Superfund Strategy

April 1985

NTIS order #PB86-120425
Recommended Citation:

Superfund Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-ITE-252, April 1985).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600527

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
Foreword

The cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the Federal Superfund program has received much

attention since Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act in 1980. As Congress debates reauthorization and possible expansion of the program,

it is instructive to examine the “lessons learned” from the initial Superfund program.

The objectives of this OTA study are, as requested by the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the House Science and Technology Committee: 1) to understand future Superfund needs

and how permanent cleanups can be accomplished in a cost-effective manner for diverse types

of sites; 2) to describe the interactions among many components of the complex Superfund system; and 3) to analyze the consequences of pursuing different strategies for implementing the program. The study brings together a great deal of information on what can be learned from the initial Superfund program in order to improve it. In particular, the study focuses on the choice between

continuing and improving the current program and adopting a new strategy on the basis of improved information. Such a new strategy has been defined and analyzed by OTA in considerable

detail to provide Congress with an understanding of critical policy trade-offs,

As Congress and the Nation attempt to address major economic and budgetary issues, it is

important to examine the economic as well as the environmental dimensions of the Superfund

program. In the face of scientific uncertainties, limited information, fiscal constraints, public demands for cleanups, and real threats to health and the environment, how can Congress assure effective and efficient spending of Superfund resources? How can it determine how much to spend?

How can it decide on whether to proceed with costly cleanups in the absence of national cleanup

goals and with technologies that may not be effective? Is there a need to perceive Superfund as

a long-term program that would require money to be spent in improving institutional capabilities

and cleanup technologies?

Because of the strong emotions surrounding this major national environmental program, comprehensive analysis can assist all interested parties in their quest for technically sensible, cost-effective, and equitable solutions. The present reauthorization process provides an opportunity to

examine the latest information and alternative strategies.

This report builds on the analyses and findings in OTA’s earlier work on hazardous waste

issues, specifically our March 1983 report, Technologies and Management Strategies for Hazardous Waste Control. That report identified many of the problems with long-term containment of

newly generated hazardous wastes; these problems are of direct relevance to the Superfund program, both in understanding the likely size of the uncontrolled hazardous waste site problem, and

in examining technology choices for Superfund wastes,

A number of other OTA studies bear on the issues surrounding the Superfund program. Interested readers are referred to Habitability of the Love Canal Area—A Technical Memorandum (June

1983), Protecting the Nation Groundwater From Contamination (October 1984), Technologies for

Disposing of Waste in the Ocean (in progress), and Hazardous Materials Transportation: Technology Issues (in progress).

The viewpoints of the private sector, community and environmental groups, academia, and

State officials were sought in conducting this study. Many private and public groups cooperated

in surveys performed for this study, and provided useful information. OTA thanks the many people—advisory panel members, workshop participants, reviewers, and consultants—who assisted

in this work. As with all OTA studies, the information, analyses, and findings of the report are

the sole responsibility of OTA.

Director
Superfund Strategy Advisory Panel

Martin Alexander, Chairman

Cornell University

Kirk W. Brown Adeline G. Levine

Texas A&M University State University of New York at Buffalo

Morton Corn Randy Mott

School of Hygiene and Public Health Breed, Abbott & Morgan

The Johns Hopkins University Norman H. Nosenchuck

Bonnie L. Exner New York State Department of

Colorado Citizens Action Network Environmental Conservation

Ted Greenwood James T. O’Rourke

Columbia University Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc.

Linda E. Greer James Patterson

Environmental Defense Fund Illinois Institute of Technology

Robert Kissell Robert Repetto

E. I. du Pent de Nemours & Co., Inc. World Resources Institute

Gary Kovall Bernard L. Simonsen

ARCO Petroleum Products Co. IT Corp.

Stephen Lester William A. Wallace

Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous CH2M Hill

Wastes
OTA Project Staff –Superfund Strategy

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Audrey Buyrn, Industry, Technology, and Employment

Program Manager

Joel S. Hirschhorn, Project Director

Miriam Heller, Analyst

Karen Larsen, Senior Analyst

Kirsten Oldenburg, Analyst

William Sanjour*

Patricia Canavan, Administrative Assistant

Andrea M. Amiri, Secretary

Individual Contractors

Harold C. Barnett

James Cannon

George Trezek

James Werner

Chris Elfring, Editor

Irene S. Gordon, Editor

Contractors

Arthur D. Little, Inc.

Colorado School of Mines

Environ Corp.

ERM-Midwest

JRB Associates

TTEMD, Inc.

● On detail from EPA.
OTA Workshop–The Use of Innovative Cleanup Technologies for

Superfund Remedial Action

Lowell C. Bowie

RoTech, Inc.

Jimmy W. Boyd

J. M. Huber Corp.

Pranas Budininkas

GARD, Division of Chamberlain

Manufacturing

Louis Flax

Lopat Enterprises

Linda Jones

Missouri Department of Natural Resources

Robert Kissell

E. 1. du Pent de Nemours & Co., Inc.

Michael Model]

MODAR, Inc.

M. L. Mullins

Monsanto Co.

Norman Nosenchuck

New York State Department of

Environmental Conservation

Greg Peterson

CH2M Hill

Stanley Sojka

Occidental Chemical Corp.

Theodore Taylor

NOVA, Inc.
Contents

Chapter

1. Summary and Introduction . . . , , ,

2. Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3. A Systems Analysis of Superfund

es for Setting Cleanup Goals . . , . , . . .

iring Cleanup . . . , . . , . ,

echnol ies. . . . . . . . . . . , . . , ,

7. Achieving Qualit Cleanups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8. Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program . . . . . . .

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . . . , . , . . . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . . ,

Page

3

37

61

103

125

171

223

257

277
Chapter 1

Summary and Introduction
Page

Overview .*** .*. ***. * *.**.*...*.***..***.********.*********.********** 3

Background .*. ..** 0**. *e.....*..***..**********.*.**..*.*.**********.* 5

The Key Policy Option: Considering a New Strategy for the System . . . . . . . . . . 7

Cleanup of How Many Sites, and at What Costs? 11

Costs and Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Resolving the “HOW Clean is Clean?” Issue 17

Do We Have and Use Effective Cleanup Technologies? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Are Superfund Efforts Resulting in Quality Work? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Is Public Involvement Adequate? 2 2

Financing Mechanisms 22

Cleanups by Responsible Parties 24

The Role of the States 24

Scope and Objectives of the Superfund Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Superfund Seen Through Case Studies 26

Other Case Studies on Completed Cleanups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

List of Tables

Table No. Page

l-1. Summary Data on Solid Waste Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

I-2. Summary of Problems With RCRA Groundwater Protection Standards

Governing Operating Hazardous Waste Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

1-3. Factors in EPA’s Examination of Potential NPL Sites That Lead

l-4. Current Estimates for Cleaning Up Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites . . . . . 14

1-5

1-6

1-7

1-8

1-9

Illustrative Scenarios for Two-Different Cleanup Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Future Use of Containment Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l9

Future Use of Treatment Technologies ... ... ... .. ... ... ... ... . . . . . . 19

Summary Data on Some Innovative Cleanup Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Summary Comparison of Several Major Financing Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

List of Figures

Figure No. Page

l-1. Program Length v. Impermanence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

l-2. Program Cost v. Impermanence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Chapter 1

Summary and Introduction

OVERVIEW

The Federal Superfund1 program for cleaning up toxic waste sites has made progress, and

much can be learned from its initial efforts to

improve protection of public health and the environment.

The Environmental Protection Agency’s

(EPA) low estimate of Superfund costs can be

traced to a lack of detailed planning for the

program and optimism about both the number

of toxic waste sites that will require cleanup

and the effectiveness of cleanup technologies.

While EPA estimates that about 2,000 sites will

reach the National Priorities List [NPL), OTA

estimates that 10,000 sites (or more) may

require cleanup by Super fund. With Superfund’s existing resources, it is not technically

or economically possible to permanently clean

up even 2,000 sites in less than several decades.

OTA defines permanent cleanups to be those

where the likelihood of recurring problems

with the same site or wastes have been minimized through the use of treatment rather than

containment technologies,

Only 50 percent of the 538 sites now on the

NPL are receiving remedial cleanup attention,

even though about $1 billion (two-thirds of the

initial 5-year program’s funding) have been

committed. Initial actions and cleanups now

emphasize the removal of wastes to land disposal facilities, which themselves may become

Superfund sites, or wastes are left on the site.

Current “remedial cleanups” tend to be imper-

‘This study is limited to one use of the Superfund program

established under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA): the cleanup of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. However, the Superfund program is very broad and other threats from releases of hazardous substances are managed, such as leaking underground

storage tanks, spills from transportation accidents, and groundwater contaminated from pesticide use. The demands on Superfund from these uses in the future are uncertain but may also

increase, This study does not consider federally owned uncontrolled sites, which are recognized to pose a large problem, but

which do not qualify for cleanup under Superfund.

manent. Some sites get worse, and repeated

costs are almost inevitable. Environmentally,

risks are often transferred from one community to another, and to future generations,

Underestimating national cleanup needs

could result in an environmental crisis years

or decades from now. With many more NPL

sites, repeated responses, and uncertainty

about private cleanups and contributions,

cleanup needs could outstrip financial, personnel, and technological resources. Environmental damage could escalate. The issue now

is not so much about whether or not to have

a continued, expanded Superfund program as

it is to choose to continue with the current

approach or, on the basis of what we have

learned so far, to restructure the program,

OTA finds that a two-part strategy (see

below) offers cost and time advantages over the

current program with its lack of attention to

long-term factors. Even so, costs to Superfund

could easily be $100 billion—out of total costs

to the Nation of several hundred billion dollars,

and it could take 50 years to clean 10,000 sites.

The two parts of the strategy would overlap in

time, but differ in focus and priorities. This

two-part strategy could be advantageous regardless of the size of the Superfund program.

(I) In the near term, for perhaps up to 15

years, the strategy would focus on: a) early

identification and assessment of potential NPL

sites, b) initial response to reduce near-term

threats at all NPL sites and prevent sites from

getting worse, c) permanent remedial cleanups

for some especially threatening sites, and d) developing institutional capabilities for a longterm program. A substantially larger Superfund program would be needed to carry out

these efforts. Initial responses that accomplish

the most significant and cost-effective reduction of risks and prevent sites from getting

worse might cost about $1 million per site for

3
4 ● Superfund Strategy

most sites. This is three times the current cost

of immediate removal actions and about 10 percent of currently projected remedial cleanup

costs. Case studies by OTA and others reveal

that both immediate removals and remedial

cleanups are ineffective for their intended

purposes, Under the two-part strategy, initial

responses would emphasize covering sites and

temporarily storing wastes and contaminated

materials to reduce groundwater contamination and, where technically and economically

feasible, excavating wastes to minimize releases into the environment.

(II) Over the longer term, the strategy would

call for more extensive site studies and focus

on permanent cleanups, when they are technically feasible, at all sites that pose significant

threats to human health and the environment

(unless privately or State-funded cleanups offering comparable protection have taken

place), These cleanups would draw on the institution building that occurred during the first

phase. Spending large sums before specific

cleanup goals are set and before permanent

cleanup technologies are available leads to a

false sense of security, a potential for inconsistent cleanups nationwide, and makes little

environmental or economic sense.

Federal support could contribute in five

areas. Such efforts take time, but cost little relative to Superfund’s total costs and could result

in more environmental protection at lower

costs. The five areas are:

1. Intensify Federal efforts to obtain more information on health and environmental effects and develop specific national cleanup

goals, Without this effort, selecting technologies, estimating costs, and evaluating

public and private cleanups will be difficult and contentious. Cleanup goals could

employ site classification based on locally

decided site use, in combination with

other information such as risk assessment,

cost-benefit analysis, and existing environmental standards.

2. Provide substantially more support for developing and demonstrating innovative,

permanent cleanup technologies for a va3.

4.

5.

riety of problems, The immediate costs for

cleanups based on waste containment and

redisposal omit much: monitoring, operation and maintenance, and the costs of

future cleanups, especially for groundwater. Also, they are highly uncertain and

can add greatly to total costs. For some

geological settings, like the Stringfellow

site in California, containment does not

work. Permanent remedies, which destroy, detoxify, or otherwise treat wastes

will be necessary to any cost-effective,

long-term Superfund program; many innovative approaches exist, but they face substantial barriers to demonstration and use,

such as the absence of protocols to

evaluate their effectiveness.

Provide increased support for EPA and

perhaps the States so they can improve

technical oversight of contractors and thus

ensure quality cleanups,

Provide Federal support for technical

training programs, An expanded national

cleanup effort could increase the need for

certain technical specialists fivefold by

1995; shortages of experienced technical

personnel such as hydrogeologists have

already been noticed.

Improve the Superfund program, and public confidence in it, by supporting public

participation in decisionmaking about initial responses and remedial cleanups and

providing technical assistance to communities. Improved public participation could

address the intrinsic tension between the

desires of communities to obtain fast, effective, and complete cleanups at their

sites and the limitations and goals of a national program.

OTA has considered only one use of Superfund, the remedial cleanup of hazardous waste

sites that are “uncontrolled” because actual or

potential releases of hazardous substances into

the environment must be managed. A number

of other applications exist and could increase

in the future (e. g., leaking underground storage tanks, pesticide contamination areas, and

transportation accidents). There is little doubt

about the need to clean up sites that now get
Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 5

placed on the NPL, but additional sites are

likely to require clean up. OTA’s estimate of

additional waste sites include: 5,000 sites from

the more than 600,000 open and closed solid

waste facilities, such as sanitary and municipal landfills, which can release toxic substances to groundwater; 2,000 from an improved site identification and selection

process; and 1,000 from hazardous waste management facilities operating with ineffective

groundwater protection standards.

A much larger Superfund program would

likely mean that more reliance would have to

be placed on general tax revenues or some

other broadly based tax. Along with continued

use of the tax on chemical and petroleum

feedstocks, a tax on hazardous wastes could

raise significant sums, but this latter tax would

generate significant revenue only in the nearterm, if less hazardous waste is generated over

time. If such “waste-end” taxes, already

adopted by 20 States, were made simple to

administer, they would aid in reducing the generation of hazardous waste and the use of land

disposal and, hence, the creation of still more

Superfund sites.

Finally, OTA has stressed estimating future

national needs, without making specific

assumptions about non-Federal spending.

Other research has assumed significant cost

recovery of Superfund expenditures through

enforcement actions and a fairly high level of

privately and State-funded cleanups. Such

assumptions often are not made clear, tend to

be quite optimistic, and lead to “adjusted” costs

for Superfund that could prove to be substantially low. Cost recovery to date has amounted

to about 1 percent of Superfund spending, but

EPA assumes cost recoveries of 47 percent for

removals and 30 percent for remedial actions.

To date, about $300 million has been committed by responsible parties for cleanups, an

amount commensurate to what EPA has spent.

EPA assumes that 40 to 60 percent of sites will

be cleaned by responsible parties. Current obstacles to private cleanups, such as uncertain

future liabilities, could discourage private

spending. Continued, substantial spending by

the private sector on cleanups is desirable and

incentives (or the removal of barriers) may be

necessary. However, clear cleanup goals and

technical oversight are still essential to assure

that effective cleanups are performed. Furthermore, it is not necessarily correct to assume

that current policies on required matching

funds from States will remain, as significant

concerns exist about the willingness of some

States to provide these funds.

BACKGROUND

Proved releases of hazardous substances

have occurred from uncontrolled sites throughout the Nation. Groundwater and surface

waters have been contaminated, drinking

water supplies have been lost, and people have

been evacuated or, in some cases, permanently

relocated. There have been some fires and explosions. Most sites must be strictly off limits

to unprotected people. Across the Nation, from

Love Canal in New York, to Times Beach in

Missouri, to the Stringfellow Acid Pits in

California, people are worried about acute and

chronic threats to their health, loss of natural

resources, and sharp declines in the value of

their homes and property,

After Federal legislation was enacted to manage newly generated hazardous wastes, it became apparent that a separate Federal program

was needed to tackle the cleanup of uncontrolled waste sites. The Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 was followed

by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(CERCLA) in 1980. CERCLA established the

Superfund program to handle emergencies at
6 ● Superfund Strategy

uncontrolled sites, to clean up the sites, and

to deal with several other related problems.

At the very beginning of Superfund, the full

scope of the uncontrolled site problem was

unclear. Several releases of hazardous substances into the environment had been documented, and limited and often anecdotal evidence of adverse health and environmental

impacts had been gathered. But unambiguous,

comprehensive, and scientific understanding

of the effects, particularly of the long-term effects, of such releases was lacking. For these

reasons, Congress limited the Superfund program. The Environmental Protection Agency

was directed to establish an NPL of at least 400

sites which needed remedial cleanup;2 considerable flexibility was allowed to respond to

emergencies. In addition, Congress directed

the Department of Health and Human Services

to gather data on health impacts from uncontrolled sites. Although in 1980 and earlier some

people thought the evidence showed that a very

large program would be necessary, many

uncertainties and the new, highly technical

challenge of performing large numbers of

cleanups, caused Congress to limit the program

to $1.6 billion over 5 years.

Now, as we approach the end of the initial

Superfund program, Congress and the Nation

have the benefit of more information about uncontrolled sites and can learn much from the

early experiences of the program. This study

concentrates on what can be learned from the

results of the initial program; but it must be

stressed that the Superfund program has made

progress, especially considering that the program was created as a fast public policy response to a newly recognized and highly complex, technical, and diverse set of problems.

Much uncertainty about health and environmental effects remains. But EPA and the States

have obtained more information about the

number and kinds of uncontrolled sites, and

ZTO qualify for remedial cleanup, a site must be placed on the

NPL. EPA’s Hazard Ranking System is used to obtain a numerical rating for sites; current]y sites receiving a score of 28.5 or

above qualify, plus each State may designate one priority site

for inclusion. However, non-NPL sites may receive emergency

attention and some limited, low-cost initial response.

they have studied the nature of releases from

the sites. Thus, EPA has expanded the NPL to

538 sites, has proposed several hundred more,

and has estimated an eventual NPL of some

2,000 sites.

Responses to emergencies, such as transportation accidents, have been swift and effective

in dealing with immediate threats. However,

although responses at many sites have been

limited, they usually consist of moving the

waste to land disposal sites (which themselves

may become Superfund candidates] or leaving

the waste in the ground. Sites that pose threats

only to the environment have received little attention. In a number of cases, even expensive

“cleanups” quickly proved to be ineffective because hazardous substances continued to be released. The public has started to demand permanently effective cleanups; that is, cleanups

which minimize the likelihood of future actions

for the same sites or wastes. This usually means

treatment of wastes and contaminated

materials. But little progress has been made

toward permanent cleanups, particularly for

the expensive, difficult, new, and uncertain

task of cleaning up contaminated groundwater.

Moreover, detailed goals for permanent cleanups remain unclear, and without them it is difficult to select cost-effective cleanup technologies and evaluate their effectiveness, Finally,

how much private parties and the States can

or will contribute has not been settled. At first,

it was generally thought that Superfund would

deal only with the Nation’s worst sites, especially those without identifiable responsible

parties. Now, however, some believe that

Superfund must move beyond this early limitation to address many more sites if national

environmental protection goals are to be met

expeditiously,

Congress faces a number of complex issues

and policy trade-offs in its debate on the new

Superfund program. Evidence on the number

of sites and the extent of pollution is clearer,

but much of the uncertainty about health and

environmental effects remains unresolved.

How should risk assessment techniques be

used? Can cleanup goals be established more

quickly? Moreover, a multibillion dollar pro-
Ch. 1—Summary and /introduction ● 7

gram raises questions about impacts on the

Federal budget and the national economy, Experts disagree on how much money Superfund

needs and have different opinions on how the

money should be raised. Deciding how many

sites need cleanup, how to clean them up, how

much money to make available, and other policy judgments will determine how long the national cleanup program will last. A consensus

has not yet emerged on many issues, including

how long the public is willing to wait for permanent cleanup.

Lastly, performance of the Superfund program to date raises questions about institutional capabilities for an expanded program.

How should Superfund operate, in terms of

decisions regarding what sites get selected and

acted upon, and in what order? Many people

viewed the Superfund as lasting 5 or 10 years.

Therefore, relatively little emphasis has been

placed on work important for a long-term program, such as research, development, and demonstration of innovative, permanent cleanup

technologies, and building up an adequate

supply of technical personnel.

The principal goals of this study are: 1) to understand future Superfund needs and how permanent cleanups can be accomplished in a

cost-effective manner for diverse types of sites,

2) to describe the interactions among the components of the complex Superfund system, and

3) to analyze the consequences of pursuing different strategies for implementing the program.

A number of policy options are presented for

congressional consideration.

THE KEY POLICY OPTION: CONSIDERING A NEW STRATEGY

FOR THE SYSTEM

The initial Superfund program was viewed

as temporary and was assembled quickly to

deal with a technically complex and unique

environmental threat defined in a preliminary

way, Its strategy was oriented to taking limited

responses at the worst sites, to addressing, for

the most part, immediate threats to human

health, and to gathering information on the extent of the national problem and its solution.

In identifying the following key policy option

for congressional consideration, OTA recognizes that as an initial Federal effort the Superfund program has been effective in limited

ways. To be considered now is the evolutionary

development, restructuring, and improvement

of the Superfund program. The opportunity is

to move from a program that generally considered immediately threatening sites on a caseby-case basis to a comprehensive approach for

effective control of all NPL sites, whether

2,000, 5,000, 10,000, or more. This reappraisal]

of the program is possible because of the experiences, both positive and negative, with the

initial program and because of recent data on

the magnitude of the national uncontrolled site

problem and information about the potential

solutions, In order to devise a more costeffective risk management strategy, it is useful

to: 1) recognize how large the uncontrolled site

problem is nationally, and 2] evaluate the longterm economic and environmental performance of the program rather than just the numbers of actions taken.

If OTA is correct in its assessment of future

cleanup needs, then it is technically and economically impossible to permanently clean up

all uncontrolled waste sites in the near term,

But how can the Superfund program equitably address public demands for an effective,

timely, national cleanup program when there

are constraints involving budget, technology,

and technical personnel? OTA has analyzed

the long-term aspects of different strategies for

implementing Superfund. This has been done

by using a systems analysis of major interrelated variables of the program to examine
8 ● Superfund strategy

how they affect certain outcomes such as program cost and duration.

The complexity of the Superfund system confronts policy makers with difficult decisions

and trade-offs. For example, yielding to pressures to increase and speed cleanup actions,

both by Superfund and private parties, can be

counterproductive if such actions are impermanent and have a high probability of leading

to substantial future costs. But perhaps the

most difficult issue is the choice of either staying with the basic structure of the current program (on the assumption that it will improve

substantially in response to lessons learned

from early experiences), or restructuring the

program to achieve greater environmental protection and cost effectiveness. OTA’s analysis

has found that if a new strategy is to be considered, the following two-part strategy appears advantageous.

A Superfund program that tackles a very

large number of sites over several decades

could be based on two parts that overlap to

some degree in time, but differ in their focus

and priorities.

Part I: In the near term, for perhaps up to

15 years, the strategy would focus on: a) early

identification and assessment of potential NPL

sites, b) initial responses to reduce near-term

threats at all NPL sites and prevent sites from

getting worse, c) permanent remedial cleanups

for some especially threatening sites, and d) developing institutional capabilities for a longterm program.

A substantially larger Superfund program

would be needed to carry out these efforts. Initial responses to accomplish the most costeffective and significant reduction of risks and

to prevent sites from getting worse might cost

about $1 million for most sites. This is three

times the current cost of immediate removal

actions and about 10 percent of currently projected remedial cleanup costs. Case studies by

OTA and others reveal that both immediate

removals and remedial cleanups are ineffective

for their intended purposes. Under the two-part

strategy, initial responses would emphasize

covering sites and temporarily storing wastes

and contaminated materials to reduce groundwater contamination and, where technically

and economically feasible, excavating wastes

to minimize releases into the environment.

Part II: Over the longer term, the strategy

would call for more extensive site studies and

focus on permanent cleanups, when they are

technically feasible, at all sites that pose significant threats to human health and the environment (unless privately or State-funded

cleanups offering comparable protection have

taken place). These cleanups would draw on

the institution building that occurred during

the first phase. Spending large sums before specific cleanup goals are set and before permanent cleanup technologies are available leads

to a false sense of security, a potential for inconsistent cleanups nationwide, and makes little environmental or economic sense.

Under the current program, cleanups have

tended to be both costly and impermanent, and

thus likely to lead to substantial future spending for the same sites or wastes. However, in

some cases the ad hoc nature of the current

program has resulted in use of the two-part

strategy, such as cases where large amounts

of contaminated soil have been removed for

temporary storage. Moreover, cleanups have

not progressed rapidly, and many sites have

received little attention, although the pace is

picking up. For example, 30 percent of the current 538 NPL sites are receiving some form of

cleanup attention.

Having few permanent cleanups in the first

part of the two-part strategy makes sense for

several basic reasons, and it does not represent

a slowdown in cleanups which are as thorough

and permanent as possible for critical sites.

First, it is both technically and economically

impossible to permanently clean up all sites—

even for an NPL of 2,000 sites—in the near

term, certainly not within 20 years. Costeffective permanent cleanup technologies have

not been developed for some problems, particularly for the extremely difficult (and possibly

intransigent) problem of decontaminating entire aquifers. It will take time to demonstrate

the effectiveness and costs for innovative tech-
Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 9

nologies. There is also too little information on

most sites to decide about permanent cleanup,

particularly when there are no detailed national cleanup goals. Furthermore, there are

not enough people with experience in this area

to implement a large permanent cleanup effort.

In the two-part strategy, initial responses

would not be designed for long-term effectiveness; they would probably be impermanent

and, thus, in almost all cases permanent cleanups would have to follow. Their purpose is to

quickly and sharply reduce exposure to hazardous substances at NPL sites without simply

transferring the threat somewhere else. Initial

responses can be thought of as a subset of the

interim, impermanent approaches now being

used and described as “cleanups. ” The public,

however, must be assured that initial responses

can be environmentally effective both to deal

with immediate risks and the critical need to

stop sites from getting worse. When there are

continuing releases of hazardous substances

into the air, land, and water, the difficulty

and costs of cleanup increase drastically. Both

in terms of environmental protection and economics, the most important thing to do is to

quickly reduce risk once a site has been found

to present significant hazards. It is quite possible to know that a site poses significant risk

even though it is not possible to know precisely

what the risk is, how to eliminate it, or what

constitutes an eventual safe level of permanent

cleanup. For initial responses it is necessary

to think not solely in terms of “cleanup,” but

also in terms of isolation, stabilization, and

recontrol of the site.

Relatively low-cost initial responses could include pumping to contain plumes of contamination in aquifers, covers to keep out

water, excavation of buried wastes or removal

of wastes from surface impoundments for

above ground temporary storage, and environmental monitoring. However, in contrast to

current immediate removals and interim

‘‘cleanups, ’ wastes would not be moved to

operating land disposal sites and reliance on

the use of underground material barriers to prevent migration of wastes offsite would be

limited to special conditions. Substantial longterm economic benefits would result from

avoiding costly “cleanups” based on containment and land disposal, which, despite their

high initial expense, also require major future

spending.

In contrast to the present program’s use of

immediate removal actions, which do not necessarily include actual removal of materials

from the site, the initial responses defined here

place great emphasis on reducing present and

future exposures to hazardous substances

under the assumption that no further action

may take place for some years. For example,

if the site is exposed to water intrusion, partially draining or building berms around a surface impoundment containing liquid waste is

unlikely to be effective because of the potential for repeated overflows. Nor will removing

some surface waste and contaminated soil be

effective at a landfill exposed to rain if other

contaminants can reach groundwater. Waste

removal and excavation, temporary storage,

and surface capping can be more effective. As

with the current program, there will be sites

where it will be necessary to take actions such

as supplying alternate water and relocating

residents, rather than or in addition to tackling the site itself.

In examining the costs of a variety of technical actions, OTA finds that effective initial

responses might average about $1 million for

most sites; at some sites where there is extensive groundwater problems initial responses

would cost substantially more. The current program spends an average of about $300,000 for

immediate removals and estimates about $10

million for remedial cleanups, neither of which

meets their intended purpose very well (i. e.,

sites often get worse, exposures may continue,

and problems often persist). In other words, by

spending more money initially it is possible to

receive more benefits per unit cost. This is consistent with the fact that in addressing environmental problems, substantial benefits are generally achieved with the first response although

more work may have to be done to reach the

ultimate or permanent solution.
10 ● Superfund Strategy

In the near term, say 5 years, the two-part

strategy would result in a Superfund program

substantially larger than the present one. The

two-part strategy would lead to a different distribution and type of spending, not to decreased or level spending. While spending

under the two-part strategy would be focused,

in large part, on taking many initial responses,

there would also be spending for expensive

permanent cleanups at some high priority sites,

and (as discussed in chapter 2) significant

spending for several efforts aimed at

strengthening institutional capabilities (e.g., expanding the information base for establishing

cleanup goals, development and demonstration

of innovative cleanup technologies, training

programs for critical technical specialists, and

increased funding for EPA and States to expand technical oversight). With the two-part

strategy, much more money is spent on efforts

to ensure that future spending on cleanups produces cost-effective results. If Superfund is a

short-term program, such investments are not

likely to be made. The current program has not

addressed these kinds of investments.

Furthermore, if the current program were

simply expanded, many expensive and timeconsuming Remedial Investigation/Feasibility

Studies ($800,000 is the average figure used by

EPA) as well as a number of expensive but impermanent cleanups would need to be done.

With the two-part strategy, more money is

spent on initial responses and less money is

spent on studies to select permanent cleanups

and/or expensive cleanups (which are often

done in stages).

To decide which sites should eventually receive permanent cleanups, we will need much

more sophisticated methods than are now being used. For example, EPA’s recent groundwater protection strategy uses a classification

system for aquifers to set priorities. As discussed later, some sort of classification approach may be useful to establish cleanup goals

and priorities in an objective, orderly fashion;

these might include classification for restoration, rehabitation, and reuse of NPL sites. Without well-defined cleanup goals it is not possible to know if a permanent cleanup technology

exists for every site that needs permanent

cleanup, or even to know how to decide which

sites need permanent cleanup.

Concluding that a much larger Superfund

program is necessary is not the same as quickly

implementing the program. Moreover, if the

Superfund program is viewed as a short-term

effort, then large sums of money will probably

be spent ineffectively and future generations

will pay repeatedly for cleaning up wastes that

should have been rendered harmless years earlier, or that should have been safely managed

until they could, if possible, be treated.

From a policy perspective, substantial costs

and risks could result if the number of sites on

the NPL is underestimated. Thus, another important objective of the strategy’s initial period

is to resolve uncertainties about future needs.

This issue cannot be delayed without encountering high costs. Many festering sites

may go unattended, spreading contamination

and getting worse. Should impermanent

“cleanups” continue at many sites, they and

the sites receiving cleanup wastes could also

get worse, eventually requiring more expensive

work and large amounts of drinking water

might become contaminated. The resulting

“environmental deficit” could come due eventually and the Nation would face thousands of

sites requiring cleanup; few cost-effective, permanent cleanup technologies; not enough technical specialists; little time to control sites to

prevent great damage to public health and the

environment; and costs so great that they might

be impossible to meet. In other words, a planning mistake now based on an underestimate

of the national cleanup problem could result

in an environmental crisis years or decades

from now. Therefore, this study emphasizes

the importance of greatly reducing the uncertainty about future needs as soon as possible.

Policy Options: More specifically, Congress

may wish to consider the following legislative

options for CERCLA: 1) a policy statement on

the long-term nature of the program, 2) a policy statement on the explicit strategy to be pursued so Congress can evaluate the program’s

performance, and 3) a redefinition of the types

of responses to NPL sites and their intended

purpose.
Ch. 1—Surnrnary and Introduction ● 11

CLEANUP OF HOW MANY SITES, AND AT WHAT COSTS?

Most assessments have underestimated the

number of uncontrolled sites that may require

Superfund action. OTA’s work indicates that

10,000 sites (only considering waste sites) is a

more realistic figure for planning purposes

than EPA’s projection of about 2,000 sites.

Even OTA’s figure may prove conservative, but

the main goal here is not determining the

precise number of future NPL sites. Rather it

is important to consider the confidence policymakers can have in current estimates. OTA

does not dispute the need to clean the sites

already qualifying for placement on the NPL.

But many sites not now listed on or considered

for the NPL may also require cleanup.

At least 5,000 of the 621,000 operating and

closed solid waste facilities may require

cleanup (see table l-l). Hazardous substances

often leak from these facilities and contaminate

groundwater; at least 20 percent of current

NPL sites were solid waste facilities. About

1,000 operating hazardous waste facilities may

require cleanup, chiefly because of problems

with RCRA groundwater protection standards

that regulate about 2,000 of these land-based

facilities (see table 1-2). Finally, OTA estimates

that an improved site identification and selection process would add some 2,000 sites now

listed in EPA’s inventory of uncontrolled sites

to the 2,000 projected by EPA for the NPL. Important changes include: recognizing environmental as well as human health threats, using

national guidelines to evaluate sites, increasing emphasis on site identification, and removing the arbitrary cutoff score for placement on

the NPL. These changes will qualify more sites

sSolid waste facilities are governed by Subtitle D of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulatory program, There are a number of sources of hazardous substances

in these facilities, including some household wastes and industrial wastes not regulated as hazardous waste by RCRA or the

States. Concerning the latter, a forthcoming report by the Congressional Budget Office estimates that in 1983 over 26 mi]]ion

metric tons of hazardous waste were disposed of in sanitary landfills nationwide. A study for EPA has found that hazardous

wastes not so defined by RCRA are being disposed of in surface impoundments. (M. Chassemmi, et al, “Assessment of Hazardous Waste Surface Impoundment Technology—Case Studies

and Perspectives of Expert s,” May 1984. )

Table 1-1 .—Summary Data on Solid Waste Facilities

Percent of uncontrolled sites that are

solid waste facilities:

Of 1,389 sites with actual or presumed

problems of releases of hazardous

substances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180/0

Of 550 sites on National Priority List ., . . . 20°/0

Two most prevalent effects at problem

solid waste sites:

Leachate migration, groundwater pollution:

at 89°/0 of sites

Drinking water contamination: at 49°/0 of sites

Mean size of problem solid wastes sites . . 67.4 acres

Median hazard ranking score:a

Solid waste sites on the NPL . . . . . . . . . . . . 40.8

All NPL sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.2

Estimates for national number of

solid waste sites:

Operating sanitary, municipal landfills . . . . 14,000

Closed sanitary, municipal landfills . . . . . . 42,000

Operating industrial landfills . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75,000

Closed industrial landfills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150,000

Operating surface impoundments . . . . . . . . 170,000

Closed surface impoundments . . . . . . . . . . 170,000

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 621,000

Estimate of need for future cleanup:

Low: 5°/0 landfills, 1°/0 impoundments likely

to release toxic substances . . . . . . . . . . . 17,400

High: 10°/0 landfills, 2°/0 impoundments likely

to release toxic substances . . . . . . . . 34,800

Conservative figure used for cleanup by

Superfund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000

azfj,s ~~~uired for placement on National Priorltles List, current highest site score

IS 756

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

that pose threats to public health or the environment for cleanup,

OTA’s estimates are only semi-quantitative,

but an effort has been made to be conservative,

especially in view of the uncertainties of

cleanup actions by States and responsible parties. Furthermore, there is no reason to conclude that the additional sites pose substantially

smaller or more easily managed risks than

EPA’s 2,000. OTA’s projection of an NPL with

10,000 sites is consistent with the results of a

survey conducted by State officials which indicated a need to clean up about 8,000 sites.4

4

The survey, funded by EPA, was conducted of its members

by the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials IASTSWMO). With responses from 44 of its members, a report issued in December 1983 presented the following
12 • Superfund Strategy

Table 1-2.—Summary of Problems With RCRA

Groundwater Protection Standards Governing

Operating Hazardous Waste Facilitiesa

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Interim Status Facilities: Groundwater protection standards for these facilities are less stringent than for new

facilities, and most of them already are, or are likely to

become leaking sites.

Fixing Leaks: With confirmed groundwater contamination

there are no requirements that a facility be closed until the

leak is found and corrected, nor to even find or stop the

leak.

RCRA Coverage Limited to 30 Years: New facilities must

be designed not to leak for 30 years after closure during

which time the operator must maintain the facility, but later

when leaks are more likely CERCLA becomes responsible.

Contaminants Which Are Regulated: Because CERCLA

regulates more substances than RCRA, and detection

levels for other substances are set lower by CERCLA than

by RCRA standards, a permitted but leaking RCRA facility can become an uncontrolled site under CERCLA.

Tolerance Levels of Contaminants: Acceptable levels of

groundwater contaminants are not based on health effects,

and using detection limits of analytical techniques may

not be protective of human health.

Geological Standards: There are difficulties in predicting

groundwater movement or the rapid movement of contamination in some geological environments which make

early detection and correction uncertain at some sites.

However, RCRA has no facility siting standards to restrict

hazardous waste sites to geologically suitable locations.

Groundwater Monitoring: Technical complexity and site

specificity make it difficult for government rules to set the

conditions for effective groundwater monitoring.

Monitoring in the Vadose Zone: Although the technology

exists, RCRA standards do not require monitoring in the

land between the facility and underground water; hence,

an opportunity to gain an early warning of leaks is lost.

Test for Statistical Significance: Tests required by RCRA

keep the probability of falsely detecting contamination low

at the expense of high probability that contamination might

go undetected.

Corrective Action Delays: Complex RCRA procedures can

lead to delays of several years, increase cleanup costs, and

increase the chances of CERCLA financing of cleanup.

Compliance Monitoring and Corrective Action: Technology

does not necessarily exist to meet the RCRA standards

for taking corrective action, nor in all cases for compliance

monitoring, required after contamination is found.

aBe~a”~e of these problems, OTA has estimated that 50 Dercent of these facilities

may require cleanup by Superfund

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment,

findings: “At least 7,113 sites nationwide require some form of

remediation. These figures understate the extent of the nation’s

uncontrolled hazardous waste site problems because they do not

take into account the states not responding to our questionnaire.

Our members’ judgments on the number of sites needing response were significantly greater than the number of sites now

on the NPL. ” When EPA used the survey for its CERCLA 301

(a)(l)(E) study on State participation given to Congress in December 1984, the following statement appeared: “The most important observation . . . is that states’ estimate that over 7,000

sites require response (sic), although the scope of response for

The principal reasons why EPA’s projection

of a 2,000 site NPL differs so substantially from

OTA’s estimate of 10,000 are summarized in

table 1-3. (Note that EPA considered several

categories of sites that OTA ignored, such as

mining waste sites and leaking underground

storage tanks.) EPA has stated that a full examination of the problem of future sites could

lead to a situation where the costs “would overwhelm” the Superfund program. But OTA’s

point is that by acknowledging the full extent

of future needs, rather than underestimating

them, effective planning could prevent a crisis.

For planning purposes, an NPL with 10,000

sites implies a need for a much larger Superthese sites is likely to be less than for sites listed on the National

Priorities List. ” The latter observation did not appear in the

original report which also indicated that only about 10 percent

of known sites had been scored to evaluate eligibility for placement on the NPL. The States’ estimate of Superfund sites was

not used by EPA in its CERCLA 301 (a)(l)(C) study on future

Superfund needs also issued in December 1984. The usefulness

of ASTSWMO data has been shown by the fact that the States

were the basis for the 1983 estimate by OTA of hazardous waste

generation in the United States of about 250 million metric tons

annually, a figure over six times greater than the then current

EPA estimate, The figure of about 250 million metric tons annually was later verified by EPA and will be substantiated shortly

by the Congressional Budget Office.

Table 1.3.—Factors in EPA’s Examinationa of

Potential NPL Sites That Lead to a Low Projection

Site category: Factor

Solid waste facilities:

● Surface impoundments are not included, even though

all types now account for one-third of NPL sites, and they

are recognized as a major problem in EPA’s Groundwater

Protection Strategy

Ž No accounting for closed industrial landfills

● The basis for saying that there are only twice as many

closed municipal landfills as open ones is not given

Hazardous waste facilities:

● No accounting for the more stringent 1984 amendments

to RCRA and effect on number of failures of companies

● No consideration of the sites created due to failure of

EPA’s RCRA groundwater protection standards as

acknowledged in EPA’s Interim Status Ground-Water

Monitoring Implementation Study

Site selection process:

● Limited considerate ion of current site selection process

and potential changes in it

au,s ErlVlrOrlrnental protection Agency, “Extent of the Hazardous Release problem and Future Funding Needs-CERCl_A Section 301(a)(l)(C) Study, ” December

19s4.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 1 3

fund than previously contemplated, easily $100

billion or more over some decades. A better

estimate of future Superfund needs could be

made if more were known about the extent of

environmental contamination. For example, it

is unclear how many sites will require groundwater cleanup, which is the most costly type

of cleanup. Nor is it yet clear how advanced

technology might reduce the costs of permanently effective cleanups and provide solutions

that do not now exist. For example, although

it is sometimes possible to pump and treat contaminated groundwater at considerable cost

and time, it is not clear that an aquifer, once

contaminated, can be restored to a drinkable

condition. 5

‘See U .S, Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Protecting the Nation Groundwater From Contamination, OTA0-233 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1984).

In addition, it is difficult to estimate how

much money will be recovered from responsible parties and will be spent by industry and

the States for cleanups (for non-NPL sites and

for their share for NPL sites). A number of

States have not yet earmarked enough money

to provide their expected share of cleanup

costs. OTA has stressed estimating future national Superfund needs, without making specific assumptions about non-Federal spending

on the problem. Other estimates of future

Superfund needs often make explicit assumptions (leading to “adjusted costs” for Superfund) even though they are highly speculative.

Table 1-4 is a brief summary of several recent

estimates of future national unadjusted cleanup

costs and program lengths.

COSTS AND STRATEGIES

OTA has considered the implication of two

primary strategies (see chapter 3) on the costs

and duration of a program that must deal with

about 10,000 sites. The variable used by OTA

in its modeling of these strategies called the

“impermanence factor” describes in an average, statistical sense the extent to which interim actions result in unforeseen future costs.

It is an attempt to examine the consequences

of currently employing cleanup technologies

that are less than totally effective in the long

term. The impermanence factor can be interpreted in several ways, and the particular interpretation does not affect the results of this simple model. One simple way to think of the

impermanence factor is that it is the ratio, averaged over all sites, of the costs of successive

interim actions at the same site or on the same

wastes. That is, for example, for an impermanence factor of 0.5, 100 first interim actions

will result at some time in 100 second actions

at one-half the cost, which in turn result in 100

third actions at one-quarter the cost of the first

action, and so on. Other more complicated interpretations of the impermanence factor are

possible; these incorporate continuous operating and maintenance costs in addition to the

probability and/or cost of discrete repeated

actions.

Increasing impermanence factors signify increasing environmental risks and damages,

High impermanence factors indicate the use

of cleanups that are on average ineffective and

lead to future spending. Later in this chapter,

when the results of several case studies are

given, it is seen that an impermanence factor

greater than 1 for a specific site is possible. Experience to date with cleanups indicates that

rather high impermanence factors are likely

with the widespread use of containment and

land disposal for cleanups because these methods are known not to be permanently effective.6

Continuing operating and maintenance costs

can also account for a high impermanence

factor.

‘See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies and Management Strategies for Hazardous Waste Control, OTA-M-196 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, March 1983).
Table 1-4.—Current Estimates for Cleaning Up Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites

EPA (1 984)’ EPA (1983)2

Department of National Audubon

GA0

3 Commerce’ ASTSWMO5 CMA6

Society 7

Total costs (unadjusted)

billion) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10.0 -33.3 $10.3-20.6

Number of sites requiring

cleanup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,500-2,200 1,400-2,200

23-56°/0 require

groundwater

cleanup

Projected years to clean

sites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA 14 for 1,800

sites

$5.6-33.8 $10.5 $14.6-42.7 NA $29-92

1,270-2,546 546 NPL 7,113 (43 States 1,000 (27 States 2,200-7,000

23-56°/0 require 1250 non-NPL surveyed); 1,500 surveyed) 56°/0 require

groundwater 41 municipal most serious 3,681 (potential) groundwater

cleanup sites cleanup

NA 10-15 16-23 if NA 26-84

constrained by

personnel; 28-90

if constrained

financially

SOURCES

(1) U S Environmental ProtectIon Agency, “Extent of Hazardous Release Problem and Future Funding Needs, ” CERCLA SectIon 301(a)(l)(C) Study, ” December 1984

(2) U.S Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund Task Force Preliminary Assessment, December 1983.

(3) U.S General Accounting Office, EPA “s Pre//rn/nary Estimates of Future Hazardous Waste C/earwp Are Urrcerta/n, GAO/RCED-64-152, May 7, 1964.

(4) U.S Department of Commerce, “Estimated Costs and Expenditures for Cleanup of the Nation’s Uncontrolled Hazardous Sites” (draft), Feb 22, 19334

(5) Association of State and Terrltortal Solid Waste Management Officials, “State Cleanup Programs for Hazardous Substance Sites and Spills, ” Dec. 21, 1963

(6) Arthur D Little, Inc , Report to the Chemtcal Manufacturers’ Assoc!atlon, “An Analys!s of the Number of Inact!ve Hazardous Sites That Will Use Superfund,” July 1963.

(7) National Audubon Society, Testimony of Leslie Dach Before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Transpotiatlon, and Tourism, Mar. 1, 1964

I

I

I
Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 15

Two strategies are modeled: an interim strategy (which simulates the approach of the current EPA program) and a two-part strategy.

Both strategies are described and compared in

table 1-5 and figures 1-1 and 1-2. The impermanence factor is used in interim strategy; but

for the two-part strategy, it is simply assumed

Table 1-5.— Illustrative Scenarios for Two Different

Cleanup Strategies

Scenario 1: Interim Strategy Scenario II: Two-Part Strategy

Brief description:

Cleanups result in Initial response (at most one

repeated future costs. per site) over first 15 years

(Part l). After 15 years, for 90

percent of sites, permanent

cleanups, with no future

costs (Part II}.

System assumptions:

●

●

●

●

In Scenario 1, future costs depend on the impermanence factor and the average interim cleanup cost,

In Scenario II, future costs of initial actions depend

on the cost of permanent cleanup, which is taken at

900/0 of sites,

Total number of sites requiring cleanups = 10,546a

20°/0 of sites require groundwater (gw) cleanup.

Initial period (5 yr) budget = $5 billion; growth @

100% for each of next three periods then @ 20°/0

each successive period. b

Scenario assumptions:

Average interim cleanup Average initial response

costs: costs:

$6M per site $1M per site

$12M per site, with gw $3M per site, with gw

cleanup cleanup

Average permanent cleanup

costs:

$24M per site

$60M per site, with gw

cleanup

Breakeven program cost at $313 billion, breakeven

program length is 45 years.

On the basis of program cost alone; the interim

strategy is chosen if its average impermanence factor

is less than 0.73,

On the basis of program length alone, the interim

strategy is chosen if its average impermanence factor

is less than 0.25,

Overall, when the average impermanence factor is

less than 0,25, the Interim Strategy is preferred; when

it is greater than 0.73, the two-part strategy is preferred; for values in between, reduced program length

can be obtained with the two-part strategy at a cost

above that the interim strategy.

aln{tlal Iy 546 sites, 200 new sites per year for ye~rs 1.5. 800 new Sites Per Year

for years 6.10 and 1,000 new sites per year for years 11.15

bBUdgetS and total costs reflect total spending by all Pafll@s. not lust by the

Superfund program

cTlme to Inltlate 9000 of work T!mes are given for future costs Incurred over 30

years

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

that 90 percent of the initial cleanups will have

to be followed by a permanent cleanup during

the second part of the program. The total adjusted cost and duration of the program depends on a number of assumptions, such as the

average cost of site cleanup; the important assumptions are summarized in the table. The

program duration and costs shown in table 1-

5 and figure 1-1 do not represent what will happen in the future, but only what might happen

under certain conditions and policy decisions.

If a program duration of more than about 50

years is unacceptable, then under most conditions (i.e., levels of “impermanence” as discussed above) a two-part strategy offers both

cost and time advantages over an interim strategy. The results are similar for the other computer-simulated scenarios described chapter 3,

including those with a smaller NPL.

However, to the extent that the interim strategy modeled by OTA approximates the current

program, there are conditions under which the

current program could be viewed in a positive

manner. Much depends on the values for the

average impermanence factor for the remedial

cleanup technologies now being used. As discussed above, there are several reasons why

OTA believes that the average impermanence

factor is likely to be high, at least 0.5 to 0.7. If

this is the case, then a two-part strategy offers

time and probably cost advantages over the

current program (i.e., the interim strategy). If

the average impermanence factor were to be

low, say about 0.1 or 0,2 (i.e., remedial cleanups which had a low probability of leading to

unforeseen future costs), then a decision to continue with the current program would not lead

to undesirable consequences. Adoption of a

two-part strategy would still be a valid option

to consider because of the opportunities it affords for institution building, for quickly addressing most sites through initial responses,

and because the medium-cost, low impermanence actions of the interim strategy could

then be appropriate for part two. If, however,

the current program continued and

it became clear that the average impermanence

factor was high, then much money and time

could be wasted. The conclusion of OTA's
16 ● Superfund Strategy

Figure 1-1 .—Program Length v. Impermanence Factor (Scenario 1USG)

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

I

I

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Impermanence factor

Figure l-2.—Program Cost v. Impermanence Factor (Scenario 1USG)*

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

1

1 1

.

I 1 I

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Impermanence factor

“See also table 1.5 and “Costs and Strategies” section One simple way to think of the Impermanence factor

IS that It IS the ratio, averaged over all sites, of the costs of successive I ntertm actions at the same site or on

the same wastes
Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 1 7

analysis is that, in the face of important uncertainties, the two-part strategy is less risky and

more “fail-safe” in the sense that proceeding

with it is less likely to result in ineffective

spending.

policy Options: Congress may wish to consider including in CERCLA a statement on

what strategy the program is to pursue. More

specifically, Congress may wish to consider

directing EPA to: 1) examine the potential

cleanup problems of RCRA Subtitle D solid

waste facilities and to strengthen and hasten

the development of Federal regulations for: a)

the monitoring of a broad range of hazardous

substances at both open and closed sites, and

b) the future operation of open and new solid

waste sites; 2) reexamine its RCRA Subtitle C

regulatory program for hazardous waste land

disposal facilities, particularly the groundwater

protection standards, from the perspective of

minimizing the creation of future uncontrolled

sites; and 3) redesign its system of identifying,

assessing, and ranking sites for the NPL to reduce the likelihood of excluding sites that merit

cleanup. Congress may also wish to reexamine the policy requiring matching funds from

States, particularly the 50 percent match for

State and municipally owned and operated facilities. Already, the 10 percent State matching requirement for private sites presents an

obstacle to cleaning up some sites. The unwillingness, but not necessarily the inability, of

many States to provide their matching requirement might slow the national cleanup as much

as or more than almost any factor.

RESOLVING THE “HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN?” ISSUE

Identifying and quantifying risks to health

and the environment for the extremely broad

range of conditions, chemicals, and threats at

uncontrolled hazardous waste sites pose formidable problems, Risk management will have

to proceed even though there is no quick way

to determine the precise levels of cleanup. For

example, quantitative risk assessments cannot

be performed for most cases, except at considerable cost and time, as the necessary technical data do not now exist.

The paucity of documented, unambiguous

findings of adverse health and environmental

effects caused by uncontrolled sites does not

mean that such effects have not occurred or

will not occur. Nor is it inconsistent to say that

enough information exists to know that a site

presents significant risk to warrant action, but

not enough to know precisely what the level

of cleanup should be. Much better understanding is needed of adverse health effects from uncontrolled sites, and the work required by Congress is proceeding slowly. However, society

must understand that multiple exposures to

toxic chemicals at home, in the workplace, and

in the general environment make it difficult to

attribute causality to any one source of exposure,

A detailed framework for determining and

achieving cleanup goals that are nationally consistent in themselves or in the process used to

reach them, effective in protecting human

health and the environment, and appropriate

for site-specific conditions does not yet exist.

While there are a number of approaches to

establishing cleanup goals, none are simple or

easily administered. OTA has examined the

current ad hoc, highly flexible, and nonspecific

approach and six others. It finds that the current approach is not satisfactory and that more

explicit attention is warranted for this issue at

the highest policy levels. Without clear and

well-supported cleanup goals the selection of

cleanup technologies and the ultimate evaluation of cleanup performance will remain contentious.

Two approaches to establish cleanup levels

are not practicable technically or economically;

they are: 1) requiring sites to be restored to pristine or background levels, and 2) using best
18 ● Superfund Strategy

available technology. A third approach, the use

of existing environmental standards or criteria

for particular chemicals, will cover only a small

fraction of the broad range of the health threats

at uncontrolled sites and does not address all

environmental problems. However, this approach can be used to some extent. Two other

approaches, risk assessments and cost-benefit

analyses, present many difficulties and uncertainties but also offer ways to establish cleanup

levels.

One approach has been found to offer a policy framework for moving more forcefully

toward clear cleanup goals: it is to use information and decisions about restoration,

rehabitability, and reuse of the site to establish

cleanup levels. In particular, it appears worthwhile to examine in more detail how classifying sites according to their future use and other

site conditions can be used to select the process to set cleanup levels, as well as determine

how the site is managed more generally. For

example, the use of costly risk assessments

could be limited to high-priority sites where

reuse and rehabitation is certain. Cost-benefit

analyses could be used for sites where future

use may be limited or where risk management

options other than site cleanup (e.g., relocation

of residents) is practicable. For some sites

where exposures are small and reuse not an

issue, use of existing standards may be sufficient. Since this approach relates to land use,

it is clear that local communities would have

to be involved in decisions.

It is also necessary to address the extent of

action needed in initial responses. Generic

standards that consider both immediate reduction of exposures to hazardous substances and

the prevention of further deterioration while

the site is awaiting remedial cleanup would be

useful.

Policy Options: For risk management purposes, Congress could consider a Superfund

policy that: 1) first establishes environmentally

effective cleanup goals for a site, then 2) determines the cost-effective site response, and

lastly 3) implements the fund-balancing provision of the statute by considering how a site

cleanup or risk management decision affects actions taken at other sites. Congress may also

wish to consider two more specific options: 1)

having EPA develop an implementation plan

that establishes cleanup levels on the basis of

a classification of sites according to their future

use and other site conditions, and 2) designating a well-funded, high-priority interagency

program (e.g., EPA, Department of Health and

Human Services, Department of the Interior)

whose purpose is to more expeditiously and

comprehensively deal with the problem of obtaining more complete information on the

health and environmental effects of toxic

wastes.

DO WE HAVE AND USE EFFECTIVE CLEANUP TECHNOLOGIES?

The problems with using containment and

land disposal approaches to cleanup have

already been discussed. These technologies are

not likely to be effective over the many decades

corresponding to the lifetimes of some toxic

chemicals of concern. Even though they may

be proven technologies for their original applications in construction engineering, they are

not proven for long-term effectiveness in containing hazardous wastes. Nor are their immediate costs indicative of the likely total longterm costs, including monitoring, operation

and maintenance, and the costs of future

cleanup actions, especially for cleaning up contaminated groundwater. Table 1-6 projects

future uses of conventional containment technologies. Table 1-7 gives similar projections for

conventional treatment technologies; these existing technologies that can permanently clean

up sites are underused. These projections are
Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 1 9

Table l-6.—Future Use of Containment Technologies

Capital Projected level

Technique Applicability Effectiveness Confidence cost Cap/O&M of use

Barriers:

Slurry wall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 2 2 1 Extensive

Grout curtain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3 1 2 2-3 1 Limited

Vibrating beam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 2-3 2-3 1 Moderate

Sheet pile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1-2 2 2-3 1 Nil-Limited

Block displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 4 3 1 Nil

Hydraulic controls (wells) . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1,3 1 1 3 Extensive

Subsurface drains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 2 1 2 Moderate

Runon/runoff controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 1 1 2 Extensive

Surface seals and caps . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2,3 2 1 1 Extensive

Solidification, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1,3 3-4 2 1 Moderate-Limited

KEY’

Applicability:

1 = Very broadly applicable, Iittle or no site dependency 3 = Limited experience, used in other applications

2 = Broadly applicable; some sites unfavorable 4 = Developmental; little data

3 = Limited to sites of specific characteristics Capital cost for function provided:

Effectiveness 1 = Low

1 = Can produce “leak-tight” containment 2 = Normal

2 = Can reduce migration—some leakage likely 3 = High

3 = Used as supporting technique in conjunction with other elements Capita/ to operation and maintenance (O&M) cost ratio:

Confidence 1 = Capital higher than O&M

1 = Well proven—long-term effectiveness—high 2 = Capital about same as O&M

2 = Well proven—long-term effectiveness—unknown 3 = Capital lower than O&M

SOURCE A D Little, “Evaluation of Available Cleanup Technologies for Uncontrolled Sites, ” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,

Nov. 15 1984

Table 1-7.—Future Use of Treatment Technologies

Capital Secondary Projected level

Technique Applicability Effectiveness Confidence cost Cap/O&M disposal use of

Biological treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . Or, 1-2

Chemical treatment:

Neutral ization/precipitation . . . . In, 1

Wet air oxidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . Or, 2

Chlorination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In, 3

Ozonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Or, 3

Reduction (Cr) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In, 3

Physical treatment:

Carbon adsorption . . . . . . . . . . . Or, In, 1

Sedimentation/filtration . . . . . . . Or, In, 1

Stripping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Or, 2

Flotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Or, 2

Ion exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In, 3

Reverse osmosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . Or, In, 3

Gas stream controls:

Thermal oxidation . . . . . . . . . . . . Or, 1

Carbon adsorption . . . . . . . . . . . Or, 1

Incineration

Onsite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Or, 1

Off site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Or, 1

In situ biodegradation . . . . . . . . . . Or. 3

2

1

2

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1-3

1-2

1

1

1

1

2

1 1 1-2

1 1 2

2 3 1-2

2 2 2

3 3 2-3

2 2 2

1 2 2-3

1 1 2-3

1 1 2

1 1 1

3 3 3

3 3 3

1 3 3

1 3 2-3

2 3 1

1 3 NA

3 2 3

3

4

1

1

2

3

2-3

4

4

4

4

4

1

2-3

3

a

3

a

1

Moderate

Moderate-Extensive

Limited

Limited

Nil

Limited

Moderate-Extensive

Moderate-Extensive

Moderate

Limited

Nil

Nil

Limited-Moderate

Limited-Moderate

Limited

Moderate

Limited

NOTES:

a Mu st dispose solid residues 2 = Output may need further treatment; may 2 = Capital about the same

b Depen ds on reactive material used. have pockets untreated (in-situ)

KEY

3 = Capital lower than O&M

Confidence” Secondary treatmenf or disposal

Applicability 1 = Well proven—easily transferable to site 1 = None

Class. cleanup 2 = Minor

Or = Organic compounds 2 = Well proven—but not in clean-up settings 3 = Major, but does not require hazardous

In = Inorganic compounds 3 = Limited experience

Range

waste techniques.

4 = Developmental; little data 4 = Basically a separation process; must be

1 = Broadly applicable to compounds in in. Capita/ cost for function provided

dicated class

used with subsequent hazardous waste

1 = Low

2 = Moderated applicable” depends on waste

treatment or secure disposal step.

2 = Normal

composition concentration 3 = High

3 = Limited to special situations Capital to operations and maintenance (O&M) cost

Effectiveness basis

1 = Highest levels available 1 = Capital higher than O&M

SOURCE A D Little, “Evaluation of Available Cleanup Technologies for Uncontrolled Sites, ”

Nov. 15, 1984

contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,
20 ● Superfund Strategy

based on OTA’s evaluation of how these technologies meet the goals of permanently effective cleanups.

Not enough research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) is devoted to innovative

cleanup technologies. Many innovations exist,

but few have overcome institutional barriers

to their use. A major barrier is the lack of clear

criteria developed by EPA for judging their effectiveness for certain types of cleanups. Cleanup technologies should be judged effective according to their ability to destroy, detoxify, or

immobilize hazardous wastes and to decontaminate soil and groundwater (although it may not

be possible to clean or restore an entire aquifer

or even a portion of an aquifer). Summary data

on some innovative cleanup technologies are

given in table 1-8.

The long-term environmental and economic

benefits of permanent cleanups have not been

assessed properly or considered when cleanup

technologies are being chosen. Considering the

large cost of the Superfund program, spending more RD&D money on innovative cleanup

technologies could offer considerable economic advantages in the long term. To date,

EPA has not made a major commitment to

assist the development of innovative technologies. For the first 5 years of Superfund, EPA

will have spent no more than about $25 million on cleanup technology RD&D.

Policy Options: Congress may wish to consider establishing a program to fund RD&D of

innovative cleanup technologies that offer

promise for effective permanent cleanups at

lower total costs for a range of uncontrolled

site problems. Funding of perhaps $25 million

to $50 million annually for some years could

lead to substantial economic and environmental benefits when applied to a multibillion

dollar program over a number of decades.

Removing institutional barriers to the demonstration and use of innovative technologies also

can be examined. Such actions could include

directing EPA to: 1) reduce the time and cost

of obtaining RCRA permits for waste treatment

facilities, 2) establish protocols to evaluate new

cleanup technologies, 3) make it easier to obtain samples of waste and contaminated

materials from uncontrolled sites and transport

them to test facilities, 4) streamline the RCRA

procedure for delisting harmless residues of

waste treatment operations (residues are now

presumed to be hazardous wastes), and 5) continue to remove the bias in favor of land disposal over waste treatment options in Superfund cleanups, particularly by establishing a

procedure for performing cost-effectiveness

analyses that more accurately reflect the full,

long-term costs of impermanent technologies.

There is a particular need to address the problems facing small businesses (e.g., inability to

afford demonstration) attempting to enter the

cleanup market with new technologies.

ARE SUPERFUND EFFORTS RESULTING IN QUALITY WORK?

In case studies of Superfund cleanups by

OTA and others there is evidence of significant

problems in the quality of technical work. Federal oversight of contractor work, State efforts,

and private cleanups is not adequate. Lack of

coordination, redundancy of efforts, delays,

and high costs also result from the use of many

contractors, sometimes selected more because

of cost than technical competence, and from

the involvement of a number of Federal and

State agencies at each site.

Moreover, a shortage of experienced technical experts in several fields may explain a lack

of quality performance now and it may cause

a major bottleneck in an expanded Superfund

program. OTA estimates the demand for technical professionals (primarily, bachelors level)

to work on cleanups of uncontrolled sites may

rise from the present 3,750 to about 21,000 by

1995 and then stabilize at that level. This projection assumes an increased national cleanup

effort of about $4 billion annually from all
Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 2 1

3———00000000000000000000= = 0 0
22 ● Superfund Strategy

sources. Current educational programs may

not be able to prepare sufficient numbers of

some professionals, particularly hydrogeologists, and perhaps toxicologists, geologists, civil

engineers, and some types of chemists. But a

more critical problem is that the already strong

demand for people with a masters degree and

3 to 5 years of experience may increase and

not be met for the next decade.

Policy Options: If the Superfund program

is to be a long-term one, the Congress may wish

to consider: 1) funding various expanded training and educational programs, perhaps $5 million to $10 million annually for some years; 2)

providing funding for EPA to build up its inhouse professional staff in disciplines appropriate for cleanup work and oversight, perhaps

increased funds of $25 million to $50 million

annually; 3) making direct grants to the States

for their staff development, perhaps $25 million to $50 million annually for some years; and

4) directing EPA to reexamine: a) how it selects

and uses contractors, particularly with respect

to its emphasis on the cost of proposals rather

than technical qualifications; and b) how it involves government agencies at Superfund sites.

IS PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT ADEQUATE?

More emphasis is needed to address the

legitimate concerns of the public, improve public confidence in the Superfund program, and

promote effective public participation in site

identification, site assessment, initial responses, cleanups, and long-term monitoring.

EPA has concentrated on providing information to the public rather than involving the public in decisionmaking. An expanded public role

in the Superfund program might reduce delays

by dealing with community concerns before

substantial actions are taken and by providing

useful oversight of activities. Public participation, if given Federal support for obtaining

technical assistance, could lead to more effective cleanups for all communities, not just for

those who happen to be better organized or fortunate enough to have citizens with political

or technical expertise. Concerns about delays

caused by more public participation could be

addressed by using established methods of arbitration and mediation, for example. Public

education is also critical.

policy Options: Congress may wish to consider incorporating in CERCLA a mandate,

similar to that in other environmental statutes,

for public involvement in decisions that determine which sites are placed on the NPL and

the type of cleanups or other actions to be used

at Superfund sites. Providing Federal support

to aid communities in obtaining technical

assistance is also worth consideration.

FINANCING MECHANISMS

Many of the results of this study suggest the financing question in depth, it did examine the

need for a considerably larger Superfund pro- use of a tax on hazardous wastes currently gengram than the present one. A larger Superfund erated (generally referred to as a waste-end tax)

program would need to consider broadly based to help finance a Superfund program for the

funding and more extensive use of general tax near term.

revenues in contrast to the current emphasis

on the tax on chemical and petroleum A summary of the three principal sources of

feedstocks. While this study did not assess the funds—feedstock tax, waste-end tax, and gen-
eral tax revenues—is given in table 1-9. These

three sources could generate considerable

sums annually. If Superfund is expanded

greatly it may prove necessary to rely much

more on general tax revenues or some other

broadly based tax, as there are limits–perhaps

$1 billion to $2 billion annually–to the amount

that could be raised with feedstock and wasteend taxes. It should also be noted that this study

has examined uncontrolled hazardous waste

site cleanups only. Should other major uses of

Superfund be mandated by Congress, such as

a victim compensation program, long-term

Superfund requirements could be far greater

than $100 billion.

A waste-end tax could provide funding to

complement other sources, but of equal or

greater importance, it should be designed to

slow the creation of still more uncontrolled

waste sites. The tax could be large enough to

Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 2 3

provide an economic incentive for generators

to reduce the amount and degree of hazard of

their wastes and to shift management of waste

away from land disposal, the chief cause of

Superfund sites. Indeed, the greater the future

cleanup needs facing the Superfund program,

the greater is the need to stop creating still

more uncontrolled sites and to stop adding to

the mass of hazardous wastes at existing sites.

OTA and others have found that 20 States are

using waste-end tax systems effectively and

without major problems, A Federal waste-end

tax could be made simple to administer and

could generate from $300 million to $1 billion

annually over the next several years, before

waste reduction efforts reduce the tax base substantially. It would not be necessary or productive to displace State waste-end taxes, however;

a deduction for waste-end taxes paid to States

is possible.

Table 1-9.—Summary Comparison of Several Major Financing Schemes

Feedstock taxa Waste-end taxb

Current Expanded Low High General tax revenuesc

Fairness:

Very few companies Improved

pay most of the

taxes

Administrability:

Easy, established Probably easy

Secondary impacts:

None apparent Might reduce

international

competitiveness

of some

companies

Good, many parties Improved if land

pay disposal gets high

tax

Probably easy on Possibly more

basis of States’ enforcement

experience necessary

None likely Provides economic

incentive to reduce

wastes and shift

away from land

disposal, thus

capacity to raise

basic revenue

declines

Parties most directly

responsible for problems do

not bear burden

Very easy

With large amount may have

undesirable effect on

Federal budget

aBa~ed on tWe~ lmP~~ed on chemical and petroleum feedstocks which can be expanded by increasing tax rates and number of materials taxed

bBased on taxes on haardous wastes generated or managed, and may va~ according to how wastes are managed and what hazards Wastes pose, If the rateS are

high enough current management decis!ons may be affected Low less than about $10 per dry ton, high about $30 to $50 per dry ton

currently a small fraction (1 z 5 percent) from this source, but much larger amounts could be raised

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
24 ● Superfund Strategy

CLEANUPS BY RESPONSIBLE PARTIES

To a substantial extent, future Superfund

spending depends on how many sites are

cleaned up by responsible parties. Although

considerable sums have been spent by private

parties, the original users and operators of uncontrolled sites are worried that the current

program does not facilitate private responses.

The most frequently heard concern is that after

private cleanup many uncertainties about

future liabilities remain. Both in government

and the private sector there is interest in providing greater incentives for cleanups by responsible parties. Although various approaches

can be considered, including reducing future

liabilities, sharing costs, and aiding attempts

to use innovative cleanup technologies, sensitivity is needed to two problems addressed

in this study. Explicit, environmentally effective cleanup goals are needed whoever does

cleanup, and public awareness and effective

technical oversight by the Government are important for private cleanups.

OTA is aware that there now exists what

might be called a “quiet market” for cleanups.

Responsible parties are cleaning up sites, usually on their property, before the sites enter the

Superfund system and before public awareness

is awakened. Although these cleanups may be

done well, there are no assurances that these

actions (which will often make detection of the

sites difficult) are environmentally sound. Interestingly, one positive aspect of this situation

is that some new cleanup technologies are being given a chance to prove themselves under

field conditions. However, it is not clear that

information about positive and negative results

is being disseminated.

THE ROLE OF THE STATES

Congress has always envisioned the Superfund program to be a joint Federal-State effort.

States could clean up some uncontrolled sites

on their own (this has occurred to a limited extent), and States are required by statute to pay

for some of the costs undertaken under Superfund. However, there is evidence that a number of States are unwilling to meet their share

of cleanup costs, T At the beginning of the

Superfund program, States may have faced financial constraints; however, this does not

now appear in general to be the case. The ef7

For example, a recent study of State efforts to clean up uncontrolled waste sites reached the following conclusions: “States

appear less willing to shoulder the financial burden associated

with hazardous waste correction actions . . . While state

legislatures respond to the hazardous waste problem with policy statements, the allocation of state dollars does not necessarily

follow . . . The availability of federal dollars strengthens the

[needed response] linkage, the influence of hazardous wasterelated industry in state politics depresses it. ” (A. O’M. Bowman,

“Explaining State Response to the Hazardous Waste Problem,”

Hazardous Waste, vol. 1, No. 3, 1984, pp. 301-308.)

feet is that some cleanups have not and will

not take place because some States are not providing and may not provide future required

matching funds, However, it must also be

stressed that several States, usually those with

many uncontrolled sites, have established

means to raise substantial sums for cleanups

and do have extensive State programs (e. g.,

New York, California, New Jersey, and Illinois).

Under Superfund, States are required to pay

10 percent of capital costs (50 percent for publicly owned and operated sites) but all future

operating and maintenance (O&M) costs. The

selection of the cleanup approach used at sites

has been influenced by the availability of State

funds. The result is a bias on the part of States

for high “up-front” costs, usually meaning

more expensive and permanent remedies. But

this understandable State preference is counter

to EPA’s general preference for the use of containment and land disposal, which usually have

uncertain and high O&M costs.
Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 2 5

OTA finds little reason to believe that most

States could play a stronger role in the Superfund program, particularly if it were to be

greatly expanded, However, a small number

of States with many NPL sites could do so. On

the other hand, questions can be raised as to

why some States have not confronted their own

current and future needs in cleaning up sites.

The slowness of some States to devise ways to

raise funds for cleanups may be explained by

many factors, including: State priorities that

do not give a high rank to this environmental

problem; a “wait-and-see” attitude concerning

the matching share requirements of Superfund;

local obstacles to raising revenues for this purpose; and a perception of an uncertain and still

ineffective Federal program.

Another problem is that many States lack

technical know-how and people to assume major responsibilities for leading cleanups, or to

carry out other aspects of the Superfund program such as site identification, selection, and

long-term monitoring. For the most part, States

have difficulties obtaining experienced technical professionals, Even with current spending,

the demand for such professionals is so great

that most States cannot offer competitive

salaries.

Policy Options: If OTA is correct in its estimate of much greater future cleanup needs,

then Congress may wish to consider two options. First, Congress may wish to accept the

trend toward reducing the matching fund requirements for the States (as EPA has done) or

it may wish to allow de facto decisions on what

sites get cleaned up because of the unwillingness of some States to supply matching

funds. Alternatively, Congress may wish to

provide incentives for the States to retain or

expand their role in the Superfund program.

This could be done by providing near-term aid

to improve States’ technical staffs, arranging

for more effective Federal oversight, and directing EPA to establish an information transfer

program about cleanup technologies.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SUPERFUND ASSESSMENT

Congress has decided, and has reaffirmed

through oversight, the need for a national

Superfund program to clean uncontrolled

waste sites. Everyone understands that information on the scope of the problem is imperfect and incomplete. Scientific uncertainty

about adverse health effects is substantial and

data on environmental contamination are incomplete. But in the absence of an effective and

substantial cleanup program, releases of hazardous substances into the environment could

cause widespread damage to public health and

the environment long before these uncertainties can be resolved.

This Superfund report addresses the problems and issues in implementing and continuing the Superfund cleanup program, not in

justifying its fundamental need. The Superfund

program has achieved much, especially considering that it was a fast public policy response to a diverse set of newly recognized,

highly complex, technical problems. The basic

issue at hand, however, is to decide whether

it is necessary to change and improve the program so it can achieve its goals and, if so, how

to do this in the most economical and efficient

way by learning from the experiences of the

past 5 years.

OTA has not addressed all the issues surrounding Superfund. As in its earlier study,

Technologies and Management Strategies for

Hazardous Waste Control, a work that was

chiefly concerned with the RCRA program, the

focus has been placed on those issues with a

significant technical content,

Chapter 2 presents policy options for congressional consideration. The options are supported by the results and conclusions of the

other chapters. Some of these options are

38-745 0 - 85 - 2
26 . Superfund Strategy

broad, while others are specific. Several broad

policy issues directly and indirectly related to

the Superfund program, such as approaches to

financing Superfund and the role of the States

in the program are also discussed.

Chapter 3, a systems analysis, ties together

a number of technical and economic variables

of the national cleanup program. Two different

strategies are examined for their effects on total

program duration and costs under various

assumptions and constraints, such as number

of sites requiring attention and budget limitations, The strategies make use of an important

concept, the “impermanence” of cleanup actions, which assesses currently unforeseen

long-term costs following the immediate costs

of a cleanup. The difficult choices and tradeoffs facing policy makers are illustrated through

the use of scenarios comparing the two

strategies.

Chapter 41 addresses the issue of strategies

to achieve cleanup goals and examines the difficult issue of how to establish cleanup goals

that are protective of the environment, nationally consistent, flexible enough to deal with

site-specific situations, and administratively

feasible and practical. Resolution of this issue

affects the selection of cost-effective cleanup

technologies, selection of sites for action, and

evaluation of cleanup performance.

Chapter 5 considers the number of sites requiring cleanup and examines the future needs

of Superfund by assessing the extent to which

certain types of sites may merit cleanup, This

is an area of considerable uncertainty, but one

which is fundamental to policy decisions about

the nature and size of the national program,

The benefits of investment in a stronger institutional infrastructure—such as developing innovative cleanup technologies—increase with increasing size of the NPL.

Chapter 6 discusses cleanup technologies.

The purpose is to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the capabilities and

limitations of existing cleanup technologies,

and the problems involved in choosing among

them. It also examines the need for, potential

benefits of, and problems facing emerging,

innovative technologies, and the need for additional or different Federal research, development, and demonstration efforts. A variety of

cleanup technologies are necessary to meet environmental protection goals, and meet them

in the most cost-effective way.

Chapter 7 examines issues related to achieving quality work and assesses current and

future problems in achieving timely and effective cleanups at reasonable cost. Three areas

are examined: a) the performance to date of the

Superfund program; b) EPA’s oversight function at cleanups undertaken by EPA, States,

and private parties; and c) problems associated

with the need for highly specialized technical

personnel for site investigations and cleanups.

Chapter 8 considers public confidence and

participation and examines how the public currently is involved in Superfund cleanup activities. Perhaps more than other Federal environmental programs, Superfund has been shaped

by public demands. Yet the formal role of the

public in decisionmaking is limited by statute.

SUPERFUND SEEN THROUGH CASE STUDIES

OTA performed several major case studies usually focuses on numbers of various types

of Superfund sites to understand the problems of actions, numbers of sites and types of probconfronting the program and better define the lems at the sites, actual and potential damages

issues facing Congress in its deliberations over to health and the environment, levels of spendthe extension and possible expansion of the ing, and how these and other factors have

program. It is common to introduce the sub- changed over time. Such statistics are used

ject of Superfund with statistics. Such a review throughout this report.
Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 2 7

—

However, to introduce both the general subject and this report, OTA believes it is useful

to present summaries of case studies. OTA’s

engineering case studies, based on in-depth

analysis of how each site has been managed,

illustrate the difficult and diverse set of challenges facing the national cleanup program.

While there is some truth to the proposition

that each uncontrolled site is unique, it is also

true that sites share some common characteristics that become more obvious as the cleanup

program progresses. It is likely, therefore, that

these case studies can be instructive in learning how to improve the Superfund program.

For example, these studies reveal problems

associated with the current approach to establishing cleanup levels, with the quality of

cleanup work, and with inadequate technical

oversight by the Government.

The case study sites were selected because

they had received a good deal of response action that could be examined for effectiveness.

These sites all had major problems, though not

necessarily typical of all Superfund sites.

The Seymour Site

The Seymour Recycling Corp. (SRC) site in

Seymour, Indiana, was one of the first major

cleanup actions under Superfund. Although

land disposal sites are the most common operation requiring cleanup, the Seymour site illustrates how a processing or treatment facility

can also create substantial problems. Over a

lo-year period SRC established and operated

a facility where large amounts of hazardous

waste were sent for recycling and treatment.

Eventually, authorities discovered that these

wastes were not well managed. By 1978 the

State of Indiana found it necessary to file a lawsuit to get SRC to clean up an estimated 40,000

drums of waste in various states of decay, leakage, and disarray.

In 1980, after SRC had ceased operations,

EPA became involved through the Clean Water

Act. Limited containment actions costing less

than $1 million were taken, and two companies

voluntarily spent slightly more than $1 million

to remove their drums and place them in a

commercial land disposal facility. EPA estimated that total cleanup costs would be $25

million. Throughout 1980 EPA took legal actions against a number of parties, spent more

than $700,000 removing some wastes for incineration, and hired contractors to investigate

the groundwater.

In 1981, EPA took the position that Superfund should not be used at SRC because the

site did not present an emergency. The State

maintained it did not have the resources to

cover the 50 percent match ($15 million at that

time) required under Superfund for the cityowned site, As a result, EPA pursued an enforcement strategy based on getting responsible private parties, chiefly the generators of the

wastes, to pay for cleanup, To some extent,

EPA’s policy now is to use Superfund to clean

up NPL sites first and later try to get responsible parties to pay for the cleanup. Much seems

to depend on how urgent the cleanup is

deemed and on whether responsible parties are

known and financially able to contribute to the

costs.

Although the problem of States not being able

to pay for their matching requirement still

exists, current policy requires the 50 percent

match only when the local government also

operates the facility. This was not the case at

SRC. However, the State might have had difficulty providing even 10 percent of the $30 million required at that time. Currently the State

and city face the problem of the operating and

maintenance costs of an onsite treatment facility. This facility cleans surface water runoff before the water enters the local sanitary

sewer system. The runoff is quite contaminated, revealing that the surface cleanup (described below) left substantial contamination

in place.

During 1982 and 1983, two important events

took place. EPA reached a settlement with

some of the companies that had used the site.

Those companies agreed to spend as much as

$15 million for a surface cleanup, and EPA

agreed to eliminate their responsibility for

future subsurface cleanup, The issue of collecting money for groundwater cleanup (estimated

at $15 million but quite uncertain), is not re-
28 ● Superfund Strategy

solved; $5 million has been collected from

some parties. A major issue raised in this approach is the question of whether it is technically possible and administratively reasonable

to make a distinction between surface and subsurface cleanup.

Indeed, the case study has revealed that the

negotiated surface cleanup was not technically

sound. Although 1 foot of soil was removed,

there is no reason to think that all contaminated soil was removed. No testing was done

before or after the removal to demonstrate that

all contaminated soil was removed. No cleanup

goals were set for acceptable levels of residual

contamination in the remaining soil. Leaving

significantly contaminated soil at the site could

worsen groundwater contamination over time.

It should be noted that an early estimate judged

that 5 feet of soil would need to be removed;

removal of only 1 foot reduced removal costs

substantially to about $8 million. The surface

cleanup was completed in early 1984.

The surface cleanup simply extended the

fundamental approach used from the beginning; that is, for the most part, cleanup consisted of removing wastes and contaminated

soil from the site and sending them elsewhere

for land disposal. The issue of future problems

associated with land disposal sites that have

received removed wastes has become important, as the problems with the technical soundness of and regulatory control over operating

hazardous waste land disposal facilities have

become more evident.

During 1982 and 1983, the SRC site was

scored to determine its eligibility for placement

on the NPL. The site received a relatively high

score, in large part because an observed release

of hazardous substances into both surface and

groundwater was recognized, There are indications that there were problems with the attempts to assess air pollution from the site. The

air route for migration of hazardous substances

off the site appears to be the most troublesome

one for the NPL scoring system.

potentially large, costly groundwater cleanup

may be required. It is not clear yet, however,

exactly what the extent of groundwater contamination is, what the difficulty and costs

might be, what cleanup goals would be used,

and what the effect of the surface cleanup has

had on the groundwater problem. Nor is it

clear if groundwater cleanup will be delayed

until responsible parties agree to pay for it or

whether Superfund will be used,

Finally, the Seymour site illustrates the concept of impermanent cleanups leading to high

future costs (as discussed in chapter 3). About

$12 million has been spent thus far at Seymour

for initial responses involving site containment

and waste removal, surface cleanup involving

waste removal, and many studies and investigations, including the ongoing groundwater

work. Nevertheless, no permanent cleanup can

be said to have occurred. Future actions will

be required, including a probable groundwater

cleanup, a possible need to remove or treat

much contaminated soil, possible cleanup actions at land disposal sites that have received

wastes from Seymour, and continuing O&M

costs for the water treatment plant. Altogether,

future spending for this site is likely to surpass

what has already been spent,

The Stringfellow Site

The Stringfellow Acid Pits site near Glen

Avon, California, was used as a surface impoundment between 1956 and 1972, during

which time over 30 million gallons of a large

variety of liquid hazardous wastes were disposed there. The history of investigations and

actions at Stringfellow is longer than at most

Superfund sites. Much of the work, and many

of the misinterpretations of the site hydrogeology, occurred before Superfund was even

passed; EPA and Superfund are therefore late

arrivals on the Stringfellow stage. However,

just because the history is so long, and so much

happened so early, this case study is especially

rich,

The scoring of the site, results of various Original geological studies concluded that

studies, and the need to supply alternate drink- the site was on impermeable bedrock and that,

ing water to some residents suggest that a with the installation of a downstream concrete
barrier, there would be no damage of groundwater contamination. Therefore, the canyon

site was legally sanctioned as a hazardous

waste facility. Subsequent information and

events have revealed that the site was quite unsuitable for such a facility, and there have been

substantial amounts of surface and groundwater contamination over a period of years. In

fact, the site sits over the Chino Basin aquifer,

a major source of water for drinking and other

uses in an area serving about 500,000 people.

Even now, it is not clear whether there is a far

more serious groundwater contamination

problem than previously recognized, but recent

data suggest there is.

Early findings of groundwater contamination in 1972 were wrongly interpreted to be a

result of surface water runoff rather than

groundwater contamination. The same mistake

was made by other consultants in 1977. Undue

optimism about the suitability of land disposal

sites for hazardous waste disposal is not uncommon, as detailed data on the characteristics

of a location are usually lacking. One lesson

to be learned from Stringfellow is that problems can arise from having many different consultants, contractors, and government agencies

involved with cleanup studies and decisions.

The record indicates problems with inadequate

oversight of work by qualified government people, problems with redundant activities, and

problems associated with conflicts among many

local, State, and Federal agencies.

Now there is little doubt about the moving

plume of contamination in the groundwater,

and it is likely that it will enter the main flow

of the Chino Basin sometime in 1985. Downgradient wells 1 mile and more from the site

have revealed substantial contamination by

toxic chemicals in concentrations sufficient for

recertification of a drinking water supply. Alternate drinking water is being supplied to

some local residents.

In 1977, the option of total removal of all contaminated liquids and solids from the site was

estimated to cost $3.4 million. Two years later,

after inaction and heavy rains, this option was

still the preferred one, but the estimated cost

Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 29

was four times higher. A State agency, therefore, chose a lower cost option based on containment, which involved removing contaminated liquids and some contaminated soil,

onsite neutralization of soil with kiln dust,

placement of a clay cap, and installation of

monitoring and interceptor wells to deal with

groundwater. Both before and after this approach was implemented, large discharges of

contaminated water from the site flowed into

the downhill area of Glen Avon (800,000

gallons) and 4 million gallons of contaminated

water was disposed of at considerable expense

in a California land disposal site. This site (BKK

in West Covina) is now recognized to be leaking as well and was closed recently to hazardous waste. The Casmalia Resources landfill

that now receives 70,000 gallons per day from

Stringfellow was fined recently by EPA for inadequately monitoring the groundwater. Thus,

Stringfellow illustrates the problem of transferring risk from one community to another

when cleanup is based on removal of wastes

to land disposal sites.

Already about $15 million has been spent at

the site and all concerned acknowledge that no

permanent cleanup has been achieved. A permanent cleanup is still being studied by EPA,

but its cost could be very high. The State estimates it would cost $65 million. A program for

onsite treatment of contaminated groundwater

is now underway. But this, too, is not a permanent solution. The OTA case study has concluded that the unfavorable hydrogeology of

the site (e. g., fractured bedrock and underground springs) has frustrated all containment

attempts to date. Therefore, a commitment is

needed to excavate toxic wastes and contaminated soil, and store them onsite until the materials can be treated to render them as harmless as possible. As long as these materials

remain in the ground it will be necessary to attempt to extract contaminated water and treat

it at considerable O&M costs to the State. Even

so, there may well be further spread of contaminated groundwater in the surrounding aquifer

as extraction is not likely to be completely effective, It is not clear whether ongoing studies

to determine a cost-effective cleanup are ade-
30 ● Superfund Strategy

quately considering total removal and treatment of hazardous materials. For about 15

years, dependence on land disposal and containment at the site has not provided either environmental protection or cost effectiveness,

but it is still not clear that the cleanup solution

preferred originally—total removal of all contaminated liquids and solids—is being seriously

considered, since its near-term costs would be

quite high.

In all likelihood the eventual cleanup costs

for the site will far surpass what it would have

cost some years ago to remove materials and

even treat them. (The original plan was for

removal followed by redisposal in land disposal

facilities.) As time continues to pass, cleanup

costs are likely to mount, and cleanup may become infeasible if there is widespread contamination of more soil and groundwater. Indeed, actions other than cleanup may have to

be considered eventually. As in the previous

case, much money has been spent on impermanent “cleanup” of the site with a high probability that much more money will be spent in

the future for more permanent cleanup, expensive groundwater monitoring of a large aquifer,

and possibly for cleanup of the site that has

already received much waste from Stringfellow.

The Sylvester Site

The Sylvester site in Nashua, New Hampshire, was a former sand and gravel pit where

hazardous wastes were dumped illegally along

with solid wastes for 5 to 10 years through

1979, In addition to large quantities of nonhazardous materials, drums of hazardous

waste, bulk materials, and liquids were disposed in a 3-to 4-acre area. Various consultants

who have worked on the site used a figure of

about 240,000 pounds for the total weight of

hazardous waste deposited, based on an estimated 800,000 gallons of dilute liquid wastes,

and exclusive of 1,314 drums removed from the

site (see below). OTA finds that this figure

could be a significant underestimate.

State officials are confident, however, that

the figure of 240,000 pounds is substantially

correct, based on: 1) affidavits submitted by

several potentially responsible parties; 2) records of inspection and surveillance at the dump;

and 3) exploratory test pits and borings in the

solid materials in the pit above the water level.

But the purpose of test pits and borings is to

sample the site, not to examine all of it. Based

on the number of solid samples, and what they

contained, considerable amounts of waste

could be present, but undetected, in the volume

above the water level; that is, the possibility of

a significantly higher figure for total hazardous waste deposited cannot be rejected with

confidence on the basis of the sampling of solid

material at the site. (Groundwater sampling

seems to have well delineated the amount of

hazardous materials currently in the groundwater.) State officials have put considerable

confidence on the affidavits, inspection, and

surveillance, and OTA cannot judge how well

placed that confidence is. OTA notes, however,

that various documents speak of the site being

used for hazardous waste disposal for about 5

years, through late 1979, and agree that the site

was used for waste disposal of some sort for

10 years. A legitimate question can be raised

about how perfect inspections and surveillance

were likely to have been over this long period.

For example, such inspections and surveillance

did not prevent illegal disposal of hazardous

wastes at the site,

This site became eligible for Superfund

cleanup because in 1980 a wide variety of hazardous substances were found in groundwater,

surface waters, and air. It became clear that

a plume of contamination had seeped into a

brook which eventually fed into the Merrimack

River, a source of drinking water for Lowell,

Lawrence, and Methuen, Massachusetts. Several nearby private drinking water wells were

also threatened, and air pollution threatened

a nearby trailer park.

Early actions included supplying municipal

water to replace the private wells, removal of

1,314 drums (roughly 70,000 gallons) that were

visible and accessible from the surface for land

disposal elsewhere, installation of a security

fence and a number of groundwater monitoring wells, and, for about a year, operation of

a groundwater interception and recycle system
Ch. 1 —Summary and Introductlon Ž 31

to delay further seepage of leachate into the

nearby brook. The latter system has been restarted because of the delay in completing the

chosen remedial cleanup and because there is

an indication of greater than expected water

flow off the site.

The strategy adopted to cleanup the site was

to: 1) minimize the amount of water entering

and leaving the site through use of a slurry wall

around the area and a cap over it, and 2) clean

up the contaminated groundwater and contaminated soil through a complex water treatment

system. The latter system includes pumping

contaminated groundwater downgradient of

the site and discharging it upgradient, and

treating contaminated water by several techniques to remove a variety of contaminants. On

the one hand this strategy was bold and innovative. However, there are several uncertainties with this cleanup approach.

The slurry wall and cap system has been

much less effective than anticipated, The design predicted a 95 percent reduction in water

flow through the site, A year after installation

of the cap and slurry wall system, measurements of the outflow showed only a 39 to 67

percent reduction of the original flow; that is,

over five times as much water is flowing

through the system as was predicted. A hydrogeological study is underway to evaluate this

problem. On the basis of extensive modeling,

the hydrogeological contractor believes that the

cause of the leaky containment is water flowing under the wall, Some underflow was predicted because the bedrock is fractured, and

the contractor and the State officials now think

that the bedrock is more highly fractured than

originally estimated. Another possible contributing factor is problems with construction

during the installation of the wall. A further

possibility, which State officials reject based

on the hydrogeological modeling, is leakage

through the wall because of the degradation of

the wall by the contaminants in the water. The

possibility of chemical degradation of the

slurry wall has come up several times in contractor reports, and a recognized side-benefit

of the water treatment systems is that the flows

it sets up would protect at least part of the wall

from the contaminated water in the site.

The reduced effectiveness of the containment system will not cause major problems if

the treatment system removes the contamination to the degree predicted. The design of the

treatment system assumes that nearly all contaminants will be flushed out during the relatively brief period (about 2 years) currently

planned for treatment. However, to the extent

that there is uncertainty about the quantity and

particularly the nature of waste that may remain in the soil and in the portion of the site

above the water level, there is uncertainty

about the long-term effectiveness of the

groundwater cleanup. The cleanup may succeed in removing contaminants from groundwater in several years, as the operation of the

pilot plant indicates, and still leave waste that

will leach out over time, recontaminating

groundwater. If this should occur, the containment system will not be capable of preventing

the new contamination from flowing offsite.

Prudence suggests that extensive monitoring

of groundwater will be needed at Sylvester for

a long time, and that a contingency plan be developed to deal with recontamination should

it occur.

The cleanup goals established for the site required a hundredfold reduction in the release

of contaminants from the site. The goals were

based on: 1) meeting the acceptable lifetime exposure level for inhalation of chloroform, the

most serious of the airborne pollutants from

the site; and 2) meeting water criteria at the

Lowell intake of the Merrimack River, with

arsenic as the chemical of greatest concern.

This attempt to set explicit goals was commendable. As EPA and the State recognize,

however, the early emphasis on arsenic was

misplaced, The background levels of arsenic

in the area are very high; the arsenic levels in

the Merrimack are about 1,000 nanograms per

liter (rig/l), and the contribution of Sylvester to

Merrimack of arsenic would be only about 15

rig/l. This contribution is relatively unimportant, and by itself, probably not worth the cost
32 ● Superfund Strategy

of stringent cleanup. However, there are several other toxic chemicals predicted to exceed

water quality criteria at the Lowell intake, and

other toxic chemicals at high levels for which

criteria have not been formulated; the background levels at Lowell for these are likely to

be lower, relative to the Sylvester contribution,

than is the case for arsenic. If so, these chemicals are appropriate ones on which to formulate cleanup goals based on water quality.

When only the chemicals for which water quality criteria exist are considered, the cleanup

goal is similar to that originally proposed on

the basis of arsenic.

In the case of Sylvester, it is not yet possible

to evaluate the effectiveness of the cleanup

strategy. If State officials are correct in their

estimate of the nature and quantity of the hazardous waste disposed at Sylvester, the cleanup

will be permanent. If not, future costs could

raise the total cleanup costs significantly above

the currently estimated $13 million,

Other Case Studies on Completed Cleanups

Recently a study was performed on six NPL

sites cleaned up under the Superfund program.

These six sites had fewer problems than the

OTA case study sites, but they too can be instructive. 8 The report questions the widespread

impression that the Superfund program has

permanently cleaned up six dangerous hazardous waste sites. According to its evaluation,

which OTA finds valid, there were thorough

cleanups at two of the sites (Chemical Minerals

Recovery and Walcott Chemical) which posed

only minor hazards. A thorough cleanup was

done at the Luminous Processes Site, but some

problems remain, including the need for medical testing of former workers exposed to

radium. But actions at three sites (Chemical

Metals Recovery, Butler Tunnel, and the

Gratiot Country Golf Club) have not been permanent cleanups. Surrounding communities

fIR. C. Bird, Jr., and M. Podhorzer, “Evaluations of the Six National Priority List Sites Delisted by the Environmental Protection Agency” (Washington, DC: National Campaign Against Toxic Hazards, Oct. 24, 1984).

still could be exposed to serious hazards, and

future cleanups may be necessary.

The Luminous Processes, Inc., facility

(Athens, Georgia) was a radioactive watch and

clock dial painting operation initially licensed

by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1952.

The plant used considerable quantities of

radium until it was forced to close in 1978 due

to repeated violations of Federal and State regulations. The company was also required to

decontaminate the facility, which was heavily

contaminated with radium-226. Investigation

and limited removal of contaminated materials

began in 1979. However, most of the cleanup

was accomplished with Superfund assistance,

This work began in 1982, 3 years after the site

was abandoned by Luminous. Overall, the

study finds a thorough job was done. About

15,000 cubic feet of radioactive soil was barreled and transported to a low-level radiation

facility in Richland, Washington. The building

was also cleaned. A slab of concrete was

removed from the floor; testing revealed that

soils below the building were not contaminated, The study does point out that monitoring and cleanup may have missed contaminated layers below the level of testing (3 feet

in most cases). No monitoring of test wells was

conducted to detect potential radiation at

deeper levels or possible groundwater contamination. Furthermore, the grounds were not

surveyed for the possibility of waste burial, a

frequent practice at many plants. Also, there

has been no medical testing of former employees for radium contamination effects.

The Chemical Minerals Recovery sit e

(Cleveland, Ohio) was a warehouse that had

been used for less than 1 year as a temporary

storage facility. The warehouse was closed

down by judicial order after a fire, It was near

collapse, and contained 700 drums of various

chemicals, plus another 700 drums outside.

Both the company and the property owner

refused to clean up the site. EPA approved immediate funding of $205,000 in November

1981. The removal was completed in May 1982.

There was little reason to believe that significant amounts of chemicals had been spilled
Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction ● 33

into the ground or remained below the surface,

Cleanup in this case consisted of removal to

another land-based facility.

The Walcott Chemical Co. site (Greenville,

Mississippi) consisted of two warehouses. Both

were in poor condition, but only one was designated as a Superfund site. It became an NPL

site because the State chose it as its priority site,

not because it scored high enough. The first

problem with the site in April 1981 occurred

when a fire official filed a fire and explosivity

hazard complaint. EPA investigated the site in

July 1981 and soon thereafter the property

owner cleaned up the site by removing the

wastes to a land disposal facility, There was

no evidence of spilled materials and in July

1982 the site was judged clean.

The Butler Tunnel (Pittston, Pennsylvania)

cleanup dealt with discharges of oily wastes

into the Susquehanna River, but not with the

remaining wastes and contamination in the

tunnel itself. The initial incident occurred in

July 1979 prior to the Superfund program. At

that time, tens of thousands of gallons of wastes

began discharging from the old coal mining

tunnel; discharges continued through March

1980. Pollution was detected in the drinking

water of Danvers, 60 miles downstream. Federal funding for the response came entirely

from funds provided under Section 311 of the

Clean Water Act. The original discharge drew

a quick and thorough response, EPA and State

agencies cleaned up the large spill on the river

and took steps to monitor and prevent future

damage. Substantial evidence exists, however,

to indicate that significant quantities of toxic

chemicals still exist in the tunnel, These pose

threats to residents living above the tunnel,

Cyanide gases in dangerous concentrations

have reached the surface through boreholes to

the tunnel, which are common in the area and,

for the most part, not tested. In June 1980, EPA

believed that it had identified the location of

the “mother lode” of the wastes in the tunnel,

but funding was suspended. Further cleanup

was abandoned, In 1983, the State investigated

whether dangerous chemicals from sediment

contamination may be accumulating in fish,

which are caught and eaten, The study has not

been made public,

The Gratiot Country Golf Club site (St.

Louis, Michigan) was a sanitary landfill; cleanup consisted of relocating the problem. The

Velsico Chemical Co. used the 3,5-acre site on

the Pine River to dump and burn toxic industrial chemicals between the 1930s and 1970s.

In November 1982 Velsico signed a consent

agreement with the State and EPA, under

which it agreed to spend $38 million to clean

up the site and two others across the river.

Velsico was to remove soil to a level of 3 feet

below where any chemicals were identified

through testing. About 68,000 tons of soil were

removed to the company’s site across the river,

where they were placed on a clay liner and

under a clay cap. In other words, wastes were

land disposed in a sensitive area. In addition,

1.25 million gallons of contaminated water

were disposed of in a deep well, raising questions about future leakage. The company was

not required to conduct a health effects study,

nor was it required to consider the feasibility

of removing highly toxic chemicals from river

sediments. Even now, for 60 miles downstream,

the State warns against fish consumption.

The Chemical Metals Industry site (Baltimore, Maryland) consists of two properties in

a commercial and residential section, on both

sides of a group of 20 row houses. Initially,

there were reported complaints of eye, nose,

and throat irritation during spills that occasionally forced residents to leave. There were also

burns to children and animals playing in the

area, and runoff into one of the neighboring

basements. The company never had a permit

to handle hazardous materials, and it was shut

down in August 1981, EPA investigated the facility, determined that it presented an immediate threat, and that it warranted an immediate removal action. Approximately 1,500 drums

of hazardous materials were removed for land

disposal, Significant levels of contamination

were detected as deep as 15 feet, but less than

1 foot of the contaminated soil was removed
34 ● Superfund Strategy —

for disposal. No action was taken to intercept there is a threat of contamination of the Gwynn

the migration of chemicals into groundwater, Falls tributary. It is also likely that toxic gases

despite evidence of contamination. Although are escaping into neighboring basements.

local residences do not use the groundwater,
Chapter 2

Policy Options
Contents

Page

Choosing a Strategy for the Superfund System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

A Two-Part Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Generic Strategic Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Goal l: Comprehensive and Effective National Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

A Long-Term Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Funding Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Coping With Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Funding Increases Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Spending by Responsible Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Matching Funds From States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Other Uses of Superfund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Program Duration and Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Financing Superfund. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Goal 2: Accurate Estimates of the National Problem.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Goa1 3: Initial Responses at all Priority Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

The Nature of Initial Responses in the Two-Part Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Better Use of unimproved Hazard Ranking System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

Technical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Economic Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Goa1 4: Implementation Needs of a Long-Term Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Resolve the Cleanup Goals Issue and Address Scientific Uncertainties . . . . . . . . . . 53

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Technical Staffs, Support, and Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Detailed Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Public Participation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

List of Tables

Table No. Page

2-1.

2-2.

2-3.

2-4,

2-5.

Summary Comparison of Several Major Financing Schemes, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Summary of State Waste-End Tax/Fee Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Illustration of Applying a Hazardous Waste-End Tax by Management Activity 47

Illustration of Applying a Waste-End Tax to Land Disposed Waste:

Degree of Hazard Based on Toxicity.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Illustration of Applying a Waste-End Tax to Land-Disposed Waste:

Degree of Hazard Based on Reportable Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Chapter 2

Policy Options

CHOOSING A STRATEGY FOR THE SUPERFUND SYSTEM

OTA finds that a detailed strategy for planning and evaluating the Superfund program

has not been formulated explicitly. Instead, a

combination of alarmed public responses to

events, congressional mandates, Federal policies, and Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) management decisions have resulted in

ad hoc program policies. Consequently, a national consensus has not yet emerged on

whether Superfund is to be a well planned,

multi-decade program, or a short-term, emergency effort.

Congressional] debate on reauthorization of

the Superfund program and its funding levels

can be viewed in two ways. Both views recognize that much can be learned from the program’s early efforts:

●

●

The first view is that the current program

is progressing and evolving and becoming

more effective, The ad hoc nature of the

program provides flexibility to respond to

new information and experiences,

An alternate view is that the early lessons

learned from Superfund can be applied

now to change the program, and that

enough information has been collected to

define a more explicit strategy for policy

and program implementation.

OTA has examined the accomplishments of

the Superfund program to date. Some significant changes have already been made. Although EPA is discussing still more changes

in the program and has made some proposals,

it is not possible at this time to know what

changes will be made and, importantly, how

they will be implemented.1 Thus, a critical

i I;or example, on Jan. 28. 1985, EPA a nnoun[, ed proposed revi-

~ions I n Su~)~;rf’und National (contingency Plan; the puhlic has

a n ()~}~x)rt u n it j t f} rcspon(] to t he p ro[msa I a nd, hen( ,e. i t is not

known u’hat (,han~es uil] finallj’ be ma(ie. one of tbr ma]or

f:har]gc~ re+(lnlblc+ t~’hat ()’I’A h~s stressed in the first ]XI rt of

choice for Congress centers around how much

confidence it and the public have in EPA’s

determination and institutional capabilities to

improve the Superfund program in an evolutionary manner.

The situation is complicated by Superfund’s

relationship to other national issues. For example, increases in Superfund budgets are related

to national budgetary and fiscal issues and the

state of the economy. It is inevitable that Superfund will be compared to the progress of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),

enacted in 1976, the other major Federal environmental program that deals with hazardous

waste, Congress recently culminated extensive

examinations of the RCRA program with a reauthorization that includes substantial changes

in its policy and implementation, It is not clear

whether the Superfund program could evolve

into a more effective program in a smoother

fashion than RCRA has, but it might.

Many of the findings of this study support

the second view—that it is time to change the

Superfund program—because: 1) proceeding

with the current program poses significant

uncertainties and risks, and 2) the absence of

an explicit Superfund strategy makes it difficult for Congress to evaluate the long-term consequences of important decisions.

There are three concerns with continuing

with the current program. First, a program focused on site-specific problems and needs does

not necessarily lead to a national program that

the two-part strategy: quickly taking more effect i~e i nit Ial res]mnses at N PI, sites, without requirin~ State matching fun(is

unless the facility was owned by the State. However, there remains considerable emphasis on using removal for red isposal.

Another change wrIIIld be the circumvention of the Hazard RankI ng System, which (I’I’A be] i eves could be i m proved, for sites

where health effects were known to be important. Other changes

con(:f:rning clf?anuj) goals and public participation do not fully

a(i (i r[:ss the prohlerns (ITA fou nrl.

37
38 ● Superfund strategy

is effective environmentally and economically.

This study indicates that as the National Priorities List (NPL) increases (even if only to

EPA’s projected 2,000 site level), it will no

longer be efficient or effective for the program

to respond to problems that capture public attention on a site-by-site basis. Nor is it prudent

to ignore inter-site effects. The technical and

institutional complexities of individual uncontrolled site problems should not overshadow

the interlocking technical, social, and economic components of the national Superfund system. Conflicts arise between the needs of individual sites and the limits on a national

program. The future will demand a thoroughly

discussed and explicit Superfund strategy.

Second, there is evidence that the scope of

the national uncontrolled site problem has been

underestimated. If this is true, an unmanageable environmental crisis might occur years or

decades from now. The environmental deficit

created today could come due in the future.

