aggression and aid Korea war is a big school where we engage in a large
maneuver. Such a maneuver is better than a military school. If the war
continues next year, our entire army will have undergone training by rota-
tion.

For this war we originally had three problems: (1) whether we could fight;
(2) whether we could defend; (3) whether we would have food.

The problem of whether we could fight was solved within two or three months.
The enemy had more cannons, but its morale was low. It was a case of more
metal than morale.

The problem of whether we could defend was solved last year. The solution
was tunnels. We dug two levels of tunnels. When the enemy attacked, we
went underground. Sometimes when the enemy occupied the surface, the un-
derground still belonged to us. When the enemy took up positions, we would
counterattack and inflict heavy casualties. We acquired foreign cannons
by this native method. The enemy was helpless against us.

The problem of food, i.e., supplies, was not solved for a long time. In
those days we did not think of digging tunnels and storing food in them.
Now we know better. Every division has warehouses and a three-month sup—
ply of grain, as well as auditoriums. They live very comfortably.

Now the policy is clear, the position consolidated, the supply guaranteed
and each and every soldier understands that we must persevere to the bitter
end.

Just how long must we fight? How long must we negotiate? I feel that we
must negotiate, fight and seek peace.

Why do we want to seek peace? The war will not last 30 years, 100 years,
because a long-term war will be detrimental to America.

(1) Manpower: To fight for the 10,000 prisoners of war detained by us,
they lost over 30,000 men. Their total manpower was much less than ours.

(2) Money: They require over 10 billion U.S. dollars a year, but we
spend much less. Our war expenditures this year will be reduced by half
compared with last year. The money collected from the "three-anti" and
“€iye-anti" movements will be sufficient for 18 months of war, and the
money from production increases and thrift can be entirely spent on domes-
tic construction.

(3) They have insurmountable international and domestic contradictions.
(4) There is also the issue of strategy. The strategic point of America

is Europe. When they sent troops to invade Korea, they did not expect
us to send troops to aid it.

16



of the Wang Ming and the Li Li-san lines? It was to demonstrate that we
made a distinction between those making ideological mistakes and the coun-
terrevolutionaries and schismatics (such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-t 'ao,
Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih). Advocating subjectivism and sectarianism, the
former openly declare battle, sound the gong and beat the drum and try to
convince others with their own political programs. Wang Ming had a polit-
ical program and so did Li Li-san. Of course, Ch'en Tu-hsiu also had a
political program, but he promoted Trotsky—ism and schisms and pursued
anti-party activities outside the party. Chang Kuo-t'ao promoted conspir-
acies and schisms and defected to the Kuomintang. Therefore, the issue
of Wang Ming and Li Li-san was not just an issue of them as individuals.
What was more important was its social factor. The reflection of this
social factor is that a considerable number in the party will vacillate
at a crucial moment. Such vacillation is opportunism. Opportunism means
doing whatever is beneficial without any set principle, bylaw or direction.
An opportunist is one way today and another way tomorrow. Wang Ming, for
instance, was this way. He was a radical "leftwing" first, but a radical
rightwing later.

At the Seventh Congress I convinced the comrades to elect Wang Ming and
Li Li-san. Then in the 11 years since, have we suffered any loss? None
at all. Our revolution did not fail and its success was not delayed even
in terms of months just because we elected them.

Did those making mistakes receive encouragement with their election? If
those making mistakes can become members of the Central Committee, then we
can all make mistakes because we will have the chance to become Central
Committee members anyway. Will this happen? It will not. Among our 70
odd Central Committee members, none of them purposely made mistakes in
order to become a member. Among those who are not Central Committee mem-
bers, whether before, during, or after the "three-eight work style," will
they imitate Wang Ming and Li Li-san and also promote two lines, result-
ing in four lines, in order to become members of the Central Committee?
No one will do so. On the contrary, forewarned by the mistakes of Wang
Ming and Li Li-san, they will be more careful.

Then, what about the saying some time ago that "It is better to join the
revolution late than early; it is better not to join the revolution than
join." If they are elected, will the issue that mistakes are better than
accuracy and that major mistakes are better than minor ones arise in the
party? If Wang Ming and Li Li-san who made line mistakes are elected as
Central Committee members, those who are correct or who have only made
minor mistakes must yield two seats to them. Will this not be the most
unfair arrangement in the world? In this respect, it is most unfair.

That those who are correct or who have only made minor mistakes must yield
their seats to those who have made major mistakes is obviously unfair. If
we look at it this way, we must admit that mistakes are better than accu-
racy and major mistakes are better than minor ones. However, in another
respect it is not so. Their line errors are well-known in the whole nation

37



ideology and work style and oppose subjectivism and sectarianism and also
bureaucratism. I will not discuss bureaucratism today, but only subjectiv—
ism and sectarianism. These two things pop up again after having being
swept away, and they must be swept away again.

Making a mistake means to make a subjective mistake and to have the wrong
ideology. In the many articles criticizing Stalin's mistakes, this issue
is not mentioned, or seldom mentioned. Why did Stalin make mistakes? On
some of the issues, his subjective view was incompatible with objective
reality. Many occurrences of this type appear constantly in our work.
Subjectivism is not to start from objective reality, from practical feasi-
bility, but from subjective desire. We must conform with and approximate
as much as possible China's reality in the matters to be determined and
discussed in the documents of this Congress. Meanwhile, we must, based on
our past experiences, criticize those viewpoints incompatible with reality,
criticizing and condemning such subjectivism. This task was proposed
several years ago. Today, what we oppose is subjectivism in the socialist
revolution and socialist construction. In the past during the democratic
revolution, we were seriously damaged by subjectivism and severely punished,
losing almost all our bases and over 90 percent of our revolutionary strength.
Only now are we beginning to become aware. After the Yenan rectification
movement, stressing investigation and study and starting from the practice,
the issue was clarified. The universal truth of Marxism must be combined
with the concrete practice of China's revolution otherwise it will not
work. In other words, the unity of theory and practice is a most funda-
mental principle of Marxism. According to dialectical materialism, ideology
must reflect objective reality and be verified in the objective practice.
Only after proven will it become a truth; otherwise, it is not. There have
been achievements in our work of the past several years, but the subjec-
tivist defect exists everywhere. Not just at present; it will also occur
in the future. Subjectivism will forever exist, 10,000 years from now,

100 million years from now. As long as mankind does not perish, it will
always exist. With subjectivism, there will always be mistakes.

There is another thing which is called sectarianism. Every area has its
own local general situation, every nation has its own national general
situation, the earth has its own planetary general situation. Now we will
not discuss what is beyond the earth, because communication lines have
not been opened. If we should discover the presence of man on Mars or
Venus, we would discuss the issue of uniting with them and building a
united front with them. Now we are discussing the issue of unity in the
party, in the country and in the world. Our principle is that regardless
of who you are, foreign parties or foreign non-party members, as long as
you are the least bit useful to the cause of world peace and human progress,
we will unite with you. First we must unite with the several dozen commu-
nist parties and the Soviet Union. We have discussed and elaborated much
on the mistakes which have occurred in the Soviet Union, as if they were
insurmountable. Such a view is not proper. It is impossible for any na-
tion not to make mistakes, let alone the fact that the Soviet Union is the

33



The Party Central Committee has told them many times about the Soviet
things which we do not approve. Some of the problems have not been dis-—
cussed, but they will be discussed in the future. The discussions must

be conducted through the Central Committee. As for information, it must
not be transmitted. It will serve no purpose but only be detrimental. It
will damage the relations between the two parties and between the two na-
tions. Those who do such things find it awkward for themselves. Since
you act behind the party's back, you will always feel guilty. If those who
have transmitted information come out and admit, that will be the end of it.
If not, there will be an investigation, and once uncovered, there will be
appropriate punishment.

I wish to discuss the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. I feel
that there are two "swords": One is Lenin and the other is Stalin. The
sword of Stalin has now been discarded by the Russians. Gomulka and some
people in Hungary have picked it up against the Soviet Union, so-called
Stalinism. The communist parties of many European nations also criticize
the Soviet Union and the leader is Togliatti. Imperialism also uses this
sword to kill people. Dulles also wielded it for a while. This sword was
not loaned out but discarded. China has not discarded it. First, we pro-
tect Stalin and, second, we at the same time criticize his mistakes and
we have written the article "On the Historical Experience of the Dictator-
ship of the Proletariat." Unlike some people who have tried to defame and
destroy Stalin, we are acting in accordance with objective reality.

Have the Soviet leaders also discarded a part of Lenin as a knife? 1
think they have discarded quite a bit of it. Is the October Revolution
still efficacious? Can it still serve as a model for various nations?
Khrushchev said in his report at the 20th Soviet Party Congress that
political power can be gained by means of the parliament, indicating that
it is no longer necessary for the various nations to follow the example

of the October Revolution. Once this door is opened, Leninism is basically
discarded.

The Leninist theory is a development of Marxism. In what aspects is it a
development of Marxism? First, it is a development in world philosophy,
the materialist and dialectical aspect. Next, it is a development in the
aspect of revolutionary theory and revolutionary strategy, especially on
the issues of class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the
proletarian political party. Lenin also had a theory on socialist con-
struction. There is construction in revolution. Beginning from the Octo-
ber Revolution of 1917, he already had seven years of practice which Marx
did not. What we study then are these fundamental principles of Marxism-
Leninisn.

In the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, we always
mobilized the masses to wage class struggle and educated them in strug-
gle. We learned to wage class struggle from the October Revolution. In
the October Revolution, the masses, whether in the cities or villages,

42



THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS SHOULD CHERISH EVERY HILL, EVERY RIVER,
EVERY TREE AND EVERY BLADE OF GRASS IN KOREA (19 JANUARY 1951)

--Comrade Mao Tse-tung's instructions to the Chinese People's Volunteers
Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 p 33

[Text] The comrades of China and Korea must unite together like brothers,
sharing fortunes and misfortunes, and depending on one another in life and
death, and struggle to the final end against the common enemy. The Chi-
nese comrades must regard all Korean matters as their own, educate the
combat commanders and fighters to cherish Korea's every hill and every
river, every blade of grass and every tree, and refrain from taking one
needle or one thread belonging to the Korean people, in the same manner
as we do in China. This is the political foundation of victory. So long
as we can do so, we will win the final victory.

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problems, one after another, were all solved. Our troops became stronger
as they fought. In the summer of this year, we were already able to break
through 21 kilometers of the enemy frontal position in one hour, discharge
several hundred thousand rounds of artillery shells in concentrated firing,
and penetrate 18 kilometers. If we continued, two, three, or four times,
the entire enemy line would have been broken.

Second, in politics, the enemy had many insolvable problems within, and
the peoples of the whole world demanded peace.

Third, in economics, the enemy spent much money in the war of aggression
in Korea, and could not balance his budget.

