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CHINA’S RAPID POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

ADVANCES IN CENTRAL ASIA AND RUSSIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 16, 2013

Serial No. 113–22

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Rensselaer Lee, Ph.D., senior fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute ............ 4

Mr. John Tkacik, Jr., director and senior fellow, Future Asia Project, International Assessment and Strategy Center ......................................................... 12

Dmitry Shlapentokh, Ph.D., associate professor, Indiana University South 

Bend ...................................................................................................................... 22

Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D., research professor of national security affairs, U.S. 

Army War College ................................................................................................ 29

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Rensselaer Lee, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 7

Mr. John Tkacik, Jr.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 15

Dmitry Shlapentokh, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................. 24

Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................... 31

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 58

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 59

The Honorable Tom Marino, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Material submitted for the record ............................. 60

(1)

CHINA’S RAPID POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 

ADVANCES IN CENTRAL ASIA AND RUSSIA 

TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The committee will come to order. 

Writing 10 years ago, the head of research at a Moscow bank 

suggested that China should just buy the Russian Far East because ‘‘if the Earth’s territory were divvied up according to demographic need and by potential for economic development, China 

would play Pac-Man at the expense of the Russian Far East.’’ This 

has not, however, been the view of either the Russian Government 

or the Russian people. China, though, finds the prospect appealing 

and much of what was on President Xi’s agenda when he met with 

President Putin last month involved using China’s new wealth to 

take control of the resource rich Russian eastern territories in Eurasia. 

Beijing’s economic, political and demographic integration with 

foreign lands follows a specific pattern. First, Chinese workers as 

well as managers, technicians and merchants accompany Chinese 

capital. Second, investments expand to control the entire supply 

chain for both exports and imports. Control of agricultural lands, 

raw materials, energy resources, local manufacturing, and retail 

business freeze out local firms and workers. Third, the areas of investment are directed by the Beijing regime through state-owned 

banks, sovereign wealth funds and state enterprises. They become 

an extension of the Communist Party and China itself. And finally, 

control of large, strategic segments of overseas economies gives Beijing dominate political influence over local governments. Corruption makes sovereignty a paper illusion, and if demographic shifts 

like those which could take place along China’s border follow, the 

borders themselves can change. 

While this Chinese model has been most evident and successful 

in Africa, where local governments are weak, it can be seen elsewhere as well. The advantages it confers on Beijing make it the 

preferred way of doing business. It is not in the national security 

interests of the United States for this to happen. For China to gain 

direct control of the resources of Russian Far East would tip the 

2

balance of power not only in Asia but worldwide. America and its 

allies need to strengthen their economic relationship with Russia 

and provide a viable alternative to China for the development of 

the Far East. The Russian people and their leaders see the danger 

of falling into a neocolonial dependency on China, but if they cannot find other business partners, they will be drawn into the Chinese orbit because Beijing has the money, the power and the will 

to entrap them. 

Finding common ground with Russia in the Far East could also 

lead to a wider strategic rapprochement. During the Cold War I 

was an implacable enemy of the Soviet Union; but I was never an 

enemy of the Russian people. The Cold War is long over, and we 

won it. Moscow is no longer the home of a Communist dictatorship. 

But there is still a Communist dictatorship in China. Curtailing 

the growth of its power should now be our prime concern; and we 

should work with other countries that come to see the same danger. 

I would hope our panel today can provide some suggestions how 

we can add Russia to our alignment, or at least keep it out of China’s clutches. 

With that said, I know the ranking member Keating has an 

opening statement of his own, and you may proceed. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

holding today’s timely hearing. I would like to note I not only speak 

for myself, but for the other members here, that is we are here 

today, our hearts and prayers are with the Boston Marathon victims and families today. And this meeting, attendant to that that 

I apologize. I’ll be leaving this hearing. 

Both China and Russia have a long history within Central Asia. 

This history can both be viewed through at times, an adversarial 

relationship, more recently, through the framework of an opportune 

partnership. In fact, the seeming success of the recent China-Russia Summit highlights the dynamic nature of the modern Sino-Russian relationship, which has both domestic and international implications for both countries. 

On the international stage, Beijing and Moscow have been actively leveraging their partnership to expand their influence over 

global affairs, particularly on the United Nations Security Council, 

where both Nations vetoed resolutions condemning the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria. Further, the two countries have been 

working to coordinate their efforts on the establishment of a new 

international lending institution to serve as an alternative to the 

International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. At home, the 

Chinese benefit from the domestic perception that they are recognized and respected by a major player like Russia while also expanding their outside energy sources. 

In turn, the Chinese selected Russia for Xi Jinping’s first visit 

abroad to grant credibility to an increasingly belligerent Russian 

leadership whose relationship with the West has deteriorated since 

the re-election of President Putin. At its foundation, energy and security agreements have drawn these two regional powers into what 

seems to be a relatively positive working relationship. In this way, 

their role in Central Asia is not only based on proximity, but on 

a natural need to ensure the stability of their neighborhood, given 

3

that the Central Asian States only established their sovereignty 

after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For this reason, despite 

differences between Russia, China and the United States, it is in 

the best interest of all three countries to work together. 

Although both the Chinese and Russians have strong historical, 

security and trade links to Central Asia, the United States can also 

provide a stabilizing influence through increased trade and democracy-building initiatives to ensure the durability of future of those 

investments and bringing the influence to the rule of law. Kicking 

out foreign NGOs that work on rule of law and democratization has 

been an unfortunate trend in the region and does not necessarily 

bode well for U.S. business interests. Without the basic foundations 

of government being taught and exercised, the region will be prone 

to greater instability and chaos. This being said, Russia and China 

must display their own willingness to provide more freedoms, services and information to their people. 

Finally, this subcommittee has been examining the potential for 

and the uncertainty surrounding the rise of extremism in Central 

Asia following the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan. The U.S., 

China and Russia have been working together on security matters 

since 9/11, and I believe that this cooperation should be maintained 

in a manner that is consistent with our own values in the United 

States. This includes cooperation on other transnational challenges 

such as narcotics, HIV prevention, and trafficking in persons. 

In conclusion, there is no doubt that this is a dynamic region 

that holds great potential, but this potential can only be harnessed 

through a willingness to work with the United States and moreover, the West. 

I look forward to circling back with you, Mr. Chairman, on this 

subject and in the meantime, will turn to Congressman Lowenthal 

who has graciously agreed to act as the ranking member for the remainder of the hearing. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you, Mr. Lowenthal. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We appreciate your thoughtful statement and 

any questions you might have to submit to our witnesses you can 

do so within 10 days. And we will transfer them on and they will 

be made a part of this record. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Cook, do you have any opening statement? Mr. Lowenthal? All right. I will introduce all of the witnesses and then how we will proceed, each witness will give an 

opening statement hopefully around 5 minutes, although the rest 

of your opening statement will be made part of the record and then 

we will go to a question and answer session. 

