BORDER SECURITY

Progress and Challenges in 

DHS Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts

Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director

Homeland Security and Justice

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:00 a.m. EDT

Thursday, June 27, 2013

GAO-13-653T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-653T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

June 27, 2013 

BORDER SECURITY 

Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts

Why GAO Did This Study

At the end of fiscal year 2004, DHS 

had about 28,100 personnel assigned 

to patrol U.S. land borders and inspect 

travelers at air, land, and sea POEs, 

with a total security cost of about $5.9 

billion. At the end of fiscal year 2011, 

DHS had about 41,400 personnel 

assigned to air, land, and sea POEs 

and along the borders, with a total 

security cost of about $11.8 billion. 

DHS has reported that these resources 

have contributed to stronger 

enforcement efforts on the border.

However, challenges remain to secure 

the border. In recent years, GAO has 

reported on a variety of DHS border 

security programs and operations. 

As requested, this statement

addresses some of the key issues and 

recommendations GAO has made in 

the following areas: (1) DHS’s efforts to 

secure the border at and between 

POEs; (2) DHS interagency 

coordination and oversight of border 

security information sharing and 

enforcement efforts; and (3) DHS 

management of infrastructure, 

technology, and other assets used to 

secure the border. This statement is 

based on prior products GAO issued 

from January 2008 through March

2013, along with selected updates 

conducted in April 2013. For selected 

updates, GAO reviewed DHS 

information on actions it has taken to 

address prior GAO recommendations. 

What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO made 

recommendations to DHS to 

strengthen its border security programs 

and efforts. DHS generally concurred 

and has taken actions, or has actions 

planned or underway to address them. 

 

What GAO Found

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), has reported progress in stemming illegal cross-border activity,

but it could strengthen the assessment of its efforts. For example, since fiscal 

year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border 

between ports of entry (POE) as an interim measure for border security. GAO 

reported in December 2012 that apprehensions decreased across the southwest 

border from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, generally mirroring a decrease in 

estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. CBP attributed 

this decrease in part to changes in the U.S. economy and increased resources 

for border security. Data reported by CBP’s Office of Border Patrol (Border 

Patrol) show that total apprehensions across the southwest border increased 

from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012. It is 

too early to assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend. GAO 

testified in February 2013 that the number of apprehensions provides information 

on activity levels but does not inform program results or resource allocation 

decisions. Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and 

measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between 

POEs, but it has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and 

implementing them, as GAO recommended. DHS concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations and said that it plans to set a date for establishing such 

milestones and time frames by November 2013. 

According to DHS law enforcement partners, interagency coordination and 

information sharing improved, but challenges remain. GAO reported in November 

2010 that information sharing and communication among federal law 

enforcement officials responsible for federal borderlands had increased; 

however, gaps remained in ensuring law enforcement officials had access to 

daily threat information. GAO recommended that relevant federal agencies 

ensure interagency agreements for coordinating information and integrating 

border security operations are further implemented. These agencies agreed, and 

in January 2011, CBP issued a memorandum affirming the importance of federal 

partnerships to address border security threats on federal lands. While this is a 

positive step, to fully satisfy the intent of GAO’s recommendation, DHS needs to 

take further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing 

interagency agreements. 

Opportunities exist to improve DHS’s management of border security assets. For 

example, DHS conceived the Secure Border Initiative Network as a surveillance 

technology and deployed such systems along 53 miles of Arizona’s border. In 

January 2011, in response to performance, cost, and schedule concerns, DHS 

canceled future procurements, and developed the Arizona Border Surveillance 

Technology Plan (the Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. GAO 

reported in November 2011 that in developing the Plan, CBP conducted an 

analysis of alternatives, but it had not documented the analysis justifying the 

specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of technologies proposed in 

the Plan, which GAO recommended that it do. DHS concurred with this 

recommendation. GAO has ongoing work in this area, and among other things, is 

examining DHS’s efforts to address prior recommendations, and expects to issue 

a report in fall 2013.

