alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A20A1807. BILLY NORRIS v. THE STATE.

In 2004, Billy Norris was convicted of aggravated sodomy and sexual battery

and was required to register as a sex offender. In 2019, Norris filed a petition for

removal from the sex offender registry pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-19. On June 18,

2019, the trial court entered an order denying the petition. Norris filed a motion for

reconsideration, which the trial court also denied. On September 4, 2019, Norrisfiled

a notice of appeal to this Court. We lack jurisdiction for two reasons.

First, under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5.2), “[a]ppeals from decisions of superior

courts granting or denying petitions for release pursuant to Code Section 42-1-19”

must be taken by application for discretionary appeal. “The failure to comply with the

discretionary appeals procedure of OCGA § 5-6-35 is . . . a jurisdictional defect

compelling dismissal where, as here, the discretionary application is required[.]”

Crosson v. Conway, 291 Ga. 220, 220 (1) (728 SE2d 617) (2012). 

Second, even if a direct appeal were permissible here, this appeal is untimely.

Under OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of an

appealable judgment. The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute

requirement to confer appellate jurisdiction on this Court. Rowland v. State, 264 Ga.

872, 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Here, Norris filed his notice of appeal 78 days

after entry of the trial court’s order denying his motion for removal from the sex

offender registry. Although he filed a motion for reconsideration of that order, the

filing of a motion for reconsideration does not extend the time for filing a notice of

appeal, and the denial of a motion for reconsideration is not itself a directly

May 14, 2020
appealable judgment. State v. White, 282 Ga. 859, 860 (1) (655 SE2d 575) (2008);

Bell v. Cohran, 244 Ga. App. 510, 510-511 (536 SE2d 187) (2000).

For these reasons, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal, which is hereby

DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

05/14/2020
Before the Third Division,

May 13, 1958

No. 61923.

#### United China & Glass Co. *v.*United States,

protest 316399-K/14901 (New Orleans).

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

In accordance with oral stipulation of counsel that the articles of merchandise, consisting of lady puff boxes and lids, and cigarette boxes and lids, are entireties, and are china or porcelain articles, other than tableware, not containing 25 percent or more of calcined bone, the merchandise was held dutiable, as claimed, at 50 cents per dozen, but not less than 45 percent nor more than 70 percent ad valorem, under paragraph 212, as modified, *supra.*
#### HOHENSEE, et al. *v.*MINEAR

[No. 153,

September Term, 1968.]

*Decided April 1, 1969.*

The cause was argued before Hammond, C. J., and Barnes, McWilliams, Finan and Smith, JJ.

Ervin Hohensee and Richard Hohensee in proper person.

*Jo V. Morgan, Jr.,*for appellee.

*6Per Curiam.

After a sale under a deed of trust in default had been finally ratified, the trustee moved, as the deed of trust authorized, for the allowance of a counsel fee against the estate in his hands in the amount of $15,000. In support of the fee was a certificate of the lawyer showing services rendered during some 300 hours in connection with his services in the circuit court and in this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States. After a hearing at which appellants, the former owner of the property and his son who had defaulted as purchaser on the first sale, had so vigorously challenged the fairness and permissibility of the fee asked that they did not reach its reasonableness, Judge Meloy, who had handled the case from its inception, stated that the court was “fully cognizant of the amount of work done by the attorney” and allowed a fee of $7,500 “subject, of course, to any exceptions that might be noted with respect to the auditor’s report.” A formal order of May 16, 1968, to that effect followed and appellants appealed on June 13, 1968. Because of the pendency of this appeal, the auditor has not filed his report.

The trustee sought dismissal of the appeal before briefs were filed but his motion was denied. On the ground that the appeal was not from a final order or decree, he renewed the motion in his brief, as Maryland Rule 836 d permits. See *Dubin v. Mobile Land Corp.,*250 Md. 349, and *Agnoli v.*Powers, 235 Md. 289.

The motion must be granted. Code (1968 Repl. Vol.), Art. 5, § 6, limits appeals in equity to those from “any final decree or order in the nature of a final decree.” Section 7 of Art. 5 permits 'appeals from certain specified interlocutory orders of courts of equity but an order directing an attorney’s fee to be included in an auditor’s account subject to the usual exceptions is not one of the interlocutory orders set out in § 7. In *Johnson v. Hoover,*75 Md. 486, 490, where the factual situation was that of this case, the Court held:

> “This is not a final order, and is, therefore, not appealable. It simply directs the auditor to make the allowance subject- to exception. That is the place where the allowance, if it is to be made, should appear; and *7exceptions to the auditor’s report would bring up the question of the propriety of such allowance. The Court in passing the order it did was only providing for proper contestation of the application, and evidently intended to leave that question open for future argument and consideration. Appeal from that order therefore is premature and cannot now he entertained.”