Our first witness is John Tkacik, senior fellow and director of Future Asia Project at the International Assessment and Strategy 

Center. He spent 3 or 4 years in the United States State Department as a Foreign Service Officer with almost 20 years of that 

working in China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong. Before assuming his current position, he was a research fellow for China, Taiwan, and 

Mongolian Policy at the Heritage Foundation and holds a master’s 

degree from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. 

Next, we have Dr. Rensselaer Lee. He’s a research fellow at the 

Foreign Policy Research Institute and president of the Global AdviVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:41 Jun 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\041613\80462 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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sory Services in McLean, Virginia. Dr. Lee has performed overseas 

contract assignments for the State Department, the Department of 

Energy as well, the World Bank, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy and other agencies. He has worked as 

an analyst for the Congressional Research Service and he is author, among other things, of ‘‘Smuggling Armageddon, the Nuclear 

Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe,’’ and he 

holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University. 

Next we have Dmitry and I’m going to get this one, too, 

Shlapentokh, is that right? Okay, got it. He is an associate professor of history at Indiana University at South Bend. He holds 

master’s degrees from Moscow State University and Michigan State 

University and received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. 

He was born in the USSR which no longer exists and emigrated to 

the United States in 1979. He has written monographs for the U.S. 

Army’s Strategic Study Center and his new book, ‘‘Global Russia, 

Eurasianism, Putin and the New Right,’’ will be published later 

this year. 

Finally, we have Dr. Stephen Blank. He’s a research professor of 

national security affairs at the U.S. Army War College where he 

also works with the Strategic Studies Institute. He has written on 

Russia’s prospects in Asia as well as on other aspects of Russian 

policy. Dr. Blank holds a B.A. in history from the University of 

Pennsylvania, an M.A. and a Ph.D. in history from the University 

of Chicago. 

So with that said, we will start off with Dr. Lee and work our 

way this way and why don’t you start. And then as I said, if the 

witnesses could keep their remarks to about 5 minutes and put the 

rest in the record, it will give us more of a chance to have a dialogue. And let me just say, when I say dialogue, if you want to ask 

questions of other members of the panel, we are going to encourage 

that type of interaction. 

So with that said, Dr. Lee, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF RENSSELAER LEE, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 

Mr. LEE. I think my remarks follow very closely the sentiments 

you expressed in your opening statement. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let’s just note that when you’re speaking 

with the microphone on, we are using energy. So all of a sudden 

we are using electricity, not using oil or natural gas. 

Mr. LEE. Let me start with a few introductory remarks about the 

Russian Far East and where it figures in this dialogue. The Russian Far East is a land of contradictions, rich in resources and economic potential. It’s also seriously under developed and demographically challenged. It makes up 36 percent of Russia’s national 

territory, equivalent to about two-thirds the size of the United 

States but it only has 4 to 5 percent of Russia’s total population. 

It accounts for just 5 to 6 percent of its national GDP. It’s also a 

very vulnerable territory geographically. And you must consider 

that Vladivostok is five times closer to Beijing and almost six times 

closer to Tokyo than it is Moscow. And for these various reasons 

the Far East has traditionally been difficult to administer from 

5

Moscow, a pain in the neck to administer from Moscow as a matter 

of fact, and a perennial opportunity for Russia’s Asian neighbors. 

Now to go back in time a little bit, Japan was the main threat 

to Russian sovereignty of the Far East, most conspicuously at the 

time of the Russian civil war when Imperial Japanese troops occupied parts of the region. Today, the main perceived threat, not a 

specifically military threat, but a much more subtle threat, comes 

from an increasingly powerful and regionally assertive China. 

China has made important economic and demographic inroads into 

the Russian Far East, as it has elsewhere along its long, Asian periphery. 

Among other things, China wants to secure a land accessible 

base of raw materials as a hedge against a military conflict that 

could severe China’s maritime lines of communication. What else 

China wants is a matter of speculation and controversy. But a 

sphere of influence, a sphere of Chinese influence in the Russian 

Far East if this is, in fact, in China’s sights, could certainly compromise Russia’s territorial sovereignty in an economic sense and 

perhaps politically as well. 

Now political factors such as Moscow’s strategic partnership with 

Beijing have contributed to China’s evolving special relationship 

with Russia’s Far East. The relationship also reflects factors on the 

ground such as the country’s long 3600 kilometer common border 

and historical associations of the peoples and China’s dynamically 

growing economy. 

China dominates trade with Russia’s border provinces supplying 

vital food stuffs and consumer goods to their populations. Migrant 

Chinese labor provides essential services in areas such as construction, agriculture, trade, forestry, and mining. The valuable energy 

and raw material endowments of Siberia and the Far East are increasingly being programmed to serve China’s industrial requirements, especially in China’s northeast, that is Manchuria. 

Now as economic integration continues apace, the Russian Far 

East could become less a part of Russia’s periphery and more a 

part of Asia’s periphery or in the words of some Russian commentators, ‘‘a resource appendage of North East China.’’

I submit that this trend could have broader strategic implications. Even partial or indirect Chinese control over that vital region 

could increase China’s overall geopolitical weight and even reshape 

the regional balance of power in North East Asia to China’s advantage. 

This won’t happen overnight. And China isn’t the only foreign 

power that has interests in the Russian Far East. And China’s economic penetration is more advanced in the RFE provinces that adjoin the Sino-Russian border than in the provinces that are farther 

away. But given the regional dynamics of China’s rise, its relentless quest for natural resources and uncertainty about its future 

ambitions, there is certainly no cause for complacency. 

America and its Pacific allies need to be more engaged and 

proactive in Russia’s Far East economically, politically, and otherwise. This is not for outright containment of China which would be 

impractical in any case and risky. But it just makes good sense as 

a balancing strategy. Russia needs large-scale financing and technical assistance to maximize the economic potential of Siberia and 

6

the Far East. And Russia’s democratic partners should be prepared 

to assume a role in this transformation. 