Many cleanups in the current remedial cleanup

program are costly and, because they are not

effective in the long term, all too frequently

need repeated expensive work at the same sites

or on the same wastes. Detailed national cleanup

goals or a process to achieve them and to select cleanup technologies and evaluate their

performance have not been formulated. In the

absence of goals, the least costly alternative

may look effective because of the way the

cleanup requirements are set. Even best available technology may not be able to achieve adequate or effective environmental protection at

some sites over the long term (see chapter 4).

Third, many, if not most, uncontrolled sites

have not received significant cleanup attention

of any sort other than removal of waste. This

may get worse as more sites are added to the

NPL, It is likely that every site which merits

placement on the NPL, because it is found to

require a long-term (i.e., permanent) remedial

cleanup, would also benefit from an initial response to: 1) provide environmental protection

during the long time it is awaiting remedial

cleanup, and Z) ensure that the site does not

get worse during this period. While it may be

suggested that some sites may not need initial

responses, the benefits of doing so for all NPL

sites, if the costs are kept low, are likely to

outweigh the costs of not doing so.

However, a case can be made for continuing with the current Superfund program. Chapter 3 shows that, to the extent that the interim

strategy modeled by OTA approximates the

current program, there are conditions under

which the current program can be viewed in

a positive manner. Much depends on the values for the average impermanence factor (described in chapters 1 and 3) for the remedial

cleanup technologies now being used, It has

not been possible for OTA to obtain data on

a large number of current Superfund sites to

calculate values for the impermanence factor

(i.e., basically the extent of unforeseen future

costs). However, detailed work on several case

studies of Superfund sites (see chapter 1), an

analysis of future operating and maintenance

costs (see chapter 3), and the conclusion that

containment and land disposal technologies

are not permanently effective, z indicate that

rather high impermanence factors are possible for many sites. OTA believes that the current program’s average impermanence factor

is likely to be at least 0.5 to 0.7. If this is the

case, then the two-part strategy defined below

offers time and probably cost advantages over

the current program.

If the average impermanence factor were to

be low, say about 0.1 or 0,2 (i.e., remedial cleanups that had a low probability of leading to unforeseen future costs), then a decision to continue with the current program would not lead

to undesirable consequences. Adopting the

two-part strategy would still be a valid option,

however, because of the opportunities it affords

for institution building, for quickly reducing

risk at most sites through initial responses, and

because low impermanence actions of the interim strategy could also be used. If, however,

the current program continued and it became

clear that the average impermanence factor

was high, much money and time could be wasted.

‘See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, ‘~echncr]ogies and Management Strategies for Hazardous Waste f;ontroJ, OTA-h’f-196 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

office, March 1983).
Ch. 2—Policy Options . 39

OTA concludes that, in the face of important

uncertainties, the two-part strategy is less risky

and more fail-safe than Superfund’s current ad

hoc strategy and less likely to result in ineffective spending.

For all these reasons, OTA finds that: 1) even

though some sites are being worked on, from

a national perspective the current strategy can

be judged to be both environmentally and economically unsound; and 2) the two-part or permanent strategy OTA has examined offers a

number of advantages.

A Two-Part Strategy

The two parts of OTA’s strategy overlap in

time, but differ in their focus and priorities.

(I) In the near-term, for perhaps up to 15

years, the strategy would focus on: a) early

identification and assessment of potential NPL

sites, b) initial responses to reduce near-term

threats at all NPL sites and to prevent sites

from getting worse, c) permanent remedial

cleanups for some especially threatening sites,

and d) developing of institutional capabilities

for a long-term program (see below). A substantially larger Superfund program would be needed

in the next 5 years to carry out these efforts.

Initial responses that accomplish the most costeffective and significant reduction of risks and

prevent sites from getting worse might cost

about $1 million for most sites. This is three

times the current cost of immediate removal

actions and about 10 percent of EPA’s currently projected remedial cleanup costs. Case studies by OTA and others find that both immediate

removals and remedial cleanups are ineffective

for their intended purposes. Under the two-part

strategy, initial responses would emphasize

covering sites and temporarily storing wastes

and contaminated materials to reduce groundwater contamination and, where technically

and economically feasible, excavating wastes

to minimize releases into the environment.

(II) Over the longer term, the strategy would

perform more extensive site studies and focus

on permanent cleanups, when they are technically feasible, at sites that pose significant

threats to human health and the environment

(unless private or State-funded cleanup actions

offering comparable protection have taken

place). These cleanups would draw on the institution building that occurred during the first

phase. Spending large sums before specific

cleanup goals are set and before permanent

cleanup technologies are available leads to a

false sense of security, a potential for inconsistent cleanups nationwide, and makes little

environmental or economic sense.

This two-part strategy resembles what is

sometimes done in the current program. For

example, in the case of the sites in Missouri

contaminated by dioxin, large amounts of contaminated soil may be temporarily stored until cost-effective permanent solutions become

available. Testing and evaluation of permanent

solutions are proceeding.

One of EPA’s most experienced Superfund

contractors has proposed a strategy almost

identical to this one:

Realizing that there are significant shortfalls

in or current knowledge of destruction technologies and that permanent containment is

not a solution, I propose the following strategy: Destroy what contamination we can and

hold the rest in temporary containment until

a permanent solution can be found. a

Similarly, another of EPA’s major Superfund

contractors has cited the need for a two-phase

approach:

At these complex sites, although not widely

recognized, there are typically two distinct

phases or remediation. The first is an immediate action which usually lasts from 1 to 2

years. This phase is very site-specific and is

very effective for the amount of money spent

in that it dramatically and quickly reduces the

threat to public health. The second is a complex and expensive long-term action which

could last from 2 to 20 years or even 30 years.4

sWilliam A. Wallace, CH2M Hill, Inc., testimony at hearings

before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation,

and Tourism, 1983, Serial No. 98-128,

4Gary A. Dunbar, Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., testimony at

hearings before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism, 1983, Serial No. 98-128,
40 ● Superfund Strategy

Generic Strategic Goals

OTA suggests four major goals that the twopart strategy or indeed any strategy for a longterm Superfund program should be able to

meet:

1. provide nationally effective, long-term protection of public health and the environment at the lowest possible cost from the

threats posed by uncontrolled hazardous

waste sites.

2. Rapidly identify all uncontrolled sites and

avoid underestimating the national cleanup problem. Use site selection criteria for

the NPL that are consistent with the first

goal.

3. Assure the public that they are being protected while they wait for remedial cleanups. That is, in the near-term give the highest priority to providing initial responses

at all NPL sites in order to quickly and

sharply mitigate immediate threats to public health and the environment.

4. Address the institutional needs of a longterm program. For example, develop and

demonstrate the effectiveness of new permanent cleanup technologies, improve institutional capabilities of Federal and State

agencies, resolve scientific uncertainties,

improve public participation in decisionmaking, and develop a detailed strategic

plan to implement a decades-long effective

Superfund program.

OTA finds that the present program falls

short of meeting these goals. Discussion of

these goals, the means for their implementation, and the policy issues they raise are given

below. References are made to the findings and

conclusions of other chapters which the reader

can consult for further details.

GOAL 1: COMPREHENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE NATIONAL PROTECTION

Because of urgency and limited resources,

the initial Superfund program has fallen short

of providing comprehensive and effective protection. This is probably a consequence of the

original emergency nature of the program. For

example, contrary to the statutory mandate,

sites that pose threats to the environment but

not to human health do not enter the Superfund system. A different strategy responding

to the same conditions and constraints might

have brought such sites into the program, but

with a different priority and management approach. Loss of natural resources and effects

on sensitive elements of the ecosystem, important in themselves, may also lead to substantial indirect effects on human health and welfare. Even for threats to human health, the

current system is likely to exclude sites that

threaten relatively small numbers of people.

Sites that pose uncertain long-term health effects may not be given as high a priority as less

ambiguous acute effects.

Congress can meet this goal through clear policy directives, provision of adequate budgets,

and effective oversight of Federal programs.

A Long-Term Program

A most important policy issue for Congress

to consider is whether Superfund should be

continued as a long-term program. If so, the

initial steps would include directing EPA to

plan for a long-term program and providing it

with resources to implement a multi-decade

program. Without a commitment to long-term

funding, comprehensive protection based on

a long-term strategy will be difficult to achieve.

Therefore, Congress might reconsider the

current approach of authorizing Superfund for

5-year periods. Should a longer period than 5

years be used for authorization, budgeting

could still be done for shorter periods based

on the scope of the national problem and the

progress of the program,
Ch. 2—Policy Options ● 41

Funding Levels

Based on the analyses in chapters 3 and 5,

OTA concludes that a multi-decade Superfund

program could easily require about $100 billion of Superfund resources out of total costs

to the Nation of several hundred billion dollars.

Note that an NPL considerably smaller than

10,000 sites would not alter OTA’s principal

conclusions about the need for an improved,

better defined Superfund strategy encompassing well understood cleanup goals and the development of new technologies effective over

the long term. (See chapter 5 for derivation of

the 10,000-site figure.)

The estimate of the costs to Superfund contains many uncertainties. Consequently, the

estimate could be too high or too low depending on:

• The number of sites that qualify for the

NPL.

—OTA’s estimate that 5,000 solid waste

sites (RCRA Subtitle D sites) may become future Superfund sites might be

low; this figure is only about 1 percent

of OTA’s estimate of the Nation’s open

and closed solid waste sites. Moreover,

improving the site-selection process by,

for example, removing the cutoff score

for NPL placement and recognizing environmental threats, might lead to more

than the 2,000 additional sites estimated

by OTA. OTA did not include in its estimate of future uncontrolled sites several

categories which even now are being addressed by Superfund and which will almost surely increase in number. Examples are leaking underground storage

tanks, mining waste sites, and pesticide

contamination sites.

–However, it is also possible that OTA

may have overestimated the number of

sites to be placed on the NPL. In particular, perhaps groundwater problems and

threats from solid waste facilities have

been overstated. With EPA’s current

groundwater protection strategy, many

aquifers may not be classified so as to

require cleanup; this possibility deserves

detailed examination by Congress.

● National cleanup goals and the costs of

cleanup.

—National cleanup goals might lead to

levels of cleanup that would be more expensive than indicated by experience so

far, and cleanup costs for treatment of

wastes may be underestimated, Waste

treatment costs are typically two to eight

times greater than the immediate costs

for land disposal. But the costs of waste

treatment technologies may decrease because of technological innovation, and

savings may be realized from learning

curve and economy-of-scale effects.

—Furthermore, the costs of groundwater

cleanup are very uncertain. Groundwater problems exist at more than threequarters of current NPL sites although

fewer sites than that may eventually

need groundwater cleanup. Experience

with groundwater cleanup is scanty and

costs may be extraordinarily high, depending on cleanup goals.

—Finally, a 10,000-site NPL resulting, in

part, from increased site identification

efforts might include some sites with far

higher cleanup costs than are now typical; for example, very large solid waste

landfills which contaminate important

aquifers, very large mining waste sites,

and deep injection wells. s

● The size of expenditures by private parties

and States.

—To date, expenditures by private parties

and the States have contributed significantly to cleanup (although cost recovery

has been extremely low so far), These

contributions are discussed below, and

could increase or decrease in the future

depending on several factors, also discussed below, In particular, under current policies that require matching funds

5r1’here are now about 70() cieep injection wells mhirh could

he recei~’ing hazardous wastes but for which there are not l+’e(iera 1 rw)u i r~ments for mon i tori n~ nearby unciergroun(i sour[,e~

o f (i ri n ki n ~ ~t.at er.
42 ● Superfund Strategy

from the States, some States may not

provide these funds and consequently

large numbers of sites may not get cleaned

up under the Federal program.

Coping With Uncertainty

There is no analytic way to resolve all uncertainties. Chapter 3 addresses the consequences

of making important policy decisions in the

face of uncertainty. OTA’s analysis indicates

that there are substantial costs and risks in underestimating future Superfund needs. Prevention is far less costly than remedial action when

it comes to hazardous waste problems. Furthermore, technically speaking it is possible to conceive of a situation where, as EPA says, the system could be “overwhelmed. ” Simply put,

releases of hazardous substances from many

uncontrolled sites could cause pollution so

widespread that it would either be technically

impossible, very costly, or too time-consuming

to redress. In particular, contamination of

underground drinking water, if indeed it could

ever be cleaned up, would be an exceedingly

expensive and lengthy job. The task is to reduce risk while developing information and

technology to reduce uncertainty.

Funding Increases Over Time

If OTA is correct that a much larger, longer

program will be necessary, how might Congress reshape Superfund? A much larger

Superfund program cannot be implemented

immediately. To the contrary, many of OTA’s

findings from case studies and other work (see

chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8) indicate that capabilities are strained at the current level of funding. Thus, although very large amounts of money will be needed for the program, in the

near-term funding could be increased gradually

as policies are developed and institutional capabilities improved. This is an important dimension of the two-part strategy examined by

OTA. The first part of the strategy might last

up to 15 years. (In OTA’s model discussed in

chapter 3, a period of 15 years is used, but this

figure should not be regarded as certain or as

rigid. ) A major uncertainty during part one of

the strategy is how fast sites are added to the

NPL; this will determine, to a large degree, annual budget needs, The second part of the strategy, with its emphasis on permanent cleanups,

might last for as long as 30 to 410 years, The major uncertainties are cleanup goals and the

costs of cleanup, with costs depending in part

on goals.

For example, under the two-part strategy,

funding might build up from current levels of

about $300 million to $400 million annually to

perhaps $800 million for the first year of the

initial period, $1.2 billion for the second year,

and $1.6 billion for the third year. Afterwards,

funding might be stabilized at about $2 billion

to $3 billion per year to address more costly

permanent cleanups. These figures would result in a total spending of about $7 billion to

$10 billion for a 5-year period, These near-term

increases in annual spending are very large.

But the efforts stressed in the first part of the

strategy are those that EPA is best able to implement; they require fewer technical specialists than the later period with its emphasis on

remedial cleanups rather than initial responses,

Moreover, as discussed later, these figures

would include significant sums devoted to improving institutional capabilities.

Spending by Responsible Parties

Higher levels of cost recovery and non-Federal spending are likely in the future. Even so,

projections of future Superfund needs seem

overly optimistic about these two contributions. Optimism about cost recovery is hard to

justify from the experiences so far, with recovery amounting to about 1 percent of Superfund

commitments. A recent audit by EPA’s Inspector General criticized EPA’s system to identify

and track the status of cost recovery cases and

to file a cost recovery case before the 3-year

statute of limitations expires. However, recovery may improve when more sites, such as industrial surface impoundments, having only a

single or several responsible parties are

tackled.

Although responsible parties have spent considerable sums to date on cleanups (about $300
Ch. 2—Policy Options ● 4 3

— .

million), there are obstacles to and uncertainties about their future spending. These center

around uncertain future liabilities after cleanup. Incentives may be required if responsible

parties are to maintain or increase the pace of

cleanup, However, it is not necessarily desirable to have more non-Superfund cleanups

without effective cleanup goals and Federal

oversight to ensure environmentally effective

work. Even for sites cleaned up by responsible parties under agreements with EPA or

States there appears to be little effective technical oversight, and already it is clear that a

“quiet market” exists for cleanups. These are

done by or for responsible parties, usually on

their property, without government involvement, and usually before public awareness is

awakened, (These cleanups are not included

in the $300 million estimate given above. Their

total is unknown, but probably large.) One interesting and positive aspect of this situation

is that some new cleanup technologies are being given a chance to prove themselves under

field conditions. However, it is not clear that

information about positive and negative results

is being disseminated.

Matching Funds From States

The issue of the States’ share of the national

cleanup effort is also important in considering

funding decisions, Beyond initial studies and

investigations, States must pay 10 percent of

cleanup costs and all operating and maintenance costs after the first year. The States have

spent perhaps 15 percent of Superfund funding to date. Some suggest removing or reducing the current requirements for matching

funds from the States.

The chief reason to consider such a change

is that many sites might not receive cleanup

because some States are unwilling to provide

the required matching funds. In December

1982 the head of the Superfund program said

that about 50 Superfund sites had received no

attention because States had not provided their

shares of the money, an estimated $97 million.

In February 1983 the same official said that 42

States do not have the money to complete

cleanups, Although the situation may not be

as severe today because of the improved economy, it still appears to be a problem. Should

OTA’s estimates of future needs be correct, the

problem could get considerably worse. This is

especially true if a large number of municipally

owned and operated solid waste facilities become Superfund sites, because the current

matching requirement for these sites is at least

50 percent of cleanup costs. Thus, an increase

in the matching State share might sharply curtail cleanups.

The current dependence by States on Superfund for remedial cleanups is shown by data

from a survey conducted for EPA. For fiscal

year 1983, $103.7 million (82 percent) of a total

of $126 million (for 37 responding jurisdictions)

came from Superfund, and projections for fiscal year 1984 indicated that $201 million (76

percent) of a total of $263.2 million [for 35 responding jurisdictions) would come from

Superfund. This survey also found that for

fiscal year 1983 through fiscal year 1985 a total

of $293 million was available in State budgets

for dealing with uncontrolled sites. Of that,

$194 million (66 percent) was available for cost

sharing under Superfund (these data are for 42

States and the District of Columbia). This

would indicate more than enough potential to

adequately meet the matching requirements

currently in effect (i. e., Superfund spending of

about $2 billion for those three years). However, it should be noted that there are considerable differences among the States; some

States with substantial numbers of NPL sites

have strong, well-funded programs (e.g., New

York, New Jersey, California, and Illinois).

Information on State budget surpluses suggest that it is not necessary to remove or reduce requirements for matching funds from

States. The National Governor’s Association

reports that the 50 States will end fiscal year

1984 with $5.8 billion in budget surpluses and

that for fiscal year 1985 the total surplus will

be $4.3 billion. From 1979 through 1984, the

total States’ surpluses amounted to $43.5 billion. Although there are significant variations

among the States, with some having small,

unreliable, or no budget surpluses, the data sug-
44 ● Superfund Strategy

gest that money alone does not explain the difficulties some States have in supplying matching funds to clean up Superfund sites.

Therefore, a policy change may be viewed

as unnecessary because many States have the

potential to supply the matching funds; indeed,

a number of States have developed a variety

of means to do so, Moreover, the obligation

currently placed on the States to pay for all

future operating and maintenance costs provides considerable incentive to use either lower

cost initial responses or more permanent remedies rather than containment at the site.

The reasons why some States have been less

enthusiastic about helping to pay for Superfund

cleanups include: a) spending priorities that

give cleanups low rank; b) uncertainty about

the Federal program, with a “wait-and-see” attitude about changes in the matching funds requirement; c) dissatisfaction with the Federal

program and the States’ limited role in deciding

policy; d) conflicts among State agencies and

between legislatures and executive branches

that result in inaction; e) the influence of hazardous waste-related industries on State decisionmaking or the perceptions of potential negative impacts on industry; and f) obstacles to

establishing highly technical programs, such

as limits on salaries or hiring freezes.

Other Uses of Superfund

It must be emphasized that OTA has considered only the hazardous waste site cleanup

function of Superfund in estimating future

needs. Should other major uses be mandated

for this program, such as for victims compensation or cleanups of Federal sites, these would

have to be taken into account. Moreover, OTA

has not considered uncontrolled sites under the

responsibility of Federal agencies which, although placed on the NPL, do not now qualify for funding from Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act (CERCLA).

Program Duration and Equity

Program duration is an important factor and

it probably will become more of an issue. It will

likely take several decades to address even a

2,()()()-site NPL. OTA has assumed that about

50 years is the longest practical program, but

it is not clear how the public will respond to

such a long program.

In developing the two-part strategy, OTA

stresses the importance of taking initial responses that are effective in managing immediate risks, but that, in most cases, are not

cleanups. Nevertheless, there is an inherent

tension in a program that places priority on taking initial responses at all sites, while most sites

wait a long time for permanent cleanup. This

is why it is necessary to develop detailed plans

to decide when sites receive a permanent

cleanup, to develop goals to decide whether all

sites need permanent cleanup, and to involve

the public early in the entire process, from site

identification through initial response and remedial cleanup.

Some may view an initial period where few

permanent cleanups occur as unacceptable.

But there are two basic reasons to support this

approach. First, it is both technically and economically impossible to permanently clean up

all sites—even for an NPL of only 2,000 sites—

in the near term, certainly not within 20 years.

Cost-effective permanent cleanup technologies

for some problems do not yet exist; there is not

enough information on most sites to make decisions about permanent cleanup; there are no

detailed national cleanup goals; and there are

not enough people to implement a large permanent cleanup effort,

Second, the current Super fund program does

not offer equity, as it assures neither rapid reduction of risk at all NPL sites nor permanently

effective cleanups. Furthermore, the way particular sites are chosen for cleanup in the current program is not clear. EPA has said that

the hazard ranking scores given sites as part

of the site selection process for the NPL do not

establish exact priorities for responses, However, according to EPA’s latest data on the 538

NPL sites the site scores seem to have an effect; for example, 30 percent of all sites on the

NPL are receiving some type of remedial attention, but out of the top 50 ranked sites 60

percent are receiving attention. For the next
50 sites, 40 percent are receiving attention, and

for the remainder just over 20 percent. This

may be viewed with some concern because of

criticisms of the Hazard Ranking System

(HRS).6

There is evidence that decisions to take action at a site also depend on which EPA Region the site is in, the resources available from

the State, the ability of the local community to

present a forceful case for action, and news

media attention, The time it takes for EPA to

get responsible parties to agree to pay for cleanup may also have some effect, but perhaps more

on the nature of the cleanup than on when it

takes place.

Financing Superfund

This study has focused on estimating future

needs rather than on analyzing how to raise

funds for the program. In suggesting to Congress that a much larger, longer Superfund program may be necessary, OTA is sensitive to

broader financing issues. A multibillion dollar

Superfund program raises issues about potential impacts on the national economy and the

Ch. 2—Policy Options • 45

Federal budget which are beyond OTA’s capabilities to examine.

When Congress was considering CERCLA,

various financing mechanisms were examined

for Superfund. In 1980, Congress adopted a tax

on chemical and petroleum feedstocks supplemented by general tax revenues. Discussions

on the extension and expansion of Superfund

have examined a number of other approaches.

OTA has analyzed only one of these, a tax on

the generation and/or the management of newly produced hazardous wastes—generally referred to as a “waste-end tax. ” This approach

was considered but judged unworkable in 1980.

A brief comparison of the feedstock tax, wasteend tax, and general tax revenues as funding

sources for Superfund is given in table 2-I.

Note that there are limits to the amount of

money that could be raised from feedstock and

waste-end taxes, perhaps $1 billion to $2 billion annually from both, Feedstock taxes raise

concerns about adverse secondary impacts on

industry, such as a loss of international competitiveness. With a waste-end tax, the tax base

will gradually shrink as waste reduction efforts

proceed. Thus, although a combination of all

three sources is possible, a larger Superfund

program increases the likelihood of reliance on

general tax revenues to a greater extent or

Table 2-1 .—Summary Comparison of Several Major Financing Schemes

Feedstock taxa Waste-end taxb

.

Current

—

Expanded Low Hig h

Fairness:

--

Very few Improved Good, many Improved if land disposal

companies pay parties pay gets high tax

most of the taxes

Administrability:

Easy, established Probably easy Probably easy on Possibly more enforcement

basis of States’ necessary

experience

Secondary impacts:

None apparent Might reduce None likely Provides economic incenInter na tiona l tive to reduce wastes and

competitiveness shift away from land

of some disposal, thus capacity to

com pan ies raise basic revenue

General

tax revenuesc

Parties most directly

responsible for problems do

not bear burden

Very easy

With large amount may have

undesirable effect on Federal

budget

declines

aBased on taxes imposed on chemical and petroleum feeds tocks wh(ch can be expanded by tncreaslng tax rates and number of materials taxed

bBased on taxes on h~ardous wastes generated or managed, and may vary according to how wastes are managed and what hazards wastes Pose. lf ~be rates are

high enough current management declslons may be affected Low IS less than about $10 per dry ton /r/gh IS about $30 to $50 per dry ton

CCU ~rent Iy a smal I fract ion (12 5 percent) from t h,Is source but much larger amounts cou Id be raised

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
46 ● Superfund Strategy

adopting some new, broadly based tax. This

also becomes more likely if non-cleanup uses

of Superfund are mandated.

Waste-End Tax Approach

OTA examined the waste-end tax option because it concluded in its 1983 report on hazardous waste that a waste-end tax was an important option to deal with the national

hazardous waste problem. Its importance

stems from its potential to generate funds while

it serves as an economic incentive to reduce

waste generation and shift management away

from land disposal. However, to use a wasteend tax as an economic incentive, the tax must

be structured carefully. This means varying tax

rates depending on the nature of the waste, the

way it is managed, or both. Moreover, the tax

rates must be sufficiently high to act as an economic incentive. This requires an understanding of current market conditions and management policies.

Many of the original objections to using the

waste-end tax have less force today. Because

of the gradual development of the RCRA program, many States have found it practical to

use a waste-end tax. OTA, EPA, and others

have concluded that a Federal waste-end tax

could be made administratively manageable. T

For example, for the past several years EPA

found that State income from waste-end taxes

as a percent of projected revenues were: California, 89 percent; Connecticut, 71 percent; Illinois, 83 percent; Ohio, 98 percent; Minnesota,

102 percent; New Hampshire, 107 percent;

New York, 101 percent; and South Carolina,

96 percent. For comparison, EPA reports that

collections from the feedstock tax ranged from

78 to 84 percent of projected revenues from

1980 to 1983.8

But there remain different viewpoints on

whether to structure the tax to provide an eco7U. S, En\ ironmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy Analysis, ‘*Survey of States’ Experience With Waste-End Taxes, ” September 1984; Howard J, Hoffman, 4

’Workabilit y of the WasteEnd Tax,” testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, ]ul~r 25, 1984.

8“Sur\’ey of States’ Experiences LfJith Waste-End Taxes, ” op.

(:it.

nomic incentive for changing waste generation

and management practices, or to use it simply

to generate revenues, OTA has concluded that

the benefits of using a waste-end tax for preventing more Superfund problems are likely to

outweigh the costs of implementing such a

measure. It is possible to structure a waste-end

tax both to raise substantial revenues in the

near-term and to act as an economic incentive

to modify waste disposal practices and reduce

waste generation.

To act as an economic incentive, that is, to

affect waste generation and waste management

practices significantly, tax rates would have to

be about $30 to $50 per ton of hazardous waste.

This is because of the current costs faced by

waste generators: about $50 to $100 per ton for

most land disposal, and usually from $200 to

$800 per ton for waste treatment. Most of the

20 States that have adopted waste-end taxes

have relatively low rates (see table 2-2). Only

six States have maximum tax rates high enough

to significantly affect waste disposal practices.

The States have not encountered major problems in implementing waste-end taxes, although

at the beginning some States made rather imprecise estimates of revenue generation.9 Note

that States are concerned about whether a Federal waste-end tax could seriously reduce State

sources of revenue, This could be dealt with

by explicitly allowing States to have their own

waste-end taxes or by providing for a deduction to Federal taxpayers for waste-end taxes

paid to a State.

Several illustrations of a Federal waste-end

tax are given in tables 2-3, 2-4, and 2-5. These

are based on 1981 EPA data that are imprecise

and may not be valid today because the Federal RCRA and Superfund programs have increasingly influenced waste management practices. The tax rates chosen were based on

industry concerns, the costs of waste management options, and what some States found effective. These examples show how the degree

of hazard of a waste can be used, and how dif-

—

‘For more detail on States’ experiences and waste-end taxes,

see the EPA report referenced above and testimony of Joel S.

Hirschhorn on behalf of OTA for the hearing record of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Sept, 10, 1984,
Ch. 2—Policy Options ● 4 7

.

Table 2-2.—Summary of State Waste-End Tax/Fee Systems

Treated wastes

State taxed

Alabama . ., . X ., ~ÏÁ•,ÐÁ•_•

California ,. . . . . . . . .

Colorado . ., .X....,.

Connecticut . . . ... .X......

Illinois, ....,,... ,.. ,. .X,.,,..

Indiana . . . . . .

Iowa, . . . . . . . . . . . .., . .,X....,,

Kansas . . . . .,. ., ,X.,..,.

Kentucky. .,.,.... ,.. ,, .X,.....

Louisiana . . . . . .X.

Maine ,,.. ... . .,X..,..,

Minnesota. . . . . .., .. .X.,,.,.

Misslsslppl, ,.,,.., ..., . . . . . .

Missouti ... .. .X,,..,.

New Hampshire .,.. .,. .,.X.,.,. .

New York .....,, ,, ,.. ...X, ,..,

Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . .

South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tennessee . . . . . . .

Wisconsin ......, . . . . . .

—. Higher rate for

offsite management

. . . . . . . . x.. ,.:,..

. . . . . Eaclllty

operators pay

,.., x.... .

,,.. x.... .

.,.. x.,.. .

H19t_teSt possible

tax ratea (per ton)

$1o.oo--

$45.66

$ 2.00

$10.00

$ 6.60

$ 1.50

$50.00

$ 5.00

$11.00

$Io.oob

$33.00

$70.40

$ 9.00

$26.00’

$36.60

$12.00d

$ 8.99’

$ 7.00

$ 7.00

$ 0.135

Generators pay —

.,. x,.. .

. . ,.., ,.., ,. x....,,

.,.. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . x... . . . . .

.,.. ,,.. x... . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . ,.

. . . . . . x..... . ,... . . . . . . .

. . . x,..,,

,... x,.,,.

,... x...,,

... , x.,.,.

,.., ..,,.

,.., . . . . . . . . . .

..., ..., x... . . . . .

..,. . . . x... . . . . .

. . x... . . . . .

..., ..,. . . . . . . x

.., . x.,...,. .

,.,. . . . . . . .

,.,, .,.,. . . .

.,.. ,. x..,,..

.,.. x... , .,.. . . .

. . . x...,.

... , x.....

..., . . . .

.,.. ,,..,. . .

.,.. . . . . . . . x,..,. ,

. . . x... . . . . .

,,.. . . .

..,, x.... .

.,,. x.,,.,

. . . . . . . . . .

,... . . . . . ..., ,. x..,.. .

,,.. . x,...,.. .

,... ,..,x...,..,,

..,. . . . . x.,. . . . . .

,.., . x..,.. . ,... . . . .

. . . . x.,,... . . . .

..., x..,,.

..,, x..,. .

. . . . . . . . .

,,.. .,.,, . . . .,,

,... .,., x....,,..

. . . . . . .

,... ,. x..,.,, ,,.. . . .

. ,,. . ,..,, ,,.. . x.,.. .

a M~~e than one tax rate may be applled to achieve w ton rate

b Dry we!ght ton

c The 2 percenf charge on dIsposaJ receipts IS not Included

dHlgher rates may soon be Implemented

e Based on 1982 d!sposal charges and 6 percent charge on disposal receipts

SOURCE OffIce of Technoloq~ Assessment

Table 2’3. —illustration of Applyinga Hazardous Waste-End Tax by Management Activity

Scena;o 1 Annual quantitya – --——.—— Scenario2 ‘

-

.——.

Tax category (million metric tons) Tax rate ‘Revenue ($ millions) Tax rate Revenue ($ millions)

Well injected waste.. ,,.., 32.0 $ 5/tonne - $ 160-

$ 31tonne

~g6. .—-

All otherb land disposed waste ., 22.4 $50/tonne 1,120 $301tonne 672

Treated waste. ., . 176.0 $ 21tonne 352 $ lltonne 176

Total revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .., ,. $1,632 $944

aWastequan~ lt!es data from National Survey of Hazardous Waste Generators and Treat merit, Storage and Disposal Facllltles Regulated Under RCRA!n 1981 pre

pared for !he EPA by Westat I nc Aprl I 1984

b Land f,lls surface !mpoundrnents land aPPl~CatlOn et’

SOURCE Of’ Ice of Technology Assessment

Table 2-4.—illustration of Applying a Waste-End Tax to Land Disposed Waste:

Degree of Hazard Based on Toxicity (waste quantities in millions of metric tons)

Land disposal b excluding well injection: ‘

T OXIC waste’ . . . . ., . . . $50/tonne 19.8 $ 990.0

Nontoxic wasted 

. . . . . . . $10/tonne 1,3 13,0

Well injection:

T OXIC waste c ... $ 5/tonne 8.3 41.5

Nontoxic wasted . . . . ... . . $ 3/tonne 17,7 53.1

Total revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,097.6

a Waste quant{t!es data from National Survey of Hazardous Waste Generators and Treatment, Storage and Disposal Fac!ll

ties Regulated Under RCRA In 1981 prepared for the EPA by Westat, lnc April 1984 Waste quantity conslderatloris

— Survey only requested top 10 waste streams so quantities based on waste type differ from total disposal quantifies

— Survey results are subject to statlst!cal rel{ablltty assumptions

— 4200000 tonnes of I n)ected waste and 100,000 tonnes of al I other land disposed wastes were assumed t o be n ont ox I c

n o hazardous waste code was explicitly ass!gned In data

— Generation land dlsposd and waste deflnit!ons may have changed since 1981

b Landfl I IS surface Impoundments land application etc

c As de f( ned (n 40 CFR 261 24, 261 302261 33

d wa5t es I hat are only q n I table corros Ive and ~or react lve

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
48 . Superfund Strategy

Table 2-5.—llIustration of Applying a Waste-End Tax to Land-Disposed Waste: Degree of Hazard

Based on Reportable Quantities (RQ) (waste quantities in millions of metric tonsa)

Scenario 1

Tax category Tax rate Quantity b Revenue ($ millions)

Land disposalc excluding well injection:

RQ = 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $50/tonne <0.1 $ 1.5

RQ > 1, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10/tonne 21.1 211.0

Well injection:

RQ = 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 5/tonne o 0

RQ > 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 3/tonne 26.1 78.3

Total revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $291

Scenario 2

Quantity b “. Revenue ($ millions)

18.0 $ 900.0

3.0 30.0

6.1 30.5

20.0 60.0

$1,020-

a waste ~uantitie~ data from ,LNati~”al Suwey of H~ardous Waste Generators and Treatment, Storage arid Disposal Faclllttes Regulated Under RCRA in 1981 ,“ prepared

for the EPA by Westat, Inc., April 1984 Waste quantity considerations:

– Survey only requested top 10 waste streams so quantities based on waste type differ from total disposal quantities

— Survey results are subject to statistical reliability assumptions.

— 4,200,000 tonnes of Injected waste and 100,000 tonnes of all other land disposed wastes were assumed to be RQ >1, no hazardous waste code was explicitly

assigned In data

— Generation, land disposal, and waste def!n!tlons may have changed since 1981

b Reportable quantity designations from the Federa/ Reg/ster, VOI 48, NO 102, May 25, 1983, proposed Rules

“ Only those wastes with a proposed reportable quantity of 1

. . Wastes with a Dro~osed re~ortable guantity of 1 PIUS wastes with ~resumed reportable quantfty of 1 pendlnq reassessment

c Landfills, surface impoundments, land aPPllC~tiOn, ~tc

SOURCE. Off Ice of Technology Assessment.

ferent types of waste management can be taxed.

Where judgments have been necessary, OTA

has used data that reduce revenue estimates in

its examples. One way to deal with estimates

that might be overly optimistic and with a trend

toward increasing waste reduction and shifting

away from land disposal is, within limits, to

steadily increase the tax rate (as California has

done). For example, the tax rate for each category might be increased by 10 percent annually

until some limit was reached.

Reducing the Generation of Hazardous Wastes

If a waste-end tax is successful as an economic incentive, the tax base will shrink over time

as less waste is produced and as it is managed

in more desirable ways. Thus, a waste-end tax

to raise money for Superfund has limits. Nevertheless, the more serious the national uncontrolled site problem is perceived to be, the

stronger is the reason to use an approach that

will reduce the number of new uncontrolled

sites. To a large degree, the need to encourage

waste reduction has been better recognized by

some States than by the Federal Government.

A handful of States (e.g., Massachusetts, Illinois, North Carolina, and Minnesota) have

started efforts to foster waste reduction, particularly by smaller companies. Most of these

efforts emphasize information and technology

transfer, and local technical assistance. The

connection between hazardous waste reduction and the Superfund program is likely to become sharper if the program is seen more as

a long-term, high-cost effort.

GOAL 2: ACCURATE ESTIMATES OF THE NATIONAL PROBLEM

The importance of accurate estimates of the of more permanent cleanups are underestinational cleanup problem for planning pur- mated. The findings in chapter 5 on future NPL

poses is discussed in chapter 3. Substantial sites, the case studies given in chapter 1 and

risks and penalties result if the problem is un- elsewhere, chapter 4 on the difficulties of dederestimated; for example, if too small a future veloping national cleanup goals, chapter 6 on

NPL is assumed, or if the future costs of im- the limitations of current cleanup technologies,

permanent cleanups are ignored, or if the costs chapter 7 on problems in implementing the
Ch. 2—Policy Options ● 47

Table 2-2.—Summary of State Waste-End Tax/Fee Systems

Treated wastes Higher rate for Facility Highest possible

State taxed off site management Generators pay operators pay tax ratea (per ton)

Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .X . . . . . .

California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X . . . . . .

Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .X . . . . . .

Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .X......

Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Iowa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... X . . . . . .

Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .X......

Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .X......

Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .X......

Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .X......

Minnesota. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .X......

Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .X......

New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . ... .. .X......

New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .X......

Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . x

$10.00

$45.66

$2.00

$10.00

$6.60

$ 1.50

$50.00

$5.00

$11.00

$10.00b

$33.00

$70.40

$9.00

$26.00C

$36.60

$12.00d

$ 8.99e

$ 7.00

$7.00

$0.135

aMore than onet~ rate may be applied tO achieve Perton ‘ate.

bDry weight ton.

cThe 2 percent charge On disposal receipts is flOt included.

dHigh”rrat”S may soon be implemented,

eBased on 1982 disposal charges and8 percent chargeon disposal reCeiPtS

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment,

Table 2-3.—illustration of Applying a Hazardous Waste-End Tax by Management Activity

Annual quantitya Scenario 1 Scenario 2

Tax category (million metric tons) Tax rate Revenue ($ millions) Tax rate Revenue ($ millions)

Well injected waste. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.0 $ 5/tonne $ 160 $ 3/tonne $ 9 6

All other b land disposed waste . . . . 22.4 $50/tonne 1,120 $30/tonne 672

Treated waste. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176.0 $ 2/tonne 352 $ I/tonne 176

Total revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,632 $944

a Waste ~uantitiesd~a from ,, National Suwey of H~ard~s Waste Generators and Treatment, storage and Disposal Facilities Regulated Under RCRA in 1981 ,“ prepared for the EPA by Westat, Inc , April 1984.

b Landfills, surface impoundments, land application, etc.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment,

Table 2.4.—illustration of Applying a Waste. End Tax to Land Disposed Waste:

Degree of Hazard Based on Toxicity (waste quantities in millions of metric tons)

Land disposal b excluding well injection:

Toxic wastec 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $50/tonne 19.8 $ 990.0

Nontoxic wasted

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10/tonne 1.3 13.0

Well injection:

Toxic wastec 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 5/tonne 8.3 41.5

Nontoxic wasted

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 3/tonne 17.7 53.1

Total revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,097.6

a Waste ~uantities data from “Nati~al su~ey of Hzwdous Waste Generators and Treatment, storage and Disposal F@li”

ties Regulated Under RCRA in 1981,” prepared for the EPA by Westat, Inc., April 1984. Waste quantity considerations:

— Survey only requested top 10 waste streams so quantities based on waste type differ from total disposal quantities.

— Survey results are subject to statistical reliability assumptions.

— 4,200,000 tonnes of injected waste and 100,000 tonnes of all other land disposed wastes were assumed to be nontoxic;

no hazardous waste code was explicitly assigned in data.

– Generation, land disposal, and waste definitions may have changed since 1981.

b Landfills surface impoundments, land application, etc.

c AS de fjn&j in 40 CFR 281.24, 281.30-2261.33.

d Wastes that are only ignitable, corrosive, andlor reaCtiVe.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment,
48 ● Superfund Strategy

Table 2.5.—illustration of Applying a Waste-End Tax to Land-Disposed Waste: Degree of Hazard

Based on Reportable Quantities (RQ) (waste quantities in millions of metric tonsa

Scenario 1 Scenario 2

Tax category Tax rate Quantity b Revenue ($ millions) Quantityb 

● “ Revenue ($ millions)

Land disposal C excluding well Injection:

RQ = 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $50/tonne <0.1 $ 1.5 18.0 $ 900.0

RQ > 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10/tonne 21.1 211.0 3.0 30.0

Well injection:

RQ = 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 5/tonne o 0 30.5

RQ > 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 3/tonne 26.1 78.3 20.0 60.0

Total revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $291 $1,020

awa~tequantltie~ data from f’pJation~ su~eyOfH~ar(jOua Waste Generators and Treatment, Storage and Disposal Facilities Regulated Under RcRAinlg61:’Pwmred

for the EPA by Westat, Inc,, April 1984. Waste quantity considerations:

— Survey only requested top 10 waste streams so quantities based on wasta type differ from total disposal quantities.

— Survey results are subject to statistical reliability assumptions.

— 4,200,000 tonnes of injected waste and 100,000 tonnes of all other land disposed wastes were assumed to be RQ> 1; no hazardous waste code was explicitly

assigned In data.

– Generation, land disposal, and waste definitions may have changed since 1981.

b Reportable quantity designat[orls from the Federa/ Register, vol. 48, No. 102, May 25 IW pwomd Rules.

● Only those wastes with a proposed reportable quantity of 1.

● * Wastes with a proposed reportable quantity of 1 plus wastes with presumed reportable quantity of 1 pending reassessment.

c Landfills, surface Impoundments, land awlkatiom etc.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

ferent types of waste management can be taxed.

Where judgments have been necessary, OTA

has used data that reduce revenue estimates in

its examples. One way to deal with estimates

that might be overly optimistic and with a trend

toward increasing waste reduction and shifting

away from land disposal is, within limits, to

steadily increase the tax rate (as California has

done). For example, the tax rate for each category might be increased by 10 percent annually

until some limit was reached.

Reducing the Generation of Hazardous Wastes

If a waste-end taxis successful as an economic incentive, the tax base will shrink over time

as less waste is produced and as it is managed

in more desirable ways. Thus, a waste-end tax

to raise money for Superfund has limits. Nevertheless, the more serious the national uncontrolled site problem is perceived to be, the

stronger is the reason to use an approach that

will reduce the number of new uncontrolled

sites. To a large degree, the need to encourage

waste reduction has been better recognized by

some States than by the Federal Government.

A handful of States (e.g., Massachusetts, Illinois, North Carolina, and Minnesota) have

started efforts to foster waste reduction, particularly by smaller companies. Most of these

efforts emphasize information and technology

transfer, and local technical assistance. The

connection between hazardous waste reduction and the Superfund program is likely to become sharper if the program is seen more as

a long-term, high-cost effort.

GOAL 2: ACCURATE ESTIMATES OF THE NATIONAL PROBLEM

The importance of accurate estimates of the of more permanent cleanups are underestinational cleanup problem for planning pur- mated. The findings in chapter 5 on future NPL

poses is discussed in chapter 3. Substantial sites, the case studies given in chapter 1 and

risks and penalties result if the problem is un- elsewhere, chapter 4 on the difficulties of dederestimated; for example, if too small a future veloping national cleanup goals, chapter 6 on

NPL is assumed, or if the future costs of im- the limitations of current cleanup technologies,

permanent cleanups are ignored, or if the costs chapter 7 on problems in implementing the
—

Ch. 2—Policy Options ● 5 1

uncont rolled sites even if they are in compliance with RCRA regulations-and standards,

which often they are not.l0 EPA agrees that

Superfund wastes have been brought to leaking RCRA facilities, This situation has been described as a “toxic waste merry-go-round. ”11

Several other aspects of using removals for

redisposal merit attention. First, there is little

doubt about EPA’s reliance on such removals.

In establishing a priority list of 31 activities for

all of EPA during fiscal year 1985, the first priority is given as, “Stabilize imminent threats

at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites through

Superfund removal actions.’’12

Second, the head of the Superfund program

noted recently that with regard to the use of

RCRA facilities “the requirement for inspection is not applicable to removal actions due

to time constraints, ”13 However, if removal is

part of a remedial action, an inspection is necessary if there has not been one within the past

12 months,

Third, in EPA’s January 1985 proposal for

a revised National Contingency Plan there is

evidence that removal for redisposal will not

necessarily be limited in the future. For example, EPA gives some examples where RCRA

regulations would not be applicable which

seem to ignore the basic nature of the waste:

1) a case where RCRA wastes are indiscrimi10’I’h15 [:on(;]usion about land disposal sites for Superfund

wastes is supported by the analysis in chapter 5 on operating

hazardous waste facilities. The recentlj reauthorized RCRA with

its plan ned prohibition on the land d isposa] of some hazardous

wastes will not necessarily eliminate redisposal. Tile prohibitlr)ns may not take effect for some years. EPA may also be able

to grant wal~ers for Superfund wastes, especially for situations

where it would take time to \erify’ that the wastes were co~rereci

by RCRA prohibitions.

1 Isome ~om[la n ies are making considerable money from waste

rernoials e~en though they themsel~’es have been responsible

parties at Superfund sites, E\’en though the} may not ha~re paid

for cleanu~), they have been funded b} the go~’ernment to take

ti’astes and dispose of them and, for the Stringfellow and Sey -

mou r sites, the redisposal sites ha~’e either been shut down or

fined by EPA for substantial violations of existing RCRA regulations.

I z U,s, E; n ~, I ron rnenta] protection Agenc k’, memo randu m by

A]tin 1.. A]m, “[)etwloprnent of Operating }’ear Guidance for

F’}’ 198,5 and F’}r 198[;, ” .No\I. 2, 1 %43.

1 ~~\’l]} iam N. Hedeman, ] r., ““1’hc Pursuit of Consistent I]e(,Ision mak i ng LJ rider Su perfu nd, paper presenteci at American

Bar Association Conferencel 1984.

nantly disposed on a roadway, and 2) contaminated river beds. Apparently a waste that might

be prohibited from land disposal, but which became a Superfund waste in a transportation accident or through purposeful midnight dumping, could be land disposed, and a river sediment contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) could also be land disposed

even though PCBs would not normally be allowed to be so managed. Finally, it is also

stated that interim measures might not have to

be consistent with existing standards, “If the

selected remedy is not the final remedy for the

site, it might be impractical or inappropriate

to apply other environmental standards. ” This

raises the possibility of Superfund wastes being taken to a RCRA facility which is not in

compliance with existing regulations.

Finally, it should be noted that the States also

perform a considerable number of removal actions at uncontrolled sites without the use of

Superfund. Removal of wastes for redisposal

is typical for small sites where hazardous

materials are easily accessible from the surface,

A survey of States performed for EPA found

that in 1981 and 1982 for 29 responding States

there were 350 immediate removals; there were

106 Federal removals for these same States in

that period, and nationwide in that time there

were 212 Federal immediate removals. (There

are also other types of removals in the Superfund program.)

Better Use of an Improved

Hazard Ranking System

Choosing the correct initial response is an

important decision, which could be helped if

the initial site evaluation were improved. Currently preliminary assessments, site investigations, and the Hazard Ranking System are limited to arriving at a score to determine eligibility for the NPL. There is little linkage between the initial hazard assessments and subsequent studies to decide on action at the site.

If the early assessment system were improved,

it could help determine the appropriate initial

response more rapidly, Costly and lengthy

studies could be avoided in the first part of the

strategy.
52 ● Superfund Strategy

Technical Issues

The widespread use of initial responses would

raise several technical issues. To what extent

can above ground temporary storage be effective? There are a variety of existing technologies to store waste in a safe and cost-effective

way. For example, containerization as used in

transportation and traditional storage of chemicals would be possible for small amounts of

waste. Stronger materials with greater corrosion resistance have been developed for such

containers. Containers can be placed in structures that are protected from the weather. For

larger amounts, bulk storage in tanks, vaults,

and other structures is possible. Here, too,

much conventional storage technology exists in

the chemical and petroleum industries,

Considerable opportunities to use offsite storage facilities, perhaps even some constructed

on a regional basis to manage Superfund

wastes, may be possible, Indeed, this may be

necessary when there is not enough space at

the NPL site. However, the use of offsite facilities raises the issue of public opposition to

siting new hazardous waste management facilities, as well as problems obtaining RCRA

permits for facilities, Furthermore, some States

will not want to receive wastes from other

States, There is no simple solution to this, but

it does suggest that some initial responses may

be contingent upon the State or local community providing a site or storage facility for

Superfund wastes, Finally, innovative ideas are

being developed for temporary storage (see

chapter 6).

An associated issue is: over what length of

time will storage be effective? Any container

or storage structure will have some finite engineering lifetime. Generally speaking, it

should be possible to safely store wastes for 5

to 20 years. Moreover, above ground storage

provides the important advantage of accessibility, That is, it is relatively easy to visually

inspect containers and structures to detect

damage or leakage. Many types of monitoring

devices are also available.

EPA could develop information on above

ground storage and other initial response techniques for general use by contractors, States,

and companies, Some R&D in this area might

be warranted.

Another issue is waste treatment. Some hazardous materials might be treated immediately

to render them as harmless as possible, Over

the past several years there has been considerable unused waste treatment capacity at

many facilities, Furthermore, in some cases it

might be cost effective to build onsite treatment

facilities immediately; regional treatment facilities serving the Superfund program are also

possible, If initial responses are used for all

NPL sites, it is likely that the private waste

treatment industry will respond to the demand.

However, this could lead to problems with siting new facilities.

The issue of determining the extent of an initial response is discussed in chapter 4. Simple

generic standards could be developed to satisfy

the two primary goals of these actions.

Economic Issues

The advantages of initial responses at all sites

depend on keeping the the costs are kept low

relative to permanent cleanup costs (see chapter 3). On average, initial responses should cost

about 10 to 20 percent of permanent cleanup

costs, If the cost of initial responses are too

high, they would resemble the current highcost impermanent cleanups. But if the costs are

too low, the actions would be no more effective than current removal actions, As a result

of examining the costs of specific technical actions (see chapter 6), OTA finds that initial response costs would probably average about $1

million per site. This is about three times

greater than the costs of immediate removal actions (i.e., an average of $302,000 per action

for 165 sites from December 1980 through February 1984). Impermanent remedial cleanups

(consisting of initial remedial measures, surface cleanups, phase one remedial cleanups,

and final remedial cleanups) typically cost from

$5 million to $10 million per site, but additional

costs may be incurred later.

Questions may arise concerning who is responsible for operating, maintaining, and mon-
Ch. 2—Policy Options ● 53

itoring an initial response before permanent

cleanup is achieved. Since so many NPL sites

are likely to receive only initial responses for

some time, the public must be assured about

several things: 1) that the initial response measures are effective, and that there are no significant uncertainties about their continued effectiveness over the limited period of time before

cleanup, and Z) that the site will receive a remedial cleanup. Therefore, a policy to assure

adequate funds for each site to cover future

costs may be necessary. Where possible, these

could be obtained from responsible parties.

Perhaps the costs of initial responses should

not require matching State funds. Furthermore,

an explicit program is needed to gather information on the site for remedial cleanup as is

a decision making process to determine objectively the timing of the remedial cleanup.

Lastly, there are circumstances that will tend

to favor the rapid use of a remedial, permanent

cleanup. First, there will be some sites that are

so bad that it would be unacceptable to delay

permanent cleanup. Second, some responsible

parties may want to resolve the cleanup cost

issue as soon as possible.

Possible specific congressional

dress Goal 3 are:

Simplify the categories of

actions to adresponses to

NPL sites to initial responses and remedial

cleanups. Modify the statute to allow initial responses to have costs exceeding $1

million.

Require initial responses at all NPL sites

to be initiated within one year of placement on the NPL.

Require EPA to establish simple generic

standards to determine the extent of an initial response by setting goals to deal with

immediate threats and to prevent the site

from deteriorating.

Require EPA to establish procedures to assure communities that sites will be selected for remedial cleanups in an equitable and objective manner.

Direct EPA to perform an analysis of the

potential demand for new storage and

treatment facilities for Superfund wastes

and recommend ways to address obstacles

to siting and permitting these facilities.

GOAL 4: IMPLEMENTATION NEEDS OF A LONG-TERM PROGRAM

Because it is almost inevitable that Superfund

will be a long-term program, Congress may

wish to consider ways to improve the Superfund delivery system.

Resolve the Cleanup Goals Issue and

Address Scientific Uncertainties

The discussion in chapter 4 on establishing

cleanup goals demonstrates the difficulty of resolving the issue of “How clean is clean?” It

appears necessary to elevate policymaking on

the degree of cleanup to the statutory level and

clarify the role of the Federal Government in

determining levels of cleanup performed by

States and responsible parties.

It is vital to obtain more information on health

and environmental effects, both laboratory and

epidemiological data. Without more complete

information, it will be difficult to implement

any approach to establish national cleanup

goals and determine the magnitude of the national problem. Although it is impossible to

remove all scientific uncertainty, the goal

should be to steadily reduce uncertainties over

time. In this regard, although cleanup actions

cannot wait indefinitely, the two-part strategy

does offer some opportunity to significantly improve the information base before large sums

of money are spent,

Specific options for congressional consideration are:

● Establish an interagency group (e.g., EPA,

Department of Interior, and the Department of Health and Human Services) to re-
54 ● Superfund Strategy

port periodically to Congress on the state

of information on health and environmental effects of uncontrolled sites, gaps in the

data base, and proposed means to address

these deficiencies. Such an effort would

benefit from the participation of people

from outside the Federal Government.

● Increase spending on laboratory and field

research to obtain more data on health and

environmental effects,

Ž Direct EPA to develop and implement a

classification system based on the present

and future use of NPL sites to help establish cleanup goals and determine other site

management priorities. Classification

based on reuse, restoration, and rehabitation of the site could help determine the

extent of cleanup and the applicability of

health and environmental effects in the

cleanup decision.

 Ž Direct EPA to better define how the Superfund program evaluates the performance

and effectiveness of remedial cleanups financed under Superfund, by the States,

and by private parties, over both the short

and long terms. This should include explicit attention to unintended consequences

involving transfer of hazardous chemicals

among environmental media, transfer of

risks among populations, and residual contamination.

Technology

The results of chapter 6 on cleanup technologies support the need for greater Federal involvement in the research, development, and

demonstration (RD&D) of innovative cleanup

technologies. For the first 5 years of Superfund,

EPA will have spent about $25 million on

cleanup RD&D. Although some conventional

containment, disposal, and treatment technologies will continue to be used, and may be improved, substantial opportunities exist to advance treatment technologies that are geared

to the needs of cleaning uncontrolled sites.

These technological advances offer the promise of permanently effective cleanups for a variety of uncontrolled site problems and, possibly, reduced cleanup costs over time.

OTA has identified a number of innovations

that have advanced beyond the laboratory

stage. The chief problem is that some institutional barriers stand in the way of using these

innovative technologies, It is in the environmental and economic interests of the Nation

to foster a competitive market for cleanup technologies. For example, currently the major alternative to land disposal and waste containment is incineration, which has a long history

in the management of newly generated hazardous waste. But even though it can be effective

in treating Superfund wastes, the costs are

high, and regulation may be inadequate (e.g.,

few standards for air emissions of toxic chemicals), Other technical approaches are less familiar to the regulatory community and waste

generators and face more severe obstacles to

their evaluation and use.

A number of specific Federal initiatives could

prove effective:

• Analyses of cost effectiveness could be directed to include: a) a clear statement of

the total cleanup objectives for the site;

b) a discussion of whether alternative technologies have proven capabilities or uncertainties for the application under consideration; c) a discussion of which (if any)

innovative technological approaches

might be demonstrated at the site and how

demonstration would aid the national

cleanup effort for similar sites; d) an estimate of all short- and long-term costs for

each alternative which takes into account:

i) uncertainties about effectiveness in

meeting the cleanup objectives, and ii) the

likelihood that further cleanup and corrective actions will be required; and e) a discussion of technical and economic needs

and uncertainties, including institutional

considerations, for long-term monitoring,

operation, or maintenance of the site.

● Federal support could be substantially increased to help private companies and universities develop and demonstrate innovative permanent cleanup technologies,

These are the most costly phases of technological innovation, but they are necessary to prove technical feasibility under
operating conditions and to obtain accurate cost data. Demonstrating a particular

application of a new technology often requires several million dollars. The work

should focus on techniques that can reduce permanent cleanup costs, A program

funded at the level of perhaps $25 million

to $50 million annually for some years

could pay off handsomely for a long-term

Superfund program. These funds would be

in addition to what EPA now spends on

R&D. Special attention should be given to

small businesses; these firms face major

problems in getting money and coping

with institutional barriers, even though

they often have attractive innovations. It

should be noted that increased spending

in this area would also benefit the RCRA

program because some cleanup technologies could also treat newly generated hazardous waste.

● EPA could be directed to develop protocols by which technologies can be evaluated by the government and companies;

such protocols should address different

generic types of problems at uncontrolled

sites (e.g., decontamination of soil, groundwater, or buildings; destruction of wastes).

Without evaluation protocols, innovations

struggle with the Catch-22 of not being

able to prove themselves and not being

used because they are not proven.

● EPA could be directed to help companies:

a) obtain samples from uncontrolled sites,

and b) conduct field demonstrations and

pilot cleanups at NPL sites to better establish technical performance and reliability

and provide more accurate estimates of actual costs. If public resistance to the use

of new technologies is feared, incentives

could be considered, such as a high priority for cleanup and financial support for

direct citizen involvement in the cleanup

effort. However, the public may be quite

receptive to new technologies, provided

they are kept informed and have some

voice in the decisions (see chapter 8).

● EPA could be directed to develop incentives for responsible parties to use or demonstrate innovative cleanup technologies,

Ch. 2—Policy Options ● 5 5

EPA could be directed to provide a simplified means of determining whether residues from waste treatment operations

qualify as RCRA hazardous wastes; those

that are not can be disposed of simply and

at low cost.

EPA could be directed to expeditiously establish appropriate RCRA regulations for

waste storage and treatment facilities of

particular importance to Superfund efforts.

EPA could be directed to expand its information and technology transfer functions

and make better use of what has been and

will be learned from cleanups throughout

the Nation, There does not appear to be

any central repository of information and

insights obtained by EPA’s Regions and

contractors, who often repeat the similar

work at different sites.

Technical Staffs, Support, and Oversight

Chapter 7 shows the need to improve the capabilities of EPA and the States to implement

Superfund and, particularly, to carry out various oversight functions. EPA has a responsibility to oversee its Regions, its contractors, the

States, and private parties carrying out cleanups. The States must oversee its contractors

and, sometimes, local government units. Increased funding may be required. Also, more

appropriately trained and experienced technical professionals are needed in a number of critical disciplines, plus an assurance that the

most qualified contractors are used. Working

with hazardous waste is a relatively new area

and, therefore, many technical specialists do

not have the specific experience with hazardous waste necessary for cleanups. For example, hydrogeologists maybe experts about the

flow of water but not about the movement of contaminants, which can be much more complex.

Options for congressional consideration are:

Ž Provide Federal funding for training programs in disciplines of particular importance to Superfund, such as hydrogeology,

toxicology, environmental engineering,

and chemistry. Emphasis should be placed
56 ● Superfund Strategy

on continuing education and training programs to increase the pool of experienced

specialists who know how to deal with the

specific problems of hazardous waste sites.

A program costing perhaps $5 million to

$10 million annually for some years could

yield great benefits in the long term.

Provide increased funding, perhaps $25

million to $50 million annually, to EPA to

build up its in-house professional staff and

emphasize the need to carry out technical

oversight. There has been a steady drain

of experienced people from EPA’s Superfund program to its contractors and the

private sector, whose cleanup work often

receives little EPA scrutiny.

Provide direct grants to States to develop

and expand their technical staff. This

would be similar to the RCRA grants program. Over a period of perhaps 5 years,

such grants could do much to strengthen

the States’ capabilities and perhaps their

willingness to participate in the national

program. As with the RCRA program,

some formula could be devised to determine how much money a State received;

for example, basing the amount on its

number of sites in EPA’s national inventory of uncontrolled sites, on its number

of NPL sites, on the number of cleanups

where it has assumed the lead role, and on

its number of cleanups funded without

Federal funds. Nationally, such a grants

program might require from $25 million

to $50 million annually. This compares to

$80 million annually authorized for RCRA

Subtitle C and D grants to States for fiscal

year 1986 through fiscal year 1988. Total

annual Federal spending on RCRA is

roughly one-quarter of current annual

Superfund spending.

Direct EPA to reexamine how it selects

and uses contractors and involves government agencies at Superfund sites. The performance of contractors on work already

completed and underway in the Superfund

program needs to be evaluated. The already rapid expansion of the Superfund

program often has resulted in poor technical performance by contractors eager,

but not necessarily qualified, to enter this

market. Another possibility is to use a

single contractor for a site, rather than a

succession of contractors who each start

from scratch. EPA could examine its procurement procedures and place more emphasis on technical qualifications rather

than cost proposals.

Improve the relationships between EPA

and State agencies by providing more opportunities for the States to participate in

decisionmaking (even though they may

only be paying for 10 percent of the costs)

and in policy development.

Detailed Strategic Planning

Detailed strategic planning is fundamental

to any long-term program. In the case of the

Superfund program, this is a particularly difficult problem because there are so many interrelated technical, social, and economic factors to consider (see chapter 3). The two-part

strategy stressed in this study is not the only

possible alternative strategy. Nor has OTA considered in detail the myriad problems facing

implementation of any long-term strategy. If

it did not wish to change Superfund now, Congress could direct EPA to submit a detailed

strategy (or several options) for a long-term

Superfund program. The proposal should make

clear how critical decisions about the choice

of sites to be cleaned are to be made, the specific criteria by which the performance of the

program can be measured, and how institutional capabilities assure that funds are spent efficiently and effectively.

The inherent conflict between the current

cost-effectiveness and fund-balancing provisions of the CERCLA statute must be addressed. As discussed previously, there is often

an inherent conflict between what is viewed

as necessary on a site-by-site basis and what

is possible for the national program, What may

be a cost-effective cleanup to provide maximum protection at a single uncontrolled site

may be unreasonable considering the resources

that are available from the national program

for other sites. As the Superfund grows (even
Ch. 2—Policy Options ● 5 7

. — — —

if only to the 2,0(10-site NPL envisioned by EPA),

this inherent conflict will become more acute.

The problem intensifies even more when costly

permanent cleanups are deemed necessary for

some sites, particularly for groundwater cleanup. To some degree, the current program has

trapped itself. If it stressed more permanent

cleanups, it could not take so many actions. It

tries to get many sites into the pipeline. But the

actions are ineffective and meanwhile the number of sites increases steadily. The pipeline never seems to end. Any strategic plan must address this issue and introduce objectivity and

equity into decisions about the allocation of

scarce resources to address many sites over

time.

Public Participation

Chapter 8 supports the need to involve the

public more directly in decisionmaking in all

phases of the Superfund program—from site

identification and selection for the NPL, to

choosing an initial response and remedial

cleanup, to measuring the effectiveness of the

cleanup measure. Congress could consider

making CERCLA more similar to other environmental statutes, such as RCRA, by mandating specific roles for the public in the decisionmaking process.

Whatever is done, however, it must be recognized that the interests of affected communities often conflict with the limits and goals

of a national program. But it is possible that

early and steady public participation in decisionmaking could lead to more effective site

cleanup and a more effective national program.

It is necessary, however, to consider whether

such participation might incur delays. This potential problem could be addressed by trying

to resolve conflicts equitably and expeditiously

through, for example, mediation, binding arbitration, and ombudsmen. More specifically,

Congress may wish to consider providing

funds to communities and other groups to help

them obtain independent technical expertise

so, even when they lack economic and technical resources, they can fairly evaluate the technical complexity and options available to decisionmakers. Where this has been done, it has

proved beneficial.

38 – 745 0 – 85 – 3
Chapter 3

A Systems Analysis of Superfund
Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Current Estimates of Future Superfund Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Uncertainty and the Need to Evaluate the Superfund Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Alternative Approaches to Projecting Superfund Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Historical Performance of the Superfund Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

A Systems Analysis Approach to Define a Long-Term Strategic Plan 67

Simulation: A Systems Analysis Method for Comparing Two Strategies

. . . . . . . . .

and Incorporating Long-Term Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Models and Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Use of Models and Findings . . . . . 74

A Two-Part Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Conclusions: Program Planning Under Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Effectiveness and the Future Cost of Cleanups ....., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Health and Environment Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Non-Federal Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Discount Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Means to Address Uncertainties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Appendix A 90

List of Tables

Table No. Page

3-1. Current Estimates for Cleaning Up Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites . . . . . 62

3-2. Summary of Remedial Cleanup Actions Approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

3-3. System Definitions and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

3-4. Summary of Simulation Scenarios ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

3-5. Illustration of How an Average Impermanence Factor of 0.5 Might Arise . . . . 73

3-6. Scenario 1UAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

3-7. Program Planning With Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

List of Figures

Figure

3-1.

3-2a.

3-2b.

3-3a.

3-3b.

3-4.

3-5a.

3-5b.

3-6.

3-7.

3-8a.

3-8b.

No. Page

Superfund System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Program

Program

Program

Program

Program

Program

Program

Program

Program

Program

Program

Length v. Impermanence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Cost v. Impermanence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Length v. Impermanence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Cost v. Impermanence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Cost v. Impermanence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Length v. Impermanence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Cost v. Impermanence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Costs v. Impermanence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Length v. Impermanence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Cost v. Impermanence Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Chapter 3

A Systems Analysis of Superfund

INTRODUCTION

In the Superfund program so far, more attention has been paid to short-term costs and

budgets than to total program costs and program durations which can cover decades. A

Superfund program designed from a short-term

perspective may not be consistent with the

need for long-term programs to permanently

deal with the problems posed by thousands of

uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. Without

adequate planning, the result may be a cleanup

program that extends beyond several decades,

presenting uncertain and possibly serious

health and environmental risks.

This chapter examines how future financial

needs of the Superfund program may be assessed and what program strategy can meet

these needs. A simple simulation model is presented which illustrates how cleanup costs,

present and future, might be taken into account. The past performance of the program

is considered, the uncertainty of historical

costs is recognized, and alternative strategies

are compared. The results indicate there will

be trade-offs between program cost and the

time required to mitigate the threats posed by

large numbers of uncontrolled hazardous

waste sites.

Finally, a two-part cleanup strategy is identified that shows promise as a sound, long-term

approach to the problem, especially in the face

of many uncertainties.

Current Estimates of Future Superfund Needs

Recent estimates of future financial needs of

the Superfund program confirm the need for

an expanded fund. The studies summarized in

table 3-I estimate that the cost to clean up the

Nation’s uncontrolled hazardous waste sites

will be substantially greater than the current

fund of $1.6 billion. Their estimates range from

$6 billion to $92 billion, with all but one calculating the Federal share of these costs at $5

billion to $26 billion. Only the Department of

Commerce (DOC) study predicts that the current Superfund of $1.6 billion can meet requirements for cleanup. However, DOC assumed

that only 546 sites would be eligible for the

Fund; this estimate is already out-of-date since

over 200 new sites have been proposed for listing on the current 538 site National Priority

List (NPL).

Several sources of uncertainty are responsible for the wide range of estimates in table 3-

1; the most important are the number of sites

requiring cleanup and the costs of cleanup.

Estimates for the total number of sites to be

cleaned ranged from 1,400 to over 7,000. While

this may appear large enough to encompass

true lower and upper bounds, there is evidence

to the contrary. OTA finds that a more appropriate estimate is 10,000 sites (see chapter 5),

without including several categories of candidates for Superfund sites, e.g., as many as

75,000 mining wastes sites and 100,000 currently leaking underground storage tanks, projected to increase to 350,000 within the next

5 years.1

Similarly, estimates of cleanup costs vary a

great deal, from $1 million to $30 million per

site. Also, most of the predictions of total

cleanup cost assumed that the worst sites, those

requiring the most costly response, were captured in the current estimates of the numbers

of sites. This may not be so. For example, DOC

estimated that those sites not already on the

NPL will cost much less to clean up than NPL

sites ($3.2 million per site v. $9.7 million per

1 Donald J’, Fcliciano, “Leaking Underground Storage Tanks:

,~ ~Jot(~nti:~] ~~n\rironnlenta] I’rot)lcIll! “ [ T,S, [Jihrary of Congress.

(;ongrcssional Resrxir(:h %r~’i(:c. lam I I, 1984.

61
Table 3-1 .—Current Estimates for Cleaning up Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites

Department of

EPA (1 984)’ EPA (1983)2 GA0

3 Commerce 4

Number of sites requiring cleanup:

1,500-2,500 1,400-2,200 1,270-2,546 546 NPL

23-56°/0 require 23-56°/0 require 1,250 non-NPL

groundwater response groundwater response 41 municipal

Total average cleanup costs per site (million):

$6.7 -$13.3

Total costs

$10.0 -$33.3

Total costs

$7.6-$22.7a

$6-$12 including $2.25-$6.75 constr. $9.7 NPL

groundwater response $5.25-$15.75 constr. $3.2 non-NPL

including groundwater $30 municipal

response

$1 .5-other costs

(unadjusted) (billion):

$10.3 -$20.6 $5.6 -$33.8 $10.5

to Fund (billion):

$8.4 -$16b

$5.3-$26C

($1.5 surplus)-

$1.5f

Projected years to clean sites:

NA 14 for 1800 sites NA 10-15

NOTES

—

ASTSWMO5

7,113 (43

States surveyed)

1,500 most

serious

$1-$6

$6 serious sites

$14.6 -$42.7

NA

16-23 if

constrained by

personnel

28-90 if

constrained

financially

National Audubon

CMA6 Society

1,000 (27 States 2,200-7,000

surveyed) 3,681 (potential) 38-56°/0 require

$4-$7 studies, removal,

and containment

$17-$30 studies, removal,

containment, and

groundwater response

NA

$4.5e

NA

groundwater response

$8 including O&M

$17 including groundwater response

$8-$92

NA

17-26 for 2,200 sites

53-84 for 7,000 sites

aA~~ume~ 40 t. 60 percent of ~lte~ cleaned by prln~lpal Re~p~n~lble pafile~ (pRp~), Federal ~~~t share l.s go percent, c~~t recovery IS 47 percent for removals and 30 percent for remed!al actlon$, 85 perCent

Interest earned quarterly on prev!ous year’s balance. and 65 percent I nflat!on on removal actions, assumed 190 per year at $75 million per year

bpRp lead actions deducted

cAssumes RpRs clean 29 to 44 perCent Of Sites

dAnnual O&M costs are $3 I ,500, $20,900, and $117,600 for NPL, non-NPL, and munlclpal Site.$ respectlve~y

estatement of E c Holmer, on behalf of the Chemical Manufacturers Assoclatlon, June 13, 1984 (This est, mate assumes no groufldwater cleanup ,l+lso might Include estimate that only 10 perceflt are orphan SlteS )

fA~sumes 45 t. 55 percent cost recovev, 1 t. 15 percent of slte~ cleaned by pRps, 6,5 percent annual Construction Inflatlon, 5 percent annual general Inflation, and 85 percent annual lntereSt on cash balances

9LoW estimates reflect $12 bllllon per year budget; high estimates are for $15 bll)lon per year budget

SOURCES

(1) U S Environmental Protection Agency, “Extent of the Hazardous Release Problem and Future Funding Needs, CERCLA SectIon 301(a)(l)(c) Study, ” December 1964

(2) U S Environmental ProtectIon Agency, Superfund Task Force Prellmlnary Assessment, December 1983

(3) U S General Accounting Office, EPA’s Preliminary Estimates of Future Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Are Uncerfaln, GAO/RCED-64-152, May 7, 1964

(4) U S Department of Commerce “Estimated Costs and Expenditures for Cleanup of the NatIon’s Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites” (draft), Feb 22 1984

(5) Association of State and Terrltonal Solld Waste Management Of flclals, “State Cleanup Programs for Hazardous Substance Sites and Spills,” Dec 21, 1964

(6) Arthur D Little, Inc , Report to the Chemical Manufacturers” Assoclatlon, “An Analysls of the Number of lnactlve Hazardous Waste Sites That WIII Use Superfund,” July 1983

(7) National Audubon Society, Testimony of Leslle Dach before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Touws.m, Mar 1, 1984
Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 63

site), However, the Environmental Protection 1.

Agency’s (EPA] recently released list of proposed NPL sites contains contaminated aquifers on the island of Oahu. Although this is only 2.

one very expensive site, it suggests that other

large contaminated aquifers might be addressed

by Superfund in the future.

All the studies share one common assump- 3,

tion in their cost estimates, however—a complete effectiveness of cleanup technology. This

leads to some critical questions:

Should the effectiveness of cleanup technologies be considered in evaluating cleanup costs and program planning?

Is the assumption that these technologies

are completely effective, warranted, and,

if not, how should cost predictions be

changed?

How certain are the “givens” of these predictions, namely continued use of historical cleanup technologies in the future

program?

UNCERTAINTY AND THE NEED TO EVALUATE

THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM

The Superfund program was established in

response to an emergency situation of uncertain proportions. Both the threats and the measures to control hazardous waste sites were uncertain, but Congress decided that action was

imperative. Little attention to uncontrolled

toxic waste sites existed at the State level.

Precedents existed for legislating and developing regulatory programs in difficult areas. Indeed, the preamble to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) states that “the

courts have repeatedly sanctioned . . , other

EPA statutes where, as here, the Agency is implementing a complex program in an area

‘fraught with scientific uncertainty where Congress has directed EPA to act quickly and decisively despite the lack of exact data’. ”2

To resolve the many uncertainties, Congress

mandated several information-gathering tasks

in the Superfund legislation, such as:

●

●

●

the designation of additional hazardous

substances; s

the development of notification procedures for hazardous substance spills;4

the identification of all possible hazardous

waste sites;5

245 Federal Register 33088,

WE RCLA, Section 102(a),

4

1 birf., Section 103(a),

51bid.

● the collection of information about hazardous substances at those sites for preliminary assessments;6

Ž the establishment of the Agency for Toxic

Substances and Disease Registry to establish and maintain: a) a national registry of

serious diseases and illnesses and a national registry of persons exposed to toxic substances, b) an inventory of information of

health effects of toxic substances, c) listing

of areas closed to public or restricted in

use because of contamination, and d) programs to study the relationships between

exposure to toxic substances and illness; p

and

● reports and studies on the experience with

the implementation of the Superfund program, including one to project “any future

funding need remaining after the expiration of authority” and another to determine “the extent to which the Act and

Fund are effective . . .“8

The uncertainties and complexities connected with releases of hazardous substances

are also reflected in the National Contingency

Plan (NCP), which outlines the regulatory

mechanisms for Federal response to these reblbid., Se~ti~n IOA(e].

7

1 bid., Section 10A(i].

81bid., Section sol(a)(l),
64 ● Superfund Strategy

leases. Throughout the preamble to the modified NCP, including the comments section,

there is explicit mention of the need for flexibility in program design.9 In part, the need for

flexibility reflects the site-specific nature of the

release and appropriate response. But flexibility was also built into the NCP “to incorporate

our expanding knowledge and experience in

developing remedies.”l0

In conclusion, there were both legislative and

regulatory motivations to address uncertainty.

In particular, Congress mandated EPA to evaluate effectiveness and project future financing

requirements, and EPA, in the NCP, acknowledged the need to continue to develop and improve its program, Evaluating the effectiveness

of cleanup approaches is a key step in meeting

these congressional mandates.

Alternative Approaches to Projecting

Superfund Needs

Projecting future funding needs of the Superfund program can be approached in two ways.

A descriptive approach was used in making the

estimates summarized in table 3-I. This approach assumes that the program will, for the

most part, continue to operate as it has historically, using the same methods for selecting

sites for remediation and implementing the

same cleanup technologies. An average cost of

cleanup is derived from historical data, perhaps subject to various rates of inflation. Next,

the expected number of sites requiring remediation is estimated, again relying largely on

examinations of past and current information,

The percentage of sites requiring response in

the past is applied to an updated universe of

potential sites. A range of values may be assumed for these parameters, to reflect sampling

errors or the inherent problems of projection,

Future funding needs are determined by multiplying the estimate for average cleanup cost

and the number of sites to be cleaned.

An alternative method of prediction is prescriptive, incorporating new information as

well as historical experience, It proposes and

evaluates a number of cleanup strategies, not

947 Federal Register 31180-31202.

1047 Federal Register 31182.

limited to those used in the past. Each strategy is then compared to the others on the basis

of evaluation criteria and a preferable strategy

is selected, The cost of the preferred strategy

provides projections for fund requirements, as

mandated by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(CERCLA).

The best way to evaluate the usefulness of

the descriptive method, which is based on past

practices, is to look at the historical performance of the Superfund program. If the program

has been operating at an acceptable level of efficiency and effectiveness, if uncertainties in

cost are adequately accounted for, and/or if no

other alternatives exist, then the descriptive

method is acceptable. The analysis below indicates that none of these conditions exists.

Historical Performance of the

Superfund Program

As of September 30, 1984, the Emergency

and Remedial Response Information System

(ERRIS), the inventory of uncontrolled hazardous substance sites from which NPL sites are

selected, contained 18,900 sites. EPA anticipates that the list will grow to between 22,000

and 25,000 sites.11 Preliminary assessments had

been conducted at 10,700 sites and site inspections completed at 3,600 sites.l2 Of the 1,700

sites scored with EPA’s Hazard Ranking System, 538 have been selected for the National

Priority List and an additional 238 sites have

been proposed for listing.13

The first 21⁄2 years of the Superfund program

progressed slowly, but the pace has accelerated

since May 1983. At the end of fiscal year 1982,

57 removal actions at both NPL and non-NPL

sites had been initiated; after 2 more years, a

total of 422 had been started. Of this total, only

17 were planned removal actions.14

IY LJ. s. IZrlVlrOnrnenta] Protection Agency, “Extent of the Hazardous Release problem and Future Funding Needs, CERCLA

Section 301(a)(l)(C) Study” (Washington, DC: Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, December 1984).

‘z Ibid.

‘s Ibid.

14u .S. Environmental Protection Agency, “The Effectiveness

of the Superfund Program, CERCLA Section 301(a) (l)(A] Study”

(Washington, DC: Office of Emergency and Remedial Response,

December 1984). These statistics include CERCLA-financed, enforcement-lead, and responsible party actions.
The remedial aspects of the program, which

pertain to long-term cleanups, are occurring

more slowly. By the end of fiscal year 1982 only

about 60 remedial investigation and feasibility

studies (RI/FS) had been initiated; but by the

end of fiscal year 1984, 315 RI/FSs had been

started. l5 Remedial design has begun on 56

sites. Six sites have been designated as clean.

Of the remedial cleanup actions currently

underway or approved, most responses have

been removal of hazardous materials for offsite disposal, or onsite containment, or both.

Table 3-2 summarizes remedial actions taken

for 24 sites.l6

The institutional framework for responding

to uncontrolled sites is in place. Despite initial problems, the program is beginning to operate more swiftly and smoothly. Many more

sites have moved into the RI/FS and design

study stages, As more studies are completed,

more sites will move into the construction

phase. However, only 30 percent of the 538

sites now on the NPL are receiving remedial

cleanup attention.

It is also necessary to understand what is being done, and what the implications of current

actions are for the future. Most of the cleanup

actions approved so far involve removal and/or

excavation, followed by offsite disposal. Although the facilities where Superfund wastes

are taken are regulated under RCRA, these regulations do not assure detection and prevention of groundwater contamination. There is

Table 3-2.—Summary of Remedial Cleanup

Actions Approved

Cleanup actions approved Number of decisions

.

Removal/offsite disposal

—

with or without source control . 14

Removal/offsite disposal with some

incineration . . . . . 1

Alternative water supply . . . . . . . . . 3

Alternative water supply with

treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Treatment (1 aeration; 1 air-stripping). . . . 2

Source control and onsite treatment . . . . 2

SOURCE U S Environmental ProtectIon Agency, “The Effect weness of the Super

fund program, CERCLA SectIon 301(a) (1)(A) December 1984

Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 65

a strong likelihood that a number of RCRA facilities may become Superfund sites, some

might even be able to qualify as Superfund sites

now, and some already have.

This issue is examined in more depth in

chapter 5 and leads to the conclusions that

removal followed by disposal is not an effective or efficient cleanup option, environmentally or economically, unless removed wastes

are destroyed, detoxified, treated, or stabilized

in some fashion prior to redisposal.

Without the measures just specified, offsite

removal will probably only relocate the hazard

and transfer the risk. Furthermore, offsite removal usually leaves some (often considerable)

residual surface waste in the form of contaminated soil that can threaten groundwater. Offsite removal does not address problems of

groundwater already contaminated at the site.

While partial cleanups have been common,

source control and containment have also been

used after removal to address groundwater

problems, While the short-term costs of these

remedial methods often compare favorably

with other options, their long-term effectiveness can be greatly limited by site conditions,

such as hydrogeology, rainfall, and geomorphology. l7

Another response to groundwater contamination is to provide an alternative drinking

water supply. (Note that water for other uses,

such as bathing, often is not supplied even

though health effects may be significant.)

Sometimes this response is appropriate, for example when the alternate water is easily accessible and not too costly and when the affected

population is not large. However, with groundwater now providing 50 percent of the Nation’s

drinking water, this can be a viable long-term

alternative for only a limited number of sites.

It is not an alternative for large populations.

There is a limit to how many aquifers can be

foresaken.

The groundwater problem is receiving attention; EPA has recently established an Office of

1 TTh~; ~xper]ence at the Stri ngfe]]ow Acid Pits i]] ustrates many

of the problems that can arise with continued use of cr)nta i nment [see chapter 1],
66 • Superfund Strategy

Groundwater and developed a groundwater

protection strategy.l8 The EPA has also acknowledged that groundwater contamination

at Superfund sites has not yet been extensively

addressed. When it is addressed, it will greatly

increase the cost of the program,

The performance of cleanup actions during

the last 4 years of the Superfund program do

not support the use of the descriptive method

for predicting future costs. The approved actions are weighted heavily in favor of least-cost

options that are available now. While they are

often called proven, the long-term effectiveness

of these options is highly uncertain, and they

may be ineffective even in the short term. The

total costs of cleanup using these technologies

are not accurately represented by the sum of

their construction costs and first year operating and maintenance costs, On the contrary,

these options are likely to prove costly in the

long term. Additional remedial measures at the

original sites or at other redisposal sites may

be required as a consequence of the original

cleanup technology decisions. In a sense an

environmental deficit is created for future generations.

The final consideration is whether new, more

efficient technologies exist or can be developed. The descriptive prediction method, relying on historical cleanup decisions, assumes

little technological change or improvement.

OTA has found that there are substantial opportunities to develop permanent, cost-effective cleanup technologies (see chapter 6). Many

innovative cleanup technologies, ranging from

methods of biological and chemical treatment

to thermal destruction show great promise, but

their development and demonstration are hampered by several institutional problems, including the fact that the Superfund program has

not recognized their potential long-term cost

effectiveness.

Thus, when the state of knowledge is considered, coupled with the experiences of the

l~FOr In Ore information see U ,S, Congress, Office Of ‘reChmlo~y Assessment, Protecting the Nation (lroundwater From

Contamination, OTA-O-233 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

f)rinting Office, October 1984).

program and the potential for new technologies, it is clear that projections of the costs of

the Superfund program must be based on:

Ž a comparison of alternative strategies; and

● future development, demonstration, and

use of innovative, permanent cleanup technologies,

The desirability of defining a preferred longterm strategy becomes greater as evidence accumulates that many more sites may need

cleanup. The long-term costs of traditional

cleanup technologies, possibly acceptable with

a relatively small number of sites, grows burdensome as the number of sites rises–with the

number going as high as 2,000, 10,000, or more,

Policy and planning decisions based mostly on

low short-term costs may hamper program

progress, if site after site deteriorates and must

be recleaned, and as still more sites are discovered, Under such conditions, the total cost and

time required to fulfill the Superfund mandate

may become unacceptable to society,

The need to reevaluate and perhaps define

a new program strategy is not a new concept.

It was suggested by William Hedeman, EPA’s

Superfund chief:

And it seems to me that the more fundamental question that has to be asked is whether

or not the program and the structure and statutory base that has been established thus far

to deal with this problem is really the most

sensible way to go. Whether indeed we don’t

have as much of a national problem in the area

of abandoned hazardous waste as we had in

the 1930s and 40s in terms of flood control,

or as we had in the 1970s with contaminated

air and contaminated water? And we haven’t

inadvertently set into motion a system with

a problem that is so convoluted and complex

and difficult to manage that it could collapse

of its own weight rather than accomplishing

the results that were ever intended?19

1g” A Conversation With Superfund Chief Bill Hedeman, ” The

Enkrironrnenta! Forum, August 1983.
Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 6 7

A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS APPROACH TO DEFINE

A LONG-TERM STRATEGIC PLAN

Has the current Superfund program “inadvertently set into motion a system with a problem that is so convoluted and complex and difficult to manage that it could collapse of its

own weight rather than accomplishing the results that were . . . intended?” The critical step

toward developing a better program strategy

is to realize that, in fact, the Superfund program, with its response mechanisms for threats

posed by uncontrolled hazardous waste sites,

is a complex system,

The Superfund system can be viewed as a

series of interacting issues, conditions, and

decisions. The mechanics of the system are depicted in figure 3-1. The primary inputs are

listed in the box labeled issues/conditions.

These include the potential number of Superfund sites, public demands and perceptions

about the threats posed by these sites, and the

technologies available to deal with them. All

of these components affect Federal policy decisions.

Superfund policy decisions at the Federal

level define an upper limit on the resources to

manage the problem, provide the framework

for management, and set the goals of the program, Furthermore, Federal policy dictates

what sites are eligible for consideration. For

Figure 3.1 .—Superfund System

Issues/

conditions

Ž Potential number

of sites

— Current

ERRIS sites

— Active

Subtitle C

facilities

— Closed and

active

Subtitle D

● Existing

technologies

● Existing

qualified

personnel

● Health and

environmental

effects data

. Public demands

and perceptions

● Responsible

parties

• State programs

and funds

Federal

policy

decisions

● Fund size and

duration

● States’ share

requirements

● Sites selection

criteria

● Cleanup goals

● CERCLA enforcement and recovery

● RCRA rules and

enforcement

● Technology

RD&D

● Research on

effects from

hazardous

waste

. Technical

personnel

Program

management

decisions

● Number of sites

eligible for

fund (NPL)

• Measures of

immediate and

long-term risk

● Method of

remedial technology selection

● Application of

cleanup goals

at sites

● Allocation of

fund

Ž Oversight/

guidance for

contractors,

responsible

parties, and

states

● Selection of

initial

responses

● Selection of

remedial

cleanups

● Selection of

other actions

Program goals or

evaluation

criteria

• Total cleanup

costs

. Duration

● Environmental

protection

effectiveness

. Equity/fund

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment
68 • Superfund Strategy

instance, EPA has decided that sites with only

environmental problems, which do not pose

threats to human health, do not now qualify

for Superfund attention, The Hazard Ranking

System has no component to account for natural resource damages that do not affect human health directly. Even though Congress did

not establish this policy, it did limit resources

for the program.

In addition, non-Superfund policy decisions

may influence the Superfund program, For example, policy changes in the RCRA program

for hazardous and solid waste land disposal facilities may alter the frequency at which new

Superfund sites enter the pool, depending on

improvements in prevention, detection, and

correction of leaks and groundwater contamination. Federal policy also affects how the financial requirements placed on the States might

affect the cleanup of facilities. Many sites may

fall into the 50 percent State matching share

category.

Broad Federal policies are eventually translated into a program strategy via program management policies. Management decisions on

ranking criteria and methodology determine

which sites are included on the NPL. Program

management policies also govern the allocation

of resources to eligible sites and define which

cleanup technologies are employed. These decisions are extremely complex because they,

too, entail many interdependencies and interactions. For example, cleanup technology decisions are dependent not only on what technologies are available and at what cost, but also

on the availability of funds and qualified personnel, the nature of cleanup goals, and the

threats posed by uncontrolled hazardous waste

sites. Management decisions by EPA define the

scope and form the strategy, even if unintentionally, of the cleanup program.

The resultant program strategy may in turn

lead to secondary, long-term consequences that

also affect the system, The remedial actions

alter the risks associated with the remediated

sites but, if they are not wholly effective, they

may impose future costs and risks. Decisions

to remove and dispose of waste offsite may

pose threats at other sites, which, in turn, may

result in further demands on Superfund resources. Thus, current program decisions affect future system inputs and needs. The historical emphasis in the Superfund program has

been on detailed site-by-site analyses, with little, if any, analysis of intersite effects. This is

one reason why responses have usually entailed offsite disposal. But cleanup on a siteby-site basis is not necessarily an effective national cleanup. Considering each uncontrolled

site independently may also lead to inconsistency; sites posing similar risks in different

locations may be dealt with differently. Moreover, the long-term effects of all the interactions may not be obvious unless viewed systematically.

The complexity of the Superfund program

suggests that projections of needs or changes

of the program strategy should be tackled in

a systems framework, using the discipline of

systems analysis, With the interdependencies

and interactions defined, program strategies can

be evaluated more objectively and thoroughly,

Definition of Goals

An obvious Superfund objective is to minimize the cost of cleaning up uncontrolled sites.

This goal raises an interesting question,

namely, costs to whom? Focusing only on the

costs to the Fund can lead to distortions. For

instance, long-term operating and maintenance

(O&M) costs are the States’ responsibility. Concern with only the costs to the Fund, therefore,

might emphasize cleanup technologies with

lower capital costs even if the total cleanup

costs will ultimately be very high (and higher

than other options) because of high operating

and maintenance costs. Although the current

methodology used in feasibility studies for selecting remedial action does deal with O&M

costs, three points should be made. First, funding estimates currently include only the initial

year of O&M costs regardless of estimates

made in the feasibility studies. Second, the feasibility studies often choose optimistic estimates despite limited experience with the O&M

costs of the remedial technology options, Fur-
Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund Ž 69

thermore, limited experience with the application of the current technology options to hazardous waste problems coupled with undue

concern about short-term costs might lead to

technology decisions that fail to accomplish a

long-term, permanent remedy,

Thus, to prevent distortions, all expenditures—from the Fund, from the States, and

from responsible parties—must be included in

the estimate of total long-term costs. This approach is highly flexible. In considering alternative or additional goals, the costs to specific

parties can be derived, assumed, or compared

after preferred solutions to the problem are

generated, and the results can affect the criteria for the next iteration on the solutions.

If minimizing cleanup costs were the only

goal, the solution would be to do nothing at

zero cost. The goal that forces the program to

operate is maximizing effectiveness in protecting human health and the environment. In the

CERCLA 301(a)(l)(A) study, effectiveness is related to the “Government’s ability to respond

to and mitigate the effects of releases of hazardous substances, ” This implies that effectiveness is the avoidance or mitigation of risks to

health and the environment. This is the

congressional mandate.

One CERCLA provision specifies that remedial actions are to be chosen that:

. . . provide for that cost-effective response

which provides a balance between the need

for protection of public health and welfare

and the environment at the facility under consideration and the availability of amounts

from the Fund .. .20

According to this provision, cleanup actions

are supposed to be cost effective and, at the

same time, the Fund is to be allocated in a balanced fashion nationwide. The cost effectiveness criterion could be viewed as total program

cost effectiveness as well as site-specific cost

effectiveness. However, if affected by real or

perceived budget limitations, choosing what

appears to be the most cost-effective way of

q: EK[, A, Sc(:t ion 104(r.](4)

dealing with each site individually could reduce the cost effectiveness of the national system. The analysis in this chapter addresses the

problem of how to simulataneously achieve site

and national cost effectiveness.

The fund-balancing requirement raises a

complex issue of equity, costs, and effectiveness. Furthermore, without a reliable measure

of effectiveness, there is no way to determine

whether a particular Superfund strategy is cost

effective, nor can adherence to the fund-balancing provision be evaluated (see chapter 4).

Another goal that has received limited attention is minimizing the time required to complete the program. This goal is reflected in the

idea of a mandatory cleanup schedule. The

longer a site remains uncontrolled, the greater

the risk may be. The risks may be the same

each year and simply accumulate or they might

increase over time as leaching progresses and

as contaminants migrate further into the environment.

Whether or not total program length is a valid

measure for risk, the public perceives it as

such. For this reason, a Superfund program

that emphasizes permanent cleanup actions

might still pose problems if it left sites, and

their affected communities, waiting for cleanup for extended lengths of time (e. g., beyond

50 years). Program length defines the planning

horizon for the program and, therefore, the

period over which the costs and benefits of

each program strategy should be evaluated.

The effects of excluding longer term costs in

the planning horizon may be dramatic, as shown

later in this chapter,

Such goals—proper accounting of costs over

time, effective cleanup, and timeliness—can be

used to evaluate different Superfund program

strategies and choose among them. Because

Federal and program management policies determine the cleanup strategy, the evaluation

process can elucidate how these policies affect

the performance of the strategy. Understanding the system dynamics can help to define

how Federal policy and program management

policy might change to improve program performance.
70 ● Superfund Strategy

Simulation: A Systems Analysis Method for

Comparing Two Strategies and Incorporating

Long-Term Uncertainty

Systems analysis can be used for simulation—a model that mimics events occurring in

the real system. In the context of the Superfund

program, the primary event is a cleanup action.

A wide range of policy and management decisions may alter the numbers, types, and rates

of occurrence of the responses. These decisions

can be tested using simulation for their effects

on the performance of the system, In the discussion that follows, the objective is to evaluate

the effects of the uncertainty in costs on program duration after a first site response and

on total program costs under different program

cleanup strategies.

Future Costs and an Impermanence Factor

The importance of examining the effects of

uncertain and unforeseen future costs associated with a site cleanup cannot be overstated.

As has been shown, effects of uncertainty about

long-term costs of cleanup technologies have

not been considered to any great extent, despite

evidence that the technologies typically employed today may incur total costs significantly

in excess of their short-term costs. Program

planning based on short-term costs may result

not only in an unexpectedly costly program,

but in one that lasts over a very long time. It

is particularly important to evaluate the effects

of uncertainty on long-term cleanup costs before more money is spent on costly remedial

cleanups.

An “impermanence factor” is defined to reflect the uncertainty of near-term cost estimates

for response. Additional future costs, above the

near-term costs of “impermanent” actions,

may be incurred due to the need for additional

actions, or operating and maintenance costs,

or compensation for health and environmental

damage. How the impermanence factor is integrated into the model differs according to the

cleanup strategy chosen.

Program Cleanup Strategies

Two extreme cleanup strategies are examined. These interim and permanent strategies

are useful as boundary conditions, clarifying

the importance of certain cleanup strategies

toward which the actual Superfund program

could move. A third strategy, a variation of the

permanent strategy and representative of the

two-part plan described in chapters 1 and 2 is

also analyzed.

In the interim strategy, successive interim actions, which are not permanent, are taken. Future costs are incurred and are a function of

the impermanence factor and the cost of interim cleanup, In the basic permanent strategy,

initial actions (with technologies and costs the

same as the interim actions of the interim strategy) are undertaken for the first 15 years of the

program. Like the interim responses, initial actions are impermanent, but no site receives a

second impermanent action. After 15 years,

cost-effective permanent technologies are assumed available; permanent cleanups are then

performed on all sites, both those never responded to and those requiring a second action because of a previous impermanent action.

Explicit in this strategy is the concept of concerted but limited initial actions with plans for

]ong-term permanent cleanup. Future costs in

this strategy are a function of the impermanence factor (from the early responses) and the

costs of permanent cleanups.

Under the two-part cleanup strategy, less

costly, impermanent initial actions are performed (only once) on all NPL sites until permanent cleanups are cost effective and available. As in the basic permanent strategy, after

the 15-year development period, permanent actions are mandatory. In this variation, a larger

number of initial actions are taken, but they are

less extensive, less expensive actions, thus preserving funds for developing and implementing permanent cleanup plans. This strategy is

discussed later; the model description will

focus on the two primary strategies.
Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 7 1

Model Description

In OTA’s simulation model actions are undertaken annually; a particular class of actions—

interim or initial—incurs future costs depending on the degree of impermanence and the distribution of costs over time.

The usefulness of the model lies not in projecting actual Superfund program costs or

Superfund program duration, but rather in understanding the dynamics of the system under

uncertainty. The model tells us what might

happen. To correctly interpret the results of the

model, the elements that characterize the system must be understood. In this modeling exercise, these elements fall into two categories:

1) system definitions and assumptions, and 2)

uncertain elements to be tested.

The values of system definitions and assumptions are specified and are not varied. This is

done because their behaviors and values are

known with relative certainty, or the uncertainty inherent in them is not suspected to influence the aspects of the system being tested, or

the effects of the uncertainty can be easily intuited. Table 3-3 summarizes the system definitions and assumptions of the model. The system definitions, such as how the budget is

allocated among the different sites, relate to the

system as a whole. The assumptions about parameters relate to specific cleanup actions.

The first definition given in table 3-3 is the

number of uncontrolled sites eligible for the

Federal fund; this figure changes as the NPL

is revised periodically. Parameters such as

cleanup costs and appropriate cleanup technology differed enough to warrant dividing the

sites into two categories: those with only surface contamination and those with both surface and groundwater contamination. This

breakdown, and the costs for each class of site,

correspond to early estimates by EPA.21 The

cleanup costs, $6 million for a surface cleanup

and $12 million including groundwater remedial action, include only the short-term costs

of those remedial technology actions currently

z 1 [].s, EnY, iro nrn~nta] ~]rote~tion Agency, ,$uperfund ‘~as~

~“orce Pre/irninarJ Assessment, I)w,. 8, 1983.

Table 3.3.—System Definitions and Assumptions

(not varied in model)

System definitions:

● 546 sites currently (initially) eligible for Superfund money

• Two categories of sites:

—Sites with only surface contamination

—Sites requiring groundwater response and surface

response

● 20°/0 of sites eligible for Fund use require groundwater

responsea

. Each annual budget is distributed between surface and

groundwater responses so that the same percentage of

sites of each type are responded to annually

Assumptions about parameters to be held constant:

. Average interim action costs (estimates of currently used

technologies) b (for interim strategy and initial action of

the basic permanent strategy):

–$6 million/site for surface response only

—$1 2 million/site including groundwater response

• Average initial action costs (for two-part strategy only):

–$1 million/site for surface response only

—$3 million/site including groundwater response

● Time required to complete actions:

—3 years: Interim surface response

—6 years: Interim groundwater response

—3 years: Permanent surface cleanup

—10 years: Permanent groundwater cleanup

a 56 percent of the N PL sites exhlblted groundwater contamination but only 23

percent were estimated to require treatment (U S Environmental Protect Ion

Agency, .%perfund Task Force Pre//mlnary Assessment, Dec 8, 1984) Ground

water releases have been recorded at 75 percent of the N PL sites For NPL s!tes

where releases have not yet occurred 90 percent had potential ground water

release scores over 15 and 70 percent had scores over 30 out of 45 These data

suggest that this IS a very conservative estimate

bAn average cleanup cost of about $9 m!lllon was given tn the 301(a)(l)(C) study

Thts figure was for all types of cleanup actions (over 13 types) not accounting

for States’ shares, recovery and voluntary cleanup This est!mate corresponds

to a 50 percent rate of sites requlnng groundwater cleanup

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

used. These costs, therefore, are the average

costs of interim responses. The model conservatively estimates that 20 percent of the sites

would require groundwater response, although

more than three-quarters of NPL sites have

groundwater problems,

A method of allocating a fixed annual budget

(or total, unadjusted costs to all parties) to the

sites is also defined. The annual budgets are

distributed to surface and groundwater responses

so that the same percentage of each type of site

is addressed. This allocation method may be

overly optimistic with regards to the attention

that groundwater has received historically.22

ZZA statist i[; a] analysls perforrne~ on those s I t(; s for ~~’h I (:h

monies mere obligated prior to mid-l 983 revealed that sites with

higher levels of groundwater contamination, as reflected b~’ their

HRS scores, bore a negative relationship with Fund-finan[:ed

actions, See Haro]d C. Barnett, “The Allocation of Superfund,

198(1-1 983, ” f)epartment of Economics, [Jniversitj of Rhode

Island.
72 ● Superfund Strategy

Only two NPL sites now have an active remedial program for contaminated groundwater.

Finally, because the program length is an

evaluation criterion, certain assumptions about

time are made. It has been estimated that the

average remedial response takes 3 years to

complete. 23 Since surface responses provide

most of the experience, this estimate is increased to 6 years for groundwater actions.

These estimates are for interim actions. Since

no permanent cleanup has been implemented,

its duration is speculative. It is assumed that

permanent surface cleanups take 3 years to

complete, and permanent cleanups of groundwater contamination take 10 years.

For those elements of the system that are illdefined, different options are tested for their

effects on the system. A simulation scenario

is defined by choosing one option for each element. These choices are summarized in table

3-4.

Because this model could not consider sitespecific data on risk and fund balancing, only

total program cost and total program length are

examined in any detail. Undiscounted total

costs are used, but later an analysis of discounting is presented, While some of the following

findings are deductive, others refer directly to

particular results from the scenarios tested.

Complete scenario results are given in the appendix to this chapter, along with a more detailed examination of the model.

The Interim Strategy

The primary element of uncertainty to be

tested is the cleanup strategy, The interim strategy assumes no permanent cleanup technology

is used; thus all cleanups are interim actions

and their short-term costs do not represent the

total costs of dealing with the site or the wastes.

Use of interim responses implies the need for

involved operation and maintenance (O&M),

the costs of which have not been included in

the short-term costs, The possibility of subsequent and repetitive remedial actions involving additional future costs and additional O&M

costs also are not included, Interim actions in- —

““~~t~nt of the Ha~ar~ous Release Problem ~n(i Future Funcf -

in~ ~twls, ~ IZ RC1.A Se~ti~n SO l(a)(l )(C) Study, ’ op. cit.

Table 3-4.—Summary of Simulation Scenarios

(choose one from each element of uncertainty)’

Element of uncertainty: Options

Cleanup strategy:

Ž Interim strategy— Interim actions result in repeated

future costs.

● Permanent strategy—An interim action during the first

15 years results in a future cost, which is a permanent

cleanup. Permanent cleanups start after 15 years and

result in no future costs themselves.

● Two-part strategy —Less costly initial response only (not

more than once per site) over first 15 years. Afterwards,

if required, a permanent cleanup with no future costs.

Future costs of impermanent cleanup actions:

Impermanence factor varied between O and 1.

Average permanent cleanup costs:

1.$24 M—surface cleanup

$60 M—groundwater cleanup

2.$12 M—surface cleanup

$30 M–groundwater cleanup

Time distribution of future cleanup actions:

U. Future actions occur uniformly over 30 years after an

interim action.

E. Future actions occur ear/y, i.e., 5 years after an interim

action.

L. Future actions occur late, i.e., 30 years after an interim

action,

Budget:

A. Initial period (5 yr) budget is $1.6B; growth @ 100°/0 each

successive period.

B. Initial period (5 yr) budget is $1.6B; growth @ 10°/0 each

successive period.

C. Initial period (5 yr) budget is $9B; growth @ 30°/0 each

successive period.

D. Each period (5 yr) budget is $9B.

S. Initial period (5 yr) budget is $5B; growth @ 100°/0 for

each of next 3 periods then @ 20°/0 for each successive

period.

Number of new sites per year for the first 15 years:

0 . 0

F. 100

M. 200

G. 200 for years 1-5; 800 for years 6-10; and 1,000 for years

11-15.

aFor ~Xa~Ple, scenario IUAF has the following values option 1 for averwe Per’

manent cleanup costs, option U for time distribution of future cleanup actions,

option A for budget, and option F for the number of new s!tes per year The

scenarto is run for both strategies, the Interim and Permanent, and the lmper.

manence factor IS varied in both strategies between zero and one

SOURCE. Of ftce of Technology Assessment

elude offsite disposal of wastes and contaminated materials, and traditional onsite control

and containment techniques.

To capture future costs, the impermanence

factor is used. This factor is itself uncertain,

so values for the factor between O and 1 are

tested in different scenarios. The impermanence factor averages the future costs of all interim actions over the whole system. (Note that

the future costs of interim actions may vary
widely among the individual responses, but

this model can deal only with averages.) An illustration of how an average impermanence

factor might be derived from various cleanup

actions is given in table 3-5.

The average impermanence factor can be interpreted in a number of ways. To illustrate one

interpretation, suppose each initial interim surface response, costing $6 million, has an impermanence factor of 50 percent (0.50). Then

the second action required for each interim action will cost only $3 million per site. But this

second action will also be interim, and therefore will result in a third response, at half the

cost of the second, and so on. The result is a

decreasing geometric series with a finite sum.

That is, each interim action requires another

interim action, whose cost is related to the cost

of the previous action by the impermanence

factor. In other words, the sites slowly approach cleanliness, or the repeated cleanup

process finally becomes effective.