With the combination of the above factors, the enemy had no choice but to
seek peace. Meanwhile, the first was the main factor. Without it, it
would not have been easy to discuss peace with the enemy. U.S. imperialism
is very arrogant, and will not be reasonable wherever it can get away with
it. If it talks reason, it is being forced to do so.

In the Korean war, enemy casualties totaled 1.09 million. Naturally, we
also paid a price. However, our casualties were much lighter than our
original estimate. After we had our trenches, our casualties became even
less. We grew stronger as we fought. The Americans could not dislodge
our position. On the contrary, they were always wiped out by us.

A while ago, everyone mentioned the factor of leadership. I feel that
leadership was one factor, and the most major factor was the masses think-
ing of the means. Our cadres and soldiers devised all kinds of means to
fight battles. Let me give an example: In the first month of the war,
our vehicle losses were very heavy. What should we do? Besides the
leaders, we relied mainly on the masses to devise the means of solution.
Over 10,000 people stood guard on both sides of the roadway, firing signal
guns whenever enemy planes were spotted, so that the drivers could either
take evasive actions or find a hiding place for the trucks. Meanwhile,
the vehicular roadways were widened, and many new ones built, so that the
trucks could travel back and forth easily. Thus, vehicle losses were re-
duced from the 40 percent at the beginning to less than 1 percent. Subse-
quently, underground warehouses and auditoriums were built. The enemy
could drop bombs above while we held mass meetings below. Every time they
thought of the Korean battlefield, some of those living in Peking felt
that it was fairly dangerous. Naturally, there was danger, but, as long
as everyone tried to think of the means, it was not such a big thing.

Qur experience has been that when we relied on the people and with a rela-
tively correct leadership, we were able to use our inferior equipment to
overcome the enemy with its superior equipment.

The victory in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea is a great
victory and one of great significance.

20



and throughout the whole world. We would be electing them because they
are well-known. What can you do? You, who have not made mistakes or who
have only made minor ones are not as well-known. In our nation with a
broad petty bourgeoisie, they are the banners. If we elect them, many
people will say, the Communist Party still waits for them; it would

rather give them two seats to afford them the chance to rectify themselves.
Whether they will rectify themselves is another issue, which is a minor
one and concerns only the two individuals themselves. The issue is that
our society has such a large petty bourgeoisie, our party has so many un-
stable petty bourgeois elements, and there are so many vacillating intel-
lectuals and they want to see examples. When they see that their two
banners are still there, they feel relieved, they can sleep and they are
happy. If you take away the two banners, they will become alarmed. There-
fore, it is not the issue of whether Wang Ming and Li Li-san will reform.
Whether they reform or not is unimportant. What is important is the 1 mil-
lion petty bourgeois elements in the party, especially the intellectuals
who are subject to vacillation. They want to see our attitude toward Wang
Ming and Li Li-san. Similar to our handling of the rich peasants in land
reform, when we did not touch the rich peasants, the middle peasants felt
relieved. If our Eighth Congress adopts the same attitude at the Seventh
Congress toward these two, then our party will reap a benefit, a kind of
advantage. It will make it relatively easier to reform the broad petty
bourgeoisie in the nation. It will have an effect in the world. Very

few foreign countries adopt our attitude toward those who have made mis-
takes. One can say that there are none.

The preliminary meeting of this Congress, starting now, will last only

10 odd days, but if we arrange it properly, it is entirely possible to com-
plete the preparatory work. We believe that this Congress will be success-
ful--the caliber of the delegates will make it successful. But we must

be cautious and attentive and all must exert themselves.

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PUBLICATION NOTE TO VOLUME V OF THE 'SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG'
Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 pp i-ii

[Text] The works of our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao Tse-tung
are immortal monuments of Marxism-Leninism. In accordance with the deci-
sion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Volume V
of the "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" has now been published and the
subsequent volumes will come out in succession.

The previously published Volumes I to IV of the "Selected Works of Mao
Tse-tung" contain important writings from the period of the new-democratic
revolution. Volume V and succeeding volumes contain important writings
from the period of the socialist revolution and socialist construction.

In the new historical period since the founding of the People's Republic
of China, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, consistently upholding the principle of
integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete
practice of the revolution, inherited, defended and developed Marxism-
Leninism as he led our Party and our people in a series of struggles;
these were struggles to carry out the socialist revolution and socialist
construction, to oppose the revisionist lines of Kao-Jao, Peng Teh-huai,
Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao, to fight against im-
perialism and the reactionaries of all countries and to combat modern
revisionism, with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as its center.
During this period Comrade Mao Tse-tung's greatest contributions to theory
were to systematically sum up the historical experience of the dictator-
ship of the proletariat in China and abroad, analyze the contradictions,
classes and class struggle in socialist society by means of the funda—
mental concept of materialist dialectics, the unity of opposites, and
thereby to reveal the law of development of socialist society and create
the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of
the proletariat. The new ideas, new theses, of Comrade Mao Tse-tung
concerning the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat have greatly enriched the treasure house of Marxist-Leninist
theory in the realms of philosophy, political economy and scientific
socialism. They not only chart for the Chinese people the true road for



revolutions. One was the bourgeois democratic revolution to seize the
political power of the nation; the other was the proletarian socialist
revolution to realize socialist reform and build a socialist state. That
we have accomplished much in the 11 years since the Seventh Congress is
recognized by the entire nation and the whole world, even by the foreign
bourgeoisie. The two revolutions have proved that from the Seventh Con-
gress to the present, the line of the Party Central Committee has been
correct.

The October Revolution overthrew the bourgeoisie. It was something new
in the world. The international bourgeoisie, with its eyes closed, cursed
it and said it was no good. The Russian bourgeoisie was a counterrevolu-
tionary class. At that time, setting aside state capitalism, it slacked
off, sabotaged and picked up the gun to fight. The Russian proletariat
had no choice but to destroy it. The bourgeoisie in various nations was
enraged and reviled the Russian proletariat. We here are relatively more
lenient toward the national bourgeoisie, and it feels more comfortable and
finds that there are some benefits. That currently Eisenhower and Dulles
do not permit American journalists to visit China actually indicates their
admission that our policy has this one good point. Had everything been in
a mess here, they would have let the journalists come so that they could
write articles of condemation. Eisenhower and Dulles are afraid that not
all articles might be unfavorable but might say something good. The matter
would then be hard to handle.

"A big old empire," "the sick man of East Asia," backward economy, back-
ward culture, unhygienic, not skillful in ball games, not skillful in
swimming, women with bound feet, men with pigtails, eunuchs, and the idea
that China's moon was not that bright and the moon abroad was brighter
were some of the terms used to describe China in the past. Anyway, there
were many bad things. However, after six years of reform we have trans—
formed China, and no one can deny our achievements.

The nucleus to lead our revolutionary cause is our party. When summariz—
ing experiences, this Congress must first make the entire party more
united. Up till June, our party had 10.73 million members. For these
members we must conduct extensive education, persuasion and unity work
so that they will play a more successful role as a nucleus among the
people. Just the party alone is not sufficient. The party is a nucleus
and it needs the masses. Ninety percent of all items of our concrete
work, including industry, agriculture, commerce and culture and educa-
tion, are not performed by party members but by non-members. Therefore,
we must successfully rally the masses, rallying all those who can be
rallied to work together. In the past, we had many shortcomings in
rallying the entire party and those outside the party. We must conduct
propaganda education during and after this Congress and successfully
improve work in this aspect.

Internationally, we must rally all forces in the world which can be ral-
lied. Primarily we must unite with the Soviet Union, fraternal parties,

31



We can handle matters relatively easily. We are in complete control of
domestic matters. Nevertheless, we are not America's chief of staff.
America's chief of staff is their own man. Therefore, whether the Korean
war will continue, Korea and we can have only half the say.

In view of the general situation, it will be detrimental for America to
continue the war.

The theory of an imminent World War III is alarmist. We must seek 10 years'
time to build industry and lay a firm foundation. Everyone must unite suc-
cessfully and make a clear distinction between the enemy and ourselves. We
are strong today because of the unity of the people of the entire nation,
the cooperation of those attending the meeting today and the cooperation
of the democratic parties and factions and the people's organizations.
Unity and drawing a clear distinction between the enemy and ourselves are
extremely important. Mr Sun Yat-sen was a good man, but why did the 1911
revolution led by him fail? The reasons were: (1) Land was not divided;
(2) He failed to recognize the importance of suppressing the counter-
revolution; and (3) He was not sufficiently vigorous in resisting imperial-
ism. Besides the distinction between the enemy and ourselves, there is
also, internally, the distinction between right and wrong. When the two
are compared, the distinction between right and wrong is secondary. With
the majority of corrupt elements, for instance, it is the issue of right
and wrong and they can be reformed and are different from counterrevolu-
tionaries.

All the democratic parties and factions and religious circles must conduct
education, guard against being tricked by imperialism and refrain from
taking the side of the enemy. Take Buddhism, for instance. It does not
have much connection with imperialism; it is basically linked with feudal-
ism. Due to the land issue, the monks were included in anti-feudalisn,
but those attacked were the head and resident monks. When the minority
was knocked down, the monks in general were liberated. I do not believe
in Buddhism, but I do not oppose the organization of a Buddhist federa-
tion to clarify the line between the enemy and ourselves. Will the united
front be abolished one day? I do not advocate its abolition. No matter
who it is, as long as he truly makes a clear distinction between the enemy
and ourselves and serves the people we want to unite with him.

Our country has a future; it has hopes. In the past, we wondered whether
the national economy would recover in three years. After two and a half
years of struggle, it has recovered and we have started systematic con-
struction. Everyone must unite and make a clear distinction between the
enemy and ourselves so that our country will progress steadily.

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great consideration. It is a bias to give consideration to the benevolent
administration at the expense of major benevolent administration.

At present some of our friends are onesidedly emphasizing the minor benevo-
lent administration. Actually, they want us to stop fighting the war to
resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and give up on heavy industry. We
must criticize this erroneous idea. This idea also existed in the Commu-
nist Party, and we encountered it in Yenan. In 1941, the Shensi-Kansu-
Ninghsia frontier region collected 200,000 piculs of public grain, and
some people hollered, claiming that the Communist Party had no concern

for the peasants. Some individual leading cadres of the party also linked
this to the issue of so-called benevolent administration. I criticized it
at that time. What was the biggest benevolent administration at that time?
It was to smash Japanese imperialism. If less public grain was levied, we
would have to reduce the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army, which would
be favorable to Japanese imperialism. Therefore, this idea actually repre-
sented the interest of Japanese imperialism and constituted an aid to it.

At present one phase of the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea has
ended. If the U.S. still wants to fight, we will fight. If we fight, we
must levy grain, and we must perform work among the peasants, persuading
them to make a contribution. Only thus do we truly represent their inter-
est. Hollering is actually in the interest of U.S. imperialism.

