1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 16a0260p.06 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

R OSELYNE M ARIKASI , Petitioner ,

v

.

L ORETTA E. L YNCH , Attorney General, Respondent

. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ No. 16-3281

On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals. No. A 096 155 535.
Decided and Filed: October 20, 2016
Before: KEITH, McKEAGUE, a nd WHITE, Circuit Judges.

_________________ COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Larisa I. Schneider, Fl orence, Kentucky, for Petitioner. Alexander J. Lutz, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIC E, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Roselyne Marika si (“Marikasi”) appeals the decision of the Board of Immigration App eals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her asylum petition. On August 20, 2014, an IJ denied Marikasi’s application for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigr ation and Nationality Act (“INA”) 8 U.S.C. § 241(b)(3) and withholding of re moval pursuant to the Conventi on Against Torture (“CAT”).
The IJ determined that Marika si was not a credible witness due to inconsistencies in her testimony and her failure to suffici ently corroborate her claims. Th e BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial 

### >No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 2

of Marikasi’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal on all counts and ordered
Marikasi removed to her native country of Zimbabwe. Marikasi timely appealed the BIA’s decision on March 24, 2016. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).
For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the BIA.

I. BACKGROUND

Marikasi, a native citizen of Zimbabwe, legally entered the United States on January 19, 2002 on a non-immigrant vis itor’s visa with an expiration date of Ju ly 18, 2002. On November 25, 2002, Marikasi filed a form I-589 application fo r asylum and withholding of removal. Since she had overstayed her visa, he r application was referred to the Immigration Court, and on September 25, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings alleging that she was in viola tion of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). On July 11, 2005, Marikasi filed an amended Form I-589 applicat ion for asylum and withholding of removal.
In her initial application fr om 2002, when asked whether she had suffered from harm or mistreatment in the past, Mari kasi stated the following:
I got married to a very abusive husba nd it all started when I kept having miscarriages and that was when beatings and death threats st arted from a man I was living woth [sic] everyday [sic]. He use [sic] to sleep with a knife under the pillow and he was accusing me of cheating on him and I was causing all the miscarriages.
She did not check the box provide d for “political opinion” as a reason for seeking asylum, but instead checked “nationality” and “membership in a particular group.” Th is initial application made no mention that her husband was a governm ent agent in Zimbabwe or that she or her husband were members of any political party. In the portion of the application that asked whether Marikasi had been a member of any orga nization, such as a political party in Zimbabwe, she mentioned only the Musasa Project for battered women.
In the 2005 amended application for asylum, Marikasi provided a different answer. In this application, when asked whether she had suffe red from harm or mistreatment in the past,
Marikasi stated:No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 3

I was tortured and mistreated by my husband who was a Government agent [in Zimbabwe] and by members of the ZANU PF [the leading party] because I belonged to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) [the opposition party]. My brother was brutalized and killed in 2002 by ZANU PF members because of my political activities in the MDC.
This time, Marikasi checked the box provided for “political opinion,” “membership in a particular group,” and “torture convention” as re asons for seeking asylum, but did not check the box for “nationality.” In response to the quest ion concerning whether she had been involved in any organizations, such as a political party, Ma rikasi stated that she belonged to the MDC, Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe and actively organized meetings, campaigns,
and rallies.
Following the submission of these asylum applications and several corroborating documents, a hearing was first held before an IJ in 2006. The IJ found that Marikasi was not a credible witness. The IJ said her story “developed wings,” transitioning from a battered wife’s story of domestic abuse at the hands of her hus band to a political asylum story from an antigovernment activist. As such, the IJ denied Ma rikasi’s claim for asylum due to its lack of credibility and deemed her removable.
On appeal in 2011, the BIA remanded the cas e for further factual development regarding
Marikasi’s claim of domestic abuse.
Following remand in 2014, an IJ once again deni ed Marikasi asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. The 2014 IJ made the following findings concerning Marikasi’s testimony: (1) Marikasi was inconsiste nt regarding the number of times she went to the hospital, when she went to the hospital, and what caused her husband to beat her so badly she had to go to the hospital; (2) Marikasi was incons istent with regard to whether she reported the abuse she suffered; (3) Marikasi was inconsiste nt regarding her involvement with the Musasa Project for battered women; (4) Marikasi’s testimony that she we nt into hiding from her husband in either April 2001 or October 200 1 was inconsistent with eviden ce in both her initial asylum application and her amended asylum application; a nd (5) Marikasi was incons istent in describing the reason or reasons why her husband would a buse her. Because domestic abuse was theNo. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 4

central reason for her asylum app lication, the 2014 IJ held that her inconsistencies, and her stated explanations for them, warranted an adverse credibility determination.