The second way to interpret the impermanence factor is that an interim action only has

a probability of requiring another interim action. If required, the future action will have the

same unit response cost. An impermanence

factor of 50 percent (0.50], in this case, would

mean that half of all interim actions require an

additional interim action, In other words, out

of 100 initial interim actions performed at a

Typ e

Partial remova l

Partial remova l

Table 3-5.— Illustration of How an

Cleanup actions

Percent

(off site disposal) 10

(offsite disposal) plus

onsite containmen t 40

Onsite containment . . . . . 20

Onsite containment/treatment . . . 20

Alternative water supply or relocation

of resident s 10

aRernal rider of s{tes have a zero Impermanence factor

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 73

cost of $6 million per site, 50 interim actions

will be required at the same unit cost, These

in turn will result in 25 interim actions and

so forth. (As before, cleanup of the system of

sites slowly becomes effective. ) More complicated interpretations that explicitly incorporate

long-term operating and maintenance costs

could also be constructed. However, the model

may underestimate such costs since they are

represented as decreasing with time for impermanence factors less than 1.

Another uncertainty is the timing of future

costs. Because the program ends when the expenditures stop, it is necessary to investigate

a number of alternatives. One option is that the

future costs of an interim action occur uniformly over 30 years after completing the action. The other options are that the future costs

occur every 5 years or every 30 years, choices

which represent optimistic and pessimistic

estimates of the time over which interim responses are effective. (Note that interim actions

are performed over time, so that the entire program lasts substantially beyond 30 years.)

The Permanent Strategy

For the permanent cleanup strategy, the

model assumes that permanent remedial technologies for all types of site problems will be

available in 15 years. (Some are available now. )

Average Impermance Factor of 0.5 Might Arise

Sites incurring

future costs Contribution

to average

Potential source of Impermanence impermanence

future cost Percent a

factor factor

Future action at disposal 50

site

Future action onsite

Future action at disposal 30

site

Future action onsite

High O&M costs

Future action onsite 75

High O&M costs 50

Future action onsite 20

Average

2.0 010

1,5 0.18

1,0 0.15

0.5 0.05

1.0 0.02

mpermanence factor 0.50
74 ● Superfund Strategy

Technologies that might fall into this class are

discussed in chapter 6. Under this strategy, permanent cleanups become not only available but

mandatory after 15 years. During the first 15

years only initial actions where an impermanence factor is applicable are used, but no future impermanent actions may follow, only future permanent actions. The number of initial

actions depends on funding during the first 15

years. Therefore, the effect of different budget

levels is tested. When the permanent cleanups

become available, they are used on sites that

have never been treated as well as sites that received initial responses. The 15-year period

simulates the time needed to develop and demonstrate more cost-effective permanent cleanup technologies, as well as other efforts to improve institutional capabilities (see chapters 1

and 2).

Models and Reality

Systems models have been used in a variety

of disciplines to aid in planning and decisionmaking. Some models are dependent on natural phenomena that are easily quantifiable; this

facilitates the analysis of model results. Other

models cannot be easily verified because they

depend on difficult-to-measure phenomena,

such as behavior. The strategies modeled in

this analysis are of the latter type. Other models

could have been chosen. Some might define the

concept of impermanence differently; others

might have modeled impermanence in a more

complex way. To effectively use models, it is

important to understand their assumptions and

limitations.

A basic assumption of the interim strategy

is that there is no learning from experience.

This assumption leads to drastic results, As the

system’s average impermanence factor approaches the value 1, total program costs and

duration approach infinity, The model does not

represent reality at average impermanence factors of 1 or greater; in reality, program costs

cannot approach infinity. The program costs

may become very large, but in reality decisions

will be made to stop the program—any program—from approaching infinity. The interim

strategy does, however, represent a boundary

condition for what the future could be. The

lack of an explicit long-term strategic plan for

the uncontrolled site problem, and the continued emphasis on remedial actions with substantial unforeseen future costs suggest that the

interim strategy approximates current reality.

The purpose of the modeling exercise is to

compare a strategy that emphasizes seemingly

more expensive cleanups that have low or highly predictable future costs (modeled here as

zero) with one that follows the historical path.

Even without such a plan, the cleanup program

will evolve and improve, but how long will the

process take and what will be the costs? The

interim strategy gives insights into these questions by addressing the costs of not learning

fast enough from experience,

USE OF MODEL AND FINDINGS

OTA has used its model to perform an analysis of Superfund, not to attempt to design a

program. Thus, it is only meant to be illustrative. Other models could be devised. Following are examples of how OTA’s model can be

used as an aid to decisionmaking and the findings that it generates in terms of program costs

and duration, Various scenarios under both the

interim and permanent strategies are compared and a variation of a permanent strategy

(representing the two-part strategy proposed in

chapters 1 and 2) is illustrated. 24

Question: Is it possible that after taking an

interim cleanup action, each additional future

interim cleanup action will cost as much or

more? That is, can a given class of interim

Z4Deta1]ed information on a]] components of ~rrA’s model, the

mathematical formulations, and how the results were generated

can he found in the appendix to this chapter,
Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund • 75

cleanup technologies have an impermanence

factor of 1 or greater? What would happen in

the long term under an interim cleanup strategy if this were true?

Findings: The experience of the Superfund

program to date, although limited, suggests that

it is possible that second interim actions can

cost as much or more than the first interim responses. 25

If only interim cleanup technologies are

available and if each additional interim action

costs as much or more than the first, the total

undiscounted program cost will be infinite and

the program will continue indefinitely (unless

terminated). It is unlikely that this would be the

case for all sites, but repeated, expensive, ineffective cleanup at even a few sites could have

serious consequences for the program.

Another possibility, however unlikely, should

also be mentioned: an interim technology

might accomplish little besides dispersing the

contamination, This might be appropriate at

some sites. Eventually, with extensive dispersion, hazardous concentrations might become

low enough to be regarded as acceptable or the

toxic substances might degrade. If this occurred, an interim cleanup strategy with an impermanence factor of 1 or greater might result

in finite program cleanup costs and length.

However, attempts at isolating hazardous wastes

would have to be abandoned and society would

have to accept the health risks that were present before very low concentrations of hazardous substances were attained, Furthermore,

dispersion might increase exposure.

— ~jr’or I nst a 11{ , [~,,~t s! r I ngff;l ]oit’ a n ] nter i m remedial action Y$’a ~

tak\~Il to prc~[:nt ()~erfl{)w of (,onta m inated liquid into the com -

munlt~ of (;I(;II ~Iron, ‘1’hf: action increased the capacit} of the

\ itt: f I’(I m ah[)u t ~ million to 8.2 mill lon ~allons, Howr;\rer, this

a I \() ‘‘I nc: r(~asml t hc (1 r i \ 1 ng ~)oten! ial for (:o nta m] na nts in the re-

~ I (i (I a I \l LIdg[?+ a n (1 po II(I a 11 II ~’ iu m to leach i n to the u nderlyi n H

grou ndwat cr. F’urth(~rm{Jre, the addition of lime and kiln dust

to nl:utralizc matcrial~ at the site in(:reased the irnlumc of conta}n inat[?d soil. F’or thc~[; an(l [)thcr reason~, further cleanup at

Str]ngfellt)w WII1 (Ix(.{!c(i the (,(~~t~ of the first interim action,

((;f:orgf> ] ‘1’rt:zf~h, “ [;n~in[~f~rlng (;asc Stud} of the Strin~fcllow

Slll)[’rf(][l{l Sit f~\, ” I ( ]nt ra(:t[jr \t tIfl~ prcpa rod for the office of

‘1’[J( hn[)logt .~i~f~tsmcnt, Al]gu>t 1984, ]

Question: Will an interim cleanup strategy

always lead to infinite program costs and

length?

Findings: As long as the average impermanence factor is less than 1, the total cost and

duration of the program will be finite because

additional future costs will decrease over time.

Consider a case when the impermanence factors for both interim surface and interim

groundwater cleanup are 5 percent (0.05). The

first interim surface cleanups cost $6 million

per site. Under the assumption that future actions are required, 5 years after each interim

action, the second cleanups average $300,000

per site. Ten years after the first action, the additional costs will be$15,OOO per site, and after

15 years, only $750 per site. So after 15 years,

for all practical purposes, a permanent cleanup

will have been achieved by a series of four interim cleanups at a total cost of slightly over

$6,300,000 per site. Similarly, the long-term undiscounted average cost per groundwater cleanup would be about $12,600,000.

These two costs can be thought of as the per

site interim cleanup costs adjusted for future

costs. Just as the cost of cleanup for one site

is finite, the total cleanup costs for all sites requiring remedial action are also finite. The time

it will take to complete the program also will

be finite but will be determined by several factors, which will be explored later. Furthermore,

depending on the costs of permanent cleanups

and preferences on program length, an interim

cleanup strategy might be the preferred strategy.

Question: Based on evaluation criteria of total

program cost (to all sources, not just Superfund)

and program length, under what conditions

would the interim cleanup strategy be preferable to the permanent cleanup strategy?

Findings: Many of the assumptions listed in

table 3-3 may affect the values of these two evaluation criteria. But it is primarily the average

costs of an interim cleanup technology class

and permanent cleanup technology class, and

the impermanence factor (signifying the level
76 . Superfund Strategy

of future costs) that determine total program

cost and length. For example:

●

●

●

●

Under some conditions the interim

cleanup strategy is clearly preferable: when

future costs of interim cleanups are very

low (i.e., impermanence factors are very

low), and the cost of permanent cleanups

is high compared to the cost of interim

cleanup. If health and environmental risks

do not exist or are small, it makes sense

not to spend money to develop and use

permanent cleanup technologies because

the interim strategy costs less and the program progresses about as quickly.

Under other conditions, the permanent

strategy is preferable, Even when the costs

of interim cleanups adjusted for future

costs are equal to the costs of permanent

technologies, the interim strategy progresses more slowly than the permanent

strategy, Because greater health and environmental risks may be incurred with the

longer program, the permanent strategy is

preferred.

When the adjusted interim cleanup costs

are higher than the costs of permanent

cleanups, program costs under the interim

strategy skyrocket and the program progresses much more slowly. Total long-term

costs and risks would be minimized by devoting resources to the development and

use of permanent cleanup technologies.

If the adjusted costs of interim cleanups

are moderately lower than those of permanent cleanups, there will be trade-offs between program cost and duration; the permanent strategy will cost more but progress more rapidly, Strategy decisions

would have to be made based on other criteria, most importantly the reduction or

avoidance of risk, which would favor the

permanent strategy.

Figures 3-2a and 3-2b illustrate how the impermanence factor influences program cleanup costs and the time to initiate 90 percent of

the work26 under

Scenario 1UAF.

specific at ions.)

each strategy, according to

(See table 3-4 for scenario

With an impermanence factor of 15 percent

(0,15), the program length under each strategy

is the same. However, at this impermanence

factor the total program cost under the interim

strategy is about $18 billion, considerably less

than about $32 billion under the permanent

strategy, Under Scenario 1UAF, then, for impermanence factors less than or equal to the

relatively low value of about 0.15, the interim

cleanup strategy is preferable in terms of total

program cost and program length.

In contrast, in Scenario 1UAF, when the impermanence factor reaches 0.76, the total costs

of both strategies are equal, but the interim

strategy leads to a much longer—probably unacceptably longer—program, Cleanup takes

several decades with the permanent cleanup

strategy, but well over 100 years with the interim strategy, For impermanence factors

above 0,76, the interim cleanup strategy costs

rise rapidly; the cost, as well as the program

duration become highly unfavorable.

In the range of impermanence factors between 0.15 and 0.76, choices must be made between program cleanup cost and program

length, For example, at 0.5 the permanent strategy costs $50.8 billion; under the interim strategy it is only $29.5 billion. The program length

under the interim strategy is, however, 8 3

years, about double that of the permanent strategy (41 years), The trade-off between program

duration and cost is $507 million for each year

the program is shortened. If it were worth $507

million per year to eliminate the risks in the

entire system (an average of only several hun-

~eF~r imp~rmanen(; e factors less than 1.(), the interi rn strategy represents a decay process. Thus, a progress percentile must

be used to measure program duration. The progress percentile

of 90 percent, used in the findings, is the number of years after

the start of the program to initiate 90 percent of all the cleanup

actions ultimately required. Results for progress percentiles are

found in the appendix,
Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 7 7

Figure 3-2a.— Program Length v. Impermanence Factor

Scenario 1UAF

120 I

110

100

90

I

I

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

i n

Interim

I

I

I

I

I

1 I

0 0.2 0.4 0.6

Impermanence factor

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

0.8 1

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

Figure 3-2b.– Program Cost v. Impermanence Factor

Scenario 1UAF

Interim

Permanent

I

I

I I

I 1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Impermanence factor

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
78 ● Superfund Strategy

dred thousand dollars per site per year), then

the permanent strategy would be preferred.

Knowing the risk consequences of interim

cleanups is important to an intelligent program

selection.

In general, as the impermanence factor rises,

the cost advantage of the interim strategy (dollars saved for each additional program year)

shrinks (see table 3-6). If 50 years is judged, for

example, to be the longest program the public

is likely to accept, then in Scenario 1UAF the

permanent strategy is always preferred for impermanence factors greater than 0.3.

Knowledge about actual future costs is vital

to understanding the relative benefits of the different strategies. As it becomes clearer that certain cleanup technologies are impermanent

(e.g., containment and land disposal), then the

economic and environmental advantages of developing and using permanent cleanups become clearer. Only with low impermanence

factors is the interim strategy advantageous.

Question: Since the costs of permanent technologies are quite speculative, how would

program strategy preferences change if the

average costs of the permanent technologies

changed?

Findings: If the costs of permanent cleanups

were to decrease, as might happen over time

with experience or improvement, the permanent cleanup strategy is preferred to the interim cleanup strategy over a wider range of

impermanence factors. The impermanence

factor at which the costs of both strategies is

equal drops, narrowing the trade-off range. In

Scenario 2UAF, the cost of a permanent surface cleanup averages $12 million (versus $24

million per site as in Scenario 1UAF) and the

cost of a permanent groundwater cleanup is

$30 million (versus $60 million). The results of

Scenario 2UAF are given in figures 3-3a and

3-3b. The point where costs are equal drops to

slightly below 0.53, compared to 0.76 in Scenario 1UAF (see figures 3-2a and 3-2 b). Additionally, where trade-offs occur (impermanence

factors between 0.1 and 0.53), the penalty for

choosing the permanent strategy, higher program cost, is reduced.

This static analysis of two different sets of

permanent costs can be extrapolated to understand the effects of permanent cleanup costs

decreasing as the program gains experience

(i.e., the “learning curve” effect). As cost-effective permanent technologies are used more,

program costs and duration both decrease.

The opposite may occur. If the cost of the

permanent cleanups were higher than anticipated, the interim strategy would be preferred

over a broader range of impermanence factors

and the differences in the costs of the two programs over the trade-off range would be larger.

Certainly as the costs of permanent cleanups

decline, the permanent strategy becomes more

appealing. If, however, permanent cleanups

costs are underestimated, there is a risk of incorrectly choosing the permanent strategy.

Question: How does the budget affect cleanup

strategy decisions and the evaluation criteria

values under each strategy?

Table 3-6.–Scenario 1UAF

Average impermanence factor

0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

Interim strategy:

Program cost (in billions) . . . . . . . . . . $16.4 $21.0 $29.5 $36.8 $49.1 $73.7 $147.3

Program durationa (years). . . . . . . . . . 17 49 83 113 >140 >140 >140

Permanent strategy:

Program cost (in billions) . . . . . . . . . $31.4 $41.1 $50.8 $55.6 $60.5 $65.3 $70.2

Program durationa (years). . . . . . . . . . 21 44 44 45

Trade-off b ($ B/year) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1.256 $0.507 $0.269 <$0.119

aMeasured by the time to start 90 percent Of the cleanup work

bonly applied [n range where tradeoffs occur

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 7 9

Figure 3-3a. —Program Length v. Impermanence Factor

Scenario 2UAF

120

110

100

40

I

30 I Permanent

I

20

- - I

1 1 10 I I

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Impermanence factor

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Figure 3-3b .—Program Cost v. Impermanence Factor

Scenario 2UAF

140

120

100

80

60

Permanent

40 -

20

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Impermanence factor

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
80 ● Superfund Strategy

Findings: The size of the budget (for all revenue sources, not just Superfund) devoted to

cleanup activity influences cleanup strategy

decisions differently,” depending on the level

of the future costs of impermanent cleanups.

Inadequate budgets can bias selection toward

the interim strategy and increase long-term

risks from cleanups.

If the adjusted costs of interim cleanups are

equal to or greater than the permanent cleanup

costs, then the less spent on interim cleanups

when permanent technologies are being developed, the greater the program savings.

First, consider the permanent strategy. During the first 15 years, only initial actions are

undertaken. A higher budget during the early

years of the program permits more initial actions and therefore results in greater total costs,

The program costs under the permanent cleanup strategy with two different budget levels are

compared in figure 3-4. Over the range of imzTN~te that even though the budget continues to grow (for all

options but D) through the duration of the program, after time,

not all the available budget is used. Since future actions are taken

only as required, as they taper off, less and less money is required.

permanence factors where the permanent strategy has the lower cost, program costs are greater for the larger budget scenario (Scenario

1UCF) than for the more limited budget scenario (Scenario 1UAF). While this suggests that

no initial actions be taken if future costs are

very high, recall that there are no explicit risk

criteria in this model. It may be necessary to

take some interim actions to mitigate risk when

no permanent cleanup technology is available,

or to consider other options, such as relocation

of residents.

Now compare the interim strategy and the

permanent strategy, If the adjusted costs of interim cleanups are less than those of permanent cleanups, more confidence is needed about

low levels of future cost before a larger budget

is devoted to interim cleanups. This makes

sense: it is desirable to be more certain about

the effectiveness of a particular cleanup strategy before more money is invested in it. The

effect of increasing the annual budget is demonstrated by comparing Scenarios 1UAF (low

budget) and 1UCF (high budget) in figures

3-2a and 2b and 3-5a and 5b. As the budget is

increased, the interim cleanup strategy leads

Figure 3-4.— Program Cost v. Impermanence Factor

Permanent Strategy (Scenario 1UAF & 1UCF)

80

70

----- - -—- --- --- -- - --- -

60 —

50 “

Low budget

I

I

40

I

30 —

I

20 I I I 1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Impermanence factor

SOURCE :Office of Technology Assessment
110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis

Figure 3-5a.— Program Length v. Impermanence Factor

Scenario 1UCF

of Superfund ● 8 1

‘ - -

- -

I

I

I

I

I

Interim

/ /

I

I

I

I

I

I

!

I

I

I

I

1

I

1

.

10 I I

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

Impermanence factor

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

Figure 3-5b.—Program Cost v. Impermanence Factor

Scenario 1UCF

Interim

. — — - — - —- -— — — - - — —- - - - -. - -

Permanent

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

o 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Impermanence factor

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
82 ● Superfund Strategy

to a shorter program over a narrower range of

impermanence factors: up to 0.15 for the low

budget scenario versus up to 0.10 for the high

budget scenario. The downward shift occurs

because the program duration is reduced under

both strategies as the budget increases.

Thus, an increased annual budget can affect

cleanup strategy decisions. Similarly, reducing

the annual budget also can affect the strategy

decisions. In particular, a lower annual budget

(e.g., lower spending by Superfund and responsible parties) makes the interim cleanup strategy appear attractive over a wider range of future cost levels.

Spending less on unproven technologies is

a logical way to conduct cleanups where many

uncertainties exist. However, this approach to

strategy selection does not eliminate the uncertainty of future costs or risks resulting from

program delay and inaction—it only minimizes

potentially ineffective expenditures. It does not

assure that the real future costs be reasonable

or that the interim strategy is preferable. Furthermore, limiting this type of spending may

hamper the cleanup program. Therefore, pressures to limit expenditures on cleanup together

with uncertainty resolution or alternative planning would be preferable. One answer is to use

the two-part strategy, as discussed below.

Question: Will a substantial increase in the

number of sites affect cleanup strategy decisions?

Findings: As chapter 5 points out the number of sites that will require cleanup is uncertain. An increase in the number of sites will

obviously increase program costs and duration;

in addition, increasing the number of sites to

be cleaned up exaggerates some of the above

findings, Most notably, increasing the number

of sites without a comparable increase in the

budget has the same effect as a more constrained budget. The consequence is that the

interim cleanup strategy is preferred, with

more uncertainty in future costs (i.e., over a

wider range of impermanence factors).

The program length under the interim cleanup strategy is more sensitive to the time distribution of the required future actions than to

budget constraints. The converse is true of program duration under the permanent cleanup

strategy; program length will be extended primarily due to budget constraints. Therefore, an

interim cleanup strategy can be made to appear

more attractive than the permanent strategy by

not providing enough money fast enough.

Question: How would discounting future

costs affect cleanup strategy decisions?

Findings: Discounting places more weight on

near-term costs and less on long-term costs. For

both the interim and permanent cleanup strategies, as the impermanence factor increases,

long-term costs become greater and are stretched

over longer periods of time. Therefore, as impermanence increases, discounting reduces the

program cost. Under the interim cleanup strategy, impermanent actions continue through the

course of the program; however, under the permanent strategy, future costs result only from

impermanent actions taken in the first 15 years.

For this reason, the interim strategy has greater

costs occurring later in the program. Thus, program cleanup costs under the interim strategy

are more sensitive to discounting than are program costs under the permanent strategy.

Low and moderate discount rates affect strategy decisions by increasing the trade-off range

between the two strategies, The application of

a 2 percent per year discount rate to Scenario

1ECO is illustrated in figure 3-6. The trade-off

range is extended because the impermanence

factor at which the present value of both the

program costs is equal is shifted higher (from

0.76 to over 0.85). Even though the range of impermanence factors over which the permanent

strategy costs less is shortened, the program

duration remains high so long that choosing

the interim strategy is difficult to justify,

As higher discount rates are applied, a decisionmaker becomes indifferent to the two strategies in terms of cost and prefers the permanent strategy because of its shorter length. At

a 10 percent per year discount rate, both strategies become almost insensitive to future cost

levels. Figure 3-7 illustrates a 10 percent discount rate applied to Scenario 1ECO. Because

the two cleanup strategies are similar over the
Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 8 3

Figure 3-6. —Program Costs v. Impermanence

Undiscounted and discounted costs (Scenario 1ECO)

I

I

8

I I 1 1 I

I

I I

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

Impermanence factor

-

—- lnt D = O

Interi m Interi m

strateg y strateg y

undiscounte d discounte d

at 20/0

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

first 15 years, at very high discount rates the

present value of both program costs do not differ by much. Costs incurred beyond year 15

contribute little to the present value cleanup

costs of either program. At high discount rates,

the permanent strategy is preferred because it

provides a much shorter program,

This application of discounting is limited to

program evaluation, It helps make long-term

strategic decisions. With this model, the strategic decisions made with discounted future

costs generally are the same as those with undiscounted costs; preference for the interim

strategy occurs only with certain and low future costs. No useful information for year-byyear financial planning is generated. Furthermore, to accurately identify the total costs of

the cleanup program, other factors such as inflation and interest earned on cash balances,

would have to be considered.

— Perm D = O ‘

-- Perm D = 2° o

Permanent Permanent

strategy strategy

undiscounted discounted

at 2%

A Two-Part Strategy

What are the implications of these comparisons between interim versus permanent cleanup strategies for a variation of the permanent

strategy with initial responses at all NPL sites

(representing the two-part strategy described

in chapters 1 and 2)?

Under the two-part strategy, technologies

similar to those defined as interim technologies

would be used for lower cost initial responses

than those considered in the basic permanent

strategy, Initial responses are not designed to

be effective for long periods. The purpose of

this cheaper, more limited response is to prevent sites from getting worse, and to control

near-term releases of hazardous substances

into the environment and, hence, exposures to

them. Low-cost initial responses are one part

of interim, impermanent approaches now be-
84 ● Superfund Strategy

o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

Impermanence factor

-—- lntD = O .0000.00=- Int D = 10°/0

Interim Interim

strategy strategy

undiscounted discounted

at 100/0

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

ing described as cleanups. Low-cost initial responses could include pumping to contain

plumes of contamination in aquifers, covers to

keep out water, excavation and temporary storage of wastes and contaminated soil above

ground (greatly reducing the use of below ground

barriers), and environmental monitoring. In

contrast to the current immediate removals,

more money would be spent and removal of

wastes to operating land disposal sites would

be avoided.

A strategy of low-cost initial responses would

achieve rapid risk reduction at many sites,

thereby responding in an equitable manner to

public demands for protection and visible progress. OTA’s modeling, however, suggests that

the costs of initial responses should be low

— Perm D = O --- Perm D = 10°/0

Permanent Permanent

strategy strategy

undiscounted discounted

at 10%

(about 10 percent of permanent cleanup costs),

and that they should be followed not by other

impermanent responses, but rather by a permanently effective response. In this strategy

the conservative assumption is made that 90

percent of all sites will need a permanent

cleanup; that is, 10 percent of the initial responses will subsequently be found to be sufficient.

In this variation of the permanent strategy

the costs of initial responses are: $1 million per

site for surface response and $3 million per site

to initially respond to groundwater contamination, Additionally, to examine the effect of

many more sites, after all sites are discovered,

10,546 sites are to be cleaned and a higher

budget is allocated. (Table 3-4 defines Scenario
Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund • 85

1USG.) This variation was compared with the

interim cleanup strategy under the same scenario.

The results are illustrated in figures 3-8a and

3-8b. They show that at an assumed impermanence factor of 0.9, the total program cost of

the two-part strategy is about $310 billion. At

an impermanence factor of about 0.73 in the

interim strategy, the two strategies have the

same program cost ($310 billion).

The two-part strategy is preferable to the interim strategy on the grounds of program duration, except for impermanence factors under

about 0.25. If the impermanence of the interim

responses is greater than 0.73, then the twopart strategy is preferred both in terms of total

cost and program duration. When total program costs are the same for both strategies, the

interim strategy results in an unacceptably long

program (longer than 100 years).

Strategy decisions between the two-part strategy and the interim strategy are interestingly

altered if high discount rates are used. With

very high discount rates, the present value of

program cleanup costs under either strategy

become insensitive to the impermanence of the

cleanup response. The costs incurred in the

earliest years of the program determine the

(present value) program cost. However, since

initial actions are less costly than interim actions, with high discount rates the two-part

strategy will result in lower discounted program costs, in addition to shorter programs,

than the interim cleanup strategy. If there is

sufficient justification for a high discount rate,

then the two-part strategy with low-cost initial

responses is preferable over all levels of impermanence.

In summary, the two-part strategy used initial (and emergency] responses as a first priority for allocating program resources, with remaining funds spent on permanent cleanups

at sites that have been “isolated, ” “decontrolled,”

or “stabilized.” Exactly how funds would be allocated (the order of actions and cleanups)

under this third strategy considering budget,

qualified personnel, and technology constraints

is an extremely difficult problem. Its solution

depends on the resolution of the cleanup goals

issue (see chapter 4) and a systematic approach

to the problem that illuminates trade-offs.

CONCLUSIONS: PROGRAM PLANNING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

The results of the simulation exercise indicate that cleanup costs and program duration

show a high degree of sensitivity to a number

of uncertain factors. The potential effects of

planning without considering these uncertainties also can be derived from the simulation

findings. The probability of adverse effects of

uncertainties could be limited in a carefully

planned program, Table 3-7 presents the sources

of uncertainties in the Superfund program as

identified by OTA, the dangers posed by planning without considering them, and offers options to mitigate their adverse effects.

Effectiveness and the Future Cost of Cleanups

A primary element of uncertainty is the effectiveness of the cleanup responses and their

future costs. OTA’s findings indicate that it is

desirable to develop, demonstrate, and use permanent cleanups if the effectiveness of the interim cleanup and its future costs are uncertain. The interim cleanup strategy is preferred

only if future costs are known to be small, This

is because the interim strategy results in an extremely long program (despite an advantage in

total cleanup cost) for a wide range of interim
86 ● Superfund Strategy

o

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

Figure 3-8a .—Program Length v. Impermanence Factor

Scenario 1USG

I

I

I

I

I

I

I Two-part

I ~

I i

I

I

I

I

I

I

I I

I I

I I

I I

1 00 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

Impermanence factor

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Figure 3-8b.—Program Cost v. Impermanence Factor

Scenario 1USG

Interim

--- - - - - - - — - ---- -- - - --— -

1 I

I

I I I I

I

u 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

Impermanence factor

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 8 7

Table 3-7.—Program Planning With Uncertainty

Dangers of planning

without consideration of uncertainty

Effectiveness and future cost of cleanups:

Inadequate funds and program infrastructure;

● Cleanup delays

. Increasing risks and cleanup costs

Inefficient resource expenditures and cleanup choices:

● Cleanup is not cost effective in the long term

● Risks are aggravated rather than mitigated

Loss of public confidence

Number of sites requiring response:

Inadequate funds and program infrastructure;

● Cleanup delays

. Increasing risks and cleanup costs

Inefficient resource allocation:

● Worst sites are not addressed

—Risks and cleanup costs increase

—Cleanup delays

● Less hazardous sites are “over-cleaned”

Loss of public confidence

Health and environmental effects:

Inefficient resource allocation:

● Worst sites are not addressed

—Risks and cleanup costs increase

—Cleanup delays

● Less hazardous sites are ‘‘over-cleaned”

. Ineffective technologies continue to be used

Loss of public confidence

Non-Federal money:

Inadequate funds and program infrastructure:

● Cleanup delays

• Increasing risks and cleanup costs

Inefficient resource expenditures and cleanup choices

● Cleanup is not cost effective in long term

● Risks are aggravated rather than mitigated

Discount rate:

Inadequate funds:

● Cleanup delays

. Increasing risks and cleanup costs

Inefficient resource expenditures and cleanup choices:

Ž Cost effective responses not chosen

. Risks are transferred,

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

cleanup future costs. A mistake in estimating

future costs of interim cleanups carries the

penalty of a drastic, unanticipated, lengthening of the program—and of a period of perhaps

high risk–under the interim strategy. For higher levels of future cost, the interim strategy results in both unacceptably high cleanup costs

and program duration.

A program designed without consideration

of cleanup response effectiveness and future

costs is likely to result in a lack of money and

inadequate program infrastructure. Even if

more money is expeditiously provided, it is

Options to hedqe against adverse effects

●

●

●

●

●

Incorporate future costs and cleanup effectiveness in

cleanup strategy decisions

Limit costly impermanent cleanups

Develop long-term strategic plan for developing and

using permanent cleanups

Consider all likely sources of sites; and potential for

sites to enter program over long term

Develop long-term strategic plan based on revised

estimates

Ž “Recontrol” responses at maximum number of sites

. Resolve cleanup goals sequentially as improved

information is available

● Develop detailed strategic plan for long-term

permanent cleanups

● Use conservative estimates; refine estimates with

experience

• Exclude discount rate or use conservative discount

rate; test sensitivity of cleanup strategy decisions

to rates

unlikely that the program infrastructure, or institutional delivery system, will be able to grow

rapidly enough for timely responses. Indeed,

a contributing factor to the slow startup of the

1980 program was simply the time required for

organization and staffing. Further delays in the

cleanup program may result in site deterioration and increasing risks. In turn, the costs of

cleanup may escalate, impose greater financial

burdens and delays; a crisis situation could ensue, In EPA’s words, the program could be

“overwhelmed. ” In addition, delays in cleanup

and the use of ineffective cleanups may contribute to loss of public confidence.
88 ● Superfund Strategy

To deal with uncertainty about cleanup effectiveness and future costs, more realistic estimates can be used. For instance, life-time or

life-cycle O&M costs could be included in

cleanup cost estimates. The implications of incorporating realistic O&M costs can be significant, EPA has estimated average annual O&M

costs at $400,000 per site, The average Federal

cleanup cost per site, less the first year O&M,

is about $7.5 million, This is comparable to the

average cleanup costs used in the model which

shows that if O&M costs are the only future

costs of interim cleanup, and are incurred over

only 5 years, then the corresponding impermanence factor is about 0.27. Thus, the inclusion

of realistic O&M costs can reduce the margin

for error.

Number of Sites

The number of sites that will ultimately require cleanup is another source of uncertainty

which, if not adequately taken into account,

could seriously impact the cleanup program.

Insufficient money and an underdeveloped

program infrastructure could result from overly optimistic (under) estimates of the number

of sites to clean, The program grows too slowly

for effective response and further delays result

in site deterioration and increasing risks, increasing costs, further delays, and loss of public confidence.

Health and Environment Effects

Although health and environmental issues

could not be incorporated into OTA’s simple

model, high uncertainties of their effects exist

and their importance is felt in making tradeoffs, If health and environmental effects are not

better understood, and cleanup goals better

defined, any program will potentially misallocate resources. Without effective cleanup goals

it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of cleanups, A rush to “cleanup” sites by, for example, mandating cleanup schedules, before goals

are established could result in too many initial

resources being devoted to: 1) the use of ineffective technologies; and 2) the less hazardous

sites, depriving worse sites of attention.

One reliable way to plan with uncertainties

in a dynamic system is to resolve the cleanup

goal issue sequentially, incorporating new information as it becomes available, while taking more limited initial responses, and “recontroling” a maximum number of sites. At the

same time, other initiatives should focus on

planning for more extensive, permanent cleanups that will be needed at some sites, and

which can be accomplished gradually.

Non-Federal Money

How much of cleanup costs will be provided

by potentially responsible parties (PRPs), income from cost recovery, and States’ shares?

EPA estimates it will recover 47 percent for

removals and 30 percent for remedial actions

(see table 3-1).

The limited experiences of the program suggest that lower contributions will be received.

As of September 30, 1984, cost recoveries have

totaled $6.6 million, less than 1 percent of total

obligations and disbursements toward hazardous substance response.28 One cause of these

high estimates is the assumption that rates of

recovery will be comparable to those for early

removals conducted under the Clean Water Act.

Direct cleanup actions by responsible parties

are projected by EPA at 40 to 60 percent, Similarly, estimates from GAO range from 29 to

44 percent for RP lead activities (see table 3-1).

The uncertainty of both these estimates may

be heightened by the much larger numbers of

sites and sums of money that could be involved.

Additionally, it might be expected that it will

become more difficult to identify some responsible parties as the program progresses and

older, abandoned sites are identified, While

many sites in the larger estimate maybe smaller, industrial surface impoundments, which

may have associated with them lower remedial

costs and fewer (often single), identifiable responsible parties, others may be large municiZ8U. S. Environmental protection Agency, “Hazardous SUbstance Response Trust Fund Receipts, Obligations, and Disbursements, CERCLA Sections 301(a)(l)(B) and (D)” [Washington, DC: Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,

December 1984).
pal landfills. This broader, more costly aspect

of the program may stress the States’ willingness to provide their matching shares of construction costs.

Discount Rate

The differences between present and future

values of cleanup expenditures and risks result

from uncertainty over future values of money,

inflation, and risks. Cleanup costs and risks

may occur over a period of decades. Discounting is used in program evaluations and planning to adjust the costs and risks to present

value. The discount rate, an expression of the

time value of money, should reflect how society

values current versus future consumption.

To illustrate how costs and risks might be valued differently over time, consider a decisionmaker faced with the choice of a program that

costs $5 billion now and $5 billion over the next

20 years and a program that costs $10 billion

now. The choice might be simplified if it could

be shown that the $10 billion program reduces

risk more over the next 20 years and if a reliable dollar number could be calculated for the

risk reduction. However, in reality, the difference in risk reduction associated with program

options is rarely simple.

Controversy arises over the choice of discount

rates for public investrnents.29 One school of

thought holds that society should have a longer

planning horizon than individuals, which means

that public discount rates should be lower than

private rates, Furthermore, since future generations have no way to express their preferences, an unimaginative society may err on the

side of too high discount rates, from the point

-— —z~~~[)r ~)rli,~lte s~c;tor jnkestrnents, the discount rate is apJ]lied

t{) kno~tn in~estmeni costs and anticipated benefits, both of

wrhi(:h (:an u~ually be (.a]culated easil~’ in dollars. The approj)riate dit(:ount rate is usuallj’ the corporate internal rate of return on capital or the rate of return on alternative in~’estment

(J~)pf) rtll n it if:s.

Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 8 9

of view of their descendants. Many would argue

that this is happening now.

OTA makes no attempt here to resolve these

issues. However, discounting often has utility,

and the selection will influence the allocation

of resources, the level of social welfare, and

cleanup strategy. If the discount rate is too high

the Superfund program may be underplanned.

Means to Address Uncertainties

The potential risks arising from uncertainty

can be mitigated in several ways. Clearly, resolving the uncertainties would be the most efficient approach, Resources can be devoted to

learning how many sites will require cleanup,

understanding health and environmental risks,

developing cleanup goals, and deciding on a

realistic, achievable level of non-Federal contributions. However, the cleanup program can

not wait for total and perfect knowledge. Rather, the program plan should be sequentially refined as new information is available.

The effectiveness of currently used cleanup

technologies and the extreme sensitivity of program duration and cost to these uncertainties

suggest that efforts are needed to develop permanent cleanup technologies. Limited initial

responses in the near-term make economic and

environmental sense only if they are part of a

long-term, flexible strategic plan whose goal is

permanent cleanup. Otherwise, public confidence will not be obtained.

There are intrinsic conflicts between maximizing the number of limited initial responses,

and their effectiveness over time, and keeping

their costs low to save enough money for expensive permanent cleanups. In addition, there

will be competition for money and people for

research, demonstration, and use of permanent

technologies, and enforcement. Furthermore,

a method to allocate and schedule cleanups

efficiently must be part of a long-term strategic plan,

38-745 0 - 85 - 4
90 ● Superfund Strategy

APPENDIX A

This appendix provides detailed information on

the mathematical formulations and assumptions

used in OTA’s model discussed in chapter 3.

Undiscounted Program Cost

Definitions of Cleanup Strategies

If costs are not discounted, total program costs

can be derived without the use of simulation. Three

strategies are defined and discussed in terms of

costs and cost comparisons.

Interim Cleanup Strategy

The total undiscounted program costs adjusted

for future costs, TCI, under the interim cleanup

strategy can be expressed mathematically as:

T CI = CIX + iCIX + i

2CIX + i3CIX + i4CIX + . . . (1,1)

where:

C I = average near-term cost of an interim action.

X = number of sites to clean up.

i = average system impermanence factor of interim

actions.

In equation (1.1), the first term is total near-term

costs of interim actions. The remaining terms, which

constitute a geometric series, represent total future

costs of all future actions. (It should be noted tha t

if O&M costs are included in i, they may be understated if i < 1, since the terms decrease,) For all

i < 1, this series converges, so that:

T CI = CIX/(l -i) (1.2)

Thus, the average adjusted cost per site under the

interim strategy is:

Avg(TCI

) = CI/(1-i) (1.3)

Equation (1.2) elucidates the use of the impermanence factor in the interim strategy. Rearranging

terms reveals:

T CI = CIX + iTCI

(1.3a)

The total cost of the interim strategy is composed

of the total near-term cost, CIX, plus total future

costs, iTCI

. In the model, however, equation (1,2 )

was only used as a tool for terminating scenario s

that exceeded computer memory. Actual cost calculations were made on the basis of equation (1.1).

Clearly, no scenario with a system impermanence

factor equal to or greater than 1 was run since, on

the basis of either equations (1.1) or (1.2), total cost

will be infinite .

Basic Permanent Cleanup Strategy

The total undiscounted program costs adjusted

for future costs, TCI, under the permanent cleanup

strategy can be expressed mathematically as:

T CP = CIYX + Cp

iYX + CP(1 - Y)X (1.4)

where :

C P = average cost of a permanent action

Y = percent of all sites addressed by an initial action

during the first 15 years of the program. This percentage will be dependent on funding availability during the 15 years.

The first term in equation (1.4) represents nearterm costs of the impermanent interim actions tak -

en in the first 15 years. In the basic permanent

cleanup strategy, the interim actions are the same

as the interim actions under the interim strategy:

the technologies are the same, the costs are the

same, and the impermanence factor is the same.

The second term is the future costs of initial actions

relating to the need for second but permanent actions. This term may misestimate total costs since

permanent cleanup costs after an initial action may

be more or less than costs of permanent cleanups

at sites that have had no response, The last term

is the costs of permanent cleanup at sites that have

no response. The average cost per site under the

permanent cleanup strategy is:

(1.5]

Two-Part Strategy

The two-part strategy is a variation of the permanent strategy and differs from the basic permanent

strategy in that the initial responses are not necessarily the same as those of the interim strategy, The

unit cost is less for an initial response than for an

interim response. Therefore, the impermanence

factors may be different for initial responses and

interim responses. The total cost of the variation

of the permanent strategy, T CPV, may be expressed as:

T Cpv = C I VYX + Cp ivYX + CP

(l - Y)X (1 .6)

where:

c IV = average near-term cost of an initial action.

i V —— impermanence factor for initial actions.
New Sites

In all of the strategies, new sites are discovered

during the first 15 years of the program. These sites

may be responded to in the following year. Slight

deviations from the above cost formulae occur as

a result of sites entering the system in the 15th year.

In the basic permanent strategy and the two-part

strategy, these sites only receive permanent

cleanups.

Cost Comparisons of the Interim and

Basic Permanent Strategies

Since the interim actions considered in the interim and basic permanent strategies are identical,

equations (1. 1) and (1.4) can be equated and solved

for in terms of i. The impermanence factor at which

either total program costs or average program costs

are equal under either strategy, i*, is called the critical impermanence and is expressed as:

,*1 = 1 - CI/CP

(1.7)

At this impermanence factor, we are indifferent

to the cleanup strategies, on a cost basis. For all i

< i*, the interim strategy is preferred if only cost

is considered and duration [discussed below) is ignored. For all i > i*, the permanent strategy is unambiguously preferred.

Cost Comparisons of the Interim and

Two-Part Permanent Strategies

The difference between the interim actions of the

interim strategy and the initial actions of the twopart permanent strategy demand a different cost

comparison method than that stated above. Given

equations (1. 1) and (1.6), a total cost for the two-part

strategy can be based on a specific value for iV.

The impermanence factor for the interim strategy ,

i, can then be determined and results in the same

total cost. If the impermanence factor for interim

actions is above this level, then the two-part permanent strategy is unambiguously preferred .

Program Duration With Uncertain

Technology Effectiveness

While undiscounted program costs can be derived mathematically, simulation must be employed

to determine program duration under each strategy and to determine the effects of discounting,

which is time dependent, on cleanup strategy decisions. A simulation model, programmed using LOTUS

1-2-3, was developed to mimic cleanup actions, the

impermanence of those actions, and additional acCh. 3–A Systems Analysis of Superfund

tions resulting from impermanence, over time,

● 91

The

following discussions are focused on the interim

and basic permanent strategies. While the discussions are related to the two-part permanent strategy, modifications in analysis would have to be

made.

Impermanence Factor

In the model, two impermanence factors were

used: i(sc), the impermanence factor for interim

surface actions, and i(gw), the impermanence factor for interim groundwater actions. This breakdown is consistent with previous calculations since

these two cleanup types are assumed to be independent of one another. The independence assumption may compound the conservative estimate of

the percent of sites requiring groundwater response

(20 percent) since it does not permit sites with surface contamination to deteriorate in a way that

causes groundwater contamination. In fact, surface

contamination often leads to ground water contamination. If, however, the impermanence factor for

surface contaminated sites is high, it may capture

the future costs associated with deterioration. Total

program costs under the interim strategy can be expressed as:

T CI = C Isc - Yg w

)X/(l - i(sc) )

+ C I g w

( Yg wX)/(l - i(gw)) (3.1)

where:

c I s c

average near-term cost of an interim surface

action.

c Igw = average near-term cost of an interim groundwater action.

Y gw = percentage of all sites requiring groundwater response.

Similarly, total program costs under the permanent strategy are:

T CP = CIsc Y(l-Y gw )X + CIgw YX gw X

+ CPSC(l-YYgw)(i(sc)Y + (1-Y))X

+ Cp g wYg w (i(gw)Y + (1-Y))X (3.2)

where:

c Psc = average cost of a permanent surface action.

c Pg-

. average cost of a permanent groundwater action.

w Separability of costs relating to surface actions

and groundwater actions permits the derivation of

individual critical impermanence factors, i*(sc)

and i *(gw), the impermanence factors where costs

associated with surface actions and groundwater

actions, respectively, are equal under either strategy. These are:

i*(sc) = 1 - CIsc/CPsc (3.3a]

i*(gw) = 1 - CIgw/C

Pgw (3.3b)
92 . Superfund Strategy

The composite or average impermanence factor

can be determined from equations (3.3a and b). For

example, the average critical impermanence factor, i*, can also be expressed as:

i*= i*(sc)(l - YgW) + i*(gw)Ygw (3.4)

The simulation was verified using equations (3.3a,b,

and 3.4). These results are discussed and were also

used to ascertain program durations when the undiscounted program costs of both strategies were

equal.

Base Case Simulation

To model the system, various system definitions

and assumptions about model parameters are required. These model definitions (presented in table

3-3) represent conservative estimates of their real

world analogs.

To calibrate the model, a base case is generated

where the uncertain estimates are defined to closely

match current real world estimates. Although it is

incorrect to use the term interim cleanup strategy

if the impermanence factor is zero, simulation of

this case provides a base case and comparison with

current EPA estimates of program costs and length.

The zero impermanence assumption appears to be

consistent with EPA’s exclusion of future costs

from cost estimates for currently used technologies.

Budget options A and C were the lowest budgets

that gave base case program durations similar to

EPA estimates (see table A-l).

Uncertain Assumptions and Model Sensitivity

To determine program durations under each strategy, it is necessary to make assumptions about the

impermanence of interim actions, the number of

sites that will require cleanup, the annual budget

devoted to cleanup actions, how the budget is allocated among sites, when future costs are incurred,

average costs of permanent technologies, and discount rates. The performance of each strategy was

tested under different scenarios defined in table

3-4. The goal of this exercise is to clarify a cleanup

strategy toward which the Superfund program could

move if there is uncertainty about the permanence

of currently used technologies. If the model is overly sensitive to some assumptions (namely, when the

future costs occur, the annual budget, the costs of

permanent technologies and discount rates), then

few if any general unqualified statements can be

made about cleanup strategy decisions under uncertainty, If, however, the results remain generally

the same while each element of uncertainty is varied, then the model can provide meaningful conclusions about cleanup strategy decisionmaking.

First, the methods of incorporating these assumptions into the model are discussed; the sensitivity

of the model to these assumptions follows.

Assumptions About Timing

While the assumptions about how long it takes

to perform an interim cleanup are founded in experiential data, little data exists on which to base

assumptions about how long after an impermanent

action future costs are incurred, That future costs

do, indeed, result from impermanent actions has

not been recognized much less quantified. The sensitivity of the model to assumptions about the timing of future costs was tested, Three options were

used: 1) early occurrences (every 5 years), 2) late

occurrences (every 30 years), and 3) occurrences

uniform over 30 years. In the early option, there

Table A-1 .—Comparison of Simulation Base Case With Current Estimatesa

EPA (1984) EPA (1983) Base case

Total costs (billion) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $7.6 -$22.7

Projected time to clean sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA

Number of sites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,500-2,500

Total average cleanup cost per site , . . . . . . . . . . $8.84’

Percent of sites requiring

groundwater response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA

Average length of response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA

$10.3 -$20.6

14 years for 1,800 sites

1,400-2,200

$6 M

$12 M including groundwater

response

23-560/o

3 yearsd

$14.7

16-17 yearsb

2,046

$6 M

$12 M including groundwater

response

20%

3 years

6 years including

groundwater response

a For sources and additional information see table 3.1 of this chapter

bRange corresponds to Budget Options A and C

cDoes not Include tnltlal remed!al measures

du s Environmental ProtectIon Agency, “CERCLA 301(a)(l)(c) Study, ” draft, December 1984

SOURCE As noted
would be rapid response and early information on

the level of impermanence. The late option corresponds to the 30-year period required under RCRA

for post-closure care of disposal facilities. The uniform distribution reflects that sites and cleanups

will vary.

Some Examples of Timing

The mathematical formulation follows, but several simple, nonmathematical examples are given

first.

(I) Assume the interim strategy, surface cleanups

only, with an impermanence factor of 0.5, and the

5-year timing option. Then, of every 100 primary

cleanups started in year 1 of the program, there will

be 50 secondary cleanups at the same cost as the

primaries (or 100 secondaries at half the cost of the

primaries) started in year 9 of the program, and 25

tertiaries at the same cost as the primaries (or 100

tertiaries at one-quarter the cost of the primaries)

started in year 17 of the program. The secondaries

are started in the ninth year of the program, rather

than the sixth, because they are started 5 years after

the completion of the primaries, and it takes 3 years

to perform a surface cleanup.

(II) Assume the interim strategy, surface cleanups only, impermanence factor of 0.5, and the uniform timing option. Then, 120 primary cleanups

started in year 1 of the program will be followed

by three sets consisting of: a) 10; b) 20; and c) 30

secondaries at the same cost as the primaries (or:

a) 20; b) 40; c) 60 secondaries at half the cost of the

primaries) which will be started in years 9, 19, and

34 of the program. That is, the “uniform” distribution is not continuously uniform, but is clumped

i n three bunches. (This choice was made for ease

of computing; a more accurate representation of a

discrete uniform distribution using more and smaller intervals could have been used with a faster computer. ) Note also, that tertiary and higher order actions following early secondary cleanups overlap

with later secondary cleanups of the same primary

set.

(III) Assume the permanent strategy, with surface

cleanups only, and impermanence factor of 0.5 and

the uniform timing option. This means that, if 120

initial responses are started in year 1 of the program, 10 require a future action in year 9, 20 in year

19, and 30 in year 34; these 60 sites are slated for

permanent cleanup. The sites that require additional action in year 9 cannot be addressed until year

15 or later; they go into a pool of sites that will receive permanent cleanup in the future.

Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund . 93

—

How the Model Handles Timing, Mathematically

Future costs are incorporated into the model by

pooling future action requirements. Let Fsc (t) and

Fgw(t) denote the costs of future actions that become necessary at time t due to previous interim

surface and groundwater actions, respectively. Let

Xsc(t) and Xgw(t) indicate the number of interim

surface and groundwater actions started in year

t. For future costs incurred on the early schedule,

the undiscounted costs of actions that enter the pool

for future action in year t are related to previous

actions so that:

(4.1a)

(4,11))

The 8-year lag in future costs for interim surface

actions reflects the 3 years required to complete the

action and the 5 years after that before which future

actions are required. Similarly the 11-year lag for

interim ground water actions includes 6 years to

complete the action.

If the future actions are required after 30 years,

the lags become 33 years for interim surface response and 36 years for interim groundwater response, so that:

(4.2a)

(4.2b)

For future actions that are required on a 30-year

uniform schedule, the time distribution is represented discretely in the model, with costs incurred

5, 15, and 30 years after completion of the interim

actions. The undiscounted costs of actions required

in year t are related to previous actions as:

As before, the lags of 3 and 6 years reflect completion time for interim surface and groundwater

response, respectively,

In all of the cases above, the future costs of an

interim action are a function of the number of actions taken, the costs of those actions, and their impermanence.

In the permanent strategy, impermanence of the

initial actions results in permanent response. Let

actions taken in year t due to previous impermanent actions, The future costs associated with the

initial actions can be represented mathematically’

in a way similar to equations (4.1a-4.3b), depending on the time distribution of future actions. For
94 ● Superfund Strategy

example, if future actions are required under the

early time distribution, they are:

Psc(t) = i(sc)CPscX sC(t -8 (4.4a)

Pg W(t) = i(gw)CPgW X g W(t -11 (4.4b)

In this case, costs resulting from impermanent

actions are a function of the number of impermanent actions taken, the impermanence of those actions, and the costs of permanent cleanup.

Comments on Timing

The assumptions about the time distribution of

future actions may directly determine the program

duration, although it is typically these assumptions

together with budget assumptions that do so. If the

budget is large enough, and grows quickly enough,

then the bulk of the cleanup efforts can be achieved

earlier in the program. However, the results of impermanent actions linger. For instance, if there

were no budget constraints, under the permanent

strategy all initial responses would be taken in the

first year. The latest future groundwater actions

that would result from these impermanent actions

would be dealt with in the 37th year (6 years to complete the action and 30 years until additional action is required), The shortest program attained in

the modeling effort for the permanent strategy was

26 years. This reflected the last initial groundwater

cleanups starting in the 15th year. Six years is required to complete the initial response, then future

actions can be started 5 years later, under the early

time distribution of future action occurrence. Of

course, with expensive enough permanent cleanups, high enough impermanence factors, and/or a

low enough budget, the program would be longer,

as there would not be enough money to do all permanent cleanups in the year they came due.

Any of the time lags before future actions are

taken may be lengthened because of the budget constraints. Because the model incorporates no measure of risk, future actions may be deferred without

penalty, Therefore, in this model, no distinction is

made in allocating the budget between sites requiring first time response and sites requiring additional response. (The only exception is for permanent

responses under the permanent strategy during the

first 15 years; they are not permitted,)

Budget Allocation

Each annual budget is allocated so that the fund

is distributed in a deterministic way among surface

and groundwater responses, primary and followon responses, Consider first the interim strategy,

If SSC(t) indicates the number of sites that have

never been addressed requiring surface response

in year t, and Sgw(t) is similarly defined for sites

requiring groundwater response, then an allocation percentage, Yt, is defined for an annual

budget in year t, B(t), as follows:

The percentage is similar during the first 15 years

of the permanent strategy except there are no terms

for future costs. Instead, the future costs enter the

model when permanent cleanups are pursued, after

the 15th year. The percentage then becomes:

The effect of this allocation is response to sites

with surface and groundwater contamination in the

same proportion as their occurrence. If the impermanence factors for interim and initial actions for

surface and groundwater contamination are the

same, this proportion is maintained through the

simulation; that is, the initial 80 percent surface to

20 percent groundwater occurrence assumed in the

model stays constant as the program runs. (Note

that groundwater responses are more expensive

than surface response by a factor of 3 in most

simulations; therefore if the ratio of occurrence is

80:20, the budget is split as 0.57 :0.43, the ratio of

cost.) If, however, the impermanence factors are

different the proportion will change. For example,

if the groundwater responses have higher impermanence, more attention and money will be devoted to groundwater response as the program progresses.

One outcome of this allocation method is that no

preference is given to primary actions under either

strategy. It is possible, therefore, that with a low

enough budget and high enough impermanence

factor, nearly all funds could be devoted to secondary and higher order interim actions in the interim

strategy and secondary but permanent actions in

the permanent strategy. This is particularly striking if future actions are required on the early time

distribution schedule, While the real-world implications of this are unappealing, i.e., sites are not

addressed and deteriorate, this poses few problems

in terms of affecting the performance of the strategies in the simulation. The correct amount of money is spent and it is the length of time these expenditures continue that determines program length,

Measuring Program Duration

To evaluate the strategies in terms of program

length and examine the effects of different time

distributions of future cost occurrences, a method
of measuring program duration was

Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 9 5

required. Program duration could be measured in terms of the

last year where expenditures are made for an action. Since responses extend over time, this way of

measuring duration would shorten program length

by at most 10 years, the time required to complete

the longest response—the permanent groundwater

cleanup.

By definition the interim cleanup strategy for i

< 1 represents a decay process, meaning that fewer

and fewer interim actions are taken over time. It

would be misleading to measure program duration

by the time needed to initiate the final single action (or fraction, thereof, since real variables were

used). By the same token, it would be equally misleading to only consider the time required to initiate all first interim actions since these might constitute only a very small fraction of the total

program under the interim strategy.

To resolve this dilemma, program progress was

measured in terms of the year at which different

percentages of all expected cleanups were undertaken. The percentiles are 30, 50, 70, 90, 95, and

100 percent. Assuming that the model did delineate

between primary and future actions, a simple interpretation of progress percentiles can be given. For

instance, under the interim cleanup strategy, if i(sc)

.= i(gw) = 0.7, the 30 percent program progress

might mean (depending on the timing of future actions) that at most all first interim cleanups were

completed, and no future actions had started. For

i(sc) = i(gw) > 0.7, the 30 percent program progress

mark would have to include additional future actions. In general, the minimum program progress

level required to cleanup all sites with an interim

action exactly once, under the interim strategy is:

X(%) = 100(1 - i) (6. 1)

The inverse relationship may bias strategy decisions toward the interim strategy for low impermance factors if low program progress percentiles are

used to measure duration. For example, if a 30 percent program progress level is used for i = 0.1

under the interim strategy, this represents no more

than the first cleanup of only one-third of the sites.

For this reason, the 90 percent program progress

level, which could represent first cleanup of all sites

if the i = 0.1 (the lowest impermanence factor

tested], was used to measure program progress.

Model Sensitivity

Each strategy was simulated for impermanence

factors where total costs were supposed to be equal

for the two strategies. Varying budgets (options A,

B, C, and D) were run to verify that cleanup actions

were modeled properly and that correct program

costs were generated, and to derive corresponding

program durations. Results are given in table A-2.

All program costs were equal at the critical impermanence factors, i*(sc) = 0.75 and i*(gw) = 0,8,

thereby verifying this aspect of the model,

Despite the mathematical justification for measuring program duration in terms of the 90 percent

program progress level, to arrive at a verifiable conclusion each strategy was compared in terms of

program duration at all program progress levels.

(See tables A-3a and A-3b for simulation results at

different impermanence factor levels.) At the critical impermanence factors for permanent cost option 1, where program costs of the two strategies

are equal, the interim strategy performs poorly in

terms of program duration even at the 30 percent

program progress level (refer to tables A-4a and

A-4 b).

Table A-2.—Simulation of Cleanup Program Progress

Ranges of Years in Which Required Cleanups are Initiated’

Total Program Cost $63.6 Billion

Selected percentages of sites ‘ ‘

3 0 % 50 % 70 “/0 90 “/0 95 ‘J/o 100 “/0

— - .

1. Initial Budget-= $1.6 B; i(sc) = 0.75; i(gw) = 0.8

Cleanup strategy:

Interim ... ... 19-48 31-90 48-140+ 84-140+ 110-140 + 140 +

Permanent .. . 12-19 16-47 22-65 26-79 26-82 27-85

II. Initial Budget = $9.0 B; i(sc) = 0.75; i(gw) = 0.8

Cleanup strategy:

Interim . . . . . . . . . . . 14-37 25-75 42-140+ 79-140+ 104-140+ 140 +

Permanent . . . . . . . 7 14 19-40 24-53 25-56 26-59

aflange de f(n(t!ons

I Shortest programs correspond to scenario 1 EAF longest programs to scenario ILBF

II Shortest programs correspond to scenario 1 ECF longest programs to scenario 1 LDF

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
96 . Superfund Strategy

m I m I m m ’ m I m I

m I m I m m I

m I m

m m I m I

m m I m I m I

m I m I m I

m I

m I

m , m I
Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 9 7

Table A-4a.—Summary of Simulation Results

With Budget Options A and Ba

Program Duration Ranges for i = 0.1 to 0.9b

(in years)

.

Permanent strategy lntenm strategy

Time distribution option: cost range cost range

Program progress $31.4 $70 2BC

$16.4 $147 3BC

Unifor~ (U;:

100 0/0 51 101 140 +

95‘~ o 28 47 38 140 +

90 ’10 . , 21 45 17 140+

70“ o 15 27 16 140 +

50 “’0 13 18 13 140 +

30°10 : : : : : : : 10 13 11 81

Early (E):

1000/’ 0 26 28 41 140 +

95° 0 : : 21 27 22 140 +

90 0/0 21 26 17 140+

70°1 0 15 23 16 105

50 “/0 ., 13 17 13 64

300/o . 10 13 11 37

Late (L):

100 ‘/0 51 119 140 +

95 0/0 42 48 47 140 +

900/’. 21 47 17 140 +

7 0 0 10 15 41 16 140 +

50 0/0 13 18 13 140 +

300/0 : : : : : 10 13 11 111

apermanent cleanup costs option 1 and new sites option F

bshort ~rogram5 Correspond to budget oPtlon A and I O 1 Long programs cor

respond to budget opt!on B and I O 9

C

LOW cost corresponds to budget option A and I O 1 High cost corresponds

to budget option B and I O 9

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Since under either strategy, for i < i*, the interim

strategy is preferred on the basis of cost. But program durations under the interim strategy so greatly exceed those of the permanent strategy at the critical impermanence factor that trade-offs between

program cost and duration are expected. Therefore,

the hypothesis for cleanup strategy decisionmaking based on two evaluation criteria at this point

is: Regardless of when future costs occur and how

we choose to measure program progress:

1. The permanent strategy is preferred unequivocally for i > i * because it is both cheaper and

shorter.

2. For i < i*, there are trade-offs between program cost and length.

3. At some level of impermanence, the interim

strategy is preferred both in terms of program

cost and duration.

To be sure the method of measuring program

progress or assumptions about the time distribution

of future costs do not disprove this hypothesis, sensitivity analysis is performed.

All program progress levels for each strategy

were calculated while varying values of i = (O. 1,

0.3, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9). To properly ascertain the shortest and longest program duration, the

Table A-4b.—Summary of Simulation Results

With Budget Options C and Da

Program Duration Ranges for i = 0.1 to 0.9b

(in years)

Permanent strategy Interlrn strategy

Time distribution option: cost rang e cost range

Program progress $23.2 $71 8BC$16.4 $147 3BC

Uniform (U);

1000/0 ., 51 98 140 +

950/0 ., ... : 29 45 35 140 +

9 0 0/ 0 . , 16 41 16 140 +

700/o . . 12 25 12 140 +

500/o : 7 15 7 140 +

300/o ., 3 7 3 76

Early (E):

100”/’0 . 26 27 39 140 +

95 0/, ., 17 26 16 140 +

90°/’c 16 25 15 140 +

700/o : : ., 12 21 11 100

50”1O 7 15 7 59

3O”1O : : : 3 7 3 32

Late (L):

100 0/’0 51 115 140 +

950’ , 38 47 41 140 +

900/ o 16 45 16 140 +

70”10 12 37 12 140 +

500/0 : : : : : : : 7 15 7 140 +

300/0 ... 3 7 3 105

a permanent cleanup costs option 2 and new sites option F

bshort programs correspond to budget oPtlon C and I O 1 Long programs cor.

respond to budget option D and I O 9

c LOW cost corresponds to budget option C and I O 1 High cost corresponds

to budget option D and I O 9

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

time distributions of future costs and budgets were

also varied. The shortest program under each strategy is achieved for the high growth rate budget options, A and C, and for the early future cost time

distribution. The longest program under each strategy occurred for the low growth budget option B

and D and for the late future cost t i me distribution.

This information is given in tables A-5 and A-6.

Examination of these tables shows that the hypothesis is supported, since parts 1 and 3 are true,

and 2 is intuitive. Regardless of when future costs

occur and our measurement of program duration,

the permanent strategy is preferred for i > i*.

Again regardless of these assumptions, the interim

strategy is preferred only at low impermanence values and/or if program duration is measured at

biased low program progress levels.

Solving the Allocation and Scheduling

Programs: Systems Modeling

as a Management Tool

While simulation models enable comparison between strategies, they require that the strategies

first be defined. The simulation so far defined only
98 ● Superfund Strategy

two extreme and inflexible strategies. It is not likely,

in a real program, that choice would be reduced

to a very expensive permanent solution on the one

hand or an ineffective impermanent solution,

which is not even cheap, on the other, More likely,

different levels of cleanup would be warranted at

sites according to their different levels of health

risks and environmental threats. There appears to

be a trend emerging at EPA where cleanup would

be approached in stages. The notion of “operable

units” has been put forth in draft versions of the

revised NC,. Essentially, the remedial response

system will be approached in terms of phased-in

cleanup, which for most sites will separate surface

from subsurface cleanups (this is not necessarily

technically sound). Cleanup will assume the form

of a three-stage process.1 This approach could be

somewhat consistent with the “hedge-against-uncertainty” strategy defined earlier,

With cleanups structured into three-stage processes, a cleanup strategy could define or provide

guidance for long-term allocation and scheduling

policies, i.e., the tactics of the program. Decisions

must be made about which sites are cleaned to what

level and when each stage of cleanup is implemented. These are difficult management policy decisions for a number of reasons.

First, the crucial element for evaluating scheduling and allocation tactics is a measure of risk and/or

cleanup goals. Such measures or goals could: 1) define the urgency and level of cleanup on a site-specific basis; 2) aid in designating sites requiring different levels of cleanup; 3) provide information for

assessing cost effectiveness on an intersite basis,

which could be used to measure the equity of cleanup schedules and allocations over all sites; and 4)

maintain consistency within the cleanup strategy.

Second, it is necessary to relate various cleanup

actions to levels of risk reduction or avoidance.

Without defining such relationships, it is not possible to evaluate the site-specific cost effectiveness

of cleanup options, In evaluating the cost effectiveness of the cleanup options it may be necessary to

not only consider immediate risks but potential

risks as well. A particular option may not appear

very cost effective when considering only the nearterm risks but may be extremely cost effective in

light of longer term risks,

This complication touches on the third difficulty,

that of evaluating cleanup action cost effectiveness

on an intersite basis, The problems arise due to the

interrelationship between allocation and scheduling. Limitations on budget, the availability of permanent cleanup technology, or the degree to which

program infrastructure is developed will likely delay some remedial actions or some stages of remedial action. While initial responses may retard the

deterioration of a site, some sites will continue to

degrade. For this reason, scheduling and allocation

of the Superfund among sites are deeply linked

with projected or potential risks and costs of remedial measures. Trade-offs are likely between more

extensive actions and initial responses in the near

term, and between permanent cleanup actions at

different sites in the long term,

The fourth management problem to address is the

enormous number of possible allocation and scheduling sequences. There will be many possible cleanup action-risk reduction relationships, all of which

may have different levels of cost effectiveness depending on when the actions are undertaken. The

possibility of 2,000 to 10,000 sites and three stages

of response represents well over a trillion possible

sequences, Even though some will be patent nonsense and experience can eliminate others, a method for evaluating allocation schedules will be

indispensable to efficient and equitable fund distribution, especially in a program of such magnitude and subject to intense public scrutiny.

Simulation could provide valuable comparative

information among schedules if measurements of

risk and the interrelationships of allocation and

scheduling were reflected in the model. However,

to arrive at preferred schedules, simulation methods would require defining them all and exhaustively testing them; this would most likely be computationally infeasible. Thus, simulation may not

be the most useful tool for deciding management

policies at the tactical level.

Fortunately, there are systems techniques that

offer greater flexibility than simulation. Such techniques might include linear and nonlinear programming, dynamic programming, and decision analysis methods, all in a multicriteria context given that

there would be more than one evaluation criterion.

One of the largest applications of such mathematical models is in financial and investment planning,

e.g., capital budgeting, cashflow analysis, portfolio

management, etc. z Mathematical models would not

require predefining tactics; the preferable tactics

would be the output solution,

Modeling the system might begin with site classification, a step that might also be time dependent.

—

ZF J Fabozzl ~nd J. I’alcnte. “ h4athcnlati[ a] Programming rn Amer]-

(.a n ( :[)nlparli[~~. A Sample SU rvey, fnterfa~ (,. s, iol 7, No 1, .N(I\ ember

1976, ])p, 9:1-98
. . —

In addition to the classification scheme presented

in EPA’s ground water protection strategy, certain

States, e.g., New York, hate alread~ implemented

a site classification scheme as a method of allocati n,g cleanup actions. The effects of deferring

cleanup actions at particular site classes could be

reflected b}’ a deterioration coefficient. The cleteriorat ion coefficient might transform deferred sites

from one classification to another. The variables in

the mode] could relate spec ifi(: classes of sites and

clean up actions tl, at would also be time dependent.

Again it is the value of these ~ariables in the model

solution that would pro~ide the tactics.

These ~ariables might represent ho~t’ many actions using a specific technolog] ~~’ere ap~)lied to

how’ man~ sites of a particular (:lass in a giien ~ear.

Remedial actions would also alter the site classificat ion. This problem might be formulated to m inirnize

program cost and duration subject to a (;leanup goal

(constraint. The level of cleanup might be increased

to rcfle(;t the effects of increasing margins of safetj’,

a n d SO1 LI t i o ns (: ou Id be compared on t h e basis o f

.s~rstem cost effe(:tiveness. The solution-the distribution of remedial technologies o~rer sites as a function of time-could also be used as a management

tool. This (:ould be (lone h~r more (:losel~ exa mini ng sit f]-spec ific data to determi nc ~trh ich sites

Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund ● 9 9

would actually undergo clea nu]) using that type of

technology.

While it may appear to be an ambitious undertaking, efforts are being taken already to incorporate limited but useful health information into decisionmaking. EPA is formalizing its risk assessment

guidelines and attempts are being made to appl~’

them to hazardous waste disposal site cleanup, Furthermore, site-specific hazardous ~~aste i nformation is accumulating as RI/FSs are completed. Other

data are becoming available as the }Iazard Ranking System is applied to more and more sites. FOI.

example the El RS has been applied to o~er 1,70 0

sites. ~ ‘rhe next step is to de~’elol) a n d formal i Ze a

risk management strategy that wroul(] ac(; ount for

intersite cost-effecti~’e trade-offs o~’er t i me. More

extensive and systematic use of the information

a~’ ai 1 abl e now a n d i n t h e fu t L1 re is desirable. I)e\’ eloping a strategy for the partial s}rstem that (:oul(i

be refined as health and eniironrn[:nt al effe(;ts data

are enhanced is also appro~)ri ate. ‘1’o (: a]]t u re the

d}rnarnics of the s~rstem, a s}rstems a])~)roa(:h could

be considered.

IL I s I,:n\ I I IJl)[llol)t, i] I)r(]t (,( t 1( 111 ,,IH(,I1( \ t :\tt,lll [Ii t 1)(, t I <1/,11 (1( )(1. 1<(,

I(,cI\(I 1]1 ot]l(,fu dIIIi f;~it~ir(, f;l)ll(iln~ NI,(IIIS ( :11{( I, \ S(I t[,]fl {() 1[11~[ I ~[( ‘]

Stll(fi ,’ F’l[l(il [<(,1)(1[ t [)(,( (,[111)(,1 I ‘1[!4
Chapter 4

Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals
Introduction

Current Institutional Framework . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CERCLA: Summary of Key Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

National Contingency Plan: Summary of Key Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Applicability of Other Laws to Determining Extent of Cleanup at Superfund

Use of Hazard Ranking System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Use of Cleanup Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Approaches to Establishing Cleanup Goals or Standards

Factors for Evaluating Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Discussion of Alternative Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

, . . .

Sites

Conclusion ● ..*. ... *.. .*** *.. **. ***. a m . . * . ..***...*

List of Tables

Table No,

4-1. Illustration of a Site Classification System for Selecting Cleanup Goals . . . . . .

103

103

103

104

104

105

105

106

106

112

119

Page

120
Chapter 4

Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals

INTRODUCTION

Establishing goals for cleanup by Superfund,

the States, and private parties will depend on

scientific, technical, economic, and legal analyses. Ultimately, however, the answer to “How

clean is clean?” will be a major policy judgment

that must strike a delicate balance among certain and uncertain health and environmental

risks, available resources, technological capabilities, and public concerns. OTA’s analysis

does not produce a simple answer to this key

question. However, one approach has emerged

that offers a way to choose among several processes for determining cleanup goals; it is based

on a classification of sites according to their

present and future use.

When a site has been identified as a potential source of dangerous chemical releases, decisions are made on how to respond.1 Removal

actions are short-term responses to immediate

threats. Remedial actions are long-term responses designed to provide permanent remedies and are the focus of this chapter. A critical component of the Superfund program is

determining the extent of cleanup that is required at sites, i.e., defining the residual level

of contamination or exposure that is acceptI (” n [;{JI] t r(~l I ed release of (. hem i ca]s from ,Superfu n d SI tes presents the ~jote n t i a I for various types of damage. Some rclea ses

(:an harm people di rcctly, otbers prima ril} affect the eni’i ronrnt; nt, Some damage ma} be imme(iiately ohscr~rahle while other

harm ma~ maniff; ~t itsf; lf only after jears of exposure; .

able. Unfortunately, it is possible to know that

a site poses significant threats, but not know

precisely what those threats are or what constitutes a safe level of cleanup.

While certain criteria, such as the necessity

of fund balancing and use of cost-effective

remedies, are present in the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act (CERCLA) and the National Contingency Plan (NCP), they do not actually prescribe a course of action. This lack of clear

direction has led to problems.

The current methods for determining the extent of cleanup at Superfund sites may not meet

statutory goals of public protection. Current actions appear to be ad hoc and inconsistent; no

national goal on the extent of cleanup has been

defined. Without specific cleanup goals [with

which to confirm cleanup), the selection, use,

and evaluation of cleanup technologies will be

difficult and contentious. Moreover, goals can

help determine whether a technology is technically feasible and guide the development of

new technologies.

The chapter begins by examining the current

institutional framework within which goals are

now structured, It then discusses six factors

to evaluate alternative approaches to establishing cleanup goals and outlines seven alternative approaches. Finally, the chapter the cleanup goals issue might be resolved.

CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

CERCLA: Summary of Key Provisions Removal actions are short-term responses to

prevent or mitigate immediate threats. RemeCERCLA, or Superfund, was enacted to ad- dial actions (the focus of this chapter) are

dress the problem of uncontrolled releases of longer term responses designed to provide perhazardous substances into the environment. manent remedies, The statute does not provide

103
104 ● Superfund Strategy

explicit guidance on how to decide on the extent of a cleanup. The statute does, however,

impose constraints on the choice of removal

and remedial actions. Removal actions are limited to $1 million or 6 months unless certain

statutory conditions are met,

Remedial actions are restricted by fundbalancing and cost-effective requirements. The

fund-balancing requirement limits the selection

of a remedial action to one that provides a balance between the need to protect public health

and welfare and the environment at that site

and the availability of Superfund money for response to other sites. The NCP is directed to

require that remedial actions be cost effective

over the period of potential exposure to the hazardous substances or contaminated materials.

It is commonly accepted that cost effectiveness

pertains to a fixed goal that different approaches

may meet.

National Contingency Plan:

Summary of Key Provisions

The NCP establishes the process for determining appropriate removal and remedial actions at Superfund sites. The NCP can be revised periodically, which was last done on July

16, 1982. EPA proposed revisions to the NCP

on January 28, 1985, pursuant to a settlement

agreement reached in Environmental Defense

Fund and the State of New Jersey v. EPA.

The existing NCP authorizes two types of removal actions: immediate and planned. EPA

is empowered to conduct immediate removal

actions when it determines such actions are

necessary to prevent or mitigate an immediate

and significant risk to human life or health or

to the environment. There is no explicit provision establishing the required extent of cleanup. Immediate removal actions are considered

“complete” when there is no longer an immediate and significant risk to human life or

health or to the environment, and the contaminated waste materials have been treated or disposed of properly offsite.

Planned removals are authorized when the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determines that continuing an immediate removal

action will result in a substantial cost savings

or that the public or the environment will be

at risk if response is delayed at a site not on

the National Priorities List (NPL). As with immediate removals, there is no explicit provision

establishing the extent of cleanup for planned

removals. They are “terminated” when the risk

to the public health or the environment has

been abated.

The current NCP provides extensive guidance for choosing an appropriate remedial action plan. There is a process EPA uses to evaluate the nature and extent of contamination at

a site; propose and evaluate possible remedial

alternatives; and select a remedial action plan,

As with removal actions, the NCP does not provide explicit guidance on what degree of cleanup must be achieved by a remedial action. The

appropriate extent of remedy is determined by

selecting the most cost-effective remedial alternative (i. e., the lowest cost alternative that is

technologically feasible and reliable and which

effectively minimizes damage to and provides

adequate protection of public health, welfare,

and the environment). As with CERCLA, the

NCP requires that the need to respond to other

releases with Fund monies be considered in determining the appropriate extent of remedy,

Applicability of Other Laws to Determining

Extent of Cleanup at Superfund Sites

The proposed draft revisions to the NCP incorporate EPA’s policy on CERCLA compliance with the requirements of other environmental statutes. For removal actions, EPA

proposes to meet applicable or relevant standards of other Federal environmental and public health laws to the maximum extent practicable, considering the exigencies of the

situation.

For remedial actions, EPA proposes to comply with applicable and relevant standards of

other Federal public health and environmental

laws, with limited waivers. Specifically, the

draft revisions would require that the appropriate extent of remedy be determined by se-
Ch. 4—Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals ● 105

lecting a cost-effective remedial action that effectively mitigates and minimizes threats to

and provides adequate protection of public

health and welfare and the environment. In

particular, the remedy must, at a minimum, attain or exceed applicable or relevant existing

Federal public health or environmental standards. Applicable standards are those standards

that would be legally applicable if the actions

were not taken pursuant to Section 104 or 106

of CERCLA. Relevant standards are those that

are based on scientific or technological considerations that are similar to conditions at the

site.

Where two or more alternatives achieve comparable levels of protection of public health and

welfare and the environment, the most costeffective alternative will be selected; one which

provides the most favorable balance between

cost and protection. Selection can consider the

reliability of the remedy, available technology,

administrative concerns, and other relevant

factors. According to EPA, an alternative that

does not meet applicable or relevant standards

may be selected for one of the following reasons:

fund-balancing;

the selected alternative is not the final

reined y;

technological infeasibility;

unacceptable environmental impacts; or

overriding public health concerns,

Thus, it is not clear that EPA’s approach necessarily leads to a cleanup decision consistent

with the level of protection originally intended

for a site.

Use of Hazard Ranking System

Sites that are included on the NPL are ranked

by the Hazard Ranking System (HRS). The

score assigned to each site is intended to reflect the relative potential of the hazardous substances present to cause damage, the rapidity

with which the damage will occur, and the

magnitude of the impact. Three scores are combined to produce the final rank. These scores

reflect the potential for harm by chemicals that

have migrated away from the facility and are

found in the groundwater, surface water, or

air. If the final priority score is equal to or

above 28.5, the site is placed on the NPL and

is eligible for remedial action.

The HRS addresses the possibility that a site

will cause harm. Since it neglects actual exposures and effects, however, it does not provide

a qualitative assessment of the risk presented

by the site. Moreover, sites where data are lacking may have lower scores than appropriate because zero is generally assigned for any specific points lacking data (see chapter 5).

Some of the factors used in the HRS model

indicate the types of concerns that should be

addressed in determining cleanup goals. The

model estimates hazard based on limited data

and can lead to scores which other information could increase or decrease. For example,

an increasing number of points are given for

decreasing distance to surface water, buildings,

or local populations. The current model cannot incorporate additional knowledge that

would substantially affect the danger posed by

the site, e.g., whether the geologic conditions

are likely to allow the chemicals to contaminate the surface water, whether the buildings

are occupied, or whether the activities of the

local population cause frequent contact with

the site. The presence of an observed release,

an unusual smell, or a large number of drums

or tanks increase the score in the model. Thus,

some parts of the current model address issues

of concern for determining extent of cleanup,

but not all important issues are considered. The

model was not designed to and is not used to

determine extent of cleanup and, as currently

structured, is inadequate for this purpose. But

a revised, improved model could be used to determine, at least partially, the extent of response, even if only the initial response (see

chapter 2).

Use of Cleanup Goals

At the four sites OTA examined closely, all

the remedial strategies were based primarily

on waste containment and groundwater treatment, rather than waste removal and treat-
106 . Superfund Strategy

ment. Several factors seemed to influence these

decisions. Costs required for complete site

cleanup appeared to be important factors at the

Love Canal and Seymour sites. At Stringfellow,

incorrect assumptions regarding the permeability of underlying bedrock formed the basis

for remedial action decisions that have proven

ineffective. Little consideration was given to

the long-term effectiveness of containment,

continually increasing operating and maintenance costs, possibilities of containment failure and continuing groundwater contamination, and practical problems resulting from the

very long times (hundreds or thousands of

years) required to manage these hazardous

waste sites.

At three of the sites (Seymour, Stringfellow,

Love Canal), initial actions were required prior

to remediation. These actions were short-term

solutions to immediate problems, and in some

cases may have actually worsened the problem.

At these sites, there was also a lack of specific

cleanup goals specifying acceptable residual

levels of contamination.

The Sylvester site was the only one where

environmental goals were set prior to remedial

action. The specific cleanup goals involved a

hundred-fold reduction in the offsite release of

contaminants in groundwater, compliance with

EPA water quality standards at Lowell drinking water intakes, and compliance with certain

EPA air quality criteria at a nearby trailer park.

In particular, the goals were aimed at meeting

standards for several contaminants in water

and chloroform in air emissions. The cleanup

goals did not consider other sources of toxic

chemicals entering the water supply.

APPROACHES TO ESTABLISHING CLEANUP

GOALS OR STANDARDS

This section will evaluate some alternative

approaches to establishing the extent of cleanup at Superfund sites. No attempt has been

made to consider all possible approaches. The

approaches selected were those that appear

most reasonable given current knowledge and

past experience with remedial actions at Superfund sites.

The analysis of each approach will consider

six major factors that define the nature and extent of cleanup that is possible at Superfund

sites: 1) inherent hazard of the chemical wastes

found at the sites; 2) site-specific considerations

and exposure; 3) assessment of risks to human

health, environmental biota, and natural resources; 4) available technologies and remedial

action alternatives; 5) resource limitations; and

6) institutional constraints. While many of

these factors involve scientific and technical

issues, it is important to recognize that the

choice of a cleanup goal or standard is ultimately a policy decision.

Factors for Evaluating Alternatives

Inherent Hazard of Chemical Wastes

Found at Superfund Sites

The inherent hazard of the chemicals present

at a site determines their potential to cause

harm to human health or the environment.

When inherent hazard is combined with potential exposure, the potential risk (i.e., the possibility of an adverse effect) for harm to human

health or the environment can be assessed. Inherent hazard of chemicals can be evaluated

by the type of damage they cause, the amount

present as compared to existing standards and

acceptable levels, the extent of reliable knowledge about them, and the mixture of hazardous substances present at the site.

Several types of hazard can occur from the

release of chemicals into the environment. For

example, some chemicals are likely to ignite

or explode, causing both the danger of physical damage and the potential for the chemicals
to be spread over a large area. The corrosive

properties of chemicals can directly damage

human health or the environment and can affect the stability of the site by causing a breach

of natural or engineered barriers, The chemicals can also present a toxicological risk to people or local flora and fauna.

Each chemical can present one or several

types of toxicological hazards. The compound

can be acutely toxic, i.e., exposure for minutes

or hours can produce an effect that is generally observed within a very short period of time.

Somewhat longer exposures may also produce

adverse effects, either a more severe consequence or an entirely different effect, including

cancer. Certain more sensitive populations

may be affected by lower levels of exposure

than the general population, For instance,

some chemicals are most toxic to developing

fetuses in utero but cause little harm to the

pregnant woman, Still other effects may be observed in young children or the elderly,

Adverse health effects range from reversible

effects, e.g., skin or eye irritation, to irreversible damage, e.g., malfunction or cancer of vital

organs. A chemical may cause predominantly

one effect or may cause several diverse toxic

reactions. Moreover, each chemical can produce a variety of effects depending on the level

of exposure. While all chemicals can produce

an adverse effect at some level of exposure, the

le~el of exposure ttrill determine both the type

of damage and the severity of the harm. Thus,

low levels of some chemicals will produce dizziness or headaches while higher levels may

cause unconsciousness or death. Similarly, a

dilute acid ma} cause skin irritation while a

more concentrated solution will burn the skin.

Knowledge of both the inherent toxicity of the

chemicals present at the site and levels of potential exposure is, therefore, necessary to determine what hazard exists.

Standards or levels that have been deemed

acceptable exist for some of the chemicals

found at Superfund sites. Some standards,

which have had some peer and public review,

and other established levels (e. g., judicially established action levels) can be used to evaluate

Ch. 4—Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals • 107

inherent hazard. Care must be taken to ensure

that the standard or other acceptable level is

appropriate for the Superfund site. Standards

are usually developed for one medium and one

route of exposure. For example, a standard of

1 part per billion of dioxin in soil has been set

for Superfund sites, but not for water or air.

A standard developed for one medium is frequently inappropriate for another since the

medium may determine the extent and route

of exposure. The severity and type of toxicity

of a chemical can also vary with route of exposure. Furthermore, some standards are for

acute (short-term) exposures while others are

for chronic (long-term] exposures. Occupational standards for exposure assume a limited time

exposure for healthy adults. Other standards

may be partially based on cost or available technology and should not be considered a measure of inherent toxicity.

Although the inherent toxicity of several

chemicals has been studied in depth, a recent

study by the National Academy of Sciences

concluded that most chemicals have not been

adequately examined for all potential toxic effects.2 Based on an examination of randomly

selected compounds, the report estimates that

no toxicity information is available on 76 to 82

percent of chemicals in commerce included on

the Toxic Substances Control Act Inventory,

38 percent of pesticides and inert ingredients

of pesticides formulations, 56 percent of cosmetic ingredients, 25 percent of drugs and excipients used in drug formulations, and 46 percent of food additives. Less than 18 percent of

the chemicals in these categories were estimated to have a sufficient data base to provide

a complete health hazard assessment. The lack

of data is a particular concern for chemical

wastes, i.e., chemicals that are unwanted byproducts of chemical synthesis or other manufacturing process. Until recently, there has

been little economic incentive to study the potential toxic effects of such chemicals. Moreover, there have been few studies on health ef-
108 ● Superfund Strategy

fects associated with actual uncontrolled sites,

and those completed have generally posed significant scientific uncertainties.

Finally, few waste sites contain only one

chemical; thus, chemical and toxicological interactions need to be considered. Chemical reactions can result in new compounds whose

physical, chemical, and toxicological properties differ significantly from those originally at

the Superfund site, Chemical reactions can also

cause fire or explosions. The potential of toxicological interactions is poorly understood.

While some chemicals have been shown to enhance or interfere with the toxicological effects

of another (e.g., synergism or antagonism), only

a few such mixtures have been examined. In

the absence of knowledge, the hazards of combinations of chemicals is generally ignored and

may present a large uncertainty in the assessment of the site.

Site-Specific Considerations and Exposure

For chemicals to pose a hazard to health and

the environment, people, flora, and fauna must

be exposed to them. Geology, geography, and

weather conditions are some of the factors that

will affect the routes and levels of exposure.

Thus, site-specific factors will affect which

media are contaminated and the routes and extent of potential exposure.

Site-specific factors will determine the probability that chemicals will leach into groundwater, drain into rivers, or evaporate into the

air. For example, soil with high organic content will tend to retain hydrophobic chemicals

such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) while

soils with less organic content will tend to release these chemicals into the groundwater or

air. Soil composition and permeability will influence the rate at which contaminants leach

from the site, which in turn can affect the rate

and extent of exposures, e.g., via drinking water wells or via contamination of nearby surface water. Weather, including temperature,

amount and type of precipitation, and wind

strength or direction can affect the movement

of chemicals and their transfer among media.

Conditions that affect the route of exposure,

e.g., exposure to contaminated soil via dermal

contact versus inhalation of dust particles, can

affect the amount absorbed into the body and,

thus, the extent of exposure.

Models can be used to predict environmental

fate and potential levels of exposure by various routes. Confirmation of the accuracy of environmental fate models is limited by the paucity of data on the actions and reactions of

chemicals in the environment. For example,

predictions of a chemicals’s movement for several decades is often based on data collected

over several months. Small errors in initial

measurements or in assumptions can be compounded for long-term predictions.

Modeling potential exposure will also depend on the ability of the assessor to estimate

human activity. Route and level of exposure

will depend on the activities of the local population, e.g., digging in soil, swimming in or

drinking of water. Inhalation exposure levels

will vary with breathing rate which, in turn,

depends on factors such as age and level of

activity. The average exposure for a population

can differ significantly from the exposure of

a person whose habits or occupation cause

more or less contact with the site. Exposure

models also make assumptions about the extent to which an individual’s activities will

change over a lifetime and the likelihood that

people will remain in their current residence

and/or occupation.

The size and sensitivity of the local population and the nature of the flora and fauna will

determine the extent of the effects of exposure

to the chemicals. The size of the local population and its proximity to the site will determine

the number of people potentially exposed. The

presence or absence of particularly sensitive

populations (e.g., children, the elderly) needs

to be known to adequately assess the level of

exposure that will produce an adverse effect,

Knowledge of activities on or near a site will

indicate potential routes of exposure and allow

reasonable estimations of durations of exposure, e.g., children at Love Canal faced potentially high exposure because of the location of

their school and playground.
A Superfund site should not be examined in

a vacuum, Other factors in the surrounding environment can affect the nature and extent of

remedial action at a site. Naturally occurring

chemicals can present a hazard when combined

with residual levels from a cleaned site. Even

if a Superfund site is cleaned to a level that is

acceptable by itself, the background level of

some toxic chemicals, such as heavy metals,

may be sufficiently high that exposure to the

background levels combined with the residual

contamination can raise exposure to an unacceptable level. Local sources of pollution need

to be considered when determining the potential risk to an exposed population. Some of

these other sources may cause concomitant exposures, especially if they contaminate the

same resource, e.g., the same aquifer. Other

sources may cause exposure to the same chemicals but by different routes, for instance, organic solvents may be in the drinking water or

in the air.

Assessment of Risks to Human Health,

Environmental Biota, and Natural Resources

An assessment of a site’s potential health and

environmental risks is based on the inherent

hazard of the chemicals present and the routes

and levels of potential exposure. Risk assessment is the use of available data to estimate the

potential effects of exposure to particular hazardous materials or situations on an individual, species, or populations. Results of risk

assessments are frequently expressed as the

probability of the occurrence of a particular effect under specific conditions. The National

Academy of Sciences has identified four processes that comprise a risk assess ment:3

Ž Hazard identification: The determination

of whether a particular chemical is or is

not casually linked to particular health

effects,

● Dose-response assessment: The determination of the relation between the magnitude

of exposure and the probability of occurrence of the health effects in question.

Ch. 4—Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals ● 109

● Exposure assessment.. The determination

of the extent of human exposure before or

after application of regulatory controls.

● Risk characterization: The description of

the nature and often the magnitude of human risk, including attendant uncertainty.

The first three issues were discussed during

considerations of inherent hazard and site-specific conditions. Risk characterization is discussed below.

Risk assessments should explicitly consider

the uncertainties in knowledge about the inherent hazard of the chemicals at the site and the

routes and levels of exposure. Thus, if the toxicological data limitations were greatest for

chemicals that would be expected to volatilize

easily and if the greatest exposure were expected to be by inhalation, a greater uncertainty factor might be incorporated into the risk

assessment to account for these compounds’

potential toxicity, Similarly, if the toxicity of

the compound that poses the most significant

risk at the site were estimated from incomplete

data or from experiments that were inadequately performed, a greater uncertainty factor

would be included in the risk assessment or,

alternatively, the next most toxic chemical

might be used for the evaluation,

A site-specific risk assessment is comprised

of a series of such assessments: for each route

of exposure, for each duration of exposure (i.e.,

acute, short-term, or chronic), and for various

adverse effects (e. g., cancer or organ toxicity)

for each organism (e.g., human, animal, or

plant) potentially affected. Usually the exposures producing the highest risks based on preliminary assessments for the populations of

concern are more carefully evaluated.

In addition to uncertainties associated with

conditions at a site, the process of risk assessment itself has inherent uncertainties. For example, toxicological risk assessments are based

on current knowledge and assumptions about

biological processes use models that have been

developed to describe them, Often the models

are designed to overestimate rather than underestimate risk. While such prudence is reasonable given the limitations of toxicological
110 . Superfund Strategy

knowledge, it must be recognized that such decisions are based on considerations other than

those provided by science alone. This is one

example of the difference between risk assessment and risk management.

Risk assessment is defined as the calculation

of the probability of adverse outcomes such as

injury, disease, or death. Risk management incorporates other considerations such as acceptability of risk, costs and benefits, and policy

into a determination of a course of action. Although theoretically distinct parts of the decisionmaking process, risk assessment and risk

management are too often interwoven. In the

case cited above, deciding which risk extrapolation model to use is a risk management decision, Evaluating and selecting data to be used

in the extrapolation model, as well as the extrapolation process, are elements of risk assessment. Decisions about what actions to take

based on the extrapolated risk are risk management judgments. When elements of risk management are imbedded in risk assessment processes, confusion about the “scientific” or

“objective” content of policies and decisions

can result.

Site-specific risk can be compared with risk

levels that are considered to be acceptable.

Non-chronic toxic effects are thought to have

a threshold of exposure below which no toxicity will occur. Acceptable exposure levels for

these compounds are frequently based on a noobserved-adverse-effect level which is lowered

by uncertainty factors that consider concerns

such as variation in individual susceptibility

and extrapolation of results from animals to

man. The resultant levels are often called acceptable daily intakes or ADIs. EPA has published draft guidance on the use of ADIs for

assessment of the risk to human health from

nonchronic effects. *

Acceptable exposure levels for carcinogens

are usually based on the estimated increase in

an individual’s probability of contracting cancer. In the past, EPA has regulated carcinogens

———.——- —

4L’ .S. E;n\”ironmental Protection Agency, Guidan(;e and Afethods for (he Use of Acce~tabie [lai]~ intakes in Health l?i.sk Assessment, 1984,

at individual risk levels in the range of 104 (1

in 10,000) to 108

(1 in 100,000,000). The breadth

of this range is caused by many factors including cost-benefit analysis (when applicable under

the appropriate legislation), availability of substitute chemicals (e.g., for regulating pesticides), or feasibility (e. g., ability to remove

chemicals from groundwater). In general, EPA

recommends that residual risk levels for carcinogens at Superfund sites be in the range of

104 to 108 before consideration of site-specific

factors, 5 with a risk of 108 (1 in 1,000,000) as

the point of departure for an acceptable level.

Available Technologies and

Remedial Action Alternatives

The ability to detect the identity and levels

of contaminating chemicals and achieve cleanup goals depends on currently available technology. Although technology continues to advance, it has limitations that cannot be

exceeded regardless of situation or intentions;

there can be no a priori assurance that even

a proven technology will work for each particular situation. Technological limitations affect

several aspects of cleanup goals and procedures.

The state of the art of sampling technology

limits the extent to which the identity and levels of chemicals contaminating a site can be

determined. Sampling can represent the most

difficult problem at large sites with diverse

chemical contaminants and geologic conditions.

Analytical procedures do not exist for the unambiguous identification of all chemicals that

may be encountered at Superfund sites. Procedures have been developed for some chemicals, but they only detect that compound above

a certain level, As analytical procedures limit

knowledge of the presence of chemicals, they

also limit the extent to which cleanup can be

achieved with certainty. After a remedial cleanup, the presence or absence of a compound can

at best be determined to be at or below the lim5[J .S. Enk.ironrnental Protection A~en(:y, hfemoran[ju~n t~l, I AX

fvl. Thomas on International Paper A(lI, I)~:l~lc~rlstratiO1l, No\.

19, 1984.
Ch. 4—Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals • 111

its of detection. These may be above or below

levels of concern for threats to health or environment.

Cleanup technologies are similarly limited.

Public expectations usually ignore the limitations of even the best technology to eliminate

exposure to a waste once it is released into the

environment, particularly groundwater, or to

completely prevent future releases. Current

options for handling waste chemicals include

destruction (e.g., incineration), blocking movement (e. g., slurry walls), or removal (e. g., offsite disposal). Many prospective cleanup technologies are in the R&D or the pilot plant stages

of development (see chapter 6).

The unintended consequences of the use of

any remedial technology may include transfer

of toxicants among media, transfer or risks

among populations, and residual pollution resulting from the technology. Transfers of toxicants among media may involve the same chemicals (e. g., when chemicals are stripped from

water by aeration) or chemical byproducts of

processing the orginal contaminants (e.g.,

transfer of combustion products of solids or liquids into air pollutants by incineration), Although such processes can remove the contaminants from the Superfund site, the residual

risks posed by the chemicals or their byproducts in new media need to be considered.

Remedial technologies can also involve the

transfer of risks among populations. Offsite disposal of waste chemicals will potentially expose additional populations during transit,

treatment, or disposal of the waste chemicals.

Risks to new and previously unexposed populations should be considered when evaluating

the effectiveness of any remedial action.

Most technologies will leave some level of residual contamination, either at the original site,

in aquifers distant from the site, or at the ultimate site of treatment or redisposal. Some residual contamination results from the inability

of any process to completely eliminate a chemical. Risks posed by this residual contamination should be considered when cleanup goals

are established. Other remedial processes produce new wastes (e.g., contaminated carbon

from filtration systems), While not always immediately obvious, generation of such wastes

must be considered in establishing cleanup

procedures and goals.

Resource Limitations

A number of resource limitations significantly affect the nature and extent of remedial actions. First, there is a finite amount of public

and private money that can be devoted to the

cleanup of Superfund sites. In addition to financial limitations, other resources such as the

number of trained personnel, laboratories for

sampling and analysis, and equipment to

achieve the desired cleanup response are also

limited and may not be available even if money

were (see chapter 7). Similarly, decisions to use

offsite hazardous waste management facilities

assume that these facilities have sufficient

capacity,

Dividing the total available resources among

all NPL sites involves difficult decisions based

on limited data and can result in inconsistencies in the extent of cleanup among sites. Whatever the allocation of resources for any site, the

cleanup should obtain the highest level of

cleanup for resources spent. But this still begs

the issue of cleanup goals. It is becoming increasingly clear that at this time the potential

number of Superfund sites is not accurately

known, nor is it known what resources will be

needed for remedial actions at those sites. Consequently, the resources made available for any

single site must be carefully considered. Without such consideration, several intractable sites

could significantly deplete the available funds

and necessitate less extensive cleanup at serious sites that are discovered or investigated

later (see chapters 2 and 3).

Institutional Constraints

As discussed, CERCLA and the NCP as currently drafted provide little guidance about

how to determine the extent of cleanup required at Superfund sites. Draft revisions to the

NCP would require that in most cases, cleanups must attain or exceed relevant and applicable Federal standards. It is not clear that this
112 ● Superfund Strategy

requirement would really resolve the issue of

extent of cleanup, especially in light of the exceptions incorporated in the draft provision,

The extent to which other laws and regulations may define the extent of cleanup and the

manner in which the cleanup is achieved also

lacks clarity. For example, it is obvious that material removed from a Superfund site for offsite disposal must be handled in compliance

with the provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), (However, see

chapter 5 for a discussion of the problems with

RCRA facilities.) Less clear is the impact of the

provisions of RCRA if the material is to be disposed, stored, or contained on site. Does the

site become a de facto RCRA facility that must

comply with all RCRA requirements? The resolution of these issues could substantially affect the nature of remedial actions.

Other laws such as the Safe Drinking Water

Act (SDWA), Clean Water Act (CWA), and Clean

Air Act (CAA) regulate contaminants in the environment, Current provisions of these acts are

insufficient to define the extent of cleanup

under CERCLA. The number of chemicals regulated under each act is small compared with

the number of compounds already identified

at Superfund sites, The standards developed

under these laws consider one medium and/or

route of exposure: SDWA, drinking water (ingestion); CWA, surface water; CAA, air (inhalation). SDWA health advisories only consider

short-term effects (1 day to 2 years) and do not,

therefore, consider carcinogenic effects. While

none of these existing standards are alone sufficient to determine the extent of cleanup, they

may provide guidance for a particular medium

or route of exposure.

Hazardous waste sites have generated considerable public, political, and media interest.

These concerns have focused attention on the

problem in general, and decisions about actions at Superfund sites are being examined

with increased intensity, While the high level

of interest may increase the probability that all

alternatives are examined and that appropriate action is ultimately taken, this interest can

also present problems. The issues involved in

determining the extent of cleanup at any site

are technically complex and contain large uncertainties. Oversimplification of the issues can

lead to an overstatement or understatement of

the risk that, in turn, can lead to unnecessary

concern or complacency. Public, political, or

media pressure may cause cleanup based on

notoriety rather than hazard. When the method

or extent of cleanup is well-publicized at one

site, public perception of fairness may require

that the same method or extent of cleanup be

used at another site, even if site-specific considerations would suggest a different action.

Actions of the local population, media, or

elected officials can be based on calculated, potential adverse effects or on their perception

of risks that may not exist, Studies of real versus perceived risk have clearly demonstrated

that the risk perceived by the public may differ significantly from the calculated risk, not

that calculated risk is necessarily a complete

indicator of actual risk, b Both perceived and

actual risks may have to be addressed in the

remedial action program, perhaps through

more effective public participation in decisionmaking (see chapter 8).

One factor influencing public perception of

risk will be actions taken at other sites where

remedies have been instituted, Public reaction

may be adverse if actions that are perceived

to be less stringent are implemented at one site

as compared with another, Because of site-specific factors affecting the design of remedial

action programs, comparison of one cleanup

plan with another will be difficult and in many

cases unfair. What is ultimately important and

realistically achievable is consistency in the

process of determining what the cleanup of

sites should be, rather than necessarily making all cleanups the same.

Discussion of Alternative Approaches

This section analyzes seven alternative approaches for determining the extent of cleanup

6F’. T. CO\’ellO, W.G. Flare m, ] .V. Rod ricks, and R.G, l’ard iff,

‘l-he Anal~,sis of Actual Versus f%rcei~wf Risks (New York:

plenum Press, 1983).
Ch. 4—Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals ● 113

at Superfund sites. The primary focus of four

of the approaches is to establish cleanup goals

based primarily on current scientific and technical considerations: site-specific risk assessments, national levels of residual contamination, background or pristine levels of chemicals, or best available technology. The fifth approach, the use of cost-benefit analysis, balances the extent of cleanup at each site against

cost, with or without a site-specific resource

limitation, A potential-use driven approach is

designed around a classification system based

on present and future use of sites. Also discussed is a continuation of the current ad hoc

practices,

Continued Use of Current Ad Hoc Practices

Description of Approach.—In general, the present

reliance on ad hoc practices has not provided

a consistent explicit process for determining

goals. Nor is it likely that the remedial actions

thus far have resulted in consistent levels of

cleanup among sites posing similar threats. A

review of remedial actions at various Superfund sites indicates that the inherent toxicity

of the chemicals present has, in part, determined the chosen remedy. Site-specific factors,

especially as they affect feasibility, have also

been considered. Risk assessments of the potential for sites to harm human health or the

environment have rarely been explicitly included in the decision process.

Availability and presumed effectiveness of

best available remedial technologies have been

driving factors in determining the extent of

cleanup. This may be due, in part, to the comparative ease of analyzing the cost, feasibility,

and reliability of existing technologies contrasted with the difficulty of making such judgments regarding health and environmental

risks. There has been some sensitivity to the

concerns of the local population, elected officials, and the media.

Analysis of Approach.—Continuation of current

practices, possibly with additional guidance,

would provide an increased opportunity to

evaluate remedial actions. One might then have

a stronger basis for deciding on the preferred

approach to establishing cleanup goals. On the

other hand, CERCLA was enacted over 4 years

ago; considerable resources have been expended and continue to be spent with mixed

results, Now may be the time to resolve an

issue which is critical to the remedial action

program.

Site-Specific Risk Assessment

Description of Approach.—One alternative a p -

proach to determining cleanup goals involves

the explicit use of risk assessment coupled with

a site-specific or national determination of acceptable risk levels. Uniform procedures and

methodologies would also need to be used. Risk

assessment would involve determining the potential hazards of the chemicals at each site,

characterizing exposures based on site-specific

considerations, and calculating risks based on

the inherent toxicity of chemicals at the site

and potential exposures to humans and the environment.

Various models can be used to determine

site-specific risk. One model illustrates some

of the issues that need to be resolved in sitespecific risk assessment.7 In this model, the individual chemicals to be used in the risk assessment are selected by a ranking scheme that

evaluates each chemical’s potential for toxicity

(based on ADI and/or carcinogenic potency)

and exposure (based on quantity present and

physical-chemical properties). For each selected chemical, potential exposure is estimated by all appropriate routes, for each remedial action plan considered. The risk for

each chemical for each route is calculated and

compared with the predetermined acceptable

level for the toxic effect. Remedial actions are

compared, and the appropriate response is selected to achieve the maximum difference between the residual and acceptable level of risk

at the lowest cost.

For the sake of consistency and defensibility,

uniform procedures and methodologies should

be used in risk assessment; therefore, a num-

‘J.V. Rodricks, “Risk Assessment at Hazardous Waste Disposal

Sites, ” Hazardouswaste, \ol. 1, 1984, pp. 333-362.
114 ● Superfund Strategy

ber of choices must be made. A site-specific

risk assessment of human health effects can be

expressed in terms of individual or population

risk. Individual risks estimate the risk of any

person exposed under the conditions stated in

the estimate and are independent of the size

of the population exposed. Population risks are

derived by multiplying the individual risk by

the number of people exposed by that route of

exposure. If individual risks are used for setting the standards for extent of cleanup, cleanups will be consistent throughout the country

regardless of the size of the potentially exposed

population. If population risks are used, Superfund sites in sparsely settled locations may

have higher residual individual risk than those

in more populated areas.

