[Cite as Rocky River v. Alaref, 2023-Ohio-924.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF ROCKY RIVER, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 111567

v. :

MAZEN ALAREF, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,

 AND REMANDED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 23, 2023

Criminal Appeal from the Rocky River Municipal Court

Case No. 22-CRB-0538

Appearances:

Michael O’Shea, Law Director, City of Rocky River, and A. 

Steven Dever, Assistant Law Director, for appellee. 

Scott J. Friedman, for appellant. 

LISA B. FORBES, J.:

Appellant Mazen Alaref (“Alaref”) appeals the municipal court’s 

journal entry imposing community-control sanctions. After reviewing the facts of 

the case and pertinent law, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s 

order.
I. Facts and Procedural History

On April 26, 2022, Alaref pled guilty to persisting in disorderly 

conduct, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree in violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(5) and 

(E)(3)(A).

On the same day, the municipal court sentenced Alaref to a 

suspended 30-day jail sentence. Additionally, the court ordered Alaref to “continue 

to support wife/daughter until further order of court” as restitution and to pay a fine 

of $250. The court also imposed community-control sanctions for five years with 

the following conditions pertinent to this appeal:

Defendant is to abstain from the use of alcohol and drugs of abuse[;]

Defendant is subject to random testing for alcohol/drugs of abuse, at 

defendant’s costs * * *[;]

Defendant is to have no contact with daughter [and] wife[;] [and]

[Defendant is to] [c]ooperate with original * * * or separat[e] 

application of asylum[.]

It is from this order that Alaref appeals raising the following 

assignment of error:

The trial court imposed conditions of community control that violated 

Ohio law and violated [his] Constitutional rights.

II. Law and Analysis

Appellate courts review the imposition of community-control 

sanctions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cooper, 2016-Ohio-8048, 75 N.E.3d 

805, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 

N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion “connotes more than an error of law or 
judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 

(1983). Trial “courts lack the discretion to make errors of law, particularly when the 

trial court’s decision goes against the plain language of a statute or rule.” Johnson

v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 39.

Community-control sanctions must reasonably relate to the goals of 

community control: rehabilitation, administering justice, and “‘insuring good 

behavior.’” Talty at ¶ 12, quoting 1983 Am.Sub. S.B. No. 210, 140 Ohio Laws, Part 

I, 604. To determine whether a community-control sanction is proper, courts 

“consider whether the condition (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the 

offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, 

and (3) relates to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future 

criminality and serves the statutory ends of [community control].” State v. Jones,

49 Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990). The trial court abuses its discretion if 

the community-control sanctions do not satisfy all three prongs of the Jones test. 

State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111173, 2022-Ohio-3233, ¶ 11.

As previously noted, Alaref pled guilty to persisting in disorderly 

conduct in violation of R.C. 2917.11(A)(5) and (E)(3)(A). Pursuant to 

R.C. 2917.11(A)(5):

No person shall recklessly cause inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to 

another by doing any of the following:

* * *
Creating a condition that is physically offensive to persons or that 

presents a risk of physical harm to persons or property, by any act that 

serves no lawful and reasonable purpose of the offender.

R.C. 2917.11(E)(3)(A) makes the conviction for disorderly conduct a fourth-degree 

misdemeanor if “the offender persists * * * after reasonable warning or request to 

desist.”

A. No-Contact Order

Alaref argues that the trial court’s order that he have no contact with 

his daughter as a condition of community control “bears no rational relation to the 

crime” of disorderly conduct because “[h]is daughter had nothing to do with the 

offense.” Further, he claims that “the no contact order, as it relates to both [his] 

daughter and wife, fails the Jones test.” We disagree. 

Prior to the imposition of sentence, the court heard statements from 

the state that Alaref “has issues as far as how he conducts his relationships and the 

use of violence and verbal abuse, * * * hopefully he understands by what he is 

receiving today, that he corrects his behavior so that he’s not * * * causing harm to 

people that he claims that he loves[.]”

