U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

81–468 PDF 2013

S. HRG. 113–36

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 7, 2013

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Acting Democratic Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Bosworth, Hon. Stephen W., dean, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 

Tufts University, Medford, MA ........................................................................... 33

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement ................. 3

Davies, Hon. Glyn T., Special Representative for North Korea Policy, U.S. 

Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 5

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Jeff Flake ..... 50

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Benjamin 

L. Cardin ........................................................................................................ 51

DeTrani, Hon. Joseph, president, Intelligence and National Security Alliance, 

Arlington, VA ........................................................................................................ 34

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36

Joseph, Hon. Robert G., senior scholar, National Institute for Public Policy, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 38

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA 

THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Udall, Murphy, 

Kaine, Corker, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, McCain, and Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,

U.S SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. 

This being the first hearing of this new term, it could not be a 

more timely hearing. Recent developments in North Korea, most 

notably, the February 12, 2013, nuclear test and the December 12, 

2012, missile tests, highlight the growing threat that North Korea 

poses to the United States, our allies and friends in the region, and 

the increasing dangers of severe instability on the Korean Peninsula. Given this growing set of circumstances, I believe the committee needs to take a close look at current United States policy 

toward North Korea, evaluate its effectiveness, and identify any 

midcourse corrections or new measures that are required to get our 

North Korea policy right. 

I understand that as we convene this hearing, this morning, that 

in New York the United Nations Security Council is sitting down 

to consider a resolution that imposes additional sanctions on North 

Korea. This new Security Council resolution, based on a United 

States-China draft, includes tough new sanctions intended to impede North Korea’s ability to develop further its illicit nuclear and 

ballistic missile programs. These sanctions include targeting the

illicit activities of North Korean diplomatic personnel, North 

Korean banking relationships, illicit transfers of bulk cash, and 

new travel restrictions. 

I think that these actions are a step in the right direction and 

very much in keeping with the sort of approach that the ranking 

member, Senator Corker, and I called for in the North Korea Nonproliferation and Accountability Act of 2013, which the Senate 

passed on February 25. 

And I congratulate the administration on moving things forward 

so effectively at the United Nations. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2

But I also believe that we need to do more to better determine 

how the United States can combine effective sanctions and military 

countermeasures with strong and realistic diplomacy aimed at 

North Korea and at China—and with the clear goal of North 

Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear programs. 

North Korea yesterday made what I consider to be, of course, an 

absurd threat of a ‘‘preemptive nuclear attack’’ to destroy the 

strongholds of the ‘‘aggressors’’ in response to the action that the 

United States, China, and others are seeking at the United 

Nations. 

There should be no doubt about our determination, willingness, 

and capability to neutralize and counter any threat that North 

Korea may present. I do not think that the regime in Pyongyang 

wants to commit suicide but, as they must surely know, that would 

be the result of any attack on the United States. 

But even as we think about potential measures and actions necessary to safeguard the United States and our allies, there should 

also be no doubt about our determination to work with the international community through peaceful diplomatic means to achieve 

a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. 

Today it is estimated that North Korea has accumulated between 

20 and 40 kilograms of plutonium, enough perhaps for six to eight 

nuclear weapons. It has now conducted three nuclear explosive 

tests. It has developed a modern gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program to go along with its plutonium stockpile, and it is 

seeking to develop the capability to mate a nuclear warhead to an 

intercontinental ballistic missile. 

Taken together, these developments present a growing danger 

that North Korea may well become a small nuclear power, a scenario which, while bad enough on its own, could well have additional dangerous effects if it leads other nations in the region to 

reconsider their own commitments to nonproliferation. 

Moreover, there is also the continuing danger of further conventional military provocation from North Korea that results in a serious military clash between North and South and the potential for 

unintended escalation that could draw in the United States and 

China and result in a dangerous confrontation on the peninsula. 

And beyond these security concerns, there are also the ongoing 

questions about human rights and the lot of the North Korean people. Security concerns may be our most important priority on the 

peninsula, but they are not our only priority. 

It has now been a little over a year since Kim Jong-un took 

power amid speculation that this transition could lead to a period 

of instability inside the North, perhaps even leading to collapse. 

Yet, that instability does not appear to have materialized. 

Although, of course, we can never be sure about what the future 

is in North Korea, by all appearances Kim has asserted control 

over the military and strengthened party institutions, and contrary 

to some media hype focus on his education in Switzerland, he has 

not proved to be a reformer. It is unclear whether he has any objectives other than maintaining tight control of his political and economic system. 

Above all else, North Korea clearly represents a real and growing 

threat to national security interests and therefore deserves our 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3

close attention. In time, if its present course remains unaltered, 

North Korea could pose a direct threat to the United States. 

Today North Korea certainly poses a growing threat to our allies 

and to American forces in the region. It also threatens to undermine the international nonproliferation regime, particularly as its 

arsenal grows, by spreading its threat to other countries through 

a transfer of nuclear technology and materials. We know, for example, that North Korea has made efforts to proliferate nuclear technology in the past, building a plutonium separation plant in Syria 

which Israel destroyed by bombing it before its completion, and we 

know that there is a long history of North Korean-Iranian military 

cooperation. 

I hope that this hearing, as well as a continuing dialogue with 

the administration on this issue, will help us explore several key 

questions that are critical to informing our future policy toward 

North Korea. Does North Korea pursue a nuclear weapons program 

as a deterrent for defensive purposes, or does it pursue such a program as part of a policy intended to reunify the peninsula by force? 

Could the current regime ever conceive of parting with its nuclear 

capability, or does it view these weapons as essential tools as deterrence against others to continue its hold on power? Getting these 

answers right will be critical to determining if there is hope for 

diplomacy or if a different approach is necessary. 

It is also important to note the coming power of a new South 

Korean administration led by President Park at this difficult time. 

We offer her our congratulations on her inauguration last week. 

There is no basis for successfully dealing with the North absent a 

solid foundation for policy rooted in the United States-Republic of 

Korea alliance. With President Park’s inauguration, we have an 

opportunity to consult and work closely with a close ally to chart 

our future course in dealing with North Korea. 

And finally, we need to consider how recent transitions in other 

countries in the region, including our close ally, Japan, as well as 

China, may present new opportunities in building a more effective 

approach to dealing with Pyongyang. 

Whatever one’s views on the various policy efforts of the past two 

decades, and what has worked and what has not worked and why, 

there can be little question that these efforts have failed to end 

North Korea’s nuclear or missile programs, failed to reduce the 

threat posed to our allies, and failed to lead to greater security in 

the region. But I am hopeful that today’s hearing and the conversation we start today may help us get to a place where 20 years from 

now we can look back at successfully having ended North Korea’s 

nuclear and missile programs, and having built greater stability 

and security on the peninsula and throughout the Asia-Pacific 

region. 

Let me call upon the distinguished ranking member, Senator 

Corker, for his comments. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely

hearing. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4

And welcome, Ambassador Davies. We thank you for being here. 

I look forward to hearing from you today, along with our panel of 

expert witnesses later this morning. 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, missile program, and 

proliferation activities pose a threat to the United States national 

security interests. 

Over several decades, United States policymakers have attempted to influence North Korea’s behavior through an array of 

deterrent tools, including inducements and punitive measures. U.S. 

officials have used diplomacy, energy assistance, financial sanctions, and counterproliferation tools, including proactive interdiction activities. Despite the varying combinations of tools, the 

United States has failed to persuade the North Korean regime to 

abandon its nuclear weapons program. 

We know that North Korea continues to engage in a range of 

illicit and proliferation-related activities to generate hard currency 

to support the regime. Simultaneously, the situation for the North 

Korean people has continued to deteriorate with rampant human 

rights abuses, the continued expansion of North Korean prison 

camps, and some analysts estimate they may hold as many as 

200,000 political prisoners. 

In addition, China continues to serve as North Korea’s primary 

benefactor, accounting for nearly 60 percent of all North Korean 

trade. Beijing remains Pyongyang’s main source of food and fuel. 

United States policymakers have not been able to persuade China 

that the costs of Beijing’s continued support for North Korea far 

outweigh the perceived benefits. It is clear that we must redouble 

our efforts in that regard. 

I recognize that North Korea is a complex policy conundrum and 

that there is no silver bullet solution. Yet, after nearly 20 years of 

unsuccessful policies by successive administrations, it seems logical 

to me that we ought to undertake a comprehensive review of our 

North Korean strategy, including harnessing new tools to try to 

crack the North Korean policy nut. 

That is why I worked with Senator Menendez and other members of this committee to move forward with the North Korean 

Nonproliferation and Accountability Act, S. 298, which would 

require the administration to review our approach to North Korea. 

Undertaking such a review does not require abandoning diplomatic 

efforts nor terminating sanctions. However, it necessitates that we 

redouble efforts to think outside the box. 

In recent months, it has become increasingly clear to me that 

U.S. policymakers ought to pay closer attention to the nonmilitary 

aspects of deterrence, including efforts to weaken and debilitate the 

North Korean regime. In particular, we ought to do more to expose 

the North’s brutality toward its own citizens as a means to influence the Kim regime. 

We also should promote the flow of information to the North 

Korean people, including through our own Radio Free Asia broadcasts. 

However, do not mistake my interests in the nonmilitary aspects 

of deterrence as a call to abandon the military and security aspects 

of our overall North Korea policy. I firmly believe that a robust 

United States nuclear deterrent is essential to United States 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5

security and it remains critical to maintaining our security commitments to allies in the Asia-Pacific, including Japan and South 

Korea. I know that Ambassador Joseph will speak to the importance of our nuclear deterrent later during this hearing. 

Ambassador Davies, I do look forward to hearing from you 

regarding the administration’s strategy for confronting North 

Korea, including our efforts this week at the Security Council on 

a new sanctions resolution. 

In addition, I look forward to hearing from you and all of our 

expert witnesses about our capabilities to deter North Korean 

provocations, options to elicit enhanced Chinese cooperation, and 

opportunities to improve the lives of the North Korean people. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Today’s two panels pull together some of the top decisionmakers 

on North Korean policy from the current and several previous 

administrations. They represent decades of experience, following 

North Korea from both in and outside the Government, and can 

bear witness to years of both progress and setbacks in our policy. 

And I can think of no better group to help analyze what has 

worked and what has not, and I fully expect they may hold, in 

some cases, quite different views in this regard. That is only natural considering the critical importance and extraordinary complexity of addressing North Korea, and I would view simple 

answers with considerable skepticism. So we are going to look forward to this discussion. 

We start off with the distinguished Ambassador Glyn Davies. He 

has served as the Special Representative of the Secretary of State 

for North Korea Policy since January 2012. He oversees U.S. 

involvement in the six-party talks process, as well as aspects of our 

security, political, economic, human rights, and humanitarian 

assistance policy regarding North Korea. He is a career member of 

the Senior Foreign Service, served previously as the Permanent 

Representative of the United States to the International Atomic 

Energy Agency and the U.N. office in Vienna, as well as the 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Executive Secretary of the 

National Security Council staff. So an extraordinary wealth of 

knowledge. We welcome you to the committee and look forward to 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GLYN T. DAVIES, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NORTH KOREA POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, thank you very much, Chairman 

Menendez and Senator Corker and members of the committee, for 

inviting me to testify today on United States policy toward North 

Korea or, as it is also known, the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea. 

North Korea’s February 12 announcement of its third nuclear 

test and its subsequent threats to conduct even more follow-on 

measures are only the latest in a long line of reminders that the 

DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities pose serious threats to U.S. national security, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6

to regional security in the Asia-Pacific, and to the global nonproliferation regime. 

Pyongyang continues to violate its international obligations and 

commitments, including to denuclearize. Its human rights record 

remains deplorable. Its economy is stagnant. Its people are impoverished. It pours significant sums into nuclear and ballistic missile 

programs that are forbidden by the United Nations. 

The DPRK has consistently failed to take advantage of the alternatives available. The United States has offered Pyongyang an 

improved relationship, provided North Korea demonstrates a willingness to fulfill its denuclearization commitments and address 

other concerns. The DPRK rebuffed these offers and instead responded with a series of provocations that drew widespread international condemnation. 

North Korea again brazenly defied the international community 

on April 13, 2012, and again on December 12, 2012, with longrange missile launches, in flagrant violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and in the face of united calls from the international 

community to desist. Some 60 countries and international organizations issued statements criticizing the December launch. 

The DPRK’s February 12 announcement of a nuclear test, which 

Pyongyang proclaimed was targeted against the United States of 

America, represents an even bolder threat to national security, the 

stability of the regime, and the global nonproliferation regime. The 

international response has been unprecedented. Over 80 countries 

and international organizations from all corners of the world have 

condemned the tests. 

We are working with the international community to make clear 

that North Korea’s nuclear test has costly consequences. In adopting Resolution 2087 in January after the December launch, the 

U.N. Security Council pledged to take significant action in the 

event of a nuclear test. We are working hard at the United Nations 

Security Council to make good on that pledge, and as you noted, 

Mr. Chairman, that is occurring even as we speak and we are hoping that the council adopts the resolution that the United States 

put forward. The Security Council will deliver a credible and strong 

response that further impedes the growth of North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons and ballistic missiles program and its ability to engage in 

proliferation activities. 

The resolution today that we tabled builds upon, strengthens, 

and significantly expands the scope of the strong U.N. sanctions 

already in place. The sanctions contained in this draft resolution 

will significantly impede North Korea’s ability to proceed in developing its nuclear and missile programs and significantly expand 

the scope of the tools the United Nations has available to counter 

these North Korean developments. 

We are also strengthening our close coordination with our sixparty partners and our regional allies, and through a whole-ofgovernment approach, working closely with our partners in the 

Department of Defense and other agencies, we will take the steps 

necessary to defend ourselves and our allies, particularly the 

Republic of Korea and Japan. 

Effective, targeted multilateral and national sanctions will 

remain a vital component of our effort to impede the DPRK from 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7

advancing its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and 

its proliferation activities. We continue to exercise national authorities to sanction North Korean entities, individuals, and those that 

support them in facilitating programs that threaten the American 

people. Most recently on January 24, the Departments of State and 

the Treasury designated a number of North Korean individuals and 

entities under Executive Order 13–382, which targets actors 

involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 

their supporters. We will continue to take national measures as 

appropriate. 

Sanctions are not a punitive measure, but rather a tool to impede 

the development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs 

and its proliferation-related exports, as well as to make clear the 

costs of North Korea’s defiance of its international obligations, and 

working toward our end game will require an openness to meaningful dialogue with the DPRK. 

We remain committed to authentic and credible negotiations to 

implement the September 2005 joint statement of the six-party 

talks and to bring North Korea into compliance with its international obligations through irreversible steps leading to denuclearization. 

The United States will not engage in talks for talks’ sake. 

Authentic and credible talks will first require a serious, meaningful 

change in North Korea’s priorities, demanding that Pyongyang is 

prepared to meet its commitments and obligations on denuclearization. 

This leads to a few important other principles. First and foremost, the United States will not accept North Korea as a nucleararmed state. We will not reward the DPRK for the absence of bad 

behavior. We will not compensate the DPRK merely for returning 

to dialogue. We will not tolerate North Korea provoking its neighbors. We have made clear that U.S.-DPRK relations cannot fundamentally improve without sustained improvement in interKorean relations and in human rights. These positions will not 

change. 

In the meantime, active United States diplomacy on North Korea 

on a wide range of issues continues. Close coordination with our 

valued treaty allies, the ROK and Japan, remain absolutely central 

to our approach. 

We have also expanded our engagement by developing new dialogues on North Korea with key global actors who have joined the 

rising chorus of voices calling on the DPRK to comply with its 

international obligations. 

China, however, does remain central to altering North Korea’s 

cost calculus and close United States-China consultations on North 

Korea will remain for us a key focus of diplomatic efforts in the 

weeks and months ahead. 

While denuclearization remains an essential goal of United 

States policy, so too does the welfare of North Korea’s nearly 25 

million people, the vast majority of whom bear the brunt of the 

government’s decision to perpetuate an unsustainable, self-impoverishing, military-first policy. Improving human rights conditions is 

an integral part of our overall North Korea policy, and how the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8

DPRK addresses human rights will have a significant impact on 

prospects for improved U.S.-DPRK ties. 

The entire world is increasingly taking note of the grave, widespread, and systematic human rights violations in the DPRK and 

demanding action. The United Nations High Commissioner for 

Human Rights Navi Pillay has called for an in-depth international 

inquiry to document abuses. We support this call, and next week, 

my colleague, Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights Issues 

Robert King, will travel to Geneva to attend the United Nations 

Human Rights Council’s 22nd session where he will call attention 

to North Korea’s human rights record and urge adoption of an 

enhanced mechanism of inquiry into the regime’s abuses against 

the North Korean people. 

Mr. Chairman, the Obama administration’s dual-track policy of 

engagement and pressure toward the DPRK reflects a bipartisan 

recognition that only a policy of openness to dialogue when possible, combined with sustained, robust pressure through sanctions 

when necessary, can maximize prospects for progress in denuclearizing North Korea. 

But genuine progress requires a fundamental shift in North Korea’s strategic calculus. The DPRK leadership must choose between 

provocation or peace, isolation or integration. North Korea will not 

achieve security, economic prosperity, and integration into the 

international community while it pursues nuclear weapons, while 

it threatens its neighbors, while it tramples on international 

norms, abuses its own people, and refuses to fulfill its longstanding 

obligations and commitments. 

