Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction

380 

SIGAR Audit 13-13

Afghan Special Mission Wing: DOD Moving Forward 

with $771.8 Million Purchase of Aircraft that the 

Afghans Cannot Operate and Maintain

SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing

SIGAR

JUNE

2013
For more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil

WHAT SIGAR REVIEWED

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 

developed a “concept of operations” to 

address a need for air support for 

Afghan Special Forces that execute 

counternarcotics and counterterrorism 

missions in Afghanistan. In July 2012, 

the Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW) 

was established to meet that need. The 

SMW has an existing fleet of 30 aging 

aircraft, 10 of which are on loan from 

the Afghan Air Force; DOD’s concept 

calls for 48 new aircraft costing a total 

of $771.8 million.

This report identifies (1) the extent to 

which the SMW has the capacity to 

operate and maintain its current and 

planned fleet; and (2) the effectiveness 

of U.S. government oversight of two 

task orders valued at $772 million to 

provide ongoing maintenance, logistics, 

and supply support to the SMW. 

To accomplish these objectives, we 

obtained data and met with officials 

from DOD, the Department of State, 

Drug Enforcement Administration, the 

SMW, U.S. contractors, and the 

Counter-Narcotics Police of 

Afghanistan. We also reviewed the 

status of the SMW’s current aircraft, as 

well as contracts to purchase new 

aircraft. Furthermore, we reviewed two 

major U.S. task orders that provide 

maintenance and repair services to the 

SMW, with a total obligation of 

approximately $772 million. 

We conducted this work in Washington, 

D.C., Huntsville, Alabama, and other 

U.S. sites; and in Kabul and Kandahar, 

Afghanistan, from July 2012 to March 

2013. 

WHAT SIGAR FOUND

The Afghans lack the capacity—in both personnel 

numbers and expertise—to operate and maintain the 

existing and planned SMW fleets. For example, as of 

January 23, 2013, the SMW had just 180 personnel—

less than one-quarter of the personnel needed to reach 

full strength. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and 

DOD do not have a plan that identifies milestones and 

final dates for achieving full SMW personnel force 

strength to justify the approved fleet. Ongoing recruiting 

and training challenges have slowed SMW growth. These 

challenges include finding Afghan recruits who are 

literate and can pass the strict, 18- to 20-month U.S. 

vetting process, a process that attempts to eliminate 

candidates that have associations with criminal or 

insurgent activity. Further, the Afghan Ministry of 

Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) have not 

come to agreement on the command and control 

structure of the SMW, which also adversely impacts 

SMW growth and capacity. In addition, DOD has not 

developed a plan for transferring maintenance and 

logistics management functions to the Afghans. 

Currently, DOD contractors perform 50 percent of the 

maintenance and repairs to the SMW’s current fleet of 

30 Mi-17s and 70 percent of critical maintenance and 

logistics management, as well as procurement of spare 

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction

SMW flight crews prepare for a training mission in Kabul on October 

30, 2012.

June 2013

Afghan Special Mission Wing: DOD Moving Forward with $771.8 

Million Purchase of Aircraft that the Afghans Cannot Operate and 

Maintain

SIGAR AUDIT 13-13
For more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil

WHAT SIGAR RECOMMENDS 

SIGAR recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics suspend all activity under the 

contracts awarded for the 48 new aircraft for the SMW until the 

memorandum of understanding between MOI and MOD is 

completed and signed. Provided the memorandum of 

understanding between the MOI and MOD is completed and signed, 

we recommend setting clear personnel and maintenance and 

logistics support milestones for the SMW and tie the acquisition 

and delivery of the new aircraft to successful completion of these 

milestones. SIGAR also recommends that NSRWA and the 

Commander of Deputy Commander Special Operations Force jointly 

develop a plan for transferring maintenance and logistics 

management to the Afghans and incorporate the performance 

metrics and milestones into a proposed statement of work for the 

new maintenance and logistics contracting action. Finally SIGAR 

recommends that the Commander of Army Contracting Command 

direct NSRWA Contracting Division to modify task orders 20 and 32 

to incorporate performance metrics and appropriate quality 

assurance surveillance plans; ensure that the new contract/task 

order contains these metrics and plans; and deploy contracting 

officer representatives to Afghanistan with the appropriate level of 

authority and the requisite experience to effectively oversee 

contractor support for the SMW. 

SIGAR received formal comments on a draft of this report from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A), U.S. Army 

Material Command, and NSWRA. OSD and NTM-A/CSTC-A did not 

concur with SIGAR’s recommendation to suspend plans to acquire 

new aircraft for the SMW. Both stated that contracting actions have 

already been awarded and that the International Security 

Assistance Force is engaging the Afghan government to formulate a 

charter that would accomplish the same purpose as the planned 

memorandum of understanding between the MOI and MOD. 

However, SIGAR maintains that moving forward with the acquisition 

of these aircraft is highly imprudent until an agreement between 

the ministries is reached. SIGAR also notes that, prior to awarding 

the contract for the 30 Mi-17s on June 16, 2013, DOD received a 

draft of this report containing a recommendation to suspend plans 

to purchase new aircraft for the SMW. OSD and NTM-A/CSTC-A 

concurred with the other six recommendations in the report. The 

U.S. Army Materiel Command responded to the three 

recommendations addressed to it and concurred with each. 

NSRWA, similarly, concurred with the two recommendations 

addressed to it.

parts and material. Finally, we found 

that the SMW relies heavily on DOD 

to fulfill its counterterrorism 

responsibilities, a key part of its role. 

As of January 16, 2013, only 7 of the 

47 pilots assigned to the SMW were 

fully mission qualified to fly with night 

vision goggles, a necessary skill for 

executing most counterterrorism 

missions. 

Despite these problems, DOD has 

moved forward to purchase 48 new 

aircraft for the SMW. Specifically, in 

October 2012, DOD awarded a $218 

million contract to Sierra Nevada 

Corporation for 18 PC-12 fixed-wing 

aircraft, and on June 16, 2013, DOD 

awarded a $553.8 million contract 

modification to Rosoboronexport for 

30 Mi-17 helicopters. 

In addition to the challenges related 

to SMW capacity to operate and

maintain its current or planned fleet, 

we found that two key DOD task 

orders—task orders 20 and 32, which 

provide ongoing maintenance, 

logistics, and supply services to 

support the SMW—lack performance 

metrics, and DOD oversight has been 

inadequate. Only one measureable 

outcome was identified in one of the 

two task orders—a requirement that 

the contractor maintain the fleet at a 

mission-capable rate of at least 70 

percent. SIGAR’s review indicates 

that poor oversight by DOD’s NonStandard Rotary Wing Aircraft 

(NSRWA) Contracting Division 

resulted in the contractor failing to 

properly account for certain aircraft 

hours in depot maintenance and a 

misrepresentation of readiness. 

Further, task orders 20 and 32 do 

not have quality assurance 

surveillance plans, and DOD did not 

have necessary personnel in Kabul 

with the right authority and requisite 

experience to effectively oversee U.S. 

contractor performance.
June 28, 2013

The Honorable Charles T. Hagel 

Secretary of Defense

This report discusses the results of SIGAR’s audit of U.S. Support for the Afghan Special 

Mission Wing (SMW), an air wing supporting counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions in 

Afghanistan. On June 3, 2013, we provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense 

(DOD). The draft report included seven recommendations to various DOD entities that would 

help protect planned DOD investments in the SMW by (1) suspending major aircraft 

acquisitions until the Afghan government takes necessary steps to build SMW capacity, (2) 

linking acquisition and delivery of aircraft to key development milestones, and (3) enhancing 

DOD oversight of critical functions. Despite our recommendations, the Department awarded a 

$553,759,240 contract modification to Rosoboronexport, a Russian government agency, on

June 16, 2013, for 30 Mi-17 helicopters, spare parts, test equipment, and engineering support 

services. We maintain that moving forward with the acquisition of these aircraft is imprudent. 

This final report includes seven recommendations to improve Afghan commitment and 

sustainability of the SMW and effective DOD contractor performance. 

When preparing the final report, we considered comments on a draft of this report from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training 

Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A), 

U.S. Army Material Command, and the Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft Project Office 

(NSRWA). In commenting on a draft of this report, OSD and NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with six 

recommendations; the U.S. Army Materiel Command concurred with the three 

recommendations directed to it; and NSRWA concurred with the two recommendations 

directed to it. Comments from OSD, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and NSRWA are reproduced in appendices 

V and VI. We did not reproduce comments from the U.S. Army Materiel Command because the 

command labeled its comments as “For Official Use Only.”

