DEFENSE 

TECHNOLOGY 

DEVELOPMENT

Technology Transition 

Programs Support 

Military Users, but 

Opportunities Exist to 

Improve Measurement 

of Outcomes

Report to Congressional Committees

March 2013

GAO-13-286

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-286, a report to 

congressional committees 

March 2013 

DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 

Technology Transition Programs Support Military 

Users, but Opportunities Exist to Improve 

Measurement of Outcomes

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD and Congress recognize that

technology innovation sometimes 

moves too slowly from the lab to the 

field. Programs have been created in 

DOD to help facilitate the transition of 

new technologies. The conference 

report accompanying the fiscal year 

2012 National Defense Authorization 

Act directed GAO to undertake a body 

of work that will provide a holistic 

assessment of DOD’s S&T enterprise. 

This report reflects the results from 

GAO’s first review, which focuses on 

technology transition. Generally, when 

technologies have been sufficiently 

matured in the S&T environment, the

technologies are available to transition 

to a military user. GAO’s specific 

objectives were to (1) determine what 

DOD programs are dedicated to 

facilitating technology transition, (2) 

assess the outcomes of these 

transition programs, and (3) identify 

practices among the programs that 

may facilitate technology transition. 

GAO conducted interviews with and 

collected information from each 

technology transition program to 

identify their selection, management, 

and assessment practices, as well as 

project outcomes.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD require 

programs to track and measure project 

outcomes to document transition 

results and benefits from transition, as 

well as assess programs to identify 

opportunities for more widespread use 

of existing transition management 

tools. DOD generally concurred with 

these recommendations and stated 

that it will initiate actions to address 

potential opportunities for improvement

identified in the report.

What GAO Found

GAO identified 20 technology transition programs—managed by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military departments—that provide 

structured mechanisms and funding to facilitate technology transition. All of the 

programs GAO reviewed are consistent in providing opportunities to transition 

technologies from the science and technology (S&T) environment to a user, such 

as a weapon system acquisition program or the warfighter in the field. To help 

speed the delivery of technologies to users, most transition programs target fairly 

mature technologies, which are suitable for final stages of development and 

demonstration. Collectively, the programs GAO reviewed obligated about $7.9 

billion in Department of Defense (DOD) research, development, test, and 

evaluation funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2012 to support technology 

transition. 

Most programs that GAO assessed track whether their projects were completed 

and successfully transitioned to intended users. On average, programs reported 

a historical transition rate of over 70 percent for projects. The vast majority of 

these projects resulted in technologies transitioning to acquisition programs or 

directly to the warfighter. However, about one-quarter of the projects transitioned 

to other organizations, such as test and evaluation centers, for further 

development. Prior GAO work found that tracking technology transitions and the 

impact of those transitions, such as cost savings or deployment of the technology 

in a product, provides key feedback that can inform the management of 

programs. For the most part, transition programs that GAO reviewed do not track 

projects beyond transition, which limits their ability to know and report final 

outcomes for transitioned technologies and the associated benefits realized from 

those technologies.

As GAO has reported in the past, effective selection and management processes 

as well as tools are needed to ensure that new technologies can be successfully

transitioned to military users. GAO found that OSD’s and the Military 

Departments’ technology transition programs make use of these practices to 

varying degrees. Most programs have formal review processes to determine 

whether candidate projects have sufficiently mature technologies, are in demand 

by users, and have schedules and costs that fit within the programs’ criteria. 

Once selected, projects require effective management to ensure risks are 

minimized and transition commitments are confirmed. Many program officials 

indicated that regular stakeholder communication during project execution is

important to ensure projects stay on track and transition commitments are 

sustained. Moreover, many program officials identified the use of formal 

management tools, such as technology transition agreements, as key 

mechanisms to help hold stakeholders accountable and facilitate technology 

transition. 

View GAO-13-286. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 

or sullivanm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Letter 1 

Background 2

DOD Has a Variety of Technology Transition Programs That 

Support Military Users 5

Technology Transition Programs Provide Technologies to Military 

Users, But Tracking of Project Outcomes and Benefits after 

Transition Is Limited 16

Programs Facilitate Transition Through Sound Project Selection 

and Management Practices 23

Conclusions 29

Recommendations for Executive Action 30

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 34

Appendix II DOD Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget 

Activities 36

Appendix III DOD Technology Readiness Levels 38

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 39

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 42

Tables

Table 1: OSD Technology Transition Programs Funding and Project 

Characteristics 7

Table 2: Military Departments’ Transition Program Funding and 

Project Characteristics 11

Table 3: Historical Transition Rates Reported by OSD and Military 

Departments Technology Transition Programs 17

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Figures

Figure 1: DOD Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget for Research, 

Development, Test, and Evaluation 3

Figure 2: DOD Technology Management: Investment, Development, 

and Transition 4

Figure 3: Technology Maturity and Typical Project Duration for 

Transition Programs 15

Figure 4: Technology Transition Results Reported by Programs for 

Completed Projects, Fiscal Years 2010-2012 19

Figure 5: Example of Transition Commitment Level Project 

Evaluation Tool 28
Page iii GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Abbreviations

ATD Advanced Technology Demonstration

ATO-D Army Technology Objectives-Demonstration

CP3 Core Process 3

DAC Defense Acquisition Challenge

DOD Department of Defense

FCC Flagship Capability Concepts

FCT Foreign Comparative Testing

FNC Future Naval Capabilities

FY fiscal year

JCTD Joint Capability Technology Demonstration

ManTech Manufacturing Technology

ONR Office of Naval Research

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

QRF Quick Reaction Fund

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation

REF Rapid Equipping Force

RIF Rapid Innovation Fund

RRF Rapid Reaction Fund

RTT Rapid Technology Transition

S&T science and technology

SBIR Small Business Innovation Research

SW/Exp SwampWorks and Experimentation

TCL transition commitment level

TECD Technology Enabled Capability Demonstration

TIPS Technology Insertion Program for Savings

TMI Technology Maturation Initiative

TRL technology readiness level

TS TechSolutions

VTUAV Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial 

 Vehicle

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

March 7, 2013

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend about $70 billion in 

fiscal year 2013 to develop and enhance weapon systems. Despite the 

high caliber of systems delivered to the warfighter, weapon system 

programs too often experience cost, schedule, and performance 

problems, in part because they attempt to incorporate advanced 

technologies that have not been proven. DOD’s science and technology 

(S&T) community, which receives about $12 billion annually, is tasked 

with identifying, developing, and ensuring that high value technologies are 

mature and available for use by the department’s acquisition and military 

user communities. Generally speaking, technology transition means 

identifying technologies that have been sufficiently matured in the S&T 

environment and are ready to transition to a user such as a weapon 

acquisition program or the warfighter in the field. Transitioning 

technologies from defense S&T labs and research organizations to 

military users, however, has been a long-standing challenge for DOD. 

Sometimes technologies are not ready to transition when needed 

because they may still be too risky or too costly to adopt. At other times 

promising technologies are not taken advantage of because of insufficient 

processes and mechanisms to expedite their transition to users.

Congress and DOD recognize the difficulties involved in transitioning 

technologies and have established many programs over time aimed at 

removing barriers to technology transition and accelerating the flow of 

technologies to military users. GAO was directed by the Congress, in the 

conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2012 National Defense 

Authorization Act, to undertake a body of work that will provide a holistic 

review of DOD’s S&T enterprise. This report reflects the findings from our 

first review, which focuses on technology transition. Specifically, as 

discussed with your offices, the objectives of this review were to (1) 

determine what DOD programs exist that are dedicated to facilitating 

technology transition from the S&T base to military users, (2) assess the 

outcomes for these transition programs, and (3) identify practices among 

the programs that may facilitate technology transition.

To conduct this work, we evaluated documentation from, as well as 

interviewed, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military 

department officials as appropriate. We reviewed 20 technology transition 

programs and assessed information on program structure, processes, 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

transition tools, and metrics kept to track transition outcomes. This 

included data on each transition program and its technology transition 

projects for fiscal years 2010 through 2012.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2012 to March 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides further 

details on the scope and methodology used for this work.