In addition, the 2014 IJ held th at Marikasi did not sufficien tly corroborate her claims to meet her burden of proof on the issue of past persecution. Relevant corroborating documents included a medical record showing that there was a “scuffle” with her husband, an affidavit from
a former co-worker to whom Marikasi confided regarding the alleged dome stic abuse, a letter from an American psychologist re porting anxiety related to dome stic abuse and a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), a nd a letter from a doctor in Zimbabwe reporting “political violence” she allege dly suffered in 2001. The BIA a ffirmed the IJ after according limited weight to the individualized eviden ce of corroboration proffered by Marikasi.
The 2014 IJ, however, made the following dete rminations in Marikasi’s favor: (1) the Zimbabwean government is unabl e or unwilling to control dom estic violence, and (2) women
who suffer from domestic violence in Zimbabwe at the hands of a domestic partner and are unable to leave are sufficiently “particular” and th erefore meet the requisite “social distinction” for asylum purposes. However, the 2014 IJ found th at Marikasi was unable to demonstrate that her status in the domestic relationship with her husband was or is immutable because she could
not show that she was unable to leave the abusiv e relationship and therefor e failed to show that she was a member of this “particular social group.”

Next, the 2014 IJ held that Marikasi also did not meet the higher burden of proof for showing fear of future persecu tion. Similarly, the 2014 IJ f ound that she could not meet the higher burden required for withholding of removal under the INA or CAT.
Marikasi appealed the 2014 IJ decision to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ and dismissed the appeal. The BIA concluded that the 2014 IJ ’s adverse cred ibility determination was not clearly erroneous. The BIA also agreed that Ma rikasi failed to present sufficient corroborative
evidence to rehabilitate her disc redited testimony or independently satisfy her burden of proof. Further, it held that Marikasi waived the issu e of whether she could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of Zimbabwe and th at she was not a member of an immutable groupNo. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 5

based on marital status because she did not s how that she was unable to leave the marital relationship. Accordingly, th e BIA dismissed the appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
This court has jurisdiction to review a final order of removal from the BIA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “The agency’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, and questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Abdurakhmanov v. Holder , 735 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Khalili v. Holder , 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009)). “The BIA’s decisions are final agency determinations for purposes of ju dicial review, and we are also empowered to review the IJ’s opinion to the extent that the BIA adopt s that opinion.” Gaye v. Lynch , 788 F.3d 519, 526 (6th Cir. 2015).
“Credibility determinations ar e considered findings of f act, and are reviewed under the
substantial evidence standard.” Sylla v. I.N.S. , 388 F.3d 924, 925 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Yu v. Ashcroft , 364 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2004)). “This is a deferential standard: A reviewing court should not reverse simply because it is convi nced that it would have decided the case differently.” Id . (internal quotation omitted). Rather, findings of fact, such as adverse credibility determinations, are “conclusive unless any re asonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Liti v. Gonzales , 411 F.3d 631, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Yu , 364 F.3d at 702). However, “[a]n adverse credibility finding must be based on issues that go to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” Id . at 637 (quoting Sylla , 388 F.3d at 926). 1 Adverse credibility determinations “cannot be based on an irrelevant inconsistency.” Daneshvar v. Ashcroft , 355 F.3d 615, 619 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2004). “If disc repancies cannot be viewed as attempts by the applicant to enhance [her] claims of pe rsecution, they have no bearing on credibility.” Id.

1 We note that there is a new standard of review for credibility determinations, which was created by the REAL ID Act of 2005. Under the REAL ID Act, consid ering the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors, a fact finder in an asylum claim may base an adverse credibility determination on an inconsistency, regardless of whether the inconsistency goes to the “heart of the claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii). However, when an application for asylum is filed before May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act of 2005 does not apply. See Abdurakhmanov , 735 F.3d at 345 n.3. Here, Marikasi’s application for asylum was filed in 2002. Thus, the inconsistencies on which the adverse credibility determinati on was made must go to the “heart of the applicant’s claim.” See Sylla , 388 F.3d at 926.No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 6

at 623 (quoting Shah v. INS , 220 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000 )). Even where several inconsistencies cited by the IJ are irrelevant or do not go to the heart of the applicant’s asylum claim, only one relevant inconsistency is required to uphold an adverse credib ility determination.
See Sy v. Holder , 337 F. App’x 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2009).