There are major principles and minor principles. The living standard of
the people in the whole nation must be improved year after year, but im-
provement must not be excessive. If it is excessive, then the war to
resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea cannot be fought, or so conscien-
tiously fought. We fight thoroughly, conscientiously, and with our full
effort. As long as we have it, whatever the Korea front wants we will
supply it. We have been doing this for the past several years.

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OUR GREAT VICTORY IN THE WAR TO RESIST U.S. AGGRESSION AND AID KOREA AND
OUR FUTURE TASKS (12 SEPTEMBER 1953)

--Comrade Mao Tse-tung's speech at the 24th Session of the Central People's
Government Council

Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 pp 101-106

[Text] After three years, a great victory has been won in the war to re-
sist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, and one phase has come to an end.

What did we rely on to win victory in the war to resist U.S. aggression
and aid Korea? A while ago you mentioned correct leadership. Leadership
was one factor. Without correct leadership, we could not have succeeded.
Nevertheless, the main factor was that ours was a people's war, supported
by the people of the whole nation, with the peoples of China and Korea
fighting shoulder to shoulder.

In fighting such an enemy as U.S. imperialism, their weapons were many
times superior to ours, and yet we could overcome them, forcing them to
seek peace. How did we accomplish it?

First, in military affairs, the U.S. aggressors were placed in an unfavor-
able position--a passive position. If they did not seek peace, their en-
tire line would have been broken, and Seoul could possibly fall into the
hands of the Korean people. This situation could be seen in the summer
of last year.

Both sides of the war claimed that their own defense line was impregnable.
On our side, it was truly impregnable. Our soldiers and cadres were in-
genious, courageous, and fearless, while the aggressor troops of the U.S.
feared death. Their officers were also relatively rigid, not so flexible.
Their line was not consolidated, let alone impregnable.

The problems confronting us were, first, whether we could fight, subse-

quently, whether we could defend, thereafter, whether we could guarantee
supply, and finally, whether we could withstand germ warfare. These four

19



fraternal nations and peoples and all peace-loving nations and people and
associate with all useful forces. The communist party delegates of more
than 50 nations will participate in our Congress this time. It is an ex-
cellent thing. In the past, we did not have national political power,
the victory of the two revolutions nor the achievements in construction.
Now everything is different. Our foreign comrades respect us more.

What is our goal in rallying those inside and outside the party and the
nation who can be rallied? It is to build a great socialist state. We
may and should use the word "great" for a nation like ours. Our party is
a great party; our people are a great people; our revolution is a great
revolution; our construction cause is a great one. There is only one
nation on earth with 600 million people, and we are it. The contempt felt
by others in the past was understandable. It was because we had not
contributed much. Even the few hundred thousand tons of steel a year
were in the hands of the Japanese. During the 22 years of Kuomintang
dictatorship under Chiang Kai-shek, there were only several ten thousand
tons a year. We do not produce much now, but we have started. This year
we have over 4 million tons; next year we will exceed 5 million tons. The
second five-year plan will exceed 10 million tons; the third may possibly
exceed 20 million tons. We must strive to realize this goal. Though
there are almost 100 countries in the world, those producing more than
20 million tons of steel a year number only a few. Therefore, once this
nation of ours is built, it will be a great socialist nation. We will
completely change the backward condition of the past century, the situa-
tion of being held in contempt, the hard luck situation, and catch up
with the most powerful capitalist nation in the world, the United States.
It has only 170 million people, but our population is several times
greater, our resources abundant, and our climatic conditions more or less
the same. Therefore, it is possible to catch up. Should we catch up?
We definitely should. What are you 600 million people doing? Are you
sleeping? Is sleeping proper, or is working proper? If we say working
is proper, then if their 170 million people produce 100 million tons of
steel, should not your 600 million people produce 200 million or 300 mil-
lion tons? If you cannot catch up, you have no excuse; you are not so
glorious, nor very great. With a history of only 160 years, America pro-
duced only 4 million tons of steel 60 years ago, and we are 60 years be-
hind. Given another 50 or 60 years, we should surpass it. This is an
obligation. You have such a big population, such a vast territory and
such rich resources, and what is more, it has been said that you are
building socialism, which is supposed to be superior; if after much ado
for 50 or 60 years you are still unable to overtake the United States,
what a sorry figure you will cut! You should be read off the face of

the earth. Therefore, to overtake the United States is not only possible,
but absolutely necessary and obligatory. If we don't, we the Chinese
nation will be letting the nations of the world down and we will not be
making much of a contribution to mankind.

My second point concerns continuing the party tradition. This Congress
must continue to develop our party's superior tradition in the aspects of

32



Dalai Lama and the majority of his group, feel that they were compelled to
accept the agreement and they are unwilling to implement it. At present,
not only do we lack the material foundation for implementing it in its
entirety, but we have neither the mass foundation nor the upper level
foundation for it. Implementation by coercion will do more harm than good.
Since they are unwilling to implement it, let it go; we will not implement
it at present but wait a while and see.

The longer we drag on, the more grounds will we have and the less grounds
will they have. Dragging on will not be very detrimental to us; it may
even be more beneficial. Let them commit bad deeds of abusing the people
and contradicting reason while we concentrate on such good deeds as pro-
duction, trade, road building, medicine and a united front (rallying the
majority, patient education) in order to win the masses and wait until the
time is right before discussing the issue of implementing the agreement in
its entirety. If they feel that elementary education should not be under-
taken, then we can stop pursuing the subject.

The recent demonstration in Lhasa must be interpreted not just as some-
thing instigated by the two ssu-lun's, but also as an expression of the
majority of the Dalai Lama group. The content of their petition is very
strategic; it does not indicate a break but only asks us to concede. In
the article on resuming the method of the Ch'ing Dynasty and not having a
Liberation Army garrison stationed in Tibet, it hints that this is not
their true intent. They well know that this cannot be done, and they are
only attempting to use this article as a means of bargaining. In the peti-
tion, they criticize the 14th Dalai Lama, relieving him of political re-
sponsibilities for the demonstrations. They come out in defense of the
national interest of Tibet; they know that their military strength is
inferior to ours but that their social strength is superior. We should
accept the petition in fact (not in form) and postpone implementation of
the agreement in its entirety. That they chose this time before the
arrival of the Panchen Lama to hold a demonstration was premeditated.
After the Panchen Lama arrives in Lhasa, they may court him vigorously

and recruit him for their group. If we work successfully and the Panchen
Lama is not tricked by them and arrives safely in Shigatse, the situation
will become more favorable to us. However, our lack of material founda-
tion will not change for the time being, nor will their superiority in
social strength. Therefore, the reluctance of the Dalai Lama group to
implement the agreement in its entirety will not change for the time being.
Currently, in form we should adopt the offensive, rebuking them for the
irrationality of the demonstrations and petition (breaching the agreement) ,
but in substance we should be prepared to yield and wait until the condi-
tions are ripe before launching an offensive (implementing the agreement).

Please consider and wire us your views.

6080
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14



Speeches at the National Conference of the Chinese Communist
Party (March 1955)

Opening Speech
Concluding Speech
I. Evaluation of the Present National Conference
II. On the First Five-Year Plan
III. On the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and
Jao Shu-shih
IV. On the Current Situation
Vv. Strive for the Successful Convocation of the Eighth
National Congress of the Party

In Refutation of "Uniformity of Public Opinion" (24 May 1955)

Preface and Editor's Notes to "Material on the Counter-
Revolutionary Hu Feng Clique" (May and June 1955)

Preface
Editor's Notes (Selections)

On the Question of the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture
(31 July 1955)

In the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture Rely on Party
and League Members and Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants
(7 September 1955)

A Debate on the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture and
the Current Class Struggle (11 October 1955)

I. The Relationship Between Agricultural Cooperation
and the Transformation of Capitalist Industry
and Commerce
II. Summary of the Debate on the Question of Cooperation
III. On the Question of Comprehensive Planning and
Strengthening Leadership
IV. On Ideological Struggle
V. Other Questions

Prefaces to "The Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside"
(September and December 1955)

Preface I
Preface IT

Editor's Notes From "The Socialist Upsurge in China's Country—
side" (September and December 1955)

Page

138-156
138
143
143
145

146
152

154

157-159

160-167
160
162

168-191

192-194

195-217

196
200

203
207
210
218-224
218
221

225-259



To resist U.S. imperialism, the European immigrants in Central and South
American nations must unite with the native Indians. The white immigrants
from Europe may be divided into two categories: The rulers and the ruled.
Thus, the oppressed white people will easily become close to the natives,
because their positions are identical.

We are in the same position as our Latin American and our Asian-African
friends, and we do the same kind of work, doing something for the people
and reducing the imperialist oppression of the people. If we are success-
ful, we will fundamentally eliminate imperialist oppression. On this
point, we are comrades.

In resisting imperialist oppression, our stand is identical with yours,
the only differences being our location, race, and language. But there
is an essential difference between us and imperialism. We find it un-
pleasant every time we see imperialism.

Why do we want imperialism? The Chinese people do not want imperialism;

the peoples of the whole world do not want imperialism. There is no
necessity for its existence.

6080
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29



U.S. IMPERIALISM IS A PAPER TIGER (14 JULY 1956)
~-A part of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's interview with two Latin Americans
Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 pp 289-292

[Text] The U.S. displays everywhere the anticommunist sign for the pur-
pose of attaining its goal in invading others.

The U.S. is indebted everywhere. It is indebted to the Central and South
American nations, and the Asian and African nations. It is also indebted
to the European and Oceanian nations. The whole world, including Great
Britain, does not like the U.S. The broad masses of people do not like
it. Japan does not like it, because of its oppression. None of the na-
tions in the East has escaped U.S. aggression. It invaded China's Taiwan.
Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Pakistan have also suffered
from its aggression, and some of them are its allies. The people are un-
happy about it, and the authorities of some countries are also unhappy
about it.

All oppressed nations must become independent.

Everything will change. The rotten and great forces will yield to the
newborn and small forces. The weak will become strong, because the
majority of the people demand a change. The great power of U.S. imperi-
alism will become small, because the American people are also dissatis-
fied with their own government.

Those of my generation have experienced the changes. Some of us here at
this meeting were born in the Ch'ing Dynasty, and some during the Chinese
Republic.

The Ch'ing Dynasty was overthrown long ago. Who did it? The party and
the people led by Sun Yat-sen did it together. Sun Yat-sen's strengths
were small, and the officials of the Ch'ing Dynasty found him insignifi-
cant. His many uprisings always ended in failure. But finally, it was
Sun Yat-sen who overthrew the Ch'ing Dynasty. The big is not frightening.

26



TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOLUME V OF 'SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG'
Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 pp 1-7

[Text] The Period of the Socialist Revolution and Socialist Construction (1)

Contents Page
The Chinese People Have Stood Up! (21 September 1949) 3-7
Long Live the Great Unity of the Chinese People!