View GAO-13-653T. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov. 
Page 1 GAO-13-653T 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to address the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) efforts to secure U.S. borders against threats of 

terrorism; the smuggling of drugs, humans, and other contraband; and 

illegal migration. At the end of fiscal year 2004, the first full year DHS 

existed as an agency, it had about 10,500 agents assigned to patrol the 

U.S. land borders and about 17,600 officers inspecting travelers at air, 

land, and sea ports of entry (POE),1 and a total of about $5.9 billion 

allocated to secure the entire U.S. border.2 At the end of fiscal year 2011, 

both the number of personnel and amount of resources dedicated to 

border security had substantially increased, with approximately 21,400 

agents assigned to patrol the U.S. land borders and more than 20,000 

officers assigned to air, land, and sea POEs, amounting to about $11.8 

billion allocated to secure the entire U.S. border.3

DHS has reported that these increased resources have contributed to 

stronger enforcement efforts on the border. However, challenges remain 

in securing the border both at and between land POEs. For example, 

DHS data also show that several hundred thousand persons have 

entered the country illegally through and between the nation’s POEs. 

Further, our analysis of DHS data indicated that across southwest border 

sectors, seizures of drugs and other contraband increased 83 percent 

from fiscal years 2006 through 2011—from 10,321 to 18,898.4

 

1

POEs are the facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the 

United States for persons and materials. Specifically, a POE is any officially designated 

location (seaport, airport, or land border location) where DHS officers or employees are 

assigned to clear passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws.

In fiscal 

2

The number of border agents includes those assigned to northern and southwest border 

sectors. The number of officers assigned to POEs does not include those performing trade 

or agricultural inspections. The $5.9 billion includes all funds appropriated to DHS for 

border security in fiscal year 2004. 

3

In fiscal years 2011 and 2012, appropriations acts provided that DHS was to maintain an 

active duty presence of no fewer than 21,370 agents protecting the border of the United 

States. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, div. B, 

tit. VI, § 1608, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 140; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

2012, div. D, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 945-46 (2011). 

4

Drugs accounted for the vast majority of all contraband seizures; contraband seizures 

other than drugs include firearms, ammunition, and money.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-653T 

year 2012, DHS data indicated that seizures decreased to 17,891 across 

the southwest border.

DHS’s efforts to secure the border at and between the POEs are the 

primary responsibility of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) 

Office of Field Operations (OFO)5 and Office of Border Patrol,6

Over the years, we have reported on a variety of DHS border security 

programs and operations. As requested, my statement discusses 

progress and challenges in the following areas:

respectively. Other DHS components also play a role in border security. 

CBP’s Office of Air and Marine operates a fleet of air and marine assets 

in support of federal border security efforts. DHS’s U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for investigating cross-border 

illegal activity and criminal organizations that transport persons and 

goods across the border. In addition, other federal, state, local, and tribal 

law enforcement agencies also expend resources for border security. For 

example, the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture (USDA) 

have jurisdiction for law enforcement on federal borderlands administered 

by their component agencies, including DOI’s National Park Service, Fish 

and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Land Management, and USDA’s 

Forest Service.

(1) DHS’s efforts to secure the border at and between POEs;

(2) DHS interagency coordination and oversight of border security 

information sharing and enforcement efforts; and

(3) DHS management of infrastructure, technology, and other assets 

used to secure the border.

 

5

OFO is responsible for processing the flow of people and goods that enter the country 

through air, land, and sea POEs, where CBP officers inspect travelers and goods to 

determine whether they may be legally admitted into the country.

6

Border Patrol works to prevent the illegal entry of persons and contraband into the United 

States between POEs by using intelligence information to inform risk relative to threats of 

cross-border terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal migration across locations; integrating 

border security operations with other law enforcement partners to address threats; and 

developing rapid response capabilities to deploy the resources appropriate to changes in 

threat.
 

Page 3 GAO-13-653T 

This statement is based on related reports and testimonies we issued 

from January 2008 through March 2013 that examined DHS efforts to 

secure the U.S. border (see Related GAO Products at the end of this 

statement). It also includes selected updates we conducted in April 2013. 

Our reports and testimonies incorporated information we obtained and 

analyzed from officials from various DHS components, the Department of 

Justice (DOJ), DOI, USDA; and state and local law enforcement 

agencies. More detailed information about our scope and methodology 

can be found in our reports and testimonies. For the updates, we 

collected information from DHS on actions it has taken to address 

recommendations made in prior reports on which this statement is based. 