B. Legal Standard
Under the INA, “the Attorney General may gr ant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum” if it is determined that “such an alien is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(A). The applicable definition for refugee includes a person away from her home country “who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country be cause of persecution or a well -founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationa lity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). When in terpreting the INA, this c ourt defers to the BIA’s judgment. Castellano-Chacon v. I.N.S. , 341 F.3d 533, 546 (6th Cir. 2003) (“we recognize the deference due the BIA’s interpretation of the I NA insofar as it reflects a judgment that is peculiarly within the BIA’s expertise”) holding modified on other grounds by Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales , 453 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2006).
“The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that th e applicant is a refugee[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Th is burden can be carri ed “‘either because [s]he has suffered actual past persecution or becau se [s]he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.’”
Mikhailevitch v. I.N.S. , 146 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 1998) ( quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)-(b) (1997)). “The applicant’s testimony, if credible, ‘m ay be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof
without corroboration.’” Id . (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (a) (1997)). If past persecution is shown, “[a]n applicant . . . [establishing] such past pe rsecution shall also be presumed to have a wellfounded fear of persecution on the basis of th e original claim.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
The INA does not define persecution, but this court has held that it “does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” Lumaj v. Gonzales , 462 F.3d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). We have interpreted “persecution” to re quire “physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significantNo. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 7

deprivation of liberty.” Mikhailevitch , 146 F.3d at 390. Further, pe rsecuted individuals are those who are “specifically targeted by the government for abuse base d on a statutorily protected ground and . . . not merely a victim of indiscriminate mistreatment.” Gilaj v. Gonzales , 408 F.3d 275, 285 (6th Cir. 2005).
Likewise, membership in a “particular social group” is statutorily undefined, “but several [BIA] decisions have refined and articulated the requirements to include: (1) a shared immutable or fundamental characteristic; (2) social visibility; (3) particular ity; and (4) the group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that its members have been subject to harm.” Kante v. Holder , 634 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

1) Adverse credibility determination
Marikasi challenges each of the inconsistencies on which the 2014 IJ based the adverse credibility determination. Because only a single relevant inconsistency that goes to the heart of the applicants claim, and that “plausibly could be viewed as incredible” or “could be viewed as inconsistent” need support an IJ’s adverse credib ility determination, we will not review each of
these in detail. Pilica v. Ashcroft , 388 F.3d 941, 954 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Sy , 337 F. App’x
at 495. We conclude that Marika si’s inconsistent statements pr ovide substantial evidence on the record that “plausibly could be viewed as incredible” or “coul d be viewed as inconsistent.”
Regarding whether any of these inconsistenc ies are relevant and go to the heart of Marikasi’s claim, “[i]f discrepa ncies cannot be viewed as attemp ts by the applicant to enhance . . . claims of persecution, they have no bearing on credibility.” Daneshvar , 355 F.3d at 623. The hospitalizations recounted by Marikasi were allegedly caused by either her husband’s abuse or a group of pro-government youths who attacked Marikasi for organizing a political opposition rally. The BIA found that Marika si was inconsistent regarding the number of times she was hospitalized, the dates of her hos pitalization, and the reasons fo r the abuse that led to the hospitalization. Marikasi also did not mention being hospita lized in her initial asylum application. Her asylum claim is based on abuse from her husband, who she alleged was a Central Intelligence Officer for the leading party in Zimbabwean government, the ZANU-PF.No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 8

Marikasi’s initial asylum application alleged persecution based on “membe rship in a particular social group,” and her amended asylum applica tion alleged persecution on basis of “political opinion.” These hospitalizations can be viewed as attempts to “enhance [her] claims of persecution” because evidence of hospitalization can show the “physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty” re quired in the context of an asylum claim.
Mikhailevitch , 146 F.3d at 390. If credible , hospitalizations resulting from Marikasi’s domestic abuse or her political activities would bolster her asylum application and t hus her inconsistencies concerning those hospitalizations go to the hear t of her claim. Accordingly, we find that substantial evidence on the record supported an adve rse credibility determination in this case and
we will not disturb those findings on appeal.
Additionally, we agree with the BIA that other important factual inconsistencies between Marikasi’s asylum application and her testimony supported an adverse credibility determination. In Marikasi’s initial asylum appli cation, she reported the following:
I got married to a very abusive husba nd it all started when I kept having miscarriages and that was when beatings and death threats st arted from a man I was living woth [sic] everyday [sic]. He use [sic] to sleep with a knife under the pillow and he was accusing me of cheating on him and I was causing all the miscarriages.
Yet, as the BIA noted, Marikasi claimed in he r declaration and testimony upon remand that her husband physically abused her and she subsequently suffered two miscarriages. This differs significantly from the claim in her first asylum application that the mis carriages predated the abuse. This inconsistency in the timeline of do mestic abuse is relevant and at the heart of Marikasi’s asylum claim because domestic abuse forms the very basis for her claim. It is of no moment that Marikasi expre ssed varying reasons as to why her husband abused her. Yet, alarm bells rightly toll on account of her variant stories as to when such tragic miscarriages transpired. Thus, Marikasi’s testimony surrounding her misca rriages “plausibly could be viewed as incredible” and support IJ’s advers e credibility determination. Pilica , 388 F.3d at 954.No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 9