(30 September 1949) 8-10
Eternal Glory to the Heroes of the People (30 September 1949) 11
Always Keep to the Style of Plain Living and Hard Struggle

(26 October 1949) 12
Asking for Opinions on the Tactics for Dealing With Rich Peasants

(12 March 1950) 13-14
Fight for a Fundamental Turn for the Better in the Nation's

Financial and Economic Situation (6 June 1950) 15-20
Don't Hit Out in All Directions (6 June 1950) 21-24
Be a True Revolutionary (23 June 1950) 25-29
You Are Models for the Whole Nation (25 September 1950) 30-31
Order to the Chinese People's Volunteers (8 October 1950) 32

The Chinese People's Volunteers Should Cherish Every Hill,
Every River, Every Tree and Every Blade of Grass in Korea
(19 January 1951) 33



consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist
restoration and building socialism, but are also of great and lasting world
significance.

Volume V of the "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" contains important writ-
ings from September 1949 through 1957. It was in these writings that Com-
rade Mao Tse-tung for the first time put forward: the scientific thesis
that the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the
“socialist road and the capitalist road, will still exist for a long time
after the basic completion of the socialist transformation of the ownership
of the means of production; the doctrine of correctly distinguishing and
handling the two types of contradictions in socialist society that are
different in nature, those between ourselves and the enemy and those among
the people; the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dicta-
torship of the proletariat; and the ideas underlying the general line for
building socialism. Later, particularly during the Great Proletarian Cul-
tural Revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung continued to enrich and develop
this body of brilliant thought on the basis of the practical experience
of the revolution.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung was the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time. Mao
Tse-tung Thought is the victorious banner under which our Party, our army
and our people will fight in unity and continue the revolution; it is a
treasure shared in common by the international proletariat and the revolu-
tionary people of all countries. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's thought and teach-
ings will live for ever.

Some of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's writings from the period of the socialist
revolution and socialist construction contained in the "Selected Works"
have been published before; others have not and they include documents
drafted by him, his manuscripts and official records of his speeches.
Some necessary technical editing of the records of the speeches was done
in the course of compilation.

Committee for Editing and Publishing

Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Works, the

Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China

1 March 1977

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LET US UNITE AND CLEARLY DISTINGUISH BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE ENEMY
(4 AUGUST 1952)

--Salient points of a speech delivered at the 38th meeting of the Standing
Committee of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference

Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 pp 66-69

[Text] During last year, we fought, negotiated and stabilized simultane-
ously.

The situation of the Korean war stabilized after July last year, but the
domestic financial and economic conditions failed to do so; we still lacked
confidence at that time. In the past, we could only say, "Commodity prices
are basically stabilized; income and expenditures are close to balancing,"
indicating that commodity prices were still not stabilized and that income
and expenditures were still not balanced. Too little income and too much
expenditure--it was a problem. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee held a meeting in September last year and proposed pro-
duction increases and stringent thrift. In October, I again proposed pro-
duction increases and thrift at the third meeting of the First National
Committee of the Political Consultative Conference. In the production
increase and thrift movement, relatively serious corruption, waste, and
bureaucratism were uncovered. The "three-anti" movement was launched in
December and immediately thereafter the "five-anti" movement. Now the
"three-anti" and "five-anti" movements have been successfully concluded,
the issues have been clarified and all is well in the country.

The expenditures last year for the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid
Korea were roughly the same as those for domestic construction, about

half and half. This year is different. It is estimated that the war
expenditures will be only half of last year's. Currently, our troops

have been reduced but our equipment has been reinforced. During our more
than two decades of fighting in the past, we never had an air force;

there were only those of others which bombed us. Now we have an air force,
and we also have anti-aircraft guns, cannons and tanks. The resist U.S.

15



Criticize Han Chauvinism (16 March 1953)

Solve the Problem of the "Five Excesses" (19 March 1953)

Liu Shao-chi and Yang Shang-kun Criticized for Breach of
Discipline in Issuing Documents in the Name of the Central

Committee Without Authorization (19 May 1953)

Refute Right Deviationist Views That Depart From the General
Line (15 June 1953)

The Youth League in Its Work Must Take the Characteristics of
Youth Into Consideration (30 June 1953)

On State Capitalism (9 July 1953)
The Party's General Line for the Transition Period (August 1953)
Combat Bourgeois Ideas in the Party (12 August 1953)

The Only Road for the Transformation of Capitalist Industry and
Commerce (7 September 1953)

Our Great Victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and
Aid Korea and Our Future Tasks (12 September 1953)

Criticism of Liang Shu-ming's Reactionary Ideas
(16-18 September 1953)

Two Talks on Mutual Aid and Cooperation in Agriculture
(October and November 1953)

I. The Talk of 15 October
II. The Talk of 4 November

On the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China
(14 June 1954)

Strive to Build a Great Socialist Country (15 September 1954)

Letter Concerning the Study of "The Dream of The Red Chamber"
(16 October 1954)

The Chinese People Cannot Be Cowed by the Atom Bomb
(28 January 1955)

Page

75-76

77-79

80

81-82

83-87
88
89

90-97

98-100

101-106

107-115

116-124

116

119

125-131

132-133

134-135

136-137



First, together with the Korean people, we fought back to and defended
the 38th parallel. This was very important. Had this not been done, the
front line would have remained at Yalu and T'u-men rivers, and the people
of Shenyang, An-shan, and Fu-shun would not have been able to settle down
to production.

Second, we gained military experiences. The army, air force, navy, in-
fantry, artillery, engineer corps, tank units, railway units, air defense
units, and signal corps of our Chinese People's Volunteers and our medical
and logistics units gained experiences in actual combat against the aggres—
sor troops of the United States. This time, we learned something about the
U.S. troops. Before coming into contact with them, we were afraid of them.
But after fighting them for 33 months, we understood them thoroughly. U.S.
imperialism is not frightening; there is not much to it. We have gained
this one item of experience, and it is an invaluable one.

Third, we raised the political awareness of the people of the whole nation.

These three points led to a fourth point: A new imperialist war of ag-
gression against China has been postponed; a third world war has been
postponed.

The imperialist aggressors must understand that the Chinese people have
now been organized and that they must not be provoked. If provoked, the
matter will be hard to handle.

Hereafter, the enemy may still be able to fight. Even if they do not,
they will inevitably use all kinds of means to make trouble, such as send-
ing secret agents to conduct sabotage. They have set up gigantic secret
service structures in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan. Yet, we have gained
experience in the war to resist America and aid Korea. As long as we
activate the masses and rely on the people, we will have the means to
handle them.

Our present situation is not the same as in the winter of 1950. At that
time, were the American aggressors on the other side of the 38th parallel?
No, they were on the other side of the Yalu and T'u-men rivers. Did we
have the experience of fighting the U.S. aggressors? No. Were we familiar
with the American troops? No. Now, all such conditions have changed. If
U.S. imperialism does not postpone a new war of aggression, if they say:
"We want to fight," then we will confront them with the three points men-
tioned above. If they say: "We will not fight," then we will come to

the fourth point. This will also serve to prove the superiority of our
people's democratic dictatorship.

Do we invade others? We will not invade anyone. However, if others
invade us, we will fight, and fight to the finish.

The Chinese people have this one principle: We support peace, but we
are not afraid of war; we can handle either alternative. We have the

21



JPRS 69195

3 June 1977 .

TRANSLATIONS ON PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
No, 382
SELECTIONS From VoLUME V oF
THE “SELECTED Works oF MAO TSE-TUNG”

|

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268 Reproduced From
—& ao Best Available Copy
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U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY

NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
‘SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

1 20000202 124 |


A DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO INNER-PARTY UNITY (18 NOVEMBER 1957)

--Excerpts from a speech at the Moscow meeting of representatives of Com-
munist and Workers' Parties

Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 pp 496-498

[Text] I wish to discuss the problem of method on the unity issue. I
feel that in regard to comrades, no matter who they are, as long as they
are not hostile or destructive we should adopt the attitude of unity. We
should adopt the method of dialectics toward them, not the method of meta~
physics. What is the dialectical method? It is to analyze everything,
admit that man will always make mistakes and refrain from negating every-
thing just because a person has made mistakes. Lenin once said that there
was no one in the world who had not made mistakes. Everyone needs the
support of others. A hero needs three assistants; a fence needs three
posts. Though the lotus blossom is pretty, it needs the support of the
green leaves. It is a Chinese proverb. China has another proverb: Three
stinking cobblers make one Chu-ko Liang. One Chu-ko Liang is incomplete
and always defective. Just look at our 12-nation declaration. After the
Ist, 2d, 3d, and 4th drafts, the revisions of the wording have still not
been completed. I feel that to claim to be all-wise and all-powerful like
God is improper. Therefore, what should be our attitude toward those com-
rades who have made mistakes? We should analyze and adopt the dialectical
method, not the metaphysical method. Our party once became entrapped in
metaphysics--dogmatism, destroying completely those whom it did not like.
Subsequently, we criticized dogmatism and gradually learned some dialectics.
The basic viewpoint of dialectics is the unity of opposites. After recog-
nizing this viewpoint, what do we do with a comrade who has made mistakes?
First we must struggle against him and thoroughly rid him of his erroneous
thinking. Second, we must help him. First is struggle and second is help.
With good intentions we should help him to correct his mistakes so that he
will have a way out.

It is different when it comes to another type of people. With people like

Trotsky and China's Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chang Kuo-t'ao, and Kao Kang it was
impossible to adopt an attitude of help because they were irremediable.