DOD relies on its S&T community—DOD research laboratories, test 

facilities, industry, and academia—to identify, pursue, and develop new 

technologies that improve and enhance military operations and ensure 

technological superiority over adversaries. These activities by DOD’s S&T 

community support the development of technologies for new or existing 

weapon systems, as well as development of capabilities that are 

transitioned directly to warfighters in the field. The S&T community 

engages in activities ranging from basic research through advanced 

technology development that are conducted by the government or 

externally by universities and commercial industry. Once the S&T 

community has completed its technology development, additional product 

development activities, such as technology demonstration and testing, 

are often needed before incorporating the technologies into military 

weapon systems. Under the management of the acquisition community, 

product development further advances technology received from S&T 

developers and integrates it into systems that are ultimately delivered to 

support the warfighter.

Supporting these activities is DOD’s research, development, test, and 

evaluation budget. As shown in figure 1 below, this budget is divided into 

seven categories that follow a generally sequential path for developing 

technologies from basic research to operational system development. 

The first three categories represent DOD’s S&T activities to advance 

research and technology development, while the remaining categories

support product development for DOD acquisition programs. Appendix II 

provides further details on research and development activities in these 

budget categories.

Background
 

Page 3 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Figure 1: DOD Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget for Research, Development, 

Test, and Evaluation 

Note: RDT&E = research, development, test, and evaluation. 

The large size and scope of DOD’s national security mission imposes 

broad and competing demands on the S&T community, and determining 

the right mix of technology investments to pursue is challenging. One key 

expectation is that S&T funding will result in relevant and feasible 

technologies that can transition into weapon system programs or go 

directly to the warfighter in the field. DOD has also tasked its S&T 

community with anticipating its technological needs for an uncertain 

future. Further, the S&T community serves as a technology innovation 

mechanism to expand scientific knowledge and investigate technologies 

that may provide breakthrough warfighting capabilities. As a result, some 

investments focus on conducting research to generate scientific 

knowledge, exploring new technologies, demonstrating the feasibility of a 

technology concept, and other science and technology endeavors. The 

challenge is finding the right balance between taking risk to develop 

breakthrough technologies versus investing in moderate technology 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

enhancements that are likely to transition to a military user. Although not 

precisely defined, technology transition generally occurs when advanced 

technology development ends and product development begins. Figure 2 

below provides a notional picture of how DOD’s S&T community 

manages technology investment, development, and transition to a user.

Figure 2: DOD Technology Management: Investment, Development, and Transition

DOD’s research laboratories and test facilities, as well as industry and 

academia, provide many examples of developing new technologies that 

improve warfighter capabilities and enhance military operations. However, 

as we have reported in the past, for a variety of reasons DOD historically 

has experienced problems in transitioning technologies out of its S&T 

environment and into military systems.

1

 

1

GAO, Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology Transition 

Processes. 

Technologies may not leave the 

lab because their potential has not been adequately demonstrated or 

recognized, acquisition programs may be unwilling to fund final stages of 

GAO-06-883 (Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2006).
 

Page 5 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

development, or private industry chooses to develop the technologies 

itself.

Despite these challenges, technology transition can be facilitated in many 

ways, and is affected by choices made throughout the S&T management 

cycle. Before technology development is begun, critical S&T investment 

decisions must be made that balance needs, resources, and technical 

feasibility in a way that ensures the S&T community is responsive to 

warfighter priorities. Once S&T projects are underway, technology 

development provides opportunities to demonstrate feasibility and 

management decisions must be made along the way by S&T 

developers—with input from the acquisition community—on which 

technologies should be developed to a final state that would facilitate 

technology transition.

We identified 20 technology transition programs, managed by OSD and 

the military departments, that provide structured mechanisms and funding 

to facilitate technology transition. These programs vary in size, mission, 

approach, funding, and technology maturity expectations. However, all 

are consistent in providing opportunities to transition technologies from 

the S&T community to a military user, such as an acquisition program or 

the warfighter in the field. Many of the transition programs are focused on 

rapid response to warfighter needs, which has received greater emphasis 

in the recent past because of the United States’ operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. In addition, most programs target fairly mature technologies, 

which are suitable for final stages of development and demonstration. 

Collectively, the programs we reviewed use a mix of S&T and other 

research, development, test, and evaluation funding—about $7.9 billion 

obligated from fiscal years 2010 through 2012—to facilitate technology 

transition.

DOD Has a Variety of 

Technology Transition 

Programs That 

Support Military 

Users
 

Page 6 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

OSD manages seven transition programs that are intended to accelerate 

development, testing, and delivery of mature technologies that provide 

new solutions for military needs. Six programs are managed by the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Rapid Fielding, who reports to the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

They include three programs authorized by Congress—the Defense 

Acquisition Challenge (DAC),2 Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT), and 

Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF)3

—and three programs established by 

DOD—Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD), Quick 

Reaction Fund (QRF), and Rapid Reaction Fund (RRF). In addition, OSD 

manages a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program,4

The OSD programs share the general purpose to transition technologies, 

but vary in what type of technology developers and operational needs are 

targeted. For example, the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 

program addresses joint warfighting needs of the combatant commands, 

in partnership with the military services, by demonstrating mature 

technology prototypes that may transition to acquisition programs or 

directly to the warfighter in the field. In contrast, the Foreign Comparative 

Testing program mission is to identify and test technologies that have 

already been developed by other countries and may have utility in 

addressing U.S. military needs. Other programs like the Rapid Innovation 

Fund and Small Business Innovation Research seek to leverage 

which 

was established by Congress and has technology transition—described 

by the program as “commercialization”—as a tenet.

 

2

The Defense Acquisition Challenge program, which was still active in fiscal year 2012, is 

expected to be terminated as part of budget efficiency efforts beginning in fiscal year 

2013.

3

The Rapid Innovation Fund pilot program was funded by Congress in fiscal years 2011 

and 2012 to provide DOD with another mechanism for rapid technology transition efforts. 

Funding for fiscal year 2013 will depend on whether Congress reauthorizes the program. 

4

Every federal agency with a budget of $100 million or more for extramural research or 

research and development—which is conducted by nonfederal employees outside federal 

facilities—is required to establish and operate a Small Business Innovation Research 

program funded by a legislatively specified percent of that budget—2.5 percent in recent 

years. The DOD Small Business Innovation Research program is made up of 13 

participating components, including the Army, Navy, Air Force, Missile Defense Agency, 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Chemical Biological Defense, Special 

Operations Command, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, National GeospatialIntelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Microelectronics Activity, 

Defense Health Program, and the Office of Secretary of Defense. 

OSD Has Seven 

Technology Transition 

Programs That Vary in 

Their Broader Missions, 

Approaches, and Funding
 

Page 7 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

technology solutions from small businesses. And still others, like the 

Quick Reaction Fund and Rapid Reaction Fund programs, seek to target 

specific urgent conventional and irregular warfighting problems, 

respectively, and rapidly deliver technologies to operational users.

Collectively, research, development, test, and evaluation funding for the 

OSD technology transition programs we reviewed included about $1.75 

billion for fiscal years 2010 through 2012.5

Table 1: OSD Technology Transition Programs Funding and Project Characteristics

The Joint Capability 

Technology Demonstration and Rapid Innovation Fund programs were 

the most substantial part of that funding—over $1.2 billion for fiscal years 

2010 through 2012. The majority of OSD technology transition programs 

constrain project time frames to 2 years or less, since their focus is rooted 

predominately on providing funds to accelerate transition for technologies 

that rapidly respond to current or near-term military needs. Individual 

projects also represent relatively small funding commitments for the 

department, with $3 million on the high end of costs, although Joint 

Capability Technology Demonstration projects can be higher. It also is 

important to note that several of the programs utilize co-funding provided 

by prospective technology users to further advance projects. Table 1 

provides further information on funding as well as project-related details 

for each OSD program.