Right now, America doesn’t have much of a presence in the region. Our trade with the Russian Far East was just 2.2 percent of 

its total external trade in 2011. U.S. investment there has declined 

to near zero in recent years. U.S. development assistance for Russia’s regions is less than what it was in the 1990s. U.S. policy makers don’t seem to consider Russia as a serious Pacific partner in 

economic and security terms. In fact, our overall relationship with 

Russia is adrift right now. And maybe partnering with Russia and 

developing its remote Far Eastern territory would be a way to put 

the relationship back on track and reinforce America’s Pacific security posture at the same time. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lee follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for those thoughtful 

remarks and you’ve made some very significant points that we will 

come back to during the question and answer and dialogue part of 

this. I just note, I would have to say that just for the record, Russia 

needs to wake up. They need to wake up. Who is really and what 

is really the greatest threat to the security and the economic wellbeing of their own people? For some reason, they have been treating the United States as if we fit into their hostile category and 

enemy category and that the Chinese who are really their greatest 

threat to their security and their prosperity are in some way their 

friends. And I’m very anxious to hear about the opinion of the 

other witnesses as well on that. But thank you very much, Dr. Lee, 

for your testimony. 

Now let me get this, Tkacik. 

Mr. TKACIK. Tkacik. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I’m sorry, pardon me. 

Mr. TKACIK. The first K is silent. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, I’ll tell you, with a name like 

Rohrabacher, I actually can get other people’s name wrong. 

You may proceed, Doctor. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN TKACIK, JR., DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, FUTURE ASIA PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER 

Mr. TKACIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members. 

I thank you for giving me this opportunity to appear today. Chinese’s rapid rise as Eurasia’s preeminent power is of the greatest 

strategic importance to the United States. And I say this because 

as one top America specialist in Beijing says, ‘‘In the world today, 

virtually all of America’s adversaries are China’s friends.’’ When 

you think about that, indeed, that is the case. 

Future Asia will not look like today’s Asia. Eurasia in 10 years 

in 2023 will be a Chinese dominion and China is now being helped 

along by a strategic alignment with the Russian Federation. Why 

does Russia side with China in a relationship that makes little geopolitical sense in the year 2013? Might it be a prudent strategy for 

the United States to tip the scales in the Russia-China relationship 

once again, as we did 44 years ago to prevent the emergence of a 

new hegemon in Eurasia. 

Now remember in 1969, 44 years ago, Russia and China were the 

bitterest enemies on earth. Now I don’t have much of a sense of 

humor and neither did Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, but Chairman Mao apparently had a sense of humor, so let me tell you a 

humorous anecdote about Russia, China, and nuclear war. Russia 

almost launched a nuclear strike on China in 1969 after a summer 

of unrelenting Chinese provocations. And on September 11, 1969, 

following the funeral of North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin, seething about China’s attacks, suddenly diverted his plane from Hanoi to Peking’s capital airport 

where he was met by Mao Zedong himself. Kosygin warned Mao to 

his face that the USSR’s patience was at an end and he alluded 

to a nuclear strike. Mao Zedong replied to Kosygin and I quote, ‘‘I 

have always said that the struggle between China and the Soviet 

Union will last for 10,000 years. But on the merit of your coming 

13

to see me in person, Premier Kosygin, I will cut that down to 9,000 

years.’’

Kosygin was not amused. Five days later, Moscow’s top journalist 

in Europe wrote an authoritative commentary predicting a Soviet 

nuclear strike on China and alluding to the Soviet invasion of 

Czechoslovakia the year before, he reminded the world that ‘‘the 

Soviet Union adheres to the doctrine that socialist countries have 

the right to interfere in other’s affairs in the interest of socialism.’’ 

The Soviets had already approached the Nixon administration secretly about just such an attack. Nixon’s reaction was explained in 

Kissinger’s memoirs and this is Nixon’s reaction:

‘‘A Soviet attack on China could not be ignored by us. It would 

upset the global balance of power. It would create around the 

world an impression of approaching Soviet dominance. Soviets 

may be using us to generate an impression in China and in the 

world that we are being consulted in secret and that we would 

look with equanimity on Soviet military actions.’’

It was then a tenet of America’s 20th century foreign policy that 

no power should achieve hegemony in Eurasia. And for 20 years 

after Nixon’s visit in China in 1972, U.S. strategy successfully balanced Soviet dominance in Eurasia by a counter alignment with 

Communist China. Since 1972, however, it has been the grave misfortune of the United States that neither its political leaders nor 

its professional diplomats appreciated the substance of that strategy. The Soviet Union abruptly gone and China not yet then coalesced into an economic super power that was more politically repressive than the Soviets were in the years before its collapse. 

China did not have to struggle for Mao’s 9,000 years for its victory over the Soviet Union. In the two decades since the Soviet 

Union’s collapse, since the collapse of China’s democracy movement 

in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented a single-minded strategy by any means necessary to reincarnate the communist state in China’s ancient dominance of Eurasia. 

Today, the United States confronts Eurasia’s new hegemon. Island Asia, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, most of Southeast Asia 

and most importantly Vietnam and Indonesia and India now look 

to the United States’ pivot to the Pacific to organize a new Asia Pacific order to balance China. But for Russia, the key factor is—but 

for us, the key factor is Russia in this equation. India still relies 

on Russia for weapons systems to deter China. Central Asian Mongolia hope the Russian influence can balance China’s tightening 

grip on their economies and resources. They hope that America can 

mitigate both Russian and Chinese pressures. And even our old 

enemy, Vietnam, was heartened last month by renewed Russian interest in a maritime presence in the South China Sea. 

The new Russian state, its own legitimacy in tatters, seeks to legitimize its oligarchy by rebuilding influence over its lost Eurasian 

empire. It rationalizes political repression at home by rebuilding its 

Eurasian military power and it enhances its global prestige by 

leveraging its resource exports, oil, natural gas, metals, minerals, 

lumber and energy for political acceptance among the democracies. 

And I have an lengthy analysis of Russia’s relationship to China 

14

in my written submission and I think my colleagues here beside me 

will already address the details in their own presentation. 

But let me conclude with the observation that Russia’s relationship with China is not one of unalloyed affection. Just in the past 

few weeks we’ve seen tension between Russia and China on a matter of vital importance to Moscow, the gas pipeline in the Far East. 

For several years, we’ve seen the Russians insulate their border 

with Manchuria keeping out Chinese investment, controlling as 

they can Chinese immigration and legislating against Chinese 

domination of the small retail industry throughout Russia. I think 

we’ve seen a renewed Russian naval interest in the South China 

Sea and in the Pacific seemingly to show China and India, not just 

America, that Russia is still a global player. Russia also faces vast 

demographic, resource and environmental challenges from a selfcentered China. But Russia has yet to recover from its collapse of 

1992. It must rebuild its own agriculture, its own industrial, scientific and resources infrastructure. It must rebuild its atrophying 

population and it must rebuilt its defenses before it can afford to 

challenge China’s hegemony in Eurasia. 