We conducted all of this work in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-653T 

Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of 

apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim 

measure for border security, as reported in its annual performance 

reports. As we reported in December 2012, our data analysis showed that 

apprehensions across the southwest border decreased 69 percent from 

fiscal years 2006 through 2011.7 These data generally mirrored a 

decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border 

sector. As we testified in February 2013, data reported by Border Patrol 

following the issuance of our December 2012 report showed that total 

apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000 

in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012.8

In addition to collecting data on apprehensions, Border Patrol collects 

other types of data that are used by sector management to help inform 

assessment of its efforts to secure the border against the threats of illegal 

migration and smuggling of drugs and other contraband. These data 

It is too early to 

assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend for Border 

Patrol apprehensions across the southwest border. Through fiscal year 

2011, Border Patrol attributed decreases in apprehensions across sectors 

in part to changes in the U.S. economy, achievement of strategic 

objectives, and increased resources for border security.

 

7

GAO, Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform 

Border Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-25 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 

2012).

8

GAO, Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security 

Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-330T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2013).

DHS Has Reported 

Progress in 

Addressing Illegal 

Cross-Border Activity, 

but Could Improve 

Assessment of Its 

Efforts

Border Patrol Has 

Reported Some Success in 

Addressing Illegal 

Migration, but Challenges 

Remain in Assessing 

Efforts and Identifying 

Resource Needs
 

Page 5 GAO-13-653T 

show changes, for example, in the (1) percentage of estimated known 

illegal entrants who are apprehended, (2) percentage of estimated known 

illegal entrants who are apprehended more than once (repeat offenders), 

(3) number of seizures of drugs and other contraband, and (4) number of 

apprehensions of persons from countries at an increased risk of 

sponsoring terrorism.9 Our analysis of these data show that the 

percentage of estimated known illegal entrants apprehended from fiscal 

years 2006 through 2011 varied across southwest border sectors. The 

percentage of individuals apprehended who repeatedly crossed the 

border illegally declined by 6 percent from fiscal years 2008 through 

2011. Further, the number of seizures of drugs and other contraband 

across the border increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in 

fiscal year 2011. Our analysis of the data also show that apprehensions 

of persons from countries at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism—

referred to as Aliens from Special Interest Countries—increased each 

fiscal year from 239 in fiscal year 2006 to 399 in fiscal year 2010, but 

dropped to 253 in fiscal year 2011.10

As we reported in December 2012, Border Patrol sectors and stations 

track changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool to determine if the 

appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets are being 

deployed and used effectively and efficiently, according to officials from 

 

9

Border Patrol’s estimate of known illegal entries includes deportable entrants who were 

apprehended, in addition to the number of entrants who illegally crossed the border but 

were not apprehended because they crossed back into Mexico (referred to as turn backs) 

or continued traveling into the U.S. interior (referred to as got aways). We defined these 

illegal entries as estimated “known” illegal entries to clarify that the estimates do not 

include illegal entrants for which Border Patrol does not have reasonable indications of 

cross-border illegal activity. These data are collectively referred to as known illegal entries 

because Border Patrol officials have what they deem to be a reasonable indication that 

the cross-border activity occurred. Indications of illegal crossings are obtained through 

various sources such as direct agent observation, referrals from credible sources (such as 

residents), camera monitoring, and detection of physical evidence left on the environment 

from animal or human crossings. 

10According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, the agency is transitioning to a new 

methodology to identify the potential terrorist risk in fiscal year 2013. This new 

methodology is to replace the use of a country-specific list with a range of other factors to 

identify persons posing an increased risk for terrorism when processing deportable aliens.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-653T 

Border Patrol headquarters.11 Border Patrol data showed that the 

effectiveness rate for eight of the nine sectors on the southwest border 

improved from fiscal year 2006 through 2011.12

Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and 

measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border 

between POEs and for informing the identification and allocation of 

resources needed to secure the border, but has not yet identified 

milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. Since 

fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the 

southwest border between POEs as an interim performance goal and 

measure for border security as reported in its annual performance report. 