Dollars in millions

Program

Year 

established

FY2010-2012 

funding

Typical 

funding per 

project 

Typical completion 

timeframe Examples of projects

FCT 1980 $72.4 $2 or less 18-24 months • Complete arrestment gear breaking system that 

supports F-22 through full range and 

operational loads

• Enhanced fuse for 70mm warhead that will 

enable pilots to change settings in-flight to 

engage a wide range of targets

 

5

The OSD component of DOD’s Small Business Innovation Research program represents 

$179.8 million of the $1.75 billion associated with OSD technology transition programs in 

the fiscal year 2010-2012 time frame. Because Small Business Innovation Research 

includes early-stage research and development to explore technology feasibility, not all 

program funding is associated with technology transition efforts.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Dollars in millions

Program

Year 

established

FY2010-2012 

funding

Typical 

funding per 

project 

Typical completion 

timeframe Examples of projects

SBIRa 1982 $179.8 $1.65 or 

less

42 months or less • Cloud based critical knowledge retriever will 

allow soldiers with portable devices to consult 

remote information services for critical 

information

• Active software defenses that will recognize a 

broad spectrum of threats and respond 

intelligently.

JCTD 1994b $538.6 Varies 12-36 months • Airborne weapons surveillance system will 

detect, classify, and relay locations of enemy 

artillery, rocket, and mortar fires

• Rapid reaction tunnel detection will provide 

detection and mapping technologies capable of 

detecting, characterizing, and interdicting 

tunnels

DAC 2002 $80.9 $2 or less 18-24 months • Wearable battery power source that will provide 

increased flexibility and performance for the 

warfighter

• New high strength tempered glass that will 

provide blast and impact protection that is far 

superior to traditional options

QRF 2002 $63.4 $2.5-$3 12 months or less • Robust, lightweight fuel cell charging system 

capable of charging military batteries from a 

liquid fuel source

• Adaptive clutter map algorithm will mitigate 

false target detections resulting from wind farms 

within specific radar coverage area

RRF 2004c $115.2 $0.5 6-18 months • Field-deployable, rapid DNA profiling and 

matching using automated prototype systems

• Small, lightweight, expendable, hand or canister 

launched airborne surveillance system that will 

provide real-time electro-optical/infrared video

RIF 2011 $700.0d $3 or less 24 months or less • System designed to monitor areas of interest 

that automatically detects and warns of 

intruders

• C-130 aircraft corrosion monitoring system for 

inaccessible areas that reduces labor and 

maintenance cycles

Source: GAO analysis; DOD data.

Notes: FY = fiscal year. 

a

There are distinct phases in which each SBIR project may participate. SBIR Phase I provides for up 

to $150,000 for a 6-month period. If a project is selected to continue past Phase I, Phase II provides 

up to $1 million over 24 months. Some projects may also participate in Phase II Enhancement, which 

provides up to $500,000 in additional funding and an additional 12 months for projects where 

matching funding of equal value is provided by DOD non-SBIR programs or from an outside investor. 

b

The JCTD program was originally known as the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations 

program. 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

c

RRF was funded through a reprogramming action in fiscal year 2004 for a single year to allow a 

rapid response to operations in Iraq and initiate high-priority S&T projects in the execution years. It 

received reprogrammed funding again in fiscal year 2005 and its own funding line in the fiscal year 

2006 President’s budget. 

d

RIF funding is for fiscal years 2011-2012 because this pilot program was not established until fiscal 

year 2011.

The Departments of the Navy, Army, and Air Force have created distinct 

programs that rapidly respond to pressing warfighter needs, while also 

initiating programs that work to address needs that are more mid-term in 

nature. In addition, as directed by Congress, DOD has established a 

Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program and Small Business 

Innovation Research program that provide technology transition 

opportunities.6

In the Navy, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) has a well-established 

technology transition focus. ONR’s Office of Transition manages the 

Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) portfolio, which is the Navy’s largest 

transition program—for which nearly $450 million was budgeted in fiscal 

year 2013. The program, which was initiated in 1999, seeks to provide the 

best technology solutions to address operational requirements, delivering 

technology products to acquisition programs that enhance capabilities 

within a 5-year time frame. ONR’s Offices of Transition and Innovation 

also support rapid technology transition to the fleet, force, and acquisition 

communities via the Rapid Technology Transition (RTT), Technology 

Insertion Program for Savings (TIPS), TechSolutions (TS), and 

SwampWorks and Experimentation (SW/Exp) programs.

All three of DOD’s military departments manage ManTech 

and Small Business Innovation Research programs.

The Army’s efforts to facilitate transition are evolving. In 2011, the Army 

began a new Technology Enabled Capability Demonstration (TECD) 

program, which is replacing Army Technology Objectives-Demonstrations 

(ATO-D). According to Army officials, Technology Enabled Capability 

Demonstration characteristics were influenced by the Navy’s Future 

Naval Capabilities program, with the Army identifying a need for a more 

integrated S&T approach. Key characteristics of Technology Enabled 

 

6

ManTech is the oldest program with technology transition ties, and each Military 

Department manages its own efforts. The program focuses on technologies to enhance 

manufacturing capabilities, with deliverables that often result in measurable returns on 

investment from addressing process deficiencies and improvements to sustainment 

practices for military systems. 

The Military Departments’ 

14 Technology Transition 

Programs Differ in Size, 

Structure, and 

Expectations
 

Page 10 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Capability Demonstrations include senior leadership input at the outset for 

S&T decisions, greater focus on providing capabilities, and better 

planning on how a technology will transition to provide an operational 

capability. When fully implemented, the Army expects Technology 

Enabled Capability Demonstrations to garner about 50 percent of its 

advanced technology development budget. The Army also established 

another technology transition effort in 2012, the Technology Maturation 

Initiative (TMI), which is intended to encourage a stronger partnership 

between the S&T and acquisition communities. The Army’s Rapid 

Equipping Force (REF) program straddles the boundary between being a 

technology transition program and rapid acquisition program, scanning 

the S&T base for technologies that require limited development, testing, 

or both, as well as readily available technologies that can be delivered 

immediately to the warfighter to fill capability gaps.

Similar to the Army, the Air Force is modifying its approach to technology 

transition. The Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) program is an 

established Air Force Research Laboratory program that provides 

technology transition opportunities, though the size of the program has 

declined in recent years. According to Air Force officials, a challenge for 

the Advanced Technology Demonstration program is that priorities of the 

major commands, such as Air Combat Command, can change due to 

environmental factors, internal analysis, and funding constraints. This can 

result in ongoing Advanced Technology Demonstration projects not being 

completed because of new, higher priorities overtaking existing projects. 

A new program—Flagship Capability Concepts (FCC)—is expected to 

provide a mechanism through which the Air Force can ensure 

commitments from senior leadership as well as from the major commands 

to transition technologies to the acquisition community. Specifically, 

Flagship Capability Concepts are vetted through Air Force senior 

leadership to ensure they align with strategic priorities and have clear 

intent for transition. Finally, the Core Process 3 (CP3) program provides 

the Air Force with its own program focused on rapidly responding to 

urgent needs.

In total, the military departments’ technology transition programs received 

over $6 billion for fiscal years 2010 through 2012. Over 40 percent of this 

funding—about $2.6 billion—supported DOD’s Small Business Innovation 

Research program, which in addition to pursuing technology development 

that leads to technology transition, also supports early-stage research 

and development to explore technology feasibility. In addition to the Small 

Business Innovation Research funding, the military departments made 

substantial investments in their other technology transition programs 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

during the fiscal year 2010-2012 timeframe—about $1.7 billion by the 

Navy, over $1.5 billion by the Army, and nearly $370 million by the Air 

Force. Table 2 provides a distribution of funding and project-related 

details for each of the military department’s transition programs.

