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CONTINUING OVERSIGHT OF THE 

NATION’S WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAMS: 

AN UPDATE ON JPSS AND GOES–R 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND 

OVERSIGHT 

JOINT WITH THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 2012 

Serial No. 112–94 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

VACANCY 

VACANCY 

VACANCY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Wednesday, June 27, 2012 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 22 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24 

Statement by Representative Paul D. Tonko, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 25 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 26 

Statement by Representative Andy Harris, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 26 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 27 

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 28 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 29 

Witnesses: 

Hon. Kathryn Sullivan, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Environmental Observation and Prediction, and Deputy Administrator, National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 30 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 33 

Mr. Marcus Watkins, Director, Joint Agency Satellite Division, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 42 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 44 

Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, 

Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 47 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 50 

Discussion 72 

Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Hon. Kathryn Sullivan, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Environmental Observation and Prediction, and Deputy Administrator, National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ......................................................... 93 

Mr. Marcus Watkins, Director, Joint Agency Satellite Division, National Aeronautics and Space Administration ...................................................................... 97 

Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 103 
Page

IV 

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record 

Weather-X Blog by Cliff Mass: Submitted by Representative Andy Harris, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment ................................... 110 
(1) 

CONTINUING OVERSIGHT OF THE 

NATION’S WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAMS: 

AN UPDATE ON JPSS AND GOES–R 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Broun 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight] 

presiding. 
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Chairman BROUN. This joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight on the Committee of Science will come 

to order. This Joint Committee meeting with Subcommittee on Energy and Environment. 

Good afternoon. First, I apologize for running late. I was on the 

floor, and please forgive me, my colleagues as well as all our witnesses, for running late, and I appreciate you all’s patience. 

Welcome to today’s joint hearing entitled, ‘‘Continuing Oversight 

of the Nation’s Weather Satellite Programs: An Update on JPSS 

and GOES–R.’’ 

In front of you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies, and truth in testimony disclosures for today’s witnesses. 

Before we get started, since this is a joint hearing involving two 

Subcommittees, I want to explain how we will operate procedurally, 

so that all Members will understand how the question-and-answer 

period will be handled. 

As always, we will alternate between the majority and minority 

and allow all Members the opportunity for questions before recognizing a Member for a second round of questions. We will recognize 

those Members that were present here at the gavel in order of seniority on the full Committee and those coming in after the gavel 

will be recognized in their order of arrival. 

I now recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

This is the ninth hearing this Committee has held on either the 

National Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite System, NPOESS, 

Program, or its successor, the JPSS Program, since 2003. That does 

not even include hearings related to Geostationary Observational 

Environmental Satellite and weather satellites in general. This 

level of oversight, continued under both Republican and Democratic 

administrations as well as Congresses, is indicative of how important weather satellites are to our society and to Members of Congress. Without both polar and geostationary satellites, our weather 

forecasting ability would be severely compromised. 

Because of the importance of these programs, it is frustrating to 

watch them struggle. The original polar satellite program, 

NPOESS, was supposed to cost taxpayers $6.5 billion. That was 

supposed to get the taxpayers six satellites operating in three separate orbits, carrying 13 instruments which would launch around 

2010. Instead, we now have a program that will only purchase 

three satellites and will operate in only one orbit and cost twice as 

much. 

To make matters worse, one of those satellites is a research satellite that was never intended to serve operationally. NOAA is now 

dependent upon European partners for data from the mid-morning 

orbit, and it is anyone’s guess what data the Department of Defense will supply from the early morning orbit. 

Even more frustrating is the fact that this program still does not 

have a baseline cost or a schedule. I understand that NOAA is 

working towards developing this, but as they point out, the ground 

segment has already passed its critical design review, all of its contracts are signed, JPSS–1’s instruments are 60 to 95 percent complete, and the spacecraft will essentially be a clone of the NPP bus, 

all indications of a mature program. 
23 

To quote the GAO report, not having a baseline, ‘‘makes it more 

difficult for program officials to make informed decisions and for 

program overseers to understand if the program is on track to successfully delivering expected functionality on cost and schedule.’’ 

I understand that NOAA has committed to developing a program under a lifecycle cost cap of $12.9 billion, but with an impending 

gap in coverage that limits schedule flexibility, the only option that 

NOAA may have to manage program risk is to diminish capability. 

I am also concerned that this $12.9 billion cap is $1.7 billion lower 

than the independent cost estimate conducted just last year. 

I look forward to monitoring how NOAA decides to cover that 

shortfall and any future challenges. Just since our hearing last fall, 

the program has grown by $1 billion as a result of extending the 

program by four years, the addition of free flyers, contract transitions, and a work slowdown because of the 2011 budget. Also, the 

schedule has slipped approximately three months. One of the most 

concerning findings from the GAO report on JPSS pertains not to 

cost increases or schedule gaps in NOAA’s afternoon orbit, but to 

the health of the entire polar orbiting constellation. 

GAO points out that because of uncertainties in DOD’s early 

morning orbit, as well as the European’s mid-morning orbit, there 

is a risk of a data gap in each orbit, not just NOAA’s. After the 

2010 decision to split up the program, NOAA was only given responsibility for the afternoon orbit, but it is clear that the parties 

need to coordinate to identify synergies and to mitigate risks to the 

entire constellation. 

GOES–R, on the other hand, seems to be making progress toward delivering its spacecraft and ground system within cost and 

schedule. This wasn’t always the case, as the program was significantly de-scoped in 2007 in order to prevent cost growth and schedule slips. Still, there are some findings in the GAO report that require monitoring, such as the rate at which the program is burning 

through reserves and the fidelity of its schedules. Most concerning, 

however, is the GAO finding that there is only a 48 percent chance 

that the program will meet its 2015 launch date, and that there is 

a 37 percent chance that there will be a gap in the availability of 

two operational GOES-series satellites. 

A gap in one program is bad enough. A gap in both programs 

would and could be—could and would be catastrophic. 

I would be remiss if I did not at least mention the Senate Appropriations proposal to transfer the weather satellite programs from 

NOAA to NASA. I hope NOAA and NASA can provide their 

thoughts on this proposal, specifically how it would impact the current programs as well as the rest of their agencies. 

I know these oversight hearings can sometimes be tough, but 

considering NOAA’s current position, the House may be one of the 

agency’s few friends, maybe the last friend. I hope not. 

The Administration has proposed moving NOAA into the Department of Interior, and the Senate has proposed gutting the satellite 

program from NOAA, effectively removing $2 billion of NOAA’s $5 

billion budget. The Committee has a positive working relationship 

with the satellite sector of NOAA, which is typically forthcoming 

with information. Unfortunately, this was not the case with questions the Committee posed to NOAA last fall after the last hearing. 
24 

Although we sent questions on October 17, we did not receive a response until June 7, eight months later. I certainly hope NOAA 

will be more responsive to the questions that we will have after 

this hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Broun follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

CHAIRMAN PAUL C. BROUN

I want to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses and thank them for appearing 

today. 

This is the ninth hearing this Committee has held on either the National PolarOrbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program or its successor, the 

JPSS program, since 2003. That does not even include hearings related to the Geostationary Observational Environmental Satellite (GOES) and weather satellites in 

general. This level of oversight, continued under both Republican and Democratic 

administrations and Congresses, is indicative of how important weather satellites 

are to our society. Without both polar and geostationary satellites, our weather forecasting ability would be severely compromised. 

Because of the importance of these programs, it is frustrating to watch them 

struggle. The original polar satellite program, NPOESS, was supposed to cost $6.5 

billion. That was supposed to get the taxpayers six satellites, operating in three separate orbits, carrying 13 instruments, which would launch around 2010. Instead, we 

now have a program that will only purchase three satellites; that will operate in 

only one orbit; and cost twice as much. To make matters worse, one of those satellites is a research satellite that was never intended to serve operationally; NOAA 

is now dependent on European partners for data from the midmorning orbit, and 

it’s anyone’s guess what data the Department of Defense (DOD) will supply from 

the early morning orbit. 

Even more frustrating is the fact that this program still does not have a baseline 

for cost and schedule. I understand that NOAA is working towards developing this, 

but as they point out, the ground segment has already passed its critical design review, all of its contracts are signed, JPSS–1’s instruments are 60 to 95 percent complete, and the spacecraft will essentially be a clone of the NPP bus—all indicators 

of a mature program. To quote the GAO report, not having a baseline ‘‘makes it 

more difficult for program officials to make informed decisions and for program 

overseers to understand if the program is on track to successfully deliver expected 

functionality on cost and schedule.’’ 

I understand that NOAA has committed to developing the program under a life 

cycle cost cap of $12.9 billion, but with an impending gap in coverage that limits 

schedule flexibility, the only option that NOAA may have to manage program risk 

is to diminish capability. I am also concerned that this $12.9 billion cap is $1.7 billion lower than the independent cost estimate conducted last year. I look forward 

to monitoring how NOAA decides to cover that shortfall and any future challenges. 

Just since our hearing last fall, the program has grown by $1 billion as a result 

of extending the program by four years, the addition of free flyers, contract transitions, and work slowdown because of the 2011 budget. Also, the schedule has 

slipped approximately three months. 

One of the most concerning findings from the GAO report on JPSS pertains not 

to cost increases or schedule gaps in NOAA’s afternoon orbit, but to the health of 

the entire polar-orbiting constellation. GAO points out that because of uncertainties 

in DOD’s early morning orbit, as well as the Europeans’ midmorning orbit, there 

is a risk of a data gap in each orbit, not just NOAA’s. After the 2010 decision to 

split up the program, NOAA was only given responsibility for the afternoon orbit, 

but it is clear that the parties need to coordinate to identify synergies and mitigate 

risks to the entire constellation. 

GOES–R, on the other hand, seems to be making progress toward delivering its 

spacecraft and ground system within cost and schedule. This wasn’t always the 

case, as the program was significantly descoped in 2007 in order to prevent cost 

growth and schedule slips. Still, there are some findings in the GAO report that require monitoring, such as the rate at which the program is burning through reserves, and the fidelity of its schedules. Most concerning, however, is the GAO finding that there is only a 48 percent chance that the program will meet its 2015 

launch date, and that there is a 37 percent chance that there will be a gap in the 

availability of two operational GOES-series satellites. 
25 

A gap in one program is bad enough. A gap in both programs would be catastrophic. 

I would be remiss if I did not at least mention the Senate Appropriations proposal 

to transfer the weather satellite programs from NOAA to NASA. I hope NOAA and 

NASA can provide thier thoughts on this proposal, specifically how it would impact 

the current programs as well as the rest of their agencies. 

I know these oversight hearings can sometimes be tough, but considering NOAA’s 

current position, the House may be one of the agency’s few friends. The Administration has proposed moving NOAA into the Department of Interior, and the Senate 

has proposed gutting the satellite program from NOAA, effectively removing $2 billion of NOAA’s $5 billion budget. The Committee has a positive working relationship 

with the satellite sector of NOAA, which is typically forthcoming with information. 