44



I. Two Types of Contradictions Differing in Nature
II. The Question of Eliminating Counter-Revolutionaries
III. The Question of the Cooperative Transformation of
Agriculture
IV. The Question of the Industrialists and Businessmen
V. The Question of the Intellectuals
VI. The Question of the Minority Nationalities
VII. Overall Consideration and Proper Arrangement
VIII. On "Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let a Hundred
Schools of Thought Contend" and "Long-Term
Coexistence and Mutual Supervision"
IX. On the Question of Disturbances Created by Small
Numbers of People
X. Can Bad Things Be Turned Into Good Things?
XI. On Practicing Economy
XII. China's Path to Industrialization

Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on
Propaganda Work (12 March 1957)

Persevere in Plain Living and Hard Struggle, Maintain Close
Ties With the Masses (March 1957)

Things Are Beginning to Change (15 May 1957)

The Chinese Communist Party Is the Core of Leadership of the
Whole Chinese People (25 May 1957)

Muster Forces to Repulse the Wild Attacks of the Rightists
(8 June 1957)

Wenhui Bao's Bourgeois Orientation Should Be Criticized
(1 July 1957)

Repulse the Attacks of the Bourgeois Rightists (9 July 1957)
The Situation in the Summer of 1957 (July 1957)

Be Activists in Promoting the Revolution (9 October 1957)
Firmly Believe in the Majority of the People (13 October 1957)
A Dialectical Approach to Inner-Party Unity (18 November 1957)

All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers (18 November 1957)

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Page

363
376

379
382
384
384
387
388
395
397

398
400

403-418

419-422

423-429

430

431-433

434-439
440-455
456-465
466-479
480-495
496-498

499-500



Asking for Opinions on the Seventeen-Point Document
Concerning Agriculture (21 December 1955)

Speed Up the Socialist Transformation of Handicrafts
(5 March 1956)

On the Ten Major Relationships (25 April 1956)

I. The Relationship Between Heavy Industry on the
One Hand and Light Industry and Agriculture on
the Other
II. The Relationship Between Industry in the Coastal
Regions and Industry in the Interior
III. The Relationship Between Economic Construction and
Defense Construction
IV. The Relationship Between the State, the Units of
Production and the Producers
Vv. The Relationship Between the Central Authorities
and the Local Authorities
VI. The Relationship Between the Han Nationality and the
Minority Nationalities
VII. The Relationship Between Party and Non-Party
VIII. The Relationship Between Revolution and Counter-
Revolution
IX. The Relationship Between Right and Wrong
X. The Relationship Between China and Other Countries

U.S. Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger (14 July 1956)

Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward the Party's Traditions
(30 August 1956)

Some Experiences in Our Party's History (25 September 1956)
In Commemoration of Dr Sun Yat-sen (12 November 1956)

Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China (15 November 1956)

Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal
and Autonomous Region Party Committees (January 1957)

I. The Talk of 18 January
II. The Talk of 27 January

On the Correct Handling of Contraditions Among the People
(27 February 1957)

Page

260-263

264-266

267-288

268
269
271
272
275

277
278

280
283
285

289-292

293-304
305-310

311-312
313-329
330-362

330

339

363-402



the class struggle. At that time there will still be contradictions be-
tween production relations and productive forces and between the super-
structure and the economic foundation. When production relations are not
handled successfully, they must be overthrown. When the superstructure
(including ideology and public opinion) protects production relations
which are unpopular, the people will reform it. The superstructure is
also a sort of social relations. It is built on the economic foundation.
The so-called economic foundation is production relations, mainly the
ownership system. Productive forces are the most revolutionary factor.
When productive forces develop, there will always be revolution. Produc-
tive forces include two items, man and tools. Tools are created by man.
Tools want to revolutionize. They will express themselves through man,
through the laborer, destroying the old production relations and the old
social relations. "A gentleman will use his mouth rather than his hands."
The best means is to use one's mouth. When friendly words are rejected,
one has to resort to force. What should one do when there is no weapon?
The laborer has tools in his hands. If he has no tools, he can use stones.
When even stones are not available, he can use his two fists.

Our state organs are those of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Take
our courts, for instance. They are there to deal with the counterrevolu-
tion. But not exclusively. They must also handle the many internal dis-
putes among the people. It looks as if courts will be indispensable even
10,000 years from now. After the extinction of classes, there will still
be the contradictions between the advanced and the backward, struggles
among individuals, quarrels and all kinds of troubles. Therefore, how can
we not have courts? However, the essence of the struggles will have
changed; it will be different from the class struggle. The essence of
the courts will also have changed. By that time, the superstructure may
have problems. People like us, for instance, may make mistakes. Losing
the struggle, we may be ousted, and a Gomulka or Jao Shu-shih may come
into power. Are you saying that nothing like this will happen? I think
it is possible even 1,000 years, 10,000 years, from now.

TIl

Everything in the world is a unity of opposites. The unity of opposites
means the unity of things which are qualitatively different and opposed

to each other. Water, for instance, is a combination of the elements of
hydrogen and oxygen. There can be no water if either element is missing.

T hear that there are now over 1 million named chemical compounds and an
unknown number of unnamed ones. Chemical compounds are the unity of
opposites of qualitatively different things. This is also true with things
in society. The central and the local governments are the unity of oppo-
sites; this department and that department are also the unity of opposites.

Two countries are also the unity of opposites. Both China and the Soviet

Union are socialist. Are there any differences? There are. The races
are different. The October Revolution occurred 39 years ago, but it has

40



After we underwent the war of resistance period and fought Japan, our
troops developed to 900,000. Thereafter it was the liberation war. Our
guns and cannons were inferior to those of the Kuomintang, and the Kuo—
mintang had 4 million troops. After three years of fighting, a total of
8 million were wiped out by us. The Kuomintang, with the help of U.S.
imperialism, could not defeat us. The powerful could not win; the weak
always succeeded.

At present U.S. imperialism is very powerful, but not truly so. It is
very weak politically, because it is divorced from the broad masses of
people. No one likes it, not even the American people. Powerful on the
surface, it actually is not frightening, it is a paper tiger. A tiger on
the surface, it is made of paper and cannot withstand the wind and the
rain. I see the U.S. as a paper tiger.

The entire history proves this point; the history of thousands of years
of the class society of mankind proves this point: The strong must yield
to the weak. It is thus with America.

Only if imperialism is eliminated will there be peace. There will come
the day when the paper tiger will be destroyed. Nevertheless, it will not
disappear on its own. It will be destroyed by the wind and the rain.

When we say that U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger, we are talking in terms
of strategy. As a whole, we must hold it in contempt. From each and every
part, we must give it serious attention. It has claws and teeth. If it
is to be liquidated, we must tackle the parts one by one. If it has 10
teeth, for instance, we will knock out one the first time, leaving 9. We
then will knock out another one, leaving 8. After all the teeth have been
knocked out, it still has claws. If we proceed conscientiously step by
step, we will succeed finally.

Strategically, we will hold U.S. imperialism in complete contempt. Tacti-
cally, we must give it serious attention. When we struggle against it,
we must pay serious attention--battle by battle, item by item. At present
the U.S. is powerful, but, in the broad sphere, as a whole, and by long-
range consideration, it does not have the support of the people, its
policies are unpopular, and it oppresses and exploits the people. As a
result of this point, the tiger will perish. Therefore, it is not fright—
ening, and one may hold it in contempt. However, the U.S. still has
strengths, producing over 100 million tons of steel annually and attack-
ing people everywhere. Therefore, we must struggle against it, fighting
with a tremendous effort, and contesting position after position.

It looks like that the American and the Asian and African nations will

continue to quarrel with the United States, quarreling to the bitter end,
until the paper tiger is destroyed by the wind and the rain.

28



Then there were also those like Hitler, Chiang Kai-shek and the Czar.
They were also irremediable, and could only be knocked down because as far
as we were concerned they were absolutely repellent. In this respect,
they had no dual essence, only a single one. In the final analysis, it
is the same with the imperialist and capitalist systems, and they will
eventually be replaced by the socialist system. It is the same with ide-
ology. We must replace idealism with materialism and theism with atheism.
This is in terms of strategy. Tactically it is different and there must
be compromise. Did we not compromise with the Americans on the 38th
parallel? Did we not compromise with the French on Vietnam?

In each tactical stage, we must be skillful in both struggle and compro—
mise. Now we will return to the comrade relationship. I suggest that,
whenever there is any misunderstanding between comrades, they must hold
discussions. Some people seem to feel that once joining the communist
party, everyone becomes a saint without any differences or misunderstand-
ings. They are unable to analyze. Like a piece of iron plate, uniform
and even and no discussion is necessary. It seems that, once having
joined the communist party, a person has to be a 100 percent Marxist.
Actually, there are all kinds of Marxists: There are 100 percent, 90 per-
cent, 80 percent, 70 percent, 60 percent and 50 percent Marxists, and
some are only 10 or 20 percent. Can we not hold a conversation of two
or several persons in a small room? Can we not start from unity and dis-
cuss in the spirit of help? Naturally, it will not be a discussion with
imperialism (we also will hold discussions with imperialism), but one
inside the communist party. Let me give an example. Are we not holding
a discussion this time among 12 nations? Is it not a discussion among
more than 60 parties? Actually, we are holding discussions. In other
words, under the principle of not damaging Marxism-Leninism, we must ac—
cept some of the opinions of others which are acceptable and relinquish
some of our own opinions which can be relinquished. Thus, we have two
hands: ‘Toward the comrades who have made mistakes, we struggle against
them with one hand and discuss unity with them with the other. The goal
of struggle is to adhere to Marxist principles. It is the fundamental
essence, involving one hand. With the other hand, we discuss unity. The
goal of unity is to afford the wrongdoer a way out and compromise with
him. It is flexibility. The unity of the fundamental essence and flexi-
bility is a Marxist-Leninist principle. It is a sort of unity of oppo-
sites.

Any kind of world, especially class society, naturally, is always filled
with contradictions. Some people say that we can "find" the contradic—
tions in a socialist society. I think this theory is not correct. It is
not a question of finding or not finding the contradictions. Contradic—
tions exist everywhere. There is no place where contradictions do not
exist, nor one individual who cannot be analyzed. If we admit that an
individual cannot be analyzed, it will be metaphysics. Just look at the
atom. It is full of the unity of contradictions, the opposite unity of
atomic nucleus and the electrons, the opposite unity of proton and neutron

45



The big will be overthrown by the small, and the small will become big.
After overthrowing the Ch'ing Dynasty, Sun Yat-sen failed, because he did
not satisfy the people's demands, such as their demand for land and their
demand to resist imperialism. Nor did he realize that the counter-revolu-
tion must be suppressed, and the counter-revolutionaries at that time were
active everywhere. Subsequently, he met with failure in the hands of
Yuan Shih-k'ai, the leader of the Northern warlords. Yuan Shih-k'ai was
more powerful than Sun Yat-sen. Nevertheless, the following pattern still
emerged: When the weak united with the people, it became strong; when the
strong was against the people, it became weak. Sun Yat-sen's bourgeois
democratic revolutionaries cooperated with our Communist Party and defeated
the warlord system left by Yuan Shih-k'ai.

Recognized by the governments of all nations in the world, Chiang Kai-
shek's regime lasted 22 years, and was most powerful. We were weak. After
suppression by the counter-revolution, only several thousand party members
were left out of the original 50,000. The enemy made trouble everywhere.
Nevertheless, the following pattern still emerged: The powerful failed
because they were divorced from the people; the weak succeeded because
they united with the people and worked for the people. The result was
precisely so.

During War of Resistance Against Japan, Japan was very powerful. The
Kuomintang troops were driven to outlying areas, and the armed forces led
by the Communist Party could only launch guerrilla warfare in the rural
areas behind enemy lines. Japan occupied China's large cities of Peking,
Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, Wu-han, and Canton. Nevertheless, Japan's
militarism, and Germany's Hitler, also followed the above pattern and
collapsed in a few years.

We underwent many difficulties, driven from the south to the north, and
our numbers dwindled from several hundred thousand to several ten thousand.
After the Long March of 25,000 1i, we had only 25,000 men left.

In our party history, there were many "leftist" and rightist line errors.
The most serious were Ch'en Tu-hsiu's right tendencies and Wang Ming's
"left" tendencies. In addition, there were also the rightist mistakes
of Chang Kuo-t'ao and Kao Kang.