SIGAR conducted this audit under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and

the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

John F. Sopko

Special Inspector General

for Afghanistan Reconstruction

CC: The Honorable John Kerry, Secretary of State; The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney 

General
TABLE OF CONTENTS

SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page i 

Background.................................................................................................................................................................. 2

Lack of Personnel and Technical Capacity Put $771.8 Million DOD Investment in SMW At Risk.......................... 5

DOD’s Execution of Task Orders for Ongoing Maintenance and Logistics Support Failed to Hold Contractor 

Accountable for Its Performance ..............................................................................................................................11

Conclusion..................................................................................................................................................................15

Recommendations ....................................................................................................................................................16

Agency Comments .....................................................................................................................................................16

Appendix I - Scope and Methodology .......................................................................................................................18

Appendix II - Status of Current Mi-17 Fleet ..............................................................................................................20

Appendix III - Organizations Supporting The Special Mission Wing ........................................................................22

Appendix IV - Special Mission Wing Structure and Command and Control............................................................24

Appendix V - Comments from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and SIGAR’s Response...25

Appendix VI - Comments from the Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft Project Office...........................................31

Appendix VIII - Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................................32

TABLES

Table 1 - Current and Planned Breakdown of SMW Afghan Manning by Job Type.................................................. 6

Table 2 - SMW Operations Completed from May 1, 2012 through October 14, 2012 .........................................10

Table I - Status of Special Mission Wing Mi-17 Aircraft, as of February 12, 2013................................................20

Table II - Organizations Currently Supporting the SMW...........................................................................................22

FIGURES

Figure 1 - Planned Aircraft Locations and Breakdown for SMW............................................................................... 3

Figure 2 - Contractor Air Interdiction Unit (AIU)/Special Mission Wing (SMW) Fleet Data Versus Army Regulation 

(AR) 700-138 (in percent).........................................................................................................................................12

Figure I - Special Mission Wing Organization and Command Structure ................................................................. 24

PHOTOS

Photo 1 - Mi-17s at Kabul International Airport......................................................................................................... 2

Photo 2 - SMW Warehouse in Kabul .......................................................................................................................... 5

Photo 3 - English Language Training .......................................................................................................................... 7

Photo 4 - Mi-17 Undergoing Maintenance ................................................................................................................. 8
TABLE OF CONTENTS

SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page ii

ABBREVIATIONS

ANA Afghan National Army

COR Contracting Officer Representative

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan

DCOM-SOF Office of the Deputy Commanding General, Special Operations Forces

ETT Embedded Training Team

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

MOD Ministry of Defense

MOI Ministry of Interior

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSRWA Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft

NTM-A NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan

SMW Special Mission Wing
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 1 

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, about 90 percent of the world’s opium comes from

Afghan fields, and Afghanistan is a major producer of hashish, a drug produced from cannabis. Intelligence 

indicates that profits from the Afghan drug trade are being used to finance the Taliban and other insurgent 

groups operating in the region. In 2009, Afghan drug traffickers earned around $2.2 billion, Afghan farmers 

earned about $440 million, and Afghan Taliban earned around $155 million from Afghanistan’s narcotics 

trade.1 

The Afghan National Army (ANA) Special Operations Forces’ mission is to combat the narcotics trade and 

terrorism in Afghanistan. In December 2011, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–

Afghanistan (NTM-A), under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), identified a need to provide air 

support to these Special Operations Forces. NTM-A developed a concept of operations for an Afghan air wing 

dedicated to special operations. Subsequently, the Afghan government commissioned its Special Mission Wing

(SMW) in July 2012. Since then, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has provided nearly $122 million to 

support and mentor the SMW so that it becomes an independent and self-sustaining aviation unit capable of 

conducting professional counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions.2 Additionally, to provide an enduring 

air capability to support these missions, DOD has awarded two contracts totaling approximately $771.8 million

to purchase new aircraft─18 fixed-wing aircraft and 30 rotary-winged aircraft─for the SMW. In addition to this

$772 million investment, there will be $109 million per year required for oversight, maintenance, training, and 

logistics support that DOD intends to provide the SMW over the next several years.3 

This audit assesses (1) the extent to which the SMW has the capacity to operate and maintain its current and

planned fleet; and (2) the effectiveness of U.S. government oversight of two task orders valued at $772 million 

to provide ongoing maintenance, logistics, and supply support to the SMW. 

To accomplish these objectives, we obtained data and met with officials from DOD, the U.S. Department of 

State, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. contractors, the Afghan SMW, and the Afghan CounterNarcotics Police. SIGAR also reviewed the history and status of all aircraft currently committed to the SMW, as 

well as a contract to purchase new fixed-wing aircraft and plans to purchase new rotary-winged aircraft. 

Further, SIGAR analyzed two major U.S. task orders that provide ongoing maintenance and supply services to 

the SMW, with a total obligation of approximately $121.9 million since the SMW’s commissioning in July 

2012.4 SIGAR conducted work from July 2012 to March 2013 in Washington, D.C., Huntsville, Alabama, and 

other U.S. sites, and at sites in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan, in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. A discussion of the scope and methodology is in appendix I.

 

1United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Global Afghan Opium Trade – A Threat Assessment, July 2011. Afghan 

drug trade figures after 2009 are not yet available.

2Funding to support the SMW comprises DOD counternarcotics funds and Afghanistan Security Forces Funds.

3U.S. program managers for the SMW estimate sustainment costs (including maintenance, mentoring, training, and parts) 

for the existing fleet of rotary-wing aircraft at $109 million per year; however, costs to maintain a new fleet of rotary-wing 

aircraft (as planned) might be less since new aircraft would cost less to maintain than the current aging fleet. There would 

also be an additional unknown cost to maintain the new fixed-wing aircraft.

4These amounts may not include all obligations to support the SMW under these task orders because some of the funds 

obligated prior to July 2012 – when the contractor supported the Afghan Air Interdiction Unit – may have been spent to 

support the SMW’s initial mobilization costs. Obligations during the full performance period of the task orders (as of April 1, 

2013, and including the Ministry of Defense support) totaled approximately $772 million. 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 2 

BACKGROUND

At a December 2011 Special Operations Summit, ISAF senior leadership identified the development of air 

support capacity as a priority for improving Afghan military capabilities for counterterrorism and other special 

operations missions. To respond to this need, NTM-A sponsored a RAND study to assess requirements and 

provide recommendations.5 The study’s recommendations discussed different scenarios for the planned size—

in terms of both personnel and aircraft—of air support, the command structure, and scope of operations. 

NTM-A determined that the Afghan Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) existing Air Interdiction Unit,6 a counternarcoticsfocused unit, would provide the best foundation to develop an Afghan counterterrorism and special operations 

aviation capability, while maintaining critical counternarcotics efforts. On May 12, 2012, NTM-A issued a 

military order identifying its concept for the establishment of the SMW.7 On July 18, 2012, the ANA

commissioned the SMW, which replaced the Air Interdiction Unit.

NTM-A’s Concept for the SMW Calls for 48 New Aircraft and 806 Personnel

Based on RAND’s study, NTM-A developed 

a “concept of operations” that defined the 

SMW mission and organizational structure

and established aircraft and personnel 

requirements. NTM-A intended the SMW 

to conduct aviation operations in direct 

support of the MOI and Ministry of 

Defense (MOD) counternarcotics, 

counterterrorism, and special operations 

forces across Afghanistan. NTM-A 

recommended that the ANA Special 

Operations Command have operational 

control over the SMW, but the MOI and 

MOD would initially share administrative 

control, including management of 

personnel and mission development (see appendix III for SMW structure and command and control). NTM-A 

favored a full transition of the SMW to MOD administrative control, pending the approval of each ministry.

To reach full operational capacity, the NTM-A concept calls for 806 Afghan personnel, including pilots, flight 

engineers, mechanics, and security staff to support the SMW. The concept also calls for the SMW to have 30 

rotary-wing and 18 fixed-wing aircraft organized into four squadrons: two based in Kabul, one in Kandahar, and 

one in Balkh province. Each squadron is designed to include seven Mi-17s (the selected rotary-wing aircraft)8

 

5RAND Corporation, Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces: An Assessment of Aviation Requirements, December 

2011. RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and 

analysis. Its research is commissioned by global clientele including government agencies, foundations, and private-sector 

firms. 

6In mid-2006 the U.S. government funded the establishment of the Afghan Air Interdiction Unit to support counternarcotics 

law enforcement operations in Afghanistan. The unit provided general helicopter support to the police. Mentored by the 

U.S. Army and United Kingdom Royal Air Force, the unit also executed counternarcotics operations with partnered special 

operations forces. 

7Established under fragmentary order 12-391. 

8In 2005, the U.S. Central Command determined that the Russian-built Mi-17 was the best available platform to rebuild 

Afghan rotary-wing capabilities. The Afghans had 30 years of experience with Mi-17s, and the U.S. had 6 Mi-17s in its 

Photo 1 - Mi-17s at Kabul International Airport

Source: SIGAR site visit, October 23, 2012 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 3 

and four PC-12s (the selected fixed-wing aircraft).9 (See photo 1 of Mi-17s at Kabul International Airport.) In 

addition, the MOI would have a detachment of two Mi-17s and two PC-12s for missions that support the rest of 

the MOI, including casualty evacuation support. (See figure 1 for planned location and breakdown of aircraft.)

The original NTM-A concept called for the two Kabul-based squadrons to be in place by the end of 2012, the 

Kandahar squadron by the end of 2013, and the Balkh squadron by the end of 2014. 

Figure 1 - Planned Aircraft Locations and Breakdown for SMW

Source: SIGAR graphic of NTM-A concept of operations

Once delivered, the new Mi-17s will replace the SMW’s existing fleet of 30 aging aircraft. The SMW currently 

has 30 Mi-17s at its disposal, with 20 older aircraft obtained from: the United States (13), United Kingdom (5), 

and Germany (2). It also has 10 aircraft on loan from the Afghan Air Force. However, because of the 

maintenance needs of the aging aircraft, only about half of the fleet is mission ready at any given time, most of 

which are the aircraft from the Afghan Air Force.10 (For a complete description of the status of the Mi-17 fleet, 

including origin and age, see appendix II.) 

 

inventory. In addition, 19 more Mi-17s had been donated to the Afghan government from other sources. The Mi-17s were 

considered inexpensive, easy to fly and maintain, and available for purchase. 

9A former Assistant Commanding General Special Operations Forces Mobility Commander who was involved in early SMW 

planning recommended the PC-12 to be the SMW’s fixed-wing asset because it has more horsepower and is roomier than 

the alternatives. Further, the PC-12 has a pressurized cabin, which allows it to fly at a higher altitude and is quieter, which 

facilitates training. 