Table 2: Military Departments’ Transition Program Funding and Project Characteristics 

Dollars in millions

Program

Year 

established

Funding, 

FY2010-

2012

Typical 

funding per 

project

Typical 

completion 

timeframe Examples of projects

All military 

departments

ManTecha 1956 $465.9 Varies Varies • Automated application of rotorcraft blade 

erosion coating

• Submarine material management system 

to reduce material delivery lead time and 

increase material availability at build site

SBIRb 1982 $2,560.0 $1.65 or less 42 months or 

less

• Aerosol mass spectrometer improvement 

for measuring the size and chemical 

composition of submicron particles in 

real-time from an aircraft

• Air-activated flameless heating without 

water to heat food for warfighters in the 

field

Navy FNC 1999 $1,311.2 Varies 3-5 years • Improved means of rapidly testing 

donor’s and recipient’s blood types to 

decrease risk of transfusion 

reactions/transmitted disease

• Submarine track and trail provides covert 

forward area surveillance using 

unmanned underwater vehicle 

technologies

RTT 2000 $59.1 $2 or less 24 months or 

less

• Variable exhaust nozzle seals with 

chevrons to provide ~50 percent 

reduction in engine exhaust noise of the 

F-18 engines

• Continuous active sonar displays, 

trackers, and system integration for antisubmarine warfare 

SW/Exp 2000 $77.0 $1-$2 / $1 or 

less

12-24 months /

12 months

• Submarine advanced control effectors 

that improve low speed maneuvering and 

use of submerged operating envelope

• Mobile fuel cell technology for unmanned 

underwater vehicles
 

Page 12 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Dollars in millions

Program

Year 

established

Funding, 

FY2010-

2012

Typical 

funding per 

project

Typical 

completion 

timeframe Examples of projects

TS 2001 $26.5 $1 or less 12 months or 

less

• New mortar fire control unit loaded that 

can be used day or night and also 

incorporates an integrated heat shield

• Catapult capacity selector valve 

calculator provides electronic energy 

levels information to launch aircraft from 

aircraft carriers

TIPS 2004 $24.9 $2 or less 24 months or 

less

• High durability, environmentally friendly, 

spray applied coatings to reduce Navy 

platforms’ maintenance and sustainment 

costs 

• High bay lighting systems that improve 

performance and reduce maintenance 

via high output fluorescent and light 

emitting diodes

Army REF 2003 $53.4 $1 or less 3-6 months • Integrated-blast effect sensor suite that 

monitors blasts from explosions for head 

trauma assessment

• SandFlea, a robot with the capability of 

jumping 30 meters into the air that 

detects improvised explosive devices

ATO-D 2005 $1,169.7 Varies 2-4 years • Rotorcraft drive system technologies that 

increases horsepower and reduces 

weight, enhancing payload/range and 

affordability

• Improvised explosive device/mine 

detection and neutralization capabilities 

for route clearance vehicles

TECD 2011 $128.6 Varies 36-60 months • Develop and prototype seats for 

occupant centric Army vehicles

• Modular, scalable, tailorable soldier 

ensemble and small unit surveillance 

equipment to improve protection and 

effectiveness 

TMI 2012 $8.3 Varies Varies • Next generation wireless 

communications for logistics

• Advanced weapon sight technology to 

support a family of sights

Air Force ATD 1999 $126.3 Varies 6 years or less • Light-weight, portable and handheld 

evaluation tool for low observable 

signature assessment systems on F-35 

and F-22

• Learning management system for 

distributed mission operations and live, 

virtual, and constructive operations for 

training
 

Page 13 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Dollars in millions

Program

Year 

established

Funding, 

FY2010-

2012

Typical 

funding per 

project

Typical 

completion 

timeframe Examples of projects

CP3 2005 $21.0 $2.2 12-13 months • Modular pod for tactical unmanned air 

vehicles to pre-deploy wind measuring to 

support cargo aircraft single pass 

airdrops

• Lightweight, highly maneuverable, high 

speed small air vehicle with automatic 

image-based tracking to engage fleeting 

targets

FCC 2011 $88.3 Varies 6 years or less • Series of high velocity penetrating 

weapon technologies

• Selective cyber operations technology 

integration that provides a framework 

from which to launch graphic user 

interface programs

Source: GAO analysis; DOD data.

Note: FY = fiscal year. 

a

The distribution of ManTech funding across the military department components includes – Air 

Force, $131.9 million; Army, $177.1 million; and Navy, $156.9 million, respectively. 

b

The distribution of SBIR funding across the military department components includes – Air Force, 

$1,050 million; Army, $633.0 million; and Navy, $877 million, respectively. 

Beyond funding availability and technology turnaround times, technology 

maturation plays a key role in technology transition. DOD uses 

Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) to measure technology maturity 

using a scale of one to nine. Level one starts at the lowest level of 

technology readiness, where scientific research begins to be translated 

into applied research and development. TRL 1, for example, may begin 

with a paper study of a technology’s basic properties. It proceeds through 

laboratory demonstrations, and ends with an application of the technology 

in its final form and under mission conditions. DOD generally expects a 

TRL 6 or higher for technologies to be included in a new acquisition 

program.7

 

7

TRL 6 constitutes a representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond that 

of TRL 5, that is tested in a relevant environment. It represents a major step up in a 

technology’s demonstrated readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a highfidelity laboratory environment or in a simulated operational environment.

 Figure 3 portrays each transition program’s TRLs expectations 

for a technology to be selected for inclusion in the program and for a 

technology at project completion. For example, OSD’s Defense 

Acquisition Challenge program typically accepts projects that are already 

Programs Differ in the 

Maturity of Technologies 

They Accept and 

Transition
 

Page 14 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

a TRL 7 or higher, though on occasion will accept projects at a TRL 6, 

and will advance the technologies to as high as a TRL 9 before project 

completion and transition. Further details on the demonstrated maturity 

associated with each TRL are provided in appendix III. In addition to 

technology maturity, the figure distinguishes programs that target 

conventional transition with longer project timelines and with acquisition 

programs often the intended recipients, and programs focused on rapid 

response to warfighter needs.
 

Page 15 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Figure 3: Technology Maturity and Typical Project Duration for Transition Programs
 

Page 16 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

While the figure shows the full range of TRLs that may be accepted by 

programs, programs generally prefer to limit the amount of less mature 

technologies they will accept, particularly because immature technologies 

pose greater risk to successfully completing projects in the short time 

frames that many programs demand. Higher TRLs tend to be desired by 

most OSD transition programs as well as several military department 

programs, such as the Navy’s Technology Insertion Program for Savings, 

Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, and the Air Force’s Core Process 3 

program. Because these programs are focused on rapidly delivering 

technology solutions for the warfighter, many require technologies of TRL 

6 or higher for each project from the outset.

Figure 3 also provides context on the outlook for technology transition 

programs that are focused more on addressing anticipated technology 

needs for future warfighters. Military department programs like the Navy’s 

Future Naval Capabilities, Army’s Technology Enabled Capability 

Demonstrations, and Air Force’s Flagship Capability Concepts, 

encompass a broader focus that primarily targets technology 

development opportunities that are expected to meet capability needs 

further into the future. Typical transitions for technologies in these 

programs are expected to occur in 3 to 6 years, and may be to acquisition 

programs that can take several more years to actually deploy the 

technologies for warfighter use. Because there is more time afforded by 

these programs to develop technologies, they are able to accept less 

mature technologies (which is demonstrated in figure 3), as these types of 

programs are shown to select technologies that are TRLs 3 and 4 and 

advance them to TRL 6 or beyond.

Most programs that we assessed track whether their projects were 

completed and successfully transitioned to intended users. On average, 

programs reported a historical transition rate of over 70 percent for their 

technology transition projects. The vast majority of these projects resulted 

in technologies transitioning to acquisition programs or directly to the 

warfighter. However, about one-quarter of the projects transitioned to 

other organizations, such as test and evaluation centers and industry, for 

further development. For the most part, the programs do not track their 

projects beyond transition, which limits their ability to know and report 

final outcomes for transitioned technologies and any associated benefits 

DOD achieved from those technologies.