The DPRK leadership in Pyongyang faces increasingly sharp 

choices, and we are working with our friends and allies to further 

sharpen these choices. If the North Korean regime is at all wise, 

it will reembark on a path to denuclearization for the benefit of the 

North Korean people, the Northeast Asian region, and the world. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this chance to appear before 

you today, and I am happy to try and address any questions you 

may have. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Davies follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GLYN T. DAVIES

Chairman Menendez, Senator Corker, and Members of the committee, thank you 

for inviting me to testify today on U.S. policy toward the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea (DPRK). 

Nearly 60 years have passed since the conclusion of the armistice that ended the 

hostilities of the Korean war, yet North Korea still persists as one of the thorniest 

challenges confronting the United States and the international community. 

Pyongyang’s February 12 announcement of a third nuclear test—conducted in brazen defiance of the demands of the United Nations Security Council—and its subsequent threats to conduct even more follow-on ‘‘measures’’ are only the latest in a 

long line of reminders that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities pose serious threats to U.S. national security, to 

regional security in the Asia-Pacific, and to the global nonproliferation regime. 

Pyongyang continues to violate its international obligations and commitments, 

including to denuclearize. Its human rights record remains deplorable. Its economy 

is stagnant. Its people are impoverished. It pours significant sums into nuclear and 

ballistic missile programs that are forbidden by the United Nations. The leadership’s choices are isolating North Korea from the international community. International outrage against North Korea and its provocative and threatening actions, 

meanwhile, continues to grow. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9

The DPRK has consistently failed to take advantage of the alternatives available. 

The United States offered—and has continued to offer—Pyongyang an improved 

relationship with the United States and integration into the international community, provided North Korea demonstrated a willingness to fulfill its denuclearization 

commitments and address other concerns. The DPRK rebuffed these offers and instead responded with a series of provocations that drew widespread international 

condemnation. 

Pyongyang appeared prepared to enter a period of serious diplomatic engagement 

in mid-2011, and the United States responded with a proactive, nearly year-long 

diplomatic effort to push forward on denuclearization in a way that would lay the 

groundwork for improved bilateral relations. Starting in July 2011 and continuing 

over the next 10 months, the United States and the DPRK held three rounds of 

bilateral denuclearization talks on three continents. In our meetings, we worked to 

forge the conditions necessary for resuming the six-party talks, which had been 

stalled since 2008. Shortly after Kim Jong-un’s assumption of power, we reached a 

modest but potentially important bilateral understanding announced on February 

29, 2012. 

Pyongyang announced its commitment to, among other things, a moratorium on 

nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and all nuclear activity, including uranium enrichment activity, at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. North Korea also committed to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to return to 

Yongbyon to monitor the cessation of uranium enrichment and confirm the disablement of plutonium-related facilities there. 

But just 16 days later, North Korea reneged on these commitments by announcing 

its intent to launch a satellite into orbit. Such launches use ballistic missile technology proscribed by multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), and we 

had made it abundantly clear during our negotiations that such a launch, even if 

characterized as a satellite launch, would be a deal-breaker. Pyongyang nevertheless conducted such a launch on April 13 and was greeted by deep international 

opprobrium. All five six-party partners—China, Russia, the United States, the 

Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan—joined a long list of states publicly condemning Pyongyang’s provocation. The U.N. Security Council unanimously issued a 

Presidential Statement condemning the act as a ‘‘serious violation’’ of UNSCRs 1718 

and 1874, tightened existing sanctions, and made clear its commitment to ‘‘take 

action accordingly’’ in the event of another launch. 

North Korea again brazenly defied the international community on December 12, 

2012, with another long-range missile launch, again characterized by the DPRK as 

a satellite launch, in flagrant violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 

and 1874 and in the face of united public and private calls by the international community to desist. Over 60 countries and international organizations issued statements criticizing the launch. The U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted 

UNSCR 2087, which condemned the launch, further expanded the scope of sanctions 

on the DPRK, and promised ‘‘significant action’’ in the event of a future DPRK missile launch or nuclear test. 

The DPRK’s February 12 announcement of a nuclear test, which Pyongyang proclaimed was targeted against the United States, represents an even bolder threat 

to U.S. national security, the stability of the region, and the global nonproliferation 

regime. The international response has been unprecedented. Over 80 countries and 

international organizations from all corners of the world have decried the test. 

Many are speaking out against DPRK provocations for the first time. As the list 

continues to grow, it is increasingly clear that an international consensus is coalescing in opposition to North Korea’s destabilizing activities. 

We are working with the international community to make clear that North 

Korea’s nuclear test has costly consequences. In adopting Resolution 2087 in January after the December launch, the U.N. Security Council pledged to take ‘‘significant action’’ in the event of a nuclear test; we are working hard at the U.N. Security 

Council to make good on that pledge. We are intensively engaged with our six-party 

partners, members of the U.N. Security Council, and other U.N. Member States on 

a strong and credible response by the international community. 

China’s support for firm action remains key, and we are deeply engaged with the 

Chinese in shaping an appropriate response. We are strengthening our close coordination with our six-party partners and regional allies. And—through a whole-of-government approach, working closely with our partners in the Department of Defense 

and other agencies—we will take the steps necessary to defend ourselves and our 

allies, particularly the ROK and Japan. We have reassured both Seoul and Tokyo, 

at the highest levels, of our commitment to extended deterrence through the U.S. 

nuclear umbrella, conventional capabilities, and missile defense. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10

North Korea’s WMD, ballistic missile, conventional arms, and proliferation activities constitute a serious and unacceptable threat to U.S. national security, to say 

nothing of the integrity of the global nonproliferation regime, which many around 

the world have labored—over generations—to devise, nurture, and enforce. Effective, targeted multilateral and national sanctions will consequently remain a vital 

component of our efforts to impede the DPRK’s efforts to advance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities. UNSCR 2087 was an 

important step forward in this regard. Combined with the measures in Resolutions 

1718 and 1874, UNSCR 2087 further constricts North Korea’s efforts to procure 

weapons components, send agents abroad, smuggle dual-use items, and make headway on its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. 

Full and transparent implementation of these resolutions by all U.N. Member 

States, including China, is critical. We are actively engaged with the international 

community to underscore the importance of full enforcement of these measures. 

We also continue to exercise national authorities to sanction North Korean entities, individuals, and those that support them in facilitating programs that threaten 

the American people. Most recently, on January 24, the Departments of State and 

the Treasury designated a number of North Korean individuals and entities under 

Executive Order 13382, which targets actors involved in the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction and their supporters. The Department of State designated the 

Korean Committee for Space Technology—North Korea’s space agency—and several 

officials directly involved in North Korea’s April 2012 and December 2012 launches, 

which contributed to the DPRK’s long-range ballistic missile development efforts. 

The Department of the Treasury designated several Beijing-based North Korean 

officials linked to the DPRK’s Tanchon Commercial Bank, which has been designated by the U.N. and the United States for its role in facilitating the sales of 

conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and related items. The Treasury Department 

also targeted Leader (Hong Kong) International Trading Limited, a Hong Kongbased firm, for its links to the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, the 

DPRK’s premier arms dealer and exporter of missile- and weapon-related goods. 

We will continue to take national measures as appropriate. We are also working 

closely with the U.N. Security Council’s DPRK sanctions committee and its Panel 

of Experts, the EU and like-minded partners, and others around the globe to harmonize our sanctions programs and to ensure the full and transparent implementation of UNSCRs 1718, 1874, and 2087, which remain the heart of the multilateral 

sanctions regime. 

Sanctions are not a punitive measure, but rather a tool to impede the development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and proliferation-related 

exports, as well as to make clear the costs of North Korea’s defiance of its international obligations. Working toward our endgame—the verifiable denuclearization 

of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner—will require an openness to meaningful dialogue with the DPRK. But the real choice is up to Pyongyang. 

We remain committed to authentic and credible negotiations to implement the 

September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and to bring North Korea 

into compliance with its international obligations through irreversible steps leading 

to denuclearization. The President made this clear last November when he said, 

‘‘. . . let go of your nuclear weapons and choose the path of peace and progress. If 

you do, you will find an extended hand from the United States of America.’’ But let 

me state the obvious: North Korea’s reckless provocations have certainly raised the 

bar for a return to dialogue. 

The United States will not engage in talks for the sake of talks. Rather, what we 

want are negotiations that address the real issue of North Korea’s nuclear program. 

Authentic and credible negotiations therefore require a serious, meaningful change 

in North Korea’s priorities demonstrating that Pyongyang is prepared to meet its 

commitments and obligations to achieve the core goal of the September 2005 joint 

statement: the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful 

manner. 

This leads to some other important principles. First and foremost, the United 

States will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. We will not reward 

the DPRK for the absence of bad behavior. We will not compensate the DPRK 

merely for returning to dialogue. We have also made clear that U.S.-DPRK relations 

cannot fundamentally improve without sustained improvement in inter-Korean relations and human rights. Nor will we tolerate North Korea provoking its neighbors. 

These positions will not change. 

In the meantime, active U.S. diplomacy on North Korea—on a wide range of 

issues—continues. Close coordination with our valued treaty allies, the ROK and 

Japan, remains central to our approach. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11

ROK President Park Geun-hye and President Obama agree on the need for continued close U.S.-ROK coordination on a range of security issues, including North 

Korea. We are confident of President Park’s commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance 

and anticipate close consultation with her administration on its North Korea strategy. Close consultation will also continue with Japan. During his visit to Washington in late February, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Obama 

agreed to continue working together closely in responding to the threat posed by 

North Korea, including through coordination on sanctions measures. 

We have also expanded our engagement by developing new dialogues on North 

Korea with key global actors who have joined the rising chorus of regional and

global voices calling on North Korea to fulfill its commitments, comply with its 

international obligations, and refrain from provocative acts that undermine regional 

security and the global nonproliferation regime. 

China, however, remains central to altering North Korea’s cost calculus. Both 

geography and history have endowed the People’s Republic of China with a unique—

if increasingly challenging—diplomatic, economic, and military relationship with the 

DPRK. Close U.S.-China consultations on North Korea will remain a key locus of 

our diplomatic efforts in the weeks and months ahead as we seek to bring further 

pressure to bear on North Korea and, over the longer term, seek genuine diplomatic 

openings to push forward on denuclearization. 

While denuclearization remains an essential focus of U.S. policy, so, too, does the 

welfare of North Korea’s nearly 25 million people, the vast majority of whom bear 

the brunt of their government’s decision to perpetuate an unsustainable, self-impoverishing military-first policy. While the DPRK devotes limited resources to developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and devising ways to avoid sanctions, 

one in three North Korean children is chronically malnourished, according to a 2009 

UNICEF estimate. An elaborate network of political prison camps in the country is 

reportedly estimated to contain 100,000–200,000 inmates, who are subjected to 

forced labor, torture, and starvation. It has been reported that whole families have 

been condemned—in most cases without trial—when one member commits an 

alleged crime. The courageous and charismatic Shin Dong-hyuk, whose life story is 

chronicled in Blaine Harden’s excellent book, ‘‘Escape from Camp 14’’, was born in 

one of the most infamous political prison camps and spent the first 23 years of his 

life there. He was not only tortured and subjected to forced labor, but was also cruelly made to witness—at the age of 14—the execution of his mother and his brother. 

Even outside this prison-camp system, the North Korean Government dictates 

nearly all aspects of people’s lives through a highly structured social classification 

system called songbun, which it uses to divide North Korea’s population into categories. This system, in turn, determines access to education and health care, employment opportunities, place of residence, and marriage prospects. Improving 

human rights conditions is an integral part of our North Korea policy, and how the 

DPRK addresses human rights will have a significant impact on prospects for improved U.S.-DPRK ties. 

The world is increasingly taking note of the grave, widespread, and systematic 

human rights violations in the DPRK and demanding action. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay has called for an in-depth international inquiry 

to document abuses. We support this call, and next week, my colleague Special 

Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Robert King will travel to Geneva 

to attend the U.N. Human Rights Council’s 22nd session, where he will call attention to North Korea’s human rights record and urge the adoption of an enhanced 

mechanism of inquiry into the regime’s abuses against the North Korean people. 

We continue, meanwhile, to engage countries across the globe to raise awareness 

about North Korea and enlist their help in pushing for action. We are also working 

with international and nongovernmental organizations to improve the situation on 

the ground for the North Korean people, including by supporting the flow of independent information into the DPRK. Working with the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and independent broadcasters in the 

ROK, we aim to provide information to the North Korean people and—over the 

longer term—plant the seeds for the development of civil society. 

The Obama administration’s dual-track policy of engagement and pressure toward 

the DPRK reflects a bipartisan recognition that only a policy of openness to dialogue 

when possible, combined with sustained, robust pressure through sanctions when 

necessary, can maximize prospects for progress in denuclearizing North Korea. 

Progress on this decades-old problem will not be achieved easily or quickly. We 

cannot and should not dignify or, worse, feed the North Korean narrative that U.S. 

actions determine DPRK behavior. North Korea makes its own choices, selects its 

own timing, and is alone responsible for its actions. Similarly, we need to bear in 

mind that this is certainly not now—if it ever truly was—solely or even primarily 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12

a bilateral U.S.-DPRK issue. It is, rather, increasingly a global issue that requires 

an entrepreneurial approach, multilateral diplomacy and—yes—continuing, robust 

American leadership. 

But above all else, genuine progress requires a fundamental shift in North Korea’s 

strategic calculus. The DPRK leadership must choose between provocation or peace, 

isolation, or integration. North Korea will not achieve security, economic prosperity, 

and integration into the international community while it pursues nuclear weapons, 

threatens its neighbors, tramples on international norms, abuses its own people, 

and refuses to fulfill its longstanding obligations and commitments. 

The international community has been increasingly clear about this, and so have 

we. The DPRK leadership in Pyongyang faces sharp choices. And we are working 

to further sharpen those choices. If the North Korean regime is at all wise, it will 

reembark on the path to denuclearization for the benefit of the North Korean people, the northeast Asia region, and the world. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am happy to 

answer any questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

We will start a round and I will start. 

Let me just take off of that almost closing comment that you 

made, that real progress depends upon North Korea changing its 

strategic calculus. The question is, What is it that we and our 

allies can do to affect changing North Korea’s strategic calculus so 

that it moves in a different direction? And in that context, isn’t 

really the key here, despite everything else that we are in the 

midst of pursuing, China and its potential influence with the North 

Koreans? And if that is the case, how is it that we can get the 

Chinese to be more robust in their efforts to get North Korea to 

change its strategic calculus? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Yes. Well, you have asked probably the biggest question that can be asked about North Korea policy, and I 

think you are hitting on key themes here. 

Changing North Korea’s calculus is proving to be a challenge. 

Administrations of both stripes have been at this at least since 

Ronald Reagan was President and one can argue even before that. 

What we are attempting to do is continue to present a united 

front in terms of, if you will, concentric circles beginning with our 

allies in the region, extending out to our partners in the six-party 

process, China and Russia, and then, going beyond that, to try to 

build an international coalition that understands the threat that 

North Korea poses to the international system, not just on nonproliferation, but on human rights, how it comports itself in the 

international financial system, and so forth. North Korea appears 

not yet to be absorbing those lessons, but we will continue to certainly sharpen them working with our colleagues and with our 

friends. 

At a more basic level, we are working very closely, as we have 

for decades, with our South Korean ally to ensure that should 

North Korea miscalculate—and we call on them not to do that once 

again in the face of these new threats emerging from Pyongyang 

even in recent hours and days. We work with the South Koreans 

to make sure that we are ready from an alliance standpoint militarily to deal with any threats that arise. So that is very much at 

the macrolevel, if you will, how we are dealing with this problem. 

You mentioned China. You are absolutely right about China. 

China is a critical piece of this challenge. They are North Korea’s 

closest neighbor. They are often North Korea’s protector. They are 

certainly an ally of North Korea. They have had a special relationFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13

ship of sorts for quite a while. So we are concentrating a lot of diplomatic energy and effort on deepening our dialogue with China to 

present to them the proposition that there is still a peaceful, diplomatic way forward to deal with the North Korea issue. However, 

it will not work and cannot work unless China steps up, plays its 

full role in bringing home to Pyongyang the choices it faces and 

setting the table, if you will, for any return to negotiations. 

I am afraid that the history of trying to draw North Korea into 

talks that can deal with its nuclear program, its missile program, 

and all of the other issues that we are concerned about has not 

been a fully successful one because the North Koreans have often 

been able to split us. 

We think it is time to work more closely with China but also, of 

course, with our close allies and other partners in the six-party 

process to bring home to North Korea the choices it faces and to 

try to direct them——

The CHAIRMAN. Let me pursue that with you. For China, it 

seems to me—and correct me if I am wrong—there are two calculus 

here. One is they can do what they are doing with us at the United 

Nations today, which is pursue a set of new sanctions, and that 

will rattle the North Koreans to some extent. Or they can choose 

to go ahead and significantly cut back on that which is essential 

to North Korea’s existence which is its assistance directly in fuel, 

as well as other sources. That would be far more significant. 

From your perspective, what is the Chinese calculus then? Now 

they are joining us—we welcome that—at the Security Council. But 

they have a much bigger, more significant ability by virtue of the 

incredible assistance it gives North Korea. 