Border Patrol 

headquarters officials said that differences in how sectors define, collect, 

and report turn back data (entrants who illegally crossed the border but 

were not apprehended because they crossed back into Mexico) and got 

away data (entrants who illegally crossed the border and continued 

traveling into the U.S. interior) used to calculate the overall effectiveness 

rate preclude comparing performance results across sectors. Border 

Patrol headquarters officials stated that until recently, each Border Patrol 

sector decided how it would collect and report turn back and got away 

data, and as a result, practices for collecting and reporting the data varied 

across sectors and stations based on differences in agent experience and 

judgment, resources, and terrain. Border Patrol headquarters officials 

issued guidance in September 2012 to provide a more consistent, 

standardized approach for the collection and reporting of turn back and 

got away data by Border Patrol sectors. Each sector is to be individually 

responsible for monitoring adherence to the guidance. According to 

Border Patrol officials, it is expected that this guidance will help improve 

data reliability. Implementation of this new guidance may allow for 

comparison of sector performance and inform decisions regarding 

resource deployment for securing the southwest border.

 

11Border Patrol calculates an overall effectiveness rate using a formula in which it adds 

the number of apprehensions and turn backs in a specific sector and divides this total by 

the total estimated known illegal entries—determined by adding the number of 

apprehensions, turn backs, and got aways for the sector. Border Patrol views its border 

security efforts as increasing in effectiveness if the number of turn backs as a percentage 

of estimated known illegal entries has increased and the number of got aways as a 

percentage of estimated known illegal entries has decreased.

12The exception was the Big Bend sector, which showed a decrease in the overall 

effectiveness rate from 86 percent in fiscal year 2006 to 68 percent in fiscal year 2011.
 

Page 7 GAO-13-653T 

Prior to this, DHS used operational control as its goal and outcome 

measure for border security and to assess resource needs to accomplish 

this goal.13 Operational control—also referred to as effective control—was 

defined as the number of border miles where Border Patrol had the 

capability to detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. 

DHS last reported its progress and status in achieving operational control 

of the borders in fiscal year 2010. At that time, DHS reported achieving 

operational control for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles across U.S. 

northern, southwest, and coastal borders.14 Along the southwest border, 

DHS reported achieving operational control for 873 (44 percent) of the 

about 2,000 border miles.15 At the beginning of fiscal year 2011, DHS 

transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome 

measure for border security. We testified in February 2013 that the 

interim goal and measure of number of apprehensions on the southwest 

border between POEs provides information on activity levels but does not 

inform program results or resource identification and allocation decisions, 

and therefore until new goals and measures are developed, DHS and 

Congress could experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability.16

Further, studies commissioned by CBP have found that the number of 

apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency 

officials do not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-border 

illegal activity.17

Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of 

developing performance goals and measures, but has not identified 

milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. 

According to Border Patrol officials, establishing milestones and time 

frames for the development of performance goals and measures is 

contingent on the development of key elements of its new strategic plan, 

 

13Border Patrol sector officials assessed the miles under operational control using factors 

such as operational statistics, third-party indicators, intelligence and operational reports, 

resource deployments, and discussions with senior Border Patrol agents. 

14GAO, Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts, GAO-12-688T (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2012).

15GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for the 

Southwest Border, GAO-11-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2011) 

16GAO-13-330T. 

17For example, see Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the Effect of the Arizona 

Border Control Initiative (Arlington, Virginia: Oct. 18, 2005).
 

Page 8 GAO-13-653T 

such as a risk assessment tool, and the agency’s time frames for 

implementing these key elements—targeted for fiscal years 2013 and 

2014—are subject to change. We recommended that CBP establish 

milestones and time frames for developing a performance goal, or goals, 

for border security between POEs that defines how border security is to 

be measured, and a performance measure, or measures, for assessing 

progress made in securing the border between POEs and informing 

resource identification and allocation efforts. DHS concurred with our 

recommendations and stated that it plans to set a date for when it will 

establish such milestones and time frames by November 2013.

As part of its homeland security and legacy customs missions, CBP

inspects travelers arriving at POEs to counter threats posed by terrorists 

and others attempting to enter the country with fraudulent or altered travel 

documents and to prevent inadmissible aliens, criminals, and goods from 

entering the country. In fiscal year 2012, CBP inspected about 352 million 

travelers, and over 107 million cars, trucks, buses, trains, vessels, and 

aircraft at over 329 air, sea, and land POEs. We have previously 

identified vulnerabilities in the traveler inspection program and made 

recommendations to DHS for addressing these vulnerabilities, and DHS 

implemented these recommendations. For example, we reported in 

January 2008 on weaknesses in CBP’s inbound traveler inspection 

program,18 including challenges in attaining budgeted staffing levels 

because of attrition and lack of officer compliance with screening 

procedures, such as those used to determine citizenship and admissibility 

of travelers entering the country as required by law and CBP policy.19

 

18GAO, Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at 

Our Nation’s Ports of Entry, 

Factors that contributed to these challenges included lack of focus, 

complacency, lack of supervisory presence, and lack of training. We 

recommended that CBP enhance internal controls in the inspection 

process, implement performance measures for apprehending 

inadmissible aliens and other violators, and establish measures for 

training provided to CBP officers and new officer proficiency. DHS 

concurred with these recommendations and has implemented them. 