And Moscow’s leadership must rebuild its own legitimacy on the 

foundation of popular support among Russia’s jaded and disillusioned citizens, so clearly that will have to wait for a new core 

leadership. Until then, Russia will try to accommodate China without jeopardizing its own future and until then, the United States 

must be hyper vigilant of the balance of power in Eurasia. Russia 

is now entering a period of instability that America has insufficient 

resources to moderate. As the new Chinese super power demonstrates, the United States has few permanent friends or enemies 

in Eurasia, but it does have permanent interests in preventing any 

one power from dominating the land mass. And we must, at all 

costs, avoid the appearance of collusion with China in the Asia Pacific as we do that. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tkacik follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much and next we have Dr. 

Shlapentokh. 

You may proceed, Doctor. 

STATEMENT OF DMITRY SHLAPENTOKH, PH.D., ASSOCIATE 

PROFESSOR, INDIANA UNIVERSITY SOUTH BEND 

Mr. SHLAPENTOKH. Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to discuss these matters. My point is that—good. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we just had a hearing on cyber-attacks. 

Mr. SHLAPENTOKH. That’s right, that’s right, that’s right. Vigilance, vigilance, vigilance. 

So the point of my presentation given the Russian dimensions of 

the relationship with China and my point is that Far East could 

well be a test for China because of the invasion of horde of Chinese 

or military stuff, but because as threats proceed, the Russians 

themselves from Far East could choose China, geopolitical domination over Moscow. 

The reason for this is as following: The Far East prospered during the Soviet era mostly because of heavy investment from the 

center. Now all of this is gone. Moreover, most of their resources 

exploited by the Moscow-centered companies go back to Moscow, 

the money goes to Moscow, nothing left for the Far East. 

In addition, the Moscow prevents the Far Easterners to engage 

in profitable trade with nearby countries like Japan. And this led 

to very serious resentment. In 2008, Moscow imposed heavy tariffs 

on the used cars brought from Japan which bring considerable benefits to the locals. There was a big demonstration in Vladivostok, 

the local police were not able or willing to deal with this demonstration and brought riot police from center, from Moscow, which 

beat up people relentlessly. There was extremely high level of 

anger and internet was full of remarks that we need to blow up the 

pipelines because of action in Moscow. 

In 2010, a group of youngsters in the Far East called partisans, 

guerrillas, engaged in systematic killing of law enforcement in Far 

East. The interesting element of this story was that majority of the 

locals supported them completely, that law enforcement should be 

killed. So if at the same time where there is hatred to Moscow increases or there is fragmentation of the Russian nation conscience 

increasing regionalism as more people of the Far East represent 

part of the Russian Confederation. 

At the same time they are increasingly rich and prosperous 

China became an attractive magnet for an increasing number of 

the Russians. There was quite a few tourists. People would go to 

China for trade. People who buy property over there or even plan 

a retirement which is absolutely extraordinary because you could 

hardly mention any Russia from Far East or from any part of Russia going not just to Central Asia, but even to the Russian Caucuses. Moreover, most of the Russian-speaking folk in Central Asia 

or Russian Confederation Caucuses tried to run away from those 

places. So some of them are planning to go retire in China indicates a considerable level of security and sort of ability to lead 

among the Chinese. 

Of course, everything is predicated on the trends of China who 

has more and more reach, but if it proceeds in this direction and 

23

China will be seen by the locals as sort of big Japan, sort of Eastern-West. Located in the West, but have the amenities and high 

living standard of the East, or the West, and in case if Moscow 

would not be able to control the area in case of big political crisis, 

the Far East could be attached to China. By the way, during the 

2008 demonstration in Vladivostok some locals carried slogans, 

‘‘Give Vladivostok to Japan.’’ So this is what could happen. Of 

course, any prediction is hard, but with the strength to proceed, it 

could be done. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shlapentokh follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Blank, and then we’ll have some questions and dialogue. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN J. BLANK, PH.D., RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. ARMY WAR 

COLLEGE 

Mr. BLANK. Thank you. It’s a great honor to appear before this 

subcommittee again and I wish to point out that my remarks do 

not reflect the views of the Army, the Defense Department or the 

U.S. Government. Since 2008, Russia has reoriented its foreign policy to try and recover what was once the Soviet and Czarist status 

of Russia in Asia, namely that of a great independent power that 

had to be consulted about any major change in security and development in North East Asia. 

The precondition for success there is the reconstruction and development of the Russian Far East, RFE. Thanks to factors that 

are both natural, such as climate and cost of labor and absence—

and demographic decline, as well as to systematic misrule by Russian Governments for years, this is an area that was quite literally 

depressed. And it’s still not preforming at the same standard as 

European Russia. What that means is that unless the Russian Government comes up with a coherent development plan for the area, 

it will not be able to develop the region on its own. By 2009, it had 

already come to the conclusion that it could not do so on its own 

and it has been soliciting foreign partners. The main foreign partners that it solicits in the Russian Far East are, of course, China, 

Japan, South Korea, and the United States. 

As Congressman Rohrabacher pointed out, the United States has 

not been particularly interested in seeing Russia as a Pacific 

power. I wrote an article calling for this 2 years ago. I got no response. So we’re aligned in that respect. 

Japanese business sees Russia in a very negative light, not just 

because of the unresolved Kurile Islands although efforts are now 

being made to solve that problem, but because Russia is a lousy 

place to invest. Your investment is not safe. You are subjected to 

confiscatory expropriation, taxation, corruption, criminality, unjustified sudden environmental penalties and the like. And the cost 

of doing business there are not conducive to investment, when you 

can invest elsewhere and get much more for your money. And 

that’s not only in terms of oil and gas, but in terms of power stations, infrastructure, all the things that the Far East needs. 

Russia’s dream of building a railroad connection the Trans-Siberian Railroad to the Korean Peninsula, going through North Korea 

and then South Korea goes back to 1890, but it’s still a dream. It’s 

not a reality. And the idea of building a Trans-Korean pipeline that 

would bring gas to South Korea from Russia and give North Korea 

tariff payments, as well as access to gas, is obviously not going 

anywhere given the present conditions there. So by default, the 

only major investor in the Russian Far East is China and the Chinese are taking advantage of this opportunity to obtain what you 

might call points of pressure or pressure points, points of leverage, 

key nodes in the energy infrastructure and other key industries in 

the Far East. 