2) Corroborating evidence

The BIA concluded that Marikasi did not present sufficient corroborative evidence to rehabilitate her discredited testimony or indepe ndently satisfy her burden of proof. Marikasi raises several arguments in response to this determination.
First, Marikasi claims that the BIA ignor ed the medical records reflecting Petitioner’s hospitalization in 1999 resulting in her miscarriag e due to her beating by her husband. However, this claim is without merit. In regard to the 1999 medical records, the IJ found that the records corroborated only the fact that Marikasi was abused by her husband in 1999, but failed to provide sufficient details to allow the court to determine that the abuse qualified as persecution under asylum standards. Considering that, oddly, Marikasi failed to discuss the account of the abuse in 1999 in her initial app lication or her 2006 hear ing, we agree that this medical record, which reported a “scuffle at home with her husband,” does little to corroborate domestic abuse rising to the level of persecution, which requires evidence of physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty. Mikhailevicht , 146 F.3d at 390. Nor does the medical record clear up the credib ility concerns stemming from Mari kasi’s inconsistent statements.
In her remaining arguments concerning corro boration, Marikasi esse ntially argues that the corroborating evidence should have been afforded more weight. However, the role of this court is not to weigh the evidence. See Gray v. SLC Coal Co. , 176 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that “[w]e should not re-weigh evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the [factfinder]”). Our role here is to ensure th at substantial evidence on the record supported the BIA’s fact-finding. In this regard, the letters, a ffidavits, and reports cited in Marikasi’s brief do not sufficiently corroborate her underlying asylum claim because they fail to fill significant, relevant gaps in her testimony.
Additionally, Marikasi cites to a Third Circuit case, Fiadjoe v. Attorney Gen. of U.S. , 411 F.3d 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2005), to argue the imp act that PTSD can have on the accurate testimony of women who have been subjected to domestic or sexual violence. However, comparison to this case is inapposite. Fiadjoe involved a victim later recalling sexual abuse from when she was seven years old. Id. at 137. The adverse credibility determination in thatNo. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 10

case turned in part on allegedly imprope r conduct by the IJ at her hearing. See id . at 155. In addition, some of the inconsistencies were based on testimony that was given to an INS officer in the airport very shortly after she suffered abuse. Id . at 159. Marikasi had a significant amount of time—almost a year—between her arrival in th e United States and filling out her asylum application, and she claims no partiality or abuse on the part of the IJ. Further, her psychologist’s note provides no particularized explanation for how PTSD played a role in Marikasi’s varying accounts of the events in Zimbabwe. Thus, none of the pressures or
circumstances that existed in Fiadjoe are present here, and the BI A did not err in finding that Marikasi failed to corroborate a litany of out standing inconsistencies in her statements.

3) Past Persecution - “Particular social group”
Lastly, Marikasi contests the IJ and BIA dete rmination that she did not meet the standard for an abused spouse seeking asylum. Under the INA, a refugee includes a person away from her home country “who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unabl e or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that c ountry because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationali ty, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U. S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). In Matter of A-R-C-G- , 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), the BIA reviewed the issue of wh ether spouses escaping an abusive domestic relationship can obtain asylum on refugee gr ounds and concluded in the affirmative.
This court has held that a “p articular social group” is a gr oup of individuals who share a common, immutable characteristic that is one that members of the group ei ther cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences. Umana-Ramos v. Holder , 724 F.3d 667, 671 (6th Cir. 2013); Kante v. Holder , 634 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2011). The group may not be circularly defined by the fact that it suffers persecution, and the group must be both particular and so cially visible. Umana-Ramos , 724 F.3d at 671. In this case, the BIA determined that, while victims of an abusive domestic relationship can qualify as a particul ar social group, Marikasi did not prove that she was part of a group with the requisite common, immuta ble characteristic. We agree.No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 11

“Marital status” is an immutable characteristi c when the “the individu al is unable to leave the relationship.” 2 Matter of A-R-C-G- , 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392. As further explained:

A determination of this issue will be dependent upon the particular facts and evidence in a case. A range of factors could be relevant [in a domestic abuse situation], including whether dissolutio n of a marriage coul d be contrary to religious or other deeply held moral be liefs or if dissolution is possible when viewed in light of religious, cu ltural, or legal constraints.

