INTEGRITY  EFFICIENCY  ACCOUNTABILITY  EXCELLENCE

Inspector General 

Department of Defense

JULY 9, 2013

Report No. DODIG-2013-091

Evaluation of the Military Criminal 

Investigative Organizations Sexual 

Assault Investigations
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DODIG-2013-091 │ i

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Results in Brief

Evaluation of the Military Criminal Investigative 

Organizations Sexual Assault Investigations

Objective

We evaluated the Military Criminal Investigative 

Organizations’ (MCIOs’) sexual assault investigations completed in 2010 to determine whether 

they completed investigations as required by 

DoD, Military Service, and MCIO guidance. Our 

evaluation focused on the following question:

Did the MCIOs investigate sexual assaults 

as required by guiding policies and 

procedures? 

Findings

• Most MCIO investigations (89 percent) met 

or exceeded the investigative standards. 

• We returned cases with significant 

deficiencies (11 percent) to the MCIOs for 

corrective action.

• Although 83 cases had no deficiencies, 

most of the remaining investigations 

had deficiencies that were not deemed 

significant.

• The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation 

Command (CID) and Air Force Office of 

Special Investigations (AFOSI) policy 

guidance does not direct the collection of 

clothing articles that a victim or suspect 

might have placed on themselves shortly 

after the assault, if different from the 

clothing worn during the assault. 

• Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) 

policy does not require NCIS investigators 

to notify or coordinate with their servicing 

July 9, 2013

judge advocate(s) upon initiating an investigation. 

• CID guidance regarding records checks does not provide a 

definitive timeliness requirement. NCIS policy on this topic 

needs improvement.

• NCIS needs policy to require Sexual Assault Response 

Coordinator (SARC) notifications and documentation.

Recommendations

• The Director and Commanders of the MCIOs implement 

measures to improve crime scene processing, evidence 

collection, supervision, and documentation to reduce 

investigative deficiencies.

• The Commanders of CID and AFOSI evaluate their existing 

policies regarding the collection of clothing worn by suspects 

and victims subsequent to a sexual assault.

• The Director of NCIS evaluate current policy regarding the 

timely notification and coordination with servicing judge 

advocates upon the initiation of sexual assault cases, as well as 

the continued coordination with the servicing judge advocates 

until final case disposition.

• The Commander of CID and Director of NCIS evaluate existing 

policy guidance regarding the timely completion of records 

checks.

• The Director of NCIS implement policy requiring SARC 

notifications and documentation.

Comments 

Overall, the Commander, CID, agreed with our recommendations. 

The Director, NCIS, and the Commander, AFOSI, agreed in part with 

our recommendations, but objected to our assessment in a number 

of areas in the report. See the recommendations table on the next 

page.

Findings Continued
ii │ DODIG-2013-091

Recommendations Table

Management Recommendations 

Requiring Comment

No Additional 

Comments Required

The Director and Commanders of the Military 

Criminal Investigative Organizations

1, 2.a, 3.a, 3.b, and 

3.c

The Commander, U.S. Army Criminal 

Investigation Command 7

The Director, Naval Criminal Investigative 

Service 7 and 9 2.b, 4, 5, 6.a, 6.b, and 8 

The Commander, Air Force Office of Special 

Investigations

2.b, 2.c, 4, 6.a, and 

6.b
DODIG-2013-091 │ iii

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

DRAFT REPORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

July 9, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

 SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 

 COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND

 DIRECTOR, NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

 COMMANDER, U.S. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL

INVESTIGATIONS

 DIRECTOR, DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

OFFICE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations Sexual Assault

 Investigations (Report No. DODIG-2013-091)

This report is provided for review and comment. We evaluated Military Criminal 

Investigative Organizations’ (MCIOs’) sexual assault investigations to determine whether 

they achieved DoD, Military Service and MCIO investigative standards. This was a 

self-initiated project to meet our statutory obligation to provide policy, oversight, and 

performance evaluation of all DoD activities relating to criminal investigation programs. 

We determined that most (89 percent) of the sexual assault complaints reviewed 

met investigative standards. We returned cases with significant deficiencies to the 

responsible MCIOs for corrective action. Significant deficiencies are key evidence not being 

collected, crime scenes not examined, and witness or subject interviews not conducted 

or not thorough. We also found that certain MCIO policies and practices regarding the 

collection of physical evidence, crime scene examinations, legal coordination, and records 

checks need improvement. Lastly, investigative interviews, for all the MCIOs, could 

benefit from increased emphasis on thoroughness by supervisors, training, and policy 

improvements. 

Additionally, we invite your attention to the “Case Detail Data” which provides 

factual data on a myriad of sexual assault characteristics. This information may prove 

helpful in combatting sexual assault in the Department of Defense.

We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing 

the final report. DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that recommendations be resolved 

promptly. Overall, the Commander, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), 

agreed with our recommendations. The Director, Naval Criminal Investigation Service 

(NCIS), and the Commander, U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), agreed 

in part with our recommendations. 

Please provide comments that conform to the requirements of DoD Directive 

7650.3 by August 30, 2013. Please send a portable document file (.pdf) containing 

your comments to chris.redmond@dodig.mil. Copies of management comments must 

INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500
iv │ DODIG-2013-091

contain the actual or electronic signature of the authorizing official. If you arrange to 

send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet 

Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the evaluation staff during the review. 

For additional information on this report, please contact Mr. Chris Redmond at (703) 

604-8556.

Randolph Stone

Deputy Inspector General 

Policy and Oversight
DODIG-2013-091 │ v

Contents

Introduction

Objectives________________________________________________________________________________________1

Background______________________________________________________________________________________1

DoD Policy and Requirements _________________________________________________________________2

Scope and Methodology ________________________________________________________________________3

Finding

Condition of the MCIOs’ Sexual Assault Investigations ______________________________________5

Did the MCIOs Investigate Sexual Assaults as Required by Guiding Policies and 

Procedures? _____________________________________________________________________________________5

Analysis of Investigative Deficiencies _________________________________________________________8

Demographic and Other Case Data _________________________________________________________ 20

Conclusions____________________________________________________________________________________ 21

Management Comments on the Report and Our Response________________________________ 23

Recommendations, MCIO Comments, and Our Response__________________________________ 29

Appendices

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology _______________________________________________________ 42

Appendix B. References ______________________________________________________________________ 45

Appendix C. Case Detail Data ________________________________________________________________ 48

Appendix D. Memorandum of Results ______________________________________________________ 70

Management Comments

CID Comments ________________________________________________________________________________ 72

NCIS Comments _______________________________________________________________________________ 73

AFOSI Comments______________________________________________________________________________ 84

Acronyms and Abbreviations_____________________________________________ 92

Introduction

DODIG-2013-091 │ 1

Introduction

Objectives

We evaluated the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations’ (MCIOs’)1 sexual assault 

investigations to determine whether they were adequately investigated. Our evaluation 

focused on the following question:

Did the MCIOs investigate sexual assaults as required by guiding 

policies and procedures?

Background

The DoD Inspector General (IG) has statutory authority in accordance with the Inspector 

General Act of 1978 for policy, oversight, and performance evaluation with respect to all 

DoD activities relating to criminal investigation programs. This authority is embodied 

in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5106.01, “Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG 

DoD),” April 20, 2012, and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5505.03, “Initiation of Investigations 

by Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations,” March 24, 2011. The DoD IG’s 

responsibilities regarding the DoD’s sexual assault investigations are further specified in 

DoDD 6495.01, “Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program,” January 23, 

2012, and DoDI 6495.02, “Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures,” 

June 23, 2006. This guidance directs the DoD IG to develop policy and to oversee the 

DoD’s criminal investigative organizations’ investigations of sexual assaults. 

Within DoD, the MCIOs are responsible for investigating most sexual assaults.2

 In the 

Army, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) investigates all sexual 

assault complaints. Whereas, at the time of this evaluation, the Air Force Office of Special 

Investigations (AFOSI) did not normally investigate wrongful sexual contact (formerly 

indecent assault) and indecent exposure.3

 Wrongful sexual contact involves improper, 

unwanted touching of a sexual nature with the specific intent to demean the victim and 

gratify the lust of the accused’s sexual desires. Both the NCIS and AFOSI, in accordance 

with Service policies, exercised independent discretion regarding the investigation of 

1 The MCIOs include the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Air Force Office 

of Special Investigations.

2 Sexual assault includes rape, forcible sodomy (oral or anal sex), and other unwanted sexual contact that is aggravated, 

abusive, or wrongful (to include unwanted and inappropriate sexual contact) or attempts to commit these acts. The 

definition generally encompasses offenses classified under Articles 120 and 125 of the 2007 and 2008 version of the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice. Navy Masters at Arms, Navy and Air Force command officials, and Air Force Security 

Forces investigate offenses involving unwanted sexual touching outside the clothing.

3 Definitions in the 2007 and 2008 version of the Uniform Code of Military Justice were in effect at the time of this review.
Introduction

2 │ DODIG-2013-091

wrongful sexual contact (formerly indecent assault) offenses based on the complexity of 

the case. As a result, NCIS conducted 31 investigations and AFOSI conducted 7 of these 

investigations compared to CID, which conducted 61 investigations. Although NCIS 

conducted 31 investigations, some NCIS wrongful sexual contact (or indecent assault) 

investigations may have been referred to the Navy Masters at Arms and Marine Corps CID 

investigators, based on policy guidance in effect at the time. Air Force Security Forces 

investigators typically investigated wrongful sexual contact complaints for the Air Force. 

Current DoD policies implemented in January 20134

 require the MCIOs to investigate all 

sexual assaults.

Additionally, the MCIOs are responsible for developing Service-specific investigative 

policy and requirements governing the conduct of sexual assault investigations and the 

training of assigned special agents in accordance with the Services’ training standards.

In August 2011, the DoD IG formed the Violent Crime Division within the Investigative 

Policy and Oversight Directorate having the primary purpose of providing oversight to 

the MCIOs in the area of violent crimes, to include sexual assaults.

The DoD IG initiated this project to evaluate whether the MCIO sexual assault investigations 

were adequately investigated in compliance with policy and guidance.

DoD Policy and Requirements

DoDD 6495.01, October 6, 2005, requires:

an immediate, trained response capability for each report of sexual 

assault in all locations, including deployed locations, and ensure 

victims of sexual assault are protected, treated with dignity and 

respect, and receive timely access to treatment and services . . . .

Within DoD, the MCIOs provide a trained response capability to investigate reported 

sexual assaults in all locations.

DoDI 6495.02 establishes requirements and responsibilities regarding DoD’s response 

to sexual assaults for DoD Components including the DoD Sexual Assault Prevention and 

Response Office (SAPRO), the DoD IG, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments. 

4 DoDI 5505.18, “Investigation of Adult Sexual Assault in the Department of Defense,” January 25, 2013, now requires the 

MCIOs to “initiate investigations of all offenses of adult sexual assault of which they become aware . . . regardless of the 

severity of the allegation.”
Introduction

DODIG-2013-091 │ 3

The Instruction designates the MCIO criminal investigators as DoD sexual assault first 

responders.

Scope and Methodology

The evaluation focused on the adequacy of MCIO investigations of adult sexual assaults. 

By reviewing closed (completed and adjudicated) sexual assault investigations, we 

determined whether the MCIOs conducted investigations in accordance with DoD, Service, 

and MCIO policies and procedures. A closed investigation means investigative work and 

adjudication actions were complete. 

This review was based on a simple random sampling of completed cases closed in 2010 

and included sexual assault offenses (of adult victims) defined under Articles 120 and 

125, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), worked by the MCIOs. Table 1 depicts the 

case totals for the sexual assault investigations closed in 2010.

Table 1. Calculation of Total Cases Reviewed

Explanation Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Case Population 2,263 1,082 704 477

Sample Cases 584 216 195 173

Cases Excluded 81 18 36 27

Cases Missing 2 0 2 0

Net Total Reviewed 501 198 157 146

We developed sexual assault case review protocols for each MCIO based on each MCIO’s 

investigative policies and procedures. The review protocols were developed to uniformly 

determine compliance with DoD, Service, and MCIO requirements that were in effect 

during the period we examined. They also addressed, in detail, investigative steps required 

to complete a thorough sexual assault investigation. We noted deficiencies and identified 

investigations with significant deficiencies, and when practicable, recommended follow 

up or corrective action.

Although we identified a sample size of 584 cases, information about 83 cases was 

not included in our project. We excluded 81 from the review for one of the following 

three reasons: 1) the investigation was determined to be a monitor-type investigation 

in which another investigative entity conducted the bulk of the investigative activity; 2) 

adjudication of the case extended into 2011 (therefore, the case was not closed in 2010 

even though the investigative activity was complete); or 3) the victim in the case was 
Introduction

4 │ DODIG-2013-091

a juvenile rather than an adult victim.5 Additionally, as reflected in Table 1, NCIS was 

unable to locate (either the hard or digital copies) two case files. This resulted in a sample 

size of 501 cases.

We engaged DoD IG’s Quantitative Methods Division (QMD) analysts for computations 

of the case sample selection and statistical calculations and projections to the total case 

population. The QMD analysts opined that the calculation of projections to the total case 

population, based on the sample (see Appendix D for details of projected totals based 

on sample results) would not be adversely affected by the cases that were excluded or 

missing (83 cases) from the original random sampling of 584 cases.

See Appendix A for details of the scope and methodology. See Appendix B for a list of 

references used throughout this report.

5 On January 29, 2013, DoD OIG initiated an evaluation of the MCIOs’ child sexual assault investigations.
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 5

Finding

Condition of the MCIOs’ Sexual Assault Investigations 

To determine the condition of the sexual assault investigations, we focused on the 

following question.

Did the MCIOs Investigate Sexual Assaults as Required 

by Guiding Policies and Procedures?

Most of the cases we reviewed (445 of 501 cases or 89 percent) met investigative 

standards or did not have significant deficiencies. Eighty-three cases met investigative 

standards because they had no deficiencies. Although we found deficiencies in 362 cases, 

they were not significant because they did not have a negative impact on the investigation. 

Eleven percent (56 of 501) of the cases we reviewed had significant deficiencies.6

 We 

returned the cases with significant deficiencies to the MCIOs for resolution. Of the 56 

cases returned, the MCIOs reopened 31 cases for additional investigative work. For the 

remainder, the MCIOs determined additional investigative activity was not practicable 

due to the amount of time elapsed or based on their judgment that additional efforts 

would be futile. We will oversee the results of reopened investigations.

The primary offenses observed during this review were rape, aggravated sexual assault, 

aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, indecent acts, wrongful sexual contact, 

indecent assault, forcible sodomy (oral or anal sex), sodomy, assault with intent to commit 

rape, and attempted rape.

The cases reviewed included incidents in which neither the subject nor the victim 

consumed/ingested alcohol or drugs, as well as cases in which the subject(s) used alcohol 

and/or drugs to facilitate sexual assaults.

The offenses occurred both on and off military installations, and in some instances, the 

exact location where the offense occurred could not be determined. Offenses occurred in 

a variety of settings, such as bars/nightclubs, barracks/dorms, overseas deployed billets, 

hotels, and residences. 

We observed and documented the types of relationships between the subject and the 

victim, to include determining the subject’s or the victim’s military affiliation. We also 

6 See page 7 for examples of significant investigative deficiencies.
Finding

6 │ DODIG-2013-091

analyzed a host of other victim- and subject-specific data such as age, pay grade, and 

gender.

Twenty-seven incidents were initially reported as restricted reports,7

 but each victim 

later elected to pursue an unrestricted report.8

We also collected and analyzed the disciplinary actions taken against the subjects of the 

investigations. We did not analyze whether the action was appropriate. The propriety or 

appropriateness of disciplinary actions taken by commanders, based on legal guidance, 

was not within the scope of this evaluation. Disciplinary actions taken against the 

subjects included court-martial, punitive discharge, administrative separations, civilian 

prosecution, nonjudicial punishment, reprimand, counseling, other actions, and no action 

taken. See Appendix C, Table C-35, for details. 

Cases with No Deficiencies or Minor Deficiencies

Of the 501 cases reviewed, 445 (89 percent) either had no deficiencies or the deficiencies 

noted did not have a negative impact on the investigation. Eighty-three cases had no 

investigative deficiencies. The remaining 362 cases had one or more deficiencies but 

the deficiencies were minor and did not adversely affect the successful resolution of the 

investigation. Table 2 depicts a breakdown by MCIO of the number of cases, with and 

without deficiencies.

Table 2. Cases with No Deficiencies or Minor Deficiencies

Category Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Cases w/o Deficiencies 83 41 20 22

Cases with Minor 

Deficiencies 362 144 111 107

Total 445 185 131 129

See Appendix C for details of all sample results.

7 According to DoDD 6495.01, E2.1.10 (October 6, 2005, version in effect at the time of this review), restricted reporting 

is “[a] process used by a Service member to report or disclose that he or she is the victim of a sexual assault to specified 

officials on a requested confidential basis. Under these circumstances, the victim’s report and any details provided to 

healthcare personnel, the SARC [Sexual Assault Response Coordinator], or a VA [Victim Advocate] will not be reported 

to law enforcement to initiate the official investigative process unless the victim consents or an established exception is 

exercised . . . “. 

8 Section E2.1.16 of DoDD 6495.01 states that unrestricted reporting is “[a] process a Service member uses to disclose, 

without requesting confidentiality or restricted reporting, that he or she is the victim of a sexual assault. Under these 

circumstances, the victim’s report and any details provided to healthcare personnel, the SARC, a VA, command authorities, 

or other persons are reportable to law enforcement and may be used to initiate the official investigative process.”
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 7

Cases with Significant Deficiencies

Of the 501 cases reviewed, 56 cases had significant deficiencies. Table 3 depicts a 

breakdown by MCIO of the number of cases with significant deficiencies. 

Table 3. Cases with Significant Deficiencies

Category Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Returned 56 13 26 17

Reopened* 31 7 14 10

*DoD IG will oversee the results of reopened investigations

Significant deficiencies included:

• key evidence was not collected from the crime scene, the victim, or the subject;

• crime scene examinations were not completed, not completed thoroughly, or 

not completed before the loss of crucial evidence;

• witness interviews were not thorough or not conducted; and

• subject or victim interviews were not thorough or reinterviews of subject or 

victims did not sufficiently develop new information.