Mistakes have their uses. They may be used to educate the people, educate
the party. We had many negative teachers, such as Japan, the U.S., Chiang
Kai-shek, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san, Wang Ming, Chang Kuo-t'ao, and Kao
Kang. We had to pay a great price in order to learn from them. In his-
tory, Great Britain has fought us many times. Great Britain, the U.S.,
Japan, France, Germany, Italy, the czarist Russia, and Holland all coveted
this land of ours. They are all our negative teachers, and we are their
students.

27



Main Points of the Resolution Adopted at the Enlarged Meeting
of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party (18 February 1951)

I. Twenty-Two Months for Preparation
II. Propaganda and Education Campaign for Resisting
U.S. Aggression and Aiding Korea
III. Agrarian Reform
IV. Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries
Vv. Urban Work
VI. Party Consolidation and Party Building
VII. United Front Work
VIII. Rectification Movement

The Party's Mass Line Must Be Followed in Suppressing Counter—
Revolutionaries (May 1951)

Strike Surely, Accurately and Relentlessly in Suppressing
Counter-Revolutionaries (December 1950-September 1951)

Pay Serious Attention to the Discussion of the Film
"The Life of Wu Hsun" (20 May 1951)

Great Victories in Three Mass Movements (23 October 1951)

On the Struggle Against "the Three Evils" and "the Five Evils"
(November 1951-March 1952)

Take Mutual Aid and Cooperation in Agriculture as a Major Task
(15 December 1951)

New Year's Day Message (1 January 1952)

On the Policies for Our Work in Tibet--Directive of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (6 April 1952)

The Contradiction Between the Working Class and the Bourgeoisie
Is the Principal Contradiction in China (6 June 1952)

Let Us Unite and Clearly Distinguish Between Ourselves and the
Enemy (4 August 1952)

Hail the Signal Victory of the Chinese People's Volunteers
(24 October 1952)

Combat Bureaucracy, Commandism and Violations of the Law and
Discipline (5 January 1953)

Page

34-38

39-41

42-45

46-47

48-52

53-58

59

60

61-64

61-64

66-69

70-71

72-74



HAIL THE SIGNAL VICTORY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS (24 OCTOBER 1952)

--Instructions drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Military Commission to the
responsible persons of the Chinese People's Volunteers

Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 pp 70-71

[Text] Our Volunteers, in coordination with the Korean People's Army, be-
gan a tactical counteroffensive against the entire enemy front on 18 Sep-
tember and, within a month, destroyed and wounded over 30,000 enemy troops
and won a tremendous victory. The Central Committee and the Military Com-
mission wish to extend to you and all the combat commanders and fighters
their enthusiastic congratulations. In this type of operation, at certain
selected crucial tactical points, we concentrate our superior forces and
fire power, take surprise actions, and launch attacks to wipe out platoons,
companies, or battalions of the enemy army in whole or in greater parts;
subsequently, when the enemy launches a counterattack, we inflict large
numbers of casualties on the enemy in repeated operations; thereafter,

in regard to the key points taken by us, we will, according to the situa-
tion, defend those which are defensible and abandon those which are in-
defensible, thus preserving our initiative and preparing for future coun-
terattacks. By continuing this method of operation, we will subdue the
enemy and force him to fall back on compromises and end the Korean war.
Ever since our army adopted the firm position warfare in July last year,
the amount of losses inflicted on the enemy army has far surpassed its
losses in the mobile warfare prior thereto. Meanwhile, our army's losses
have been greatly reduced. In regard to our personnel losses in terms of
the Volunteers alone, in the 15 months since July last year, there has
been an average reduction of over two-thirds per month compared with the
eight previous months. This situation is a result of relying on the posi-
tions and following the above method of operation. In the current period
beginning 18 September, such method of operation has become more organiza-
tional and more of the nature of the entire line; therefore, it deserves
special attention.

Now on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Volunteers' operation
abroad, it is hoped that you will summarize your experiences, raise your
organizational essence, improve your tactics, economize on ammunition,
unite with your Korean comrades and people more closely, and win greater
victories in future battles.

18
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may even do some bad things. In regard to these people, we must unite
with them, educate and help them. As I said once before, in regard to
those with defects and mistakes, not only must we watch to see whether
they correct themselves, but we must also help them. First is to watch
and second is to help. If you only watch, standing still and not moving,
what do you do? If you handle it successfully, it will be good. If not,
you will suffer the consequences. It is a negative attitude, not a posi-
tive one. A Marxist must adopt a positive attitude, not just watching but
also helping.

My third point concerns the election of the Central Committee. A while
ago Comrade [Teng] Hsiao-p'ing said that the number of members of the
Eighth Central Committee will be 150 to 170. The Seventh Central Commit-
tee had 77 members. This time, it is a little more than double. It is
probably rather appropriate. After a few years, five for instance, we
will expand it again which will probably be more beneficial. Currently,
many of our useful talents were trained during the War of Resistance
against Japan--the so-called "three-eight style" cadres. They constitute
the important foundation of our current work and are indispensable. Never—
theless, their number is great. If we want to place them, the number of
members of the Central Committee of this session will have to be increased
to several hundred. Therefore, we will not consider placing them at this
time. I hope the comrades will consider whether the number of 150 to 170
proposed by the Central Committee is appropriate or not and just how many
are appropriate.

We must affirm that the previous session of the Central Committee did per-
form its work and that it did not abuse the trust of the Seventh National
Party Congress. In 11 years these people correctly led China's democratic
revolution, correctly led the socialist revolution and socialist construc-
tion without making any serious mistakes, struggled against all types of
opportunist matters and erroneous things and overcame all kinds of factors
detrimental to the revolution and construction. They had achievements and
they included some comrades who made mistakes. Here, we are talking about
the Central Committee as a whole. As for the individual comrades, we can-
not assess them the same way. At the Seventh Congress, Wang Ming, for the
purpose of meeting the situation, wrote a declaration admitting the accu-
racy of the Central Committee line, recognizing the political report of
the Seventh Congress and indicating his willingness to abide by the deci-
sions of the Congress. Nevertheless, when I talked with him subsequently,
he reneged, forgetting what he had written. Thinking it over, he said
the next day: I wrote something and admitted my mistakes. I said: If
you admitted your mistakes at that time, but now you no longer admit them,
you can withdraw your statement. But he did not withdraw it. Later on,
at the plenary session of the Second Central Committee, we hoped that he
would discuss his own mistakes, but he talked about other things instead,
about how good we were. We said: You don't need to talk about those
things. Just talk about the mistakes you made. He refused. He promised
to write a self-examination after the meeting. But later he claimed that

35



he was sick and could not exert himself mentally and that the moment he
started writing, his illness would recur. Maybe he did it on purpose. It
was hard to tell. He has been sick all along and cannot attend this Con-
gress. Should we elect him? Should we elect Comrade Li Li-san? There
are relatively more people who excuse Li Li-san than those who excuse Wang
Ming. As stated by Comrade [Teng] Hsiao-p'ing, if we elect them, it will
have the same significance as their election at the Seventh Congress. At
the time of the Seventh Congress, many delegates were unwilling to elect
them (not just Wang Ming, but also several others). At that time, we said
that if we adopted such a policy we would be making a mistake. Why was
not electing those who had made mistakes a mistake? Because it would have
been handling affairs according to their method. Their method was that
regardless of whether you had really made a mistake or not, the moment you
were declared an opportunist you were rejected. If we followed their
method, we would be following their line, i.e., the Wang Ming line or the
Li Li-san line. We refused to do so. We refused to follow the Wang Ming
line or the Li Li-san line. That is how they would handle inner-party
relations. They rejected all those who had once made mistakes, struggled
against them or called them opportunists. They claimed that they them-
selves were 100 percent bolshevik. Upon subsequent investigation we found
that they were 100 percent opportunists, while we who were called "oppor-
tunists" by them possessed some Marxism, more or less.

Here, the most basic factor is that they are not isolated individuals, but
represent a rather large portion of the petty bourgeoisie. China is a
country with a large petty bourgeoisie, and a rather large portion of it

is unstable. Take the well-to-do middle peasants, for instance. In any
revolution, they always vacillate and are not firm, becoming insane when
happy but depressed when pessimistic. Their eyes are glued to their little
bits of assets, nothing more than one or two domestic animals, a large cart
and some 10 odd mou of land. They worry about profits and loss and are
afraid to lose their possessions. They are different from poor peasants.
China's poor peasants amount to 50 percent in the North and 70 percent in
the South. In terms of its makeup, our party basically consists of work-
ers and poor peasants, i.e., proletarians and semi-proletarians. The semi-
proletariat also belongs to the petty bourgeoisie, but its stability is
much better than the middle peasantry. Our party has also recruited some
of the intellectuals. Among our membership of over 10 million, there are
approximately 1 million large, medium and small intellectuals. One cannot
say that these 1 million intellectuals represent imperialism, the land-
owner class, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, or the national bourgeoisie.

It is more appropriate to include them in the petty pourgeoisie. Which
part of the petty bourgeoisie do they represent? They represent that part
of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie which has relatively more means

of production, such as the well-to-do middle peasants. These intellectual
party members are afraid of their own shadows, vacillate constantly and
suffer seriously from subjectivism and not a little from sectarianism.

What did we wish to demonstrate in electing the two representative figures

36



THE CHINESE PEOPLE CANNOT BE COWED BY THE ATOM BOMB (28 JANUARY 1955)

--Essential points of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's talk with the first Finnish
ambassador to China, Cay (Carl Johan) Sundstroem, when the latter presented
his credentials

Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 pp 136-137

[Text] China and Finland are friendly nations. Our relationship is built
on the foundation of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

China and Finland have never had any conflict. Among the European nations,
there were wars in history between China and England, France, Germany, the
czarist Russia, Italy, the Austria-Hungary Empire, and Holland. These na-
tions came from far away to invade China, such as the joint forces of Eng-
land and France and the eight-nation joint forces, including the U.S. and
Japan. A total of 16 nations, including Turkey and Luxemburg, participated
in the Korean War. All these aggressor nations proclaimed their love of
peace and accused Korea and China of aggression.

Today, the dangers of a world war and the threat against China come mainly
from the warmongers in the U.S. They encroach upon China's Taiwan and the
Taiwan Strait, and wish to launch an atomic war. We have two principles:
First, we do not want war; second, if anyone should invade us, we will hit
back firmly. This is how we educate the Communist Party members and the
people of the whole country. The U.S. atomic blackmail cannot intimidate
the Chinese people. China has 600 million people and 9.6 million square
kilometers of land. The atom bombs of the U.S. cannot wipe out the Chinese
people. No matter how powerful its atom bombs are, if they are dropped on
China, pierce the planet of earth, and destroy it, it will be a major event
in terms of the solar system, but not very significant in terms of the
universe as a whole.

We have an old saying: Millet plus rifles. In the U.S., it is airplanes
plus atom bombs. Nevertheless, if the U.S. with airplanes plus atom bombs
should launch a war of aggression against China, then the China of millet
plus rifles will win. The peoples of the whole world will support us.

