Honorable Thos. Bartlett, Jr. 

County Attorney 

Falls County 

Marlin, Texas 

Opinion~.No. ~2~ 203. 

FE: Whether Acts 1961, 57th Leg., 

Ch. 487, exempting personal 

property of charltable~ 

Institutions from ad valorem 

taxes is constitutional 

Dear Mr. Bartlett: 

In your letter of December 9, 1963, you have requested an 

opinion from this department as to whether or not that part of 

Section 7 of Article 7150, Vernon's Civil Statutes, as amended by 

Acts 1961, 57th Legislature, Chapter 487, exempting certain personal 

property is constitutional. This amendment reads as follows: 

"All buildings and personal property belonging 

to institutions of purely public charity, together 

with the lands belonging to and occupied by such 

institutions not leased or otherwise used with a 

view to profit, unless such rents and profits and 

all moneys and credits are appropriated by such 

institutions solely to sustain such institutions 

and for the benefit of the sick and disabled members and their families and the burial of the same, 

or for the maintenance of persons when unable to 

provide for themselves, whether such persons are 

members of such institutions or not. An lnstitution of purely public charity under this article 

is one which dispenses Its aid to Its members 

and others in sickness or distress, or at death, 

without regard to proverty or riches of the 

recipient, also when the funds, property and 

assets of such institutions are placed and bound 

by its law to relieve, aid and administer In any 

way to the relief of Its members when In want, 

sickness and distress, and provide homes for its 

helpless and dependent members and to educate and 

maintain the orphans of its deceased members or 

other persons." 

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Honorable Thos. Bartlett, Jr., Page Two (Opinion No.'C-203) 

Article 8; Section 2 of the Texas Constitution provides in 

part as follows: 

II . . . the Legislature may, by general laws 

exempt from taxation . . . all buildings used 

exclusively and owned by persons or associations 

of persons for school purposes and the necessary 

furniture of all schools and property used exclusively and reasonably necessary in conducting 

any association engaged in promoting the religious, 

educational and physical development of boys, 

girls, young men or young women operating under 

a State or National organization of like 

character; also the endowment funds of such 

institutions of learning and religion not used 

with a view to profit; and when the same are 

invested in bonds or mortgages, or in land or 

other property which has been and shall hereafter be bought in by such institutions under 

foreclosure sales made to satisfy or protect such 

bonds or mortgages, that such exemption of such 

land and property shall continue only for two 

years after the purchase of the same at such sale 

by such Institutions and no longer+, and institutions of purely public charity; . . ." 

This Section 2, as adopted in 1876, reads in part as follows: 

II . . . the Legislature may, bye general laws, 

exempt from taxation . . . all buildings used 

exclusively and owned by persons or associations 

of persons for school purposes, (and the 

necessary furniture of all schools), and instltutions of purely public charity; , . ." 

An amendment adopted November 6, 1906, making the pertinent 

part of Section 2 read as follows: 

M 

. . . the Legislature may, by general laws, 

exempt from taxation . . . all buildings used 

exclusively and owned by persons or associations 

of persons for school purposes and the necessary 

furniture of all schools, also the endowment 

funds of such institutions of learning and religion not used with a view to profit; and when 

the same are Invested in bonds or mortgages, or 

in land or other property which has been and 

shall hereafter be bought in by such institutions 

under foreclosure sales made to satisfy or protect 

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. . 

Honorable Thos. Bartlett, Jr., Page Three (Opinion No. C-203) 

such bonds or mortgages; that such exemption 

of such land and property shall continue 

only for two years after the purchase of the 

same at such sale by such institutions and 

no longer, and institutions of purely public 

charity; . . ." 

The amendment adopted November 6, 1928, added the provision 

concerning property owned by a church or strictly religious society 

for use as a dwelling place for the ministry, and the provision 

beginning with the words "and property used exclusively and reasonably necessary," to and including the words, "operating under a 

State or National organization of like character." (Emphasis added). 

The courts in Texas have uniformly held that the Legislature 

may exempt real property belonging to and used exclusively by 

institutions of purely public charity. 

In the case of Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, Royal~ Arch 

Masons, 68 Tex. 698, 5 S.W. 516 (1887) the Supreme Court of Texas, 

in talking about institutions of~purely public charity, as used in 

Section 2 of Article 8 of the Texas Constitution said: 

"The grammatical construction of this 

provision Is not clear. The word 'institution' 

properly means an association organized or 

established for some specific purpose, . . ." 

The court said that that part of the section under consideration which contains the word institution may have been intended to read either: 

" I . . . . all buildings used exclusively and 

owned by persons or associations of persons 

for school purposes, . . . and all instltutions (meanin 

‘i 

establishments with houses, 

grounds, etc. of purely public charity,' or 

'all buildings used exclusively and owned by 

persons or associations of persons for school 

purposes, . . . and all buildings used exclusively and owned by institutions of purely 

public charity.'" 

The Texas Supreme Court said, '. . . we are of the opinion 

that the latter reading gives the more reasonable construction of 

the language as used in the constitution of our State. This gives 

to the word its proper meaning, and Is in accord with the spirit 

of the other provisions contained In the section." 