10Analysis of the older aircraft shows 19 of the 20 are more than 18 years old, while 10 are at least 25 years old. The 

average mechanical Mi-17 lifespan is 35 years, with a service life extension performed after 25 years to add additional 

years (based on the condition of the airframe). As of October 15, 2012, 9 of the Mi-17s were in depot maintenance outside 

of Afghanistan. The remaining fleet is stationed at the Kabul International Airport. 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 4 

The SMW’s current fleet does not have any fixed-wing aircraft. However, on October 13, 2012, the U.S. Air 

Force Life Cycle Management Center awarded a $218 million contract11 to Sierra Nevada Corporation to 

purchase 18 new PC-12s.

On June 16, 2013, DOD awarded a $553.8 million contract modification to Rosoboronexport—the sole Russian 

government agency selling Russian-made defense items and military hardware—for 30 Mi-17 rotary-wing 

aircraft. DOD had delayed this contract action because of political considerations associated with U.S. 

transactions with this vendor. Specifically, under the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, 

Congress prohibited contracting with Rosoboronexport. However, by using fiscal year 2012 funds for the 

award, DOD concluded that it was legally able to proceed with this purchase. 

Multiple organizations support the development of the SMW. For example, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats in Washington, D.C., provides U.S. counternarcotics funding 

for the SMW. The Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft (NSRWA) Program Management Office in Huntsville, 

Alabama, provides program management and contract management services for DOD’s support of the SMW. In 

Afghanistan, the Office of the Deputy Commanding General, Special Operations Forces’ (DCOM-SOF) 

Embedded Training Team (ETT) supervises training of SMW Afghan pilots, flight engineers, and mechanics. (For 

a complete list of organizations supporting the SMW and their roles, see appendix III.) 

DOD Obligated Nearly $122 Million on Two Key Task Orders to Provide Ongoing 

Maintenance and Logistics Support to the SMW 

DOD has awarded multiple contracts and task orders to support and develop the SMW. The Federal Acquisition 

Regulation states that performance-based acquisition is the preferred method for acquiring services. Agency 

officials are responsible for accurately describing the need to be filled, or problem to be resolved, through 

contracting to ensure full understanding and responsive performance by contractors. For service contracts, 

program officials should describe the need to be filled using performance-based acquisition methods.12 U.S. 

Army Space & Missile Defense Command wrote task orders 20 and 32, currently valued at nearly $772 million, 

as level-of-effort type task orders, providing extensive listings of contractor duties.13 

Our audit focuses on these two large task orders that provide ongoing aircraft maintenance and logistical 

support services.14 Specifically, the U.S. Army Space & Missile Defense Command awarded: 

• Task order 2015 on September 26, 2008, to Northrop Grumman to provide maintenance and logistics 

support services for Afghan MOI and MOD air assets, as well as training for Afghan pilots, flight 

engineers, and mechanics.16 As of April 4, 2013, the amount obligated was approximately $364.6 

million, with approximately $50.7 million supporting the SMW since its inception in July 2012. 

 

11 Contract FA8620-13-C-4007. 

12Federal Acquisition Regulation section 37.102 (a) and (e).

13DOD obligated $365 million on task order 20 and $407 million on task order 32. These amounts reflect obligations to 

provide services for the Afghan MOD as well as the SMW, as of May 6, 2013. 

14U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command awarded the task orders. To achieve demonstrable “synergies, 

efficiencies, and benefits”, the task orders were realigned under Army Contracting Command – Redstone in October 2011. 

Currently, NSRWA Contracting Division under Army Contracting Command – Redstone manages the task orders. 

15Contract W9113M-07-D-0007, task order 20, is a firm fixed-price level of effort task order with cost-plus-fixed-fee 

contracting line items for cost reimbursable travel, Defense Base Act insurance, materiel, and other direct costs.

16Part of the task order covers the SMW and part covers other MOD assets including the Afghan Air Force.
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 5 

• Task order 3217 on September 30, 2009, to Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems, Inc. for 

procurement of materiel and spare parts in support of MOI and MOD air maintenance and repair 

options. As of February 21, 2013, the total obligated amount on task order 32 was approximately 

$407.1 million, with approximately $71.2 million supporting the SMW since its inception. 

Coordination between the two contractors is necessary to maintain efficiency since one contractor maintains 

the aircraft and identifies parts requirements, and the other contractor actually orders the parts. Contractors 

perform their maintenance and logistics functions at the Kabul International Airport and store spare parts and 

supplies at a warehouse there (see photo 2). Task orders 20 and 32 each provide services for both the MOI 

and the MOD; however, each task order lists the services for each ministry separately and the contractors have 

separate teams supporting each ministry. Services to support the SMW fall under the MOI task order line 

items. 

LACK OF PERSONNEL AND TECHNICAL CAPACITY PUT $771.8 MILLION DOD 

INVESTMENT IN SMW AT RISK

The SMW lacks the capacity—both in 

personnel numbers and expertise—to operate 

and maintain its current and planned fleets, 

and NTM-A and DOD do not have personnel 

or performance milestones requiring the 

SMW to develop the necessary capacity 

before DOD acquires and delivers the full 

complement of aircraft for the SMW at a cost 

of $771.8 million for 30 new Mi-17s and 18 

PC-12s.18 The NTM-A concept of operations 

calls for an SMW comprising 806 personnel 

at full strength, and DOD officials call for the

SMW to have full operational capability by 

July 2015. However, as of January 23, 2013, 

the ETT Commander confirmed that the SMW 

had just 180 personnel—less than onequarter of the personnel necessary to meet 

full operational capacity. Moreover, although 

the original NTM-A concept called for the two 

Kabul-based squadrons to be in place by the 

end of 2012, NTM-A later shifted the date 

calling for the two squadrons to be in place 

by mid-2013. However, neither squadron had 

been fully established as of May 15, 2013. 

Because of the shortages in personnel and 

capacity, U.S. military personnel and DOD contractors currently join Afghans when the ETT assembles flight 

crews for SMW operational missions. 

 

17Contract W9113M-07-D-0006, task order 32, is a firm fixed-price level-of-effort task order with cost-plus-fixed-fee line 

items for travel (no fee), DBA insurance (no fee), labor, materiel, and other direct costs.

18The SMW intends to return the 10 younger Mi-17s to the Afghan Air Force if the U.S. procures new Mi-17s. In addition, if 

the procurement is completed, the U.S. has no plans to continue the overhaul of the other 20 aging Mi-17s. 

Photo 2 - SMW Warehouse in Kabul

Source: SIGAR site visit. SMW warehouse in Kabul, on October 23, 

2012 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 6 

The NTM-A concept and documentation of the DOD purchase approval do not identify timelines, milestones, or 

position staffing levels that the SMW should meet to achieve the full staffing levels required to operate and 

maintain the new aircraft.19 However, the ETT Commander stated that the staffing level of job types for the 

planned force of 806 would likely parallel the staffing level for the current force, i.e. the same ratios as the 

current force. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the SMW force at its current size and its planned size, based on 

the ratios of the existing force. 

Table 1 - Current and Planned Breakdown of SMW Afghan Manning by Job Type

Job Type Current Number of 

Staffing Positionsa 

Planned Full Force (Date 

Undetermined)

Pilot 42 188 

Crew Chief/Flight Engineer 32 143 

Mechanic 86 385 

Security 20 90 

Total 180 806 

Source: SIGAR analysis of NTM-A and ETT data and interviews. 

aPositions current as of January 23, 2013.

Despite the SMW’s ongoing personnel shortages and lack of capacity, and despite no clear DOD plan to 

transfer critical functions to the SMW, DOD plans to proceed with the $771.8 million purchase of 30 Mi17s 

and 18 PC-12s under its contracts with Rosoboronexport and Sierra Nevada Corporation, respectively. While 

the aircraft requirements identified by NTM-A are clear, making such a sizeable purchase without clearly linking 

delivery to SMW development could result in wasted funds, more aircraft than the SMW can operate or 

maintain, and a requirement for DOD to support the wing—at a cost of more than $100 million per year—for 

years to come.20 

The SMW Faces Significant Recruiting and Training Challenges

SMW recruiting and training efforts are ongoing to address these shortfalls in SMW personnel, but there are 

significant recruiting and training challenges. According to DOD and Drug Enforcement Administration officials, 

these challenges include finding Afghan recruits who are literate and can pass the strict, 18 to 20-month U.S. 

vetting process—a process that attempts to eliminate candidates that have associations with criminal or 

insurgent activity. The ETT Commander explained that the Afghans identify recruits, the ETT executes its vetting 

process, and the Afghan SMW Commander makes the final decision about which recruits to approve. 

According to SMW leadership, the unit prefers recruits who are at least literate in their own language (recruits 

must also be trained in English—photo 3 shows SMW mechanics attending an English training). However, 

based on this stipulation, even the initial recruiting pool is limited because the Afghan populace is largely 

 

19A former DCOM SOF official who played a major role in developing the concept of operations stated NTM-A’s concept was 

to pursue the aircraft first and then recruit and train the personnel necessary for operation.

20The $100 million cost for operations and maintenance refers just to expenses associated with the full complement of 30 

Mi-17s and does not include costs for operating and maintaining the PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft that will also support the 

SMW. 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 7 

illiterate with only 26 percent of the adult population having basic literacy.21 U.S. officials also stated that many 

potential recruits are disqualified from service due to prior or ongoing relationships with criminal elements.