Id . at 393.
The BIA distinguished Marikasi’s case in the following important respects from Matter of A-R-C-G- : (1) when Marikasi went into hiding with the Musasa Project, she did not have any contact with her husband; (2) after she left the Mu sasa Project, she stayed with friends and never returned to her husband; (3) a substantial period of time had passed since Marikasi went into hiding and she remained out of contact with he r husband; and (4) she remained out of contact with her husband after leaving Zimbabwe. In a ddition, we note that because of her ability to freely move through the country and avoid her husband, Marikasi failed to subs tantiate any religious, cultural, or legal constraints that prev ented her from separating from the relationship in Zimbabwe or moving to a diffe rent part of that country. 3 See Matter of A-R-C-G- , 26 I. & N. Dec. at 393. Furthermore, Mari kasi’s case illustrates that sh e had a substantial network of family, friends, and co-workers who showed willingness and ability to help her within Zimbabwe and she did not credibly show any pa rticular actions or complicity by the government
which would have rendered her unable to avail herself of that country’s protection.
Thus, Marikasi failed to carry her burden b ecause she failed to prove that she could not leave the relationship or that she could not relocate to a nother part of Zimbabwe.

2 At least one sister circuit has utilized this analysis in a domestic abuse asylum claim. Vega-Ayala v. Lynch , No. 15-2114, 2016 WL 4205890, at *3 (1st Cir. Aug. 10, 2016) (denying petition for review because petitioner, who was not married to the abusive man, co uld not prove immutability or social distinction).
3 We note that this analysis is based on Marikasi’s demonstrated ability to escape the abusive relationship and survive safely within her native country. The facts of Matter of A-R-C-G- dictate that asylum applicants who allege that they cannot leave the relationship under this rule are not precl uded from relief merely because they were able to escape the relationship and arrive in the United States. The petitioners in Matter of A-R-C-G- were “natives and citizens of Guatemala who entered th e United States without inspection.” Id . at 389. Thus, it would be inappropriate to use the fact that Marikasi was able to es cape her country and arrive in the United States to defeat her asylum claim, as this undercuts the very purpose of asylum.No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 12

4) Fear of Future Persecution
Having found that Marikasi did not show past persecu tion, consequently, there is no presumption that she faces a well-f ounded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii); see also Mapouya v. Gonzales , 487 F.3d 396, 412 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that where an applicant proves pa st persecution, “there is a presum ption of a well-founded fear of future persecution”). Marikasi argues that th e burden of proof was improperly placed on her by the BIA. However, because we agree with the BIA that she has not sh own past persecution, the burden is properly on her to show future persecution. Mikhailevitch , 146 F.3d at 390.
Having made a determination that Marikasi has not suffered past persecution, we must determine whether the evidence would compel a r easonable factfinder to conc lude that there is a reasonable possibility of Marika si suffering future persecution if she were to return to
Zimbabwe. Id .; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B). Our inquiry requires reasonably specific information showing a “real threat of individual persecution,” and a general, speculative assertion of fear is not enough to compel such a conclusion. Mapouya , 487 F.3d at 412 (emphasis added). Marikasi cites primarily to a State Department Re port that discusses the difficulties the government of Zimbabwe has with controlling domestic violence in support of her claim. This report, however, does not suppor t Marikasi’s individual claim of persecution. Further, despite her general expression of fear that her husband will resume the abuse upon her return, Marikasi failed to expl ain why she cannot move to another part of Zimbabwe, where she
could avoid contact with her husband. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). Therefore, we are not compelled to conclude that the BIA erred in fail ing to find a reasonable probability of future persecution.

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm th e BIA’s determination that Marikasi’s has not met her burden of proof to es tablish eligibility for asylum.

5) Withholding of Removal

Because Marikasi has not met her burden of proof on her eligibility for asylum, she accordingly cannot satisfy the more demanding sta ndard that there is a clear probability of persecution required for withholdi ng of removal under the Act. Liti , 411 F.3d at 641.No. 16-3281 Marikasi v. Lynch Page 13

III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the BIA.