30

The Chinese threats to the independence and sovereignty of Russia and the Far East are not Chinese migration. As a matter of 

fact, according to Russian scholars, Chinese migration has declined 

every year since the beginning of 2000. What is the real point or 

tip of the spear is Chinese investment and trade. And here, we see 

China utilizing the same kinds of tactics it has used elsewhere to 

obtain key economic and political leverage. The giant firm, Rosneft, 

has borrowed something like $27 billion from China in order to sell 

it oil and the Chinese are going to demand that that oil be sold at 

less than market price. 

China is now getting access into the gas industry and into Russia’s Arctic energy developments as well and the Arctic energy is 

the great hope of the Russian energy sector for the future so China 

is already there. What we see, therefore, is a systematic Chinese 

economic penetration to investment and trade which will give it the 

political leverage over key sectors of the Russian economy in the 

years to come. And in the absence of any competitors this could 

create major security issues for the rest of Asia and the United 

States. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blank follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank all of you for your very thoughtful testimony. 

We are also joined with our good friends, Steve Stockman from 

Texas, and the Colonel is leaving now, but has no questions right 

now. 

Mr. COOK. I wish I did. I have another commitment. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right, thank you, Colonel. 

Mr. COOK. Great testimony. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Tom, do you have an opening statement or 

would you like to ask some questions? 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity say a couple of things or ask some questions. I travel a little 

bit and when I was in Venezuela, I was in the American Building 

built by American Airlines and they had a lot of Chinese folks 

there. I went to Republic of Congo and in the hotel, they had a lot 

of Chinese folks there. Wherever I travel, I see that the outreach 

is phenomenal in breadth. And one of my African leader friends 

said that they are now the new colonial masters of Africa. 

I’m wondering if, any of you can comment on this, if you were 

in the position of making decisions for the United States and what 

would you recommend to counterbalance the ever-growing presence 

around the world to the garnering and gathering of key resources 

and minerals and oil, what would you recommend we do? 

Dr. Blank? 

Mr. BLANK. That question, you have to go region by region, but 

in the Russian Far East and in Central Asia, first of all, we’d have 

to restore American growth at home in order to be able to compete 

economically in a more robust way. 

In the Far East, as I wrote 2 years ago, what is necessary, I believe, is to organize with Japan and South Korea a consortium that 

could actually come to the Russia Government and say that we are 

prepared to invest in selected projects in the Far East, energy, 

power transmission, infrastructure, etcetera in return for essentially the right to do so in a rational economic manner. As I put 

in the article, one of the preconditions is no more Magnitskys. Basically, that people can invest in Russia with the expectation that 

they get their money out safely, that profits can be made, that 

they’re not subjected to extraordinary corruption and criminality. 

Unfortunately, that has not happened, one of the reasons why 

American investment generally, not just the Far East has slipped. 

In Central Asia, it’s even more imperative, another region because over there, to be honest with you and I wrote a big paper 

about this last year, we talk a lot about the Silk Road, but there’s 

nothing concrete. It’s talk. It’s not actuality. President Karimov, 

I’m told, laughs every time he hears it because he knows it’s not 

a reality. So if the United States wants to compete with China, it 

needs to be able to compete economically by demonstrating a capacity and willingness to invest and sustain big investments in major 

projects in areas that are critical to our national interests. If we 

don’t take that first step, everything becomes much more difficult. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Dr. Lee? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, I would really second all of Steve’s remarks. What 

I’ve been toying with is the idea of a U.S. partnership with our 

treaty allies in East Asia, Japan, and Korea, to come to the RusVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:41 Jun 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\041613\80462 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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sians and say look, we’ve got a lot of money we want to invest. We 

want to upgrade your railroads, your roads, your maritime facilities, your air traffic, all of this and meanwhile invest in the fabled 

resources of Siberia and the Far East, but you’ve got to make some 

changes at your end. And the changes have to be made that are 

going to improve the business environment. 

We’re talking about things like protection, physical, intellectual 

property. We’re talking about transparency and procurement. We 

don’t want to get the feeling that the Chinese have some kind of 

an edge getting early information about projects that are going out 

to bid. I mean we want to be in a position to be able to take advantage of all of the commercial opportunities that are available. 

But I think at the same time, there should also be encouragement from the U.S. Government. It’s not just a commercial issue 

here. We’re not going into Russia here, the Far East, just for commercial reasons. There are big strategic—there’s a big strategic 

stake here. We have to look upon the Russian Far East as kind of 

a gigantic buffer between China and North America. I think that 

we have to, in a sense, take a position there, increase our engagement and presence in the region, not just to make money, but also 

for our strategic well-being as a country. 

Mr. TKACIK. If I could just add, when I was in the Foreign Service in my earlier days, it was at the last two decades of the Soviet 

Union. The State Department had a Soviet Affairs Officer in just 

about every office of the State Department, whether it was Oceans 

Environment, whether it was Visas, whether it was any geographic 

area, and everybody was tasked to write and report on how the Soviets were engaging in whatever sector they were in. We don’t have 

that with China these days. 

And if we’re going to deal with the growing Chinese presence, 

you really have to know what you’re dealing with. You have to 

have a Treasury Department that’s focused on China. You have to 

have an Agriculture Department that has China people that are—

whose task is to report on how China is competing with the United 

States. We don’t—we really don’t have that. And I think the first 

thing that should be done is some kind of perhaps mandatory requirement, a mandate on the State Department on all government 

agencies to report on China policy as it affects their missions. Until 

we have that, we don’t even know what the size of the problem is 

unless, of course, a congressman shows up in Venezuela and he’s 

overrun with 200 Chinese and he doesn’t know what they’re doing. 

And he goes to Africa and he sees the same thing. 

If I could just be indulged 1 more minute, one of the places 

where I think we are facing the biggest challenge from China’s sort 

of invisible hegemony is in the Pacific. The Pacific has been our 

sphere of influence for the last 60, 70 years. But now I think we’re 

watching our Pacific foreign policy be outsourced to Australia and 

New Zealand, both of whom have completely different interests 

from us. And we’re seeing China basically take over each individual 

Pacific island state one by one in a very subtle, but very effective 

way. And there’s no American presence to counter balance that. 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to point out that this morning on NPR they had a former President Obama official stating 

that very thing, that he feels we’re abdicating and this his policy 

48

maker, abdicating the Middle East and much of the area. And 

that’s not coming from a conservative or a Republican official. It’s 

coming from a former Obama official. And I’d like to, if I may, 

Chairman, if we can get it and submit it into the record, I think 

it’s critical because while these hearings are vital, I think the overall problem is not a lot of people are aware of the dangers. 