Technology Transition 

Programs Provide 

Technologies to 

Military Users, But 

Tracking of Project 

Outcomes and 

Benefits after 

Transition Is Limited
 

Page 17 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Technology transition programs reported rates of technology transition 

ranging from 56 to 86 percent. Newer programs—such as Army’s 

Technology Enabled Capability Demonstrations and Technology 

Maturation Initiative, Air Force’s Flagship Capability Concepts, and OSD’s 

Rapid Innovation Fund—are still in the process of determining what steps 

they will take to measure transition outcomes. The DOD Small Business 

Innovation Research program relies heavily on self-reporting by small 

businesses for transition data, and because there is no requirement that 

all small businesses participating in the program report transitions, 

comprehensive program data on transitions is not available. The Air 

Force Advanced Technology Demonstration program does not track 

transition outcomes for completed projects, which precludes the program 

from readily identifying a transition rate. Table 3 provides details on 

reported transition rates by program.

Table 3: Historical Transition Rates Reported by OSD and Military Departments 

Technology Transition Programs 

Transition program Transition rate (as percent)

All SBIR—OSD and military departments Not available

OSD DAC 80

FCT 73

JCTD 80

QRF 65-70

RIF Not available

RRF 60-65

Navy FNC 86

ManTech 57a

RTT 62

SwampWorks 75

TechSolutions 75

TIPS 70

Army ATO-D 83

ManTech 79

REF 56

TECD Not available

TMI Not available

Air Force ATD Not available

CP3 75-80

FCC Not available

Most Programs Reported 

the Majority of Their 

Projects Successfully 

Transitioned
 

Page 18 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Transition program Transition rate (as percent)

ManTech 70-80

Source: GAO analysis; DOD data.

Note: Programs provided self-reported historical rates of transition either as ranges or specific 

estimates and the timeframes for which the rates applied varied. 

a

Navy ManTech tracks implementation by the manufacturer, which is only achieved by a subset of 

their projects that transition to a program office or user. 

While most programs have demonstrated success in transitioning 

technologies to military users, differences in expectations across 

programs are key to understanding what programs provide to the 

warfighter. For example, programs have different definitions for what 

project outcomes are considered as “transitions,” particularly as they 

relate to transition recipients. To gain a better understanding of transition 

outcomes for each program, we evaluated who the recipients of 

transitioned technologies were in recent years. Figure 4 shows the 

distribution of transitions reported by the transition programs we assessed 

for fiscal years 2010-2012 that fall into one of three categories—transition 

to an acquisition program, transition directly to the field for use by the 

warfighter, and transitions to “other” users such as S&T organizations, 

test and evaluation centers, or industry.
 

Page 19 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Figure 4: Technology Transition Results Reported by Programs for Completed 

Projects, Fiscal Years 2010-2012
 

Page 20 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Note: Figure does not include the recently initiated Flagship Capability Concept, Rapid Innovation 

Fund, Technology Enabled Capability Demonstration, and Technology Maturation Initiative programs 

because no data are available. Additionally, program totals may omit some fiscal year 2012 results 

based on the date of program reporting. 

Collectively, these programs reported that 545 projects transitioned in 

fiscal years 2010 through 2012. The vast majority of the projects resulted 

in technologies transitioning to acquisition programs or directly to the 

warfighter in the field. However, some programs take a broader view and 

consider the transfer of technologies to other organizations for further 

development and demonstration, such as test and evaluation centers, or 

to industry as technology transition. In total, nearly one-fourth of reported 

transitions constituted this type of transition. For example, Navy’s 

SwampWorks and Experimentation, which has a mission to focus on 

high-risk technologies and concepts, stated that successful transition can 

be showing the feasibility of a high risk technology to allow further 

development of it at another level in the Navy’s S&T community.

The following are a few examples of transition program projects that 

provide context for the array of technologies and the users supported by 

these transitions.

Persistent Ground Surveillance System: A Joint Capability 

Technology Demonstration project that transitioned a family of wide 

area surveillance systems consisting of intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance technologies, as well as communications 

technologies to forward operating bases in Afghanistan. The systems 

were integrated into tailored tower and aerostat platforms that are in 

use and sustained by the Army.

Mosquito prototype: An Air Force Core Process 3 project that 

provided a field-tested prototype of a backpack-carried system for 

rapidly determining ground bearing strength for landing aircraft in 

remote sites. Following evaluations by users, the Air Force funded 

efforts to ruggedize and deliver additional units to the field for use.

Tactical Control System Digital Video Enhancements: A Navy 

Rapid Technology Transition project to upgrade the computer 

interface and video processing capability for the Vertical Takeoff and 

Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) system’s ground 

control station. The VTUAV acquisition program has already 

purchased and fielded the complete system upgrade, and plans to 

acquire more of the systems.
 

Page 21 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

As GAO has reported in the past, tracking technology transitions and the 

impact of those transitions, such as cost savings or deployment of the 

technology in a product, provides key feedback that can inform the 

management of programs.8

A few programs did identify processes for tracking transitioned projects 

through the acquisition process and to deployment within a fielded 

weapon system. The Navy uses a Transition Review Board to monitor 

completed projects from the Future Naval Capabilities, Rapid Technology 

Transition, and Technology Insertion Program for Savings programs. The 

board determines and reports on whether transitioned projects are utilized 

in systems that support Navy warfighters. The Navy determined, for 

example, that of the 155 technology products the Future Naval 

Capabilities program delivered to acquisition programs between fiscal 

years 2006-2011, 21 percent were subsequently deployed to fleet forces, 

35 percent were still with the acquisition programs, and 44 percent failed 

to deploy. For projects that do not successfully deploy, the board 

assesses whether there are other benefits achieved, such as 

technologies leveraged for follow-on S&T work. The board also identifies 

obstacles to transition, such as loss of interest by the user or inadequacy 

of funding. These findings, along with a detailed one-page summary for 

each project, are then used to inform the Navy’s annual review process. 

We found that by maintaining this level of tracking, the Navy is better 

In particular, GAO found that leading 

commercial companies tracked technology transition not only to enable 

them to measure success, but also to assess their processes and 

determine what changes are necessary to improve transition rates. In 

addition, tracking outcomes provides the laboratories and management 

with feedback on the impact technology investments have on their 

companies. The transition programs we reviewed predominately stop 

tracking a project once the program is no longer funding it, or shortly 

thereafter, and generally have limited insight into benefits realized by 

users for their transition project portfolios. For example, most program 

officials we spoke to indicated they lack the ability to obtain feedback that 

would indicate a technology that transitioned to a weapon system 

acquisition program was ultimately integrated into the weapon system 

and deployed for use by the warfighter, or was not integrated into the 

system, but did support competition that led to enhanced capabilities or 

reduced cost for the weapon system.

 

8

GAO-06-883. 

Few Programs Track 

Project Outcomes and 

Benefits after Transition
 

Page 22 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

aware of the benefits and obstacles associated with a substantial portion 

of their S&T portfolio, which may better inform decisions made by Navy 

leadership.

In addition to tracking from transition to deployment, another notable 

project outcome measure we observed among the transition programs—

specifically within the ManTech program—is the amount of cost savings 

or cost avoidance for projects. ManTech is somewhat unique when 

compared to other transition programs because its mission is focused on 

reducing acquisition and supportability costs of DOD weapon systems 

and improving manufacturing and repair efficiency for weapon systems. 

The ability of the Navy, Army, and Air Force components of ManTech to 

provide actual as well as projected cost-reduction benefits coming from 

transition and implementation of their projects presents an opportunity to 

clearly demonstrate value to the warfighter and value of the program. A 

couple of examples for ManTech cost savings and cost avoidance 

measures are illustrated by the projects below.

Energy Storage Manufacturing Very High Power Batteries: Army 

project that reportedly has produced $20 million in cost avoidance 

benefit by developing an automated lithium-ion battery manufacturing 

line to include improvements that yield affordable, high-power battery 

packs.

Virginia Class Submarine Affordability Initiative: The Navy 

estimates that this effort has already yielded over $21 million in cost 

savings per hull through a series of projects transitioned to the 

acquisition program that provides manufacturing efficiencies.
 

