23 GAO-13-535 Defense Infrastructure

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 

Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 

Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental 

Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property. 

GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.

Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. 

Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and 

Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. 

Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC 

Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need 

for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2004.

Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and 

Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.

(351752)
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