24



No. 382

SELECTIONS FRoM VoLUME V OF
THE “SELECTED Works oF Mao TSE-TUNG”

ConTENTS PAGE
Publication Note to Volume V of the 'Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung'... 1
Table of Contents of Volume V of ‘Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung'...... 3
The Chinese People's Volunteers Should Cherish Every Hill, Every
River, Every Tree and Every Blade of Grass in Korea

(19 January 1951)...ceecceecee scene eee eee cenececessesscseessseceees LO

Propaganda and Education Campaign for Resisting U.S. Aggression
and Aiding Korea....sseesessccnceesreeceee

On the Policies for Our Work in Tibet--Directive of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (6 April 1952)......+seee5-. 12

Let Us Unite and Clearly Distinguish Between Ourselves and the
Enemy (4 August 1952)..ccceeeececcececcrceececercteceseesscescseseene LS

Hail the Signal Victory of the Chinese People's Volunteers
(24 October 1952). .ccceccccececceccececeecencrcetcnecscsesesecsereecs 18

Our Great Victory in the War To Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea
and Our Future Tasks (12 September 1953)....s.sseeeeecscececseeceeees LY

The Chinese People Cannot Be Cowed by the Atom Bomb (28 January 1955).. 24
U.S. Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger (14 July 1956).....+eeeeeeeeeeeereeee 26

Strengthen Party Unity and Carry Forward the Party's Traditions

(30 August 1956)... cece ee cree eeeeeeeeeee seceeeee 30

Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China (15 November 1956)......seseeeeeeeees 39

A Dialectical Approach to Inner-Party Unity (18 November 1957)........- 44
-a- [III - cC - 80 S & T]

| JPRS 69195
3 June 1977
TRANSLATIONS ON PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA



were fully mobilized to launch class struggle. Those now being sent by
the Soviet Union to the various nations as experts were only infants or
teenagers at the time of the October Revolution; many of them have for-
gotten it. The comrades of some countries say that China's mass line is
not correct and that they like to study the gift-of-grace viewpoint. They
have no way to study. Anyway, ours are the five principles of peaceful
coexistence, mutual nonintervention in internal affairs and mutual non-
aggression. We do not attempt to be the leader of any other nation. We
lead only one, the People's Republic of China.

The fundamental problem of some Eastern European countries is their failure
to wage class struggle, eliminate the many counterrevolutionaries, train
the proletariat in the class struggle, and distinguish between the enemy
and ourselves, right and wrong and idealism and materialism. And now, they
have made their own bed and burnt their own brows.

How much capital do you have? Merely a Lenin and a Stalin. You have
thrown away Stalin and most of Lenin. You no longer have Lenin's legs.
Maybe you still have his head. Maybe you have chopped off one of his
hands. We want to study Marxism-Leninism and the October Revolution.
Marx and Lenin both wrote about many things. We have learned from the
masses to rely on them and to trod the mass line.

Not to rely on the masses in waging class struggle and not to make a clear
distinction between ourselves and the enemy would be very dangerous.

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43



only been seven years since we gained national political power. As for

our undertakings, there are many differences. Our agricultural collec-
tivization, for instance, went through several stages which were different
from theirs, our policy on capitalists is different from theirs, our market
price policy is different from theirs, our handling of the relations among
agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry is different from theirs
and our systems in the army and in the party are also different from theirs.
We once told them, We disagree with what you do; we disapprove of some of
your ways.

Some comrades fail to follow dialectics or to analyze. They think all
things Soviet are good and arbitrarily copy them. Actually, be they things
Chinese or things foreign, we should analyze them; they contain both the
good and the bad. The work of a province is also thus; there are achieve-
ments and shortcomings. This applies to us as individuals. There are al-
ways two points, the superiorities and the defects, not just one point.
The one-point theory has been in existence since ancient times, and so has
the two-point theory. It is metaphysics and dialectics. China's ancients
said, Negative and positive become The Way. It is impossible to have only
the negative without the positive, or vice versa. It is the ancient two-
point theory. Metaphysics is the one-point theory. Currently, a consid-
erable number of comrades cannot change their one-point theory. Looking
at issues onesidedly, they feel that all things Soviet are good and they
copy everything, including things which should not be copied. We must
correct those which should not be copied and which are not suitable to
this land of ours.

Here, I will discuss the issue of "Having illicit relations with foreign
countries." Do we have such people in China who pass information to for-
eigners behind the back of the Central Committee? I think we do. Kao
Kang, for instance, was one. It has been proved by many facts. At the
Central Committee meeting of 24 December 1953 to expose Kao Kang, I an-
nounced that there were two headquarters in the city of Peking. One be-
longed to us and stirred up an open wind and lit an open fire. The other
was the underground one and it too stirred up a sort of wind and lit a
sort of fire, which I call a sinister wind and a sinister fire. As stated
by the ancient Lin Tai-yu, if it is not the east wind prevailing over the
west wind, it would be the west wind prevailing over the east wind. As
for now, if it is not the positive wind and positive fire prevailing over
the negative wind and the negative fire, it is the negative wind and the
negative fire prevailing over the positive wind and the positive fire.

The purpose of blowing negative wind and lighting negative fire is to pre-
vail over the positive wind and extinguish the positive fire and knock
down a large group of people.

There are those among our high- and middle-level cadres and individuals
(not many) who have illicit relations with foreign countries. This is

not desirable. I hope the comrades will clarify the issue in the party
organizations and committees and at the provincial, municipal, and autono-—
mous region party committee levels so that they will stop doing such things.

41



PROPAGANDA AND EDUCATION CAMPAIGN FOR RESISTING U.S. AGGRESSION AND AIDING
KOREA

[Part II of article: "Main Points of the Resolution Adopted at the En-
larged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party (18 February 1951)"]

--Inner Party circular drafted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung for the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 p 34
[Text] We must continue to promote this movement on a nationwide scale,
intensifying it where it has been launched and popularizing it where it

has not been launched, so that everyone in the nation will undergo this
education.

6080
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11



our army will still survive. We must devote all our efforts and adopt
appropriate means to rally the Dalai Lama and the majority of the upper—
level group and isolate the minority of undesirables in order to attain
our goal of gradually reforming the economy and politics of Tibet after

a number of years and without bloodshed. But we must also be prepared

for the possibility of a revolt and attack against us by the Tibetan army
led by the undesirables so that in case of such an eventuality, our army
will be able to survive and hold firm in Tibet. All these things depend
on our careful calculations and self-sufficiency in production. Only by
making this most basic policy the foundation will we attain our goal. The
second item, which is feasible and mandatory, is to establish trade rela-
tions with India and the interior so that Tibet's imports and exports will
tend toward balancing and the living standard of the Tibetans will not
suffer in any manner due to the entry of our army. We must also seek to
improve their living somewhat. If we cannot solve the issues of produc—
tion and trade, we will lose the existing material foundation, the unde-
sirables will have the capital to incite the backward masses and the
Tibetan army against us and our policy of rallying the majority and isolat-
ing the minority will become weak and unrealizable.

In the Southwest Bureau's wire of 2 April there is only one point which
requires further consideration: Whether it is feasible and proper to re-
organize the Tibetan army and form a military administration commission
within a short time. Our view is that we will not reorganize the Tibetan
army at present, nor formally form a military subdistrict, nor establish
a military administration commission. Temporarily we will leave every-
thing as is and drag on until a year or two later when our army has truly
attained self-sufficiency in production and won the support of the masses
before discussing such issues. Within a year or two, two situations may
possibly develop: Our upper level united front policy of rallying the
majority and isolating the minority may prove effective and the Tibetan
masses may gradually become more trustful of us, so that the undesirables
and the Tibetan army will not dare to riot; or, the undesirables may find
us weak and lead the army to revolt, and our army in self-defense will
launch counterattacks and deal blows to them. Either of these two situa-
tions will be beneficial to us. From the point of view of the Tibetan
upper level group, the grounds for implementing the agreement in its en-
tirety and reorganizing the Tibetan Army are inadequate. It will be
different a few years hence. They may then feel that implementing the
agreement in its entirety and reorganizing the Tibetan army are the only
things to do. If the Tibetan army stages an uprising, or even several
uprisings, and these are quashed by our army, we will have more grounds
to reorganize it. It seems that not just the two ssu-lun's*, but also the

*"§su-lun" is the highest administrative officer under the Dalai Lama.

The two "ssu-lun's" at that time were the reactionary tenant slave masters
Lu K'ang-wa [7627 1660 1216] and Lo-sang Cha-hsi [5012 2718 2610 0823].

13



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4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date
TRANSLATIONS ON PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, No. 382 3 June 1977
Selections From Volume V of the 6.

"Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung"

7. Author(s)

8. Performing Organization Rept.
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The report contains political, sociological, economic, government, scientific

and technological information on China.

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first socialist nation in the world and, after such a long time, it is
impossible for it not to have made mistakes. In regard to the mistakes
which have occurred in the Soviet Union, such as those of Stalin, which
kind were they? They were partial and temporary in essence. Though we
hear that some of the mistakes lasted 20 years, they are temporary and
partial and can be remedied. The main current, the major aspect and the
majority of the Soviet Union are correct. Russia created Leninism and
with the October Revolution became the first socialist nation. It built
socialism, defeated fascism and became a powerful industrial nation. We
can learn many things from it. Naturally, we must learn the advanced ex-
periences, not the backward ones. Our slogan has always been to learn
the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union. Who wants you to learn the
backward experiences? There are some who, with their eyes closed, claim
that even the wind broken by the Soviet people is fragrant. That is sub-
jectivism, too. Even the Soviet people themselves say it is foul! There~
fore, we must analyze. We once said that we must see both the good and
the bad in Stalin. The major and numerous things of the Soviet Union are
good and useful; some things are wrong. We also have some things which
are not good. We must discard them ourselves. We do not want other coun-
tries to learn them from us. Nevertheless, bad things also constitute a
sort of experience and produce a great effect. We had the likes of Ch'en
Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san, Wang Ming, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih
and they were our teachers. We also have other teachers. Inside the
country, the best teacher is Chiang Kai-shek. Once he teaches them, those
whom we fail to convince are convinced. How does he teach them? He does
so with machine guns, cannons and airplanes. We also have imperialism as
a teacher. It educates our 600 million people. In the past 100 years,
several imperialist powers oppressed and educated us. Therefore, the bad
things have an educational value, a warning effect.