Ambassador DAVIES. Sure. I think the safest thing to say about 

the Chinese calculus is it is evolving. I mean, yesterday we were 

greeted with the news, somewhat stunningly, that Chairman Mao’s 

grandson, who was a general in the Peoples Liberation Army, 

called on North Korea to move forward on denuclearization. So 

there are some stunning developments occurring within China. One 

could almost describe it as the beginnings of a debate about how 

China will deal with its neighbor. Relations have not always gone 

smoothly of late between the two countries. 

Now, I do not think it is up to us to try to figure out how to engage too deeply in that internal dialogue in China, but I think 

those are very helpful signs. 

You are right. China is always the ‘‘get out of jail free’’ card for 

North Korea. They can always provide ways for the North Koreans 

to export materials, import materials, should they wish. 

China, however, is part of the Security Council. I have just been 

given a note that the resolution has passed. The Chinese played a 

big role in crafting that resolution. It contains lots of new provisions that we could talk about. 

So I think that there are signs that China is beginning to step 

up even more robustly to play its role. They say that they enforce 

these sanctions. We take them at their word. We trust but verify 

on that front and will continue to engage the Chinese to deepen our 

dialogue and to ensure that the Chinese do the maximum amount 

they can to deal with this problem. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, Ambassador, thank you for your testimony. 

I hear of the things that you are working on and we thank you 

for your work. And we understand this has been going on for 20 

years and through many administrations. But when you talk about 

verifiable denuclearization, it seems to me that we continue to go 

in the opposite direction. And while we are talking today, I know, 

at the Security Council about some additional sanctions, it feels to 

me more like we are at a real crossroads, that this is not about additional sanctions, but we are at a crossroads where if something 

does not happen soon, there is no way that we can begin talking 

about verifiable denuclearization. 

Do you agree with that, or do you think, just adding on additional pressures in the way we have been doing it, will work at 

some point? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, I think it has to be a combination of 

all of the above plus more. I mean, I think we need to continue to 

press North Korea when necessary, and right now it is necessary 

to do that because they are in a provocation’s phase. And so, therefore, you are getting the reaction from the U.N. Security Council. 

So I think pressure through sanctions is important. 

I also think we need to stay strong in our alliance with the ROK, 

present a united front there, continue to sharpen and deepen our 

capabilities. 

I also think it is important to continue to build this international 

coalition. I mean, 80 nations is somewhat stunning. You have got 

nations like South Africa, Brazil, even Communist nations like 

Laos and Vietnam, issuing statements condemning this most recent 

nuclear test. So the Greek chorus out there in the world is growing 

in volume. 

And you are right. That is only good as far as it goes because 

what is most important is to change North Korea’s calculus. So, 

therefore, we need to also be ready to engage North Korea in credible and authentic talks, if we can ever see that they are prepared 

to take real steps to denuclearize and to address our concerns. I 

think all of those things are exceedingly important. 

And I think also, very quickly, we need to take account of what 

we have achieved over the last 60 years. We have worked with 

South Korea and helped them create a bit of an economic miracle. 

I think the ratio is now 36 to 1 in terms of the amount of goods 

and services produced per capita by the average South Korean as 

against the average North Korean. So things are not going well 

from the standpoint of the correlation of forces when it comes to 

North Korea right now. 

So I think we move on all these fronts diplomatically, militarily, 

in terms of the international coalition. I think we need to keep 

drawing attention to their human rights, and I think by continuing 

to press them and continuing to present to them the opportunity, 

should they choose to accept it, to come talk to the international 

community and find a different way forward, away from provocations, away from bluster, away from threats, and move toward a 

different future that is absolutely available for them, I am at least 

guardedly optimistic that at some point they will see that is the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15

way to go. And I think that is why we need to stay true to our principles and keep that pressure on. 

Senator CORKER. I know you talked about us ensuring that 

Japan and South Korea and our other allies understand that we 

are going to be there to protect them. And yet, I think you are 

aware that we are not investing in modernization here in our own 

country regarding our nuclear armament as we should. Does that 

create any concerns with our allies that they see us really falling 

behind and not doing the things in our own country to ensure that 

that deterrence is there? 

Ambassador DAVIES. I mean, to be fair, I work for the State

Department, and that is a question ultimately for our Defense 

Department and defense planners, but I can take a bit of a stab 

at it. 

Senator CORKER. If you will, take a short stab. 

Ambassador DAVIES. I will take a short stab. 

I have not seen in my frequent travels in Japan and the ROK 

that there are really deep concerns that our commitment to them 

is at all in jeopardy, and I think because we have begun what is 

called popularly the ‘‘pivot to Asia,’’ we have begun to devote even 

more resources to the Asian theater, and I think that has gone, to 

a great extent, to reassure them. 

Senator CORKER. So, you know, the mechanism that is funding 

this nuclear activity uses illicit activities. And we have ways of 

countering that. There are some people that are saying we should 

call the entire North Korean Government as a money laundering 

concern, and we could then enforce against third-party entities, 

some of which might reside in China. Could you talk to us about 

ways of getting involved in that illicit activity or stopping it so that 

it is not funding what they are doing from a nuclear proliferation 

standpoint and what your thoughts are about us actually being 

involved in clamping down on entities that are allowing that money 

to flow through? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, some of the sanctions that have been 

part of the now many resolutions that have been passed get at this. 

I think it is important that we remain vigilant. 

Senator CORKER. But at present, they are not really doing what 

needs to be done. I realize that some of the sanctions get at that. 

Ambassador DAVIES. Sure. 

Senator CORKER. But we are still not stopping the flow of money 

to these nuclear activities from illicit concerns. And is there more 

that we should be doing there? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, I think we are slowing it, and I think 

that that is good because it makes it more difficult for the North 

Koreans to gain the inputs they need for their WMD program. I 

think it is important, though, in a kind of a, you know, all-aspects 

policy to look at that. That is something we continue to work on. 

It is interesting. I will be quick here. If you look at the trend 

over a period of years, there was a time not so many years ago 

when these problems with supernotes, with methamphetamine 

exports, with the counterfeiting of cigarettes and drugs—this was 

really epidemic. I am not saying it is not still a problem. It is and 

we are very vigilant about it. But a lot of the steps that were taken 

by the international community led by the United States, I think, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

16

did a good job of making it much more difficult for them to do that. 

A lot more work to do. No question about it. I think you are right. 

It ought to be a focus of attention. 

Senator CORKER. I know my time is up. I want to say I do agree 

with efforts to point out the human rights issues that are taking 

place. I think that helps us build an even greater coalition. And I 

would love to hear at some point about how we might influence the 

citizens there through a better broadcast activity taking place 

there. 

But thank you for your testimony and I look forward to the rest 

of your answers. 

Ambassador DAVIES. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Menendez. 

Thank you, Ambassador, for being here. I very much appreciate 

your service and willingness to go into these difficult situations. 

Could you tell us with regard to the WMD programs, what is the 

current estimate of when North Korea would have a warheadmissile combination that could strike the United States? And what 

are the most effective means to prevent this from occurring or 

slowing down progress in that area? 

Ambassador DAVIES. A great question and it is a subject of a lot 

of debate among some highly qualified experts in the government 

and then among the expert community beyond, people like Dr. Sig 

Hecker out at Stanford who have tremendous expertise here. 

Senator UDALL. He was the director of our national laboratory at 

Los Alamos. 

Ambassador DAVIES. Absolutely. Yes, he is a good friend. He is 

a national treasure. That is exactly right. 

What I am going to have to do is take a dive on this one, sir, 

because you are asking a question that really does go deeply into 

intelligence matters. I love the lights of cameras, but I think with 

all that attention, I would really rather not get into what I know. 

And I have to be honest that I am not an expert on these matters. 

So I think, though, as a general proposition, a lot of what is written in the popular literature about this by the think tanks and others is not too far off in terms of the estimates, some of which you 

have alluded to. 

But I am sorry. I cannot get into those highly classified intelligence matters. 

Senator UDALL. I understand that, but I wanted you to just give 

us a general answer as you did. I think various folks have talked 

about a matter of months or even a year or so in those kinds of 

situations. And I am sure that we will be getting briefings on that. 

You know, a lot has been said about China’s great cyber wall 

which blocks information critical of the Communist Party or policies from the Chinese people. But my understanding is North 

Korea has even a more robust restrictive policy in terms of the 

Internet. And it seems to me that one of the things we are seeing 

around the world, when you see democracy movements, is the 

Internet playing a role, the people being connected, people turning 

out in the streets as a result of that interconnectedness. And you 

may have noticed recently—and I know the administration did not 

bless this, but our former Governor, Governor Richardson, and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

17

Google’s Eric Schmidt recently visited to try to, I think, promote 

the idea of the Internet in North Korea. 

And I was wondering should the United States be actively engaged in helping to create access to the Internet in North Korea? 

And do you believe that this is in the interest of the North Korean 

people as well as other countries in the region? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Yes, a great question. And that is right. It 

is in our interests to do that, but it is a tough target set to convince 

the North Koreans to open up. While we were not crazy about the 

timing of the Richardson-Schmidt trip to Pyongyang, I was pleased 

to see Eric Schmidt make those statements. I think that was a very 

important challenge that he kind of laid down to the North 

Koreans. 

Funny things are happening in North Korea. Interesting things 

are happening in North Korea that could eventually have an effect. 

You have 1.5 million cell phones now mostly among the elite and 

on a closed system, so huge limits there. They are not able to access the outside. But nonetheless, it promotes the spread of information within North Korea. 

We know from lots of good studies that have been done by private organizations interviewing these 23,000 North Korean refugees who found their way to South Korea, that there is a surprising 

degree of understanding and knowledge in North Korea about the 

world outside their borders. South Korean soap operas are popular, 

and it probably is a bit of a shock to North Koreans when they get 

a thumb drive and they stick it in their machine and they watch 

one of these to see South Koreans with one and two cars in their 

garages and flat screen TVs and all the rest. So I think that the 

media picture in North Korea is changing. That is important. That 

is happening organically because of the trade between China and 

North Korea. 

And I think we do need to look at entrepreneurial ways to promote more of that, get more information in. I think broadcasting 

is a big part of that. The Broadcasting Board of Governors spends 

a lot of time on this issue. We work with the ROK on that as well. 

We work with private groups. There are a number of NGOs, a 

number of evangelical organizations, and others who work hard to 

try to alleviate the challenges faced by average North Koreans, and 

their presence in the country I think is a great way to bring to the 

North Koreans an image of what Americans and the outside world 

are like. 

So I think across all of these fronts, there is much that is happening. There is much more to do. And I am very glad you raised 

it. 

Senator UDALL. Ambassador, back to the nuclear weapons, and 

I think this one is much less in the classified area. Is getting North 

Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons still the goal of U.S. policy, 

and under what conditions might North Korea give up its nuclear 

weapons? 

Ambassador DAVIES. It is still the goal of United States policy to 

achieve a Korean Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons. The 

United States a generation ago removed our few short-range weapons that we had there. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

18

We know this is not going to happen overnight even if we are 

able to get some sort of a diplomatic process started. I was personally engaged in following up the tremendous work that Ambassador 

Steve Bosworth did before he left my position to try to draw out 

the North Koreans to begin a process where we could go down that 

road and get them to, first of all, bound their nuclear program and 

eventually give them up. 

I think there is still a chance for diplomacy. There is still a 

chance for the six-party talks to work, but it will require a united 

front on the part of all of us who are part of it. And most of all, 

it will require a change of calculus in Pyongyang, and that is what 

we are working to. But I am hopeful we can get to that future. I 

am hopeful that within a generation or so we could see a very different picture on the peninsula, and that is what we are working 

toward. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here with us. I know this is a difficult 

assignment you have been given by evidence of the fact that 

Ambassador Rodman last week visited North Korea and was not 

able to accomplish much either. 

Ambassador DAVIES. Yes, but he gave up the baseline. That was 

the problem. 

Senator RUBIO. I know. 

You said a moment ago that you are guardedly optimistic that 

at some point this could be resolved through negotiations. I want 

to share with you my impressions based on the work we have done 

here and in some other committees that I serve on and get your 

impressions of that. 

My impressions are that the North Korean regime—what they 

seek more than anything else is legitimacy and acceptance for who 

they are and what they are. And in essence, what they are looking 

for is the following. They want the world to accept them as a 

nuclear power. They want to be legitimized as a government that 

the world accepts as is despite all of the atrocities they commit and 

all the weird things they do abroad. And they want to be accepted 

and they want to be insulated from foreign interference in their affairs. And they have concluded that the only way they can accomplish these things is by being a nuclear power. And their strategy 

for moving forward on all these things is this series of escalations 

with potential off-ramps along the way that they conduct. 

So, for example, they do these tests on the missiles. They conduct 

weapons tests. They say outrageous things like they are going to—

I forgot their exact rhetoric used a week ago about wiping out the 

U.S. forces if they conduct a joint exercise. I think it was last night 

or this morning that they said they were going to strike us here 

in the homeland. 

The point is that they use this escalating rhetoric and the actions 

that they take to further all this and to scare people or to get a 

reaction from the world toward one goal, and that one goal is very 

simple, to get the world to say, fine, North Korean regime, you can 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19

keep your weapons. We will accept you as who you are. That is 

their goal. 

And I am not sure how we can negotiate them out of that position at this point. I think that is very difficult. For example, I think 

they sit there and decide, do we want to be Muammar Qaddafi or 

Saddam Hussein or do we want to be here forever and be able to 

hold onto this thing. And once we have a nuclear weapon and particularly once we have the capability of striking the United States 

at the homeland, they will have no choice but to accept us. And 

everything they do between now and then is just to delay or buy 

time or to scare us into a position of negotiation. 

That does not mean I do not also hope that one day they will 

wake up and say, hey, this is bad for us. I just do not think a government like this can survive if they had to somehow get rid of 

their weapons and engage the world in a civilized way. And that 

is my concern. Why does this matter? For two reasons. And this is 

what I really wanted to share with you. 

No 1, because I believe that if you are Japan, if you are South 

Korea, if you are other countries in the region, if North Korea continues to expand and, in fact, it gets global acceptance of their 

nuclear program, they are going to want one as well. So I think 

this fear of an escalation of nuclear weapons in the region is very 

real. 

And the second concern that we have is that other countries are 

measuring their behavior. I think Iran is closely watching what is 

happening with North Korea. By the way, Iran has very similar 

goals. They want to be accepted as the government that they are, 

and they want to be insulated from foreign interference. And they 

think the nuclear weapons system is the way to do it. And they are 

watching very closely the way North Korea is being treated by the 

global community and determining from that how they need to proceed forward. 

So I do not share this guarded optimism. I hope I am wrong. I 

really do. But the reality of it is, I think, the best we can hope for 

here is three things. 

No. 1, we have to do everything we can to delay and preferably 

prevent them from accomplishing the goal of being able to reach 

the United States or the West with these weapons. 

No 2, we should never allow the world to forget who these people 

are and what they are doing. And their list of atrocities is too long 

to catalog here today, but they kidnap people abroad. Any religion, 

particularly Christianity, is banned, punishable by death. Google 

has begun to catalog all these gulags that they have all over the 

country. The list goes on and on. 

And third, I think we need to begin to create the conditions, God 

willing, for reunification, which is impossible today. Today that is 

not going to happen. But we do not know when the moment comes 

if those conditions become possible. And I think we need to do 

everything we can, along with our partners in the region and the 

world, to create the conditions where hopefully one day we could 

have a unified, democratic, peaceful Korea. And that is not possible 

today, but we can begin to create the conditions where hopefully 

one day that will be possible. Who could have predicted East 

Germany would have fallen, but it did. And one of the best ways 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20

we can do that is to strengthen and continue to strengthen our relationship economically and militarily with South Korea. 

Those are my general impressions of this issue. I know that as 

a diplomat, your job is to try to bring a resolution to this that is 

negotiated. I just do not think that is going to happen with this guy 

because I think they are convinced that the only way they are ever 

going to accomplish what they want is by having a nuclear program and being able to hold the world hostage with it. 

Ambassador DAVIES. Thanks so much. And let me just quickly—

I mean, I do not disagree with anything you have said. This is one 

of the hardest foreign policy problems out there and not just for 

this particular administration but for many predecessor administrations. So you are right about all that. 

Everything you prescribe I think is being done in one form or 

another: delaying their acquisition of these materials, working 

hard—and here Ambassador Joseph I think will have more to 

say—to prevent them from proliferating these technologies, never 

letting people forget the nature of this regime and what it is they 

have done to their own people, what it is they are doing to the 

international system by remaining an outlier. 

And you talk about creating conditions for unification. 

I think here you are right. What we need to do is continue to 

support the Republic of Korea. 

What the ROK has done over the last couple of generations is 

nothing short of a miracle in terms of the way it has pulled itself 

up by its bootstraps, created the 11th-largest economy in the world, 

become a much, much more stronger nation. And I think we need 

to do all of this, and we certainly need to work more closely every 

day with the ROK and its new President, President Park Geunhye, to present this united front to North Korea and to do that also 

more broadly. 

Within hours of their nuclear test, all of the other five parties, 

China and Russia included, issued statements denouncing what 

they had done. 

So I agree with you. 

Senator RUBIO. Can I just ask about the: Are we potentially in 

the midst of a recalibration among Chinese policymakers with 

regard to the utility of their current situation with North Korea? 