Unfortunately, this was not the case with questions the Committee posed to NOAA 

last fall after the last hearing. Although we sent questions on October 17, we did 

not receive a resonse until June 7—eight months later. I certainly hope NOAA will 

be more responsive to the questions we will have after this hearing. 

Chairman BROUN. Now, I recognize Mr. Tonko, my good friend 

from New York, for his opening statement. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our witnesses. 

This Committee has been holding hearings to ask critical questions of the satellite programs since at least 2003. We have seen 

cycles of disaster as when we witnessed the JPSS, in its prior imposed guise, double in cost before the entire enterprise was redesigned and rebaselined. 

We have witnessed Herculean efforts to restructure acquisition 

plans to get problems under control. Frankly, despite these efforts, 

we have not had much to cheer about with JPSS, and even GOES– 

R has been a source of concern. 

However, my sense is that both of these programs are on sustainable paths. That said, it appears that an auditor at GAO could 

build a pretty good 20-year career out of simply tracking the 

weather satellite program, and that is a sorry state of affairs. 

The group that sits before us today is not responsible for the 

mess. Rather, we are counting on them to get us out of a mess they 

inherited. It is our job to probe the answers they offer, assess 

whether the programs appear robust, and offer whatever advice 

and support we can to get these satellites launched and operating. 

Believe me, if we could have altered these acquisitions, we could 

have—would have, but these satellites and the instruments that 

are to fly on them are too important to our Nation to abandon this 

program. 

I want to come away from this hearing with an understanding 

that there is solid planning going on to fill any data gaps, I want 

a firmer grasp of where remaining risks lie in each of these programs, and I want to know there are reasonable strategies for dealing with those risks. 

In short, I want to leave with confidence that the management 

teams running the JPSS and GOES–R satellite programs are, indeed, up to the challenges. 

In closing, Mr. Chair, I want to express my hope that we not leap 

to conclusions, either good or bad, about either of these programs. 

We should be cautious about these programs, but it appears that 

nothing staff learned in preparing for this hearing and nothing in 

GAO’s testimony leads us to condemn either program or to conclude that things are off the tracks again. 
26 

I thank our witnesses for being here today and sharing information and providing the sort of in-depth discussion that is absolutely 

required, and I look forward to their testimony today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I yield. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tonko follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT SUBCOMMITTEE RANKING

MEMBER PAUL D. TONKO

This Committee has been holding hearings to ask critical questions of these satellite programs since at least 2003. We have seen cycles of disaster, as when we witnessed the JPSS—in its prior NPOESS guise—double in cost before the entire enterprise was redesigned and rebaselined. We have witnessed Herculean efforts to restructure acquisition plans to get problems under control. Frankly, despite those efforts, we have not had much to cheer about with JPSS, and even GOES–R has been 

a source of concern. However, my sense is that both of these programs are on sustainable paths. That said, it appears that an auditor at GAO could build a pretty 

good 20-year career out of simply tracking the weather satellite program, and that 

is a sorry state of affairs. 

The group that sits before us today is not responsible for the mess. Rather, we 

are counting on them to get us out of a mess they inherited. It is our job to probe 

the answers they offer, assess whether the programs appear robust, and offer whatever advice and support we can to get these satellites launched and operating. Believe me, if we could have halted these acquisitions, we would have. But these satellites, and the instruments that are to fly on them, are too important to our Nation 

to abandon this program. 

I want to come away from this hearing with an understanding that there is solid 

planning going on to fill any data gaps. I want a firmer grasp of where remaining 

risks lie in each of these programs, and I want to know there are reasonable strategies for dealing with those risks. In short, I want to leave with confidence that the 

manangement teams runnning the JPSS and GOES–R satellite programs are up to 

the challenge. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to express my hope that we not leap to conclusions—either good or bad—about either of these programs. We should be cautious 

about these programs, but it appears that nothing staff learned in preparing for this 

hearing and nothing in GAO’s testimony leads us to condemn either program or to 

conclude that things are off the tracks again. I thank the witnesses for being here 

today, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Tonko. Appreciate that, and 

I agree with you. I am not sure if we are off track. I sure hope not, 

and I think we—it is one of the most bipartisan Committees in this 

very bipartisan overall Full Committee, and I appreciate that. I 

just want to get some information. I think both sides want to do 

just the same. 

Just as we are going to do with the question-and-answer period, 

we will recognize not only the Chairs and Ranking Members of 

both Subcommittees before we go to the rest of the Members of the 

Committees, as I mentioned earlier we will—I will now recognize 

Dr. Andy Harris from Maryland for his statement. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. I would 

like to thank the witnesses for joining us to discuss NOAA’s environmental satellite issues. 

This is the second hearing we have had on NOAA’s satellites in 

this Congress alone, and I understand this Committee has had 

many more over the past several Congresses. With this much oversight, we typically hope to see some improvement, and in some 

areas we have. However, with every step forward it seems we are 

taking two steps back. 

The launch of the NPP satellite last October was certainly an 

achievement, and NOAA and NASA are to be applauded for the 
27 

successful launch. But the satellite was five years late, and some 

of the instruments are not working as well as they should be. The 

contracts for the Joint Polar Satellite System, JPSS, have finally 

been transferred from its predecessor program, and NASA and 

NOAA are making progress. But the threat of a data gap remains, 

the cost of the program has increased by $1 billion, squeezing 

funds available for important ground- and air-based weather systems. 

The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite or GOES 

Program moves along, but NOAA is burning through its funding 

reserves quicker than anticipated, and risk has still not been reduced. Today we will be told that there is a possibility of a GOES 

gap right around the same time as the possibility of a JPSS gap. 

As we learned in an Energy and Environment Subcommittee hearing several months ago, the majority of the data used in weather 

prediction models by the National Weather Service comes from satellite data. The prospects of a JPSS coverage gap is troubling 

enough in itself, but the possibility of a concurrent gap in GOES 

coverage represents a truly scary scenario that significantly threatens U.S. lives and property. 

Given these difficulties, perhaps it is time for us to seek a new 

paradigm for procuring data for weather forecasting. The current 

procurement process may simply not be working, and time is running out, but to date there appears little interest in pursuing alternative solutions. While there are no easy answers to this dilemma 

and the choices we make will require a significant effort and evaluation, we must accept that the status quo cannot continue. 

Again, I thank the witnesses for being here with us today. I look 

forward to an informative discussion, and I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT CHAIRMAN

ANDY HARRIS

Good afternoon. I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us to discuss 

NOAA’s environmental satellite issues. 

This is the second hearing we have had on NOAA satellites in this Congress 

alone, and I understand this Committee has had many more over the past several 

Congresses. With this much oversight, we would typically hope to see some improvement. And in some areas, we have. However, with every step forward, it seems we 

are taking two steps back. 

The launch of the NPP satellite last October was certainly an achievement, and 

NOAA and NASA are to be applauded for the successful launch. But the satellite 

was five years late, and some of the instruments are not working as well as they 

should be. 

The contracts for the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) have finally been transferred from its predecessor program, and NASA and NOAA are making progress. 

But the threat of a data gap remains, and the cost of the program has increased 

by $1 billion, squeezing funds available for important ground- and air-based weather systems. 

The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite, or GOES, program, is 

moving along, but NOAA is burning through its funding reserves quicker than anticipated, and risk has still not been reduced. 

Today we will be told that there is a possibility of a GOES gap, right around the 

same time as the possibility of a JPSS gap. As we learned in an Energy and Environment Subcommittee hearing several months ago, the majority of the data used 

in weather prediction models by the Nationl Weather Service comes from satellite 

data. The prospect of a JPSS coverage gap is troubling enough in itself, but the pos-
28 

sibility of a concurrent gap in GOES coverage presents a truly scary scenario that 

significantly threatens U.S. lives and property. 

Given these difficulties, perhaps it is time for us to seek a new paradigm when 

procuring data for weather forecasting. The current procurement process is simply 

not working, and time is running out, but to date there appears to be little interest 

in pursuing alternative solutions. While there are no easy answers to this dilemma, 

and the choices we make will require significant effort and evaluation, we must accept that the status quo cannot continue. 

Again, I thank the witnesses for being here with us today, and I look forward to 

an informative discussion. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Harris. 

The Chair now recognizes my good friend from North Carolina, 

Mr. Miller, for five minutes. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Chairman Broun. I want to thank both 

Chairs of the Subcommittees for holding the hearing today on two 

satellite programs; JPSS and GOES–R, that have unfortunately 

been a central part of this committee’s oversight responsibility for 

years. I say unfortunately because the attention of oversight does 

not gravitate to programs that are running smoothly. It gravitates 

to programs that are a problem, and these programs had been a 

problem. Although they need to work. Though seldom the headline 

grabber, it is hard to overstate the importance of satellite programs 

for the lives of Americans. The daily life. 

Satellite-based weather, inclement forecasts tell us whether to 

carry an umbrella on any given day, where to fly planes, what 

crops to plant, whether to run our power plant, how to plan military missions, when to take cover from deadly storms. When they 

work, when we get timely and accurate information, we are safer 

and more prosperous, but when satellite programs falter, we find 

that lives, property, infrastructure, and economic health are at 

risk. 

During my tenure as Chairman of the Investigation Oversight 

Subcommittee of the Science Committee, we kept a very close eye 

on these two programs, particularly the Joint Polar Satellite System, or JPSS, recognizing that poor management and wasteful 

spending put more than federal jobs and money at stake. Until recently we have been profoundly disappointed, and even now the 

data gap that threatens our forecasting capabilities is just inexcusable. 

But today I am cautiously optimistic that we are finally on the 

right path, that the Administration has put into—the work that 

the Administration has put into reorganizing and rescoping JPSS 

has put that program on a new path to mission success. Time will 

tell, but until then, until time does tell us, we will focus on the real 

and viable options we will need to use in order to get us through 

a difficult period. 

At the same time, we have to keep a watchful eye on NOAA’s 

progress on the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite 

System, R Series, or GOES–R, from their stations above the Equator that GOES satellite tracks weather across the western hemisphere. While the GOES program has not suffered from the same 

mismanagement and mistakes that have plagued the Polar Satellite Program, we have seen that preliminary cost estimates for 

these satellites have doubled, and as a result, NOAA has found it 

necessary to cut in half the number of satellites that are—that they 

have ordered. 
29 

Even so, we remain cautious to ensure that this program remains within budget and on schedule. And I don’t claim to know 

how much a weather satellite should cost. I don’t, in my normal 

life, buy satellites. 