We provided information including the documented deficiencies on all 56 significantly 

deficient investigations to the respective MCIOs. We asked the MCIOs to consider our 

findings and, where practicable, reopen those cases to conduct additional investigative 

activity to correct shortcomings. In some instances, reopening the investigation would 

not be a prudent use of investigative resources due to the length of time elapsed or 

judgment that additional efforts would be futile. Table 3 also depicts a breakdown by 

MCIO of the number of returned significantly deficient cases that were reopened by the 

MCIOs to conduct additional investigative activity.

Cases Returned to CID: On June 7, 2012, we returned 13 cases to CID for consideration 

of our findings. On June 29, 2012, CID agreed to reopen 4 of the 13 cases to conduct 

additional activity. They declined to pursue additional investigative activity in the nine 

remaining cases because they believed it would not alter the outcome of the case or a 

significant amount of time had elapsed since the incident, causing additional investigative 

activity to be impracticable. After reviewing CID’s response, we disagreed with their 

assessment of seven of the nine remaining cases. We provided additional rationale 

regarding the seven cases for CID to consider. On January 7, 2013, CID advised that they 
Finding

8 │ DODIG-2013-091

reopened three of those cases. No additional investigative activity will be undertaken on 

the remaining four cases for the reasons stated above.

Cases Returned to NCIS: On August 2, 2012, we returned 26 cases to NCIS for 

consideration of our findings. On September 5, 2012, NCIS advised that they reopened 

11 of the 26 cases to conduct additional activity. On October 9, 2012, NCIS advised that 

they reopened one additional case (12 of the 26 cases) to conduct additional activity. 

They declined to pursue additional investigative activity on the 14 remaining cases 

because they believed it would not alter the outcome of the case or too much time had 

elapsed, causing additional investigative activity to be impracticable. After reviewing 

NCIS’ response, we disagreed with their assessment of 2 of the 14 remaining cases. We 

provided additional rationale regarding the two cases for NCIS to consider. On December 

28, 2012, NCIS advised that they reopened one case and intend to reopen the remaining 

case. On February 14, 2013, NCIS advised that they reopened the final case. 

Cases Returned to AFOSI: On April 23, 2012, we returned 17 cases to AFOSI for 

consideration of our findings. On May 21, 2012, AFOSI agreed to reopen 10 of the 17 cases 

to conduct additional activity. They declined to pursue additional investigative activity in 

the seven remaining cases because they believed it would not alter the outcome of the 

case or too much time had elapsed, causing the recommended investigative activity to be 

impractical. After reviewing AFOSI’s response, we agreed with their assessment of the 

seven remaining cases.

Missing Cases

As previously mentioned, we were unable to review two NCIS cases because NCIS 

personnel could not locate the files. The NCIS records management officials were unable 

to determine what happened to the two missing case files. NCIS officials stated that field 

office personnel where the investigations were conducted indicated they had mailed the 

files to NCIS headquarters for digital scanning as required by NCIS policy. Once the field 

office confirmed the existence of the digitized files in the NCIS case management system, 

they destroyed the local copies. A search by NCIS personnel for the original files and the 

digital copies failed to locate the two missing cases. After NCIS officials could not locate 

the two cases, they initiated a records inventory to determine the accountability of other 

sexual assault investigative records. 

Analysis of Investigative Deficiencies

We analyzed the deficiencies found in a total of 418 cases. Our analysis disclosed six 

categories of deficiencies including: 1) interview and post-interview, 2) evidence, 3) 
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 9

crime scene documentation and processing, 4) subject-focused actions, 5) investigative 

coordination/notification, and 6) documentation (investigative and administrative) 

deficiencies. In addition, we included case data such as types of sexual assault, where the 

assault occurred, use of alcohol or drugs, and the relationship between the subject and 

the victim.

Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

In total, 399 of the 501 sample cases had interview and post-interview deficiencies. 

We categorized them by subject, victim, and witness interview and post-interview 

deficiencies to more efficiently analyze the results. Table 4 depicts a breakdown by MCIO 

of the number of cases with interview deficiencies. 

Table 4. Cases with Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

399 140 145 114

Subject Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

We found two issues related to the thoroughness of subject interviews and post-interview 

actions. They were: 1) the interview documentation did not address all elements of the 

offense(s), or pertinent information surrounding the assault was omitted and should have 

been captured by investigators (for example, investigators did not capture information 

about the suspect’s alibi in an effort to substantiate or refute the alibi) and 2) investigators 

did not pursue relevant investigative leads generated from the interview.9

 Table 5 

depicts a breakdown by MCIO of the number of cases with subject interview deficiencies. 

Additionally, not reflected in Table 5, one subject was not advised of his legal rights as 

required. Although not advising a subject of their legal rights could have an adverse effect 

on a case, our review indicates this to be anomalous and not a systemic issue. In two 

instances (one for NCIS and one for AFOSI), the subject was never interviewed and the file 

provided no explanation. 

Table 5. Subject Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Category Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Subject interview was not thorough or did not 

address all elements of the offense investigated. 67 24 22 21

Investigators did not follow up on logical leads 

stemming from interviews. 78 18 31 29

9 See Appendix C for additional information on the two areas of concern. 
Finding

10 │ DODIG-2013-091

Victim Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

We separated victim interview thoroughness and post-interview action deficiencies into 

four areas of concern as follows: 1) the interview was not considered thorough because 

the documentation of the interview did not address all elements of the offense(s), 

or pertinent information surrounding the assault was omitted and should have been 

captured by investigators; 2) investigators never followed up on relevant investigative 

leads generated from the interview; 3) investigators did not attempt to corroborate 

pertinent information the victim provided to them; and 4) investigators did not address 

or investigate the victim’s recantation. Additionally, we found two items not related to the 

thoroughness of interviews but shortcomings related to operational and administrative 

interviews requirements as follows: 1) investigators did not issue or failed to document 

that they issued a DD Form 270110 to victims and 2) investigators did not provide routine 

or recurring briefings to the victims on the status and various aspects of the investigations 

or investigators failed to document that the briefings were conducted (CID and NCIS). 

DoD guidance requires that victims receive recurring case status briefings but it does 

not specify from whom. Both CID and NCIS policies have supplemented their Service 

policies and require investigators to periodically brief victims. For the Air Force, these 

briefings are provided by the victim’s commander. The AFOSI reports of investigations 

we reviewed did not include information related to victim briefings. Table 6 depicts the 

total and a breakdown by MCIO for each of the areas of concern of the number of cases 

with specific deficiencies.11 

Table 6. Victim Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Category Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Interview was not thorough or did not address all 

elements of offense. 98 27 35 36

Logical leads stemming from interview were not 

developed or pursued. 132 39 51 42

Information provided was not corroborated. 44 14 13 17

Victim’s recantation was not addressed or investigated. 11 0 3 8

Victim was not issued a DD Form 2701. 79 66 N/O* 13

Routine/recurring victim briefs were not conducted in 

accordance with (IAW) MCIO policy. 179 64 115 N/A

*Not Observable. There were 111 instances in which we were unable to verify NCIS’ compliance 

with the issuance of the DD Form 2701, because the case activity records, where the information 

is normally documented, had been destroyed IAW Secretary of the Navy Manual-5210.1 (SECNAV 

M-5210.1), “Department of the Navy Records Management Program, Records Management Manual,” 

November 2007 (Rev.).

10 The DD Form 2701, “Initial Information for Victims and Witnesses of Crime,” provides recipients with an understanding of 

the military criminal justice process, actions to take in certain situations, a list of victim rights, and contact information if 

additional assistance is needed.

11 See Appendix C for additional information on the eight areas of concern.
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 11

Witness Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Witness interview and post-interview action deficiencies were broken down into five 

areas of concern as follows: 1) significant witnesses were identified but not interviewed, 

and the file contained no documented explanation for why they were not interviewed; 2) 

the initial witness the victim confided in was not interviewed; 3) canvass interviews were 

not conducted when appropriate; 4) the interview was considered not thorough because 

pertinent information surrounding the assault was omitted and should have been captured 

by investigators (for example, investigators often did not explain discrepancies between 

witness, subject, or victim testimony when appropriate, or investigators annotated the 

general opinion from a witness rather than descriptive observations in relation to a victim 

or subject’s intoxication); and 5) investigators never followed up on relevant investigative 

leads generated from the interview.12 Table 7 depicts the total and a breakdown by MCIO 

for each of the areas of concern of the number of cases with specific deficiencies. We 

found no noted instances of witness information not being corroborated.

Table 7. Witness Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Category Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Significant witnesses were identified but not interviewed, 

and the file was not documented to explain why. 173 38 74 61

Initial witness the victim confided in was not interviewed. 9 4 2 3

Canvass interviews were not conducted.* 28 10 11 7

Witness interview was not thorough. 102 43 26 33

Investigators did not follow up on logical leads stemming 

from interviews. 98 33 30 35

*Canvass interviews are interviews conducted in the immediate vicinity of a crime scene in an effort 

to identify potential witnesses or information related to the matter being investigated.

CID and NCIS policies fully address the elements of thorough interviews including: 1) 

establishing and understanding the elements of the offense(s) being investigated; 2) 

investigating inconsistencies in victim, witness, or suspect statements; and 3) investigating 

subject/suspect alibis. Although AFOSI policies address the first two elements of 

thorough interviews, AFOSI has no policy guidance pertaining to investigating subject/

suspect alibis. We believe that these principles, if applied to the interview process, will 

result in more thorough interviews. In addition, CID’s practice of documenting interviews 

in narrative, and question and answer format is thorough, and it routinely captured 

necessary details of interviews.

12 See Appendix C for additional information on the five areas of concern.
Finding

12 │ DODIG-2013-091

Evidence Deficiencies

In total, 127 of 501 cases had evidence deficiencies. We separated the evidence deficiencies 

into five areas of concern.13 Table 8 depicts a breakdown by MCIO of the number of cases 

with evidence deficiencies. 

We narrowed these deficiencies down to one specific action requiring additional oversight 

during future investigations, that is, the failure to collect all items of physical evidence (for 

example, clothing, deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA] samples, phone records, text records) 

identified by subjects, victims, or witnesses. We observed incidents when investigators 

did not seize clothing items identified during investigative activity that were worn by 

victim(s) or subject(s) during or immediately after an alleged sexual assault. In other 

instances, the victim(s) or subject(s) used cell phones to discuss alleged sexual assaults 

or details pertaining to them that were never collected and exploited for evidentiary 

value. Finally, we observed instances when investigators did not collect DNA on potential 

suspects or other key participants in an investigation in an effort to exclude them as 

potential suspects.

Table 8. Evidence Deficiencies

Investigators did not: Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Collect all items of physical evidence identified by 

subject(s), victim(s), or witness(es). 95 31 39 25

Submit collected physical evidence to U.S. Army Criminal 

Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) for examination, if 

appropriate.

2 0 2 0

Submit collected evidence to USACIL in a timely manner. 25 11 3 11

Coordinate lab submission with forensic science 

consultant (FSC) (AFOSI) or special agent-in-charge (CID). 23 11 N/A 12

Have lab request form reviewed by FSC. 14 N/A N/A 14

Note: The disparity in the number of cases with evidence deficiencies and the total number of 

deficiencies is due to some cases having multiple deficiencies.

Collection of Evidence

We noted investigators were not collecting the subject’s or victim’s clothing or certain 

relevant articles of clothing worn during the assault or shortly thereafter as evidence. 

As indicated in Table 8, of the 501 investigations, 95 contained evidence collection 

deficiencies. Among those deficiencies, we discovered about one-third of the evidence 

collection deficiencies involved investigators not collecting the clothing from the victim 

13 See Appendix C for additional information on the five areas of concern.
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 13

or suspect as required by organizational policy. Most of these deficiencies occurred in 

cases of rape or aggravated sexual assault when the crime was reported within a day after 

the incident. Additionally, guiding MCIO policies regarding the collection of the subject or 

victim’s clothing were inconsistent.

All of the MCIOs have policy advising agents to collect clothing from the subject or victim; 

however, subtle differences exist between each MCIOs’ policies. For example, CID policy 

requires the collection of the subject or victim’s clothing regardless of its probative value 

but it does not address the collection of any articles of clothing the subjects or victims 

might have placed on themselves following an assault, if that clothing was something 

other than what the subject or victim wore during the assault. NCIS policy advises agents 

to collect clothing worn by the subject or victim during the assault, as well as clothing 

the subject or victim might have placed on themselves following the assault when the 

clothing was different than what the subject or victim wore during the assault. However, 

NCIS policy relies on the word “should” instead of “will” or “must,” which provides 

investigators discretion to decide an article of clothing’s probative value and to choose 

when they should collect the clothing. AFOSI policy does not address the collection of 

articles of clothing the subject or victim might have placed on themselves immediately 

following an assault, if that clothing was something other than what the victim or suspect 

wore during the assault. Clothing worn during a sexual assault as well as clothing worn 

immediately following a sexual assault may contain evidence. 

Crime Scene Documentation and/or Processing Deficiencies

In total, 218 cases had crime scene documentation and/or crime scene processing 

deficiencies. We separated the crime scene documentation and/or processing deficiencies 

into five areas.14 Table 9 depicts a breakdown by MCIO of the number of cases with crime 

scene documentation and/or processing deficiencies. 

We narrowed these deficiencies down to four specific actions requiring additional oversight 

during future investigations as follows: 1) crime scene examination or validation, 2) crime 

scene photography, 3) crime scene sketches, and 4) evidence collection. Neither AFOSI 

nor NCIS consistently evaluated and/or documented crime scenes during the course of 

their sexual assault investigations. We also observed trends indicating that investigators 

failed to collect all items of physical evidence (such as clothing, DNA samples, phone 

records, and text records). Crime scene validations are less thorough examinations 

of a scene. These less thorough examinations may be appropriate in an investigation 

when there is a significant delay in reporting it to law enforcement and collection of 

14 See Appendix C for additional information on the five areas of concern.
Finding

14 │ DODIG-2013-091

physical evidence is no longer possible. Validations normally consist of documenting 

observations, photographing, and preparing sketches. Validations are important because 

they provide valuable investigative information and assist during interviews. In addition, 

the documentation from validations helps others understand how events occurred.

Table 9. Crime Scene Documentation and/or Processing Deficiencies

Investigators did not: Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Examine or validate the crime scene. 129 25 51 53

Have authority to search the scene. 9 4 3 2

Photograph the scene. 156 28 56 72

Sketch the scene. 207 33 86 88

Collect potential evidence from the scene. 21 3 9 9

Note: The disparity in the number of cases with crime scene documentation and/or processing 

deficiencies and the total number of deficiencies is due to some cases having multiple deficiencies.

Crime Scene Examination/Search

As reflected in Table 9, crime scene examinations or validations were not conducted in 

129 of the reviewed cases. In 61 investigations, the report of the sexual assault was made 

within 7 days of the date of the incident and a crime scene should have been available; 

however, the investigators did not conduct a crime scene examination and did not attempt 

to collect physical evidence from the scene. In the remaining 68 cases, investigators 

could have responded to the scene(s) to validate them by documenting observations, 

photographing, and preparing sketches.

CID routinely completed crime scene examinations. CID policy requires agents to promptly 

respond to a crime scene when it is available. We found that CID crime scene processing 

and documentation was thorough and routinely included detailed observations, 

photographs, and sketches.

Fifty one of the NCIS investigations reviewed lacked a crime scene examination. NCIS 

policy regarding crime scene processing uses the word “should” throughout; therefore, 

it does not explicitly require an investigator to conduct a crime scene examination. 

However, when NCIS used a Major Case Response Team (MCRT),15 the quality of NCIS 

crime scene processing increased. The MCRTs conducted thorough and detailed crime 

scene examinations, which included photography and sketches of the scene.

15 The MCRT provides a 24-hour surge capability of highly trained agents who are trained in crime scene processing 

techniques and are summoned to all major incidences to search, locate, photograph, document, collect, and preserve 

physical evidence.
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 15

Fifty three of the AFOSI investigations reviewed lacked a crime scene examination. The 

AFOSI does not have specific mandatory guidance to establish when to conduct a crime 

scene examination. The AFOSI guidance for crime scenes is covered in AFOSI Manual 

(AFOSIMAN) 71-124, “Crime Scene Handbook,” September 30, 2003. This is a how-to 

manual regarding searches, seizures, and evidence collection procedures. The AFOSIMAN 

does not establish policy requirements for conducting crime scene examinations. 

Additionally, AFOSI Manual 71-122, volume 1, “Criminal Investigations,” May 29, 

2008, which establishes procedures for general investigative methods, refers readers 

to AFOSIMAN 71-124 for procedures on searches, seizures, and evidence collection 

procedures.

Subject-Focused Action Deficiencies

In total, 190 cases had deficiencies in administrative requirements related to the 

processing of subjects of sexual assault investigations. These deficiencies are not related 

to the thoroughness of the sexual assault investigations but are important in identifying 

and “titling” the subject in the investigative report and indexing the subject in the Defense 

Central Index of Investigations (DCII).16 We separated the deficiencies into two areas of 

concern.17 Table 10 depicts a breakdown by MCIO of the number of cases with subjectfocused action deficiencies.

Table 10. Cases with Subject-Focused Action Deficiencies

Investigators did not: Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Title/index subject(s) IAW DoDI 5505.07. 14 1 13 0

Comply with guidance regarding the release of subjects 

to unit personnel. 187 47 103 37

Note: The disparity in the number of cases with deficiencies shown and the total number of 

deficiencies is due to some cases having multiple deficiencies.

Investigative Coordination/Notification Deficiencies

In total, 103 cases had investigative coordination/notification deficiencies. We categorized 

investigative coordination/notification deficiencies into four areas of concern.18 Table 11 

depicts a breakdown by MCIO of the number of cases with investigative coordination/

notification deficiencies.

16 The DCII System is an automated central index that identifies investigations conducted by DoD investigative agencies, and 

personnel security determinations made by DoD adjudicative authorities.

17 See Appendix C for additional information on the two areas of concern.

18 See Appendix C for additional information on the four areas of concern.
Finding

16 │ DODIG-2013-091

Table 11. Cases with Investigative Coordination/Notification Deficiencies

Investigators did not: Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Receive headquarters or supervisor approval to close 

short1

 (AFOSI) (administratively close) or as a Final C2

(CID) investigation.