Is it possible that we are in the moment that the Chinese are looking at the situation and saying they are no longer what they once 

were? We really do not need the headache that these guys are. 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, you know, we might be. They are 

clearly not pleased in Beijing that every time they have tried to impress upon the North Koreans that they should take a different 

path, North Korea thumbs their nose at them. And we have seen 

stunning developments, articles appearing in the press that have 

to have been done with the knowledge of the central authorities. 

I mentioned Chairman Mao’s grandson speaking out on this issue. 

You have got the Chinese blogosphere and netizens in China who, 

after Fukushima Daiichi, are saying what goes here. There is a 

nuclear test right across the border with North Korea. This country 

is still testing nuclear weapons 15 years after the last country 

tested a weapon. So things are changing in China. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21

What does it all mean? Where is it all headed? Will it create a 

fundamental shift in their strategic calculus? Very, very hard to 

say, but we are watching it closely. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for your testimony. 

There are three major challenges that I want to talk about. You 

have already talked about them. 

One, it is clear that North Korea is moving aggressively on its 

nuclear weapons program. 

Second, as Senator Rubio pointed out, the record on human 

rights violations in the country is one of the worst of any country 

in the world, the way they treat their people, no opportunity for 

dissent, no opportunity for criticisms. Their kidnapping and torture 

are notorious. 

And the third is the condition of their own people, the level of 

poverty, the level of hunger. 

So I want to ask you three points that have been raised. 

One is that North Korea has threatened to cut off the military 

hotline. How important is that in dealing with the threat of confrontation? 

Second, the United Nations is looking at a commission on human 

rights. Should we have any confidence that that, in fact, would put 

an adequate spotlight on what is happening? 

And the third is our contact in North Korea is limited. We do not 

have a great deal of NGOs to work with. We are not providing any 

significant aid at all. Should we be reevaluating the United States 

participation with NGOs to try to reach out to deal with the population itself in North Korea? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Great questions. Let me be quick about 

that. 

The hotline cutoff. They have done this before. It is one of the 

things they do on occasion. I do not know that it is necessarily the 

case that this latest threat to cut off the hotline—or perhaps they 

have already cut the line—is going to be, at the end of the day, 

much different from what we have seen in the past. Nonetheless, 

it is serious. 

Senator CARDIN. Have we used it in the past? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Yes. At the Peace Village on the border, it 

has often been used to convey messages back and forth. 

Your question about what is happening in Geneva and the likely, 

we hope, establishment for the first time of a permanent mechanism, a commission of inquiry, to look at North Korean human 

rights, I think this is a significant development. It is somewhat 

stunning that this has not been the case in the past. But anyway, 

the United Nations is, we hope, going to take that step. And I 

think that it is not a magic bullet, but I think it will be a great 

way for the entire international community institutionally and 

indefinitely to look at what is going on in North Korea and to 

broadcast to the rest of the world the results of their efforts. 

On NGOs——

Senator CARDIN. Before we leave that point, are there still

hurdles that have to be overcome for that commission to be 

established? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, it is not done yet. The Human Rights 

Council has not looked at it. And having served a couple of years 

in Vienna working in the U.N. system, I know nothing is done until 

it is done in U.N.-land. So we will see. 

But we have reason to believe that there is the right kind of 

correlation of forces. The European Union is behind this. Japan is 

behind it. The ROK has just announced their support for this 

mechanism. We are actively seeking it. And of course, I had 

mentioned in my statement that U.N. officials are behind it and 

promoting it. So I think the planets are lining up. It is going to 

happen, I hope. And we are going to do what we can to make it 

happen. And it will have an effect. 

On NGOs, that is a great point. Yesterday during the snow day 

that wasn’t, I was in the office and I was on a wonderful conference 

call with about seven NGOs, Mercy Corps, GRS, many of them religiously based. These people do heroic work in North Korea. And it 

is very unsung. They get in there. They do medical programs. They 

get out of Pyongyang, that walled city where the elite lives, and 

they get into the countryside and they do everything from tuberculosis work to digging wells to helping hospitals and dental clinics. You name it. And I think it is important that we do everything 

we can to kind of clear the path for them to do what they can do. 

It is not easy. And one of the concerns they had was about sanctions and whether sanctions will affect their ability to bring things 

into North Korea to do the work they have got to do. 

I think we need to try to find a way—and there is a bit of a 

carve-out in the language of the resolution—to promote their work 

because I think that is exceedingly important that this kind of people-to-people work go forward. Why? Because one-third of North 

Koreans, according to a number of studies, are severely, chronically 

malnourished. They are clearly forgotten by the elites who live in 

Pyongyang building amusement parks and holding rock concerts 

and so forth. And so it is very, very important that we do what we 

can to work with them. 

Senator CARDIN. We have, in the past when we have imposed 

sanctions, tried to figure out ways that we can get direct aid to 

NGOs that we have confidence in to provide the type of humanitarian aid that is appropriate. Do we have confidence that if that 

aid were to be made available, that the NGO network is strong 

enough and there is enough accountability that we would be able 

to assure that the aid, in fact, went for the designated purpose and 

was not diverted to compromise the importance of the sanctions? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, the NGOs take it very seriously. They 

have got decades of experience. They are very good about it. A lot 

of their work is scaled such that it is a lot less likely that the 

regime is going to try to divert the resources that they provide, the 

services to the military or the elites. I have been impressed as I 

have looked at the specifics of these programs that they have 

underway. They have, to a great extent, figured out how to do this, 

and whether it is flood relief or whether it is bringing nutritional 

supplements to malnourished children, they are one of the ways we 

ought to go. And when we have done big feeding programs in North 

Korea—there was the 500,000 metric ton program under the previous administration that the North Koreans cut off only about a 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23

third of the way into it. And this most recent one we tried to put 

in place—we do most of that work through U.S. NGOs because 

they are that good and they have the right understanding of how 

to ensure that the goods and services they provide get to the people 

who need them. 

Senator CARDIN. I will just make a final point. For Congress to 

allow that type of assistance, we need to know and have confidence 

that we can account for how the aid is being used since we are not 

present in the country to be able to do that. We have to have that 

type of confidence. So it is something that you need to be able to 

build up as far as the questions that will be asked in Congress. 

Ambassador DAVIES. Absolutely. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Davies, welcome. Thank you for your testimony. 

Can you just kind of bring me up to speed in terms of the 

progress of the new leader in terms of his consolidation of power 

and how much of that consolidation really leads to the high jinx we 

have been seeing here recently? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, that is a really hard target. A lot of 

terrific intelligence professionals work at that. We stay in close 

touch with our European allies, some of whom have small embassies there. I just, a week ago, spent a couple of hours with the 

ambassador of one of those nations who had lots of insights to provide about the thinking of the government. 

Just as a general matter, I think what has happened was, you 

know, Kim Jong-un came into power the beginning of last year on 

the death of his father in mid-December in 2011. There was then 

this period that lasted a few months where everybody was saying, 

oh, this may be a new day. He is a young Gorbachev. One think 

tanker even talked about a Camelot moment occurring in North 

Korea. I personally was not buying any of this stuff at the time, 

nor were many in Government. But what we have seen is that that 

debate has gone away, that the hope for the kind of a more enlightened approach to these issues—that is fading fast. 

I think he has consolidated his power. He has now got the six 

key titles. He is the head of the army, head of the military, head 

of the government. And remember, the logic of their system is 

such—it is such a strictly hierarchical, dictatorial, top-down system 

that in order for that system to operate as it has for the last three 

generations, there has to be a man at the top to whom all issues 

are referred and from whom all wisdom flows. So we think that he 

is, for all intents and purposes, in charge. 

And as to why he has taken the steps he has taken, some of the 

purges, I think some of that has been consolidating his power, firing the generals and so forth, and then all of this tough talk going 

on—it is hard to say why they are doing that. I think a lot of it 

is just their classical reaction to the fact that the international 

community increasingly is coming together and making it tougher 

for them operate. So I think that is the kind of acting out that we 

often see from North Korea. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you. 

I am new to the committee, but I have certainly been watching 

the laying out of sanctions and then relaxing them a little bit, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24

basically the dual strategy here. Can you tell me in your mind 

what was the most effective set of sanctions? I will start there. I 

mean, what worked best. But I also want you to speak to what mistakes were made. What lessons have we learned both in terms of 

the effectiveness of sanctions and how we maybe relaxed them and 

basically how the United States has been kind of played like 

Charlie Brown more than once here? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Yes, but on sanctions I think what is important—the most important sanctions often tend to be the ones that 

have the buy-in of the broadest number of nations. And here I 

talked about the role of China and the importance of working with 

them to ensure that they follow through on their commitments 

when it comes to sanctions. 

What is the most effective set of sanctions? That is hard to say. 

You know, I am tempted to say that probably the sanctions that 

have helped to cut off the flow of luxury goods is pretty important 

because it has prevented the regime, to some extent—they find 

ways around it, but of rewarding members of the elite. 

But I think a more serious answer is that the sanctions that are 

getting at the nuclear program, getting at the missile program, preventing the inputs from going into North Korea that they need in 

order to build up those weapons of mass destruction programs, 

those are the most important. 

This latest resolution that I was given a note that has passed in 

New York contains not only a tightening of the existing sanctions 

but it has got some new sanctions in it that get at that problem. 

And I think we need to keep building on that. I think what you 

will see is that there will then be national sanctions that will be 

promulgated by not just us but others in order to tighten sanctions 

down further. 

But I think it is in the missile and nuclear areas where the sanctions are having the most effect and then finally, interdiction which 

is to say—and this new resolution has a lot of good stuff in it about 

preventing the export by North Korea of its armaments, which is 

a key source of income, by sea and by air. And there is a lot in this 

resolution that gets at that, and I think that is what we need to 

keep working on first and foremost. 

Senator JOHNSON. Did we not freeze bank accounts at some point 

in time for the top leaders? 

Ambassador DAVIES. We have done a number of financial sanctions that are more in this particular resolution approved just minutes ago. There are individual designations of key people and their 

apparatus who play key roles in exporting their materials, importing what they need to build up their programs, travel bans on 

these individuals, and so forth. So it is a combination of these individual designations, institutional designations, and then also the 

specific inputs, the actual machinery and technology that they 

need. And I think we just need to push on all of these fronts and 

keep it up. 

Senator JOHNSON. Senator Rubio mentioned the word ‘‘recalibration,’’ and somebody else talked about strategic calculus. Of the 

members of the six-party talks, what has been the most significant 

movement or most significant recalibration of the strategic calculus 

whether it is Russia, China, Japan? Can you just speak to that? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25

I mean, where has there been some movement just to give me some 

sense of that history? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, I think the movement—it is a little bit 

like, I have to admit, watching paint dry sometimes. It is such a 

long process. But I think the movement has been incremental. I 

think the movement has been all of the various efforts, and there 

have been really quite a variety of approaches to this problem by 

various administrations in the past whether engagement, whether 

pressure, different architectures internationally, six-party talks. 

There were four-party talks at one point, and here Ambassador 

Bosworth can speak to a great deal of this. I think the biggest 

change has been just the steady accumulation of experience, of 

pressure, of sanctions over the years, over the decades, and I think 

that has made a huge difference. 

And then the final thing I will say is that, you know, the world 

is beginning to wake up to a greater extent to this problem. It is 

still kind of stunning, as a diplomat, that 80 nations from every 

corner of the world would issue statements condemning North 

Korea’s nuclear test. These are developments we would not have 

seen even a few years ago. So this coalition is building. It is growing. It is strengthening, and it is meaningful because these are people who send messages to North Korea. They send messages to 

China. And it is very difficult in an international system for a 

nation like North Korea to ignore the fact that increasingly their 

actions are seen as deleterious to the functioning of the world system and to the interests of these countries. 

So it is hard for me to point to one particular recalibration that 

has occurred. Maybe what is going on in China will fit that bill. 

But I would just say that it is this incremental deepening and 

broadening of pressure on North Korea that has been most important. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to start by talking about the North Korean economy. 

I think there is this sort of popular impression that the North 

Korean economy is sort of this vast wasteland of work camps and 

starving people, and while that is certainly true for a big part of 

the country, there is also a relatively stable economy in the capital. 

There is a class of ruling elites that are doing fairly well. And you 

mentioned in your response to Senator Johnson briefly about the 

impact that our sanctions have had on holding back luxury goods 

from that class of individuals that has seemingly been pretty 

resistant to the type of poverty that has struck the rest of the 

nation. 

Can you talk a little bit about the state of the North Korean 

economy today? Can you talk a little bit about our relative success 

or lack of success in trying to change the calculus for the ruling 

elite based on their economic status and any new tools that may 

be at our disposal to try to change that? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Yes. Well, the economy question is a great 

one, and there are a number of experts who look at this hard. It 

is tough to measure. They do not produce statistics that are at all 

reliable to indicate the scope of it. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26

Many people are fooled when they go to Pyongyang which, as I 

have said, is a bit of a walled city state. You cannot easily get in 

and get out where the elites live, and they see people with cell 

phones and they see a few more cars on the street, a few more restaurants, and they conclude that North Korea is really coming up 

in the world economically. I do not think that is the case. 

They have some goods and services to offer to the world. They 

have mineral deposits that are of value certainly to China which 

seeks to exploit them and others. They export laborers to Russia 

and China and other places around the world who remit moneys 

to North Korea. Their economy in some sectors has done reasonably well. 

But the problem, of course, is that their agriculture sector 

remains unreformed; their light industrial sector, the same. When 

the new leader came in, he made a number of promises about—

hinted at reforms that he would institute. We have yet to see that. 

For whatever reason, he seems to have drawn back from going forward with those reforms. To some extent, reform of the North 

Korean economy would be good for the North Korean people, and 

the Chinese are often telling us that we should help the North 

Koreans reform their economy and we beg to differ on that. 

And I am sorry. Your second question, sir? 

Senator MURPHY. No. That was the first question. 

The second one would be this. So to what extent is food aid an 

actual tool to recalibrate their strategic interests? We have certainly had success in these temporary agreements by exchanging 

food aid for concessions on their nuclear program, but of course,

as we saw with the Leap Day Agreement, it can blow up within 

months. 

Ambassador DAVIES. Sure. 

Senator MURPHY. Is this a real pressure point in negotiations, or 

have they just used this as a means to sort of delay and delay and 

postpone? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Yes. I think the latter is the case. 

We do not link food assistance to political matters. What I found, 

when I came into the process toward the end of our yearlong effort 

to negotiate this deal with the North Koreans, was that the North 

Koreans were insisting that the offer we had made of 240,000 metric tons be linked to the concessions they were going to make on 

nuclear and missiles. So they enforced that linkage from their side. 

We do not use food as a weapon or a tool and we do not link it 

to political matters. 

And no country has been more generous than the United States 

over the years in providing food to the North Korean people I think 

since 1989, if I have the statistic right or 1997. It has been on the 

order of some $800 million of food, almost 2 million metric tons. So 

we support the people of North Korea. We try—and it is not easy—

to bring them aid and comfort, bring them food because it is quite 

clear that the authorities in Pyongyang do not care about what 

happens in the hinterland of North Korea, and they allow this malnutrition and sometimes, as was the case in the 1990s, starvation 

to occur. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27

So we do not link the two. I would never posit or put forward 

that food aid is something we should use as an inducement to political change or change on denuclearization. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

And then one last question on China, and you may have responded to this in response to Senator Menendez. But in particular 

to what Senator Rubio talked about with regard to the arms race 

that could develop in the region should they get full nuclear capacity, what does China think about that? I can understand that they 

could say, listen, we can control the North Koreans if we continue 

to be responsible for 70 percent of their economy. Even if they do 

get nuclear capacity, we can deal with that. But they have to 

understand that the balance of power in the region dramatically 

shifts if all of a sudden 10 years from now or 15 years from now 

there are three or four or five nuclear powers in the region. Is that 

a bright line for them? Do they view that as a serious threat? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, I mean, the last thing I will do is 

speak for the Chinese on this. But there are signs that the Chinese 

are watching closely these debates that are occurring, in particular 

in Japan and the ROK among some. I do not think any consensus 

is developing or will develop in favor of going forward with developing nuclear weapons. I certainly hope not because it is important 

from the standpoint of the integrity of the Nonproliferation Treaty 

that they not go forward in doing that. But the Chinese are taking 

notice and I think it concerns them. 

You know, one of the things that we say to them when we have 

these conversations about what is happening in North Korea is if 

you have concerns about America’s kind of recalibration of its force 

posture toward Asia, then if North Korea continues to go in the 

same direction and we cannot find a way to work together to 

resolve it, you will see more of the same and you are not going to 

like it. You will see more developments such as the extension by 

the ROK of the range of its missiles. You will see more developments like the placement of TPY–2 radars in Japan. You will see 

more on missile defense. You will see more on the rest of it. 

And so you have some voices in China talking about, oh, well, 

this is the United States trying to encircle us. It is not what we 

are trying to do at all. What we are trying to do is defend ourselves. And I think that they know these phenomena are related. 

And I think that they are concerned about it and we hope it becomes an incentive for China to step up and do a bit more, given 

their special relationship with North Korea, to try to resolve this 

problem. And we stand ready to work with the Chinese to do that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Special Representative Davies, I am just going to pick up on the 

chairman’s opening question, which I think we are all kind of grappling with. What is the right way to change the calculus with 

North Korea vis-a-vis the nuclear program? And many of the questions thus far have been about external measures, and I want to 

get to those in a second. 