As with JPSS, we need to take a hard look at the necessary funding levels and reserves required to keep overall costs down and the 

project online. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses from GAO again, NOAA, 

and NASA, to discuss how these relevant agencies can keep these 

programs on track and in the process fulfill the promise of keeping 

Americans safer and our economy more efficient and productive. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT RANKING

MEMBER BRAD MILLER

I want to thank both Chairs of the Subcommittees for holding today’s hearing on 

two satellite programs—JPSS and GOES–R—that have been central to our Committee’s oversight responsibilities for years. 

Though seldom the headline grabber, it is hard to overstate the effect that satellite programs have on the life of Americans. For instance, satellite-based weather 

and climate forecasts tell us not only how to dress for the day, but also where to 

fly airplanes, what crops to plant, when to run our power plants, how to plan military missions, and when to take cover from deadly storms. When they are more 

timely and accurate, we are more prosperous and safer. When satellite programs falter, we put lives, property, infrastructure, and our economic health at risk. 

But today, I am cautiously optimistic that the work the Administration put into 

reorganizing and rescoping JPSS has put the project on a new path to mission success. Time will tell. But until then, we should focus on the real and viable options 

we will need to use in order to get us through a difficult period. 

At the same time, we have to keep a watchful eye on NOAA’s progress on the 

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite System–R series, or GOES–R. 

From their stations above the Equator, the GOES system tracks weather across the 

western hemisphere. 

While the GOES program has not suffered from the same mismanagement and 

mistakes that have plagued the polar satellite program, we have seen the preliminary cost estimate for these satellites double and, as a result, NOAA found it necessary to cut in half the number of satellites to be ordered. Even so, we remain cautious to ensure this program remains within budget and on schedule. 

As with JPSS, we need to take a hard look at the necessary funding levels and 

reserves required to keep overall costs down and the project on time. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses from GAO, NOAA, and NASA discuss how 

the relevant agencies can keep these programs on track and, in the process, fulfill 

their promise of keeping Americans safer and our economy more efficient and productive. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you very much, Mr. Miller. I thought 

you went out and bought satellites every week or so. 

Mr. MILLER. That was just bread and milk. 

Chairman BROUN. Oh. Okay. Well, I just was confused, I guess. 

At this time, I would like to introduce our first panel of witnesses. The first witness is the Honorable Kathryn Sullivan, Dr. 

Sullivan, Ph.D., the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Environmental Observation and Prediction and the Deputy Administrator 

at NOAA. Our second witness is Mr. Marcus Watkins, the Director 

of the Joint Agency Satellite Division at NASA, and our final witness is Mr. David A. Powner, the Director of Information Technology Management Issues for the GAO. I thank you all for being 

here. 
30 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes each, after which Members of the Committee have five 

minutes each to ask questions. Your written testimony will be included in the record of the hearing. Because of the importance and 

the complexity of the issues before us today, I will allow you to go 

over five minutes if you need to. If you can make it within five minutes, please do so, and I am very proud of my colleagues for keeping theirs under five minutes. I was slightly over, I think. 

It is the practice of the Subcommittee on Investigations and 

Oversight to receive testimony under oath, and we will use that 

practice today as well. 

Do any of you have an objection to taking an oath? 

Okay. Let the record reflect that the witnesses were all willing 

to take the oath by saying no and shaking their head from side to 

side, indicating such also. 

You also may be represented by counsel. Do any of you have 

counsel here today? 

All three, again, indicated shaking their head and saying no, so 

let the record reflect such, that the witnesses do not have counsel. 

Now, if you would please stand and raise your right hand. Do 

you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the whole truth, and nothing 

but the truth, so help you God? 

You may be seated. Let the record reflect that all the witnesses 

have taken the oath. 

I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Kathryn Sullivan of the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Dr. Sullivan, 

you have five minutes. Thank you, ma’am. 

STATEMENT OF DR. KATHRYN SULLIVAN, PH.D., 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR 

ENVIRONMENTAL OBSERVATION AND PREDICTION, 

AND DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairmen Broun and 

Harris, Ranking Members Tonko, Miller, and Members of the Subcommittees. You have my written statement. It gives you much 

more detail. I would like this afternoon just to highlight a few key 

points. 

First, significant progress has been made in both the GOES–R 

and JPSS Programs. GOES–R remains on schedule for launch in 

the first quarter of fiscal year 2016. The Joint NOAA–NASA team 

has a history of working extremely well together and effectively. 

This has led to the completion of key program milestones and substantial demonstrable progress towards that launch date. 

For JPSS substantial progress has also been made since I last 

testified before this Committee, most notably as cited the successful launch of the Suomi NPP Satellite. While there is more work 

that needs to be done to reach comparable maturity to the GOES– 

R Program, JPSS has come a long way. 

Second, NOAA’s priority is to maintain and improve the accuracy 

and reliability of the life- and property-saving weather forecasts, 

watches, and warnings that our Nation depends upon. To do this 

we must maintain schedule and costs so that each satellite is ready 
31 

for launch as close to the end of its predecessor’s life as possible, 

ideally before. Meeting this priority requires established and stable 

requirements, strong, effective management with rigorous and dependent checks, and stable funding. We have achieved the stable 

requirements. We are committed to strong, effective management. 

We have independent checks in place, and we are working hand in 

hand with this Committee to assure the funding remains as stable 

as possible in this challenging fiscal environment. 

Nobody cares about the products these satellites provide and the 

services they support more than NOAA. They are essential to our 

own mission performance and important to a very long list of government, private sector, and academic customers. As every successful business owner knows, it is essential to understand your customer in order to assure that you are meeting their needs. NOAA 

is the critical link between operational satellite observations and 

our users, and continuity of service is the most important thing we 

can do. 

I would like to just illustrate briefly, if I may, some of the 

progress that the systems we are bringing online will support. One 

of our GOES satellites is currently watching Tropical Depression 

Debby, monitoring her every move and helping our forecasters predict where she will go next so they, in turn, can help emergency 

managers prepare. 

I have brought some images along, and staff will provide them 

to you in hard copy, from relevant current events that demonstrates some of the advances that Suomi NPP is already providing to our forecasters and their emergency management partners. These are specifically some images from the Visible/Infrared 

Radiometer Suite or VIIRS. We have one that shows fires that are 

currently active in Colorado, Wyoming, and demonstrate the capability of VIIRS to not only see temperatures associated with 

wildfires far more intense than those that we could do before but 

also locate them more accurately on the ground to aid responders. 

We also have some images of Hurricane Debby or Tropical Storm 

Debby that show the sort of detail on storm intensity that, again, 

the higher resolution and greater bands in the VIIRS imager will 

provide. 

Turning now to some highlights of the progress in each of the 

programs, the GOES–R Series Program is on schedule and on 

budget for launching its first satellite in the first quarter of fiscal 

’16. Over the last year, some of the notable milestones achieved include successful completion of the mission and preliminary design 

review, passage of the key decision point approval to move toward 

mission critical design, successful completion of the instrument, 

spacecraft, and core ground segment critical design reviews. Good 

progress on construction of the ground antenna and our command 

and data acquisition sites, the selection of the launch service provider, which was completed this past April. 

GOES–R remains within a solid lifecycle cost, and we are committed to maintaining that $10.8 billion figure. This includes development, launch, operations, and sustainment for four GOES Series 

spacecraft R, S, T, and U, plus the instruments and running them 

through 2036, as well as development of the ground system and 

procurement of the launch. 
32 

Last year, when I appeared before you to discuss the JPSS Program, we were still in the formulation phase. The transition from 

NPOESS, I believe, is now behind us. We have the proper program 

management in place, and the teams are working well together. 

Again, major milestones have been achieved this past year, the 

launch and successful operations of Suomi NPP have been noted. 

We are already using Suomi NPP data operationally today at seven 

months post-launch, three times faster than has been achieved before. We have, we believe, a sound program office estimate for 

lifecycle costs and independent reviews, independent review teams 

in place, and we are proceeding towards the first key decision point 

in July of next year. This is the point in which, according to formal 

NASA practice, we will have a full detailed baseline for you. 

I am confident the cost and schedule presented in the President’s 

FY 2013 budget are sound, and they will support a successful program. This $12.9 billion figure retains the same instrument suite 

as was outlined in the February 2010, restructure decision. It includes over $4.3 billion in sunk costs that covered NOAA’s contributions to NPP and the development of the instruments and 

ground systems, and the remaining will fund instruments to support two JPSS spacecraft, free flyer accommodations for instruments that cannot fit on that footprint, launch vehicles, the development of an updated ground system, and sustainment and operations through 2028. 

As GAO points out and you all have noted, despite this progress 

we still face a gap in coverage. We agree with the GAO’s recommendation to formally document our long-hailed and well-defined practices of using all available assets that can help mitigate 

such a gap and being ready to ingest the data from these sources. 

Our prime strategy remains to leverage any remaining capabilities 

of existing on-orbit assets from NOAA and to use our partnerships 

with international nations. 

Finally, I would like to thank your Committees for their continued interest and support of NOAA satellite programs. With NASA 

as our acquisition agent and partner in these programs, we are on 

track and headed for success. We have strong and seasoned managers at the helm. They are supported by a dedicated and talented 

team of technical professionals. We have reaffirmed our international partnerships for the JPSS Program, and all parties are 

moving forward to meet their commitments. We take our life and 

property protecting mission very, very seriously. Our commitment 

to you to ensure that the progress we have seen in this past year 

continues, that these programs stay on schedule and on budget to 

deliver for our Nation, is rooted in our commitment to NOAA’s mission for the country. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify to you here today. I look 

forward to our discussion, and I appreciate the extra time, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sullivan follows:] 
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Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Sullivan. Appreciate your testimony. 

Now I recognize our next witness, Mr. Marcus Watkins of NASA. 

Mr. Watkins, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MARCUS WATKINS, DIRECTOR, 

JOINT AGENCY SATELLITE DIVISION, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. WATKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and 

Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to share information regarding the NASA role in 

and commitment to NOAA’s Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) 

and NOAA’s Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite R 

Series (GOES–R ) Program. 

JPSS—— 

Chairman BROUN. Could you pull your microphone slightly closer? 

Mr. WATKINS. Is that better, sir? Okay. JPSS and GOES–R are 

critical to the Nation’s weather forecasting system, climate monitoring, and research activities. NASA and NOAA have been partners for over 40 years in developing the Nation’s polar and geosynchronous weather satellites. With the President’s direction in 

2010, NASA and NOAA returned to the successful partnership for 

JPSS. Since that time the NASA Program Management Office was 

established, and it is nearly fully staffed. 

In addition, NOAA and NASA have established joint program 

management counsels to oversee the NOAA portfolio of satellites 

and have integrated their decision-making processes to efficiently 

and effectively manage this cooperative activity. Over the last two 

years, the NASA and NOAA teams have strengthened their working relationship. 