Additionally, according to training officials, the 

flow of Afghan trainees from initial rotary-wing 

training at Ft. Rucker, Alabama, to the Mi-17-

specific training in the Czech Republic has been 

slow and uneven, ranging from a low of two up to 

eight trainees at a time.22 The Mi-17 Product 

Director at NSRWA stated that the transition of 

Afghan pilots and flight engineers from the Fort 

Rucker training to Mi-17 training in the Czech 

Republic has been slow due to the lack of a 

steady stream of DOD funding for training, failed 

background checks on the part of pilots and flight 

engineers, and the Czech government’s 

requirement that each Afghan class participant 

have an end-user certificate signed by Afghan 

ministers.23 

According to the SMW Deputy Commander, 

compensation, especially for mechanic trainees, 

is also a factor contributing to low levels of 

recruitment because Afghan personnel with a basic command of English are in high demand and can earn

higher pay elsewhere. The Deputy Commander further stated the compensation levels for all positions are not 

commensurate with the rare literacy and education skills that the SMW requires from recruits. The recruiting 

challenge is particularly acute for mechanics, who do not receive incentive bonuses that pilots and flight 

engineers receive for attending training.

Ongoing tensions between the MOI and MOD over administrative control of the SMW also impacts recruitment. 

The NTM-A concept calls for the transfer of SMW from joint MOI/MOD to strictly MOD command and control. 

The ETT Commander pushed the Afghan government to make the transition by January 2013—although it did 

not happen—because he believes the transition will allow the SMW to leverage the recruiting efforts and 

resources of the Afghan Air Force. The Afghan government has generated a draft memorandum of 

understanding between MOI and MOD to transfer the command authority of the SMW to the MOD. 24 The 

 

21United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007/8: A profile of Afghanistan. 

October 2009.

22Once pilots and flight engineers are vetted and achieve the required English competency, they enroll in Initial Entry Rotary 

Wing training at Fort Rucker, Alabama. This course involves primary aircraft training, followed by instrument training and 

basic war fighting skills. The entire course lasts about 22 weeks. After passing this initial training course, pilots must 

complete advanced Mi-17-specific training in the Czech Republic. Mi-17-specific training is expected to transfer to Fort 

Rucker, with training in the Czech Republic intended as a bridge until Fort Rucker is ready to take over that part of the 

training. 

23The Czech Republic requires an end-user certificate for all trainees to ensure the appropriate use of the knowledge, skills, 

and abilities transferred to the students as a result of the training. Typically, end-user certificates are used in international 

arms transfers to certify that the buyer is the final recipient of the materials and is not planning to transfer the materials to 

another party. 

24The ETT Commander stated this commitment to support MOI police missions is critical to gaining MOI endorsement of the 

plan. The draft memorandum describes SMW missions and states that under the agreement MOD would agree to apportion 

approximately one in every four missions to MOI element support based on intelligence and target development. MOD 

would further agree to support MOI requested missions with a minimum of four SMW Mi-17 helicopters and two PC-12s. 

Photo 3 - English Language Training

Source: SIGAR site visit. A U.S. contractor teaches English to 

Afghan mechanics in Kabul, October 23, 2012.
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 8 

memorandum states that, effective upon publication, the ministries agree the SMW will fall under the 

command authority of the MOD and be assigned to the ANA Special Operations Command.25 Nevertheless, the 

memorandum is still in draft form and remains unsigned by the ministries due largely to MOI resistance to 

surrendering authority over the SMW. 

Further, according to the ETT Commander, the MOD is unwilling to allow SMW recruitment from its ranks 

without assurances that the pilots, once trained, will remain under its control. The ETT Commander stated that 

he expects recruitment to improve when the two ministries agree on the planned memorandum of 

understanding that completes the SMW’s transition to the MOD.26 The ETT Commander also stated many new 

recruits will come from the Afghan Air Force and he stated 15 fixed-wing pilots will be absorbed by the SMW 

from the MOD when the memorandum of understanding is complete.

In addition to the recruitment challenges, in the task order 20 November and December 2012 monthly 

progress reports, the contractor reported the following issues were negatively impacting training:

• Maintenance challenges caused a 31 percent decrease in available Northrop Grumman training 

hours.

• Northrop Grumman lost training flights due to SMW crew members not showing up for scheduled 

training.

• The SMW’s flight simulator in Kabul has been inoperable since September 2012 due to lack of 

needed repairs and an expired warranty. 

The SMW Relies Heavily on DOD for 

Maintenance and Logistics Support

Compounding the challenges faced in recruiting and 

training personnel, the SMW may not be able to 

perform maintenance and logistics support function on 

its own without continued assistance from DOD. 

According to the responsible contractors, they perform 

50 percent of the maintenance and repairs to the 

SMW’s current fleet of Mi-17s, with SMW Afghan 

mechanics performing the rest under the contractor’s 

mentorship at a hangar at Kabul International Airport 

(see photo 4). The contractors also stated that they 

perform 70 percent of logistics and maintenance 

management,27 as well as procurement of spare parts 

and materiel (under task order 32).28 U.S. military, U.S. 

 

25The memorandum also discusses command authorities for mission prioritization, allocation of SMW resources, and 

conflict resolution, and identifies continued support that would be provided to the MOI. 

26The ETT referred to the memorandum of understanding as a “cipher.”

27Maintenance under task order 20 includes managing schedules for routine aircraft maintenance and maintaining aircraft 

air worthiness certificates by tracking and recording repairs and maintenance for each aircraft. Task order 20 also requires 

logistics support which comprises warehouse management and inventory control. Task order 20 requires the contractor to 

provide training to Afghan maintainers, but is not specific regarding training or assistance to Afghans in establishing a 

maintenance management system. 

28Task order 32 requires repair of repairable parts services and procurement services but does not contain provisions for 

training Afghans. There is no training requirement under task order 32. 

Photo 4 - Mi-17 Undergoing Maintenance

Source: SIGAR site visit to SMW hangar in Kabul on 

October 23, 2012
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 9 

Drug Enforcement Administration, and contractor personnel all acknowledge that this type of support is 

essential for the sustainment of the SMW beyond the U.S. military drawdown scheduled for 2014. However, 

the ETT Commander and U.S. government contractors acknowledge that the Afghan government will not be 

able to independently perform maintenance and logistics support functions for at least 10 years. 

While the NTM-A concept for the SMW discusses aircraft and staffing in general terms, it does not contain any 

discussion of logistics and maintenance support. Furthermore, DOD does not have a formal plan for 

transferring this critical support responsibility to Afghan control. Consequently, neither task order 20 nor task 

order 32 identifies how or when the contractor should begin transitioning management responsibilities to the 

SMW or specify associated training and performance measures. 

Senior Northrop Grumman officials in Afghanistan stated that the SMW does not provide enough Afghans with 

sufficient education to perform these logistic and maintenance support functions. As a result, they have 

elected to directly hire some local Afghans with stronger skills than the skills demonstrated by the Afghans 

provided by the SMW. Northrop Grumman is training these new hires on maintenance management, in hopes 

of building the early stages of an Afghan civilian service to support the Afghan military. The officials stated that 

training direct local hires is better than training the Afghans serving in the SMW because the direct hires are 

accountable to the contractor. Northrop Grumman is taking this approach on its own; the task order 20 

performance work statement has no such requirement. 

The SMW Is Largely Incapable of Fulfilling Its Counterterrorism Responsibilities

The SMW lacks the capacity to conduct counterterrorism missions—part of its stated role. Key stakeholders—

including U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration officials, who sometimes fly with the SMW—were pleased with 

the SMW’s responsiveness to counternarcotics mission requests and stated that the SMW successfully 

executes its traditional, counternarcotics mission, even at times independent of U.S. and allied forces. 

However, the SMW has conducted very few “pure” counterterrorism missions,29 in part because 

counterterrorism missions are primarily flown at night, requiring pilots certified to fly using night vision goggles. 

As of January 16, 2013, only 7 of the 47 pilots assigned to the SMW were fully mission qualified to fly with 

night vision goggles. From SMW conception in May 2012 to our in-theater field work in October 2012, the SMW 

conducted 25 operations, only one of which was a pure counterterrorism mission.30 (See table 2 for a category 

breakout of these missions.) 

 

29According to the ETT Commander, a “pure” counterterrorism mission is a counterterrorism mission that has no nexus to a 

counternarcotics mission. As Afghan pilots gain experience in night flying, the SMW expects to fly more counterterrorism 

missions.

30In January 2013, the ETT Commander stated that the current operations tempo is 80 percent counternarcotics missions 

and 20 percent counterterrorism missions.
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 10 

Table 2 - SMW Operations Completed from May 1, 2012, through October 14, 2012

Type of Mission Number of Missions

Counternarcotics Nexusa 14 

Counterterrorism 1 

MOI Supportb 10 

Total Operations 25

Day 22 

Night 3 

Source: SIGAR Analysis of Office of the Deputy Commanding General Special Operations Forces data, 

10/14/12 

Notes:

aAccording to the ETT Commander, missions can support both counternarcotics and counterterrorism 

at the same time. Counternarcotics Nexus indicates missions that have at least some connection to 

the counternarcotics mission, as opposed to a “pure” counterterrorism mission.

bMOI Support missions refer to missions in support of the rest of MOI that are of general support 

nature, including human remains transfer, casualty evacuation support, and missions the Minister 

directs for immediate launch.

According to the ETT Commander, until the MOI and MOD sign the memorandum of understanding, MOI 

personnel assigned to the SMW cannot conduct counterterrorism missions because their life insurance 

coverage, which was provided through the MOI, does not cover deaths resulting from these types of missions. 

The transition of command and control to the MOD would mean that the MOI personnel would become MOD 

personnel and covered by MOD life insurance when conducting counterterrorism missions. The ETT 

Commander also stated that 15 MOD fixed-wing pilots will be absorbed into the SMW after the memorandum

is complete. 

