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THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S STRATEGY FOR 

EXPORTING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY POLICY, 

HEALTH CARE AND ENTITLEMENTS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 19, 2013 

Serial No. 113–11 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

MARK POCAN, Wisconsin 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

TONY CARDENAS, California 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

VACANCY 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

ROBERT BORDEN, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY POLICY, HEALTH CARE AND ENTITLEMENTS

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma, Chairman 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

PAUL GOSAR, Arizona 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JACKIE SPEIER, California, Ranking 

Minority Member 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MATTHEW CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

TONY CARDENAS, California 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on March 19, 2013 ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Tom Choi, National Practice Leader, Gas, Deloitte Marketpoint LLC 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 8 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 11 

Mr. Paul Cicio, President, Industrial Energy Consumers of America 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 18 

Dr. Charles Ebinger, Director Foreign Policy, Energy Security Initiative, 

Brookings Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 30 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 32 

Mr. Chris Smith, Actng Assistant Secretary Fossil Energy, U.S. Department 

of Energy 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 42 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 44 

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Jim Jordan, a Member of Congress from the State of Ohio, 

Opening Statement .............................................................................................. 98 

The Honorable James Lankford, a Member of Congress from the State of 

Oklahoma, Opening Statement ........................................................................... 99 

The Honorable Jackie Speier, a Member of Congress from the State of California. Opening Statement .................................................................................. 101 

DEI, Opening Statement ......................................................................................... 104 

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings, a Member of Congress from the State 

of Maryland, Opening Statement ....................................................................... 106 

(1) 

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S STRATEGY 

FOR EXPORTING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS 

Tuesday, March 19, 2013, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY POLICY, HEALTH CARE AND

ENTITLEMENTS, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:10 p.m. in room 

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James Lankford [chairman of the subcommittee], presiding. 

Present: Representatives Lankford, Gosar, McHenry, DesJarlais, 

Farenthold, Massie, Issa, Speier, Horsford, Lujan Grisham, and 

Cummings. 

Also present: Representatives Turner, Meadows, and Fleming. 

Staff Present: Ali Ahmad, Majority Communications Advisor; 

Molly Boyl, Majority Parliamentarian; Joseph A. Brazauskas, Majority Counsel; Sharon Casey, Majority Senior Assistant Clerk; 

Drew Colliatie, Majority Legislative Assistant; Brian Daner, Majority Counsel; Linda Good, Majority Chief Clerk; Tyler Grimm, Majority Professional Staff Member; Ryan M. Hambleton, Majority 

Professional Staff Member; Frederick Hill, Majority Director of 

Communications and Senior Policy Advisor, Christopher Hixon, 

Majority Deputy Chief Counsel, Oversight; Mark D. Marin, Majority Director of Oversight; Scott Schmidt, Majority Deputy Director 

of Digital Strategy; Jaron Bourke, Minority Director of Administration; Jimmy Fremgen, Minority Legislative Assistant; Nicholas 

Kamau, Minority Counsel; Chris Knauer, Minority Senior Investigator; Adam Koshkin, Minority Research Assistant; Safiya Simmons, Minority Press Secretary and Mark Stephenson, Minority 

Director of Legislation. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Let us begin this hearing by saying the Oversight’s mission statement. 

We exist to secure two fundamental principles. First, Americans 

have the right to know that the money Washington takes from 

them is well spent. Second, Americans deserve an efficient and effective government that works for them. 

Our duty on the Government Oversight and Reform Committee 

is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold the 

government accountable to taxpayers because taxpayers have a 

right to know what they get from their government. We will work 

tirelessly in partnership with citizen watchdogs to deliver the facts 

to the American people and bring genuine reform to the federal bureaucracy. 

2 

This is the mission of the Government Oversight and Reform 

Committee. 

Today we are here to discuss the Department of Energy’s strategy and process in reviewing applications to export liquefied natural gas, LNG, specifically to non-free trade agreement countries. 

For countries with which we have a free trade agreement covering the Natural Gas Act of 1938, and obviously amended multiple 

times since then, the Department of Energy is required to grant 

applications to export LNG. Such export is deemed to be consistent 

with the public interest and the authorization must be granted 

without modification or delay. 

For countries with which we do not have a free trade agreement 

covering natural gas, the Natural Gas Act presumes the Department of Energy will grant the application to export LNG unless the 

Department finds the proposed exportation will not be consistent 

with the public interest. 

The issue we are here to discuss today is not if we should export 

natural gas. The U.S. has exported natural gas via pipeline to Canada and Mexico since the 1930s. We are also not here to discuss 

if we should export liquefied natural gas. The U.S. has exported 

LNG from the Kenai Peninsula in Alaska since 1969. 

Again, by statute, the Department of Energy must approve LNG 

exports to FTA countries and the default position is it exports to 

non-FTA countries unless DOE finds that it is not consistent with 

the public interest. 

Finally, we are not here to discuss if we should export liquefied 

natural gas to non-FTA countries. Again, the U.S. has exported to 

Japan, which is not an FTA country, from Alaska since 1969. In 

the lower 48 in May 2011, the Department of Energy granted the 

first permit to export LNG to a non-FTA country. That facility is 

currently under construction in southwest Louisiana and will begin 

exporting LNG within two years. 

We are not even here to discover for the first time the economic 

impacts of LNG export. DOE has already commissioned and released the results of a two-part study. The first part was conducted 

by the U.S. Energy Information Administration and the second 

part was conducted by NERA, Economic Consulting. Dave Montgomery of NERA was invited to testify today as well, but due to 

a last minute scheduling conflict, has submitted written testimony 

for the record for which I will ask unanimous consent to put into 

the record. 

Mr. LANKFORD. The DOE studies concluded that for every one of 

the market scenarios examined, net economic benefits increased as 

the level of LNG exports increased and that exports of natural gas 

will improve the U.S. balance of trade and result in a wealth transfer to the U.S. 

Two additional studies on LNG have also been commissioned by 

Brookings and Deloitte, which will testify here today on the risks 

and potential gains for our economy and global relationships. 

As a Nation, we have already decided exporting is consistent 

with our public interest and we will continue to export natural gas 

by pipeline and LNG to FTA and non-FTA countries. The only 

issue here is how and when the Department will process the approximately remaining 20 LNG export applications. Every other 

3 

applicant is now significantly behind the first permit holder which 

was permitted almost two years ago. It is essential that the process 

moves fairly and expeditiously. 

Today’s question is really a narrow and simple set of process 

questions, although each answer has enormous implications for our 

international economic relationships and capital investments at 

home. When will DOE make its determination of public interest 

and what are the specific criteria in that decision, especially since 

the law encourages a default yes answer to exports. 

The two DOE-requested studies are complete. They both show a 

favorable gain for our nation when we export LNG. Now the comment period and replies are also complete. Will the DOE seek to 

limit the number of billion cubic feet that can be exported per day? 

Has DOE already set a certain amount of LNG to export and if so, 

how was that limit chosen? Will DOE seek to limit the number of 

export facilities permitted and thus allowed to compete and explore 

for contracts worldwide? What role will the market or geopolitical 

goals play in this decision? When can potential exporting companies begin competing for those contracts? 

There are not an infinite number of contracts that can be acquired worldwide. If we delay making a decision on permitting, 

other countries with a more efficient bureaucracy will beat us. The 

U.S. has a great head start in terms of technology, experience, 

pipeline infrastructure and processing. We have developed financial 

and legal systems to support gas development. These advantages 

will not last forever. 

There are massive shale gas fields around the world. China and 

India have invested in the Marcellus Shale in order to learn more 

about our technologies and currently Australia has eight LNG export facilities under construction. We have one. The demand window is open. We can step through it or we can delay until the window closes. 

If DOE intends to delay the decision to export to reduce the opportunity for global contracts, that is also something we should 

know. I don’t believe that is the Administration’s intent. In December 2012, President Obama said to Time Magazine, ‘‘The United 

States is going to be a net exporter of energy because of new technologies and what we are doing with natural gas and oil.’’ 