A similar flat holding was made in *Clarke v. O’Brien,*97 Md. 738.

*Appeal dismissed and case remanded for the stating of an auditor’s account, costs to be paid by appellants.*
Exhibit 31.2
**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**
I, Carole R. Wright, Chief Financial Officer of UTEK Corporation, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of UTEK Corporation;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
          (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
          (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based onsuch evaluation; and
          (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, tothe registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s Board ofDirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
          (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and
          (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.
Dated this 17th day of March, 2004.         By:       Carole R. Wright   Carole R. Wright    Chief Financial Officer
#### SOOEY *v.*ZACHARSKI.

1. Specific Performance — Option to Purchase Real Estate — Acceptance According to Terms.

Where written memorandum of sale of lot in subdivision acknowledged receipt of $50 and required deal for balance to be closed within 30 days and there is not proof purchaser offered or tendered balance of purchase price or to deposit it in escrow and performance is not shown to have been excused by vendor’s conduct, the purchaser was not entitled to specific performance, since he failed to accept option according to its terms.

2. Costs — Briefs.

No costs are allowed appellees upon affirmance of decree, where they failed to file a brief within proper time.

References for Points in Headnotes

I'll 49 Am. Jur., Specific Performance, §§ 40, 42, 143.

[1] Right of party who has once refused to perform to have specific performance of contract. 2 A.L.R. 416.

[2] 14 Am. Jur., Costs, § 92.

Appeal from Macomb; Noe (Alton H.), J.

Submitted April 9, 1948.

(Docket No. 54, Calendar No. 43,991.)

Decided May 18, 1948.

Bill by Ernest C. Sooey against Frank Zacharski and wife for specific performance of alleged contract for sale of real estate. Decree for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

*E. 0. Eugel,*for plaintiff.

*Riseman, LemJce & Piotrotvshi,*for defendants.

*352Boyles, J.

Plaintiff filed this bill of complaint in the circuit court for Macomb county in chancery seeking to compel specific performance of the following claimed memorandum for sale of land:

“January 24, 1946, received of Mr. Ernest Sooey, $50 deposit on lot 11, East Detroit, Michigan, Henry Stevens Sub., Gratiot corner of Williams, total price $2,003. This deal to be closed 30 days from date. Frank Zacharski, Lucille Zacharski.”

After a hearing on the merits, the circuit judge dismissed the bill of complaint and plaintiff appeals.

Assuming, as these parties have, that the foregoing is a sufficient memorandum in writing to satisfy the statute of frauds, * plaintiff has failed to establish any right to specific performance.

Plaintiff in testifying before the court admitted that he had made no offer or tender of payment of the purchase price within said 30 days; nor did he make any deposit of such money in escrow. The record is barren of any proof that the defendants either did or would have refused to perform, if performance had been offered by the plaintiff within said time. Plaintiff did not offer performance within said 30 days and has not shown any excuse for his failure to do so.

One who fails to accept an option to sell real estate according to its terms is not entitled to specific performance. *Bergman*v. *Dykhouse,*316 Mich. 315.

Under the above circumstances, plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance. The decree dismissing his bill of complaint is affirmed but without costs, appellees not having timely filed a brief in this Court.

Bushnell, C. J., and Sharpe, Reid, North, Dethmers, Butzel, and Carr, JJ., concurred.

*

 See 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13411 (Stat. Ann. § 26.9ÜG). —Reporter.
EX 31.1



CERTIFICATION



I, Arthur Viola, certify that:



1.I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of INFe-Human Resources, Inc.;



2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and



5.I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.



October 22, 2007



/s/  ARTHUR VIOLA

________________________

Arthur Viola

Chief Executive Officer,

Chief Financial Officer and Sole Director
#### Vivian L. Hausch, Appellant, v Mary D. Topper et al., Respondents.