20 4 N/A 16

Coordinate/notify forensic science consultant. 13 N/A N/A 13

Notify the sexual assault response coordinator (SARC).3 78 34 N/A4 44

Coordinate with trial counsel. 21 6 N/A5 15

Note: The disparity in the number of cases with deficiencies shown and the total number of 

deficiencies is due to some cases having multiple deficiencies.

1 According to AFOSIMAN 71-121, paragraphs 9.1.1.3.1 and 9.1.1.3.3, closed short (administrative 

closure) is when information is obtained indicating the investigation should not have been 

initiated or the investigation is no longer the responsibility of AFOSI.

2 CID Regulation 195-1, paragraph 4.10, states that a criminal investigation may be terminated prior 

to exhausting all investigative leads and a Final (C) report of investigation be prepared when the 

CID investigative resources could be better employed on other investigations and when certain 

other criteria exist.

3 According to DoDD 6495.01, paragraph E2.1.15.1 (October 6, 2005 edition), the SARC is the 

central point of contact for coordinating appropriate and responsive care for sexual assault 

victims.

4 In spite of DoD policy that requires SARC notifications in all sexual assault complaints, NCIS policy 

did not require SARCs to be notified. Notwithstanding, SARC notifications were documented in 

71 of 157 investigations, but they were not documented in 86. 

5 Although NCIS policy does not require coordination with trial counsel, it “strongly encourages” 

early and continuous contact with trial counsel or other appropriate attorney. NCIS documented 

such contacts in 100 instances in the reports we reviewed.

MCIO/Judge Advocates Coordination and Collaboration

In 57 NCIS cases there was no initial and continuing coordination with the supporting 

Judge Advocate (JA) or Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA). Both CID and AFOSI have specific 

guidance requiring investigators to develop a process of continued interaction with their 

respective JAs/AUSAs throughout the life cycle of their investigations. We observed clear 

guidance and strong interaction between CID investigators and their servicing JAs/AUSAs 

throughout the life cycle of their cases. We observed robust interaction between AFOSI 

investigators and their respective JAs, along with detailed guidance. NCIS policy does 

not specify that investigators are required to notify or coordinate with their servicing 

JA at the initiation of investigations, nor does it specify that NCIS and the servicing JA/

AUSA are required to establish a collaborative relationship throughout the life cycle of an 

investigation. However, NCIS Manual for Investigations, NCIS 3, Chapter 6, “Investigative 

Theory and Procedures,” December 2006, section 6-2.3, states that “. . . strong consideration 

should be given to early and continuous contact with trial counsel or other appropriate 

attorneys when conducting an investigation.”
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 17

Investigative and Administrative Documentation Deficiencies

In total, 88 cases had investigative and administrative documentation deficiencies. The 

investigative and administrative documentation deficiencies were broken down into four 

areas of concern.19 Table 12 depicts a breakdown by MCIO of the number of cases with 

investigative and administrative documentation deficiencies. 

Table 12. Cases with Investigative and Administrative Documentation Deficiencies

Category Total1 CID NCIS AFOSI

Required supervisory reviews not documented. 72 11 N/O2 61

Review/inclusion of other law enforcement agency’s 

report not documented. 4 1 3 0

Location of offense not fully identified. 13 0 0 13

Case agent notes were not retained through the 

appellate review process. 5 N/A 5 N/A

1 The disparity in the number of cases with investigative and administrative documentation 

deficiencies and the total number of deficiencies is due to some cases having multiple 

deficiencies.

2 Not Observable. In 141 instances, we were unable to verify whether supervisory reviews 

were conducted in the NCIS investigations because the case activity records and supervisor 

review records, where the information is normally documented, had been destroyed IAW 

SECNAV M-5210.1.

Additionally, we found disparate policies and practices among the MCIOs related to 

report of investigation documentation, the timely completion of Defense Central Index 

of Investigations records checks pertaining to victims and suspects, and the filing and 

retention of investigative notes as discussed below. 

Timely Records Checks

We noted that CID and NCIS showed trends of not documenting or not conducting law 

enforcement records checks,20 or failing to do them in a timely manner. Although not 

required by DoD guidance, we observed that AFOSI, IAW its policy guidance, conducted 

records checks at the onset of its investigations. AFOSI guidance requires that investigators 

conduct records checks within the first 2 days of an investigation and preferably prior to 

the initial subject or victim interview. If investigators fail to meet this requirement, they 

are required to document this fact in the report of investigation. This practice provides 

additional details and background about key participants in the investigation, which 

in turn leads to more thorough and insightful interviews. In addition, timely records 

19 See Appendix C for additional information on the four areas of concern.

20 Law enforcement records checks include, but are not limited to, local, state, and national law enforcement criminal history 

checks.
Finding

18 │ DODIG-2013-091

checks also enhance officer safety by providing investigators with information regarding 

weapons, officer safety information (for example, the individual is known to assault 

law enforcement personnel), and criminal history that would otherwise be unknown if 

investigators failed to complete the checks early in the investigative process. CID guidance 

requires that investigators complete criminal records checks “promptly,” but it does not 

provide a definitive timeliness standard. 

CID guidance emphasizes the importance of conducting prompt records checks for 

subjects, suspects, complainants, and victims; however, the language in this guidance 

does not establish a timeliness standard. In one CID case, investigators failed to realize 

that the subject of an active sexual assault investigation had been identified as the subject 

of a previous sexual assault investigation. NCIS guidance indirectly requires that records 

checks be conducted within the first 3 days of an investigation (first day if a priority case). 

Although NCIS policies indirectly provide a timeliness standard, we found a majority of 

the cases reviewed (82 of 157) did not meet the standard. In one NCIS case, investigators 

did not identify that the subject of an investigation had a record of illegal activity until 

after the subject had been interviewed. We observed instances in CID and NCIS cases 

when investigators failed to complete records checks before interacting with subjects. 

Report of Investigation Documentation

The reports of investigation and supporting files of NCIS and AFOSI often lacked basic case 

information such as date, time, location of occurrence, and offenses under investigation. 

For example, in one victim’s statement in an AFOSI report of investigation, the victim 

described an assault occurring in her home but she did not specify her home address 

in the statement, and it was not documented anywhere in the report or supporting file. 

CID provides basic information at the beginning of each report of investigation on a title 

page, or as much of the information as is known, which simplifies locating basic case 

information for commanders and JAs/AUSAs reading the reports.

Investigative Case Notes

Investigative case notes are often the first investigative documentation produced as part 

of an investigation. As such, they may provide vivid and timely details agents can refer 

to when completing more concise and formal case reporting and when testifying at trial. 

Although DoD has no standardized policy for creating and retaining investigative case 

notes, each MCIO has unique procedural guidance.
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 19

A review of AFOSI guidance revealed that investigators are encouraged to complete 

thorough, detailed, and legible investigative case notes. These notes are maintained 

with the original case file and retained at the AFOSI File Repository. The effectiveness of 

AFOSI’s policy and procedures regarding investigative case notes was evident when we 

observed lengthy and detailed case notes that were readily available with the respective 

case file. AFOSI guidance requires investigators to maintain all original agents’ notes 

relating to allegations and complaints. The guidance explains how investigators were to 

save and attach agent’s notes to investigative activities documented in their investigative 

management system and procedures for completing, retaining, and storing. 

CID Regulation (CIDR) 195-1, “Criminal Investigation (Operational Procedures),” 

March 22, 2010, version 11, section 7-7c.4, specifies that “[a]ll investigative interview/

crime scene related notes prepared by special agents will be maintained in the case 

folder.” CIDR 195-1, section 5-7c.6, further states that “[s]pecial care will be taken to 

see that any written statement and/or notes are secured in the case file and retained 

for purposes of the Jencks Act.21” This same CID policy also outlines procedures for the 

retention of case notes associated with investigations that take place in deployed areas, 

and how agent’s notes regarding investigations in deployed areas will be forwarded to the 

U.S. Army Crime Records Center. Field Manual 3-19.13, “Law Enforcement Investigations,” 

January 10, 2005, describes the importance of documenting the initial actions and 

observations of the first military policeman to respond to an incident and how they are 

vital in providing information to substantiate investigative considerations. Investigative 

case notes are maintained with the local case file and are destroyed IAW investigative file 

retention standards in CID policy.

NCIS guidance specifies that agents on a Special Agent Afloat (SAA)22 assignment can 

destroy investigative case notes no longer required for administrative/court-martial 

action upon completion/termination of their assignment. However, if administrative/

court-martial action is being considered and/or pending, “rough notes” should be 

forwarded to the homeport NCIS Resident Agency for inclusion in the case file. NCIS 

guidance mandates that accurate and complete investigative documentation, supported 

by investigator notes and other pertinent documentation, obtained during the course of 

an investigation be placed in the case file. NCIS policy requires case activity records 

(CAR), case review records (CRR), agent notes, and investigative plans be kept in the case 

21 The Jencks Act (section 3500, title 18, United States Code [18 U.S.C. § 3500]), requires the government (prosecutor) to 

produce a verbatim statement or report made by a government witness or prospective government witness (other than 

the defendant), but only after the witness has testified. 

22 The NCIS SAA Program was initiated in Europe in March 1967. Since its inception, its purpose has been to provide 

professional investigative support to afloat operational elements of the Department of the Navy throughout the world. 
Finding

20 │ DODIG-2013-091

file while the investigation is open. The case file, CAR, CRR, and case agent’s notes can be 

destroyed, if they are no longer needed, 1 year after the case is closed. NCIS Manual 1, 

Chapter 19, “File Retention and Disposal of Closed Case Law Enforcement and CI/CT/CIO 

Investigations and Security Clearance Adjudication Cases,” October 2007, supplements 

SECNAV M-5210.1 and further defines those NCIS files to be destroyed or retained. NCIS 

Manual 1, Chapter 19, excludes cases “. . . awaiting judicial, administrative or appellate 

action . . .” from the 1-year destruction requirement and requires them to be maintained 

in “Extended Retention” files.

Labeling of CID case notes with the originator’s name, date, place, and case number was 

not always accomplished. AFOSI consistently used a cover sheet to clearly label case agent 

notes in the investigative case file. Additionally, there were disparate levels of ease in 

retrieving case notes when we requested them. The AFOSI case notes were all maintained 

in the investigative case file at the file repository to allow for easy retrieval. The CID 

agent notes were maintained in the case file at the field unit where the investigation was 

conducted. CID agent notes were retrieved in response to our request, with only a few 

exceptions. With the exception of five investigations reviewed, the NCIS case agent notes 

were either destroyed IAW Navy and NCIS policy or not maintained in the case file or in 

the case agent’s possession and therefore, were not retrievable. In a few instances among 

all of the MCIOs, we found notes pertaining to proposed investigative leads annotated 

in case notes that were not accomplished, nor was there additional documentation 

explaining why these leads had not been accomplished. However, when available, case 

notes provided pertinent details of interviews, crime scenes, and other investigative 

activity that was later incorporated into the respective report of investigation.

Demographic and Other Case Data 

In addition to analyzing the cases for compliance with guiding policies, we gleaned 

information related to various topics including: alcohol use by the subject and victim; age 

ranges; pay grades; locations where the offenses occurred; the relationship, if any, between 

the subject and victim; numbers of unrestricted cases from previously restricted reports; 

primary offenses investigated; cases with multiple subjects and victims; comparisons of 

military pay grades between subjects and victims; and various other items. We did not 

draw conclusions concerning the data. The data are for information only and for possible 

future analysis if compared to data gleaned from comparable statistical samples. See 

Appendix C for details.
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 21

Conclusions

Most of the cases we reviewed (445 of 501 cases or 89 percent) met investigative standards 

or did not have significant deficiencies. Eleven percent (56 of 501) of the cases we reviewed 

had significant deficiencies. We returned the cases with significant deficiencies to the 

MCIOs for resolution. A total of 83 cases (17 percent) had no deficiencies. Eighty-one 

percent of the remaining cases (362 of 445) had deficiencies; however, the deficiencies 

did not have a significant impact or an adverse effect on the investigation.

We found 56 of 501 (11 percent) cases had significant deficiencies that likely affected the 

outcome of the investigation. Significant deficiencies included:

• key evidence was not collected from the crime scene, the victim, or the subject;

• crime scene examinations were not completed, not completed thoroughly, or 

not completed before the loss of crucial evidence;

• witness interviews were not thorough or not conducted; and

• subject or victim interviews were not thorough or reinterviews of subject or 

victims did not sufficiently develop new information.

Interviews

Thoroughness and documentation of MCIO investigative interviews need improvement. 

AFOSI needs policy guidance on investigating or explaining inconsistencies in statements 

provided by victims, witnesses, subjects, and suspects. Moreover many MCIO investigations 

did not clearly establish the elements of the offense and did not resolve investigative 

inconsistencies in statements provided by victim(s), witnesses, and subjects/suspects.

The CID process of obtaining written statements in the form of narrative followed by 

questions and answers is the most effective in obtaining the required information from 

victim(s) and in establishing the elements of the offense(s) being investigated.

Collection of Evidence

MCIO policies regarding collection of physical evidence need improvement. CID and 

AFOSI policy guidance does not direct the collection of clothing articles that a victim or 

suspect may have placed on themselves shortly after the assault, if different from the 

clothing worn during the assault. Although NCIS policies recommend collecting these 

items, it is discretionary. NCIS and AFOSI policy regarding the collection of clothing 

articles worn by the victim and suspect during the assault is not directive or authoritative 
Finding

22 │ DODIG-2013-091

and allows investigators discretion as to when and what pieces of physical evidence they 

must collect.

Crime Scene Examination/Search

The policies and supervision regarding crime scene examinations for NCIS and AFOSI are 

not adequate. NCIS policy addresses crime scenes; however, it uses the word “should” 

throughout the guidance and due to this ambiguity, does not specifically require an 

investigator to conduct a crime scene examination. AFOSI lacks crime scene examination 

policy guidance. It has a crime scene manual, but it is a guide and not a policy document. 

MCIO/Legal Coordination and Collaboration

NCIS policy regarding MCIO/legal coordination and collaboration is not adequate. It does 

not address the need for NCIS investigators to notify or coordinate with their servicing 

JA upon initiating an investigation. Further, NCIS policy does not create a requirement 

for continued coordination between investigators and legal personnel throughout the life 

cycle of an investigation.

Report of Investigation Documentation

NCIS and AFOSI can better support action commanders, legal personnel, and other 

customers by providing readily identifiable information regarding the location(s), 

dates, and times of occurrence, as well as offenses under investigation in each report of 

investigation.

Timely Records Check

CID and NCIS policy guidance on records checks needs improvement. CID guidance 

regarding records checks does not provide a definitive timeliness requirement. NCIS 

policy establishes an indirect timeliness requirement that may contribute to the poor 

compliance noted in our review. The NCIS policy that relates to records checks of 

suspects and victims does not have a timeliness requirement. However, NCIS Manual 1, 

Chapter 25, “SSD Report Writing,” January 2010, requires records checks to be included 

in the ROI (Open), that is, required to be produced within 1 day or 3 days, depending 

on the priority of the investigation, and when an investigation is initiated. AFOSI policy 

AFOSIMAN 71‐118, volume 4, “General Investigative Methods,” April 2009, pertaining to 

the completion of records checks is specific and requires investigators to obtain “as much 

detail and background about the investigation as possible before an interview.”
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 23

Investigative Case Notes

CID and NCIS policies regarding the retention of investigative case notes raise both 

practical and legal issues. AFOSI retains case notes permanently, but both CID and NCIS 

dispose of case notes at some point following adjudication and completion of the appeals 

process. We referred this issue to the DoD IG Policy and Programs Division to determine 

the need for DoD policy on the retention of investigative case notes and other internal 

documents, such as the NCIS CAR and CRR, and to determine whether MCIO policies 

comply with Federal law, such as the Jencks Act.

Missing Cases

The process NCIS uses to transfer closed investigative files from field elements to the NCIS 

Headquarters Records Management Division for digitization and subsequent destruction 

of hard copy files needs improvement to preclude the loss of critical criminal record files 

that require permanent retention. NCIS policy establishes the method that case files are 

to be sent, how the Records Management Division confirms receipt of the investigative 

files, and when the copy of the case file maintained by the field unit is to be destroyed. 

Despite the policy guidance, NCIS could not locate two cases requested by the review 

team.

SARC Notifications

In spite of DoD policy that requires SARC notifications in all sexual assault complaints, 

NCIS policy does not require SARCs to be notified. Notwithstanding, NCIS investigators 

documented SARC notifications in 71 of 157 investigations.

Management Comments on the Report and Our 

Response

Some management comments highlighted initiatives enacted by the MCIOs subsequent to 

the completion of our fieldwork and preparation of the draft report. We appreciate the 

efforts undertaken to improve MCIO sexual assault investigations; however, we did not 

modify our report to reflect programmatic changes that occurred after the draft report 

was issued. 

The Director, NCIS, expressed concerns that we evaluated NCIS investigations against DoD 

and NCIS policies that did not exist in 2010, and our report does not reflect the current 

status of NCIS’ adult sexual assault investigation program. We responded by memorandum 

(May 13, 2013) and assured the Director, NCIS, that we relied on the information NCIS 

provided in response to our data call of November 29, 2011, and coordination with NCIS 
Finding

24 │ DODIG-2013-091

representatives to identify the applicable Navy and NCIS policies. We agree with the 

Director’s assertion that our evaluation does not reflect the current status of NCIS’ adult 

sexual assault investigation program. The scope included sexual assault investigations 

closed in 2010. The results provide a snapshot for that timeframe only. We met with 

NCIS representatives to discuss our evaluation of NCIS management comments on 

May 5, 2013. NCIS comments not related to the recommendations are addressed in the 

following sections.

Report Section: Background 

NCIS Comments

The draft report stated “Both NCIS and AFOSI, in accordance with Service policies, 

exercised independent discretion regarding the investigation of a wrongful sexual 

contact, indecent acts, or indecent exposure offenses based on the complexity of the 

case.” NCIS commented that NCIS policy requires the initiation of an investigation into all 

wrongful sexual contact (formerly indecent assaults) allegations. Investigative guidance, 

General Administration memorandum (GEN ADMIN): 23A-0056 provided to all NCIS field 

elements on December 9, 2008, reiterated that “[a]ll allegations of wrongful sexual acts or 

contacts shall be investigated.”

Our Response

Within the scope of our evaluation, Navy and NCIS guidance provided conflicting direction 

relative to the initiation of wrongful sexual contact and indecent assault investigations. 

