### ~~A~~~OIRNEY GENEIKAL OFTEXAS
GROVER SELLERS AUSTIN ~~.T%xan -ON A1T"RNWY G:lrNERAl.

Hon. Geo. R. Sheppard Comptroller~~

of Public Austin, Texas
Dear Sir: Accounts

Re: OpinionNo. o-6828 The date of "cessationof hostilities"as referred to In Sec. 1, S.B.No. 130, Acts of 48thLegislature
We have your request for an opinion as to "thedate of the cessation of hostllltlesas referred to In Sectlon 1 of Senate Bill 130,Acts of the Regular Session of the Fortyeighth Legislature." Many wartime statutes,both state and federal, contain provisions for terminationupon "cessationof hostilities," "terminationof the emergency-,""terminationof then war," etc. (See "Report to the Presidentby the Attorney General ooncernlng the Limitation, Suspension, OP Termlnatlon of Emergency, National Defense and War Legislation,"dated September 1, 1945.) Each statutemust be construed in the light of Its particular wording and purpose and In the light of the factual conditions prevailing at the time the questlon is raised,

Senate Bill 130 releases interestand penalties on certain ad valorem taxes,

I!

. . 0providing that the release of such Interest and penalties shall extend for the duration of World War JI, and providing that the respectivemembers of such Armed Forces 0

. 0 shallbe allowed a period of not to exceed six (6)months after the cessation of hostilities Inwhich to pay without penalty and interest their taxes which have accrued and which shall accrue durlng the duratlon of thewar." (Underscoringours) - It is apparent from the above quoted language that the phrases "the cessation of hostilltles ' "theduration ofWorld War II," and "theduration of the war' are inter-relatedand must necessarllgrefer to the same time. Conceivably,actual fightingmight cease more than slx.monthsprlor to the formal termination of thewar. Obviously, the Legislaturedid not intend that the six-months'perlod of grace should terminateRon. Geo. R. Sheppard, page 2 o-6828

prior to the acrual of the taxes. The Intent of the Act is that taxeswhich accrue against persons entitled-to the benefit of the Act prior to the termlnatlon of the war, If paid within SIX months thereaftier, are Interest-freeand penaltgfree. ~Furthermore,Section 3 of the Act states, "The fact that many persons affected by the provisions of this Act 'are In distant countries In the service of their county and may unavoldablgpermit their taxes to become delinquent" creates an emergency. This clause shows that the Legislature intended to provide relief for personswho might unavoidablydelay pagment of-taxesuntil.termination of their service in the Armed Forces and subsequentreturn to their homes. It Is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the Legislature, in fixing the time allowed suchpersons for payment of taxeswlthout penalty and interest,considered the Federal laws fixing the period of military service.

Prior to enactment of'theAct in question the 77th Congress of the United States had, by PublicLaw 336 extended the period of service ofmembers of the Army of the United States, and suspendedrestrlctlons on their terrltorlaluse, "durlrig the existence of any war Inwhich the United States 1s engaged, and during the six months immediately followlng‘~the,termlnatlo~n of any suchwar," 55 Stat. 799; and by Public Law 360, author; lzed the President to extend the period of service of Inductees a~sslgned

ko the Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard, provided that the 0 0 eperlod~of service s D
. shallbe terminated not later than six months after the terminatlon of the war," 55 Stat. 844.

It Is our opinion, therefore, that "the cessation of~~~hostillties" as used In Senate Bill130 means the legal termination of World War II, rather than the actual cessation of flghtlng on the fields of battle. Upon what date did, orwill, World War II terminate, in the legal sense?

It is the province of the political department, and not of the judicialdepartment, of the federal-governmentto deter-- minewhen war is at an end. The-Protector, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 700, 20 L.~ed. 463; Perklns v, Rogers, 35 Ind. 124, 9 Am, Rep. 639,;’ Kneeland-Bigelow Co, v. Michigan Cent. RR. Co., 207 Mlch. 546, 174 N.W. 605; 67 Corpus J'uris.429.