I am pleased to report that the NASA and NOAA team completed development of National Polar-Orbiting Partership (NPP), 

and it was successfully launched on October 28, 2011. Activation 

and initial checkout are now complete, and the JPSS Program has 

assumed operational control of the satellite, now renamed the 

Suomi National Polar-Orbiting Partnership. While Suomi NPP was 

not intended to be used as an operational asset, NOAA will be 

using Suomi NPP data in its operational weather forecasting models. 

As a measure of how well the Suomi NPP mission is progressing, 

NOAA meteorologists are already using data products from the 

ATMS instrument in their weather forecasts, and we are getting 

excellent performance from the VIIRS instrument as well. 

NASA, as NOAA’s acquisition agent, now controls all of the JPSS 

instrument, spacecraft, and ground system contracts. The first 

JPSS satellite, JPSS–1, will essentially be a copy of Suomi NPP 

with upgrades to meet the JPSS level one requirements. Assuming 

full funding of the President’s FY 2013 budget request for NOAA, 

it is anticipated that JPSS–1 will be ready to launch before the end 

of the second quarter of FY 2017, close to five years after the October launch of Suomi NPP. 
43 

In addition, the GOES–R Series Program of four geosynchronous 

satellites, continues to make progress towards launching GOES–R, 

the first satellite of the series in the first quarter of FY 2016. 

Again, assuming full funding the President’s budget, the program 

completed its preliminary design review phase, and the GOES–R 

Series flight project conducted a successful critical design review 

for the spacecraft and awarded launch vehicle task orders to 

United Launch Services for the GOES–R and GOES–S missions, 

which will be launched on Atlas V–41 series launch vehicles. 

Additionally, all flight instruments’ critical design reviews are 

complete, and all of the flight instruments are in flight hardware, 

fabrication, integration, or tests. 

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I appreciate the support of this Committee and the Congress for these 

critical programs and would be pleased to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Watkins follows:] 
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Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Watkins. Appreciate your testimony. 

And now our final witness is Mr. David Powner of the Government Accountability Office. Mr. Powner, you have five minutes. 

Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. POWNER. Chairman Broun, Chairman Harris, Ranking Members Tonko, Ranking Member Miller, and Members of the Subcommittees, we appreciate the opportunity to testify this afternoon 

on the JPSS and GOES–R Programs. Starting with JPSS, this nearly $13 billion acquisition is proceeding along with a planned launch date of the first satellite by 

March 2017. This afternoon I would like to provide an overview of 

progress to date, the program’s current cost estimate, key risks to 

the program, and potential gaps in data satellite continuity. 

Starting with progress. NPP, the planned demonstration satellite 

now used for operations, was successfully launched in October 

2011, and the instruments were commissioned by March 2012. 

NOAA has made good progress transferring management and contracting responsibilities from the old NPOESS Program. Also, solid 

development has occurred on all five sensors associated with the 

first satellite. Specifically, all five are at least 60 percent complete, 

and two are 85 percent complete. 

Last September when I testified before you, the overall program cost was $11.9 billion. After recent reconciliations of various cost 

estimates, the program determined that the new cost estimate 

should be about $14.6 billion, an increase of $2.7 billion from last 

year’s hearing. In working with OMB, NOAA officials told us that 

they expect the program to be funded at roughly $900 million a 

year, but that OMB placed a lifecycle cap on the program at $12.9 

billion. 

Therefore, the program faced a funding gap of $1.7 billion, and 

our report being released today highlights options NOAA was considering to address this nearly $2 billion funding gap, which included removing certain sensors. 

To its credit, NOAA has recently made some tough decisions to 

address this funding gap. At a high level, their plan is to take a 

more effective approach to the operations and maintenance phase 

and to fly three sensors on other satellites. This approach to a rideshare arrangement with the three sensors clearly helps reduce program costs but, like most options, has tradeoffs. In this case, this 

approach raises schedule risks since the launch dates are no longer 

in the hands of the JPSS Program. 

Other risks to the program reside with the launch vehicle. No decision has yet been made on which launch vehicle will be used. 

Finally, turning to potential gaps in satellite data, we continue 

to be concerned about the afternoon orbit and highlight a potential 

17-month gap if NPP lasts five years and the JPSS hits its March 

2017 launch date. In our opinion, this is the best-case scenario. If 
48 

NPP lasts less than five years and if JPSS launch date slip, this 

gap could be greater. 

We also highlight continuity concerns for the first time regarding 

DOD’s early morning orbit and the European midmorning orbit. 

For example, the follow-on European satellite may no longer be 

supported with NOAA-funded sensors due to constrained budgets. 

Given these concerns, we have recommended that NOAA establish 

mitigation plans for pending satellite gaps for all three orbits. 

NOAA plans to issue a report by August to address this recommendation. 

In summary, NOAA and NASA continue to make progress on 

JPSS. However, three areas deserve Congressional oversight. First, 

how NOAA and NASA operate within the $12.9 cap, how the rideshare arrangement proceeds with certain sensors since significant 

cost savings is associated with this approach, and third, how the 

satellite constellation, all three orbits, will be effectively managed 

to ensure critical weather and climate data. 

Next, I would like to turn to the GOES–R Program. This nearly $11 billion acquisition is proceeding toward an October 15 launch 

date for its first satellite. What I would like to do is highlight 

progress to date on GOES, the program’s cost profile, including use 

of management reserves, and observations on the program’s schedule and launch dates. 

Before I get into these specifics, I would like to clarify the scope 

of the GOES–R Program. Originally it was a four-satellite program 

in 2006 that was to cost about $11 billion. So the program eliminated a key sensor and dropped two satellites, among other things, 

to keep the cost around $7.7 billion. 

So, for about five years, we had a fairly stable program, two sat- ellites at $7.7 billion. As part of the fiscal year 2012 budget request, NOAA added the two satellites back and increased the 

lifecycle cost to $10.9 billion, so we are back to where we were in 

2006; four satellites costing about $11 billion. 

Starting with progress, the program has completed preliminary 

design reviews for the flight and ground segments and for the program overall. The program is to have its critical design review in 

August, meaning that all designs are complete and that the program overall is ready for full-scale development. 

Regarding costs, the program continues to operate within the 

$7.7 billion lifecycle cost for the first two satellites. This is the case 

despite the fact that in our report, we highlight cost increases associated with sensors, the spacecraft, and the ground components 

over the last two years that tally about $750 million. Most notably 

the Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI) grew $148 million, and the 

ground segment grew nearly $300 million. 

Despite this contractor cost growth, the program has been able 

to operate within the $7.7 billion overall estimate by using management reserves. Initially the bucket tallied $1.7 billion, and it is 

now down to about $1.2 billion. 

A few points here on management reserves. Thirty percent have 

recently been used and significant development remains. Twothirds of the development for the spacecraft and the ground segments remains. In addition, during the course of our review, we 

found that the transparency associated with the use of and the re-
49 

maining balance of the reserves was not where it needed to be, and 

we made associated recommendations to address that. 

Turning to schedule and launch dates, first, some of the key design reviews were late. We also performed a detailed review of the 

spacecraft, ground segment, and two sensors. Our review exposed 

some questions with the current schedules and raised some questions ultimately about the October 2015, launch date. 

In addition, NOAA risk logs identify schedule risks associated 

with the key sensor and also with the flight and ground segments, 

and finally, NOAA’s own assessment claims that there is only a 48 

percent confidence level that the program will meet its October 

2015, launch date. We made recommendations to address these 

concerns, Mr. Chairman. 

In summary, to date the GOES–R Program has been able to op- erate within the cost estimate of $7.7 billion and the current schedule by effectively using cost and schedule reserves. More transparency is needed on the use of the reserves. In addition, questions 

about the reliability of the program schedule and their own assessment show that the October 2015, launch date could slip. 

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:] 
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Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Powner, and I thank the 

whole panel for your testimony. 

Reminding Members the Committee rules limit questioning to 

five minutes each. Ordinarily, the Chair would open the first round 

of questions, but I am going to defer to the Full Committee Chair, 

Mr. Hall, to begin the first round of questions. 

Mr. Hall, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Chairman HALL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

I, you know, the Senate proposed—I think the Senate Commerce, 

Justice, and Science Appropriations Subcommittee proposed—in 

some report language to transfer funding for weather satellite acquisition from NOAA to NASA, and I am as bad as Mr. Miller 

about not knowing what a satellite might cost. I remember one 

time when I left the Texas Judge’s seat in my little hometown to 

go to Austin to take on a job as a state senator; our kids had to 

change schools, and my wife and I both assured them we would 

help them with their schoolwork, and the first week they studied 

how much was the national debt. And it got my little kid in trouble 

because he gave them the answer I gave him; a hell of a lot, he 

said. That wasn’t what the teacher was looking for, but maybe Mr. 

Miller and I might know that a satellite costs a hell of a lot. 

But the Senate proposed to transfer the weather satellite from 

NOAA to NASA. I guess my question is, is this going to result in 

cost savings? I ask Dr. Sullivan that. She might have one answer 

and maybe Mr. Watkins might have another, and I might have another, but—and you don’t have to answer that now but in a 

minute—will this result in any efficiencies, or will it streamline 

management? Will it increase the likelihood of the program’s success by meeting mission requirements on schedule and within 

budget? 

Would you like to answer that, Dr. Sullivan? Do you have an 

opinion on that, probably? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. The Administration is taking the Senate’s proposal very seriously, Mr. Hall, and is analyzing potential impacts 

in all of those areas and the points that the Senate highlighted in 

their proposal. We don’t have an official position from the Administration yet, so I can’t give you details of those considerations. 

We share the Senate’s concerns about growth in the program 

costs and the consequences that this has had on other elements of 

NOAA’s budget, so we certainly appreciate where they are coming 

from on this and are working very diligently to look at the possible 

impacts, assess the places where they assert there will be savings, 

and look at the things we hold as priorities: mission assurance, 

management stability and effectiveness, and maximum continuity 

of data. 

Chairman HALL. That is the sound of a good soldier. What is 

your real opinion? If you want to give it. If you don’t, I understand. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Well, I have highlighted the areas where I would 

focus my analysis on, and I’m a scientist, so, you know, I would go 

with the analysis of what we think impacts in those areas might 

be, and we were sharing those with the appropriators and with the 

Administration. 

Chairman HALL. Mr. Watkins. 
73 

Mr. WATKINS. Yes, sir. We have been working with the Administration, again, to assess the Senate’s proposal. At this point in time 

that continues to go on. Again, we, too, would want to make sure 

that we are able to maintain overall schedules and the concerns of 

getting these critical space assets in space as soon as possible. 

Chairman HALL. Okay. I guess—your answer is not no, and it is 

not yes. I guess can we expect the Administration to take any position on this, on a change like this, and if so, when would it happen? 

Mr. WATKINS. Sir, I don’t know the answer to that question. It’s 

my understanding that the Administration has taken this under 

advisement, and their process is ongoing. 