Navy policy, SECNAV Instruction 5430.107, “Mission and Functions of the Naval Criminal 

Investigative Service,” December 28, 2005, para 3.i., defines a “Major Criminal Offense” 

as “[a]ny offense punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or 

similarly framed federal, state, local, or foreign statutes, by confinement for a term of 

more than one year.” Further, para 7.a., states in part “NCIS is a federal law enforcement 

agency that . . . investigates major criminal offenses, . . . .” The maximum punishment for 

wrongful sexual contact established by the Manual for Courts-Martial, 2008 MCM, Part 

IV, Article 120 f (7), is “[d]ishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, 

and confinement for 1 year.” Therefore, technically, wrongful sexual contact (formerly 

indecent assault) is not a “major criminal offense” as defined by Navy policy, and not 

an NCIS investigative responsibility. This is reinforced by NCIS interim policy: GEN 

ADMIN: 23B-0025, JUN05, which states: “Felony level sexual assaults will continue to be 

investigated/tracked through disposition by NCIS, and minor incidents will be properly 

referred to the appropriate military authority for resolution.” This policy has not been 

rescinded or incorporated into any other NCIS policy. A May 1, 2013, e-mail from NCIS 
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 25

confirmed that this GEN ADMIN: 23B-0025 is still valid. We were not aware of NCIS GEN 

ADMIN: 23A-0056, 2.e., 09DEC08, during the course of this evaluation. 

With the publication of DoDI 5505.18, “Investigation of Adult Sexual Assault in The 

Department of Defense,” January 25, 2013, the MCIOs will investigate all sexual assault 

complaints to include wrongful sexual contact.

Report Section: Victim Interview and Post-Interview 

Deficiencies

NCIS Comments

NCIS disagreed with our finding that the “victim was not issued a DD Form 2701,” in 

111 instances. NCIS commented that its policy, NCIS Manual 3, Chapter 6, section 20.4, m., 

requires documentation of issuance of the DD Form 2701 in the Case Activity Record and 

the Investigative Plan, which are maintained as notes in the original case file.

Our Response

As documented previously in this report, NCIS did not provide case notes (including case 

activity records, case review records, investigative plans, etc.) for our review. IAW NCIS/

Navy policy guidance, they destroyed these items with the case file.

Therefore, we revised the report to state: “In 111 instances, we were unable to verify 

NCIS’ compliance with the issuance of the DD Form 2701, because the case activity 

records, where the information is normally documented, had been destroyed IAW 

SECNAV M-5210.1.”

Report Section: Evidence Deficiencies

NCIS Comments

NCIS did not agree with our finding that in three NCIS investigations they did not submit 

evidence to USACIL. NCIS commented they reviewed the three investigations and 

found that evidence in one case was submitted to USACIL. Further, the remaining two 

investigations involved subjects who claimed the sexual acts were consensual, and IAW 

policy, USACIL will not conduct an analysis when subjects admit to the sexual act but 

claim consent.

Our Response

We reduced the findings from three investigations to two. In one instance, evidence had 

been submitted for DNA examination, but additional evidence, which was probative to 
Finding

26 │ DODIG-2013-091

the investigation, was not subsequently submitted. In the second investigation, we found 

that although the case involved a subject claiming consensual sex, the evidence deemed 

probative was not DNA evidence and should have been submitted. 

Additionally, NCIS’ assertion that USACIL will not accept evidence on cases when 

the subject admits sexual contact but claims consent is not accurate. USACIL has not 

published policies restricting the submission of DNA for analysis when consent was an 

issue. The only policy USACIL was aware of had been issued by CID on February 3, 2005, 

Operational Memorandum 001-05, “Submission of Physical Evidence to Serology Division, 

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) for DNA Examination/Analysis.” 

This policy memorandum stated that USACIL will accept evidence for DNA analysis under 

the following conditions: 

a. The suspect recants his statement.

b. The suspect’s confession/admission is anticipated to 

become inadmissible. This cannot be a “what if”, but a 

documented issue with the confession/admission (i.e., 

no or improper rights advisement, failure to obtain the 

suspect a lawyer when requested, etc).

c. Charges have been preferred for courts-martial or civilian 

court, and the trial counsel, with the explicit approval of 

the Staff Judge Advocate or Chief of Justice, or local civilian 

prosecutor requests that the examination be conducted 

and is needed for trial.

Evidence meeting these exceptions will be forwarded to USACIL 

for examination. The SAC will review the laboratory request. SAC 

reviews will be annotated in either the Agent Activity Summary 

(AAS) or on the actual laboratory request.

NCIS does not have an organizational policy addressing the submission of DNA evidence 

when the subject of a sexual assault allegation claimed that the encounter was consensual. 
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 27

Report Section: Investigative Coordination/Notification 

Deficiencies

NCIS Comments

NCIS disagreed that investigators did not notify the SARC in 86 instances (Table 11). 

NCIS stated that NCIS agents work with SARCs to ensure all victims are assigned a Victim 

Advocate who accompanies the victim during the NCIS interview, if they so desire, but 

NCIS policy, NCIS Manual 3, Chapter 34-4.4, does not require agents to document SARC 

notification in NCIS Reports of Investigation.

Our Response

DoDI 6495.02, para E4.3.1, requires the SARC be notified of all incidents of reported sexual 

assault. The SARC, in turn, will assign a Victim Advocate to assist the victim. 

We revised Table 11 in the NCIS column on the SARC notification row to reflect “N/A”, 

and we revised Table Note 3 to reflect that although neither Navy nor NCIS policies 

require SARC notifications, they are required by DoD policy. Notwithstanding, we found 

documentation that NCIS personnel notified a SARC in 71 of 157 investigations.

In addition, we added a recommendation that the Director, NCIS, revise policies to coincide 

with DoD policy requirements and require documentation of SARC notifications in the 

case file or investigative report.

Report Section: Investigative and Administrative 

Documentation Deficiencies

NCIS Comments

NCIS disagrees that it was deficient in 141 investigations for supervisor reviews 

(Table 12). NCIS does not require case reviews to be documented in the ROI. The case 

reviews are documented in the case activity record, which is maintained in the original 

case file as notes. NCIS does not require notes to be sent to NCISHQ. The field case files 

are destroyed 1 year after a case is closed, or, with legal authorization, upon completion 

of the appeal process if the investigation resulted in a conviction. As this review involved 

investigations initiated during 2010; notes were no longer available for review.

IAW NCIS Manual 1, Chapter 19, section 19-8.1 and 19-8.1(a), NCIS stated that the 

FO [field office] and NCISRA [NCIS resident agency] are the 

primary field repositories for closed investigations and operations. 
Finding

28 │ DODIG-2013-091

. . . The FO and NCISRA shall retain files on closed investigations, 

operational, and collection matters to include specific phase 

Polygraph Examination cases for a period not to exceed one year 

as prescribed in SECNAV M-5210.1. 

At the field level, this includes agent notes and other material (for example, original 

correspondence). The Manual states, “Exceptions include cases awaiting judicial, 

administrative, or appellate action . . . .”

Our Response

As a result of not being able to verify that the reviews were accomplished, we modified 

Table 12, under the NCIS column on the pertinent line to reflect “N/O” [not observable] 

and revised the report by adding Table Note 2. 

Report Section: Investigative Case Notes 

NCIS Comments

NCIS did not agree that labeling of NCIS case notes with the originator’s name, date, place, 

and case number was not always accomplished. The case notes were not available for this 

review due to NCIS’ policy of maintaining the notes with the original case file in the field 

office and the destruction policy, as previously noted.

In accordance with NCIS policy, NCIS Manual 1, Chapter 19, sections 19-8.1 and 19-8.1(a), 

the 

FO and NCISRA are the primary field repositories for closed 

investigations and operations . . . . The FO and NCISRA shall retain 

files on closed investigations, operational, and collection matters 

to include specific phase Polygraph Examination cases for a period 

not to exceed one year, as prescribed in SECNAV M-5210.1. 

At the field level, this includes agent notes and other material (for example, original 

correspondence). The Manual also states, “Exceptions include cases awaiting judicial, 

administrative, or appellate action . . . .”

Our Response

In response to our data call memorandum, NCIS provided case notes related to only five 

investigations. Our finding was based on only that material. Due to the small sample 

reviewed, we removed that portion of our finding related to NCIS. 
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 29

Report Section: Investigative Case Notes 

NCIS Comments

NCIS did not agree with our conclusion that NCIS retention of investigative case notes 

raises a legal issue. They stated that NCIS is in full compliance with legal requirements 

established by the Jencks Act because notes are maintained with the original case file 

throughout the life of the investigation, to include the appeal process for investigations 

that result in a criminal conviction (NCIS Manual 1, Chapter 19, section 19-8).

Our Response

NCIS’ assertion of being in full compliance with the Jencks Act is incorrect. Further 

evaluation of the data collected has revealed that case agent notes for five investigations 

under appellate review were not provided for our review. Four of the investigations we 

reviewed are still under appellate review, and the fifth case completed appellate review 

subsequent to the conclusion of our case review. 

In response to our data call memorandum, NCIS provided notes and materials associated 

to only five investigations. We were informed that all other notes and case review records 

were destroyed IAW policy. Based on that assertion, we conclude that NCIS improperly 

destroyed case documentation. 

We stand by our conclusion that NCIS policy on retention of investigative case notes raises 

a legal issue.

Recommendations, MCIO Comments, and Our 

Response

Added Recommendations

We added Recommendation 9 for NCIS to require the notification of SARCs in all reported 

sexual assault investigations and document the notification within the investigative files. 

1. Adequacy of Investigations

We recommend that the Director and Commanders of the Military Criminal Investigative 

Organizations emphasize thorough and timely completion of all sexual assault 

investigations to ensure that all investigations are completed as required by DoD, Military 

Service, and command regulatory guidance.
Finding

30 │ DODIG-2013-091

CID Comments

The Commander, CID, agreed with our recommendation. CID has issued guidance to all 

field elements re-emphasizing the need to conduct timely and thorough sexual assault 

investigations, noting the comments and recommendations provided in the report.

NCIS Comments

The Director, NCIS, agreed with our recommendation. NCIS emphasizes the thorough and 

timely completion of all NCIS investigations. The message of “Operational Excellence” as it 

has been referred to within NCIS, permeates throughout all NCIS investigative disciplines 

and has been a consistent message to field and headquarters components. Additionally, 

in recent years NCIS has implemented enhancements to its management oversight/

inspection processes. The Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) Program is used to assess field 

performance and adherence to “Operational Excellence,” focusing on investigative quality, 

timeliness, and compliance with NCIS policy and standards. SAVs are initiated by the NCIS 

Deputy Director at his/her discretion. The Quality Assurance Visit Program is a program 

in which the NCIS geographic executive assistant directors for Atlantic, Pacific, and Global 

Operations conduct regularly scheduled visits to field offices to assess investigative 

quality, timeliness, and compliance with NCIS policy and standards.

AFOSI Comments

The Commander, AFOSI, agreed with our recommendation. Sexual assault investigations 

have been an AFOSI Commander’s special interest item (SII) for more than a year and 

have received significant, ongoing, high-level attention across the Command. In June 

2012, Commander, AFOSI, published a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) directing all AFOSI 

agents to increase focus and attention on improving the sufficiency and timeliness of 

AFOSI’s sexual assault investigations. The Commander, AFOSI, directed that all sexual 

assault investigations be reviewed and approved for investigative sufficiency before the 

final investigative report is published. The Commander, AFOSI, repeated this message 

through 2012 and into 2013 at leadership forums and commander’s calls. In December 

2012, the Commander, AFOSI, published a second NOTAM to inform field agents AFOSI 

would soon begin investigating abusive/aggravated sexual contact allegations and again 

communicate the importance of urgently and sufficiently investigating all allegations of 

sexual misconduct and ensuring that the facts are accurately documented. In addition, 

in January 2012, AFOSI initiated a headquarters AFOSI case review process to assess 

investigative sufficiency. 
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 31

Our Response

We recognize and applaud the MCIOs’ commitment to timely and thorough sexual 

assault investigations. NCIS implementation of “Operational Excellence” coupled with 

its SAV program illustrates its recognized responsibility for improving the investigative 

processes for the organization. We also acknowledge AFOSI’s efforts to highlight the 

significance of sexual assault investigations by designating the crime of sexual assault 

as an AFOSI Commander’s SII for over a year. It is clear that the MCIOs understand the 

impact that the quality of their sexual assault investigations has on the Department. No 

further comments are required.

2. Interviews

a. We recommend that the Director and Commanders of the Military 

Criminal Investigative Organizations place increased emphasis on 

interview thoroughness through training, supervision, and policy 

improvements. 

CID Comments 

The Commander, CID, agreed with our recommendation. CID has issued guidance to all 

its field elements re-emphasizing the need to conduct timely and thorough sexual assault 

investigations. 

NCIS Comments 

The Director, NCIS, agreed with our recommendation. NCIS acknowledges interview 

and interrogation techniques are central to the success of any investigations. The NCIS 

Training Academy dedicates approximately 75 hours to interview and interrogation 

techniques: 25 hours during the Criminal Investigations Training Program (CITP) and 

50 hours during Special Agent Basic Training Program (SABTP). NCIS has also partnered 

with the U.S. Army to further develop and expand the USA Advanced Sexual Assault Course 

to include NCIS investigative perspective and practices. Currently, NCIS personnel attend 

training at Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) and Fort Leonard Wood.

AFOSI Comments 

The Commander, AFOSI, agreed with our recommendation. AFOSI stated it has improved 

the interview training provided to its agents. AFOSI has taught the cognitive interview 

(CI) technique since August 2012, at the behest of AFOSI’s operational psychologists, 

in its advanced Sex Crimes Investigations Training Program course. AFOSI claims the 

CI technique, backed by many years of peer-reviewed scientific research, is expected 
Finding

32 │ DODIG-2013-091

to empower sex crimes victims and improve their ability to provide more detailed 

information, which should enhance the Air Force’s ability to pursue appropriate legal 

action in these cases. Further, the FLETC is planning to incorporate the CI technique 

into the initial skills training course attended by all AFOSI agent trainees. AFOSI are also 

teaching CI in our Advanced General Crimes Investigations Course, primarily attended 

by unit superintendents who oversee field investigations. Superintendents will also be 

given the tools to provide the training to field agents they supervise and to assess its 

proper use. Also, AFOSI has begun sending agents, who are assigned to installations 

with a high prevalence of sex crimes, to attend FLETC’s Advanced Interviewing for Law 

Enforcement Investigators Training Program. Finally, in 2012, AFOSI incorporated a 

4-week interviewing and interrogation block into its Basic Extension Program. 

Our Response

The MCIO’s comments are responsive to our recommendation. No further comments are 

required.

b. We recommend that the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 

and the Commander, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, evaluate 

the benefits of using the combination of narrative and question and 

answer interview format to help ensure that facts and circumstances are 

documented thoroughly. 

NCIS Comments

The Director, NCIS, agreed with our recommendation and recognizes the combination of 

narrative and question and answer interview format and does not prohibit its use. There 

is no plan at this time to effect a change for taking statements, but NCIS will continue to 

emphasize the requirement for thorough statements regardless of the format used.

AFOSI Comments 

The Commander, AFOSI, agreed with our recommendation. AFOSI has assessed the issue 

and made a research-informed decision not to use a question and answer format in the 

written statements obtained from subjects, victims and witnesses, based on input from 

our investigative psychologists and judge advocates. AFOSI stated that a more open, less 

suggestive questioning style is more appropriate to all interviews and interrogations. In 

addition, AFOSI policy directs agents to videotape all subject interviews. Videotaping 

subject interviews ensures both the exact words and context are accurately documented. 

AFOSI stated that its current interviewing style, together with written agent notes and 
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 33

recorded subject interviews, provides the best method for conducting and documenting 

interviews.

Our Response

NCIS and AFOSI management comments are responsive. Both agencies evaluated their 

current policies regarding the use of a combined narrative and question and answer 

statement style as recommended. Although a combined narrative and question and 

answer style statement will not be prohibited by either organization, they assessed 

that their current style for taking statements is a more efficient means for obtaining 

information through written statements. No further comments are required.

c. We recommend that the Commander, Air Force Office of Special 

Investigations, evaluate current policy and enhance its guidance on 

investigating subject/suspect alibis and the resolution of significant 

inconsistencies between statements of victims, witnesses, subjects, and 

suspects.

AFOSI Comments 

The Commander, AFOSI, agreed with our recommendation and believes its current policy 

and procedures for scoping investigations to the facts and circumstance of each case is 

appropriate for conducting investigatively sufficient cases. AFOSI has no specific policy 

regarding investigating subject/suspect “alibis,” per se. Investigating the validity of a 

subject/suspect’s alibi is addressed as part of a complete, properly scoped investigation 

based on the information and circumstances involved in each case, including possible 

defenses the accused may offer. AFOSI’s requirement for close coordination with Air Force 

JAG personnel throughout the lifecycle of investigations further ensures any anticipated 

alibi is addressed during the investigation. AFOSI does not feel it needs additional policy 

specifically pertaining to investigating subject alibis.

Our Response

AFOSI comments are responsive. AFOSI evaluated our recommendation and found 

its current policy sufficient to meet its investigative mission. We recognize the newly 

implemented practice of reviewing and evaluating 15 percent of its closed cases monthly 

may reduce or eliminate our concerns with subject/suspect alibis or inconsistencies 

between statements of victims, witnesses, suspects, or subjects during the course of their 

investigations. No further comments are required.
Finding

34 │ DODIG-2013-091

3. Collection of Evidence

We recommend that the Director and Commanders of the Military Criminal 

Investigative Organizations.

a. Evaluate their existing policies and enhance their guidance regarding 

the collection of clothing worn by suspects and victims subsequent to a 

sexual assault. 

CID Comments 

The Commander, CID, agreed with our recommendation. CID has issued guidance to all 

its field elements re-emphasizing the need to conduct timely and thorough sexual assault 

investigations.

NCIS Comments 

NCIS disagreed and stated that as the current policy reflects that clothing worn by the 

victim or left at the scene by the subject should be seized vice must be seized. This is 

particularly important if the sexual assault just occurred and/or if the clothing has not 

been washed. Discretion must be given if the clothing has been washed unless required 

for corroboration purposes. 