The War of X360-66 did not terminate upon surrender of the last Confederategeneral (May26,1865) but continueduntil the proclamation of the President (August20, 1866). UnitedThe War with Spain did not end when actual: hostilftles

were suspendedby theprotocol of August 12, 1898, but contlnued.untl.1

the ratlflcatibn of the treaty ,of peace In April, 1899. Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 48 L. ed. 994, 24 s. ct. 727. World War I did not terminate,whenthe actual flghtlng and the Armlstlce was signed (November11, 1918). Hamllceased ton-v.KentuckyDistilleries & W. Co., 251 U.S. 146,, 64 L. ed,. 194, 40 S. Ct. 1.06; Kahn v. Anderson, 25 In re Miller, 281.F. 764 (CCA, 2nd Clrc.7 U.S. 1, 65 L. edb 469; ; Zimmerman v. Hicks, Hon. Geo. H. Sheppard, page 3 O-6828

States v. Anderson, 9 Wall, (U,S,)56; The Protector, supra; McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426.

7 F (2d) 443 (CCA, 2nd Clrc.);Kneeland-Blgelow Co. v.'Michlgan Cent. R.R. Co., supra; Palmer v. Pokorny, 186 N.W. Sup. Ct.); State v.Dixon, 213 P. 227 (Mont.Sup. 50 i'(Mlch'. Ct. trial Comm. of Ohlo v, Rotar, 179 N.E. 135 (OhioSup.7; IndusCt.); contra: United States v. Hicks, 256 F. 707 (Dist.Ct.).

Most cases lnwhich the point isdirectly involvedhold that World War 1 terminatedby the jointresolution of Congress of July 2, 1921. Clemens v. Perry, 51 S.W. (2d) 267 (Tex.~ Comm. App.); In re Miller, supra; Zimmerman v. Hicks, snpra; State v. Dlxon,'supra; Industrlal Comm. of Ohlo v.'Rotar, supra; see SWISS Nat, Ins. CO. v. Miller, 267 U.S. 42, 69 L. ed. 504. But some cases have held that it co tlnued until the ratification of the treaty ofpeace. First aat. Bank v. Anglo-Ceslerrelchische Bank; 37 F. (2d)564 (CCA, 3d Clrc.); Palmer v. Pokorng, 186 N.W. 505. (Mlch.Sup. Ct.). And other decisions have Indicated, by d~lcta,that a war Is not concludeduntil the treaty of peace Is made and becomes effective. See United States v, Anderson, supra;Hamilton v. Kentucky Dlstlllerles & W. Co., supra; Commercial Cable Co. v, Burleson, 255 F. 99 (Dlst.Ct.); Slplyak v. Davis, 119 Atl. 745 (Pa.Sup. Ct.).

The 77th Congress of the United States, by jointresolutions, formally declared a state of war between the United States and certain foreign governments, PublicLaws 328 (Japan), 331 Gerinany i 1 332 (Italy),563 (Bulgaria),564 (Hungary),and 565 ~Rumanla~: To date, neither Congressnor the Presidenthas formallydeclared a termination of these wars.

It is our opinion, therefore, thatWorld War II has not yet terminated, and will not terminate, In the legal sense, and ln the sense that the words "cessationof hostllltles"are used In Senate Bill 130, until the Congress of the Unlted States, or the President by authority from Congress, formally Proclaims that It is terminated.Hon. Geo. H, Sheppard,page 4 o-6828

We have heretofore forwarded to you copies of our Opinions Nos. O-5566, o-6258, and O-6565, which we believe answer the other qnestlons asked in your letter.
Yours very truly,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS By s/RaymondA. Lynch; Raymona A. Lynch, Assistant. RAL/rt/wc

APPROm OCT 19 1945 s/Grover Sellers ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS Approved Opinion CommitteeBy s/BWB ChaIrman