IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

In the Matter of the No. 53385-5-II

Personal Restraint of

EDWARD JAMES WILKINS,

Petitioner.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LEE, A.C.J. — Edward Wilkins seeks relief from personal restraint imposed as a result of 

his 2015 convictions for first degree rape of a child and first degree child molestation. We issued 

the mandate of Wilkins’s direct appeal on March 19, 2018. His petition, received on March 21, 

2019, was placed in the prison mail system on March 19, 2019, making his petition timely filed

under GR 3.1 and RCW 10.73.090(3)(b).

A. AMENDED INFORMATION

Wilkins argues that the amended information adding the charge of first degree child 

molestation was constitutionally deficient. Where, as here, the validity of the information was not 

challenged at trial, the defendant must show that (1) the essential elements do not appear in any 

form, or by fair construction, in the information and (2) that he was actually prejudiced by the 

language of the information. State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 105-06, 812 P.2d 86 (1991). 

A person is guilty of child molestation in the first degree when the person has, or 

knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual contact 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

October 15, 2019
No. 53385-5-II

2

with another who is less than twelve years old and not married to the perpetrator 

and the perpetrator is at least thirty-six months older than the victim.

RCW 9A.44.083(1). 

The amended information charging Wilkins with first degree child molestation alleged:

The defendant, in the County of Cowlitz, State of Washington, on, about, 

or between 01/01/2007 and 03/16/2008, being at least thirty-six months older than 

Jane Doe, DOB 07/08/2004, did engage in sexual contact with Jane Doe, a person 

who was less than twelve years of age and not married to the defendant, contrary 

to RCW 9A.44.083 and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.

Pet., App. A, at 1. Thus, this information alleges all of the essential elements of the crime and is 

therefore valid. 

Wilkins appears to be under the misapprehension that the child molestation charge had to 

allege an act separate and distinct from the alleged act of rape of a child. But as explained in his 

direct appeal, State v. Wilkins, 200 Wn. App. 794, 807-08, 403 P.3d 890 (2017), review denied, 

190 Wn.2d 1004 (2018), the State can charge and convict a defendant of both rape of a child and 

child molestation for the same act.

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Wilkins argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. To 

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Wilkins must demonstrate that his counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that as a result of that deficient 

performance, the result of his case probably would have been different. State v. McFarland, 127 

Wn.2d 322, 335-36, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. 

Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). We presume strongly that trial counsel’s performance was 

reasonable. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 42, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011).
No. 53385-5-II

3

Wilkins argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he did 

not object to those portions of the victim’s child hearsay statement that referred to acts Wilkins 

committed against other children. But Wilkins’s trial counsel objected to the admission of the 

child hearsay statement under former RCW 9A.44.120 (1995) and State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 

172, 691 P.2d 197 (1984), and the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence. 

Wilkins’s trial counsel also objected under ER 404(b) to those portions of the statement that 

referred to acts Wilkins committed against other children. The trial court overruled that objection 

and we affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that ER 404(b) 

did not apply because the statements went not to the defendant’s propensity to commit other bad 

acts but to the victim’s state of mind. Wilkins, 200 Wn. App. at 814-15. Wilkins now appears to 

argue that his trial counsel should also have objected on grounds of hearsay. But given that the 

trial court had ruled that the statements went to the victim’s state of mind, Wilkins does not show 

that not additionally objecting on grounds of hearsay was below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Wilkins fails to show ineffective assistance of counsel.

Wilkins also argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 

agreeing to the admission of the video containing the victim’s child hearsay statement. But trial 

counsel’s objection to the admission of the child hearsay statement had been overruled. Wilkins 

does not show that his counsel had any valid grounds for additionally objecting to the video of the 

statement and so does not show ineffective assistance of counsel.

Finally, Wilkins argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 

not calling as witnesses two women, Crystal Clark and “Shawna,” who would have testified that 
No. 53385-5-II

4

Wilkins did not have herpes in 2008.1 Pet., App. B, at 5. But Wilkins does not show how either 

of these women could have been competent witnesses to render such a medical diagnosis and so 

does not show ineffective assistance of counsel.

CONCLUSION

Wilkins does not present grounds for relief from restraint. We, therefore, deny his petition.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

LEE, A.C.J.

We concur:

WORSWICK, J.

MELNICK, J.

 

1 The State established that the victim had contracted herpes in 2008 when the child rape and child 

molestation occurred. Wilkins, 200 Wn. App. at 799-801.