AFOSI Comments

The Commander, AFOSI, disagreed with our recommendation. AFOSI stated that the 

best approach is for agents to assess and identify items with evidentiary value, through 

mandatory expert forensic science consultation, in all sexual assault cases, early in an 

investigation. This approach better ensures all items that may have evidentiary value are 

identified and prioritized for collection in consideration of the facts and circumstances of 

the incident. In cases when a report is made soon after the assault, the clothing a victim 

changed into or worn by the victim at the time of the sexual assault medical examination 

would be seized as part of a Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE). In such 

instances, the clothing is collected as evidence and, in turn, agents must consider locating 

and seizing the clothing worn by the victim at the time of the assault. In cases involving 

a delayed report, the clothing a victim changed into may have since been washed and no 

longer offer a reasonable likelihood of containing evidence. Likewise, AFOSI agents are 

also trained to consider, locate, and seize the clothing the suspect wore and the clothing 

he/she changed into after the assault as these clothing items may too contain evidence 

and should, therefore, be located and seized. AFOSI will soon be publishing an updated 

crime scene manual that discusses the evidentiary value of various types of evidence. 

This manual, along with the existing mandatory expert forensic science consultation in 
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 35

every sex crimes investigation, will further assist agents in identifying and collecting the 

right evidence, based upon the unique facts and circumstances of each case.

Our Response 

MCIO management comments are responsive to the recommendation. Both NCIS and 

AFOSI evaluated their processes as recommended and asserted that their current 

guidance sufficiently addresses the issue of collecting clothing worn by both the subject 

and victim subsequent to an alleged assault. They maintain that discretion on whether 

to seize items of evidence is an important aspect of the criminal investigative process. No 

further comments are required.

b. Conduct new or additional refresher training to highlight the critical 

nature physical evidence plays in sexual assault investigations and the 

subsequent prosecutions. 

CID Comments 

The Commander, CID, agreed with our recommendation. 

NCIS Comments 

The Director, NCIS, agreed with our recommendation. NCIS has continuously provided 

training in conducting sexual assault investigations, which includes the significance of 

physical evidence. In addition, NCIS has partnered with the U.S. Army to further develop 

and expand the USA Advanced Sexual Assault Course to include NCIS investigative 

perspective and practices. Currently, NCIS personnel attend training at FLETC and Fort 

Leonard Wood.

AFOSI Comments 

The Commander, AFOSI, agreed with our recommendation and is currently altering its 

annual sexual assault investigations refresher training to highlight it. AFOSI anticipates 

that the revised refresher training will be completed by September 1, 2013.

Our Response

MCIO comments are responsive to our recommendation. No further comments are 

required.

c. Add evidence collection in sexual assault investigations as a special 

interest item during command inspections for the next 2 fiscal years at 

all levels. 
Finding

36 │ DODIG-2013-091

CID Comments 

The Commander, CID, agreed with our recommendation.

NCIS Comments 

The Director, NCIS, disagreed with our recommendation and stated that evidence 

collection in all investigations is by procedure already part of the review process from 

the first-line supervisor review to the NCIS IG inspection process. NCIS will continue to 

ensure all evidence is handled in accordance to policy and procedure.

AFOSI Comments 

The Commander, AFOSI, disagreed with our recommendation. However, AFOSI agreed with 

the need for additional, special emphasis on ensuring that the right evidence is collected 

and processed in sexual assault cases, relational to the probative value the evidence might 

have based on the unique circumstances in each case. Therefore, in January 2012, AFOSI 

created the Performance Management Branch (PMB), a team of seven seasoned agents 

charged with reviewing a minimum of 15 percent of closed cases monthly to ensure 

investigative sufficiency. The PMB, using updated case review checklists, evaluates 

whether investigations meet a comprehensive list of requirements, to include whether 

agents collected all probative evidence. Reviewers compare the specific guidance offered 

to agents by their servicing forensic science consultant

Our Response 

AFOSI comments are responsive and meet the intent of the recommendation. On inquiry, 

NCIS provided details on “Operational Excellence” efforts published in December 2011 

and inspection program changes implemented in November 2010, which for the most part 

postdate the scope of this evaluation. The “Operational Excellence” program amplifies 

NCIS’ investigative oversight responsibilities at strategic and tactical levels; specifically 

addressing field unit execution of the NCIS mission and thoroughness of investigations. 

The Deputy Director emphasized sexual assault investigations and “SAC [Special Agent In 

Charge] Interest” and “functional awareness” of the overall status and timeliness of these 

investigations. In addition, during FY 2011, NCIS implemented a new inspection schedule 

for its management visit program. These inspections target a number of areas across the 

NCIS mission spectrum to include case reviews and evidence processes. Although NCIS 

disagreed with our recommendation, we find the steps taken subsequent to the period of 

our evaluation satisfy the intent of our recommendation. Therefore, NCIS comments are 

responsive. No further comments are required. 
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 37

4. Crime Scene Examination/Search

We recommend that the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the 

Commander, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, evaluate their policies and 

enhance their supervision regarding their agents’ response to known and available 

crime scenes and evaluate the necessity for conducting a crime scene examination 

for all sexual assault investigations. 

NCIS Comments

The Director, NCIS, agreed with our recommendation and will continue to place emphasis 

on the requirement to conduct crime scene documentation for delayed sexual assault 

reports. NCIS is unable to place a mandate for a crime scene examination for all sexual 

assault investigations because agents, at times, do not have access to the scene because of 

the location (for example, a foreign location such a port visit or combat zone).

AFOSI Comments 

The Commander, AFOSI, agreed with our recommendation. On March 1, 2013, AFOSI 

added into policy the requirement that all crime scenes, when possible, must be located 

and documented (photographed/sketched) to accurately convey the location of the 

incident.

Our Response

NCIS and AFOSI’s comments are responsive. Our observations do not include instances 

when the reasons for not conducting crime scene examinations provide well-documented, 

justifiable reasons. In instances, such as the examples provided in NCIS comments, the 

lack of a crime scene examination or validation should be well-documented and justified. 

No further comments are required.

5. MCIO/Judge Advocate General Coordination and 

Collaboration

We recommend that the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, evaluate 

its current policy and enhance its guidance regarding the timely notification/

coordination with servicing judge advocate(s) upon the initiation of sexual assault 

cases, as well as the continued coordination with the servicing judge advocate(s) 

until final case disposition.
Finding

38 │ DODIG-2013-091

NCIS Comments 

The Director, NCIS, agreed with our recommendation. NCIS stated that NCIS requires 

investigators to notify or coordinate with the “convening authority” upon initiating a case, 

which often involves “SJA” for the command.

They further commented that NCIS policy does not require notification or coordination 

with the trial service office. NCIS commented that its current policy regarding “resolved 

criminal investigations” with military personnel identified as subjects or co-subjects, 

NCIS-3, Chapter 6-16.2., requires NCIS agents to brief “the military commander who has 

disciplinary responsibility for the individuals; this briefing will be documented in a ROI 

(INTERIM).” NCIS did not disagree with the recommendation, but did not agree with 

the draft report comments as written. Regardless, NCIS are currently changing its policy 

to ensure that all investigations will be coordinated with the prosecutive agency upon 

initiation of an investigation. 

Our Response

We did not change our recommendation based on NCIS comments. However, we found 

NCIS deficient in 57 investigations for not coordinating with trial counsel. In arriving 

at this decision, we note NCIS Manual 3, Chapter 6, section 6-2.3, “Investigative Theory 

and Procedures,” December 2006, states that “strong consideration should be given to 

early and continuous contact with trial counsel or other appropriate attorneys when 

conducting an investigation.” As written, NCIS policy allows for discretion regarding trial 

counsel contacts. Therefore, we revised our findings to read “although NCIS policy does 

not require coordination with trial counsel, it ‘strongly encourages’ early and continuous 

contact with trial counsel or other appropriate attorney. NCIS documented such contacts 

in 100 instances in the 157 reports we reviewed.” Although NCIS did not agree with our 

evaluation of its processes, NCIS intends to establish a requirement that is responsive to 

our recommendation. No further comments are required.

6. Report of Investigation Documentation

We recommend that the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the 

Commander, Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

a. Ensure information related to the location(s) of incident, dates and 

times of occurrence, dates and times the incident(s) were reported, 

offenses under investigation, and other pertinent administrative data 

are properly documented within reports of investigations.
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 39

NCIS Comments 

The Director, NCIS, agreed with our recommendation and stated that emphasis has been, 

and will continue to be placed on ensuring all reports contain thorough and complete 

information. IAW NCIS Manual 3, Chapter 25, section 25.1-5.2(a-c), “ROI (OPEN),” the NCIS 

Report of Investigation (ROI) Open is primarily an internal NCIS document that reports 

the receipt of information, which serves to predicate the initiation of an investigation. 

The Manual states:

The first paragraph of the Narrative portion should clearly state 

the reason for case initiation; i.e., reactive, reciprocal, details, and 

disposition, and if applicable, the relevant statute(s) that is/are 

suspected to have been violated. The ROI (OPEN) should answer, 

at minimum; who, what, where, when, why and/or how the offense 

was committed.”

AFOSI Comments 

The Commander, AFOSI, agreed with our recommendation and stated that the location(s) 

of the incident, dates and times of occurrence, dates and times the incident(s) were 

reported, offenses under investigation, and other pertinent administrative data should be 

properly documented within ROIs.

Our Response

NCIS and AFOSI comments are responsive to our recommendation. No further comments 

are required.

b. Evaluate the benefits of preparing a report of investigation title page that 

includes the location(s) of incident, dates and times of occurrence, dates 

and times the incident(s) were reported, offenses under investigation, 

and other pertinent administrative data.

NCIS Comments 

The Director, NCIS, disagreed with our recommendation and stated that the reporting 

system used by NCIS satisfies the requirements of both its military and civilian customers. 

The information is contained in the Executive Summary, which is provided in every report 

upon initiation.
Finding

40 │ DODIG-2013-091

AFOSI Comments 

The Commander, AFOSI, agreed with our recommendation and stated that it will further 

evaluate the benefits of preparing a ROI title page that includes all pertinent administrative 

data listed by DoD OIG. However, AFOSI stated that its preliminary assessment is that this 

requirement is not necessary. AFOSI ROIs typically contain all the information identified 

by DoD OIG. Additionally, action authorities, the appropriate base legal office, and other 

base authorities are provided updates throughout the investigation. The updates include 

the case details cited in the recommendation.

Our Response

NCIS and AFOSI comments are responsive to our recommendation. No further comments 

are required.

7. Timely Records Checks

We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, 

and Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, evaluate their existing policy and 

enhance their guidance regarding timely completion of records checks to ensure 

they adequately support investigations. 

CID Comments 

The Commander, CID, agreed and stated that CID has issued guidance to all its field elements 

re-emphasizing the need to conduct timely and thorough sexual assault investigations, 

noting the comments and recommendations provided in the report.

NCIS Comments 

The Director, NCIS, disagreed with our recommendation. NCIS asserts that its current 

policies are adequate. IAW NCIS-1, Chapter 25, section 25.1-5.2.d. “Records Check,” “[w]

hen a NCIS investigation is initiated, it is the responsibility of the controlling field office to 

conduct complete records check of all subjects, co-subjects, and victims.” These database 

checks are reported in the ROI (OPEN), which must be submitted within 3 business days 

of initiation of the investigation (OPEN).

Our Response

CID comments are responsive to our recommendation. No further CID comments are 

required. 
Finding

DODIG-2013-091 │ 41

We believe NCIS guidance on timeliness of records checks needs improvement to enhance 

results. NCIS Manual 1, Chapter 25, section 25.1-5.2.d., states “[t]hese database checks 

should be conducted at the earliest stage in an investigation with their results reflected 

in the ROI (OPEN).” The time requirements are outlined in NCIS Manual 1, Chapter 25, 

section 25.1-9.1.b., which establishes criteria for priority (I) and (II) investigations, i.e., 1 

and 3 business days, respectively. We believe the records check policy should explicitly 

state the time requirement. Unclear policy guidance may contribute to the low compliance 

level found in the sample. We stand by our recommendation as written. We request 

further comments from NCIS in response to the final report.

8. Missing Cases

We recommend that the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

a. Ensure the full accountability of all NCIS investigative files.

b. Correct policies and procedures to preclude the loss of additional 

records.

NCIS Comment

The Director, NCIS, agreed with our recommendation and stated that NCIS has policy to 

ensure accountability of NCIS files and will ensure set polices are adhered to in order to 

avoid the loss of any case files.

Our Response

NCIS comments are responsive to our recommendation. No further comments are 

required.

9. Sexual Assault Response Coordinator Notifications.

We recommend that the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, develop 

policy that requires its investigators to: 

a. Notify the Sexual Assault Response Coordinators in all reported sexual 

assault investigations.

b. Document the notifications within the investigative file.

Management Comments Required

We request that NCIS provide comments on this recommendation. 
Appendices

42 │ DODIG-2013-091

Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this review from February 2012 through September 2012. Our work 

included a review of adult sexual assault investigations completed (closed and 

adjudicated) in 2010 for investigative sufficiency and compliance with DoD, Service, and 

MCIO policy requirements effective at the time of investigation while noting observations 

and deficiencies.

We conducted the review in accordance with the professional standards for evaluation 

established by the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our observations and 

recommendations based on our objectives. We used professional judgment in making 

observations and recommendations. 

We reviewed the MCIOs’ sexual assault investigative policy guidance to assess the extent 

to which they addressed investigative activity expected to be conducted in response 

to sexual assault reports. We familiarized ourselves with tasks expected in any sexual 

assault investigation. 

At the onset of the review, we sent a data call memorandum to each MCIO requesting 

the number of sexual assault investigations with adult victims closed and/or adjudicated 

in 2010 to establish the population. We worked with the DoD IG Quantitative Methods 

Division to determine a simple random sample number of cases to review based on a 

desired level of reliability giving us our sample size. The sample size was selected from 

the population using a 90-percent confidence level, 50-percent probability of occurrence 

at a 5-percent precision level. We excluded 81 cases from the review for one of three 

reasons: 1) the investigation was determined to be a monitor-type investigation in which 

another investigative entity (civilian police agency) conducted the bulk of the investigative 

activity; 2) adjudication of the case extended into 2011 (therefore, the case was not closed 

in 2010 even though the investigative activity was complete); or 3) the victim in the case 

was a juvenile rather than an adult victim. Additionally, the NCIS was unable to locate two 

cases we identified for review in our sample selection; neither the hard copy file nor the 

digital copy could be located. Our final total of cases to review was 501 cases.
Appendices

DODIG-2013-091 │ 43

The review of the adult sexual assault investigations was based on offenses defined 

under Article 120 UCMJ23 as listed in the table and Article 125, forcible sodomy (of adult 

victims). The child sexual assault offenses are grayed-out but are included in the Table 

for edification. A limited number of case types (such as wrongful sexual contact) were 

not routinely investigated by all MCIOs during this period; however, they fell under the 

purview of this review. 

Table. Article 120 Sexual Assault Offenses

Offense/Manual for Courts-Martial, Part IV, Paragraph 45

Aggravated sexual assault of a child 

Aggravated sexual abuse of a child 

Abusive sexual contact with a child 

Indecent liberties with a child 

Rape 

Wrongful sexual contact 

Aggravated sexual assault 

Aggravated sexual contact 

Abusive sexual contact

Indecent Acts

Pandering

Aggravated sexual assault of a child over 12 

Aggravated abuse of a child 

Abusive sexual contact with a child over 12 

Indecent liberties with a child 

We developed a sexual assault case review protocol for each MCIO based on each MCIO’s 

investigative policies and procedures. The review protocols addressed, in detail, all 

investigative steps required to complete a thorough sexual assault investigation ensuring 

compliance with applicable DoD, Service, and MCIO policies that were in effect during the 

life of the investigation. 

In executing the review, we went to AFOSI and CID headquarters to review their 

investigations. NCIS provided its investigations electronically for us to review; 

therefore, we reviewed the files at DoD IG headquarters. In conducting the review, we 

noted observations and deficiencies found in the investigative files. An investigation 

23 Definitions in the 2007 and 2008 version of the UCMJ were in effect at the time of this review.
Appendices

44 │ DODIG-2013-091

was classified as significantly deficient if investigative steps or an activity was not 

undertaken that the reviewer believed to have, or likely would have had, a significant 

impact and/or resulted in an adverse outcome of the investigation. Not all significantly 

deficient investigations warranted reopening. An example of a significantly deficient 

investigation that should be reopened would be an investigation that failed to fully 

identify and interview all potential victims. In this example, identifying and interviewing 

additional victims may lead to subsequent prosecution of an offender. The reopening of 

an investigation would not be expected or beneficial when the MCIO failed to conduct 

time-critical investigative steps or failed to conduct them according to established policy. 

Examples include conducting telephone subject and victim interviews or failing to collect 

crucial evidence from a crime scene. These investigative steps are time sensitive and the 

opportunity to complete these steps cannot be replicated during the course of reopening 

the investigation. Although the failure to properly interview the victim, subject, or collect 

crucial evidence had a significant impact and/or adverse outcome of the investigation, 

reopening the investigation cannot overcome these errors.
Appendices

DODIG-2013-091 │ 45

Appendix B

References

Executive Order/Directive

None.

Federal Law

Public Law 108-375, “Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2005,” October 28, 2004. 

DoD Issuances

DoD Directive (DoDD) 5106.01, “Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG 

DoD),” April 13, 2006 and April 20, 2012. 

DoDD 6495.01, “Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program,” October 6, 

2005 and January 23, 2012. 

DoDD 1030.01, “Victim and Witness Assistance,” April 13, 2004. 

DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5505.18, “Investigation of Adult Sexual Assault in the Department 

of Defense,” January 25, 2013. 

DoDI 5505.03, “Initiation of Investigations by Defense Criminal Investigative 

Organizations,” June 21, 2002 and March 24, 2011. 

DoDI 5505.14, “Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Collection Requirements for Criminal 

Investigations,” May 27, 2010.

DoDI 5505.11, “Fingerprint Card and Final Disposition Report Submission Requirements,” 

June 20, 2006 and July 9, 2010.

DoDI 6495.02, “Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures,” June 23, 

2006. 

DoDI 1030.02, “Victim and Witness Assistance Procedures,” June 4, 2004. 

DoDI 5505.07, “Titling and Indexing Subjects of Criminal Investigations in the Department 

of Defense,” January 27, 2003. 
Appendices

46 │ DODIG-2013-091

Service Issuances

Army Regulation (AR) 27-10, “Military Justice,” November 16, 2005 and October 3, 2011.

