J-S66009-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RAYMOND NAVARO BOWMAN,

Appellant No. 577 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 3, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0004042-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2014

Appellant, Raymond Navaro Bowman, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of an aggregate term of five to ten years’ incarceration, imposed 

after he pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver, possession of drug 

paraphernalia, and two counts of person not to possess a firearm. Appellant 

essentially seeks to argue on appeal that his plea counsel provided him with 

incorrect information and deceived him into pleading guilty. Additionally, 

Appellant’s current counsel, Christopher P. Lyden, Esq., seeks permission to 

withdraw his representation of Appellant pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), as elucidated by our Supreme Court in 

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981), and amended 

in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After careful 
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review, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw.

Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to the above stated offenses 

on March 3, 2014.1 He was sentenced in accordance with his plea 

agreement to an aggregate term of five to ten years’ incarceration. 

Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. On March 6, 2014, Appellant 

filed a pro se “Motion to Appeal Guilty Plea.” Therein, he stated that he 

wished to appeal because (1) his plea counsel “deceived him” during the 

plea process, (2) counsel failed to help “him form a more solid decision” 

regarding whether to plead guilty, (3) Appellant “was not given information 

that could have [aided] him if in fact he chose to go forward with a trial[,]” 

(4) Appellant was not provided with “sound counsel,” and (5) his plea 

counsel “played on [Appellant’s] ignorance [in] the law and misinformed him 

about search warrants and how they are to be applied and carried out.” 

Motion to Appeal, 3/6/14, at 1-2 (unnumbered). Attorney Lyden was 

thereafter appointed to represent Appellant and he filed a timely notice of 

appeal on March 26, 2014.2 However, Attorney Lyden subsequently filed a 

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1 At the same time, Appellant pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver 

and possession of drug paraphernalia in an unrelated case, docketed at 4437 

of 2012. He was sentenced in that case to an aggregate term of 

incarceration of two to four years, which was imposed to run concurrently 

with the sentence imposed in the instant case, docketed at 4042 of 2011.

2 Attorney Lyden only filed a notice of appeal in the case docketed at 4042 of 

2011, not in the case docketed at 4437 of 2012. 
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petition to withdraw and Anders brief with this Court, claiming that an 

appeal on Appellant’s behalf is utterly frivolous. 

“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review 

the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to 

withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. 

Super. 1997)). In Santiago, our Supreme Court altered the requirements 

for counsel to withdraw under Anders. Thus, pursuant to 

Anders/Santiago, in order to withdraw from an appeal, counsel now must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal; 

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; 

and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to 

the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361). “Counsel also must provide a copy of the 

Anders brief to his client.” Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 880 

(Pa. Super. 2014). 

Attending the brief must be a letter that advises the client of his 

right to: “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) 

proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the 

appellant deems worthy of the court[']s attention in addition to 

the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.” 
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Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 

2007), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 704, 936 A.2d 40 (2007).

Orellana, 86 A.3d at 880. Once we are satisfied that counsel has met these 

technical requirements, this Court must then conduct its own review of the 

record and independently determine whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly 

frivolous. See Daniels, 999 A.2d at 594.

Instantly, Attorney Lyden’s Anders brief substantially complies with 

the above-stated requirements for withdrawal. While Attorney Lyden 

provides few citations to the record or pertinent legal authority, he does 

provide an adequate summary of the procedural history of Appellant’s case 

and a brief discussion of the issues raised in Appellant’s pro se “Motion to 

Appeal Guilty Plea.” Ultimately, Attorney Lyden concludes that Appellant’s 

issues, and any other claims regarding the validity of his guilty plea, must be 

framed as ineffective assistance of counsel claims and raised on collateral 

review pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002). 

Accordingly, Attorney Lyden asserts that a direct appeal on Appellant’s 

behalf is frivolous. Additionally, Attorney Lyden attached to his petition to 

withdraw a copy of a letter he sent to Appellant advising him that he has the 

right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, and/or raise any issues he 

deems worthy of this Court’s examination. Because Attorney Lyden 

substantially complied with the requirements for withdrawal, we will now 

independently review Appellant’s claims, and also determine whether there 

are any other issues he could arguably present on appeal. See Daniels, 

999 A.2d at 594. 
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Initially, we agree with Attorney Lyden that the arguments Appellant 

raised in his pro se “Motion to Appeal Guilty Plea” are properly construed as 

challenges to the adequacy of his plea counsel’s representation. Recently, in 

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court 

reaffirmed its prior holding in Grant that, absent certain circumstances, 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be deferred until collateral 

review under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-

9546. Holmes, 79 A.3d at 576. While the Court did identify specific 

circumstances under which ineffectiveness claims may be addressed on 

direct appeal, such circumstances are not present in the instant case. See 

id. at 577-78 (holding that the trial court may address claim(s) of 

ineffectiveness where they are “both meritorious and apparent from the 

record so that immediate consideration and relief is warranted,” or where 

the appellant’s request for review of “prolix” ineffectiveness claims is 

“accompanied by a knowing, voluntary, and express waiver of PCRA 

review”). Accordingly, the claims Appellant raised in his pro se “Motion to 

Appeal Guilty Plea” may only be presented in a PCRA petition after the 

conclusion of this appeal.

Additionally, our review of the guilty plea/sentencing transcript reveals 

no other issues that Appellant could raise on direct appeal. Appellant’s plea 

counsel did not object to the validity of Appellant’s plea during the oral 
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colloquy or in a post-sentence motion. Thus, Appellant has not preserved 

any challenge to the validity of his plea for our review.3 Moreover, Appellant 

entered a negotiated plea agreement, and the court imposed the agreedupon sentence. Thus, Appellant has waived his right to challenge the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Dalberto, 

648 A.2d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citing Commonwealth v. Reichle, 589 

A.2d 1140, 1141 (Pa. Super. 1991) (“Where the plea agreement contains a 

negotiated sentence which is accepted and imposed by the sentencing court, 

there is no authority to permit a challenge to the discretionary aspects of 

that sentence.”)). Finally, we ascertain nothing illegal about the sentence 

Appellant received. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

____________________________________________

3 See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Commonwealth Lincoln, 

72 A.3d 606, 610 (Pa. Super. 2013) (indicating challenges to the validity of 

a guilty plea “must be raised by motion in the trial court in order to be 

reviewed on direct appeal”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 

945, 949 (Pa. Super. 2008)). 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/22/2014