Chairman HALL. Once again I give an illustration in my own life. 

I went before a big company to borrow a lot of money one time, and 

they said, Mr. Hall, we will listen to your ignorant proposal with 

an open mind, and that is kind of what I am getting here. You 

must have an opinion, both of you, on that. You work for NOAA, 

you work for NASA, you are high up there. 

The proposed transfer is not a trivial thing, and I just got about 

40 more seconds. I guess my question is why hasn’t the Administration, why have they been silent, and can we expect them to take 

a position? The proposal is not trivial. The satellite program represents a significant portion of NOAA’s overall budget. Let’s also 

not forget that NASA also has its hands full already with its own 

acquisition problems as the GAO listed on its high-risk series. In 

the decision also the program of such a domestic fashion should be 

fully reviewed by the authorizing committees. While I share the 

Senate’s frustrations in these programs, I hope that this decision 

is not made in the backroom as always, and I am committed to 

working with the Administration some, as much as I possibly can, 

and the Senate and my House colleagues to ensure that our Nation 

maintains its critical weather forecasting capabilities. It is very important. 

My time is up, and I yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Chairman Hall. I now recognize 

my Ranking Member, Mr. Tonko from New York, for five minutes. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. The odds are extremely high 

that there will be a gap in data between the end of NPP’s productive life and the time that JPSS–1 can be launched and data 

brought online. In fact, the NPP may not even last the projected 

five years for which we are looking. As a result, we need a clear 

plan for how to cope with the data gap, so to speak, a gap that may 

start sooner rather than later. 

Dr. Sullivan, what is NOAA’s plan for filling that gap, and who 

have you assigned to manage the effort to identify other data 

sources and ensure that the data we can get will work seamlessly 

in our weather prediction models? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Tonko, for that question. Our mission to deliver accurate and life and property protecting forecasts 

is one that we take extremely seriously, and so I can assure you 

that no one is more concerned about and working harder on this 

gap than my colleagues and I at NOAA do. 

You have asked the single most common question we receive 

from Congress, from our weather enterprise stakeholders, that I 

ask myself, and if I had a silver-bullet answer to magically fix it, 
74 

I assure you I would give it to you. There is no easy direct substitute on orbit, just go get it, for the data of the precision and the 

accuracy and the compatibility that JPSS is designed to provide. 

What we are doing and we are working very hard at this, we 

have been renewing and reconfirming written and firm commitments with international partners for mutual aid. These are arrangements akin to utility companies mutual aid arrangements in 

the time of a storm. We have used such arrangements in the past 

in instances where we had temporary outages of a GOES satellite 

back in March of 2010 I believe it was and years prior when other 

nations have had more extended gaps in their geostationary coverage. 

So we are working those, we are ensuring they are in place. We 

have good understanding of the technical characteristics of many of 

those data streams. Many of them we use as complementary data 

to improve the forecasts off of our core data streams today. 

We have begun the efforts with our modeling centers and our 

weather service to look at what technical changes would be needed 

if we did need to and wish to take data streams in that we don’t 

commonly. I would cite one there. The Defense Department’s satellite has a microwave imager sounder, the data from which we 

don’t commonly use. It has noise characteristics and bias that are 

not suitable for our normal weather models. We have worked hard 

over the last year to whittle those down and understand how we 

could accommodate those. That has shortened the time frame, the 

runway it would take to incorporate those data. We will continue 

such efforts. 

The GAO rightfully, we believe, points out that these plans 

should be better documented. That is a fair comment. We will deliver on that. They rightly point out that it is not enough just to 

list out a roster of things one might do. We really need to take the 

positive steps as your question is suggesting—— 

Mr. TONKO. Uh-huh. 

Dr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. To be sure that we are technically 

ready as well, and we are beginning on that work and will document it appropriately. 

Mr. TONKO. And who is leading that, who is taking that effort 

up? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Our international partnership work and the overall effort for gap assessment is being led by our Associate Administrator for NESDIS, Mary Kicza, and we have as I alluded to, colleagues within both our algorithm shops and the National Weather 

Service engaged as well. And I assure you I keep a close eye on 

it. 

Mr. TONKO. Uh-huh, and Mr. Powner, do you have any comment 

or views on this matter? 

Mr. POWNER. Well, clearly we would like to see those plans documented. A couple thoughts here, though. One is the one thing that 

NOAA and NASA do control is keeping JPSS launch date where it 

currently is. You need to keep that on track, because if that slips 

more, the gap becomes even greater. So that is one thing you need 

to really focus on keenly. 

The other thing is with NPP over the next year as you look at 

calibration and validation activities, there might be a greater indi-
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cation on how long NPP will last. So the key is to try to get NPP 

to last as long as you can, and that picture should become clearer 

when you go through calibration and validation, but you really 

need to keep that first JPSS–1 on track. 

Mr. TONKO. Uh-huh. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Tonko, I would just add, we completely agree 

with that. I thought your question was directed more towards alternative data streams. I endorse my colleague’s comments. 

Mr. TONKO. Okay. Thank you, and Mr. Powner, you have seen 

a lot of program teams come and go, and do you have a view on 

the current JPSS Program Manager and team that you would be 

willing to share? 

Mr. POWNER. Yeah. I think there is strong program management 

there. We have seen many program managers over the years testifying before this Committee, and clearly when you look at where 

the program is now, it is in a much better position than where it 

has been in the past, and when you look at the aggressive mitigation of risk, one of the key things to highlight, the $1.7 million— 

billion funding gap to get down to the cap on the program is being 

aggressively worked by the program. Those plans make sense right 

now. Obviously we need to see more details, but I think the aggressive management of risk has been where we want it. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Tonko. Now I recognize my 

colleague from Maryland, Dr. Harris. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROUN. You have five minutes. 

Mr. HARRIS. As I indicated in my opening statement, you know, 

the status quo with respect to weather satellite programs may simply not be a sustainable option, and a question we should be asking 

and exploring is to what alternative options we have. 

To that end, I would like to enter into the record a piece by University of Washington Atmospheric Scientist Cliff Mass, entitled, 

‘‘Weather-X.’’ 

Chairman BROUN. And without objection. 

[The information may be found in Appendix 2.] 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much. Dr. Mass makes the argument that NOAA should consider pursuing a model similar to that 

which NASA pursued with SpaceX. Mass argues that the weather 

data necessary for forecasts could be provided by a private company that could build, launch, and maintain the satellites. 

Dr. Sullivan, what is NOAA’s philosophy towards the type of alternative private model that Dr. Mass has suggested? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Well, I would say I have not read the blog post 

in detail, Dr. Harris, so I can’t comment on the particulars that are 

sited there. In general, my posture would be that innovative ideas 

deserve careful exploration. 

My administrator just testified before another committee at this 

chamber last week about the desirability and the importance of the 

Weather Service, as indeed all of NOAA, being resilient and adaptable for the changes that are coming ahead and the changes in our 

customer base and the demands for our products and services, the 

changes of our challenges of our fiscal times. So those are important attributes for any organization to have. 
76 

Mr. HARRIS. Sure, and I understand there are private sector 

models of this type currently being proposed to NOAA. At a hearing earlier this year, we heard from a company proposing to launch 

a hyperspectral sounder that would provide dramatically improved 

severe storm forecasting capability, and with that in mind, could 

you be specific about how NOAA is evaluating these proposals? I 

mean, who is in charge of these evaluations, and how specifically 

they would go forward if they could? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Well, I think there are two different characteristics there. The proposal that I understand was brought to us with 

respect to that hyperspectral instrument was that we procure the 

instrument or the data from it as a substitute for current data. Our 

environmental satellite service organization in concert with the National Weather Service evaluate those proposals to determine the 

suitability of data and the judged reliability, feasibility of the proposal in terms of technical maturity and cost reliability and the estimates. All satellites and all instruments are very easy in Power 

Point. Most are much harder in actuality, so we look for some evidence that we have got a viable path. 

To my mind, the SpaceX type model is an altogether different 

thing. If the proposal is that a third party actually set their standards, set their targets, and decide to go do something and open a 

new market, which is, in a nutshell, my understanding of the 

SpaceX proposal, and as I think we have seen NASA do, one applies a very different posture to a proposal like that. We have not 

had such a one come before us at NOAA. I think we would take 

a similar kind of posture. 

Weather forecasting to protect the lives and livelihoods of Americans is not the same commodity as tickets to ride. So the details 

might well turn out differently. 

Mr. HARRIS. Okay, but there is some method. I mean, is someone, for instance, is there someone actively pursuing the—or investigating this Weather-X proposal? I mean, is there any discussion 

at NOAA at all about the potential for commercialization as NASA 

has done with SpaceX? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. I am not aware that—— 

Mr. HARRIS. Not as an individual effort. You are waiting to be 

reactive, not proactive about it. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. I wouldn’t characterize it that way, Dr. Harris. We 

interrogate and interact with the private sector abundantly. As you 

know, there is a very vibrant private sector weather enterprise that 

has privatized the dissemination portion of the enterprise. It used 

to be, once upon a time, government as well. We engage with potential providers of launch services and instruments quite frequently. We put an RFQ out in 2008, prior to letting instrument 

contracts for JPSS to take extra care and be sure there were not 

candidate providers we had overlooked. 

So I think we are more active than your question suggests. I just 

don’t know if anyone yet has seen the Weather-X blog. It had not 

been brought to my attention until your question. 

Mr. HARRIS. Well, it will be in the record so they can see if 

they—I would hope that someone would be, you know, watching 

something, again, by university scientists being published. Even if 

it is in a blog. 
77 

At the same prior hearing on NOAA weather data, a panel of 

outside experts all recommended that NOAA undertake an observing system simulation experiment, an OSSE, which I hope you are 

familiar with the concept, which would quantitatively evaluate different capabilities and options to determine the best mix of systems 

that NOAA should pursue. 

Now, absent one—an OSSE—NOAA is basing its weather data 

planning mostly on subjective opinions. 

So, Dr. Sullivan, when will NOAA finally undertake an OSSE on 

these systems? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. We agree with the characterization of OSSEs as 

a highly rigorous and very good way to assess total ensembles of 

observing systems. We do use them, and we have used them periodically in the past. We have neither the high-performance computing capacity nor the manpower, frankly, to devote to a standing 

large effort to run multiple OSSEs. That—we are sort of rate limited in that step. 

We did, as you know, I believe, conduct an OSSE or more appropriately, an observing simulation experiment, to evaluate the potential loss of data of weather forecasting in the midlatitudes like 

the Snowmageddon example that I think we spoke about at this 

hearing last year. 

So we do them selectively. I am sure they will come into play as 

we look at some of the gap mitigation strategies that may lie before 

us. We would love to do, have the capacity to do, more of them. 

They are an important and rigorous tool. 