GAO-08-329T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3, 2008).

19The Immigration and Nationality Act, implementing regulations, and CBP policies and 

procedures for traveler inspection at all POEs require officers to establish, at a minimum, 

the nationality of individuals and whether they are eligible to enter the country. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1225(a); 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a), (b), (f)(1).

CBP Has Strengthened 

POE Inspection Programs 

and Officer Training, and 

Has Additional Actions 

Planned or Under Way
 

Page 9 GAO-13-653T 

Specifically, in January 2008, CBP reported, among other things, that all 

land port directors are required to monitor and assess compliance with 

eight different inspection activities using a self-inspection worksheet that 

is provided to senior CBP management. At that time, CBP also 

established performance measures related to the effectiveness of CBP 

interdiction efforts. Additionally, in June 2011, CBP began conducting 

additional classroom and on-the-job training, which incorporated ongoing 

testing and evaluation of officer proficiency.

In December 2011, we reported that CBP had revised its training program 

for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with its own training 

development standards.20

We also reported that CBP took some steps to identify and address the 

training needs of its incumbent CBP officers but could do more to ensure 

that these officers were fully trained. For example, we examined CBP’s 

results of covert tests of document fraud detection at POEs conducted 

over more than 2 years and found weaknesses in the CBP inspection 

process at the POEs that were tested. In response to these tests, CBP 

developed a “Back to Basics” course in March 2010 for incumbent 

officers, but had no plans to evaluate the effectiveness of the training. We 

also reported that CBP had not conducted an analysis of all the possible 

causes or systemic issues that may have contributed to the covert test 

results. We recommended in December 2011 that CBP analyze covert 

tests and evaluate the “Back to Basics” training course, and DHS 

concurred with these recommendations. In April 2012, CBP officials 

reported that they had completed an evaluation of the “Back to Basics” 

training course and implemented an updated, subsequent training course. 

Further, in November 2012, CBP officials stated that they had analyzed 

the results of covert tests prior to and since the implementation of the 

subsequent course. According to these officials, they obtained the results 

of covert tests conducted before and after the course was implemented to 

Consistent with these standards, CBP 

convened a team of subject-matter experts to identify and rank the tasks 

that new CBP officers are expected to perform. As a result, the new 

curriculum was designed to produce professional law enforcement 

officers capable of protecting the homeland from terrorist, criminal, 

biological, and agricultural threats.

 

20GAO, Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Officers Are Fully Trained, 

GAO-12-269 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2011).
 

Page 10 GAO-13-653T 

determine to what extent significant performance gains were achieved 

and to identify any additional requirements for training. In April 2013, CBP 

provided a copy of its analysis of the covert test results. GAO is reviewing 

CBP’s analysis of the covert test results and other documentation as part 

of a congressional mandate to review actions the agency has taken to 

address GAO recommendations regarding CBP officer training.21 We 

expect to report on the status of CBP’s efforts in the late summer of 2013. 

Further, in July 2012, CBP completed a comprehensive analysis of the 

results of its document fraud covert tests from fiscal years 2009 through 

2011. In addition, we reported that CBP had not conducted a needs 

assessment that would identify any gaps between identified critical skills 

and incumbent officers’ current skills and competencies. We 

recommended in December 2011 that CBP conduct a training needs 

assessment.22 DHS concurred with this recommendation. In April 2013, 

CBP reported to us that it is working to complete a training needs 

assessment, but has faced challenges in completing such an assessment 

because of personnel and budget issues, including retirements, attrition, 

loss of contract support, sequestration, and continuing resolutions. CBP 

plans to develop a final report on a training needs assessment by August 

2013 outlining findings, conclusions, and recommendations from its 

analysis. 