Opposing sectarianism deserves special discussion. We must unite with
those who once struggled against us. He once quarreled with you and
knocked you down. You got a beating and lost face. You were not that
bad, yet he conferred a "title" on you, calling you an opportunist. If
he was right, it was proper for him to beat you up. If you were really an
opportunist, why shouldn't he beat you? Here I am talking about those
who were wrong in beating and struggling against you. If they later on
changed their attitude and admitted that they were wrong in beating you
and calling you an opportunist, it should be the end of it. If some indi-
viduals refuse to admit that they were wrong, should you wait. You should.
By unity we mean uniting with those who have differences with you, who
look down upon you or show little respect for you, who have had a bone to
pick with you or waged struggles with you and at whose hands who have
suffered. As for those who agree with us, we have already united with
them and this issue no longer exists. The issue is with those with whom
we have not united. We mean those who disagree with us or whose short-
comings are great. Inside our party, for instance, many have joined the
party in organization but not in ideology. Though they have not quarreled
with you, as they have not joined the party ideologically, their perfor-
mance will inevitably not be very proper, it may even be defective or they

34



support of the people. In the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid
Korea, the people enthusiastically applied to join the army. We were
very strict in selecting among the applicants, only one out of every one
hundred was selected. The people said that it was more stringent than
picking a son-in-law. If U.S. imperialism wants to fight again, we will
do so.

Wars cost money. Yet, the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea
did not cost very much. The several years of war did not even cost us

one year of industrial and commercial taxes. Naturally, if we can avoid
war and save money, it is even better, because we need money now for con-
struction, and the peasants still have difficulties in their livelihood.
The agricultural tax of last year and the year before was on the heavy
side. Thus, some of our friends criticized us. They asked for "benevolent
administration," as if they represented the interest of the peasants. Did
we agree with their views? We did not. At that time, it was necessary

to exert our every effort to strive for victory in the war to resist U.S.
aggression and aid Korea. In regard to the peasants and the people of the
entire country, their livelihood experienced some temporary difficulties.
But would victory or saving some money be more beneficial to them? Natu
rally, victory in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea would
be more beneficial. Last year and the year before, we collected a little
more agricultural tax, because we needed money for the war. This year it
is different. There is no increase in agricultural tax, and we have
stabilized the amount of tax.

In regard. to "benevolent administration," we do subscribe to it. However,
what was the greatest "benevolent administration"? It was to resist U.S.
aggression and aid Korea. To do so, there must be sacrifice, expenses,
and more agricultural taxes. When we collected a little more agricultural
tax, some people immediately hollered, claiming that they represented the
interest of the peasants. I do not support such opinion.

The war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea was benevolent administra-
tion; at present developing industrial construction is also benevolent
administration.

There are two kinds of so-called benevolent administration: One is for
the people's current interest; the other is for their long-range interest,
such as the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and building heavy
industry. The former is minor benevolent administration, while the latter
is major benevolent administration. Both must be given consideration,

for otherwise it will be wrong. Then, which one should be stressed? We
should stress the major benevolent administration. At present the stress
of our benevolent administration should be placed on the building of

heavy industry. To build, we need money. Therefore, while the people's
livelihood must be improved, temporarily the improvement cannot be much.
In other words, the people's livelihood must be improved, but not greatly
improved; we must give consideration to the people's livelihood, but not

22



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in the nucleus, the proton and anti-proton in the proton and the neutron
and anti-neutron in the neutron. In sum, the unity of opposites is found
everywhere. We must extensively propagate the concept of the unity of
opposites, dialectics. I say that dialectics must be brought to the broad
masses of the people from the small circle of philosophers. I suggest
that this issue be discussed at the party politburo and the party central
committee plenary sessions of the various nations and at the local party
committees of all levels. Actually, our branch secretary understands
dialectics. When preparing to make a report at the branch mass meeting,
he often writes down two points in his little notebook--the superiorities
and the shortcomings. Dividing one into two is a universal phenomenon

which is dialectics.

6080
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46



STRENGTHEN PARTY UNITY AND CARRY FORWARD THE PARTY'S TRADITIONS (30 AUGUST
1956)

--Speech at the first session of the preparatory meeting for the Eighth
National Congress of the Communist Party of China

Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 pp 293-304

[Text] Today we hold the preliminary meeting of the Eighth National Con-
gress. This meeting will last more than 10 days. The main things to be
accomplished are (1) preparing the documents of the Congress, (2) primary
election of the Central Committee, and (3) preparing the drafts of speeches
at the Congress.

Now I will discuss my views.

My first point concerns the goal and purpose of the Congress. What are
the issues to be solved and the goals to be reached by this Congress? In
general, it is to sum up the experiences gained since the Seventh Congress,
unite the entire party and unite all domestic and international forces
which can be united in the struggle to build a great socialist China.

As to summarizing experiences, these are very abundant. However, we can—
not list all the facts, but must seize the crucial points, start from the
practical and summarize according to the Marxist viewpoint. Such sum-
marization will furnish our entire party with a motivation and make our
work more successful than ever before.

That ours is a great, glorious and correct party is publicly recognized

by the whole world. In the past, some foreign comrades wondered what we
were doing. Many did not comprehend our policy on the national bourgeoisie,
nor did they understand very well the rectification movements we carried
out. Now, I think more people understand them. One may say that most
understand them. Naturally, there may still be some who do not understand,
In the nation, or even in the party, there may be some who do not under-
stand and consider that the line since the Seventh Congress has not been
that correct. Nevertheless, the facts are before us. We undertook two

30



SPEECH AT THE SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA (15 NOVEMBER 1956)

Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 pp 313-323

{Excerpts] I will discuss four issues: The economy, the international
situation, Sino-Soviet relations and great democracy and small democracy.

IL

The international situation as a whole is good. What do a few imperialists
amount to? Even several dozens more will not matter.

Currently, two areas have problems, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
Trouble started in Poland and Hungary, and England and France launched an
armed invasion of Egypt. I feel that all these bad things are good. Ac-
cording to a Marxist, a bad thing has a dual essence--bad and good. See-
ing the word "bad" before the word "thing," many people think that it is
only bad. We say that there is another significance and that it is also a
good thing. This is the meaning of the saying that "Failure is the mother
of success." Under certain conditions, all failures, disastrous happen-
ings and mistakes will produce good results. Be it Poland or Hungary,
since there is fire, it will burn. Is it better for it to burn or not to
burn? Fire cannot be wrapped up in paper. Now that it has begun to burn,
it is good. Hungary has many counterrevolutionaries; now they will be
exposed. The Hungarian incident is a lesson to the comrades of the Soviet
Union and of China as well as to the Hungarian people. The emergence of
Beria was a shock. How could a Beria emerge in a socialist country? The
emergence of Kao Kang was another big shock. We must learn our lessons
from such happenings. They are part of the whole scheme and always possi-
ble.

In the future, when all the imperialists in the world have been knocked
down and classes have vanished, will there still be revolution? I think
there will. The social system will still have to be reformed, and the

word "revolution" will still have to be used. Naturally, the essence of
revolution by that time will be different from revolution in the era of

39



As a result of the first world war, the czar, the landowners, and the
capitalists of Russia were swept away. As a result of the second world
war, Chiang Kai-shek and the landowners in China were overthrown, and

the Eastern European nations and some Asian nations were liberated. If
the U.S. launches a third world war, then, even if it lasts 8 or 10 years,
the ruling class of the U.S., Great Britain, and their accessories will
be wiped out as a result, and the greater part of the world will become
communist-led countries. The result of a world war will be unfavorable
to the warmongers but favorable to the communist party and the revolu-
tionary people of the world. If they wish to launch wars, then, do not
blame us for promoting revolutions, i.e., accusing us vociferously for
“subversive activities." If they do not promote wars, they may survive

a little longer on earth. The sooner they launch wars, the sooner they
will perish. By that time a United Nations of the people will be formed--
maybe in Shanghai, maybe in some place in Europe, or may even be in New
York, if the U.S. warmongers have been completely eliminated by then.

6080
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25



ORDER TO THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS (8 OCTOBER 1950)

--Excerpts of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Order to the Chinese People's
Volunteers

Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 p 32
[Text] Leading Comrades of All Levels of the Chinese People's Volunteers:

(1) To aid the Korean people in their liberation war and to resist the
aggression of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, in order to protect
the interests of the Korean people, the Chinese people, and the peoples of
various countries in the East, the Chinese People's Volunteers are hereby
ordered to immediately proceed across the Korean border, cooperate with
our Korean comrades to combat the aggressors and seek glorious victories.

(2) Upon entering the territory of Korea, the Chinese People's Volunteers
must show friendship and respect toward the Korean people, the Korean Peo-
ple's Army, the Korean Democratic People's Government, the Korean Workers'
Party, other democratic parties and factions, and the leader of the Korean
people, Comrade Kim Il-sung, and strictly observe military and political
disciplines. These constitute an extremely important political foundation
to assure the completion of a military mission.

(3) The Chinese People's Volunteers must intensively assess all possible
and inevitable difficult situations and overcome the difficulties with a
high degree of enthusiasm, courage, and meticulousness, and the spirit of
diligence and endurance. At present the international and domestic situa-
tion as a whole is favorable to us and unfavorable to the aggressors. As
long as the comrades are firm and courageous, skillful in rallying the
local people, and expert in combatting the aggressors, final victory will
be ours.

Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Affairs
Commission Chairman Mao Tse-tung

8 October 1950, Peking

6080
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ON THE POLICIES FOR OUR WORK IN TIBET--DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (6 APRIL 1952)

--Inner-Party directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party which was sent to the Southwest Bureau and the Working
Committee in Tibet and communicated to the Northwest Bureau and the
Sinkiang Sub-Bureau

Peking MAO TSE-TUNG HSUAN-CHI in Chinese Vol V, 1977 pp 61-64

[Text] The Central Committee basically agrees with the directive wired by
the Southwest Bureau and the Southwest Military Region on 2 April to the
Tibet Work Committee and the Tibet Military Region, finding that the basic
policy (except in regard to the reorganization of the Tibetan army) adopted
in the wire and the many concrete measures are correct. Only thus will our
army occupy an invincible position in Tibet.

The situation in Tibet is different from Sinkiang. Whether in politics

or economy, Tibet is far behind Sinkiang. Even when Wang Chen's [3769 7201]
unit entered Sinkiang, we had to devote our full attention to careful cal-
culations in advance and rely on self-revitalization and self-sufficiency
in production. Now they have established themselves and won the enthusi-
astic support of the minorities. Currently, they are in the process of
reducing rent and interest and will introduce land reform in the coming
winter. The masses will support us even more enthusiastically. Vehicle
transport moves easily between Sinkiang and other areas, and the minorities
have greatly benefited in material welfare. As for Tibet, it will not be
ready for rent reduction or land reform for at least the next 2 or 3 years.
Sinkiang has several hundred thousand Chinese, while Tibet has almost none
at all. Our army is situated in an entirely different minority environ-
ment. We can only depend on two basic policies to win the masses and
place ourselves in an invincible position. The first is to calculate
carefully and attain self-sufficiency in production and to thereby influ-
ence the masses. This is the most fundamental link. Even if highways

are built we cannot rely on them for shipping large amounts of grain.

India may possibly agree to ship grain into Tibet in exchange, but our
stand must be that, if one of these days India does not send us grain,

12