AR 195-2, “Criminal Investigation Activities,” May 15, 2009, and July 8, 2010. 

AR 600-20, “Army Command Policy,” November 30, 2009.

AR 195-5, “Evidence Procedures,” June 25, 2007.

AR 190-45, “Law Enforcement Reporting,” March 30, 2007. 

Army Field Manual (FM) 3-19.13, “Law Enforcement Investigations,” January 10, 2005.

Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1752.1B, “Sexual Assault Victim 

Intervention (SAVI) Program,” December 29, 2006.

Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5800.14A, “Notice of Release of Military 

Offenders Convicted of Sex Offenses or Crimes Against Minors,” May 24, 2005.

SECNAVINST 5430.107, “Mission and Functions of the NCIS,” December 28, 2005.

SECNAVINST 1752.4A, “Sexual Assault Prevention and Response,” December 1, 2005.

Secretary of the Navy Manual 5210.1, “Department of the Navy Records Management 

Program, Records Management Manual,” November 2007 (Rev.).

Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-6001, “Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) 

Program,” September 29, 2008 and October 14, 2010.

AFI 51-201, “Administration of Military Justice,” December 2007 with February 2010 

change.

Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 36-60, “Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) 

Program,” March 28, 2008.

AFI 71-101 Volume 1, “Criminal Investigations,” December 1, 1999.

AFPD 71-1, “Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence,” July 1, 1999.
Appendices

DODIG-2013-091 │ 47

MCIO Issuances

CID Regulation 195-1, “Criminal Investigation (Operational Procedures),” June 3, 2009 

and March 22, 2010.

CID Pamphlet 195-10, “Crime Scene Handbook,” June 30, 1999.

NCIS Manual for Investigations, “NCIS 3,” July 2008.

NCIS Manual for Administration, “NCIS 1,” July 2008.

AFOSIMAN 71-121, “Processing and Reporting Investigative Matters,” January 13, 2009. 

AFOSI Handbook (AFOSIH) 71-105, “An Agent’s Guide to Conducting and Documenting 

Investigations,” March 9, 2009.

AFOSI Manual (AFOSIMAN) 71-118 Volume 4, “General Investigative Methods & Evidence,” 

April 30, 2009.

AFOSIMAN 71-122 Volume 1, “Criminal Investigations,” May 29, 2008.

AFOSI Instruction (AFOSII) 35-101, “Public Affairs Policies & Procedures,” October 6, 

2006.

AFOSIMAN 71-124, “Crime Scene Handbook,” September 30, 2003.

AFOSIMAN 71-103 Volume 3, “Technical Services,” August 8, 2003.

AFOSIMAN 71-103 Volume 2, “Forensic Sciences,” December 16, 2002.

AFOSIMAN 71-103 Volume 1, “Forensic Psychophysiological Detection of Deception 

Program,” August 29, 2000.

AFOSII 71-107, “Processing Investigative Matters,” March 15, 2000.

Supplemental Guidance

Army MEDCOM Regulation 40-36, “Medical Facility Management of Sexual Assault,” 

January 21, 2009.
Appendices

48 │ DODIG-2013-091

Appendix C

Case Detail Data

On request, the MCIOs provided a list of sexual assault cases totaling 2,263, which made 

up our population. We, in turn, forwarded the list to the DoD OIG QMD. The QMD analysts 

applied survey design methods to develop appropriate documentation or electronic 

instruments for collecting information. They are used as a specialized support element 

that provides detailed analysis tailored to specific projects. We asked QMD to provide 

a simple random sample of cases using a 90-percent confidence level and a 5-percent 

precision rate. They randomly selected a sample consisting of 584 cases (CID – 216, 

NCIS – 195, and AFOSI – 173) from the lists provided by the MCIOs for review. We provided 

each MCIO with a list of the randomly selected cases, which they made or attempted to 

make available for our review.

We excluded 81 cases from the review for one of three reasons: 1) the investigation 

was determined to be a monitor-type investigation in which another investigative entity 

conducted the bulk of the investigative activity; 2) adjudication of the case extended into 

2011 (therefore, the case was not closed in 2010 even though the investigative activity 

was complete); or 3) the only victim in the case was a juvenile rather than an adult victim. 

Additionally, NCIS was unable to locate (either the hard or digital copies) two cases. Our 

final total of cases to review was 501 cases. Of the 501 cases reviewed, 83 cases were 

determined to have no investigative deficiencies (reflected in Table C.1.). 

Table C.1. Cases with No Investigative Deficiencies

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

83 41 20 22

Of the 501 cases reviewed, 418 cases (CID – 157, NCIS – 137, and AFOSI – 124) contained 

investigative deficiencies. Investigative deficiencies were broken down into six 

subcategories: interview and post-interview deficiencies, evidence deficiencies, crime 

scene documentation and processing deficiencies, subject-focused actions, investigative 

coordination/notification, and documentation (investigative and administrative). The 

significance of each deficiency noted depended on the deficiencies’ detriment to the 

successful resolution of an investigation. Regardless of the category or total number of 

deficiencies within an investigation, a case annotated as having a single deficiency in any 

category was deemed deficient. Table C.2 depicts the cases with investigative deficiencies.
Appendices

DODIG-2013-091 │ 49

Table C.2. Cases with Investigative Deficiencies 

(Includes cases reopened following our review)

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

418 157 137 124

The remaining cases (362) had one or more deficiencies. Table C.2.a. depicts the 

breakdown of cases by MCIO.

Table C.2.a. Cases with Investigative Deficiencies

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

362 144 111 107

Of the 501 cases reviewed, 56 cases (CID – 13, NCIS – 26, and AFOSI – 17) had significant 

deficiencies. Significant deficiencies included:

• key evidence was not collected from the crime scene, the victim, or the subject;

• crime scene examinations were not completed, not completed thoroughly, or 

not completed before the loss of crucial evidence;

• witness interviews were not thorough or not conducted; and

• subject or victim interviews were not thorough or reinterviews of subject or 

victims did not sufficiently develop new information.

Of the 56 cases identified as being significantly deficient, the DoD IG returned all of 

these investigations along with the documented deficiencies to the respective MCIOs to 

consider reopening and conducting additional investigative activity. As a result, 31 cases 

(CID – 7, NCIS – 14, and AFOSI – 10) or 55 percent were reopened by the MCIOs to conduct 

additional investigative activity. Table C.2.b depicts data regarding cases returned and 

reopened by the MCIOs.

Table C.2.b. Cases with Significant Deficiencies

Category Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Returned 56 13 26 17

Reopened 31 7 14 10

Cases Returned to CID: On June 7, 2012, we returned 13 cases to CID for consideration 

of our findings. On June 29, 2012, CID agreed to reopen 4 of the 13 cases to conduct 
Appendices

50 │ DODIG-2013-091

additional activity. They declined to pursue additional investigative activity in the 

nine remaining cases because they believed it would not alter the outcome of the case 

or too much time had elapsed, causing the recommended investigative activity to be 

impracticable. After reviewing CID’s response, we disagreed with their decision not to 

reopen seven of the nine remaining cases. We provided additional rationale regarding 

seven cases for CID to consider. On January 7, 2013, CID advised they reopened three of 

those cases. No additional investigative activity will be undertaken on the remaining four 

cases because CID believed it would not alter the outcome of the case or too much time 

had elapsed, causing the recommended investigative activity to be impracticable.

Cases Returned to NCIS: On August 2, 2012, we returned 26 NCIS cases to NCIS for 

consideration of our findings. On September 5, 2012, NCIS advised they reopened 11 

of the 26 cases to conduct additional activity. On October 9, 2012, NCIS advised they 

reopened one additional case (12 of the 26 cases) to conduct additional activity. They 

declined to pursue additional investigative activity on the 14 remaining cases because 

they believed it would not alter the outcome of the case or too much time had elapsed 

causing the recommended investigative activity to be impracticable. After reviewing 

NCIS’ response, we disagreed with their decision not to reopen 2 of the 14 remaining 

cases. We provided additional rationale regarding the two cases for NCIS to consider. 

On December 28, 2012, NCIS advised they reopened one case and intend to reopen the 

remaining case. On February 14, 2013, NCIS advised that they reopened the final case. 

Cases Returned to AFOSI: On April 23, 2012, we returned 17 AFOSI cases for 

consideration of our findings. On May 21, 2012, AFOSI agreed to reopen 10 of the 17 

cases to conduct additional activity, but they declined to pursue additional investigative 

activity in the seven remaining cases because they believed it would not alter the outcome 

of the case or too much time had elapsed, causing the recommended investigative activity 

to be impractical. After reviewing AFOSI’s response, we agreed with their decision not to 

reopen the seven remaining cases.

Table C.3 depicts the total number of investigations with interview and post-interview 

deficiencies. Tables C.4 thru C.6 depict interview deficiencies categorized by subject, 

victim, and witness interviews in an effort to obtain a higher degree of fidelity. 

Table C.3. Cases with Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

399 140 145 114
Appendices

DODIG-2013-091 │ 51

Table C.4. Cases with Subject Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

119 35 42 42

Table C.5. Cases with Victim Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

332 115 142 75

Table C.6. Cases with Witness Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

250 79 87 84

Tables C.7 thru C.9 depict breakdowns of specific deficiencies for the areas of subject, 

victim, and witness interviews.

Table C.7. Subject Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Category Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Subject was never 

interviewed, and the file 

was not documented 

explaining why.

2 0 1 1

Subject interview not 

thorough or did not address 

all elements of the offense 

investigated.

67 24 22 21

Subject was not advised of 

legal rights (when required). 1 1 0 0

Investigators did not 

follow up on logical leads 

stemming from interviews.

78 18 31 29

We noted various deficiencies, which occurred during the subject interviews of the 

reviewed investigations. Based on the dynamics involved in subject interviews, we 

recognize there may have been reasons these logical investigative steps were not 

conducted. However, the reviewed cases did not contain supporting documentation 

explaining why the subjects were not interviewed nor did they indicate the reasons that 

all logical information was not addressed. The deficiency of not advising a subject of 

his legal rights as required could have an adverse effect on a case; however, the review 

results and projections indicate this is an anomaly (less than 1 percent of cases) versus a 

potential systemic issue.
Appendices

52 │ DODIG-2013-091

Table C.8. Victim Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Category Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Interview was not thorough or did 

not address all elements of offense. 98 27 35 36

Logical leads stemming from 

interview were not developed or 

pursued.

132 39 51 42

Information provided was not 

corroborated. 44 14 13 17

Victim’s recantation was not 

addressed or investigated. 11 0 3 8

Victim was not issued a DD Form 

2701. 79 66 N/O* 13

Routine/recurring victim briefs were 

not conducted IAW MCIO policy. 179 64 115 N/A

* Not Observable. There were 111 instances in which we were unable to verify NCIS’ compliance 

with the issuance of the DD Form 2701 because the case activity records, where the information is 

normally documented, had been destroyed IAW SECNAV M-5210.1.

Table C.9. Witness Interview and Post-Interview Deficiencies

Category Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Significant witnesses were identified 

but not interviewed, and the file was 

not documented to explain why.

173 38 74 61

Initial witness the victim confided in 

was not interviewed. 9 4 2 3

Canvass interviews were not 

conducted. 28 10 11 7

Witness interview was not thorough. 102 43 26 33

Investigators did not follow up 

on logical leads stemming from 

interviews.

98 33 30 35

Table C.10 depicts the total number of cases that contained evidence deficiencies.

Table C.10. Cases with Evidence Deficiencies

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

127 46 39 42
Appendices

DODIG-2013-091 │ 53

Table C.11 depicts a breakdown of specific deficiencies for the area of evidence.

Table C.11. Evidence Deficiencies

Investigators did not: Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Collect all items of physical evidence 

identified by subject(s), victim(s), or 

witness(es).

95 31 39 25

Submit collected physical evidence 

to USACIL for examination if 

appropriate.

2 0 2 0

Submit collected evidence to USACIL 

in a timely manner. 25 11 3 11

Coordinate lab submission with 

forensic science consultant (FSC) 

(AFOSI) or special agent-in-charge.

23 11 N/A 12

Have lab request form reviewed by 

FSC. 14 N/A N/A 14

Table C.12 depicts the total number of cases that contained crime scene documentation 

and/or processing deficiencies. Of the 501 cases reviewed, 298 cases contained crime 

scene documentation and/or processing deficiencies (CID – 88, NCIS – 99, and AFOSI – 

111). 

Table C.12. Cases with Crime Scene Documentation and/or Processing Deficiencies

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

218 40 88 90

Table C.13 depicts a breakdown of specific deficiencies for the areas of crime scene 

documentation and processing.

Table C.13. Crime Scene Documentation and Processing Deficiencies

Investigators did not: Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Examine the crime scene or validate 

the crime scene. 129 25 51 53

Have authority to search the scene. 9 4 3 2

Photograph the scene. 156 28 56 72

Sketch the scene. 207 33 86 88

Collect potential evidence from the 

scene.

21 3 9 9
Appendices

54 │ DODIG-2013-091

Table C.14 depicts a breakdown of specific deficiencies for the area of subject focused 

actions. 

Table C.14. Cases with Subject-Focused Action Deficiencies

Investigators did not: Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Title/index subject(s) IAW DoDI 

5505.07. 14 1 13 0

Comply with MCIO-specific guidance 

regarding the release of subjects. 187 47 103 37

Table C.15 depicts a breakdown of specific deficiencies for the area of investigative 

coordination/notification. 

Table C.15. Cases with Investigative Coordination/Notification Deficiencies

Investigators did not: Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Receive higher headquarters or 

supervisor approval to close short1

(AFOSI) (administratively close) or as 

a Final C2 (CID) an investigation.

20 4 N/A 16

Coordinate/notify forensic science 

consultant. 13 N/A N/A 13

Notify the SARC.3 78 34 N/A4 44

Coordinate with trial counsel. 21 6 N/A5 15

1 According to AFOSIMAN 71-121, paragraph 9.1.1.3.1 and 9.1.1.3.3 closed short (administrative 

closure) is when information is obtained indicating the investigation should not have been 

created or the investigation is no longer the responsibility of AFOSI.

2 CID Regulation 195-1, paragraph 4.10 states a criminal investigation may be terminated prior to 

exhausting all investigative leads and a Final (C) report of investigation may be prepared when the 

CID investigative resources could be better employed on other investigations.

3 According to DoDD 6495.01, paragraph E2.1 (October 6, 2005 edition) the SARC is the central 

point of contact for coordinating appropriate and responsive care for sexual assault victims.

4 In spite of DoD policy that requires SARC notifications in all sexual assault complaints, NCIS policy 

did not require SARCs to be notified. Notwithstanding, SARC notifications were documented in 

71 of 157 investigations, while they were not in 86. 

5 Although NCIS policy does not require coordination with trial counsel, it “strongly encourages” 

early and continuous contact with trial counsel or other appropriate attorney. NCIS documented 

such contacts in 100 instances in the reports we reviewed.
Appendices

DODIG-2013-091 │ 55

Table C.16 depicts a breakdown of specific deficiencies for the area of investigative and 

administrative documentation.

Table C.16. Cases with Investigative and Administrative Documentation Deficiencies

Category Total1 CID NCIS AFOSI

Required supervisory reviews were 

not documented. 72 11 N/O2 61

Review or inclusion of other related 

law enforcement agency’s report was 

not documented.

4 1 3 0

Location of the offense was not fully 

identified. 13 0 0 13

Case agent notes were not retained 

through the appellate review process 5 N/A 5 N/A

1 The disparity in the number of cases with investigative and administrative documentation 

deficiencies and the total number of deficiencies is due to some cases having multiple 

deficiencies.

2 Not Observable. There were 141 instances in which we were unable to verify whether 

supervisory reviews were conducted in the NCIS investigations because the case activity records 

and supervisor review records, where the information is normally documented, had been 

destroyed IAW SECNAV M-5210.1.

The following tables begin the demographic and other data section and contain 

information on alcohol use by the subject and victim, their age ranges, pay grade, location 

where offense occurred, the relationship between the subject/victim, etc. These tables do 

not contain any information on deficiencies.

We identified the following details regarding intoxicant use (alcohol and/or drug) in the 

reviewed investigations.

• In 241 of the 501 cases reviewed, the subject was determined to have consumed 

alcohol at some point prior to the commission of the offense. Instances when 

prescription, over-the-counter, or illicit drugs, and/or a combination of 

alcohol and drugs were used by the subject were negligible.

• In 252 of the 501 cases reviewed, the victim was determined to have used 

alcohol. We also identified 16 instances when the victim had ingested 

prescription drugs at some point during the incident. The number of instances 

when the victim used illicit drugs, over-the-counter drugs, or a combination 

of drugs and alcohol was negligible.

• In 219 cases, both the victim and the subject ingested alcohol and/or drugs 

prior to the commission of a sexual assault.
Appendices

56 │ DODIG-2013-091

• In two cases, the victims reported they were sexually assaulted after they 

unknowingly consumed an unknown intoxicating substance.

Table C.17 depicts the total number of cases where the subject(s) was or was not under 

the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. The table also shows, where applicable, the type of 

intoxicant the subject(s) used.

Table C.17. Cases with Subject Alcohol and/or Drug Use

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Alcohol 235 87 73 75

Alcohol with prescription drug 3 1 2 0

Alcohol with illicit drug 2 1 1 0

Alcohol with unknown drug 1 0 0 1

Illicit drug 1 0 1 0

Unknown/undetermined 149 51 57 41

None 110 58 23 29

Table C.18 depicts the total number of cases in which the victim(s) was under the influence 

of alcohol and/or drugs. The table also shows, where applicable, the type of intoxicant 

the victim(s) used. 

Table C.18. Cases with Voluntary Victim Alcohol and/or Drug Use

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Alcohol 240 82 79 79

Alcohol with prescription drug 9 5 0 4

Alcohol with illicit drug 1 1 0 0

Alcohol with unknown drug 2 1 0 1

Prescription drug 16 2 5 9

Over-the-counter drug 1 1 0 0

Illicit drug 1 0 1 0

Unknown/undetermined 87 25 40 22

None 144 81 32 31
Appendices

DODIG-2013-091 │ 57

In two investigations, the victim unknowingly consumed an unknown substance. This 

information is depicted in Table C.19.

Table C.19. Cases with Involuntary Victim Alcohol and/or Drug Use

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Alcohol with unknown drug 1 0 1 0

Unknown drug 1 1 0 0

Table C.20 depicts the total number of cases in which both the subject(s) and victim(s) 

were under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.