Another potential impediment to the SMW’s successful completion of its newly expanded counterterrorism 

mission is the size of the ETT. Because of restrictions on contractors as warfighters—codified in the Geneva 

Conventions—contractors are prohibited from participating in pure counterterrorism missions. As a result, the 

SMW largely relies on the ETT to support the counterterrorism missions that it cannot independently execute. 

However, as of May 2013, the ETT had filled only 10 of its 14 positions and was facing challenges increasing 

its size beyond the 14 authorized positions. In September 2012—to coincide with the SMW’s planned growth in 

end strength from 180 to 806—DCOM-SOF requested a total of 23 ETT positions. As a result of a shrinking 

international footprint throughout Afghanistan, however, NTM-A instructed DCOM-SOF to lower its request. 

Nevertheless, the DCOM-SOF Commanding Officer believes the additional trainers are required and told us that 

he would again request additional ETT personnel following the planned U.S. military reorganizations in 2013-

2014. 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 11 

DOD’S EXECUTION OF TASK ORDERS FOR ONGOING MAINTENANCE AND 

LOGISTICS SUPPORT FAILED TO HOLD CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS 

PERFORMANCE

In addition to our review of SMW capacity to operate and maintain its current and planned fleet, we reviewed 

DOD oversight of ongoing maintenance, logistics, and supply services under two major DOD task orders that 

support the SMW. In general, we found that an absence of measurable outcomes, as well as poor contract 

oversight and quality assurance practices, limited DOD’s ability to assess whether the contracts were achieving 

their intended purposes and presented opportunities for the contractor to underperform. We also found that 

these two task orders are set to expire soon and that NSRWA has not yet issued or taken meaningful action to 

issue a new contract. As a result, there is concern that ongoing operations and/or support may be interrupted. 

DOD Task Orders Lack Performance Metrics

We only identified one measureable outcome in one of the two task orders—a requirement under section 7.2.2 

of task order 20 for the contractor to maintain assigned aircraft in theater at a fully mission capable rate at or 

above 70 percent.31 However, the task order does not set any consequences for failing to meet that rate. 

Specifically, we found that Northrop Grumman failed to properly account for certain aircraft hours in depot 

maintenance, resulting in a misrepresentation of readiness. When calculating the total hours that aircraft are 

on hand for the reporting period, Northrop Grumman is required to include hours that aircraft are in depot 

maintenance, unless the aircraft has been transferred to another facility. Starting with the SMW’s inception in 

July 2012, Northrup Grumman failed to calculate the correct hours, resulting in over-reporting the fully mission 

capable rate for every monthly period.32 This miscalculation meant the contractor did not actually achieve the 

prescribed 70 percent fully mission capable rate for 3 of the 5 months for which reporting was available. (See 

figure 2 for details on the differences between the reported rates and the actual rates.) Further, task order 20 

requires the reporting format outlined in Army Regulation 700-138 calling for the “Commander,” or 

government representative, to review, sign, and submit the form reporting the readiness rates. However, the 

contractor—not the U.S. military commander or government representative—signed the forms it submitted to 

NSRWA. 

 

31Army Regulation 700-138 defines fully mission capable as “a status condition where fully operational equipment or 

systems are safe and correctly configured as designated by the U.S. Army. Equipment is fully mission capable when it can 

perform all of its combat missions without endangering the lives of crew or operators.”

32A “monthly period” runs from the 16th day of a month to the 15th day of the following month.
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 12 

Figure 2 - Contractor Air Interdiction Unit (AIU)/Special Mission Wing (SMW) Fleet Data Versus 

Army Regulation (AR) 700-138 (in percent)

Sources: SIGAR analysis of Northrop Grumman data and U.S. Army Regulation 700-138. 

The performance work statement for task order 20 also requires Northrop Grumman to provide aircraft 

maintenance, flight training, and operational support for SMW missions.33 The performance work statement 

describes the types of training required, but does not identify measureable outcomes to determine if the 

training achieves results. For example, section 3.4 of the task order states, “Contractor instructor pilots shall 

be responsible for leading, training and advising student pilots progressively to full mission qualification across 

all country unique terrain and weather conditions.” However, there are no measurements or timelines for 

these outcomes. Section 3.4 contains flight training requirements and states that Northrop Grumman’s 

instructor pilots “shall provide hands on training in the configuring of the aircraft for missions... [and]...visually 

and orally discuss/summarize tactics, techniques and procedures,” but does not identify metrics to assess

whether the training is achieving results. In October 2012, Northrop Grumman contractors stated night vision 

goggle training had only recently been added to task order 20, even though this type of training had been a 

program goal for some time and had not been executed. As discussed earlier in this report, delays in this type 

of training will impact the number and experience of SMW pilots available to fly these types of missions. 

Similarly, task order 32 performance work statement describes the contractor’s—Lockheed Martin’s—duties 

and identifies deliverables such as progress reports and a management plan, but it does not provide specific 

measures of the quality of services. 

 

33A performance work statement for performance-based acquisitions describes the required results in clear, specific, and 

objective terms with measurable outcomes.
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 13 

DOD Oversight of Contractor Performance under Task Orders Was Limited 

NSRWA Contracting Division is responsible for overseeing contractor work on the task orders, including fleet 

readiness reporting. With better oversight, an NSRWA contracting officer representative (COR) might have 

identified Northrop Grumman’s failure to calculate the correct fleet readiness, provided decision-makers with 

accurate data, and evaluated Northrop Grumman more effectively. The contracting officer responsible for 

these task orders is responsible for deciding the need for an individual(s) to serve as an authorized 

representative for purposes of monitoring the technical or administrative aspects of contractor performance 

during the life-cycle of a contract. Contracting officers must delegate specific authorities to a COR to perform 

the functions needed to ensure the contractor provides quality products and services, in accordance with their 

contracts. 

In March 2011, the contracting officer for task orders 20 and 32 appointed the current COR to monitor the 

contractors. According to the COR’s appointment letter, the COR must keep the Contracting Officer, “...fully 

informed of any technical or contractual difficulties encountered during performance,” and “assure the KO 

[contracting officer] that the contractor is performing the technical requirements of the contract/task order in 

accordance with contract terms, conditions, and specifications.” The appointment letter further states the COR 

should, “implement government contract quality assurance actions in accordance with the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation... and the task order quality assurance surveillance plan.” The letter notes that the COR must

“observe, monitor, and assess the contractor’s performance under the terms of the contract/task order,” and 

“perform routine inspections of the contractors’ work products and deliverables,” which requires the COR to 

have a regular presence at the place of performance. 

The principle COR34 for task orders 20 and 32 (also responsible for at least seven other task orders) works 

from Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama. The COR stated he relies on the contractor’s deliverables and 

teleconferences to oversee performance. Based upon the duties assigned in the COR’s appointment letter, the 

COR cannot properly execute the oversight responsibilities outlined in his appointment letter from Alabama. 

For example, the COR cannot observe contractor work or perform inspections. Northrop Grumman officials 

stated that an in-country COR would be useful for providing feedback to the contractors regarding their 

performance. The contractors also stated that NSRWA did not have awareness of security threats to the 

contractors, whose camp is located near the airport, and the effect security threats have on the contractor’s 

ability to perform. 

To demonstrate evaluation of contractor performance, NSRWA provided us with a document called 

“Contractor’s Quarterly Interim Progress Report,” dated November 22, 2011. However, this report only 

evaluates one quarter for one task order, and NSRWA has not completed any additional evaluations. The 

completed report evaluates Lockheed Martin’s performance on task order 32 for the period of August 2011 

through October 2011. The evaluator rated the contractor’s performance as satisfactory, or better, in all 

categories. However, the report does not include the name of the evaluator—so it is not clear that it was 

prepared by an authorized official—and the evaluation did not provide any quantitative measures and is not 

tied to a quality assurance surveillance plan.

To help ensure some Afghanistan-based oversight of these task orders, NSRWA deployed representatives in 

2012 to Afghanistan, but these representatives were not formally appointed with specific oversight 

responsibilities. For example, when we visited the SMW in October and November 2012, one NSRWA “liaison” 

was present, but the liaison did not have any formal oversight responsibilities for the task orders. When we met 

with NSRWA in January, a senior program management official stated that NSRWA was taking action to 

improve oversight. The NSWRA liaison in Kabul was appointed as a COR for task orders 20 and 32 in 

December 2012, and a second individual was appointed as a COR on task order 20 in the same month. 

 

34NSRWA Contracting Division appointed two additional CORs for task order 20 in Afghanistan in December 2012.
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 14 

Although NSRWA contracting presence in Afghanistan has recently increased, senior contractor officials and a 

senior official at DCOM-SOF expressed concerns that the real authority continues to reside in Huntsville.35 

Task Orders Lack Appropriate Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans 

The Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement require 

agencies to develop and manage a systematic, cost-effective quality assurance program to ensure that 

contract performance conforms to specified requirements.36 These regulations also require that the 

government conduct quality assurance “at such times (including any stage of manufacture or performance of 

services) and places (including subcontractors’ plants) as may be necessary to determine that the supplies or 

services conform to contract requirements.” Quality assurance surveillance plans should be prepared in

conjunction with the statement of work. The plans should specify (1) all work requiring surveillance and (2) the 

method of surveillance. 

Task orders 20 and 32 do not have quality assurance surveillance plans. Each task order has a performance 

requirements summary in the form of a matrix. However, these matrices, which are appended to the task 

orders, do not meet the federal requirements to develop a quality assurance surveillance plan. The matrices in 

the two task orders are identical, suggesting the contracting agency used a template rather than developing 

individual plans that are specific to each statement of work. These matrices identify four performance 

objectives, including quality of service, adherence to schedule, cost control, and small business participation; 

a government representative (an “evaluator”) is responsible for ensuring adherence to the performance 

requirements.

The Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office, which managed the contracts prior to their transfer to 

NSRWA, developed a draft of an overall quality assurance surveillance plan or master plan, which was to be 

used in the development of unique surveillance plans for task orders. The master plan provides direction on 

developing the elements of the task order’s unique plans. However, the master plan is a draft and was not 

officially approved as recommended by the DOD Office of Inspector General in 2009.37 In addition, a 

document titled “Task Order Surveillance Approach” for task order 20 provides some information, such as 

location of inspections; however, this document was never incorporated into the task order. Also, the 

performance requirements summaries do not conform to the U.S. Army Contracting Command’s elements of a 

good performance requirement summary, and the performance indicators are not sufficiently measureable as 

defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation 37.603 to identify the following: key performance indicators 

requiring surveillance, when the COR will inspect and how surveillance will be conducted, and the method used 

to assess whether performance objectives are being met. The COR for task orders 20 and 32 acknowledged 

that the task orders do not contain quality assurance surveillance plans, but the COR stated that he is 

preparing quality assurance surveillance plans. 

The objective of contract surveillance is to monitor contractor performance and ensure the services received 

are consistent with contract quality requirements and received in a timely manner. Without well-written plans, 

the contracting officer cannot effectively evaluate the contractor performance when deciding to execute the 

option years. In addition, the U.S. may not receive the best benefit of maintenance and logistics services 

 

35The U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command’s Aviation/Missile Resource Assessment and Analysis team completed an 

assessment of SMW contract oversight, as well as SMW operational issues. The assessment provided multiple 

recommendations, and senior officials stated they will travel to Kabul in March 2013 and be on the ground for 60 days in 

an effort to reshape the NSRWA support and oversight of the task orders. 

36Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, subpart 246.1 and Federal Acquisition Regulation, part 46.401 (a).

37Contracts Supporting the DOD Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office, Report D-2009-109, 9/25/2009, pgs. 

24-25. 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 15 

provided if the need for process improvements are not quickly identified. Substandard contractor performance 

may also adversely impact the SMW’s development and mission goals if pilots and mechanics do not receive 

effective training. 

Ongoing Maintenance and Logistics Support May Be Disrupted

The original period of performance for task order 20, including option years, was September 2008 through 

August 2012, and the original period of performance for task order 32 was September 2009 through August 

2012. However, through multiple task order modifications, DOD extended the period of performance for task 

order 20 through September 30, 2013, and the period of performance for task order 32 through August 23, 

2013.38 According to DCOM-SOF leadership, in November 2012, responsible U.S. military personnel in 

Afghanistan drafted and submitted to NSRWA a follow-on performance work statement for a new contract 

vehicle to provide similar support and replace the existing task orders. 

However, NSRWA has not issued a request for proposal to award a new contract or task order to replace the 

expiring task orders 20 and 32. A senior NSRWA program management official stated NSRWA plans to award a 

new contract in the summer of 2013. According to this official, the new contract may promote efficiency by 

combining task orders 20 and 32 into a single task order to promote transparency and streamline processes. 

The new contract is expected to cover both the PC-12s and Mi-17s. 

ETT and contractor personnel stated that a 90-day transition period between contractors is desirable to allow 

overlap and continuity of operations. However, because NSRWA has not yet issued or taken meaningful action 

to issue a new contract for the expiring support of task orders 20 and 32, there is concern that ongoing 

operations and/or support may be interrupted.

CONCLUSION

Combating the narcotics trade and terrorism is the central mission of the ANA Special Operations Forces. In 

July 2012, the Afghan government commissioned the SMW to provide critical air support for counternarcotics 

and counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. Since then, DOD has obligated nearly $122 million to develop

the SMW, awarded $771.8 million more to purchase 48 new aircraft, and plans to spend hundreds of millions 

more for oversight, maintenance, training, and logistical support. This is a massive financial investment in the 

SMW, given that the Afghans have not yet agreed to NTM-A’s concept for reorganization within the Afghan 

government to support the SMW and given the lack of planning to transfer critical maintenance and logistics 

functions to the Afghans. We question the wisdom of moving ahead with the provision of 30 new Mi-17s and 

18 PC-12s unless these issues are properly addressed. We believe that the purchase and delivery of the

aircraft should be contingent on the SMW’s achievement of personnel and maintenance and logistics support

milestones and indications that the SMW has the capacity to execute its mission and operate and maintain its 

fleet. Without an effective support structure, U.S.-funded SMW aircraft could be left sitting on runways in

Afghanistan, rather than supporting critical missions, resulting in waste of U.S. funds. 

Regarding ongoing DOD contractor support for the SMW, without well-written task orders to provide 

maintenance, logistics, and supply order services, and without effective oversight of those task orders, DOD’s 

ongoing financial investment in the SMW is also at risk. The lack of an effective quality assurance surveillance 

plan and adequate performance metrics increases the risk that contractors will underperform when providing 

 

38Multiple DOD organizations had responsibility for executing each task order since they were first signed, including 

Counter Narco-Terrorism Technology Program Office and now NSRWA. Each of these DOD organizations executed task 

order modifications extending the periods of performance. According to the U.S. Army Contracting Command, task orders 

20 and 32 cannot be extended beyond the current performance period without an additional sole source justification.
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 16 

these support services, including training of Afghans, which could result in wasted funds. If contractors fail to 

provide an effective level of maintenance or fail to order the right parts and supplies in a timely manner, the 

SMW may experience grounded aircraft that will undermine the Afghans’ ability to execute counternarcotics 

and counterterrorism missions, which in turn adversely impacts stability and the security environment in the 

country. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

To justify DOD purchases of new aircraft for the SMW, SIGAR recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics: 

1. Suspend all activity under the contracts awarded for the 48 new aircraft for the SMW until the 

memorandum of understanding between MOI and MOD is completed and signed. 

2. Provided the memorandum of understanding between the MOI and MOD is completed and 

signed, set clear personnel and maintenance and logistics support milestones for the SMW and 

tie the acquisition and delivery of the new aircraft to successful completion of these milestones. 

To improve Afghan sustainment of maintenance and logistics management for the SMW as the U.S. departs, 

SIGAR recommends that NSRWA and the Commander of DCOM-SOF jointly: 

3. Develop a plan for transferring maintenance and logistics management, including procurement of 

spare parts, to the Afghans. As part of the plan, develop appropriate performance metrics to 

measure contractor performance and appropriate milestones. 

4. Incorporate the performance metrics and milestones into a proposed statement of work for the 

new maintenance and logistics contracting action. 

To strengthen contractor performance on logistics, SIGAR recommends that the Commander of Army 

Contracting Command direct NSRWA Contracting Division to: 

5. Modify task orders 20 and 32 to incorporate performance metrics and appropriate quality 

assurance surveillance plans. 

6. Ensure that any new contract/task order contains these metrics and plans. 

7. Deploy contracting officer representatives to Afghanistan with the appropriate level of authority 

and the requisite experience to effectively oversee contractor support for the SMW. 

AGENCY COMMENTS

SIGAR received written comments on a draft of this report from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 

NTM-A/CSTC-A, NSWRA, and the U.S. Army Material Command. We made revisions to the report, as 

appropriate.

OSD and NTM-A/CSTC-A did not did not concur with our first recommendation. One of their reasons for 

disagreeing with the recommendation was that they have already awarded contracts for the aircraft. However, 

while the contract for the 18 PC-12 fixed wing aircraft had already been awarded when these entities received 

our draft report,39 DOD had not yet awarded the contract to Rosoboronexport for the 30 Mi-17 rotary wing 

 

39 This was noted in both our draft and final reports.
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 17 

aircraft. The draft recommendation, therefore, was for DOD to suspend plans to purchase additional aircraft. 

We consider it unfortunate that DOD went forward with these plans in light of the significant problems we 

identified in our draft report. 

Other reasons OSD and NTM-A/CSTC-A disagreed with our first recommendation were that: (1) delaying 

contract awards would unacceptably delay efforts to develop the SMW into a capable force; and (2) ISAF is 

currently engaged with the Afghan government to finalize a charter that would accomplish the purposes of the 

memorandum. However, our work shows that the impediments to developing the SMW into a capable force are 

not related to the timing of contracting actions, but rather to significant challenges in recruiting and training. A 

formal agreement between the MOI and MOD would address many of these problems, and we are encouraged 

that ISAF is taking steps to finalize a charter. Nevertheless, until such an agreement is reached, we maintain 

that DOD should not acquire or deliver the new aircraft to the SMW. 

OSD concurred with the other six recommendations and stated that appropriate DOD stakeholders are already 

taking action to implement them and mitigate the risks discussed in the audit report. NTM-A/CSTC-A also 

concurred with these six recommendations and identified ongoing or planned actions to implement them. OSD 

and NTM-A/CSTC-A’s comments and our responses to them are presented in appendix V. 

NSRWA concurred with the two recommendations directed to it, and the U.S. Army Materiel Command 

concurred with the three recommendations that were directed to it. Both NSRWA and the U.S. Army Materiel 

Command identified ongoing or planned actions to implement our recommendations. NSRWA’s comments are 

presented in appendix VI. We did not reproduce comments from the U.S. Army Materiel Command because the 

command labeled its comments as “For Official Use Only.”
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 18 

APPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

In July 2012, SIGAR initiated an audit of U.S. support for the Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW). This audit 

identifies (1) the extent to which the SMW has the capacity to independently perform its mission; and (2) the 

effectiveness of U.S. government oversight of contracts/task orders to provide support to the SMW. We 

reviewed aircraft daily status reports for the period November 15, 2011, through February 12, 2013. 