Since most Superfund sites contain many

chemicals, the risk assessor, for a variety of reasons, including cost and expediency, may

choose to determine the risk on the basis of a

few indicator substances. If the selection of indicator chemicals is based on their relative

abundance at the site, the most toxic chemicals may be overlooked. If the selection is based

on inherent toxicity, compounds that have

been extensively studied may be favored since

knowledge about lack of toxicity is not always

distinguished from lack of knowledge about

toxicity. Clearly making such a choice without

doing assessments for the alternatives could

lead to results that are not indicative of the

site’s greatest risks.

Similarly, choices must be made for predicting potential exposure. These choices are often

between the use of models to predict exposures

and collecting more extensive data on actual

exposure. After the site has been generally

characterized for factors such as geology,

weather, and local population, models can provide an estimate of exposure, albeit with some

uncertainty. Gathering more data can reduce

this uncertainty, but can delay action, cause

more exposure to the pollutants, and be quite

expensive.

Analysis of Approach.—By definition, a cleanup

goal determined by risk assessment must give

appropriate consideration to the inherent hazard of the chemicals present at a site, the sitespecific factors affecting exposure, and the potential risks to human health, environmental

biota, and natural resources. All of the previously discussed uncertainties and concerns

associated with these factors would still apply,

It is possible to structure conservative risk

assessments through a “worst-case” perspective, or to consider “average” or “likely” risks.

This approach’s sensitivity to technology and

resource limitations depends to a large extent

on whether the cleanup would need to achieve

a national or site-specific standard (perhaps

within a nationally established range of acceptable residual risk). For example, an inflexible

risk goal for a chemical or for the total site may

not be achievable for technical reasons. The

goal may be below the limits of detection with

current analytical procedures. Technologies

may not exist to remove low levels of specified

chemicals from air, water, or soil. Alternatively, the technologies may exist but may require

resources disproportionate to the incremental

reduction of risk. TO attempt to achieve a national risk goal might allow a few sites to virtually bankrupt the system, unless considerable

resources were provided. A site-specific standard would be more sensitive to the particular

circumstances of a site and the resources and

technologies that are available to effect cleanup, but does not assure national consistency

for protection at similarly contaminated sites,

In any event, performing a risk assessment

is a costly, time-consuming process that requires highly trained technical specialists in a

number of disciplines. Thus, a critical issue is

how to choose when to use risk assessment,

A risk assessment approach to establishing

cleanup goals is not inconsistent with CERCLA,

Because of the uncertainties that are likely to

be associated with a particular site and the uncertainties in the risk assessment process itself,

public acceptance of the outcome of risk

assessment is likely to be mixed. This would

be especially true when the “real” risk is quite

different from the “perceived” risk, Considerable effort to educate and inform the public

would need to accompany this approach, The
Ch. 4—Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals Ž 115

choice of a national or site-specific standard

of acceptable risk (i. e., a probability) would

have a significant impact on public reaction,

A single, minimal national standard for acceptable risk, if perceived to provide adequate protection, would be easy to explain and would

result, at least in theory, in consistent cleanups. A site-specific standard (even within a

range of acceptable risk) would probably result

in inconsistent cleanups and cause more public concern.

National Goals for Residual Contamination

Description of Approach.—This approach would

involve setting new residual levels and using

available ones for all chemicals or classes of

chemicals found at Superfund sites. These levels would be the same for all sites and not consider site-specific conditions. A major issue

that would need to be resolved in the use of

this approach is what factors to consider in establishing new levels, i.e., inherent hazard, cost

and/or available technology, or some combination of them.

Existing standards, criteria, and guidelines

will be of limited utility in establishing national

goals. They currently exist for only a small

number of chemicals found at Superfund sites.

Most were designed for a specific environmental medium and none suit all possible routes

of exposure that may exist at Superfund sites.

Many were developed for exposures that are

not compatible with those at Superfund sites.

For example, a standard developed for an occupational exposure (the calculated risk would

be for a group of healthy adults for a daily duration of 8 hours, 5 days per week) would not

match the conditions of exposure of most Superfund sites,

This is not to say that existing standards, criteria, and guidelines cannot be used, only that

one needs to be careful in doing so. In fact, as

discussed previously, draft revisions to the

NCP would require remedial actions in most

cases to comply, at a minimum with “applicable” and “relevant” Federal standards. Under

this approach to establishing cleanup goals, for

those chemicals for which there are no existing

applicable or relevant standards, new ones

would need to be developed, or perhaps some

other approach to setting cleanup goals used.

Hence, what at first appears to be an expeditious approach may be just the opposite.

Analysis of Approach.—Establishing national

goals for residual contamination would certainly consider, to some extent, the inherent hazard of the chemical wastes. As discussed, there

currently exists limited knowledge of the inherent hazardous properties of chemicals at

Superfund sites. Consequently, the establishment of standards for all hazardous substances

or classes at Superfund sites would be hampered by a limited data base and would involve

extrapolation of current knowledge beyond

limits of verification.

This approach would not consider site-specific conditions, and the extent to which risk

assessment is considered would depend on

how the standards were established. For example, if the standards were established in a way

so that, under any conditions of exposure, the

resulting risks would be acceptable, then a sitespecific risk assessment would be of no additional value.

Resource and technological limitations could

be addressed in the development of the goals.

For example, the cost and/or availability of

cleanup technology could be the determining

factor in establishing a goal for particular

chemicals. Such a standard might not achieve

an acceptable level of risk. On the other hand,

goals established solely on the basis of inherent

hazard may be only theoretical benchmarks if

the resources and technologies are not available to attain them.

Establishing national goals is certainly consistent with the direction that EPA is moving

in the draft revisions to the NCP and would satisfy the need for national consistency. But if

this approach was based on a commitment to

develop standards for all or most chemicals

and conditions, the system would be slow to

initiate and the costs would be substantial, If

the goals are set at levels generally perceived

to protect health and the environment, public

concern would focus almost exclusively on the
116 ● Superfund Strategy

effective implementation of those goals. On the

other hand, if the driving force behind the goals

is perceived to be resource limitations, public

confidence could quickly erode.

Clean to Background or “Pristine” Levels

Description of Approach.—This approach for

establishing the extent of cleanup would require that the cleanup continue until the levels

of all contaminants were indistinguishable

from those of the surrounding background. A

variation of this approach would require that

the cleanup continue until the site were “pristine, ” i.e., as if the pollution had never occurred.

The first issue that would need to be resolved

with this approach is how to determine background or pristine levels. Historical background levels are not usually available for most

sites, for a diversity of chemicals and media.

Frequently, background is determined by sampling nearby locations and can include pollution from other sources. In most cases, pristine would be a cleaner level than background,

especially if the site is in an industrial area.

Analysis of Approach.—Cleaning to background

or pristine levels does not explicitly consider

the inherent hazard of the chemical wastes on

site. Only the environmental context of the site

is considered in determining the levels of cleanup. This approach includes an implicit risk

assessment, i.e., it assumes that any level above

background or pristine is an unacceptable risk

and levels at or below background or pristine

are acceptable. These assumptions may not be

true. For example, certain industrial contaminants do not exist naturally in the environment

and the pristine levels for these chemicals

would be zero, Putting aside the financial or

technical capability of reaching a zero level of

residual contamination, it is hard to imagine

that such a result would be necessary from a

public health or environmental perspective.

Further, “background” levels might not necessarily provide the desired level of protection,

especially in heavily industrialized areas with

multiple sources of industrial contamination.

This approach to establishing a cleanup goal

is not particularly sensitive to resource limitations or available technologies. In general, this

approach would be expensive and difficult to

implement.

Because this would likely be the most expensive approach, its successful implementation

would be significantly constrained by the fund

balancing provision of Superfund. Public acceptance of this approach could be expected

to be mixed. There would be inconsistencies

among cleanup of sites with similar wastes depending on where they are located. Moreover,

because this is a costly approach, fewer sites

could be expected to be cleaned up at any one

time.

Technology-Based Standard: Best Available

Technology or Best Engineering Judgment

Description of Approach.—This approach would

involve examining all available remedial technologies that address the chemical contamination at a Superfund site, A remedial action plan

would be developed that used the best available technology to minimize exposure to the

waste chemicals at the site.

Analysis of Approach.—A detailed analysis of the

inherent hazard of the chemical wastes found

at a site would not be an integral part of this

approach, However, it might be important to

at least identify the wastes of major health and

environmental concern at a site as a guide to

the designers of remedial action. Site-specific

factors would be critical. Knowledge of the

quantity and identity of wastes present; of the

geology and geography of the area; of the identification of potentially affected natural resources and local populations; and of the routes

and levels of exposures would be essential to

reach a best engineering judgment as to what

remedial measures to take,

A risk assessment would not need to be performed. Implicit in this approach would be the

assumption that, by using the best available

technology, the risks from the site would be reduced to the lowest level that is technically fea-
Ch. 4—Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals ● 117

sible. (It may be suggested that technical feasibility is a practical limitation of any approach

to establishing cleanup goals for remedial action, However, delaying cleanup or taking

other risk management actions can be considered also.)

A technology-driven approach would be sensitive to the strength and weaknesses of currently available remedial procedures, The less

confidence there is in existing technologies, the

less satisfactory is this alternative, Since risk

assessment is not an integral part of this approach, concerns about the transfer of risks

among populations and the risks associated

with residual pollution from the disposal technology would not be central to the decisionmaking process.

Unless limits were imposed on cleanup costs,

this approach could be perceived as providing

a blank check for those in the cleanup business.

The designers of the remedial action program

should employ a cost-effective use of resources.

But can this be done without pre-established

cleanup goals? Without some assessment of the

risks, significant resources could be spent on

a site that posed little or no risk. Unproven

technologies might be used with little protection obtained, The incremental public health

or environmental protection provided by a

technology that is substantially more expensive

than the second choice might be insignificant,

but this could not be evaluated without a risk

assessment. How would one know exactly what

constituted a complete cleanup, or when to

cease operations such as groundwater treatment? Moreover, advances in technology could

raise the possibility of subsequent expensive

retrofits to achieve higher levels of protection.

This approach would make it difficult to

make informed decisions under the fund-balancing provision of CERCLA. Public reaction

is likely to be mixed. A policy that Superfund

sites will be cleaned up using the best available

technology is initially appealing and appears

to offer the best that can be provided. Realistically, limited resources are available to devote

to cleaning up uncontrolled hazardous waste

sites. This approach might create enormous

pressure to be among the first sites where resources are spent, without attention to the

uncertainties of cleanup effectiveness and the

benefits of waiting for different technology or

specific goals more related to exposures. Compromises would need to be made that would

likely result in inconsistent cleanups.

Cost-Benefit Approach

Description of Approach.—A quantitative cost-benefit approach to establishing cleanup goals

would require that the costs of any initial or

incremental remedial measures be compared

with the benefits (reduction of potential

adverse effects to health and the environment)

to be derived from such expenditures. Only if

the (total or incremental) benefits are greater

than the (total or incremental) costs would the

expenditures be made. All this assumes that the

benefits are measurable and the unit of measurement is comparable to costs. Benefits and

cleanup goals are variables weighed against

available funds. A less formal cost-benefit analysis based on articulation rather than quantification also could be used,

Analysis of Approach .—This approach requires an

understanding of the benefits to be derived

from remedial measures at a site, i.e., the reduction in risk to public health or the environment that those measures are likely to produce,

To determine this, an analysis of the inherent

hazard of the chemical wastes on site, a consideration of site-specific factors, and a risk

assessment would be required. All of the uncertainties about the hazards of the materials of

concern, the site-specific conditions, and the

process of risk assessment would need to be

recognized in a quantitative approach, especially when uncertain additional health or environmental protection would be compared with

certain expenditure of resources. The more uncertain the benefits, the more dubious the results of the analysis. An assessment of risk and

reduction of risks would need to be determined

on a site-specific basis, This approach would

not use national standards for residual risks,

If there were national goals for residual risk

levels, a cost-benefit analysis would be superfluous.
118 ● Superfund Strategy

Calculating the benefits of a reduced risk is

difficult, In the first place, regulatory decisionmakers are generally unwilling to assign dollar

values to human lives, additional cases of cancer, or even the value of natural resources.

The evaluation of costs would need to be

done carefully. Not only should the initial costs

associated with a remedial measure be included but its impermanence and long-term (often uncertain) costs associated with the monitoring and maintenance of the technology need

to be included in the calculation as well.

This approach would certainly be consistent

with the fund-balancing provisions of CERCLA.

However, public reaction is likely to be mixed,

Attractive in theory, this approach would cause

decisionmakers at individual sites to be tested

publicly, especially when the uncertainties and

value judgments implicit in this approach became apparent. Inconsistent levels of cleanup

among sites could result unless very specific

national procedures and policies were used.

Site Classification: Determining Cleanup Levels

by Present and Future Use of a Site

Description of Approach.—To date, little attention

has been given to what will happen to a site

after it is cleaned. Under this approach, the extent of cleanup would be based on the present

and future use of a site and its surrounding

area, as determined by local government and

communities. How a particular site is classified

as to its present or future use (i. e., restoration,

rehabitation, and reuse) would be the driving

force in the selection of a remedial plan.

Classes could be established early in the program, for example, when a site is placed on the

NPL. For purposes of classification, the site

would include any land or waters already or

likely to be contaminated.

A classification system based on current and

potential use has been recommended as part

of EPA’s groundwater protection strategy.8 In

establishing this strategy, EPA considered its

‘U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, A L’roundwater Protection Strategy for the Environmental Protection Agencj’, August

1984.

inability to protect all groundwater from contamination, its fundamental purpose of protecting human health and the environment, and

the cost and difficulty of monitoring and cleaning groundwater. These same considerations

apply to NPL sites. In EPA’s groundwater protection strategy, three classes of groundwater

are recommended. Class I includes special

groundwater, so designated because it represents irreplaceable sources of drinking water

or ecologically vital areas, e.g., contamination

would destroy a unique habitat. Class II includes current and potential sources of drinking water. Class III includes groundwaters that

are not a potential source of drinking water and

are of limited beneficial use, e.g., with total

dissolved solids over 10,000 mg/l or already so

contaminated that they cannot be cleaned by

methods reasonably employed in public water

treatment.

Analysis of Approach.—Implicit in the development of such a classification system is the policy decision that the extent of and the initiation of cleanup would differ among sites. Consequently, some of the cleanup approaches previously described could be used with such a

system, For example, certain sites might be

classified as so valuable as present or future

resources that the goal would be developed

through use of a site risk assessment. Other

sites might not require any cleanup. Based on

a cost-benefit analysis, the provision of an alternative water supply or the relocation of nearby

residents might comprise the remedial (risk

management) response.

For sites where only minimal remedial measures are taken because of limited future use

(e.g., a site “paved over” and used for an airport runway or a large parking lot), methods

such as deed restrictions must be used to communicate these decisions to future generations

so that these contaminated resources are not

unknowingly used for unforeseen purposes.

The uncertainties in future land use must be

weighed against the costs of more extensive

cleanup. Transfer of liability to future land

users or developers might be effective in enforcing land use restrictions.
Ch. 4—Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals ● 119

The development of a classification system

would be consistent with the fund-balancing

provision of CERCLA. In many ways, it would

be the most nationally cost-effective approach

discussed in this chapter. Public reaction

would be mixed depending on the classification system developed, the proposed response

at individual sites, and the degree of local participation in deciding on land use.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of its analysis OTA finds that:

There is a need to raise the cleanup goals

issue to the highest levels of policymaking

and to have open, public debate on it. The

effectiveness of the Superfund program

and private and State cleanups depend on

an equitable and technically sound resolution of this issue.

What is ultimately important and realistically achievable is consistency in the process of determining what the cleanup of

sites should be, rather than necessarily

making all cleanups the same.

In setting cleanup levels, it is necessary to

examine whether the remedial technologies under consideration can lead to unintended consequences, including transfer of toxicants among media, transfer of

risks among populations, and residual pollution.

It is no longer acceptable to continue

cleanups under the current ad hoc approach. As a large number of sites enter

the program, dealing with each site as a

unique case is inefficient and there is increasing likelihood that sites with similar

problems will not be cleaned to comparable levels of environmental protection,

Pursuing a strategy of establishing cleanup

levels on the basis of background or pristine chemical levels does not make environmental, technical, or economic sense,

This approach does not assure protection

of health and the environment, in many

cases is not possible to achieve, and it

would cost excessive sums.

Although seemingly attractive and extensively used, best available technology or

best engineering judgment do not offer environmental protection comparable to the

likely high costs of implementation. This

approach does not directly address actual

or potential exposures threatening health

and the environment.

● Although the use of existing standards,

risk assessment, and cost-benefit analysis

approaches pose considerable problems

and have substantial limitations, they

could be used.

The most important conclusion is that a

cleanup strategy based on site classification

could be the most beneficial approach to pursue. The present and future use of an uncontrolled site is now sometimes considered prior

to cleanup decisions. What this approach

would do is to explicitly and uniformly incorporate a decision about site use as the key element of a policy framework. To do this, however, means that a decision about land use must

be made. Such a decision would generally need

to be made at the local level. This is crucial to

proceeding with this approach. It is consistent

with the need to have public participation in

cleanup decisionmaking (see chapter 8).

Developing a classification based on site use

also presents an opportunity to have a hierarchy for establishing priorities for site response.

It can provide a policy framework that objectively decides what process is used to set cleanup levels for a site on the basis of the most important site-specific consideration—how the

site is or will be used and, hence, what exposures must be considered to determine health

and environmental effects.

An illustration of how this approach might

be used is given in table 4-I, Under this classification, the most technically sophisticated but
120 ● Superfund Strategy

Table 4-1 .— Illustration of a Site Classification System for Selecting Cleanup Goals

Classes of NPL sites

(established when site

placed on NPL)

1. Known or likely exposures to people

or sensitive ecological elements requiring restoration of site (for possible rehabitation or reuse), including

cleanup of contaminated groundwater if technically feasible,

II.

Ill.

Known or likely exposures exist, but

limited number of people and sensitive environments. Clear alternatives

to site cleanup such as relocation

and use of alternative water supply;

site restoration or reuse not critical,

Site not likely to lead to exposures

to people and not situated near sensitive environment. No site restoration or reuse anticipated,

Cleanup goals For comparison purposes,

for remedial cleanup EPA classes of

set by Likely course of action ground watera

—

Site risk 1. High-priority initial re- 1. Special groundwaters vul -

assessment. sponse to recontrol site nerable to contamination

2.

3.

using HRSb information,

Obtain necessary data and

perform risk assessment.

High-priority full-scale permanent cleanup when

technology available to

meet cleanup goals.

and: a) i replaceable

source of drinking water

to substantial populations, or b) ecologically

vital,

Cost-benefit 1.

analysis. 2.

Applicable and rele- 1.

vant environmental

standards, 2.

Initial response. Il.

After cost-benefit analysis

choose risk management

opt ion.

Current and potential

sources of drinking water

or have other uses.

Low-priority initial Ill. Not potential source of -

response. drinking water and of

Reevaluation every 5 limited use,

years to assess need for

remedial cleanup.

au s Environmental protection Agency, Grourrd-Wafer Protect/on Strategy, August 1984 k‘Assume an Improved Hazard Ranking System

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, except as noted

expensive process of risk assessment is used

for the highest priority sites. These sites unequivocally require a remedial cleanup, the extent of which depends on the exact nature of

the site’s use. The next category of sites are

those where site use suggests risk management

options that would allow delay of a remedial

cleanup, or a less complete cleanup, or conceivably no cleanup. For example, the risk

management options could be relocation of residents, supplying alternate water, and creating

an area where all use is prohibited. For this category, therefore, it is reasonable to use a costbenefit process to establish cleanup levels in

a context that allows comparison to non-cleanup alternatives.

Lastly, the third category of sites are those

where exposures and damages are minimal.

For this category, existing standards might be

used to set cleanup levels; indeed, it might be

unlawful or unacceptable to do otherwise.

However, cleanup may not be necessary or it

may be delayed. Also shown in the table, for

comparison, are the analogous categories

established by EPA in its groundwater protection strategy, However, it must be emphasized

that cleanups of uncontrolled sites often involve much more than dealing with contaminated groundwater.

The table also shows site management decisions other than cleanup that could be associated with the site categories. For example, decisions concerning initial responses and timing

of cleanups could be consistent with the hierarchy based on site use,

This discussion pertains to remedial cleanups that are expected to be effective in the long

term, There is also a parallel question concerning actions known in the current program as

immediate removals (comparable to initial responses in OTA’s suggested two-part strategy).

These actions are acknowledged to be temporary. Such actions must proceed quickly on the
Ch. 4—Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals ● 121

basis of limited information. Hence, a practical

approach might be to establish generic standards to direct actions based on: 1) reducing the

immediate threats to health and the environment by blocking or preventing releases of hazardous substances into the environment; and

2) assuring that the site, exposed to known environmental conditions, would not deteriorate

further over a substantial period of time, perhaps some years before it could receive remedial cleanup. Such standards would not imply

that the site is cleaned, but rather that it is isolated, stabilized, and decontrolled. A generic

standard could also require continued monitoring and/or inspection consistent with the

nature of the site and the likely exposures.

3 8

-

745 0 - 85 - 5
Chapter 5

Sites Requiring Cleanup

Contents

Page

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● . . . . . . . 125

Introduction 125

Solid Waste Facilities 126

Current Recognition and Evidence of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Estimate of Possible Future Contribution to the NPL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Hazardous Waste Facilities 137

EPA’s Dependence occurrent Groundwater Protection Standards. . . . . .. 138

RCRA and Land Disposal . . . . . . 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... ... ... ... ... .. . . . . . 138

Interim Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. ... ... .. 139

Limitations on Coverage .. .. .. . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Groundwater Monitoring Wells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Contaminant Tolerance Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Monitoring in the Vadose Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Delays in Starting Corrective Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

The Site Selection Process 159

Setting priorities for Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Site Scoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Variability Among EPA Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 162

Estimate of Future NPL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 164

Summary Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● ....,.. . . . . . . . . . 167
.——

List of Tables

Table No. Page

5-1. Known Problem Subtitle D Sites by EPA Region and State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

5-2. Mismanagement Events at Problem Subtitle D Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

5-3. Affected Media at Problem Subtitle D Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

5-4. Affected Receptors at Problem Subtitle D Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

5-5. RCRA Subtitled Facilities by State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

5-6. Types of Surface Impoundments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

5-7. purpose of Impoundments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

5-8. Estimates of Sites With Potentially Significant Releases into the Environment 137

5-9. EPA Detection Limits for Some Carcinogens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

5-10. Data on RCRA Pollutants With Primary Drinking Water Standards. . . . . . . . . 147

5-11. Some Pollutants Regulated Under CERCLA But Not Under RCRA . . . . . . . . . 148

5-12. Some Examples of Groundwater Detection Levels of Hazardous Chemicals

Which Are Higher Under RCRA Than Under CERCLA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

5-13. Some Carcinogenic Chemicals for Which EPA Has Not Yet Determined the Levels

at Which They Can Be Detected in Groundwater by the Methods of Reference 149

5-14. Scenario for Instituting Corrective Action at a RCRA Permitted Site

in Detection Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

5-15. Removal of Selected Specific Organics From Groundwater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

5-16. Site Selection Variability Among EPA Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

5-17. Summary Statistics on Hazard Ranking Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

5-18. Analysis of NPL Sites With Air Route HRS Scores. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

5-19. ERRIS/NPL v. State Officials Views on Site Cleanup Requirements ..... 165

5-20. Range of Estimates for Future Size of the NPL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . 167

List of Figures

Figure No. Page

5-1. Summary Site Scoring Flowchart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

5-2. Region 5 Prioritization Criteria.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......,,..,..,., 161
Chapter 5

Sites Requiring Cleanup

SUMMARY

OTA’s assessment of major sources of waste

sites and improvements in site selection methods indicates that 10,000 sites might eventually

be included on the National Priorities List

(NPL), and that even this figure might rise substantially. Sites that now get placed on the NPL

do merit cleanup, but many other sites also require cleanup.

At least 5,000 of the 621,000 operating and

closed solid waste facilities in this country,

such as sanitary and municipal landfills, may

require cleanup. About 20 percent of the current NPL sites were such facilities. More than

1,000 operating hazardous waste land-based facilities may require cleanup under Superfund

because of the limitations of the Environmental

Protection Agency’s (EPA) groundwater protection standards.

An improved site selection process could

place some 2,000 more sites on the NPL. Improvements would include attending to environmental threats as well as threats to human

health, removing the cutoff score which has no

technical basis or merit, and providing national guidance for preliminary assessments and

site investigation.

EPA’s estimate that about 2,000 sites will

eventually be placed on the NPL is likely to significantly underestimate the future needs of

Superfund. This chapter will discuss the basis

for OTA’s higher estimates.

INTRODUCTION

A major uncertainty in the Superfund program is the question of how many-uncontrolled

waste sites may require cleanup. OTA has examined three areas in order to assess future

needs; they are: 1) solid but not hazardous

waste facilities governed by Subtitle D of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),

2) hazardous waste facilities regulated under

Subtitle C of RCRA, and 3) sites in EPA’s inventory of uncontrolled sites that under current procedures are not likely to be placed on

the NPL but that may warrant cleanup.

To determine whether or not a site merits

cleanup under Superfund requires considerable information about the hazards it presents.

OTA’s analysis estimates in a statistical or

probabilistic sense the number of sites not adequately accounted for in EPA’s projections of

future national needs.

From a policy and planning perspective such

an attempt cannot be anything other than semiquantitative. The key point, however, is whether EPA’s projection of an NPL of about 2,000

sites might be off by as much as 100 percent

or more. Each of the three areas listed above

will be examined in detail,

The reader is cautioned, however, about several limitations of these analyses. For example,

OTA has not considered nonwaste sites that

also qualify for inclusion on the NPL, such as

leaking underground storage tanks and areas

contaminated by pesticides. Evidence of a

threat from such nonwaste sites is likely to increase. Nor has OTA considered sites associated with mining wastes. It may also be argued

that OTA’s estimates represent a worse-case

scenario because companies and States may

clean-up sites on their own without the use of

125
126 ● Superfund Strategy

Superfund. But a low estimate may result from

the exclusion of some sites from the analysis.

As discussed in chapter 3, underestimating

the future size of the NPL could lead to cleanup

strategies and allocation of resources that eventually incur higher costs and environmental

risks than necessary.

Consider this scenario: a large number of

sites go unattended or receive highly impermanent cleanups. These sites get worse over time

and lead to large amounts of environmental

contamination, particularly of drinking water.

At some time, after Superfund resources have

been depleted, the costs to cleanup the sites become staggering, perhaps impossible, if permanently effective cleanup technologies or adequate numbers of technical personnel are not

available. Overestimating future needs appears

to be far less likely, and it presents fewer problems because Congress could adjust the program to account for smaller expenditures.

SOLID WASTE FACILITIES

Our society produces exceptionally large

amounts of solid waste from households, commercial establishments, industrial facilities,

and virtually every other place where materials

are consumed, processed, or examined. The

traditional, convenient, and cheap way of disposing of these vast quantities of waste has

been to place them in landfills if they were

mostly solid or in surface impoundments if

they were mostly liquid. Solid waste disposal

has been managed both by local governments

and private industry. Only recently has it become clear that the land disposal of solid

wastes might pose threats to public health and

the environment similar to those stemming

from the disposal of what are now called hazardous wastes.

There are three reasons why solid waste facilities may become uncontrolled sites that can

release hazardous substances into the environment and, therefore, be eligible for the NPL.

First, prior to the creation and implementation

of the Federal RCRA Subtitle C program, hazardous wastes were generally disposed of along

with ordinary solid wastes. Prior to the 1970s

few people recognized the dangers of hazardous wastes and the toxic chemicals in them.

Thus, hazardous waste produced over many

decades simply were placed in land disposal

sites, many of which have since been closed.

This became particularly significant after

World War II, with the widespread production,

use, and disposal of synthetic organic chemicals, many of which are toxic and very stable.

These closed facilities present unique problems

because by now their locations may not be

known and there are few, if any, records of

what was placed in them. Now they are part

of the landscape on which new, often suburban, housing and other buildings have been

placed. The technology used to build those facilities and contain the waste was far less sophisticated and safe than today’s still-limited

containment technologies. Furthermore, because there was little consideration of environmental threats, they were more likely to be

placed near sensitive areas such as aquifers

that supply drinking water.

Second, even after the regulation of hazardous waste on a broad national level various statutory and regulatory exemptions and exclusions continue to make it possible for some

hazardous waste to be disposed of legally in

solid waste facilities. A forthcoming report by

the Congressional Budget Office estimates that

in 1983 over 26 million tons of hazardous

wastes were disposed of in sanitary landfills

nationwide. It is important to note that relatively small amounts of hazardous waste from

individual sources, including households and

small businesses, can add up to substantial

amounts in a particular solid waste facility. The

fact that solid waste facilities may be very large,

often hundreds of acres, and that the hazard-
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 127

ous waste may be only a small fraction of, and

widely dispersed within, the total waste does

not preclude major environmental problems.

To the contrary, although it might take longer,

often decades, for hazardous substances in

these sites to reach the environment, eventually

large amounts of a broad variety of substances

may be released, Moreover, cleaning up such

large operations or closed sites presents major engineering problems and is very costly.

Third, even with a well-enforced regulatory

program for hazardous wastes on both the Federal and State levels, which is not yet the case,

there will be illegal disposal of hazardous waste

in solid waste facilities. It is virtually impossible to examine and monitor all incoming waste

to detect the broad range of hazardous substances that might be present, perhaps in small

amounts and in containers. In many cases it

is also possible for midnight dumpers to gain

access to a solid waste facility and bypass normal inspections of incoming materials.

Current Recognition and Evidence

of the Problem

There are several reasons that explain why

the solid waste facility problem for Superfund

has received little detailed attention. State and

local officials, closest to the problem, comment

to OTA that they are aware of the likelihood

of release of hazardous substances from solid

waste facilities. Because of limited resources,

including a nearly total ending of Federal support for solid waste programs, they have tended

to focus on hazardous waste facilities and there

has been little testing and monitoring of solid

waste sites, Where testing has been done, the

broad range of hazardous substances of concern to Superfund may not be tested for. Moreover, although some monitoring results have

indicated a significant problem of leachate

leaving the site, such results generally are not

made public. There is considerable concern

that once there is public documentation connecting toxic waste problems with solid waste

facilities there will be public pressures against

their operation and the siting of new facilities.

How would the vast amounts of solid waste be

managed?

Nor is it likely that States could finance

cleanups of large numbers of leaking solid

waste facilities, either by themselves or even

under the current Superfund program. Superfund requires a contribution from the States for

cleanups, and for publicly owned and operated

facilities that contribution is 50 percent.

At the Federal level, little attention and funding has been given solid waste programs. EPA

has only recently recognized that solid waste

facilities might be a major source of sites for

Superfund. In a congressionally mandated

study to evaluate the first period of the Superfund program, EPA states:

Municipal landfills, both large and small,

can cause potentially serious problems, Some

facilities have already been closed down,

some are still operating. Although such facilities can no longer accept hazardous wastes,

many especially in large urban areas and in

heavily industrialized areas did in the past accept industrial waste which could include

hazardous waste. In addition, people may

continue to dump small quantities of paints,

solvents, pesticides and other household

chemicals which are hazardous. In big landfills, these can potentially add up to big problems. In small towns and rural areas, while

the problem may be small, it can be significant to the surrounding community. 1

Similarly, municipal and private landfills are

widely used for sludges from wastewater treatment, generally in very large quantities, The

National Research Council recently concluded:

Landfills have been increasingly used to isolate wastewater sludges containing trace contaminants at levels high enough to be of regulatory concern. The assumption has been that

remobilization of such contaminants is minimized by using landfills and that release of

contaminants to the environment is unlikely.

The panel believes that the data supporting

such a conclusion are scant and that remobilization of contaminants i n surface and

ground waters as well as to the atmosphere is

possible.’

1 LJ. S. En\’ i ron mental Protection Agency, 4‘Supporti ng Ana 1}=

SIS for (; ERCI .A Section 301(a)(1)(c) Study, ” draft, ]u]y 1984, p. 5.

~National Research Council, Disposal of lndustria] and Domes-

(I[; 11’a.stcs (tl’ashin~tf]n, 11(;: National Academ} Press, 1984),

[). 166.
128 . Superfund Strategy

—

The above statements, however, consider

only one part of the solid waste facility universe, municipal landfills. The following statement contained in EPA’s Ground-Water Protection Strategy provides a more comprehensive

view of the problem, although only with respect to groundwater contamination rather

than the full range of environmental problems

that solid waste facilities pose:

In addition to facilities receiving hazardous

wastes, other facilities that may contaminate

ground water are of concern. In the mid

1970s, EPA and the States became increasingly concerned that all waste disposal landfills (not just those receiving hazardous wastes

under RCRA) may be creating a substantial

problem for ground water. There are an estimated 93,000 such landfills in the United

States. Of these, 75,000 are classified as onsite/industrial, and we know little about them.

Another 18,500 are classified as municipal.

Fewer than 10 States require any form of regular monitoring for ground-water quality at

these facilities. Landfills are invariably located

on land that is , . . susceptible to ground-water

contamination problems.

A similar situation obtains at pits, ponds,

and lagoons—usually grouped and referred to

as surface impoundments—that receive both

hazardous and non-hazardous wastes. EPA’s

recently completed Surface Impoundment Assessment (S IA) surveyed the numbers and locations of surface impoundments, and estimated their potential effects on ground-water

quality ., . The SIA identified a total of 181,000

surface impoundments. Most of them are

unlined, About 40 percent of municipal and

industrial impoundments are located in areas

of thin or permeable soils, over aquifers currently used for drinking or that could be used

for drinking. About seven percent of all sites

appear to be located so as to pose little or no

threat to ground water. Because of the lack of

generally available knowledge, ground-water

protection was rarely, if ever, considered

when these facilities were sited . . . facilities

handling non-hazardous wastes and hazardous wastes produced by small generators are

covered by RCRA Subtitle D criteria (enforceable under citizen suits), but they are not regulated under the Federally enforceable provisions of RCRA. These facilities may be significant sources of ground-water contamination.3

Within the context of Superfund, EPA has

acknowledged, but only to a limited degree, the

contribution to the future size of the NPL by

solid waste facilities. These sites, along with

several other types of sites “not currently included in the determination of NPL sites, ”

caused EPA to conclude that as many as 8 0 0

more NPL sites might result.4 This brought the

total projected NPL to a maximum of 2,200

sites, but EPA has generally used a figure of

2,000 sites.

Congress recently has acknowledged the significance of the solid waste facility problem for

Superfund. However, improvements in regulations and their enforcement would not occur

for several years and might significantly affect

only new facilities. The Conference Report on

the recent reauthorization of RCRA noted:

Subtitle D facilities are the recipients of unknown quantities of hazardous waste and

other dangerous materials resulting from the

disposal of household waste, small quantity

generator wastes, and illegal dumping. Since

construction, siting, and monitoring standards for these facilities are either nonexistent

or far less restrictive than those governing

hazardous waste disposal facilities, environmental and health problems caused by Subtitle D facilities are becoming increasingly serious and widespread. A high proportion of

sites listed on the National Priority List were

sanitary landfills. Without the additional environmental protection that the implementation

of this provision will provide, even more Subtitle D facilities are destined to become Superfund sites.’

Solid waste facilities continue to attract attention at the State and local levels across the

Nation. For example, a New York State legis3U .S. Environmental Protection Agency, A L’round- Wa ter Protection Strategy for the Environmental Protection Agenc}?, August 1984, pp. 14 and 38.

4Alvin R. Morris, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

memorandum to Alvin L. Alm and Lee M. Thomas on the results of a Superfund Task Force assessment, Dec. 8, 1983, p, 5.

5U. S. Congress, Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of

1984, Conference Report 98-1133.
later brought to pub lic attention that a high

fraction of solid waste landfills could be contaminating groundwater:

In late 1983, at least 50 of the state’s 538

legal landfills were known to be polluting

ground water. Officials at the state’s Department of Environmental Conservation estimate

that the number could be zoo or more.6

Similarly, an official in the Puerto Rican legislature indicated the severe nature of the problem there:

The major problem is underground water

contamination caused by inadequate disposal

of hazardous wastes. For more than 10 years,

these industries have been disposing of waste

in sanitary landfills in a region where the

underground is basically permeable to liquids.7

For a closed landfill in Southwest Philadelphia for which Superfund cleanup had not yet

been obtained the following was reported:

The state Health Data Center recently released a study that showed the cancer mortality rate in Sharon Hill, Darby Township,

and Darby Borough—which are adjacent to

the landfill—is 22 percent higher than in the

state and the nation. . , . The landfill was

ordered closed in 1972 by a court order, but

documents and photographs . . . show that the

landfill is still operating. . . . EPA officials

confirmed the findings of a study that showed

a number of carcinogens and other toxic substances were leaking from the landfill into

Darby Creek. Although EPA officials said

toxic wastes were only found in small quantities, they said it posed a hazard to children

who may swim or fish in the creek.8

In Maryland an aluminum smelting plant’s

waste has been interpreted to be an exempted

mining waste, but controversy has continued:

Residents have complained, without much

success, about the threat of wastes produced

by the plant, particularly contamination of

well water with the cyanide they say is leaching out of disposed materials. . . . In 1981,

after receiving no public comment to the con-

———.— 

‘J(J h n ], h! a rch i, ‘f’hf) AJc~i’ } “ork TIn J(~s, ju ne I (], 1984, ( )p-ed

pagf:.

7’I’hc ,\I~~I\ }’ork Y’Imes, F-et). ZI, I {)(M,

“1’hr Philaflel{)hja Trihune, June 5, 1984.

trary, EPA pulled pot liners off its list [of hazardous wastes], pending completion of the

study. . . . As a result of that action [the company] terminated an agreement to recycle the

pot liners . . . and instead decided to bury

them on its 2,000-acre plant site here. The

company received a landfill permit from the

state last year, but a consultant report released in April found cyanide in groundwater

at the plant site. g

In a more systematic way, a study performed

for OTA analyzed three data bases on sites

already known to be or likely to become uncontrolled sites eligible for Superfund cleanup.

The three data bases, which contained sufficient detail to make a judgment as to whether

a site could be characterized as a RCRA Subtitle D facility, were: 1) a computerized data

base maintained for EPA on about 1,000 mismanaged waste facilities, 2) 550 NPL site

descriptions, and 3) a survey of 365 sites where

remedial actions have been performed,

Out of 1,389 sites, 245, or nearly 18 percent,

were Subtitle D facilities. For the 550 sites proposed or included on the NPL, 108 sites, or

nearly 20 percent, were classified as Subtitle

D facilities. Examination by OTA of recent proposed additions to the NPL and other data indicate that these percentages are low. The distribution for the 245 solid waste facilities

according to EPA Region and State is given in

table 5-1,

The greatest number of problem solid waste

sites were in EPA Region II, which contained

33 percent of the sites. Regions III, IV, and V

also had relatively large numbers of sites. Together these correspond to the Eastern (Atlantic coastal area) and Midwestern portions of

the Nation. New York had the greatest fraction

with 17.5 percent, followed by New Jersey with

15 percent, Pennsylvania with 7.5 percent, and

Tennessee with 5 percent, with these four

States containing 45 percent of the sites identified, These statistics should not be interpreted

to mean that other regions and States do not

have current or potential problems with solid

waste facilities; but the older, more densely

—

‘J’l’llP 11’iishjngton [)o,st, Noi, 22, 1984,
130 . Superfund Strategy

Table 5.1 .—Known Problem Subtitle D Sites

by EPA Region and State

Table 5-2.—Mismanagement Events at Problem

Subtitle D Sitesa

Location Number Location Number

Region 1:

Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Massachusetts. . . . . . . . 3

New Hampshire . . . . . . . . 5

Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . 3

Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

19

Region II:

New Jersey. . . . . .......36

New York . . . . . . .......43

Puerto Rico . . . . . . . . . . . 2

81

Region Ill:

Delaware. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Pennsylvania . . . .......18

Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . 4

38

Region IV:

Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Florida. . . . . . . . . .......10

Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

North Carolina . . . . . . . . . 1

Tennessee . . . . . .......13

31

Region V:

Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Michigan . . . . . . . .......12

Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..11

Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

38

Region VI:

Arkansas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

9

Region VII:

Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Nebraska. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2

Region VllI:

Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . 1

Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

12

Region IX:

Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

California . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

8

Region IX:

Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Washington . . . . . . . . . . . 5

7

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........245

SOURCE: JRB Associates, “Evaluation of RCRA Subtitle D Facilities,’’ contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, June

1984

populated and more highly industrialized areas

may find more environmental problems with

larger numbers of solid waste facilities.

Table 5-2 presents the waste mismanagement

events identified at the solid waste sites, Mismanagement events are categorized as documerited or suspected based unavailable information. For example, a documented leachate

mismanagement event would be one where

groundwater monitoring data showed downgradient contamination by leachate. For a suspected event there would be some evidence of

leachate movement from the site, such as contamination of surface water, but insufficient

hydrogeologic data to establish a causal connection between the site and groundwater conTotal

Event Documented Suspected frequency

Erosion . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 11 35

Flood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 8

Fire/explosion . . . . . 15 6 21

Gaseous emission . . . 20 15 35

Leak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 23 40

Leachate . . . . . . . . . . . 129 66 195

Spill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9 24

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 14

alndivldual facllltles may be classified (n several categories Therefore. totals

do not add to 245

SOURCE JRB Associates, “Evaluation of RCRA Subtitle D Facllltles, ” contrac.

tor report prepared for the Off Ice of Technology Assessment, June

t984

lamination. Leachate migration was the most

common problem, occurring at 80 percent of

the sites and leading to groundwater contamination; at 65 percent of the sites surface water

was affected (see table 5-3).

Table 5-4 gives the data on affected receptors of hazardous releases. Drinking water was

the most frequently affected receptor at 49 percent, followed by human health at 23 percent.

Table 5-3.—Affected Media at Problem

Subtitle D Sitesa

Exposed media Documented Suspected Total

Air. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 23 50

Groundwater . . . . . . . . 119 77 196

Soil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 71 134

Surface water . . . . . . . 74 85 159

alnd{vldual facilities may be classified in several categories Therefore, totals

do not add to 245

SOURCE JRB Associates, “Evaluation of RCRA Subtitle D Facilltles, ” contrac

tor repori prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, June

1984

Table 5.4.—Affected Receptors at Problem

Subtitle D Sitesa

Total

Affected receptor Documented Suspected frequency

Drinking water . . . . . . 54 67 121

Fauna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 29 37

Flora. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 15 28

Human health . . . . . . . 8 48 56

Property damage . . . . 22 7 29 .

alndlvldual faci I it Ies may be classified In several categories Therefore, totals

do not add to 245.

SOURCE JRB Associates, “Evaluation of RCRA Subtltte D Facltlttes,” contractor report prepared for the Off Ice of Technology Assessment, June

1984
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 131

Various other information was obtained on

the sites. Ownership data showed that nearly

half of the sites were owned and probably operated by municipalities. About 80 percent of the

facilities were landfills, and nearly 20 percent

surface impoundments, Generally the contaminants found at the facilities and their frequency

resemble what has been found at all sites evaluated for the NPL. The most common contaminants, found at at least 30 sites, were lead,

benzene, phenol, toluene, and trichloroethene.

Data on the size of 92 sites were available;

the mean size was 67.4 acres if one 5,000 acre

site is excluded. Hazard Ranking System (HRS)

scores for placement on the NPL were available for 77 of the solid waste facilities. The median score for the solid waste facilities was 40.8

and for the original 406 sites on the NPL it was

42.2. The range for the solid waste sites was

from 19.5 to 75.6. All the information suggests

that solid waste sites on the NPL score similarly to NPL sites that dealt solely with hazardous wastes.

Limited information on Superfund expenditures was found. Average Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study costs for 41 sites averaged $450,000, which is about half of what EPA

now estimates to be average RI/FS costs. Estimated remedial cleanup costs (including RI/FS

costs and excluding operating and maintenance costs) for six sites averaged $3 million,

less than half of the average figure for remedial cleanups now being used by EPA,

Case Studies

As part of the effort to examine the current

problem with solid waste facilities two sets of

detailed case studies were performed. In the

first set, four landfills already on the NPL were

examined; in the second set, four landfills believed to be typical of solid waste facilities, but

which have not been considered for the NPL,

were examined, These eight case studies are

summarized below.

The Combe Fill South Landfill, Chester

Township, New Jersey, received an HRS score

of 45.2. The 60- to 100-acre site was privately

owned and operated before the last owner filed

for bankruptcy in 1982. The original 30-acre

landfill operated from the 1940s and was closed

in 1972; a newer, engineered landfill was approved by the State in 1972 for nonhazardous

waste disposal and it was closed in 1981. The

site is atop a hill in a wooded, rural residential area. Within one-half mile are 90 residential drinking wells; within one-quarter mile are

38 residentially zoned lots; 1 mile away is a

State park; and the immediate area is the headwater for several local streams and a brook that

receive runoff from the site, In 1981, State

agencies sampled surface and groundwater

near the site, found contamination and a threat

to drinking water supplies, Later, air emissions

of volatile organics were found. Even if RCRA

Subtitle C regulations for a hazardous waste

landfill had been applied to this site, they probably would not have been effective. The site

is fundamentally unsuitable for land disposal.

The Laurel Park Landfill, Naugatuck, Connecticut, received an HRS score of 46,8. The

facility is a 35-acre, privately owned and operated sanitary landfill, active since 1951, and is

atop a hill. About one-half mile downhill are

homes; one side of the hill is heavily wooded

and abuts a State forest; the area comprises

part of the headwaters of two watersheds,

Roughly 200 tons per day of municipal and industrial wastes, and septic and sewage sludge

are discharged at the site. Since the early 1960s

the site has been subject to numerous citizen

complaints and regulatory actions. There were

fires, spills on roads, noxious fumes, and findings of contaminated leachate affecting surface

and groundwaters. Various actions have allowed the facility to remain in operation, including: monitoring groundwater, installing

leachate collection and treatment systems, and

supplying potable water to some residents. As

the site is not particularly well suited for land

disposal, even RCRA Subtitle C regulations

would not have been totally effective in combating these problems.

The Marshall Landfill, Boulder, Colorado, received an HRS score of 46.5. Marshall Lake is

about one-quarter mile east and receives runoff from the site; the town of Superior is 2 miles
132 ● Superfund Strategy

west; industrial and cattle grazing areas are

nearby; and Boulder is 3 miles southeast of the

site. Several bodies of water that ultimately receive runoff from the site are used as drinking water supplies. There is an inactive 80-acre

portion and an active 80-acre portion of the

site. The inactive portion was operated under

various owners from 1955 to 1974 and received

municipal solid wastes, septic tank wastes, secondary wastewater treatment sludges, and unknown industrial liquid wastes. The active portion accepts sewage sludge, but suspicions

have arisen concerning the disposal of radioactive waste and polychlorinated biphenyls

(PCBs). There is evidence of contamination of

surface and groundwaters, as well as methane

generation. If the facility had been regulated

under Subtitle C, many of the problems could

have been reduced or prevented.

The Syosset Landfill, Syosset, New York, received an HRS score of 54.3. It is located in

a residential and light industrial area of Long

Island with five public water supply wells within 6,000 feet of the site. The 40-acre landfill was

opened in 1936 by the local municipality and

closed in 1975, because of suspected groundwater contamination. The water table is only

about 30 feet below the bottom of the fill; the

landfill is in a recharge zone (where new water

enters) of a sole source aquifer. In 1968 the

landfill stopped receiving municipal waste. Prior to 1968 and up until 1975 the site received

much industrial waste. A study in 1982-83 revealed evidence of migrating contamination,

but public water supply wells were not yet contaminated. Compliance with Subtitle C regulations would have mitigated, or at least delayed, the environmental impacts of this facility.

Further, the facility probably would not have

been located in a recharge zone of a sole source

aquifer.

The second set of case studies was performed

on four currently operating or recently closed

Subtitle D facilities that are not on the NPL.

(Three of these sites have not been named at

the request of the operators.) Sites selected for

the case studies had to have groundwater monitoring data, which are not generally available

for most solid waste facilities, but not all of the

sites made the data available. Two HRS scores

were calculated for each site.l0 The methodology, however, was altered because rigid adherence to the current procedure would lead t o

zero values when certain data were absent; this

is a major criticism of the current scoring procedure.

Site A is a closed, county-owned municipal

landfill in Maryland that operated from 1962

to 1982. The 161-acre site is hilly and part of

the site was originally a ravine. The site is

bounded by two streams which discharge to

a river that is not a source of drinking water.

Groundwater monitoring data obtained by the

county over an 8-year period indicate that

groundwater leaving the site and discharging

into local streams is contaminated with acidic

leachate from the landfill, Although probable

sources of hazardous substances were being

dumped in the unlined site, there is little information about the specifics of the situation,

At this point, although human health problems

do not appear imminent, environmental damage is likely and there is a potential for future

remedial action at the site. It is important to

note that the site monitoring does not monitor for halogenated organic toxic chemicals nor

for some toxic metals, Lead, however, has been

found downgradient, There are no Federal or

State requirements to perform such monitoring. HRS scores calculated for this site were

3.5 and 4.4; these low scores currently preclude

placement on the NPL and result because the

contaminated water does not affect people

downstream,

Site B is a municipally owned and operated

landfill in Pennsylvania and was officially permitted by the State in 1983. The 175-acre site

is surrounded mostly by cropland. Several

houses within 1 mile downgradient have pril~~”or the fjrst score, the lowest non-zero rating va]ue was used

to score items for which data on waste quantity and toxicity were

missing. For the second score, certain assumptions were made;

for example, it was conservatively assumed that 0.01 percent

of the total amount of waste was hazardous. This approach to

the HRS provides an indication of the ~ossible level of scores.

‘l’his exercise also confirms two other problems with the HRS

procedure, a discounting of sites which affect small populations

or which affect en~’ironmental quality but not human health directly.
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 133

vate wells. There is shallow, diffuse, and slow

groundwater flow at the site, and surface water

discharges into a tributary of a large creek. The

facility receives mostly domestic waste, some

debris from construction demolition, and some

industrial wastes. Before the open dump was

turned into a municipal facility, industrial

wastes were disposed there, including chemical and fertilizer wastes, dyes used for textiles

and printing, sludges from foundries, and shoe

factory wastes, Now, surface runoff and leachate are treated and the discharged water appears to meet its National Pollution Discharge

Elimination System (NPDES) permit requirements, Groundwater monitoring began in 1983

but it does not measure organic pollutants nor

most inorganic chemicals of importance in

Subtitle C facilities, Monitoring, however, has

revealed evidence of contamination, including

some toxic metals, attributed to migrating

leachate from the unlined site. There is a significant potential for future remedial action to

prevent contamination of drinking water supplies downgradient. The HRS scores for this

site were 14.8 and 18.5, which are below the

current NPL cutoff of 28.5 primarily because

the affected population is small.

Site C opened in 1972 and is a municipal}

owned sanitary landfill in Virginia, operated

by a contractor. It is located in a generally rural area, but with some nearby commercial development and light industry, The 57-acre site,

with 20 acres still operating, is in marshy area,

although the site itself is not marshland. With

50 feet of land buffer, there is a wooded rural

residential area to the south and a cattle grazing area to the west. One mile downstream is

a small lake used infrequently for irrigation.

Surface runoff also enters streams used for recreational fishing.

A shallow aquifer near the site is used by residents to the south and east. A higher quality

but deeper aquifer is used by a company to the

north. The facility is unlined and has no leachate collection system, Waste received is primarily residential and commercial refuse, with

some industrial waste, including chemicalresistant fabric, residues from plastic processing, and residues from glues for paper products. Much emphasis has been placed on not

accepting hazardous waste. Groundwater monitoring of the shallow aquifer has occurred for

about 2 years, but not for toxic organic chemicals. There is evidence of groundwater contamination by leachate from the site and, hence,

future remedial action may be required. HRS

scores calculated for this site were 3.5 and 26,

too low for placement on the NPL.

The last site is the Marathon County landfill,

Wisconsin, owned and operated by the county.

The landfill comprises 27.3 acres and could be

expanded greatly. The surrounding area is

mostly woodlands and forest. A small number

of nearby residences are believed to have private wells and there is a dairy nearby, but both

are separated by the 572 acres of the overall

site. The site does not drain into locally used

surface waters. The site is in a recharge zone

for aquifers used for some residences.

A clay liner is used together with leak detection and leachate collection systems; contaminated leachate is treated in a nearby industrial

wastewater treatment plant. Just over half the

wastes accepted originates from industry, including wastewater treatment sludge, fly ash,

alkaline sludge, foundry sand, and papermaking waste, none of which are RCRA hazardous wastes. There is extensive air, surface, and

groundwater monitoring by the county, as well

as various State-imposed financial responsibility requirements. To date, the containment

technology appears to be presenting any migration of leachate offsite. The HRS scores were

zero for this site, and it is unlikely to require

remedial actions because of the care applied

to its location, design, and operation. However,

the groundwater monitoring program does not

measure for a number of toxic chemicals, and

some hazardous substances are probably in the

wastes accepted.

The case studies support the genera] proposition that many, if not most, solid waste facilities have and will continue to pose threats

associated with the release of hazardous substances into the environment. Subtitle D facilities already identified for Superfund attention

resemble hazardous waste sites, Just as impor-
134 ● Superfund Strategy

tant, the solid waste facilities that have been

placed on the NPL are basically similar to typical ones, such as the three out of four in the

second set of case studies that might qualify

someday for the NPL. Moreover, those solid

waste facilities, closed or operating, that have

not been judged appropriate for the NPL have

not been monitored closely for the range of hazardous substances that might qualify them for

the NPL, even though considerable evidence

often exists for migration of leachate off site.

This suggests that the 20 percent of the NPL

now accounted for by solid waste facilities

could rise substantially. The concerns of citizens, the media, some State and local officials,

and the EPA about the Subtitle D facility problem for Superfund appears well founded.

Estimate of Possible Future

Contribution to the NPL

It appears very likely that many solid waste

facilities will become uncontrolled sites requiring cleanup under Superfund. The next question, then, is how will this affect the size of the

NPL? OTA first examined the total number of

Subtitle D facilities and then estimated what

fraction of this total might someday be placed

on the NPL.

Data on Operating and Closed Facilities

There is considerable uncertainty about how

many Subtitle D facilities there are in the Nation, The uncertainty is greater for closed, older facilities than for operating ones. Table 5-5

presents survey data by EPA Region and State

on operating landfills for the years 1981-83, The

table also gives the number of open dumps

identified by States in their 1983 inventory and

projected numbers of dumps that will be upgraded to landfill status (sites not upgraded are

usually closed). The numbers of open dumps

reported may be low because additional dumps

probably exist and remain uninventoried. The

data also presents problems because there are

varying definitions of landfills. Some States

may include industrial landfills, perhaps only

offsite ones, while most include only municipal landfills. Definitions may also change from

year to year, explaining, for example, the large

increase in Texas from 1981 to 1982; 793 sites

surely were not built in 1 year in Texas. Considering the transformation from open dumps

to landfills and what appears to be a rate of approximately 500 new landfills being permitted

annually, the number of operating and presumably chiefly municipal or sanitary landfills in

1984 was probably about 14,000, up from 13,000

in 1983.

The same survey indicates that in 1983 the

estimated number of landfills with groundwater, gas, and/or leachate monitoring wells was

1,609, although 14 States did not report this information. An estimated 37 facilities had artificial liners in 1983, with 12 States not reporting this information. In 1983, 30 percent of the

facilities were publicly owned, 65 percent privatel y owned, and 5 percent had some combination of ownership.

There must, in addition, be many closed municipal and sanitary landfills, To estimate their

number, OTA obtained data from several States

on operating and closed landfills. For six States

there was a minimum of 2,784 closed facilities

and a total of 895 operating ones. This ratio of

about 3:1, applied nationally, yields an estimate

of 42,000 closed municipal and sanitary landfills in 1984,

EPA estimates that approximately 75,000 onsite, nonhazardous waste industrial landfills

operate nationally, Although this figure has

been used in 1984, it is based on an estimate

made in 1978 and the advent of the RCRA and

Superfund programs may have reduced it significantly. There are no estimates for the number of closed, onsite industrial landfills, but an

estimate of twice the above number—l50,000—

may be reasonable,

Surface impoundments falling under the Subtitle D classification include wastewater treatment lagoons, potable water treatment lagoons,

pits, ponds, basins, mining waste disposal facilities, evaporation ponds, agricultural waste

disposal facilities, and others. Often a site may

consist of several impoundments, EPA’s Surface Impoundment Assessment for 1978-80

gives the best available data. Table 5-6 summa-
State

Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 135

Table 5-5.– RCRA Subtitle D Facilities by State

Number of all landfills

Region 1:

Connecticut . . . . . . . . ... . . . . .

Maine ., ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Massachusetts . . ... ., . . .

New Hampshire . . . . . . . ...

Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vermont . ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Region 2:

New Jersey ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Puerto RICO ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Region 3:

Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

District of Columbia ... . ,

Maryland : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Virginia ... ., . . . ... . . .

West Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Region 4:

Alabama . ... , . . . ., . . . . .

Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

North Carolina ., . . . . . . . . . . . . .

South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tennessee ., ., . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1981

170

336

286

450

35

73

240

641

68

NA

2

NA

1,400

NA

228

146

209

517

210

286

170

128

134

Region 5:

Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470

Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 680

Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,050

Region 6:

Arkansas ., ., . . ..., ..., 490

Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA

New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

Oklahoma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

Region 7:

Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA

Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . 243

Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Nebraska . . ., ..., . . . . . . . . . 277

Region 8:

Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Montana. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Utah . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300

Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA

Region 9:

Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

California . . . . . . . . . . . . 450

Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Nevada . . . . . 114

1982

155

328

273

250

22

85

185

525

NA

4

3

64

847

250

127

135

214

299

112

120

225

78

160

450

129

NA

105

235

1,100

141

532

231

225

1,043

95

220

108

500

206

250

97

NA

290

86

122

443

NA

120

1983b

151

308

283

101

18

92

185

525

NA

35

NA

47

925

209

127

135

248

284

128

253

167

225

161

329

348

362

185

318

1,085

311

532

228

225

1,075

94

224

128

400

206

222

130

200

296

210

116

542

25

99

Number of open dumpsab Open dumps to upgradea

36 24

45 NA

81 NA

26 0

4 1

4 0

5 1

56 38

NA NA

4

4

NA NA

o 0

94 75

50 34

41 36

12

55

6

34

133

1

0

6

11

17

4

NA

10

0

0

2

42 0

191 2

150 0

60 0

54 NA

66 10

78 NA

532 95

0 0

66 60

11 8

0 0

1 0

2 1

2 0

32

16

0

140

26

0

28

40

9

52

26

13

0

5

8

0

27

31

4

10
136 ● Superfund Strategy

Table 5-5.—RCRA Subtitle D Facilities by State—Continued

Number of all landfills

State 1981 1982 1983b Number of open dumpsab Open dumps to upgradea

Region 10:

Alaska. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 NA NA NA NA

Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 130 132 42 20

Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 249 226 28 3

Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NA 136 136 36 18

Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 NA NA NA NA

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,606 11,704 12,991 2,396 598 —— — aData for 1983 bTh~r~ ~aY be some Overlap between these colurnfl efltrles

SOURCE Nancy Peterson, 1983 Survey of Land fills,’ Waste Age, VOI 14, No 3, March 1983 “Land Disposal Survey, ” Waste Age, VOI 12, No 1, January 1981

Table 5-6.—Types of Surface Impoundments

Active sitesa Active impoundments Abandoned sites Abandoned impoundments

Agricultural. .. . . . . . . 14,677 19,167 173 270

Municipal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,116 36,179 630 1,006

Industrial . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,819 25,749 941 2,163

Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,100 24,451 264 587

Oil and gas. . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,527 64,951 463 537

Other ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,500 5,745 53 168

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77,739 176,242 2,524-

4,731

Total active and abandoned sites: 80,263

Total active and abandoned impoundments: 180,973 — —

‘A s,t~ maY~ave more than one (impoundment

SOURCE U S Environmental Protection Agency, Surface /rnpoundmerit Assessment Nat/ona/ Repor?, EPA 570/9-84.002, December 1983

rizes the results of this survey, which found a

total of 176,242 active facilities and a minimum

of 4,731 closed ones. The latter is a minimum

because the survey did not attempt to count

closed impoundments and a more realistic figure might be as high as the number of active

impoundments.

Table 5-7 gives the data broken down according to purpose of the impoundment. An unknown fraction of the 96,443 storage and treatment facilities may pose environmental

problems similar to disposal impoundments

and thus may affect future Superfund needs.

For example, both during storage, which may

be for long periods, and treatment, which may

only constitute settling or evaporation, hazardous substances may migrate into the land and

water. Evaporation of volatile organic toxic

chemicals also presents problems. Only 29,250

of all impoundments had any sort of liner, artificial or natural. Based on limited data, only

1,359 impoundments had any type of monitoring. EPA found that about one-quarter of impoundments potentially would affect groundwater supplies.

Table 5-7.—Purpose of Impoundments (by percenta and number)

Storage Disposal Treatment

Category Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number

Agricultural . . . . . . . . . 55 10,542

Municipal . . . . . . . . . 5 1,809

Industrial ... . . . . . . . . . 17 4,377

Mining . . . . ... . 18 4,401

Oil and gas . . . . . . . . . . 29 18,836

Total ... . . . . . . . . . . 39,965

apercent storage disposal and treatment per cate90rY

26 4,983

31 11,215

31 7,982

27 6,602

67 43,517

74,299

19 3,642

64 23,155

52 13,390

56 13,693

4 2,598

56,478

SOURCE U S Environmental Protect Ion Agency Surface /rnpourrdrnent Assessment Nat/ona/ Report EPA 570/9 84002, De

cember 1983
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 137

The above data suggest a total of as many as

281,000 landfills, and 340,000 surface impoundments, including both open and closed

facilities. These figures are only approximate

but are based on the best available, albeit limited and imprecise, data,

Estimates of Future Superfund Needs

The key question is what fraction of the above

total of 621,000 Subtitle D facilities might require cleanup under Superfund? There is, of

course, no precise means of answering this

question. One approach is to consider several

possible percentages that appear conservative

and reasonable, based on the information from

case studies, the lack of current monitoring for

hazardous substances, and on the very small

numbers of facilities with 1iners and monitoring wells. Information presented earlier on

Subtitle D facilities on the current NPL suggest

that landfills may pose more serious problems

than surface impoundments. This is consistent with the fact that many impoundments may

be used for dilute aqueous wastes that pose less

serious problems than do the more concentrated hazardous materials often placed in

landfills.

Table 5-8 presents two scenarios for sites that

might release significant amounts of hazardous substances. The low scenario estimates

that 5 percent of landfills and 1 percent of impoundments might require cleanup and leads

to a total of 17,4oo cleanups. The high scenario

estimates that 10 percent of landfills and 2 percent of impoundments might require cleanup

and leads to a total of 34,800 cleanups. If these

figures, which OTA believes to be conservative,

are even approximate} correct, they suggest

that very large sums of money will be needed

just to perform studies of Subtitle D facilities,

and much more to clean them up. The figure

could be hundreds of billions of dollars. Even

a fraction, say 5,000 sites or one-third, of the

lowest estimate, together with other contributions to be discussed, would quintuple the size

of EPA’s projected 2,000-site NPL.

Table 5-8.— Estimates of Sites With Potentially

Significant Releases into the Environment

Low Hig h

scenario scenario

Landfills (281 ,000) ., . . . ., 5°/0 14,000 1OO/o - 28,000

Surface impoundments

(340,000) . . . . . . . . . . 1 0/0 3,400 2% 6,800

17,400 34,800

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES

The expectation has been that effective protection of public health and the environment

from hazardous wastes eventually would be

achieved by Superfund’s cleaning up past problems and RCRA’s preventing future ones. The

purpose of this section is to examine the extent to which operating RCRA Subtitle C hazardous waste facilities might become candidates for cleanup under Superfund.

OTA has studied the groundwater protection

standards covering land-based facilities regulated by RCRA. Although other types of environmental pollution are possible from hazardous waste facilities, groundwater problems

exist at most NPL sites. Moreover, other types

of environmental problems are not addressed

by the RCRA regulatory program to the same

extent as groundwater contamination, For example, there are few regulations covering air

emissions of toxic chemicals.

A recent report by EPA’s Superfund Task

Force

11 indicates that as of December, 1983,

groundwater contamination was the number

one problem in uncontrolled sites. For example, for the 881 sites rated for the NPL, 526 had

observed releases of hazardous substances into

groundwater. Over 8 million Americans are potentially exposed to the groundwater from these

I I h 1()1.1, is mtIm( I. (J[). ( i t
138 ● Superfund Strategy

sites, and for about 350 of these sites the contaminated groundwater is the only source of

drinking water for the affected population. Another 6.5 million people are potentially exposed

to contaminated surface water at 450 sites.

EPA acknowledges that most of the 444 commonly encountered toxic pollutants found at

these 881 sites exhibit chronic toxicity and pose

health threats at extremely low levels of human

exposure. Of the 538 sites on the NPL, 40 percent were originally landfills and 30 percent

were surface impoundments.

Furthermore, most of the cleanups being conducted under Superfund involve either leaving

the wastes in the ground and attempting to contain them, or removing contaminated materials

to land disposal sites, Land disposal sites that

have and continue to receive Superfund cleanup wastes may themselves become Superfund

sites (although not solely because of the redisposal of wastes), so this issue is particularly important, We are beginning to see examples of

this already (e. g., the BKK facility in California). This is to be expected, as EPA estimates

that 50 to 60 precent of interim status land disposal facilities are leaking. Over 50 RCRA interim status facilities regulated by EPA are

already on the NPL.l2

EPA’s Dependence on Current Groundwater

Protection Standards

Current Federal regulatory control of hazardous waste land disposal facilities is critically

dependent on EPA’s groundwater protection

standards. Because of the admitted deficiencies and uncertainties of land disposal technology, such as the unproven long-term effectiveness of leachate liners and collection systems,

protection of human health and the environment rests ultimately on the protection afforded by the groundwater monitoring requirements. For example, EPA’s director of its

Office of Solid Waste has said:

While no method of hazardous waste management is failproof, our rules should protect

— It(; .s. ~jlll, ir(jlllnf; llta] Protw:tion Agency, computer printout

from the “Ilazardous Waste I)ata Management System, ” pro-

~i(led by Jeffrey ~’umarkin, Jllne 19, 19~3.

human health and the environment. Even if

a containment system fails, groundwater monitoring will identify leakage and the pollutant

plume will have to be cleaned up.

13

However, no mention is made of dealing with

the leak itself, nor of stopping the disposal of

hazardous materials in the leaking site. Cleaning up the pollutant plume is of limited effectiveness if the leakage continues.

The director for air and waste management

in EPA’s Region VIII has said:

In the Agency’s view, the cornerstone of our

land disposal program rests on the groundwater protection standards. They were devised

to provide essential environmental and health

controls. 14

More recently, EPA has formulated a national groundwater protection strategy that recognizes that “cleaning up contaminated groundwater is difficult, expensive, and often unsuccessful, These facts clearly argue for future

programs to focus on better protection of the

resource while efforts to detect and deal with

serious contamination resulting from past actions continue, ” EPA’s new national groundwater protection strategy guidelines indicate

that the RCRA groundwater protection standards will still be used.l5 OTA finds that, because

of the inadequacies of the RCRA groundwater

protection standards, the goal of protecting the

resource rather than cleaning it up after the

fact is in jeopardy,

RCRA and Land Disposal

Several aspects of the RCRA regulations have

already received considerable analysis. For example, OTA completed a major study of hazardous waste control in March 1983.16 Another

1 ~JOhrl ,W, Skinner, U.S. ~ nvrir~n mental Protection Agency, l(:tter to Keith H. Gordon, Aug. 12, 1983.

14 Robert 1,. Duprey, Ll,S, Environmental Prote(:t ion /\g(;tl(:\’,

letter to I.eo Younger, Aug. 10, 1983.

15A (~roon~-~$ra ter pr~te[:tjun .5’trate~\, for the .E’11 ~’ironmrn till

I)rotection AgencJ, 01). cit.

IH[ J, S (;ongress, office of ‘j’echnolog\, Assessment, ‘[’~{;hn~)/-

ogies and Alanagement Strategies for H:]xardou.s il’a.ste (.’ontrol,

OTA-hl-I 96 (Washington, 1)C: 1;.S. Goiernmcnt Printing ofl i(:[),

Nlarch 1983].
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup . 139

major study was done by the National Academ}’ of Sciences.17

These works show that even with the best

available land disposal technology, hazardous

wastes placed in land disposal facilities will

likely migrate into the broader environment

sooner or later. Moreover, there are commercially available waste reduction and waste

treatment alternatives to the land disposal of

many hazardous wastes. Finally, RCRA regulations present technical and economic disincentives to industry that limit the use of alternative technologies.

More resources continue to be allocated to

the regulation of fundamentally flawed land

disposal technology than to the development

and demonstration of alternatives to land disposal. EPA frequently has been criticized for

not encouraging alternative technological approaches to the land disposal of hazardous

waste. EPA’s response has been: a) that the

technology for recycling and alternative treatment to land disposal may not exist for all or

most wastes, b) that the technologies are not

“on-the-shelf” but are in some stage of development, and c) that to the extent to which technology does exist, the necessary plant capacity may not be in place. However, EPA’s land

disposal groundwater protection regulations do

not meet these standards either.

To sum up, RCRA regulations do not overcome the fundamental inadequacies of land

disposal technology because: 1) experience has

shown that regulatory enforcement efforts do

not assure compliance with regulations; and

2) as the following analysis shows, even with

compliance with RCRA groundwater protection standards, land disposal will still pose serious risks to health and environment.

Interim Status

When Congress passed RCRA in 1976, it provided a grandfather clause for existing facilities so that they could continue to operate as

if they had a permit until EPA issued them a

permit .18 This interim status was to allow for

a smooth transition to a condition of federal1y

permitted hazardous waste facilities,

There remains considerable uncertainty as

to the exact number of interim status sites covered by the groundwater protection standards.

According to applications for RCRA permits,

as of December 1983, 2,000 out of 8,000 interim status sites were required to monitor groundwater.

l9 To date only about a dozen of these

2,000 facilities have been issued permits by

EPA, thus most continue to operate under interim status. EPA estimates that it will not complete the permitting of the 2,000 facilities for

10 more years,20 In the following discussions

the use of the terms “new” or “permitted” facilities refers to either newly built facilities or

interim status ones that have received permits.

EPA’s Implementation

In May 1980, EPA issued “interim status

standards ”21 as the “minimum requirements”

for interim status facilities. These interim status standards (or Part 265 standards) are “in

lieu of” the more stringent Part 264 standards22

that go into effect only after the facility is permitted by EPA. This action cut off any means

of bringing an interim status facility into compliance with standards “adequate to protect

human health and the environment” short of

issuing (or denying) a permit. ’s The RCRA re-
140 ● Superfund Strategy

authorization has addressed this issue in part

(see below).

Although the interim status groundwater

monitoring requirements have only recently

gone into effect, as of mid-1984 210 out of 972

facilities were “in assessment” because their

groundwater monitoring systems indicate that

they are polluting groundwater.24 Some of these

are receiving wastes from Superfund cleanups,

Of the 210 facilities, only 72 were found by

EPA to have adequate monitoring programs,

with 86 not evaluated by a State or EPA office.

Of the 586 facilities in the normal detection

mode, only 175 were found to have adequate

monitoring programs; 85 had no monitoring

wells at all, and 173 never were evaluated.

Thus, more than the 210 facilities might be required to be in the assessment monitoring

mode if they were performing adequate detection monitoring, perhaps as many as 400, A

1983 study by the General Accounting Office

of several States with above-average regulatory

programs found that only 22 percent of the regulated facilities were complying with the interim status groundwater monitoring requirements.25

EPA estimates that 50 to 60 percent of the

interim status land disposal facilities are leaking and will require corrective action. 26 There

is some evidence that the figure might be closer

to 90 percent. A study conducted by EPA in

1975 investigated 50 randomly selected facilities and found that over 90 percent of them

were leaking into groundwater, 27 Therefore,

even before the passage of RCRA, the poor

state of these interim status facilities was

known.

EPA could have written regulations for financial assurance for corrective action, regulations to monitor and gather necessary environmental data, and regulations to bring

facilities promptly into compliance or close

Z4 [;, S, ~: II ~, i r~ rl m~ntii] IJrote[:t ion Age IIcj’, ‘‘ ] Iltt!I’ i 111 Stii t US

(;round-il’ater Monitoring Implementation Study, ” (lr~ft, 1984.

z5[;,qo/R(;E1)-83-2LI 1, ol) cit.

~f$lll$jd~ b’. 11..A,, Feb. 17, 1984, P. 3.

17[ J,s, ~; Ilk iron Lnenta i I)rotect ion Agenc}, ‘1’lIe Prt:\aleIlce of

.Subsurf;ice hfigraiion of Hazardous Cht:mical Substances at

,S(?l(?(ttxi lndo.$tria] J1’asie 1,aIld Disposal ,Siteis, SL’I’-634 [\lras}lI ngt{jn, 1)(;: Of fi(:[; of Soli(i t~raste, 1 977),

them down, Instead, the interim status standards abrogate most of EPA’s authority to regulate interim status sites until their application

for a permit is acted upon by EPA.

Indicator Parameters

EPA has identified four indicator parameters

to determine whether an interim status hazardous waste facility is leaking. The four indicator

parameters are: specific conductance, pH, total

organic carbon, and total organic halogen. EPA

limited the groundwater monitoring requirements for purposes of leak detection to these

four parameters, 28 EPA gave the following reason for choosing these parameters:

Increases in specific conductance indicate

the presence of inorganic substances in the

groundwater. Likewise, increases or decreases in pH suggest the presence of inorganic contamination, Total organic carbon (TOC)

and total organic halogen (TOX) concentrations in groundwater tend to increase as a result of organic contributions from a hazardous waste facility. The methodology to sample

and analyze for these indicators is presently

available, EPA believes that monitoring these

indicators will be sufficient to make the threshold assessment of whether a facility is leaking.29

However, the more stringent Part 264 standards for EPA permitted sites30 give the EPA

permit writer the option that the actual waste

constituents or their reaction product be monitored rather than the four indicator parameters. EPA’s guidance to the permit writers says

this about the four indicator parameters:

In some cases, these parameters may not be

the most appropriate, and this use should be

carefully reviewed before they are included

as indicator parameters in a detection monitoring program. For example, TOC and TOX

will be of little value at a facility where no

organic wastes are present, and even at facilities handling organic wastes, background levels may reduce the utility of these parameters.

The use of pH and specific conductance may

also not always be appropriate. There are so

ZIW() (;I:R 265, W(b).

294 ~ ~~(;{jeraj Register 331 g~.

‘(’40 (:FR 264.98,
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup Ž 141

many geochemical controls on pH, such as

natural buffering capacity, that it is difficult

to predict what changes in pH might occur

in a leach ate migrating through the unsaturated and saturated zones. In addition, unless

extremely acidic or basic, the addition of large

amounts of leachate will likely be required to

significantly alter pH. [consequently, pH may

be suitable only as an indicator of gross contamination. Detectable changes in specific

conductance will similarly require a relatively

large increase in ion concentrations. Consequently, it may also be useful as an indicator

of gross pollution, and then only at facilities

where constituents migrating to ground water

are primarily inorganic ions .31

Further criticism of the ability of the indicator parameters to detect toxic contaminants at

critical concentrations was made at a recent

groundwater symposium:.

. .. there can be highly selective migration of

contaminants that are hazardous to human

health in drinking waters at concentrations

far less than those that would be detected

using the ‘‘indicator’ parameters .32

More recently, EPA has acknowledged that

“the indicator parameters are not functioning

in either an efficient or effective manner . . . “33

Number of Monitoring Wells

The interim status standards require only

three wells for detecting groundwater contamination. This is true regardless of the size of

the facility, the size of the aquifer, the extent

of pollution, or the potential for damage to human health and the environment. In many cases,

three wells are far too few to give a reasonable

probability of detecting pollution early. In processing RCRA permits, the number of required

detection wells is generally 4 to 20 for interim

status sites currently operating with 3 wells. —

11 ( ; (!()’1’ 1’,1 11‘1 , 1 n ( ., “ K(:I<A f) f’rrnit L1’ritcrs hlanual. Grountlti iI t~>r [’rot (:( t lf)r], 4[1 (: F R I),irt 26-I Sul]l)a rt l-’. (I(t. 4, 1983. i).

192.

IZ(; ~{’ r[}(j 1 ,(>~: ;~ II (1 R. .4 n nf’ J{) n ~~~, “ilratcr Qualit\ Nlc)nitoring

,]t 11 az,i rdou~ ilra~t(; Illsposa] Sites: Is I)uhli{ Health I)rotc[:t ion

l)()>~it)l(’ “1’hr[)ugh ~l(]rl lt(]rl ng l)rograrn~’?’” paper prcsentmi dt

tl~f’ ‘1’hfr[] .N’ationa) S’,\rm/M).S;(Im on ,~quifer Restoration aIl(i

(;~(J~]r~(/li,ft(>{ .$fonitori~]g” >l)on~orfx]” h} the Nat iona] LIrater L$’cll

.l~~()( lat ion, ( ;(]lurnhut, 01 I, Rla} 1983.

‘ !( ,S, I;I1l ironm[:rlt al Protmt ion A~en(:}, “ Int(’rlrn Stat 11s

(jro(lrl(l-t\”,lt[~r hl[~rl it(]rinx lnlplf;nwntdt ion St~l(ij,” 01). (:it.

On the State level, one interim status site in Illinois was required by the State to install 40

wells and another over 50,34 and three sites in

New Jersey are required to have over 100 wells.35

RCRA Reauthorization

Congress has addressed several aspects of the

interim status facility issue. The lifetime of interim status has been limited. Existing facilities

will lose their interim status 12 months after

enactment (November 1985) unless application

is made for a final RCRA permit and the site

is certified to be complying with the groundwater monitoring and financial responsibility

requirements. Existing facilities that become

subject to Subtitle C have 6 months to apply

for a final permit. Interim status surface impoundments become subject to minimum technological requirements for at least two liners,

leachate collection, groundwater monitoring,

and early leak detection, unless certain stringent conditions are met and evidence to allow

an exemption is submitted within 24 months.

Furthermore, upon closure an exempted impoundment (e.g., because of a natural clay liner

being present) must remove or decontaminate

all waste residues, all contaminated liner material and contaminated soil. If the latter is not

removed the operator must comply with postclosure requirements. EPA is also given additional means to seek corrective action at interim status sites by obtaining an administrative

order through a civil Federal court action,

Summary

The facilities that are most likely to leak,

about 2,000 interim status facilities, have a

much less stringent groundwater monitoring

standard then the three permitted and presumably far better designed new facilities. According to EPA, these standards are “minimal and

are specifically designed not to be burdensome." 36 There are no corrective action re-
142 . Superfund Strategy

quirements or requirements to stop disposal

should groundwater contamination be detected.

Sites found to be polluting will be put on a “fast

track” for issuing a permit so that corrective

action may be required, but so far few Federal

permits have been issued to interim status facilities requiring groundwater monitoring. Although the recent legislative changes reduce

the risks associated with interim status, a likely

effect may be to hasten the closure of interim

status facilities prior to applying for, or obtaining, full permits. To the extent that a facility

operator perceives that a permit is unlikely to

be issued, or very high costs would be required,

closure could lead to placement on the NPL.

Limitations on Coverage

EPA’s strategy, as evidenced in the groundwater protection provisions of Part 264 of RCRA,

is to determine when groundwater is becoming polluted enough to threaten public health

and then to require the groundwater to be

cleaned up, However, groundwater monitoring is not a substitute for techniques such as

leak detection systems to analyze the engineering soundness of the waste management facility, e.g., to locate a ruptured liner in a landfill

or a leaking storage tank.

Permitted facilities are required to be built

to exacting EPA engineering standards whose

goal is to “minimize the formation and migration of leachate to the adjacent subsurface soil

or groundwater. “37 However, when leachat e

does appear in groundwater, facility operators

are not required to find out what went wrong,

“a landfill liner which has been designed not

to leak does not violate the design standards

if the liner fails at some future time. “38 RCRA

regulations for fully permitted facilities do not

require that the leak be fixed or that the waste

disposal activities be halted. When pollution

may be coming from one of several sources,

there is no requirement to determine which of

them it is. In short, it is not a violation of any

RCRA regulation to pollute. Nor is there currently any evaluation of the implications of a

“XY IJetl{:ral Register 32312.

q P ~’(;(jera] Register 32330.

leak for the continued operation of a facility.

There is only the requirement that the pollution that has reached groundwater be cleaned

up. This, as will be discussed later, is a very

limited requirement.

Under RCRA jurisdiction, EPA limits the site

owner’s responsibility for site maintenance to

30 years after site closure.39 Since EPA (and

many others) have concluded that it is “inevitable” that landfills and disposal lagoons will

leak,40 many of these facilities are likely to eventually fall under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(CERCLA). As firms go out of business, cleanup costs would shift from facility owners and

users to the government.

RCRA Reauthorization

Several of the above problems have been addressed legislatively, but it is not yet clear how

the new legislative provisions will be implemented. The minimum technological requirements for almost all types of land disposal facilities include the use of early leak detection

systems; however, the requirement applies only

to new units. Another change concerns regulations and permits issued after enactment. Facilities must act to control and clean up all releases of hazardous constituents from all units

at the facility, including inactive ones. This requirement may hasten the closure of some facilities in ways that result in their eventual

placement on the NPL.

Groundwater Monitoring Wells

The hydrogeology of the site is important in

the design of a groundwater monitoring system for interim status and permitted facilities.

A good knowledge of the hydrology and geology in the immediate area of a waste disposal

site is necessary to know where, how many,

and how deep to locate detection monitoring

wells. In addition, for compliance monitoring

it may also be necessary to create a mathematical model to get some understanding of the

. . . . .

~~~~ f;~-~ ZG4. 117 and 2fj5. 117.

4t)~[j ~’e(][; ra] Re~ister 11 12&28.
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 143

speed and direction of the movement of contaminants,

In determining the location, depth, number,

and type of monitoring wells a great many assumptions have to be made about the underground geological structure and the location,

depth, quantity, direction, and speed of underground water. Furthermore, the proper location of monitoring wells depends on a knowledge of how all the above parameters may vary

with season, rainfall, tidal water, and groundwater usage. These latter factors can cause

groundwater flow to greatly increase, decrease,

or even change direction over time.

Hydrogeological structures have physically

hidden characteristics that must be inferred

from limited data, Data are obtained from sources

such as core samples, well drilling logs, and

historical records of rainfall, The difficulty of

doing this was summarized picturesquely in a

recent review by the Princeton University Water Resources Program:

Imagine that we cannot see the sky, we cannot tell the direction or velocity of the wind,

and we ask: Is the factory (with its thousands

of little chimneys) polluting the air? That is

our ground water monitoring problem—at its

easiest. It is made more difficult because the

geological properties of the soil vary with

depth and direction, and this variation is unknown or uncertain. When we look up in the

sky, we observe the spatial variation of the pollutants. If we could look up only through a

small tube or telescope, then the information

we gathered from the one sighting might not

be representative of what we would see if we

looked everywhere. The small tube into the

sky is like our groundwater monitoring well:

the data we gather may not tell us too much

about what is occurring in other nearby locat ions .41

One of the few studies of operational land

disposal sites was an investigation of 50 typical

hazardous waste disposal sites conducted in

1976-77 for EPA.42 This study concluded:

At sites presently monitored the use of wells

as an aid in evaluating groundwater conditions is generally poor, due to inadequacies

with respect to one or more of the following

parameters: number of wells, distance of wells

from potential contamination source, positioning of wells in relation to ground water flow,

selection of screened intervals, use of proper

well construction materials, sealing against

surface water contamination, or inter-aquifer

water exchange, completion methods (such as

development, maintenance, and protection

against vandalism),

Of the 50 sites evaluated, 32 had existing

groundwater monitoring systems, usually installed to meet the requirements of State law.

Of the 32, the study found seven monitoring

systems (or 22 percent) so inadequate that they

had to install new wells to conduct the relatively basic monitoring required by the

contract.

More recently, EPA has found considerable

problems with monitoring wells. Of 148 interim status facilities that had implemented

groundwater monitoring programs in response

to RCRA interim status regulations, 64 facilities (or 43 percent) had “deficiencies related

to the number, depths, and/or locations of monitoring wells. ”43 Among the problems encountered were:

• background wells not in the uppermost

aquifer,

Ž background wells affected by the facility,

Ž downgradient wells not located in the direction of expected contamination movement, and

 • downgradient wells not located at depths

which would intercept contaminants.

These studies show that the percentage of unsatisfactory monitoring systems was 22 percent

in the 1977 study and 43 percent in the 1983

study. These two studies are not comparable,

so it is simplistic to conclude that groundwater

monitoring had deteriorated in those 6 years.
744 ● Superfund Strategy

But there is no basis for believing, in spite of

improvements in technology, that the practice

has gotten better, There are several possible explanations (not mutually exclusive) for this

state of affairs, First, monitoring may be mostly

a procedure to reassure the public.

One expert pointed to limitations in the state

of the art as a second explanation. He observed,

for example, that “contamination migration in

fractured rock is complex and generally unpredictable” and that “prediction . . . is generally

beyond the state of the art. Pollutant movement

is easiest to predict in sand and gravel. Ironically, sand and gravel make the worst base for

land disposal because pollutants move very

rapidly in these porous soils. Soils that have

good containment properties and are hydrogeologically predictable are found in only about

10 to 20 percent of the United States,44

There are many other hydrogeological conditions that make the design of groundwater

monitoring systems very difficult:

●

●

●

●

There can be connections between different aquifers that are difficult to detect.45

Groundwater flow can change direction

because of intrusion of tidal water, seasonal recharge patterns, or nearby production

wells.

Leachate does not always flow straight

down to an aquifer, but under some geological conditions would flow at an angle

and enter an aquifer downstream of the

monitoring wells.46

Liquid contaminants in an aquifer do not

always flow in the same direction as the

groundwater.

A third possible explanation for lack of progress is that a proper groundwater monitoring

44J. A. Cherry, “Contaminant Migration in Groundwater With

Emphasis on Hazardous Waste Disposal,” WOrkSIIOp on Cround-

~iater Resources and Contamination in the United States, Mar.

14 and 15, 1983 [\ Washington, DC: Di\ision of l>olic~ Research

and A nal~sis, National 5’cience Foundation); J. A. Cherr~’, p~~rsonai communication, Dec. 7, 1983.

45[;, .5’, EII I,iron n]enta] {>rote<; tier] ~genc~r, 6 ‘[>eIY1lit i~ ‘1’iters

Training Course on ~round~trater Alonitoring, RCRA 264. Subpart F“ (blrashington, DC: Oflice of Solid JVaste, ]UIJ 1983), pp.

3-7,

dfi~[]rxlel] \ ‘jI]~el] t, L’,5’, b’ntrironmenta] protection ~geIlcJ’, prit~te (;omm unication, Oct. 21, 1983,

system takes a great deal of money, time, and

expertise. In order to meet governmental regulatory requirements without spending too

much, reliance is placed on engineering judgment rather than hard data. This warning appears in the EPA RCRA permit writers guide:

Experience with the installation of monitoring systems for compliance with the Interim

Status Regulations has indicated that most

owners/operators who have hired a groundwater consultant to install the groundwater

monitoring system have not envisioned spending the time or money to conduct as thorough

an investigation as is suggested in this chapter. To retrieve all of the information necessary to design the system in accordance with

considerations in this document, test-boring

and piezometer installation programs will be

necessary, Though some local geologic reports usually exist in the region of most facilities, site specific considerations almost invariably require extensive test borings. Because

of the lack of time and funds, in most cases

parameters such as the direction of groundwater flow and the nature of subsurface materials have been determined through evaluation of local topography and, to the extent

possible, evaluation of existing building foundation borings. Monitor wells are usually

located on the basis of this information and

completed to just below the water table. Variations in ground-water flow direction and geologic variability have usually not been considered because of lack of information. The

primary factors for minimizing the pre-monitor well installation field investigation have

been time and cost.47

A similar point about cost was made at a congressional hearing in 1982 on EPA’s Part 264

groundwater protection standards:

There are, of course, certain geologic environments in which monitoring becomes extremely expensive and may not be cost-effectively employed, In order to obtain credible

information, dozens of wells and hundreds of

groundwater samples may be required to develop an adequate analysis of the hydrogeologic system, Although there are probably a

large number of existing land disposal sites

located in such areas, it is my recommenda47Geo7’rans, Inc., op. cit., p, 16.
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 145

tion that no new land disposal facilities be

allowed under these conditions regardless of

engineering design. 48

What is required for a facility operator to detect groundwater pollution? The hazardous

waste disposal facility operator must want to

detect groundwater pollution and must determine how effective monitoring will be, given

the geology of his site. The operator must be

willing to hire experts, spend time, and spend

money (probably far in excess of EPA’s minimum requirements), Finally, sampling and

analysis procedures must be designed that optimize the ability to detect contamination, even

if they are more stringent than EPA’s procedures (see the section in this chapter on statistical procedures). Some facilities operate this

way, although they are not required to do so,

but they are not required to report to EPA the

results of anything over the minimum requirements,

At the other extreme is the facility operator

who fulfills only the minimum requirements

of the law. Consultants may not be used to optimize the efficiency of the groundwater detection system, Under these circumstances, groundwater detection systems have a low probability

of detecting contamination. Many of the sites

on the National Priorities List had such groundwater monitoring systems. 49

The latest EPA Part 264 regulations (July 26,

1982), while an improvement over the Part 265

standards, do not acknowledge the past failure

of regulatory groundwater monitoring systems,

nor the unsuitability of many geological formations. They continue to rely on regulatory

groundwater monitoring in any terrain to detect leaks. But the minimum requirements of

the regulations are inadequate to-ass

probability of detection.

ht:i]ring of the Huu.w Suhc~]m&ittee on Natural Resourck~s, Agri-

{:u]ture Rcscar~’h and En irironment, NOIr. 30, 1982.

4Y[ r, ,>7, En ~riron Mt?rltal Prote(;tion Agen(:~’, Hazardous 11’ast(’

,Sitc II f:sc:riijtions: A’ational Priorities [,ist, FinaI Rulf?, and I+(jJx).se(f ( ~pf]a~e [fl’ashington, 1)(;: office of Solid \Vastc an(j Em(;Ig(’11( }“ [<os[)(111s[?! .~u~u$t 1 983).

Contaminant Tolerance Levels

The RCRA regulations for EPA permitted

land disposal facilities,50 unlike those for interim status facilities,51 provide for detection monitoring of the specific contaminants being disposed as an alternative to the use of the four

indicator parameters (at the discretion of the

EPA permit writer). This would overcome the

problem of indicator parameters mentioned in

the section on “Interim Status. ” Upon close examination, however, this process raises other

issues having to do with the tolerance levels

of these contaminants.

In regulatory parlance, the tolerance level of

a chemical is the concentration that is acceptable to the regulatory agency. The Part 264

RCRA regulations do not have explicit tolerance levels for groundwater contaminants except for the 16 chemicals listed in the EPA primary drinking water standard. However, for

the hundreds of toxic constituents listed in the

RCRA regulations52 there is an implicit tolerance level. The regulations specify that the

EPA publication “Test Methods for Evaluating

Solid Waste, Physical/Chemical Methods” 53 be

used to determine whether a sample contains

a given toxic constituent. 54

For most substances, this publication lists

more than one analytical method, Some methods are more sensitive than others. In issuing

permits, EPA plans to use relatively low-cost

scanning techniques, which are the least sensitive methods, explaining:

The Agency feels that a special hierarchical

approach is appropriate for this purpose.

These approaches will first use scanning techniques designed to detect broad classes of

compounds. If the presence of a particular

class of compound is detected, more specific

analysis to determine which constituents are

actually present can then be initiated. Although some sensitivity may be sacrificed by

5(]40 CFR 264.

51qo ~~7R 2fj5,

wo c FR 2EiI al][lend ices VII and VI 11.

~~ [J S ~ ntr i ron me nta] ~)rot ect ion Ag f?ncjT, T’est hfeth~ffs for” .

[<~,]loating Solid il’aste, l>l]~rsi(;al/[~ht:n]i(:al Alethods, S\\’ -846,

2(1 cdltion (it’ashington, E)(;: office of Solid Waste, 1982].

54Ao [: FR PM app(; ndi x ] II.
146 ● Superfund Strategy

such an approach, the range of detection of certain scanning methods are clearly adequate . . .

Therefore, the detection limit of the scanning

methods, which are the least sensitive of the

required test methods, constitutes a de facto

tolerance level, since no further action will be

taken if the scan does not detect contamination. Furthermore, there are more sensitive test

methods than those chosen, and EPA has demonstrated in the case of dioxin that more sensitive methods can be developed when required.

The RCRA regulations do not explain why certain test procedures were chosen and others

were not. Finally, tolerance levels are implicit

rather than determined for most cases,

Table 5-9 illustrates that these implicit tolerance levels are quite high, when certain EPA

health effects projections are considered. The

first column shows the minimum concentrations at which 12 selected chemicals can be

detected using the RCRA procedures,” The

second column shows EPA’s estimate of the

concentration that EPA projects will cause one

cancer per 100,000 people drinking 2 liters a

day of the water over a lifetime. These cancer

estimates are based on animal studies. There

are substantial disagreements about the accuracy of such projections, and the values listed

in table 5-9 are not universally accepted. However, they continue to be used by EPA, although

they may be changed. Since it is EPA’s criteria

which determine whether a site should be included in CERCLA, these projections are relevant to this study.

The projected number of cancers per 100,000

is estimated in column three. For example,

table 5-9 shows that a hazardous waste disposal

site operator, permitted by EPA, may, without

violating his permit, pollute groundwater with

up to 2,500 nanograms per liter of dieldrin,

This is a concentration which EPA projects

may cause 3,500 cancers per 100,000 people

who drink the water over their lifetime,

EPA is currently seeking to ban the use of

pesticides for which the cancer risk is as low

as 1 in 100,000.58 Therefore, it is likely that a

facility which is polluting groundwater at a level projected to cause 3,500 cancers per 100,000

would come to the attention of CERCLA.

Next, consider the explicit tolerance levels

associated with the 16 contaminants for which

there is an EPA drinking water standard. EPA

allows that for pollutants for which there is an

55(J .S. Environmental Protection Agency, SW-846, op. c:it.

Table 5-9.—EPA Detection

se~~estjcjde & To,yj~ Chemjca] News, vol. 12, No. 4, Jan. 11,

1984, p. 15,

Limits for Some Carcinogens

Concentration projected* ●

Highest permitted to cause one cancer per

EPA detection limit 100,000 peoplett Projected ● ● cancers per

Chemical (nanograms/liter) (t) (nanograms/liter) 100,000 people

aldrin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,900 0.74 2,600

dieldrin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,500 0.71 3,500

1,1 ,2,2 -tetrachloroethane. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,900 1,700 4

3,3’ -dichlorobenzidine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16,500 103 160

heptachlor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,900 2.78 680

PCBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36,000 0.79 46,000

benzo(a)pyrene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,500 28 90

benzidine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44,000 1.2 37,000

chlordane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.6 3

DDT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,700 0.24 20,000

“A nanogram IS a billionth of a gram One nanogram per liter IS approximately one part per trillion:

“ ‘Projections based on the consumption of 2 liters (a Itttle over 2 quarts) a day of the contaminated drinking water over a lifetime ProjectIons are also based on animal

studies that include assumptions on the transfer of results from animals to humans, and extrapolate ion from high doses to low doses Despite the uncertalnt Ies introduced by these assumptions, these are the projections EPA uses Column 3 has been calculated by OTA by dividing column 1 by column 2 This calculation converts

back to high doses Uncertainties Introduced into column 2 by high.to-low dose extrapolations are thus partially corrected for in derlvlng column 3. Column 3 contains

no correction for uncertainties Introduced by applying an!mal results to humans

tU S Environmental Protection Agency, Test Methods for Eva/uat/rrg Solid Waste, Hrysica//Chern/ca/ Methods, SW-846, 2d ed. (Washington, DC Office of Solid Waste,

EPA, 1982)

ttReference 45 FR 79325-79341
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 147

—

existing EPA primary drinking water standard,

RCRA permitted facilities may contaminate up

to the standard.57 The primary groundwater

pollution standards are shown in table 5-Io. As

in table 5-9, this table also projects the cancers

per 100,000 for those substances for which data

are available from the EPA. In addition, the

fourth column indicates the substances known

or believed to be carcinogens.

For some of these pollutants, there may be

no zero effects level and any amount of the substance is considered a risk to human health.

For example, cadmium is carcinogenic 58 

and

is not considered without risk at any level.59

Arsenic, lindane, and toxaphene are thought

to be carcinogens and, as shown in table 5-10,

are associated with significant cancer risks at

the EPA tolerance level.

“)”’1 {Jrl(I\ H,III[;y , 1<( :K:\/(; [;f{(; [.:! hotline, (

 r .S. EII\lr(IIl m[~nt,]]

l’rt)t[If,t io]l A:[:n(} , ijrlt at[~ I,om mu[lit.at ion, NOI, 2$], I [)8:].

“’8[ ‘ S. 1)(;[)(I rt m(~tlt of I{calth an(] Itllman S(:r\i[c\, t?(~glstr,l

f~f ‘/’{J\ I( I;II(I[ t f~l’ (,’/IfIrrIi[{I) ,5’IIII\t{fn[;CS (\l’,i~tli II~t{I n, 1 )(;: l) Lll)-

11(, 1 l(:dlth S(;ri I( t;, ( ;(:r)t(]r~ for I)IS(J;ISC (;ontrol,” Nciti(~n,ll 1 II St It (It{’ t(~r ()( ( u[):itl(jnal 1 { calth iln(f SaffJtj, F’[?t)ruar}’ 1 982].

~’+( ‘, S, 1; II ~ I rf)[l III(I II t:) ] I ‘IV )tc(, t 1011 Agf;ll[, y. .5’(. 1(?11 tific’ ~ll{i ‘I’{’( ‘h

1]){ ,11 .\ s$f’~$lr](’fl( h’(’~~f~rl [jr] (,’{) [lt)lium, l; 1),1-600-7” 3-()():) (\\’Cl\ll-

] r) ~t I )11 , 1)( ; ( )ff ]( [’ of R(!>(’ii [( II ,) II [1 I)~I\ (,]()]) l~](>l~t , Lli) [( t] 1 [1 7,5]

Regarding tolerance levels, not all toxic pollutants that can cause a site to be regulated

under CERCLA are monitored under RCRA.

A conspicuous example is dioxin contaminated

soils. Although sent to RCRA regulated landfills, EPA has not been able to require that the

soil be monitored for some dioxins, although

they have proposed doing so.60

Table 5-11 lists other hazardous substances

regulated under CERCLA that are not regulated or monitored under RCRA.61 A reportable

quantity (RQ) is the quantity of a hazardous

substance which if spilled must be reported to

the National Response Center62 to determinate

if any response under CERCLA is necessary.

RQs are based on six criteria: aquatic toxicity,

mammalian toxicity, ignitability, reactivity,

acute toxicity, and carcinogenicity. They are

in five reporting levels: 1, 10, 100, 1,000, and

5,000 pounds, The lower the RQ, the more hazardous the substance.

Table 5-10.— Data on RCRA Pollutants With Primary Drinking Water Standards

EPA Primary Drinking Concentration projected” ● to cause Projected ● ‘ cancers per

PolIutants Water Standard (μg/l)* one cancer per 100,000 people† (fig/l) 100,000 people Comments

arseni c 50 0.022 2,300 a

barium ., . . . . . 1,000 — — b

cadmiu m 10 — — a

chromiu m 50 — — —

lea d 50 — — —

mercury . 2 — — —

nitrate (as N ) 10,000 — —

seleniu m

—

10 — — —

silve r 50 —

fluoride ., .. .

— —

1,400-2,400 — — —

endri n 0.2 — — —

Iindan e 4 0.186 22 b

methoxychlor . . . 100 — — —

toxaphene .. . 5 0.0071 700 b

2,4- D 100 —

2,4,5,-T, Silvex

— —

10 — — — .

aknown human carcinogen ( t t 1 —

bprobable human carcinogen based on animal studies (tt)

“ ~~gl I m Icrog ram Per I lter or ml I I Ionth of a gram per I Iter 1 pgll IS approximately one part per b! I I ion

‘‘ Project Ions based on the consumption of 2 I!ters (a I!ttle over 2 quarts) a day of the contaminated drlnklng water over a I Ifetlme Except for arsenic projections are

also based on arwmal s[udles that Include assumptions on the transfer of results from animals to humans, and extrapolations from h!gh doses to low doses For

arsen IC projections are extrapolated from the effects of htgh doses I n humans Desptte the u ncertal ntles I nt reduced by these assu m pt Ions these are the p rolect Ions

EPA uses Column 3 has been calculated by OTA by dlvldlng column 1 by column 2 This calculation converts back to high doses Uncertalntles Introduced Into

COIU mn 2 by h! gh to low dose ext rapolatlons are thus part Ial Iy corrected for ! n derlvl ng CO I u m n 3 Except for the arsenic number which Is based on human data

column 3 retal ns the uncertarn I{es Introduced by app(ylng an [real resu Its to humans

preference 45 FR 7932579341

t t U S Department of Health and Human Services /?eg/stry of TOXIC Effecfs of Chern/ca/ Substances (Washl ngton DC Public Health Sew Ice Centers for Disease Con

trol, National Instlfute for Occupational Health and Safety February 1982)
148 ● Superfund Strategy

Table 5-11 .—Some Pollutants Regulated Under

CERCLA (Reportable Qualities) But Not Under RCRA

Proposed Oral

reportable (mammal) LD50*

Pollutant quantity (pounds)† (mg/kg) (23)

carbofuran. . . . 10 11

chlorpyrifos. . . 1 97

diazinon . . . 10 76

dichlone . . . . . . . . . 1 —

alpha-endosulfa n 1 —

beta-endosulfan . . 1 —

endosulfan sulfate. . 1 —

endrin aldehyde . . . 1 —

guthion . . . . . . . . . . . 1 13

mercaptodimethur . . 10 34

mevinphos . . . . . . . . 10 3.7

naled . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 250

f48 FR 23552.23595

. LD,,—Lethal Dose Fifty—a calculated dose of a substance which IS expected

to cause the death of 50°i0 of an entire defined experimental animal population It IS measured In milligrams of substance Ingested per kilogram of antmal

body weight For comparison purposes note that the oral toxlclty of iodine IS

14,000 mg/kg, arsenic ac{d IS 48 mg/kg, and potassium cyanide IS 10 mg/kg

Table 5-11 lists those hazardous substances

that have proposed RQs in the two most hazardous categories (1 and 10 pounds) and which

are not regulated under RCRA. The proposed

rules do not indicate the basis of the rating for

each substance; therefore, it is possible that it

is inappropriate to regulate some of these hazardous substances under RCRA, but no discussion of this issue has been found.

The significance of table 5-11 is that these

substances could be leaking into groundwater

from a RCRA permitted facility without violating the permit, yet would be candidates for

regulations under CERCLA. Even more to the

point, if these substances are spilled in transportation or manufacturing operations in excess of their RQ, they must, under CERCLA,

be cleaned up and disposed in a RCRA regulated facility where RCRA regulations would

not require their monitoring.

Table 5-12 addresses those contaminants of

concern to CERCLA that are also regulated

under RCRA. In many cases, the groundwater

detection levels are higher under RCRA, a s

much as 1,000 times higher, This is another example of the puzzle that occurs in comparing

RCRA regulations with CERCLA. The cure is

considered more protective of public health

than the prevention, Thus a RCRA regulated

Table 5-12.—Some Examples of Groundwater

Detection Levels of Hazardous Chemicals Which

Are Higher Under RCRA than Under CERCLA

CERCLA RCRA

detection detection

Pollutant levels (ng/l)††† levels (rig/l)

dieldrin . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2,500†

DDT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4,700†

DDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5,600†

DDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2,800†

heptachlor . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1,900†

heptachlor epoxide . . . . 5 2,200†

aldrin . . . . . . . 5 1,900†

antimony. . . . . . . . . . . 20,000 32,000††

arsenic . . . . . . . . 10,000 53,000††

cadmium . . . . . . . 1,000 4,000††

lead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000 42,000††

selenium . . . . . . 2,000 75,000††

thallium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,000 40,000††

tu.s Environmental Protection Agency, Test MefFrods for Evaluaffng So/Jd Waste,

F%yslca//Chern/ca/ Methods, SW-846, 2d ed (Washington, DC Off Ice of Solid

Waste, EPA, 1982)

t tLee M Thomas, Assistant Administrator, U S Environmental Protect Ion AgenCY, Memorandum to the Adml nlstrator Pro Posing addlt ional test methods for

reference 17, Oct 17, 1983

tttU S Environmental Protect Ion Agency, “Statement of Work, Organlcs

Analysls, Contract Laboratory Program” (Washington, DC EPA, September

1983) U S Enwronmental Protect Ion Agency, “Statement of Work, Inorganlcs

Analysls, Contract Laboratory Program” (Washington, DC EPA, May 1982)

site may pollute groundwater to a level tolerated by RCRA but come to the attention of

CERCLA for the same pollution.

The last, and perhaps most important point

with regard to tolerance levels, is that for many

of the several hundred hazardous constituents

for which EPA has published test procedures

to monitor groundwater, the level at which

these contaminants can be detected has not

been published or determined by EPA.63 Moreover, the test protocols were set more by considerations of analytical chemistry than human

health effects; thus some of the detection limits

might be too high to protect human health,

while others might be lower than necessary.

Some of the hazardous constituents for which

EPA does not yet know the detection limits are

listed in table 5-13. The substances shown were

selected because they are alleged carcinogens

and preliminary EPA research has given them

high hazard ratings, Although research is underway to determine detection levels, RCRA rules

permit groundwater contamination by these

and other substances to a currently undetermined level.
Table 5-13.—Some

Which EPA Has Not

Carcinogenic Chemicals for

Yet Determined the Levels at

Which They Can Be Detected in Groundwater

by the Methods of Reference

afIotoxin

4-aminobiphenyl

aziridine (ethyleneimine)

bis-(chloromethyl)ether

chloromethyl methyl ether

1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP)

diethylnitrosamine (n-nitrosodiethylamine)

diethylstiIbesterol a

dimethylaminoazobenzine

7,12-dimethylbenz(a)anthracene

dimethylcarbamoyl chloride

1,2-dimethylhydrazine

ethyl methanesulfonate

hydrazine

methyl nitrosourea

nitrosomethylurethane (n-nitroso-n-methylurea)

n-nitosopiperidine

n-nitrosopyrrolidine

streptozotocina

2,3,7,8-tetrachlrodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD)

ethylene dibromide (EDB)

aTest methods not ye! publlshed by EPA as of Jan 19 1984

SOURCE U S Environmental Protect (on Agency Test Methods for Eva/uat(ng

So/(d Was(e Phys/ca/ Chernfca/ Me(hods, SW 846 2d ed IWash!ngton

DC Off Ice of Solld Waste, EPA 19821

In addition, the RCRA test procedures manual indicates that when several chemicals are

mixed together, as is usually the case in

groundwater monitoring, the ability to detect

a specific chemical by a given test procedure

is reduced. These analytical interferences raise

the detection limits by an undetermined

amount. 64 Not being able to detect carcinogens

reliably, which can be of concern at very low

levels of contamination, is dangerous to human

health and increases the likelihood of CERCLA

involvement.

The effects of this can be illustrated with the

example of ethylene dibromide (EDB). EPA recently has canceled the use of EDB as a fungicide because of its carcinogenicity. In congressional testimony, EPA’s pesticide program

director said:

. . . we believe that the risks posed by EDB in

drinking water at levels in the low parts per

billion are roughly comparable to the risks

posed by grain fumigation. In both cases we

consider these estimated risk levels to he un-

“~1 t)l(l

Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 149

acceptable for a lifetime of exposure . . . According to our information, the State of Florida has acted to provide alternative drinking

water for approximately 500 wells found to

contain EDB at or above 0.1 parts per billion

(ppb). This appears to be a responsible and effective way of dealing with these potential

risks. In short, the risks of EDB being reported

in Florida ground water (typically 1 to 20 ppb)

are probably similar to risks posed by grain

products .65

EPA does not list a detection level for EDB,

but it does list detection levels for 21 other

volatile organics. These range from 1.6 to 7.2

parts per billion. Thus, the RCRA tolerance level for EDB might be substantially greater than

the 0.1 parts per billion indicated as “responsible” in the EPA testimony quoted above.

In summary, CERCLA is required to address

releases of any “hazardous substance, ” that is,

any substance designated under CERCLA and

four other acts administered by EPA, EPA has

chosen to have RCRA regulate a narrower universe of substances and many of those are not

regulated with the same stringency as in other

EPA programs. Therefore, compliance with a

RCRA permit will not necessarily be sufficient

to prevent a site from becoming a CERCLA

site. However, proposals being considered by

EPA might lower CERCLA requirements rather than increase RCRA ones.

Monitoring in the Vadose Zone

EPA regulations for permitted facilities require that groundwater detection monitoring

wells be placed in the uppermost aquifer at the

edge of the waste disposal area.66 Any contaminant detected by the well may first have traveled anywhere from a few feet to several hundred feet under the waste disposal area before

it reaches the aquifer. Then the contamination

may have traveled anywhere from a few feet

to several thousand feet in the aquifer before

it reached the well, Then, if the leading point

fit ~;dti. j 11 I,, j oh n son, [)i r(:(; to r ( ) f t h(] of fi(, e of ]’t>s~ i ( 1(] (> 1) 1’[ )-

u I.a [n$ [‘,S, EjIlvlr[)Il n]f;ntal [}r(]tc[, tlon A~f311(; \’, t(!it i In( ~ IIy t 1(’f[ )1’t’ n .,

the S[JnatP ( ;onlrnittpc (JI1 ,.!gri(,lllturc, N’llt rlti(~n ,ln(i l;[)r[lit [ I ,

1,111, 23, 1984,

qo ( : ~J R 26-I ,98[ h )
150 . Superfund Strategy

of the plume of contamination is between two

monitoring wells, it could travel some distance

past the wells before it is detected, Therefore,

even if a detection monitoring system works

well, considerable environmental damage could

occur before the contamination is detected.

The vadose zone is the ground above the uppermost aquifer. In humid areas of the United

States it is rarely over 100 feet deep and is usually much less. In arid western areas, however,

the vadose zone can be several hundred feet

deep. Water and associated contaminants from

a land disposal facility will travel through the

vadose zone to an aquifer at a rate determined

by the soil characteristics, the depth of the

vadose zone, the amount of fluids in the waste,

and the amount of water. It can take anywhere

from a few months to many decades.

By the time contamination is discovered in

a groundwater monitoring well, the vadose

zone could have stored significant amounts of

contamination. Thus toxic materials could continue to pollute the groundwater for many decades even if disposal is halted and the groundwater is cleaned. Furthermore, the trend is to

require land disposal facilities to be located in

areas with low-porosity clay soils, with great

depth to groundwater, This may postpone the

time it takes contamination to reach groundwater, but also increase the amount of contamination stored in the vadose zone,

Not all contamination that reaches the aquifer is carried away by the groundwater. Some

contaminants may be adsorbed on solid surfaces or otherwise contained in the aquifer and

gradually released or desorbed in small amounts

to pollute the groundwater, One important example is the class of halogenated immiscible

hydrocarbons such as paint thinners, pesticides, and PCBs. Thus, by the time this type

of contamination is detected in groundwater

the vadose zone may be significantly contaminated. Thus it would be useful to detect leachate contamination in the vadose zone beneath

a hazardous waste disposal site before it

reaches groundwater. It might help avoid the

costs of groundwater and contaminated soil

cleanup and human health and the environment would be better protected. EPA does require vadose zone monitoring for land treatment of hazardous wastes 67 in the standards

for EPA permitted facilities of July 26, 1982.

The preamble to the regulations states that

“EPA believes that adequate technology and

expertise is available to develop effective and

reliable systems. “

68 Yet in the same regulations

vadose zone monitoring is not required for

landfills, surface impoundments, and waste

piles where the need and the benefits would

appear to be far greater.

The technology for which there is the most

experience in waste disposal monitoring in the

vadose zone is the suction lysimeter, a porous

ceramic cup placed in the vadose zone to collect a sample of the fluids. In the interim status

standards for existing land disposal facilities,

EPA rejected the use of lysimeters with this explanation:

Available leachate monitoring technology

generally involves the placement of probes

(lysimeters) beneath the disposal facility.

Since each probe is not generally capable of

monitoring a large area, many of them would

have to be placed under a facility in order to

detect a localized flaw in the landfill design.

It may not be possible to place such devices

below an existing landfill or surface impoundment without completely removing the waste

and redesigning the facility. Moreover, once

such a system is in place, the probes tend to

fail over time due to deterioration or plugging.

It is difficult to determine when such a failure occurs and, if discovered, the damage is

generally irreparable. Under these circumstances EPA does not believe that leach ate

monitoring should be a general requirement

for landfills and surface impoundments during interim status.69

Other commentors have pointed out that lysimeters do not work well in subfreezing or

conditions of low soil moisture70 or very hot and

“’[’h is method is used for less than I per(:ent of wastes that

iir~: laIld disposed; it is also known as land sprea(iing or lan(i

farming uf f~astes.

6H47 [~t;(jeral ~egister 32329.

WW~ ~’[;(]ertl] Register 33191, M~\I 19, 1 ~~~.

701J{l~%, ~~llgillef?ri ng Testi w (;(). ~ “I,ysimeter Evaluation Stud\r”

(il’cishingtorl, DC: American I]ctroleum Institute, 1983J.
—

Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 151

dry conditions.71 Are these arguments valid?

The first point, that the “probe is not generally capable of monitoring a large area” is contradicted by field experience. Some data indicate that a suction lysimeter located 10 feet

below an impoundment could measure a distance of 10 to 30 feet laterally .72 Second, placing suction lysimeters under existing land disposal sites can and has been done by the

technique of drilling at a slant. Third, the plugging problem can be largely overcome by packing the sampler with silica flour,73 a standard

technique which appears in EPA manuals. 74

Fourth, the statement that the “damage is generally irreparable” is unclear since what has

been placed ought to be replaceable.

As for the other comments, it is not very relevant that lysimeters do not work well in conditions of freezing or low soil moisture since

these are not conditions in which there would

be much leachate. And as for hot and dry conditions, vadose zone monitoring is currently

being conducted in Beatty, Nevada. In any

event, it is not necessary that lysimeters work

perfectly (no technology does) or that they be

convenient to use. The important question is

whether they are cost effective in reducing

groundwater cleanup costs through early detection of contamination.

Lysimeters have been used for many years

for monitoring land disposal sites. At least one

State, Texas, uses them for regulatory monitoring. Wisconsin has been requiring vadose

zone monitoring since the mid-1970s and there

are 19 solid waste sites there with either suction lysimeters or collection lysimeters.75 Cal-

.

‘

1

‘1’f’r r\ 1,. ‘1’h~j~~tn, (~ onoc; o I II(:,,let ter to U, S, En\’ Iron ment a ]

[)rrjt[:{,tl{)rl ~~R[;ll(,} (jo[;ket for regulations of JUIY 26 1982 (~~

[’K 32274), docket N() f) I,I)F 11 090.

7

-’ R[~hert 1). Alor-riw)n, Kenneth A. I,epic, and John A. Baker.

“\’a(io~e Z(~n(J hlonitor-ing at a Hazardous Waste Disposal Fa-

(. illt\ ,“ ~]a~wr prcwntw] at the conference (Jhi]r:]ctf;rizat;or] and

.llon~toring” in thf: 1‘ado,sf? Zonf} spor~tored” h\’ the National \Vater

Llrell A~\()( Iatlon , l.a~ \’fIRas, N\’, Dec. 8-10, 1983.

“ i I ) r, I,, ( j ]{\”fJrf:t !, K a m f! n ‘1’ f:rn])o, j]r i irat f) r;o m m u n i(: at ion,

\l d r 2:}, 1 !)84.

“q [,, (;, [t i(’ ret t, 1,. (j. LIT i I LX) n, a n d E, L\’. H o\’1 rn a n, ‘‘ L’a d OS(’

Zon~” hlonlt(]rin~ for Hazardou~ b\raste Sites, ” performed uncfcr

(, [ ) rl t r CI[ ~ t IX(). [jH-() R~-x)$)o for t hc [1, S. E n ~i r-on me nta 1 f)rotw, t io n

~\gf:n[ \ [Sa nt;i H(irharti, (;A: Kamcn ‘1’ernpo), p[). 5-[j3.

“5 [J[ ‘t (’ r h rn(; t, \lr I w:() n si n I)c ~),~ rt m [;n t of Nat (]ral Rcsoll r( ‘(’~,

IJr]i ,It[’ ( (]mrnuni( atlon. hlar, 20, 1984 .

ifornia has proposed regulations that would require vadose zone monitoring in new installations.

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has installed suction lysimeters (albeit, not without

difficulty) at two existing low-level nuclear

waste landfills. This research projected was

started by USGS in 1981.76

A 2-year study of three sanitary landfills by

the Illinois State Geological Survey placed lysimeters under the existing landfills; all three had

contamination in the vadose zone that had not

been detected by groundwater monitoring

wells. 77 In one site the lysimeters showed that

a clay liner had ruptured and in another site

lysimeter monitoring showed that contamination detected by a monitoring well was coming from a different site. The researchers did

not experience the difficulties reported by

EPA,

There is also field experience with geophysical vadose zone monitoring techniques. A commercial hazardous waste disposal facility in

Oregon uses a vadose zone monitoring system

that “integrates lysimeters, dual purpose tensiometers/lysimeter units, and geophysical arrays to provide an early warning leak detection and sampling system. ” 78 A firm in Las

Vegas has installed three resistivity grids since

1980 at hazardous waste lagoons, and they are

all reported to be working well. 79

Many techniques available for monitoring in

the vadose zone for both new and existing land

disposal facilities have been evaluated. In 1980,

the University of Arizona Water Resources Research Center reviewed a number of techniques for vadose zone monitoring below waste

disposal sites for EPA. 80 Many of these are

781)r, John [3. Robertson, U .S, Geological SurIc\, pri~at(; (:onmun i[;ation, hlar. 23, 1984,

77 Th[)mas M. Johnson and Keros Cartn’right, hlonitorln~ Of

l,ea{;hatc ,llr’~ration in the [ ‘saturated Zone in the \’icr’njtJ ()/

Sani(arj Landfills. Circular 51 LI (Urbana, I I,: State Ceologi(:al

Sur\ey [)ilision, Illinois Institute of Natural Resources, 1980].

7BNI o rrlso n, f?t al., Op. cit.

7“I)r, Rohert Kaufmann, Conkrerw Consultants, I/as \’ega~, Ni’,

prik’atc (:omrrlllrli(:ation, hlar. 20, 1984.

~(1], (;, \$’ i ] son, hfon jforjng jrr the i ‘a ffosf; Zone: A R(?1‘r’(’l\’ c~f

Tcf; hni(;d] Elements and hff~thod. s, Fli’A-600/7-80-l 34 (lJas \’cgCi\,

Xl”: [ (,S, Iin~ir[Jnr~l(?rlt;]l Prote(;tion Agenc\, June 1980),
152 ● Superfund Strategy

commercially available and are in common

use. Another survey for EPA evaluated stateof-the-art techniques and techniques under research or development that are capable of localizing liner leaks.81

EPA, in rejecting the use of vadose zone

monitoring in 1982, referred to the University

of Arizona work but discussed only one of the

26 techniques evaluated, the suction lysimeter. 82 This technique was rejected largely because of cost, although no analysis was made

of the trade-off of avoiding the cost of cleaning the contaminated groundwater. The many

applications of vadose zone monitoring were

not reviewed. The extent to which the requirements in the reauthorized RCRA for leak detection systems might lead EPA to require vadose

zone monitoring is not clear.

Vadose zone monitoring techniques are not

generally easy to use nor are they inexpensive.

No one technique is universally applicable and

to get a reasonable assurance of detecting

leachate, several may have to be used at any

given site. However, the techniques for groundwater monitoring are also difficult, fallible, and

expensive. The cost of cleaning groundwater

can be tens of millions of dollars, depending

on the amount of contamination. Thus, even

if the technology for vadose zone monitoring

is more difficult and less reliable than groundwater monitoring there can be substantial benefits from detecting pollution early.

Delays in Starting Corrective Action

Under the Part 264 EPA standards for EPA

permitted facilities in a detection monitoring

mode, 83 if hazardous constituents are detected

by the groundwater monitoring system a “compliance monitoring” program must be instituted. This program consists of two parts, First,

the EPA permit writer will establish a “ground-

— —.

al M. j. Wa]]er and J. L. Davis “Assessment of Techniques to

Detect Landfill Liner Failings, ” Land Disposal of Hazardous

Waste, EPA-600 KI-82-002 (Cincinnati, OH: Municipal Environmental Researc; h Laboratory, March 1982), p. 239.

‘U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Summary and Analysis of Comments (40 CFR Part 264, Subparts F, K, L, M and

N)” (Washington, IX: Office of So]id Waste, July 9, 1982), p. 72.

~t40 (~FR part 264, Subpart F.

water protection standard” for the unit, which

will be specified in the permit for the facility.

Second, a new groundwater monitoring program will be instituted to determine whether

the unit is in compliance with its groundwater

protection standard. This new program will

consist of monitoring at the compliance point,

i.e., the edge of the disposal area, to detect any

statistically significant increase in the concentration levels of hazardous constituents.

The groundwater protection standard includes

the hazardous constituents to be monitored or

removed if necessary, the concentration limits

for each hazardous constituent that trigger corrective action, the “point of compliance” for

measuring concentration limits, and the compliance period,

The regulations require that the concentration limits be set at the background level of the

constituent in the groundwater or the maximum concentration limits for drinking water

established for any of the 16 hazardous constituents covered by the National Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulations, The facility owner may ask for a variance to establish

an alternate concentration limit (ACL) if he can

demonstrate that the constituent will not pose

a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment.

If the groundwater protection standard is exceeded, then another step, the corrective action program, is instituted. This program attempts to bring the facility into compliance

with the groundwater protection standard by

removing the hazardous waste constituents

from the groundwater or treating them in the

aquifer. The regulations require that corrective

measures be taken to clean up the plume of

contamination that has migrated beyond the

compliance point but not beyond the property

boundary.

Earlier it was shown that even in a well designed and properly functioning groundwater

detection monitoring system, a long time (even,

in some cases, decades) could elapse before

contamination from a leak from a hazardous

waste disposal site reached a detection monitoring well. However, because of the structure
of the EPA regulations, a long time could also

elapse between the time the contamination

reaches a monitoring well and the time anything is done about it. Table 5-14 shows a scenario where this elapsed time is over 2 years.

This example does not present a “worst case”

scenario, but simply illustrates times required

Table 5-14.—Scenario for Instituting Corrective Action

at a RCRA Permitted Site in Detection Monitoring

Jan. 1, 1984. —Contamination reaches groundwater detection

monitoring well.

Apr. 1, 1984. —Sample is drawn from monitoring well. Well

must be sampled semi-annually (40 C.F.R. 264.98(a)).

Assume average time to detect contamination is 3 months,

May 1, 1984. —Determination is made that there is a statistically significant increase over background. This determination must be made “within a reasonable time period”

(264,98(g)(2)). Assume 1 month, however, discussion in

next section will show this is optimistic.

Aug. 1, 1984, —Submit request to EPA for permit modification to establish compliance monitoring program. This

must be done within 90 days (264.98(h)(4). Include notice

of intent to seek a variance for alternate concentration

limits under part 264.98(b) (264.98 (h)(4) (iv)).

Nov. 1 1984.—Submit data to justify variance under part

264.94(b) for every hazardous constituent identified under

part 264.98(h)(2), This must be done within 180 days of the

time that a determination is made that there is a statistically significant increase over background (264.98(h)(5)(ii)(B)).

Mar, 7, 7985. —EPA rejects request for variance and issues

draft revised permit for compliance monitoring. No time

limit specified in the regulations. Assume it takes 4

months for EPA to review the data and prepare a draft permit. Notice is given for public comment.

Apr. 15, 1985.—End public comment period. Regulations require 45 days (124.10(b)).

May 15, 1985. —EPA issues revised draft. No time limit

specified in regulations. Assume it takes EPA 1 month

to review public comments and revise permit accordingIy. Compliance monitoring begins.

Aug. 15, 1985.—Submit request to EPA for permit modification to establish corrective action program. This must be

done within 90 days (264.99(i)(2) and 270.14(c)).

Sept. 1, 1985. —Submit engineering feasibility plan for corrective action program. This must be done within 180 days

of the time that the request for variance is rejected, i.e.,

Mar. 1, 1985 (264,98(h)(5)(ii)).

Dec. 1, 1985. —EPA issues draft revised permit for corrective

action. No time Iimit specified i n the regulations. Assume

it takes 4 months for EPA to review the data and prepare

a draft permit. Notice is given for public comment.

Jan. 15, 1986. —End public comment period, Regulations require 45 days (124.10(b)).

Feb. 15, 1986. —EPA issues revised permit. No time specified

in the regulations. Assume it takes EPA 1 month to review

public comments and revise the permit, Corrective action

begins,

Total elapsed time: 2 years 11⁄2 months not including delays

from statistical analysis.

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment –

Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 153

to work through the many steps prescribed by

the regulations.

The action required is that the plume of

groundwater contamination be cleaned up

from the edge of the disposal area to the property line. There is no requirement to find the

source of the leak and to repair it; and there

is no requirement t to stop disposal operations.

Statistical Analysis

Contamination in a well must be shown to

be a statistically significant increase over background levels, But doing this within 1 month

(see table 5-14) is very unlikely,

In sampling groundwater, there is considerable variability due to factors other than the introduction of waste-related contamination.

These include seasonal fluctuations, geochemical processes, perturbations introduced by the

monitoring well, contamination or other changes

introduced by the sampling technique, natural

and nonwaste contamination, variability in

chemical analysis, and a great many others. It

is necessary to distinguish changes in groundwater due to contamination from those due to

random or periodic effects. The EPA regulations for both Part 264 and Part 265 state that

when a sample of the groundwater is taken

from a monitoring well and analyzed for the

required contaminants, the results should be

compared with the previously determined background levels to see if there is any “statistically

significant “ increase in contamination .84 Statistical significance is determined by one of

several mathematical formulas approved by EPA.

There are four possible outcomes from such

a calculation:

1. The test could indicate that groundwater

is contaminated when in fact it is not (false

positive),

2, The test could indicate that groundwater

is contaminated when in fact it is (true

positive).

3. The test could indicate that groundwater

is not contaminated when in fact it is (false

negative).