When I was a young man, my father was very much involved in 

international relations. That’s how I got involved in politics. And 

not it’s not popular to talk about anything beyond our borders. As 

people remember 9/11 and other times, it’s a very grave danger to 

ignore the storms that are formulating outside our borders. And I 

yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Shlapentokh, did you have something to 

add to that? 

Mr. SHLAPENTOKH. My point is the U.S. needs to invest in the 

Far East, but in order to attract the people of the Far East to the 

United States is this money should have some implication for 

them. It should be good jobs. It should be housing. It should be 

something that goes in their pocket, not just to the pockets of the 

big American company and its Russian partners. 

In this case, they will go along the way of the money. The good 

way would be, of course, unite their efforts with the Japanese and 

South Koreans, but once again to be sure that money benefits go 

to Far East, not to Moscow. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. Just to back up Mr. Tkacik’s 

point about State Department not paying attention, we could not 

get the State Department to send anyone here today, for example, 

just to have a discussion, a dialogue with us about the subject. And 

to say that they’re not interested is an understatement. 

Mr. Lowenthal, would you like to proceed? 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. First, I find the conversation very fascinating 

and obviously maybe it’s an oversimplification what you all are 

saying, but obviously the increasing role of China in both Central 

Asia and throughout the world is cause of concern. The question I 

have are there any positive signs in this that we could work with 

and what is going to be the impact, not just between Russia and 

China, but on the emerging of the new Central Asian republics. 

Can you talk a little bit about the impacts of China on the—that 

used to be part of the Soviet Union that are now independent countries and where do they fit in? I believe that the Soviet Union 

wants to—how are they—what is to their advantage, the Soviet 

Union wanting them to come, to return Mr. Putin to kind of more 

under the relationship of the Soviet Union. What role is China 

playing actually in these Central Asian republics themselves and 

what role should we be playing with them? 

Mr. BLANK. China is playing the role of investor and trade. It is 

now the number one investor and trade partner for Central Asia 

is also increasingly the place where they go to raise money on 

international capital markets. 

Now Central Asian governments, all of them each in their own 

way, pursue what they call a multivector policy. They try to balance off all of the great powers, U.S., China, Russia, and keep them 

each at arm’s length so that nobody can exercise a disproportionate 

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fluence in them. China’s means of influencing them is this enormous economic power and in reserve, although it has never been 

used and China doesn’t show any interest in it, is the possibility 

of military power. 

Russia’s economic power of Central Asia is steadily declining because of the fact that the Russians simply cannot compete with the 

Chinese capital, so they have tried to build a number of institutions, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, CSTO which is 

essentially an attempt to create a military organization to defend 

them against terrorism or invasion and to keep them in the Russian military orbit. Now they have set up a Customs Union, one 

purpose of which is to keep Chinese goods out. If you have a Customs Union, goods produced inside become much cheaper than 

those produced outside. You have a visible Chinese and Russian 

economic rivalry, but both of them see us as a potential threat because of our supposed desire to maintain a military presence in 

Central Asia after 2014 and of course, because they’re all opposed, 

including Central Asian governments to democracy. 

What the U.S. needs to do here is first of all come to a decision 

whether or not Central Asia is a strategically important area for 

the United States. That has not been done. There is no discernible 

strategy. Some talk of maintaining military bases or troops in Afghanistan of certain advisory level after 2014, but we’re getting out 

of there militarily. Economically, we’re not investing anything like 

what would be required to sustain a viable American presence. And 

instead, we’re relying on Uzbekistan which is essentially a government whose security and legitimacy depends on the health of a 74-

year-old dictator. 

So what I’m saying is there’s no U.S. strategy for that area. That 

answers your question about Central Asia. 

Mr. TKACIK. I’d add that a dozen years ago, the Chinese finally 

pulled together a Central Asian-Russian alliance in the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization. And I think the Chinese intent of this 

was to cement their influence in Central Asia as the Russian influence was receding. 

I have to say in the intervening 12 years, the Russians have been 

very adept at moving in and sort of making sure that the SCO, the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is mostly about Russian-Chinese cooperation and that the Central Asians wind up being sort 

of junior partners in this. 

The problem, of course, is that the United States is far removed. 

We can’t—we don’t have a geographic border there. We have no 

way of getting our influence in. We have no way of getting either 

military or economic power into Central Asia without going 

through Russia or China or Pakistan or Iran. And it’s very difficult, 

I think, for us to break that stranglehold. Central Asians, of course, 

as Steve mentioned, are desperate to try to play off both Russia 

and China and hope that the United States can come in and sort 

of tip the balance one way or the other. 

Mongolia, in particular, I mean is the only democracy in the region, Mongolians are terrified of their future. They only have two 

land borders. They have Russia on the top north and China on the 

bottom. They’re desperate to get the United States and Canada and 

Europe and Japan investing in there so at least they have a stake, 

50

but if push comes to shove, it’s going to be difficult for the United 

States to make its influence felt in any way other than that before 

the United Nations. But I mean if this, I thought I would—pass on, 

as China is usually the SCO to crystallize its security leadership 

in that region. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. The chair will ask a 

few questions and see if there’s any final last minute statements 

by members of the panel. I guess what we’re talking about is a 

major change in history in terms of who dominates certain areas 

and is there any question among the panel that let’s say 70 years 

ago or 50 years ago that Russia, which was then the Soviet Union 

dominated Central Asia in that part of the world? Is there any 

question about that? 

And is there any question among the panelists that 50 years 

from now China will play that same dominant role or at least be 

that dominant—maybe not as Dr. Blank suggested, they won’t have 

Chinese troops occupying the various or even Chinese immigrants 

dominating the scene, but the decision making and economic—how 

do you say—dominance, thus the political dominance will be on the 

part of China 50 years from now, so we’ll see that shift away. Does 

anyone disagree with that? 

Go right ahead, Dr. Blank. 

Mr. BLANK. I would be very hesitant about predicting first of all, 

that far out because 35 years ago people in our profession didn’t 

think the Soviet Union was going to collapse, let alone peacefully. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I did. 

Mr. BLANK. Well, you are in a minority. And as Yogi Berra said 

‘‘Prediction is difficult, especially about the future.’’

The Central Asians don’t want to be subservient to anyone. They 

want to be independent. That’s why they strive for these balancing 

policies. Second, I think we’ve all seen in Iraq and Afghanistan just 

how difficult it is to subjugate people who don’t want to be ruled 

by foreign governments and therefore the age of direct empire and 

maybe even of indirect empire is becoming much more unlikely. 

The prospect of this could become much more costly to anybody. 