To assess the extent to which the SMW has the capacity to operate and maintain its current and planned fleet, 

we reviewed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan’s (NTM-A) concept of 

operations for the SMW and the RAND study which informed it. We interviewed a U.S. military official who 

played a major role in developing the concept. We also reviewed the memorandum of understanding that 

outlined responsibilities to establish the SMW among the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (DASD CN>), the Office of the Deputy Commanding General, 

Special Operations Forces (DCOM-SOF), NTM-A/Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, and 

the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. We reviewed contractor reporting that identified the status and 

availability of SMW aircraft. We interviewed officials at the SMW embedded training team (ETT), U.S. 

Department of State, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DASD CN>, the Interagency Operations 

Coordination Center–Afghanistan, and the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force. 

SIGAR also reviewed financial information relevant to the proposed purchase of new aircraft for the SMW. We

toured the SMW maintenance hangar and warehouse, and we accompanied the SMW on a training flight. We 

observed an English class for Afghan mechanics. We toured training facilities and observed flight simulator 

training in the Czech Republic. We interviewed officials at the SMW; DCOM-SOF; the ETT; the Non-Standard 

Rotary Wing Aircraft (NSRWA) program office; DASD CN> contractors Northrop Grumman and Lockheed 

Martin; the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the Counternarcotics Police–Afghanistan; Mi-17 flight training 

contractor Lom Praha; and U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command. 

To assess the effectiveness of U.S. government oversight of two task orders valued at $772 million to provide 

ongoing maintenance, logistics, and supply support to the SMW, we selected two key task orders that support 

maintenance and repairs at the SMW as our focus because of their size and importance to the SMW 

operations and sustainment. For each task order, we reviewed the base contract, the base task order, and the 

modifications. We reviewed the task order performance work statements and quality assurance surveillance 

plans. We analyzed agency internal control processes including the invoice review and payment process, as 

well as processes to oversee contractor operations. We reviewed contracting officer representative 

appointment letters. We interviewed officials at NSRWA Contracting Division, DCOM-SOF, the CounterNarcoterrorism Technology Program Office, the Defense Contracting Audit Agency, the Defense Contract 

Management Agency, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, ARMA, and U.S. Army Aviation and Missile 

Command. 

We reviewed NSRWA Contracting Division internal controls as they relate to monitoring and evaluation of U.S. 

contractors executing the two task orders in Kabul. We found that task orders lacked adequate performance 

metrics and quality assurance surveillance plans with which to effectively evaluate contractor performance. We 

also found that NSRWA Contracting Division did not have adequate oversight of the contractors on the ground 

in Afghanistan. We discuss these control deficiencies in the body of our report.

We relied on aircraft mission capable rate data compiled and reported by a U.S. contractor. We noted that the 

validity and reliability of the data were limited by the fact that the contractor self-reported, and there was no 

evidence of U.S. government review of the data. To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed relevant guidance, 

including the Federal Acquisition Regulation and section 1277 of the fiscal year 2013 National Defense 

Authorization Act. We did not use computer-processed information and therefore did not assess its reliability.
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 19 

We conducted our audit work in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan; Pardubice, Ostrava, and Vyskov, the Czech 

Republic; Huntsville and Fort Rucker, Alabama; Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; 

Dahlgren and Manassas, Virginia; and Washington, D.C., from July 2012 to March 2013, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This audit was performed by SIGAR under the authority 

of Public Law 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 20 

APPENDIX II - STATUS OF CURRENT MI-17 FLEET

The SMW currently controls 30 Mi-17s. Of the 20 used aircraft, 13 were obtained from the United States, 

5were from the United Kingdom (5), and 2 were from Germany. Ten new aircraft are on loan from the Afghan 

Air Force. According to ETT leadership, no loan terms are specified, and it is not known if the new Mi-17s will be 

returned to the Afghan Air Force. 

The status of each Special Mission Wing Mi-17 aircraft in the current fleet is identified in Table I. 

Table I - Status of Special Mission Wing Mi-17 Aircraft, as of February 12, 2013. 

Aircraft Statusa Current 

Location a Source Tail # Age (years) b

Fully Mission Capable c Afghanistan Purchased, U.S. Department of Defense 

(DOD), Counternarcotics Funding

609 21

185 18

Donated, Germany 102 8 

Loan, Afghan Air Force d 716 1+

717 1+

718 1+

719 1+

720 1+

721 1+

722 1+

729 1+

Not Mission Capable 

Maintenance e 

Afghanistan Loan, Afghan Air Force d 731 1+ 

Waiting or Undergoing 

Depot Maintenance

Afghanistan Purchased, DOD, 

Counternarcotics Funding

291 30 

Donated, Germany 101 20

Donated, United Kingdom 805 28

041 27

233 26

311 25

Loan, Afghan Air Forced 730 1+

Slovakia Donated, United Kingdom 303 27 

United Arab 

Emirates

Purchased, DOD, 

Counternarcotics Funding

447 29

510 29

355 21

930 20

076 19

Waiting Dispositionf Germany Procured, U.S. Army 501 30

Purchased, DOD, 

Counternarcotics Funding

505 27

506 23

Slovakia Procured, U.S. Army 503 24

502 21
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 21 

Aircraft Statusa Current 

Location a Source Tail # Age (years) b

Source: SIGAR analysis of Office of the Deputy Commanding General Special Operations Forces data.

Notes: a Status and current location of aircraft as of 2/12/2013. b Age of aircraft as of 10/21/2012. c Blue shading 

indicates aircraft in which fully operational equipment or systems are safe and correctly configured as designated by the 

U.S. Army. d Gray shading indicates aircraft indefinitely on loan from the Afghan Air Force. e Aircraft not capable of 

performing assigned missions because of maintenance requirements. f Aircraft that have crashed or are otherwise 

unserviceable and waiting inspection and disposition instructions.
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 22 

APPENDIX III - ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING THE SPECIAL MISSION WING 

Table II shows the organizations currently supporting the (SMW, as well as the mission of those organizations 

and their relationship with the SMW.

Table II - Organizations Currently Supporting the SMW

Organization Mission Relationship with SMW

North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) Training 

Mission-Afghanistan (NTMA)/Combined Security 

Transition Command–

Afghanistan

Jointly support the Afghan government 

in generating and sustaining the 

Afghan National Security Force, 

developing leaders, and establishing 

enduring institutional capacity to 

enable accountable, Afghan-led 

security. 

• training oversight

• equipping

Office of the Deputy 

Commanding General 

Special Operations Forces

The NTM-A executive responsible for 

developing, training and supporting 

the establishment of the Afghan 

National Army Special Operations 

Command (ANASOC) and its 

subordinate units.

• Oversight of overall 

development of the SMW

• oversight of aviation asset 

distribution to ensure the 

SMW has the capacity to 

conduct counternarcotics, 

counterterrorism, and 

special operations force 

missions

• coordinate the transition to 

all-Afghan crews for 

operational missions

• operational oversight and 

supervision of the Embedded 

Training Team (ETT) 

Embedded Training Team Train, advise, and assist the SMW in 

order to provide an enduring 

counterterrorism/narcotics special 

operations aviation capability in 

support of Afghan national interests.

• partners with SMW Afghans 

and supervises training in 

Kabul

Afghan National Army 

Special Operations 

Command

Established July 2012 to organize, 

man, train, lead, and equip Afghan 

National Army Special Operations 

Forces and to provide responsive and 

decisive action in support of Afghan 

Government security objectives.

• operational oversight
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 23 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Counternarcotics 

and Global Threats

Provides management oversight to 

ensure that counternarcotics funds 

are used to support DOD goals and in 

compliance with applicable law. The 

office manages the counternarcotics 

Central Transfer Account, a single U.S. 

budget line-item that funds DOD 

counternarcotics requirements (except 

active duty military pay and service 

operations tempo). 

• policy and resource planning 

oversight

• counternarcotics operations 

and activities funding

• provides funding for initial 

flight training for some SMW 

pilots

Program Management NonStandard Rotary Wing 

Aircraft (PM-NSRWA) Office

PM-NSRWA was established July 2010 

in Huntsville, Alabama to procure, 

field, and sustain non-standard rotary 

wing aircraft for the U.S. and allied 

countries. NSRWA Contracting Division 

falls under Army Contracting 

Command-Redstone. NSRWA is 

located at Redstone Arsenal in 

Huntsville, Alabama.

• Mi-17 procurement and 

program management 

services 

• internal contracting division: 

contract management 

services and oversight of 

U.S. contractors supporting 

the SMW in Afghanistan 

U.S. Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Coordinates with federal, state, and 

local agencies, and with foreign 

governments, in drug eradication 

programs, crop substitution, and 

training of foreign officials. Supports 

counternarcotics missions by moving 

passengers between bases and 

providing intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance services. As of 

October 2012, the U.S. Drug 

Enforcement Administration had 97 

positions in Afghanistan

• counternarcotics law 

enforcement expertise

• personnel vetting program 

development 

• tasking mission support 

• providing liaison officer and 

planning support

• occasional participation in 

counternarcotics missions

U.S. Department of State 

Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, Office of 

Aviation 

Provides aviation support necessary 

for the establishment and operation of 

air operations in support of the Chief 

of Mission in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

• counternarcotics missions 

air support, as available/as 

needed

Sources: SIGAR analysis of NTM-A, DOD, State, and Drug Enforcement Administration data
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 24 

APPENDIX IV - SPECIAL MISSION WING STRUCTURE AND COMMAND AND 

CONTROL

The SMW’s current organizational command structure is explained in Figure I.