[635 NYS2d 496]

—In an action to foreclose a *592mortgage on real property, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Robbins, J.), dated May 3, 1994, which granted the defendants’ motion to stay the foreclosure sale pending certain discovery and denied her cross motion to vacate the stay.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion, with costs, the defendants’ motion is denied, the plaintiff’s cross motion is granted, the stay of foreclosure is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, to set a date for the foreclosure sale of the real property.

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in staying the foreclosure sale *(see,*CPLR 2201). A review of the record indicates that the defendants wholly failed to establish any fact to support their position that the deceased mortgagor had violated the Banking Law in making the mortgage *(see,*Banking Law § 590 [2] [a]). O’Brien, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8166 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8166

To require the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations requiring that 
optional combat boots worn by members of the armed forces wear be made 
                  in America, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 30, 2024

Ms. Budzinski (for herself, Mr. Bost, and Mr. Crawford) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To require the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations requiring that 
optional combat boots worn by members of the armed forces wear be made 
                  in America, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO COMBAT FOOTWEAR OF MEMBERS OF ALL 
              BRANCHES OF THE ARMED FORCES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall issue regulations 
prohibiting any member of the armed forces from wearing optional combat 
boots as part of a required uniform unless the optional combat boots 
are entirely manufactured in the United States and entirely made of--
            (1) materials grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced in 
        the United States; and
            (2) components that are manufactured entirely in the United 
        States and entirely made of materials described in paragraph 
        (1).
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Armed forces.--The term ``armed forces'' has the 
        meaning given such term in section 101(a) of title 10, United 
        States Code.
            (2) Optional combat boots.--The term ``optional combat 
        boots'', with respect to a member of the armed forces, combat 
        boots not furnished to such member of the armed forces by the 
        Secretary of Defense.
            (3) Required uniform.--The term ``required uniform'' means 
        a uniform a member of the armed forces is required to wear as a 
        member of the armed forces.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Date: May 9, 2008
    /s/ Heath B. ClarkeHeath B. ClarkeChief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)/s/ Douglas S. NormanDouglas S. NormanChief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Mark Balk, Appellant, v Austin Ford Logan, Inc., et al., Respondents. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

[633 NYS2d 675]

—Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed October 17, 1994, which ruled that claimant’s decedent sustained an accident solely due to intoxication and denied claimant’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

Decedent was killed in an automobile accident while returning to her home from a restaurant after making a sales call. During the extended period she and her client were at the restaurant, they consumed a significant number of alcoholic beverages. Claimant, decedent’s husband, filed an application for workers’ compensation benefits which was denied on the basis that "decedent’s accident was solely the result of intoxication”. Upon review of the record, we find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. The testimony of the eyewitnesses to the accident and the police investigator, as well as the medical evidence, established that alcohol was the *796underlying cause of the accident; there was also testimony that alcohol was a factor in decedent’s high rate of speed. Moreover, no evidence was presented that wet pavement contributed to the accident. Accordingly, the Board’s decision must be upheld.

Cardona, P. J., Mercure, Crew III, Casey and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
#### William R. Travers, *Respondent, v.*John McB. Davidson, *Appellant.*

J udgment modified as directed in opinion. Opinion by Daniels, J.
McGladrey
      & Pullen














Consent
      of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm








We
      hereby
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement of
      Patriot National Bancorp, Inc. on Form S-3 (No. 333-100981) of our report dated
      March 8, 2006, which appears in the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Patriot
      National Bancorp, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2005.







/s/
      McGladrey & Pullen


New
      Haven, Connecticut


March
      28,
      2006








































McGladrey
        & Pullen, LLP is a member firm of RSM International,
 an
        affiliation of separate and independent legal
        entities.
No. 44056.

#### Protest 328996-G of Lord & Taylor (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

On the 'authority of Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protest.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,



AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





The undersigned, Terence Yap, the Chief Financial Officer of CHINA SECURITY & SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY, INC. (the Company), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY that:



1. The Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended March 31, 2007 (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the undersigned has executed this statement this 1st day of November 2007.



| |                                                                   |                
| | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------
| |                                                                   | /s/ Terence Yap
| | Terence Yap
Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
| |                                                                  



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to China Security & Surveillance Technology, Inc. and will be retained by China Security & Surveillance Technology, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



The forgoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to § 18 U.S.C. Section1350. It is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.



---
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 15

- 00030

- CR

Triston Ray McDonald

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§ From the 371st District Court

o f Tarrant County (1244269D )

October 29, 2015

P er C uriam

(nfp)



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRIC T COURT OF APPEALS

PER CURIAM