~~~() (: ~: K ~[j~ ,$] T(ll] ~] 11(]~(j~.$] ~(~)].

38-745 0 - 85 - 6
154 ● Superfund Strategy

4. The test could indicate that groundwater

is not containinated when in fact it is not

(true negative).

A test for statistical significance attempts to

minimize the false positives and the false negatives. This can be done by increasing the sample size, i.e., by increasing the number of monitoring wells, the frequency of sampling, and

the number of samples taken. But for a given

sample size, any test of statistical significance

that reduces the probability of false negatives

also increases the probability of false positives

and vice versa.

There are two ways to design a test for statistical significance. One is to decide in advance the probability of detecting groundwater

contamination one wishes to achieve (the probability of detection being one minus the probability of a false negative). In this case the probability of a false positive will be a function of

the sample size and the variability of the data.

Another way is to determine in advance the

probability of a false positive and allow those

same factors to determine the probability of detection. In the former case the probability of

a false positive will not be known in advance

and in the latter case the probability of detecting contamination will not be known in advance, EPA has chosen the latter approach.

The cost of a false positive could be several

thousand dollars; e.g., the cost of additional

sampling and testing to establish that there is

actually no contamination. The cost of a false

negative, groundwater contamination that goes

undetected, could be large additional cleanup

costs and increased threats to human health

and the environment. And if the owner cannot afford the necessary corrective action, the

site might become a candidate for CERCLA action. Minimizing the occurrence of false positives reduces the short-range costs of disposal

site operators but OTA found no mention in

any EPA document of why this approach was

chosen over the other.

EPA proposed standards for monitoring interim status sites on December 18, 1978, 85

which included a statistical test with a proba-

‘-L1543 Fe(~er~] Ileglster 58982 .

bility of false positives (the level of significance]

of 5 percent. In the final regulations adopted

in 1980, EPA decreased the probability to 1 percent, But this increased the probability of false

negatives. In the preamble of the regulations,86

it is implied that the change was made because

of industry concerns over the cost of a false

positive. There does not seem to have been an

attempt to balance this against the cost of false

negatives borne by industry and the public.

In the 1982 regulations for EPA permitted

sites, EPA raised the probability of false positives to 5 percent once again, explaining:

EPA is fixing the level of significance for the

Student’s t-test at 0.05 for each parameter at

each well. When the Agency proposed this

significance level for interim status groundWater monitoring, it received some criticism

that this would produce too many notifications of contamination where none had actually occurred.

EPA recognizes that this could be a problem, particularly when there are many comparisons being made for different parameters

and for different wells. However, EPA is concerned that a lower significance level would

unduly compromise the ability to detect contamination when it did, in fact, occur.87

EPA did not, however, raise the probability

of false positives from 1 to 5 percent at the interim status sites. No explanation was given for

not including interim status facilities in this

decision,

OTA has tried to find an estimate by EPA of

the probability of detecting groundwater contamination by this statistical procedure. While

EPA documents contain many discussions and

calculations of false positives, OTA could not

find an estimate of the probability of a false

negative. The only related material is a study

for EPA that was to “estimate the false positive

and false negative probabilities for various statistical procedures. ”88 However, the study estiJJ1345 Federa] Register 33195.

13T47 Federa] Register 32303.

88 J R13 Associates, “Evaluation of Statistical Procedures for

Croundwater Monitoring” in U .S, Environmental Protection

Agency, Ground-water Monitoring Guidance for Owners and

Operators of Interim Status F’aciiities, SW-963 (Washington, IX:

(Iffice of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, March 1983).
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup Ž 155

. .

mated the probabilities of false negat il~es for

onlj’ one statistical proccdu re, and that one is

not the one that EPA uses.

hfore recently, EPA has :l(:kl~~)\\l[](lg[}[~ that:

. . . the t-test, as it is [;urrenfly being applied,

is i 11 equippe(i to deal ~~’it h t be i’er~’ small data

sets t)[!i n,g generate(] . . . nor can it eff(;(; tik’eljr

han(ll[) th(; w’i(ie an(] largel~. unknolt’n variabilities d[ie to spatial. t(~m~)ora], sarn~]ling, arl(]

a n a 1 j’ t i (, ~) rob 1 [: IT1 .s. 8’)

The conference report for the recent ly reauthorized R~ RA that deals with surface impoundments notes that in addition to a statist icall~ sign ificant increase o~rcr background

con cent rat ions “other ct’idencc of leaking ,

su(; h as ~’isible leaks or su(lden drops in liquid

level of the impoundment, also ~iould be sufficient, ‘‘~0 I t is not ~ le a r, howe~’er, to what extent EPA might act on this use of adjuncts to

stat i st ic al analysis.

Compliance Monitoring

Compliance monitoring at permitted facilities measures the degree and extent of the

ground ~t’ater contaminant ion. Results are espec i all}’ i rnportant i n designing a n(l e~aluat ing

correct ikre actions. Su(:b rnon itoring is (lifficult

a n d e x ] ] c ns i ~’ e:

1 n a t~pi(;a] (:ase . . . determining the extent

a n ( 1 s(: IT e r i t }’ () f’ a ~) 1 u m e e m a n a t i n g f’r () m o n e

single sou r(:e in a sh a I loik aquifer requires

(loze ns () f mo rl i to r i n g ;t’el IS a II(1 h u n(l re(ls () f

sa mi)les. I t also takes ii ~r-eat (ieal of t i me an(l

s(: [’[: r:11 h u n (i r-[;(i t h () u sa n (i ( i()11 a I-s. I f t h (: g(:-

olog J’” is mo r(; (;() m [)1(:x () r s(; i’era 1 pot en t i al

(;() 1) t:] m i na t i [Jr] sou r-(, ()~ [:x i st, t h [: (;0s! \tri11 })[;

on t ho or(]er of’ h a 1 f a m i 1] ion (]01] ars. I n a (:a se

itrh er[) t h [: aq u i f’f:r is (i e[)~) or su rf’ace feat u rcs

(;a nnot h(:ll) in (let(!rnli n i ng t )](; t)jr(lr’og(;ologj’,

(:() sts (:oulci soar t () $2 () r $3 m i 11 if) n .[]l

Here again, as with the placement of the

monitoring wells, the science of hydrogeolog~’

enters, but with the additional requirement to

model and predict underground contaminan~

flow. Such modeling is not a routinelj a\ailable technique like well drilling or chemical

analysis; it is state-of-the-art scientific research

generally carried out by universities and a fe~~’

companies. Where modeling ground~~’ater flo~t’

is possible, predicting cent am i nant ilow ma]’

still be very difficult if possible at al 1 (see the

section on the vadose zone in this chapter]. As

pointed out in 1982:

It is not prcsentljr possil)lo” to (ieieJIIn in[; ho~l

thousands of inditidua] (:hem icals iirill react

in the grwun(i ~i’ater entri ron m(; nt or to con f’icientlj’ predict the aggregate ef’fe(:ts of’ n u mer -

OUS ])ro(;esses such as iitten[lat ion, (i is])ersioll,

a n (i c1 i ffu si () n. A vast a mOLI n I () f’ fi [;l(i d a t a

t~ould be required to de~relo~) ;I reliable basis

for such predictions.

It is frequently suggested that mo(lelin~

coul(i serx~e as an adequate ])redi(:t i~re t 001 for

this purpose. Ilowevcr. e~’en deta ileci in~est igat ions which might cost on the or(ier of

$250,000 tO $500,000 per site ma] not ])ro[i(ie

enough data t () de~’elo~) a model t () t)e u s(; (I i n

this capacitj. Furthermore, :1 rf:lat i~ely su(:-

(;essful model based on adequate data (:a n only

be expecte[i to yield results ~lithirl an or(i(:r

of magnitude of the actual s ituat ion. This I(N(:I

of” a(; (;{lra(:y rnajr not be a(:(:el)t able ~fhen ])~lblic health is at risk an(~ (:rit i(;al (;ol](;(:rltr;] tiorls”

are mea SL1 red i n parts per b i ] ] ion.

“1’hc process of obtaining the data for j)re-

(i i(; t ing ground water (;ond it ions, i nterprct i ng

the information and makin~ a(; (:uratc dc(: isions to implement complian(:e monitori” ng is

a s [; i e n t i f’i (: endeavor. I t c a n o n 1}. b e (: a r r i cd

out in a confident manner t)yr ~~’ell t rai n(:(i

groun(iwater technicians. There is ~)resently’

a se~’ere shortage of trained grou n(i II’ at (;I

scientists in the public an(i pri~’at (~ st:(:t ( )r, tin(i

it is doubtful that t her(} is su ff’i(:i(!nt t a l(:nt

available to work on more t ban a re]at i~’e]~

sma 11 percentage of the existing sit (?s t h ;I t

~vou ld fa 11 u n d er the (:() m p 1 i a n ( :(; m ( ) n i t () r i n H

aSpWt S of the II(:W’ haza I’(i OUS ~~’ast [: regu ] ;I -

t ions .q2

“ I ),I\ i[~ \l’. k 1 I I It’r , ( 1(’r(i p,ll t \ K h 1 il 1(’r, 1 rl[ t[’~t I rr]c)fl 1’ t]{ ‘i I I I t’

tl[),i] IIIg I )f t]}f) ] ] ( )iist> SII!N ( )rll]llittt>t> ( III N,)t l]r’,il I{f>>l)llr( ()~, \:l’i-

( Ii I t \I I (~ ]<f~~t,,i r( II ,1 rl[ \ F: Ill I r~ )rl ll}f~rlt. N (J\ :10, 1 ‘H\2.
156 ● Superfund Strategy

EPA seems to understand these shortcomings for modeling and predicting contaminant

flow. The preamble to the regulations states:

The way to meet this objective [of protection] is to avoid regulatory schemes that principally rely on complicated predictions about

the long term fate, transport, and effect of hazardous constituents in the environment. Such

predictions are often subject to scientific uncertainties about the behavior of particular

constituents in the hydrogeologic environment and about the effects of those constituents on receptor populations.93

However, the RCRA permit writers’ manual

in its instructions for evaluating the design of

a corrective action program takes a somewhat

different view of the capability of hydrogeology in predicting contaminant flow:

Predictions of groundwater flow patterns

throughout the contaminated areas, including

the drawdowns and hydraulic gradients, that

will be established by the recovery system

should be provided. On the basis of predicted

withdrawal rates, estimates should be provided for the time required to exchange an

amount of groundwater equivalent to that

originally contaminated,

The applicant will need to use either analytical solutions or numerical (computer)

models to provide these predictions of the response of groundwater on site to the proposed

recovery system.

To summarize, the requirement that compliance monitoring predict plume movement is

a regulatory requirement t that depends on a

technology which does not really exist. Thus,

EPA is putting more reliance on state-of-theart technology to clean up pollution than it does

to prevent pollution.

Corrective Action

Corrective action regulations for permitted

facilities require that contaminated groundwater be cleaned to background levels. Background

contaminant levels can be, and frequently are,

extremely low if they are known at all. The regulations require technology which is capable

9347 Federal Register 32283

of removing contaminants to below the level

of detection. But again, the corrective action

requirements ask for technology that does not

really exist. This is acknowledged by EPA in

the preamble to the regulations which states:

. . . the technology of performing corrective

action is new. The Agency’s and the regulated

community’s experience in conducting remediation activities (beyond the feasibility study

stage) is fairly limited to date.94 The standards

are based on the hope that technology will become available in the future as stated in the

preamble. The national experience with groundwater cleanup . . . is relatively limited at this

time. EPA expects that over time, the state of

knowledge about groundwater cleanup measures will improve.95

The most comprehensive study of attempts

to clean up sites where groundwater had been

polluted was made by EPA in 1980.96 This was

a study of 169 hazardous waste sites requiring

remedial action. Groundwater was polluted at

110 sites. In most cases the groundwater supply

was abandoned and replaced by a pipeline to

another source. In very few cases, because of

the high costs, was there any attempt to clean

up the groundwater, and none were cleaned

to background levels.

Although experts have little experience in restoring polluted groundwater to below detection levels, some attempts have been made to

restore groundwater to some degree. It is difficult, very expensive, and the results have been

mixed. Typically, treatment of a plume is considered adequate when levels of volatile organics are at or below 100 μg/l. Operating costs for

a single site can run over a million dollars a

year for 20 or 30 years. One expert summed

up the situation:

Substantial efforts are now being made to

reclaim polluted groundwater. In the southwestern U. S., where highly prolific alluvial

aquifers are common, a number of problems

9447 Federa] Register 32313.

9547 Federal Register 32286.

WIN. Nee]y, D. Gillespie, F. Schauf, and J. Walsh, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Remedial Actions at Hazardous

Waste Sites: Survey and Case Studies, EPA 430/9-81-05, SW-91O

(Washington, DC: Oil and Special Materials Control Division,

January 1981).
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup Ž 157

can be encountered when attempting to reclaim polluted groundwater. First, many of

the zones of polluted water are large—often

in the range of thousands or tens of thousands

of acre-feet. This results in the need to pump

substantial amounts of water, which must

then be treated and/or disposed. Decades will

be required to remove polluted water in many

situations. Second, pumpage of groundwater

for reclamation often has legal constraints.

Third, land ownership often presents a formidable problem, because polluted zones frequently extend beyond property controlled by

the responsible entity. Fourth, relatively deep

water levels usually allow substantial amounts

of pollutants to be in the vadose zone, where

pumping is not effective. Fifth, pumping

schemes are inherently inefficient in heterogeneous, non-isotropic alluvial aquifers, due

to inflow of unpolluted water during pumping. Because of the many limitations of reclamation, groundwater quality management

should focus on aquifer protection.97

The regulations permit two basic corrective

approaches. The first is to pump out the contaminated groundwater. This is not always

simple:

in very arid portions of the country,

groundwaters are generally located well

below the ground surface. Therefore, it may

be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to

pump such underground waters. In complex

geologic environments, contaminants may

perch on clay layers, In such circumstances,

even if pumping of surrounding waters were

possible, such pumping would not succeed in

bringing contaminants to the surface. In addition, in these circumstances, the depth of

the contaminant layer may prohibit trenching

to reach the contaminants . . . Shallow aquifers may not have sufficient waters to permit

effective pumping. In addition, certain tight

clay formations may prohibit effecting pumping from shallow aquifers. In these circumstances, if excavation is not possible, it is impossible to remove all contaminants.98

8TKenneth D. Schmidt, “Limitations in lmp]ementing Aquifer

Reclamation Schemes,” paper presented at Third National Symposium on Aquifer Restoration and Groundwater Monitoring

sponsored by the National Water Well Association, Columbus,

OH, 1983.

““’’Comments on Interim Final Hazardous Waste Regulations

Promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection

The EPA RCRA permit writers’ guide recognizes these difficulties and gives technological

approaches for handling them. Where there is

insufficient groundwater for efficient pumping,

then fresh water must be injected into the aquifer by injection wells to flush out the plume of

contamination. But the plume itself is the lesser

problem:

. . . the removal of additional amounts of

water, frequently many times in excess of that

originally contaminated, will be required to

reduce contaminant concentrations to acceptable levels . . . Many of the hazardous constituents present in any plume of contamination

migrating from a hazardous waste management facility will likely be subject to some

amount of adsorption to the geologic materials

on site . . . as contaminated groundwater is removed from the subsurface and replaced by

water of lower contaminant concentrations,

contaminants will desorb from subsurface solids and establish new equilibrium concentrations of contaminants in the groundwater.

Thus, the process of restoring groundwater

quality will become a process, in most cases,

of not only removing contaminants originally

present in groundwater but also of removing

contaminants adsorbed to subsurface solids.

The expensive process of pumping huge

amounts of water for decades does not guarantee that cleanup standards will be met. The

issue of whether EPA will insist on full compliance with its standards when faced with

such costs becomes important. In addressing

such public concerns, an EPA official wrote:

“It may be costly and take decades, but it can

be done and under the regulations the owner

is required to undertake it.”99 However, EPA’s

instructions to their permit writers are less optimistic:

. . . the permit writer should also consider the

relative costs of these measures when determining the adequacy of flushing rates predicted for proposed recovery systems. InAgency Pursuant to Sections 3004 and 3005 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Docket 3004, Permitting Standards

for Land Disposal Facilities” (Washington, DC: The American

Petroleum Institute, Nov. 23, 1983].

~Lee M. Thomas, Assistant Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, letter to Senator Robert C. Byrd, Dec. 30,

1983.
158 . Superfund Strategy

creasing flushing by increasing pumping rates

and the number of wells, well points, and/or

drains will certainly increase the costs associated with the recovery system. Similarly, requiring the use of injection wells and/or increasing their number and rates of injection

will increase cost. In some cases, particularly

as flushing rates become higher, the cost of

increasing flushing rates by requiring these

design changes will become disproportionally high relative to the additional flushing

achieved and the advantages gained.

Thus, the permit writer will need to balance

a number of factors when reviewing the adequacy of flushing rates expected from a proposed recovery system.

The EPA permit writers’ guide also points

out many problems that may be encountered

in attempting corrective action and it does not

have solutions to all of them. For example, the

problem of cleaning up immiscible fluids is

poorly understood.

Once contaminated water is pumped out of

the ground, something must be done with it.

One solution is to remove the contaminants

and return the cleaned water to the aquifer.

This has been tried at some CERCLA sites.

Table 5-15 shows some examples of the kind

of levels of cleanup that can be practically

(albeit at great cost) achieved using the most

common techniques. Although impressive,

these results are far from background levels,

and are higher than generally accepted safe

levels.

A second technology that the RCRA groundwater protection standards allow for corrective action is “in situ” treatment. This is the

introduction of chemical or biological agents

into the aquifer to react with and destroy the

hazardous constituents. If anything, even less

is known about these technologies than those

discussed above, as the permit writers’ guide

points out:

. . . to date in situ treatment has been applied

in only limited circumstances, and little experience is available that can be related directly to the cleanup activities required in Part

264 corrective actions programs. In most cases,

use of’ these techniques will assume the character of a field experiment.

Table 5.15.—Removal of Selected Specific Organics

From Groundwater

Process effluent concentration range*

Organic compound Adsorption Stripping Biological

phenol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <10 — 10-50

toluene ., . . . . . . . . . . . <100 <10 10-50

benzene. . . . . . . . . . . . . <50 <10 1o-1oo

ethyl acetate . . . . . . . . — — 10-20

formaldehyde . . . . . . . . — — 50-100

aceton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — 10-20

methyl ethyl ketone . . — 25,000 10-20

aniline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <10 10-50

nitroaniline . . . . . . . . . . 50-100 - 10-50

methanol . . . . . . . . . . . . — 15,000 10-50

isopropanol. . . . . . . . . . — 10,000 10-50

isobutanol . . . . . . . . . . . — 40,000 10-50

methylene chloride . . . <100 200 <50

trichloroethylene . . . . . <10 5-1o <10

1,1 ,1-trichloroethane . . <10 50 10-50

1,1,2-trichloroethane . . <10 50 10-50

tetrachlorethylene . . . . 5-1o 5-1o 10-200

nitrobenzene. . . . . . . . . <10 — 100-1,000

Wow: All values in Pg/1 or ppb.

SOURCE: J. R. Absalon and M. R. Hockenbu~, “Treatment Alternatives Evaluation for Aquifer Restoration” (paper presented at the Third National

Symposium on Aquifer Restoration and Groundwater Monitoring sponsored by the National Water Well Association, Columbus, OH, May

19s3).

The purpose of this discussion is not to condemn available technologies for cleaning up

contaminated aquifers. However, it is possible

to see the predicament facing a facility operator with a need to take corrective action. To

abandon his facility, thus making it a Superfund site, may seem an attractive option.

Estimating Future Needs

Data to Illustrate the Scope of the Problem

About 2,000 hazardous waste land disposal

facilities required to conduct groundwater

monitoring have filed for interim status. Many

more may require regulation, particularly surface impoundments. (Note that injection wells

are regulated under another statute and not by

the RCRA groundwater protection standards

although they are used for hazardous waste

disposal.) Various EPA data provide some indication of the number of hazardous waste

management facilities that might threaten

groundwater: surface impoundments, 770;

landfills, ZOO; injection wells, 700; land treatment, 70; waste piles, 170; and storage and

treatment tanks, 2,040.
C)rI’i\ l)iiS ilIli]lJrZ(?(l th(l (i[lttl from E 1)/l’S 1981

stu(l~’ of ~j’ast(; nlanagcn~[:~)t to examine the c.xtont ‘to ~~’hi(:h lan(] disposal fa(:ilitie.s re(:ei~’c

t ox i(; hazardous Jt’astes. Tox i(: Llastcs ~)rcscnt

long-term (:hroni(: health risks and arc to bc

(:ont rastwl 1~’ith ~~’astes that a r[? haza r(lous onl~r

on the basis of (:llar[~(:t(}r’isti(:s such as react itit~, ignitabilit}r, and corrosilrit~r. The da~a in-

(li(:ate that a significant t fr:](~tioI]—p(:rh:]i).s a

majori[~r-of the [~rastcts being placed in land

(Iisposa] facilities nation ~~’ide arc to.yic chemicals that Lt’ould pose long-term health problems if released into the eni’ironment. For surface impoundments and lfindfills almosl

LI’ astes ma}’ be toxic, \\’h ile for i nje(:t io

a b o u t one-third o f t h e w’as t es ma}’ be

Number of Future NPL Sites

all the

1 I\’ells

toxic.

Planning needs to take into account the possibility}’ that currently operating RCRA hazardous ivaste facilities will become future NPL

sites. The reasons are:

● Hazardous waste land disposal facilities

ha~’e a poor record of performance. They

continue to be used for toxic materials posing long-term problems. Even w’ith the

man}’ changes in the recent RCRA reauthorization, including the etrentual limits

on some land disposal, low’ -cost land disposal will remain widely used for some

time.

●

●

Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 1 5 9

‘1’he (:urrent groun(]~~’atcr ])rotc(;t ion st al)(la rds are so i n a d eq u a t c that, t! II (: II ~~’ i t h

perfect compliance, the} l$oul(l not ])r(?-

~’en t the release of hazardous subst a n (:(:s

from man~ of the faci]it ies thc~r (:oicr. R[)-

leases are unlike]}’ to tw (Icte(:t(xl earl~

enough i n al] cases t o ] i m i t (;(III t a n) i na t ion

to l(l\’~lS that ~~’ould or (;oul(i be cffc(:t i~(;l~

cleaned L1 p b}; R~ RA faci ] i t ~’ o]wra t {)rs.

One important conscquen(;e of th(; r(:authorized R~RA ma} bc to l~astc]~ the (:losing of the worst hazardous ~t’aste fa(: i lit ies.

Man\ owners find opera t(lrs ma}’ escape

near-term and possibl}’ long-term respo nsibilit~’ for cleaning up sites that ha~’c scrious enough problems to e~~entuall~’ place

them on the NFL.

As indicated earlier, it is possible onl} to estimate the number of facilities that might become future NPL sites. On the basis of the analysis in this chapter, OTA helic~’es that a reasonable estimate is that at least half of the approximately 2,OOO operating hazardous waste facilities that are or should be subject to RCRA

groundwater protection standards will become

NPL sites. Many more sites may require cleanup, but they might be cleaned up b~’ their owners or users.

THE SITE SELECTION PROCESS

This section describes EPA’s current proc- tification, and Federal resources are not being

ess for selecting sites for the NPL (figure 5-I]. supplied. EPA policy is to place highest priority

This process was analyzed to ascertain the like- on evaluating already identified sites. Only a

lihood that sites that merit cleanup will not be few States, including New York, Michigan, and

placed on the NPL. California, have developed programs to identify additional sites, However, even without

emphasis on discovering new sites, the nationSite Identification al inventory has been growing steadily, to

There is a large backlog of about 12,000 sites, about 19,000 by late 1984. -

that have not y& been evaluated. Efforts to dis- The argument has been made that the vast

cover sites have slowed. For the most part, majority of the worst sites have been identified.

States do not have the resources for site iden- But there are likely to be older, abandoned sites
760 ● Superfund Strategy

Figure 5.1 .—Summary Site Scoring Flowchart

I

NO further

I

action; site

placed in

I

ERRIS

I

Validated

None

I —

I

I

High

I

I

Step 7

Review and

QA check ERRIS

inventory

G.T. 28.5

,

Step 7

National

Priorities

List

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup Ž 161

and sites that pose indirect environmental hazards that have not been identified.

Setting Priorities for Sites

As a result of the “desk-top” preliminary

assessment (PA) based on known information,

priorities for subsequent actions at the site are

established. Each site is given a high, medium,

low, or no priority ranking. Without priority,

a site is retained in EPA’s basic site inventory,

ERRIS (Emergency and Remedial Response Information System), High-priority sites are immediately inspected; the others wait their turn,

Sites with low priority are unlikely to get attention. (Although some States may request inspection of low-priority sites, this does not yet

appear to be happening. ) Documentation is required only if a low or no priority status is

assigned, There are no national EPA guidelines

or criteria for setting priorities, The process is

subjective, rests on professional judgment, and

provides little assurance of consistency among

EPA Regions or States. No national data are

available on the numbers of sites in the various priority categories. On most occasions, little attempt is made to verify the completeness

or accuracy of the information upon which the

priority judgment is made.

Although States usually conduct PAs, regional EPA offices, EPA contractors, and Field Investigation Teams (FIT), also conduct them.

The States are supposed to perform this task

to a greater extent in the future. For fiscal year

1985, EPA has budgeted $1,800 per PA for

State work. An example of the type of guidance

provided by some Regions is given in figure 5-2

for EPA Region 5. The guidance is minimal.

In addition, as a practical matter, sites that do

not affect a large population are less likely to

receive a high priority, even though they may

present serious hazards,

Figure 5-2.— Region 5 Prioritization Criteria

High

priority

for

inspection

1. Known hazardous waste onsite.

and

2. Known contamination of surface, water,

groundwater, or air,

or

Potential to affect large population

I

Medium

priority 1. Known or suspected hazardous waste onsite.

for and

2. Potential to contaminate surface water, inspection groundwater or air,

or

I Potential to affect any population. I

Low

priority

for

inspection

(pending)

I

1. Known or suspected hazardous waste onsite,

and

No potential to contaminate surface water,

groundwater, or air,

and

No potential to affect any population.

2. Site has been or is being evaluated and State

is taking action.

3. No known hazardous waste onsite, but the

potential exists.

No

further I

1. No hazardous waste onsite.

-- I

action I 2. Site has been cleaned up. I or

3. Hazardous material onsite, but handled correctly.

Complete documentation needed to justify

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Site Inspections

Most site inspections (SIs) are conducted by

EPA FIT contractors with the purpose of obtaining data to evaluate and score the site to

determine its eligibility for placement on the

NPL. SIs involve considerable field work, often

with limited sampling and analysis. For fiscal

year 1985, EPA has budgeted $16,800 per SI

for State work. The order in which sites are in-
162 ● Superfund Strategy

spected does not necessarily reflect the priorities assigned in the earlier step. Instead, inspection schedules take into account geographic distribution and other logistical factors.

~Tithin the same region, the completeness Of

the information entered into the S1 form ~aries

(:onsiderabl~’ according to who conducted t h~~

i nspe(;t ion, prior known facts about the site,

suspected hazards, and other factors. ‘1’he lack

of detailed guidance can lead

inaccuracies that can have an

on site scoring.

to data [roids or

important effect

Site Scoring

Sites are scored by an established procedure

called the Hazard Ranking System (HIM), ~1’hicll

can be regarded as a crude hazard or risk

assessment. A n initial scoring is conducted h}r

the State, the region, or the FIT. ‘f’h~~r~: are reviews at the EPA regional and headquarters

levels, with EPA headquarters assigning the

final score. All the facts pro~’idwl in the file arc

assumed correct. The c u t o f’f sc o rc of’ 28. ~ LIT as

(:hosen to proi’ide an original N PI, of 400 sites,

the minimum required by statute. E’I’A has retained this cutoff for a[ir?lix]i.strati~~f: (:omvenicncc and consistenc~ o~~er time, t?ITen thou~~h

there is no technical justification !hr tmlic~’in,q

that sites writh lower scores do not mcrif cleal]-

~]p. Sites dcs ignated by States as their highest

~)rioritl site are exam~)tccf from t hf: (:utoff. As

of SeJ)tember 1984, onl}’ se\7en sites ii’ i t }1 sf;ort)s

ICSS than 28.5 were on the NP1..

The H KS methodology has been crit ized elsewhere, and the major prok)lcms 11

7 ill bc summa rized only b r iefl y here. 100 The final score is

a co rnpos ite of’ three migration route s(:ores f’o r

grou Ild water , Su I’f’ace Lva ter, ~Ild iii r. some of’

the major problems i~rith the H RS are:

● ‘1’here is a ~rer} strong bias t(]~tra r(i human

health effects, with little chaJ](:(~ of” a site

~etting a high score if ther[: art} ])rimaril}

e n~’i ro n mental haza r(ls or t h r(:a ts.

● 1“() 1’ hU Hli+ 11 heii Ith Cff M:t S, t h[;l’[; iS {i St1’01)~

I)ias in faker of high aff’e(:ted ~)tj])ulations.

“’’’s(’(’ [ I’(){’A +/)( )/) 01) ,s( ‘/(‘[ /10/) [)/ 1 /(//,1 /”{/01/ \ I 1 ‘(l $(( ‘ .s/ /( ‘~ /()/’

,s///)( ‘1 ”/[/1)(/ /’/) /lo//l L/, [ I s S(,l),lll, ( :[)111111 Itt(v’ (1[) :\l)[)I’[)~)l’l( ltloll\,

\l(l 1’( 11 1 ‘182.

For the air route there must be docunlentation (e. g., laboratory data) of’ a release,

but ther~] is no su(:h I’equircm(?nt foI” th(:

Lt’ater routes.

S(:oring for toxicit}’/pt;]sistell[:c ma} be

based on a site contaminant, ~th i(;h is Ilot

ne(;essa rily one with a kno~vn or potential

relca se.

A site tvith a ~cr~’ high score for on[! migrat ion route but zero or ier}r low” s(; ores for

the other twro routes can get a re]at i[~el~’

low total score, ~~’hile a site with modera t e scores for all three routes might get a

hi~her score: in other ~~ordst a~[!raging the

rou tc scores c rca tes a bias against a site

~l~ith one parti(;~l]arlj’ important hazar’d.

Onlj the quantit~ and not the distribution

of [vaste is considered, ct’en though s i nlilar quantities ()~’er ma rke(il}r differ[; nt

areas pose d i f’f’e re n t t h rea ts,

Variability Among EPA Regions

‘1’able 5-16 presents data, arranged hj I~I~A

Region, on a number of aspects of’ the site selection process. No matter ~vhat statist i[; is exami n[; d, there is (:() n si(lf:rahle \Ta riabi 1 it~ a nlon~

t h[?

●

●

●

●

●

●

Regions. Some examples are:

‘h: p(H’C(Hlt Of ~jKKIS Sk thilt hN(! hCcome NP1, sites \raries from 1.1 per(;ent

(Region 7) to 5.3 percent (Region 2],

The percent of tllf; national ERR] S in\cn -

tor~’ by Region ~rarie,s from 3 per(;ent (Region 8) to 20 per(:ent (Region 5).

‘1’he percent of the national NP1, hj Region

i~aries from 3 per(:ent (Regions 7 and 8) to

26 ~)er(;cnt (Region 5).

Sei’era] Regions ha~e a high fraction of’

NpI, sites (:(jllll)tllTecj to ERKIS sites (Kcgions 1, 2, 3, and 5]. TLtro Regions ha~e

much smaller f’ra[; t ions of the N]]) I. s itcs

(;om])ared to F1 RRIS sites (Regions 6 and 7).

F’or f’is(;al ~ear 1985, plans to ~)erf’orm PAs

as a f’ract ion of the Keg ional E R R 1,S n u nlber Irarics f’rom 4 percent (Region 6) to 38

percent (Region 8).

fJO1° f’iS(;al }’(~aI’ 1 {]8~, ~)hillS to PWfoI’111 SIS

as a fraction of the Regional ERRIS number Iarics frOITI 1 percent (R(:gi(~ns 5 an(]

7) to 7 percent (Region 1 O).
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 163

.

Table 5-16.—Site Selection Variability Among EPA Regions

ERR IS

Region Number

1 . . 937

2 . 2,313

3 . 1,741

4 3,423

5 3,689

6 2,289

7 1.318

8 576

9 1,388

10 : 878

% N P L

4.8

5.3

3.4

19

3 8

1.3

11

31

19

2.4

% of national FY 85

total Preliminary Assessments (PAs)

ERR IS NPL Number (%, ERRIS) $(000)

5 8 240 (26) 432

12 23 NA NA NA

9 11 NA NA

18 12 1,135 (33) 2,043

20 26 1,295 (35) 2,331

12 5 100 ( 4) 100

7 3 290 (22) 522

3 3 220 (38) 396

7 5 NA NA NA

5 4 260 (30) 468

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment US ing data from various EPA documents

● Regions 4 and 10 appear to ha~’e planned

for a large PA/S I effort for fiscal jear 1985

as (;ompared to their fra(; tion of the national ERRIS sites. Con~erse]y, Regions 5,

7, and ~ hate relativel}r small efforts (;onlparcd to their fraction of the national ERRIS

sites.

Data on trariations in total and t:omponent

H KS data for EPA Regions and the Nation arf;

~i[’cn in table ,5-17. While the Iariation a nlon~

total scores for the regions is not great, there

:~ re (: o ns i (Ic rab 1 e ~’ a r i a t i o ns for t h e c o m po n e n t

scores. This sug~ests problems in the Hazar(]

Ranking Sj’stem.

I n part i(:ular, for most regions the air route

s(; o res are ~er~’ Ioit’, t~r it h the notable ~:x(:ept ions of” Rf;gions 1 and fi ~~’hic:h ha~re r[?lt]ti~(:])’

h i~h s(;ort;s ~trith high (:orrc]at ions oi’ those

FY 85

Site Investigations (SIs)

Number (% ERRIS) $(000)

55 (6) 921

NA NA NA

NA NA NA

190 (6) 3,183

25 (1) 419

100 (4) 4

10 (1) 168

15 (3) 251

NA NA NA

65 (7) 1,088

FY 85 PA/Sl

Total

$(000) % Total

1,353 7

1,775 10

1,820 10

5,226 28

2,750 15

1.869 10

690 4

647 3

805 4

1.556 8

scores LV ith the total scores. To ascertain the

extent and significance of the national 1’ a ri ability in air scores, a more detailed anal~.sis ii’as

done; thf; results are giten in tat)lf; 5-18.

In examining the number of’ sites writh a nonzero a i r s(; ore, i t is seen that Regions 4, 5, a no

{] h[l~c rt}l a t i~’el}’ ]ow’ fra(; t ions. For all l-legions,

.

20 percent of the N PI. sites recci~’cd nonz{)ro”

a i r S(: o res, but w i th ou t Regions 4, 5. a n ( i 9 t h ~] t

fraction increases to 29 per(;ent. Of’ morf! i mportance is the number of sites it’ i(h :~1] air

score for ~~’hich placement on t h[! N’ P 1, is (: ru -

c i al ] }r dependent on that a i r sc f) rc ( t ~] OSC sit [!s

that would ha~’e a total H KS score b[;lo~~ 28.5

Lt’ ithout their air scores). (~onsidcr t h[! f’ra(: t ion

of” crucial sites relati~rc to the nu mbf}r of h’ ]}],

sites. W’ithout Regions 4, 5, and !1, n i nc ))er(;(;II t

of’ IX PI, sites depend on t hci r air S( :or(?s for ,N 1) 1,

stat us, (:() m pa red t o 6 pcr(; e nt f’o r a 11 R [;(q i ( ) ns.

Table 5-17. —Summary Statistics on Hazard Ranking Scores

EPA Regton Number NPi- sites Mean total Mean GW R GW-total

1 45 466 67,3 0.557

2 122 449 627 0.468

3, 59 403 492 0.525

4 . . . 66 42,9 68,5 0.777

5 137 425 68,6 0.710

6 29 435 59,0 0557

7 . . . 14 385 52.7 0748

8 18 459 61 1 0722

9 . . 28 392 515 0.578

10 21 409 525 0.443

A l l 539 425 593 0712

Mean SW

207

203

195

16.0

129

190

19 3

390

202

137

201

R SW-total

0.433

0443

0475

0173

0272

0,120

0,431

0652

0.368

0.282

0.435

Mean A

169

139

207

228

379

249

118

878

642

19.3

129

R A-total

0.570

0390

0299

0012

0232

0539

0179

0270

0007

0335

0.055
164 ● Superfund Strategy

—

Table 5-18.—Analysis of NPL Sites With Air Route HRS Scores

Sites with-air scores

—

Number Number/percent N-umber/percent Crucial sites,

Region of NPL sites of NPL sites crucial for Iistinga

percent of NPL sites

1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 ‘1 2/27 3/25 7

2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 30/25 9/30 7

3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 22/37 9/41 15

4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 3/5 0/0 o

5..... . . . . . . . 141 11/8 2/18 1

6. . . . . . . . 30 13/43 2/15 7

7... . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4/29 1/25 7

8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3/17 0/0 o

9.... . . . . . . 29 3/10 2/67 7

10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7/33 3/43 14

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546 108/20 31/29 6

Without regions 4,5,9... . . . . . ..., . . —.

309 91/29 27/30 9 —

aA ~(te has a ~rUclal alr Score ,f ItS total HRS score without the alr score would be below 285 the cutoff fOr Placement on the NpL

SOURCE US Environmental Protection Agency, NPL dated September 1983

If the 9 percent is applied to the NPL sites of

Regions 4, 5, and 9 (and accounting for the four

crucial sites), then there is an indication that

17 sites may have been missed due to the procedures followed in these three Regions. This

discrepancy could increase if more attention

is given to Subtitle D landfills, which often pose

problems of methane generation.

Although the groundwater route clearly has

the highest scores and the highest correlation

with total scores in table 5-I7, here too there

is considerable variation among the regions.

Most of the variations are difficult to explain

other than through administrative, procedural,

or policy variations among the Regions and

States. The one exception is probably for Regions 1, 2, 3, and 5 (and to a lesser extent for

Region 4), for which an argument could be

made that these locations have a substantially

greater number of uncontrolled sites resulting

from earlier periods and higher densities of industrial activities as compared to the rest of the

Nation.

Estimate of Future NPL

Many sites may not be making it through the

site selection system, Available statistical data

support this view.

Table 5-19 gives the results of a 1983 survey

of States conducted by the Association of State

and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials (ASTSWMO), States were asked to identify the number of sites that might require

cleanup and the number of sites needing a

cleanup response. This table also gives the

number of sites in EPA’s ERRIS inventory and

on the NPL (as of August 1984), These data reveal marked differences between the estimates

made by States and EPA data for the total population of uncontrolled sites, even though the

totals appear similar, about 18,000 for each. It

appears that some States believe there are

many more sites than EPA estimates, and in

other cases the reverse appears the case. Only

a few States have estimates within about 10

percent of the ERRIS data. If the highest figures

are used for each State, then the universe of

uncontrolled sites appears to be about 24,000.

The responding States estimate about 8,000

sites will require cleanup. That is, the States

foresee the need for a large NPL. According

to the States, about 40 percent of all uncontrolled sites will need cleanup. But less than

5 percent of current ERRIS sites have been

placed on the NPL, and EPA’s projection of

about 2,000 NPL sites out of a total ERRIS of

20,000 amounts to a 10 percent placement for

the NPL. The problem of estimating the future

size of the NPL is further shown by the considerable variation among the State estimates.

Seventeen States believe that 50 percent or

more of sites will need cleanup and 13 States

believe that 10 percent or less will require

cleanup.
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 165

—

Table 5-19.—ERRlS/NPL v. State Officials Views on Site Cleanup Requirements

Region /:

Maine ., . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vermont ... ... . . . . .

New Hampshire .

Massachusetts ., ... . . . . . . . .

Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . .

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . .

Region II:

New York . . . . . . . . . .

New Jersey ., ..., .

Puerto Ric o

Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . .,

Subtotal . .

Region Ill

Pennsylvania .

Maryland ...., . . . . . . .

Delaware. . . . . . .

Virginia . . . . . . . . .

West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . .

District of Columbia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Subtotal ..., ..., . .

Region IV:

North Carolina ..,... . . . . . . . .

South Carolina . . . . . . .

Georgia. .

Florida . . . . . . . . . . ..., .

Alabama . . . . . . . . . . .

Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tennessee . . . . . . .

Kentucky . .

Subtotal . . . . . .

Region V:

Ohio . . . . . . . .

Indiana . . . . . . . . . .

Michigan. . . ..., . . . . . . . .

Illinois. . .

Wisconsin .. ... . . . . . . . . .

Minnesota . . .

Subtotal . . . . . . . . .

Region VI:

Arkansas. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Louisiana . . ..., . . . . . . . . . .

Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . .

Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New Mexico. ..., . . .

Subtotal . . . . . . . . .

Region VII:

Iowa . . . . . . . . . . .

Missour i

Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nebraska ..., ..., . . . . .

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . .

Region VIII:

North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .....,.. . .

South Dakota. .

Wyoming . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . .

ASTSWMO data

Total sites Response needed

—

12

95

350

200

—

657

750

1,500

—

1

2,251

1,200

100

80

275

200

3

1,858

—

30

300

237

400

250

650

150

2,017

40

200

1,200

550

750

125

2,865

300

—

50

1,300

200

1,850

—

100

150

150

400

15

50

—

—

6

50

53

200

—

309

200

800

—

o

1,000

600

11

8

15

—

o

634

—

30

150

90

100

25

500

75

’97 0

40

200

700

100

500

90

1,630

20

—

15

150

100

285

—

65

100

15

180

0

2

—

ERRIS/NPL data

Percent Total ERRIS Total NPL Percent

—

50

52

15

100

—

47

27

53

—

o

44

50

11

10

6

—

o

34

—

100

50

38

25

10

77

50

48

100

100

58

18

67

72

57

7

—

30

12

50

15

—

65

67

10

45

0

4

78

22

74

455

230

78

937

1,132

1,041

139

1

2,313

1,008

166

69

280

213

5

1741

646

203

589

373

402

272

622

316

3.423

855

696

779

896

241

222

3,689

248

319

449

1,109

164

2,289

280

604

260

174

1,318

31

38

74

5 6

2 9

10 14

16 4

6 3

6 8

45 5

29 3

85 8

8 6

0 0

122 5

39 4

3 2

9 13

4 1

4 2

0 0

59 3

3 <1

9 4

5 1

28 8

7 2

1 <1

6 1

7 2

66 2

22 3

17 2

48 6

11 1

20 8

23 10

141 4

6 2

5 2

4 1

10 1

4 2

29 1

3 1

7 1

4 2

0 0

14 1

1 3

1 3

1 1
166 . Superfund Strategy

Table 5-19.—ERRlS/NPL v. State Officials Views on Site Cleanup Requirements—Continued

ASTSWMO data ERRIS/NPL data

Total sites Response needed Percent Total ERRIS Total NPL Percent

-. —

Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 20 25 81 5 6

Colorado. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 8 40 242 9 4

Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — 110 1 1

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ‘- 164 30 18 576 18 3

Region IX:

Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 50 25 225 6 3

Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 15 10 118 0 0

California ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,750 2,000 42 955 19 2

Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5 10 77 0 0

Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — 13 1 8

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

—

5,150 2,070 40 1,388 26 2

Region X:

Idaho, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — 8 — 114 4 4

Oregon . . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . . . . . . 45 8 18 167 3 2

Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500 — o 501 14 3

Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2 20 96 0 0

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555 18 3 ’ 878 21 2 —

Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . ,.., ..., . . . . . 17,767 — 4 U 3

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

It is not possible for OTA to calculate exactly

how much the current site selection process

might underestimate future NPL sites. But an

estimate can be made. First, it should be noted

that the results of the ASTSWMO survey and

the ERRIS data do not include most Subtitle

D solid waste facilities nor Subtitle Chazardous waste facilities examined in the two previous sections of this chapter. Thus, the Following estimates do not include those categories.

Three main parameters can be examined to

make an estimate. First, the size of the ERRIS

inventory can vary. As shown in table 5-20,

OTA has considered a low and high case, with

the low case representing EPA’s current estimate of 22,000 sites, and the high case assuming an inventory of 32,000 sites. The high case

assumes that the steady increase in ERRIS over

the past 2 years, amounting to several thousand

sites, will continue. If site discovery and identification is given renewed emphasis, an inventory of 32,000 appears possible within 5 to 10

years,

The fraction of sites that receive a site investigation after the preliminary assessment has

been 28 percent. The fraction of sites that have

received a site investigation and have been

scored, and which then have been placed on

the NPL, has also been 28 percent. If it is assumed that the inconsistencies discussed above

were corrected, including removal of the arbitrary 28.5 cutoff score and that environmental

problems were recognized, then both of these

fractions could increase significantly. OTA

has, therefore, used two additional fractions of

35 and 45 percent for each of these step-downs.

Note that in 1982 and 1983 the fractions of sites

investigated that were placed on the NPL were

42 and 38 percent, respectively, Also, in a study

of 11 civilian agencies with uncontrolled sites

(excluding the Department of Defense) it was

found that 39 percent of sites which had received preliminary assessments had completed

site investigations, with more SIs possible. 101

These higher fractions also recognize that if the

site selection system were improved, the sites

that have been eliminated from the NPL could

be reevaluated and contribute to the NPL,

The range of step-down fractions for the two

levels of ERRIS in table 5-20 yield a wide range

I (] 1 [ I ,,$ ( ; (:1) [:1;] I l\( (;( )1] 1) t 1 [)g () f’f 1 (’(}, ,5’t,l t (l,s ()/ (,’i~.~/i(f/]F’e(/erd/

.l<q(lf)(it’s Iiflorfs ‘/’() ,l({[frms }fdzdr[~oi~s tt’asfc })rol)l(’n).b [)f]

‘/’h(Iir l,dt)(]~, R(: Ii 1)-84- I Htj ((j:]itll(~rsl)[]]g, NI I): [ 1,S. ( j{II]tIr,i I

A( (t){]lltlng ( )ff i(:t~, S(>pt, 28, 1 984].
Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup ● 167

Table 5.20.– Range of Estimates for Future Size of the NPL

Estimated future Site investigations Additional Estimated

ERRIS sites - PAs completed = PAs to complete - to complete - sites for NPL + Current NPL = future NPL —

22,000 (low) 6,859 15,141 4,239

32,000 (high) 6,859

5,299

6.813

25,141 7,039

8,799

11,313

NOTE: PA Preliminary assessment

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

(280/o) 1,187

1,484

1,908

(35%) 1,484

1,855

2,385

(45%) 1,908

2,385

3,066

(280/o) 1,971

2,464

3,168

(35%) 2,464

3,080

3,960

(45%) 3,168

3,960

5,091 —

(28%)

(35%)

(45%)

(28%)

(35%)

(45%)

(28%)

(35%)

(45%)

(28%)

(35%)

(45%)

(28%)

(35%)

(45%)

(28%)

(35%)

(45%)

. 

538

538

538

538

538

538

538

538

538

538

538

538

538

538

538

538

538

—538

1,725

2,022

2,446

2,022

2,393

2,923

2,446

2,923

3,604

2,509

3,002

3,706

3,002

3,618

4,498

3,706

4,498

5.629

for a future NPL based on an improved site se- believes that with an improved site selection

lection process. In comparison to EPA’s pre- process an additional 2,000 sites might be recjection of about 2,000 sites on the NPL, OTA ognized as requiring cleanup.

projects an additional 1,000 to 3,000 sites. OTA

SUMMARY ESTIMATION

On the basis of the information in this chapter, OTA concludes that the number of uncontrolled waste sites that may merit cleanup and

placement on the NPL will be markedly greater

than EPA’s current estimates. There are some

basic benefits to be derived from a site selection system that maximizes early identification.

With early identification, better decisions can

be made about priorities and the allocation of

resources for cleanups. There will be less

chance that the worst sites will be neglected.

As discussed in chapter 3, setting national

priorities requires as complete a picture as possible of total cleanup needs facing the Superfund program. It is not now possible to understand whether it makes sense, environmentally

and economically, to let 50 percent of the NPL

sites go unattended, while at the same time

some 30 percent are receiving remedial cleanup, and another 20 percent receive attention

of some sort. Placement on the NPL establishes

eligibility for cleanup, and there is some indication that a site’s score establishes priority for

determining whether it receives an initial response, a remedial cleanup, or studies to select a cleanup option.

OTA finds that the contribution from solid

waste facilities to an expanded NPL could easily be 5,000 sites, and perhaps more, The contribution from operating hazardous waste facilities could to be 1,000 sites. Improving the

site selection process could add another 2,000

sites. Therefore, together with the 2,000 sites,

which would result from current procedures

and policies and which OTA agrees merit

cleanup, the total NPL could reach 10,000 sites.
168 Ž Superfund Strategy

The largest uncertainty is for the contribution

from solid waste facilities, both open and

closed. Assuming that only 5,000 sites from this

category might require cleanup is conservative;

it could be two to three times greater.

The 10,000 figure is consistent with the results of the survey of State officials; they estimated a need for about 8,000 cleanups. But it

is unlikely that the estimates of State officials

included many solid waste facilities.

l02 I t

should also be noted that State officials also

concluded that the more than 10,000 sites that

were not put into the highest priority category

still had “the potential to threaten public health

and the environment. ”

Finally, consider EPA’s recent analysis of future Superfund needs.103 It concluded that “the

current inventory of sites and anticipated new

additions will produce an NPL of 1,500 to 2,500

sites over the next several years. ” Although

EPA discussed a number of potential sources

of additional NPL sites, including some that

OTA did not, the major factors that lead to their

lower projection include:

● EPA did not consider surface impoundments, even though: a) according to their

data such sites are the single largest source

of NPL sites, about one-third, and b) the

surface impoundment problem is acknowledged in EPA’s Ground-water Protection

IOZThis view is supported by the basic similarity in the States’

estimates of total number of uncontrolled sites to the number

in ERRIS, and their dissimilarity from the numbers of solid waste

facilities. (ERRIS does contain some solid waste facilities, something over z,000 sites according to EPA; but this is a small fraction of the total universe of Subtitle D facilities.)

103u. s. Environment] Protection Agency, “Extent of the H=-

ardous Release Problem and Future Funding Needs, CERCLA

Section 301(a)(l)(C) Study” (Washington, DC: Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, December 1984),

●

●

●

●

Strategy. In OTA’s analysis, 340,000 such

facilities were considered.

EPA did not consider closed as well as

open industrial landfills. OTA estimated

that there were twice as many closed as

open ones (150,000 sites).

No basis was provided for concluding that

there were only twice as many closed municipal landfills as open ones. OTA used

data for several States to develop an estimate of three times as many closed as open

facilities (42,000 such sites).

EPA did not account for the more stringent 1984 amendments to RCRA for hazardous waste facilities that could lead to

more failures of companies. Nor was there

any reference to EPA’s problems with

groundwater protection standards, which

could lead to the creation of uncontrolled

sites. EPA’s Interim Status Ground-Water

Monitoring Implementation Study substantiates this problem. OTA estimated

that 1,000 hazardous waste facilites could

become NPL sites; EPA’s estimate was

about half this figure.

EPA gave limited consideration to the site

selection process and changes in it that

could result in more ERRIS sites, with

more of them becoming NPL sites. Nevertheless, there is some indication that EPA

believes that an improved site selection

process (without further site identification)

could add an additional 1,670 to 2,170 sites

to the NPL. OTA’s estimate from further

site identification and improved site selection was 2,000 additional sites.

EPA has said that a full examination of the

problem of future sites could lead to a situation where the funding needed “would overwhelm” the Superfund program. But OTA’s

point is that by acknowledging the full extent

of future needs, rather than underestimating

them, effective planning can prevent a crisis.
Chapter 6

Cleanup Technologies
Contents

Page

Introduction .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

The Problem . ... . . ... . . . . . . . . . .. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

Site Conditions and Wastes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Technology Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Barriers to the Adoption of Improved Technology . . . . . . . ● .....*. . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Policy Uncertainties Create Market Uncertainties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Access to RD&D Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Institutional Practices and Regulatory Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

The Status Quo/Existing Technology Bias Syndrome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

The Technical Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Temporary Storage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Conventional Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Innovative Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Support of Cleanup Technology RD&D. . . . . . .. . 214

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

EPA Technology Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

National Science Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

State Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

Private Sector .. .. .. .. $ . . . 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 04 .0....0. . . . . ..4.”..”. 220

List of Tables

Table No, Page

6-1. Generic Technology Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

6-2. Estimated Costs of Conventional Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

6-3. Containment Technologies—Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

6-4. Treatment Technologies-Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

6-5. Innovative Technology Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

6-6. Innovative Technology Applicability to Superfund Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

6-7. Innovative Technology Advantages and Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

6-8. EPA RD&D Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

6-9. Superfund R&D Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Chapter 6

Cleanup Technologies

INTRODUCTION

In the Superfund program so far cleanup of

uncontrolled sites has generally meant that hazardous wastes are confined on the site or disposed of elsewhere. Containment strategies

have been adapted from construction engineering techniques and little thought given to the

development and application of innovative

technologies to deal with the unique problems

encountered. With increasing evidence that

containment is not effective in the long term

and may result in the need to repeat site remedial action at the same site or on the same

waste and as the dimensions of groundwater

problems at these sites become clearer, technologies which aim at destroying the toxic

component of hazardous wastes are now being developed by the private sector, However,

the adoption of new treatment technologies by

the Superfund program faces institutional, regulatory, and financial barriers.

This chapter is divided into four sections.

The first section is an overview of the problems

encountered at Superfund sites and an introduction to the applicable technologies. Next,

the barriers to the adoption of improved technology are discussed. In the third section, conventional and innovative technical options are

summarized and analyses of the effectiveness

and applicability of both types is provided. The

final section reviews the current status of Federal, State, and private sector support for

Superfund technology research, development,

and demonstration (RD&D).

THE PROBLEM

The selection of the preferred technology or

set of technologies for cleanup at a Superfund

site depends on the characteristics of the site,

the composition and distribution of hazardous

materials, the technical characteristics of the

technologies, the costs of the technologies, the

nature of the selection process mandated by

regulation, and other institutional factors.

Ultimately, the selection of technologies for remedial action is accomplished by examining

the cost effectiveness of a technology or a set

o 1’ technologies vis-a-vis the alter natives.1

The feasibility’ of any given technology for

a site cleanup is decided early i n the decision

process. Once a Superfund site has been iden1,1 ( { 1 >[ II >> I ( J [1 ( )f ( (J>t (if f(, ( t 1 \ (,11 (J\+ ,111 ( { III\t lt~]ti[lrl(]l !(I( t(Ir\

t}l(i t ,i f }fv t t }tf, ( I(Y 1> 1( lr) ~ )r( J( (,<> ,1 ~)~Jf,(I ri III t II(J f[ II loft i rlq ~f~( t i( )1 I,

}\,] r r ]1’r L, I ( I t I)f’ l(lo~)t ror] of I rr)l)roi (J(J I (’[ h r) f)lr)q~ .‘

tified and remedial action proceeds, current

practices call for the following basic steps:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

A

problem definition (Remedial Investigation);

selection of alternatives (Feasibility Study);

engineering design;

construction;

startup, trouble shooting, and cleanup: and

long-term operation and maintenance, if

necessary,

Remedial Investigation (RI) and Feasibility Study (FS) are required for all Superfund

financed and enforcement-lead remedial actions. The RI focuses on data collection and

site characterization; the FS on data analysis

and evaluation. Despite the dependence of the

FS on results from the RI, EPA conducts the

two concurrently rather than sequentially.

171
172 ● Superfund Strategy

Site Conditions and Wastes

As part of its data collection, the RI catalogs

the site’s conditions and its wastes, Site factors that affect technology applicability include

its geologic, topographic, hydrologic, and meteorologic characteristics. Waste characteristics pertain to the chemical and physical state

of the waste and to the media where it is found.

Hazardous wastes may have been placed in

“surface impoundments, ” such as settling

ponds or lagoons that can contain liquid wastes

and sediments; may be found in drums; and/or

may have been landfilled (buried). Other Superfund sites have been created by the application

of pesticides (e.g., dioxin) to large land areas.

Contaminated environmental media at Superfund sites include air, soils, water (surface or

groundwater), and biota.

While there is an extraordinary degree of

variability among uncontrolled sites, most

wastes found at sites can be broken down into

five distinct classes for consideration of applicable technologies:

slightly contaminated solids and soils,

contaminated groundwater,

concentrated liquid wastes,

concentrated organic sludges and solids,

and

concentrated inorganic sludges and solids.

Organic materials of concern are hydrocarbons (compounds of carbon and hydrogen) or

compounds containing carbon, hydrogen, and

other elements, The latter include solvents,

PCBs, pesticides (e.g., dioxin and DDT), and

halogenated compounds (primarily those with

chlorine). Inorganic materials of primary concern include heavy metals (e.g., cadmium,

chromium, mercury, copper, zinc), cyanide,

ammonia, and nitrates.2 Because mixed wastes,

plus variable concentrations of wastes, must

be dealt with, Superfund cleanup technologies

must operate in a different environment than

‘A recent EPA stud~’ shows that, of the z 5 most frequent substances found at Superfund sites, 11 are chlorinated solvents,

7 are heavjr metals, 5 are aromatic solvents, and 1 is cyanide.

(Reported in the Hazardous Materials Control Research institute’s Focus newsletter, February 1985.)

those processes that treat the more consistent

waste streams generated at industrial plants.

Technology Evaluation

As the FS evaluates alternative remedial actions, various types of technologies are introduced as possible solutions to site problems.

After an initial screening of technologies, obviously infeasible or inappropriate alternatives

are eliminated, The remaining technologies are

then subjected to complete technical, cost, institution, public health, and environmental

analyses to provide a “cost-effectiveness”

evaluation. The cost-effectiveness measure attempts to weigh the costs of various options

versus the effectiveness of the cleanup

achieved. This evaluation limits the number of

technologies suitable for consideration and

forms the basis of an engineering design study

for the cleanup procedure. However, without

cleanup goals, alternatives cannot be properly

evaluated. This leads to cost-benefit analysis

where both effectiveness and cost vary. It is

possible, therefore, to choose a relatively lowcost option whose level of effectiveness may

equate to some arbitrary level of protection.

The basic generic technological approaches

at any Superfund site are:

1.

2.

3.

in situ treatment of soils or groundwater

containing hazardous waste;

excavation of the hazardous waste solids,

liquids, and/or sludges for disposal, storage, or treatment offsite (removals) or onsite; and

pathway control through encapsulation

and/or containment, or by ground or surface water diversion, a

Nontechnical alternatives to cleanup that

also are relevant to site (risk) management include mitigating exposures by providing an

sTrade-offs occur when hazardous wastes are transported offsite. While transportation adds a cost that can be substantial,

for low volumes of a particular hazardous waste it may be less

expensiy’e to treat in regionally located facilities. Transportation off site adds a health and environmental risk. onsite treatment may be restricted due to the availability and cost of ne[; -

essar~’ infrastructure, such as power and water sour(;es.
alternate water supply, restricting land use,

and evacuating people.

Remedial technologies are often broken

down into two broad categories: containment

and treatment. Table 6-1 compares containment and treatment technologies, both conventional and innovative, in terms of their effectiveness, reliability, environmental media

affected by their use, least compatible waste,

and estimated cost. The primary functions of

containment technologies are: 1) to arrest or

prevent the movement of contaminants from

a source (e. g., overflow of a holding pond); 2)

to limit the extent of already contaminated

groundwater plume or soil mass; or 3) to immobilize the contaminants to prevent or reduce

exposure to humans or the environment, The

functions of treatment technologies are: 1) to

detoxify contaminants by changing or destroying the chemical characteristic(s) that render

them hazardous, or 2) to separate those hazardous materials from the environmental

media that serve as routes of exposure.

Since containment technologies do not render harmless that which is the source of the

problem, Superfund sites subjected to containment may have to be monitored indefinitely,

or at least for as long as containment is used,

to assure continual protection. Landfills under

Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (RCRA) are containment technologies. Treatment processes, while they have

been shown to destroy extremely high percentages of hazardous constituents, inevitably produce a residue that must be dealt with. Processes such as incineration, for instance,

produce ash that may or may not be considered a hazardous waste and air emissions that

may have to be controlled, Physical separation

techniques produce an output stream that retains the hazardous properties of the original

waste, frequently in a more concentrated, manageable form. These residues require proper

disposal (and perhaps additional treatment) to

achieve overall objectives. If the subsequent

treatment and disposal are not properly managed, the original hazards may be shifted to

other environmental media or locations and to

new exposed populations. Such a shift is

Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 173

always the case when hazardous wastes are

simply removed from Superfund sites for containment (land disposal) elsewhere.

Both containment and treatment technologies range greatly in potential applicability

and expected effectiveness. Most containment

technologies depend primarily on site factors.

On the other hand, most treatment technologies are dependent on waste properties, both

in terms of class (organic or inorganic) and also

physical state. In general, containment systems

have low capital costs but long-term operating

and maintenance (O&M) costs which can be

substantial if measured over their lifetime. The

reverse is generally true for treatment technologies: high capital costs with short-term O&M

costs. The result is that if all costs are accounted for over the long term, then treatment

technologies can offer lower overall costs, Offsite application of either type of technology

adds cost to cleanup activity and introduces

risks from the transportation of hazardous

wastes.

Containment systems generally fall into four

types. The first, based on hydrologic principles,

uses wells and pumping to control the outward

flow from, or the potential contact of groundwater with, a source of contamination. Alternatively, some sort of physical barrier, such as

a grout curtain or slurry wall, can be installed

to prevent groundwater from moving into or

out of the contaminated mass of soil or aquifer.

The third type comprises conventional interception and drainage systems. The fourth set

of technologies isolates the wastes in containers or highly impermeable matrices. These

techniques are often employed in combination

to increase effectiveness,

Treatment technologies employ many types

of processes. Organic chemicals can be broken

down by biological, chemical, or thermal methods, or toxic organics can be separated from

nontoxic materials by physical methods. Detoxification of inorganic species, such as arsenic or cadmium, is more difficult. Toxicity

often resides in the element itself. Treatment

technologies act on inorganic species by immobilization and separation, or in a few cases,
Effectiveness: How

well it contains

or destroys

hazardous

characteristics

Reliability issues

Environmental

media most affected by use of

technology

Least compatible

wastea

costs: (low,

medium, high)

Containment

Landfills ‘and

impoundments

Low for volatiles,

questionable for

liquids; based on

field tests, preliminary use data

Siting, construction

and operation

Uncertainties: longterm cover, liner

life less than life

of toxic waste

Surface and

ground water

Linear reactive; highly

toxic, mobile, persistent, and bioaccumuIative

L – M

Table 6-1 .—Generic Technology Comparison

Treatment

Conventional Emerging thermal/ Physical/chemical

incineration chemical destruction separation methods —

High, based on field Very high. High, based on conventional

tests, except little commercial-scale uses

data on specific con- tests

stituents

Long experience with

design

Monitoring uncertainties

with respect to high

degree of DRE, surrogate measures, PICs,

incinerability

Air

Limited experience None, due to long experience

Residues, PICs

Mobile units; onsite treatment

avoids hauling

risks

Operational simplicity

Air Depends on waste

management

Highly toxic and refrac- Metals Possibly none. Each process

tory organics, high highly waste specific

heavy metals concent ration

M — H M – H L — M

awa~te for ~h,~h th, ~ method may be less effective for reduc{ng ex~osure relative to other technologies Wastes Ilsted do not necessarily @mOtf? common usa9e

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Biotechnology

High, when combined

with pre/post

treatment

Completeness of in

situ process

None likely; except

groundwater, if in

situ

Mixtures

L – M
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 175

by converting the element to a nontoxic or less

toxic compound. As with toxic treatment

residues, unless a separated material can be

recycled for reuse, landfilling will be the

ultimate means of disposal.

Unless a Superfund site is found to contain

a single source of a hazardous waste and in a

single form, a combination of technologies will

most likely have to be applied. A number of

containment techniques are often combined—

for instance, groundwater barriers with pumping and treatment of leachate. Treatment technologies may have to be applied in combination to permanently destroy hazardous wastes,

or with some form of containment to prevent

the contamination from spreading during the

period required for treatment. In the Superfund

program, the choice of technologies has been

primarily containment methods applied on a

site or off’. In a 1984 study that evaluated 395

Superfund sites,4 destruction technology (incineration) was employed for 1 percent of the

sites. The balance of responses were combinations of onsite containment technologies or offsite removals of the hazardous wastes.

4U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Summary Report: Remedial Response at Hazardous Waste Sites, EPA-54012 -84-O02a

(Cincinnati, OH: Office of Research and Development, March

1984).

BARRIERS TO THE ADOPTION OF IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY

The selection of technology rests on a costeffectiveness measure previously discussed. To

be among the alternatives whose cost and effectiveness are evaluated, a technology must

be known to the contractors who prepare the

FS and it must have been judged viable through

research, development, and demonstration

(RD&D). Once included in the evaluation process, a technology must be treated equitably relative to other technologies. But the current

Superfund selection system inhibits the development and consideration of innovative technologies for permanent remedies in a number

of ways. These barriers can be broken down

into four categories:5

● policy and market uncertainties,

● RD&D financing,

● institutional practices and regulatory

impacts, and

● a status quo/existing tech

SAS developed by a workshop held by

nology bias.

OTA in Washington,

DC, in November 1984 entitled “The U-se of Innovative Technologies for Superfund Remedial Action. ” Attending were representatives of technology developers, State agencies, an EPA

Superfund contractor, and industrial firms who conduct voluntary cleanups.

Policy Uncertainties Create

Market Uncertainties

Superfund, along with the Federal-State

RCRA program, industrial generators of hazardous wastes, and the current commercial

waste management industry, determine the

market for hazardous waste treatment technology. The market is driven by regulations imposed by the Federal Government under the

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),

RCRA, and the Toxic Substances Control Act

(TSCA) and those imposed by individual States.

Regulations determine which materials are

classified as hazardous wastes, whether and

the extent to which such materials must be controlled, and how they are controlled. Technologies evolve because of and based on these regulations, Institutional practice has determined

how the market views innovative, developmental technologies. They must compete with the

dominant, historically used solutions (land disposal and incineration techniques).

Continuing to view Superfund as a shortterm program results in weak market support

for long-term development of innovative tech-
176 ● Superfund Strategy

nology. Uncertainties over the ultimate size

and type of the Superfund program (how many

sites undergo remedial action, the level of

cleanup desired, the type of solutions selected)

create market uncertainties. Technology developed to treat newly generated hazardous

wastes may be inadequate and/or inappropriate

for cleanups.

According to the president of one technology firm, the Superfund program is full of

uncertainties, elusive, going through a shakedown process, a market characterized as one

of “indeterminate clients. ”6 Such uncertainties

affect the availability of funds to conduct R&D

programs and corporate decisions to enter the

market or continue involvement with technology development. Another view expressed is

that there may be no clear market for treatment

options until the destruction of hazardous

wastes is the prime Superfund goal.7

Uncertainties also result from technology

marching ahead of the regulatory process. The

only standards available to judge Superfund

technologies are those for incineration and

land disposal. Without regulation or guidance

for other technologies, there are no operating

standards to incorporate into the design of a

new technology. Thus, there is no clear-cut, objective way to judge the effectiveness of new

technologies, or to compare them with the

traditional technologies. For biotechnology,

rules for the release of genetically engineered organisms are not yet set. How much

effort should a private firm risk developing an

in situ biological process for destroying hazardous wastes when the technology may be

regulated out of use? Another unknown that

industry faces are patent rules for both microorganisms and the process technology necessary to use the bugs.

The continuing lack of cleanup standards for

Superfund sites, a definition of “how clean is

clean,” gives the impression that new cleanup

technologies are not necessary to safeguard

‘Lowell Bowie, president of RoTech Inc., OTA Workshop, November 1984.

7Michael Modell, president of MODAR Inc., OTA Workshop,

November 1984.

public health and the environment. Technology development that does push ahead suffers

from uncertainties over whether levels eventually will be set too high to meet or too low

to justify the cost of the process.

Access to RD&D Financing

Without adequate R&D and demonstration

funding, no technology will reach the stage

where it can demonstrate an acceptable level

of reliability and effectiveness under field conditions. This critical and expensive demonstration period is preceded by laboratory and pilot

stages that often must be funded without guarantee that a commercial product will result.

The degree of market uncertainty will determine when and at what levels the private sector will support the RD&D process. The private

sector funds RD&D either by committing internal funds (primarily in the case of large

firms) or through the use of venture capital and

limited partnerships (in the case of entrepreneurial firms) but they will do so only on

a limited basis and only if a clear, sustainable

market for the end results can be identified.

One large firm, J. M. Huber Corp., has spent

$6 million so far in RD&D of its Advanced Electric Reactor. Now, at the point of committing

additional funds to attempt to commercialize

their technology, several criteria must be met,

including an appropriate market size for their

product, an estimate about when that market

will be available, and a sense that the risks of

entering the market are manageable. Another,

small firm sought funding for 9 months before

it secured $2 million to produce a demonstration unit. Part of the necessary money came

from several foreign firms seeking treatment

technologies because they are subject to regulations prohibiting landfilling of hazardous

wastes.

Ultimately, it is up to the public to decide

how much it is willing to pay for the best possible cleanup of hazardous wastes. Support for

RD&D of innovative technologies offers a real

possibility to lower those costs. Direct support

by the Federal Government, however, has been

very limited, in terms of level of funding, ac-
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 177

cess to funds, or relevant programs. B State

funding is, for the most part, constrained by

budgets that must consider immediate cleanup

costs before engaging in long-term R&D funding, Some market risk could be mitigated by

indirect support, such as tax incentives.

Institutional Practices and

Regulatory Impacts

It is often difficult to separate institutional

practices and regulatory impacts. In terms of

Superfund technology, these factors combine

to increase the financial burden on technology

firms seeking operating permits and increase

the uncertainties over permitting for testing

purposes. Testing standards are not available

and valid testing materials are difficult to acquire. A bottleneck exists, make recognized

testing standards unavailable and access to

testing materials from sites difficult, and create

a bottleneck under RCRA hazardous waste delisting procedures. The problems culminate

when a technology is at the stage of actually

demonstrating its effectiveness. They can raise

the cost of (or bar) such demonstrations and

result in inconsistencies in the information

available on new technologies. There is no established procedure for collecting and disseminating the information that is generated.

Authentication

Permitting requirements under the RCRA

program for processes in the RD&D stages are

expensive and time-consuming. Procedural

duplication between Federal and State agencies and differences between the various

States, and even between EPA Regions,

multiply time and expenses. A 1- to 2-year processing period is not uncommon and one firm

has calculated that it has spent $1 million so

far in permitting procedures.

Because landfill and incineration technologies are defined under RCRA, these technologies are given de facto established technology

status even though not much data has been collected about their performance as Superfund

technologies. On the other hand, new technologies are required to present recognized testing

results to demonstrate comparable reliability

and effectiveness. A protocol, a detailed, technology and application specific testing procedure, must be followed. Protocols, however, by

their very nature are not available for innovative technologies, and cannot be written without first acquiring testing information. The following examples of what two different firms

had to undergo in order to prove their technology illustrate these points.

A permit for a 3-month demonstration project was applied for by MODAR Inc., a small

R&D firm, through Region 2 of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in August

1983. Permission was finally granted by October 1984, over a year later. Two parallel permitting processes were necessary, one under

RCRA and the other under TSCA since one of

the wastes that MODAR intended to test was

PCBs. (RCRA permits protect against adverse

affects of hazardous wastes; TSCA regulates

specific wastes. ) Under RCRA law at the time,

there was no provision for R&D permitting as

opposed to operations permitting unless the

system classified as an incinerator. MODAR’s

unit is not an incinerator, but they had to convince EPA of that fact. Eventually it was classified as a “new chemical physical process” for

which tests would be needed to develop a protocol. In this instance, EPA decided that the

3-month demonstration testing would be considered the required tests and gave MODAR

a release to conduct those tests. For TSCA purposes, MODAR developed a set of tests for

their unit equivalent to those established for incineration and was given a permit. Meanwhile,

the State of New York conducted its own investigation and issued a permit after EPA did

so. The end result is a permit/release valid for

3 months demonstration testing at one site in

New York, Testing anywhere else, or beyond

the 3-month period, will require MODAR to apply for a new permit.9

8Scx? the discussion of RI)&I) support for technology in the last

sect ion of this (;hapter, ‘Michael Model], personal communication, Decemher 1984,
178 ● Superfund Strategy

Lopat Enterprises has produced a sealant or

encapsulant which they state is applicable to

PCB contaminated structures, After trying unsuccessful y on their own to reach someone

within EPA who could make a decision about

evaluating the sealant, they secured assistance

from congressional staff in setting up meetings

with appropriate EPA officials, The writing of

a protocol was agreed on but testing did not

occur due to EPA’s lack of funds, Lopat, meanwhile, was testing their product at their own

expense. They were told, however, that running tests on their own in a recognized laboratory would not be valid because the government had to run parallel tests. At one point,

when EPA was well aware that Lopat’s process was a chemical one, they provided a protocol covering processes that incinerate

PCBS.

10

Often no response is forthcoming. Deluged

with requests for authentification of many

black box processes, EPA is forced, in the absence of established procedures and adequate

staff, to essentially ignore the information it receives regardless of the possible merit of a technology. One particular incident involved the

participation of the Mayor of Verona, Missouri,

who repeatedly asked the regional EPA office,

EPA in Washington, and the State agency for

a hearing on a chemical process designed to

detoxify dioxin-contaminated soils, The Mayor

saw it as a possible alternative to expensive and

controversial incineration techniques which

were being imposed on her community. Over

a period of months, meetings were agreed to

and then canceled. No action was ever taken.11

Testing Material

Testing that will result in applicable and valid data requires the use of real material rather

than synthetically produced wastes. Material

can be supplied from the outflow of an industrial process or can be samples from Superfund

sites, Firms encounter costly delays and other

— ‘

- 

IoU. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on

Small Business, hearings Oct. 27, 1983. From the statement of

Louis Flax, president of Lopat Enterprises Inc., p. 49.

11 Jane Johnson, Mayor of Verona, MO, personal communication, September 1984.

problems in the acquisition and transport of

such material that can strain their resources.

Transporting relatively small quantities of hazardous waste requires the transportation system and receiver to follow the same rules and

procedures as those for regular hazardous

waste shipments. Under these circumstances

it can be difficult to locate an experienced carrier who is willing to handle an LTC (less than

carload) shipment. If the material is acquired,

the receiver becomes subject to uncertain liabilities.

Regulations

This section about policy uncertainties has

shown how the lack of regulations or uncertainty about new regulations can negatively affect technology development. Existing regulations also affect technology adoption because

of: 1) duplication in permitting requirements

between Federal, State, and local agencies; 2)

differences between various States and EPA regions and; 3) the preemption of sister regulations, such as those covering landfill and incineration practices under RCRA.

Simply figuring out which regulations apply

in any given case can be frustrating. Experts

attending an OTA workshop in November 1984

could not agree among themselves, even after

extended discussion, about the applicability of

various regulations. In fact, the only agreement

they reached was that sorting out conflicting

regulations and determining applicability were

a major problem for technology developers

who are trying to demonstrate their processes.

There appears to be no one place to consult to

obtain definitive information,

One option available under Superfund remedial actions is to use mobile or transportable

treatment systems, but the regulatory climate

does not yet support this option. Under RCRA,

once a permit is granted it only covers the operation of a treatment technology on a particular substance at a particular site. Moving the

system requires engaging once more in the permit process, The availability of class rather

than site permits would alleviate a considerable burden on treatment technologies.
Any residue from a hazardous waste treatment process is considered hazardous waste

itself unless the residue receives a delisting, i.e.,

is removed from regulation. This is one of the

most important steps in determining the acceptability of a new process as it can provide

information about the completeness of the destruction and assure that no new hazardous

products are created. Under current EPA practices, however, delisting is a costly and lengthy

procedure which can take over a year. Two

components appear to adversely affect the procedure: 1) lack of sufficient EPA staffing, and

2) the analytical burden on the technology developer to provide a negative finding (i.e., that

the residue is in no way hazardous).

The Status Quo/Existing Technology

Bias Syndrome

Both the regulations under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) that deal with remedial

action (Section 300.68 of CFR 40) and EPA’s

“Guidance on the Preparation of Feasibility

Studies” encourage a bias toward containment

and, to a lesser extent, incineration technologies. It is against these so-called established

technologies that all others are measured, even

though the presumption that such technologies

have proven their effectiveness for cleanups

generally is not correct. A predilection for

short-term costing and a reluctance to reach

beyond comfortable, traditional technology favors the status quo.

For instance, the user of the Feasibility Guide

is advised to adhere to the guidance document

in order to guard against legal challenges to enforcement actions,12 Since established technologies are emphasized, innovative ideas seem

to be viewed as detrimental to the overall process of remedial action. In another example, in

the first step of the FS the Guide advises that

“technologies which are unreliable, offer inferior performance, or are not demonstrated

(emphasis added) processes should be eliminated from further consideration."

13 No pro -

IJ [ T,,$, 1; I) L I [,( III r]){; r] t (i ]I)r( j t (>(, ! I()n A ~(’ 11 ( j ,‘‘(~(11 (1 II 11 (f’ ( ) r] t t] f’

I’rcf)drdt i(t[) of [: fJ(I\I})Il iti St~](fl(’~,” f ]rl(il (Iraft, NI)\ 15, 1 !IHI

~)[) l-f)

1 ~It)i(i , ])]) 2-12

Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies •

visions are offered for obtaining recognized

179

information that may constitute demonstration,

The lack of demonstration data prevents a

new technology from being considered in the

RI/FS process and ultimately used for remedial

action. Both the high cost of demonstration

projects and the lack of EPA procedures and

support for the evaluation of technologies are

obstacles that a new technology must overcome to be adopted. (See the section, “Support

of Cleanup Technology RD&D, ” in this chapter. )

The primary criterion for selecting technologies at cleanup sites, as reflected in the NCP

and in most equivalent State documents, is cost

effectiveness; that is, the “lowest cost alternative that is technologically feasible and reliable

and which effectively mitigates and minimized

damage to and provides adequate protection

of public health, welfare, or the environmerit, ’ ’14 In the Federal decisionmaking process, this criterion is qualified by the fund-balancing provisions of the NCP. These provisions

require that prospective costs at a given site

be balanced against the overall needs for all

sites to be cleaned up. In essence, even the

most cost-effective alternative at a site may be

ruled out if the total cost is out of line with

needs at other sites.

The effectiveness portion of the cost-effectiveness criterion is based on technical factors

(performance, reliability, implementability),

public health (level of cleanup/isolation achievable, reduction of impacts], institutional factors (permitting requirements, community impacts), and environmental factors (beneficial

and adverse effects] factors.15 Costs considered

include capital costs, operation and maintenance costs, and/or a present value calculation

combining both capital and O&M costs.l6

If these factors and their components are not

uniformly applied to both containment and

treatment technologies, the options will not be

judged fairly. Containment technologies, for instance, despite increasing evidence to the contrary, are considered to be more reliable than

141 hl(i., 1) i\,

15 I h i(i , ( 1) a ~)t [Jr H.

161 t) it].
180 ● Superfund Strategy

treatment technologies. Moreover, permitting

requirements for treatment technologies tend

to be more burdensome than for containment

technologies.

The cost elements applied to containment

versus treatment are quite different. For treatment systems, estimates are generally quite

straightforward, Project life is usually short; a

few years is common. Assuming proper design

and that the system will operate as projected,

all the cost elements can be estimated quite accurately. (Decommissioning costs have been

less consistently included and are more difficult to estimate, ) No long-term costs are involved because the project is expected to end

with an acceptable level of residual contamination.

The situation for containment is quite different. Since the hazards remain in place indefinitely, any future costs associated with maintaining the original level of protection, such as

monitoring, major repairs, and future cleanups,

should be included. When removal for redisposal is considered and only the immediate

costs for commercial land disposal are included in the cost projection, the analysis is not

realistic, O&M costs for onsite containment,

moreover, are usually considered only for a

relatively short time, often 20 to 30 years. Since

no long-term performance data is available for

containment systems for hazardous waste applications, O&M uncertainties are likely to be

high. Discounting or computing the costs on

a present value basis, with conventional discount rates (currently around 10 percent), effectively ignores costs beyond a 30-year period,

even though many contained hazardous wastes

are likely to remain toxic and will need to be

controlled well beyond that period.

One factor that has influenced the choice of

technology is related to the cost-sharing provisions of CERCLA. For State and Federal lead

sites, the Federal Government generally pays

90 percent of the capital costs and costs for the

first year’s operation. Subsequent O&M costs,

on the other hand, are entirely the State’s responsibility. The consequences are fairly

straightforward: the Federal Government

favors technologies with low capital costs and

States argue for low and/or short-term O&M

costs,

National cleanup goals do not exist to compare and evaluate technology performance,

Without cleanup standards, choices must be

made as to what environmental standards apply (if any) to any given situation, If, for instance, effluent limitations rather than water

quality standards are chosen for a groundwater

treatment system, capital and O&M costs can

change. This will alter the apparent costeffectiveness of the solution and its potential

for selection, If RCRA or equivalent State permits are deemed to be required for operations

at cleanup sites, technologies considered difficult to permit will be discriminated against,

as obtaining a permit adds time, cost, and uncertainty to the process.

The budget process in most States creates a

bias against alternatives that have costs spread

out over a number of years. Most States can

only budget year-by-year and many have no authority to operate cleanup projects through

trust funds or bond proceeds.

EPA and most State agencies rely heavily on

contractors to carry out the RI/FS process, Because of public and political concerns, there

is tremendous pressure to move through the

site study phases quickly. The time pressures

can inhibit thoughtful and careful examination

of all alternatives. This is of particular significance now because few sites have yet moved

beyond the study phase. Consulting firms are

conservative, concerned about liability, and are

under considerable pressure to produce sound

and reliable solutions and to control their costs.

These conditions have made it hard for innovative or developing technologies to receive serious consideration thus far in the Superfund

program,
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 181

. —

THE TECHNICAL OPTIONS

Technical solutions to the problems of Superfund sites are either long-term containment systems or relatively expeditious treatment remedies. These technologies are discussed in

some detail in the following sections on conventional containment and treatment. A review

of emerging innovative treatment methods follows. Another option is presented first: techniques for temporary storage. These are most

appropriate for use in initial responses to reduce immediate threats to public health and the

environment under a two-part Superfund

strategy.

Temporary Storage

Increasing attention is being given to the

above ground storage of cleanup wastes (see

chapters 1, 2, and 3). A variety of technologies

exist to carry out storage safely and cost effectively. There are three approaches: 1) whe n

amounts are small, containerization as used in

transportation and traditional chemical storage; 2) when amounts are large, bulk storage

in tanks, vaults, and other structures; and 3)

when amounts are large, new forms of above

ground encapsulation technology. The first two

options are likely to be combined at some

Superfund sites.

In general, it should be possible to safely

store cleanup wastes for anywhere from 5 to

20 years, When onsite storage is difficult because of limited space or unsuitable geologic

or climatic conditions (e.g., earthquake fault

zones or flood plains), offsite storage can be

considered. It may be necessary to examine the

possibility of building regional storage facilities

to deal with Superfund wastes. Most importantly, above ground storage offers the intrinsic advantage, compared to traditional burial

and land disposal, of ready accessibility and

relatively easy visual inspection to detect leakage and damage to containers and structures,

Moreover, many types of instruments and

monitoring devices are available to provide

safeguards, including those to deal with the

chance of fire and explosion.