 

21Explanatory Statement, Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, 

159 Cong. Rec. S1287, S1550 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2013). 

22GAO-12-269. 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-653T 

Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal lands 

protected by DOI and USDA law enforcement personnel on the southwest 

and northern borders and can cause damage to natural, historic, and 

cultural resources, as well as put agency personnel and the visiting public 

at risk. We reported in November 2010 that information sharing and 

communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA law enforcement officials 

had increased in recent years.23

 

23GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated 

Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, 

For example, interagency forums were 

used to exchange information about border issues, and interagency 

liaisons facilitated exchange of operational statistics. Federal agencies 

also established interagency agreements to strengthen coordination of 

border security efforts. However, we reported in November 2010 that 

gaps remained in implementing interagency agreements to ensure law 

enforcement officials had access to daily threat information to better 

ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response to illegal 

activity. For example, Border Patrol officials in the Tucson sector did not 

consult with federal land management agencies before discontinuing 

dissemination of daily situation reports that federal land law enforcement 

officials relied on for a common awareness of the types and locations of 

illegal activities observed on federal borderlands. Further, in Border 

Patrol’s Spokane sector, on the northern border, coordination of 

intelligence information was particularly important because of sparse law 

enforcement presence and technical challenges that reduced Border 

Patrol’s ability to fully assess cross-border threats, such as air smuggling 

of high-potency marijuana.

GAO-11-177 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 18, 2010). 

DHS Law 

Enforcement Partners 

Reported Improved 

Results for 

Interagency 

Coordination, but 

Challenges Remain

DOI and USDA Reported 

Improved DHS 

Coordination to Secure 

Federal Borderlands, but 

Gaps Remained in Sharing 

Information for Daily 

Operations
 

Page 12 GAO-13-653T 

We recommended that DHS, DOI, and USDA provide oversight and 

accountability as needed to further implement interagency agreements for 

coordinating information and integrating operations. These agencies 

agreed with our recommendations, and in January 2011, CBP issued a 

memorandum to all Border Patrol division chiefs and chief patrol agents 

emphasizing the importance of USDA and DOI partnerships to address 

border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to 

fully satisfy the intent of our recommendation, DHS would need to take 

further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing 

interagency agreements to enhance border security on federal lands.

DHS has stated that partnerships with other federal, state, local, tribal, 

and Canadian law enforcement agencies are critical to the success of 

northern border security efforts. We reported in December 2010 that DHS 

efforts to coordinate with these partners through interagency forums and 

joint operations were considered successful, according to a majority of 

these partners we interviewed.24

We also reported in December 2010 that while Border Patrol’s border 

security measures reflected that there was a high reliance on law 

enforcement support from outside the border zones, the extent of partner 

In addition, DHS component officials 

reported that federal agency coordination to secure the northern border 

had improved. However, DHS did not provide oversight for the number 

and location of forums established by its components, and numerous 

federal, state, local, and Canadian partners cited challenges related to the 

inability to provide resources for the increasing number of forums, raising 

concerns that some efforts may be overlapping. In addition, federal law 

enforcement partners in all four locations we visited as part of our work 

cited ongoing challenges between Border Patrol and ICE, Border Patrol 

and Forest Service, and ICE and DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration 

in sharing information and resources that compromised daily border 

security related to operations and investigations. DHS had established 

and updated interagency agreements to address ongoing coordination 

challenges; however, oversight by management at the component and 

local levels has not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of 

these agreements.

 

24GAO, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency 

Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border, GAO-11-97 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 

2010).

Northern Border Partners 

Reported Interagency 

Forums Improved 

Coordination, but DHS Did 

Not Provide Oversight to 

Resolve Interagency 

Conflict in Roles and 

Responsibilities
 

Page 13 GAO-13-653T 

law enforcement resources that could be leveraged to fill Border Patrol 

resource gaps, target coordination efforts, and make more efficient 

resource decisions was not reflected in Border Patrol’s processes for 

assessing border security and resource requirements.25 We 

recommended that DHS provide guidance and oversight for interagency 

forums and for component compliance with interagency agreements, and 

develop policy and guidance necessary to integrate partner resources in 

border security assessments and resource planning documents. DHS 

agreed with our recommendations and has reported taking action to 

address one of them. For example, in June 2012, DHS released a 

northern border strategy, and in August 2012, DHS notified us of other 

cross-border law enforcement and security efforts taking place with 

Canada. However, to fully satisfy the intent of our recommendation, CBP 

would need to develop policy and guidance specifying how partner 

resources will be identified, assessed, and integrated in DHS plans for

implementing the northern border strategy. To address the remaining 

recommendations, DHS would need to establish an oversight process for 

interagency forums to ensure that missions and locations of interagency 

forums are not duplicative and consider the downstream burden on 

northern border partners, as well as an oversight process that evaluates 

the challenges and corrective actions needed to ensure Border Patrol and 

ICE compliance with interagency memorandums.