The Chinese are certainly trying to gain economic and political 

leverage all across their periphery from Russia to Far East, Central 

Asia, Southeast Asia and into the South Pacific and so on. That 

doesn’t mean their dominance is simply a foregone conclusion. It 

depends on what we do with the opportunities that we have and 

what other states do if the capabilities and resources and opportunities they have and the fact of the matter is that the aggressive 

Chinese policies of the last 4 or 5 years, have brought into being 

a pretty robust coalition that is becoming ever closer to the U.S., 

South Korea, Japan, Australia, key states in Southeast Asia like 

Vietnam and Indonesia and India who are making it clear that 

they are going to resist efforts by China to bring about a tributary 

or hegemonic Chinese system. I would not be nearly as confident 

that China is going to succeed in establish hegemony, although 

they may well try and that may lead to major crisis. But I think 

we have to leave the door open for countervailing actions by other 

actors. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you for that very optimistic answer. 

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dained, but the trends seem to be going and the dominance that 

we were talking about again was not a dominance of that part of 

the world by occupation and I think perhaps one of the things that 

as most come out of this hearing from me is the idea that in the 

past when I had spoken to our Russian friends, I’ve talked about 

the potential of millions of Chinese migrating into territory which 

is their territory and that perhaps that will not be the methodology 

which creates Chinese power in those areas. That instead, people 

coming slowly, but carrying lots of money and buying all of the natural resources of an area and becoming the only employer in the 

area may well be just as powerful an influence as having large 

numbers of Chinese people moving there. 

And that strategy, as you’re pointing out, Dr. Blank, is a fascinating strategy and it does have its weaknesses as we’ve seen in 

Burma. Burma, for the last 30 years has been, 40 years, has been 

at least 30 years has been really under the major influence of 

China, that’s not the domination of China, but now the Burmese 

regime is actually trying to break lose and head more toward the 

West. 

Also let me note that the Russians, another factor that we put 

into this equation is that—and obviously, this is stereotyping, but 

the Russians seem to be people who have a creative genius about 

them. When it comes to science—I’m also on the Science Committee, Science, Space, and Technology Committee that we’ve always admired the fact that the Russians have been the power on 

this earth that has developed so much space technology and so 

much other technologies that were very innovative in pushing humankind, although they were not good at implementing those and 

commercializing them and put into practice. They were very good 

at the creative part. 

The Chinese, on the other hand, have been very good at taking 

the creations of the West and building them and mass producing 

them at a cheaper price. I would think the genius is a very valuable asset that the Russians have. And also, I might add, as the 

United States is now finding that the Chinese are stealing our intellectual property by the boat load or by whatever megaload it is. 

The Russians will find that as well. 

Just something about U.S. policy and Russia, are we—just very 

quickly with the panel. In the last, since the fall of the Soviet 

Union, have we pushed Russia into a good relationship with China? 

And should we have not been as tough on Russia in certain ways 

that we were? Just very quickly. We’ll start over here with Dr. Lee. 

Mr. LEE. Yes, I certainly have the feeling that we have missed 

out on many opportunities to make more of our relationship with 

Russia. And a lot of this in a sense is water over the dam. We can’t 

do anything about some of the more controversial acts, the 

Magnitsky bill, NATO enlargement, arguments over Iran, over 

Syria, over a number of different issues. I don’t think that we can 

do that much about these problems. These are sort of fixed in our 

relationship, at least for the time being. But I do think that if we 

can develop a relationship in the Pacific between what I call Pacific 

Russia and Pacific America, this relationship, which would affect 

the Russian Far East could certainly spill over into other areas of 

52

the U.S.-Russia relationship and create possibilities for a broader, 

overall improvement. 

In the Pacific, we don’t really have many outstanding differences 

between us and Russia. I think there’s the question of the demarcation of the Bering Strait. My understanding is that that’s being negotiated, but it’s between Atlantic Russia and European Russia 

where we have a lot of the problems. Let’s try to build the relationship on the Pacific side and see if it might not have a positive effect 

on the U.S.-Russia relationship overall. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That was a very good answer to that question. Thank you. And I want to come back with a follow up after 

we go through the——

Mr. TKACIK. Did we push Russia into China’s hands? I don’t 

think so. I think what happened is that we didn’t—the United 

States was not sufficiently vigilant as Russia was transitioning 

from a Soviet dictatorship into a democracy and then into something else. And when—by the time Putin took over it seems to me 

that he was basing his legitimacy not on the consent of the governed, but more of how he would bring Russia back into the world 

as a global power again. And that if you were against Putin that 

you were against Russia. That’s not to me us pushing Russia into 

China’s hands. What we were doing was basically saying wait a 

minute, this is a dictatorship, this is not something that we can 

countenance. In the meantime, the Chinese said, oh, that’s all 

right, we’re dictators, too. We get along quite well. 

I think this sense in Moscow that the United States championing 

democracy and human rights is an attack on the legitimacy of the 

Putin government is probably at bottom the real reason why we 

have this conflict with them. So if we’re going to resolve the issue, 

I think one has to start, I think, there. A democratic Russia, to me, 

is a far better player in the world stage than non. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Doctor. 

Mr. SHLAPENTOKH. Here, I think we need to see two types of approach. Approach with a Moscow central government. Here, of 

course, there is a strong imperial feeling and of course, did start 

with the expansion of the NATO and especially after the Serbian 

war. It was sort of watershed. The liberals became look at the 

United States with the eyes of so-called red to brown Eurasianists 

and similar other folk. 

The rise of dimension is Far East. In this case we will, the 

United States could, of course, played the same regionalism as 

China, but in this case the Far East would look at the United 

States much better than Chinese. The Russian preferences for 

masses would be in the peck order, Europe mostly, Germany, 

France, ideal. Second in the peck order would be United States. 

China, only if China became East and West, rich, property rights, 

more economically political, personal liberties. Russians would not 

mind to see tough Chinese dealings with bureaucracy. They would 

say yes, it’s nice to shoot, we would like to see most of our bureaucracy be shot. But Russia would like to have some kind of property 

rights, some kind of personal liberties. They could travel abroad, no 

one interfering with this or that. So if United States will approach 

the Far East in the way that Far East would benefit personally 

with jobs, maybe scholarships or whatever, some material benefits, 

53

not words, hard cash, they would play the game both with China 

and with Japan and the United States. 

If the United States tried to play with Moscow, the central government, it is a another story. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And finally, Dr. Blank. 

Mr. BLANK. I believe that we’ve undoubtedly made mistakes in 

our foreign policy in the last 20, 25 years, but I would not want 

to eliminate the fact that the Russian turn to China begins in 1992 

and I think is very much connected with the fact that the Russian 

Government already in 1992 was turning away from democracy. 