Recent advances in materials have improved

containers. High-strength, corrosion-resistant

materials are now readily available for the most

hazardous materials; often these containers can

be cleaned and reused. Containers can be

placed in various types of structures to reduce

the effect of weather, For example, they can

be stacked on concrete slabs in shelters with

roofs but not necessarily walls. Containers,

such as drums, can also be encapsulated with

polyethylene to mitigate the effects of leakage.

If the amount of cleanup waste is relatively

small, use of containers and onsite storage is

feasible.

Tanks, vaults, and more complete buildings

are also used for conventional storage in the

chemical and petroleum industries. This is attractive for bulk materials that are not highly

hazardous or corrosive, and materials that can

be moved easily in large amounts, such as liquids and soil. If the amounts of cleanup waste

are very large, it may be too costly to store onsite, and a regional storage facility may be

needed.

A recent proposal in Minnesota combines

containers and bulk storage and illustrates

what might be conceived of for regional storage facilities for Superfund wastes. The concept was developed for “long-term monitorable

and retrievable storage facility for hazardous

wastes . , . The facility was designed to store

22,000 drums in a container building and 185,000

gallons in bulk-liquid tanks each year. Assuming an operating life of ten years, the facility

would require an area of 60 acres. ”17 The study

dealt with every conceivable type of environmental safeguard and was probably over designed, resulting in relatively high costs, particularly for construction of buildings to house

drums. The initial investment was estimated

at $10.6 million; annual O&M costs varied from

$1 million to $2 million over the lifetime of the

17C. ]. Lough, et al., “Above Ground Storage of Hazardous

Waste, ” Management of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites

(Silver Spring, MD: Hazardous Materials Control Research Institute, 1982).
182 ● Superfund Strategy

— —

facility. More recent work, such as in Missouri,

has focused on the use of less costly structures

while affording environmental protection.

There have also been several recent proposals for new types of above ground storage

aimed especially at the hazardous waste market, In one of these, wastes are chemically

treated to solidify and stabilize them; they are

then formed into an onsite mound on top of

various engineered materials, The mound is

covered to prevent water intrusion, Again, various safeguards are used to collect and monitor water. The author notes that the method

“provides easy access for future manipulation

of the waste for resource recovery and new

treatment technology. “

18 It is also claimed that

exhumation and solidification rates of about

1,000 to 3,000 tons per day are possible. Some

cost data are provided that indicate savings

over more traditional offsite removal and redisposal. One project involving PCB sludge

was estimated to cost $70 to $80 per cubic yard

to evaluate and execute. O&M costs to monitor groundwater were not provided,

A case has also been made for what is called

an above ground “hillfill” that provides ease

of collecting leachate and protection against

contaminating groundwater.

19 Most of the

problems with conventional landfills are reduced or eliminated by this approach, which

still allows removal of the wastes later for

treatment.

Conventional Technologies20

Since containment methods have been the

technology of choice for Superfund remedial

action, they constitute the bulk of applicable

conventional technologies. Existing methods

of treatment, such as incineration, are also conventional in the sense that forms of the tech-

“L. Grayhill, “Ei’olution of Practical On Silt’ Aho~e Ground

Closures, ” Alanagemen t of [ ~ncontrolled Hazardous 14rastf; Sites

(Silver Spring, MD: Hazar{lous Materials Control Research Institute, 1 983).

I~K, ~$~, ~ ro;~,n a IIC] 1),(;. ~ndf?rsun, “The Case for Aho\egroun(l

I.andfills, ” }Jollution -li’ngineering, No\emher 1983,

ZorI’hls section is l]as~~ prima ri]v on A. D, I,ittle, ‘‘ Ek’ai uat ion

of Ak’ailah]e Cleanup Technologies for Un(;ontrol]ed Waste

Sites, ” cent ractor report prepared for the offi{[~ of Technology}”

Assessment No\emher 1984,

niques have been used in many industries for

many years and are relatively easy to adapt to

Superfund problems. These conventional containment and treatment technologies are examined below. Containment technologies use construction engineering techniques that have long

records of successful use in that application.

However, because relatively few remedial actions have actually taken place and because no

long-term record of performance at Superfund

sites exists, there is little data available to support the view that containment technologies

are reliable or proven for use with hazardous

wastes, In fact, the evidence appears to be

pointing in the opposite direction (see chapter

5). Existing treatment technologies, so far limited in use for Superfund cleanups, constitute

the basis for most emerging technologies.

Table 6-2 compares the estimated costs of applying a number of conventional technologies

at Superfund sites.

Conventional Containment

Hazardous waste—regardless of whether disposed of in the ground, in barrels or drums,

in impoundments, or in landfills—eventually

leaks to some extent. The threat that this

leakage (or migration) presents is related to the

level of contamination (exposure) at points of

concern. Migration primarily occurs when

ground or surface water or air comes in contact with the hazardous waste. Thus the objective of containment is to seal the hazardous

waste as well as possible and reduce the possibility of an inflow of migration media or outflow of contamination. In addition, any leachate formed by contact of the hazardous waste

with water must be collected and treated, This

system of control requires that a number of

technologies be combined to produce the lowest possible probability of failure.

The following is a summary of these containment technology components, how they are

used and function. Their applicability depends

almost entirely on site factors (e.g., topography,

erosion potential, surface and groundwater water flow patterns, and expected rainfall) and is

primarily independent of waste specific fac-
-———

Ch. 6—C/eanup Technologies ● 1 8 3

Containment t:

Ground water barriers.

Slurry wall s

Grout curtai n

Plllng . ,

Vibrated bea m

G roundwater pump(ng

Subsurface drains

Runon/runoff controls

Surface seals/caos:

Table 6-2.—Estimated

Materials available onsite

Using off site materials

Synthetic cap (top layer)

sub-base materials

available onsit e

Onsite treatment:

Solidification

and stabilizatio n

Groundwater treatment;

Biological treatment

activated sludge . . . . . .

Chemical treatment

neutralization and

precipitation . . . . . . . . . .

Physical treatment

carbon absorption . , .

ion exchange . . .

air stripping . . .

NOTES

Costs of Conventional Technologies

Capital costs:

based on a hypothetical sitea Operation and maintenance costs

$250.000

$1,25 million

$800,000

$250,000

2,400 ft long, 20 ft deep barrier

$55,000 to $65,000

18 PVC well points, 15 ft apart

Pumped at 25 gpm with 18 pumps

1,250 ft piping, wellheads to

treatment

$15,000 to $20,000

200 ft long drain, 20 ft deep

using 12“ PVC pipe; backfilled

with 5 ft clay

$1,000

500 ft dike, up slope

Due to the lack of operational experience using these

technologies at remedial sites, there is little data

avaiIable on which to base estimates of operation

and maintenance costs.

Operation and maintenance costs for containment

technologies include site costs such as: 1) the

running of any necessary equipment (i.e., pumps);

2) site monitoring (particularly for groundwater

migration); 3) inspection of the systems; and 4)

any necessary repairs and possible replacement.

Repairs and replacement constitute the most

expensive items. Several years after construction,

repairs might cost 50 percent of the original cost;

replacement, over 100 percent (due to inflation and

worsening conditions).

$32,000 Uncertain: depends on life of system relative to

$150,000 lifetime of toxic wastes.

$50,000

Cap over source area consisting

of sand (6 in), clay (2 ft),

sand/gravel (1 ft), and top

soil/vegetation (2 ft)

-.

$5,000 to $10,000

60 cubic yards of sludge in

lagoon excavated and mixed

with kiln dust; then replaced ——— .

Based on treating 450 gallons per Costs per 1,000 gallons –

m i n ute Costs per yearb

treated b

. .-

$3.1 million $940,000 $4.14

$650,000 $233,000 $1.03

$7.5 million $3.8 million $16.75’

$2.25 million $1.2 million $5.13

$360.000 $153,000d

$0.67d

aThls example site !s 200 ft by 200 ft and has three sw rces of contaml nation — a drum recycling area, a metals recovery operat!on, and a lagoon filled WI th sludge

(4 ft . 20 ft , 20 f!) As a result of leakage and spIIls from these sources, groundwater has been contaminated with organic solvents and heavy metals A 200 ft wide

plume of contamination extends 81X ft of fslte, and IS only 2,500 ft from a nearby well field The water table is 5 ft below the ground surface Bedrock IS sound and

unf ract u red and bg I ns 20 ft below the site Groundwater travels at O 001 cm/second, and a groundwater treatment rate 450 gpm Is expected

bBoth O&M and ~pltal recovery costs are Included O&M costs are incurred Until treatment has been ‘orndeted

‘carbon regeneration not Included

d vapor treatment not Included

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
184 ● Superfund Strategy

tors. Table 6-3 presents the advantages, disadvantages, and limitations of their use.

Groundwater Barriers.—Groundwater barriers are

designed to prevent the offsite migration of

contaminated groundwater by physically restricting horizontal groundwater flow. Groundwater barriers have become one of the principal options to contain plumes of contamination

at cleanup sites threatening aquifers, They can

be used alone, but often are employed in combination with capping or groundwater pumping, All methods, except block displacement,

are derived from general construction practices. Experience under conditions at cleanup

sites, however, is as yet limited, and little data

are available to show the long-term effects of

wastes in contact with the barrier. Considerable research evidence for adverse impact of

wastes on barrier materials does exist. 21

Except for the block displacement technique,

barriers must be keyed in or attached to a lowpermeability layer, such as bedrock or clay, beneath the site that will restrict vertical or

downward migration of contaminants. Barriers, then, are limited to sites where bedrock is

not extensively fractured or is not too far below

the surface, The extent of fracture in bedrock

is difficult to predict,

None of these techniques provides a completely impermeable barrier, even if constructed

ideally. Rather, they reduce groundwater flow

through the contained region to on the order

of 10-* centimeters per second (77 gallons of

groundwater per year would pass through a

barrier 10 feet deep by 100 feet long), Thus, an

anciliary pumping or drainage system is used

to contain the leakage or dewater the zone near

the barrier. Caps over the site are used to reduce the amount of water that can enter the

contained area. Such systems must function indefinitely or as long as a medium for movement

of the contaminant is present.

‘

t

See, for instance, “Barrier-Leachate Compatibility: Permeability of Cement/Asphalt Emulsions and Contaminant Resistant Bentonite/SOil Mixtures to Organic Solvents” by David C,

Anderson, Alicia Gill, and Wayne Grawley. Paper presented at

bth National Conference on Management of Uncontrolled Ha~-

ardous Waste Sites, Washington, DC, November 1984 (Silver

Spring, MD: Hazardous Materials Control Research Institute,

1984).

The major types of groundwater barriers are:

●

●

●

●

Slurry walls: fixed underground physical

barriers formed by pumping slurry (e.g.,

a cement-bentonite mixture) into a trench

and either allowing the slurry to set or

backfilling with a suitable engineered material, Use of a vibrating beam technique,

a relatively new procedure, avoids the

need to dig a trench prior to filling with

slurry.

Grout curtains: fixed underground physical barriers formed by injecting a grout (either particulate such as portland cement

or chemical such as sodium silicate) into

the ground through well points.

Pilings: fixed underground physical barriers constructed by driving webbed sections of sheet piling (typically steel) into

the ground. Each section is connected

with interlocking socket or bowl and ball

joints that fill with fine-medium grain soil

particles. This serves as a seal to restrict

groundwater flow through the barrier.

Block displacement allows for the placing

of a fixed underground physical barrier beneath a large mass of earth, This developmental technique was field tested by EPA

in 1982.22 Unexpected geologic details of

the site interfered with accomplishment of

the barrier placement according to the design plan.

Groundwater Pumping.—Groundwater pumping

involves the use of a series of wells to remove

groundwater for treatment or to contain a

plume. Techniques are well developed, depend

on standard technology, and offer high design

flexibility (number of wells, location, depth,

and pumping rate) to meet a wide variety of

site-specific requirements. Uncertainties with

groundwater information and modeling, especially in complicated flow regimes and for deep

well systems, mean that the effectiveness of the

system must be verified in the field. Modifications that might be required can reduce the cost

effectiveness of the system. (See chapter 5 for

ZZRonald D, Hill, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

“Promising Site Cleanup Technology, ” paper presented at Superfund Update: Cleanup Lessions I.earned, Schaumburg, IL, Oct.

11-12, 1983.
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 185

Table 6-3.—Containment Technologies—Summary

Disadvantages — Advantages

Groundwater barriers:

● Slurry wall

Most versatile, best

understood barrier

technology.

Can be inexpensive compared

to other barrier techniques.

Low O&M

. Grout curtain,.

Minimal site disturbance,

No excavation required,

Low O&M.

Limitations

Requires excavation.

Requires site area to mix backfill.

Difficult to verify continuity of slurry or

backfill.

Difficult to key to bedrock.

Must tie to impervious zone.

Not 100°/0 impermeable.

Long-term effects of some chemicals on

permeability uncertain.

Less than 20°/0 soil can pass No. 200

sieve.

Must tie to impervious zone.

Not 100°/0 impermeable.

Long-term effects of some chemicals on

permeability uncertain,

Chemicals in the grout may cause site

safety or environmental problems.

Difficult to verify continuity of wall.

Limited applicability.

Expensive compared to other barriers.

Difficult to key to bedrock.

Very sensitive to construction quality.

Difficult to verify continuity of wall.

Difficult to key to bedrock.

Relatively new technology.

● Vibrated beam

Special slurries improve

chemical compatibility.

No excavation required,

Low O&M.

No obstructions in soil.

Must tie to impervious zone

Access for large crane needed.

Not 100°/0 impermeable.

Long-term effects of chemicals on

permeability uncertain.

● Sheet pile

No excavation required

Low O&M.

Expensive.

Difficult to key to bedrock.

Continuity of wall at joints difficult to

verify.

Soils must be loosely packed,

Limited to about 50 ft.

Must tie to impervious zone.

Not 100°/0 impermeable.

Some chemicals may attack piling

material.

● Block displacement t

No underlying impervious

zone needed,

Groundwater pumping:

● Well points

Proven and well understood,

Can function for very long

periods.

High design flexibility,

High reliability,

Useful in many situations.

Effectiveness can be verified

. Deep we// systems

Same as well points.

Site conditions must conform to complex

design requirements.

Technology under development.

Continuity is difficult to verify.

Design may require expensive modeling.

Long-term O&M required.

Performance sensitive to design.

Collected liquid must be treated or

disposed of.

Useful up to 10 meters.

Will not affect contaminants in

unsaturated zone or contaminants that

do not flow. Site conditions may

complicate use and performance.

Same as well points; except useful to any

depth.

Same as well points

Subsurface drains:

Proven and well understood,

Low O&M.

Superior to wells under

certain conditions.

Less sensitive to design than

welIs.

Conceptually simple.

Less flexibility than wells.

Susceptible to clogging.

Excavation required.

Collected liquid must be treated or

disposed of.

Difficult to install beneath waste site.

More cost effective in shallow

applications.

Runon/runoff controls:

Proven and well understood,

Inexpensive.

Effectiveness desirable.

Only conceptual design

required.

Periodic inspection and maintenance

required.

May not be able to handle abnormal

storms.

Surface seal/caps:

Inexpensive compared to

excavation and removal.

May be used as an interim

measure where surface

infiltration is a problem,

Periodic inspection and maintenance

required.

Difficult for very large sites, or if

obstructions are present.

Subject to potential failure without proper

design, installation, and maintenance.
186 . Superfund Strategy

Table 6-3.—Containment Technologies—Summary -Continued

Advantages Disadvantages Limitations

Solidification and stabilization:

Improves containment Extensive testing may be required. Long-term integrity uncertain.

performance. Many processes developmental. Not useful for many organics.

High short-term effectiveness

possible.

Waste material (e.g., fly ash,

kiln dust) can be used as

pozzolan.

Encapsulation:

Improves effectiveness of Developmental.

land disposal.

Long-term integrity uncertain.

Requires solidification of bulk wastes.

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

a discussion of problems related to understanding groundwater and containment movement.)

As soon as a pumping system is shut down,

groundwater flow patterns are likely to return

to their pre-pumping condition. Therefore,

pumping systems have to be operated for long

periods of time unless the source of contamination is eliminated or degraded through treatment. If, during this time, other wells are used

to draw water from the same groundwater system, flow patterns may change.

Subsurface Drains .—Subsurface drains can be installed to collect leachate as well as lower the

water table for site dewaterin. They are built

by placing tile or perforated pipe in a trench,

surrounding it with gravel (or similar material),

and backfilling with topsoil or clay.

The use of subsurface drains is a very old

technology, well proven in applications other

than for hazardous waste environments. While

overall costs will vary depending on sitespecific conditions, the drains are relatively inexpensive to install and have low O&M costs.

Drains are not as versatile as wells and are

more sensitive to design errors. They compete

with wells where soils are heterogeneous or exhibit low hydraulic conductivity, or where the

plume of contamination is very large. They

may be preferred to wells where there is a contaminant layer floating on the groundwater or

where the contaminants are viscous.

placing drains in highly contaminated soils

can require special construction techniques.

They are susceptible to clogging and their performance can be affected by variations in

groundwater flow and level, important problems, considering the long lifetimes of many

hazardous substances.

Runon/Runoff Controls.—Surface water control

technologies are designed to prevent contaminated surface water from leaving a site and uncontaminated water from entering a contaminated area. They are almost always employed

in conjunction with other technologies (e. g.,

surface seals or excavation and removal), Conventional and inexpensive techniques include

dikes, terraces, channels, chutes, downpipes,

grading, and revegetation. Contaminated runoff, if it occurs, requires treatment prior to discharge.

Surface Seals/Caps.—Surface seals are lowpermeability barriers placed over a site to reduce surface water infiltration, prevent contact with contaminated materials, and control

fugitive emissions (gases and odors) at cleanup

sites. Various materials are used including soils

and clays; mixtures (e. g., asphalt and concrete,

soil and cement); and polymeric membranes.

Soil and vegetation generally cover these materials.

Surface seals are versatile and can be designed for most sites, although they may be difficult to install at large sites, sites with surface

obstructions, sites with extremely irregular topography, or sites with inadequate subbase stability, which leads to subsidence or settling.

They require very careful installation, as well

as continued inspection and maintenance to

ensure their integrity over time. Vents may be
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 187

required to prevent gas buildup from cracking

the cap. Over the long term, there are concerns

about increased permeability resulting from

puncturing by roots, animals, and activities on

the surface. Under some conditions, contact

with waste or leachate also causes problems.

Solidification and Stabilization.—Solidification, stabilization, and chemical fixation technologies

reduce the potential for leachate production by

binding waste in a solid matrix via a physical

and/or chemical process. Wastes are mixed

with a binding agent and subsequently cured

to a solid form. The stabilized waste then usually is capped, contained, or land disposed to

prevent contact with water,

Applicability of the technique is affected by

both waste and site characteristics, Prime candidates for fixation by state-of-the-art processes

are inorganic materials in aqueous solution or

suspension and those containing large amounts

of heavy metals or inorganic solids. Organic

wastes and waste streams containing organic

constituents (one of the major problems at

Superfund sites) are less amenable to fixation.

Site-specific factors determine the feasibility

of mixing the waste with a fixative, and whether the mixing can occur in situ or after excavation of the waste. In some cases significant volume increases raise problems for onsite use,

While in situ and onsite solidification and

stabilization technologies offer promise in decreasing leaching at cleanup sites (in combination with caps and barriers), reliability over

time is uncertain due to the lack of monitoring data. Questions remain as to the long-term

integrity of the resultant matrices. Freeze-thaw

cycles can cause cracking in the wastes above

the frost line. For in situ use, nonuniform conditions at a site and operational difficulties can

create pockets of incomplete immobilization,

Encapsulation .—Encapsulation is a process

where wastes are enclosed in a stable water-resistant material. The process may be applied

to wastes in containers or to wastes that have

been bound into a matrix of sufficient strength

to hold together while the covering is applied.

Once encapsulated, wastes must be placed in

a landfill.

As long as the covering is intact, the potential for leaking is very low. However, no data

are available on the long-term stability and integrity of the covering materials.

Conventional Treatment

Treatment technologies can be broken down

into four major types: physical, chemical, biological, and thermal. All tend to be waste-specific, some more so than others. This section

explains each type in general and looks at specific conventional treatment technologies.

Table 6-4 summarizes these technologies and

their advantages and disadvantages.

Few have been applied at Superfund sites.

Largely, these technologies are standard processes that are used to treat industrial hazardous waste streams and might be adaptable to

Superfund wastes, perhaps using specially constructed onsite facilities, The complexities and

variability of wastes at Superfund sites as compared to the outflow of a given industrial process, however, may reduce the applicability and

efficiency of most of these techniques. Thus,

multiple treatment may be necessary.

Physical Treatment.—Physical treatment processes do not destroy contaminants. They change

the hazardous constituents to a more convenient form through concentration and/or phase

change. Ideally two output streams are produced. One is a concentrated volume of hazardous material that must undergo additional

treatment or be placed in a landfill and the second is a nonhazardous liquid or solid material.

Physical treatment systems are used widely

for conventional wastewater treatment, and

methods are available to treat many types of

wastes over a wide range of conditions. Nevertheless, the combinations of wastes found at

cleanup sites may limit the degree of separation that can be achieved.

Some of the more widely used processes include carbon adsorption, flocculation, sedimentation, filtration, flotation, stripping, ion

exchange, and reverse osmosis. Many are used

in combination with other treatment processes.

Some of the systems that remove inorganic
188 ● Superfund Strategy

Table 6-4.—Treatment Technologies—Summary

Advantages Disadvantages Limitations

DESTRUCTION/DETOXIFICATION PROCESSES:

Biological treatment:

● Conventional

Applicable to many organic May produce a hazardous sludge which

waste streams. must be managed.

High total organic removal. May require pre-treatment prior to

Inexpensive. discharge.

Well understood and widely

used in other applications.

• In-situ biodegradation

Destroys waste in place.

Chemical treatment:

● Wet air oxidation

Good for wastes too dilute for

incineration or too

concentrated or toxic for

biological treatment.

● Chlorination for cyanide

Essentially complete

destruction.

Well understood and widely

used in other applications.

● Ozonation

Can destroy refractory

organics.

Liquids, solids, mixes can be

treated.

. Reduction for chromium

High destruction.

Well understood and widely

used in other applications.

Ž Permeable treatment beds

Limited excavation required.

Inexpensive,

● Chemical injection

Excavation not required.

No pumping required.

incineration:

● Conventional incineration

Destroys organic wastes

(99.99 + “/0).

Limited experience.

Extensive testing may be required.

Containment also required.

Oxidation not as complete as thermal

oxidation or incineration.

May produce new hazardous species.

Extensive testing is required.

High capital investment.

High level of operator skills required.

May require post-treatment.

Specialized for cyanide.

Oxidation not as complete as thermal

oxidation or incineration.

May produce new hazardous species.

Extensive testing is required.

High capital investment; high O&M.

Specialized for chromium.

Developmental.

Periodic replacement of treatment media

required.

Spent treatment medium must be

disposed of.

Developmental.

Extensive testing required.

Disposal of residue required.

Test burn may be required.

Skilled operators required.

Expensive.

Micro-organisms sensitive to oxygen

levels, temperature, toxic loading, inlet

flow.

Some organic contaminants are difficult

to treat.

Flow and composition variations can

reduce efficiency.

Aeration difficult to depths > 2 ft.

Many common organic species not easily

biodegraded.

Needs proper combination of wastes and

hydrogeological characteristics.

Obtaining proper mix of contaminants,

organisms, and nutrients.

Organisms may plug pores.

Poor destruction of chlorinated organics.

Moderate efficiencies of destruction

(40-90 ”/0),

Interfering waste constituents may limit

applicability or effectiveness.

Not well understood.

Interfering waste constituents may limit

applicability or effectiveness.

Best for shallow plumes.

Many reactants treat a limited family of

wastes.

Effectiveness influenced by groundwater

flow variations.

Best for shallow plumes.

Need fairly homogeneous waste

composition.
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies . 189

—

Table 6-4.—Treatment Technologies—Summary -Continued

Advantages Disadvantages Limitations —

• Onsite

Destroys organic wastes Disposal of residue required.

(99.99 + %). Onsite feedstock preparation required.

Transportation of wastes not Test burn may be required,

required. Skilled operators required.

Expensive.

● Thermal oxidation for gases

Proven technology. May require auxiliary fuel.

High destruction efficiencies. O&M cost can be high.

Applicable to most organic

streams.

SEPARATION/TRANSFER PROCESSES:

Chemical:

● Neutralization/precipitation

Wide range or applications. Hazardous sludge produced.

Well understood and widely

used in other applications.

Inexpensive.

● /on exchange

Can recover metals at high Generates sludge for disposal.

efficiency. Pre-treatment to remove suspended solids

may be required.

Expensive.

Physical treatment:

. Carbon absorption for aqueous streams

Well understood and Regeneration or disposal of spent carbon

demonstrated. required.

Applicable to many organics Pre-treatment may be required for

that do not respond to suspended solids, oil, grease.

biological treatment. High O&M cost.

High degree of flexibility in

operation and design.

High degree of effectiveness.

. Carbon absorption for gases

Widely used, well understood. High capital and O&M costs.

High removal efficiencies.

. Flocculation, sedimentation and filitration

Low cost. Generates sludge for disposal.

Well understood.

. Stripping

Well understood and Air controls may be required.

demonstrated.

● Flotation

Well understood and Generates sludge for disposal.

demonstrated.

Inexpensive.

. Reverse osmosis

High removal potential. Generates sludge for disposal.

Pre-treatment to remove suspended

or adjust pH may be required.

Expensive.

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Mobile units have low feed rate.

Completing agents reduce effectiveness.

Resin fouling.

Removes some constituents but not

others.

Many inorganic, some organics are

poorly absorbed.

More effective for low molecular weight,

polar species.

Disposal or regeneration of spent carbon

required.

Applicable only to relatively volatile

organic contaminants.

solids

Variability in waste flow and composition

effects performance.
190 ● Superfund Strategy

will produce a sludge or solid (e.g., heavy metals) that must be sent to a landfill for disposal.

Reverse osmosis and ion exchange produce a

dilute aqueous stream containing the toxic substances that have been removed. Stripping

transfers volatile compounds to a gas stream

where they may be destroyed by thermal oxidation, treated by other techniques, or emitted

into the atmosphere. These systems range in

cost from quite low (sedimentation, filtration)

to quite high (ion exchange, reverse osmosis).

Operating costs for carbon adsorption are generally high and depend on the concentration

of the contaminant stream.

Under carbon adsorption waste streams are

passed through beds of activated carbon particles, Organic compounds and some inorganic

species in the waste stream become bound to

the surface of the particles and can subsequently be removed along with the carbon adsorbent, But treatment and disposal of spent

adsorbent poses a significant secondary problem. The adsorbent can be regenerated, in

which case the contaminants and carbon are

separated and the contaminants must undergo

subsequent treatment, or the adsorbent including contaminants must be destroyed or landfilled.

Carbon adsorption is a highly effective, well

demonstrated technique for removing organic

compounds, and to a lesser degree metals, from

aqueous waste streams. It is a widely used technique for removing organic contaminants from

gas streams. It also can treat many organic species that do not respond well to biological treatment. Streams with high organic concentrations can be treated but the cost may become

excessive due to high carbon use and other

O&M costs. In such cases, combining carbon

adsorption as a finishing step with a cheaper

process such as biological treatment may be

more cost effective. Pre-treatment stages may

be needed to remove suspended solids, oil, and

grease, all of which would rapidly plug and deactivate the carbon bed.

Flocculation, sedimentation, and filtration

are used to remove suspended solids from a

waste stream. Flocculation is a process in which

small particles are brought together in larger

aggregates. The larger particles can then be filtered out of the waste stream. Sedimentation

removes suspended solids by permitting the

particles to settle to the bottom of a vessel

through the action of gravity. Filtration separates the solids from the liquids by forcing the

fluid through a porous medium. Filtration can

also be used to dewater sludges.

Stripping removes volatile contaminants

from an aqueous waste stream by passing air

or steam through the wastes, Contaminants are

transferred to the air stream, or, in the case of

the steam process, to a distillate.

Dissolved air flotation removes insoluble hazardous components present as suspended fine

particles or globules of oils and greases from

an aqueous phase. After being saturated with

air at high pressure and being removed to tanks

under atmospheric pressure, bubbles form in

the aqueous mixture, The bubbles containing

the fine particles and globules rise to the surface and can be skimmed off.

In ion exchange, unwanted ionic species,

principally inorganic, are exchanged with innocuous ions on a resin. The process results

in a sludge that requires management.

Reverse osmosis removes contaminants from

aqueous wastes by passing the waste streams

at high pressure (usually in the range of 200

to 400 psi) past a semipermeable membrane.

Clean water passes out through the membrane,

leaving behind a concentrated waste stream for

further treatment, Typical membranes are impermeable to most inorganic species and some

organic compounds,

Chemical Treatment.—In chemical treatment,

hazardous constituents are altered by chemical reactions, In the process, hazardous constituents may be either destroyed or the resultant product or products may still be hazardous,

although in a more convenient form for further

processing or disposal. Since chemical reactions involve specific reactants under specific

conditions, these processes are usually used

when only one substance is involved (or a few

substances similar in chemical character).
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 191

.

When chemical treatment is applied to a mixed

composition waste, there can be problems because the treatment chemical might be consumed by side reactions, the intended chemical reactions might be blocked by impurity

interference, or unexpected end products

might add new hazards. 23

Neutralization and precipitation are widely

used in industry to remove inorganic and some

organic compounds from aqueous streams.

They are important options for separating out

heavy metals in hazardous wastes, Neutralization may be used alone or in combination with

other techniques. Precipitation is always used

with follow-up steps to remove the insoluble

matter produced. Both are often used as parts

of larger treatment programs. Neutralization

adjusts the pH of acidic or basic liquid wastes,

soils, or other contaminated materials. It may

be used alone to reduce the corrosivity of wastes

or to adjust the pH to a range where metals are

immobilized (remain in insoluble form). Precipitation is used, often in combination with

neutralization, to reduce the concentration of

metals, and in rarer cases organics such as

phthalates, to low levels in an aqueous stream.

The major problem with both processes is that

they create hazardous sludges that must be subsequently disposed of in a secure manner.

Other chemical processes can be used to treat

contaminated hazardous liquids. Both wet air

oxidation and chemical oxidation can be applied to broad families of organic wastes. Other

processes apply to specific waste types. While

there has been little or no experience with these

technologies at Superfund sites, all have been

used at regulated hazardous waste treatment

facilities or in conventional industrial waste

treatment, The variable nature of contaminant

streams at cleanup sites may limit performance

relative to conventional applications.

Wet air oxidation involves a combustion reaction occurring in the liquid phase through

addition of air or oxygen at high pressure

(greater than 350 psi) and elevated temperature

(greater than 1700 C]. The products of the re23Ja\ A. hlackie, et al., ‘(}lazar(lr)us-tl~ aste Alanagemf’nt: The

Alternati\res, ” Chemical Engineering, Aug. 6, 1984, ~). 57,

action are steam, N2, CO2 and an oxidized liquid stream. In chemical oxidation, an oxidant

(e.g., ozone, perchloric acid, or permanganate)

is mixed with the waste and reacts with those

oxidizable species present. Neither process

breaks down organic molecules as completely

as thermal destruction or incineration, and

new hazardous species may be produced in the

process of destroying those in the wastes. Both

require extensive testing to determine their efficiency and the properties of their effluents.

Both are expensive to operate and require major capital investments,

Toxic hexavalent chromium ion (Cr VI) can

be reduced to the less toxic trivalent chromium

ion (Cr 111) by adding a reducing agent under

highly acidic conditions. The reduction process is followed by Cr III removal through precipitation as the insoluble hydroxide. Alkaline

chlorination is used to remove cyanide from

alkaline cyanide-containing waste by oxidation

in stages,

Biological Treatment.—Biological treatment uses

micro-organisms to degrade (biodegradation)

or remove (bioadsorption) contaminants from

a waste stream. It has seen widespread application for many years for treating wastewaters,

both hazardous and nonhazardous, in closed

systems such as sewage treatment plants. It is

a generally inexpensive method of treatment

for groundwater, surface water, or impounded

liquids containing a low concentration of organics. Although systems can be designed to

achieve fairly high levels of overall removal,

the effectiveness for specific hazardous organic

species can be quite low. For this reason, some

sort of post- or pre-treatment, such as carbon

adsorption, may be required.

Conventional biological treatment processes

include activated sludge, aerobic stabilization

ponds (surface impoundments), rotating biological disks, and trickling filters, All of these techniques produce a sludge containing the remains of the organisms, unreacted organic

matter, and the insoluble inorganic constituents. Metal removal occurs by processes that

attach the metal cations to the sludge. Some

organic compounds, such as PCBs and poly -

nuclear aromatic compounds, may become ad-
192 ● Superfund Strategy

sorbed to the sludge and exhibit some removal

although not by biological activity, The sludge

may be considered hazardous and require additional treatment if residual toxic contaminants are present. The performance of biological systems can vary substantially from unit to

unit depending on the individual compounds

treated. Variations are due to the basic composition of the micro-organisms present, the

degree to which the mix has become acclimated to the wastes, the presence of interfering or toxic (to the organisms) contaminants,

flow and concentration variations, and other

factors.

Biological treatment systems are very sensitive to changes in temperature, oxygen content,

and to toxic loading of contaminants. Sensitivity to changes in inlet composition is a particular problem in adapting these techniques for

use at cleanup sites. Achieving low enough residual levels of contaminants can be a problem

under some conditions.

Biodegradation is discussed in the “Innovative Technologies” section.

Thermal Treatment.—Thermal treatment processes use high temperature as the principal

mechanism, either to drive a chemical reaction

or to simply break chemical bonds and thus destroy the hazardous nature of a substance. During incineration, the conventional method of

thermal treatment, organic materials are

burned (i.e., oxidized) at very high temperatures. Common types of incinerators applicable to hazardous wastes include rotary kilns,

multiple hearth, fluidized bed, and liquid injection and are discussed below.24 New forms

of thermal destruction processes are discussed

under “Innovative Technologies. ”

The end products of complete incineration

depend on the input materials but will generally include CO2

, H2O, SO2, NOX, HCl gases,

and ash. Emission control equipment (scrubbers, electrostatic precipitators) for particulate, SO2

, NOX, and products of incomplete

ZiM~re complete information can be found i n U.S. Congress,

Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies and Management Strategies for Hazardous Waste Control, OTA- M-I96

(Washington, LX: U.S. Chvernment Printing Office, March 1983),

combustion (PICs) are needed to control emission of hazardous air pollutants, Incineration

is effective for essentially all organic contaminants, particularly if they are present as liquids.

Sludges and contaminated soils require special

incinerators, usually rotary kiln types that

properly mix the reactants and provide even

heat transfer.

Incineration can be employed on or off a

Superfund site, Although commercially available techniques could be adapted for onsite incineration, the technology has not been used

at cleanup sites. Limited quantities of wastes

and contaminated soils have been transported

to offsite incinerators, As with the onsite/offsite applications of any technology, trade-offs

will occur. Onsite units could be semi-permanent, constructed onsite, or mobile units brought

to the site as component units and assembled

onsite. Offsite units could be regionally located,

permanent facilities that might offer economies

of scale. However, they would require that hazardous wastes be transported, an expensive

and potentially risky operation. Onsite incinerators require substantial supporting activities, such as electric power, and must be permitted by Federal, State and, often, local

governments for each site at which they are

used. (See the “Barriers to Adoption of Improved Technology” section in this chapter.)

The secondary effects of incineration include

residue disposal, possible exposure to unburned contaminants or toxic products of combustion in the stack gases, scrubber sludge disposal, and scrubber effluent discharge, Removing wastes to an offsite incinerator changes the

population affected by exposure to these secondary effects. Incinerating contaminated soil

would produce large amounts of residues. Until the issue of delisting is handled efficiently,

residues would be deemed hazardous and

would have to be placed in a RCRA-permitted

landfill.

Rotary kilns can handle a wide variety of

burnable waste feeds—solids and sludge, as

well as free liquids and gases, A rotating cylinder tumbles and uncovers the waste, assuring uniform heat transfer. The cylinders range

in size and the kilns operate between temper-
— .

Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 193

atures of approximately 1,5000 and 3,0000 F,

depending on the position along the kiln.

Multiple hearth incinerators use a vertical

cylinder with multiple horizontal cross-sectional floors or levels where waste cascades

from the top floor to the next and so on, steadily moving downward as the wastes are burned,

This action provides for long residence times.

While such incinerators are able to handle a

wide variety of sludges, they are not well suited

for most hazardous waste for two reasons,

First, they exhibit relatively cold spots wherein

complete combustion will not occur producing a very uneven burn, Second, because wastes

are introduced relatively close to the top of the

furnace, where hot exhaust gases also exit,

there is the potential for volatile waste components near the top of the incinerator to escape to the atmosphere without being destroyed.

Fluidized bed combusters are a relatively

new design being applied in many areas. They

achieve rapid and thorough heat transfer to the

injected fuel and waste, and combustion occurs

rapidly. Air forced up through a perforated

plate maintains a turbulent motion in a bed of

very hot inert granules, which provide for direct conduction heat transfer to the injected

waste. The bed itself acts as a scrubber for certain gases and particulate. The units tend to

be compact and are simple to operate relative

to incinerators but have low throughput capacity. Other disadvantages are a limited range of

applicable wastes and difficulties in handling

the ash and residues. (The “Innovative Technologies” section has information on adaptions

of this conventional technique, )

With liquid injection incineration, freely

flowing wastes are atomized by passage through

a carefully designed nozzle. It is important that

the droplets are small enough to allow the

waste to completely vaporize and go through

ail the subsequent stages of combustion while

they reside in the high-temperature zones of

the incinerator. Injection incinerator designs

tend to be waste-specific, especially nozzle design, but can be designed to burn a wide range

of pumpable waste.

Groundwater Treatment.—The contamination of

groundwater is a common occurrence at Superfund sites and may be the major and most intransigent problem. Treatment often incorporates a combination of the above technologies,

is costly, and there is no guarantee that complete renovation of aquifers can ever be accomplished.

While some innovative techniques pursue in

situ biological or chemical treatment of groundwater, the current practice is to first contain

a plume of contamination to avoid further migration and then pump the contaminated water

from the ground and through a treatment facility located onsite. Treated water can be reinjected into the ground to enhance and speed

up the flushing of the contaminants from the

system or pumped down gradient (i.e., returned

to the aquifer or a stream or river).

Some discussion of how technology has been

applied at Superfund sites to treat groundwater

and its effectiveness can be found in chapter

5. For a more complete discussion of groundwater treatment options, see OTA’s report, Protecting the Nation Groundwater From Contamination .25

Innovative Technologies

Innovative technologies are varied but can

be broadly classified into containment and

treatment categories. The concentration in this

section, however, is on new treatment technologies 26 that offer the possibility to destroy hazardous wastes and eliminate the need to tie up

resources in long-term operation and maintenance of containment facilities. Not all innovative treatment technologies destroy contaminants, however. Some improve on physical

separation methods and, as such, can provide

important pre-treatment steps. Others, such as

~s~l ~ [;O ~~ress, ~ffi[;e of ‘re~hn~l~~j, Assessment, }’ro[tx ~- ,,

i~g f~~ Nation Ground~~’ater From (~ontarninafjon, OTA-O-233

(Washington, DC: U.S. (~ f)~ernment Printing Office, octobcr

1984),

~~h~ost of these technologies are not brea kth roughs i n basic

sc i[~ncc but rather are inncn’at i~’e in adopting existing processes

for the management of hazardous waste.
194 ● Superfund Strategy

vitrification, decompose and entrap hazardous

wastes.

The nature of innovation makes it more difficult to classify developing treatment methods

as strictly physical, chemical, biological, or

thermal processes, In fact, procedures for qualifying new technologies on the basis of preexisting classifications can inhibit their adoption, New methods of analysis will have to be

considered to properly evaluate the effectiveness and reliability of innovative technologies,

Because the procedure for testing incineration technologies (the most common conventional destruction technique) has been defined under

RCRA and performance standards adopted, the

recognized bottom line for any hazardous

waste reduction/destruction technology has become the Destruction and Removal Efficiency

(DRE) 27 rating. This system forces all technologies to a level of 99.99 percent (“four nines”)

removal for organic hazardous wastes and

99.9999 (“six nines”) for PCBs (regulated under

TSCA). The blanket use of this rating ignores

the question of whether these degrees of thoroughness are an appropriate level of hazard reduction for the public and the environment for

all hazardous wastes found in all media and

whether the public ought to pay that cost in all

cases, However, until national cleanup goals

are established and/or additional ways of measuring technology effectiveness are adopted,

DREs will remain the prime criterion for technology evaluation.

Comparing technologies by their DREs must

take into account that the type and concentration of the input material can affect the outcome for each technology. Often it will be less

z~rhe DRE is calculated by the following mass balance formula:

DRE = (1-Wout/Win) x 100 percent

where:

Win . the mass feed rate of 1 principal organic hazardous constituent (POHC) in the waste stream going

into the incinerator.

Wout = the mass emission rate of the same POHC in the

exhaust prior to release to the atmosphere.

Incinerators are also regulated by the amount of hydrogen

chloride and particulate emitted. See U.S. Congress, Office of

Technology Assessment, Technologies and Management Strategies for Hazardous Waste Controf, OTA-M-196, p. 159 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1983) for

more detailed information.

expensive to attain desired removal rates by

combining techniques that individually offer

relatively low removal rates. Other methods of

regulating technologies include “design and

operation” standards (such as applied to landfill techniques under RCRA) and environmental standards (comparable to National Primary

and Secondary Air Quality Standards). With regard to the latter, it should be noted that even

high DREs do not necessarily signify acceptably low levels of toxic air emissions in terms

of the quantity released over time.

Technology Comparisons

Of the many technologies that are now being conceived, researched, and developed,

OTA has selected some examples of alternatives to common Superfund practices that appear to offer the potential for improved reliability and cost effectiveness.

Much of the analysis of innovative technologies and their applicability to Superfund must

be based on judgement due to a lack of Superfund performance data.28 Comparisons among

the technologies is difficult because of a lack

of standardization in the available information.

While only one of the technologies presented

below has been applied at an uncontrolled site;

some have been used to treat industrial hazardous waste streams.

All have undergone a variety of tests, but only

a few of the technologies have actually been

tested on a Superfund site or on a large scale

with Superfund waste (i. e., have been demonstrated), Instead, the material used for testing

has ranged from pure hazardous waste compounds to synthetically produced wastes to

sample Superfund wastes, in varying concentrations. Testing has been conducted at different levels (e.g., laboratory, bench, and pilotscale) since the technologies exist at these different levels of development,

ZsAn assumption is often made that such data exists for conventional technologies and that, therefore, their reliability and

effectiveness is better known. In fact, conventional technologies

are only conventional in the sense that the techniques have been

proved in conventional applications; i.e., applications other than

Superfund remedial action.
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 195

There are no standardized estimates of capital and operating costs for each technology.

Costing is often based on the results of tests

specific to a certain type and concentration of

hazardous waste and is not necessarily transferrable to the treatment of other types and concentration of hazardous wastes. For example,

as a waste stream becomes more dilute (i.e., the

water content of an aqueous waste stream increases), incineration techniques become increasingly expensive due to the need to raise

the water in the waste stream to treatable temperature, Therefore, while a technique maybe

technically capable of treating a variety of

waste streams, it may be inefficient to do so.

Physical, chemical, biological, and thermal

treatment processes have been described earlier under “Conventional Technologies. ” For

innovative technologies, thermal and biological categories require further descriptions.

Thermal Destruction.–High temperatures (800°

to 3,0000 F) are used to break down organic

compounds into simpler, less or nontoxic

forms under either oxidation or pyrolysis. Two

important questions to ask are how completely

the process will destroy the input hazardous

wastes and what products are created out of

the destruction of hazardous wastes.

During incineration, combustion occurs in

the presence of excess oxygen (more oxygen

than theoretically needed for a reaction to occur). In general, complete incineration produces water, carbon dioxide, ash, and acids

and oxides that depend on the input material.

Pyrolysis occurs in an oxygen deficient atmosphere, and pyrolysis facilities consist of two

stages: a pyrolyzing chamber and a fume incinerator. The latter, which operates at 1,800°

to 3,0000 F, combusts the volatilized organics

and carbon monoxide produced in the pyrolyzing chamber. This two-stage system avoids the

volatilization of inorganic components (i.e., the

production of hydrogen chloride, for instance,

which can corrode the system) and forms inorganic, including any heavy metals, into an

insoluble solid char residue. Thus, the air emissions and residues from incineration and pyrolysis are different and depend on the point

at which they are removed from the system or

released to the atmosphere. Ash and char residues can contain salts, metals, and traces of

other noncombustibles that must be properly

handled. Incineration systems must be fitted

with devices to control the release of acid gases

and particulate. And these collected materials

must be treated or landfilled.

No system is perfect or operates at maximum

efficiency at all times. Inevitably, PICs are produced along with the expected products. A recent Science Advisory Board report29 reviewed

the environmental impacts of the incineration

of liquid hazardous wastes and evaluated the

overall adequacy of existing scientific data.

Among their findings were:

●

●

●

the adoption of the concept of destruction

efficiencies emphasizes the elimination of

several preselected compounds in the waste

and does not fully address either partial

oxidation or chemical recombination,

which may create new toxic compounds

in the incineration process;

research on the performance of incinerators has been conducted only under optimal burn conditions, ignoring upset conditions that occur; and

the existing analytical data for emissions

from hazardous waste incinerators have

serious limitations and toxicology information on emissions is inadequate.

While basic research still needs to be conducted on the processes of combustion, the

emerging thermal processes offer improvements over traditional means of incineration.

Improvements show in the ways they maintain

adequate temperatures for the required reactions to occur, provide for adequate turbulence (mixing) of waste feed and fuel with oxygen for even and complete combustion, and

allow for adequate residence times in hightemperature zones so that waste materials can

volatilize and the gases completely react. In addition, new thermal processes may be superior

29 LJ, s. En \,i r~ n men ta] Pmtcction A~en [;~’, S( 1(? n (:(> A (ii’ i sors”

BOard, fin~’ironmcnta] Effects, Transport and F’atu Committee,

“I)raft Report on In(:incrat ion of Hazardous I,iquid ~~’asto,’” I)t~-

cember 1984,
196 ● Superfund Strategy

— —

to traditional incineration because of reduced

air emissions and improved quality control

during processing.

The thermal processes described below may

be unique because of their heat transfer mechanism (e. g., fluidized bed, supercritical water).

Improvement in the transfer of heat can increase the probability of reaction and decrease

the reaction time (and cost) of a process. They

also offer different mechanisms for breaking

the bonds of compounds. The plasma arc, for

instance, uses the bombardment of very high

energy free electrons.

Vitrification.–This special form of thermal

treatment involves the melting of soil and

wastes by passing an intense electric current

through the mixture. The high temperature

fuses the materials and binds them into a glassy, solid matrix after cooling.

In situ vitrification has been successfully

tested in laboratory and pilot-scale tests for

soils contaminated with radioactive wastes, but

no data is available for applications to hazardous wastes. The process should be compatible

with nonvolatile inorganic wastes/soil mixtures

in general, but probably not with soils containing organic contaminants. It may not be applicable to saturated soils and is limited by the

amount of water present. Little data exist on

long-term resistance to leaching.

Vitrification may have limited applications

because variable site conditions and the presence of complex mixes of contaminants severely lessen its reliability. If found to be practical,

however, it could be used to treat wastes in situ

and provide a more permanent containment

solution than the use of barriers.

Biodegradation. –These techniques involve the

use of naturally occurring or synthetically generated bacteria to break down chemicals via

ingestion and respiration. They include either

applying the organisms to aerated soils in situ

or after excavation and deposition in surface

impoundments, ponds, or treatment facilities

where the wastes can be mechanically aerated,

More recently, several concepts have been developed where the biodegradation occurs within the saturated, contaminated soil/groundwater system. Here, nutrients and oxygen are

injected directly into the groundwater. Oxygen

is added by pumping air into the ground through

well points located below the water table. Some

systems rely on indigenous micro-organisms;

others inject additional micro-organisms together with nutrients. All pump and recirculate

groundwater, since it takes more than one pass

to obtain high removal efficiencies.

While biological treatment of wastewater is

not a new concept, its application to solid

waste and contaminated soils, especially in

situ, is.30 Various natural and chemical processes will affect the efficiency of biotechnology used in open systems. The effectiveness of

the technology will be influenced by environmental conditions such as temperature, type

of soil, type of naturally occurring microorganisms, and the amount of air and water

within the soil matrix. 31

A biotechnology system to degrade hazardous waste consists of micro-organisms (selected mutants of natural strains already present in the contaminated matrix or genetically

engineered organisms) and a process technology. The process technology makes possible

the use of the organisms in highly variable, real

world conditions, So far, much of the research

interest and funding has been directed toward

the micro-organisms with only limited funding

to develop the technology.32

Before genetically engineered organisms can

be used effectively in Superfund applications,

especially in situ, certain problems require

solutions :33

• Foreign organisms injected into a particular system will likely create problems of

Sowastewater treatment facilities are closed systems where the

proper environment can be maintained for optimal performance

results.

sIS, W, Pirages, et al., “Biotechnology in Hazardous Waste

Management: Major Issues, ” paper presented at symposium ]mpact of Applied Genetics in Pollutions Control, University of

Notre Dame, May 1982.

szstanle}~ Sojka, Manager, Environmental Technology, Occidental Chemical Corporation, personal communication, December 1984.

33M. A. Alexander, ‘<Ecological Constraints on Genetic Engineering: Genetically Engineered Organisms in the Real World, ”

paper presented at Genetic Control of En~’ironmental Pollutants,

CJni~’ersitj’ of Washington, Seattle, 1983,
s urvival for either the indigenous or foreign organisms.

Laboratory results cannot be directly extrapolated to full scale because of differing conditions under which micro-organisms operate.

Soil particles present a physical barrier to

the movement of micro-organisms as water is required for movement between particles. Lack of proper conditions would

give uneven degradation.

The effect of possible abiotic stresses (e.g.,

unsuitable temperatures and pH levels) on

micro-organisms released into the environment are unknown. Toxic elements within

the environment might reduce, or eliminate, a microorganism’s ability to degrade

chemicals of concern. In addition, possible predators could be a critical factor to

the effective use of laboratory-bred organisms,

An additional point is that little work has

been done using organisms to treat complex

waste mixes.

An advantage to using genetically engineered

organisms at a Superfund site is that once the

wastes have been degraded, the organisms

should die, This is because the carbon source

for growth and reproduction of the microorganism has been depleted or is unavailable to

the organism.

Illustrations of Innovative Technologies

The following section describes 26 innovative technologies. Using available information,

OTA has attempted to discuss: the principles

on which each technology is based and the

process itself; whether it destroys or contains

hazardous waste; the expected products, air

emissions and residues; the applicable wastes;

economic costs and uncertainties; and the current stage of development and the level of testing, These technologies illustrate the scope of

activity underway in cleanup technologies;

OTA does not recommend or endorse any of

them. Many more innovations are also likely

to exist now, and yet more can be expected in

the future,

Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 197

Table 6-5 provides a technical summary of

the 26 technologies showing their development

stage, an estimate of how well each removes

or destroys hazardous wastes, and the relative

cost of their use. Table 6-6 summarizes their

applicability to Superfund sites and table 6-7

their technical advantages and disadvantages.

A preferred technology would effectively treat

a variety of hazardous wastes under a variety

of physical conditions, be transportable so as

to be useful for onsite treatment, transfer little health or environmental risk through air

emissions and residue, and would not require

extensive post-treatment facilities. Many of the

technical disadvantages and uncertainties of

these emerging technologies might be resolved

through demonstration testing.

1. GARD Division, Catalytic Dehalogenation.—In the

presence of a catalyst, halogenated compounds (organic compounds that include a halogen such as

chlorine, bromine, or fluorine) react with hydrogen

to form an acid and a hydrocarbon. In this system,

organic material is detoxified by reacting with

hydrogen to form nontoxic materials.

GARD, a division of Chamberlain Manufacturing, has developed a treatment system using a platinum-based reforming catalyst supported on gamma alumina. The system begins with a storage unit

that holds the hazardous waste material. The material is pumped from the tank to a preheater. When

it reaches the proper temperature, it is sent to the

catalytic reactor where it reacts with hydrogen. For

a chlorinated compound, the reaction yields hydrochloric acid and a hydrocarbon. During the processing, most solvents remain intact and can be recovered, After leaving the reactor, the products are

cooled and sent to a vapor-liquid separation stage.

The dehalogenated hydrocarbon and acid are sent

through a scrubber and on to another storage tank.

A second conversion stage can be added to the

system as a polishing stage to remove a second halogen if necessary, and a provision for product recycle can be added to the reactor for cases when one

pass is insufficient. The second conversion stage

could be used to remove oxygen from some materials to enhance their fuel value.

GARD’s process is probably best suited for treating liquids with low concentrations of halogenated

compounds (e. g., Silvex herbicide), but it is also capable of treating liquids that are pure halogenated

compounds and solids (e. g., contaminated soils),

Liquid wastes can be treated directly with no pre-
198 ● Superfund Strategy

Table 6“5.—lnnovative Technology Summary

Company

Gard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zerpol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bend Research . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DeVoe-Holbein . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MODAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zimpro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Methods Eng. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IT Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Huber.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Thagard ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pyrolysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Westinghouse. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lockheed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RoTech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Midland-Ross . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Waste-Tech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GA Tech. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rockwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sandpiper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Detox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SBR Tech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

University of Gottingen . . . . . .

Battelle Pacific. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lopat-K20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NMT-Fujibeton . . . . . . . . . . . .

Project

development

stage

pilot

pilot

pilot

pilot

pilot

full

pilot

bench

pilot

pilot

pilot

pilot

bench

pilot

full

pilot

pilot

pilot

pilot

pilot

full

pilot

research

pilot

pilot/full

pilot/full

Removal/

destruction

capability

medium

?

medium

medium

high

low-medium

?

low-medium

high

high

high

high

medium-high

high

?

medium

medium-high

high

7

medium

medium

medium

high

high

high —

NOTES

na not applicable

? = not available

KEYS

Removal/destruction capability (systems not necessarily tested on comparable waste)

Low = less than 90 percent

Medium = 90 to 9999 percent

High – 9999 percent and greater

Capital costs (based on full-scale system where possible)

Low – less than $1 million

Medium - $1 million to $5 million

High = more than $5 million

Treatment costs (not all systems evaluated using same operating costs components)

Relative estimated costs

Capital Treatment

low

7

low

low

medium

medium

medium

?

high

?

medium

high

?

medium

high

medium

medium

medium

medium

?

low

7

?

7

low

low

low

?

low

low

medium-high

low

low

medium-high

medium-high

7

high

high

7

low-medium

medium

?

7

high

medium

low

low

?

7

low

low

low

Low - less than $100/ton or $0.01/gallon

GARD has estimated costs based on the treatment

Medium = $100 to $500/ton or $0.01 to $1/gallon

High greater than $500/ton or $1/gallon

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

treatment, except for filtering to catch solids. Solid

waste must be dissolved in hydrocarbon solvents

first. Since the solvent is unaffected by the process, however, it can be used repeatedly,

A bench-scale single pass reactor has been built

for testing. GARD has considered building a pilotscale system for further testing but is seeking financial assistance (private or public sector) before continuing the research. Test results are available for

Silvex and PCBs, With a single pass, Silvex was dechlorinated by nearly 80 percent; with two passes,

greater than 99 percent. Dechlorination of 93 percent in a single pass was achieved with material

containing approximately 2,000 ppm PCBs, but

only 30 percent for material containing slightly

more than 17,000 ppm PCBs.

of 1 million gallons of Silvex, assuming a feed rate

of 50 gallons per minute. Capital costs would be

$110,000 for a skid-mounted system and site hookups (e. g., electricity). Operating costs would be $99

per 1,000 gallons of Silvex treated and include cost

of the hydrogen, pumping power, heating and cooling water without heat recovery, and labor. [GARD

is located in Niles, IL; (312) 647-9000.]34

sqEach of the 26 technologies is listed by the firm developing

the technology and the firm’s name for its product. In addition,

each firm’s location and telephone number are provided so that

the reader who wants more information ma~ contact the developer directly.
Company

GARD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zerpol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bend Research. ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DeVoe-Holbein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MODAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zimpro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,..

Methods Egg. .......,,, . . . . . . . .

IT Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Huber.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Thagard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pyrolysis ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Westinghouse . . . . . . . . . . ...,

Lockheed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ro Tech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Midland-Ross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Waste-Tech. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GA Tech. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rockwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sandpiper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Detox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SBR Tech. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

University of Gottingen . . . . . . . . . .

Battelle Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lopat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Table 6-6.—Innovative Technology Applicability to Superfund Sites

In

situa

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

P

N

P

Y

Y

Y

System applicability

Mobile(M) -

Transportable(T) Primary waste applicabilityb

Onsitea Offsite a

Permanent(P) Class “ Form —

Y Y M,T o L,SL

Y N T I GW,L

Y P M,T I GW,L

Y N M,T I GW,L

Y Y P,T o GW,L

P Y P,T o GW,L

P Y P o GW,L

P Y P o L

Y Y T o S,L

Y Y T o S,SL

Y N M,T o L

Y N M,T o L

P Y P o L

Y Y M,T o S,SL,L,S

p f Y P,T o SL,L

P

f

Y P o SL,L,S

Y Y M,T o S,SL,L

N Y P o L,SL

Y Y M,T,P o L,S,SL

Y N T o GW,S,SL

Y N T o GW,L

‘t Y P,T o GW,L

P P T o SL,L

P N T o S,SL

Y Y T O/l S,SL,L

— .

Y Y T O/l S,SL,L

.

Air emissions

and/or Post- Applicable

residues treatment systems

generated’ requiredd

standards

L P P

L P P

s Y P,DO

S,L Y DO,P

L N P

L,S P P,DO

L N P

L,A P P

A N P

A N P

A,S N P

A,S N P

s N P,DO

s N P

L,S N,P DO,P

A N P

s N P

s N DO

L P P,DO

A,S,L P P,DO,E

none N P,E

s P P

7 P ?

A N E(g),DO

s P P,E(g)

s P P,E(g) — aY = yes N . no P = perhaps with further testing

bClass

O – organlcs

I – Inorganlcs

Form

GW – groundwater(dflute aqueous)

S = so!ls/sohds (low concentrated)

L hqulds (concentrated)

SL - sludges/sohds (concentrated)

Pretreatment ~retestlna mav be reau!red

C S solld L = Ilqu[d A - alr ‘emfsslons Shown as dominant form S!nce most ~rocesses result In some of each

‘Y yes N no P poss!bly Post-treatment needs can vary Ie, products depend on treated hazardous waste In general thermal processes donot ’treat heavy metals therefore residues may have to

be tested for trace amounts prior to Iandffll Also products of Incomplete combustion may be hazardous knowledge base IS weak

elf Ut,llzedon Superfund wastes a technology Will probably require regulation Three types areconsfdered p performance(analogous to RCFIA subpart () Inclneratorregulatjons @g 9999 percent

DRE for primary organic hazardous components) DO design/operation (s+mllar to RCRA Iandf!ll standards) and E enwronmental standards (comparable to National Primary and Secondary Alr Quallty

Standards) The most applicable approach IS given first

fFor large sites, I e high volume of W=K+te tO b@ treated

gFor subsequent Ieachlng from a treated area

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
200 • Superfund Strategy

Table 6-7.—lnnovative Technology Advantages and Disadvantages

Company: Technology Advantages Disadvantages/uncertainties

GARD: Catalytic

dehalogenation

Zerpol: Zero Technology

Bend Research: Coupled

transport for sludge

reclamation

DeVoe-Holbein: Metal

extraction

MODAR: Supercritical water

oxidation

Zirnpro: Wet air oxidation

Methods Eng.: Submerged

reactor

IT Corp.: Catalyzed wet

ox id at ion

Huber: Advanced Electric

Reactor

Thagard: Fluid wall reactor

Pyrolysis:

Plasma arc

Westinghouse: Plasma arc

Lockheed.’ Microwave plasma

RoTech: Cascading Rotary

Incineration System

Mid/and-Ross: Rotary pyrolytic

incineration

Little pre-treatment for liquids

Fuel recovery potential

Good portability

Conventional equipment

Salt recovery possible

Highly treated liquid discharges

Highly concentrated residues

Leads to metals recovery

Potential for metals recovery

Requires little ion exchange agent

High copper, chromium, zinc applicability

Selective exchange leads easily to metal

recovery

High metal capture efficiencies

High DREs for wide range of organics

Operates in self-sustained mode on low

organic content wastes

Applicable to large volumes of wastes

Wide previous experience on variety of

nonhazardous wastes

Low energy requirement v. incineration

Potential onsite application

Operates in self-sustained mode on loworganic content wastes

Applicable to large volumes of waste

Can be operated to produce no aqueous

residue

Low-volume residue for further disposal

Very high reaction temperatures/absence

of oxygen limits unwanted product

formation

High destruction efficiencies for organics

Applicable to large sites

Demonstration tested

Very high combustion temperatures

PIC formation considered Iowb

High destruction efficiencies for organics

Applicable to large sites

High operating temperatures result in

high organic destruction efficiencies

Mobile system possible

High operating temperatures result in

high organic destruction efficiencies

High destruction efficiencies for

chlorinated compounds

Can process gases and liquids

Small commercial-scale operation on

actual wastes

Cascading solids have very high contact

with combustibles

No afterburner required

No refractory maintenance

Fuel recovery possible

Application shown on actual wastes

Metals retained on residual char

Low or no NO, emissions

Wastes must be in liquid phase

Development at small pilot stage

Has not undergone relevant testing

Applicable to concentrated wastestreams

Pretesting required to fix wastestream

applicability—highly selective

applicability y

Only tested at small scale

High exchange membrane costs

Sludge requires residue disposal

Clean, dilute liquid wastes required

Considerable pre-treatment required

Requires demonstration testing

Relatively high capital costs

High pressure/temperatures processa

Destruction dependent on residence time

Higher capital investment than for

incineration

Elevated temperature/pressure processa

Requires demonstration testing

Relatively high capital costs

High pressure/temperature processa

Destruction dependent on rates of

oxidation of compound in reactor—

longer rates will dominate processing

time for waste

Elevated temperature/pressure processa

High energy use

High energy use

Cost estimates incomplete

Small-scale testing to date

Cost estimates incomplete

High degree of pretreatment required

Bench-scale tests convince developer to

drop project

Testing required on mixed wastes, metals

emissions

Need pre-treatment for waste size

uniformity

Destruction efficiency difficult to assess

Not applicable to aqueous wastes

Tested on a narrow range of wastes
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 201

—

Table 6“7.—lnnovative Technology Advantages and Disadvantages—Continued

Company: Technology

.

Waste-Tech: Fluidized bed

Incineration

GA Tech: Circulating bed

combustor

Rockwell: Molten salt

incineration

Sandpiper: SEGAS process

Detox: In situ biological

treatment

GDS: Biological degradation

SBR Technologies:

Sequencing Batch Reactor

University of Gotfingen:

Biological degradation

Battelle Pacific: In situ

vitrification

Lopat: Chemical treatment

New Materials: Chemical

treatment

Advantages

—

—

Expect metals attenuation in bed

Good combustion turbulence and waste

contact

Capital costs compare to rotary kiln

Destruction efficiencies high

Disadvantages/uncertainties —

Waste character and particle size should

be uniform

Need further metals emission testing and

waste tests

Higher turbulence than typical fluidized

bed

Expect metals retention in bed

Shown on variety of wastes

High destruction efficiencies

Little/no gas discharge treatment required

Low-temperature operation—expect low

N OX emissions

Little air emission of toxics

Metals retained in melt

Very high destruction efficiency for

organics

Energy recovery possible

Compact mobile system

Tested at actual site on mixed wastes

Demonstrated lower costs than some

chemical/thermal processes

Anaerobic capability

Tested in a soil matrix

Little pre-treatment

Proven cleanup technology

Each cycle is monitored by computer

system

High throughput possible

Promising research approach

No removal costs

Very low leachability

Application in past to radioactive wastes

successful

Good control for metals

Low cost, safe chemical, easy to apply to

wastes and contaminated surfaces

Effective on organic and inorganic

materials

Low cost, safe chemical, easy to apply to

wastes and contaminated surfaces

Effective on organic and inorganic

materials

Proven technology

Need further metals emission testing

Waste feed pre-treatment for

character/size uniformity required

Need fuller testing on mixed wastes

Works best on low ash content wastes:

requires melt-ash removal system

Small-scale test thus far

Costs/testing for waste application

incomplete

Longer treatment times than

chemical/thermal

Intermediate compounds not defined

Applicability dependent on site

characteristics

In situ phase contribution uncertain

Production of sludge can reduce

efficiency of operation

Intermediates are formed

Needs process technology

High energy use

Small site applicability

For organics—requires off gas treatment

High soil moisture increases costs

Duration of effectiveness uncertain

For soils and wastes other additions such

as cement, increase volume

Long-term (greater than 10 years)

effectiveness uncertain

aHlgh temperature high. pre~ ~ure ~y~tem~ have inherent rl~k of process catastrophe Redundant safeguards required

bp\c_product of Incomplete Combustion

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
202 • Superfund Strategy

2. Zerpol Corp., Zero Technology .—This pollution control system developed for the metals finishing industry is a unique collection of conventional processes. The system recently has been extended to

other industries, such as textile manufacturers,

chemical manufacturers, petroleum refiners, paper

mills, and pharmaceuticals. It could provide a

chemical method of removing organics, heavy metals and inorganic, including cyanides, from contaminated groundwater. There is no liquid discharge from the system.

For wastewater from a metal finishing plant, proprietary chemicals sequentially reduce chromates,

oxidize cyanides and adjust the pH to 9 to 9.2 (an

alkaline solution). The primary objective is to reduce the cyanide levels in the solution and precipitate out heavy metals without the use of flocculating and settling agents. The resultant liquid contains

dissolved salts that must eventually be removed by

a distillation process. The distilled water is then

recycled back through the system.

Residues from the process include heavy metals and a concentrated salt solution that is dried by

evaporation, producing a small amount of solids,

No test data is available on hazardous waste removal levels, nor is any information regarding capital and operating costs, [Hatfield, PA; (212)

368-0501]

3. Bend Research, Coupled Transport for Sludge Reclamation.—This coupled transport system is an adaption

of ion exchange technology in which an immobilized, liquid membrane process allows certain metals to be selectively extracted from a solution containing various other metals. This system offers

several advantages over other ion exchange processes. It requires only small amounts of agent,

thereby lowering costs, and feed pre-treatment,

especially the removal of suspended solids, is expected to be minimal.

An inert, microporous support is impregnated

with a water-miscible liquid ion exchange resin.

(This agent is held in the pore of the support material by capillary forces.) When the membrane contacts an aqueous solution containing metal ions, the

membrane exchanges ions of like charge, thereby

extracting the metal ions from solution, The process includes acid leaching of sludge as a first step,

followed by the exchange in which the metal is deposited on one side of the membrane. An electrolytic extraction of the exchange-concentrated solution is the final step,

Bend has developed three membranes so far, for

copper, chromium, and zinc recovery. If the process can be made to work on a wider base of metals,

the potential for treating hazardous wastes might

be high. As this is a physical separation process,

the products are a metal and a sludge residue. Given that the metal is a hazardous waste component

of the initial sludge, that product would have to receive further treatment or disposal, if it is not

recycled.

The process has received only laboratory-scale

testing. In those tests, copper purity in a sample

was over 99,9 percent. Future work is required to

demonstrate nickel recovery and to increase copper flux in the ion exchange unit, chromium oxidation efficiency, and the number of potentially exchangeable metals.

Costs have been estimated for a plant capable of

treating 27,000 grams (60 pounds) per hour of

sludge. Post-treatment of the metal residue and

sludge disposal is not included. Capital costs would

be $118,700 and operating costs, $85,700 per year,

with payback within 4 years. At this level of operation, resale of the metal values are said to result

in income of $148,000, but this would depend on

metal market conditions. [Bend, OR; (503)382-4100]

4. Devoe-Holbein, Inc., Metal Extraction.—This technology offers a method to extract metal from relatively clean waste streams using synthetically produced compositions. Ion exchange then regenerates the compounds by separating out the metals.

The extraction compositions are patterned after the

natural metal extraction capability of living cells.

Each of the 30 compositions developed by DevoeHolbein extracts a different metal. Both the composition and the extracted metal can be recovered

and reused, reducing the cost of the process. The

technology might be used either as an independent waste treatment or in conjunction with other

processes as a pre-treatment step,

The process is mainly applicable for treating dilute wastes such as those produced by metal finishing operations (i. e., electroplating). It is highly

selective of the metal in question. Once metals considered to be hazardous have been extracted, they

must be reused or receive further management,

The measure of success for the process is the percent of metal captured from the solution being

treated. Synthetic compositions have been shown

to capture nearly 100 percent of the metals in both

aqueous solutions and industrial wastes in pilotscale tests: 99.96 percent of copper in solution,

99,91 and 99.98 percent of zinc chloride and zinc

phosphate from electroplating rinse solution, 99.99

and 99.97 percent of cobalt and zinc from a petrochemical effluent, Large-scale testing is planned.

Estimated capital and operating costs have been

made for a representative plant treating 10 gallons

per minute of waste and removing zinc. Capital in-
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 203

vestment for this relatively small plant would be

$15,000. Stated operating costs of $6,100 to $6,600

per year (at 8 hours per day and 220 days per year)

work out to less than a penny per gallon of waste,

but Devoe-Holbein has not included labor costs.

[Quebec, Canada; [514)636-6042]

5. MODAR Inc., Supercritical Water Oxidation.—Supercritical water is used by MODAR to destroy organic

materials by oxidation. Above its critical temperature [374° C) and pressure [210 atm or 0.3 g/cm3

),

the properties of water are quite different from that

of the normal liquid or atmospheric steam. For example, organic substances are completely soluble

in water under some supercritical conditions, while

salts are almost insoluble under other supercritical

conditions. The volubility of organics, coupled with

low hydrogen bonding properties in supercritical

water, facilitates the destruction of organics and

formation of inorganic acids (from the halogens and

possible metal elements present), plus carbon dioxide and water. The acids can be precipitated out

as salts by adding a base to the feed,

The MODAR system is a multi-stage process.

First, the waste in the form of an aqueous solution

or a slurry is delivered to the oxidizer inlet, where

it is pressurized and heated to supercritical conditions by direct mixing with recycled reactor effluent. Oxygen is then supplied in the form of compressed air and the inlet mixture is a homogeneous

phase of air, organics, and supercritical water. The

organics are oxidized in a controlled but rapid reaction (residence time of 5 seconds), The effluent

is fed to a cyclone where the inorganic salts that

are originally present in the feed, or which form

in the combustion reactions, precipitate out and are

separated from the effluent. The fluid effluent

(some of which is recycled through the system as

a preheater) is then a mixture of water, nitrogen,

and carbon dioxide. Once cooled to subcritical temperature, the mixture forms two phases and enters

a high pressure liquid-vapor separator. Practically

all of the N2 and most of the CO2 leaves with the

gas stream; the liquid consists of water, inorganic

salts, and an appreciable amount of dissolved CO2

.

The liquid is depressurized and fed to a low-pressure separator. The vapor stream is vented. At two

points in the system, energy can be generated.

The MODAR process can be applied to organic

wastes with a wide range of concentrations; solids

must be slurried prior to treatment. Economically,

it is currently particularly well suited for aqueous

wastes containing 1 to 20 percent weight organics.

For lower concentrated wastes, fuel value must be

added; for higher concentrations, water.

Originally designed to detoxify industrial aqueous organic waste streams, the firm is now offering the process for use at Superfund sites. A demonstration, skid-mounted pilot-scale system is

available for testing.

A continuous flow, bench-scale system with an

organic throughput of 1 gallon per day was used

to collect the test results. Feed mixtures of various

organic hazardous wastes were used, containing

from 1 to 20 percent chlorine. Liquid effluents were

analyzed for total organic carbon (TOC) and pH.

Gaseous effluents were analyzed for low molecular

weight hydrocarbons and permanent gases. In general, organic carbon is reduced to less than 1 ppm

(DREs of 99,99 to 99.9999 percent); organic chloride

DREs are also 99,99 to 99.9999 percent.

The system has low operating costs but relatively

high capital costs. Operating costs are kept low because the system recycles its superheated effluent

to heat incoming wastes. Consequently, the system

requires almost no fuel once operation has begun.

The incoming slurry must contain at least 2 percent combustible organic matter to maintain selfsufficiency (compared with a typical incinerator’s

feed of about 30 percent), Excess heat generated by

the system can be used to drive a turbine to generate electricity (an option that might only be feasible for a centrally located plant rather than a transportable system used for Superfund sites).

Disposal costs have been projected by MODAR

for a representative plant processing 10 tons of

organic waste per day; it would require a capital

investment of nearly $5 million with treatment

costs of $1.50 per gallon for organic liquid and solid

wastes and $0.15 for dilute aqueous wastes. [Natick,

MA; (617)655-7741]

6. Zimpro, Wet Air Oxidation.–The basic principles

of air oxidation are covered above under “Conventional Treatment Technologies. ” The use of water

(“wet”) as a reaction medium allows for reactions

to take place at relatively low temperatures, 175°

to 3250 C (347o to 617° F). It also modifies the reaction rates that remove excess heat by evaporation

and provides an excellent heat transfer medium.

This allows the process to be self-sustaining thermally with relatively low organic feed concentrations (i.e., feeds with low fuel value). The process

pressure is usually between 300 and 3,000 psi to

prevent excessive evaporation of the liquid phase

in the reactor,

Zimpro has been using wet oxidation for the

treatment of industrial wastes for over 30 years, and

they are now adapting the process for the treatment

of hazardous waste, The degree of oxidation
204 . Superfund Strategy

achieved (i. e., degree of destruction) depends on

temperature and residence time in the reactor and

oxidation conditions are waste-specific, Zimpro

feels that wet oxidation can be valuable for the treatment of dilute organic hazardous waste streams because it is far more efficient (in terms of energy consumption) than incineration.

Air pollution problems are nearly eliminated because most harmful contaminants produced remain

in the aqueous phase and do not burn off as gases.

The only gases discharged from the process are

spent air and a small amount of carbon dioxide.

Any harmful liquids produced may have to be

treated.

Bench-scale tests have been conducted with pure

hazardous organic compounds and DREs ranged

from 2.0 to 99.997 percent. The poorest performers

were Kepone (31 percent), Arochlor 1254 (2 and 63

percent), and 1,2, -dichlorobenzene (32 and 69 percent). Otherwise, DREs were at least 82 percent and

averaged over 99 percent. Testing and treatment

of industrial hazardous waste streams show that

most compounds are easily oxidized by the wet air

process but that halogenated aromatic compounds

(e.g., chlorobenzene and PCBs) are resistant.

The capital investment for wet air oxidation is

considerably higher than that for conventional incineration, but there is the potential for lower operating costs. A small plant processing about 4 tons

per day would require a capital investment between

$1.9 million and $3.0 million, Zimpro expects wet

air oxidation to save a great deal in operating costs

because power requirement are low. Total operating costs are expected to vary depending on plant

capacity; estimates of $30 per ton (at 100 tons processed per day) and $150 per ton (at 10 tons per day)

have been made. [Rothschild, WI; (715] 355-3523]

7. Methods Engineering, Inc., Burleson/Kennedy Submerged Reactor.—The Burleson/Kennedy reactor uses

a deep well to form a reaction chamber for the combustion of waste in water. The deep well promotes

the conditions (pressure and temperature) necessary for supercritical water, which is used as a

process medium (see MODAR, above).

The ideal structure for the submerged reactor is

an abandoned oil well at least 6,400 feet deep with

a cement casing to retard heat loss. Water, pressurized oxygen, and the hazardous waste to be treated

must be pumped into the well, The bottom of the

well serves as the reaction vessel. An electrical current input near the bottom of the well heats the fluid

for the reaction.

Aqueous organic hazardous wastes would be the

most appropriate use of this system. The products

of the process are carbon dioxide, water, and various soluble and insoluble solid salts, Depending on

the input waste, some of the salts may contain

heavy metals that will need to be separated out for

proper handling.

Information is not available on testing results.

Capital and operating costs were estimated in mid1984. The initial capital outlay would be $1.2 million, and the system is expected to be capable of

processing 480 million gallons of wastewater per

year at a cost of $0.0014 per gallon, [Angleton, TX;

(409)849-7033]

8. IT Corp., Catalyzed Wet Oxidation.—In conventional

wet air oxidation, heat and pressure drive the dissolution of oxygen from air and its reaction with

dissolved organics in an aqueous solution. In this

catalyst system, the transfer of oxygen to the

dissolved state is speeded. With enhanced oxygen

transfer, it is possible to oxidize organics at lower

temperatures (165° to 200° C versus 250° to 3250

C for conventional systems) and at lower pressures.

The catalyst consists of bromide, nitrate, and manganese ions in acidic solution.

In its simplest form, the reactor contains a continuously stirred catalyst solution. Air and waste

are continuously pumped into the reactor. Products

formed that leave the reactor are CO2

, N2, water vapor, and depending on the input, volatile organics

and inorganic solids. Water is condensed and returned to the reactor, if necessary, as are condensable organics. Any inorganic salts or acids that

may form have to be removed by treatment (e. g.,

filtration or distillation) of the catalyst solution in

a closed loop stream. The vent gases are low in volume and can, if necessary, be treated by conventional techniques such as adsorption or scrubbing,

Nonvolatile organics remain in the reactor until destroyed and there is no aqueous bottoms product.

This system is best suited for the treatment of liquid organics, and bench-scale tests have been conducted by IT Corp. Results show that organic reduction varied depending on the compound tested,

temperature, and residence time. Further R&D

awaits more funding. The initial research was internally funded by IT, supplemented by EPA funds.

Preliminary treatment costs have been estimated

so far and range from $0.12 to $1.04 per pound of

compound. Actual costs will vary markedly depending on what compound is sent through the system. Slow destruction rate compounds would cost

much more to treat than fast destruction rate compounds. In addition, treatment costs are influenced

to a lesser degree by factors such as the air compressor, condenser size, cooling water require-
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies . 205

ments, neutralization or scrubbing requirements,

and catalyst loss. [Knoxville, TN; (615)690-321 1]

9. J.M. Huber Corp., Advanced Electric Reactor.—The

Advanced Electric Reactor (AER) rapidly heats materials to temperatures in the range of 4,0000 F

(2,2000° C) using intense thermal radiation in the

near infrared region. The reactants are isolated

from the reactor core walls by means of a gaseous

blanket formed by flowing nitrogen radially inward

through the porous core walls (thus, its common

name of “fluid wall reactor”). Solid waste is introduced at the top of the reactor through a metered

screw feeder, and nitrogen is forced through the

walls of the reactor.

After leaving the reactor, where pyrolysis occurs

at temperatures of about 4,0000 F, the product gas

and waste solids pass through two post-reactor

treatment zones. The first is an insulated vessel to

provide additional high temperature (in excess of

2,000° F) and residence time (5 to 10 seconds), The

second is water cooled to reduce the gas temperature to less than 1,000° F prior to downstream particulate cleanup. Solids exiting these zones are collected in a sealed bin. Additional solids in the

product gas are removed by a cyclone and routed

back to the solids bin, The product gas then enters

a bag house for fine particulate removal followed

by an aqueous caustic scrubber for chlorine removal. Any residual organics and chlorine are removed

by passing the product gas through activated carbon beds just upstream of the emission stack. The

organic, particulate, and chlorine-free product gas

composed almost entirely of nitrogen is then

emitted to the atmosphere through the process

stack.

The AER runs entirely on electrical power and

requires 800 to 1,200 kWh per ton for treating contaminated soils and 1,500 to 2,000 kWh per ton for

the complete dissociation of liquids. Gaseous, liquid, or solid wastes can be treated. Pre-treatment

of solids and liquids may be required to ensure that

feed particle size is small enough for the reaction

to proceed to completion within the residence time,

The system is suited for the treatment of low Btu

content hazardous materials (i. e., contaminated

soils, pure PCBs, and other heavily halogenated hydrocarbons) and extremely hazardous materials

[e.g., dioxins and nerve gases).

The principal products of soil-borne PCB destruction using the Huber process are H2

, Cl2, HCl, elemental carbon, and a granular, free-flowing, solid

material. Typical products of incineration, such as

carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and oxides of nitrogen, are not formed in significant concentrations.

Huber has built and maintains two fully equipped

reactors as part of its over $6 million 17 RD&D program. The smaller reactor unit (0.6 pounds per minute of contaminated soil feed capacity) is installed

in a covered truck trailer for mobility. It is used for

proof-of-concept experiments and onsite demonstrations. The larger, pilot/commercial-scale reactor

with a capacity of up to 50 pounds per minute or

10,000 tons per hour is used solely for research purposes. Although the larger unit has been permitted

by EPA Region VI to commercially treat PCB-contaminated soils, corporate policy restricts its use

to RD&D.

To date, four test programs have been conducted

to demonstrate the effectiveness of the AER for

treating soils contaminated with hazardous wastes.

Tests were conducted in September 1983 on PCBs

and certification was received from EPA Region VI

in May 1984 under TSCA. A second series of tests

were conducted in May 1984 with carbon tetrachloride in applying for a broad RCRA permit (expected in 1985). In October 1984, a test series was

initiated on soils spiked with octachlorodibenzo-pdioxin (a thermodynamically more stable surrogate

for the acutely toxic 2,3,7,8 tetrachlorodibenzo-pdioxin isomer). In November 1984, at Times Beach,

Missouri, the mobile reactor was tested on soil contaminated with 2,3,7,8 TCDD and other dioxins.

Results from various test programs have provided

typical gas phase DREs of 99.99999+ percent. In

all cases, DREs were at least 99.9999 percent. Treated

soil concentrations have always been equal or less

than 1 ppb of the contaminant in question (PCB,

CCl2

, dioxin) and usually nondetectable. Further,

no chlorinated products of incomplete pyrolysis

have been observed.

Operating costs depend on the size of the waste

site and the soil pre-treatment requirements, which

could include drying and sizing. For a large site

(containing more than 10,000 tons of materials), the

cost is estimated to be between $300 and $600 per

ton, But costs could be as high as $1,000 per ton.

Capital costs to build a large reactor are estimated

at $10 million. [Borger, TX; (806)274-6331]

10. Thagard Research, High Temperature Fluid Wall Reactor .—This High Temperature Fluid Wall [HTFW]

process is based on the same principles as the Huber’s AER. The reactor was orginally developed for

the continuous dissociation of methane into carbon

fines and hydrogen. To accomplish this, temperatures in excess of 1,700° C (3,0920 F) and a mecha-
206 • Superfund Strategy

nism to prevent precipitate formation on the reactor walls were required. To meet both requirements

at the same time, the reacting steam is kept out of

physical contact with the reactor wall by means of

a gaseous blanket. Energy for the reaction is supplied by carbon resistance heaters that bring the

carbon core of the reactor to incandescence. Heat

transfer occurs through radiative coupling from the

core to the stream.

The destruction process is driven by pyrolysis

conditions in the reactor, In addition, some materials (e. g., soils) will vitrify under the high temperatures. The system has a wide application to many

hazardous wastes as long as they can be fed into

the reactor in a pulverized form. This may require

pre-treatment.

Two sets of testing have been done on a pilotscale unit. Thagard views one set to be correct and

the other incorrect due to errors in testing (contamination occurred), DREs for the former test were

dichloromethane (99,9999+ percent), carbon

tetrachloride (99.9+ percent), dichlorodifluoromethane freon 12 (84.99 percent), trichloroethane

(99.99 + percent), and hexachlorobenzene (percentage not reported). In the latter tests, the most significant difference showed in dichloromethane,

with much lower DREs,

Extensive cost estimates (capital and operating)

prepared by Thagard have compared its treatment

process with the cost of landfills. They concluded

that if wastes must be moved at least 100 miles at

a cost of $65 per ton, the HTFW reactor can be substituted as long as at least 100 tons per day are being processed. [Costa Mesa, CA; (714)556-4470]

11. Pyrolysis Systems, Inc., Plasma Arc Technology.–

The principle of plasma pyrolysis involves breaking the bonds between organic constituents. Once

the compounds are atomized, they reform into

other compounds under controlled conditions that

attempt to prevent the formation of hazardous

materials.

Waste fluids are injected into a plasma arc zone

of a reactor vessel where temperatures ranging

from 15,0000 to 50,0000 C exist in a gaseous cloud

of charged particles between electrodes. The organic molecules react with the plasma species and are

destroyed within microseconds. These elements are

subsequently released into another vessel where

they recombine into stable forms such as hydrogen

gas and methane.

The new compounds created are predictable.

Using a computer model, the appropriate operating conditions can also be predicted prior to destruction. Undesirable products can be reduced by

altering the character of the feedstock or modifying the operating conditions.

At the product gas outlet from the reaction chamber, water is injected along with liquid caustic soda

to quench the product gas, neutralize acidic products, and trap particulate, Saltwater and particulate are pumped and sampled before the discharge

is approved.

Product gas, mainly of hydrogen and carbon

monoxide, flows to a flare stock where it is electrically ignited and burns between 2,0000 and

3,0000 C. The flare prevents the release of methane gas to the environment, Chlorinated wastes

produce a hydrogen byproduct that is converted to

salt in a caustic scrubber. An activated carbon filter blocks the release of toxic material in the event

of a power failure.

The system has been designed to be mobile. All

of the equipment is to be contained in a 45-foot trailer. It includes a 500-kilowatt plasma device located

at one end of a stainless steel reaction chamber with

a graphite core,

The technology has been developed with financial assistance (up to $1.5 million) from EPA and

the State of New York to treat the organic leachate

from the Love Canal site. Pilot-scale testing (1 gallon

per minute) on organic sludges is to begin in 1985

in Canada. These tests will provide data for the permit to place the unit on the Superfund site in New

York for demonstration testing. Previous laboratory-scale tests of askarel fluids with contents up

to 58 percent chlorine have produced DREs in excess of 99.9999999 percent. Handling contaminated

soils for treatment would involve melting down the

inorganic components and gasifying the organic

components,

Full-scale operating costs have not been estimated

by Pyrolysis Systems yet, Estimates made in 1983

for the prototype model showed operating costs of

about $0.30 per pound of waste at a treatment rate

of 1 gallon per minute and that capital costs would

be $2 million to $2.5 million for a full-scale unit with

an input feed of 50 gallons per minute. Labor costs

have not been estimated, but it is known that three

operators would be required to run the system.

[Welland, Ontario, Canada; (416)735-2401]

12. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Plasma Arc TechnolOgy.—Plasma arc technology has been described

above under Pyrolysis Systems, Inc. Westinghouse

has been a major developer of the torch systems incorporated in plasma arc furnaces and has developed a bench-scale reactor to test surrogate hazardous waste fluids,
The surrogate material chosen for testing was 31

percent by weight hexachlorobenzene in a slurry

made up of water (26 percent), alcohol (as an emulsifier), and kerosene (3 I percent). The researcher

felt that the results for this surrogate would be similar to those of PCBs, (PCBs were not chosen because EPA approval is required to test with PCBs.]

The results demonstrated the ability of the plasma

technology to destroy hexachlorobenzene, dibenzofuran, and dibenzodioxin. In three tests the treatment product, analyzed by both a mass spectrometer and a gas chromatography, showed 0.13, 0.3, and

0.5 ppm of hexachlorobenzene. The latter substances were not detected at a 1 ppm resolution,

The company has recently begun an intensive 10-

month testing program that they expect will answer

any remaining questions about the new technology

on a larger scale.

Preliminary cost estimates were made for a fixed

plant treating 700,000 gallons of PCB liquids per

year (assuming 7,000 hours of operation a year).

Capitol cost was set at nearly $5.9 million, with total

operating costs for one year at $2.8 million. These

costs are now under revision, [Madison, PA; (412]

722-5000]

13. Lockhead Missles & Space Co., Inc., Microwave Plasma Detoxification.—In a microwave reactor, a plasma

is generated by electrons subjected to microwaves.

When used to decompose organic materials, a large

number of complex reactions take place. Free radicals and atoms are produced from collisions of free

elections with organic molecules. These species

then react further to form secondary products.

The reactor effluent consists mainly of carbon dioxide and steam, with minor amounts of chlorine,

hydrochloric acid vapors, and nitrogen oxides depending on the molecular structure of the material

being destroyed. The hot gaseous plasma effluent

is cooled, discharged through a caustic scrubber to

remove acid products, and vented to the atmosphere.

Lockheed initiated a research program on applying this process to hazardous waste detoxification

in 1975, By 1980 a bench-scale reactor (rated at 15

kilowatts) had been developed to a stage where both

gases and volatile liquids could be fed into the system. The feed rate was 10 to 20 pounds per hour,

and reaction time was on the order of 10 milliseconds.

Simulated wastes were used for testing the benchscale reactor. For vinyl bromide, DREs ranged from

99.98 to 99.9998 percent and carbon tetrachloride,

99.72 to 99.94. For tests of aniline, toulene and

1,1,1-trichloroethane, results averaged 99.99 percent.

Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 207

.

Lockheed has not compiled cost data for this project, which was primarily funded by outside sources

(EPA and a Canadian firm). It seems, however, to

be an expensive way of destroying hazardous

wastes. In 1980, EPA withdrew funding and Lockheed abandoned the research before any demonstration took place, Technical and political issues

also contributed to the project’s termination. Included among the technical problems were feed

rates too slow to be commercially viable, difficulties

in proving DREs of six nines, and corrosion by HCl

on the vaccum pump requiring an internal scrubbing system, Politically, Lockheed faced problems

in acquiring permission from the local community

to test real wastes. [Palo Alto, CA; (415)424-2593]

14. RoTech Inc. (formerly Pedco), Cascading Rotary Incineration System .—The RoTech technology is an incinerator whose cylindrical reactor unit rotates at

10 to 20 revolutions per minute (rpm), A conventional rotary kiln incinerator usually rotates at I to

3 rpm. This motion produces a cascading motion

of the solids in the reactor (ash, unburned solids,

and limestone residue) through the combustion

gases, The high turbulence and solids-gas contact

results in maximized heat transfer and optimal

combustion kinetics.

The intimate contact between solids and gases

also provides the opportunity to neutralize acid

gases (e.g., HCl) by adding limestone to the combustion zone. The high combustion efficiency and

acid gas removal eliminates the need for afterburners and acid scrubbers. Particulate are removed

with baghouse filters.

The system includes air preheating and solid reheating by countercurrent flow with combustion

gases. Combustion takes place between 1,2000 and

1,500° F (640° and 807° C).

RoTech’s system could be applied to a wide range

of organic wastes: solids (pre-treated if necessary

for size consistency), gases, solid-laden gases,

sludges, and liquids. Low heat value wastes (sewage

sludge at 1,650 Btu per pound, for instance) can be

incinerated without auxiliary fuel.

Combustion gas products include carbon dioxide,

oxygen, and water. As mentioned above, acid gases

produced from halogen compounds are reacted

with limestone to produce salts. These solids, along

with inert ash, are periodically removed from the

furnace. Additional pollution control needs will be

evaluated as testing proceeds,

At present, a pilot or small commercial size unit

is operating on industrial and other wastes and has

been tested on a sludge/emulsion, an acrylic emulsion, and a chlorinated aromatic waste. The DREs

are expected to be high, better than 99.99 percent,
208 Ž Superfund Strategy

but the data are not yet available. The technology

is ready for full-scale application, and several units

with 100 ton-per-day capacity are under design.

The installed cost for a system at the 35 million

Btu per hour capacity level is estimated to be about

$2,5 million; a 10 million Btu per hour unit is estimated to cost $1.5 million. Treatment costs are estimated to range from $70 to $150 per ton. [Cincinnati, OH; (513)782-4519]

15. Midland-Ross Corp., Rotary Pyrolytic lncineration.—

The main objective of this system is to convert

waste material from a disposal problem to a gaseous

fuel source using pyrolysis. (Pyrolysis produces a

product stream that contains a high-energy content

by virtue of its hydrocarbon concentration.)

The treatment process begins with dried sludge

being deposited onto a preheated, rotating hearth.

When the sludge comes into contact with the

hearth, its viscosity decreases and the material

spreads out in a uniform, thin layer. Due to the

absence of air, the material is pyrolyzed on the

hearth. Volatile products are exhausted through a

flue and the inert char materials that are left, mostly

carbon and ash, are removed. The generated gases

are combusted in a reactor at approximately 2,800°

F in the presence of oxygen.

The prime candidate hazardous wastes for this

system are organic sludges. Products of the process are a char and gas effluent from the energy conversion unit. The char is collected to prevent leakage to the atmosphere and must be shipped to a

landfill.

Three types of wastes have been tested using this

process: API waste, styrene waste, and rubber plant

waste. All three are organic wastes containing various metals in amounts ranging from 0.1 to 1,000

ppm. Testing results have not been made available,

Preliminary economic estimates have been made

for the processing of API and rubber wastes (styrene waste was not included because of poor test

results). The estimates were made for a system that

included waste storage, a feed system, the pyrolyzer, fume incinerator, and heat recovery. No costs

were included for air pollution control, which

could be necessary. The total estimated operating

costs for the API waste is $894 per metric ton for

a $440,000 system capable of processing 300 metric

tons per year. For rubber waste, three systems were

considered. At 1,000 metric tons per year, capital

costs were estimated at $670,000 and operating

costs, $526 per metric ton; at 2,000 metric tons,

$920,000 and $296 per metric ton; and at 6,000 metric tons per year, $150 million and $117 per metric

ton. [Toledo, OH; (419)537-6242]

16. Waste-Tech Services, Fluidized Bed lncineration.—

The fluidized bed concept was described earlier

under “Conventional Treatment Technologies. ”

Waste-Tech has extensive experience in such standard systems, having provided 45 commercial fluidized bed incinerators for nonhazardous waste disposal, They are now building two similar incinerators

for hazardous waste treatment.

Solids, sludges, slurries, and liquids can all be

treated with this system, although it is not very economical to treat liquids with a fluidized bed, Products of the incineration process are flue gases and

ash, The contents of both are dependent on the input hazardous waste.

The ash generated is sent through a cyclone to

remove particulate matter. Gases are then sent

through a scrubber to remove the remainder of the

particulate matter, A caustic neutralized wet scrub

system can be used to remove HCl from the exhaust

gases before release to the atmosphere. All noncombustible, inorganic wastes larger than the bed material are removed from the incinerator by a screening and recycling system. This material and particulate removed from ash and gases would have

to be separately treated for any hazardous waste

components.

Waste-Tech has tested chemical compounds as

well as actual wastes in their pilot incinerator, Included have been fuel oil, carbon tetrachloride, tetrachlorophenol, pentachlorophenol, and phenol at

concentrations ranging from 0.5 to 40,8 percent by

weight. All of the components tested had DREs of

at least 99.99 percent except for tetrachlorophenol

(99.97 percent). Waste-Tech claims to have destroyed tetrachlorophenol up to 99.99 percent in

subsequent experiments by raising the system temperature. Pilot-scale testing has also shown that

DREs are inversely related to the feed rate.

The company estimates capital costs to be between $790,000 and $1.35 million depending on the

size of the incinerator required (a site-specific factor). The smallest unit could treat about 2,500 tons

of waste per year; the largest, 10,000 tons per year,

The estimated operating costs for relatively small

units range from $0.18 to $0.21 per pound of treated

material, based on non-hazardous waste and include costs for labor, utilities, consumable, depreciation, cost of money, and permitting, [Idaho Falls,

ID; (208)522-0850]

17. G. A. Technologies, Circulating Bed Combustor.—

This circulating bed combustor is designed to be

an improvement over conventional fluidized beds

(see “Conventional Treatment Technologies”). It

operates at higher velocities and with less and finer
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 209

sorbents than conventional systems, allowing for

a unit that is more compact and easier to feed. The

unit also produces lower emissions and an offgas

scrubber is not necessary.

The key to the high efficiency (in terms of destructive power) of the circulating bed combustor

is high turbulence, a large combustion zone with

uniform and relatively low (less than 8500 C, o r

1,5620 F) temperatures, and longer residence times.

This technology can destroy all types of halogenated hydrocarbons, including PCBs and other aromatics. It is capable of treating solids, sludges, slurries, and liquids containing such compounds as

chlorobenzenes, acetonitrile, carbon tetrachloride,

trichloroethane, sodium fluoride, tributyl phosphate, aniline, malathion, sodium silicates, and lead

oxide. Wastes , however, must be homogeneous in

composition when fed to the combustor.

Due to the relatively low operating temperature

of the system, acid gases can be treated with lime

scrubbing within the combustor, resulting in the release of lime salts. The low combustor temperatures, coupled with good mixing in the combustor,

prevent extensive formation of NOX

.

More than 7,500 hours of testing have been completed using four pilot-scale combustors. The variety of wastes tested have included spent carboneous cathodes from primary metal plants, halogenated hydrocarbon solvents, phosphate bearing

wastes from polymer production, and radioactive

waste carbon from metals production. All tests

showed efficient destruction of hazardous chemicals, low emissions of air pollutants (NOX levels

were 120 ppm or less), high combustion efficiency,

and significant volume reduction. DREs exceed

99.99 percent for oily water sludge, chlorinated

organic sludge, aluminum potlinings and PC B-contaminated soil. Chemical plant wastes showed

DREs of greater than 99.9 percent.

The capital investment for a 25 million Btu per

hour sludge incinerator, including a process steam

generator, has been estimated at $2 million plus or

minus 30 percent. A smaller, 6 million Btu per hour,

incinerator is estimated at $1 million to $1.5 million plus or minus 25 percent. Operating costs vary

widely depending on the wastes being destroyed.

[San Diego, CA; (619)455-3045]

18. Rockwell International, Molten Salt lncineration.—

Molten salt incineration is a method of burning

organic material while simultaneously scrubbing

the objectionable byproducts from the effluent gas

stream. Materials to be burned are mixed with air

and injected under the surface of a pool of molten

sodium carbonate. The melt is maintained at temperatures on the order of 9000 C, causing the hydrocarbons of the organic matter to be immediately oxidized to carbon dioxide and water.

Rockwell’s units are capable of being fed either

crushed and sized solid material or liquid fuels. The

pulverized solids, mixed with air being used for

combustion, are injected into a stainless steel reaction vessel. The feed mixture passes through 6

inches of salt (in a bench-scale unit). Periodically,

the inorganic materials that build up in the molten

salt must be removed so that the bed can retain its

ability to absorb acidic gases. Exhaust gases (carbon dioxide and water vapor] can be directed

through a scrubber and/or baghouse, if necessary,

to remove particulate before being released to the

atmosphere.

The ultimate products of the molten salt process

are carbon dioxide, water, various inorganic salts,

and ash. The ash and any inorganic materials containing metals may be considered hazardous.

Although molten salt technology has been used

by several companies to incinerate wastes, only

Rockwell’s system has been used to incinerate hazardous liquid or solid wastes. The company currently operates three sizes of units: bench-scale

(feed rate of 2 pounds per hour), pilot-scale (up to

250 pounds per hour), and a production unit that

is operated as a coal gasifier and has not been designed for hazardous wastes.

The bench-scale unit has been tested and shown

to effectively destroy organic chemicals and wastes

(DREs have exceeded 99.99 percent). No hazardous

waste streams have been incinerated in the larger

unit but since its bed depth is proportionally larger,

it is reasonable to expect that its destruction efficiencies would be at least as great as in the benchscale unit.

Cost estimates are not available for Rockwell’s

incineration system. [Conoga Park, CA; [818) 700-4887]

19. A. L. Sandpiper Corp., SEGAS Process.–SEGAS,

or Sequential Gasification, converts incinerable solids, sludges, and liquid waste to a medium heat-value fuel gas. The process was developed in the 1970s

to convert petroleum into more volatile products.

Sandpiper is now testing the system for use on hazardous wastes typical of Superfund sites.

The basis of the SEGAS process is a pressure vessel operating at 1,2270 C [2,241 0 F) and 200 psi. The

reactants, the wastes, and superheated steam are

continuously fed into a proprietary fluid bed reactor. Wastes are thermally decomposed, releasing

hydrogen and carbon. The steam reacts with the

deposited carbon to form carbon monoxide and additional hydrogen. This mixture of hydrogen and
210 ● Superfund Strategy

carbon monoxide—synthesis gas—is a fuel gas and

basic raw material of the petrochemical industry.

Chlorine and sulfur in the waste feed material react with the hydrogen within the reactor to form

hydrogen chloride gas or hydrogen sulfide gas and

are removed by conventional scrubbing technology.

Solid residues will vary depending on the feedstream and scrubbing technology and must be landfilled if not delisted.

The process differs from conventional incineration in that it does not burn the waste and, therefore, no air of combustion is required in the system. The absence of air eliminates the necessity to

contain, heat, cool, scrub, and discharge large volumes of nitrogen. The reactor and scrubbing system are substantially smaller than for conventional

incineration of comparable waste streams.

Results of testing hazardous wastes are not yet

available but Sandpiper claims that extensive testing of the technology has been conducted on a variety of heavy petroleum products and has demonstrated process efficiency. Separate testing of the

fluid bed reactor showed high DRE capabilities. Integration of the reactor with the SEGAS process

will occur in a 60 gallon per hour demonstration

unit expected to be available by June 1985.

Sandpiper has designed a stationary or mobile

unit (on a 40-foot trailer) to treat 600 gallons of

waste per hour, They have projected capital costs

for a stationary unit of $2.3 million and $2.2 million for the mobile unit. Operating costs will vary

depending on the specific waste being processed.

Sandpiper estimates that it will cost $0.03 per

pound to process lower heat value, refractory materials (e.g., heavily chlorinated hydrocarbons).

Costs do not include any offset from the sale of synthesis gas. [Columbus, OH; (614)486-0405]

20. Detox Industries, Inc. (DTI), In Situ Biological Treatment.—This is an assisted microbiological degradation process for the destruction of organic compounds. It will work either aerobically or anaerobically. In anaerobic conditions, an oxygenating

agent is added. Chlorinated organics serve as the

carbon source for the organisms and the process

is more efficient in destroying toxic compounds if

the carbon source is limited to the compounds of

interest.

DTI developed its degrading microbe culture by

selective adaption of known bacteria in the presence of various concentrations of PCBs. The organisms were conditioned to use PCBs as the sole carbon source. The biodegradation of 14,000 cubic

yards of soil contaminated with pentachlorophenol

has been completed, and PCBs (Arochlor 1260)

have been treated in a 25,000 gallon tank. Treatment applied to several hundred thousand cubic

yards of material can be expected to take months

to complete.

The first step is to determine the parameters of

the material to be treated. Contaminant concentrations, acidity, density, volubility, temperature, oxygen, and moisture content are important variables.

Then a design is developed to most effectively stimulate growth and biodegradation. The process uses

naturally occurring microbes, but is proprietary. To

be effective, proper mixing of and contact between

the microbes, waste constituents, and nutrient supply, along with control of environmental factors,

must be maintained.

The process has been tested on PCBs and can be

designed to be applied in situ to detoxify soils,

sludge, lagoon contents, or can be designed to operate as a treatment process on or offsite. Degradation results in carbon dioxide, water, and cell protoplasm (new cells). After degradation is complete,

the micro-organisms used in DTI’s process die off

and the original culture, or mix, of organisms becomes dominant again.

Demonstrations with DTI’s process have used

concentrations ranging from 46 to 2,000 ppm of

PCBs and have achieved destruction efficiencies

greater than 99 percent, Further work will fix the

efficiencies more accurately and extend the range

of chemicals.

Costs are highly site-specific, DTI has estimated

that costs will range between $60 and $120 per

cubic yard (about 1 ton) of material to be treated,

depending on the initial concentration of contaminant and the matrix within which it is contained.

[Houston, TX; (713)240-0892]

21. Groundwater Decontamination Systems, Inc., Biological Degradation .—The GDS system takes place onsite

and aims to eliminate hydrocarbon and halogenated hydrocarbon contaminants from groundwater

and soil through accelerated biodegradation by

micro-organisms existing in the contaminated soil.

It was developed by Biocraft Laboratories in New

Jersey as a remedial technique for cleanup of their

own property under a consent order and is now being marketed for use at other locations.

It is essentially a flushing and treating operation

that must be specifically designed for the characteristics of each site and its contaminants, A pumping system is installed to remove contaminated

groundwater from the site, The water is cycled

through an activating tank, where the micro-organisms found in the water are enriched with compounds of phosphates and ammonia. From the ac-
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies . 211

tivating tanks, the water is transferred to settling

tanks and the treated water, rich in oxygen, nutrients, and micro-organisms is reinfected into the

ground upgradient from the intake system. This

permits biodegradation to occur in situ as well as

in the tanks, The groundwater and soils are aerated

through air injection wells to further increase the

rate of biodegradation.

At the original site, groundwater was contaminated by leaking underground storage tanks, The

contamination covered a surface area of 360 feet

by 90 feet and extended below the surface to a

depth of 10 feet. Biodegradation treatment was considered the most cost effective choice when compared with carbon absorption (too expensive) and

ozone treatment (too ineffective), Measurements of

the effluent indicate that removal of most of the

contaminants to the desired level has occurred.

Average removal efficiency for the system was

greater than 98 percent for isopropyl alcohol,

greater than 97 percent for butyl alcohol, greater

than 88 percent for acetone, and greater than 64

percent for dimethyl aniline during the first 16

months of operation. In the following 7 months the

acetone removal was increased to greater than 97

percent and dimethyl aniline to greater than 93

percent.

GDS claims that conventional methods might

have taken 15 to 20 years cleanup time whereas

their system will be completed in less than the 5

years originally estimated, and at a lower cost. At

the New Jersey site, 12,000 gallons of groundwater

are being treated daily at a cost of less than $0.02

per gallon. Total cost of the project has been placed

at $859,000 including the original R&D costs of

$453,000. [Waldwick, NJ; (201)796-6938]

22. SBR Technologies, Sequencing Batch Reactor.—The

Sequencing Batch Reactor (SBR) has been under development by Professor R. L, Irvine of Notre Dame

University over the past 15 years. Although initially

intended for municipal wastewater treatment, the

technology recently has been shown to be applicable to treat contaminated groundwater and hazardous waste leachates.

The SBR has several virtues that overcome the

traditional disadvantages of biological treatment.

For example, the SBR has been shown to be relatively insensitive to changing feed characteristics,

including loading rates. It is not as susceptible to

shock loadings; it selects for the proper microorganism in a mixed population; and it combines

all treatment functions in only one tank, a definite

economic advantage,

The reactor does in time what traditional biological process technology does in space with sequential tanks. There are five periods in its operation:

fill, react, settle, draw, and idle. During fill, wastewater is charged to the reactor, and during react

the biological processes started in fill are continued,

Aerobic, anoxic, or anaerobic conditions can be

created during the fill and react periods. During settle, the micro-organisms are allowed to settle to the

bottom of the tank, and during draw the supernatant treated water is removed. Idle is a short time

where the reactor is awaiting the next batch of feed.

The five time periods can be adjusted for optimum

removal efficiencies for varying types of wastes.

Two full-scale demonstration SBR plants exist:

one in Indiana treating municipal waste and a

250,000 gallon per day facility at the Cecos site in

Niagara Falls treating hazardous waste. The project at Cecos is cofunded under a demonstration

contract with the New York State Energy Research

and Development Authority and in part by JetTech., manufacturer of SBR’s aeration and decant

system, A computer controls all phases of the treatment process, Laboratory studies show that the

SBR can achieve 70 to 80 percent removal of organic materials and 98 percent removal of phenol,

A carbon adsorption system has been added as a

secondary treatment method to achieve higher removal levels.

This may be quite a cost-effective approach to the

destruction of hazardous leachates, especially when

coupled with some form of carbon treatment. Production of biomass or sludge is a potential disadvantage; however, natural decomposition seems to

circumvent the need for frequent sludge removal.

[Mishawaka, IN; (219)236-5874]

23. University of Gottingen, West Germany, Biological Degradation of Chlorophenols.—W/est German researchers have developed several bacterial strains that are

capable of degrading chlorophenols. The process

has been tested on synthetic sewage containing

phenol, acetone, and alkanols plus 4-chlorophenol

or a mixture of isomeric chlorophenols. One particular bacterial strain completely degraded the

chlorophenols in the synthetic mix. The release of

chloride and a low content of dissolved organic carbon in the cell-free effluents indicated total degradation of the organic carbon. During adaptation to

high loads of chlorophenols, hybrid strains were detected that were determined to be even more competitive than the original strain for the degradation

of chlorophenol.

The research has also shown, however, that the

presence of additional organisms capable of de-
212 ● Superfund Strategy

grading the phenol, acetone, and alkanols in the

mix caused incomplete degradation of the chlorophenols. Thus, the approach, while considered well

defined, is valid only for one organism at a time.

24. Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, In Situ

Vitrification.—In situ vitrification classifies contaminated soils in place while the organic waste constituents contained within are pyrolyzed, The gases

from the process combust when they rise above the

soil and contact the air.

The area to be treated is heated (between 1,100°

and 1,600° C) electrically, melting the soil, As the

soil is heated, the molten zone grows outward and

downward approaching temperatures of 2,0000 C.

The high temperatures and long residence times result in essentially complete combustion and destruction of the organic components. An offgas

hood is placed over the soil to catch small amounts

of hazardous elements, The effluents are directed

to an offgas treatment system in a mobile semitrailer. The effectiveness of the gas capture system

is not proven,

Cooling takes several months and depends on the

size of the mass produced. After cooling, the vitreous mass may be covered with clean fill. The mass

is a containment system that could be enhanced by

the addition of engineered barriers,

This process was originally designed for radioactive wastes. Tests have been conducted on various metals (e. g., cobalt, cadmium, lead) as well as

carbon tetrachloride, tributyl phosphate, bibutyl

butylphosphate, wood, plastics, and other organic

compounds. Bench- and pilot-scale tests have been

conducted on soils contaminated with metals and

organic wastes. While organic materials will be destroyed by the process, metals are encapsulated,

The cost of the process increases as the liquid content of the waste increases.

All residues are contained within the vitreous

mass that remains in the ground. Air emissions are

controlled by the offgas system, which includes a

scrubber, a water separator and condenser, and

particulate air filters,

Battelle has estimated costs and the major variables are soil moisture and cost of electric power.

In five different scenarios, costs ranged from $4,60

to $6.30 per cubic foot ($161 to $224 per cubic meter) of soil vitrified, (Soil was vitrified to a depth

of 5 meters in each case.) Calculations included site

preparation, annual equipment charges, operational costs (labor), and consumable supplies such as

electrical power and electrodes. [Richland, WA;

(509)375-2927]

25. Lopat Enterprises, K-20 Chemical Treatment.—The

patented agent K-20 was developed to seal surfaces

against water intrusion. It was found to be a fire

retardant and to have the ability to encapsulate a

number of toxic chemicals, K-20 is a mixture of

potassium silicates and other materials, is said to

be safe and nontoxic, can be varied to meet different objectives, and can be used in conjunction with

cement and other inorganic agents. Unlike conventional chemical fixation and stabilization products,

K-20 appears to be effective on organic as well as

inorganic toxic materials,

The product is applied to surfaces after being

mixed with a catalyst, Little technical expertise is

required to apply it once an effective formulation

has been developed for a particular application.

The product can penetrate porous materials of any

sort to considerable depths.

K-20 has been used commercially to a limited extent on building surfaces contaminated with either

PCB or chlordane. In both cases, readings on contaminated surfaces and in the air after application

of K-20 have been brought down to the nondetectable level. Lopat Enterprises is pursuing studies to

determine exactly how K-20 works on organic toxic

chemicals. Questions have been raised about how

long the chemical encapsulation will be effective.

The company maintains that the base silicates it

uses have been used for other purposes for many

years and that its product should be effective for

at least 50 years. The product has also been used

effectively on buildings with asbestos contamination. In this case, microscopic evidence shows that

K-20 penetrates deeply and coats asbestos fibers so

that they are not friable or suspendable in air,

The company also has laboratory test results on

contaminated soil. When mixed with portland cement and soil with a lead content of 200 ppm, K20 reduced the measured lead level to 0.1 ppm according to EPA’s EP Toxicity test. The product was

recently tested on dioxin-contaminated soil from

Missouri. For a sample of soil containing 174 ppb

of dioxin, treatment with K-20 at levels of 5, 10, and

20 percent by weight resulted in a finding of less

than 1 ppb, the limit of detection. Proponents say

that contaminated soil could easily be treated in situ

or in other ways. After treatment, the soil is an inert, friable material.

Research is also planned for introducing K-20

into materials used for below ground barriers for

groundwater, such as slurry walls, to reduce attack

or penetration by organic toxic chemicals. There

is also potential for the product to be used with liq-
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 213

uids in uncontrolled surface impoundments to form

solid harmless materials.

Although precise cost data is not available, costs

appear quite low. Cost depends on how much of

the product is necessary, and that depends on a

number of factors such as the nature of the contaminated material, the contaminants, and the need for

additional agents such as cement. For treatment of

contaminated soils, some equipment would be necessary to achieve thorough mixing of K-20 and soil.

The company is a small business that has faced

difficulties obtaining funds for RD&D. Thus far all

its work has been self-supported. [Wanamassa, NJ;

(201)922-6600]

26. New Materials Technology Corp., Fujibeton Encapsulation.—Fujibeton is an inorganic polymer that has

been shown to chemically bond with and physically

encapsulate both inorganic and organic toxic compounds. It has been used in large hazardous waste

treatment projects in Japan. The product was developed by Fujimasu Synthetic Chemical Laboratories in Tokyo, and New Materials Technology

Corp. is its exclusive manufacturer and distributor

in the United States. The technology’s supporters

claim over 10 years of successful application in

Japan.

Fujibeton is an advanced form of cement, [Concrete, which results from the reaction of water, cement, and aggregate is a relatively primitive example of an inorganic polymer.) It is able to improve

the bonding properties and cross-linking abilities

of silicate macromolecules. The result is to greatly

reduce the release of hazardous chemicals from the

treated materials. The combination of compounds

and the nature of the bonding mechanism of the

process are proprietary.

New Materials Technology foresees several applications in the hazardous waste area for their

product. For remedial action, its prime use would

be to treat and immobilize hazardous wastes in solid, sludge, and liquid forms. Liquid wastes must be

first mixed with an absorbent, such as fly ash. The

solidified end product can be reduced to a granular

form without substantially reducing its effectiveness. Treatment can take place onsite with simple

equipment (e. g., a concrete mixer).

An example of a successful application in Japan

was the treatment and stabilization of PCB-contaminated sludges and sediments found in the harbor

of Takasago West Port, Prior to treatment the sludge

contained 450 milligrams per kilograms (mg/kg) of

PCB plus 91 mg/kg of lead and 0.02 mg/kg of mercury. Leachable concentrations after treatment

were 0,003 milligrams per liter (mg/1) of PCB, 0.01

mg/1 of lead and 0.0005 mg/l of mercury,

Two remedial action projects are planned for

1985 in Japan using Fujibeton. Up to 763,000 cubic

yards of contaminated material will be dredged

from the bottom of Waka River which has been polluted over a long period of time with a whole range

of industrial wastes. After treatment, the stabilized

material will be used as a landfill for a new industrial site for Sumitomo Heavy Industries. At Lake

Biwa, the largest inland lake in Japan, 25.5 million

cubic yards of contaminated sediments will be

treated in place to improve the water quality to an

acceptable drinking level, The lake serves as the

main source of water for the Osaka-Kyoto area with

a population of 13 million.

Several tests have been conducted on the effect

of applying Fujibeton to a variety of hazardous

wastes, both organics and metals. In one University of Arizona test, an electroplating sludge was

treated; and the resultant material underwent the

standard EPA EP Toxicity test. For all metals present, the extractable metal concentrations from the

treated/stabilized material were one to two order

of magnitude below the maximum allowable. For

instance, lead ranging from 360 to 690 ppm was reduced to 0,5 to 0,36 ppm; chromium, from 37 to 100

ppm to 0.8 to 0.35 ppm; and cadmium, from 1.7 to

2,9 ppm to an undetectable level. Similar results

occurred when material from a toxic waste dump

at Bridgeport, New Jersey, was tested. In addition,

in the latter case the organics orginally present

were not detectable in leach tests on the treated

samples. Comparative leach testing against conventional technologies (cement/soluble silicate and

portland cement) have shown Fujibeton to be superior.

There are no capital costs associated with the use

of this encapsulation technology, Material costs for

the treatment of contaminated soils vary depending on the amount of Fujebiton required (5 to 15

percent) per pound of soil and the overall size of

the project. The amount required varies depending

on the level and type of contamination, and the unit

cost ($0.15 to $0.25 per pound) decreases as the

project size increases, For instance, a project treating 50,000 tons of soil and consuming 10 million

of pounds of Fujebiton (at 10 percent per pound of

soil) would cost from $30 to $50 per ton of soil. The

treatment process would consist of three steps: 1 ]

excavation of the soils, 2) mixture with Fujibeton,

and 3] cure and subsequent disposal as nonhazardous fill back into the original excavation. [Wichita,

KS; (316] 683-8986]
214 ● Superfund Strategy

SUPPORT OF CLEANUP TECHNOLOGY RD&D

Introduction

Research and development can lead to better ways of tackling Superfund remedial action

problems. Compared to existing cleanup options, R&D can improve the range of applicability, the effectiveness, and the reliability of

technology and also reduce costs. Hazardous

waste problems at any one Superfund site can

range from one to many, and a technology may

be applicable to only a specific waste and form,

A technology is effective when it achieves remedial action objectives and is reliable if it is

effective under operating conditions and has

the ability to maintain its effectiveness over the

long term.

The design and development of innovative

technologies are conducted within the private

sector with little assistance from the Federal

Government. The Federal Government funds

Superfund-related R&D programs in EPA and

in the Department of Defense (under its Installation Restoration program). Within EPA the

amount of funds for the support of Superfund

technologies has been relatively small and narrowly focused. For example, while over 50 percent of EPA’s total R&D budget has been spent

on contracts and grants during the last 5 years,

only a fraction of the total (4 percent in fiscal

year 1985) has been dedicated to the Superfund

program and only a portion of that to cleanup

technologies. 35 Most of the research contracts

awarded by EPA under Superfund seem to

complement internal activities rather than provide for the influx of new ideas.

In what may prove to be a more relevant link

between research and technology, the National

Science Foundation (NSF) in October 1984 provided seed money for an Industry/University

Cooperative Center in New Jersey that will concentrate on hazardous and toxic waste research.

j6According to a summary sheet prepared by the Congressional

Research Service in October 1984, a total of $307 million was

appropriated for R&D at EPA for fiscal year 1985; $202 million

is for grants and contracts, $9 million of which is for Superfund.

EPA Technology Research and Development

Because Superfund has been considered a

short-term program, EPA has not followed the

normal research and development process of

concept development, laboratory evaluation,

pilot testing, and field demonstration. Instead,

the program has been one of:

. . . technology assessment to determine cost

and effectiveness, adaptation of technologies

to the uncontrolled waste site problem, field

evaluation of technologies that show promise,

development of guidance material for the EPA

Office of Emergency and Remedial Response

(OERR), technical assistance to OERR and

EPA Regional Offices.38

Short-term thinking and an original interpretation by EPA that CERCLA excluded expenditures for basic research has concentrated activity on applied research, such as adapting

existing construction engineering technologies

to improve disposal practices and evaluating

containment and incineration technologies,

This policy, compounded by an initial belief

that existing technologies could indeed solve

Superfund problems (i.e., innovation was not

required) has resulted in little if any emphasis

on basic research and innovative approaches.

There are some signs that this attitude is beginning to change within the EPA R&D system,

but only evidence of a shift in funding levels

in the next few years will confirm a real shift

in commitment. In 1985, new emphasis will be

placed on innovative approaches, such as in

situ technologies and onsite treatment.

3 7

According to a recent report, EPA is now beginning to look at the prevalant wastes found

t6Rona1d D. Hill, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

“Promising Site Cleanup Technology,” paper presented at Superfund Update: Cleanup Lessons Learned, Schaumburg, IL, Oct.

11-12, 1983. Similar statements were made in 1984 at EPA’s

Tenth Annual Research Symposium: Land Disposal of ffazardous Waste.

sTRonald Hill, director, Land Pollution Control Division, Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, personal communication, Dec. 14, 1984.
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 215

—

at Superfund sites and to attempt to match

them with the best treatment technology. 38

R&D Funding

The total EPA R&D budget during each of

the Superfund program’s first 5 years is shown

in table 6-8, with a comparison of the amounts

dedicated to Superfund and Hazardous Waste

activities. 39 Over the 5-year period, only about

$50 million has been spent on Superfund R&D,

a small fraction of the $1.6 billion Superfund

program.

The R&D amounts for the Superfund program are modest when compared with the total

EPA R&D budget and with what many observers think is required to adequately support the

development and assessment of technology to

handle Superfund problems.’” The Superfund

R&D budget for fiscal year 1985 represents

about 4 percent of the EPA R&D budget, while

“JTheresa Hitchens, “Puhlic Push for Alternatives to Land Disposal Years Ahead of Research, ” Inside E. P. A., Feb. 15, 1985,

pp. 12-13.

39fj pA breaks CJOW. n its R&f) budget into 11 media ca tego rit%:

air, water qualit}’, drinking water, hazardous waste, pesticides,

radiation, interdisciplinary, toxics, energy, management, and

Superfund. Ea(;h of these media are subsequently broken dott’n

into i’arious program elements and program elements into ob-

~ecti~es.

‘According to an internal EPA memo dated Dec. 3, 1980, from

Altin R. hlorris, director, Superfund Task Force, projected Superfund program costs are dependent on the number of NPI. sites.

(Jnder this ~(;heme, Superfund R&D should total $115.5 million

for 1,000 site.% $152.4 million for 1,400,$1893 million for 1,8(?0,

and $226.1 million for 2,200 sites. As of late 1984, NT PI. sites totaled 538. “I”his would argue for a Superfond R&D budget of about

$90 million.

Table 6-8.— EPA R&D Budget (millions of dollars)

Fiscal year Superfund Hazardous Waste Overalla

1981 ....., .. . 4.7 21,9 303.0

1982 ........, . 13,8 29.2 314.6

1983. , . . . . . . . 6.9 33.4 228.5

1984 b . . . . . . . . . 9.0 33.5 250.0

1985 b . . . . . . . 12.7 40.7 306.0

alncludes funds for Superfund and Hazardous waste PIUS Air, Water Qual W,

Drlnk!ng Water, Pestlc!des Radlatlon TOXIC Substances Energy, lnterd!sclpllnary, and Management categories

bEst!mated

SOURCE U S Environmental Protecllon Agency, Off Ice of the Comptroller, De

cem be r 1984

the Superfund program represents 35 percent

of the total EPA Operating Budget request.41

The R&D funds are budgeted under the Office of Research and Development (ORD) and

within ORD divided as shown in table 6-9. At

most, about half these funds are related to R&D

in cleanup technologies. The EPA budget, as

shown in table 6-8, also allocates R&D funds

under hazardous waste (13 percent of R&D in

fiscal year 1985) for RCRA-related activities,

Some of this R&D, as well as that conducted

under other programs is relevant to Superfund

program needs. But only the funds committed

under Superfund consider remedial action

technology per se and are dedicated to solving

Superfund’s special problems.

R&D Activities

Superfund and RCRA R&D within ORD were

reorganized in late 1984 to more closely link

the activities of the two programs. R&D objectives that deal with technology are primarily

the concern of the ORD’s Office of Environmental Engineering Technology and its Hazardous Waste Engineering Research Laboratory (HWERL), HWERL’sS Land Pollution Control Division (through its Containment Branch

and Releases Control Branch) and the Alternate

Technologies Division deal with Superfundrelated technology investigations. The Containment Branch is responsible for research in the

area of remedial action (also for RCRA); the Releases Control Branch for emergency removals. The Alternate Technologies Division now

conducts research in incineration, chemical

and biological technologies, primarily those applicable under RCRA.

The Releases Control Branch work is divided

into three areas. The goal of the personne l

health and safety program is to develop protective equipment and procedures for personnel working in known or suspected dangerous

environments. Efforts under removal technol41{; ,s.En\,irOnmental Protection Agenc}’, %mrnar.tf of the 19~.5

Budget (Washington, DC: C) ffice of the Comptroller, Januar}’

1984).
216 . Superfund Strategy

Table 6-9.—Superfund R&D Budget (millions of dollars)

ORD Office FY84 FY85 Primary objectives

Environmental Engineering Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,7 6.3 Control technology, technical support

Monitoring Systems and Quality Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,7 4.9 Site assessment, quality assurance

Health and Environmental Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.3 Site assessment, technical support

Environmental Processes and Effect Research ... . . . . . . . . . 0.5 0.2 Site assessment

Total a 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.9 12,6

aFfgures may not add to totals due to round! n9

SOURCE U S Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research & Development, December 1984

ogy center on demonstrating equipment for

hazardous spill control. Under this program a

mobile incinerator, carbon regenerator, and

soils washer equipment are being modified,

adapted, and field tested. The chemical countermeasures program is concerned with the use

of chemicals and other additives that are intentionally introduced into the open environment for the purpose of controlling hazardous

contaminants,

The activity of the Containment Branch includes: 1) the survey and assessment of current

technologies, 2) field demonstration and verification of techniques, and 3) site design analysis. The first activity is a followup to remedial actions that have occurred, reviewing and

evaluating techniques that have been applied

at Superfund sites, Techniques identified as

having “potential for being cost effective” or

those being installed as part of a remedial action are given field testing and evaluation. For

example, the block displacement method of isolating hazardous wastes has been field tested

and a particular slurry trench installed at a

New Hampshire site has been given field evaluation. The third category, which involves the

publication of technical handbooks to guide

those handling site design analysis, is an outgrowth of the data collected and analyzed in

the first two areas of activity.

Specific projects under both branches can be

broadly classified as either pertaining to treatment or containment technologies and include:

Treatment. Development of: 1) a mobile

soils washing system that can be used to

treat excavated soils onsite, 2) mobile and

modular incineration systems for field use

to destroy hazardous organic substances

collected from cleanup operations at spills

or at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites,

and 3) a trailer-mounted system for the onsite regeneration of spent granular, activated carbon from carbon adsorption systems. In addition, bench-scale testing of a

number of leachate treatment processes

will be conducted and the Chemical Countermeasures Program mentioned above is

underway.

Ž Containment. Evaluation of installed slurry systems and low-permeability covers,

pilot-scale tests of injection grouting,

assessment of the feasibility of retrofitting

membrane liner systems to existing surface impoundments, development of the

criteria for evaluating the use of permeable

materials as hazardous waste control

mechanisms. Development and evaluation

of a prototype full-scale process and equipment for encapsulating corroding 55-gallon drums of hazardous waste. The investigation of asphalt encapsulation techniques to improve the leachate quality and

act to reduce the hazardous nature of some

sludges.

The Alternative Technologies Division now

incorporates activities evaluating fixed incineration systems that were ongoing under the previous Industrial Environmental Research Laboratory. The division is funded ($8.8 million

in contract funds in fiscal year 1985)42 from the

RCRA R&D budget and consists of two branches:

the Thermal Destruction Branch, which will

continue with the above incineration program,

and a Chemical and Biological Technology

Branch. The division’s primary emphasis is apizclyde Dial, direct[)r, Alternative Technologies Division of

the Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, personal communication, Dec. 13, 1984.
Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies . 217

plied research on industrial hazardous waste

streams although some fundamental research

is conducted in such areas as combustion (e. g.,

minimization of PIC formation) and genetic

engineering, Although this division is RCRAoriented, many of its activities could have applicability to Superfund, The group has cooperated with various States that wish to evaluate

innovative technologies. In a project completed

with the State of California, EPA paid for the

sampling and analysis of molten salt, fluid wall,

and wet oxidation processes. Emphasis on this

type of program could help generate standardized data collection to be used for the development of protocols for testing of new technologies.

Grants and Contracts

One of the major ways that technology transfer occurs between the private sector and EPA

is through the grants and contracts awarded

by EPA, That portion of the R&D budget totals

$201.8 million for fiscal year 1985 (66 percent

of the overall R&D budget). The funds are spent

under a grants program, a centers program,

and by contracts let through the laboratories

of ORD. Due to the Small Business Innovative

Development Act of 198243 at least 1 percent

of these funds must be spent to support small

business R&D.

The agency’s Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program was set up within ORD

in November 1982. Once a year, it solicits bids

on a dozen or so topics considered to be of interest to EPA, Twelve topics were listed in the

1984 offering, a number of which are directly

related to Superfund cleanup technology R&D.

Included were improved stability of containment mechanisms; organic waste/containment

liner compatibility; biotechnology applications

for hazardous waste control; advanced thermal, chemical, and physical methods for hazardous waste destruction; methods for soil and

aquifer decontamination; and innovative volatile organic compound control methods. To

participate, a firm must first apply for a Phase

I contract to show the scientific and technical

43P11 l]] I(, J,a ~t’ 97-219, July 1982.

merit and feasibility of its idea. Following successful completion of Phase I, a firm can apply

for a Phase II contract to further develop the

proposed idea. In the first year of the program

(fiscal year 1983), 10 Phase I projects were

funded for a total of $248,000. Ten Phase I and

five Phase II projects (at about $100,000 each)

were funded in fiscal year 1984 at a total cost

of $856,000. In fiscal year 1985, the SBIR program expects to spend $1.9 million. Six to eight

Phase II projects will be funded at about $150,000

each, along with Phase I projects at about

$48,000 each.

The SBIR program is considered by the private sector to be the prime source of financial

assistance for R&D in Superfund-related innovative technologies, but it has its drawbacks,

First, due to SBIR’s once-a-year funding cycle,

a firm must wait a full year to obtain followon (Phase II) funding. An option that would be

more conducive to the private sector business

climate would be to allow Phase II funding to

proceed directly following the completion and

evaluation of a Phase I project. Second, the size

of the awards may not be consistent with private sector costs of R&D.

Most of EPA’s basic research is funded

under its grants program in ORD which has

a 1985 budget of $12.2 million, The monies can

be used by nonprofit entities only. General

guidelines are provided in an annual proposals

list covering five program areas: environmental

health, environmental biology, environmental

engineering, and physical/chemical measurement of air and water. Due to the initial decision by EPA that Superfund monies cannot be

expended for basic research, grants are not

awarded for research specifically related to

Superfund. Undoubtedly some of the research

will eventually benefit Superfund but it is difficult to measure how much. (Possibly about

10 percent of the work funded under the environmental engineering category will eventually

benefit Superfund.)44

44[; ]a ~ls(; G;llz]or[j, direc t Or , Grants Office of the O ffi(:(’ of E .x -

p]oratorj Research of the Office of Research and De~elopment,

U.S. Environmental Protection Agencj, personal comnlunicatlon. December 1984.

38-745 0 - 85 - 8
218 ● Superfund Strategy

The centers program was set up within ORD

in 1979 in response to criticisms regarding

EPA’s concentration on short-term research.

EPA developed eight themes needing support

in fundamental research, and eight centers

based on these themes have now been funded

through cooperative agreements at various

universities. Each center receives about $500,000

per year from EPA (out of ORD’s R&D budget)

and is expected to supplement its income from

other public and private sector sources. The

results of the research conducted by the centers

are disseminated through peer review journals

and publications.

Three of the centers conduct research that

may have a bearing on Superfund needs: the

Hazardous Waste Center at Louisiana State

University, the Center for Advanced Environmental Control Technology at the University

of Illinois at Urbana, and the Industrial Hazardous Waste Elimination Center at the Illinois

Institute of Technology in Chicago. Of the

three, the Hazardous Waste Center is most germaine to Superfund technology needs. Its research focuses on ultimate disposal and landfill techniques and destruction technology.

At Tufts University in Massachusetts, EPA

has funded at the specific request of Congress

the Center for Environmental Management, So

far, $3 million have been appropriated for the

Center; $2 million in the fiscal year 1983 supplemental appropriations bill for EPA and $1

million in the fiscal year 1984 supplemental appropriations. This program is outside of the

Centers Program, and its grant money does not

come from ORD’s R&D budget, This “national

research, education, and policy center” is applying a multidisciplinary research approach

to link environmental research, technology,

and public policy issues. 45 The chairman of

EPA’s internal Hazardous Waste Committee

oversees the Center’s research program, and

efforts are made both by EPA and the Center

to coordinate its research with that ongoing

within EPA and with the activities of the centers program.46

4SAnthOny cortese, director, Center for Environmental Management, persona] communication, December 1984.

AeMatheJv Bills, EPA program manager for the Center fOr

Environmental Management, personal communication, December 1984,

Of the first $2 million appropriated, six research projects were funded by the Center for

$330,000. (The balance of the funds were spent

on planning and setting up the Center.) One

of these projects, investigating a new method

for groundwater monitoring using laser fluorescence fiber optics, is relevant to the Superfund program. A proposal will be made by the

Center in 1985 to use the remaining $1 million

appropriation to set up a comprehensive research project dealing with an actual Superfund site, An investigation of innovative cleanup techniques and followup assessment of their

effectiveness is expected to be part of this project. 47 This prospect has the potential to make

a substantial contribution to the Superfund

program,

Support for the Private Sector

Outside contracting by the EPA laboratories

and program offices could be a source of support for private sector R&D efforts. The established contract procedures, however, apparently inhibit participation because they do not

offer a mechanism for handling unsolicited

proposals from the private sector, Thus, if a

firm is seeking financial assistance for R&Don

its particular technology, it must be able to

mesh its requirements with those established

by an EPA Request For Proposal.

From EPA’s point of view, funding an unsolicited proposal constitutes single source procurement and EPA is loath to being viewed as

supporting any particular firm or technology

over another, This appears to be a critical barrier to the adoption of innovative technologies,

EPA is the buyer of technologies under Superfund; yet if a technology has not been evaluated

by them and testing methods declared acceptable, it will be eliminated from consideration

during the FS process of evaluating a Superfund site, (The situation may not be much different for cleanups financed in other ways.) Removing this barrier will require an active demonstration projects policy on the part of EPA.

Lately, EPA has made attempts to correct this

situation and to devise ways to handle the large

volume of unsolicited proposals that it receives.

4TCortese, personal communication, op. cit.
However, the amounts dedicated have been relatively minor and the decision process is Slow,

48

According to one EPA official, 49 demonstration projects to test commercially developed,

new technologies under actual Superfund site

conditions are hampered for three basic rea -

sons: 1) EPA’s existing R&D funding levels are

not sufficient to cover the costs; 2) demonstration projects have required RCRA permits that

are not obtainable without testing data the demonstration is intended to provide; so and 3) demonstrations conducted on Superfund sites can

run against public sentiment, which wants

cleanup activity to proceed quickly.

5 1

The Land Pollution Control Division initiated

a demonstration program in 1984 ($150,000

was offered for two solicitations), and starting

in 1985 it will begin an annual program, In

1985, with a maximum budget of $750,000 ,

three to ten projects will be selected and testing

will be conducted to develop protocols. A set

of demonstration projects are planned for 1985

and the next 5 years by the Releases Control

Branch, They are seeking technologies for u s e

in removal actions where short-term response

and mobility are key criteria. The initial year’s

effort has a maximum budget of $250,000; the

following years will be funded at about $400,000

per year. Not all of the monies will necessarily

be spent, however. Actual spending levels will

AaThc; Alternate ‘l’echnology Division, for instance, SOll Cited

bids for “ideas” in 1983. out of 27 proposals received, 2 projects were selected and funded in the fall of 1984. The total budget

for the program is $300,000 for processes considered to be at

the demonstration stage. One demonstration project can easil}

cost a firm $500,000 or more.

A8Hi11, personal (communication, op. cit.

Soprol,lslons in the RCRA legislation passed by the 9~th Congress may reduce this barrier. Under Subtitle B, EPA is authorized to issue special RD&D permits for any hazardous waste

treatment facility which proposes to use an innovative and experimental hazardous waste treatment technology or process for

which permit standards have not been promulgated. One technology firm commented to OTA that, while they were extremely

pleased to see this provision, they were worried that the

tagueness of the wording would cause EPA to be extremely

cautious in using it.

S1-ro a~,ol(i this potential problem, two Land Pollution COntrOl

Dik’Aon demonstration projects wi]] proceed in 1985 in cooperation wit h the (J. S Air Fore e on Federal la rids. I n T(?xas a

microbial profess will be tested on contaminated soils: and i n

Wisconsin, EPA’s mobile soils washer,

Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies ● 219

be determined by the quality and appropriateness of the solicitations. 52

The programs will be run on a cost sharing

basis with the selected technology firms. Each

firm is expected to provide the complete hardware (late pilot or full scale), pay for the operation of tests, and obtain the necessary permits.

EPA will help design the testing programs, provide quality assurance and quality control, and

offer an independent evaluation of the results.

Because of the potential high cost of this program to firms, only those firms with substantial financial resources will be able to participate. Accordingly, these demonstration programs are designed not to provide financial

assistance, but to give firms access to appropriate testing materials and to result in recognized testing results that will enable them t o

market their technology.

In comparison to the above-mentioned funding levels for demonstration projects and i n -

dicative of the real costs involved, EPA is planning to spend approximately $3 million ($2

million from the Superfund budget and $1 million from R&D) in 1985 to run test burns at the

Times Beach area in Missouri on its own mobile incinerators’ Technology firms have told

OTA that demonstration costs can range from

several hundred thousand to a million dollars

for one test burn.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense has been given

the authority to conduct all hazardous waste

cleanups on military bases, and the Installation

Restoration (IR) program has been set up to

parallel EPA’s Superfund program, Although

the program has been in existence for about

7 years, only in the last 2 years has it received

emphasis within DOD.

Under this program, the U.S. Air Force is taking the lead in R&D activity with a $12.1 million budget in fiscal year 1985 (an increase of

$10.8 million over 1984). Included are projects

52MarYStinsOn<EPA project officer, persona] ~ommuni~ation!

I)e(; . 13, 1984.

5344 EPA to Conduct Dioxin Test Burns in Llissouri, ” Hazardous Wastes Report, Jan, 7, 1985,
220 ● Superfund Strategy

to develop technologies to clean contaminated

groundwater. The U.S. Army will spend $2.7

million in fiscal year 1985 to develop treatment

technologies for contaminated soil/sediment,

water, and buildings; containment systems;

and methods to recover energy and materials

from hazardous waste. This program is projected into the 21st century.

National Science Foundation

NSF awarded a 5-year grant of $350,000 in

October 1984 to set up the Industry/University

Cooperative Research Center for Hazardous

and Toxic Waste at the New Jersey Institute

of Technology in Newark. In addition to NSF,

the Center is sponsored by private industry (a

dozen or so companies have paid an annual fee

of $30,000 each) and academic institutions. It

has also received a grant of $1.2 million from

the State of New Jersey.

The goal of the Center is to help bridge the

gap between governmental requirements and

the needs of industry. Its research goal is to advance the state of engineering management of

hazardous and toxic waste. According to its director, the Center has an annual budget of $2

million and has already solicited bids under

specific research topics.54 Included are a number of research projects relevant to Superfund

technologies, such as the incineration, biological/chemical, and physical treatment of hazardous wastes. Many of the projects are planned

to proceed to the pilot stage.

State Efforts

Efforts by individual States to assist in RD&D

for Superfund technology are hampered by a

lack of funding and a need to be able to prove

that any monies spent are directly applicable

to specific State problems. Their first priority

is cleanup itself, and often funding for this purpose alone is difficult to appropriate. However,

some States do offer support to RD&D and a

few examples are presented below.

As the result of a comprehensive study of

hazardous waste management in Illinois, in

1984 the State created a Hazardous Waste CensqJohn w. IJ1skoW, itz, personal communication, Dec. 12, 1984.

ter within the Illinois Department of Energy

and Resources. It will be supported by the State

hazardous waste tax and general revenue funds.

The Center, which is to take a broad view of

the hazardous waste problem from generation

to cleanup needs, will focus on technologybased applied research and technology transfer. 55 The State of Pennsylvania has a similar

program,

Missouri has turned part of its Times Beach

dioxin-contaminated area into a research facility, The objectives are: 1) to identify those

technologies that have potential to detoxify

dioxin-contaminated material; and 2) to compare different, successful technologies for their

ability to solve the State’s extensive problem

with dioxin-contaminated soils. Plots of contaminated soils are made available to firms to

test their techniques, and some of the infrastructure (e. g., water and power connections)

is provided. The cost for leasing a plot is a onetime fee of $16,500 and is meant to cover the

cost of the State’s sampling and analysis

program,

New York has underway a project to assist

in the development and demonstration of a

plasma arc technology for use at Love Canal

to treat organic sludges. The project is now

budgeted at $1.5 million and while EPA is contributing to the cost, the State’s share is over

50 percent.

Private Sector

As the previous “Innovative Technology”

section shows, a wealth of new technology

ideas is being generated by the private sector.

Two fundamental problems are faced by this

group, however, in moving these technologies

along the long path toward commercialization:

1) an initial difficulty in obtaining seed money

to continue the R&D process beyond the first

few tentative steps; and 2) overcoming the barriers to the adoption of these technologies, primarily through the ability to demonstrate their

worth, These, and other barriers have been discussed above and in a previous section of this

chapter,

J

55 amesPatterson,chairman,pritzker Department of Environmental Engineering, Illinois Institute of Technology, personal

communication, Dec. 18, 1984.
Chapter 7

Achieving Quality Cleanups

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Performance at Site Cleanups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nature of Surroundings and Contaminant Transpor

Multiple Studies, Multiple Contractors. . . . . . . . . . .

Containment Rather Than Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . .

Political Pressures . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . . . . . , . . .

ation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Studies Versus Timely Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Adequacy of Site Assessments ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ., . . . , . . . . . . . . . . .

Constraints on Superfund Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Effects of Early Responses on Long-Term Remedies . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . , . . , . . . . .

Design and Construction of Remedial Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

implications for Future Superfund Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., .

An Expanding Program’s Need for Technical Oversight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Effectiveness of Contractor Oversight, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .

A Larger Program . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . . .

EPA Staffing Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State Staffing Needs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Availability of Qualified Technical Personnel

An Overview of Findings , ..., . . . . . . . . . . .

Technical Specialists for Cleanup of Uncontrol

Estimating the Pool of Available Professionals

for Superfund Cleanups . . . . . . . .

ed Sites . . . . . . . .

Estimates of Future Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . . , , ..., ., , . . .

Analysis of Demand Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . . . , . . . , . . . . . . , . ,

Other Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., ,

Encouraging Technical Training for Hazardous Waste Cleanups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

223

223

224

225

226

227

227

228

229

231

232

233

234

234

235

240

242

243

243

245

249

249

251

252

252
List of Tables

Table No. Page

7-1. Four Examples of Inconsistencies in Reported Site Characteristics . . . . . . . . . 2 3 6

7-2. Status of Cleanup Progress, July 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

7-3, Summary of Remedial Cleanup Approved, 1981 to mid-1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

7-4. Superfund Obligations and Expenditures, 19 States, July 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

7-5. Current and Optimal Technical Staffing Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

7-6. Technical Specialties for Cleanup of Uncontrolled

Hazardous Waste Sites: Personnel Skills Survey—

Importance of Technical Skills for All Site Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

7-7. Technical Personnel Needs for Uncontrolled

Hazardous Waste Sites: Personnel Skills Survey—

Importance of Technical Skills by Cleanup Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

7-8. The Top Skills by Cleanup Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

7-9. Current and Projected Funding Levels

Allocated to Type of Cleanup Activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

7-Io. Current and Projected Funding Levels

for the Cleanup of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

7-11. Current and Projected Manpower Levels

Allocated to Type of Cleanup Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

7-12. Current and Projected Manpower Demand for 18 Critical Skills . . . . . . . . . . . 251

7-13. Preferences for Training . . . . . . ., , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

List of Figures

Figure No. Page

7-1. Desired Levels of Experience or Education for Technical Specialists . . . . . . . . 2 4 6

7-2. Classification of Importance of the Various Technical Specialties

for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Chapter 7

Achieving Quality Cleanups

INTRODUCTION

This chapter considers the challenge of as- to a successful Superfund program. Finally, besuring timely, environmentally sound, and cause competent, trained technical specialists

cost-effective remedial work at Superfund sites. from many fields are critical to a successful naThe chapter first identifies several major prob- tional cleanup program, OTA looks at current

lems affecting the quality of work at Superfund and projected needs for technical specialists.

sites. Second, it examines technical oversight Bottlenecks that might slow the program or reof cleanups. Good technical oversight is a key duce its effectiveness are discussed.

PERFORMANCE AT SITE CLEANUPS

Based on a broad examination of the Superfund program and on several engineering case

studies at NPL sites, OTA has evaluated the

performance at site cleanups. The analysis

found problems with designing and building

long-term, effective measures to control releases of hazardous substances, The three sites

studied were: Stringfellow Acid Pits, Glen

Avon, California; Seymour Recycling Corp.,

Seymour, Indiana; and the Sylvester Site, Nashua, New Hampshire, (See chapter 1 for summaries of the case studies. )

OTA looked at the history of remedial response, the extent and quality of the site assessments, and at the evaluation, selection, and

construction of remedial measures. 1 Thes e

studies show significant problems in the implementation of the Superfund program and

a pattern of incomplete and inadequate site assessments. Problems were identified in such

key

●

●

areas as:

estimates of the amounts of wastes and

contaminated materials on site;

estimates of the costs of remedial alternatives;

hydrogeological assessments;

design, installation and operation of

groundwater monitoring systems; and

design and construction of onsite containment systems.

Insufficient coordination among some States,

EPA regional offices, and EPA headquarters

may have contributed to problems with contractor performance.

Some problems may result from the newness

of the Superfund program, But there are indications that if the Superfund program expands,

they may grow acute as less qualified and less

experienced technical people are employed by

223
224 ● Superfund Strategy

the government and the private sector. Their

frequency suggests that they may be endemic

to the Superfund program as currently structured and managed. These problems are discussed below, not necessarily in order of importance. Cleanup progress at several Superfund sites is examined to identify areas where

the program might be improved.

Nature of Surroundings and

Contaminant Transportation

The interaction of wastes with soil, clay,

gravel, sand, and bedrock greatly influences

the effectiveness of a cleanup. If these interactions are misunderstood or ignored, the control measures selected may be ineffective.

Chemicals, particularly complex chemical

wastes, can change the properties of soils and

clay. For example, clay, which is considered

relatively impermeable at 10 7 cm/see, can increase in permeability by several orders of

magnitude in the presence of some contaminants. 2 Some chemicals can migrate faster than

~Waste 1 iqu ids and water carrying contaminants leached from

hazardous ~tastes {:an percolate through the soil and subsurfa(;e

and reach groundwater. Tji]ically, contaminants pass through

the unsaturate subsurface, the ‘‘zone of aeration or k’ados[!

zone, and then to the saturated zone where ~roids betw’een ro(:k

or soil particles are filled with grourrdwater; this zone that (;a n

store and transmit significant quantities of groundwater is called

an aquifer. once contaminated, and depending on site condit ions, restoration of groundwater to its prek’ious condition (;an

be difficult, if not impossible. Many factors influence g,roun(iwat(!r flow and the beha~’ior of contaminants i n grou ndw. a ter.

~)orositjr”arl(]~)(;r~n[;abi]ity(,ontro] the ability of a material to stor~:

and transmit liquids, Porosity, expressed as a percent of the bulk

volume of the material, is a measure of ~’oid space and how much

fluid can be stored in it. See generally David W. Miller, cd., bt’asle

Disposal k; ff(x:ts on Grounch$rater: A Com[]l’{:llerlsi\’t? .surbe~ of

the Oc~:urrt:ll(:e and Control of Ground\ +’ater Contamination Resulting J’rom Lt’aste Zlispo,sal Practices (Berkeley, (1A: Premier

Press, 1980), pp. 45-59. This publication is a reproduction of a

1977 publication, The Report to Congress, tVaste Disposal Practices and Their Iiffects on Groundwater, LJ .S. En~ironmental

Protection Agencj’, office of Water Supply and Office of Solid

Waste Management. See also U.S. (l]n~rrws, Office of Technology Assessment, Protecting the Nation Ground\\ Fater k’rom

c’or~ta~]]i]]atior?,” OTA-O-233 [Washington, DC: [J. S. (hrernment

Printing Office, ()(:tober 1984) for a more detailed discussion

of the nature of ground water contamination and methods for

detecting and correcting contamination in the grourrdwater. in

particular, see Volume I, p, 116, for a description of problems

and information usf!d i n assessing (:ontaminat ion and h}drogcologic conditions. Sf;e \’olunlc I 1, p. :1{)6, aIII), [) for k e y

dcfin it ions.

water alone through porous materials such as

soil and clay.

When chemical wastes are placed into the

ground they can migrate and eventually find

their way into groundwater. No natural containment is impermeable to chemical transport.

Bedrock, often wrongly assumed to be impermeable, may, for example, itself be an aquifer

or contain fractures that can act as conduits

for chemical transport. Chemicals can also attack and change the porosity and other properties of engineered containment structures

such as slurry walls. Eventually, these structures become permeable to the chemical wastes

they were designed to contain.

Once chemicals reach the groundwater, a

contaminant plume forms. Even if the waste

source is removed, a threat remains in the moving plume of contamination which may be 50

or 100 feet below the surface, The transport of

chemicals in an aquifer by the contaminant

plume is often incorrectly assumed to be similar to the flow of groundwater. The movement

of the contaminant plume may in fact be very

different from the general groundwater flow,

Contaminants in a plume may change the properties of the medium, often adsorb and desorb

from the surrounding medium and can interact

chemically with each other. Thus, the rates of

contaminant transport are complex and differ

from that of water in the same medium. For

these reasons, the common practice of using

groundwater flow maps to describe plume migration can produce misleading results,

Some contaminant flow models exist, but

they are not necessarily reliable in predicting

the migration of contaminant groundwater

plumes under complex hydrogeological conditions, The current practice of relying on homogeneous models, such as Darcy’s Law, for predictions in nonhomogeneous, stratified subsurface conditions yields, at best, crude estimates of contaminant movement, Subsurface

geology is often nonhomogeneous and contaminant plume behavior may be complex. For example, despite a predominant flow direction

for groundwater, a contaminant plume may

have multiple paths and directions,
Multiple Studies, Multiple Contractors

OTA’s case studies and other analyses of remedial activities at Superfund sites show that

frequently a single site will undergo multiple

studies and have multiple contractors. Multiple studies at the same site create the potential for delay or inaction without guaranteeing

thorough site assessment or effective cleanup

plans, Often, these studies produce conflicting

or inconsistent results and are of uneven quality. Studies of site conditions may be repeated

needlessly; for example, earlier adequate site

studies prepared for State or local agencies are

sometimes ignored during the Superfund Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study

(RI/FS), In other cases, the scope and direction

of later studies and remedial actions have been

set by inaccurate or misleading initial studies.

Sometimes poor coordination in the same

study can be a problem. OTA’s case studies

found examples of different sections of the

same report using different data and assumptions. Contractors who may not have done

quality work in an early phase maybe rehired

at a later stage of the study or during the implementation phase.

Some multiple studies at Superfund sites are

inevitable because of the highly specialized

skills required for cleanups and the sometimes

rapidly changing or uncertain site conditions.

Because multiple site studies continue to be

done, it is especially important that site supervisors: 1) are technically competent and experienced, and Z) maintain adequate oversight of

site contractors.

How do problems with multiple or repetitive

studies arise? After a site begins to have problems or is known to have contaminated groundwater, local officials, perhaps under pressure

from local citizens, may commission a study

to examine the problem and recommend remedial action. Because ground or surface waters

are at risk, the local water district or the health

department may become involved and commission studies, in addition to investigations by

the State hazardous waste agency. Water districts may have local civil-sanitary engineering consultants who have worked many years

Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups ● 225

for the district. Consequently, in many cases

they are awarded the initial study contract.

However, even skilled sanitary engineers and

hydrologists may not be familiar with the

movement or treatment of hazardous wastes.

This lack of experience can result in a flawed

study despite hard work and good intentions.

Common problems include: the effect of chemicals on soil properties usually is not considered; the fact that a contaminant plume can

have multiple paths is not reflected in a pumping program if it is predicated solely on the

direction of groundwater flow; natural basins

and aquifers that are nonhomogeneous and

stratified are modeled as constant property

homogeneous bodies; the suggested remedies

are not appropriate for the variable nature of

the buried wastes; groundwater contaminant

treatment plants are designed for a steady, predictable influx, which is unlikely; the option

of treating the wastes is usually not considered.

Other site-specific examples can be found in

the case studies.

Early studies may underestimate the magnitude of the problems, yet they often set the tone

and direction for future study and action. Opportunities for effective, timely responses to

detect or control the spread of contamination

may be lost. For example, programs to monitor surface waters, basins, and aquifers will not

be implemented if the problem is thought to

be localized.

When a site becomes a Superfund site, EPA

and its consultants become involved. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) requires that an

RI/FS be completed before remedial action begins, and thus, another study starts. In many

cases, the RI/FS follows reviews, updates, and

critical evaluations by the EPA’s zone consultant, so that the RI/FS may represent the third

or fourth study of the same site by EPA contractors. The RI/FS contractor maybe more experienced in hazardous waste management

than the earlier contractors, but if inexperienced staff are assigned to the work, the final

outcome may not be improved.

Two general problems have been encountered with multiple studies: 1) Mistakes or

omissions in early site studies are not detected
226 • Superfund Strategy

through timely and critical review and propagate through the RI/FS process, contributing

to the adoption of ineffective remedies; and 2)

good quality early work is ignored in a lockstep “start from scratch” RI/FS approach as

studies are needlessly repeated, delaying remedial action. At first glance, the two results may

appear contradictory, but they really are different possible consequences of the inherent

risks in multiple studies. Minimizing these

risks is an important goal for effective oversight

of Superfund contractors.

Information and study results obtained by a

consultant at a particular site generally are not

shared with contractors working at other sites.

Consequently, the study phase of the Superfund program suffers from the “reinventing the

wheel” syndrome. This is especially true for

Feasibility Studies where the same alternative

technologies are described and discussed generically for different sites. Even though information is obtained with public funds, consultants tend to take a proprietary view of their

work. As an example, the approach to treating

contaminated groundwater varies with consultants and may not incorporate field experience gained at other Superfund sites.

Containment Rather Than Treatment

EPA shows a consistent bias toward containing wastes on the site rather than rendering

them harmless through treatments such as detoxification, conversion, or destruction. Containment is popular because it is often seen as

a cost-effective remedy, For a variety of reasons, confining mixtures of complex chemicals

in the ground can, at best, only be temporary.

Some of these reasons have already been mentioned. Engineered containment such as grout

curtains and slurry cutoff walls can be affected

by the chemicals they are designed to contain.

A containment material that is highly impermeable to water can become several orders of

magnitude more permeable when altered by

leachate from chemical wastes. Furthermore,

such structures can be difficult to key or seal

to bedrock, which may itself be fractured

and/or only slightly less permeable than the

containment material. Containment structures

can only temporarily reduce the inflow of water into the wastes or retard the migration of

contaminants from the site.

Because containment provide only temporary and partial control of the spread of contamination, they are sometimes used in combination with groundwater pumping and

treatment, At the Sylvester site, a slurry wall

and cap with pumping, treatment, and recirculation of contaminated groundwater through

the site have been designed to reduce releases

of hazardous substances to acceptable levels

within a few years. The slurry wall and cap

have not reduced water flow from the site as

much as projected, An interim pumping program has been started to contain the plume.

The water treatment system is not ye t

complete.

The experience at Sylvester thus far has been

limited, and it is not yet possible to evaluate

the effectiveness of the remedial containment/

treatment strategy there. Waste sites often contain tons of hazardous substances. Removing

these contaminants through a water treatment

system could take decades. There is also no

guarantee that pumping and treating a particular plume are effective in stopping or controlling all of the material leaving the site. These

types of remedial actions may not be found in

the longer term to be permanent cleanups, except under certain conditions, such as where

wastes have been limited to relatively small

amounts dissolved in groundwater.

EPA’s preference for containment strategies

rather than treatment has limited the consideration of other, more reliable alternatives. At

many sites, waste treatment is only considered,

if at all, as part of an excavation and removal

for redisposal alternative. Although removing

the wastes eliminates the source of the problem at one place, it almost always means that

the problem has been shifted to another 1ocation. Onsite treatment plants for contaminated

soil and wastes are rarely considered in detail

in an RI/FS even though the proposals and contracted scope of work for these studies call for

evaluation of all options. In some cases, tech-
Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups ● 227

nologies exist to detoxify and treat the wastes

and materials that are contaminating the groundwater, but they are given little attention in the

RI/FS. In other cases, innovative solutions

would be required.

There is an important lesson to be learned

from the experiences of the Superfund program. In designing and evaluating alternative

strategies for cleanup, the cost of failure or impermanence is rarely included (see chapter 3).

The selected remedy is often presumed to be

totally effective. If, however, the cost of further

actions to repair failure is calculated, then an

option which is initially more expensive, but

more reliable, may prove to be the most costeffective solution in the long term.

Political Pressures

Political influences rather than technical considerations can control the speed and nature

of studies and cleanups at Superfund sites. In

many cases, publicity and persistent citizen

complaints eventually can force public officials

and agencies to take action. Sites located in

areas where the residents are politically sophisticated and organized are sometimes given priority over other sites that may pose greater or

more immediate threats to health or the environment. Political considerations have at times

influenced the timing of resource allocations

for cleanups.3

In addition to being sensitive to public pressure, officials are sensitive to the types of remedial actions that EPA prefers and is likely

to fund. This has a direct bearing on the scope

and results of contractor studies. The case studies document several examples of the correlation between the views of the funding agencies

and the recommendations of the consultant.

Approaches that differ from familiar containment and pumping alternative are given little

attention in the RI/FS.

Citizens, individually or in groups, often rely

on common sense rather than on technical ex3See also Hearings on Ef)A. In ~“estigation of Superfund and

Agenc~ Abuses Before the Subcommittee on O\ersighf and [n-

~restigations of the House Committee on Ener,g~’ and Commer(;e,

98th Cong., 1st ses~., 1983 (3 If)].).

pertise, yet they can sometimes provide an effective check and balance for the action being

considered or implemented at a site. At several sites, citizen suggestions modified the

preferred remedial approach (see chapter 8),

However, opportunities for effective public involvement in and scrutiny of site assessments

and evaluation of remedial alternatives are

limited.

Studies Versus Timely Actions

Successful remedial action must be based on

an accurate assessment of site conditions, risks

to health and the environment, and the technical feasibility and cost effectiveness of alternative remedies. OTA’s review disclosed a

number of problems with the adequacy, completeness, cost effectiveness, and timeliness of

site assessments.

Many of the sites on the NPL have been

known for some time and have or are undergoing a series of Federal and State responses. At

all three OTA case study sites, remedial investigations and emergency actions were initiated

before passage of Superfund legislation. OTA

has found that studies of site conditions often

were repeated by different State and Federal

agencies. In one instance, and perhaps in

others, studies were repeated to meet requirements of various emergency and remedial response programs,

EPA has defended its current ad hoc approach by emphasizing that every site is

unique. Many sites, however, share common

characteristics and, with the experience the

Superfund program has gained, it should become possible at many sites to limit extensive

site assessments for initial responses and for

high-priority remedial measures, Time and

money could be saved. For example, 2- to 3-

year site assessments may cost many hundreds

of thousands of dollars, but result in the selection of a partial remedy costing only $1 million to $3 million or less. Experience to date

suggests that there has been overdesign and

overemphasis on extensive, high-cost, timeconsuming site investigations and feasibility

studies for impermanent partial remedies such
228 ● Superfund Strategy

as temporary containment, removals, and al- the monitoring wells were improperly internate water supplies, stalled. Difficulties with inadequate design, inAt Stringfellow, remedial action was delayed stallation, and operation of groundwater monwhile several successive groundwater contam- itoring systems are not uncommon at Superfund sites and at interim status RCRA facilities ination studies and site assessments were performed by local, State, and Federal contractors. (see chapter 5).

Contamination grew and site conditions At Sylvester, initial estimates of the degree

changed. Over $15 million has been spent at to which bedrock was fractured now appear

the site so far. A permanent remedy is still to have been low, and the amount of waste deunder study and its cost could be very high, posited at the New Hampshire site might have

with the State now estimating $65 million. been significantly underestimated.

At Seymour, about $4 million has been spent

so far in studies and emergency response to

achieve a $7 million incomplete, limited surface cleanup by private parties. When further

site assessment is completed, some of the “toxic hot spots” that were buried in the partial

cleanup area may have to be reexcavated to remove a continuing source of groundwater contamination.

Adequacy of Site Assessments

OTA found a number of technical problems

with contractor studies for the three Superfund

sites. Poor quality work on groundwater conditions and site hydrology has been the most

serious recurrent problem. This underscores

the critical need for competent, trained technical specialists in hydrology and related fields

to work on Superfund sites that have extensive

or complex aquifer contamination.

The initial site investigation of the Seymour

Recycling facility had several shortcomings,

The extent of offsite contamination from incinerator operations was not investigated. Possible pathways of escape for contaminants offsite through surface runoff, groundwater, and

city sewer lines were not adequately investigated, so that the suggested onsite containment

and control options may not effectively prevent

the spread of contaminants. There were allegations that preliminary groundwater monitoring wells were not installed properly. Some

samples taken from these wells were reportedly

not usable by EPA’s contractors. One generator-funded contractor study attributed groundwater contamination to improper well installation. OTA was unable to determine whether

The Stringfellow case study found a long history of problems with contractor work on site

geology and hydrology, The complexity of the

site geology was consistently underestimated

with adverse consequences for the effectiveness of the control measures recommended.

Until the late 1970s, it was generally assumed

that the site lay on impermeable bedrock. Then

it was discovered that the granitic and metamorphic bedrocks were highly fractured and

jointed and hosted several underground

springs that flowed into the site, In 1982 the

permeability of the site and down-gradient

areas was found to be much greater than originally thought. Earlier indications of the presence of an extensive, rapidly moving plume of

contamination had been discounted and

wrongly attributed to surface runoff. In 1980,

interceptor wells were drilled to control the

plume of contaminants. However, the wells

were not pumped continuously as required and

the plume moved beyond the zone of influence

of the wells. Incorrect conclusions about site

geology caused two interceptor wells to be misplaced, The wells were set west of the buried

drainage channel in the alluvium underlying

the canyon and drilling was abandoned when

bedrock was not encountered at the projected

100-foot” depth,

Another Stringfellow contractor was unable

to analyze depth-specific samples of the plume

to determine its extent because its laboratory

could not perform the appropriate analysis of

total organics. As a result, information showing the three-dimensional extent of the plume

and the areas with the highest concentration

of contaminants is not available. The expense

incurred in designing and executing an elab-
.

orate drilling procedure to obtain the data was

wasted. This waste might have been avoided

if EPA had verified the contractor’s laboratory

qualifications before awarding the contract and

if EPA had required collection of two samples

and the use of a backup laboratory.

Optimistic Assumptions

In all three case studies that OTA examined,

a tendency towards optimistic assumptions

about site conditions and remedial technologies was evident. At Stringfellow, for example, optimism about containment has prevailed

despite mounting evidence that the site is fundamentally unsuited for this strategy. At Seymour, removal of a limited amount of soil was

deemed adequate, without testing for residual

contamination. (Contaminated surface water

runoff indicates that significant amounts of

contamination remain in the soil at the site. )

At Sylvester, the figure adopted for the amount

of waste deposited at the site might be a significant underestimate. Finally, the pervasive

preference for containment as a key festure of

remedial cleanups at Superfund sites is based

on an optimistic assumption of doubtful validity about the long-term effectiveness of this

technology.

Constraints on Superfund Contractors

Several Superfund contractors have expressed

concern over the direction of the program and

the structure of the remedial response under

the NCP. These engineering firms complain of

the lack of clear goals for cleanup design (see

chapter 4). Lack of explicit cleanup standards

or guidance from EPA makes it difficult for engineering firms to perform their assignments,

such as comparing the relative cost effectiveness of remedial alternatives. According to one

major Superfund contractor:

[Engineering practice needs the law to require the use of engineering criteria and

standards on which to base the extent and cost

effectiveness of a remedial action.4

4(; a r}” IIunba r, ( ;a mp Dresser & Nk Kec, statement i n Hearin&~$

on the Implementation of the Superfud Program I?eforc the ,5uh-

(;ommittee on Commerce, Transportation and 7’ourisn] of th(~

H[)usf; Committee on L’nerg~’ and (~on]n]f?r(;c, 98tb (;tIng., 1st

and 2d S(; SS., 1984. ( H erea ft w referrml t () as Hearings [)n Su ~)(;I’-

fund lm~}l[;r~l[]ntation,)

Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups ● 229

A representative of CH2M Hill, one of EPA’s

major Superfund contractors, testified that the

lack of cleanup standards makes evaluating the

suitability of alternative treatment and destruction technologies difficult:

There are a wide variety of existing and

promising technologies that might be employed to destroy hazardous contaminants

. . . There are few design and performance criteria against which the technologies might be

tested. In other words, we do not have any

reliable performance standards or risk assessment methodologies that we can use to determine whether or not a particular technology

performs well enough to be applied to a specific site [emphasis in the original]. It is very

difficult to determine whether a particular

technology will clean up a site if we have not

defined what “clean” means. s

The cost-balancing test for remedial actions

also poses difficulties for engineering contractors:

The practice of “balancing” site-specific

engineering issues, such as cleanup criteria,

with external factors, such as availability of

money and the remedial needs of other sites,

hinders effective engineering efforts. We have

found that this balancing requirement poses

several problems for engineering firms trying

to develop and implement an adequate cleanup plan. First, it is difficult to judge the costeffectiveness of different plans without sitespecific standards. Second, it is difficult to determine what a site can be used for after it is

“cleaned up” if such standards do not exist.

Third, the absence of standards can often delay a response action. Fourth, a remedial action lacking specific standards is not generally trusted by the public.6

Some consultants have noted that institutional tensions in the program favor the selection

of impermanent remedial alternatives. A representative of the Hazardous Waste Treatment

Council made the following observations about

problems in the use of the cost-balancing test

in the implementation of Superfund:

The situation can best be described as one

which results in the overdesign and evalua-

—

‘William A, Lf’allacc, st atcment during }ff’firings on ,$u~~f:rll)n[i

Illlj]len]f:l]ta tioll.

~I)u nba r, Hearings (~n S’uperfund lmplemen t:iti(~n, 01). (: i t.
230 ● Superfund Strategy

tion of short-term cleanups; cleanups which

will likely require additional future remedial

action. 7

The current process for assessing remedial

alternatives seems to be producing a “least

cost” preference for containment approaches

using slurry walls and caps—despite the fact

that containment is not a permanent solution.

Nor are these techniques appropriate for some

hydrogeological conditions, According to congressional testimony, construction of a slurry

containment wall at $3 million was selected as

the remedial alternative at one unnamed NPL

site in New England. Further site analysis has

determined that a more cost-effective approach

would be to install an onsite system to treat,

rather than contain, the wastes at an additional

cost of $4 million, The treatment option would

have initially cost $1 million more than containment, “but in the end would have saved approximately $3 million. ” 8

Another adverse impact of the balancing test,

in some opinions, is the trend toward employing remedial options with high operation and

maintenance (O&M) costs, e.g., dyking and

counterpumping for long periods of time. These

options may have low initial construction

costs, but have high, and perhaps indeterminable, O&M costs. These are paid by the States

rather than the Federal Superfund. In most

cases these strategies are not a truly permanent

remedy to the threat posed:

The “balancing test” issue is fundamental

in both nature and choice: the fund can either

be used to temporarily contain many sites at

a lower short-term cost or be used to permanently remove site hazards from posing future

threats to health and the environment at a

higher short-term cost. It is a most difficult

issue, but perhaps the most critical one on

which Congress must act. 9

The artificial segmentation of projects into

emergency actions, removal actions, and remedial actions, or into surface and subsurface remedial actions, also poses difficulties. A con-

‘Hearings on Superfund Implementation.

Blbid,

‘Richard Fort una, test imon~f during Hearings on 5’uperfund

Implementation.

tractor is asked to look only at part of the

problem and can expect to be responsible for

that segment only. This limited focus may preclude consideration or design of more comprehensive and effective cleanups. Not taking a

comprehensive environmental systems approach

to releases has also limited the effectiveness of

engineering consultants in designing a remedial alternative appropriate for site conditions.

It is very unlikely that a single engineering contractor will work on a site from initial response

through completion of remedial construction.

This switching of firms for successive phases

of one project and without clear cause differs

remarkably from what generally occurs in other

large engineering projects.

OTA found that contractor assessments of

remedial alternatives were very limited in

scope. Certain remedial alternatives were excluded from detailed feasibility analysis for

cost or policy reasons. This may contribute to

the ineffectiveness of some remedial actions.

In all three case studies (Stringfellow, Seymour,

and Sylvester) the cost effectiveness, long-term

reliability, and risk equity of removing wastes

from the site and redisposal elsewhere was given little or no analysis in EPA or contractors’

documents.

OTA’s Seymour case study concluded that

government contractors at the site generally

performed satisfactorily within the scope of

what they were asked to do. However, the report found that limitations on the amount of

money available and restrictions on its use (i.e.,

no offsite material disposal) may have hampered their effectiveness,

At the Stringfellow site, pressures from EPA

regional and headquarters officials may have

precluded serious consideration of site excavation and removal of the wastes, contaminated

soil, and groundwater followed by onsite or offsite waste treatment and/or destruction, Yet,

in this case, extremely complex and unfavorable hydrogeological conditions would make

any successful containment option difficult if

not impossible; removal of the materials from

the site might be the only effective option.
h. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups ● 231

The Stringfellow fast-track feasibility study

completed in 1984 was the basis for selecting

an interim remedial action to pretreat contaminated groundwater onsite. The contractor

warned of possible problems with this option.

Because of the lack of water sample testing,

there exist “extremely significant” uncertainties in the quantity of water to be treated, its

characteristics, and response to treatment.

These uncertainties may cause major revisions

to cost estimates and projections of the treatment’s effectiveness. The contractor is now

proceeding on bench-scale treatability studies

that will shed some light on these uncertainties, but EPA appears to have no plans for a

pilot facility on the site. Reliance on benchscale work to adequately resolve uncertainties

may be overly optimistic. This interim action

appears to be an attempt to respond to public

pressure rather than being a thorough engineering solution.

The full site investigation and feasibility

study for Stringfellow is now underway and

is scheduled to be completed in mid-1985. A

review of the contractor’s proposal, approved

by EPA, indicates that the scope of remedial

alternatives to be considered focuses on containment strategies and excludes several important permanent remedies. The feasibility of

removal may not be examined and, hence, not

considered as a permanent remedy. The option

of building an onsite treatment facility for contaminated materials may also not be considered.

EPA’s current preference in the Stringfellow

RI/FS would leave the contaminated soil and

water at the site and control the inflow of

groundwater upgradient by hydrofracturing

the bedrock, which is an untested and unproven technique for this application. It would also

use conventional containment systems. An onsite, permanent water treatment facility would

be built to control the hazardous constituents

leached from the site into groundwater.

OTA’s study found that the proposed RI/FS

did not attack the source of the problem: the

buried wastes and contaminated soil. Remov -

ing the source of contamination is not taken

seriously in the proposal. Emphasis is on dealing with the effect rather than the cause of the

problems, with consideration given only to

containment methods similar to those that have

been unsuccessful before at this site of complex geology,

EPA has issued guidance documents to its

contractors to help them prepare site assessments that will be used to select remedial alternatives. The use of guidance manuals suggests

the beginning of some degree of uniformity and

consistency in work being done by EPA contractors. The manuals call for extensive policyrelated technical judgments by the technical

personnel on matters such as the seriousness

of site contamination and the relative effectiveness of alternatives. But the technical judgment

of contractors is limited in other areas such as

the suitability and reliability of particular remedial technologies. The guidance documents

do not yet include information to accommodate changes in setting a cleanup standard for

remedial alternatives under the proposed NCP

revisions. It is thus possible that a significant

number of sites moving through the RI/FS and

remedial design phases will not be consistent

with the new policy. It is not known whether

these site assessments will be required to be

redone, or if remedial actions will proceed, perhaps with inconsistent and less stringent standards of protection.

Effects of Early Responses on

Long-Term Remedies

OTA has found that most emergency responses

have worked well where materials were removed from the site because of immediate

threats. When immediate removal actions consist only of waste containment, which they often do, the site may get worse over time and

require repeated removal actions. Actual removals, however, pose questions about the

long-term adequacy of redisposal sites and the

transfer of risks, The Superfund program management has put little emphasis on inter-site

problems.
232 ● Superfund Strategy

Onsite emergency responses to contain wastes

temporarily and control contamination have

not advanced permanent cleanups and in some

cases have exacerbated conditions at the site.

Often, “cleanup” is used to describe a limited

action.

At Stringfellow and Seymour, initial actions

have not been effective because contractors

misinterpreted site conditions and applied inadequate control measures. Lack of quality

supervision in building and designing these

controls may also have contributed to their failure, Total cleanup involving removal of wastes,

site decontamination, and groundwater treatment was advocated at an early stage, However, because of the cost involved, this prompt

remedial action was rejected in favor of partial removal, temporary containment, and further study. Delays let the plume of contaminants spread substantially increasing the

amount of contaminated soil and groundwater

to be dealt with in later remedial actions at

greater expense.

In 1982, construction was completed on interim abatement measures for the Stringfellow

site that were originally proposed in 1977 and

approved in 1979. Some contaminated waste

liquids and contaminated soils were removed.

The site was excavated, bedrock fractures were

grouted, kiln dust was mixed with the waste

and soil to neutralize it, and the site was covered with a clay cap and regraded. A series of

monitoring and interceptor wells were installed to deal with groundwater contamination. Contaminated groundwater is continuing

to be pumped from the wells and shipped offsite to RCRA hazardous waste facilities for disposal. The emergency and interim cleanup

actions taken to date at Stringfellow have alleviated immediate threats of floods and sudden

catastrophic failure of the site impoundment,

but they have been largely ineffective in protecting the water supply of the nearby community of Glen Avon from surface and subsurface

contamination. Some of the interim control

strategy measures exacerbated soil and groundwater contamination.

At the Seymour site the initial response in

1981-82 included: 1) security fencing, spill

cleanup and removal, restaging about 45,000

drums, constructing a berm around the drum

storage area to retard surface contamination

(all typical immediate removal actions); and 2)

building a rudimentary surface water pretreatment system consisting of an interception pond

and two large concrete pipes filled with activated carbon to treat contaminated surface water runoff before it entered the municipal sanitary sewer system. Some actions prior to the

actual surface cleanup were relatively ineffective and may have hindered the cleanup, since

the structural integrity of the drums was reduced. At least one contractor study of one site

found that the bermed area was a source of soil

and water contamination. The impact of the

initial response actions on the cost of the surface cleanup, however, was slight.

Design and Construction of

Remedial Measures

The effectiveness of a cleanup depends on

the remedial alternative selected. An ineffective remedy properly designed and built is still

ineffective. However, effectiveness also depends on the quality of design and construction of the chosen alternative.

OTA’s Stringfellow case study found several

inadequacies in the design and construction of

site control measures. Problems in construction of the Stringfellow interim abatement program were not corrected by State and Federal

supervisors overseeing construction, For instance, during work at the site, underground

springs were observed. The fact that these

springs would cause leaching of materials left

in the ground does not appear to have caused

the site cleanup approach to be reevaluated.

Kiln dust was mixed with soil to reduce the

acidity of the waste, but its effectiveness could

not be determined because no background testing was done on the soil before the addition

of the kiln dust. The kiln dust may therefore

only have added to the bulk of contaminated
material onsite. The clay cap does not appear

to have been installed as designed and consequently may be of limited value. Because the

construction contractor used local materials instead of imported clay, it is not certain that the

site does in fact have a clay cap. Surface water

intrusion into the ground was exacerbated because the cover was built concave instead of

convex because there was not enough material

available to create the proper shape. Instead,

drainage ditches were installed near the bottom of the cover. The site was not promptly

seeded and rain has eroded the cover.

The Sylvester slurry wall and cap completed

in 1982 have not contained the flow of water

to the degree predicted. A hydrogeological

study is underway to evaluate this problem.

Building a slurry wall around the 20-acre site

to a relatively unprecedented depth of 100 feet

to retard the spread of contamination in unconsolidated glacial material over fractured

bedrock was a bold engineering initiative. Because of the unprecedented construction involved, care was exercised in onsite supervision of slurry wall installation, but nonetheless

the containment is less effective than predicted. State officials believe that most of the

leakage is attributable to highly fractured bedrock. Another cause for leakage may have been

construction problems in the installation of the

wall, In addition, laboratory studies gave early

indications that contaminants in the groundwater could degrade the slurry wall material,

increasing its permeability, Based on hydrogeological modeling, State officials reject the possibility of leakage through the wall. The effectiveness of the slurry wall over time is highly

dependent on the quality of initial construction

and the length of time during which the wall

must maintain its integrity. No containment

system has been proven effective for long periods of time,

At Sylvester, the cap design and construction

may be inadequate for the long-term maintenance of a surface seal over the site. Specifications for cap design, such as topsoil thickness,

and drainage layer permeability, appear to be

less stringent than that recommended for RCRA

land disposal facilities.

Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups ● 233

Implications for Future Superfund Strategy

As seen in the case studies, the cleanup of

uncontrolled hazardous waste sites poses many

new technical and institutional challenges. The

economic and environmental costs of inadequate assessment of site conditions, of delays,

and of impermanent remedies can be substantial. Public expectations of progress in site

cleanup have been high, but the rate and success of cleanups have been disappointing. Public confidence in a renewed and expanded

cleanup program can be improved if lessons

are learned from past experiences and incorporated into a long-term strategy for permanent

cleanups that effectively protect public health

and the environment.

Difficulties can be expected in the implementation of the Superfund remedial action program and in the assessment, design, and construction of remedial measures. There are

many reasons why such difficulties will occur.

Some circumstances are inherent in the program and cannot be avoided, but they can be

anticipated and dealt with through effective

contingency plans.

There are significant uncertainties and gaps

in knowledge about site conditions, nature of

hazards, environmental fate, interaction of substances, and hydrologic characteristics and behavior at sites. As more experience is gained

and more research is done, some of these uncertainties will be reduced. But to a large degree, cleanup decisions, early or late, will

always be based on incomplete information.

Complex situations at Superfund sites require specialized and sometimes novel or experimental approaches to achieve permanent

cleanups. Because of this, the possibility or

probability of failure must be given greater consideration in the design and selection of cleanup approaches. The concept of an “Impermanence Factor” used in chapter 3 could be

further developed by EPA. Means to measure

the performance and efficacy of remedial actions and assess the availability and feasibility of later corrective actions should be given

greater attention. Where appropriate, cleanup
234 . Superfund Strategy

goals and specifications might provide for an

adequate margin of safety because of the risk

of failure.

No proven technological solutions exist for

many of the conditions present at uncontrolled

hazardous waste sites. Despite this, construction projects at remedial sites have been treated

as routine public works projects rather than as

experimental or demonstration efforts. Technologies that may be proven for some applications are not necessarily proven for dealing

with uncontrolled site problems.

For example, some containment strategies

being applied to uncontrolled sites, such as

slurry walls, were not originally designed to

control mobile, highly reactive hazardous substances in soil and groundwater. The long-term

effectiveness of these containment under

Superfund conditions remains to be demonstrated. Methods must be established to monitor the performance effectiveness of such control measures. Moreover, reliance on groundwater monitoring alone also poses some problems, and so far, the success and effectiveness

of this strategy has been poor at RCRA facilities.

How can problems be avoided when there

are no specific criteria against which to measure the cost or technical effectiveness of alternatives? The determination of relative effectiveness (more a cost-benefit analysis) is left to the

subjective judgment of individual contractors

preparing background studies. Nor has any

mechanism been established to let us learn

from mistakes, so they are not repeated, A n

overemphasis on the uniqueness of each uncontrolled site has resulted in very little collection of information for the national program. Information and technology transfer

among contractors, EPA, and States appear

minimal. Yet the guidance documents encourage an approach of selecting the alternatives

to be analyzed from a list of approved technologies (for the most part containment and land

disposal). The suitability of site conditions for

alternative technologies is inadequately considered, This is, of course contradictory to the

“each site is unique” perspective, but might be

the result of attempts to speed program progress and compensate for inexperienced personnel.

The Superfund program as currently structured and administrated seems poorly prepared

to assume greater responsibility as the number

of NPL sites increases and as many sites progress from site assessment to remedial design

and construction. The whole cleanup program

seems to assume that sites move smoothly

through the process from site investigation to

remedial design and construction and that

there is little possibility of failure or mistakes,

The history of site remedial actions contradicts

this assumption. Design and construction of remedial actions are not predictable, routine engineering or construction projects and should

not be managed that way. Some aspects of remedial action will always pose great uncertainties, but experience shows that these can be anticipated, The challenge is to build a Superfund

program that can accommodate both the controllable and the uncontrollable.

AN EXPANDING PROGRAM’S NEED FOR TECHNICAL OVERSIGHT

Effectiveness of Contractor Oversight and continuity, Contractors must be given a

technically adequate scope of work, performThe quality of work at Superfund sites de- ance must be monitored to assure compliance

pends largely on effective management of con- and to allow modification of scope or effort if

tractors. For cleanups performed by responsi- conditions change, and there must be some

ble parties, technical oversight by EPA is also continuity of oversight for long-term contracts

needed. Three aspects of cleanup supervision and multiple contractors at a site. Technical

are important: technical direction, oversight, supervisors must have an appreciation of the
complex and often unprecedented work they

are overseeing. OTA’s Stringfellow case study

found that the State and Federal people involved with the day-to-day operations were

mostly young engineers with relatively little experience in hazardous waste management.

Without technically competent and experienced site supervisors, contractors are relied

on to assure the quality of their own work. Outside review can also be used, but, as discussed

in chapter 8, opportunities for effective technical review of site studies and selected remedies by the public and by potentially responsible parties are limited. The short amount of

time available for review and comment and the

lack of independent technical assistance for

community groups limit the utility of outside

review as a quality control measure for Superfund contractor performance.

Assuring continuity in oversight of remedial

work appears to be an emerging problem, and

there is a very high turnover in agency staff

responsible for onsite coordination of contractor activities. OTA has been told by several

EPA on scene coordinators (OSC) that they do

not expect to be at the site when the evaluation is complete because they expect a reassignment or promotion to a more responsible position in Government or an outside job offer,

High turnover rates increase the possibility that

work will be repeated needlessly because of the

lack of institutional memory. Management of

an expanding Superfund cleanup program

should therefore anticipate high employee turnover and adopt measures to minimize its

impact.

OTA found that multiple contractor studies

at a single site frequently yielded conflicting

conclusions. Examples from OTA’s case studies are summarized in table 7-1. The record

does not indicate specifically how government

technical site supervisors responded to these

inconsistencies or even if they were aware of

them. However, at Stringfellow, failure of government or contract personnel to recognize the

implications of conflicting conclusions and

assumptions in a timely manner may have contributed to the selection or construction of inCh. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups ● 235

—

effective remedial measures at considerable

cost.

To be effective, the remedial response process (particularly at the design and construction

stages) must have the capability to be more flexible and responsive to new information or better interpretations about actual site conditions,

even if these contradict earlier assumptions.

This requires vigilance on the part of the site

contractors and the government cleanup supervisors,

A Larger Program

The number of remedial actions under the

Superfund program will increase substantially.

New sites are being added to the NPL and more

and more sites already on the NPL are moving from the initial study phase toward remedial design and construction. Cleanup at many

of these sites may take years, Responsible parties also are initiating more private cleanups.

As the level of activity increases, so will the

need for additional qualified and experienced

staff at the State and Federal level to design and

implement an expanded program, to make

judgments on cleanup goals, to support enforcement efforts, and to supervise work by

government contractors and responsible parties. To be successful, the program must have

adequate, experienced staff to provide sound

management and technical oversight.

EPA’s current staffing levels appear to be too

low to provide effective oversight of the rapidly expanding number of sites requiring remedial action. Moreover, EPA has identified

several institutional constraints on its ability

to expand its program quickly. EPA has projected that States may take over management

of as many as half of the NPL site cleanups.

However, many States lack the needed technical and administrative personnel to support

Superfund cleanups. Where money is available,

States report delays in obtaining qualified technical specialists,

There are several reasons to question whether the Superfund program can effectively man-
Site/location

Chem-Dyne,

Hamilton, OH

Stringfellow,

Glen Avon,

CA

Table 7.1 .—Four Examples of Inconsistencies in Reported Site Characteristics

Factor Values reported Contractors —

Linear velocity 1.71 ft/day E&E

of groundwater

2.8 ft/day Weston

Linear velocity 0.6 ft/day Neste, Brudin &. Stone

of groundwater

3.5 ft/day CH2MHill

Nature of bed- Solid Neste, Brudin & Stone

rock Fractured James M. Montgomery

Type work performed Date reported

EPA field invest. June 1982

Preliminary feasibility June 1983

investigation

Regional Water Board June 1973

study

EPA RI/FS study April 1984

Regional Water Board June 1973

study December

1979

‘1 m pact

Speed of movement of

contaminated groundwater

underestimated originally.

Might have influenced

decision on when action

needed.

Rapid movement of

contamination by groundwater rather than surface

water not realized until

after failure of containment

techniques. Effective

remedial action delayed.

Seymour, Nature of site Permeable ES&E Coast Guard study February 1982 If subsurface is permeable,

Seymour, IN subsurface much contaminated soil left

Impermeable Canonie Environmental Responsible parties July 198 2 onsite and continued water

Services study intrusion causes further

groundwater contamination.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, based on data in various reports
Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups Ž 237

. —

age and oversee even current NPL site cleanups, let alone an expanded number of cleanups,

First, progress to date has been slow. Certainly one reason for this has been the inherent delays in starting a new program, developing procedures, identifying sites, and conducting

preliminary site assessments. The Superfund

program has also changed policy direction over

the relative priority of fund-financed cleanups

and enforcement, However, there is reason to

suspect that EPA may fall short of meeting its

currently projected cleanup goals. At the end

of fiscal year 1984, EPA reported some form

of remedial activity was underway at about 30

percent of NPL sites, however, site remedial

construction had started at only 50 sites, a relatively small number of the 552 NPL sites, The

number of sites where cleanup is considered

complete or where a permanent long-term

remedy is under construction is relatively low,

Many remedial actions announced so far are

temporary or interim remedial measures that

will need further work or nonremedial measures, such as supplying alternate drinking

water, intended to remove an immediate threat

of exposure to hazardous substance releases.

Moreover, as discussed in chapter 1, the adequacy of remedial action at several of the “completed” cleanups is under question. l0

Detailed information on EPA cleanup activities at Superfund sites is not easily obtained.

One of few publicly available summaries tracking Superfund cleanup progress at individual

sites is The National Campaign Against Toxic

Hazard’s recently published “Assessment of

Cleanup Progress at Superfund Sites.’’11 This

report documents the status of remedial activities at 343 NPL sites in 19 States as of mid1984 based on EPA data and a phone survey

of EPA site project officers. (According to the

Campaign, detailed information on the remaining 209 sites was not available for study because of problems with EPA’s computerized

IOSce also R i(, ha r[j c:. B i rcj, Jr. and Michael f’odhorzer, ‘‘ E1raluation of the Six National Priorities I,ist Sites Delisted hy the Entiron mental Protection Agenc; \’, National Campaign Against

Toxic Htizarcfs, Oct. 24, 1984,

11 Dan 11 a TL] Ii \ Hen r} S. Cole, and L1 i{, hael Podho rzf?r, ‘‘A n ,!

Assessment of Cleanup Progress at Superfund Sites, ” National

Carni]aign Against Toxi(; Hazards, Septemher 1984.

site tracking system.) Table 7-2 shows the latest

stage of remedial activity for the 343 sites surveyed as of July 1984,

Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies were underway or complete at about 44 percent of the sites. These stages are the beginning

of the Superfund “pipeline. ” However, only 14

percent of the sites in the survey have advanced to remedial design (seven sites) or remedial construction (42 sites]. Responsible

party cleanups, rather than fund-financed

cleanups, account for about half of the 42 sites

where a long-term remedy is being implemented. The report found that some form of

Table 7-2.—Status of Cleanup Progress, July 1984

(343 NPL sites)

Number of

Latest stage of remedial activitya

No site activityb . . . . . . . . .

Immediate measures onlyc

:

Complete ., . . . . . . . . .

Underway . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . .

Remedial Investigation (Rl):

RI complete ., . . . . ... . .

RI underway. ., . . .. .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Feasibility study (FS):

FS complete ., ., . . ... ...

FS underway ... . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Remedial design (RD)d

:

RD complete ... . . . . . . . ., .

RD underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Remedial construction (RC)

RC complete, delisted . . .,

RC complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RC underway . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total ... . . . . . . . . . . . .

sites at

stage

96

27

19

46

5

77

82

25

45

70

2

5

7

2

4

36

42

Grand total ... . . . . . . . . . . . 343 sites

Percent of

sites at

stage

28-

8

5

13%

23

240/o

7

13

20%

1

1

2%

1

1

10

12“/0

100%

‘Number of N PL sites at thls stage of remedial actlvlty I n J ulY 1984 Th Is Is not

the curnu/at/ve number of sites at which this stage has been completed or In.

lttated

b No ‘Ctlvlty means neither Immediate measures nor studtes have been started

at these sites Studies or response activity before the site was Ii steal on the

NPL are not {ncluded Some no act!wty sites have had remedial act!on master

plan (RAMP) studies completed; RAMPs ~e low cost (about $25,GCO) summar!es

of available I nformat Ion on the site RAMPs were recent Iy d!scontlnued

clmmedlate measures Include removals that were taken after the S1 te was I i steal

on the NPL Not all NPL sites require Immediate measures

dsltes proceed to the remed!al design stage after selectlon of an appropriate

remedy based on the R1/FS Select!on of an appropr! ate remedy Is documented

In a Record of Declstom (ROD)

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment from Nat!onal Campaign Against

Toxic Hazards, ‘An Assessment of Cleanup Progress at Superfund

Sites, ” September 1984
238 • Superfund Strategy

onsite cleanup work, either immediate measures and/or long-term remedial construction,

had occurred at 147 of the 343 sites. (Immediate measures at 105 sites; remedial construction underway or complete at 34 sites; eight

sites had both immediate measures and remedial construction.) Some sites with immediate

measures have progressed to later stages of remedial activity as shown in table 7-2. No onsite cleanup had occurred at 196 of the 343 sites

surveyed (57 percent). There were 100 sites

with studies only and 96 sites with no remedial activity at all.

Based on EPA records, the Campaign was

able to assess the cleanup progress through the

end of fiscal year 1984 for all 552 NPL sites (including six delisted sites where cleanup is completed), The group found that there has been

no onsite cleanup (either immediate measures

or remedial construction) at 332 NPL sites.

Some form of remedial action (RI/FS, design,

or construction) had begun at 120 sites. There

were immediate measures underway at 100

more sites.

The Campaign’s study focused on the stage

of remedial activity at NPL sites and did not

examine what kinds of remedial activities were

occurring and whether the remedies would

provide effective long-term control of threats

to human health and the environment. OTA’s

own review of EPA Records of Decision (RODS)

for remedial actions at NPL sites and the site

activities described in the Campaign’s report

suggests that both the EPA and Campaign figures overstate the progress made in cleaning

up Superfund sites. Many of the remedial actions taken do not represent a final or permanent remedy providing for the removal, destruction, or treatment of the wastes and the

decontamination and, where feasible, restoration of the site. Such remedial actions require

more technical oversight than the early measures that now account for most program activity. (See table 7-3 and the discussion in chapter

2 of this report,) Of 24 RODS reviewed, 10 were

for initial remedial measures to deal with immediate problems at the site. Of the 14 remedial actions, six involved complete or partial

remedies with additional measures to effectively deal with site releases and contamination

still under study. Three remedial actions provided for replacement or treatment of the

threatened water supply; three others involved

only partial or surface removals with source

control measures. Only eight sites had a final

or permanent remedial action underway (these

eight are in addition to the six sites where EPA

says cleanup has been completed). The RODS

indicate that completion of remedial construction at many sites will not result in site cleanup

or a final remedy, Additional remedial activities at these sites may continue for years or may

be required at some later time.

It may take many years for cleanups at current NPL sites to be completed and varying degrees of oversight and activity will be required

for the duration of each cleanup. At the same

time, more and more sites can be expected to

Table 7.3.—Summary of Remedial Cleanup Approved, 1981 to mid-1984

—

Number of Initial remedial Final

Cleanup actions approved decisions a/ actions b/ Remedial actions remedies c/

Removal/offsite disposal with/without source control . . . . . . . . ‘- 1 4 6 8 d / 5

Off site removal with incineration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 1 1

Alternate water supply provided . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 2 0

Alternate water supply and treatment e/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 1 0

Treatment f/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 1 1

Source control and onsite treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 1 1

Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 10 14 8

al Total Includes two sites and two RODS each whtch are combined In the above table

b/ Includes planned removals

c/ Final remedies are remedial actions that are intended as the last action at the s!te and that, If successful, wi II effectively control releases from the site

d/ Includes three partial remedial acttons, e g , surface cleanup, additional remedial measures are still under review

e/ Includes treatment of contaminated drinking water

f/ Includes treatment of contaminated groundwater

SOURCE Of ftce of Technology Assessment
enter the system. The RI/FS process can take

up to 18 months to complete, remedial designs

take 9 to 12 months. The whole pre-construction process can take 3 years once activity has

begun and without any other delays. A range

of from 2 to 5 years from site investigation to

completion of construction. Complex sites, particularly those with extensive groundwater

contamination, will require more time to assess, and to design and construct a remedy.

Operations, maintenance, and monitoring could

continue for 20 to 30 years or more at sites with

significant groundwater contamination and

cleanup. There will be a continuing long-term

need for technical oversight and monitoring at

a large number of sites.

The rate at which EPA has been able to obligate and spend Superfund appropriations gives

some indication of the agency’s ability to handle a greatly expanded program. Only a small

percentage of funds obligated for remedial action actually has been spent on construction

of long-term remedies. With two-thirds of

Super fund’s $1.6 billion obligated, the resources of EPA and State agencies may not be

adequate to manage an accelerating rate of

cleanup activities, even if only for a 2,000 site

NPL. There appear to be significant delays in

Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups ● 239

—

moving sites from the study stage to construction. A major portion of the $1.6 billion Superfund appears to have been obligated for initial

contractor assessments and administrative expenses, creating the probability that the program will need very large amounts for remedial construction and, hence, oversight in the

future.

The Campaign found that for 343 sites surveyed, over $100 million had been obligated for

remedial actions out of a total of over $236 million in Superfund obligations in those 19 States.

Less than half of the remediaI action obligations were for construction. Of the total monies

obligated, $44 million had been paid out (see

table 7-4).

The slow rate of cleanup and the small portion of obligated funds spent on remedial construction suggests that EPA and State agencies

may not have sufficient resources or personnel to carry out the process efficiently. EPA

officials have admitted that the frequent

switching of project officers has been a problem in maintaining the momentum of cleanup

activities. Retention of experienced, qualified

cleanup supervisors was also identified as a

problem in OTA’s case studies.

Table 7-4.—Superfund Obligations and Expenditures, 19 States, July 1984

. .

Number ‘- Remedial” act ions Total fund -

State of sites funds obligated obligated

California . . . . . . . . . . . 19 $25,478,390 $37,867,020

Connecticut . 6 1,369,000

Florida . . ... . . . . . . . 29 6,390,828

Illinois . . . . . . . . . 11 0 4,069,291

Indiana. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 17 0 3,911,401

Iowa ., . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 3 0 2,187,014

Maine ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 1,639,932

Massachusetts ... ... ... . . . 15 8,121,800 17,415,68

Minnesota . . . . . ... . . 23 0 5,903,543

New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . 10 10,007,018 13,605,340

New Jersey . . . . . . . . . ... ... 85 17,885,809 55,004,130

New York . . . . . . ... ... ... 29 11,702,800 31,173,799

North Carolina ., . . . . ... 3 2,374,176 2,364,176

Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3,191,125 9,787,656

Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 139,000

Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . 40 11,440,400 23,575,534

Rhode Island ., ... . . . . . . 6 5,043,570 5,766,831

Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 360,000

Washington . . . . . ... ... 14 5,000,00 13,820,269

19 State total . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 $100,235,088 $236,350,445

SOURCE : Natinal Campaign Against TOXiC Hazards, An Assessment of Cleanup Progress at Superfund Sites, September 1984- at 14

Total funds

expended

$1,010,047

49,965

1,766,279

678,855

307,519

1,075,276

90,306

2,241,413

908,517

4,719,449

7,049,176

8,373,695

2,364,176

5,394,571

2,266

4,110,486

2,373,831

0

2,346,767

$44,862,594 .
240 Ž Superfund Strategy

EPA Staffing Needs

The pace at which Superfund remedial actions are moving through the system suggests

that current staffing levels are not sufficient to

support current Superfund activities. This is

shown by the lag between the number of sites

with RI/FSs and the number of sites where construction is underway and by the percent of obligated remedial action funds that have been

spent (see tables 7-2 and 7-4). The problems

with effective technical oversight of EPA contractor work revealed in OTA’s case studies is

another indication that EPA staffing may not

be adequate either in the number of technical

staff assigned to a site or in the qualifications

and experience of those employees.

EPA has greatly expanded the number of employees allocated to the Superfund program.

Administrator Ruckelshaus testified that the

hiring rate for Superfund is now at the highest level that EPA has ever experienced. l 2

EPA’s authorized Superfund employment has

been increased from 774 workyears in fiscal

year 1983 to 1,357 in fiscal year 1985, This staffing level is needed to support currently planned

activities for only a moderately increased program, With this staff, EPA estimates that it

could support about 115 sites in the RI/FS stage

per year, EPA expects that a total of about 200

sites will reach the remedial design and construction stage at the end of fiscal year 1985

(including 68 new designs and 46 new remedial cleanups). About 150 immediate removals

are also projected for fiscal year 1985. By the

end of fiscal year 1986, some kind of remedial

response would have been started at about 400

existing NPL sites. After that, the number of

sites in various phases of response would remain fairly constant. EPA has said that there

may be an upper limit of about 600 NPL sites

that EPA can effectively deal with at any one

time. This includes overseeing removals, RI/FSs,

and remedial design and construction. l3

IZH~arin~S 011 HUBIndependent Agencies Appropriations,

1985-Part 1, Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations,

98th Cong., 2d sess., 1984, pp. 302.

lsl,ee Thomas, statement before the Entironmenta] I,aw Inst itute-A merica n Eta r Assoc iat ion Superfu nd Conference, NOV.

29, 1984.

EPA officials are concerned that the agency

may not be able to quickly absorb a significantly expanded number of cleanups even if additional funds were made available for more

staff. They have identified the following limitations on the agency’s capacity to expand:

1.

2.

3,

4,

Superfund staff and resources are already

expanding at an exceptional rate to manage projects already in the pipeline,

The Federal Government’s competitive

hiring regulations would delay the hiring

and housing of additional new employees

6 to 8 months at a minimum;

Intensive training would be required before the newly hired staff would be fully

effective—at least 2 to 3 months on-the-job

training for nontechnical personnel and

considerably longer for technical personnel.

The private sector support industry for

Superfund would not ‘be able to expand

rapidly enough to allow effective use of a

larger work force for several reasons. The

analytical laboratory industry, already

operating near capacity, is unlikely to increase its capacity for organic sample analysis and high hazard sample analysis at a

correspondingly rapid rate. Lead time for

procuring additional, highly specialized

equipment is up to 6 months. It could take

years to find, hire, and train competent

technical staff.

Administrator Ruckelshaus argued that too

rapid an expansion risked increased potential

for fraud, waste, and abuse:

Too large a program pushed at too rapid a

pace could create excessive public expectations that even with the best of management

and will could not be met. The result could

be—could be—one more case of disillusionment with the ability of Government to protect and serve the public responsibly.l4

EPA’s claimed inability to expand maybe a

consequence of its own policies: Moreover, the

constraints cited by Mr. Ruckelshaus are pri- ———

laHearjn~S on $’uperfun~ Reauthorize tion Befb~ the Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of’ the House

Committee on Energ~ and Commerce, 98th Cong,, 2d sess.,

1984, pp. 725-26.
marily short-term constraints of perhaps a year

or two, Some of EPA’s statements seem to assume that Superfund staffing will not increase

much over currently projected levels. This assumption may reflect budget policies more

than actual experience or actual need. EPA has

been able to accommodate the significant

spending and hiring increases in the Superfund

program of the last 3 years, albeit with some

inefficiencies, The capacity—and, more importantly, the quality—of the private analytical laboratories to accommodate increased need for

chemical analysis for cleanups is a matter that

merits further investigation.

Another assumption in EPA’s projections for

only modest additional Superfund expansion

seems to be that sites are dealt with expeditiously and will not require further attention

after the 2 to 5 years needed to complete remedial construction. This view does not reflect

the impermanent nature of many remediaI actions or recent experience with cleanups. Perhaps EPA is assuming that the States will be

able to take over all oversight of sites with completed remedial construction. If this is so, then

State staffing needs will continue to grow, and

probably will be largely unmet. Without increases in staffing and resources for Superfund

cleanups, it could take decades to dispose of

the large number of known sites that are anticipated to require remedial action, The 10,000

site NPL seen possible by OTA (see chapter 5)

would clearly require decades under almost

any conceivable program,

OTA does not have information on specific

EPA personnel needs for an expanded number of remedial actions under Superfund, The

long-term nature of cleanup actions suggests

that long-range planning for hiring, training,

and retaining qualified technical personnel to

oversee cleanups is warranted, Existing information provides some indication of the magnitude of future staff needs. EPA estimates that

it requires 2,8 staff workyears to complete a

Superfund remedial action, ” Given the com-

.

1 ~ I )() l],1 I (] 1,;lZC1 r(, 11 I{, h, ~~ ,$’l’S\}’ hl ( ), t [;st i III() II \r a t ~ff?d rlJlg~ [~~~

,?11/1(’1”/1111(] Rf!?)llt}lol’l%; lt;ol)” Bflii)r[) the ‘sIJtl(:0171171itt f:f! 011 (,’olnmf’r( (I, ‘1 ”1 < 1 115ixJrtd tion ,11](1 ‘1’ollr) ~m of tt~t’ ! {OU,S(” {,’on)r711tt(1t>

07? k’ner~~ \ ,) r] (/ (,’orrl /11 (Ir(, (1, 98th ( ;() 11 g ,, 2(1 S(}ss ., 1984, ])[) 5:3 (i,

Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups ● 241

plexity and long-term nature of many site

cleanups, this estimate may be low for both the

duration of site activity and the level of management required. One State Superfund agency

representative has advised OTA that most sites

require a team of several technical specialists

from various disciplines over the 2 to 5 years

required to oversee site activities from initial

investigation to completion of all construction.

(This would suggest a modest estimate of from

4 to 10 staff workyears per site.) More complex

site cleanups would require a larger team and

probably more time. Post-construction operations, maintenance, and monitoring of the site

will present a continuing need for oversight.

OTA’s review of technical personnel availability later in this chapter estimates that there

are about 3,750 technical specialists currently

working on Superfund cleanups both inside

and outside of government. There were an estimated 1,000 Federal and 700 State staff positions (including administrative and technical

jobs) for Superfund and other remedial activities in 1984. Not all of these people are directly

involved in site activities and so total Superfund program employment may not have to increase in direct proportion to the growth in

cleanup expenditures. Assuming that site personnel currently represent one-half of government positions at most, this ratio would suggest that government employment would have

to increase significantly to accommodate an expanding number of cleanups. OTA has estimated that overall demand for technical personnel could grow to about 22,750 specialists

in 1990-95 under a moderately expanded level

of funding for cleanups.

New State and Federal positions for technical specialists to supervise site cleanups will

likely represent a significant share of this increased demand. Even with a significant expansion in State and Federal technical personnel to direct and oversee site cleanups, the

Superfund program will still depend to a great

degree on private contractors for site assessments, design, and construction of remedial actions for decades.
242 . Superfund Strategy

State Staffing Needs

State agencies have repeatedly testified that

they do not have enough qualified and experienced staff available to meet their responsibilities under the current program for identifying and ranking sites, consulting with EPA on

site activities and enforcement, and in participating as the lead agency at some sites. Although some Federal funds are available to the

States, they are limited and almost entirely site

specific. States vary in their ability and willingness to provide funding for these activities.

Remedial staff and funding are concentrated

in a small number of States. Massachusetts,

Michigan, California, New York, New Jersey,

and Tennessee accounted for over 60 percent

of positions in 1983 and 70 percent in 1984.

These States have a total of 201 sites. On a national average, nearly 75 percent of the positions are paid for by State monies and about

25 percent are funded by Superfund or other

Federal sources. The percentage of Federal

funding, however, varies greatly by State.

Reliance on State funding for their own staffs

leaves 20 States being able to devote less than

2.5 person years annually to Superfund program work. ” EPA is currently projecting that

State lead sites will account for about half of

Superfund site cleanups. Cleanups may fall

short of projections if States do not have

enough technical people to provide direction

and effective oversight,

The Association of State and Territorial Solid

Waste Management Officials (ASTSWMO) has

testified that States should receive Federal

funding for a number of activities under Superfund including site identification, assessment,

———-

leLazarchick, op. cit., pp. 530.

and investigation and the development and implementation of State contingency plans.

Funds are needed to support enforcement,

health studies, equipment, and staff training,

These funds are in addition to funds that States

might receive as part of a site-specific cooperative agreement.

A survey done by ASTSWMO in December

1983 for EPA’s study of State participation in

the Superfund program required by Section

301(a)(l)(E) of CERCLA concluded that States

would have to increase their total fiscal year

1983 technical staffing levels by 84 percent to

reach optimal levels to support the current

Superfund program (table 7-5). The greatest

need is for staff to oversee site cleanups, State

technical staff allocated to remedial activities

was expected to increase by 65 percent from

1983 to 1984 (from a total of 259 to 428 person

years). These aggregate figures do not reflect

the differences in individual State staffing

levels nor do they differentiate between Statefunded cleanups and Superfund actions.

The ASTSWMO survey also identified the

types of technical specialists needed by the

States. The most critical technical staffing

needs were engineers, hydrologists, and chemists (table 7-5).

Among the constraints identified by the

States in quickly obtaining additional technical personnel to support remedial activities

were limitations on hiring under State civil

service regulations, problems with the institutional stability of the programs such as hiring

freezes and noncompetitive salaries, Another

constraint on expanding State activities are delays in obtaining private contractors for site

studies, remedial design, and construction due

to competitive bidding and contract review

procedures under State procurement regulations.
Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups • 243

Table 7-5.—Current and Optimal Technical Staffing Levels (Annual totals for respondent states in person years) (41 States)

Number of

additional

Number of Number of staff needed Percentage

current optimal (optimal – increase

staff staff current) needed

Civil engineer . . . . . . . ... ... . . . . . . .. .,-..., ... ... 15.9 29.0 13.1 82

Sanitary engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86.6 165.1 78.5 91

Environmental engineer ., . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 35.7 96.6 60.9 171

Chemist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.0 108.0 66.0 157

Biologist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., 46.7 55.7 9.0 19

Public health specialist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46.3 63.6 15,3 33

Geologist/hydrologist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . 47,0 119.5 72,5 154

Soil scientist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,6 31.1 16.5 113

Other

Agricultural engineer, . . ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., . 0.5 0.3 –0.2 –40

Chemical engineer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 4,3 1.2 39

Environmental field officer/scientist technician . . . . . . . . . . . 27.2 42.9 15.7 58

Field inspectors . ..., ..., ..., ..., ..., . . ..., ..., . 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0

Investigator. . ..., . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . 1.0 1.0

Industrial hygienist . . ..., ..., . . . . . . . ..., ..., . . . . .

—

0.8 1.5 0.7 88

Pharmacist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,0 1.0 0.0 0.0

Specialists (radiation solid waste, environmental enforcement,

environmental, pollution control, resource control,

emergency response, water quality) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119,2 177.0 57.8 48

Toxicologist . ., ..., . . . . . . . . ..., ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.5 0.5

Zoologist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

—

1.0 5.0 4.0 400

Totals ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....: 492.7 907.1 414,5 88 a

aPercentage Increase of total current techmcal staff needed-~o ach[eve total optimal technical staff

SOURCE ASTSWMO survey US Environmental ProtectIon Agency State Part!clpatlonln the Superfund Program CERCLASectlon 301(afllHE~ Study flnalreporl

December 1984

AVAILABILITY OF QUALIFIED TECHNICAL PERSONNEL

FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS

An Overview of Findings

Cleanup of uncontrolled hazardous waste

sites requires a concerted multidisciplinary approach. The situations often involve great uncertainty over the amounts, types, and behavior

of the wastes and the appropriateness, feasibility, and effectiveness of various technical remedial options. Because of the relatively short

history of a large-scale commitment to cleana large cadre of experienced professionals in

this area. As the number and complexity of

public and private cleanup efforts continue to

increase, demand for qualified technical personnel will grow. Because the availability of

technical specialists could become a short- and

long-term constraint on a greatly expanded

cleanup effort, OTA conducted a study of the

expected demand and supply of professionals

ing up hazardous waste sites, there is not yet in the required technical specialties.
244 ● Superfund Strategy

Little work has been done in this area. Statistics on current and future personnel needs

and on the pool of potentially available trained

technical professionals for waste cleanup are

not readily available. Thus, OTA had to assemble information on the available pool of technical specialists, on the enrollment and training capabilities of educational institutions, and

on expected levels of future demand for technical specialists under significantly expanded

public and private cleanups. Estimates of future demand were based on current Superfund

staffing needs, contractor surveys and assumptions about future funding levels, and extrapolations for demand in 5 to 15 years. Several

technical specialties that appear to be critical

at various stages of Superfund cleanups were

identified.