 

25GAO-11-97. 
 

Page 14 GAO-13-653T 

In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a 

multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and 

reducing illegal immigration. Through this initiative, DHS planned to 

develop a comprehensive border protection system using technology, 

known as the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet), and tactical 

infrastructure—fencing, roads, and lighting. Under this program, CBP 

increased the number of southwest border miles with pedestrian and 

vehicle fencing from 120 miles in fiscal year 2005 to about 650 miles as of 

March 2013.26 We reported in May 2010 that CBP had not accounted for 

the impact of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on border 

security.27 Specifically, CBP had reported an increase in control of 

southwest border miles, but could not account separately for the impact of 

the border fencing and other infrastructure. In September 2009, we 

recommended that CBP determine the contribution of border fencing and 

other infrastructure to border security.28

 

26The length of the border with Mexico is defined by the U.S. International Boundary and 

Water Commission at 1,954 miles. The length of the land border is 675 miles, while the 

length of the border along the Colorado River and Rio Grande is 1,279 miles. 

DHS concurred with our 

recommendation and, in response, CBP contracted with the Homeland 

Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis of the 

impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. CBP reported in 

February 2012 that preliminary results from this analysis indicate that an 

additional 3 to 5 years are needed to ensure a credible assessment.

27GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and 

Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-651T (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010). 

28GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact 

of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-896 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 

2009).

Opportunities Exist to 

Improve DHS’s 

Management of 

Border Security 

Assets

DHS Has Deployed Assets 

to Secure the Borders, but 

Has Not Provided 

Complete Information on 

Plans, Metrics, and Costs
 

Page 15 GAO-13-653T 

Since the launch of SBI in 2005, we have identified a range of challenges 

related to schedule delays and performance problems with SBInet. 

SBInet was conceived as a surveillance technology to create a “virtual 

fence” along the border, and after spending nearly $1 billion, DHS 

deployed SBInet systems along 53 miles of Arizona’s border that 

represent the highest risk for illegal entry. In January 2011, in response to 

concerns regarding SBInet’s performance, cost, and schedule, DHS 

canceled future procurements. CBP developed the Arizona Border 

Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona 

border.

In November 2011, we reported that CBP does not have the information 

needed to fully support and implement its Plan in accordance with DHS 

and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance.29

 

29GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is 

Needed before Proceeding, 

In developing 

the Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives and outreach to 

potential vendors. However, CBP did not document the analysis justifying 

the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border 

surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan. Specifically, according to 

CBP officials, CBP used a two-step process to develop the Plan. First, 

CBP engaged the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to 

conduct an analysis of alternatives beginning with ones for Arizona. 

Second, following the completion of the analysis of alternatives, the 

Border Patrol conducted its operational assessment, which included a 

comparison of alternative border surveillance technologies and an 

analysis of operational judgments to consider both effectiveness and cost. 

While the first step in CBP’s process to develop the Plan—the analysis of 

alternatives—was well documented, the second step—Border Patrol’s 

operational assessment—was not transparent because of the lack of 

documentation. As we reported in November 2011, without 

documentation of the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and 

deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the 

Plan, an independent party cannot verify the process followed, identify 

how the analysis of alternatives was used, assess the validity of the 

decisions made, or justify the funding requested. We also reported that 

CBP officials have not yet defined the mission benefits expected from 

implementing the new Plan, which could help improve CBP’s ability to 

assess the effectiveness of the Plan as it is implemented.

GAO-12-22 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2011).
 