But I would like to get your sense on internal measures. You 

know, looking at the history of nations that have decided to 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

28

abandon nuclear programs, often it has been an internal political 

calculus that has caused them to do so. 

In looking at some of the events of the Arab Spring, you know, 

what struck me was that people grow to tolerate all over the world 

sadly and live under dictatorships, but they start to get restive 

under hereditary dictatorships. And so whether it was in Egypt in 

a time of potential transition to a new Mubarak or a Libya in a 

time of potential transition to a younger Qaddafi or Syria with a 

second Assad, once the dictatorship starts to become a hereditary 

dictatorship, then there is some restive possibility that a population decides that it wants to throw it off. 

Let us talk about the internal dynamics of North Korea and just 

educate me a bit on that. I mean, is there any potential for internal 

dissent that could drive a rethinking of the nuclear program? And 

is there anything we can appropriately do? It is kind of like hydrofracking, you know, finding the microfissures and then doing things 

you can to widen them. Is there anything we can appropriately do 

to drive that dissent and increase it? 

Ambassador DAVIES. We do not see signs of significant internal 

dissent in North Korea, and maybe that is often the case before 

changes occur. I do not know. So that presents a challenge to us 

to figure out where do you drill and what do you pump into that 

hole in order to engage in this kind of fracking. I love that image. 

So it is tough. 

I think the important thing is to keep firing on all cylinders, to 

keep broadcasting into North Korea, to continue to work with our 

allies who do a great deal of this work with NGOs. I do think the 

situation is changing in North Korea. They are educated. They are, 

I think many of them, hungry for information about what is happening on the outside. 

But when it comes to the classical stuff that we all know from 

history about, well, is there a unity army or is there somebody in 

the regime who is susceptible, there is nothing like that that presents itself to us right today that we can exploit or reach out to. 

And it makes it a very, very, very tough problem set. 

Senator KAINE. And just explain that as somebody who is an

expert in this area, the absence of this kind of visible dissent. And 

you are in good touch with nations that have diplomatic presence 

in North Korea. Is it just the sheer demoralization and poverty of 

those who do not have any credible ability to match up against a 

military power? Is it the long-term effects of famine? Is it a cultural—I mean, how would you describe what we are seeing elsewhere we do not see there, given famine, given the poor economic 

conditions that would drive dissent elsewhere? 

Ambassador DAVIES. That is really hard for me to answer. I am 

not a lifelong North Korea expert. 

I do not think we are going to know if and when that opportunity 

necessarily presents itself any better than we have in recent years 

when we have seen dramatic change in parts of the world where 

there were authoritarian or dictatorial systems. And the problem 

with North Korea is it is just the most hermetically sealed, highwalled, paranoid state out there. I do not think it really has its 

modern equivalent anywhere else in the world. 

Senator KAINE. Since Albania fell——

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29

Ambassador DAVIES. Maybe Albania. 

Senator KAINE [continuing]. It does not have an equivalent. 

Ambassador DAVIES. Maybe Albania. 

So I have to admit that even though a lot of very dedicated, 

qualified people work this issue in the intelligence community, in 

our military, out of the State Department, and we do that on a 

daily basis, there is not anything there that I can point to right 

now as the pressure point, the fissure that we can exploit. 

I keep coming back to the necessity for staying true to our principles, staying close to our allies, working hard with our partners, 

in particular China given their relationship, highlighting the 

human rights depredations in North Korea. And I believe that 

there will come a day when things will likely change. I do not think 

that North Korea has forever to make the strategic choice to go in 

a different direction that will involve reaching out to the rest of the 

world and fulfilling its promises and going down the path of 

denuclearization. That is it. They have got an off-ramp. There is a 

way that we can work this peacefully, diplomatically that we presented to them time and time again, and they have chosen not to 

take us up on it. We will continue to do it, and some day, I am 

convinced, when the pounds per square inch of pressure builds up 

enough, they may see the light and decide, well, maybe we ought 

to take door No. 1. I hope that is true. 

Senator KAINE. Let me ask about external pressure. Good questions have been asked already about the five parties to the sixparty talks and China especially. But there are other nations that 

we have strong relationships with that aid and abet or at least 

have interactions with the North Korean Government that probably help them to gain or continue momentum on their illicit activity, nations like Egypt and Pakistan and the UAE that are not a 

direct part of those talks. But talk about our abilities to utilize 

those relationships and, either through the U.N. action today or 

other actions, get them to stop anything that would promote North 

Korea’s forward momentum on nuclear proliferation. 

Ambassador DAVIES. That is a great question. We work at it all 

the time. There have been some successes. I mean, you are familiar 

with the Burma example where the new government has made the 

strategic decision to go in a different direction and to change the 

nature of its relationship with North Korea. That is very important. That will still take some time to play out and work through. 

The same is true of many of these other sort of traditional customers or states that have dealt with North Korea. Since the

al-Kibar reactor was taken care of in Syria, I think that is a relationship that is no longer what it was. 

So the truth is we take it case by case. We work with these countries that still maintain an arms relationship with North Korea. I 

think this effort to expand the international coalition and consensus about North Korea is important because the moral hazard 

of dealing with North Korea becomes a more important factor, I 

think, for many of these countries. But I guess the short and honest answer is it is a case-by-case effort that we undertake and we 

are seeking to step it up. And this resolution passed today in New 

York I think is going to help us, to a great extent, to get at that 

problem. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

30

Senator KAINE. Great. Thanks very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. I apologize. I had a couple other markups and 

hearings going on. 

I just want to ask—and I am not sure how this has been asked 

or answered before, but do you believe that for the reductions on 

our part as a result of these treaties will do anything to persuade 

the North Koreans to move ahead with reductions or not moving 

ahead with what they are doing? How effective is what we do or 

how persuasive is that with their own actions, or is that completely 

independent? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, here I can draw on my couple of years 

working at the International Atomic Energy Agency where in the 

wake of the President’s Prague speech where he set out his vision 

for a world without nuclear weapons, I found, representing the 

United States in that body, a 150-nation body, that that had a tremendous effect on convincing a lot of the fence-sitters around the 

world that the United States was serious about trying to move forward because if you go back to Eisenhower’s nuclear bargain, 

which he laid out in his Atoms for Peace speech, you know, it was 

quite clear. Those with nuclear weapons would seek over time to—

you know the whole thing—get rid of them. Those without would 

pledge not to acquire them. And so for many, many, many countries in the world, the United States demonstrating that it is serious about keeping up its end of the nuclear bargain has a tremendous effect. 

Now, when it comes to North Korea, I am not going to spin you 

and tell you that the North Koreans are going to pack up their 

nuclear weapons and put them in a pile and burn them up if we 

pass further arms control treaties with Russia and so forth. But 

what it does is it has a tremendous effect on all 189 nations who 

are signatories of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and it makes it 

easier for us and others who care a lot about this treaty to move 

that agenda forward, reduces North Korea’s running room, makes 

it tougher for North Korea to continue to claim that they need 

these weapons in order to defend themselves. And so I think it is 

a vital aspect of winning over hearts and minds globally and eventually setting up a set of circumstances in which it is very, very 

difficult if not, one hopes, eventually impossible for them to continue to maintain as an international outlier this commitment to 

develop nuclear weapons. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker has one additional question. 

Senator CORKER. Just one brief question. You know, I listened to 

you and I know that you are working hard and many people have 

for many, many years. But I think you basically, in answering 

some of the questions, have acquiesced and said, look, you know, 

this is probably going to continue on and we do not see any real 

changes and more pressure will be applied. 

I am just curious. We have a situation with Iran where there is 

a redline, and we have been pretty bellicose about the fact that we 

would use military action to keep them from having nuclear weapons. And yet, in Korea, equally nutty folks, human rights even 

worse—and it is bad in Iran too. But why is it that we have a policy in North Korea that is so different than what we have in Iran 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31

when you have equally bellicose and, I would say, regimes that certainly are rogue regimes? Why would we have such a differentiating policy? 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, I think actually the policy has more 

commonalities than differences. In both cases what we seek to do 

is, as I said earlier, in the case of North Korea, use pressure when 

we have to use pressure and seek to exploit engagement when it 

is possible to engage them. 

I do not agree that there has been no change. I think that the 

pressure of the sanctions, the coalitions we have built, the work in 

six-party, a lot of the diplomatic efforts in which the gentlemen to 

my right who will testify next were intimately involved went a 

great distance to——

Senator CORKER. But they are certainly way past any kind of 

redline that we would accept in Iran. They are certainly way 

beyond anything that we as a country have stated publicly that we 

would accept in Iran. So it seems to me that we have two very different policies here. I am just curious why that is the case. 

Ambassador DAVIES. Well, I think we have two very different 

historical situations that have developed, and I think it is because 

of the different set of circumstances in both. I am not an Iran 

expert. I worked the issue when I was in Vienna, but that was 

some time ago. So I can quickly get myself in trouble by trying to 

compare the Iran case to the North Korea case. 

But as the North Korea case has developed, I think that there 

have been some successes. I think we have slowed their efforts to 

create these weapons. I think we have built this coalition that is 

going to continue to decrease their running room and their space 

within which they can operate. I have faith that if we stick with 

our principles that have been devised on a bipartisan basis over 

20–30 years, that we will see the kinds of changes that we would 

like to see. 

And I am sorry. It is true. You know, these are pernicious problems. This is the land of a lot of bad alternatives. And so I think 

the way you deal with it is you stick to your principles. You stick 

to your allies. You make modest progress here, sometimes dramatic 

progress there. Occasionally there are setbacks, but you keep at it. 

And I think American leadership on this issue is absolutely essential. I think it has borne a lot of fruit. Sadly it has not changed 

the strategic situation yet, but I have got every confidence that if 

we keep at it, if we keep together, we are going to see sooner or 

later—hope it is sooner—the kinds of changes we hope are needed. 

And I want to reemphasize this one point. It is up to North 

Korea to understand that it has another path that it can take. It 

has a partner in the international community that will engage with 

North Korea, but it has got to be the one to make this decision, 

make this strategic choice, move toward abandoning nuclear weapons and missiles. And if they do, there can be a very different 

future on the Korean Peninsula and one that will be for the benefit 

of all the Korean people, North and South. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that is a highly aspirational statement that does not 

seem to be very based on reality today, but I thank you for your 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

32

optimism. And yet, I will go back to my original premise and certainly would like to understand that more fully. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me just make an observation. First of 

all, we are very aspirational here. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador DAVIES. You have to be on North Korea. 

The CHAIRMAN. But I think in part just an observation on Senator Corker’s question which is that, obviously, one of the reasons 

we have so vigorously pursued a sanctions regime on Iran is because Iran is not where North Korea is in terms of its nuclear program and we do not desire it to get to that point as North Korea 

has. So whether or not there was a different point in time in which 

maybe a previous administration should have adopted a very similar position as we have now with Iran, we are past that moment. 

And our question is how do we deal with the realities of the 

moment and try to change the dynamics, the strategic calculus 

both inside of North Korea and, I hope, the strategic calculus of 

China in this context, which plays a key role toward, hopefully, getting us to the point that we want to be. 

With the thanks of the committee and for your staying power, we 

appreciate very much your appearing here, and we look forward to 

continuing dialogue with you and the administration on this critical issue. 

As we excuse Ambassador Davies, let me call up our next panel. 

Ambassador Stephen Bosworth who served for over a decade as 

dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and from March 2009 to October 2011, served as the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy. From 1997 to 2001, 

Ambassador Bosworth was the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of 

Korea. From 1995 to 1997, he was the Executive Director of the 

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, an intergovernmental organization established by the United States, the 

Republic of Korea, and Japan. And Ambassador Bosworth has a 

distinguished career in the U.S. Foreign Service for nearly three 

decades. 

Please, gentlemen come on up and sit right at the table. 

Joseph DeTrani is the president of the Intelligence and National 

Security Alliance. He previously worked as the Senior Advisor in 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Director of 

ODNI’s National Counterproliferation Center, and as the ODNI’s 

North Korean Mission Manager. Prior to his work at ODNI, 

Ambassador DeTrani served at the Department of State as both a 

Special Envoy for Negotiations with North Korea and as the U.S. 

Representative to the Korea Energy Development Corporation. He 

has worked in numerous roles throughout the Central Intelligence 

Agency and has extensive experience in that regard as well. 

Finally, Robert Joseph is the senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy. From 2005 to 2007, Ambassador Joseph was 

the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 

Security, and from 2001 to 2004, he served in the National Security 

Council as Special Assistant to the President and the Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland 

Defense. Ambassador Joseph also served in the Department of 

Defense as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

33

International Security Policy and Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control. 

So we have a very distinguished panel here. 

I am going to ask each of you to summarize your statement in 

around 5 minutes. Your full statements will be entered into the 

record so we can have time for some dialogue here, as we move forward. We want to pick upon your expertise to draw some of the 

questions and answers to some of the issues that have already been 

raised with our previous panelist, Ambassador Davies. 

And so we will start in the order that I recognized you: Ambassador Bosworth, Ambassador DeTrani, and Ambassador Joseph. 

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN W. BOSWORTH, DEAN, THE 

FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY, MEDFORD, MA 

Ambassador BOSWORTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

am grateful for the opportunity to appear before the committee. 

I will not try to summarize the current scene with regard to 

North Korea. I think Ambassador Davies did that quite well. I 

would only say a few things as an opening. 

First, this is obviously a very, very difficult problem, and it follows that there are no good options for dealing with it. If there 

were, I trust that some of us would have found those in the past. 

Instead, I think what we have found is that North Korea, by and 

large, has continued to exceed reasonable expectations as to what 

they could accomplish technologically both in their missile program 

and in their nuclear program. Having followed this issue for now 

20 years, I would venture to say that they have consistently outperformed the expectations of the outside world, and I do not think 

we have time to get into the question of why. But they have created a situation in which now they are demonstrably within reach 

over some period of time of being able to, as someone put it earlier 

today, mate a nuclear device with a missile, and that changes the 

strategic balance in a number of ways. 

As I said, the options for dealing with them are very limited and 

very obscure. We can, as we have in the past at various times, simply stand back and wait for what we considered at the time to be 

the inevitable collapse. That policy has clearly not succeeded. We 

began waiting for their collapse back in the late 1980s, and when 

I last checked, they are still there. 

Similarly, we can rely on a policy of containment and deterrence, 

which we will have to do in any event. But I think what we have 

found is that containment and deterrence do not prevent the threat 

from growing more acute. 

Also, we can, of course—as has been hinted in various questions 

this morning—rely more heavily on China to somehow solve this 

problem for us. I am not optimistic that China is going to do that. 

I am encouraged by their apparent willingness to contemplate 

tougher sanctions as they have this last time around in the United 

Nations. 

But I think China continues to face an essential conundrum 

which is that while on the one hand, they do not want North Korea 

to become a nuclear weapons state, on the other hand, they also 

do not want North Korea to collapse. And in their view, they are 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

34

concerned that bringing sufficient pressure to bear on North Korea 

to stop their nuclear program, much less to dismantle it, would risk 

creating a situation in which North Korea could collapse. And for 

China, an equally undesirable outcome of all of this would be to 

wake up some morning and find that the border of South Korea is 

now the Yellow River because North Korea has collapsed and 

South Korea with a military alliance with the United States. That 

changes in a very fundamental way what has been called the correlation of forces on the Korean Peninsula. And Chinese strategic 

thinkers have to have this very much in mind. 

All this being said, my own personal view is that at some point—

I cannot say exactly when, but I would think sooner rather than 

later—we will come back to an effort to engage with North Korea 

in some manner only because the alternatives are so bleak. And I 

think that that probably is what we should try to do because we 

have no good options. 

The question that will exist at that time is engage on what basis. 

Do we again seek to engage on the basis of denuclearization pretty 

much by itself at least as a primary objective, or do we seek to 

engage on a broader basis going back, for example, to the joint 

statement negotiated in the six-party process back in September 

2005 in which all of the parties signed on to a four-goal/four-objective formulation: denuclearization, a peace treaty to replace the 

armistice of 1953, establishment of diplomatic relations among all 

parties concerned, and agreement to provide energy and economic 

assistance to North Korea. 

In my view, it would be more productive to seek from the outset 

to engage with North Korea on the basis of that broader agenda 

which seeks, in my judgment, to get at what is really the fundamental problem on the Korean Peninsula, the problem which gives 

rise to the nuclear threat and that is the inherent weakness of 

North Korea and the strong conviction of the North Korean regime 

that it will not do anything which risks its demise. 

So in my judgment, only by addressing these broader considerations of a peace treaty to replace the armistice, economic and 

energy assistance, and diplomatic relations do we have a prospect 

of getting at what remains and will remain our central and abiding 

concern which is the North Korean nuclear problem. But I think 

rather than simply focusing on that and trying to identify it and 

to try to resolve it in and of itself, which has not proven to be very 

feasible over the last several years, I think we would be much better off looking for a broader focus. And I think that the prior agreement of September 2005 provides the seed for such a broader 

agreement. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador DeTrani. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH DETRANI, PRESIDENT, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE, ARLINGTON, 

VA 

Ambassador DETRANI. Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, members, 

thank you for the invitation. 