Page 23 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

As GAO has reported in the past, technology transition programs need to 

establish disciplined selection and management processes as well as 

tools to ensure that new technologies can be effectively transitioned to a 

military user.9 Programs must have processes in place that support the 

selection of projects that have realistic schedule and cost expectations, 

as well as sufficiently mature technologies. In addition, early project 

endorsement from intended users and other key stakeholders, including 

senior leadership and S&T developers, is critical. Once selected, projects 

require effective management to ensure technology risks are minimized, 

costs and schedules are maintained, and transition commitments are 

confirmed. To achieve this, stakeholders must engage in regular 

communication during project execution. Formal agreements and other 

project assessment measures also are important to ensure projects stay 

on track and stakeholders sustain their commitments to transition. In 

conducting this review, we found that OSD and military department 

technology transition programs make use of these practices to varying 

degrees. All of the programs we reviewed have established project 

selection processes that strive to select relevant and feasible 

technologies that have strong stakeholder support. However, 

management practices varied across programs, with some programs 

using more robust, formal tools, such as technology transition 

agreements, to guide project management and communicate project 

progress and expectations.

Establishing a path to facilitate technology transition begins with each 

transition program’s ability to select relevant and feasible technologies to 

meet military needs. Programs must identify technologies that have the 

potential to provide new or enhanced capabilities, and can generally be 

matured or demonstrated in a timely manner with modest program 

investments. Identifying viable candidate technologies requires that 

programs clearly communicate what capabilities are needed and solicit 

proposals from the right audience.

Most of the transition programs we reviewed identify and set forth highpriority capability needs or topics for project solicitations based on input 

from some combination of the S&T and acquisition communities, 

 

9

GAO, Defense Technology Development: Management Process Can be Strengthened for 

New Technology Transition Programs. GAO-05-480 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2005).

Programs Facilitate 

Transition Through 

Sound Project 

Selection and 

Management 

Practices

Clear Expectations for 

Cost, Schedule, and 

Technology Maturity 

Objectives Are Central to 

Project Selection and 

Management
 

Page 24 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

operational users, and senior military leadership. Having individuals with 

different focuses involved in generating topics helps ensure that the right 

technology projects will be proposed and that projects will have interested 

users. A limited number of programs we reviewed do not set topics, but 

do require submitted project proposals to demonstrate a capability need. 

For example, Navy TechSolutions, which has a relatively small budget—

about $9 million per year—offers an open invitation for warfighters in the 

field to propose projects based on identified capability needs. Regardless 

of solicitation approach, all transition programs we reviewed have 

established criteria for evaluating whether to pursue proposed projects. 

As we previously identified, each program has its own project cost and 

timeline constraints, as well as technology maturity criteria in place to 

support projection selection. Clear expectations for these factors can 

reduce the risk of a technology failing to transition because of cost, 

schedule, or technology maturity concerns.

Securing comprehensive stakeholder endorsements for projects from 

their outset is another important influence on whether projects transition. 

Most of the transition programs we reviewed have processes or 

mechanisms they use to foster some type of commitment from 

prospective users to transition projects once completed. However, 

officials in some programs also reported that garnering senior leadership 

support for proposed projects is critical, as it ensures that projects are 

aligned with the priorities of department leadership as well as user needs. 

For example, the Air Force’s Flagship Capability Concept program 

emphasizes senior leadership involvement by requiring all projects to be 

approved by the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council. Approval is 

supported by recommendations from the Air Force S&T governance 

structure, which is composed of senior-level leadership from Air Force 

headquarters and major commands. According to an Air Force official, 

this governance structure serves to ensure S&T efforts are properly 

aligned with Air Force needs, thereby facilitating transition and 

deployment to the operational community.

The commitment of sponsor funding, or co-funding is another means 

used to solidify stakeholder endorsement for transition projects. The 

investment by prospective users serves as an endorsement of sorts, as it 

can create greater buy-in for transition since the intended users have a 

monetary stake in the project. Specifically, we found that several of the 

transition programs we reviewed require or encourage prospective users 

to help fund projects. For example, programs like OSD’s Foreign 

Comparative Testing and Rapid Reaction Fund and the Navy’s Rapid 

Technology Transition program do not require co-funding but do use it in 

Early Project 

Endorsements by 

Stakeholders Can 

Influence Transition
 

Page 25 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

some cases. The Joint Capability Technology Demonstration program 

requires that at least 50 percent of a project is co-funded, and program 

officials noted that their projects normally have multiple sponsors that 

provide funding.

Establishing clear and consistent commitments and communication 

channels among stakeholders is fundamental to managing transition 

projects and achieving transition. Senior leadership plays a key role in 

initiating and reinforcing effective program management practices. At the 

organizational level, we found several examples, such as with the Army, 

where officials indicated that their top S&T leadership championed 

institutional changes to emphasize transition, including the introduction of 

the Technology Enabled Capability Demonstration and Technology 

Maturation Initiative programs. These programs are intended to produce 

an integrated Army S&T strategy that uses dedicated transition programs 

to more effectively respond to warfighter needs. At the program level, 

many program officials indicated that senior leadership engagement, 

particularly in providing oversight for projects through to transition, is 

essential to having an effective program. We found the Future Naval 

Capabilities program provides a good example of senior leadership 

positively affecting project management activities. Specifically, due to 

funding constraints in its fiscal year 2013 S&T budget, Navy senior 

leadership supported the termination of ongoing Future Naval Capabilities 

projects that were determined to be lower priorities so that new, higher 

priority projects could be pursued. Navy officials stated that this type of 

awareness and understanding at senior levels enables the Future Naval 

Capabilities program to make efficient decisions that are less likely to 

meet resistance and that support the highest priority projects being 

developed for transition opportunities.

Several transition programs also emphasized the relationship between 

“working-level” stakeholders—S&T developers and acquisition programs 

or warfighters in the field—when discussing the keys to technology 

transition. These stakeholders manage expectations throughout a project 

and ensure it will meet user needs. This reduces the risk of completed 

projects languishing because funding is not available or because user 

requirements have changed, or both. Some programs that we reviewed 

use integrated product teams, which may be composed of individuals 

representing the requirements, acquisition, operational, and S&T 

communities, among others, to facilitate continuous communication with 

stakeholders and ensure that transition planning is on track. In the case of 

the Navy, integrated product teams identify capability gaps, provide input 

Stakeholder Commitment 

and Communication Are 

Key to Effective 

Management of Transition 

Programs and their 

Projects
 

Page 26 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

on which S&T projects may address those gaps, assess project progress, 

make sure transition strategies remain valid, and confirm funding is 

aligned to support transition. According to Navy officials, the results of 

integrated product team efforts also support information sharing across 

senior- and working-level stakeholders to validate development status 

and transition planning activities.

We found a range of management tools being used by some transition 

programs that underlie support and communication among stakeholders. 

Technology transition agreements are used by 9 of the 20 transition 

programs we reviewed to manage projects.10 These are “good-faith” 

agreements between stakeholders that document the expectations for 

developing, demonstrating, delivering, and integrating technologies into 

systems, or using them as standalone products. Agreement specifics vary 

by program and can be tailored for each project, but typically outline 

technology and readiness metrics, such as cost, schedule, and 

performance parameters that labs must meet for transition to occur. As 

GAO has reported in prior work, these metrics help sustain a strong 

transition path by providing a formal way to track progress against 

requirements.11

The Joint Capability Technology Demonstration program within OSD and 

the Navy’s Future Naval Capabilities program both require technology 

transition agreements for all projects and provide insights into the content 

and value these agreements can offer to stakeholders. The Joint 

Capability Technology Demonstration program agreements, at a 

minimum, must outline:

Also as GAO has reported, technology transition 

agreements are used by stakeholders to make informed decisions on 

projects that are not meeting expectations. For example, if the labs 

cannot develop a technology within cost and schedule expectations, or 

cannot meet specified performance characteristics, the prospective user 

can terminate the agreement and pursue alternative technology options.

• Operational need

 

10Within the ManTech program, the Army and the Navy use technology transition 

agreements for their projects. The Air Force does not use technology transition 

agreements for its ManTech projects.

11GAO-05-480 and GAO-06-883. 