Mr. HARRIS. Well, thank you very much. 

Chairman BROUN. The Chairman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Miller, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I mentioned before we had many hearings in this Committee 

on—or these Subcommittees on these programs but particularly the 

JPSS Program and its predecessor program, the late unlamented 

NPOESS Program. The hearings seem to have a familiar pattern 

to them. We have someone from NOAA or NASA or other government agencies saying these programs have been a big problem, 

they have been messed up, but we are fixing it now, things are on 

track now, and then we had Mr. Powner say, no, no, they are still 

messing up, and he has always been right. 

But I have heard, Mr. Powner, in your testimony today, I heard 

terms I have never heard come from your mouth. Good progress, 

solid development. Do you think that particularly the JPSS is on 

track, and what are the remaining issues and risks? What else can 

go wrong? In the past it has been true that everything that could 

go wrong has, but do you think, what do you think could still go 

wrong, and how much under control is that? 

Mr. POWNER. Well, clearly it is a much better picture than we 

testified on in the past, Ranking Member Miller. I think the challenge, the couple of challenges that we see with JPSS is operating 

within the $12.9 billion gap cap because the program when you reconcile cost estimates, it was somewhere around $14.6. So operating 

within that cap there is still that $1.7 billion delta. There is a plan 

to address that, but I think that will be a challenge going forward. 
78 

In addition, associated with addressing that $1.7 billion gap, this 

arrangement where you have a ride-share arrangement with certain sensors, and you are flying them outside of the JPSS Program, 

there is some big cost savings associated with that, and I think it 

is important to keep an eye on that, because that is where you are 

likely going to get the savings is the way I see the current plan. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay. Dr. Sullivan, that may have sounded mildly 

critical, but if you had been here before, you know that was lavish 

praise. 

How confident are you in that $12.9 billion figure for lifecycle 

cost analysis? What are the risks of that not being the right number or something going wrong? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Miller, I don’t buy satellites every day, either, 

but I have been around space systems a good bit. I think that 

sounded right on the mark. These are complex programs. They always need carefully watched. I never rested easy until the wheels 

stopped on the runway after a mission, and I don’t intend to rest 

easy until we have got these systems in orbit now as well. 

So I think Mr. Powner has characterized things quite fairly and 

quite properly. We will stay right on the bubble. 

Having said that, I am confident that we have a solid figure in 

the $12.9 billion number. The elements of work that were done to 

move from the $14.6 down to the $12.9 I think were solidly done. 

They capitalized on experience with NPP, as has been mentioned 

earlier in questioning. They took some conservative estimates that 

were based on unknowns and unproven capabilities and performance, modified those downward. They dove into remaining elements 

that were heritage legacy from the ill-fated and never lamented 

NPOESS and scrubbed those back. With respect to the ground system, as Mr. Powner has noted, moved the ground system to a different set of architectures that are less proprietary, more commercial, off the shelf, modern network protocols. 

So a lot of substantive technical things were done to stack up 

that new estimate, and I have a strong confidence in it and also 

very high and continued scrutiny. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay. Mr. Watkins, your testimony was also very 

optimistic about the GOES–R Program, and it does sound like it 

is on track, but it is the instruments that still have a ways to go 

and developing them and integrating them, and we know that that 

has frequently been a stage at which things can go wrong. 

What confidence do you have that the instruments included like 

the lightning mapper, I have never bought a lightning mapper either, will succeed and it will be on time and on budget? 

Mr. WATKINS. I think one of the things that is critical is that 

NOAA and NASA got started very early on with the instrument developments, and the instruments, when you look across satellite 

programs are usually the place where you begin to run into the 

problems. And so I think the fact that they started the instrument 

developments very early, the fact that they had developed instrument prototypes, the instruments are on the path to being completed on time. You mentioned the lightning mapper. That is going 

to be the first time that we actually will fly that instrument, and 

it, too, is progressing along very well. 
79 

So we are confident in the approach that was taken with the instrument developments and the ways in which they are currently 

being managed. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HARRIS. [Presiding] Thank you very much. I now recognize 

the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for five minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Watkins and maybe Dr. Sullivan may have some insight on 

this as well, how much money has just evaporated from the 

NPOESS Program? What do we have? We have some things that 

are left from this debacle that are worth something, but how much 

can you say is an actual total loss of value for the American taxpayer? 

Mr. WATKINS. Do you want me to—so where we are today, tied 

to the NPOESS Program, approximately $4.3 billion has been 

spent to date. Now, out of those resources we had the development 

of instruments that are ultimately going to be flying on—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. WATKINS [continuing]. JPSS–1—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. WATKINS [continuing]. Instruments that were, that are flying 

on Suomi NPP, the fact that we had developed a ground system 

that is actually being utilized today in order to operate the Suomi 

NPP mission, and instrument developments across the board, 

again, for JPSS–1. 

So a lot of the costs that have been spent to date are actually 

being utilized as part of the overall JPSS–1 Program. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. That is the basis of my question. How 

much have we lost? How much, I mean, it is not—there is no loss 

at all? It is not really a debacle? It’s an ideal program or—— 

Mr. WATKINS. No. Sir—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have been told just the opposite, that we 

are representing at least hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions of dollars of actual evaporation of wealth. 

Mr. WATKINS. Sir, we would have to take that under advisement 

and get back to you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That would be nice. Thank you very much. 

Mr. WATKINS. Okay. We will take that action. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Because I do recognize as you were pointing 

out and people should understand while evaluating this program, 

it is—of the $4 billion it is not all gone. 

Mr. WATKINS. No. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There is a large chunk of it which we will use 

eventually, however, that doesn’t necessarily make up for the cost 

overrun concept here where it started at such a low level and 

ended up escalating, I mean, over double was—as it stands now 

when it could go up more. 

Just a little bit about this Senate recommendation that Chairman Hall brought up in terms of procurement of weather satellites 

from going from NOAA to NASA rather than being this joint system that created so much havoc with NPOESS. The suggestion is 

is that we take this procurement decision-making process out of the 

hands of NOAA and NASA and give it to NASA, and that is what 

you didn’t want to comment on until we got the Administration 
80 

come down with our policy, and it is perfectly understandable. That 

is what you have to do. 

But let me just ask about common sense here. NOAA is the 

agency that utilizes this technology. NOAA is the one that is going 

to utilize it, and doesn’t it make sense that NOAA and other agencies such as the Geological Survey, to assume a greater role in actually procuring the equipment they need rather than NASA, who 

is basically aimed at exploration and—of space? Wouldn’t it make 

sense to actually go the other direction, that we are giving more 

rights to NOAA to make those decisions rather than sharing it 

with NASA, which is not going to be necessarily utilizing the equipment after it has already been procured? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. I think the logic you enunciate, Mr. Rohrabacher, 

was some of the logic that drove the decision to unwind the 

NPOESS Program to get end-mission responsibility aligned as 

tightly as possible with fiscal resources and program management. 

My colleagues at NASA appreciate the importance of this mission 

to the country as well as we do. I am confident that Congress in 

its wisdom does direct this change. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would think, I would hope that people start 

looking at that because if we are going to transfer it to, we are 

going to transfer authority and put some—and focus authority, it 

should be on the people who are going to use the system that they 

are ordering, and also it would again go to the heart of the matter 

of let’s have NASA focus on what it does, which is space exploration, and let’s have NOAA and Geological Survey and others 

focus on their mission, which is to look at the Earth. NASA’s mission is not that. 

One last thing, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, the—another issue as brought up Chairman Harris during his questions 

dealt with the privatization and looking at SpaceX as a model, 

which will save the taxpayer enormous amounts of money in the 

long run because it has proven successful or at least now if it keeps 

proving itself successful. We—there are equivalents in NOAA to 

this, and there are equivalent things in most major agencies. If we 

are going to bring down this $1.5 trillion worth of deficit spending 

that we have every year, we have got to find ways of making those 

type of savings as represented by SpaceX. 

And let me just note that NOAA has a fleet of ships in order to 

transport their various programs and their various missions 

around and determining what the weather is like. I would see 

there would be an equivalency of SpaceX transporting things into 

space and does a better job than just leaving it to a government 

agency. I would say that there is also an equivalency in NOAA that 

instead of maintaining a fleet, that could be contracted out, and we 

would probably save money. I know we looked at that several years 

ago, and we didn’t have the political will to move forward on that, 

but maybe the fact that we are about ready to go under because 

of deficit spending will encourage us to look at those type of alternatives. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, and now I recognize the 

gentlelady from California, Ms. Lofgren, for five minutes. 
81 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I was very interested in listening to Mr. Rohrabacher’s questioning about responsibility and NOAA versus NASA, and Mr. Rohrabacher and I don’t 

always agree on things, but I think his line of questioning is one 

that I have as well, which is if we are going to look at NOAA to 

be our lead in the science of all of this, you know, maybe we ought 

to think about vesting more completely the responsibility with you 

instead of having you ask your brother agency. And I am sure that 

is going to lead to what we really want. I guess that would be my 

statement rather than a question. I won’t put you on the spot. 

You know, when you think about the history of what is going on, 

I mean, it was really in 2005, I think, that the cost overruns were 

so outrageous that they really, they triggered the Nunn-McCurdy 

Program breach review, and at the time, we had a Republican 

President and a Republican committee, and even the leadership of 

this Committee couldn’t get the attention of the President at that 

time. And when you think about that to where we are today, we 

have made tremendous progress. It doesn’t mean we have to be satisfied with where we are. I don’t think anyone is. I am not hearing 

that from any of the witnesses. But we have made tremendous 

progress, and we have got to make more. 

Here is the question. It is easy for us in the Congress to look at 

the Administration whether—of either party and complain, but 

sometimes we need to turn the attention on ourselves, and so this 

is the question for you if you can answer. We have not had stable 

funding because of our inability to appropriate in the normal 

course of business. 

How would a continuing resolution, if that is what we end up 

with again this year, impact your programs? Dr. Sullivan and Mr. 

Watkins, if you could answer that, it would be very helpful. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Ms. Lofgren. I appreciate your remarks and your question. With respect to continuing resolution, 

one big item that would concern me there is FY 2013 is when 

GOES–R has a scheduled budget bump in order to accommodate 

purchase of a launch vehicle. So if we are unable to proceed with 

the launch vehicle scheduling and acquisition, that could compromise schedule. 

With respect to JPSS, if we were held on a continuing resolution 

at the appropriated level of the FY ’12, plan, that is in line with 

what we would, what we have come forward for in the President’s 

budget, so I would forecast with the same caveats of forecast. Less 

impact on JPSS but an impact of concern on GOES–R. 

Mr. WATKINS. The only thing that I would add to that is that 

with respect to the GOES–R Program, currently we are at a budget 

in this fiscal year at 615. We plan to be increased to 803, and so 

if we were actually under a continuing resolution that went beyond 

the first quarter of the fiscal year, it would begin to have severe 

negative impacts to the cost and the schedule of specifically the 

GOES–R mission. 