The President also recognizes these energy developments could 

have huge geopolitical consequences. For decades, energy has been 

used as a diplomatic tool against the U.S. Now with LNG, the U.S. 

has the potential to flip that and be in the position to use energy 

as a tool to benefit our Nation’s strategic interest. 

Now that DOE has completed the first permit and developed a 

system, what will be the timing and systems to permit the remaining applicants? With billions of private capital at stake, how can 

we make the process neutral, fair and expedited? How quickly can 

that process be released and how can we complete the process so 

that our nation can move forward with energy exploration, jobs, 

construction, midstream jobs and the narrowing of our trade deficit? 

Uncertainty destabilizes a free market economy. It is time to provide timelines and decision-making criteria ensuring fairness of the 

4 

process for everyone involved. I look forward to those answers on 

all these key issues today. 

Mr. LANKFORD. With that, I would like to recognize the distinguished Ranking Member, the gentlelady from California, Ms. 

Speier, for her opening statement. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding today’s hearing. I look forward to an informative discussion on the 

Obama Administration’s process for reviewing the export of liquefied natural gas. 

New technologies in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing 

have led to significant increases in U.S. natural gas production and 

a huge growth in our domestic gas supplies. For the first time in 

modern history, America has the opportunity to become dramatically more energy independent. 

As USAID Today reported last year, energy independence is no 

pipe dream. The U.S. is already the world’s fastest growing oil and 

natural gas producer. Counting the output from Canada and Mexico, North America is the new Middle East. Furthermore, at our 

current pace of production, the Energy Information Administration 

predicts that the United States will slash its dependence on foreign 

oil to as low as 36 percent by the year 2035, down from some 49 

percent in 2010. 

Many have called natural gas a bridge fuel to a clean energy future due to its lower emissions compared to other fossil fuels. Right 

now the natural gas producing and transporting industry wants to 

cross that bridge in part by exporting U.S. natural gas to foreign 

countries. Those foreign countries will pay a higher price for natural gas than is currently sold domestically. That means higher 

profits, more investment and more jobs for the oil and gas industry. 

Many gas consuming industries, including many businesses who 

‘‘are making it in America,’’ want to cross that bridge in a different 

way. These are companies that use gas as a fuel and as input to 

make a variety of products ranging from chemicals to cars. They 

want U.S. natural gas to be sold into the domestic market at current prices which will enable them to make higher profits and invest in more job creation. 

The domestic manufacturing industry warns that if we permit 

the export of large volumes of our domestic natural gas supply, 

prices for natural gas in the U.S. will increase. It is unclear what 

the consequences of a rush to export would be for American manufacturing jobs, as well as for many middle class and lower income 

Americans. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses about the importance of natural gas to our manufacturing sector and whether those 

benefits have been overlooked or under assessed in the debate over 

liquefied natural gas. 

We are balancing two very important interests, those that want 

to export and those that want to retain the natural gas in the 

United States for consumers and companies that make it in America. The Federal Government should proceed deliberately and carefully on LNG export. In fact, the Federal Government is legally 

bound to determine what degree of LNG exports is in the ‘‘public 

interest’’ before moving ahead on permitting new export facilities. 

5 

Currently, the Department of Energy is fulfilling its duty under 

the Natural Gas Act of 1938 to evaluate the cumulative impacts of 

allowing the natural gas industry to export U.S. natural gas. The 

Department of Energy commissioned two reports from the Energy 

Information Administration and NERA Economic Consulting and is 

now reviewing more than 200,000 public comments on those reports, including many that are highly critical of the reports’ methodologies and conclusions. 

I would like to hear from our witnesses today whether they feel 

that the EIA and NERA’s report conclusions are comprehensive or 

leave important questions unanswered or inadequately addressed. 

I do not believe it is the job of DOE or the Federal Government 

to choose sides in the natural gas marketplace. This is not what 

the Natural Gas Act requires. However, it is the job of the Department to hear all sides and determine, on balance, how much liquefied natural gas export is permissible within the ‘‘public interest’’ 

and to make sure that its decision is informed by the best data and 

analysis. 

Today’s hearing should not be read as an opportunity to influence the DOE’s process or to push on the scales of what is in the 

public interest. The Department is considering all views as it is 

charged to do by statute. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I look 

forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you. 

I now recognize the Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Issa, for 

an opening statement. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On the screen, I have a slide that I think sets of something of 

interest for us to bear in mind throughout the hearing. The two circles drawn around areas are areas of major production, one of oil 

and natural gas at Eagle Ford, the other one of almost all oil but 

with enough natural gas being flared today that it practically looks 

like New York City. That is the effect, in no small part, of artificially low natural gas. 

I think one of the points we have to make here today is that 

when natural gas falls too low, you end up with it becoming essentially waste fuel. That is not our goal. This is a valuable and clean 

energy. This is an energy that produces not just the methane we 

think of as burnable natural gas, but the ethylene that we so often 

think of for plastics and other uses; the propane, a highly portable 

fuel that on which America counts. All of this and more in the way 

of byproducts are part of what we are hoping to get to. 

The other thing is, for those who talk in terms of clean energy 

and exports, I just want to point out that in 2012, the United 

States exported 126 million short tons of coal, a great deal of it to 

China, our largest partner in that. If you could visualize that, it 

is 1.4 million railcars of coal. 

To a great extent, what we are trying to do is export a cleaner 

fuel, both in its raw form and of course if we burn it in the U.S. 

and use it in the U.S., in the form of exported product. I believe 

there is enough fuel, and the studies show there is, to do both. 

Additionally, today, with a roughly $3.90 cost of a million BTUs, 

that is about $21 equivalent to a barrel of oil. It is so cheap that 

6 

Burlington Northern has announced a $2 billion investment to convert diesel locomotives to work on natural gas. For many who find 

that interesting, let us make something more interesting. We are 

going to burn natural gas to haul coal to China. That is the reality 

of what we are doing and that’s how plentiful it is. 

I support all of the use of both liquefied and compressed natural 

gas because, in fact, it is a clean fuel, a plentiful fuel and an inexpensive fuel. It is going to be part of reducing our trade deficit. 

Mr. Chairman, in 2012, in spite of increased exports, we had our 

largest trade deficit since 2008, a whopping $475 billion. Converting to using more natural gas, producing more oil as we are in 

North Dakota, all of this comes together to reduce our imports, increase our exports and make America more competitive. 

For those who view, as they should, the lower a fuel stock gets, 

the lower a raw material gets, the better for domestic business, I 

concur. However, there comes a point at which a decision has been 

made by many companies that at $5.77, which is our 10-year average price for natural gas, they are going to bring those jobs to 

America because that is so much lower than the global price, that, 

in fact, American businesses remain very competitive with this low 

cost fuel, still half the cost of using comparable oil. 

If you look to Japan where they compete with us often, they are 

looking at nearly $20 equivalent to our $3.95. They pay a lot. They 

are an important ally. 

Mr. Chairman, one of the most important things you are bringing 

about today is a discussion on our NATO allies who find themselves being held hostage both by the Middle East and by Russia 

and our Asian allies who find themselves simply paying a very 

high price and feeling fuel is part of their diplomatic decisions. 

The ability to export at least, in part, a portion from the United 

States, along with Australia and other countries who are also going 

to be increasing exports, makes us better neighbors diplomatically 

and better allies. Last but not least, you pointed out very clearly 

if we deliberately delay the ability to compete 20 year-plus contracts will go to other nations and will not go to the United States. 

We are not dealing with whether we do it today or tomorrow, we 

are dealing with whether delay is working to the detriment of our 

long term ability to compete in this important fuel. 

Last but not least, for those who say natural prices will rise, 

when I have looked at the nature of export contracts, if we get back 

to the $12.69 peak in 2008 or above, the liquefied natural gas exporters will simply shut that down because it won’t be worthwhile. 

There is a natural stop point on all of this. 

For all of us who have viewed energy as an important tool of our 

national defense, as an important tool of our economy, we have a 

windfall. We need to make sure we have enough of the windfall 

that we do not flare gas for lack of the price to support infrastructure development. 

I thank the Chairman for this important hearing. 

Mr. LANKFORD. I would like to recognize the Ranking Member of 

the Full Committee, Mr. Cummings for an opening statement. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for holding this hearing. 

7 

I have not reached conclusions; I am coming here today to hear 

the witnesses so that I can be better informed. Today’s hearing focuses on a very important energy policy question. Is it in the public 

interest to export increasing amounts of natural gas to foreign markets overseas? That is the question. 

Because of new drilling techniques and other technology advancements, the United States is now able to produce natural gas 

in geological formations that were once impossible to tap. This new 

technology has given rise to an emerging industry that is transforming parts of our nation. This recent boom has reduced the price 

of natural gas and has saved consumers money on their electricity 

bills and is fueling a resurgence in the domestic manufacturing. 

Our natural gas has become a competitive advantage in a global 

market. 

Because so much natural gas is being produced, paradoxically, it 

may be placing the natural gas production industry and the jobs 

in that sector at some risk. As prices fall, some producers may be 

faced with the prospect of suspending operations or even going out 

of business. To address that concern, some companies are now 

seeking to export gas to foreign markets. 

While that could be a very good thing for United States producers, it raises questions that must be addressed. First, will exports drive up prices for domestic U.S. manufacturers and consumers? Multiple studies have shown that they will. That will 

mean higher gas prices for consumers, higher prices for manufacturers who want to support and potentially higher prices for goods 

and services for everyone. 

The producers contend that increasing exports will increase jobs. 

That too must be a consideration. By converting import terminals 

to export terminals, there is likely to be an increase in the number 

of jobs in certain sectors. God knows, we need more jobs. 

We also need to understand whether we will be supporting this 

set of jobs, those in the energy sector, at the expense of another 

set of jobs in United States manufacturing that rely heavily on natural gas in their operations. 

Another question we must answer is whether exporting natural 

gas will more quickly deplete U.S. supplies just as the Country is 

moving toward greater energy independence. For years, we have 

heard that the United States must reduce its dependence on foreign energy sources. By increasing gas exports, are we trading part 

of that independence for short term profits? 

Third, complex environmental questions regarding some of the 

techniques used in gas production have not been resolved. I believe 

it is critical that we give ample attention to how increased production may exacerbate those concerns. 

Mr. Chairman, as we hear today it is the Department of Energy’s 

job to determine whether exporting more natural gas is in our Nation’s best interest, but we will also hear today that studies commissioned by the Department are subject to debate. Some believe 

that recent studies demonstrate a clear benefit from gas exports 

while others believe the studies point to the opposite conclusion. 

Although we may begin to answer some of these important questions at today’s hearing, I believe we will also learn that there are 

a number of key questions that need to be studied more carefully. 

8 

I want to thank you for holding this hearing and with that, Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you. 

All members will have seven days to submit opening statements 

for the record. 

I will now recognize our panel. Mr. Tom Choi is the National 

Practice Leader, Gas, Deloitte MarketPoint LLC; Mr. Paul Cicio is 

President, Industrial Energy Consumers of America; Dr. Charles 

Ebinger is Director, Foreign Policy, Energy Security Initiative, 

Brookings Institute; and Mr. Chris Smith is Acting Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, U.S. Department of Energy. 

Thank you all for being here. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are sworn before they 

testify. Please rise and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you. 

Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, I would ask you to limit 

your testimony to five minutes. Watching our clock, we expect votes 

somewhere around the next 15 minutes, so that would be perfect. 

We will try to get through all of our testimony and will start with 

questioning time. If votes call us, then we will put temporarily 

pause, come back and continue questioning from there. 

Depending on time and the questioning, as soon as two of us get 

back, I would like to start questioning again and try to finish as 

quickly as we can to honor your time as well. 

Mr. Choi, you are at bat first. We are pleased to receive your testimony. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF TOM CHOI 

Mr. CHOI. Good afternoon, Chairman Lankford, Ranking Member 

Speier and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting 

me to testify this afternoon. 

My name is Tom Choi. I am the National Gas Practice Leader 

for Deloitte Marketpoint. 

Deloitte Marketpoint has worked for a number of clients across 

different industries to help them better understand energy markets. In particular, we have utilized a World Gas Model to help 

LNG companies seeking objective and in-depth economic analysis 

of global gas and LNG markets. The key results of our model and 

our analysis form the basis for my comments this afternoon. 

The World Gas Model computes prices and quantities based on 

established microeconomic theories. It has been used by leading energy companies and institutions for over 20 years. Vital to this 

analysis, the World Gas Model represents natural gas producers’ 

decisions regarding when and how much gas to develop given a 

producer’s resource endowment and anticipated forward prices. 

9 

The supply-demand dynamic is particularly important in analyzing the impact of demand changes, including LNG exports. 

Without a proper representation, the results would likely under estimate producer response and over estimate the price impact. It 

would be tantamount to assuming that the markets would be surprised or unprepared for the volume of exports and in effect, would 

have to ration fixed supplies to meet export, as well as domestic 

demand. 

Our findings show that the price impact to the U.S. is likely to 

be modest. The impact of 6 Bcfd of U.S. LNG exports on average 

U.S. prices is projected to be only $.15/MMBtu from 2016 to 2030. 

Abundant North American gas resources, coupled with the market’s demonstrated ability to respond to market changes, mitigate 

the price impact of exports. 

Since there is some uncertainty about the magnitude of the potential impact of LNG exports on domestic prices, an examination 

of the fundamental economic factors might be helpful. I think it is 

important to separate the timing issue, that is how quickly new 

supplies can be brought online from the resource depletion issue, 

how increased demand affects future production costs and prices. 

Can the U.S. natural gas production keep pace with projected gas 

demand, including potential LNG exports? If history provides any 

indication, the answer appears to be yes. In just four years, from 

2008–2012, the U.S. dry gas production has increased by over 10 

Bcfd a day, demonstrating just how dynamic the U.S. natural gas 

industry is. 

Hence, if export volume can be properly anticipated and productive capacity made available when needed, then the price impact 

will likely be determined by how increased demand affects resource 

depletion and future production costs. Moreover, it is not just the 

gas fields feeding directly into LNG export terminals that respond, 

but rather, the entire highly interconnected North American gas 

system. 

Since there is a large quantity of domestic gas available at similar production cost levels, U.S. exports are projected to increase the 

price of domestic gas not by very much, because it is not likely to 

change the future production cost by very much. 

Our model also projects that natural gas prices will likely be 

greater in importing countries than in the U.S. As prices in the 

U.S. firm and prices in export markets soften, their price spread 

will narrow. Hence, markets will check the volume of U.S. LNG imports, even in the absence of policy restrictions. 

Furthermore, U.S. LNG exports are unlikely to cause prices to 

rise to levels of importing regions. The cost of liquefaction, shipping 

and regasification form a large price wedge between prices in the 

U.S. and those in import markets. Exports will only occur if large 

price spreads prevail, implying that sectors of the U.S. economy 

that compete in global markets will not likely see their price advantage significantly diminished as a result of LNG exports. 

In summary, given the dynamic nature of the North American 

gas market and the abundance of U.S. gas supplies available at 

similar cost levels, our model projects modest price impacts at our 

assumed export volumes. 

10 

Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to addressing your 

questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Choi follows:] 

11 


Insert offset folio 1 here 80386.001

Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee Chairman on Energy Policy, Health Care, and Entitlements on "Economic 

Impact of LNG Exports from the US" 

Mr. Thomas Y. Choi 

National Gas Practice Leader 

Deloitte LLP 

March 19,2013 

Good morning Chairman Lankford, Ranking Member Speier, and members of the 

Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify this afternoon. My name is Tom Choi and I 

am the national gas practice leader for Deloilte MarketPoint LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of 

Deloitte LLP. 

Deloitte MarketPoint has worked for a number of clients across different industries to help them 

better understand energy markets. In particular, we havc helped LNG (liquefied natural gas) 

companies seeking objective and in-depth economic analysis of global gas and LNG markets. 

We used our World Gas Model to project the impacts of various assumed volumes of US LNG 

exports. The key results from the model and our analysis form the basis for my comments this 

afternoon. 

The World Gas Model (WGM) is a model of global gas markets hased on economic 

fundamentals. It has been used by leading energy companies and institutions for over 20 years 

to help them understand markets and make better decisions. The model computes prices and 

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quantities based on rigorous adherence to established microeconomic theories. It includes 

disaggregatcd representations of natural gas supply and demand in North America and global 

markets, including their linkages through LNG trade or export pipelines. 

Vital to this analysis, the WGM represents natural gas producer decisions regarding when and 

how much gas to develop given a producer's resource endowments and anticipated forward 

prices. The supply-demand dynamic is particularly important in analyzing the impact of demand 

changes, including LNG exports. Without proper representation of market dynamics, the answer 

will likely under-estimate the producer response and result in a misalignment of supply and 

demand causing over-estimation of the price impact. It would be tantamount to assuming the 

market will be surprised or unprepared for the volume of exports and, having failed to 

sufficiently expand supply, the market would then have to in effect, ration fixed supplies to meet 

export volumes, as well as domestic demand. 

Our findings show that the projected price impact to the US is minimal. Abundant North 

American gas resources coupled with the market's demonstrated ability to respond to market 

changes mitigate the price impact of exports. The impact of 6 Befd of US LNG exports on US 

citygate prices is projected to be only $0. 1 S/MMBtu (million British thermal units) on average 

from 2016 through 2030. The price impact is a little greater at the Henry Hub and other 

locations in the Gulf of Mexico region, where most of the proposed LNG export terminals are 

planned to be built, and a little less in distant downstream markets, such as Chicago and New 

York. Although the Henry Hub is the world's most liquid gas trading point, focusing on just 

Henry Hub prices will likely overestimate the US price impact. 

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Since there is some debate on what the price impact might be, an examination of the fundamental 

economic assumptions might be helpful. 

The price impact will be largely determined by market dynamics and North American 

natural gas resources. In analyzing the impact of LNG exports on domestie prices, I think it is 

important to separate the timing issue, that is, how quickly new supplies can be brought on line, 

from the resource depletion issue. that is, how increased demand affects future production costs 

which drive futurc prices. The combination of both factors will influence the price impact. 

If gas productive capacity lags behind demand, then the price impact will be determined by the 

tightness of the supply-demand balance at each point in time. On the other hand, if export 

volumes can be properly anticipated and productive capacity made available when needed, then 

the price impact likely will be determined by how increased demand affects resource depletion 

and future production costs. 

Even without LNG exports, US natural gas demand will likely experience robust growth over the 

coming decades. Can supply keep pace with demand growth including potential LNG exports? 

If history is any indicator, the answer appears to be yes. Indeed, the past several years have 

demonstrated how dynamic the US gas market is. US dry gas production has increased by over 

10 Bcfd from 2008 to 2012, a four year time span which is less than the time required for the 

first proposed US LNG export terminal to go from the application phase to ultimate construction. 

Given the public DOE and FERC approval processes and long construction lead timc, supplicrs 

have plenty of notice and time to make necessary supplies available. 

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If supplies can be developed in time for LNG exports, then the price impact will be determined 

by the how the incremental demand affects the rate ofresource depletion and future production 

costs. Furthermore, it is not just the cost of production of fields feeding directly into LNG export 

terminals, but rather the entire North American gas market, which is highly interconnected. 

With regards to the potential impact of LNG exports, the absolute price is not the driving factor 

but rather the shape of the aggregate supply curve which determines the price impact. The 

massive domestic shale gas resources have essentially flattened the US supply curve. Given that 

there is a large quantity of domestic gas available at similar production costs, the export of LNG 

is not projected to increase the price of domestic gas very much because it is unlikely to have a 

large impact on the incremental production cost. 

Global markets can determine the economically viable volume of LNG exports. 

As prices in tlle US firm and prices in export markets soften, the margins between the US and 

global markets will narrow. OUf study found that the impact on natural gas prices will likely be 

greater in importing countries than in the US. Furthermore, as in any commodity market, there 

are a number of competitors vying to enter the market and other gas suppliers are likely to 

capture LNG markets if the US exports are delayed or restricted. Hence, global gas markets will 

likely limit the volume of economically viable US LNG exports even in the absence of policy 

restrictions. 

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US LNG exports are unlikely to cause US prices to rise to levels of importing regions. Just 

because US markets are connected to import markets does not mean that US prices will rise to 

the level of import countries, The cost of LNG liquefaction, shipping, and regasification provides 

a large price wedge between prices in the US and import markets, Or stated differently, the price 

of natural gas in foreign markets needs to be about twice the current US price in order for LNG 

exports to be economically viable. Exports will only occur if wide price spreads persist, 

implying that sectors of the US economy that compete in global markets will not likely see their 

gas price advantage significantly diminish as a result of LNG exports, Iflarge price spreads 

between markets begin to narrow, the economic quantity of US LNG exported would likely be 

reduced. 

In summary, if sufficient natural gas supplies can be developed by the time LNG export 

terminals come into operations, then the price impact in the US will be determined by how the 

increase in demand changes the future cost of natural gas production. Given how dynamic the 

North American gas market is and the abundance of US gas supplies available at similar cost 

levels, our model projects modest price impacts at our assumed export volumes. 

Thank you for this opportunity. 

I look forward to addressing your questions, 

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16 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you, Mr. Choi. 

Mr. Cicio. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL CICIO 

Mr. CICIO. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you. 

I am Paul Cicio, President of Industrial Energy Consumers of 

America. 

IECA is a nonpartisan association of leading manufacturing companies with $1.1 trillion in annual sales, over 1,000 facilities nationwide, and with more than 1.4 million employees worldwide. 

IECA membership represents a diverse set of energy intensive 

industries including: chemical, plastics, steels, aluminum, paper, 

food processing, fertilizer, insulation, glass, industrial gases, pharmaceutical, brewing and cement. 

IECA member companies are energy-intensive and trade-exposed, EITE. For these industries, the cost of energy can be from 

10 to 85 percent of the cost of making their products. Our competitiveness is dependent upon the price of energy relative to our offshore competitors. 

The U.S. manufacturing sector is the largest consumer of natural 

gas, as a fuel and as a feedstock, and natural gas-fired electricity, 

consuming approximately 40 percent of all U.S. natural gas. We 

also consume approximately 30 percent of the electricity. 

It is important to note that IECA is not opposing LNG exports, 

although we are very concerned that exports could negatively impact manufacturing competitiveness and jobs. It is for this reason 

that we urge the DOE to do a better job than what we have seen 

so far. Even though both DOE-sponsored studies used domestic demand assumptions, I should understated assumptions, the outcome 

of the study should give public policymakers pause because they 

confirm one thing, that any level of exports will increase domestic 

prices for all consumers. 

Natural gas prices have both direct and indirect impacts on peoples’ lives and their safety for homes, for heating, cooling and electricity, for the Nation’s economic growth, exports of manufactured 

products and jobs. Energy intensive manufacturing industries are 

especially impacted. 

Specifically page 7 of the flawed NERA study confirmed that ‘‘Expansion of LNG exports has two major effects on income. It raises 

energy costs and in the prices, depresses both real wages and the 

return on capital in all other industries’’ and from our perspective, 

with only trivial net benefit to the economy. 

My comments today will focus on two issues. First, we urge the 

DOE to implement a rulemaking process to determine public interest determination criteria that will be used on an application by 

application basis. Secondly, we also urge the DOE to complete the 

necessary studies to clarify the implications of LNG exports to consumers, the economy and the manufacturing sector using up to 

date, domestic demand assumptions. 

DOE must include scenarios that consider pending legislative 

and regulatory actions that could impact natural gas production 

and spur domestic demand. Special attention is needed to address 

the impacts to energy intensive trade exposed industries. 

17 

The U.S. is at an important crossroads on the subject of LNG exports. If we do this right, the U.S. can export LNG and provide an 

adequate supply of natural gas at affordable prices to domestic consumers. If we get it wrong, the LNG exports could slow, if not stop, 

the manufacturing renaissance and every U.S. consumers’ price of 

natural gas and electricity will rise, so much is at stake. 

Today, the DOE is considering 24 applications to export LNG. In 

the modern era, the U.S. Government has not faced the need to determine the public interest in connection with requests to authorize 

exports as large as this. The DOE has extensive experience in evaluating import applications but has limited experience with export 

applications. Perhaps not surprisingly, there are no clear established criteria for DOE to apply in determining the public interest 

with regard to natural gas exports. 

IECA supports an approach to such determinations by DOE that 

are based on objective criteria and metrics, established through a 

rulemaking process and applied on an incremental case by case 

basis consistent and balanced in manner. We urge the Congress to 

embrace this process. 

Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Cicio follows:] 

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Thank you Chairman Lankford and Ranking Member Speier for the opportunity to testify before you and 

other Subcommittee Members on this important subject. My name is Paul Cicio and I am the President 

of the Industrial Energy Consumers of America (IECA). 

The Industrial Energy Consumers of America is a nonpartisan association of leading manufacturing 

companies with $1.1 trillion in annual sales, over 1,000 facilities nationwide, and with more than 1.4 

million employees worldwide. It is an organization created to promote the interests of manufacturing 

companies through advocacy and collaboration for which the availability, use and cost of energy, power 

or feedstock playa significant role in their ability to compete in domestic and world markets. IECA 

membership represents a diverse set of energy intensive industries including: chemical, plastics, steel, 

aluminum, paper, food processing, fertilizer, insulation, glass, industrial gases, pharmaceutical, brewing 

and cement. 

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has received applications to export LNG equivalent to just under 

50 percent of U.S. demand. Shipments of this volume have significant implications for all domestic 

consumers and especially the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector that competes globally. The 

DOE has sponsored two studies to help understand how LNG exports would impact the U.S. economy 

and consumers. Both studies are flawed. Among other things, domestic demand assumptions used 

were understated resulting in understated impacts to the economy. The DOE has approved one LNG 

export terminal for shipments and another 24 have applied, yet the DOE has failed to establish 

transparent criteria on how to determine the public interest determination. 

IECA Urges the DOE to: 

Complete a study that will provide a comprehensive analysis of LNG export implications. 

Develop guidelines for the public interest determination appropriate for LNG export applications 

through a formal rule making process. 

Testimony Outline: 

1. IECA position on LNG exports 

2. Implications of LNG exports for energy-intensive trade-exposed industries and other 

manufacturing 

3. Two reasons why natural gas is different than other trade products and why it is essential to 

improve the public interest determination 

4. DOE should develop guidelines for the public interest determination through a formal 

rulemaking process 

5. Criteria for public interest determination 

6. Study recommendations 

1. IECA position on LNG exports 

It is important to note that IECA is not opposing LNG exports, although we remain very concerned that 

exports could negatively impact manufacturing competitiveness and jobs. It is for this reason that we 

urge the DOE to do a better job than what we have seen so far, and improve the public determination 

test. 

Both DOE sponsored studies (that used understated domestic demand assumptions) should give public 

policymakers pause because they confirm one thing - that any level of exports will increase domestic 

prices, and that energy-intensive manufacturing industries are greatly impacted. Specifically, the flawed 

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NERA study confirmed that LNG exports increase energy costs, lower wages, and lowers the return on 

capital to "all" industries with only trivial net benefit to the economy. 

The volume of exports and the timing of when LNG terminals are approved and begin to ship are 

important public policy decisions that can negatively impact the manufacturing renaissance that has 

now begun. LNG exports have the potential to slow or stop the manufacturing renaissance. A lot is at 

stake. 

If export terminals are approved over a longer period of time, the domestic market place may have time 

to adjust, so as to avoid a price spike for domestic consumers. On the other hand, approval of several 

terminals and shipments starting all at the same time could shock the domestic market and prices could 

spike for all U.S. consumers. Under this scenario, prices would increase right away in anticipation of the 

future demand. 

2. LNG exports are an important issue to energy-intensive trade-exposed industries and 

manufacturers that competes globally 

IECA member companies are energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE). For these industries, the cost 

of energy can be from 10 to 85 percent of the cost of making their products (see Appendix, Chart 1). Our 

competitiveness is dependent upon the price of energy relative to our offshore competitors. 

Energy-intensive manufacturers are unique and the only sector which requires globally competitive 

energy, is natural gas- and/or electricity-intensive, and competes globally in an environment of unfair 

competition (other countries often subsidize energy and manufacturing). Unlike other sectors, we will 

relocate facilities offshore to be competitive. 

The U.S. manufacturing sector is the largest consumer of natural gas, as a fuel and feedstock, and 

natural gas-fired electricity, consuming approximately 40 percent of all U.S. natural gas. We also 

consume approximately 30 percent of all electricity. 

Energy-intensive manufacturing companies produce the building block commodity products that are 

used by "all" other manufacturing to produce their products as illustrated in Chart 2 (see Appendix). 

Energy-intensive products are essential for u.s. economic growth. Chart 3 and 4 (see Appendix) 

illustrate that all other sectors of the economy are dependent upon these energy-intensive products for 

the manufacture of a wide array of industries that span defense industries to consumer products. 

However, when energy prices rise, domestic energy-intensive products have a difficult time competing 

with imports. This is what happened when natural gas prices rose and peaked in 2008. U.S. 

manufacturing facilities shut down and imports increased. (see Appendix, Charts 5 & 6). 

The manufacturing sector is a highly valued sector. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 

every dollar of manufacturing economic activity returns $1.35 of indirect economic activity (see 

Appendix, Chart 7). This is the highest return as compared to any other sector of the economy. The 

average of all other sectors is only $0.75 of indirect economic activity for every one dollar. Lastly, 

according to NAM, for every manufacturing job created there are five to eight more jobs created in the 

larger economy. 

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3. Two reasons why natural gas is different than other trade products and why it is important to get 

the criteria correct for the public interest determination 

Both DOE sponsored studies make it clear that "all" consumers are impacted. Natural gas prices have 

both a direct and indirect impact on peoples' lives, their safety (heating, cooling, electricity), economic 

growth, exports of manufactured products, and jobs. 

Secondly, natural gas production and demand is highly influenced by public policy decisions. Natural gas 

production can be highly impacted by federal and state public policy decisions and regulations that can 

either slow production or make it more expensive. And, domestic natural gas demand is highly 

impacted by federal environmental regulation, although it could also be impacted by Congressional 

action. 

The fact that natural gas supply and demand is highly impacted by public policy decisions is a critically 

important distinction. When the DOE approves an LNG export terminal, it does so for as long as 30 

years. The terminal owner then secures take-or-pay contracts that are then used to secure financing of 

the terminal. This "locks" in new demand for long periods of time that will impact domestic prices. A lot 

can happen in 30 years that cannot be anticipated today. During this 3D-year time period, all of the 

imposed regulatory and legislative risks of slower production or higher domestic demand driven by 

public policy decisions are shifted to the U.s. consumer - and not the producer of natural gas, the 

terminal owner or the LNG customer. 

Examples of public policy issues that could slow natural gas production which would decrease supply 

and correspondingly increase costs include: 

Intangible Drilling Costs (lDCs) tax provision: 

The IDCs allow the oil and gas industry to deduct expenses and generate the cash flow needed to invest 

in drilling. Congress is considering eliminating this provision. If Congress took this provision away, 

capital available to drill could drop by up to one-third. Production of natural gas would drop 

precipitously and prices would rise quickly. 