Transition Agreements and 

Other Project Assessment 

Tools Are Used to 

Formalize Project 

Expectations and Help 

Sustain Commitments to 

Transition Technologies
 

Page 27 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

• Proposed technical solution

• Transition target information

• Transition requirements

• Integration strategy

• Business case

• Risks

• Costs and schedule

• Project points of contact

We found the Future Naval Capabilities program uses technology 

transition agreements as management tools to increase the level of 

documented commitment as a project progresses over time. To 

accomplish this, the program has three levels for agreements that reflect 

the requisite knowledge available at different phases of a project. Key 

elements of an initial agreement include a basic project description, 

identification of initial exit criteria, a high-level integration strategy, and a 

likely transition funding source. As a project progresses, the other two 

levels of agreement require increasing commitment and specificity of 

requirements from stakeholders to develop, deliver, and integrate a 

Future Naval Capabilities project into an acquisition program or other 

form of deployment. Key elements of the second and third tier 

agreements involve refining and finalizing project descriptions, detailing 

exit criteria, providing greater specificity about the integration strategy, 

and providing estimates for transition costs and eventually executing 

transition funding. Stakeholders review the agreements annually to 

revalidate the commitments laid out within the document.

We also found Transition Commitment Level (TCL) assessment tools—

used by the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration and Future Naval 

Capabilities programs—offer another means of validating that transition 

programs are investing in projects that have a firm transition commitment 

from prospective users. These tools provide scorecards that chart how 

well-defined the fundamental characteristics that support a strong 

commitment to transition projects are at a given point in time. The Future 

Naval Capabilities program uses a single TCL tool that documents level 

of transition commitment from project start to completion. The Joint 

Capability Technology Demonstration program uses two TCL assessment 

tools—one to identify transition commitment to support project selection 

and one to track commitment through project execution and to 

completion. Figure 5 shows the TCL assessment tool used for Joint 

Capability Technology Demonstration project execution and completion.
 

Page 28 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Figure 5: Example of Transition Commitment Level Project Evaluation Tool

As shown by the figure, a TCL tool provides a formal way for determining 

which proposed and active projects have a high, medium, and low 

probability to transition. For example, in order for a Joint Capability 

Technology Demonstration project to be designated as “green,” project 

managers must show the project has a clear path to one of the three 

transition recipients as defined by the program. The TCL tools used by 

both the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration and Future Naval 

Capabilities programs provide insights into the progress of projects based 

on established benchmarks. In addition, Navy officials stated that the TCL 

tool used by Future Naval Capabilities provides information that can be 

used by program managers to inform investment decisions. In particular, 

the TCL tool can help identify active projects that may require greater 

attention to solidify transition commitments from stakeholders, and can 

also be used to support decisions to end projects that no longer have 

stakeholder support.

Eleven of the programs we reviewed do not use formal technology 

transition agreements, but incorporate some of the elements of 

agreements in managing projects. For example, OSD’s Foreign 
 

Page 29 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Comparative Testing program requires documentation of a valid need for 

a technology when a project starts and a letter of endorsement from a 

prospective military user that supports procuring the technology at 

completion. The Rapid Reaction Fund program does not require 

commitments from users, but does require them to identify a potential 

transition path at project start and then the program will follow-up with the 

users to assess their interest in the technology if it is successfully 

developed. Although prior GAO work found that technology transition 

agreements do not guarantee transition success because requirements 

and funding changes can occur, the agreements are useful tools to 

solidify expectations and secure user commitment.12 At the time, GAO 

recommended that DOD expand the use of technology transition 

agreements. DOD concurred with the recommendation, but did not 

identify specific actions it planned to take to do so.

For the most part, technology transition programs we reviewed have been 

reasonably successful in delivering technologies to military users. 

However, a limited number of programs do not have metrics established 

to track completed projects. In addition, few programs measure whether 

transitioned technologies actually result in a benefit to users. For 

example, many programs track whether a technology is delivered to an 

acquisition program of record, but often have limited or no insight into 

whether the technology resulted in enhanced performance or new 

capabilities, cost savings, or reduced times for testing and evaluation and 

system integration. Without some measure of technology implementation 

or other benefit after transition, questions remain as to whether programs 

are providing the right technologies at the right time to users, are using 

effective approaches to select, develop, and transition technologies, and 

are providing tangible benefits.

The transition programs we reviewed generally have disciplined project 

selection and management processes in place to facilitate the transition 

of technologies to intended users. To varying degrees, programs 

emphasize the need for early and sustained commitments from senior 

military leadership, S&T developers, and military users in order to ensure 

projects are needed, have a sound basis, and risks are reduced. A key 

mechanism some programs use for obtaining these commitments are 

 

12GAO-06-883. 

Conclusions
 

Page 30 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

formal tools, such as technology transition agreements and technology 

commitment level assessments. These tools help to clarify expectations, 

hold stakeholders accountable for what they must deliver, and gauge 

progress towards achieving project objectives. There may be 

opportunities for more widespread use of these tools among the 

programs we reviewed, which could help strengthen technology transition 

success.

To improve visibility and management of the department’s efforts to 

transition technologies to support the needs of the warfighter, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:

• Require that all technology transition programs track and measure 

project outcomes, to include not only whether technologies 

transitioned to an intended user but also the longer-term impact of 

whether the technologies benefitted acquisition programs or military 

users in the field.

• Assess transition programs to identify opportunities for more 

widespread use of existing transition management tools, such as 

technology transition agreements and technology commitment level 

evaluation mechanisms.

We provided a copy of a draft of this report to DOD for review and 

comment. In written comments on the draft, DOD partially concurred with 

our first recommendation and fully concurred with the second 

recommendation. DOD’s comments appear in appendix IV. 

In responding to the first recommendation, DOD agreed that all transition 

programs should track and measure project outcomes, including how the 

technology or capability is being employed by the intended user. 

However, the department raised concerns that tracking and measuring 

technology project outcomes would be a labor-intensive and timeconsuming process requiring significant investment. DOD also suggested 

that the recommendation be revised to have the department assess 

technology transition programs for opportunities to implement processes 

to track and measure project outcomes. We continue to believe that it is 

important that DOD have a formal means to track and document 

technology transition in order to demonstrate not only whether technology 

investments under these programs are reaching their intended users, but 

also that they are providing the desired benefits. We believe that DOD 

should require all programs to track and measure technology transition, 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 31 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

and that the department’s suggested revision to our recommendation 

could potentially remove any responsibility for programs to do so. 

Moreover, while we acknowledge that tracking and measuring project 

benefits following transition would require additional time and effort, we 

believe our recommendation provides DOD with significant flexibility to 

measure outcomes in different ways that would be less resourceintensive than DOD envisions. For example, rather than tracking all 

transitioned projects, the department could assess a subset of projects or 

establish mechanisms for military users to report back on the results. In

addition, as we reported, the Navy has recently used an approach that 

could be adopted by other programs in DOD to measure potential 

benefits from transitioned projects. Specifically, the Office of Naval 

Research has employed a Technology Review Board to complete 

independent reviews of Navy transition programs and report whether 

transitioned projects were being used by the warfighter. Consequently, 

we have not revised our recommendation as suggested by DOD. In

concurring with our second recommendation, the department agreed that 

all technology transition programs should identify opportunities to use 

existing transition management tools. DOD stated that it will ensure 

guidelines are published and widely disseminated to improve the 

understanding as to when, how, and under what circumstances transition 

management tools can be employed.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretaries of the Air 

Force, Army, and Navy. In addition, this report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff 

have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-4841 or by email at sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
 

Page 32 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix V.

Michael J. Sullivan

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
 

Page 33 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Durbin 

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

To identify what Department of Defense (DOD) programs exist that are 

dedicated to facilitating technology transition from the science and 

technology (S&T) community to a user, we reviewed DOD reports and 

documents. As a starting point, we reviewed a March 2012 report to 

Congress by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics that assessed technology transition programs within DOD. 

In conducting this assessment, DOD reviewed budget program elements 

to identify potential technology transition programs and then surveyed 

these programs to validate those whose primary function is technology 

transition. We discussed the programs identified in the DOD report with 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the 

military departments and made adjustments to our scope based on their 

inputs and our own analysis. The resulting list of programs, which is the 

focus of our review, includes 20 transition programs across OSD and the 

military departments—Air Force, Army, and Navy. While there are other 

technology transition activities that occur within the military departments 

and other DOD organizations, such as those within the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization and Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency, we limited our scope to programs within DOD dedicated 

to technology transition.