My statement is on the record. Let me just offer a few comments. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

35

I certainly agree with Ambassador Bosworth. Denuclearization is 

the name of the game with North Korea. Permitting North Korea 

to sustain their program, maintain that program and, as we see it, 

enhance their program with additional nuclear weapons, not only 

through plutonium but through uranium, would be a destabilizing 

factor for the region. Other countries will be looking to acquire 

similar capabilities—Senator Rubio asked that question, and I 

think it is a fair question. We are talking about the potential for 

a nuclear arms race. We are also talking about the potential for 

nuclear terrorism, and others who want to get their hands on 

nuclear materiels and nuclear devices. 

In 2002, we confronted the North Koreans with their uranium 

enrichment program. It was a clandestine uranium enrichment 

program. They denied having that program. In 2010, they admitted 

to the program. The same gentleman who was mentioned this 

morning, Dr. Sig Hecker, was introduced to a facility at Yongbyon 

where they had 2,000, they said, functioning and operating centrifuges. As Dr. Hecker said at that time, this was a state-of-theart facility. The assessment here is that North Korea was, and is, 

pursuing a uranium enrichment program to complement their plutonium program, all for nuclear weapons purposes. That is point 

one. 

Point two—and I agree totally with Ambassador Bosworth—the 

September 2005 joint statement is a seminal statement. It speaks 

to a commitment that Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un’s father, committed to where he said even in Beijing he commits to denuclearization. And that 2005 joint statement says very clearly that in 

exchange for economic assistance, security assurances, ultimately 

diplomatic relations when they address the illicit activity issues of 

counterfeiting our currency, counterfeiting pharmaceuticals, counterfeiting cigarettes, and trafficking in methamphetamine, when 

there is transparency and progress on the human rights issues, 

then we would talk about diplomatic relations. So it was not a sine 

qua non that with denuclearization comes normalization. No. We 

need denuclearization and that is a process toward normalization. 

But in that process, they get all those other aspects to economic 

benefits, and hopefully that would be enough of an inducement. 

And the North Koreans signed up to the 2005 joint statement. 

Also in the 2005 joint statement is the provision of a light water 

reactor. When North Korea comes back to the NPT as a nonnuclear 

weapons state, because as North Korea said, they have a right to 

a civil nuclear program—and that is in there. And that was it. 

And that fell apart because on the same day, the 19th of September, the North Koreans were offended by the fact that we had 

Banco Delta Asia. And that was a question asked this morning 

also. Banco Delta Asia—the predicate there was the Patriot Act, 

section 311, the predicate being money laundering. And North 

Koreans, using the Banco Delta Asia, were laundering their money. 

The Macao authorities retained $25 million of the money that 

North Korea had in this bank until the bank was in compliance 

with U.S. law and regulations. 

Eventually the bank was in compliance. The money was returned 

to North Korea and I might add that it was returned through our 

own banking system, our financial institutions, because the North 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

36

Koreans insisted at that time they wanted to get into the international financial market and they wanted legitimacy. 

But that got us back on the path to denuclearization. That was 

what the game was all about: denuclearization. We eventually took 

them off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and that was to be 

in response to North Korea committing to a verification regime, 

that moves us toward comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of all their nuclear programs. They refused to sign a 

verification protocol, and that led to the unraveling of the September 2005 joint statement. 

And that is unfortunate; it has gone downhill ever since: the 

2006 and 2009 nuclear tests and missile launches, what we have 

just seen in 2012, and now what we have just seen last month in 

February with the third nuclear test. So North Korea is enhancing 

their nuclear capabilities and enhancing their missile capabilities. 

The one point I will put on the table is that in April 2003, China 

brought North Korea to the table after they held back on some fuel 

that went into North Korea; it certainly was a message to North 

Korea to come, we want you at the table. In April 2003, China 

brought the United States and the North Koreans together, with 

China in the chair, and that was the beginning of the six-party 

process. 

My personal view is China can do the same thing now. We bring 

South Korea into that process and sit down with North Korea and 

say, ‘‘What are you doing?’’ Is Kim Jong-un as committed to 

denuclearization and the joint statement as his father was? And 

get it on the record and address it and determine if there is any 

viability in the six-party process to go back to the September 2005 

joint statement. I think that is a process. I think that is a meaningful one. 

And I might add, as my last comment, that I was one of the few 

in early 2012 who was guardedly optimistic because I saw some 

personnel moves being made by Kim Jong-un coming into power. 

He replaced his Minister of Defense. He replaced the KPA, the 

chief of staff; he put a party officer who was overseeing the military as the director of the general political department; he brought 

his uncle into a very high position, so there was a momentum. And 

that all fell apart. After the Leap Day Agreement, they launched 

missiles and they have had a nuclear test. That has come to this 

position right now where we are at a stalemate, a very dangerous 

one. 

And I think the Chinese now can really move this process forward, get us off the dime, get North Korea to the table, and get 

some momentum going here rather than continued escalation and 

a potential for confrontation. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador DeTrani follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOSEPH R. DETRANI

From 2003 to 2006 I was the Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks (6PT) with North 

Korea and the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization 

(KEDO). For the following 4 years I was the North Korea Mission Manager with 

the ODNI; and from 2010 to 2012, I was the Director of the National Counterproliferation Center. Thus for the past 10 years, I have been intimately involved 

with developments in North Korea. 

In 2004, during one of the first bilateral meetings we had with North Korea, during a plenary session of the 6PT in Beijing, the North Korean representative stated 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

37

that if the 6PT process was unable to produce an acceptable agreement, North 

Korea would build more nuclear weapons, test these nuclear weapons and consider 

selling nuclear technology. We stated clearly that there would be severe consequences if North Korea pursued such an agenda. In this and subsequent bilateral 

meetings, during scheduled plenary sessions, the North Korean representative often 

stated that the United States should accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons 

state, noting that North Korea would be a responsible nuclear weapons state. The 

North Korean representative was told that U.S. policy was clear: complete, 

verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear programs 

was and will always be U.S. policy. During these bilateral sessions, we told the 

North Korean representative that comprehensive denuclearization would permit 

North Korea to receive economic assistance and security assurances, and once North 

Korea ceased its illicit activities—counterfeiting the U.S. $100 bill, counterfeiting 

cigarettes and pharmaceuticals, trafficking in methamphetamines—and started to 

address its human rights violations in a transparent manner, diplomatic relations 

would be possible. 

With this as background, it’s clear that there has been no progress in resolving 

North Korea’s nuclear issue. In September 2005, there was hope that these issues 

with North Korea could be resolved, when the six countries agreed to a Joint Statement committing North Korea to comprehensive denuclearization in exchange for 

security assurances; economic assistance; and when North Korea returned to the 

NPT as a nonnuclear weapons state, the discussion of the provision of a light water 

reactor. Kim Jong-il had personally endorsed this agreement and on numerous occasions, to include during a visit to Beijing, stated his willingness to dismantle North 

Korea’s nuclear programs. This optimism was dashed, however, when North Korea 

refused to commit to a written verification protocol to monitor North Korea’s nuclear 

dismantlement efforts, after the United States removed North Korea from the list 

of state sponsors of terrorism. 

Since the beginning of the 6PT process in 2003, North Korea has conducted three 

nuclear tests and four long-range ballistic missile launches, all in violation of U.N. 

Security Council resolutions. Prior to the 6PT process, starting in the mid-1990s, 

North Korea embarked on a clandestine uranium enrichment program, in violation 

of NPT obligations and counter to the intent and spirit of the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea had denied having a uranium enrichment program but in 2010 

they permitted a visiting U.S. scientist to visit a sophisticated uranium enrichment 

facility in Yongbyon. Although North Korea maintained that their uranium enrichment program was for civilian purposes and fuel for the light water reactor they 

were building, the U.S. assessment was that this facility and other nondisclosed 

uranium enrichment facilities in North Korea were for the manufacture of highly 

enriched uranium (HEU), for nuclear weapons. This permitted North Korea to have 

two paths to fabricating nuclear weapons—Plutonium and HEU. 

In addition to enhancing their long-range missile capabilities and their nuclear 

weapons programs, North Korea proliferated nuclear technology when they helped 

Syria build a nuclear weapons plutonium facility, similar to their 5 megawatt reactor in Yongbyon. This clandestine program started (ca. 1997) in Al Kibar, Syria. In 

2007, just prior to going operational, Israel bombed and destroyed the facility. Additionally, North Korea has sold missiles and missile technology to Iran, Syria, Libya 

and any other country willing to buy their missiles. 

Given North Korea’s successful long-range missile launch in December 2012

that put a small satellite in orbit, and the February 2013 nuclear test that was 

larger than two previous tests, it appears that North Korea’s objective is to fabricate 

smaller nuclear weapons that eventually can be mated to ballistic missiles that 

could reach the continental United States. 

The three U.N. Security Council resolutions sanctioning North Korea for their 

nuclear tests and missile launches are causing considerable pain to the leadership 

in North Korea. The North Korean economy is barely functioning, with Pyongyang 

dependent on China for trade, fuel, and food assistance needed to sustain the government. Despite North Korea’s significant economic problems, the Pyongyang government continues to spend billions of dollars on their nuclear and missile programs, under the banner of the ‘‘military first’’ policy. 

If North Korea refuses to return to the 6PT and refuses to denuclearize, while 

enhancing their nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, other countries in east 

Asia most likely will consider having their own nuclear weapons capabilities. 

Indeed, the biggest threat globally, if North Korea retains its nuclear weapons, is 

nuclear proliferation. The possibility that nuclear weapons and/or nuclear materials 

is obtained by a rogue state or nonstate actors is of great concern. This message 

has been passed to the leadership in Pyongyang on numerous occasions. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

38

Hopefully, China can help to convince the leadership in Pyongyang that the current escalatory path North Korea is pursuing will be disastrous for North Korea, 

the region and the international community. A potential nuclear arms race with the 

possibility of nuclear materials being acquired by terrorists and others will make 

the region and the world less secure. China is an ally of a North Korea that needs 

China’s economic assistance. With the new leadership in Beijing, it’s possible China 

will be able to convince Kim Jong-un to return to the 6PT and commit to eventual 

denuclearization, in line with the September 2005 Joint Statement. Kim Jong-il 

made this commitment. Hopefully, Kim Jong-un will. 

Indeed, when Kim Jong-un succeeded his father last year, there was hope that 

this young leader would move North Korea in a positive direction and pursue 

denuclearization in return for international legitimacy and economic and security 

assurances. His first few months in power gave a number of us some optimism that 

the young Kim would move cautiously toward economic and political reform. He replaced many of the hard-liners in the government and appointed a Korean People’s 

Party official as the Army’s Chief of the General Political Department, thus installing a Party official to oversee the military. Other appointments, like the elevation 

of his Uncle to a more prominent position in government, gave some of us a sense 

of optimism; a sense that realists would replace the hard-liners. This appearance 

of liberalization was short-lived, however, when North Korea launched a TD–2 missile in April 2012, despite the February 29, 2012, Leap Day agreement with the 

United States that committed North Korea to a moratorium on missile launches and 

nuclear tests in return for nutritional assistance. U.N. sanctions then followed, with 

North Korea defiantly launching another missile in December 2012 that succeeded 

in putting a satellite in orbit. This also resulted in additional sanctions, with North 

Korea then conducting its third nuclear test last month. With this considerable escalation were vitriolic statements from Pyongyang stating that North Korea would 

never give up its nuclear weapons, claiming the United States maintains a hostile 

policy toward North Korea. It is likely North Korea will launch additional missiles 

and conduct additional nuclear tests, working toward smaller nuclear weapons with 

the hope of eventually being able to mate these nuclear weapons to missiles that 

can reach the United States. In short, North Korea has escalated tension significantly over the last year. 

A negotiated settlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs is desirable and necessary. My personal view is that China should do what they did in April 2003 when 

they convened an emergency meeting of the United States, North Korea, and China 

to discuss the tension in the region and arrange for the 6PT process to be established, to defuse tension and hopefully resolve the extant issues. It is possible that 

China could convene another emergency meeting with North Korea and the United 

States, that also includes South Korea. Such a meeting possibly could determine if 

North Korea is serious about eventual denuclearization for economic assistance and 

security assurances, pursuant to the September 2005 Joint Statement, and if reconvening the 6PT process is viable.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ambassador Joseph. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT G. JOSEPH, SENIOR SCHOLAR, 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, thank you 

very much for the invitation to be here today and to testify. I will 

try to be very brief in summarizing my statement. 

While one can argue and I think somewhat legitimately that U.S. 

policies have succeeded in slowing the North’s progress and in galvanizing international support, the successes that we have reached, 

that we have achieved are at best tactical. As President John 

Adams once said, the facts are stubborn things. And today North 

Korea has declared itself to be a nuclear power and seems absolutely determined and well on its way to acquire the means to hold 

American cities hostage to their long-range missiles and nuclear 

weapons. 

Viewing policy from a nonproliferation perspective, I see a long 

pattern of failed policies that must be changed. This change should 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

39

be based on experience, not on hope, and it is on this basis that 

I offer the following lessons learned from my own experience. 

One, North Korea will only agree to abandon its missile and 

nuclear programs if it is judged essential for regime survival. The 

DPRK places the highest values on these capabilities. These are a 

deterrent against attack. These are a means of preventing intervention such as occurred in Libya. Missile and nuclear programs 

are important to intimidate neighbors, to build prestige at home, 

to earn hard currency. In addition, the North has successfully used 

its nuclear program to attract inducements from those who seek its 

elimination. 

Two, the prospect for a negotiated solution should be seen as a 

long shot. At times, previous administrations have thought they 

were all but there, but it never happened whether it was in 1992, 

in 1994, or in 2005. Pyongyang would formally agree to abandon 

its nuclear program only to violate its commitments each time. And 

this pattern of failed negotiations, followed by violations of obligations, provocations, and the offering of more inducements in turn 

by the United States and others to get North Korea back to the 

negotiating table, has been the main characteristic of U.S. policy 

for two decades. 

The United States and others have and will, no doubt, continue 

to apply sanctions on the North, but imposing economic hardships 

and threatening isolation have not altered the regime’s behavior. In 

part, this is because the DPRK cares little whether its people 

starve. In part, it is because regime stability is, in fact, dependent 

on isolation. In part, it is because China has continued to keep 

open a lifeline of assistance to the North no matter how blatant or 

how lethal its activities. And in part, it is because of our own practice of releasing pressure on North Korea in exchange for empty 

promises. 

Three, the record of failed negotiations is not an argument that 

diplomacy should be abandoned. But negotiations by themselves is 

not a strategy. A comprehensive approach that integrates all tools 

of statecraft is required if negotiations are to have any chance of 

success. These tools, financial, intelligence, interdiction, law enforcement, and diplomacy—and we have talked about them all this 

morning—must be brought together to bring sustained pressure on 

the regime. Pyongyang must be faced with a choice: it can retain 

its missile and nuclear programs or it pays a high price. It must 

no longer be allowed to use these programs as a means to extract 

concessions that only serve to strengthen the regime and perpetuate the missile and nuclear threat. As for diplomacy, our main 

focus should be on China, the principal obstacle to bringing effective pressure on North Korea. 

Four, the promotion of human rights, while part of official U.S. 

talking points for years, has not been a significant element of U.S. 

strategy. It should be as it was in the Reagan administration in its 

dealings with the Soviet Union. Exposing the domestic brutality of 

the regime is both the moral course and potentially an effective 

means to influence DPRK leaders. 

Five, because North Korea is likely to retain its missile and 

nuclear capabilities, the United States must ensure that it can 

deter and defend against the threat. This requires missile defenses 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

40

that protect allies and the U.S. homeland from attack. Failing to 

deploy defenses that keep pace with the growing threat, whether 

as a means to encourage Russian participation in offensive arms 

reductions or as a way to reduce the budget, will only undermine 

deterrence and increase the risk of destruction to the United 

States. 

Similarly, we must continue to deploy a credible nuclear force 

that can meet the spectrum of deterrence requirements and provide 

solid assurance to allies. Going to lower and lower levels of forces 

in pursuit of a nuclear-free world is likely only to embolden our 

adversaries and shake the confidence of our friends and allies. And 

if our allies doubt our capacity or will to meet their security commitments, the outcome will be the reverse of the goal sought by 

global zero proponents: more rather than fewer nuclear weapons. 

Six and finally, the last lesson is that the United States must 

lead. At times we have failed to show the required leadership, 

avoiding confrontation with the DPRK on a number of its most 

harmful activities, including its missile and nuclear proliferation. 

This absence of leadership affects not only the calculations in 

Pyongyang but also of Tehran where another oppressive regime is 

seeking missile and nuclear capabilities to undermine U.S. interests in a region of vital interest. 

Iran does watch closely United States policy and United States 

resolve to reverse what three Presidents, President Clinton, President Bush, and now President Obama, have declared to be unacceptable: a nuclear-armed North Korea. What they have seen so far 

has certainly not dissuaded them. 

Thank you again for the invitation of being here today. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Joseph follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT G. JOSEPH

Chairman Menendez, Senator Corker, other distinguished members present today, 

thank you for the invitation to testify before the committee on the subject of U.S. 

policy toward North Korea. It is a privilege for me to appear again before this committee and provide my views and recommendations on the DPRK’s missile and 

nuclear programs. 

For the past 20 years, I have worked both in and out of government on fashioning 

and implementing policies to meet the threat that North Korea poses to the United 

States, to our friends and allies in the region, and to the broader international 

community. The nature and scale of this threat are most clearly reflected in 

Pyongyang’s determined pursuit of longer range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The DPRK satellite launch this past December, which involved much of the 

same technology as a missile test, and last month’s nuclear test demonstrate the 

failure of U.S. policy approaches across three Presidential administrations. President Clinton, President Bush, and now President Obama, have all declared a 

nuclear-armed North Korea to be unacceptable. But all have watched as the North 

has developed and expanded these very capabilities. 

While some may argue that U.S. policies have been successful in slowing the 

North’s progress and in galvanizing support within the broader international community, such as witnessed in the adoption of U.N. Security Council resolutions 

imposing sanctions on the Kim regime, these successes are at best tactical. Today, 

North Korea has declared itself to be a nuclear power and appears determined to 

acquire the means to hold hostage American cities and American lives. Its neighbors, especially our allies Japan and South Korea, are currently within range of its 

short and medium range missiles, as are U.S. troops and bases in those countries. 

And the regime’s history of selling both missile and nuclear technology, including 

to Iran and Syria, make the DPRK the number one proliferation threat of our time. 

For these reasons, as one who assesses the strategic challenge from North Korea 

from the perspective of non- and counter-proliferation, I see a long-held pattern of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

41

failed policies that must be changed. The North Korea Nonproliferation and 

Accountability Act (S. 298), recently passed by the Senate, is a positive step. But 

more than a comprehensive report is necessary. The Obama administration should 

alter the familiar but futile course that has been followed by it and its two predecessors, Democrat and Republican alike. A new comprehensive strategy is required, 

based on experience not hope. 

It is in this context that I offer the following lessons learned for your consideration. 

(1) The Kim regime, now in its third generation, will agree to abandon its missile 

and nuclear programs only if it judges that such a move is essential for its survival. 

The DPRK places the highest value on its missile and nuclear capabilities, perhaps 

second only to the survival of the regime and keeping the elites loyal to sustain it. 

Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are seen as a deterrent to attack and as a 

means of preventing external interventions as occurred in Libya. Recent comments 

in the state-controlled media about the fate of Colonel Qadaffi after giving up his 

nuclear program reflect both the insecurities of the regime and its determination to 

keep its nuclear weapons. Missile and nuclear capabilities are also seen as important both to intimidate and coerce adversaries and to engender internal prestige at 

home. 

The missile and nuclear programs are also a means of earning hard currency for 

a country that is economically bankrupt, as observed in sales of SCUD missiles to 

any customer with the ability to pay cash and the provision of a plutonium generating reactor to Syria. And, in both bilateral and multilateral negotiations, the 

North has used the nuclear program as a means of extracting inducements from the 

United States and others who seek its elimination, from heavy fuel oil to food assistance. 

(2) Following from the first lesson, the prospect for a negotiated solution eliminating the North’s missile and nuclear programs should be seen as a long shot. At 

times, previous administrations thought they were close to achieving this outcome, 

but it never happened. In the 1992 North-South Denuclearization Joint Declaration, 

in the 1994 Agreed Framework, and in the 2005 Six-Party Joint Statement, 

Pyongyang formally agreed to abandon its nuclear program, only to violate its obligations each time. In between agreements, expectations would rise and fall as the 

DPRK would pocket each successive concession, always demanding more. 

This pattern of failed negotiations, each time followed by violations of commitments, provocations, and the offering of more inducements to get North Korea to 

return to the negotiating table, has been for two decades the main characteristic of 

U.S. policy toward North Korea. While the United States and others have at times 

applied sanctions on the North, such as after its missile and nuclear tests, these 

sanctions have not dissuaded the Kim leadership. Imposing economic hardships and 

threatening further isolation of the regime have not altered its behavior. In part, 

this is because the regime cares little whether all of its people are fed or starve, 

and prefers to keep them dependent on the state for their very existence. In part, 

it is because regime stability is dependent on its isolation. And in part, it is because 

China has undercut the impact of sanctions and has continued to keep open a lifeline of assistance to the North, no matter how blatant or lethal its actions. 

(3) The record of failed negotiations is not an argument that diplomacy is hopeless, or that negotiations should be abandoned. But diplomacy as practiced in the 

past and present context does not constitute a strategy, even though it has most 

often masqueraded as such. A comprehensive approach that integrates all tools of 

statecraft is required if negotiations are to have any chance of succeeding and, alternatively, if we are going to be prepared to meet the threat if the DPRK continues 

its missile and nuclear proliferation activities. 

Without such a change in U.S. policy, negotiations will not succeed. Specifically, 

Pyongyang must be faced with a choice: it can retain its missile and nuclear programs or pay a high price. It must no longer be allowed to use these programs as 

a means to extract concessions that only serve to strengthen the regime and perpetuate the missile and nuclear threat. 

Pressure can have an effect on the regime’s calculations. From 2001 through 2006, 

the United States employed a series of counterproliferation tools, including interdiction through the Proliferation Security Initiative, freezing regime funds abroad, and 

curtailing its illicit activities, such as cutting off its customer base for missiles and 

cooperating with other countries to end its drug and counterfeiting activities. These 

tools—financial, intelligence, law enforcement and diplomatic—must be brought together as part of a broader strategy for countering the North Korean threat. As for 

diplomacy, we need to move beyond diplomacy focused primarily on negotiating tactics or on the ‘‘carrots’’ for the next round of six-party or bilateral discussions. The 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

42

main diplomatic focus should be on China, the principal obstacle to bringing effective pressure on the North. 

(4) The promotion of human rights should be a major element of the U.S. strategy 

toward North Korea, as it was in the Reagan administration in its dealings with 

the Soviet Union. Exposing the North’s brutality toward its own citizens has not 

been a priority component of U.S. policy. In fact, concerns about how such exposure 

might affect the prospects for engagement with the regime have worked to place 

human rights atrocities in a separate box which is mostly neglected if seen as complicating higher order diplomacy. 

In North Korea, civil and religious freedoms do not exist. Political prison camps 

are reported to hold as many as 200,000 who have offended the regime and who 

suffer the greatest depravation, including summary executions and starvation. As 

with other totalitarian governments that lack moral legitimacy, the greatest fear of 

the rulers in Pyongyang is their own people, the foremost victims of their economic 

malfeasance and repression. Exposing the domestic crimes of the regime is both the 

moral course and, potentially, an effective means to influence DPRK leaders. Shining the spotlight on the darker corners of North Korea may also help strengthen 

international resolve to deal effectively with Pyongyang. The decision of the new 

Park government in Seoul to support a U.N. Commission of Inquiry to investigate 

rights abuses in the North is a welcome move that should facilitate giving more 

prominence to human rights issues by the United States. 

(5) Because North Korea is likely to retain and expand its missile and nuclear 

capabilities, the United States must act to ensure that it can deter and defend 

against the threat. This requires missile defenses that can protect allies and the 

U.S. homeland from attack. Failing to deploy defenses that keep pace with the growing threat—whether as a means to encourage Russian participation in another 

round of offensive arms reductions or as a way to reduce the budget—will undermine deterrence and increase the risk of potentially immense destruction to the 

United States if deterrence fails. Yet, even as the North Korean threat grows, the 

Obama administration shows little interest in strengthening U.S. national missile 

defenses. 

Similarly, the United States must continue to deploy a reliable and credible 

nuclear force that can meet the full spectrum of deterrence requirements and provide solid assurance to neighboring allies. Going to lower and lower levels of forces 

in the pursuit of a nuclear free world is likely to embolden our adversaries and 

shake the confidence of our friends. If U.S. allies doubt our capability or resolve to 

meet our security commitments in northeast Asia and elsewhere, the outcome will 

be the exact reverse of the stated goal of the proponents of global zero and minimal 

deterrence: more rather than less proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

(6) The final lesson that I have learned related to U.S. North Korea policy is that 

the United States must lead if it is to succeed, either in negotiations, or in ensuring 

the needed capabilities for deterrence and defense, or in preventing the further 

spread of the North’s deadly weapons of mass destruction. At times, the United 

States has failed to show the required leadership, avoiding confrontation with the 

DPRK on a number of its most harmful activities, including its missile and nuclear 

proliferation. This absence of leadership is recognized not just by the rulers in 

Pyongyang but by those in Teheran who also seek to acquire missile and nuclear 

capabilities to intimidate America’s friends and undermine U.S. interests in another 

region of vital interest. 

Iran, perhaps an even greater strategic threat than North Korea, watches closely 

U.S. policy and U.S. resolve in reversing what three Presidents have declared to be 

unacceptable: a nuclear-armed North Korea. What they have seen thus far has not 

dissuaded them from continuing down their path of nuclear proliferation. 

Thank you again for the honor of appearing before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you all for your 

testimony. 

Let us start and I would like to have an interplay between 

Ambassador Bosworth and DeTrani on this. If the 2005 joint statement was the best pathway toward achieving our goals—and, 

Ambassador DeTrani, you suggested that that issue, the Patriot 

Act sanctions of the bank and the $25 million that ultimately 

flowed back to North Korea was a disruptive element in pursuing 

the 2005 process. Clearly in any such process, there are going to 

be bumps along the road. Does that not really call into question 

how serious North Korea was even in this more expanded process 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

43

of 2005 to achieving its goals? I would like both of your observations on that because it sounds to me that especially when the 

money ultimately flowed back to North Korea, that the process 

would have resumed again if there was a real desire to pursue it. 

Ambassador DETRANI. No, Mr. Chairman. You are absolutely 

right. My point on the 2005 and the Banco Delta Asia was that we 

told the North Koreans very clearly that illicit activities would not 

be permitted. Diplomacy is one thing, and that is the 2005 joint 

statement on denuclearization. They continued to counterfeit our 

currency. They continued to deal with the methamphetamine and 

traffic in methamphetamine and counterfeit pharmaceuticals and 

so forth. That is law enforcement, and we told them we would continue to go after them on that. So they should not marry that up 

to diplomacy. These are two separate entities. And in fact, it was 

done on the same day, the 19th of September, when the Federal 

Register put out that the Banco Delta Asia was being sanctioned 

because of the predicate of money laundering based on section 311 

of the Patriot Act. That was our message to the North Koreans; 

they cannot link the two and try to get us to go soft on illicit and 

human rights and put out denuclearization as the carrot for us to 

go on. 

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently, while that may have been our message, they did not accept that message as a means to move forward. 

Ambassador DETRANI. They protested and they walked away 

from the table for about 8 months until that money was returned. 

But, of course, the Banco Delta Asia was in compliance. So they 

were permitted legally to return that money. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Bosworth, if that is the case it is so 

easily disrupted, how do we see that as the pathway forward? 

Ambassador BOSWORTH. It is easily disrupted. As we have seen, 

North Korea’s adherence to any of these agreements is tenuous at 

best, and they have to be continually reassured that they are not 

giving up their one piece of negotiating leverage in return for 

empty promises. 

So I think it is very important, as we try to move forward, that 

North Korea come away with some conviction that it is not just 

denuclearization that we are going to make progress on. We are 

also going to try to make progress on a peace treaty to replace the 

armistice. And that I think is a very high priority from a North 

Korean point of view, as well, of course, as the diplomatic relations 

and economic assistance and energy assistance. 

But please understand me. I am not saying that this is somehow 

a magic solution to the problem, but it is the one piece that we still 

have that they have agreed to and has constituted a foundation for 

trying to move forward. And they have not disavowed it in that 

sense. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador DeTrani, there are some press

reports that suggest you have been on two secret missions to North 

Korea. And I am wondering if you could tell us what was the temperature of the interlocutors that you met with. 

Ambassador DETRANI. Mr. Chairman, with due respect, sir, those 

reports have been addressed to the Senate and the House intelFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

44

ligence oversight committees, and I am really not at liberty to be 

discussing it here. 

The CHAIRMAN. So you have discussed those with the House and 

Senate——

Ambassador DETRANI. The House and Senate intelligence oversight committees have been addressed. These issues have been 

addressed with these committees. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. So we will pursue it with the Intelligence Committee. 

Let me ask you with reference to your comment that the Chinese 

were the ones who got the North Koreans to the table in 2005 as 

a result of tweaking them with some of their assistance. What was 

the calculus at that moment that made them do that, and how do 

we get them to make that calculus now? 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sir, April 2003 was a very tense time. 

North Korea said they were reprocessing the spent fuel rods. They 

had pulled out of the NPT. They had asked the IAEA monitors to 

leave the country. It was very tense at that moment. Again, they 

left the NPT and asked the monitors to leave in January 2003. And 

then in April, they announced—even before April—in March they 

announced they were reprocessing the spent fuel rods that were in 

the cooling ponds at Yongbyon with the indication that they were 

going to be reprocessed for the purpose of weaponization. And it 

was tense. And the Chinese asked that the North Koreans come to 

the table with the United States and Beijing to speak about a way 

forward, to diffuse this very tense situation. 

The reporting is that a number of days prior to those meetings, 

there were a few shipments of petroleum not sent to North Korea; 

shipments were not as extensive as they were in the past between 

the two countries. That was the reporting at the time. And the 

sense of some analysts at the time was that it could have been a 

message from Beijing to the DPRK that they should comply, and 

if they are being asked to sit at the table, they should sit at the 

table. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank each of you for your testimony and for your past 

efforts regarding this issue. 

It does not sound particularly hopeful to me, as I listen to each 

of you, and I think you would agree with that. 

Let me just ask this question. We had some discussions here 

about our Libya intervention. Here we had a person that was 

equally not a good person. We had a person who had done away 

with weapons of mass destruction. We had a person that was working with us with al-Qaeda, and we took him out when they did not 

have weapons of mass destruction. 

What kind of learning moment was that for, do you think, the 

leadership of North Korea? 

Ambassador BOSWORTH. Well, I suspect they took away lessons 

from that that were inevitable and that are going to complicate our 

policymaking with them for the foreseeable future. The most 

obvious lesson would be if people think you have weapons of mass 

destruction and then you take action to show that you do not have 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

45

weapons of mass destruction, this gives your adversaries room for 

maneuver that they might not have had previously. And there are, 

I think, legitimate reports that the North Koreans came away from 

both Iraq and Libya with the conviction that if these two countries 

had, in fact, had weapons of mass destruction, that what happened 

to them would not have happened to them. 

Senator CORKER. Any other comments? There was a point I was 

trying to make at the time, but go ahead. 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sir, I would agree. I think that the message in Pyongyang is that they saw what happened to Qaddafi and 

Saddam and so forth. It does not mean it is not doable in North 

Korea; that we will not succeed with denuclearization, but indeed, 

that fortified the hard-liners who were saying we just do not want 

to move down this path. There are those hard-liners in Pyongyang 

who are committed to retaining those nuclear weapons. 

Senator CORKER. So I would just listen to earlier statements. 

Again, I do not see any real—I cannot imagine why North Korea 

would ever consider not going down the path they are going 

because of recent experiences. And it does not sound like to me 

that we have much of a way to deter that. I have not heard anybody speak to how we really do that other than China. It sounds 

like they are the only ones that have any cards that are worth 

playing here other than something that I think our country really 

does not want to engage in at this time. So it seems to me that 

the entire issue around North Korea really is not us but China. 

And I wonder if you might speak to that. 

Ambassador DETRANI. Sir, I would just comment. I look to my 

colleagues, but it is a failed economy. I mean, North Korea, now 

with the additional sanctions—there are three sanctions in play 

now with this morning’s—there are four sanctions, the U.N. sanctions. There are executive orders from our Treasury Department. 

They are biting and they have consequences. One would have to assume that when the leadership realizes they are not getting the 

funds necessary to sustain their lifestyle, the pressure will be at an 

even higher level even while provinces are not really seeing many 

benefits because of the two-state system. It is Pyongyang and the 

rest of the country. Once Pyongyang feels they are under siege and 

they are having problems sustaining it, I would imagine there 

would be some pressure on the leadership to make some changes 

to take some of that pressure off. And to live as a pariah state, especially if China is not happy with this pariah state, although they 

are allied with it, one has to wonder how they could survive in the 

near to midterm. 

Senator CORKER. Ambassador. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Senator, I think that is a very important 

question. There is only one time in my experience in which I 

observed the Chinese on the cusp of making a strategic decision to 

change its relationship with North Korea, and that was in October 

2006 after the first test. The first nuclear test was a profound 

shock. It was a profound shock in the region and it was internationally, given the risk to the nonproliferation regime itself. 

Within a couple days of that test, Condi Rice was asked to go the 

region and asked me to go with her. We stopped in Japan. And in 

Japan, the focus of Prime Minister Abe, Foreign Minister Aso, was 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

46

on the reassurance of the Japanese public that the United States 

would stand by its security commitments and explicitly restate its 

nuclear guarantee to Japan. 

What is interesting is when we got to Beijing, the first thing the 

Chinese did was thank us for reaffirming our security and our 

nuclear guarantees to Japan. What China was concerned about 

was the nuclear dynamic. It was the dynamic of the possibility of 

Japan and maybe South Korea going nuclear in that context. That 

was the only time that there seemed to be a prospect, a window 

of opportunity for getting China to change its policy. This is the 

first time that China went along with the U.N. Security Council 

resolution which had real sanctions, 1718. China offered to work 

with us to implement those sanctions, including denying the luxury 

goods for the elites of North Korea. 

But it was not too long after that that China went right back to 

its comfort zone and did not challenge the North Korean provocations. And it did that in the context of the United States and 

others releasing pressure on North Korea. Instead of increasing 

pressure, we released pressure. And we did that because of the 

false prospect of negotiations, the false promise that North Korea 

would come back to the negotiating table. And it did. And it did 

only to start, once again, the cycle of no negotiations, provocations, 

concessions, and failure to live up to its obligations. 

I do not know what it is going to take to get China to change 

its assessment. China has many reasons for supporting North 

Korea. I mean, it is concerned about what happens with unification. It is concerned about refugees coming over the border. 

It is going to take a real concerted effort, and quite frankly, it 

is going to take pressure on the part of the United States on China 

to change. More dialogue about the six-party talks is not going to 

do it. We are going to have to decide whether this is important 

enough to us that we actually put some pressure on China to 

change its policy. 

But even if China changes its policy, I think that will be a very 

important step toward getting North Korea to alter course, but that 

is not enough either. We need a comprehensive strategy to deal 

with this. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Joseph, let me just follow up on that very important 

point. I asked a version of this question to Special Representative 

Davies. 

I tend to agree that possibly the only thing that brings the Chinese to the table is the fear that there really does become a nuclear 

arms race in the region. And we sort of cavalierly throw around the 

inevitability of nuclear arms races in the Middle East and in that 

sector of the world as well without any, I think, true understanding 

of all of the barriers that would stand in the way of that happening, particularly in a place where we hold a lot of cards with 

the other players in the region. 

So you maybe just answered this, but you talk about applying 

real pressure to China, but without China feeling that they lose 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

47

control of the nuclear situation in the region, what cards do we 

have to play there? 

And I guess the second question is, Is there any chance that we 

do lose control of the nuclear capabilities of the region? Is there 

any real chance that the Japanese and the South Koreans do 

change their disposition and decide to remove themselves from our 

nuclear umbrella and develop their own capacities, or is that not 

realistic? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Senator, taking your second question first, 

I think there is a chance that if we fail with North Korea and if 

we do not demonstrate through both our declaratory policy and our 

capacity in both the nuclear area, as well as in the missile defense 

area, there is a likelihood that Japan will overcome its long-term 

allergy about nuclear weapons and begin to hedge. South Korea 

also very much a concern about proliferation in the future if we 

fail—if we fail—with North Korea. 

In terms of what cards we have to play with China, there are not 

any easy ones. If there were easy ones, I think we would have 

played them by now. This has been going on for 20 years. I think 

we have to make the assessment whether or not this issue—the 

issue of North Korea and China’s continuing support, continuing 

lifeline of assistance to North Korea—is sufficiently important to us 

that we begin to put economic pressure on China, that we begin to 

call out China for its part in sustaining what is the most abhorrent 

regime I think in the world today. There are a number of things 

that we can do, but up until today, we have been more interested 

in China’s role as a facilitator in the six-party talks. That does not 

get us to where we need to be with China. 

Senator MURPHY. Let me ask sort of the same version of that 

question to the other two panelists. Do you agree that the thing 

that China fears most is the nuclear arms race, and what are your 

thoughts on whether that is a real concern? 

Ambassador BOSWORTH. Well, I think China is concerned about 

proliferation within the region. 

Senator MURPHY. Is that their primary concern? 

Ambassador BOSWORTH. No. It is one of several concerns. They 

are also concerned about the stability of North Korea for the reasons that we spoke of earlier. They are also concerned about the 

nature of their relationship with the United States, and I think it 

has been made quite clear to them that while North Korea policy 

is not a pivot for that relationship, it is, nonetheless, very important to that relationship. So they have very many points of interest 

at play here. 

And I think we sometimes make the mistake of thinking that 

China is somehow a policy monolith in which problems are fed and 

then solutions come out. One of the things that I came away from 

my recent experience dealing with this problem—or convinced of—

is that the Chinese are of various minds about how to deal with 

North Korea. There is no single view, and it is something that is 

being very much debated and addressed within the policy circles of 

North Korea, both within the government, within the party, and 

within the so-called think-tank world. So they do not have a solution to these concerns. They recognize the nature of the problem. 

They recognize that it is something they have got to deal with, but 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

48

they also understand how complicated and how many different 

points of interest in China are concerned about possible outcomes 

in North Korea. That includes the party, the military, and the government. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all of the panelists for being here. I am sorry 

I missed the earlier part of the hearing but very much appreciate 

your insights into what is happening in North Korea now, especially you, Mr. Bosworth, and your New Hampshire connection 

through Dartmouth. So nice to welcome you here. 

Ambassador BOSWORTH. Thank you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I wanted to follow up a little bit on the proliferation issues that have been raised because it seems to me that 

given the past history, given their efforts to help Syria build a 

nuclear weapons facility, that we may not know exactly what we 

do not know about what North Korea is doing with respect to proliferation efforts. And I just wondered how comfortable each of you 

are with where our knowledge of what is happening with respect 

to North Korea and proliferation might be right now and if you can 

elaborate on exactly what we know about that. 

Ambassador DETRANI. Can I just comment very briefly? And I 

will look to my colleagues. My colleagues mentioned Syria and alKibar. That was in many ways a wake-up call. That was going on 

for a number of years, and until the Israelis took it out in September 2007, I mean, that was almost going operational. Nuclear 

proliferation is central to the whole issue of denuclearization for 

North Korea, and that drives China and everyone else, but certainly China, as a neighbor and an ally. If there is any instability 

there, what would happen with the nuclear weapons or the fissile 

materiel? So proliferation—and of course, we know the element 

of—the potential for nuclear terrorism there. There are nonstate 

actors out there that want their hands on this. 

So this is a very central issue to why denuclearization for the 

DPRK has to be, if you will, the goal and objective. It is not nonproliferation. It is not arms control. It is denuclearization because 

of all of these other reasons, and proliferation is central to it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Anything either of you would like to add 

about what we know about those efforts? 

Ambassador BOSWORTH. Well, I would only add, Senator, that as 

a longtime consumer of intelligence within the government, I have 

been impressed on the one hand by how hard our intelligence community works on North Korea, but I have also been impressed by 

what a difficult target North Korea is. And I think their capacity 

for surprise, while not limitless, is certainly greater than we might 

expect. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. Joseph. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Senator, I come at this from a nonproliferation perspective and that is my expertise, if I have expertise. And 

clearly, North Korea has, for decades, been the No. 1 proliferator. 

It is a serial proliferator. We know it from its missile sales and the 

transfer of missile technology to a number of countries. We know 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

49

it from the Syria experience in providing a plutonium reactor to 

Syria. North Korea will sell what it has. 

I am very concerned not only about state proliferation relationships but also, as Ambassador DeTrani just mentioned, the nonstate and access through North Korea to fissile material and weapons. And it is, as someone said, a very hard intelligence problem, 

and we have been subject to a number of strategic surprises in this 

area. So despite knowing how hard the intelligence community 

works on this problem, I also share the sense that there is a lot 

we simply do not know and we need to be prepared for the worst 

based on North Korea’s experience. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So you have dashed my hopes to be reassured. 

As we enter another round of sanctions, how can we be more successful at implementing those sanctions in a way that really has 

a real impact on North Korea? Because my understanding is that 

to date we have had rather sporadic success at implementing the 

sanctions. 

Ambassador BOSWORTH. I think we have to start with the realization of the reality, which is that sanctions by themselves are not 

going to solve this problem. Sanctions can make life even more difficult for North Korea. Sanctions can force North Korea to contemplate issues that they might not have contemplated without 

them. But sanctions are not the solution to this problem. It is part 

of the solution conceivably, but they are not the solution. Sanctions 

have the effect of making us confident that we are at least doing 

something, that we are not just sitting here passively and waiting 

for divine intervention of this problem. We are taking some action, 

but we should not, in my personal judgment, be under any illusions 

that sanctions are going to solve this problem. 

Ambassador DETRANI. I would look to Ambassador Joseph, and 

I do not disagree with Ambassador Bosworth. 

But I will say I think what we saw today with China, who is very 

much a part of this new U.N. Security Council resolution; I think 

it is indicative of the fact that China is also saying what is going 

on here. And I think we need to have all the countries coming 

together, whether it is a proliferation security initiative, whether 

it is going after the banking system, or whether it is going after 

their diplomats and how they move money and so forth, all of this 

is causing significant pain to North Korea. 

Now, is that going to be the answer? Certainly that is not the 

answer per se, but it is part of the process to telling North Korea 

they must change their behavior. They need come back to the table 

and need to commit again, recommit to denuclearization. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Well, just to add to my colleague’s comments with which I certainly agree, sanctions will only work—and 

I think they have limited impact—but they will only work in the 

context of a broader strategy. It is not a question of sanctions or 

our strategy or diplomacy as our strategy. We have got to put these 

various instruments together, and that has been lacking. 

And what also has been lacking is a sustained effort. When we 

have made a difference, when we have created pain—and I think 

the Banco Delta Asia experience is very apt here. When we have 

put pressure on the North, we have allowed that pressure to be released. We have done that through this false and fanciful promise 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

50

of negotiations. Negotiations will only work if we apply pressure, 

and that is one thing we learned from the Libyan experience. It 

was not you get into negotiations, you release the pressure. I mean, 

this is negotiating 101. And yet, time after time, Republican and 

Democratic administrations, we have made the same fundamental 

mistake with North Korea. A lot of it is because we hope. We hope 

North Korea will change, and we ignore our experience for the sake 

of hope. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I am out of time. I would love to 

follow up and see how that fits with what is being proposed on 

Iran, but that is a different topic. 

Thank you all. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you all for your very insightful comments and answers to questions on a very challenging but important national security and national interests issue before the committee and before our country. 

So with the thanks of the committee, the committee’s record will 

remain open until the close of business tomorrow. 

And with that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE GLYN T. DAVIES TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF FLAKE

CHINA AND NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea is dependent on China for economic aid and diplomatic 

support. North Korea’s cycle of provocation followed by cooperation, and the numerous tests of missiles and nuclear devices, has led to several rounds of United 

Nations sanctions that China has supported. However, China has yet to agree to 

more stringent economic measures against North Korea outside the United Nations.

• What will it take to gain China’s cooperation to rein in North Korea’s provocative activities? • The United States is working to gain China’s cooperation on a number of other 

critical international issues such as Iran’s nuclear weapons program and Syria’s 

civil war. Where does North Korea fit in on that list? Is it a priority? If it is 

not, why isn’t it? • Is China in a position to bring the North Korean regime—and its nuclear weapons program—to its knees by withholding assistance to it? • Does the Obama administration view the North Korean regime as a threat to 

U.S. national security?

Answer. The United States continues to work closely with China to address North 

Korea’s nuclear programs and other provocations. We continue to concentrate our 

diplomatic energy on encouraging China to more effectively leverage its unique relationship with the DPRK and its role as chair of the six-party talks to achieve our 

common goal of verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful 

manner. The Chinese played a critical role in crafting U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094, which imposes new sanctions on North Korea, and we will continue to 

press China to enforce these tough new sanctions. We will also continue to press 

China to do everything possible to address North Korea’s threats to regional peace 

and security and the global nonproliferation regime. 

While the United States is working with China to address a number of critical 

international issues, including Iran’s nuclear weapons program and the unrest in 

Syria, North Korea remains a top priority in our policy agenda with China. Secretary Kerry has already discussed our concerns regarding North Korea, including 

after North Korea’s missile launch and after its nuclear test, with new State Councilor Yang Jiechi. 

While China provides some assistance to North Korea, we are not in a position 

to speculate on the potential impact of withholding that assistance. Chinese officials 

have made clear that they are concerned by North Korea’s destabilizing and provocFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

51

ative behavior, and that they view denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a 

critical concern. 

North Korea’s recent highly provocative threats against the United States and its 

allies and its announcement that it had tested a nuclear device in February underscore the serious threat the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs 

and proliferation activities pose to U.S. national security and the security of our 

allies. The United States will continue to take appropriate action to counter these 

threats. 

U.S. DISARMAMENT AND NORTH KOREA

Question. President Obama supports the denuclearization of the North Korean 

peninsula. There are some who have advocated for the United States to reduce its 

nuclear arsenal as a way of persuading other rogue regimes such as North Korea 

to give up their nuclear weapons as well. However, despite new reductions agreed 

to under the New START treaty, North Korea recently tested a nuclear device. During the hearing I asked you if reductions to the U.S. nuclear arsenal would persuade 

North Korea to give up its programs and come back to negotiations. Your response 

was that while it wouldn’t have a direct effect on North Korea, it would have tremendous effect on the 189 countries who are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty, and that, in turn, would have an effect on North Korea.

• Would reductions to the U.S. arsenal prompt Japan and South Korea to develop 

nuclear weapons programs of their own? 

• If Japan and South Korea did develop their own programs, how would that

affect North Korea’s proliferation activities? 

• What would the effect be on proliferation in general if, while the United States 

reduced its stockpile, Japan and South Korea began to develop their own?

Answer. The Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan are both committed partners 

and global leaders on strengthening and maintaining the integrity of the global nonproliferation regime. Both countries also stress their support for efforts by the 

nuclear weapon-state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT) to fulfill their treaty commitments on nuclear disarmament. 

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) makes clear that the United States will 

maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons 

exist. The NPR effectively balances the need to demonstrate progress toward meeting our commitments under the NPT and maintaining our security commitments 

and a credible extended nuclear deterrence to our allies and partners, including the 

ROK and Japan. 

The U.S. nuclear umbrella, along with our robust conventional weapons capabilities, will remain sufficiently strong to assure the ROK and Japan of our defense 

commitment, including to a strong response to any threat from North Korea, even 

if the United States reduced its stockpile. The United States is strongly committed 

to the defense of our allies, the ROK and Japan, and we have seen no evidence that 

either Japan or the ROK intends to develop its own nuclear weapons program in 

response to a possible reduction to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. 

RESPONSES OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE GLYN T. DAVIES TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. North Korea on March 11 cut off the Red Cross communications hotline 

between Seoul and Pyongyang which was used for general communication and to 

discuss aid shipments and separated families’ reunions. This has largely been seen 

as a symbolic gesture.

• When was the last time it was cut off? How did that impact our interactions 

with North Korea and our ability to respond to confrontation? 

• What impact do we expect this latest cut-off to have, if any? 

• Do we expect that Pyongyang will also follow up on threats to cut off a separate 

hotline with U.N. forces in South Korea, at the border ‘‘truce village’’ of Panmunjom? What would the outcome of that be? Has that ever been cut off before?

Answer. North Korea’s reported cutoff of North-South Red Cross communication 

links at Panmunjom on March 11, 2013, is not conducive to ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The last time the DPRK Red Cross stopped answering the Red Cross hotline was on May 26, 2010, after the Republic of Korea (ROK) 

announced countermeasures in response to the sinking of an ROK Navy ship. Communications resumed on January 12, 2011. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

52

North Korea has periodically refused to acknowledge the communications channel 

at Panmunjom, and its recent bellicose rhetoric and threats follow a pattern designed to raise tensions and intimidate others. North Korean forces at Panmunjom 

at times do not answer their phone line connecting to the United Nations (U.N.) 

Command. In the past, the impact of their refusal to answer the phone has been 

minimal and we do not anticipate any negative effect from this latest cutoff. The 

United States continues to have direct channels of communication with the DPRK 

unrelated to the hotline in Panmunjom and we will continue to draw upon the full 

range of our capabilities to protect against, and to respond to, the threat posed to 

us and to our allies by North Korea.

Question. What type of support is the United States Government currently providing for American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in North 

Korea, if any?

• Which American NGOs are working in North Korea? 

• How can we best get aid to them? 

• How can we account for and track the aid?

Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned about the well-being of the 

people of North Korea and supports nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities 

by offering technical and other assistance. There are a handful of U.S.-based NGOs 

working in North Korea. These NGOs secure funds from a variety of sources, including, at times, very limited and strictly controlled funding from the U.S. Government. 

U.S.-based NGOs are working in critical areas to improve the lives of North Koreans. U.S.-based NGO activity in North Korea includes providing medicine, medical 

equipment, and medical training; nutritional assistance to children in orphanages 

to help alleviate chronic undernutrition; agricultural assistance to improve farming 

methods in order to address critical food security issues; water and sanitation programs to fight waterborne disease; recovery assistance following flooding and other 

natural disasters; and other assistance targeted at North Korea’s most vulnerable 

populations. The United States has not funded any nutrition assistance programs 

to the DPRK since March 2009. The Department of State has established rigorous 

controls and reporting requirements to ensure that any U.S.-funded support reaches 

its intended beneficiaries, and U.S. NGOs strictly follow these monitoring requirements. Other NGOs equip North Koreans with tools to improve the country’s social, 

economic, and other frameworks, and facilitating cultural and other forms of exchanges. We monitor these NGO activities to be certain that they do not enhance 

North Korean capabilities that are under U.S. and U.N. sanctions. 

Given the sensitivity of this work and concern for the security and safety for U.S. 

NGOs operating in North Korea, we cannot provide a comprehensive list of U.S. 

NGOs operating in North Korea in this setting, but would be pleased to provide 

more details on specific U.S. NGOs working in North Korea and specific monitoring 

requirements in a confidential briefing.

Æ

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER