alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Frank DePasquale, Respondent, v Morbark Industries, Inc., Appellant. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[633 NYS2d 543]

—In an action to recover damages for products liability, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Fredman, J.), dated July 7, 1993, which, upon a jury verdict finding it 25% at fault in the happening of the accident and upon a jury verdict finding that the plaintiff suffered damages in excess of $13,500,000, is in favor of the plaintiff and against it.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is granted as to liability, to be followed, if necessary, by a new trial on damages, with costs to abide the event.

The plaintiff was injured when his left leg was caught in an Eeger Beever wood chipping machine manufactured by the defendant, Morbark Industries, Inc.

The plaintiff alleged several theories of liability including defective design and failure to warn. Here, the evidence was legally insufficient to support the theory of liability based on failure to warn. There is no duty to warn of a danger which is obvious and which the injured party either did or should have appreciated to the same extent as a warning would provide *(see, Jackson v Supermarkets Gen. Corp.,*214 AD2d 650; *Bazerman v Gardall Safe Corp.,*203 AD2d 56, 57; *Oza v Sinatra,*176 AD2d 926, 928). The danger of injury if one’s leg were to come in contact with the feed wheels on the wood chipping machine was obvious. The plaintiff admitted that he had been told not *410to put his hands or feet inside the machine chute, and that he knew that he could be seriously hurt if his hands or legs became caught in the infeed wheels. Since a general verdict sheet was submitted to the jury, we cannot ascertain whether the jury’s verdict was "predicated on a finding in plaintiff’s favor” on the failure-to-warn theory, which "should not have been submitted to it” *(Davis v Caldwell,*54 NY2d 176, 179-180). Thus, the verdict must be set aside, and a new trial granted.

Since there must be a new trial, we note that evidence that the defendant modified the design of the wood chipper after the wood chipper involved in the instant case was manufactured was inadmissible on the issue of negligence *(see, Cover v Cohen,*61 NY2d 261, 270; *Caprara v Chrysler Corp.,*52 NY2d 114, 122). Such evidence may be admitted "on some other theory or on another issue, such as control, impeachment or feasibility of precautionary measures”, with appropriate limiting instructions *(Caprara v Chrysler Corp., supra,*at 122). However, here feasibility was conceded by the defendant. Evidence of post-manufacture modifications was purportedly admitted for impeachment purposes, without limiting instructions, on the plaintiff’s direct case, upon direct examination of the defendant’s president Norval Morey, whom the plaintiff had called as his own witness. This was improper.

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review, without merit, or need not be addressed in light of our determination. Sullivan, J. P., Miller, Copertino and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
Notification of the Interim Final FIP – Signed by Lisa Jackson Notification of the Interim Final FIP – Signed by Lisa Jackson , , EPA Administrator 40 CFR Part CFR Part CFR Part

49 – Federal Implementation Plan for Oil and Natural Gas Production Facilities Production Facilities ,

, Fort Berthold Indian Reservation Fort Berthold Indian Reservation Fort Berthold Indian Reservation ( Mandan , Hidatsa and

Hidatsa and Hidatsa and Arikara Nations Arikara Nations ,

, or MHA Nation or MHA Nation or MHA Nation )

, North Dakota North Dakota North Dakota . (

as defined in § as defined in § as defined in § 49.152 Carl Daly Carl Daly to: John_McMichael 08/02/2012 11:12 AM Cc: Christopher_Armstong, Deirdre Rothery, Kate Fay, Sara Laumann This message is digitally signed. Mr. McMichael, This email is to inform you that Lisa Jackson, Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, has signed an interim final rule “Federal Implementation Plan for Oil and Natural Gas Federal Implementation Plan for Oil and Natural Gas Federal Implementation Plan for Oil and Natural Gas Production Facilities Production Facilities ,

, Fort Berthold Indian Reservation Fort Berthold Indian Reservation Fort Berthold Indian Reservation ( Mandan , Hidatsa and Arikara Nations

Hidatsa and Arikara Nations Hidatsa and Arikara Nations , or MHA Nation Nation) ) , North Dakota North Dakota North Dakota ,

” (Fort Berthold Oil and Gas FIP) a federal rule that applies to oil and gas operations producing from the Bakken Pool on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in North Dakota . The FIP requires owners and operators of oil and natural gas production facilities to reduce emissions of volatile organic compounds emanating from well completions , recompletions, and production and storage operations. The agency proposed a Reservation-specific FIP concurrently with this interim final rule . Please find, attached, a copy of the notification sent by certified mail to the primary contact for XTO Energy:

XTO_Actual Notice of FIP Letter 8-1-12.pdf And a copy of the interim final rule:

Fort Berthold FIP NFR_8-1-12 (interim final rule) f or ACTUAL NOTICE LETTERS.pdf If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact me or Deirdre Rothery, Chief Air Permitting, Monitoring and Modeling Unit at rothery.deirdre@epa.gov or 303-312-6431. Thank you, Carl Daly, Director, Air Program 303-312-6416
#### Charles W. Bray, *et ux.,*v. W. F. Duggan.

181 So. 378.

Division B.

Opinion Filed April 16, 1938.

Rehearing Denied June 6, 1938.

*Wilkerson & Gaylord,*for Appellants;

*Frank IV. Stebbins,*for Appellee.

*439Chapman, J.

This cause is before the Court on an appeal from a final decree of foreclosure entered by the Circuit Court of Lake County, Florida, on September 24, 1936. The equities were decreed in favor of the plaintiff and the property involved in the suit was ordered sold to pay the amount decreed to be due as found by the Chancellor below.

It was contended by counsel for Appellants, defendants below, that the plaintiff was not the owner of- the notes and mortgage sued upon and that the attempted assignment of the mortgage and the endorsement of the notes were in-, sufficient in law to authorize the plaintiff to maintain foreclosure thereon. He made a ¡similar contention in the lower court on final hearing, where the court heard the witnesses, considered the probative weight and value of the evidence in behalf of the respective parties and overruled and denied the asserted claims of the defendant.

We have reviewed the evidence upon which the final decree appealed from is based, read, the briefs, heard argument on part of counsel, and have concluded that ample testimony appears in the record to support the conclusions of the Chancellor below. The Court is of the opinion that no reversible error appears and that the final decree appealed from should be affirmed. See Farrington v. Harrison, 95 Fla. 769, 116 So. 497. It is so ordered.

Affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.

Ellis, C. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
No. 58078.

protest 213893-K (New York).

#### Gretsch & Brenner, Inc., and Gehrig Hoban & Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Oliveb, C. J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the anerchandise consists of pieces of vellum the same in all material respects as those the subject of Abstract 57385, the claim lor free entry under paragraph 1736 was sustained.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID C. RIVERS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2524 GEB PAN P

vs.

E. ROSZKO, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff, formerly a state prisoner, is proceeding pro se with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On April 28, 2005, the court gave plaintiff thirty days to complete and return

sufficient USM-285 forms and copies of the endorsed complaint so defendants could be served

with process. Plaintiff failed to comply with this order and so on March 8, 2006, the court gave

plaintiff twenty days to show cause why this action should not be dismissed for plaintiff’s failure

to prosecute. On March 27, 2006, plaintiff submitted eight copies of the complaint without any

USM-285 forms or a completed summons. He also requested an extension of time so he could

find an attorney.

////

////

Case 2:04-cv-02524-GEB-EFB Document 13 Filed 05/18/06 Page 1 of 2
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff seven USM-285 forms and

a blank summons; and

2. Plaintiff’s March 27, 2006, request for additional time is granted;

3. Within thirty days, plaintiff shall submit to the court seven completed USM285 forms and one complete summons required to effect service. Failure to return the copies

within the specified time period will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.

DATED: May 17, 2006.

/mp

/004/rive2524.8f

Case 2:04-cv-02524-GEB-EFB Document 13 Filed 05/18/06 Page 2 of 2
**EXHIBIT 32.3**

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of CanoPetroleum, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q, as amended by this Amendment No. 1 on Form10-Q/A,  for the quarterended September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael J. Ricketts, PrincipalAccounting Officer of the Company, certify to my knowledge, pursuant to 18U.S.C. section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities andExchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company, asof, and for, the periods presented in the Report.

A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained bythe Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

The foregoing certification is being furnished as anexhibit to the Form 10-Q/Apursuant to Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K and Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 202 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63of Title 18, United States Code) and, accordingly, is not being filed as partof the Form 10-Q/A forpurposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,and is not incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whethermade before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporationlanguage in such filing.

 
| December 26, 2006 | /s/ Michael J. Ricketts      |   |
|-------------------|------------------------------|--------|
|              | Michael J. Ricketts          |   |
|              | Principal Accounting Officer |   |

 

----
No. 64196.

protests 59/8865,etc. (El Paso).

#### The American Import Company et al. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Mollison, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of carrizo baskets the same in all material respects as those the subject of *Chester K. Stoner*v. *United States*(42 Cust. Ct. 178, C.D. 2083), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
#### Lorraine Richards et al., Respondents, v Kevin S. Toomey, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 846]

—Mikoll, J. P.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Harris, J.), entered January 10, 1995 in Albany County, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

On January 27, 1994, plaintiff Lorraine Richards (hereinafter plaintiff) was involved in an accident in which the vehicle that she was operating was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by defendant, causing plaintiff to strike her right knee against the ashtray. Plaintiff developed a swollen knee and back pain as a result, and a hospital diagnosis of lumbar spasm and knee contusion was made. Plaintiff followed up with a visit to the office of her treating physician, Robert Heineman, on February 3, 1994. Although X rays showed no abnormalities, plaintiff’s examination revealed muscle spasms, pain on flexion and extension, and an inability to heel and toe walk. Heineman prescribed physical therapy and instructed plaintiff to remain out of work. Thereafter, plaintiff continued under the care of Heineman’s office until August 18, 1994, when she was told she could return to restricted work as of September 2, 1994. Defendant brought this motion for summary judgment alleging that plaintiff failed to establish a "Serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Supreme Court denied the motion and this appeal by defendant followed.

We affirm. Plaintiff’s sole claim is that she has suffered a "medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature” which prevented her "from performing substantially all of * * * [her] usual and customary daily activities” for 90 of the 180 days immediately following the ac*755cident (Insurance Law § 5102 [d]). While it is true that, in support of his motion, defendant submitted sufficient proof to sustain his initial burden on a motion for summary judgment *(see,*CPLR 3212 [b]), we nevertheless agree with Supreme Court that plaintiff in turn submitted sufficient medical evidence to raise a factual question as to whether she was unable to perform her usual and customary daily activities for more than 90 of the first 180 days immediately following the accident *(see, Van De Bogart v Vanderpool,*215 AD2d 915, 915-916). Significantly, plaintiff was under doctor’s order to remain out of work *(cf., supra).*Moreover, plaintiff’s description of the effect her injuries had upon her normal routines and activities "could be found to constitute more than a 'slight curtailment’ ” of her lifestyle *(supra,*at 916; *see, Licari v Elliott,*57 NY2d 230, 236).

Crew III, White and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
July 27, 1942

No. 47432.

#### Protest 50963-K of B. R. Anderson & Co.

Plaintiffs’ application for rehearing granted.
II 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4959 

To prohibit Federal agencies from implementing environmental justice 

standards when issuing rules, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

AUGUST 1, 2024 

Ms. LUMMIS (for herself, Mr. BARRASSO, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. CRUZ, Mr. 

LANKFORD, and Mr. ROUNDS) introduced the following bill; which was 

read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

A BILL 

To prohibit Federal agencies from implementing environmental justice standards when issuing rules, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Reducing Environ5 mental Gamesmanship Act’’ or the ‘‘REG Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON AGENCY RULE MAKING. 

7 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the terms ‘‘agen8 cy’’ and ‘‘rule’’ have the meanings given those terms in 

9 section 551 of title 5, United States Code. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 4959 IS

1 (b) PROHIBITION.—In issuing a rule, or otherwise 

2 administering a duly enacted law of the United States, an 

3 agency may not consider environmental justice unless the 

4 agency is required to do so by law. 

5 SEC. 3. REPEAL OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS. 

6 Effective beginning on the date of enactment of this 

7 Act, the following Executive orders shall have no force or 

8 effect: 

9 (1) Executive Order 12898 (42 U.S.C. 4321 

10 note; relating to Federal actions to address environ11 mental justice in minority populations and low-in12 come populations). 

13 (2) Executive Order 14096 (42 U.S.C. 4321 

14 note; relating to revitalizing our Nation’s commit15 ment to environmental justice for all). 

16 (3) Executive Order 14008 (42 U.S.C. 4321 

17 note; relating to tackling the climate crisis at home 

18 and abroad). 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of Total  Luxury  Group,  Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2003 as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Sandy J.  Masselli,  Jr.,  Chief  Executive  Officer  of the  Company,  certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)      The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects,  the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.


                                             /s/ SANDY J. MASSELLI, JR.
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Sandy J. Masselli, Jr.

April 20, 2005
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant  to 18 U.S.C.  Section  1350 as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  in  connection  with the  filing of the  Quarterly
Report on Form 10-QSB/A for the Quarter Ended  November 30, 2005 (the  "Report")
by  Advanced  Media  Training,  Inc.  ("Registrant"),   the  undersigned  hereby
certifies that:

         1.       to the best of my  knowledge,  the Report fully  complies with
                  the  requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
                  Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.       to the best of my knowledge,  the information contained in the
                  Report  fairly  presents,   in  all  material  respects,   the
                  financial condition and results of operations of Registrant.




March 22, 2006                         By:  /S/ BUDDY YOUNG
                                            ---------------------------------
                                            Buddy Young
                                            Chief Executive Officer and Chief
                                            Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM TOTAL
ENTERTAINMENT INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998             DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998             DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          30,390                  23,865
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   54,802                  73,289
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               101,433                  97,154
<PP&E>                                          83,019                 333,545
<DEPRECIATION>                                   6,226                  70,150
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 253,935                 697,243
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          361,512                 975,132
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                        55,717                  57,388
<OTHER-SE>                                   (163,294)               (837,598)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   253,935                 697,243
<SALES>                                        169,993                 581,543
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               169,993                 581,543
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  771,579               1,770,653
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (601,586)             (1,189,110)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,900                   1,606
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (605,486)             (1,190,716)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (605,486)             (1,190,716)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.01)                   (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.01)                   (.02)


</TABLE>
EX. 4.32 Amendment - Coffey






AMENDING AGREEMENT NO. 2
THIS AMENDING AGREEMENT made effective as of the 12th day of March, 2015.
BETWEEN:
ONCOYLYTICS BIOTECH INC.,
("ONCOLYTICS")
- and -
MATTHEW C. COFFEY,
(the "Employee")
WHEREAS the Employee is an officer of Oncolytics whose terms of employment are set forth in the Executive Employment Agreement ("Employment Agreement") dated effective January 1, 2013;
AND WHEREAS Oncolytics and the Employee wish to amend the Employment Agreement;
NOW THEREFORE in consideration of the mutual covenants contained in this Amending Agreement, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, it is agreed as follows:
Section 1 – Amendments


The Employment Agreement is hereby amended by replacing Section 3(1) with the following:


“Commencing January 1, 2015, Oncolytics shall pay to the Employee a salary of THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN DOLLARS AND THIRTY-FIVE CENTS ($380,107.35) CANADIAN per annum, exclusive of bonuses, benefits and other compensation, payable in equal installments of FIFTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN DOLLARS AND EIGHTY ONE CENTS  ($15,837.81) CANADIAN on the 15th and last day of each month.”


   


Section 2 – Effective Date


(1)    This Amending Agreement shall be effective from and after January 1, 2015.


(2)    In all other respects the parties confirm that the Employment Agreement, as amended, shall remain in full force and effect.
	
				
	 
	 
	ONCOLYTICS BIOTECH INC.



	Per:
	/s/ Brad Thompson

	 
	 
	 
	Brad Thompson, Ph.D.
Chief Executive Officer

	 
	 
	Per:
	/s/ Kirk Look

	 
	 
	 
	Kirk Look
Chief Financial Officer






	
			
	/s/ Margaret Kowalczewski
	 
	/s/ Matthew C. Coffey

	WITNESS
	 
	MATTHEW C. COFFEY