For a significantly expanded Superfund program, OTA’s analysis concludes:

●

●

●

It is probable that substantial increases in

technical personnel needs will accompany

expansion of Superfund. These jobs will

be in Federal and State governments, in

private sector consulting firms, and in the

internal environmental management groups

of private corporations active in cleanups.

The overall number of new positions to be

created is somewhat small when compared to employment in the national economy as a whole. However, this increase is

several times more than the nuber of new

graduates in some fields currently produced by institutions of higher education,

Significant personnel bottlenecks could

develop in the Superfund program. By bottleneck OTA means a condition where employees would not have the optimum training, background, or experience for the

work required, and consequently the quality of responses and cleanups could suffer, Even moderate increases in the numbers of Superfund cleanups during the

next decade and a shift to more permanent

cleanups could lead to shortages of qualified technical specialists.

With few exceptions, the present educational programs and manpower pools can

supply adequate numbers of basically qualified scientists and engineers.

There will be difficulty in developing adequate numbers of experienced professionals for the next decade at least, and yet

the development of such a cadre of qualified supervisory professionals appears to

be the key to the successful implementation of Superfund.

There could be some shortages of technical specialists particularly in the critical

fields of hydrology, ” geological engineering, and toxicology. The increase could

strain the capabilities of existing institutions over the short term. Over a longer

period it appears that an adequate supply

of technically trained people would become available as more students are attracted to these specialties and new graduates enter the job market, Technical

specialists in related fields can also be expected to shift to remedial work at uncontrolled sites. In some instances these professionals may require some retraining

assistance.

Based on OTA’s conclusions that a large

Superfund program will be needed for several

decades to come, serious consideration could

be given to Federal support of training programs in critical technical specialties such as

geology, hydrology, risk assessment, and toxicology to meet expected sharp increases in

demand.

A range of options is available to promote

technical training for hazardous waste cleanups. Among these options are:

Ž expanding graduate research and training

in fields relevant to hazardous waste

cleanups;

● encouraging development of specialized

short courses to assist current hazardous

I TrI’hc terms ~roL] nd water hydrologist and hydrogeolog ist are

often used synonymously in this report. Many geologists” and

professionals in the field of ground water hydroln~}’ rcf(:r to t hcmselk’es simpl}’ as h~r(lrologists. Some may ass(x;iate hydrolog~

with surface waters onl~’. Hydrolog\ as a s(; iencc deals with hoth

surface and suhsurfar;e waters. In this chapter hydrologist refers

to hoth surface water and ground w’ater h~’orologists. Hydrogeologist refers to a technical specialist i n the fiel(i nf hy[lrogeology, a suhspw:ialty of hy(irolog~” dealing ~~’ith subsurface? ~~’aters

and related geologic conditions. Assessment of’ complex slll)su rfar:e conditions at un(:(]nt~)lled waste sites with extensikrf:

ground~l’ater contamination mill frequcntl~’ require the s~)e(:ial

skills of a h}’d rogeologist.
Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups ● 245

.

●

waste profess

field; and

ionals and those entering the

promoting the establishment of regional

technical centers or “centers of ex -

cellence” to provide research, professional

training, and graduate education.

Technical Specialists for Cleanup of

Uncontrolled Sites

Estimates of the size of the effort required

to clean up many of the known uncontrolled

hazardous waste sites span a wide range (see

chapters 3 and 5). There is general agreement

among State and Federal authorities, however,

that the cleanup could eventually involve many

thousands of sites, will extend over many decades, and that contamination of surface and

groundwater is a common problem.

Proposals to expand the cleanup effort raise

the possibility of creating shortages of qualified

technical professionals, Without such trained

specialists, cleanups are unlikely to be performed well or cost effectively. Since little information was available, a personnel needs survey was conducted of practicing professionals

in government agencies, Superfund contractors, and engineering firms to estimate the

numbers of people required, their specialties,

and the desired levels of training and experience.

The survey requested information on the importance and levels of skills for 30 specialties

for four phases of cleanup actions—site investigation, emergency response, surface cleanups, and subsurface cleanups. (Note that site

investigation and emergency response include

all short-term investigations and site stabilization; surface and subsurface cleanups include

all longer term “permanent solutions.”) The

specialties were identified from previous studies and a review of skills needed at 28 sites

undergoing EPA remedial response. The respondents were asked to indicate their optimal

staff training and experience requirements for

cleanup work, rather than the training and experience levels of current employees. The optimal staff requirements were used because

many contractor and government personnel

now working on Superfund cleanups were not

trained for these jobs and had little previous

experience in dealing with uncontrolled waste

sites. Analysis of survey results showed 18 specialties were deemed very important or important for at least one of these cleanup phases.

A strong demand for experienced professionals

in these fields is evident now. (See table 7-6 for

a list of specialties. ) The majority of respondents indicated that a master’s degree and 3 to

5 years training were the desired qualifications

for almost all technical specialties (figure 7-I).

The second choice is for entry level people with

a bachelor’s degree and limited experience. A

doctorate was not deemed necessary for most

cases and specialties, except for toxicology,

The survey confirmed general trends shown

in earlier surveys and the case studies. Several

disciplines were found to be most important

Table 7.6.—Technical Specialties for Cleanup of

Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites: Personnel

Skill

Rank

1 .., .

s Survey-Importance of Technical Skills

For All Site Activities

Speciality

Hydrologist —groundwater

Toxicologist

Environmental chemist

Analytical chemist

Hydrologist—surface water

Civil engineer

Soils/geotechnical engineer

Environmental engineer

Engineering geologist

Organic chemist

Risk assessment specialist

Chemical engineer

Construction management

Industrial hygienist

Geochemist

Inorganic chemist

Spill management specialist

Waste water treatment engineer

Health physicist

Mathematician/computer specialist

Surface water engineer

Remote sensing expert

Geophysicist

Biologist

Incineration specialist

Statistician

Meterorologist

Biochemist/pharmaceutical chemist

Land use planner

SOURCE A Keith Turner, Potential for Future Shortages of Technical Person

nel for a National Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites final report Nov.

30 1984
246 . Superfund Strategy

Figure 7-1 .— Desired Levels of Experience or Education for Technical Specialists

Skills

Biologist

Meteorologist

Environmental chemist

Organic chemist

Inorganic chemist

Analytical chemist

Biochemist/pharmaceutical c

Toxicologist

Health physicist

Industrial hygienist

Geochemist

Geophysicist

Remote sensing expert

Engineering geologist

Hydrologist—surface water

Hydrologist —groundwater

Statistician

Mathematician/computer spe

Civil engineer

Construction management

Soils/geotechnical engineer

Waste water treatment engin

Surface water engineer

Chemical engineer

Incineration specialist

Environmental engineer

Spill management specialist

Risk assessment specialist

Land use planner

hemist

cialist

eer

Site Emergency Surface Subsurface

assessment response cleanup cleanup

1. Entry level

Bachelors or O-2 years experience

– High 2. Intermediate level

– Middle Masters degree and 1-2 years

– Low or, 3-5 years experience

3. Advanced Level

PhD or 5 + years experience

SOURCE A Keith Turner, “Potential for Future Shortages of Technical Personnel for a National Cleanup of Hazardous

Waste sites, ” final report, Nov. 30, 1984

for Superfund activities and are likely to see chemists and chemical engineers; 5) toxicoloan increase in job opportunities. These are: 1) gists; 6) industrial hygienists (and to a lesser

hydrologists, both groundwater and surface extent health physicists); and 7) specialists in

water; 2) geologists; 3) civil engineers, espe- risk assessment and spill management. (See

cially in the disciplines of soils/geotechnical table 7-7, table 7-8, and figure 7-2.) Other speengineering, construction management, and cialties do not appear to be affected to the same

wastewater engineering; 4) certain classes of degree.
Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups . 247

.

Table 7-7.—Technical Personnel Needs for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites: Personnel Skills Survey—

Importance of Technical Skills by Cleanup Category

Skill

Biologist . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . .

Meterologist ., . . ... ... . . . . . . . . .

Environmental chemist . . ., ... ... . ,

Organic chemist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Inorganic chemist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Analytical chemist . . ... ...

Piochemist/pharmaceutical chemist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Toxicologist . . . . . . . . ..., ...,

Health physicist. . ..., ..., ..., . . . . . . . . . . .

Industrial hygienist ..., ...,

Geochemist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Geophysicist. . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . .,

Remote sensing expert. . . . . . . .

Engineering geologist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hydrologist—surface water . . . . . . .

Hydrologist—groundwater ., . . . . . . . . . .

Statistician . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mathematician/computer specialist .

Civil engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Construction management. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Soils/Geotechnical engineer . . . . . .

Waste water treatment engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Surface water engineer. . . . . . . . . . . . ...,

Chemical engineer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Incineration specialist ....,, ,

Environmental engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Spill management specialist . . . . . . . . . . . .

Risk assessment specialist . . .

Land use planner . . . . . . . . . . .

NOTE This table based on 60 responses

The maximum possible score for each category IS 600

The maximum possible total score IS 2400

Site

assessment

283

166

381

331

301

365

145

387

233

271

366

277

255

378

392

452

189

241

311

167

324

182

191

280

124

331

185

299

122

Cleanup category

Emergency

response

155

170

276

274

235

298

105

354

230

337

157

108

162

219

269

265

92

124

260

210

199

162

156

266

101

280

447

333

49

Surface

cleanup

204

174

344

297

269

336

119

316

213

293

205

139

186

283

398

261

166

196

377

400

369

280

285

313

234

339

227

277

96

Subsurface

cleanup

108

71

331

297

266

332

107

313

195

240

359

248

171

357

238

500

172

310

348

371

379

314

188

331

155

316

162

290

96

Total

750

581

1332

1199

1071

1331

476

1370

871

1141

1077

772

774

1237

1297

1478

619

871

1296

1148

1271

938

820

1190

624

1266

1021

1199

363

SOURCE A Keith Turner Potential for Future Shortages of Technical Personnel for a National Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites final report NOV. 30 1984

Table 7-8.—The Top Skills by Cleanup Category

Skill category Site assessment Emergency response cleanup Surface and subsurface

Very Important skill 1) Hydrologist—groundwater l) Spill manage r 1) Hydrologist—groundwater

(rank ordered) 2) Toxicologist 2) Toxicologist 2) Construction manager

3) Hydrologist—surface water 3) Industrial hygienist 3) Civil engineer

4) Environmental chemist 4) Soils engineer

5) Engineering geologist 5) Engineering geologist

6) Hydrologist—surface water

Important skills a) Biologist a) Organic chemist a) Environmental chemist

(not ranked) b) Organic chemist b) Analytical chemist b) Analytical chemist

c) Analytical chemist c) Hydrologist c) Toxicologist

d) Geochemist d) Civil engineer d) Waste water treatment engineer

e) Civil engineer e) Chemical engineer e) Chemical engineer

f) Soils engineer f) Environmental engineer f) Environmental engineer

g) Environmental engineer g) Risk assessment specialist

h) Risk assessment specialist — .

SOURCE A Keith Turner Potential for Future Shortages of Technical Personnel for a National Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites

—

final report Nov. 30 1984
248 Ž Superfund Strategy

Figure 7-2.—Classification of Importance of the Various Technical Specialties

for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Actions

Skills Site Emergency Surface Subsurface

assessment response cleanup cleanup

Biologist

Meteorologist

Environmental chemist

Organic chemist

Inorganic chemist

Analytical chemist

Biochemist/pharmaceutical chemist

Toxicologist

Health physicist

Industrial hygienist

Geochemist

Geophysicist

Remote sensing expert

Engineering geologist

Hydrologist—surface water

Hydrologist —groundwater

Statistician

Mathematician/computer specialist

Civil engineer

Construction management

Soils/geotechnical engineer

Waste water treatment engineer

Surface water engineer

Chemical engineer

Incineration specialist

Environmental engineer

Spill management specialist

Risk assessment specialist

Land use planner

I

I

Very important skill

Important skill

Optional skill

SOURCE A Keith Turner, ‘Potential for Future Shortages of Technical Personnel for a National Cleanup of Hazardous

Waste Sites final report, Nov. 30, 1984

Overall, hydrology seems to be the most crit- surface water contamination, With increasing

ical specialty. This is because of the frequency attention being given to protecting groundwaof water contamination problems encountered ter resources, the demand for hydrologists will

at sites, For instance, the EPA reports that 75 increase not only for waste site cleanups, but

percent of the NPL sites showed groundwater for design and monitoring of RCRA facilities

contamination and about 50 percent showed and for groundwater protection programs.
The importance of qualified specialists for

monitoring systems to determine the effectiveness of Superfund cleanups and to prevent future groundwater contamination at active hazardous waste facilities cannot be overstated.

Groundwater consultant David W. Mille r

pointed this out in congressional testimony in

1982:

The process of obtaining the data for predicting groundwater conditions, interpreting

the information and making accurate decisions to implement compliance monitoring is

a scientific endeavor. It can only be carried

out in a confident manner by well trained

groundwater technicians. There is presently

a severe shortage of trained groundwater

scientists in the public and private sector, and

it is doubtful that there is sufficient talent

available to work on more than a relatively

small percentage of the existing sites that

would fall under the compliance monitoring

aspects of the new hazardous waste regulations. 18

A report of the House Committee on Government Operations reviewing the development

of a national groundwater protection strategy

also noted the possibility of shortages of competent technical personnel:

The Committee concludes that as the

Groundwater Protection Strategy moves from

the planning and strategy development phase

into the implementation phase, there will be

a significant increase in the need for welltrained professional groundwater specialists

if the strategy is to succeed. The Committee,

therefore, recommends that EPA and the Department of the Interior act in concert to

assess the future and take such steps as are

necessary to prevent any shortfall.l9

Estimating the Pool of Available Professionals

Estimates of the current number of technical specialists in the work force and their probable future numbers were developed from data

—— --

18 [) ~ ~,l{j ~~~, M 11 ]~;r, ~~~~jrl~.$ Before thf? Hnu.$e Lf’llh~OmJn;t~(?~

on Natural Resources, Agricultural Kcscarch and En ~)ronment

of the !IOU.W ~jommittee on ,%:icn{:c and ‘i’echnolo~’, ~~th Cong,,

1 St $f?ss. Nov. 30, 1982.

1~[ J ,s. (;on Hre5s, (;M~[Jncjt~,a ff~r Profw;tjon, ’ Th(’ @CSt for a IN’:]

t)onal Po/ic;~, Report of the I{OUSC Committee on (l{}vernrnent

(lpf;rat ions, 98th (jon~., 2nd scss., Octoher 1984, [), 17,

Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups . 249

—-.—. -.

on enrollment trends, the awarding of technical degrees, and from membership in professional and scientific societies. Enrollment and

degree figures tend to overstate the potential

availability of trained graduates because not all

students find work in their academic fields.

Membership data, however, would tend to

yield conservative estimates of available manpower because not all practitioners a r e

members.

Performance issues aside, current staffing

needs are being met for the most part. This is

partly attributable to the slowdown in the minerals, petroleum, and construction industries

which has reduced the demand for geologists,

hydrologists, and civil engineers. Future staffing problems are likely to depend on general

economic conditions as well as Federal funding for cleanup programs. The future levels of

Federal funding for cleanup activities will

greatly affect the overall levels of effort, even

though not all activities will be funded from

Federal sources. EPA Superfund monies currently fund about half of all cleanup activity.

Other cleanup actions are being funded by

other Federal agencies, such as the Departments of Defense and Energy, and by the States.

Responsible parties in the private sector also

pay for a substantial share of cleanups. It seems

likely that cleanups paid for with non-Superfund money will continue to play a significant

role in the demand for trained technical personnel. The perception of the importance of

cleanup actions in the Nation’s priorities will

affect the future funding levels by these other

sources; this perception will be largely shaped

by the levels of funding authorized under

Superfund.

Estimates of Future Demand

Using a range of what are believed to be reasonable projections of future funding needs,

(see tables 7-9, 7-10, and 7-11), the demand for

cleanup professionals was estimated using historically observed ratios of funds to technical

personnel (table 7-12). About 3,750 professionals are estimated to be involved in current

cleanup activities nationwide. It will undoubtedly take many decades to complete the clean38-745 0 - 85 - 9
250 ● Superfund Strategy

Table 7-9.—Current and Projected Funding Levels Allocated to Type of Cleanup Activity (billions of dollars)

Funding Levelsa

1980-85 1985-90 1990-95

Average Average Average

Five-year annual Five-year annual Five-year annual

Type of activity total expenditure total expenditure total expenditure

Long-term cleanups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $0.75 -

- $0,15

— .

$5.0 $1.0 $10.0 $2.0

Short-term cleanups . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1.0 $0.2 $2,75 $0.55 $5.5 $1,1

Emergency responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $0.25 $0.05 $0.25 $0.05 $0.25 $0.05

Site investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1.0 $0.2 $2.5 $0.5 $5.0 $1.0

Totals . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . $3.0 $0.6 $10. 5 $2.1 $21.0 $4,2

aA[[ dollar ValUe~ are [n billions and re~lect midrange esl!mates Dollar values are COflStmt 1984 dollars

—

SOURCE A Kelfh Turner Potential for Future Shortages of Technical Personnel for a Nat!onal Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites final report Nov 30, 1984

Table 7-10.—Current and Projected Funding Levels for

the Cleanup of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites

(billions of dollars)

Funding Ievelsa

1980-85 1985-90 1990-95

Current . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $3.0 — —

Projected:

Low . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $7. 6 $19.0

Midrange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10.5 $21.0

High . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $14.4 $25.6

alncludes superfufld, other Federal (e g., DOD, DOE). Stare.futied =09raMS and

private industry

SOURCE A Keith Turner, “Potential for Future Shortages of Technical Person

net for a Nat!mal Ueanup of Hazardous Waste Sites, ” contractor report

prepared for the Off Ice of Technology Assessment, Nov. 30, 1984

up of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. The

projections cover two 5-year increments 1985-

1990 and 1990-1995. In making these projections it was assumed likely that after an initial

steep increase in funding levels, the number

of cleanups, and the number of required technical specialists, the program would reach a

plateau or steady state and activity would continue at a similar level for several more

decades.

With national spending to clean up uncontrolled hazardous waste sites at approximately

$4 billion annually, the demand for cleanup

professionals will rise to about six times current levels, to about 22,750 professionals in

1995, and remain stable at this higher level for

several decades as the cleanup actions are continued. This growth will not affect all specialties equally. As discussed in the following section, for most specialties, such growth can be

accommodated by the present work force and

the educational system, but additional emphasis on training in toxicology, hydrology, and

engineering geology will be necessary to prevent shortages in these areas, There will be an

unavoidable shortage of experienced technical

Table 7-11 .—Current and Projected Manpower Levels Allocated to Type of Cleanup Activity

Funding Ievelsa

Type of activity Ratiob

Long-term cleanups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:300,000

Short-term cleanups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:200,000

Emergency response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:200,000

Site investigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:100,000

Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1980-85

Average

annual Number of

funding FTEs

$0.15 500 -

0.2 1,000

0.05 250

0.2 2,000

$0.6

1984-90 1990-95

Average Average

annual Number of annual Number of

funding FTEs funding FTEs

$1.0 3,500 $2.0 7,000

0.55 2,750 1.1 5,500

0.05 250 0.05 250

0.5 5,000 1.0 10,000

$2.1 11.500 4 . 2 22.750

Average ratiosb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:160,000 1:182,600 1 : 184,600

aAll funding ievels are in b!lllons and reflect midrange estimate

.

bRatios are In 1 FTE/funding dollars (FTE - full time equivalent)

SOURCE. A Keith Turner, “Potential for Future Shortages of Technical Personnel for a National Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites, ” cent ractor report prepared for

the Off Ice of Technology Assessment, Nov 30, 1984
Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups ● 251

Table 7-12.—Current and Projected Manpower

Demand for 18 Critical Skillsa

Numbers of people (FTEs)

Skills 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95

1.

2.

3.

4,

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17,

18

Hydrologist —groundwater 363 1,138 2,263

Hydrologist—surface water 333 1,013 2,013

Toxicologist ., . . 330 963 1,900

Civil engineer ., . 283 938 1,863

Soils/geotechnical engineer 270 925 1,850

Environmental enginee r 208 626 1,238

Construction manage r 150 625 1,250

Engineering geologis t 280 900 1,800

Geochemis t 140 350 700

Environmental chemist . 278 851 1,688

Analytical chemist ., . . 263 806 1,593

Organic chemist .. . 135 315 615

Chemical engineer ., 88 326 638

Industrial hygienist 25 25 25

Risk assessment specialist 120 270 520

Waste water engineer ... . . 75 313 625

Biologist . . 100 250 500

Spill manager . . . . . . . . . 38 38 38

Total ., . . . . . ... . . 3,479 10,672 21,119

al ncl udes the top 18 of 29 tech n teal s pec al Ists account ng for over 90 percent

of total demand for cleanup specialists

SOURCE A K’elth Turner Potential for Future Shortages of Technical Person

nel for a National Clezm u p o{ ~ azardous Waste Sttes final report Nov

30 1984

specialists in all disciplines due to the rapid

growth projected for these activities. Additional shortages of personnel may occur if the economy improves and causes increased demands

and competition for trained personnel in science

and engineering.

Analysis of Demand Projections

The numbers of professionals needed for

each 5-year time period are estimated in table

7-12. In the periods following 1995, employment levels in each of these categories is expected to stabilize as the hazardous waste

cleanup activities at various uncontrolled sites

are expected to continue at a steady level. The

number of professionals projected in table 7-

12 are comparable to previous estimates by the

National Water Well Association (NWWA) and

ASTSWMO for the demands for hydrologists

and State employees. NWWA estimated the demand for hydrologists would double, to about

10,000 by 1990, but hydrologists work in many

fields in addition to hazardous waste cleanups.

The ASTSWMO estimated State employment

related to hazardous waste activities should

rise to 1,000 fairly quickly, and this seems in

line with these projections. In general, these

different projections show that the employment

rate over the next decade will rise to about six

times current levels. While such an increase

sounds very dramatic, the numbers must be

looked at in comparison with the total numbers

of people in these specialties. It then becomes

apparent that these demands will affect the various specialties unevenly.

Toxicologists, hydrologists, engineering geologists, and geotechnical engineers are going

to be affected by the demands placed on them

by hazardous waste cleanup activities. Current

trends suggest that about half the present toxicologists could be involved in cleanup actions,

and that over 2%-times the current number of

practicing toxicologists could be needed by

1995. Obviously there is room for growth in

this specialty. Similarly, over 10 percent of current hydrologists and engineering geologists

are now involved in cleanup actions, and this

could rise to over two-thirds of the current total

number of such professionals by 1995, if growth

does not occur.

The civil engineering profession as a whole

will not be affected because a large number of

civil engineers graduate annually. Within some

disciplines, such as geotechnical engineering,

construction management, and wastewater engineering, however, some changes will be required.

Increased opportunities for environmental

chemists are evident. This is also true, to a

lesser extent, for analytical chemists, and to an

even smaller extent for organic chemists. There

appears to be increased demand for risk assessment specialists, although the total demand is

small and will remain relatively small (perhaps

500 people).

By contrast, the changes in demand for geochemists, industrial hygienists, biologists,

chemical engineers, and the other remaining

critical skills do not seem likely to pose undue

strains on the present populations in these

fields.

Of equal or greater concern to the number

of technical specialists available is their quality
252 ● Superfund Strategy

and experience. The personnel needs survey

indicated a strong preference for experienced

middle managers, people with masters degrees

and/or 3 to 5 years of experience. The demand

for experience is going to be a major problem.

The projected rate of growth over the decade,

coupled with the relatively small base of experienced persons on which to build, will cause a

continuing shortage of fully qualified, experienced specialists in almost all the critical skills.

The impact of this shortage can be mitigated,

at least in part, with specialized training courses,

and in part, by careful personnel management

policies, but the shortages cannot be fully overcome by these measures, Nevertheless, suggestions for increased training opportunities are

made later in this chapter as one of the most

effective methods for dealing with this

problem.

Other Factors

Other factors affecting the future availability of technical specialists for hazardous waste

cleanups should also be noted. Survey respondents noted problems already with employee

burnout due to job stress and heavy workloads.

This appears true both in the administrative

agencies and in technical and administrative

jobs with contractors and consultants.

EPA’s system of awarding major contracts

for the Superfund program may create some

problems in providing a stable technical work

force. Because it cannot be guaranteed that

contracts will be renewed, large consulting

firms are hesitant to invest in developing skills

of employees who may have to be let go. Longterm employment commitments for technical

specialists may be limited. In submitting contract proposals, many firms rely on the qualifications of persons not yet employed or under

contract to them. Once the contract is awarded,

the team will be assembled. Some professionals

may be offered as staff by several different

firms competing for the same contract. If a major contract is not renewed, experienced site

assessment and remedial design teams may

break up and disperse.

Shortages at State or Federal agencies caused

by hiring freezes or noncompetitive pay-scales

could greatly hamper the cleanup programs.

A recent ASTSWMO study (1983) explored

these issues at the State agencies and found

them to be important. 20

Increased use of technicians and less qualified professionals in field and site investigators

hinges on the availability of experienced professionals to manage these teams. This underscores the importance of augmenting the supply of experienced professionals,

The survey also found that training in health

and safety procedures for all current and future

onsite employees will be required. Although

the market is likely to respond to the demand

for expansion of such courses and training facilities without government help, there may be

some need for government assistance in quality

control and monitoring.

Encouraging Technical Training for

Hazardous Waste Cleanups

OTA’s analysis concluded that the greatest

need is for experienced scientists and engineers. There do not appear to be major problems in providing basic technical training to

enough people, Methods for gaining practical

experience rapidly are essential. Although

nothing can fully substitute for years of on-thejob experience in the field, several alternatives

can help.

The personnel needs survey asked questions

about ways to gain experience. The results are

shown in table 7-13. There were differences in

preferences among respondents, The EPA,

Superfund contractors, and industry respondents favored intensive retraining/refresher

courses, while State agencies and other consulting firms favored masters level graduate

training.

ZOThe ASTSWM(l report is published as: U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, “S~ate Pa-rticipation in the Superfund Program, CERCLA Section 301(a)(l)(E) Study” (Washington, DC: Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, December 1984).
Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups ● 253

Table 7-1 3.—Preferences

Respondent/training method

EPA :

0 Undergraduate training .,

for Training

Choice ranking

Graduate (MS) Training . . . . . . . .

Retraining/refresher courses .

On job training . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State Superfund agencies:

Undergraduate training . . . . . .

Graduate (MS) training . . . . . . .

Retraining/refresher course s

On job training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Superfund contractors:

Undergraduate training . . . . .

Graduate (MS) training . . . . . . . .

Retraining/refresher course s

On job training . . . . ...

Private consultants:

Undergraduate training .

Graduate (MS) training ... . . . .

Retraining/refresher courses . . . . .

On job training . . . . . . . .

Industry:

Undergraduate training . . . . . . .

Graduate (MS) training .

Retraining/refresher course s

On job training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Academic:

Undergraduate training ., .. .

Graduate (MS) trainin g

Retraining/refresher course s

On job training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1st 2d

. . . 0....4.

2

9

2

2

4

3

3

1

2

4

3

0

4

2

1

0

1

3

1

0

1

1

0

5

3

5

2

3

5

2

0

2

3

5

1

2

2

3

0

3

2

1

0

1

1

0

3d

...9

5

1

3

2

4

3

3

2

4

2

2

0

2

2

4

0

1

0

3

0

0

0

2

4th

. .

1

0

3

6

1

1

4

7

2

1

0

7

0

2

0

5

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

SOURCE A Keith Turner, Potential for Future Shortages of Technical Person

nel for a National Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites final report Nov.

30, 1984

Each method has advantages and disadvantages. The intensive courses, if properly prepared, can significantly upgrade skills in a

short time. Graduate training is slower, usually more expensive, but offers a greater depth

and breadth of study. It also allows for the continued development of improved method s

through research programs.

Accordingly, a strategy combining the two

methods appears beneficial:

1. develop additional intensive short course

programs for training and retraining and

for maintaining skills; and

2. expand graduate research and training

programs.

A number of short courses and programs are

currently offered by universities, professional

societies, and private firms. Their quality is not

uniform. In addition, there are limited sources

of public information available, beyond that offered by the EPA.

A selected number of regional technical centers might be established to assist in the following:

offer short courses on topics of interest to

hazardous waste professionals, including

health and safety training;

develop graduate programs for hazardous

waste cleanup skills within existing academic disciplines;

conduct research on technical problems at

cleanups;

enhance the current EPA technical guidelines literature with other guidelines, technical memoranda, and reports aimed at the

public, local and regional planning officials, and others; and

serve as regional public information clearinghouses to assist the public, businesses,

and State and local governments on hazardous waste issues, much as the existing

State Water Resource Research Centers

and Agricultural Extension Stations have

assisted their clients in the past.

Such regional centers should be explicitly

identified and funded for these activities. The

cost would be a small fraction of the total cleanup budget and could be a solid investment in

the overall program efficiency.

Sources. The following OTA working papers

were used in the preparation of this chapter:

1.

2.

3.

4.

George J. Trezak, “A Case Study of the Sylvester Superfund Site, ” February 1985;

ERM-Midwest, Inc., “Case Study: Seymour Recycling Corporation, Seymour, Indiana,” March 1984;

George J. Trezak, “Engineering Case Study

of the Stringfellow Superfund Site, ” August 1984; and

A. Keith Turner, “Potential for Future

Shortages of Technical Personnel for National Cleanup of uncontrolled Hazardous

Waste Sites,” NO V. 30, 1984.

38–745 0 – 85 – 10
Chapter 8

Public Participation and Public

Confidence in the Superfund Program
Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pub.

The

ic Participation Provisions Under CERCLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

National Contingency Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EPA Proposed Changes to NAP ...,..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The EPA Community Relations Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Superfund Program in Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The National Priorities List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fund-Financed Removals and Remedial Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Enforcement and Other Legal Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Participation Under CERCLA Versus RCRA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

257

258

259

260

263

263

264

265

267

271

273
Chapter 8

Public Participation and Public

Confidence in the Superfund Program

SUMMARY

Public confidence in the Superfund program

is vital to its success, The Superfund program,

however, contains few formal opportunities for

public participation in decisionmaking. In this

chapter, the term “public” includes local residents, community groups, businesses, organizations such as environmental groups, and business and trade associations. “Public” also

generally includes potentially responsible parties; however, discussion of their specific involvement in cleanups, negotiation of settlements, and liability issues is beyond the scope

of this chapter.

Public participation does not necessarily

slow the implementation of Superfund cleanups. While public participation adds steps to

the process, which take time, it also adds public support. Public support can help a cleanup

progress smoothly and effectively, while shortcutting public review in the hope of speeding

cleanups can have unintended adverse effects.

Public review of the adequacy of site assessments and other contractor work is a check on

the quality of work and the effectiveness of

remedial activities, and public scrutiny of agency performance can help management of the

Superfund program.

The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)

information dissemination programs have received mixed reviews. Although some programs have drawn praise for keeping people

informed, information dissemination itself offers only a one-way communication that does

not substitute for active participation in decisionmaking. If cleanup strategies are developed

behind closed doors, the public will feel disenfranchised and suspicious, eroding public confidence in the Superfund program.

The principal opportunity for public involvement in Superfund cleanups occurs late in the

decisionmaking process after a proposed cleanup strategy has been identified. Even though

the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study

(RI/FS) process may have lasted for several

years and remedial design and construction of

an approved remedy may take several more

years, the time allowed for review and comment may only be several weeks. Effective participation is frequently hindered because the

public may lack the expertise needed to analyze complex environmental, public health, and

technological issues. EPA, with rare exception,

does not provide funds for citizens to hire technical advisers.

The limited opportunity for public involvement in decisionmaking to develop specific

cleanup plans and the inability of public groups

to obtain costly technical advice can affect the

type of cleanups that are undertaken at Superfund sites. For example, local residents who

do not understand complex remedial technologies or who are not involved in the development of cleanup plans can be less likely than

their more technically oriented counterparts to:

a) support more permanent cleanup strategies

based on onsite treatment or decontamination

of hazardous wastes, and b) understand if such

permanent cleanups are not yet available. Lack

of technical expertise can also result in some

viable cleanup strategies that might be acceptable to the local population being prematurely

rejected or not considered by EPA.

The pollution problems and community concerns at every Superfund site are substantial,

Furthermore, the problems of assigning responsibility among large numbers of former

257
258 ● Superfund Strategy

waste disposers are unparalleled. The complexity and variety of Superfund issues complicates

attempts to modify the program to increase

public participation, Opening the doors to public participation in negotiations and enforcement actions, granting new access to the courts

for the public to seek redress of grievances, and

even increasing public access to data collected

in the course of Superfund activities are all

confronted by some

counterarguments,

often equally compelling

That public participation in the Superfund

program could be improved is clear. How to

go about making the improvements is not nearly so obvious, and there currently is no clear

consensus, even among groups in the public

sector, on precisely how it should be accomplished. 1

I See the ‘‘National (:ont Ingenc\r Pla n‘ Se(;t ion below fur a descript ion of how EPA’s re(;ent proposed (:ha nges to the N’C P

~iou ld add ress (;oncerns about pub] 1(; participation.

INTRODUCTION

“The Superfund community relations program encourages two-way communication between communities affected by releases of hazardous substances and agencies responsible for

cleanup actions . . . An effective community relations program must be an integral part of

every Superfund action.“2 These words, amid

other EPA policy statements, attest to the perceived importance of public participation in

Superfund decisionmaking and establish an

EPA objective to promote public involvement

in the Superfund program,

This chapter compares that EPA objective

with how public participation actually works

in the Superfund program. It discusses the provisions for, and constraints on, public participation during the development of the national

Superfund program and during the implementation of cleanup programs at individual Superfund sites. The chapter examines the public’s

efforts to become involved in Superfund decisionmaking, both through avenues provided by

the program and through other pathways. It

also assesses how participation has shaped

overall public confidence in the Superfund program, confidence that has been shaken in recent years by the slow pace of program implementation at many sites and previously during

the period when allegations of program mis2 (J. S. E n ~’i ro n mental Protection Agency, ‘‘Co m m u n it}’ Relations in Superf’und: A Handbook, ” Interim \’ersion (Washington, 11(;: September 1983), p. ‘1 Introduction. Hereafter referred

to as the Communit} Relations Handbook,

management by top officials within EPA were

being made. Finally, the chapter compares public participation in the Superfund program

with other environmental programs, most notably with the hazardous waste permitting process of the Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act (RCRA).

For the purpose of this chapter, the term

“public” refers broadly to anyone who is not

working as an employee or under contract to

a government agency directly responsible for

implementing the Superfund program. Thus,

the public includes citizens living near Superfund sites, businesses, local governments, organizations such as environmental groups, professional and trade associations, and potentially responsible parties (PRPs). PRPs can be

made to clean up sites or to reimburse the government for fund-financed cleanups. PRPs

share with the public many of the same concerns about the availability of information and

opportunities to participate in decisionmaking

about remedial activities. PRPs, however, can

be held liable for the costs of cleanup and in

some cases for punitive damages. This liability exposure creates additional complications

for PRP participation that do not apply to other

groups. PRPs are or may soon be involved in

adversarial proceedings with the EPA. Litigation strategies may influence the governments’

willingness to share information with PRPs.

Litigation considerations may also limit the

PRP’s willingness to work with other members

of the public.
Ch. 8—Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program ● 259

—

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROVISIONS UNDER CERCLA

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of

1980 (CERCLA) has, compared to other key

environmental laws enacted since 1970, few requirements for, or references to, public participation in decisionmaking. The only guaranteed

opportunities for public involvement occur as

a result of Federal agency rulemaking proceedings mandated by CERCLA. The Act contains

11 rulemaking requirements.3 Under the Administrative Procedures Act, rulemaking would normally include a public comment period on the

proposed regulations. CERCLA requires that

the following be accomplished through rulemaking:

Designating hazardous substances and establishing reportable quantities of hazardous substances (Section 102).

Establishing information reporting requirements (Section 103).

Defining emergency procurement powers

(Section 104).

Revising the National Contingency Plan

(Section 105). (There are several requirements for rulemaking in this section. )

Evaluating a program of optional private

post-closure liability insurance for hazardous waste facilities (Section 107).

Determining financial responsibility for

vehicles (Section 108),

Assigning money-spending powers to government officials (Section 11 1).

Giving notice to potential injured parties

(Section 111).

Establishing procedures for filing claims

(Section 112)

Section 113 of CERCLA discusses access to

the courts by parties that disagree with EPA

actions. Subsection (a) permits the public to

seek judicial review of any Federal regulation

promulgated under the Act in the U.S. Circuit

Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. Additionally, subsection (b) provides that “ . . . the

—

q F’red An(iers[jn, ~\’fJ,qot/iltiorl dnd lr]fc)rm:il .JI~Jt’nc..\ .lftlufl. ‘1’h(’

(.’,],s[’ [)/ S[J/)crf[/nf/, Report to the A(lmin i~t rat it (I [;()]lf(!rf?n(:[’ of

thl’ [ ‘.s,, Nla} 25, 1984.

United States district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies

arising under this Act . . . ,“ but it is silent on

who has standing to bring suit regarding what

types of controversies. These are the only statements in CERCLA concerning the rights of the

public to initiate or participate in legal actions

related to Superfund activities.

Absent from CERCLA are provisions allowing “citizen suits” to be brought against the

government or a private party, such as a potentially responsible party, thought to be acting in violation of the law. Citizen suits are explicitly permitted under most other major

environmental protection laws including the

Clean Air Act (Section 304), the Clean Water

Act (Section 505), the Endangered Species Act

(Section 11g), and the Toxic Substances Control Act (Section 20).4 Moreover, CERCLA does

not define procedures by which the public may

petition EPA to promulgate new regulations

under the Act. Citizen petition provisions are

contained in the Toxic Substances Control Act

(Section 21) and the Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act (Section 7004). 5 Finally,

CERCLA does not guarantee that the public

may intervene in Superfund negotiation or enforcement actions involving potentially responsible parties,6

and several courts have ruled that

community groups may not join Superfund

lawsuits as intervening parties.7 These limitations in CERCLA may have resulted from concerns about delays in the cleanup process and

about problems associated with getting PRPs

to fund cleanups if the public were more directly involved.

CERCLA contains instructions to guide the

EPA as it develops the Superfund program,

——

4Jerl Bidirrger, “ HaiHrdous ~1’aste (;leanup in Lt’}urning: 1,[;R,II

Tools Airailable to the Prilatc (citizen, ” L<in(i ,i[llf 1l’cftf’r l.<i \\’

Rf?\ if:~~, 1984.

5!Vatu ral Resources Dcfen ~c ( ;OU n(: i 1, hfc rn[) rii n(i ~i m f r( J III Iii n (>

Bloom to the Superfun(l R(;,]~]tt~O1’lz(ltlO1l” (I(),illtl()n, lar~ :1, 198:),

pp. 9-11,

‘I bid., p. 1

71<an(l\’ h!ott, lf+ttf:r to Kdrf>n I ,ar>f~n, of fi(:f ” of ‘1’f’(:tlt~t]l(]g}

;lssf;~~mf;nt, ~(It. 30, 1984. l~crflaftf:r refflrrf?[l to d~ ttlt~ \lott

lt;t t f)r,
260 . Superfund Strategy

but, with one exception, these instructions

make no reference to public involvement. F o r

example, CERCLA requires that the Attorney

General be consulted prior to the issuance of

“guidelines for using the imminent hazard, enforcement, and emergency response authorities” (Section 106(c)), but does not require public review of those guidelines. Similarly,

Section 105(8)(B) requires that “each State shall

establish . . . priorities for remedial action,” but

it does not order the States to allow public involvement during that process, nor does it insist on public participation during EPA reviews

of State nominations.

The one exception, Section 105(4), requires

that the revised National Contingency Plan examine the “appropriate roles and responsibilities for the Federal, State, and local governments and for interstate and nongovernmental

entities in effectuating the plan” (emphasis

added). While the public is not mentioned specifically, it could arguably be considered a subset of nongovernmental entities. No guidance

is offered about how the “appropriate roles”

might be determined.

CERCLA was drafted during an era when for

the first time many abandoned hazardous

waste sites were discovered to be leaking substances that could endanger public health.

News of “toxic timebombs” such as Love Canal, New York, appeared in the press routinely.

These announcements, coupled with the apparent inability of the government or private parties to take quick action to protect the health

of people living near the sites, heightened public fears and created an emotionally charged

atmosphere. In that environment, Congress enacted a law to facilitate a rapid response by the

Federal Government to what many thought

was a national emergency.

The law seems to reflect a belief that this is

a problem best handed to the experts. The extent of pollution and the public health threats

it causes at many uncontrolled hazardous

waste sites is poorly understood. The selection

of appropriate cleanup technologies often requires sophisticated engineering and scientific

judgments. The assignment of liability to parties that caused environmental problems involves difficult legal issues. The two themes of

promoting quick action and domination of

decisionmaking by EPA and technical experts

acting on behalf of a frightened public are

reflected in CERCLA and guide the development and implementation of the Superfund

program.

THE NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN

CERCLA ordered the EPA to develop a framework for the Superfund program in the form

of Federal regulations incorporated into the

National Contingency Plan (NCP), first developed under the Clean Water Act,

Public participation during the NCP revision

process took two forms—litigation and formal

public comments on proposed regulations. Litigation resulted because the EPA missed the

June 9, 1981 statutory deadline for promulgating revisions to the NCP. The Environmental

Defense Fund (EDF) then sued in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington, D. C.,

seeking a court order forcing EPA to propose

NCP revisions.8

The suit was later combined

with a similar action by the State of New Jersey.

9 On February 12, 1982, the court ruled in

favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the EPA to

complete NCP revisions by May 13, 1982.10 The

deadline was extended for 15 days by the court

on March 18, 1982, to provide additional time

for public comment on the proposed rules

————.——

8U. ,S. Court of Appealsj District of Co] u ml) ia Ci rcu it, ( J ik’ i 1 ,4c -

tion $81-2083,

~Ll, S. (JOU rt of Appca ls, I)ist ri[; t of (lo] u nlt)i;] (j i r(:u i t, (:i ii I A[; -

t ion #81-225fl.

IIJ1)[)C isi ~ 11 r)Llh] i Sh(;(] i n th(: Iin t’ironmen t~]) I.:i t~ Ke])ort(:l” ;I t

12 1{1, R 20376-20378, April 1982.
Ch. 8—Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program ● 261

(which was expanded from 30 to 45 days). 11

The final regulations were promulgated on July

16, 1982.12

During the 45-day comment period, EPA received 146 written statements from the public,

government agencies, and industry that included

over 1,000 pages of text.13 The preamble to the

final regulations notes that the regulations were

modified in response to comments. However,

with one except ion, EPA rejected every recommendation to expand public participation procedures outlined in the draft NCP. The preamble noted four major themes contained in

comments related to public participation: 14

●

●

●

●

there should be stronger advocacy of public participation in the NCP;

the draft NCP placed too much authority

in the hands of the lead agency and the National Response Team;

some procedure should be established to

help the public understand what cleanup

actions were being taken; and

the NCP should include specific public

participation requirements.

Consequently, EPA added a provision requiring that government personnel “be sensitive to

local community concerns (in accordance with

applicable guidance)” when assessing the need

for, planning, or undertaking Superfund-financed

actions. l5 However, EPA did not include the

guidance as part of the regulations, nor did it

define any specific public participation requirements,

With regard to other comments related to

public involvement in the Superfund program,

EPA rejected a request that the Hazard Ranking System (HRS) be expanded to include consideration of nontechnical factors—including

community interests—when used to assess the

severity of a site’s environmental problems.

EPA reasoned that the appropriate place to

consider community interests was during the

development of cleanup strategies, well after

the site ranking.16 However, sites not receiving a high hazard ranking are not considered

for remedial cleanup actions.

Also relevant to the “community interest”

issue is that the HRS scoring criteria does consider population density near sites. That criterion can create a bias in favor of adding NPL

sites in populated regions in comparison to

equally hazardous sites in sparsely populated

regions. To the extent that densely populated

regions are likely to have high levels of community interest compared to rural areas, adding a specific ‘‘communit}’ interest criterion

to the HRS could exacerbate that bias.

EPA also rejected a recommendation that

meetings of the National Response Team be

open to the public by saying that ‘‘such a provision is not appropriate in this Plan, since

some meetings may be public and others may

require executive session.” 17 Finally, recommendations that private parties be allowed to

suggest to EPA that particular On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) of Superfund actions be replaced were also denied. EPA continued to limit such suggestions to the Regional Response

Teams—which contain no members from the

public-reasoning that “it is inappropriate to

encourage such requests in the Plan, especially

since the OSC will often be involved in situations where private parties have failed to clean

up properly. ”18

The final NCP is similar to CERCLA itself

in its lack of specificity with regard to required

public involvement in Superfund activities. It

is perhaps notable that the word “public” does

not appear anywhere in the introductory Section 300.3 which defines the scope of the entire NCP.

In addition to the requirements, cited above,

for “sensitivity to local community concerns”

when studying cleanup options and for public comments on proposed additions to the

NPL, the following NCP sections address public participation issues:

• “Federal agencies should coordinate planning and response action with affected

1 ~1~ ~ ~~[;(~(!l.;i I K[;~ 1 st(!r :J 1 18 i’.

1“4 7 1:(>(1 (~ra I R(Ig i stt’ r 31 ] 97.

184 ~ ~.If,fj ~,rd ] R [,X i ~t(?r 311 !l 7.
262 ● Superfund Strategy

State and local government and private citizens” (40 CFR 300.22(b).

“Industry groups, academic organizations,

and others are encouraged to commit resources for response operations” (40 CFR

300.25(a)).

“It is particularly important to use valuable technical and scientific information

generated by the nongovernment local

community along with those from Federal

and State government to assist the OSC in

devising strategies where effective standard techniques are unavailable” (40 CFR

300.25(b)).

“Federal local contingency plans should

establish procedures to allow for wellorganized, worthwhile, and safe use of volunteers” (40 CFR 300.25(c)),

“The USCG (U.S. Coast Guard) Public Information Assist Team (PIAT) and the

EPA Public Affairs Assist Team (PAAT)

may help the OSCs and regional or district

offices meet the demands for public information and participation during major responses. Requests for these teams may be

made through the (National Response Center)” (40 CFR 300.34(f)).

The promulgation of the final revised NCP

precipitated a second legal challenge by EDF

and the State of New Jersey.l9 The plaintiffs

argued that the NCP did not contain the necessary information in sufficient detail to comply with CERCLA,20 Negotiations between EPA

and the plaintiffs resulted in a consent decree

signed on January 16, 1984.21 In the agreement,

EPA promised to propose further revisions to

the NCP to address six major issues, one of

which was public participation, Specifically

EPA agreed to the following:

EPA will propose amendments to the NCP

to (a) require development of Community Relations Plans for all Funded-financed response

measures, (b) require public review of the Feasibility Studies for all Fund-financed response

measures, and (c) provide comparable public

1~~[ .s. ( ;(JL1 rt of ~ppea]s, I)ist ricf of (;oIu mbia ( ;irco it, Ci\’il ACtiuns #82-2234 and #82-2238.

ZOB()~ Per(:ilra], E II irir~n mental Defense Fund ( E D F), personal

communication, oct, 9, 1984.

ll(:ol)l, of the Settlement Agreement obtained from EIIF.

participation for private-party response measures undertaken pursuant to enforcement actions.22

EPA released a second draft version of possible regulatory language to the plaintiffs in

September 1984. The draft requires community

relations plans at every Superfund site and

orders a 21-day public comment period on all

feasibility studies.23 These actions have to date

been EPA policy, but they have not been regulatory requirements. Also, the draft contains

language that would permit public participation in enforcement actions, but only when

EPA determines that public participation will

be “useful to further the cause of settlement. ”

EDF has taken issue with that condition by responding to EPA as follows:

This requirement ignores the fact that the

central purpose of public participation is not

to facilitate settlements but rather to deal effectively with the concerns of the surrounding community , . . If public representatives

are willing to comply with the other conditions, including small numbers, technical and

legal expertise, and a pledge of confidentiality,

they should be permitted to participate in the

negotiations. 24

It is important to note that many people disagree, at least in part, with EDF’s position on

public involvement in all stages of enforcement

actions. One lawyer believes, for example, that

“public participation in enforcement cases is

a potential necessity, but public access to settlement discussions would have a potentially

disastrous effect on voluntary cleanup. We

have generally conducted all our negotiations

in the open, but this is the exception, not the

rule and, even then, on some issues privacy is

critical. ”25 A paper on Superfund negotiations

written for the Administrative Conference of

the United States cites discussions involving

the allocation of cleanup costs among private

parties or involving analysis of the amount, tox-

‘Z[bicl., p. 2,

~“’(~omments of the Enkironrnental Defense Fund on the Sept.

10, 1984, Draft Revisions to the National Contingency Plan, ”

Oct. 1, 1984, p. 8. Mailed from EDF’s Washington, DC, office

to EI]A.

241 bid,, p. 8.

ZSMott ]etter, op. Cit.
Ch. 8—Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program ● 263

icity, longevity, and condition of the wastes deposited by individual parties as examples of

issues that might require privacy.26

EPA Proposed Changes to NCP

On January 28, 1985, EPA announced its proposed changes to the NCP.27 A number of important changes have been proposed concerning public participation. However, the proposal

undergoes public comment for 60 days and it

is not now possible for OTA to know how the

proposal may be changed in response to public comments or how the new NCP will be implemented. Nevertheless, the proposed changes

significantly address concerns about public

participation.

A new section to Subpart C on Organization

entitled Public Information is proposed. This

sets up the mechanism to “address public information at a response, ” The purpose is to ensure “that all appropriate public and private

interests are kept informed and their concerns

considered throughout a response, ”

A new section to Subpart F on Hazardous

Substance Response entitled Community Relations is proposed. The Preamble notes that:

“The purpose of the community relations program is to provide communities with accurate

information about problems posed by releases

of hazardous substances, and give local officials and citizens the opportunity to comment

on the technical solutions to the site problems. ”

A formal community relations plan is required

for all removal actions and all remedial actions,

including enforcement actions, but not for

“short term or urgent removal actions or ur-

~~A\ n c][: r>c)n, (J~). ( it., p. 9 ~.

“Th~! r[~~lsi[)n~ ,]r[’ ~)uh]lshed at 5[) Ftwlcral Rc,glstf:r 5861, F’eh.

12, 1985

gent enforcement actions. ” Moreover, the formal plan is to be “based on discussions with

citizens in the community” and “should be reviewed by the public, ” The plan “should be developed and implementation begun prior to

field activities” for remedial actions, including

enforcement actions. A “responsible party may

develop and implement specific parts of the

community relations plan with lead agency

oversight .“ Furthermore:

. . . the minimum public comment period allowed for review of feasibility studies for remedial actions at NPL. releases shall be 21 calendar days. The comment period is to be held

prior to final selection of the reined} and allows for effective community and responsible

party input into the decision making process.

The public may also have the opportunity to

comment during the development of the feasibility study. This will provide the public

with advanced warning as to possible remedial alternatives.

Records of decision would be required to have

a responsiveness summary “addressing the major issues raised by the community. ”

Lastly, with regard to the interactions b e -

tween the lead agency and PRPs, there could

be meetings with “a limited number of representatives of the public, where these representatives have adequate legal and technical capability and can provide appropriate assurances

concerning any confidential information that

may arise during the discussions, if in the judgment of the lead Agency such meetings may

facilitate resolution of issues involving the

appropriate remedy at the site. ”

Note that the remainder of this chapter examines and discusses the current Superfund

program, even though some of the above

changes might address the issues and concerns

that now exist.

THE EPA COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAM

The Community Relations Program defines than law or regulation. The document that curpublic participation procedures that agency rently explains the program is a September

staff should follow as a matter of policy, rather 1983 report entitled “Community Relations in
264 ● Superfund Strategy

Superfund: A Handbook,” It describes in detail

public participation activities that EPA staff

should conduct during the development and

implementation of cleanup efforts at Superfund sites. (The specifics of how the program

is operated are discussed later in this chapter,)

Despite the length of the handbook—over 100

pages—and its degree of detail, there are some

notable limitations to the program it defines.

First, the document is an “interim version” and

is incomplete. For example, an entire chapter

concerning public participation in enforcement actions is missing. EPA has drafted several versions of the chapter, but none have been

adopted. 28 Secondly, the program applies only

to cleanup activities at NPL sites. It does not

include procedures to promote public participation during the review of proposed regulations or policy or during the hazard ranking

or site selection processes, Thirdly, the program focuses on public participation activities

by EPA employees, it does not establish legally

enforceable minimal requirements for public

involvement at Superfund sites. As explained

above, EPA has agreed to promulgate new reg-

~B~l ~ r~a ret R ~ rl(~il ]), L)~l]Ut} 111 rector of” the (Iffice of Pub] ic

Affairs EPA Region II and I.illian Johnson, Superfund (~ommun it~r Relations Coordinator EPA Region 11, personal communl-

(;ations, ()(:t. 24, 1984. Hereafter referred to as the EPA Region

11 interi’iew.

ulations requiring Community Relations Plans,

but implementing the program is currently discretionary.

Finally, the handbook is designed to help

EPA officials develop community relations programs, not to help the public participate in

them, Indeed, the handbook specifically cautions that it:

. . . does not serve as a public participation

manual, In the past, several public participation manuals have been prepared for EPA,

particularly in the water program. Readers

that need detailed guidance on public participation techniques . . . should consult these

manuals. 29

The Superfund program differs considerably

from other EPA programs. The task of explaining public participation procedures to the public has fallen to citizen groups involved in

Superfund issues. For example, the Environmental Defense Fund has published a public

participation manual entitled Dumpsite Cleanups: A Citizen Guide to the Superfund Program .30

———. —

~g(; orllnlunlt}, K~latlOnS H and book, OP. [; it., P. 1 -~.

~(]En ~,i ron menta] I)efen se Fund, Dompsjtf; C,’Jf?~Il [1/). $.’ A Cili-

.xen L’uide tO the Superfund Program, L\’asbington, 1)(;, 1983.

klereafter referred to as I)umpsite (;leanups.

THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM IN ACTION

The actual implementation of the Superfund ond phase involves selecting and conducting

program can be divided into two phases. The cleanup programs at uncontrolled sites, includfirst involves identifying potential sites for ing emergency and remedial cleanup actions,

Superfund cleanup and ranking those sites ac- EPA provides opportunities for public particicording to the severity of the environmental pation in each of these phases, as discussed

and human health risks they present. The sec- later.
Ch. 8–Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program ● 265

The National Priorities List

With the exception of some short-term emergency actions, cleanup of a hazardous waste

site as part of the Superfund program is not

undertaken unless the site is on the National

Priorities List (NPL), which is revised periodically. A site cannot become part of the NPL unless it has been identified as a potential NPL

candidate and the severity of its pollution problems have been evaluated.

While EPA states the purpose of the NPL

merely “as an informational tool for use by

EPA in identifying sites that appear to present

a significant risk to public health or the environment, “

31 appearance of a site on the NPL

has other implications. For example, listing can

provide State leverage to pressure EPA for

cleanup funds or offer citizens groups information with which to pressure EPA, States,

and responsible parties to take actions. Also,

publication of the list and the press coverage

that accompanies it provide a way for the public to learn about the Nation’s hazardous waste

problems and track the progress of the Superfund program, On the other hand, NPL listing

can have some potential adverse consequences.

For example, appearance of a site on the NPL

can heighten community fears beyond what is

warranted by the health risks posed by the site,

and it can cause negative economic consequences such as reducing local property values. Thus, for a number of reasons many citizen groups are keenly interested in the selection

process and are anxious to participate in it.

About 19,000 uncontrolled sites have been

identified in the United States and EPA estimates that the list might ultimately reach

22,000 .

32 Many sites were identified by their

present or past operators as required under

Section 103 of CERCLA. Site identification is

an ongoing process, however, and there are

two official pathways by which the public can

bring potential Superfund candidates to EPA’s

attention. First, CERCLA and the NCP require

the National Response Center in Washington,

D. C., to record site identifications phoned in

by the public and to report this information to

the On Scene Coordinator for Superfund activities in the appropriate region, In addition,

EPA headquarters and each EPA Region maintain Superfund “hot-line” numbers that people can use to identify hazardous waste sites. 33

Once a site has been identified, its pollution

problems are evaluated. The first two steps in

this process involve the collection of information during a preliminary assessment and a site

inspection (see chapter 5), While there are no

formal opportunities for public comment during these procedures, the EPA Community Relations Handbook suggests that EPA “establish

contact by phone with State and local officials

and with key citizens” during the preliminary

assessments* Furthermore, “community relations activities during a site inspection should

focus on informing the community of site inspection activities and the likely schedule of

future events.”

3 5

The public now has no formal way to influence which sites are selected for preliminary

assessments and site inspections or when those

evaluations are conducted. In the words of

Margaret Randall, Deputy Director of the Office of Public Affairs at EPA Region 11, “EPA

decides when the (evaluation process) kicks

in. “ 3

8 One community group in Greenup, Illinois, has gone as far as holding public demonstrations at a potential Superfund site to

— -——

‘lE1)A Region 11 1 nter~’ict~’, op. cit ,

34(;{)n1m 1] n it}, ~cl at ions 1{ a nd book, ” op. (; i t., I). 3‘~.

351 bid,, ]). 3-2.

361; IJA K[;g i~ 11 11 1 n t Cnrit; m,, OP. (: it.
266 Ž Superfund Strategy

pressure EPA into beginning a preliminary

assessment. 37

If the site inspection uncovers potential or

actual discharges of hazardous substances, the

HRS is used to evaluate and “score” its pollution problems. The development of the HRS itself included some public participation. Public comment was solicited on an HRS model

proposed by EPA in a Federal Register notice

along with the draft NCP on March 12, 1982.38

EPA received extensive comments on the HRS

and modified it in several ways prior to adopting a final version on July 16, 1982.39

The development of the HRS also involved

an unusual effort by the Senate Appropriations

Subcommittee on HUD—Independent Agencies to sponsor a workshop on the topic attended by representatives from industry, government, and one environmental organization.

The 2-day workshop, convened on March 19

and 20, 1982, in the midst of the public comment period on the draft NCP and HRS, was

moderated by a professional mediator, and a

written record of portions of the proceedings

was later published .40 While the information

and opinions discussed at the workshop were

not entered into the public comment record for

the draft HRS, EPA officials were present and

the meetings provided an avenue for public

participation in the HRS decisionmaking process.

There are no opportunities for public participation during the application of the HRS to

sites after the site inspection. Moreover, there

are no public participation provisions during

the reviews performed subsequently by the

States and the EPA. HRS scores and the worksheets produced during the evaluations are not

made public either by States or the EPA unless

——- - .—— sv~ob(;rt (; insbllr~, (;lt lx~ns for a Better Enlrironnlt?nt, pCI’SOIlii]

(:ommuni(:at ion, Oct. 8, 1984.

w47 ~t}[][?ra] Register 10975, Mar. 12, 1982.

J947 F~c\er~] Register 31186-31191, JuIs’ 1 ~, 1982.

40,$f1 m [; 115 Hla n, Serl i or ASSOC iate of the (;onscr~’at ion FOU ncfation, persona] communication, Oct. 5, 1984. The written record of the workshop appears as kt’orkshop on Selection of Hazarlic~lls 11’a.ste ,Sites for Super f’und Fondings. Sponsored b~’ thf:

,S[]!](:[):rlxr]ittf:t? of I)epartment of’ Housing al]d 1 Jrbtin De\elop-

[r]el]t-ll][it?~]f’lldeI] t ,qgencies of the Committfw on Appropriations, { ‘.S. Sena(e, hiar. 19-20, 1982 (Washington [)C: ().S. (loiIern men t Print i ng office, 1982). Hereafter referred to ~s tbc

Workshop” Record.

and until the EPA publishes a list of sites proposed for inclusion on the NPL. EPA treats information on sites that are not added to the

NPL as privileged and it is not available to the

public.

Once proposed additions to the NPL have

been published in the Federal Register, a 30-

day public comment begins. At the beginning

of the comment period, EPA releases ranking

worksheets and other background information,

but only for sites named for the NPL. Comments were received on about 50 percent of the

sites named to the first proposed NPL list.

About 90 percent of the comments came from

potentially responsible parties and changes

were made in the rankings for about 2 percent

of the sites based on information provided in

the public comments.41 During the most recent

proposed NPL listing, completed in September

1984, EPA received 128 comments. Fifty of the

133 proposed sites were the focus of 112 comments. Only 16 comments addressed sites not

included on the proposed list.42

In short, the public is completely excluded

from the draft NPL selection process itself, and

then is provided information only about proposed NPL candidates to assist them in preparing comments. Although many people are concerned that sites with severe toxic pollution

problems might be omitted from the NPL (see

chapter 5), the current decisionmaking process does not offer them an opportunity to examine why sites were rejected.

Thus, the current process does not generate

public confidence that sites not named to the

NPL list have been justifiably omitted. As a result, some experts believe that “every site

picked is bad, but not every bad site is

picked." 43 Others, such as PRPs, believe that

the NPL selection process overscores as many

sites as it underscores. q’

Several groups have attempted to obtain information about sites not proposed to the NPL,

41 ~ ~S(; ~~li~e, op. cit., p. 4.

q“’13ackground Information: National Priorities I,ist [ Jpdate

#l, Sf?ptflmber 1984, ” obtained from fZf]A Region 11.

4JI.inria Creer, Environmental Defense Funci, personal [;omrnunication, ~ct. 8, 1984.

44 Mot t ]f)t tf!I’, op. cit.
Ch. 8—Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program ● 267

or to influence which sites are placed on the

list. For example, prior to the publication of the

first NPL candidate list, a law firm filed a Freedom of Information Act request seeking data

about the sites submitted by the States. The request was refused. The firm had better luck at

the State level. According to an attorney at the

firm, “we had input into the 115 list solely because we went to States and found the candidates they were submitting and (somehow )

managed to whip in data and information in

the process. ”45

The staff of a public interest organization in

Ohio had a completely different experience.

They attempted to obtain information from the

State environmental agency about a site that

had been evaluated, but their request was

denied. The information was obtained from

EPA, however, not as part of EPA policy, but

unofficially from a sympathetic agency employee. 46

Bonnie Exner, representing the Colorado Citizen Action Network, was involved in a review

of a ranking process at the Lowry Landfill site

near Denver that resulted in a reevaluated

score 20 points higher than originally calculated. Several years ago during a controversy

over the permitting of an operating hazardous

waste facility at Lowry, the Governor formed

the Lowry Landfill Monitoring Committee, an

advisory group that included local citizens and

representatives of EPA, the State health department, local government, and a waste disposal

company, After a 300-acre ” area within the

much larger landfill site was evaluated as part

of the Superfund program, the local citizens

decided to perform their own HRS scoring.

When the citizens’ score turned out to be much

higher than the official evaluation, they “forced

the issue, ” in Exner’s words, and the higher

score was ultimately submitted by the State to

EPA as part of its NPL nomination. 4 7

As a final example, a citizens group in California, Concerned Neighbors in Action, used

‘

- ~i~~’tjr-~~l~fj~l rf;f,or(l, (j~). (it., p 8 ~ %t cl’cn I ,estcr, ( ;It Izcn (Heii ringh[)usc for I i a m rd{)us J}’;I jtc~,

11](.., pt:r~f]ndl (.orrlrr]~lrli(.:itif~r], ()(t. 11, 1 {184,

J 7 tjorl 11 I ~1 I; ~ Iltlr, (; 01 [) rt~clo (; }t I Z[;II ~(: ! I [~ n N [;t ~~’( j I’ h, ~wrs( ) II it I

(.omrnun](,at lorl, ()(. t, 18. 1 C)84.

lobbying and a threatened press conference to

expose conditions at the Stringfellow Acid Pits

to influence the State selection process, The

Stringfellow site did not receive the highest

ranking of all sites evaluated in the State during the initial site selection process. But, as one

analyst has summarized, the citizens group:

. . . was very active in lobbying for the passage

of the State’s Superfund law. Prior to announcing passage of the law, the State was

leaning toward selecting the McColl dumpsite

in Fullerton as the highest priority site. The

citizens prevailed, claiming that if McColl was

selected and money was not allocated for

Stringfellow, a press conference would be

held . . . 48

The State ultimately chose Stringfellow as the

highest priority site; McColl was not placed on

the Interim Priority List, but was placed on the

1982 NPL. However, a new California ranking

process has changed the entire situation.

Fund-Financed Removals and

Remedial Responses

Removal Actions

Removal programs are categorized according to the length of time involved in the cleanup. Varying levels of community relations

activities accompany the different types of removal programs. For removals estimated to last

fewer than 5 days, the Community Relations

Handbook instructs EPA staff to be ready to

respond to requests for information from the

media, to provide information to government

officials to help them to answer questions from

their constituents, and to explain the removal

program directly to the public.49

If a removal is expected to last between 5 and

45 days, regional EPA staff must prepare a

Community Relations Profile that must be approved by EPA headquarters prior to the

undertaking of the removal program. The profile should explain the public participation pro-
268 ● Superfund Strategy

visions EPA expects to conduct during the removal, Recommended activities include designating a single EPA contact person, publicizing the phone number of the contact, providing information to government officials, holding a press conference if there is sufficient

interest, establishing a repository for documents explaining the removal, and meeting periodically with small groups of local officials

and interested citizens. so

For removals lasting between 45 days and 6

months, regional EPA staff must prepare a

Community Relations Plan as part of the Action Memorandum or Draft Cooperative Agreement that must be approved by EPA headquarters. Recommended public participation

activities during these lengthier removal actions include briefings and periodic progress

reports for officials and interested citizens,

public meetings and workshops, site tours, and

news releases describing developments at the

site. After completing the removal, regional

EPA staff must submit a “responsiveness summary” to EPA headquarters describing what

community relations activities were actually

conducted. 51

All community relations efforts at removals

have a common focus on providing information. No activities permit the public to participate in decisionmaking about what type of removal program should be implemented or how

it should be implemented. Indeed, none of the

18 suggested “community relations techniques” described in the Community Relations

Handbook for use during Superfund site activity involve public participation at the points

when cleanup decisions are actually made. 52

All the techniques involve information dissemination, tours, or citizen group meetings where

no cleanup decisions are made,

Moreover, the Community Relations Handbook instructs EPA staff to fit their activities

to respond to the degree of public interest or

concern. The higher the level of interest, the

more extensive the community relations pros~tbid,, pp. 2-3.

51 lb id,, pp. 2-7.

52 [bl(j,, pp. ~-l through A-33.

gram. There is a certain logic to this guideline,

but it places citizens groups in an awkward

position, as described by Lois Gibbs, Director

of the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous

Wastes:

The message this policy sends out is “organize and raise hell and you’ll have input—sit

back, behave yourselves and you’ll be ignored. ”

The very nature of this policy is to force

people into an adversarial role. Once a

relationship begins poorly, it is difficult, if not

impossible, to build trust.53

Because rural or low-income areas often have

fewer resources and organizations compared

to more densely populated or middle-class

areas, this could produce a bias against providing extensive community relations programs for some areas.

Remedial Actions

All remedial actions must include at least one

formal opportunity for public participation, Remedial responses must be undertaken whenever cleanup of a Superfund site cannot be accomplished within the 6-month time limit set

in CERCLA. The key steps in remedial actions

include an in-depth investigation of the site (the

remedial investigation), the development of

several cleanup plans and the selection of a

preferred alternative (called the feasibility

study), the final approval of a cleanup program,

and the execution of the cleanup.

The Community Relations Handbook explains public participation activities that may

or must occur during remedial actions. 54 Thos e

activities must be explained in an approved

Community Relations Plan prepared by regional EPA staff after meetings with local officials

and citizens to assess community concerns and

the technical complexity of the site’s pollution

problems. During the remedial investigation

and the drafting of the feasibility study, the objectives of community relations activities are

to distribute information and to elicit citizen

——————

531,() is G ibbs, ‘‘ whk, ~O~,ern ment and I n d ustr}’ H a \’(> ~’a i]d at

[~ub]lc 1)artl(;ipation it Superf’und Sites,” undated r(;print, p. 192.

s4Communit}, Re]ations Handbook, op. cit., i~[). 3-1 through

3-13,
Ch. 8—Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program Ž 269

views. The recommended techniques again focus on small or informal meetings, news releases, tours, briefings, and progress reports.

It is only after the publication of the feasibility study and the delineation of a preferred

cleanup strategy that the public is given a formal opportunity to comment to decisionmakers

on the development of a remedial action. EPA

requires that a public comment period of at

least 3 weeks must follow the release of a feasibility study; EPA may extend the comment

period upon request, and it frequently does so.

After selecting a final remedial design and

while the remedial action is occurring, EPA

continues the same sorts of information dissemination activities that characterize the earlier phases of the program. In addition, EPA

community relations staff is instructed during

the cleanup implementation phase to “make

sure local residents understand that cleanup

of the site may not resolve all problems

. . . Meetings with small groups of citizens and

officials , . . may again be the most effective

communications technique during this stage

of the response action. “

55 When a remedial a c -

tion is completed, regional EPA staff must submit a report to headquarters describing and

evaluating the overall community relations

effort.

Two general criticisms of the public participation program for Fund-financed cleanups

are frequently stated by citizens groups active

at Superfund sites. The first is that the public

is not given the opportunity to influence decisionmaking early in the process while cleanup

strategies are being selected. The second criticism is that the program does not address the

lack of technical expertise on the part of citizens groups that hampers constructive public

participation. The second issue seems to be the

most difficult one to resolve, as it involves

funding needs.

On the issue of opportunities to participate

in decision making, for example, the EDF

Dumpsites Cleanup citizen guide concludes

that: “Unfortunately, EPA has not supported

~~1 t)l(l . . ~)[). :1- 1 1.

the notion of active citizen involvement in the

dumpsite cleanup program.” 56 Steven Lester of

the Citizen’s Clearing House for Hazardous

Wastes, Inc., is another critic. He terms the

community relations program “public relations, not community relations. ” He complains

that the EPA generally does only what it is required to do by law and as a result the community relations program is ‘‘almost nonexistent for us as far as public involve merit.”

Finally, he adds that he knows of “one hundred

groups dealing with the process. They are all

frustrated, ” 57

Bonnie Exner summarizes her 5-year experience at the Lowry Landfill site as follows: ‘‘All

your questions (about public participation)

have one answer. Citizens don’t have much of

a chance. ”5 8

For more than 4 years, Exner has been researching innovative technologies that might

be used successfully to treat the hazardous

wastes at the Lowry site, including gas collection, venting and burning, and carbon filtration. She has personally met with representatives from 17 companies and has tried repeatedly, without success, to interest the EPA,

which is preparing the feasibility study, in several cleanup options. So far, she says, the EPA

regional Superfund manager supervising the

Lowry site has “fought the idea of bringing in

outside technologies. He calls them magic

black boxes. ” EPA counters by asserting that

the new technologies will not work or that they

would take too long to be licensed for use at

Lowry. 59

The adequacy of EPA community relations

plans in achieving their primary purpose of

providing information has also drawn criticism

from community groups. Exner, for example,

terms EPA’s information dissemination program helpful, but complains that “90 percent

of the time EPA will not volunteer information

EPA doesn’t want citizens to understand. They
270 • Superfund Strategy

stymie them with technical terms. ” Citizens

then shy away from becoming involved because they “are afraid to look stupid. ” Lois

Gibbs points out that “public meetings have

often proved to be unproductive, uninformative, and, at times, completely out of control

. . . Too often, information is presented to communities in either technical jargon or so simplified as to be insulting.”60

The history of public participation at the Seymour, Indiana, Superfund site provides some

evidence to support such criticisms. Only one

public meeting was held prior to initiation of

cleanup activities, during which public input

was not sought. The EPA promised to provide

the public with periodic progress reports, but

none were published. The local Chamber of

Commerce was frequently briefed, but those

meetings were closed to the public. Overall, the

Mayor of Seymour concluded that the EPA’s

public participation program was of little

value. 61 Are these examples solely representative of a few “alarmed citizens”? There seems

to be rather widespread agreement with these

early experiences of the Superfund program by

PRPs and government.

Turning to the second criticism, many citizens groups do not employ and cannot afford

to hire people knowledgeable about the technical and scientific issues related to Superfund

cleanup proposals. Steven Lester, who has

worked with dozens of community groups at

Superfund sites, believes “the biggest problem

in the Superfund process is that local people

don’t have the expertise to make comments that

will help EPA. ”62 Lois Gibbs writes that: “One

of the most significant gaps in the past and

present public participation is the lack of funds

to provide a way for citizens to hire their own

experts to review a proposed plan . . . Without

these professionals, a real public participation

program will never exist. ”63

. — —

m~ ibbs, ()]), (; it,, ~). :193.

‘

l ERM-h4idw(?st, In(:, “(;as(? Stud}: S[?yrnour Recy(;ling Corp.,

Sf?ymour, lndiana, ” (:ontra(; tor report prepared for the Of fict;

of Ttx:h nology Assessment, Mar. 5, 1984, pp. 4-12 to 4-13.

“1.est[?r, oct. 11, 1984, op. (: It.

“W ibbs, op. (: it,

EPA, with rare exception, does not provide

money to community groups to hire technical

experts. One citizen group that has received

EPA funds is the Concerned Neighbors in Action located near the Stringfellow site in southern California.64 Indeed, it is not clear whether

CERCLA or current EPA policy authorizes the

funding of citizens groups, Officials at EPA Region II believe that such actions are not permitted by EPA policy. “There is no mechanism

for that, ” says the region’s Deputy Director of

the Office of Public Affairs.65

The Superfund Community Relations Coordinator at Region II, Lillian Johnson, argues,

however, that EPA community relations activities bring technical experts and concerned

citizens together throughout the development

of cleanup programs, Moreover, in addition to

public meetings and briefings, Region 11 frequently convenes 2-day “availability meetings”

at Superfund sites where technical experts,

such as Superfund project managers, contractors on feasibility studies, and attorneys are

available to talk with the public on an informal and pro bono basis.66

In fact, despite the shortcomings in Superfund’s public participation program cited by

citizens groups, many local groups have successfully involved themselves in cleanup decisionmaking processes, particularly while reviewing feasibility studies. For example, one

group in New Jersey hired an economist who

demonstrated that a cleanup option that included removal of drums of toxic pollutants

was more cost effective than the “preferred”

alternative of monitoring for groundwater contamination; EPA subsequently selected this as

the removal option.67

At a harbor Superfund site in New Bedford,

Massachusetts, a citizens group called LIFE developed a remedial program that was not considered among the five alternatives in the feasibility study. Four of the five alternatives

involve dredging PCB-contaminated sediments

841, f)stf31., O(; t, 11, 1984, op. (: it.

M~~ pA R[;gio n 1 I I nter~rif?w, op. (: i t

b81bid.

‘

7

1 bi(l.
Ch 8—Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program ● 271

and disposing the sediments in various locations. LIFE’s plan, coined the “pineapple upside down cake’ alternative, involves covering

layers of contaminated sediments with clean

sediments now lying beneath the harbor; no

dredging is involved. EPA is now studying this

plan. 68

At a site in Bruin Lagoon, Pennsylvania,

technical comments submitted by EDF and the

Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste

provided leverage for a community group

called PURE-West to argue for changes in the

preferred alternative. EPA made two additions

to the alternative based on those comments,

The first provided passive groundwater control to divert groundwater away from the lagoon by building a barrier upgradient from it.

This would lower the water table and lessen

the migration of toxic substances through the

groundwater. The second change added monitoring procedures to test the structural integrity of a dike built to hold back contaminated sludges .69

Lowell Fair Share, a community group in

Massachusetts, has also used technical comments as a leveraging tool. At the Silresim site,

the group successfully pressured the State to

investigate the possible seepage of contaminated groundwater into the basements of nearby homes. The group feared that this seepage

occurred and that the liquids, once in the basements, evaporated to produce air pollution in

the homes, In-house air pollution in the home

has been confirmed as a result of the investigations.

7 0

Although few citizen groups have the money

to hire experts, many groups have been able

to obtain some low-cost or pro bono professional assistance. For example, the Colorado Citizens Against Lowry Landfill and the Ecumenical Task Force in Niagara Falls, New York,

have been represented by lawyers in legal actions related to Superfund cleanups. 71 Also, national environmental organizations with inf,~l,(:>t(,[., .\()\ ~, 1 !]~~ , (11). (It

““ll)l(i

“’rt)l(i.

“’ I’; \I)(’r’, 01) ( lt :\l\l) H Ill t3utlt)r, F;( (J-t(ln(i ing. 1)1’ I’’+) I)CII ( o111-

m 11 II 1[.;1 t 1(111 , ()( t 24, 1 !184

house technical expertise such as Citizens for

a Better Environment have commented on

feasibility} studies on behalf of local citizen

groups. 72

In some cases, money to hire experts has

been obtained from sources outside the community, despite EPA’s policy not to fund citizen group activities. For example, The New

York State Love Canal Task Force once hired

a technical adviser for the Love Canal HomeOwner’s Association.73 In Baltimore, the State

of Maryland once hired an expert selected by

a local community group to comment on cleanup programs at the Monument St. Landfill. 74

Similarly, the Virginia Environmental Endowment has made grants to several community

groups to bolster their expertise on technical

issues at Superfund sites.75

Enforcement and Other Legal Action

In addition to Fund-financed cleanups, the

Superfund program also encompasses cleanups paid for and executed by the parties responsible for generating or managing hazardous materials found at uncontrolled sites.

These cleanups are the result of enforcement

actions that involve negotiations or legal actions between EPA and potentially responsible parties. The specifics of the cleanup programs that result are contained in voluntary

agreements, administrative orders, consent

decrees, or court orders.

In fiscal year 1981, 13 settlements were

reached between EPA and responsible parties.

The number jumped to 28 in the next year, to

36 in fiscal year 1983, and to 46 during the first

8 months of fiscal year 1984. 78 Ultimately, more

Superfund cleanups may result from settlements and enforcement actions than from

Fund-financed programs. In fact, to date EPA

has negotiated more cleanup plans with private

parties than it has undertaken on its own or

forced on private parties through court or-

“~(;111 Sl)ll [’g. ()[) c 1 t

731,(~strr, ()~), (:it,

“[, [’\t(’I’. ()( t. 11, I!IH4! ()]). I lt

77 t~ llt ][’1”, ( )[1 ( It,

“h l; E.S(: ( J II i (i f’, [ )[J. ( it.
272 ● Superfund Strategy

—

ders. 77 Still other cleanups are performed without public or government awareness or scrutiny. Thus, public participation in cleanups not

financed by Superfund is also an issue of major concern to citizen groups.

Neither CERCLA, the NCP, nor the Community Relations Handbook currently provide for

public participation during negotiations or enforcement actions. Several citizens groups—

including the Ecumenical Task Force tha t

worked at several Superfund sites near Niagara Falls78—have attempted without success to

convince a court to grant them status to intervene in legal actions involving Superfund sites.

Other groups, including one working at a

Superfund site in St. Louis, Michigan, 79 

a n d

another working in Kingston, New Hampshire, 80

have tried to gain a seat at the negotiating table,

also without success.

The current EPA policy is to exclude the public from all negotiation sessions, but to provide

periodic information about the progress of negotiations. 81 In addition to the periodic updates,

at least one EPA office, Region II, arranges

meetings between the public and parties in the

negotiations and publishes notices of when negotiating sessions will take place and what

issues are on the agenda.82 EPA policy could

change as a result of regulations adopted in

accordance with the consent decree, described

earlier in this chapter, between EDF and EPA

or when the agency publishes an enforcement

chapter to be added to the Community Relations Handbook.

Successful negotiations result in “requisite

remedial technology agreements, ” while legal

actions incorporate cleanup strategies in administrative or court orders. as Department of

Justice regulations provide that court orders

may be published in the Federal Register for

public comment. Comments are submitted to

the Department of Justice.84 As a matter of pol77,A II(i[?l. SOn. op. cit., i). z.

78tlutler, op. t;it,

79~nderson, 01), cit., p. 97.

~ol, est(?r, NoiI. 7, 1984, op. (:it.

aIAn(]Cl, SO1l, op. (:it.. p 2 .

8Z ~: pA R~?gion I I 1 nt(?rtricw, op. cit.

fl?]t~i{l

~41)u In~)s itf: ( ;]ean u~)s, oi). cit., p. 1 ~~.

icy EPA also publishes administrative orders

and voluntary agreements and provides a 30-

day comment period.85

In whatever form they appear, cleanup strategies resulting from negotiations or legal actions are the equivalent of the preferred strategy contained in the feasibility studies for

Fund-financed projects. A key difference for

negotiation or enforcement actions, however,

is that alternative cleanup strategies are not examined and presented for public comment.

What happens when citizens are faced with

a cleanup strategy not to their liking or when

they are upset at not being part of decisionmaking? Citizens are prevented from using several

of the most common legal strategies employed

in environmental law because CERCLA does

not have a “citizen suit” provision granting

legal standing in enforcement actions and the

right to petition EPA for redress of grievances,

Despite the limitations on opportunities for

legal actions by the public under CERCLA,

other laws implicitly provide some legal

options for the public to challenge Superfund

decisions,

For example, citizen suit provisions in RCRA

or the Clean Water Act can, in some instances,

be invoked at Superfund sites, but there are restrictions on their use. The citizen suit provision in the original version of RCRA was limited to operating hazardous waste sites. EPA

has in the past used “the imminent hazard provision” of RCRA to support legal action at an

abandoned site, but only EPA can use this provision.

86 Congress reauthorized RCRA in 1984

and the new version broadens the scope of citizen suits. Even so, citizen suits still cannot be

initiated at Superfund sites if the EPA is actively engaged in a cleanup action or is preparing a feasibility study, if a court ordered cleanup program exists, or if the EPA is diligently

prosecuting potentially responsible parties.

8 7

85 An~erson, op. cit., p. 98; and Iju mpsite (l]ea 11 ups, 0]). (: it.,

p. 101.

aBBicji IlgeI., op. cit., l). 400.

epLi Ilda G reer, letter to Karen Larsen, office of ‘rec 11 nol~g~”

Assessment, Not, 30, 1984.
Ch. 8—Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program ● 273

—

Similarly, legal actions under the Clean

Water Act are restricted to instances of surface

water pollution. Also, while the citizen suit provisions of other environmental laws apply to

“any person, ” the Clean Water Act applies to

‘‘any citizen." The law defines citizen as “a person or persons having an interest which is or

may be adversely affected. ” This means that

plaintiffs under the Clean Water Act must show

how they are personally affected by events at

Superfund sites.

8 8

The National Environmental Policy Ac t

(NE PA) also potentially offers the public a legal

means to challenge Superfund programs. For

example, Section 102(c) of NEPA requires,

among other things, that environmental impact

statements be prepared for “all major actions

significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment. ” This requirement exists unless

Congress has specifically exempted a Federal

action from NEPA or if the government follows

procedures or prepares a document that serve

as a “functional equivalent” of an impact statement. CERCLA does not contain a NEPA exemption, but the EPA asserts that feasibility

studies and the like are, in fact, functional

equivalents of NEPA statements. 89 This assertion, however, is subject to other legal interpretations. To date, no organization has successfully challenged a Superfund cleanup

program on the basis of insufficient compliance with NEPA.

9 0

Another possible strategy, available to some

potentially responsible parties and affected

citizens, is to challenge some Superfund decisions on constitutional grounds. Such chal-

‘-8”1 1)1( I ., i] :](j~

8“Ar](](Jr\on. 01) ( It . I) 22

“() It) 1(1 ., [). 40.

lenges would allege a denial of the plaintiffs

constitutional “due process” right to be heard

before adverse actions are taken affecting

them. Due process is addressed in many laws,

including the Administrative Procedures Act

which allows the public to challenge Federal

agency actions that allegedly: exceed the scope

of the agency’s powers; are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law; or were completed

without adhering to necessary procedural requirements.

91 A potentially responsible party

could, for example, invoke the Administrate\’e

Procedures Act to challenge a Fund-financed

cleanup plan, the cost of which it might ultimately be forced to pay. Alternatively, a dissatisfied citizens group could claim that a

cleanup program was so bad as to be inconsistent with the NCP. Case law for denial of

due process in the Superfund program appears

absent.

Finally, citizens can attempt to sue in State

court if State hazardous waste laws contain citizen suit provisions. Few States have enacted

Superfund laws on their own, however. Citizens can also sue under common law. Tort actions based on State strict liability, nuisance,

negligence, or trespass claims could apply to

pollution issues at Superfund sites.92 Federal

common law actions are preempted by environmental legislation, however. Plaintiffs in

State tort actions face difficult burden of proof

obligations. Also, most tort actions have a short

statute of limitations period during which suits

must be filed.93

‘l’’l)lalr]t i~fs \l(:rIlor’i+I l(illrll III Support of hlot 101) for l’r[’lirr]]-

rldrf 1 n jurl(, t iorl, ’” I,ong I)r’ll(’ ,Stf’(~ring (,’omrlllftf’f’, [’t ,1/. \ L’1].4.

[ 1,S [)]stj-i( t (:ot]rt, ~], (~i[ i] ~(:tlorl 484-A51 :)-[), ~) .j(j.

‘

+

’ibid., ~) 103.

~ 111 i(ii rlg[~r, ()]) ( ] t , l)]). 41 ~1-4 1 i’.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION UNDER CERCLA VERSUS RCRA

Comparing Superfund’s public participation RCRA specifically requires or permits pubprovisions with those provided by CERCLA’s lic involvement in Federal or State hazardous

legislative cousin, RCRA, can give insight into waste management programs that are denied

the extent and adequacy of the public partici- to the public or not mentioned in CERCLA. As

pation opportunities. mentioned, for example, RCRA contains a cit-
274 ● Superfund Strategy

—

izen suit provision (Section 7002) not contained

in CERCLA. RCRA also permits “any person”

to petition the EPA to request the promulgation of new hazardous waste regulations (Section 7004(a)). No petition powers are enumerated in CERCLA.

Perhaps most importantly, RCRA contains

in Section 7004(b)” specific instruction for public participation. The law reads:

Public participation in the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of

any regulation, guideline, information, or program under this chapter shall be provided for,

encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the States. The Administrator, in cooperation with the States, shall develop and publish guidelines for public participation in such

processes,

Other RCRA provisions require a public

comment period and public hearings to review

operating permits issued under the Act (Section 7004(2)). State programs must include public participation provisions if the States are to

receive EPA authorization to implement their

hazard waste management programs.

Rulemaking under RCRA, as under CERCLA,

requires public notice and comment periods.

There is a difference, however, because RCRA

requires more extensive rulemakings of greater

complexity than does CERCLA. Like CERCLA,

RCRA permits the public to seek judicial review of regulations and, in addition, it offers

judicial review of petitions.

In short, the hazardous waste management

program defined in RCRA requires and permits far more public participation than does

CERCLA. Specific public participation objectives and requirements lacking in CERCLA are

given in RCRA. The public has more opportunity to become involved in the shaping of the

RCRA program because of its detailed rulemaking requirements. Public participation at hearings must be allowed during the permitting

process—which is the backbone of the implementation phase of RCRA. And the public,

with some limitations, is guaranteed access to

the courts for judicial review of the RCRA program or its implementation. The applicability

of RCRA public participation requirements to

Superfund remedial actions (that might otherwise require a RCRA permit) is not clear. EPA

has said at various times that Superfund actions will adhere to substantive RCRA requirements, If EPA considers public participation

and review to be procedural rather than substantive, public involvement rights under RCRA

may be curtailed at Superfund sites.
.

Index
Index

Administrative Conference of the United States,

262

Advanced Electric Reactor, 176, 205

Angleton, TX, 204

Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste

Management officials, 164, 165, 242, 251,

252

A systems analysis of Superfund, 61-99

current estimates of future Superfund needs,

61

uncertainty and the need to evaluate the

Superfund program, 63

alternative approaches, 64

historical performance

A systems analysis approach to define a longterm strategic plan, 67

conclusions, 85

health and environment effects, 88

non-Federal money, 88

definition of goals, 68

interim strategy, 72

model description, 71

permanent strategy, 73

simulation: a systems analysis method for

comparing two strategies and incorporating long-term certainty, 70

use of model findings, 74

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease

Registry, 63

Athens, GA, 32

Atomic Energy Commission, 32

Baltimore, MD, 33

Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, 212

Biocraft Laboratories, 210

Borger, TX, 205

Boulder, CO, 131

Burleson/Kennedy submerged reactor, 204

Butler Tunnel, 33

California, 5, 43, 48, 151, 159, 207, 242

Avon, 28, 29, 223

Casmelia Resources

Chino Basin, 2 9

Conogo Park, 209

Costa Mesa, 206

Glen Avon, 28, 29

Palo Alto, 207

San Diego, 209

West Covina, 29

Canada, 206

Welland, 206

andfill, 2 9

Casmalia Resources Landfill, 2 9

Center for Advanced Environmental Control

Technology, University of Illinois at

Urbana, 218

Center for Environmental Management, 218

Chamberlain Manufacturing, 197

GARD, 197, 198

Chemical Metals Industry, 33

Chemical Minerals Recovery Site, 32

Chester Township, NJ, 131

Chicago, 218

Chino Basin, 29

Cincinnati, OH, 208

Citizens for a Better Environment, 271

Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes,

268, 269, 271

Cleanup technologies, 171

institutional practices and regulatory impacts,

177

site conditions and waste, 172

status quo bias, 179

support of cleanup technology R&D, 214

EPA technology R&D, 214

technical options, 181

conventional technologies, 182

conventional treatment, 187

innovative technologies, 193

technology evaluation, 172

barriers and improved technology, 175

Cleveland, 32

Colorado, 131, 271, 287

Boulder, 131

Marshall Lake, 131

Superior, 131

Colorado Citizen Action Network, 267

Colorado Citizens Against Lowery Landfill, 271

Columbus, OH, 210

Commerce, U.S. Department of, 61

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and liability Act, 5, 10, 12, 17,

22

Concerned Neighbors in Action, 270

Congress, U. S., 6, 10, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 37, 40,

40, 49, 50, 54, 57, 63, 64, 126, 128, 139,

141, 218, 272, 273

Congressional Budget Office, 126

Connecticut, 46, 131

Naugatuck, 131

Conogo Park, CA, 209

Costa Mesa, CA, 206

current institutional framework, 103

approaches to establishing cleanup goals or

standards, 106

assessment of risks, 109

2 7 7
278 • Superfund Strategy

available technologies, 110

site-specific considerations, 108

National Contingency Plan, 104

use of cleanup goals, 105

use of Hazard Ranking System, 105

Danvers, PA, 33

Darby Creek, PA, 129

Darcy’s Law, 224

Defense, U.S. Department of, 219, 249

Denver, CO, 267

Detox Industries Inc., 210

District of Columbia, 43

Emergency and Remedial Response Information

System, 64, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 168

Energy, U.S. Department of, 249

Environmental Defense Fund, 260

Environmental Protection Agency, U. S., 3, 4, 5,

6, 10, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 22, 27, 28, 29, 31,

32, 33, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51,

52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 63, 64, 65, 68, 87, 88,

92, 98, 99, 104, 105, 106, 110, 115, 118,

120, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131, 134, 136, 137,

138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146,

147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155,

156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 167,

168, 171, 177, 178, 179, 180, 204, 206, 207,

213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219, 225, 226, 227,

229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 237, 238, 239,

240, 241, 242, 245, 248, 249, 252, 253, 257,

258, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267,

268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274

office of Groundwater, 65-66

Alternative Technologies Division, 216

Chemical and Biological Technology

Branch, 216

Thermal Destruction Branch, 216

Community Relations Program, 263

Hazardous Waste Committee, 215

Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 229

Industrial Environmental Research

Laboratory, 216

Releases Control Branch, 215

Office of Emergency and Remedial

Response, 214

Office of Environmental Technology, 215

Hazardous Waste Engineering Laboratory,

215

Land Pollution Control Division, 215,

219

Containment Branch, 215, 216

Office of Research and Development, 215

Office of Solid Waste, 138

Surface Impoundment Assessment, 128, 134

Exner, Bonnie, 267, 269

Federal Register, 272

Fijimasu Synthetic Chemical Laboratories, 213

Florida, 149

GARD, 197, 198

G.A. Technologies, 208

General Accounting Office, 88, 140

Geological Survey, U. S., 151

Georgia, 32

Athens, 32

Luminous Processes, Inc., 32

Gibbs, Lois, 268, 270

Glen Avon, CA, 28, 29

Gratiot Country Golf Club, 33

Greenville, MS, 33

Groundwater Decontamination Systems, Inc.,

210

Gwynn Falls, MD, 34

Hatfield, PA, 202

Hazard Ranking System, 45, 49, 51, 64, 68, 99,

105, 131, 132, 133, 162, 163, 261, 266

Hazardous Waste Center, Louisiana State

University, 218

Health and Human Services, U.S. Department

of, 6, 18, 53

House Committee on Government Operations,

249

Houston, TX, 210

J. R. Huber Corp., 176, 205

Advanced Electric Reactor, 176, 204

Idaho, 208

Idaho Falls, 208

Illinois, 43, 46, 48, 141, 198

Chicago, 218

Niles, 198

Illinois State Geological Survey, 151

Indiana, 27, 211, 223, 270

Mishawaka, 211

Seymour, 27, 28, 106, 223, 270

Industrial Hazardous Waste Elimination Center,

Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago,

218

Industry/University Cooperative Center, 214

Interior, U.S. Department of, 53, 249

Irvine, R. L., 211

IT Corp., 204

Japan, 213

Takasago West Port, 213
Index ● 2 7 9

Tokyo, 213

Waka River, 213

Johnson, Lillian, 270

Justice, U.S. Department of, 272

Kansas, 213

Wichita, 213

Kingston, NH, 272

Knoxville, TN, 205

Lawrence, MA, 30

legislation:

Administrative Procedures Act, 259, 273

Clean Air Act, 112, 259

Clean Water Act, 27, 33, 88, 112, 259, 260,

272, 273

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act, 5, 10, 12,

17, 22, 44, 45, 52, 56, 57, 64, 69, 103, 104,

105, 111, 112, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 142,

146, 147, 148, 149, 154, 1.58, 175, 180, 214,

242, 259, 260, 261, 262, 265, 268, 270, 272,

273, 274

Endangered Species Act, 259

Freedom of Information Act, 267

National Environmental Policy Act, 273

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 5,

11, 12, 17, 20, 37, 41, 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56,

57, 63, 65, 68, 112, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131,

133, 134, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143,

144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 152, 155, 156,

157, 158, 159, 173, 175, 177, 178, 180, 194,

215, 218, 231, 233, 234, 248, 258, 259, 272,

273, 274

Safe Drinking Water Act, 112

Small Business Innovative Development Act,

217

Toxic Substances Control Act, 175, 177, 194,

259

Lester, Steven, 269

LIFE, 270, 271

Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 207

Lopat Enterprises, 178, 212

Love Canal, 5, 106, 108, 260

Lowell, M A, 30, 32

Lowell Fair Share, 271

Lowery Landfill Monitoring Committee, 267

Luminous Processes, Inc., 32

Madison, PA, 207

Marathon County, WI, 133

Marshall Lake, CO, 131

Maryland, 33, 129, 132, 271

Baltimore, 33, 271

Chemical Metals Industry site, 34

Gwynn Falls, 34

Massachusetts, 30, 48, 218, 242, 270, 271

Lawrence, 30

Lowell, 30, 32

Merrymack River, 30, 31

Methuen, 30

New Bedford

Merrimack River, MA, 30, 31

Methods Engineering, Inc., 204

Methune, MA, 30

Michigan, 33, 159, 242, 272

Gratiot Country Golf Club, 33

Pine River, 33

Velsico Chemical Co., 33

St. Louis, 33, 272

Midland-Ross Corp., 208

Miller, David W., 249

Minnesota, 46, 48, 181

Mishawaka, IN, 211

Mississippi, 33

Walcott Chemical Co., 33

Greenville, 33

Missouri, 5, 219

Times Beach, 5, 219

Verona, 178

MODAR, Inc., 177, 203, 204

Naugatuck, CT, 131

Nashua, NH, 30, 223

National Academy of Sciences, 109, 139

National Campaign Against Toxic Hazards, 237

National Contingency Plan, 51, 63, 64, 103, 104,

111, 115, 179, 229, 231, 260, 261, 263, 266,

272

National Governors Association, 43

National Interim Drinking Water Regulation,

152

National Pollution Discharge Elimination

System, 133

National Priorities List, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,

12, 13, 15, 17, 27, 28, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44,

48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 61, 63, 64, 65,

68, 70, 71, 72, 104, 111, 118, 125, 126, 128,

129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 142, 145,

159, 162, 163, 164, 167, 223, 227, 230, 234,

235, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 248, 261, 263,

264, 265, 266, 267

National Research Council, 127

National Response Center, 147, 265

National Response Team, 261

National Science Foundation, 214

National Water Well Association, 251

Nevada, 151
280 • Superfund Strategy

Beatty, 151

Las Vegas, 151

New Bedford, MA, 271

New England, 230

New Hampshire, 30, 46, 216, 228, 272

Kingston, 272

Nashua, 30

Sylvester site, 30, 31, 32, 223, 228

New Jersey, 104, 129, 131, 141, 210, 211, 213,

242, 262, 270

Chester Township, 131

Industry/University Cooperative Center, 214

Waldwick, 211

Wanamassa, 213

New Materials Technology Corp., 213

New York, 5, 43, 46, 99, 128, 129, 159, 177, 206,

242, 260, 271

Energy Research and Development Authority,

211

Love Canal, 5, 106, 108, 206, 271

Niagara Falls, 211, 271, 272

Syossett, 132

Niagara Falls, NY, 211, 271, 272

Niles, IL, 108

North Carolina, 48

Notre Dame University, 211

Office of Groundwater, 65-66

Office of Technology Assessment, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9,

11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 23, 27, 29, 30, 32, 37,

38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 50, 52, 54,

56, 61, 66, 71, 74, 84, 85, 88, 89, 103, 104,

105, 119, 120, 125, 127, 129, 134, 137, 138,

154, 159, 165, 167, 168, 178, 193, 194, 197,

219, 223, 225, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 235,

238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 244, 252, 263

Ohio, 32, 46, 267

Chemical Minerals Recovery Site, 3 2

Cincinnati, 208

Cleveland, 32

Columbus, 210

Toledo, 208

Palo Alto, GA, 207

Pennsylvania, 33, 129, 130, 271

Bruin Lagoon, 271

Butler Tunnel, 33

Danvers, 33

Darby Creck, 129

hatfield, 202

Madison, 207

Philkadelp hia, 129

Pittston, 33

Sharon Hill, 129

performance at site cleanups, 223

adequacy of site assessments, 228

constraints on Superfund contractors, 228

containment rather than treatment, 226

contaminant transportation, 224

design of remedial measures, 232

effects on early responses, 231

EPA staffing needs, 240

analysis of demand projections, 251

availability of qualified technical personnel,

243

estimates of future demand, 249

estimating pool of professionals, 249

other factors, 252

technical specialists, 245

expanding program’s need for technical oversight, 234

implications for future strategy, 233

larger program, 235

multiple studies and contractors, 225

political pressures, 227

studies versus timely actions, 227

Philadelphia, PA, 129

Pine River, MI, 33

Pittston, PA, 33

Plasma Arc Technology, 206

policy options, 4, 37-57

choosing a strategy for the Superfund system,

37

generic strategic goals, 40

two-part strategy, 39

comprehensive and effective national protection, 40

coping with uncertainty, 42

financing Superfund, 45

funding increases over time, 42

funding levels, 41

long-term program, 40

matching funds from States, 43

other uses of Superfund, 44

program duration and equity, 44

spending by responsible parties, 42

goal 2: accurate estimates of the national

problem, 48

goal 3: initial responses at all priority sites, 49

better use of an improved hazard ranking

system, 51

economic issues, 52

nature of initial responses in the two-part

strategy, 50

technical issues, 52

goal 4: implementation needs of a long-term

program, 53

detailed strategic planning, 56
Index • 281

public participation, 57

resolve cleanup goals issue and address

scientific uric, erta inties, 53

technical staffs, support, and o~ersight, 55

technology}, 5A

Princeton Uni~ersit~ Jlrater Resources Program ,

143

Protecting the ]N’ation Groun(li\’aterFronl Contamination, 193

public participation and confidence in Superfund, 257

EPA communitj relations program, 263

~Tati[ln[~l ContingenCjr plan, 26 0

public participant ion pro[risions under

CERCI,A, 259

public part i(:ipat ion under CERCI.A versus

RCRA, 273

Superfund program in action, 264

National Priorities I,ist, 265

fund-financed remo~a]s and remedial

responses, 267

enforcement and other legal act ion, 27 I

Puerto Rico, 129

p},r[jl~,sis Sjstems, Inc., 20~

. .’

Randall, Margaret, 265

Regional Response Team, 261

Richland, WA, 32, 212

Ro(:k\t’cll International, 209

RoTe(:h Inc., 207

Roths(:hild, t\’1, 204

Ru[;k[;lshaus, 240

San Diego, (;A, 209

A. 1,. Sandpiper (jor})., 20!]

S11 R ‘1’(;(;hrlologi[}s,” 2 I I

Scien(:e A(l~risor\ f~oar(l, 19 5

Senatt; t!~)~)ro~)ri;]tions” Slll)(:{Jr~lrllitt[:[; on 1 IIJI),

Z(j[j

S{)}Ino[Ir, IN, 27, 28, 106, 22:], 270

S[;\’mo(lr R[;(:\’(:lin,q (~or~)., 27, 28, 106, 223, 2s(],

yj~, ~:]:’, ~yo

Sharon 11 ill, 1)/1, 1 2!]

sitf!s r(!(]~] i ri n~ t :I[:a n ~] }), 125

hazar(lous kiiist[! fii(: ilit i(;s, 1 :)7

(:() m 1)1 i ;I II(:(; Ino n i t ori ng, 155

(:f)nt a m i na nt tol[:ra I1(:(; l(;~’t:ls. 145

Ii 1}”! ‘s (l(!~)(!n(][)ll( :(! oll \tii 11(1;1 1’(1s, 1 :18

s i t [! s[;l[;(:t ion ~)ro(:(!ss, 1 5(1

t!st i m;1 t f! () f fu t (1 r[; ,R’ 1] l,, 1 [jq

[:1 ri ;It) i I i t } ii nlon~ I’: f)l~ r[!~ io 11s, 1 (;2

sf)l i(l ~tast [: f’:l(; i 1 i t i[; s, 1 2(;

(; ils(; st (1(1 i [;s, 1 ~j I

current recognition and evidence of problem, 127

estimate of possible future contributions to

the NPL, 134

South Carolina, 46

St. Louis, MI, 33

Stringfellow r Acid Pits, 5, 28, 29, 106, 223, 228,

230, 231, 232, 235, 270

Superfund, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 18, 22, 23, 27, 28,

30, 32, 33, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49,

51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69,

70, 71, 74, 75, 80, 82, 85, 92, 103, 104, 106,

107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,

116, 117, 119, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131,

134, 136, 137, 138, 140, 168, 171, 172, 175,

176, 181, 182, 191, 197, 206, 209, 214, 215,

216, 217, 218, 219, 223, 224, 225, 227, 229,

233, 234, 235, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244,

245, 246, 249, 252, 257, 258, 259, 261, 262,

264, 265, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274

policy options, 4

Superior, CO, 131

surface impoundment assessment, 128

sylvester site, 30, 31, 32, 106, 223, 226, 228, 233

Syossett, NY, 132

systems analysis of Superfund, 61

Takasago, West Port, Japan, 213

Tennessee, 205, 242

Knoxville, 205

Texas, 134, 151, 205

Anglet on, 204

Borger, 205

Houston, 210

Thagard Research, 205, 206

Times Beach, MO, 5, 219

Tokyo, 213

Toledo, OH, 208

Trezak, George J., 253

Tufts University, 218

Turner, A. Keith, 253
282 . Superfund Strategy

Waka River, Japan, 213

Walcott Chemical Co., 33

Walwick, NJ, 211

Wanamassa, NJ, 213

Washington, State of, 32

Richland, 32, 212

Waste-Tech, 208

Welland, Canada, 206

West Covina, 29

West Germany, 211

University of Gottingen, 211

Westinghouse Electric Corp., 206

Wichita, KS, 213

Wisconsin, 133, 151

Marathon County, 133

Rothschild, 204

Zimpro, 203, 204