Page 16 GAO-13-653T 

In addition, we reported that CBP’s 10-year life cycle cost estimate for the 

Plan of $1.5 billion was based on an approximate order-of-magnitude 

analysis, and agency officials were unable to determine a level of 

confidence in their estimate, as best practices suggest. Specifically, we 

found that the estimate reflected substantial features of best practices, 

being both comprehensive and accurate, but it did not sufficiently meet 

other characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, such as credibility, 

because it did not identify a level of confidence or quantify the impact of 

risks. GAO and OMB guidance emphasize that reliable cost estimates are 

important for program approval and continued receipt of annual funding. 

In addition, because CBP was unable to determine a level of confidence 

in its estimate, we reported that it would be difficult for CBP to determine 

what levels of contingency funding may be needed to cover risks 

associated with implementing new technologies along the remaining 

Arizona border.

We recommended in November 2011 that, among other things, CBP 

document the analysis justifying the technologies proposed in the Plan, 

determine its mission benefits, and determine a more robust life cycle 

cost estimate for the Plan.30

In March 2012, we reported that the CBP Office of Air and Marine 

(OAM)—which provides aircraft, vessels, and crew at the request of its 

customers, primarily Border Patrol—had not documented significant 

events, such as its analyses to support its asset mix and placement 

DHS concurred with these recommendations, 

and has reported taking action to address some of the recommendations. 

For example, in October 2012, CBP officials reported that, through the 

operation of two surveillance systems under SBInet’s initial deployment in 

high-priority regions of the Arizona border, CBP has identified examples 

of mission benefits that could result from implementing technologies 

under the Plan. Additionally, CBP initiated action to update its cost 

estimate for the Plan by, among other things, providing revised cost 

estimates in February and March 2012 for the Integrated Fixed Towers 

and Remote Video Surveillance System, the Plan’s two largest projects. 

We currently have ongoing work in this area for congressional requesters 

and, among other things, are examining DHS’s efforts to address prior 

recommendations, and expect to issue a report with our final results in the 

fall of 2013.

 

30GAO-12-22. 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-653T 

across locations, and as a result, lacked a record to help demonstrate 

that its decisions to allocate resources were the most effective ones in 

fulfilling customer needs and addressing threats.31 OAM issued various 

plans that included strategic goals, mission responsibilities, and threat 

information. However, we could not identify the underlying analyses used 

to link these factors to the mix and placement of resources across 

locations. OAM did not have documentation that clearly linked the 

deployment decisions in the plan to mission needs or threats. For 

example, while the southwest border was Border Patrol’s highest priority 

for resources in fiscal year 2010, it did not receive a higher rate of air 

support than the northern border. Similarly, OAM did not document 

analyses supporting the current mix and placement of marine assets 

across locations. OAM officials said at the time that while they generally 

documented final decisions affecting the mix and placement of resources, 

they did not have the resources to document assessments and analyses 

to support these decisions. However, we reported that such 

documentation of significant events could help the office improve the 

transparency of its resource allocation decisions to help demonstrate the 

effectiveness of these resource decisions in fulfilling its mission needs 

and addressing threats. We recommended in March 2012 that CBP 

document analyses, including mission requirements and threats, that 

support decisions on the mix and placement of OAM’s air and marine 

resources. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it 

plans to provide additional documentation of its analyses supporting 

decisions on the mix and placement of air and marine resources by 2014.

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and members of the 

subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to 

answer any questions you may have.

For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca 

Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key 

contributions to this statement included Lacinda Ayers, Kathryn Bernet, 

 

31GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air 

and Marine Assets, GAO-12-518 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2012).

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments
 

Page 18 GAO-13-653T 

and Jeanette Espinola (Assistant Directors), as well as Jennifer Bryant, 

Frances Cook, Joseph Dewechter, Alana Finley, Barbara Guffy, and 

Ashley D. Vaughan.
Related GAO Products

Page 19 GAO-13-653T 

Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. 

Borders. GAO-13-414T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013.

Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border 

Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-330T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 26, 2013.

Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to 

Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-25. 

Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2012.

Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts. GAO-12-688T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2012.

Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of 

DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. GAO-12-518. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 

2012.

Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Officers Are Fully

Trained. GAO-12-269. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2011.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and 

Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.: 

November 4, 2011.

Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures 

for the Southwest Border. GAO-11-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 

2011.

Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of 

Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border. GAO-11-97. 

Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2010. 

Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a 

Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands. 

GAO-11-177. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying 

Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border. GAO-10-651T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 20 GAO-13-653T 

Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the 

Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections 

Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-329T. Washington, D.C.: 

January 3, 2008.

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