Table C.20. Cases with Alcohol and/or Drug Use by Both Subject and Victim

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

219 79 67 73

The majority of sexual assault incidents (310 of 501 or 62 percent) occurred on a military 

installation, while 175 of 501 (35 percent) occurred outside of a military installation. 

Most sexual assaults occurred either in a residence/home (177 of 501 or 35 percent) 

or barracks/dormitory (135 of 501 or 27 percent) and 41 of 501 (8 percent) occurred 

in a hotel/motel. These numbers indicate 62 percent of sexual assaults occurred in an 

environment familiar to the subject or victim. Additionally, 36 of the 501 (7 percent) 

cases occurred in a deployed area. Table C.21 depicts the number of cases where the 

crime occurred on or off the installation. 

Table C.21. Cases Where the Sexual Assault Occurred On/Off the Installation

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

On installation 310 142 87 81

Off installation 175 53 62 60

Unknown 16 3 8 5

Table C.22 depicts the number of cases pertaining to incidents reported to have occurred 

in the Middle Eastern deployment areas.

Table C.22. Cases Where the Sexual Assault Occurred in Deployment Areas

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

36 29 6 1
Appendices

58 │ DODIG-2013-091

Table C.23 depicts where the sexual assault took place by the number of cases.

Table C.23. Where the Sexual Assault Occurred

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Bar/nightclub 11 6 3 2

Barracks/dorm 135 54 42 39

Containerized housing unit/tent 13 9 4 0

Field training area 1 1 0 0

Government vehicle 3 1 2 0

Government/public building 37 22 6 9

Hotel/motel 41 15 15 11

Office/workplace 9 3 5 1

Park/beach 12 5 6 1

Parking lot 10 3 6 1

Private vehicle 10 4 5 1

Residence/home 177 61 40 76

Ship/vessel 11 0 11 0

Wooded/open area 11 8 2 1

Unidentified 20 6 10 4

Table C.24 depicts the number of cases that were previously reported under the restricted 

reporting procedures and later converted to an unrestricted report.

Table C.24. Cases from Previously Restricted Reports

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

27 4 14 9

Table C.25 depicts the number of cases in which the victim(s) knew or had a relationship 

with the subject(s) prior to the sexual assault.

Table C.25. Cases Victim Knew or Had Relationship with Subject

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

429 179 120 130

Although several offenses may have been investigated and/or charged, we documented 

only the primary offense investigated. The majority of the sexual assault investigations 
Appendices

DODIG-2013-091 │ 59

reviewed fell into one of the following three categories: rape (175 or 35 percent), aggravated 

sexual assault (159 or 32 percent), or wrongful sexual contact (99 or 20 percent). As 

previously explained in the Background section of this report, some offenses (such as 

wrongful sexual contact) were not investigated to the same extent by all MCIOs; however, 

these offenses fell under the purview of this review.24 Table C.26 depicts number of cases 

by type of offense investigated.

Table C.26. Primary Offense Investigated1

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Abusive sexual contact 23 10 5 8

Aggravated sexual assault 159 46 82 31

Aggravated sexual contact 10 7 2 1

Assault: intent to rape 2 0 0 2

Forcible sodomy 27 13 9 5

Indecent acts 3 0 1 2

Rape 175 59 27 89

Rape (attempted) 2 2 0 0

Sodomy: other 1 0 0 1

Wrongful sexual contact2 99 61 31 7

Total 501 198 157 146

1 Definitions contained in the 2007 and 2008 version of the UCMJ were in effect at the time of this 

review.

2 With the change to the 2008 version of the UCMJ, indecent assault was removed and wrongful 

sexual contact was added in its place. The numbers reflected in wrongful sexual contact also 

contain the two cases (one each for CID and NCIS) investigated under the previous offense of 

indecent assault.

Table C.27 depicts the number of cases that involved multiple subjects.

Table C.27. Cases with Multiple Subjects

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

38 21 10 7

24 The AFOSI did not routinely investigate wrongful sexual contact or indecent assault, IAW Air Force Instruction 71-101, 

volume 1, “Criminal Investigations Program,” December 1, 1999. As explained in the Background section, NCIS investigated 

some wrongful sexual contact cases, but not all, IAW applicable NCIS and Navy policies.
Appendices

60 │ DODIG-2013-091

Table C.28 depicts the number of cases that involved multiple victims.

Table C.28. Cases with Multiple Victims

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

23 17 4 2

Table C.29 depicts the number of cases that involved multiple subjects and multiple 

victims.

Table C.29. Cases with Multiple Subjects and Multiple Victims

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

3 1 1 1

We identified the following details regarding the military rank relationship between the 

subject and the victim in the reviewed investigations.

• In 144 of 501 investigations, the subject was senior in grade (rank) to the 

victim. 

• In 29 of 501 investigations, the victim was senior in grade to the subject. 

• In 91 of 501 cases, both the subject and the victim were equal in grade.

We noted 38 of 501 cases with multiple subjects and 23 cases with multiple victims. In 

these instances, the cases identified two or more subjects as perpetrating the offense 

under investigation, or in the case of the victims, the case listed two or more victims 

being victimized in an individual investigation. As a result, a total of 560 subjects and 

531 victims were identified.

We noted the following highlights of the 560 subjects in the reviewed investigations.

• Of the 560 subjects, 282 (about 50 percent) consumed alcohol prior to the 

commission of a sexual assault.

• The majority of subjects ranged in age from 18 to 23 (245 of 560 or 44 percent) 

and the second largest group of subjects were 24 to 29 years old (141 of 560 

or 25 percent).

• Of the 560 subjects, 473 of them (84 percent) were military personnel. The 

majority were enlisted members (455 of 560 or 81 percent) with the junior 

enlisted grades of E-3s (133 of 560 or 24 percent) and E-4s (117 of 560 or 21 
Appendices

DODIG-2013-091 │ 61

percent) comprising the largest pool of subjects. Although a limited number 

of commissioned officers perpetrated sexual assaults, the majority of subjects 

in the commissioned officers corps (10 out of 16 or 63 percent) were junior 

officers from O-1 through O-3 grades (company-grade officers).

• Of the 560 subjects, 187 (33 percent) received no punishment (adverse action 

taken against them) as a result of the investigation; 74 (13 percent) received 

nonjudicial punishment; 59 (11 percent) were convicted by courts-martial; 

and adverse action against 141 (25 percent) subjects was not applicable 

because the cases were either unfounded or the subjects were unknown.

Table C.30 depicts the military pay grade comparisons between subject and victim at the 

date of reporting the sexual assault.

Table C.30. Military Pay Grade Comparisons Between Subjects/Victims

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Subject senior to victim 144 59 51 34

Victim senior to subject 29 14 10 5

Equal pay grade 91 28 39 24

Combination (multiple persons) 20 14 4 2

Unknown subject(s) 44 16 20 8

Not applicable 173 67 33 73

The following tables (C.31-C.43) address individual subjects and victims and not the 

number of cases. Therefore, the numbers noted will exceed the number of cases reviewed. 

This is due to the number of cases with multiple subjects and victims. There were a total 

of 560 subjects and 531 victims in the 501 cases we reviewed. These tables are statistical 

in nature and contain no deficiencies.
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62 │ DODIG-2013-091

Table C.31 depicts the number of subjects that were under the influence of alcohol and/or 

drugs. The table also shows, where applicable, the type of intoxicant the subject(s) used. 

Table C.31. Subjects Alcohol and/or Drug Involvement

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Alcohol 276 99 88 89

Alcohol with prescription drug 3 1 2 0

Alcohol with illicit drug 2 1 1 0

Alcohol with unknown drug 1 0 0 1

Illicit drug 1 0 1 0

Unknown/undetermined 170 68 59 43

None 107 56 23 28

Table C.32 depicts the age ranges of each subject.

Table C.32. Age Range of Subjects

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

18-23 245 84 94 67

24-29 141 60 36 45

30-35 62 32 8 22

36-40 21 11 4 6

41-45 22 9 5 8

46-50 12 4 5 3

51-55 1 0 1 0

Over 55 1 0 0 1

Unknown 55 25 21 9

Table C.33 depicts the subject’s affiliation.

Table C.33. Subject’s Affiliation

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Military 473 192 148 133

Civilian 33 9 5 19

Unknown 54 24 21 9
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DODIG-2013-091 │ 63

Table C.34 depicts the military subject’s pay grade.

Table C.34. Military Subject’s Pay Grade

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

E-1 26 13 9 4

E-2 48 22 19 7

E-3 133 38 53 42

E-4 117 50 31 36

Junior Enlisted 324 123 112 89

E-5 63 31 12 20

E-6 42 21 7 14

NCO 105 52 19 34

E-7 21 12 7 2

E-8 2 1 1 0

E-9 3 0 1 2

Senior NCO 26 13 9 4

Total Enlisted 455 188 140 127

W-1 0 0 0 0

W-2 0 0 0 0

W-3 1 1 0 0

W-4 1 0 1 0

W-5 0 0 0 0

Total Warrant 2 1 1 0

O-1 4 0 4 0

O-2 2 1 0 1

O-3 4 1 0 3

Company Grade 10 2 4 4

O-4 3 0 3 0

O-5 1 0 0 1

O-6 2 1 0 1

Field Grade 6 1 3 2

Flag Officer 0 0 0 0

Total Officer 16 3 7 6

Military Total 473 192 148 133
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Table C.35 depicts the action that was taken on the subjects of the investigations.

Table C.35. Action Taken Against Subjects

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Convicted by trial for sexual assault 

offenses 42 17 13 12

Convicted by trial for lesser non 

sexual assault offenses 17 5 12 0

Acquitted by trial 10 3 4 3

Discharged from service in lieu of 

trial 21 14 1 6

Employment terminated and no 

prosecution (civilian subject) 5 5 0 0

Nonjudicial (Article 15) 72 40 14 18

Nonjudicial and discharged 2 2 0 0

Reprimand/counseling 56 26 8 22

Unknown* 6 4 0 2

No action taken 187 48 71 68

Not applicable (unknown subjects or 

unfounded offenses) 141 61 50 30

Deceased before action taken 1 0 1 0

Totals 560 225 174 161

*For six investigations, that the MCIOs categorized as being closed, no disciplinary action information 

available.

We noted the following highlights of the 531 victims in the reviewed investigations.

• Of the 531 victims, 251 (47 percent) of them consumed alcohol, 16 (3 

percent) used prescription drugs, and 10 (2 percent) used a combination of 

alcohol and prescription medications prior to the sexual assault. The review 

also disclosed that almost an equal number of victims 246 (46 percent) were 

determined not to have used any drugs or alcohol prior to the sexual assault. 

The victim pool was split almost 50/50 between victims who had used some 

form of drugs and/or alcohol prior to the sexual assault and those who had 

not.

• The majority of victims, 330 of 531 (62 percent), ranged in age from 18 to 23. 

The second largest group of victims (131 or 25 percent) was between the ages 

of 24 and 29 years old.

• Of the 531 victims, 500 (94 percent) were female and 31 (6 percent) were 

male. 
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DODIG-2013-091 │ 65

• The majority of the victims, 366 of 531 (69 percent), were in the military, 

and 165 (31 percent) were civilians. There were 323 (61 percent) victims 

who were junior enlisted grades (E-1 through E-4). E-3s comprised the 

largest victim pool at 129 (24 percent) personnel, followed by E-2s with 79 

(15 percent) personnel, and E-4s with 78 (15 percent) personnel. Among the 

few victims identified as commissioned officers, all six (100 percent) were 

company-grade officers (O-1 through O-3).

Table C.36 depicts the number of victims that were or were not under the influence of 

alcohol and/or drugs. The table also shows, where applicable, the type of intoxicant the 

victim(s) voluntarily used. 

Table C.36. Victims Voluntary Alcohol and/or Drug Involvement

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Alcohol 251 89 82 80

Alcohol with prescription drug 10 6 0 4

Alcohol with illicit drug 1 1 0 0

Alcohol with unknown drug 2 1 0 1

Prescription drug 16 2 5 9

Over-the-counter drug 1 1 0 0

Illicit drug 1 0 1 0

Unknown/undetermined 2 1 0 1

None or involuntary use 247 117 76 54

In three investigations, the victim involuntarily ingested alcohol and/or drugs. This 

information is depicted in Table C.37. 

Table C.37. Victims Involuntary Alcohol and/or Drug Involvement

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Alcohol with unknown drug 1 0 1 0

Unknown/undetermined 1 1 0 0

None or voluntary use 529 217 163 149
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66 │ DODIG-2013-091

Table C.38 depicts the age ranges of each victim.

Table C.38. Age Range of Victims

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Under 18 3 1 1 1

18-23 330 122 121 87

24-29 131 62 32 37

30-35 35 18 4 13

36-40 16 5 3 8

41-45 10 8 0 2

46-50 4 1 2 1

51-55 2 1 1 0

Over 55 0 0 0 0

Note: Although the scope of the evaluation involved only adult victims, there were three cases in 

which a victim under the age of 18 was included in the investigation with an adult victim.

Table C.39 depicts the victim’s affiliation.

Table C.39. Victim’s Affiliation

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Military 366 153 134 79

Civilian 165 65 30 70

Table C.40 depicts the gender of the victims.

Table C.40. Victim’s Gender

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Male 31 13 17 1

Female 500 205 147 148
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DODIG-2013-091 │ 67

Table C.41 depicts the military victim’s pay grade.

Table C.41. Victim’s Pay Grade

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

E-1 37 15 18 4

E-2 79 46 27 6

E-3 129 34 53 42

E-4 78 36 27 15

Junior Enlisted 323 131 125 67

E-5 25 13 6 6

E-6 8 4 1 3

NCO 33 17 7 9

E-7 2 1 0 1

E-8 1 0 1 0

E-9 0 0 0 0

Senior NCO 3 1 1 1

Total Enlisted 359 149 133 77

W-1 0 0 0 0

W-2 0 0 0 0

W-3 1 1 0 0

W-4 0 0 0 0

W-5 0 0 0 0

Total Warrant 1 1 0 0

O-1 1 0 1 0

O-2 4 2 0 2

O-3 1 1 0 0

Company Grade 6 3 1 2

O-4 0 0 0 0

O-5 0 0 0 0

O-6 0 0 0 0

Field Grade 0 0 0 0

Flag Officer 0 0 0 0

Total Officer 6 3 1 2

Military Total 366 153 134 79
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68 │ DODIG-2013-091

For 531 victims, a relationship of some type (acquaintance, friend, or co-worker) 

existed between the victims and the subjects. In the majority of cases, the subjects were 

acquaintances (160 of 531, or 30 percent) or friends (110 of 531, or 21 percent) of the 

victim. In some instances (55 of 531, or 10 percent), the subject was identified as a coworker of the victim. In 82 instances of 531 (15 percent), the subject was unknown to 

the victim or had no identified relationship with them. The relationship details for the 

remaining victims (124 of 531) can be found in Table C.42.

We also identified the following data regarding military subjects’ affiliation with their 

victims. 

• In 22 instances, the subject was the victim’s supervisor; in rare instances, 4 of 

531, the subject was subordinate to the victim. 

• In one instance, the subject was the victim’s roommate. 

• In 5 instances, the subject was identified as the victim’s recruiter.

• In one instance, the subject was the victim’s instructor.
Appendices

DODIG-2013-091 │ 69

Table C.42 depicts the subject-to-victim relationship type.

Table C.42. Subject-to-Victim Relationship Type

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Spouse 42 15 4 23

Ex-spouse 1 0 0 1

Boy/Girlfriend 15 6 2 7

Ex-Boy/Ex-Girlfriend 7 1 3 3

Supervisor 22 12 7 3

Subordinate 4 1 0 3

Coworker 55 27 20 8

Friend 110 34 37 39

Acquaintance 160 79 42 39

Roommate 1 0 0 1

Recruiter 5 2 3 0

Doctor/medic 2 0 2 0

Teacher/instructor 1 0 0 1

Coach 1 0 0 1

Other 3 2 0 1

Undetermined relationship 20 3 17 0

No or N/A relationship 82 36 27 19

Table C.43 depicts the number of victims that were cooperative during the investigation.

Table C.43. Victim Cooperative During Investigation

Total CID NCIS AFOSI

Yes 433 187 119 127

No 98 31 45 22
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70 │ DODIG-2013-091

Appendix D 

Memorandum of Results

 November 26, 2012 

Memorandum of Results 

To: , Violent Crime Division, 

Oversight Directorate, Investigative Policy and Oversight 

From: , QMD/DPAO/AUDIT 

Thru: , Technical Director, QMD/ DPAO/AUDIT 

Subject: QMD Support in Review of Department of Defense Sexual Assault 

Investigations (Project No. 2011C019).

Objective. The objective of the project is to evaluate the adequacy of sexual 

assault investigations, specifically to determine whether the Military Criminal 

Investigative Organizations (MCIOs) investigative procedures comply with DoD and 

Military Service guidance, and whether the MCIOs adequately investigated sexual 

assaults as required by the standards. The evaluation scope will consider sexual assault 

investigations with adult victims closed in the calendar year 2010. 

Population. The population for the three MCIOs for cases closed for sexual 

assaults during the calendar year 2010 is tabulated below: 

 MCIOs Number of Closed Cases 

1. AFOSI 477

2. CID 1,082

3. NCIS 704

 Total 2,263

Measures. The attribute measure was the number of deficiencies in the sexual 

assault cases during the investigation process. 

Parameters. We designed the sample at 90% confidence level and 5% precision. 

Methodology. We developed Simple Random Sample (SRS) plan for each MCIO, 

and randomly selected samples for each organization without replacement. A summary 

table of the population size, sample size, and the number of cases reviewed is provided 

below: 
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DODIG-2013-091 │ 71

2

 

 

 MCIOs Population Sample Cases Cases Cases

 Size Size Excluded Missing Reviewed 

1. AFOSI 477 173 27 0 146 

2. CID 1,082 216 18 0 198 

3. NCIS 704 195 36 2 157 

 Total 2,263 584 81 2 501 

 

During the review of the sample, the team could not locate 2 sample cases. They 

also determined that there were 81 cases out of the scope, and should not have been in the 

population. 