And so the continuing resolution hurts us a lot more in the 

GOES–R Program. 

Ms. LOFGREN. So if we do that, what I am hearing is it could end 

up costing us more, assuming we continue with both program efforts down the line. And if we didn’t, I mean, this is a lot of money. 
82 

I mean, where I come from this sounds like a lot of money, and yet 

when you think about what is going on in terms of very severe 

weather impacts, what was there, $60 billion in fiscal year 2011 on 

dramatic events, and I guess my questions maybe you can’t answer. 

If you can get a 10 or 15 percent increase in damage for lack of 

warning, I mean, have you done an analysis of what kind of warning leads to what kind of decrease in damage on the ground if it 

is a hurricane or if it is a tornado or if it is whatever kind of event? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Ms. Lofgren, we have not seen any rigorously evaluated economic studies that make that trace all the way through 

improvement of a warning, improvement of a forecast, improvement of a warning, to improvement of the human response to that 

warning. So I can’t give you a well-vetted figure. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, maybe that is something we ought to ask the 

post-docs of the world to take a look at, but we do know, just 

anecdotally, that adequate warning in tornado alley made a huge 

difference in terms of loss of life, and it would be good to have some 

analysis, because if we are talking, you know, a 10 or 15 percent 

reduction in loss on a $60 billion figure, that is way more than we 

are talking about to create the warning, and with that I think my 

time has expired, and I move to yield back. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, and now I recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo, for five minutes. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As the Chairman of the 

Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, I would like to echo Chairman Hall’s concerns regarding the Senate’s proposal to transfer 

$1.6 billion from NOAA to NASA for the procurement of weather 

satellites. From my perspective, Mr. Hall raised the most important point when he said NASA has its hands full. We are hearing 

about cancelled Mars and astronomy missions, delayed testing for 

SLS, continuing issues with the James Webb Space Telescope, and 

the list goes on and on. 

If this Senate proposal goes through, NASA will now own these 

troubled weather satellites also. Just based on their history, I 

would say there is a good chance we will have additional cost overruns, and now NASA, not NOAA, will have to cover in the NASA 

budget. 

So with that, Mr. Watkins, the devil is always—the detail is always—the devil is always in the details. Can you—it feels like a 

late afternoon. Has NASA done anything to analyze this switch 

from NOAA to NASA? 

Mr. WATKINS. Again, sir, we have been working with the Administration as they are taking this Senate proposal under advisement, 

and that is continuing as we speak today. They were looking across 

critical assets of satellite programs, they are looking at the overall 

budget, they are looking at the overall schedule, as well as the critical need to get these data products into weather prediction. 

And so it is a very complicated thing to evaluate, and they are 

in the process of evaluating the Senate proposal. 

Mr. PALAZZO. So then, basically, you will take your analysis, and 

you will provide that to the Administration, and is that where his 

statement of administration policy comes from, that Chairman Hall 
83 

requested and no one was able to tell him when they may receive 

that? 

Mr. WATKINS. I don’t know the answer to that question, sir. We 

will have to get back to you. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. Say when there are cost overruns just based 

on the history of this program, what missions is NASA going to 

have to reduce their funding for or eliminate such as earth sciences 

or—— 

Mr. WATKINS. At the current time, again, the NASA role in the 

weather satellite programs on behalf of NOAA is one of an acquisition agent, and we implement these critical products on behalf of 

NOAA. All of the funding that currently is tied in with this program is NOAA funding. It comes to NASA, and we build their satellites and launch them, and then, you know, commission them and 

bring back the critical data. 

And so at this point there are zero NASA dollars involved. 

Mr. PALAZZO. So the $1.6 billion transfer, if it ends up costing $2 

billion, NOAA will basically pick up that extra $400 billion, I mean, 

$400 million and transfer that to NASA? 

Mr. WATKINS. Sir, I was only speaking of the existing relationship. I wasn’t speaking of the Senate proposal. Again, I think all 

of that would have to be evaluated. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. Thank you. Dr. Sullivan, the recommendation to sever the NPOESS Program came from an independent review team chaired by Mr. Tom Young. It is our understanding that 

Mr. Young is engaged in another review for NOAA, and I have got 

several questions related to that. 

What has NOAA charged him to look at? Will this review address the funding shortfall identified by GAO? Will this review provide recommendations or just findings? Will this review be available to Congress, and also, will the findings be reviewed, vetted, 

and edited by the Administration prior to sharing with Congress? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Palazzo, for your question. Tom 

Young does, indeed, chair our Independent Review Team that is 

charged with looking across the entire NOAA satellite portfolio. It 

is a late afternoon. His co-chair is a retired Air Force General, Tom 

Moorman. The rest of the panel, we can provide you the names, are 

very experienced space professionals. 

Their charge is to look at any and all aspects of budget management, technical formulation that contribute to or detract to mission 

assurance in our satellite programs, assess them and provide both 

findings and recommendations. It is—they brief me directly, they 

write their report, their reports are not redacted by someone before 

reaching the NOAA Administrator and, nor as I understand at 

least, are they in any way redacted before they come to this Committee or other committees of this chamber and your colleagues on 

the other side of the Hill, whether verbally or written. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much. I recognize the gentleman 

from California, Mr. McNerney, for five minutes. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Sullivan, I can imagine what things were like when the 

budget reduction became known and uncertainty in what your 
84 

funding was going to be like. It must have been a sense of panic 

and scramble. 

Let me ask you, has that passed now, or are things still in a 

scramble mode to try and figure out what is going to happen or 

how you are going to deal with this shortfall? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. May I just clarify, Mr. McNerney, that you are referring to the continuing resolution in FY 2011, or did you have 

some other budget issue in mind? 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Yes, the continuing resolution. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. That—FY 2011 was a very difficult year with a 

final appropriation not in hand until some time, I forget the exact 

calendar date of the enactment and then we had spend plan negotiations with various chambers to get alignment on the use of those 

funds. So it was very late in the year. It was less than 30 days before the end of the fiscal year before we had full agreement from 

all parties on the Hill about how to spend our resources. 

That is, as you suggested, extremely difficult to manage. While 

it is difficult to manage a federal agency itself, it is extremely difficult to maintain continuity and performance for contractors, for 

our university colleagues who were subject to that uncertainly 

For JPSS in particular, the level of the CR, the level of spending 

that we were held at because of the CR, even when supplemented 

by the better part of $90 million by reprograming that the Administration requested and the Congress approved, still was far below. 

It was hundreds of millions below the target level for the ramp-up 

of JPSS. 

So with that backdrop I would say a few things. I would say that 

rather like the ripple on a carpet or a bedspread, when you give 

it a good shake, some of that is still moving through the system 

in terms of delays that were incurred that don’t just go instantly 

away when a funding stream is restored, and we are still seeing 

some of that consequence. It definitely did strain the team. It 

strained in terms of professionalism and acuminated desire to keep 

moving. Of course, it creates tensions within a team. I think largely the team is past that. The trust and battle rhythm of the NOAA 

and NASA team around JPSS has improved notably in the 12, 13 

months since I have been aboard. 

The final thing I would say, though, is, you know, the general climate of uncertainty certainly is a tension that we all have to bear, 

and we certainly hear about it also from our contractors as perhaps 

you do as well. They have got a battle rhythm and a certain 

headcount running on the factory floors that are building these 

spacecraft, and to be assured of being able to continue them, will 

they have to think about moving those workforces around? One of 

the things that I think we all worry about is, across all federal programs, if the funding is that uncertain, can the Federal Government have confidence of getting the A–Team on these programs if 

there are steadier income streams from commercial context in the 

case of this business sector? Might we be concerned about having 

lesser quality of talent applied to our work and doing the public’s 

good? 

Mr. MCNERNEY. We are all concerned about the data gap, if it 

is going to be bad enough for the public to notice, if it is going to 

be bad enough to cause additional damage due to poor forecasting 
85 

and so on. I am a mathematician for my background, and I did a 

lot of time modeling. Do you think the modeling, the mathematical 

modeling is going to pick up a lot of that slack, given the data from 

other sources and the older satellites? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. So I am a geologist, Mr. McNerney. I don’t think 

I will attempt the same estimate that you will. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Okay. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. But that is an important and open question that 

we will be looking at. I think the prospect is certainly there. The 

other forms of data, proxy data, if you will, might be able to substitute and lessen the degradation of forecasts. The afternoon orbit 

specifically as almost a piece of real estate is an important point 

here in terms of sampling the atmosphere at the peak of midday 

heating when it is, you know, the dynamics are fully active. So 

there is a question of, can you get some other sounding data from 

a different instrument, and then there is the added question of, 

and does it give you that same time coverage in terms of the daily 

cycle of the Earth, and then how old are the data by the time you 

get them into your models? All of those would be factors in how 

much we could mitigate the forecast degradation. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, there is certainly—with the current capabilities, and we would see a significant dropoff if that, if the dropoff 

happened today, if the data gap happened today. We would see a 

significant dropoff. Is that correct? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. We have run a number of studies to assess that 

about a year and a half ago, I think, they were completed. Statistically they scatter, of course, a little bit as you would expect. The 

most notable outcome in that was a simulation without polar-orbiting data, without afternoon polar data for the big snowstorm called 

Snowmageddon. And in that case, we had substantial forecasters in 

both the track of the storm and the total precipitation fell in the 

storm. The three or four other cases that we studied showed a 

varying sensitivity. Generally some degradation, not all as severe 

as the Snowmageddon case. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, and we have a few more— 

I have a few more questions, so we will do a second round. I recognize myself for the five minutes, first five minutes. 

Dr. Sullivan, one of the most troubling findings from GAO’s JPSS 

report is that the entire polar-orbiting constellation, not just the 

afternoon orbit, appears to be at risk. DOD still has DMSP satellites available for the early morning orbit, but they may not operate as expected because they have been in storage for so long. 

DOD also hasn’t figured out what is it going to do after the 

DMSP program. The Europeans are experiencing their own financial problems, and NOAA has indicated that it will not supply sensors to the Next Generation Program for the mid-morning orbit. 

Since its inception the NPOESS Program has always intended on 

operating satellites in three separate orbits that would ensure that 

no observations were more than six hours old. 

Now, understanding that your shop, NOAA, is only responsible 

for the afternoon orbit, do you have any idea what the Administration as a whole is doing to protect the entire constellation? 
86 

Dr. SULLIVAN. Dr. Harris, I know the Administration has convened a National Earth Observations Task Force to look across all 

of the civilian agencies and try to get a better handle and greater 

coordination across those assets and their capabilities. I am not 

aware of an active interagency group. It may just be my ignorance 

that is looking more at the White House levels, specifically at the 

DMSP or DWSS and NOAA constellations. 