I’m one of those people who does not think that Yeltsin built a democracy. He certainly in many ways is more appealing a character 

than Putin is, but it was by no means democracy. It was what the 

Russians would call bezobrazie, sort of anarchy and lack of form. 

No limits. But the fact of the matter is that what drives Russian 

foreign policy back then and even now is the determination of the 

Russian elite to rule Russia in traditional autocratic authoritarian 

way and that Russia must be a great power, i.e., an imperial or at 

least neo-imperial presence and they can only get that by being 

friends with China. 

To the extent that the United States is Russia’s partner, the Russians would feel their regime under pressure because we represent 

the greatest threat to the security of the Russian federation, namely democracy, not military power, but democratic governance and 

they have said so in many different ways over many times. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Interesting point. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Yes, I’m struck with this balancing again, from 

the point of view of the Central Asian republics. One, how it is 

really to their advantage that the United States be part of this balancing act. I hear you saying in terms of their survival, you know, 

yet there’s a lack of U.S. policy toward Central Asia in general. We 

spent a lot of time talking about Russia and China and I understand that, but I don’t hear a lot how we can support or can we 

both the understanding of Central Asia, how we promote investment in Central Asia, in terms of the new Central Asia republics. 

Is that possible? Should we be doing that? Should that be part of 

a strategy? Should our strategy be less concern about where Russia 

or China is at this moment, but what role we can play in Central 

Asia? And how Americans do not even understand where Central 

Asia is or know anything about Central Asia and what can we do 

about that? 

Mr. BLANK. As I said earlier, there needs to be a determination 

by the government in power at any given time in the United 

States, whether it’s a Democratic or a Republican administration, 

whether or not we consider Central Asia to be strategically important. We are there essentially because we were attacked, but economic interests was actually growing before 2001. 

There is talk of a Silk Road, but there’s no follow through. To 

give you an example, in 2011–12, the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee published a major study calling for the building of the 

Silk Road and for the investment. This was done under then Senator Kerry’s leadership. The State Department has done nothing 

with it. There is no real funding for it. They simply cobbled together existing programs. We know that bureaucratic game. There 

54

is no vision or strategy as to what we want to see in Central Asia 

after we leave Afghanistan and what instruments we have for influencing it and whether or not we even think it’s important. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Right. 

Mr. BLANK. Now if you can’t answer those questions, all the 

questions you’ve posed become unanswerable because you’re completely adrift. You don’t have a lever in which to move the situation. If you feel Central Asia is important and you educate the public to understand why we think it’s important and you develop the 

instruments of policy primarily economic ones to advance that interest, then you can actually get a hearing for what the United 

States wants to do. But without that essentially our Central Asia 

policy is—well, now it’s essentially arranging for the departure of 

our troops from Afghanistan and what happens afterwards nobody 

knows. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I’d like to thank the witnesses and did you 

have another follow up? I just have one closing statement which is 

my prerogative, thank you. We don’t live in a world that really 

looks anywhere like the world when I was a kid. And my dad was 

a Marine and he flew spy missions on the China coast. We lived 

in Japan. And anyway, of course, it was Russia and the Soviet 

Union and China then and then, of course, later that whole relationship with China supposedly changed. Whatever the reality is 

today we know that we can—it is not out of our control. One thing, 

one point that’s been made over and again in this hearing is that 

we’re not paying attention to this and we are not trying to control 

the events and not trying to have the influence that the United 

States should have in this part of the world and if we don’t, things 

are going to turn out differently than might turn out in a way that 

we don’t like. And so it is essential that we become players in that 

part of the world. And from the various elements that have also 

been talked about today, we’ve heard that America’s involvement 

with Russia on its Pacific side is vitally important to how things 

will shape up in the world. 

I would suggest then that perhaps one country that we haven’t 

talked about much in this hearing can play and should play a 

major role because it is already a partner with the United States. 

I’m talking about Japan. If the influence that we have heard outlined today by China and how they are exercising their expansion 

of influence, what other country can really have a balance to that? 

And I think it’s the Japanese. And the Japanese working with the 

United States can balance off exactly the threat that you have been 

talking about today which is expansion of Chinese influence based 

on their economic invasion rather than an invasion of troops or an 

invasion of migrants. 

The Japanese are very capable of this and we should be working 

with them on it. I see a world in which Russia, the United States, 

Japan and India will play a major role in shaping the world and 

the reason I’m not including China is that China is ruled by tyrants who are the world’s worst human rights abuser. But perhaps 

the coalition that I just mentioned, if we could establish that and 

not drive Putin away by trying to suggest or hold him to some sort 

of standard, by the way, you mentioned Dr. Blank early on that 

China is much more authoritarian and totalitarian now than the 

55

Soviet Union was when it was the Soviet Union. Did you not say 

that? 

Mr. TKACIK. No, I said that. 

Mr. SHLAPENTOKH. Much brutish. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It was Tkacik who said that and I happen to 

agree with that point. 

Mr. SHLAPENTOKH. Much brutish. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And today we have China that there is no opposition party in China. There is an opposition party in Russia. 

There are several opposition parties in Russia. You go to Russia, 

there are things that you can buy on the streets that are printed 

in Russia that oppose the Putin regime. You don’t see this anywhere in China. And you don’t see—and in Russia, there are talk 

radio show hosts that actually criticize their government. You certainly don’t see that in China. And China is a country and the expansion of the influence of that dictatorship, that clique that runs 

China I suggest is a threat to the well-being of certainly Central 

Asia and Russia, but also to the rest of us in the world who again, 

going back to the purpose of the hearing hold that the dominance 

of Central Asia will have an impact on the equilibrium of freedom 

and liberty and security and stability throughout the rest of the 

planet. And if you have a small clique in China who feel that they 

have a cartel by the bribes that they’ve offered throughout the 

world, that is just as great a threat as if they controlled these countries via an occupation army. So we must be vigilant and committed to building, to creating a future and I would suggest focusing and what I’ve got out of this hearing today is let’s try to focus 

with Russia on their Pacific role and see where that leads us and 

see where that leads Japan and the United States and I think that 

would be a very positive thing. 

Now with that said, I thank our witnesses. Thank you for the 

discussion. 

Mr. Lowenthal, thank you very much. You’re adding a lot to the 

depth of this hearing. Let me note that Congressman Lowenthal 

represents the ports in the United States in which perhaps a majority of all the trade from that part of the world coming into the 

United States comes right through his district. I know, it used to 

be my district. And he’s doing a great job in joining us today and 

thank all of you for your testimony. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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