 

The team reviewed each of the 501 sample cases, and provided to QMD the 

deficiencies or other related problems found in each sample case. After review and 

analysis of the sample results, we computed statistical projections based on the sample 

results for each MCIO by using SRS formulae, and then for DoD as a whole by using 

stratified sample formulae with the MCIOs as the three strata. These projections are 

included in the attached spreadsheet. Each line in the spreadsheet includes the relevant 

information, e.g., population and sample size, number of deficiencies (or related errors), 

statistically projected deficiencies and deficiency rate with the lower bound, point 

estimate, and upper bound. 

 An illustration of the interpretation of the statistical results for the first line in the 

attachment (and the following lines thereafter) for “Cases Excluded” would be: CID with 

a population of 1,082 cases and a sample of 216 cases has 18 cases excluded in the 

sample, and we are 90% confident that the projected number of cases excluded in the 

population is between 58 and 123, and the point estimate is 90; we are 90% confident that 

the rate of the number of cases excluded is between 5.3% and 11.3%, and the point 

estimate is 8.3%. 

Attachment: Spreadsheet 

 
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CID Comments
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NCIS Comments
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1 NCIS ES Findings S COMMENT: NCIS requires that investigators must notify or coordinate with the 

convening authority upon initiation of a case, which often times will involve the SJA for the command. NCIS does not concur with the comment as written, but NCIS is currently in the process of changing the policy to ensure all investigations will be coordinated with the prosecutive agency upon initiation of an investigation. RATIONALE: The above has been a standing policy for NCIS via Chapter 25 

(Report Writing), although a review of the chapter disclosed this was inadvertently not maintained in the chapter. Chapter 25 is in the process of being re-written; this policy, to include the notification of prosecutive agency will be included in the chapter.

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

2 NCIS ES Findings C COMMENT: DODIG reports that NCIS guidance regarding records checks does 

not provide a definitive timeliness requirement. NCIS does not concur as NCIS policy requires that database checks are completed and reported in the ROI (OPEN) report which must be provided within three (3) days of initiation. RATIONALE: NCIS-1, Chapter 25.1-5.2d. Records Check. d. Records Check. When a NCIS investigation is initiated, it is the responsibility of the controlling field office to conduct complete records check of all subjects, co-subjects, and victims. RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

3 NCIS 2 2 S COMMENT: NCIS policy requires the initiation of an investigation into all 

wrongful sexual contact “(former indecent assaults)”. Investigative guidance, GEN: 23A-0056) provided to all NCIS field elements on 09DEC08 reiterated that “All allegations of wrongful sexual acts and contacts shall be investigated.”Rationale: NCIS 3, Chapter 34, 1.1 and GEN: 23A-0056RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

Final Report Reference

RevisedRevised
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4 NCIS 11 S COMMENT: The findings report that in 111 NCIS investigations victims were 

not provided with the DD Form 2701 (VWAP). NCIS non-concurs with this finding as NCIS policy does not state that the VWAP is to be annotated in the investigative report. VWAP annotations are recorded in the Case Activity Record and the Investigative Plan which are maintained as notes in the original case file.RATIONALE: NCIS 3, Chapter 6, Section 20.4, m. “Special agents conducting 

interviews of victims and witnesses should annotate their case notes in some manner to document their provision of crime victim assistance information to that person.”

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

5 NCIS 13 C COMMENT: The findings report that three (3) NCIS investigations were found in 

which evidence was not submitted to USACIL. NCIS Non-concurs with this finding. RATIONALE: A review of the three (3) investigations disclosed that evidence in 

one case was submitted to USACIL for analysis. The remaining two (2) investigations involved subjects who reported the sexual act was consensual. Per policy, USACIL will not conduct analysis when subjects admit to the act but claim consent. 

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

6 NCIS 17 C COMMENT: The top chart cites NCIS deficient in 86 investigations in notifying 

the sexual assault response coordinator. NCIS non-concurs with this comment. Although NCIS agents work with the SARCs to ensure that all victims are assigned a Victim Advocate who accompany the victim during the NCIS interview is they so desire, NCIS policy does not require agents to document SARC notification via NCIS Reports of Investigation. RATIONALE: NCIS-3, Chapter 34-4.4

RevisedRevisedRevised
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RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

7 NCIS 17 1 C COMMENT: The top chart cites NCIS deficient in 57 investigations in 

coordinating with the trial counsel. NCIS Policy requires that investigators must notify or coordinate with the convening authority, which often times will involve the SJA for the Command. NCIS Policy does not require notification or coordination with the Service Trial Office. NCIS does not concur with the comment as written, but NCIS is currently in the process of changing the policy to ensure all investigations will be coordinated with the prosecutive agency upon initiation of an investigation. RATIONALE: NCIS-3, Chapter 6-16.2. Resolved criminal investigations with 

military personnel identified as subjects or co-subjects will be briefed to the military commander who has disciplinary responsibility for the individuals; this briefing will be documented in a ROI (INTERIM). OPNAVINST 3100 of 22DEC09 requires the convening authority consult with a SJA prior to final disposition. In those resolved investigations identifying civilians, corporations or companies as suspects, similar documentation of the prosecutive referral is required.

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

Revised
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8 NCIS 18 C COMMENT: The top chart cites NCIS deficient in 141 investigations for 

supervisor reviews. NCIS non-concurs as this comment in inaccurate. NCIS does not require case reviews to be documented in the Reports of Investigation. The case reviews are documented in the Case Activity Report which is maintained in original case file as notes. NCIS does not require notes to be sent to NCISHQ. The field case files are destroyed one year after a case is closed, or with legal authorization upon completion of the appeal process if the investigation resulted in a conviction. This review involved investigations initiated during 2010; notes were no longer available for review.RATIONALE: NCIS 1, Chapter 19-8 The FO and NCISRA are the primary field 

repositories for closed investigations and operations. The FO and NCISRA shall retain files on closed investigations, operational and collection matters to include specific phase Polygraph Examination cases for a period not to exceed one year as prescribed in SECNAV M-5210.1. At the field level, this includes Agent Notes and other material (e.g., original correspondence). Exceptions include the following: cases awaiting judicial, administrative, or appellate action.

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

9 NCIS 19 1 S COMMENT: Non-concur with comment that NCIS requires agents to conduct 

complete records checks, but does not impose a timeliness requirement. RATIONALE: NCIS 1, CHAPTER 25 (REPORT WRITING) NCIS policy requires that 

database checks are completed and reported in the ROI (OPEN) report which must be provided within three (3) days of initiation.

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

10 NCIS 20 C COMMENT: Non-concur with comment that labeling of NCIS case notes with 

the originator’s name, date, place, and case number was not always accomplished. The case notes were not available for this review due to NCIS policy of maintaining the notes with the original case file in field, and the 

RevisedRevisedDeleted
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destruction policy as previously noted.RATIONALE: NCIS 1, Chapter 19-8 The FO and NCISRA are the primary field 

repositories for closed investigations and operations. The FO and NCISRA shall retain files on closed investigations, operational and collection matters to include specific phase Polygraph Examination cases for a period not to exceed one year as prescribed in SECNAV M-5210.1. At the field level, this includes Agent Notes and other material (e.g., original correspondence). Exceptions include the following: cases awaiting judicial, administrative, or appellate action.

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

11 NCIS 27 5 C NCIS non-concurs with the comment that NCIS retention of investigative case 

notes raises a legal issue. This issue has reportedly been referred to the DoD IG Policy and Programs Division to determine compliance with “Federal law, such as the Jencks Act”. Under the Jencks Act the government must be able 

to provide statements, to include notes, throughout the trial and appellate phase of an investigation. NCIS is in full compliance as notes are maintained with the original case file throughout the life of the investigation, to include the appeal process for investigations which result in a criminal conviction.

RATIONALE: NCIS 1, Chapter 19-8 (cited above) RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

12 NCIS 28 1. S COMMENT: DODIG recommends the Director emphasize thorough and timely 

completion of all sexual assault investigations to ensure that all investigations are completed as required by DoD, Military Service, and command regulatory guidance.RATIONALE: NCIS emphasizes the thorough and timely completion of all NCIS investigations. The message of “Operational Excellence” as it has been 
Management Comments

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referred to within NCIS, permeates throughout all NCIS investigative disciplines and has been a consistent message to field and headquarter components, see reference (a). Additionally, in recent years NCIS has implemented enhancements to its management oversight/inspection processes. The Staff Assistance Visit Program (SAV) is used to assess field performance and adherence to “operation excellence,” focusing on investigative quality, timeliness, and compliance with NCIS policy and standards, see reference (b). SAVs are initiated by the NCIS Deputy Director at his/her discretion. The Quality Assurance Visit Program (QAV) is a program in which the NCIS geographic Executive Assistant Directors (EAD) for Atlantic, Pacific, and Global Operations conduct regularly scheduled visits to field offices to assess investigative quality, timeliness, and compliance with NCIS policy and standards, see reference (c).RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

13 NCIS 28 2a S COMMENT: DODIG recommends the Director place increased emphasis on 

interview thoroughness through training, supervision, and policy improvements.

RATIONALE: NCIS acknowledges interview and interrogation techniques are 

central to the success of any investigations. The NCIS Training Academy dedicates approximately 75 hours to interview and interrogation techniques –25 during CITP and 50 during SABTP. NCIS has also partnered with U.S. Army to further develop and expand the USA Advanced Sexual Assault Course to include NCIS investigative perspective and practices. Currently, NCIS personnel attend training at FLETC and Ft. Leonard Wood. 

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

14 NCIS 28 2b S COMMENT: DODIG recommends the Director evaluate the benefits of using the 

combination of narrative and question and answer interview format to help ensure that facts and circumstances are documented thoroughly.
Management Comments

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RATIONALE: NCIS recognizes the combination of narrative and question and answer interview format and does not prohibit its use. There is no plan at this time to effect a change for taking statements, but NCIS will continue to emphasize the requirement for thorough statements regardless of the format used.RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

15 NCIS 29 3. S COMMENT: DODIG recommends the Director evaluate his existing policies and 

enhance his guidance regarding the collection of clothing worn by suspects and victims subsequent to a sexual assault.RATIONALE: NCIS concurs as the current policy reflects that clothing worn by 

the victim, or left at the scene by the subject should be seized vice must be seized. This is particularly important if the sexual assault just occurred and/or if the clothing has not been washed. Discretion must be given if the clothing has been washed unless required for corroboration purposes. NCIS-3, 

Chapter 34.4.4 m.

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

16 NCIS 29 3b C COMMENT: DODIG recommends the Director conduct new or additional 

refresher training to highlight the critical nature physical evidence plays in sexual assault investigations and the subsequent prosecutions.RATIONALE: NCIS has continuously provided training in conducting sexual 

assault investigations, which includes the significance of physical evidence. In addition NCIS has partnered with U.S. Army to further develop and expand the USA Advanced Sexual Assault Course to include NCIS investigative perspective and practices. Currently, NCIS personnel attend training at FLETC and Ft. Leonard Wood. 

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

17 NCIS 29 3c S COMMENT: DODIG recommends add evidence collection in sexual assault 

investigations as a special interest item during command inspections for the next 2 fiscal years at all levels.
Management Comments

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RATIONALE: NCIS does not concur with making evidence collection in sexual 

assault investigations a special interest item during command inspections. Evidence collection in all investigation is by procedure already part of the 

review process from the first line supervisor review to the NCIS IG inspection process. NCIS will continue to ensure all evidence in handled in accordance to policy and procedure.

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

18 NCIS 29 4. C COMMENT: DODIG recommends the Director evaluate his policies and 

enhance supervision regarding their agents’ response to known and available crime scenes and evaluate the necessity for conducting a crime scene examination for all sexual assault investigationsRATIONALE: NCIS concurs and will continue to place emphasis on the 

requirement to conduct crime scene documentation for delayed sexual assault reports. NCIS will ensure that crime scene examination/documentation is completed for all sexual assault investigations. Documentation and justification will be required when NCIS is unable to complete a crime scene.

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

19 NCIS 29 5. S COMMENT: NCIS policy requires that investigators notify or coordinate with the 

convening authority upon initiation of the investigations, which often times will involve the SJA for the command. NCIS Policy does not require notification or coordination with the service trial office. NCIS does not concur with the comment as written, but NCIS is currently in the process of changing the policy to ensure all investigations will be coordinated with the prosecutive agency upon initiation of an investigation. RATIONALE: Current policy requires that NCIS agents provide investigative 

findings to the convening authority vice the Trial Service office. NCIS-3, Chapter 6-16.2. Resolved criminal investigations with military personnel 

identified as subjects or co-subjects will be briefed to the military commander 
Management Comments

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POC NAME, PHONE,

AND EMAIL

PAGE # PARA #

COMMENT 

TYPE

(C/S)

COMMENT AND RATIONALE

A/R/

P

UNCLASSIFIED 9

who has disciplinary responsibility for the individuals; this briefing will be documented in a ROI (INTERIM).RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

20 NCIS 29 6a C COMMENT: DODIG recommends the Director ensure information related to the 

location(s) of incident, dates and times of occurrence, dates and times the incident(s) were reported, offenses under investigation, and other pertinent administrative data are properly documented within reports of investigations.RATIONALE: NCIS concurs; emphasis has been, and will continue to be placed 

on ensuring all reports contain thorough and complete information. The NCIS Report of Investigation (ROI) Open is primarily an internal NCIS document that reports the receipt of information which serves to predicate the initiation of an investigation, reference (g). The first paragraph of the Narrative portion should clearly state the reason for case initiation; i.e., reactive, reciprocal, details, and disposition, and if applicable, contain the relevant statute(s) that is/are suspected to have been violated. The ROI (OPEN) must answer, at minimum; who, what, where, when, why and/or how the offense was committed. 

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

21 NCIS 29 6b C COMMENT: DODIG recommends the Director evaluate the benefits of preparing 

a report of investigation title page that includes the location(s) of incident, dates and times of occurrence, dates and times the incident(s) were reported, offenses under investigation, and other pertinent administrative data.RATIONALE: Non-concur; the reporting system utilized by NCIS satisfies the 

requirements of both its military and civilian customers. The information is 

contained in the Executive Summary which is provided in every report upon initiation.

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

22 NCIS 30 7 C COMMENT: DODIG recommends the Director evaluate his existing policy and 

enhance his guidance regarding timely completion of records checks to ensure they adequately support investigations.
Management Comments

DODIG-2013-091 │ 83

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMENT MATRIX FOR Evaluation of the MCIO Sexual Assault Investigations, Project 2011C019

(Please read instructions on back before completing form.)

# CLASS

COMMAND

POC NAME, PHONE,

AND EMAIL

PAGE # PARA #

COMMENT 

TYPE

(C/S)

COMMENT AND RATIONALE

A/R/

P

UNCLASSIFIED 10

RATIONALE: NCIS currently has adequate policy to address this area of 

concern. NCIS-1, Chapter 25-5.2.d. Records Check, reference (g). When a NCIS investigation is initiated, it is the responsibility of the controlling field office to conduct complete records check of all subjects, co-subjects, and victims. These database checks are reporting in the ROI (OPEN) which must 

be submitted within three (3) business of initiation of the investigation.(OPEN).

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:

23 NCIS 30 8a and 

b

S COMMENT: DODIG recommends the Director a. Ensure the full accountability of 

all NCIS Investigative files. b. Correct policies and procedures to preclude the loss of additional records.RATIONALE: NCIS has policy in place to ensure accountability of NCIS files and 

will ensure set policies are adhered to in order to avoid the loss of any case files.

RATIONALE FOR DISPOSITION:
Management Comments

84 │ DODIG-2013-091

AFOSI Comments
Management Comments

DODIG-2013-091 │ 85
Management Comments

86 │ DODIG-2013-091
Management Comments

DODIG-2013-091 │ 87
Management Comments

88 │ DODIG-2013-091
Management Comments

DODIG-2013-091 │ 89
Management Comments

90 │ DODIG-2013-091
Management Comments

DODIG-2013-091 │ 91
92 │ DODIG-2013-091

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFI Air Force Instruction

AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AFOSIH Air Force Office of Special Investigations Handbook

AFOSII Air Force Office of Special Investigations Instruction

AFOSIMAN Air Force Office of Special Investigations Manual

AFPD Air Force Policy Directive

AAS Agent Activity Summary

AR Army Regulation

AUSA Assistant United States Attorney

CAR Case Activity Records

CI Cognitive Interview

CID U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command

CODIS Combined DNA Index System

CRR Case Review Records

DA Department of the Army

DCII Defense Central Index of Investigations

DoDD Department of Defense Directive

DoDI Department of Defense Instruction

DoD IG Department of Defense Inspector General

DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

FM Field Manual

FO Field Office

GEN ADMIN General Administration

FSC Forensic Science Consultant

IAW In Accordance With

JA Judge Advocate

MCIO Military Criminal Investigative Organization

MCRT Major Case Response Team

NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service

NCISRA NCIS Resident Agency

NOTAM Notice to Airmen

N/O Not Observable

OPNAVINST Department of the Navy Chief of Naval Operations Instruction

PMB Performance Management Branch

QMD Quantitative Methods Division

ROI Report of Investigation
DODIG-2013-091 │ 93

Acronyms and Abbreviations

SAA Special Agent Afloat

SAFE Sexual Assault Forensic Examination

SAV Staff Assistance Visit

SAC Special Agent-in-Charge

SAPR Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

SAPRO Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office

SARC Sexual Assault Response Coordinator

SECNAVINST Secretary of the Navy Instruction

SECNAV M Secretary of the Navy Manual

SII Special Interest Item

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

USACIL U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Laboratory

U.S.C. United States Code

VA Victim Advocate

Whistleblower Protection

U.S. Department of Defense

The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 requires 

the Inspector General to designate a Whistleblower Protection 

Ombudsman to educate agency employees about prohibitions on 

retaliation, and rights and remedies against retaliation for protected 

disclosures. The designated ombudsman is the DoD IG Director for 

Whistleblowing & Transparency. For more information on your rights 

and remedies against retaliation, go to the Whistleblower webpage at 

www.dodig.mil/programs/whistleblower.

For more information about DoD IG 

reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison 

Congressional@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

DoD Hotline 

800.424.9098

Media Contact

Public.Affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

Monthly Update 

dodigconnect-request@listserve.com

Reports Mailing List 

dodig_report-request@listserve.com

Twitter 

twitter.com/DoD_IG
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE │ INSPECTOR GENERAL

4800 Mark Center Drive

Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

www.dodig.mil

Defense Hotline 1.800.424.1500