I would say that our own program managers are maintaining 

very active liaison with both Air Force weather and space and missiles command out in Los Angeles. So we are interacting closely 

with them. We have a very long history of collaboration and mutual support with the Defense Department. I believe both parties 

recognize and appreciate the other’s equities quite well and try to 

maintain high levels of mutual awareness and information so that 

we can do—we can do what we can do with the resources and latitude available to us to complement and support each other. 

Mr. HARRIS. But does the—do you know, does the Administration 

plan to mitigate the risks or how are they going to mitigate the 

risk of a gap in those other orbits, not NOAA’s afternoon orbit but 

the other orbits, which inform you and the National Weather Service for your forecasts and models? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. I know of no specific plan for those mitigations at 

this time, Dr. Harris. 

Mr. HARRIS. Now, the GAO’s testimony indicates that NOAA will 

have to shed some capability in order to live within the Administration’s cost cap. Options listed by the GAO include the loss of climate sensors, which would cause a break in the over-30-year record 

of some measurements, the loss of ground-based reception stations 

that would degrade the timeliness of data from 30 minutes to 80 

minutes, or the loss of data processing systems at two Navy locations that would impact the data used by warfighters. 

What, if anything, does NOAA plan to remove? I mean, what— 

have you prioritized what will be removed? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. I can assure you we have very clear prioritization 

of the factors that make the greatest contributions to our primary 

weather forecasting mission, and the decisions we have made to 

date and any that are driven by circumstances we face in the future will be made in accordance with those priorities. 

Having said that, as I believe Mr. Powner pointed out in his testimony, the options that we have worked on, the reanalysis that we 

have worked on, since their first look gives us confidence that the 

sensors can, in fact, be accommodated inside the $12.9 billion 

lifecycle cost cap. We did decide, and we think it is a prudent action, to drop the number of ground stations from the very high 

number that was contained in the old NPOESS so-called distributed receptor network and rely more critically on one at each pole. 

So two stations that see lots of every polar pass, Svalbard and 

McMurdo, with a backup at high latitudes in our own Fairbanks 

site. Those give us very good coverage for all polar-orbiting birds. 

Yes, the initial target of a 30-minute time delay or latency for 

JPSS data has been relaxed to 80. Our current performance, however, is 120, so that is still a substantial improvement over current 

performance and should make a notable improvement to forecasting. 
87 

With respect to the data centrals, I think that reflects, in part, 

an evolution of ground system structure from very tailored, very 

unique, to each service and each provider towards more common, 

unified ground stations. We certainly can take on the development 

of tailored interfaces for NOAA satellite data for the Air Force or 

the Navy if they wish, but at this point, with our budget constraints, we have let those partners know that would have to be 

on a reimbursable basis. The Air Force is assessing its own ground 

system options, both for current DMSP fly operations and for 

DWSS or whatever that will be, and I am not aware of any detailed 

plans from them yet. 

Mr. HARRIS. Now, with regards to the GAO report, this controversy about whether the cap is, whether the shortfall is $1.7 or 

$2.7 billion, because the GAO report states that NOAA validated 

the cost of the full set of JPSS functions would be $11.3 billion 

from FY 2012 to 2028. After adding the agency’s cost of $3.3, the 

program’s lifecycle cost estimate total, $14.6, which is $2.7 billion 

higher than that $11.9 billion estimate for JPSS when NPOESS 

was disbanded in 2010. 

So according to NOAA officials this increase is primarily due to 

a four-year extension of the program, the addition of previously 

unbudgeted items such as free flyers, costs associated with 

transitioning contracts from DOD to NOAA, and the program’s decision to slow down work on lower-priority elements because of the 

budget constraints of 2011. 

The GAO then states that in working with OMB to establish the 

President’s FY 2013 budget request NOAA officials stated that they 

agreed to fund JPSS at roughly $900 million per year through 

2017, merge funding for the two climate sensors into the JPSS 

budget, and to cap the JPSS lifecycle cost at $12.9 billion through 

2028. 

Because this cap is $1.7 billion below the $14.6 lifecycle cost, 

NOAA decided to remove selected elements from the satellite program. 

Now, so do you—is a shortfall of $1.7 or $2.7 below the expected 

lifecycle cost? Mr. Powner, maybe you can—what is your finding? 

Mr. POWNER. So the gap is $1.7 billion. It is from $14.6, that was 

the cost when you reconciled the various cost estimates, but the 

program, just to keep it simple, the program was capped at $12.9, 

so there was this $1.7 that the program was trying to get down to. 

And, again, I think their approach as we understand it is there are 

two primary ways in which they are going to reduce—address the 

$1.7 million gap. One is they found a more efficient way to operate 

and maintain the satellites which Dr. Sullivan referred to and then 

also, too, there is this savings through this ride-share arrangement 

with the free flyers where the climate sensors are still included, 

but they are going to fly them outside of the JPSS Program. 

There are still some details we want to see about both those 

things and how that tallies up to $1.7. That is why I made the comments, the question, still questions about operating within the 

$12.9 cap. 

Mr. HARRIS. Dr. Sullivan, is that an accurate assessment of 

where the $1.7 is going to be made up? 

Dr. SULLIVAN. It is, sir. 
88 

Mr. HARRIS. Okay. Thank you very much. 

I recognize Mr. McNerney for five minutes. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Powner, one thing that really stuck out about your oral testimony here was the 48 percent confidence level that NASA will 

meet the 2015 launch date. Is that in your mind the biggest threat, 

is that, not making that launch date? 

Mr. POWNER. Yeah. So a couple things. We did some very detailed schedule analysis, and so there were things we went into 

great detail on, two of the sensor schedules as well as the spacecraft and ground, and we had some questions about how the schedules were being managed and the rigor you want with that. Ultimately what that all means is it calls into question whether you 

can hit key milestones. So these milestones all need to be hit to ultimately reach the launch date. 

That coupled with the fact that their own internal assessment 

showed that there was only a 48 percent confidence level that they 

were going to hit the October, 2015, date raised questions about 

whether they will be able to do that. I think, and we are under the 

impression that if you raised it to 70 percent confidence level, 

which is, I think, what the program ultimately likes to operate 

under, that does push that launch date into early 2016. I think 

there is a 4- or 5-month slip roughly there, but those are the questions that, you know, need to be considered going forward, how 

solid is that October 2015. There are question marks there clearly. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Can you be as specific as you can in giving us 

recommendations on how we can reach that October 2015 launch 

date or achieve that date? 

Mr. POWNER. Well, one of the things we did do in our report is 

we had very detailed recommendations on how the program could 

be more rigorous in managing their schedules. So, for instance, we 

found things like not all subcontractor activities were included in 

schedules, critical paths weren’t identified. That is very important 

so you can identify the long pole in the tent, those types of things. 

And those are the recommendations we have, so hopefully that 

will be helpful in ultimately achieving that launch date. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. WATKINS. The one thing I would like to add is—— 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Sure. 

Mr. WATKINS [continuing]. As David pointed out, Mr. Powner 

pointed out, clearly we have listened to and taken seriously the recommendations from GAO. We have already implemented a lot of 

the changes or improvements that he identified with respect to 

scheduling and reporting. 

The other thing that I would say is I think the largest risk to 

that October 2015 launch date right now is, again, with stability 

associated with funding, again, because of where we are today at 

615 and needing to go to 803. In the next fiscal year if we are 

under a continuing resolution, it is going to have a negative impact 

on our ability to maintain the October 2015 launch readiness date 

in addition to the items that he pointed out. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. That makes sense. It was gratifying to hear 

about your partnership with NOAA on the Joint Polar Satellite. I 

want to get a good feel for how much benefit has been achieved by 
89 

that. Are the roles for each of your agencies and the responsibilities, decision-making authority, governance and program oversight 

clear? In other words, are these clear between your two agencies? 

Mr. WATKINS. Yes, they are, and in fact, I mean, I think one of— 

since the separation between the Defense and the civilian side for 

weather satellites, if you look at the overall performance that we, 

NOAA and NASA, have been able to achieve, first and foremost 

with maintaining that we would launch Suomi NPP on time in the 

October 2011 time period, we maintained that schedule. When you 

look across the schedules associated with the JPSS–1, we are currently on track. We share meetings together, the key decision 

points are jointly chaired between our respective agencies, and our 

programs are fully integrated at a Green Tech facility, which is 

outside of Goddard Space Flight Center. The teams are working extremely well, and it is a very good partnership. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. If I may, Mr. McNerney, I just, I would endorse 

Marcus’s comments. There is a 40-year-long partnership between 

NASA and NOAA in providing the Nation with weather satellites. 

We came back to that model in essence with the unwinding of the 

NPOESS Program, and if I could use the analogy, since JPSS 

moved out of the dysfunctional household of NPOESS, we have got 

a new team aboard. They have set fresh marks. They have, and, 

again, the 13 months I have been around they have been very consistently meeting those marks. We see great value, great productivity in the partnership and great value for the taxpayer, not duplicating a top-notch space acquisition function within that—within 

NOAA when we have an outstanding one in the partner agency. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Okay. I have one more question, Mr. Chairman. 

Has there been analysis of the anticipated operational period of the 

NPP satellite? What are we looking at here in terms of what confidence we have in that continued performance of that instrument? 

Mr. WATKINS. I will take the beginning of that. Again, the NPP 

spacecraft was developed for a five-year life, and you know, we 

have launched it last October. The calibration validation period is 

going along as planned. In fact, we are a little ahead of schedule 

with some of the products that have already been received well by 

the National Weather Service and implemented into their algorithms that has led towards additional forecasting capabilities. The 

checkout across all of the instruments is looking good. The satellite 

is operating well. 

Again, you know, there are issues that you have the first time 

you are flying a spacecraft, and this one wasn’t to be operational 

initially, but we haven’t seen anything that is outside of the ordinary with launching of a new satellite. 

Dr. SULLIVAN. And the ground system is performing well. We are 

making progress towards adding, again, the redundancy and IT security robustness that we will need to have in place when JPSS– 

1 comes along to meet the criticality one requirements that NOAA 

has. 

It was remarked, and I forget by whom earlier in the hearing 

that none of the instruments on NPP are performing as they 

should. I ask Mr. Watkins to correct me if I misstate anything, but 

my tracking of the technical data is that all of them are, in fact, 

performing at or above spec with some anomalies that are needed 
90 

to be worked out, but the technical team has shown a very good 

acumen of jumping on top of those and digging down and understanding the root causes and developing corrective actions, which 

is what you do with space systems. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Okay. Thank you. My time is up. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much. I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of either Subcommittee may have additional 

questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to 

those in writing. 

The record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments from Members. The witnesses are excused. The hearing is 

now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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Appendix 2 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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WEATHER-X BLOG BY CLIFF MASS: SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE ANDY HARRIS, 

CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
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