Figure I - Special Mission Wing Organization and Command Structure

Source: SIGAR analysis of DCOM-SOF data.

SPECIAL MISSION WING STRUCTURE AND COMMAND AND CONTROL 

Priority Tasking 

for Counternarcotics and 

Ministry of Interior 

Missions 

Ministry of Interior 

Ministry of Defense 

Coordination 

- Operational Control 

- - ~ Administrative Control 

- --·,... Priority Tasking 

General 

Staff 

Kandahar Mazar-e-Sharif 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 25 

APPENDIX V - COMMENTS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION TRAINING MISSIONAFGHANISTAN/COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN

AND SIGAR’S RESPONSE

Comment 2

Comment 1

OFFICE OF THE A SSISTANT S ECRETA RY OF DEFENSE 

2700 DEFENSE PENTAGON 

ASWI & PAC triC $fCUJUTY AFFAIRS 

Mr. John Sopko 

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2700 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

1550 Crystal City. Suite 900 

Arlington, VA 22202 

Mr. Sopko; 

21 June2013 

This is the Deparunent of Defense response to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Draft Audit 13-13. "Afghan Special Mission Wing: DoD Plans to Spend $908 

Million to Build Air Wing that the Afghans Cannot Operate and Maintain.'' 

The U.S. strategic objective in Afghanistan is to ensure it will never again be used as a 

staging area for terrorist aiUlcks against the United States. Developing the capabilities of the 

Afghan defense forces is critical to this objective. The Department appreciates the important 

role SIGAR plays in conducting oversight of our programs in developing the Afghan forces to 

ensure we are supporting this objective. 

The first recommendation- that the Department should suspend plans to purchase the 48 new 

aircraft for the Special Mission Wing (SMW) until and unless the memorandum of agreement 

between the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior is completed and signed-would not be 

in our national interest. Delaying comract award pending agreement between the ministries on 

transition of SMW administrative control would unacceptably delay our effortS to develop the 

SMW into a capable force. ISAF is currently engaged with GIRoA on an Afghan Air Force 

charter to accomplish the purposes of the MOU. Further. the contract for the PC-12s was signed 

on October 13th. 2012. and the contract for the Mi-17s was finalized on June 16th, 2013. 

The Department concurs with the other six recommendations. Comments from NATO 

Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan are 

enclosed with this memorandum. Organi7.ations directed in the draft audit to respond have 

submitted their responses directly to SlGAR. 

DoD acknowledges the significant challenges outlined in the audit: however. its title is 

misleading. The SMW was formally established less than u year ago and sustairunent effortS, 

including training, are presently underway. Delivery of the aircraft in question will take place 

over the next eighteen months. 1l1is will include training on how to operate and maintain the 

aircraft and associated equipment. 

The implementation of recommendations 2 through 7, which appropriate DoD stakeholders 

arc already pursuing. will mitigate the risks discussed in the audit repon. 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 26 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. Please direct any questions 

or comments to Captain Donna J. Buono, U.S. Army, at . 

Enclosures: 

As stated 

~-}~ MICHAEL J. DUMONT 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Mghanistan, Pakistan & Central Asia 

2 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 27 

REPLY TO 

ATTENTION OF 

'\TM-AICSTC-t\ 

HEADQUARTERS 

NATO TRAINING MISSION -AFGHANISTAN 

COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND- AFGHANISTAN 

KABUL AFGHANISTAN 

P.PO AE 09356 

24 JUN 2013 

MEMORANDUM THRU United States Forces- Afghanistan (CJIG). APO AE 09356 

United States Cenrral Command (CCIG), MacDill AFB. FL 33621 

FOR: Office of the Special Inspector Gencml for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

2530 Crystal Drive. Arlington. VA 22202 

SUBJECT: NTM-NCSTC-A and NSOCC-A response to the Draft Repon·'Afghan Special s~ion 

Wing: DOD Plans to Spend $908 Million to Build Air Wing that the Afghans Cannot 

Operate nad Maintain" (Report No. SIGAR-Audit- 13- 13) 

REFEREl\CE: SIGAR Draft Report, dated JUN 2013. Office of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). 

I. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide responses to SIGAR 's draft report. 

2. Point of contact for th1s action is COL Allen Chappell at , or "via e-mail at 

I. 

Enclosure: 

~~~ Lil!utenant General, US Anny 

Commanding General 

NTM-A/CSTC-AINSOCC-A Response to Draft Report 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 28 

Comment 1
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 29 

(4) Incorporate the performance metrics and milestones into a proposc:d statement of work 

for the new maintenance and logistics contract action. CONCUH. 

• Made recommendatio n to PMNSRW to have performance meLrics included in new CLS 

contract 

• Current I) waiting review of final PWS 

(5) Modify task orders 20 and 32 to incorporate performance metrics and appropriate quality 

assurance surveillance plans. CONCUR (~itb comment) 

• J\gree with the concept of including performance meLriL:S to T.O. 20 & 32. however this 

effort would take approx 90 days and there is not enough time left on the task orders to 

modify (T.O. 32 ends on 2:1 Aug: T.O. 20 ends on 30 Sep). 

(6) Ensure that the new contntclftask order contains these mctrics and plans. CONCUR 

• I lave made recommendations to PMNSRW for new CLS contract to include such metrics 

• Currently waiting review of final PWS 

(7) Deploy Contracting Officer Representatives (COR) to Afghanistan with the appropriate 

level of authority and the requisite experience to effectively oversee contractor support for 

the SMW. CONCUR 

• A COR is has been on-site with the ElT since April 2013 

~t.~~~( COL, S~ 

NSOCC-NCSTC-A SOF Cell Director 

J\ttachements: 

1. SMW Capability Growth Chart 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 30 

SIGAR’s Response

1. SIGAR’s draft report recommended that DOD suspend plans to purchase the additional aircraft for 

the SMW. Unfortunately, after receiving this draft report, DOD awarded the $553.8 million

contract modification to Rosoboronexport for the 30 Mi-17 helicopters. We are disappointed by 

this decision and continue to question the wisdom of this contract action. We have, therefore, 

revised our recommendation to urge DOD to suspend all activity under these two contract awards 

until the memorandum of understanding is signed between the MOI and MOD.

2. We disagree that delaying the acquisition and delivery of aircraft would also delay efforts to 

develop the SMW into a capable force. Our work shows that the impediments to developing the 

SMW are recruiting and training challenges, many of them driven by the absence of a formal 

agreement between the MOD and the MOI. We are encouraged by ISAF’s efforts to develop an 

Afghan Air Force charter with the Afghan government. Under the terms of our recommendation, 

acquisition and delivery of additional aircraft for the SMW could proceed upon successful 

completion of this charter. 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 31 

APPENDIX VI - COMMENTS FROM THE NON-STANDARD ROTARY WING

AIRCRAFT PROJECT OFFICE

SFAE-AV-NS 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY J•ROGRJ\M EXtCl Tl VF. OFFIC't:, A Vti\TION 

NON-l;"l A UAJU) ROTARY WIJ\G AJKCAA~ I PKO. c--r OFPlCF. 

'liS"~ DRIVE, SUrfP.lOI 

UUNTSVILU:.At. 35805-1944 

19Jtme2013 

MEMORANDUM f.OR Assistl\nt Inspector General for Audits w1d Investigations, Special Inspector 

General for AfghanistWl Reconstruction (SIGAR), I 550 Crystal City, Suite 900, Arlington, VA 22202 

ubject: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Dr.lfl Audit 13-13, Afghan 

Special Mission Wing: DOD Plans to Spend $908 Million to Build Air Wing that the Afghans Carmot 

Opcrale or Maintain 

I. The subject report makes recommendations to the on-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft (NSRWA) 

Proj ect Management Office (PMO) to improve the Afghan sustainment o f maintenance and logistics 

management: 

a. #3- Concur with Recommendation: The NSRWA PMO has developed pcrfom1ance metrics and 

milestones to improve the overall sustainment postun: of the Afghan rotary wing aviation flee!. 

DCOM SOF is currently relining plans for tran~fcr and transition to the Afghans. Once the plan is 

finalized, the NSR WA PMO, working in concert wiU1 DCOM SOF will adjus1 the performance 

metrit:s and milestones to accommodate any proposed transition scenario. 

b. 114 -Concur with Recommendation: Once the DCOM SOF t:ransition piau is approved, Ute 

NSRWA PMO will work wit11 ACC-R to incorporate the milestones and perfonnance metJics 

(recommendation #3) by contract W11endment/modification into the new contrat:t. 

2. Point of Contact for this memorandum is :vtr. David Piockley, 

. 

~Y- Project MW1ager (A), Non- tandard 

Rotary Wing AJrcraft Pro jeer Office 
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 32 

APPENDIX VIII - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Matt Dove, Senior Audit Manager

Stoughton Farnham, Senior Auditor

Jerome Goehring, Auditor

Parker Laite, Senior Program Analyst

William Shimp, Senior Auditor
SIGAR Audit 13-13/Afghan Special Mission Wing Page 33 

This audit report was conducted under 

project code SIGAR-064A.
Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

Public Affairs

SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate 

and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to: 

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs; 

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors; 

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes; 

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan. 

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to SIGAR’s Web 

site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publically released reports, 

testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site. 

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations of 

fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal, contact SIGAR’s 

hotline: 

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud 

• Email: sigar.pentagon.inv.mbx.hotline@mail.mil 

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

• Phone DSN Afghanistan: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303 

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

• U.S. fax: +1-703-601-4065 

Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-545-5974

• Email: sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

2530 Crystal Drive

Arlington, VA 22202