The court proceeded to sentencing, acknowledging that Alaref is a 

licensed dentist in Syria, and stated that “part of being a doctor and a dentist is that 

you care for other people. * * * And one of the biggest things that someone at times, 

and apparently in this situation here, you lost in this one instance the caring and 

support of the welfare and the health of an individual that you once loved, who was 

once your best friend, and your daughter.” Further, “the empathy of this whole thing 
is going back to your wife and your daughter, and that they do not suffer the 

consequences of someone else’s actions.” 

The record demonstrates that Alaref’s wife and daughter are the

victims of the persisting in disorderly conduct of which Alaref was convicted. That 

is, Alaref created “a condition that [was] physically offensive to [his wife and 

daughter] or that present[ed] a risk of physical harm” to them. See

R.C. 2917.11(A)(5). 

Turning the Jones test, the no-contact order imposed by the court is 

related to rehabilitating Alaref, relates to the crime, and serves the statutory ends of 

community control. The no-contact order ensures Alaref can no longer create 

physically offensive or harmful conditions regarding his wife and daughter. The nocontact order therefore encourages rehabilitation by minimizing the risk Alaref will 

repeat his offense, is related to the crime, and serves the statutory ends of 

community control. 

Alaref argues that the no-contact order violates his constitutional 

right to parent his child. Having found that the no-contact order meets the Jones 

test, we find that the trial court’s order does not violate Alaref’s constitutional right 

to parent his child. See State v. Emery, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2014-09-062, 

2015-Ohio-1487, ¶ 26 (discussing a parent’s fundamental constitutional right to 

raise his or her children and finding that “[c]ommunity-control sanctions that 

restrict parental rights, including those that prohibit contact where the defendant’s 
children were the victims of the crime for which the defendant has been convicted, 

have consistently been upheld when the conditions pass the” Jones test).

Among the cases that Alaref urges this court to follow is Cleveland v.

Cornely, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109556, 2021-Ohio-689; however, the facts of the 

case at hand are unlike those in Cornely because here the record reflects that Alaref’s 

wife and daughter are victims. In Cornely, this court reversed the imposition of an 

indefinite no-contact order with the defendant’s children when the defendant pled 

guilty to domestic violence, and the record was clear that the sole victim was the 

defendant’s wife. The Cornely Court did not state that any no-contact order with 

children would be improper. Rather, it noted that “the trial court could fashion 

conditions that included the children,” but “[t]he conditions should be reasonable, 

appropriate, and have a definite duration.” Cornely at ¶ 22. See also Lakewood v. 

Radostitz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105620, 2018-Ohio-1971 (finding the trial court 

abused its discretion when it ordered that a father have no contact with his children 

as a condition of community control when he was convicted of assaulting his wife). 

Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s sentence is supported by the record. 

Therefore, we find that the trial court was within its discretion to 

impose a no-contact order regarding both Alaref’s wife and daughter as a condition 

of community control. See Chagrin Falls v. Wallace, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 75640, 

2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 752, 6 (Mar. 2, 2000) (finding that “[t]he trial court validly 

imposed a condition of [defendant’s] probation * * * that [he] have no contact with 

the complainant” after being convicted of disorderly conduct); Defiance v. Mohr, 
3d Dist. Defiance Nos. 4-90-5 and 4-90-6, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2841, 1 (June 12, 

1991) (noting that a no-contact order was imposed following a conviction for 

disorderly conduct). 

B. Drugs and Alcohol 

Next, Alaref challenges the conditions of community control 

requiring him to abstain from drugs and alcohol and to be subject to random 

screenings at his expense. We find that these conditions do not meet any of the 

prongs of the Jones test. 

This court has routinely reversed the imposition of alcohol-related 

community-control sanctions where there is no “nexus between an offender’s crime 

and drug or alcohol abuse[.]” Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111173, 2022-Ohio3233, at ¶ 12, citing State v. Mahon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106043, 2018-Ohio295, ¶ 9. See also Strongsville v. Feliciano, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96294, 2011-

Ohio-5394 (finding that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the 

defendant to have a drug and alcohol assessment and submit to random drug and 

alcohol screening when the record is “devoid” of any reference that the crimes were 

related to drug or alcohol use or that the defendant had a history of drug or alcohol 

abuse).