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Honorable Thos. Bartlett, Jr., Page Four (Opinion No. C-203) 

At the time this opinion was written by the Supreme Court 

the pertinent part of Section 2 of Article 8 of the Texas 

Constitution read as follows: 

11 . . . the Legislature may, by general laws, 

exempt from taxation; all buildings used exclusively and owned by persons or associations 

of persons for school purposes, (and the 

necessary furniture of all schools), and instltutions of purely public charity; . . ." 

In the case of Barbee vs. City of Dallas, 64 S.W. 1018 (civ. 

App. 1901, error ref.) the court stated: 

"This appeal Involves the construction of 

Article 8 $! 2, of the state constitution, exempting from taxation 'all institutionsof 

purely public charity.' This clause has been 

considered by the supreme court, and in an able 

and exhaustive opinion the clause was construed 

by that court as authorizing the exemption only 

of real estate, with the buildings thereon owned 

and used exclusively by institutions of purely 

public charity. Morris v. Royal Arch Masons, 

68 Tex. 698, 5 S.W. 519. In other words, the 

effect of the holding is that this clause of 

the constitution authorizes the legislature to 

exempt only real estate owned and used exclusively by institutions of purely public 

charity. The property sought to be exempted 

in the case at bar consists of publications 

principally of books, tracts, and periodicals 

published by the Methodist Publishing House 

at Nashville, Tenn., of which Plaintiff is a 

branch. The petition does show, however, that 

Plaintiff 'does carry other of such articles 

making up the stock in trade of a regular 

book store.' The property described in the 

petition consists of personal property only. 

None of it can be designated as real estate or 

building. This being true, under the decision 

above referred to we conclude that it is not 

included in the exemptions provided for in 

Article 8, g 2, Const. . . . As the property 

set out in the petition is not embraced in the 

clause of the constitution authorizing the 

exemption of 'all institutions of purely public 

charity,' it is unnecessary to decide whether 

the language of the statute (Sayles' Ann. Civ. 

-984- 
. 

Honorable Thos. Bartlett, Jr., Page Five (Opinion No. C-203) 

St. art. 5065, subd. 6) is broad enough to 

exempt it, or whether the language of the 

ordinance of the city exempting property 

from taxation would include It. It is conceded that, if the constitution does not 

authorize the exemption of this property, it 

could not be exempted by the statute or 

ordinarne. . . . ’ 

These cases were decided under the constitution as it was 

originally written in 1876. The pertinent part of Section 2, as 

It now reads, is as follows: 

11 . . . the Legislature may, by general laws, 

exempt from taxation . . . property used exclusively and reasonably necessary In conducting any association engaged in promoting 

the religious, educational and physical development of boys, girls, young men or young women 

operating under a State or National organization 

of like character; . . . and institutions of 

purely public charity; . . .” 

The cases above discussed were decided in 1877 and 1901, and 

before Section 2 of Article 8 of the Constitution was amended. We 

believe that the meaning of section 2 above is entirely different 

now from that as originally written and In effect at the time the 

above court opinions were written. These cases are therefore not 

in point as to the present reading of this section of the 

constitution. 

By the amendments of Section 2 of Article 8 of the Constitution it a pears that the people of Texas intended to authorize the 

Legislatu 2: eto exempt from taxation, property used exclusively and 

reasonably necessary In conducting any association engaged in 

promoting the religious, education and physical development of 

boys, girls, young men or young women operating under a State or 

National organization of like character; and property used exclusively 

and reasonably necessary In conducting institutions of purely public 

charity. The word “property” not being in any manner qualified, includes person& as well as real property. 

The Legislature, in putting into effect the permission 

granted by Section 2 of Article 8 of the Constitution to exempt 

property used exclusively and reasonably necessary in conducting 

institutions of purely public charity went beyond the authority 

granted, In that the Legislature did not limit the exemption to 

property used exclusively and reasonably necessary In conducting 

such institutions. The statute to that extent is void. city of 

-985- 
Honorable Thos. Bartlett, Jr., Page Six (Opinion No. C-203) 

San Antonio v. Santa Rosa Infirmary 249 S.W. 498 (Tex.Civ.App. 1923, 

reversed on other grounds 259 S.W. 426). 

We are, therefore, of the opinion that Acts 1961, 57th 

Legislature, Chapter 487 which amended Article 7150, Vernon's civil 

Statutes, is constitutional insofar as it exempts from taxation, 

both real and personal, property that is used exclusively and Is 

reasonably necessary in conducting Institutions of purely public 

charity. 

------- SUMMARY 

Acts 1961, 57th Legislature, Chapter 487, which 

amended Article 7150, Vernon's Civil Statutes Is 

constitutional, Insofar as It exempts from taxation, 

both real and personal property, that is used exclusively and is reasonably necessary In conducting 

institutions of purely public charity. 

Very truly yours, 

WAGGONER CARR 

Attorney General 

BY: 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Cecil Rotsch 

Arthur Sandlin 

Marietta Payne 

Jack Norwood 

Approved for the Attorney General 

by: Stanton Stone 

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