We then interviewed officials from the programs, as well as other officials 

within OSD and the military departments affiliated with technology 

transition activities, to become familiar with their respective technology 

transition programs. We collected and analyzed information from the 

programs on their structures, processes, tools, and technology transition 

metrics used. To assess what technology transition programs are doing to 

meet their objectives, we reviewed program policies and procedures for 

selecting technology transition projects, monitoring and managing their 

progress, and determining transition outcomes. For the purpose of 

assessing the programs’ activities—including projects started, completed, 

and transitioned to users—we gathered data from the programs for fiscal 

years 2010 through 2012. For the purpose of reviewing and reporting 

historical transition rates for the programs, we collected self-reported 

transition rates from program officials for those programs that could 

provide such information. We did not validate the data provided by the 

technology transition program officials, but reviewed and discussed the 

data with them and determined it was sufficiently reliable for the purposes 

of this report. To identify what practices may facilitate technology 

transition, we reviewed prior GAO studies on DOD technology transition 

and best practices for transition, interviewed officials from OSD and the 

military departments, and reviewed programmatic information and other 

related DOD documentation. Using this information, we were able to 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

isolate a number of practices that influence a program’s ability to 

transition technology from the S&T community to a prospective user. 

Additionally, we reviewed what practices were present in each program. 

In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed OSD 

and military department officials from:

OSD Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and 

Engineering, Arlington, Virginia; Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia

Army Office of Science and Technology, Arlington, Virginia; 

Rapid Equipping Force, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia; Small 

Business Innovation Research and Manufacturing 

Technology programs, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland

Air Force Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force 

Base, Ohio; Air Force Acquisition and Research, Arlington, 

Virginia;

Navy Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia; Navy 

Research and Development, U.S. Naval Yard, 

Washington, D.C.; Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, 

Arlington, Virginia

We conducted this performance audit from April 2012 to March 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: DOD Research, Development, 

Test, and Evaluation Budget Activities

Page 36 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

DOD RDT&E Budget Activity Description

Science 

and 

technology 

funding

Basic Research (6.1) Includes all scientific study and experimentation directed toward increasing 

fundamental knowledge and understanding in physical, engineering, environmental, 

and life sciences related to long-term national security needs. It is farsighted high 

payoff research that provides the basis for technological progress. Program elements 

in this category involve pre-Milestone A efforts, which is the point where entry into the 

Technology Development phase is approved.

Applied Research (6.2) Varies from systematic mission-directed research beyond that done through basic 

research, to sophisticated breadboard hardware, study, programming and planning 

efforts that establish the initial feasibility and practicality of proposed solutions to 

technological challenges. The dominant characteristic is it is directed toward general 

military needs with a view toward developing and evaluating the feasibility and 

practicality of proposed solutions and determining their parameters. Program elements 

in this category involve pre-Milestone B efforts, also known as Technology 

Development phase tasks.

Advanced Technology 

Development (6.3)

Includes concept and technology demonstrations of components and subsystems or 

system models. The results of this type of effort are proof of technological feasibility 

and assessment of subsystem and component operability and producibility rather than 

the development of hardware for service use. Advanced Technology Development 

demonstrates the general military utility or cost reduction potential of technology when 

applied to different types of military equipment or techniques. Program elements in this 

category involve pre-Milestone B efforts, such as system concept demonstration, and 

generally have technology readiness levels of 4, 5, or 6. Projects in this category 

should have the goal of moving out of S&T and into the acquisition process within the 

future years defense program. Upon successful completion of projects that have 

military utility, the technology should be available for transition.

Acquisitionbased 

Funding

Advanced Component 

Development & Prototypes 

(6.4)

Efforts necessary to evaluate integrated technologies, representative modes or 

prototype systems in a high fidelity and realistic operating environment. Includes 

system specific efforts that help expedite technology transition from the laboratory to 

operational use. Emphasis is on proving component and subsystem maturity prior to 

integration in major and complex systems and may involve risk reduction initiatives. 

Program elements in this category involve efforts prior to Milestone B acquisition 

program start. Completion of technology readiness levels 6 and 7 should be achieved 

for major programs. Program control is exercised at the program and project level. 

System Development & 

Demonstration (6.5) 

Post-Milestone B, conducting engineering and manufacturing development tasks 

aimed at meeting validated requirements prior to full-rate production. Prototype 

performance is near or at planned operational system levels. Characteristics involve 

mature system development, integration and demonstration to support Milestone C 

production decisions, and conducting live fire test and evaluation and initial operational 

test and evaluation of production representative articles. 

RDT&E Management Support 

(6.6) 

Efforts to sustain and/or modernize the installations or operations required for general 

RDT&E. Includes test ranges, military construction, maintenance support of 

laboratories, operation and maintenance of test aircraft and ships, and studies and 

analyses in support of the RDT&E program. Military construction costs directly related 

to major development programs are included. 

Operational System 

Development (6.7) 

Efforts to upgrade systems that have been fielded or have received approval for fullrate production and anticipate production funding in the current or subsequent fiscal 

year. Programs in this category involve systems that have received Milestone C 

production decision approval. 

Source: DOD.

Appendix II: DOD Research, Development, 

Test, and Evaluation Budget Activities
Appendix II: DOD Research, Development, 

Test, and Evaluation Budget Activities

Page 37 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Note: RDT&E = research, development, test, and evaluation. 

a

Milestones and associated activities are provided by DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the 

Defense Acquisition System, Dec. 8, 2008. 
Appendix III: DOD Technology Readiness 

Levels 

Page 38 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Technology readiness 

level (TRL) Description

1. Basic principles 

observed and reported.

Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 

begins to be translated into applied research and development. 

Examples might include paper studies of a technology’s basic 

properties.

2. Technology concept 

and/or application 

formulated.

Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical 

applications can be invented. Applications are speculative, and 

there may be no proof or detailed analysis to support the 

assumptions. Examples are limited to analytic studies. 

3. Analytical and 

experimental critical 

function and/or 

characteristic proof of 

concept.

Active research and development is initiated. This includes 

analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically validate 

the analytical predictions of separate elements of the 

technology. Examples include components that are not yet 

integrated or representative.

4. Component and/or 

breadboard validation in 

laboratory environment.

Basic technological components are integrated to establish 

that they will work together. This is relatively low fidelity 

compared with the eventual system. Examples include 

integration of ad hoc hardware in the laboratory. 

5. Component and/or 

breadboard validation in 

relevant environment.

Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The 

basic technological components are integrated with reasonably 

realistic supporting elements so they can be tested in a 

simulated environment. Examples include high-fidelity 

laboratory integration of components. 

6. System/subsystem 

model or prototype 

demonstration in a 

relevant environment.

Representative model or prototype system, which is well 

beyond that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. 

Represents a major step up in a technology’s demonstrated 

readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a highfidelity laboratory environment or in a simulated operational 

environment. 

7. System prototype 

demonstration in an 

operational 

environment.

Prototype near or at planned operational system. Represents a 

major step up from TRL 6 by requiring demonstration of an 

actual system prototype in an operational environment (e.g., in 

an aircraft, in a vehicle, or in space). 

8. Actual system 

completed and qualified 

through test and 

demonstration.

Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under 

expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents 

the end of true system development. Examples include 

developmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended 

weapon system to determine if it meets design specifications. 

9. Actual system proven 

through successful 

mission operations.

Actual application of the technology in its final form and under 

mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational 

test and evaluation. Examples include using the system under 

operational mission conditions. 

Source: DOD.

Appendix III: DOD Technology Readiness 

Levels 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 39 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department

of Defense

Page 40 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 41 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 42 GAO-13-286 Defense Technology Development

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841, sullivanm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, John Oppenheim, Assistant 

Director; Danielle Greene; John Krump; Sean Merrill; Robert Miller; Carol 

Petersen; and Scott Purdy also made key contributions to the report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(121058)
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