Here, nothing in the record indicates that drugs or alcohol were 

involved when Alaref committed the offense of persisting in disorderly conduct. 

Further, nothing in the record indicates that Alaref has a history of drug or alcohol 

abuse. Of course, use of illegal drugs is prohibited by statute. Therefore, we find 
that the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited the use of alcohol and 

required Alaref to submit to screenings as conditions of community control. 

C. Asylum Cooperation

Alaref challenges the trial court’s requirement that he “cooperate with 

the asylum application” because it has “no connection whatsoever to [his] crime of 

disorderly conduct.” We find that this condition does not meet any of the prongs of 

the Jones test. 

The record demonstrates that Alaref filed an asylum “application for 

[himself] and [his] family * * *” but that his wife may “file a separate application * * * 

depending on what happens at domestic relations” court. The municipal court 

required, as a condition of Alaref’s community control, that he cooperate with either 

the original or a separate asylum application “so that all three of you are awarded 

asylum here in this country.”

Nothing in the record demonstrates how Alaref’s cooperation with his 

wife’s asylum application is related to conduct, which is criminal or 

reasonably related to future criminality. Accordingly, the trial court abused its 

discretion when it imposed the obligation to cooperate with his wife’s asylum 

application as a condition of community control. 

D. Support

Finally, Alaref argues that the trial court’s “requirement that [he] 

continue to financially support his wife and daughter” was an improper condition of 
community control. The trial court’s journal entry states that Alaref is to “continue 

to support wife/daughter until further order of court.” 

While R.C. 2929.25, permits trial courts to impose restitution 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.28 as a condition of community control, the ongoing support 

obligation imposed by the trial court is not proper. R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) states in 

pertinent part, that “[i]f the court imposes restitution, the court shall determine the 

amount of restitution to be paid by the offender” which amount “shall not exceed 

the amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate 

result of the commission of the offense.” A “trial court’s restitution order does not 

comply with R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) [when] the trial court did not ‘determine the 

amount of restitution to be paid by’” the defendant. Cleveland v. Rushton, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 108579, 2020-Ohio-1281, ¶ 38 , quoting R.C. 2929.28(A)(1). See also

State v. Peterman, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-06-149, 2010-Ohio-211, ¶ 6,

quoting State v. Friend, 68 Ohio App.3d 241, 243, 587 N.E.2d 975 (10th Dist.1990)

(“The amount of restitution ordered by the trial court must be based on the actual 

loss caused by the offender’s criminal conduct, therefore ‘restitution can be ordered 

only for those acts that constitute the crime for which the defendant was convicted 

and sentenced.’”). (Emphasis deleted.)

Here, the court did not determine a set amount, rather it gave a 

general requirement that Alaref “continue to support” his wife and daughter “until 

further order of the court.” Further, nothing in the record demonstrates that this 

ongoing support order is consistent with and no greater than the amount of 
economic loss suffered as a direct and proximate result of Alaref’s crime of persisting 

in disorderly conduct. For all the same reasons, we find that this indefinite support 

order fails the Jones test because it does not relate to rehabilitating Alaref, the crime 

of persisting in disorderly conduct, or Alaref’s criminal conduct.

In conclusion, Alaref’s sole assignment of error is sustained in part 

and reversed in part. The community-control sanctions related to Alaref’s 

requirement to abstain from alcohol and drugs, be subject to random drug and 

alcohol screening at his cost, cooperate with his wife and daughter’s asylum 

applications, and continue to support his wife and daughter are vacated. All other 

conditions of community control are affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial 

court with instructions to issue a journal entry consistent with this opinion.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. This case is 

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is ordered that appellant and appellee share costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Rocky 

River Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the 

trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR