alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXTENSION
OF MATURITY DATE FOR





PROMISSORY
NOTE


 


This
Extension of Maturity Date for Promissory Note (the “Extension”) dated February 19, 2015, is entered into by and between
CareView-Saline, LLC, a Wisconsin limited liability company (“Maker”) and Rockwell Holdings I, LLC (“Holder”)
(collectively known as the “Parties”).


 


WHEREAS,
the pursuant to a certain Master Investment Agreement entered into by the Parties on November 16, 2009, Maker issued to Holder
a Promissory Note in the principal amount of $109,230with respect to the Project (as defined in the Master Investment Agreement)
for the Saline Memorial Hospital,


 


WHEREAS,
the Promissory Note has a maturity date of three years from the date payments commenced thereunder, which would make the maturity
date of the Promissory Note August 30, 2013,


 


WHEREAS,
the maturity date of the Promissory Note was subsequently extended to December 31, 2013, then to June 30, 2014, and then to June
30, 2015,


 


WHEREAS,
the Parties have mutually agreed to extend the maturity date to June 30, 2016,


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants hereinafter set forth, the Parties hereby enter into this Extension as follows:


 


1.    Extension
of Maturity Date for Promissory Note: The Parties agree to extend the maturity date of the Promissory Note to June 30, 2016 (the
“Extended Maturity Date”).


 


2.    Other
Provisions of the Promissory Note: The Parties agree that all other provisions of the Promissory Note will remain in full force
and effect other than the Extended Maturity Date.


 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties hereto have executed this Agreement as of the day and year first above written.


  


	CAREVIEW-SALINE, LLC	 	ROCKWELL HOLDINGS I, LLC
	 	 	 	 	 
	By:	 /s/
    Steve Johnson	 	By:	 /s/
    Matt Bluhm
	 	Steve Johnson	 	 	Matt Bluhm
	 	Manager	 	 	Managing Member
Exhibit 32.1
   CERTIFICATIONS
OF
 CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
 PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of American Defense
Systems, Inc. (the “Company”) for the
quarter ended March 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Anthony
Piscitelli, Chief Executive Officer, President and Chairman of the Company and
Gary Sidorsky, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that to our best knowledge:
  1.    
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  2.    
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.
  Date:
      May 14, 2009
                  By:
                  /s/
      Anthony
      PiscitelliAnthony
      PiscitelliChief
      Executive Officer, President and ChairmanBy:
                  /s/
      Gary
      SidorskyGary
      SidorskyChief
      Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gladys Castro, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 495]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Allen Alpert, J.), rendered *246May 19, 1994, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of two counts of assault in the second degree, and sentencing her to consecutive terms of l1⁄2 to 41⁄2 years, unanimously affirmed.

The totality of the record reveals that defendant received meaningful representation at trial *(People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137). Although defense counsel did not present a child abuse expert or an orthopedic surgeon at trial, counsel consulted with two pediatricians prior to trial and thoroughly cross-examined the People’s child abuse expert. For obviously strategic reasons, counsel chose not to seek to admit into evidence a report by the Child Welfare Agency containing information that was more damaging than helpful to the defense *(compare, People v Rojas,*213 AD2d 56).

The trial court properly sustained the People’s objection to defense counsel’s summation comment that the People did not call the father of one of the child victims to the stand because he would not support their position. The witness’s potential testimony was not material. We also note counsel had specifically declined to request a missing witness charge after the People indicated that they were prepared to put the witness on the stand if necessary *(see, People v Zillinger,*179 AD2d 382, *lv denied*79 NY2d 955).

Defendant’s complaints about the court’s marshalling of the circumstantial evidence and its supplemental charges are unpreserved (CPL 470.05), and in any event without merit.

We discern no abuse of discretion by the sentencing court in the imposition of consecutive terms of incarceration in light of the severity of the injuries inflicted upon the two children who, on different dates, were left in defendant’s care. Concur— Rosenberger, J. P., Ellerin, Rubin, Asch and Nardelli, JJ.
January 31, 2013



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

CODY WAYNE HENSON , Appellant

NO. 14

- 11

- 00899

- CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

________________________________ This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. Having considered the record, this Court holds that there was no error in the judgment. The Court orders the judgment AFFIRMED

. We further order this decision certified below for ob servance.
#### IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CLARENCE R. WOLF, DECEASED.

See same case below: 98 *N. J. Super.*89.

*Messrs. Gant & Miller,*for the petitioner.

*Mr. Santo J. Salvo, Mr. 0. Zachery Seltzer*and *Mr. Robert K. Bell*for the respondents.

February 27, 1968.

Denied.
#### The People of the State of New York *ex rel.*The Commissioners of Charities and Corrections *v.*James H. Gibney.

Judgment reversed, with leave to serve amended complaint upon payment of *costs.,s*Opinions by Davis, P. J., Brady and Ingalls, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 USC, SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002   In connection with the Annual Report of Crown Marketing (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2014, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jay Hooper, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


|                           |                                                            
|-------------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------
|Dated:  September 18, 2014 | /s/ Jay Hooper                                             
|                           | By:  Jay Hooper                                            
|                           | Its:  Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Crown Marketing and will be retained by Crown Marketing and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
|   | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  August 9, 2010   | By:    | /s/ MICHAEL S. DUNLAP                                   |   |
|---------------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                        |   | Name: Michael S. Dunlap                                      |   |
|                                        |   | Title:   Chairman and Chief Executive Officer |   |
|                                        |   |                                                         |   |
|                                        |   | /s/ TERRY J. HEIMES                                          |   |
|                                        |   | Name: Terry J. Heimes                                        |   |
|                                        |   | Title:   Chief Financial Officer              |   |
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8173 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit former Members of 

Congress from engaging in lobbying contacts. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 30, 2024 

Mr. GOLDEN of Maine introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit former 

Members of Congress from engaging in lobbying contacts. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION ON LOBBYING CONTACTS BY 

4 FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 207(e) of title 18, United 

6 States Code, is amended as follows: 

7 (1) Paragraph (1) is amended to read as fol8 lows: 

9 ‘‘(1) MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.— 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8173 IH

1 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Any person who is a 

2 Senator or a Member of the House of Rep3 resentatives and who, after that person leaves 

4 office, knowingly makes any lobbying contact to 

5 a covered executive branch official, or to any 

6 Member, officer, or employee of either House of 

7 Congress, shall be punished as provided in sec8 tion 216 of this title. 

9 ‘‘(B) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph, 

10 the terms ‘lobbying contact’ and ‘covered execu11 tive branch official’ have the meanings given 

12 those terms in section 3 of the Lobbying Disclo13 sure Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1602).’’. 

14 (2) Paragraph (2) is amended— 

15 (A) by striking ‘‘(2) Any person’’ and in16 serting the following: 

17 ‘‘(2) OFFICERS AND CERTAIN STAFF.— 

18 ‘‘(A) OFFICERS AND STAFF OF THE SEN19 ATE.—Any person’’; and 

20 (B) by adding at the end the following: 

21 ‘‘(B) OFFICERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP22 RESENTATIVES.—(i) Any person who is an 

23 elected officer of the House of Representatives 

24 and who, within 1 year after that person leaves 

25 office, knowingly makes, with the intent to inVerDate Sep 11 2014 19:04 May 22, 2024 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8173.IH H8173

ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 8173 IH

1 fluence, any communication to or appearance 

2 before any of the persons described in clause 

3 (ii), on behalf of any other person (except the 

4 United States) in connection with any matter 

5 on which such elected officer seeks action by a 

6 Member, officer, or employee of either House of 

7 Congress, in his or her official capacity, shall be 

8 punished as provided in section 216 of this title. 

9 ‘‘(ii) The persons referred to in clause (i) 

10 with respect to appearances or communications 

11 by a former elected officer are any Member, of12 ficer, or employee of the House of Representa13 tives.’’. 

14 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

15 subsection (a) shall apply to individuals who leave office 

16 or employment to which such amendments apply on or 

17 after the date of adjournment of the first session of the 

18 One Hundred Eighteenth Congress sine die or December 

19 31, 2023, whichever date is earlier. 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
Before the First Division,

December 29, 1939

No. 42930.

#### Protest 720764-G of Langfelder, Homma & Hayward, Inc. (Philadelphia).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

It was stipulated that certain items consist of inflated rubber balls similar to those the subject of *United States*v. *Woolworth*(24 C. C. P. A. 338, T. D. 48770) and Abstract 41517. Certain items were therefore held dutiable at 25 percent under paragraph 1537 (b) and others at 30 percent under paragraph 1502.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Shawn Thompson, Appellant.

[635 NYS2d 558]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: The record supports County Court’s determination that defendant violated a condition of the sentencing commitment. Because defendant failed to fulfill a condition of the sentencing commitment, the court was not bound by it and could impose a greater sentence without providing defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea *(see, People v Parsons,*210 AD2d 901, *lv denied*85 NY2d 941). The enhanced sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. (Appeal from Judgment of Monroe County Court, Marks, J.— Assault, 2nd Degree.) Present—Green, J. P., Lawton, Callahan, Doerr and Davis, JJ.
No. 49718.

#### Protest 96058-K of Thomas & Pierson, Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise in question consists of raw white gutta-percha similar to that the subject of *United States*v. *United States Rubber Co.*(31 C. C. P. A. 174, C. A. D. 269). The protest was sustained.
#### Billy Ray HARBOUR v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 90-300

807 S.W.2d 663

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered April 29, 1991

*317
      *Burbank, Dodson, & McDonald,*by: *Gary L. Burbank,*for appellant.

*Winston Bryant,*Att’y Gen., by: *Clint Miller,*Sr. Asst. Att’y Gen., for appellee.

Robert H. Dudley, Justice.

Appellant was charged by a police citation with driving while intoxicated. At the time of the arrest, the arresting officer had not been given the required psychological evaluation. The statute applicable at that time provided that any action taken by such an officer “shall be held as invalid.” *See*Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108(a) (1987). Appellant filed a motion to dismiss in which he contended that the charging instrument, the police citation, was invalid, *see Grable*v. *State,*298 Ark. 489, 769 S.W.2d 9 (1989), and, in addition, filed a similar motion to suppress the evidence gathered by the officer. Before trial, the statute was amended to provide that any action taken by non-qualified officers “shall not be held invalid.” Ark. Code Ann. § 12-9-108(a) (1990-91 Advance Code Service). The amendment is expressly made applicable to pending cases. The trial court applied the amended act, over appellant’s objections, and found appellant guilty. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Appellant contends the trial court’s ruling violated the prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws. In a case squarely on point, we recently held that the amendment does not violate the ex post facto clauses of either the federal or state constitutions. *Ridenhour v. State,*305 Ark. 90, 805 S.W.2d 639 (1991).

Appellant next contends the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion to suppress. The argument is without merit as the trial court properly applied the amended act to find that the evidence gathered by the arresting officer was not invalidly *318gathered.

Appellant’s third argument is that he was deprived of procedural due process because the charging instrument, the police citation, was invalid. As previously set out, he was not invalidly charged because of the operation of the statutory amendment.

His final argument is that the amendment is void because of vagueness. We do not reach a decision on this point as it was not argued below. We do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. *Wicks*v. *State,*270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980).

Affirmed.
#### Kenneth Kahn, Respondent, v Celeste Kahn, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 382]

—In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant wife appeals, as limited by her brief, from stated portions of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Murphy, J.), entered March 22, 1994, which, *inter alia,*(1) granted the husband a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and the wife’s adultery, (2) ordered that certain monies taken by the wife from a joint account be deemed maintenance, (3) ordered that the husband pay the wife $250 per week for a period of one year, and (4) distributed to the husband all bank accounts in the joint names of the parties, all stocks and bonds in the joint names of the parties, the marital residence, the proceeds of certain escrow accounts, a BMW automobile, and all furniture and furnishings located at the marital residence.

Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The determination of the trial court as a fact-finder on the issue of cruel and inhuman treatment will not be lightly disturbed on appeal *(see, Soto v Soto,*216 AD2d 455, citing *Tortorello v Tortorello,*133 AD2d 683; *Rieger v Rieger,*161 AD2d 227). Giving due deference to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, we are satisfied that the husband sufficiently demonstrated a course of conduct by the wife which so endangered his physical or mental well being as rendered it unsafe or improper for him to cohabit with her *(see,*Domestic Relations Law § 170 [1]). Further, the court’s finding that the husband is entitled to a divorce on the ground of adultery is supported by the record and we decline to disturb it.

Contrary to the wife’s contention, the court’s distribution of the marital *property is*supported by the record. The court set forth all the facts it considered and the reasons for its determination *(see,*Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5]; *O’Brien v O’Brien,*66 NY2d 576).

*321Additionally, it is well settled that the amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court *(see, Feldman v Feldman,*194 AD2d 207, 217-218; *Loeb v Loeb,*186 AD2d 174). In fixing the amount of such an award, á court must take into account the financial circumstances of both parties, including their reasonable needs and means *(see, Feldman v Feldman, supra).*Here, the evidence established that the wife was in good health, young, and educated. There was uncontradicted evidence that subsequent to the parties’ separation, the wife withdrew close to $150,000 from a bank account held in the parties’ joint names. Although the wife claimed to have expended these monies for living expenses, she was unable to substantiate in any real terms her use of these monies. The court did not credit her testimony and concluded that she had wastefully dissipated this asset or had hid these funds for her future use. The court properly fixed the award of maintenance.

We have examined the wife’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Ritter, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Krausman, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAMUEL KWAME AMANKRAH,

Petitioner

- Appellant,

v.

F. X. CHAVEZ,

Respondent

- Appellee. No. 11

- 57060

D.C. No. 5:11

- cv

- 00701

- CAS

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 11, 2017 **

Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Samuel Kwame Am ankrah appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo the denial of a habeas

corpus petition, see Fairbank v. Ayers , 650 F.3d 1243, 1250 (9th Cir. 2011), and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

APR 20 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 11

- 57060

we affirm.

Amankrah argues that the prosecutor made several remarks during closing

argument that violated Amankrah’s F ifth Amendment right not to testify under

Griffin v. California , 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)

. The California Court of Appeal

analyzed the prosecutor’s entire closing argument and concluded that two of the

comments were improper, but that the Griffin error was harmless under Chapman

v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The state court’s rejection of Amankrah’s

claim was not c ontrary to, nor an un reasonable application of, either Griffin or

Chapman

, nor an unreasonable determination of facts based on the evidence

presented. S

ee 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Davis v. Ayala

, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199

(2015)

. Moreover, given the significant evidence of his guilt at trial, Amankrah

has not shown that the prosecutor’s remarks had a “substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993) (internal qu otations omitted); see also Davis , 135 S. Ct. at 2198.

Amankrah’s motion to present late new evidence is denied.

AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Oliver James, Appellant.

[634 NYS2d 213]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Patterson, J.), rendered July 19, 1994, convicting him of robbery in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and grand larceny in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial (Miller, J.), after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the People established that he had abandoned his knapsack, which contained a gun *(see, People v Howard,*50 NY2d 583, *cert denied*449 US 1023; *People v Hogya,*80 AD2d 621).

In addition, the defendant contends that because the crimes *659for which he was convicted were part of one transaction and arose from a single act, the court erred in ordering the sentence for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree to be served consecutively to the sentence for robbery in the second degree *(see,*Penal Law § 70.25 [2]). However, according to the testimony elicited at trial, the defendant used an unloaded, inoperable gun to rob the victim and the defendant also possessed a loaded, operable gun in a knapsack on his back during and after the robbery. The defendant dropped the knapsack while being pursued by the police and a later search revealed the loaded gun. From these facts, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant possessed the loaded gun with the intent to use it unlawfully against another, separate from the ultimate act which resulted in the robbery charge. Accordingly, imposition of consecutive sentences was permissible *(see, People v Day,*73 NY2d 208; *People v James,*211 AD2d 824; *People v Seow,*194 AD2d 635).

The sentence imposed was not excessive, *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Bracken, J. P., Sullivan, Miller and Florio, JJ., concur.
No. 56499.

protest 163019-K (New York).

#### The Products Trading Corp. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

At the trial it was conceded by counsel for the Government that the merchandise should have been classified at the rate claimed, and the memorandum of the collector to that effect was admitted in evidence. On the record presented the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
No. 45033.

#### Protest 38222-K of Sichel Co. (New York).

Opinion by

Evans, J.

On the record presented the protest was overruled.