U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM) proposed rule to regulate hydraulic 

fracturing an federal lands: 

The BLM rule will slow permitting, slow-down drilling and increase costs that will be passed onto 

consumers. 

EPA regulation of hydraulic fracturing on private lands: 

EPA is leading an inter-agency task force study that is widely believed will result in regulation of 

hydraulic fracturing. The primary focus is on water protection and these new regulations could result in 

sensitive regional watersheds being placed off limits to drilling. 

Examples of public policy issues that will result in greater natural gas demand include: 

National Ambient Air Quality Standards for: 

Ozone - Proposal due 2013, final due 9/14 

Sulfur Dioxide (502) - Final 6/10 

Nitrogen Dioxide (N02) - Final 2/10 

Particulate Matter (PM) - Final 12/12 

Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) - Vacated 8/12, rehearing requested 

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GHG Rules - Upheld DC Court of Appeals 6/12 

Endangerment Finding Rehearing denied 12/12 

GHG Tailoring Rule - Final 

New Source Performance Standards for: 

GHG for new power plants - Proposed 4/12, final due 3/13 

GHG for existing plants - Unknown, subject to Consent Decree 

National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) 

Mercury Air Toxics Standards - Final 2/12, new units in reconsideration 

Coal Combustion Residuals Rule - Proposed 6/10, final due 6/13 

Cooling Water Intake Rule [316(b)]- Proposed 4/11, final due 5/13 

Power Plant Effluent limitation Guidelines - Proposal 4/13, final 4/14 

Greenhouse Gas NSPS for refineries - Required action by EPA under the CAA 

Greenhouse Gas NSPS for industrial facilities - Required action by EPA under the CAA 

4. DOE should develop guidelines for the public interest determination through a formal rulemaking 

process 

Over 70 years ago, Congress recognized that the import and export of natural gas, a finite natural 

resource, can have critical implications for U.S. prosperity. In the Natural Gas Act, Congress charged the 

executive branch with regulating the import and export of natural gas in accordance with the public 

interest. 

The DOE has extensive experience evaluating import applications, but it has had limited experience with 

export applications. Perhaps not surprisingly, there are no clearly established criteria for DOE to apply 

in determining the public interest with regard to natural gas exporting. 

IECA supports expanded exports and trade. However, we also believe it is crucial that DOE have the 

information and analysis necessary to properly apply the Natural Gas Act requirement that exports be 

consistent with the public interest. We applaud DOE's recent acknowledgement that an economic study 

that it commissioned is but one data point in the broad array of considerations that are relevant for a 

public interest determination. In short, IECA supports an approach to such determinations by DOE that 

are based on objective criteria and metrics, established through a public process and applied on an 

incremental, case-by-case basis in a consistent and balanced manner. 

Today, DOE is conSidering 24 applications to export LNG. Since the proposed importing countries do not 

have a particular type of free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States, these applications are not 

covered by the statute's presumption that an FTA represents a determination that the application meets 

the public interest test. After approving one such application, DOE has temporarily suspended the 

processing of "non-HA" LNG export applications. Implicitly recognizing that more is at stake than can 

be resolved through its traditional approach to processing export applications, DOE commissioned a 

report from a private firm to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of higher LNG exports. 

As detailed in IECA's January 24, 2013 submission to DOE, the NERA report is fundamentally flawed and 

underestimates the potential harmful effects of sharply higher LNG exports. More broadly though, 

commissioning the report should be the first step in developing policies that will enable DOE to 

administer appropriate public interest determinations for LNG export applications. No economic study 

can account for the full profile of u.s. values that should inform a determination of the public interest 

with regard to natural gas exports. 

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The outstanding authorization requests present what is essentially a new challenge, In the modern era, 

the U.s, government has not faced the need to determine the public interest in connection with 

requests to authorize exports of large volumes of natural gas, Congress should encourage DOE to 

continue its effort to improve the process for evaluating LNG export applications by providing an 

opportunity for all affected constituencies and the public at large to comment on how best to assess the 

public interest as it pertains to exports of natural gas, 

Newly discovered sources of natural gas present a great opportunity for the U.s, At the same time, 

natural gas remains a finite natural resource with important implications for U.s, energy security, energy 

independence and the environment, Exports can have supply and price effects that have major impacts 

throughout the country, The economic impact of LNG exports is also likely to vary by geographic region 

and by business center. Consequently, public interest determinations should be thorough enough to 

evaluate nationwide implications of LNG exports as well as localized effects, 

Unchecked LNG export licensing can cause demand shocks, and the resulting price volatility can have 

substantial adverse impacts on U.s, manufacturing and competitiveness, In the recent past, the price of 

natural gas was very high and volatile until the advent of substantial shale gas production, Gas supplies 

and demand are inherently difficult to predict accurately, Thus, IECA urges a cautious, considered, 

comprehensive and deliberate approach to assessing the public interest 

Currently, DOE regulations provide for the adjudication of LNG export applications on a case-by-case 

basis in proceedings that depend on the parties to raise issues relevant to a public interest 

determination and to support their positions with persuasive evidence, DOE interprets the Natural Gas 

Act's public interest standard as creating a rebuttable presumption that a proposed export of natural 

gas is in the public interest, This means that DOE is to approve an application unless those who oppose 

the application can overcome this presumption, 

In its principal order to date authorizing exports of LNG to non-FTA countries, DOE identified certain 

topics as being relevant to its evaluation of the impact of LNG exports on the public interest: 

the domestic need for the natural gas proposed to be exported, 

whether proposed exports threaten the security of domestic natural gas supplies, and 

any other issue DOE deems to be important, including whether the export arrangement is 

consistent with DOE's policy of promoting competition in the marketplace by allowing 

commercial parties to freely negotiate their own trade arrangements, 

The topics that DOE has identified for evaluating the public interest are too narrow and vague to capture 

all of the critical national, regional and local issues at stake with LNG exports or to offer any useful 

guidance, In response to the economic study it commissioned, DOE has received more than 370 

submissions from a broad array of stakeholders covering an equally broad array of topics, The sheer 

number of submitted comments reflects the depth of interest regarding this issue, Unfortunately, the 

current process provides no assurance that DOE will consider all aspects of the public interest in any 

given proceeding, This is inevitable for an administrative process that depends on arguments and 

evidence submitted by the parties to a specific export application process, These parties are 

representing their specific interests, and may not adequately represent the totality of the public 

interest 

A timely DOE rulemaking process to formulate criteria for determining the public interest as it relates to 

LNG exports could ameliorate some of the shortcomings of the current process, All ofthe major 

constituencies affected by LNG exports should have an opportunity to be heard, which could enable 

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DOE to obtain much broader public input and do so efficiently in a single forum. This would increase the 

likelihood that all relevant considerations will be identified and that cumulative and national effects will 

be addressed as well as regional effects. The result of such a rulemaking process-establishment of 

uniform and actionable criteria with measurable metrics-would facilitate balanced, comprehensive 

consideration of the public interest by DOE, give parties in individual proceedings advance notice of 

many of the most relevant considerations, and reduce the risk of inconsistent adjudications across 

applications. DOE would then apply these criteria and metrics incrementally over time in individual 

application proceedings, which would assure fairness and uniformity, while allowing DOE to consider 

changes in circumstances from one application to the next. 

More importantly, DOE could adopt a mechanism to balance, in the aggregate, exports and u.s. 

interests that inform the public interest. A new rule of this kind should generally ensure that DOE is 

presented with adequate and accurate evidentiary records in each licensing proceeding. 

5. Criteria for public interest determination 

While criteria for determining the public interest should be developed as part of the rulemaking 

described above, we believe the list below provides a good starting point for identifying specific, 

concrete and forward-looking criteria that DOE should evaluate in connection with LNG export 

applications: 

Domestic manufacturing: How will exports impact natural gas prices and the supply/demand 

balance? Will natural gas supply be reduced? Will there be less feedstock for announced 

investment projects? Will the jobs created by increased exports exceed jobs lost by the 

manufacturing industry? Will additional exports displace U.S. consumption? 

U.S. consumers: Will exports reduce the supply of natural gas available for utilities or affect 

consumer prices or energy costs? Will utilities decrease fuel switching to natural gas? 

Energy security: Will exports reduce the volume of natural gas available for domestic use or 

increase the need to rely on imported petroleum? 

Employment: How many new jobs will be created or existing jobs impacted? Are employment 

gains in the oil and gas sector offset by job losses in other areas of the economy affected by 

relatively higher natural gas prices? 

International trade: Will exports improve the u.s. balance of trade payments sufficiently to 

offset falling exports in other value-adding sectors of the economy? As to proposed exports to 

FTA countries, are the exports destined for consumption in the FTA country or will there be 

transshipment of natural gas to non-FTA countries? How can export applications be disposed of 

in a manner consistent with U.S. trade obligations? 

Environmental: What would the proposed exports' environmental impact be? 

Strategic interests: Will the exports support a strategic American ally in a meaningful way and 

consistent with stated policy priorities? Do proposed importing countries accord the United 

States reciprocal favorable international trade treatment? What are the implications for any 

current or proposed FTA negotiations? 

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Price and volatility: How is the LNG contract being priced, and is it linked to oil in some manner? 

What is the expected short and long term impact on natural gas and electricity price volatility? 

Other regulatory impacts: What is the potential impact of other regulatory decisions on natural 

gas demand or supply and what is the interplay between those impacts and exports of natural 

gas? 

DOE should apply criteria that result from this rulemaking to applications on a case-by-case basis and in 

an incremental fashion. This would entail evaluating whether approving each individual application is in 

the public interest, and whether the incremental impact of approving that application, in light of DOE's 

prior approvals, would be consistent with the public interest. Again, the last ten years have seen great 

fluctuations in domestic gas prices, and circumstances can change as drilling techniques are improved, 

sources of consumption are expanded or the condition of the economy evolves. 

6. Study recommendations 

Among the other things needed to evaluate the impact of LNG exports on the U.S., IECA requests that a 

redo of the DOE study should take into consideration each of the following items: 

1. Proprietary economic models, such as that used by NERA Economic Consultants (NERA), should not 

be used for public policy decisions. Public policy decisions demand the trust and integrity of economic 

models that have stood the test of time and been peer reviewed. The Office of Management and 

Budget "Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review," filed in the Federal Register on January 14, 

2005, stipulates that proprietary models/data that are not peer reviewed cannot be used in public policy 

decision making. NERA's model does not meet that test. We encourage the DOE to use EIA for all 

modeling. In this way, the public knows that trusted experienced public servants, which do not have an 

agenda, are conducting the analysis. 

2. Compare the economic benefits of consuming the same quantities of natural gas domestically as 

exported under the study. The public interest test for shipment to non-free trade countries is a public 

policy decision based on comparisons of how the public will be impacted. The public interest test is 

incomplete without first comparing impacts/benefits of exports versus impacts/benefits of greater 

domestic consumption. There is just as much potential new domestic demand that can occur as 

compared to the exports of LNG. 

3. Use up-to-date demand forecasts for the industrial, electric generation and transportation sectors. 

For industrial demand, use current and prudent publically available data on announced capital 

investments that will rely upon natural gas in the forecasts and update employment data. 

4. For the industrial, electric generation and transportation industries, include scenarios of impacts to 

natural gas demand due to existing, pending (proposed/courts) and anticipated federal and state 

regulations. 

5. For the oil and gas industry, include scenarios of impacts to natural gas demand due to existing, 

pending (proposed/courts) and anticipated federal and state regulations on production of natural gas. 

6. Given that approval of export terminals permits are for 20- to 3D-year time periods, and the difficulty 

of forecasting supply, demand and price over such a long period of time, we encourage the DOE to use 

EIA's natural gas price forecasting history data base to provide a plus or minus (+/-) price factor to the 

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LNG export scenario forecasted prices, a price sensitivity analysis. The EIA has an existing database that 

compares their history of price forecasting to what really happened. Using a price sensitivity analysis 

based on past experience can illustrate the degree of potential accuracy of the LNG export price impacts 

over a 20- to 3D-year period and provide great insight into relative price uncertainty. 

7. The NERA study concluded that everyone will pay higher prices for natural gas and electricity but that 

the most vulnerable sector was the energy-intensive trade-exposed (EITEs) industries. NERA then 

erroneously concluded that EITE industries are not important so it doesn't really matter if those jobs are 

lost. We urge the DOE to study the economic and job creation "value-chain" of natural gas consumption 

by the EITE industries, to their domestic customers, and to the export of their finished goods - in 

comparison to exporting specific volumes of natural gas. In this evaluation, DOE must consider that the 

economics of these industries has changed dramatically because of favorable domestic natural gas and 

electricity prices and they have a decided competitive advantage over imports. DOE is to use up-to-date 

EITE competitive market assessments as part of this work. 

8. Both DOE studies failed to evaluate peak demand scenarios and potential regional limitations on 

storage and pipeline capacity on price. As the DOE re-evaluates price impacts of LNG exports, it needs 

to include scenarios that consider the impacts of U.S. LNG exports during winter and/or summer peak 

demand periods. This is a reasonable request given that most of the countries that would import LNG 

from the U.S. are in the northern hemisphere, which means that their LNG demand will be high during 

the U.S. winter heating season demand and could cause costly price spikes. 

Secondly, regional infrastructure such as storage and pipeline capacity needs to be evaluated. The 

capacity of such infrastructure on a regional basis can have a significant impact on the natural gas basis 

pricing as we are experiencing today in the northeast. For example, the EIA reported "spot prices of 

natural gas for delivery between Saturday, January 19 and Tuesday, January 22 exceeded $14 per million 

British thermal units (MMBtu) at some Northeast locations. This is about four times higher than the 

$3.54 price for the same delivery period reported at Henry Hub, the benchmark location for pricing 

natural gas in the United States." As new natural gas-fired power generation plants, new industrial 

facility demand and export terminal demand are all dependent upon the same infrastructure, prices will 

rise and accelerate the potential for price spikes. 

In closing, the U.S. is at an important crossroad. If we do this right, the U.S. can export LNG and provide 

an adequate supply of natural gas at affordable prices to domestic consumers. However, it is very 

important to develop a public interest determination criteria that balances LNG exports and provides 

the safeguards needed for domestic consumers. 

Thank you. 

Page 9 
26 


Insert offset folio 14 here 80386.014

APPENDIX 

CHART 1 

Examples of Energy Intensity 

(Small Energy Price Increases Have Large Competitive Impacts) 

Aluminum: 30-35% 

Recycled steel: 25% 

Integrated steel: 85% energy and raw materials 

Plastics: 80% (feedstock) 

Chemicals: varies greatlY15-20% (fuel only) 

Industrial gases: 

Paper: 10-20~'O 

Glass: 20-25% 

l'\itrogen fertilizer: 80~i;; (feedstock) 

Food processing: 30% 

Cement: 25-35% 

Refining: 15-20% (fuel only) 

i'RJllIt."etl; 

CHART 2 

Energy Price Sensitive Products are 

Essential for Economic Growth 

Building Block Industries 

D Chemicals 

Plastics 

Fertilizer 

D Aluminum 

D Pulp and Paper 

Cement 

Food Processing 

Convert 

to 

Commercial & 

Consumer Products 

D Food Production 

D Defense lndustrie s 

D Automobiles 

D Consumer Goods 

D Construction 

D Medical Supplies 

D Energy Production 

D Appliances 

D Household Products 

D Telecommunication 

Page 10 

• 
27 


Insert offset folio 15 here 80386.015

CHART 3 

Energy Intensive Products are 

Essential to Economic Growth The d,erQspaceidefenseindustry uses steel, iron .ore. aluminum, plastics and chermcals. 

The air tran'port industry mes steel, iron ore, aluminum, plastics and chenucals. 

The auto and truck industries use steel, iron ore, alumintml, plastics, 

chemicals. 

The beverageindmtry me, aluminum, steel. iron ore, paper, glass and plastic. 

The biotechnology indmtry uses chemicals. 

The commercial and home building construction indmtry me, brick, steel, 

iron ore, aluminum, wood, cement and glass. 

The oil and gas industry uses 5teel, iron ore, chemicals, cement. 

The chemical industI)' uses chemicals, steel, iron ore, cement and glass, 

The computer industry uses plastics, chemicals, and glass. 

The electrical equipment industry i,tses steel and iron ore. 

The electric and gas utility sector us.es steel, iron ore and cement. 

The food industry uses fertilizer, chemicals, plastic< and paper. 

i 9 !l'!'~r.;t 

CHART 4 

Energy Intensive Products are 

Essential to Economic Growth The heavy construction industry uses steel, iron ore and rubber, 

The home furnishing industI,- uses wood, glass, chemicals, 

The home appliance indu$tI)· uses steel, iron ore, aluminum, glass and 

'\.'!/ood. 

The household pT-oauct5 industry uses chen'llcals, plastic; paper, glass. 

The machinery indmtry uses steel, iron ore, chemicals and plastics, 

The maritime industry uses ste-el and iron ore. 

The packaging induscry uses plastics, paper, aluminum, steel and iron ore. 

The paper f forest products industry uses steel, iron ore and chemicals. 

The refining industI)· uses steel, iron ore, chemicals and cement. 

The pharmaceutical industI)· uses chemicals, glass, steel and iron ore, 

Railroads use steel and iron ore, 

The toiletries/cosmetics industry me> chemicals, plastics, paper, and 

glass, 

,..."".., 

Page 11 

• 

• 
28 


Insert offset folio 16 here 80386.016

CHART 5 

When Natural Gas Prices Increase, Manufacturing 

Employment Falls 

9 

CHART 6 

~-··I lS,Oo-ai ~j ! 17,000-

-~-'~1 16,0-0-0 

---~-"-.-~. j 

___ .. """ __ "_~_ t 1).000 E' -1 24

~ '000 i '3.0 <>0 

'iI~"'ilI--I.-~. __ --J '12 ,00 0' 

~ _ I n,ooo 

I ~ ,t 10,000. 

u .S. Total: 5.3 Million Manufacturing Jobs (30%) 

Lost II 54,905 Facilities Lost (Since z001) 

18,0-00 

17,0-0.0 

i 16,0.00 

• J. 15,000-

= 

~ 14000-

.: 

~ 13-,000 ]. 

u,ocoPage 12 

• 

• 
29 


Insert offset folio 17 here 80386.017

CHART 7 

• 

Manufacturing's Multiplier Effect 

Indirect Economic Activity Generated by $1 of Sector GDP 

Utilitli';' 

Page 13 
30 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you. 

Dr. Ebinger. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES EBINGER 

Dr. EBINGER. Chairman Lankford, Ranking Member Speier and 

other distinguished subcommittee members, thank you very much 

for inviting me here today to share my views on U.S. LNG export 

policy. 

My name is Charles Ebinger, Director, Energy Security Initiative, Brookings Institution and not the Director of the Foreign Policy Program, for the record. 

The Energy Security Initiative at Brookings has been studying 

this issue of LNG for the past two years and last March, issued a 

comprehensive report. In the interest of time, let me say the report 

had two primary conclusions. First, the negative implications of 

LNG exports in the lower 48 States are at best marginal and vastly 

are outweighed by the benefits. Second, as the lynchpin of a 

globalized economy, the United States must continue to espouse 

free trade and avoid intervening in a global market. 

As we state in our report, ‘‘The United States should neither act 

to prohibit nor to promote export of LNG, but rather let the existing process, with modifications, work its way through.’’ 

I will not spend much time talking about the economic implications because I think Tom Choi has done an excellent job of that, 

but merely say we echo Deloitte’s findings and that of other major 

public reports by ICF, EIA and others that we believe that the impact on domestic natural gas prices arising from exports would only 

be between 2 and 11 percent than they are today by the year 2035, 

hardly a massive distress to the American public. 

We also believe that LNG exports are likely to have only a modest impact no electricity prices. Again, studies done by a host of 

leading economic consulting firms have produced a range of estimates but the conclusion is profound. That is that the average increase in electricity prices per megawatt hour might be somewhere 

between $1.40 to just under $5.00. 

To put this in context for those that do not follow megawatt hour 

pricing, the EIA’s annual energy outlook in 2013 estimates that by 

2035, the average megawatt price will be $101 a megawatt hour, 

nearly 95 times bigger than the increase in prices, again hardly 

devastating to the American consumer. 

I firmly disagree with the views of people who say we cannot export because it will hurt the prospects of an industrial renaissance 

in the United States. Today, the ratio of the price of oil to the price 

of natural gas in the world market is over 30 to 1, well over the 

7 to 1 oil to gas price ratio at which the American Chemistry Council considers the U.S. petrochemical and plastic producers to be 

globally competitive. 

Let me turn quickly to the issue of geopolitics. Already, we have 

seen the fact that cargoes planned to be destined to the United 

States, when we were forecast to import up to 40 percent of our 

natural gas in the near future have had a major transformation in 

the European market and have proven to be of benefit to our European allies in both western and central Europe. 

31 

The advent of LNG coming into that market has reduced the influence of Gazprom, the Russian monopoly on the European gas 

market and today, rather than dominating the European market, 

we see a situation where last month nearly 54 percent of the gas 

that flowed in Europe was under spot contracts, not under long 

term oil index contracts, saving many of the nations huge quantities of money, particularly some of the more ailing economies in 

eastern Europe. 

Already we have seen the impact that LNG exports can have on 

alleviating the terrible situations in Asia with index pricing already beginning to come down away from oil and towards natural 

gas which will be of vital assistance to our major Allies. 

Finally, let me turn quickly to say we believe it is a prudent policy to continue to allow exports. We disagree with the two extreme 

proposals of the volumetric gap or a policy where the U.S. automatically approves all applications. 

We do, as we say in our testimony in greater detail, believe there 

are reforms that may occur in the process and we hope they will 

be seriously considered, both by our Administration and by members of Congress with oversight on these issues. 

Thank you very much. 

[Prepared statement of Dr. Ebinger follows:] 

32 


Insert offset folio 18 here 80386.018

I GS 

Dr. Charles Ebinger 

Senior Fellow and Director, Energy Security Initiative 

The Brookings Institution 

Testimony to the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Health Care, and Entitlements 

March 19,2013 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Subcommittee members: 

Thank you for inviting me hcre to share my views on U.S. LNG export policy. My name is Charles 

Ebinger and I am Director of the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution. These views are 

mine alone and do not reflect the views of the Brookings Institution, which does not take institutional 

positions on any policy issue. 

The Energy Security Initiative at Brookings has been studying this issue for the past two years, having 

published an assessment of the case for LNG exports in May 2012 in our report, Liquid Markets: 

Assessing the Case for Exports olLiquefied Natural Gas/rom the United States. I In that report, we 

focused on two determinants of whether the U.S. should allow exports of LNG: what is the feasibility of 

exporting LNG, and what are the implications? After assessing both factors. my co-authors, Kevin Massy 

and Govinda Avasarala, and I came to two primary conclusions: tirst, the negative implications of LNG 

exports from the lower 48 slates. which we believe to be technically feasible, are marginal and 

outweighed by the benefits; second, as the Iynchpin ofthe globalized economy the United States must 

continue to espouse free trade and avoid intervening in a global market. Ultimately we believe, as we 

stated in our report. "that the United States should neither act to prohibit nor to promote LNG exports." 

In the 10 months since the release of this report, more studies and information-some good, some 

misleading-have surfaced. More opinions are being voiced. Amid the increased volume of debate, 

however, my opinion has not changed. I still believe that the benefits of U.S. LNG exports are, on 

balance. a benefit to the United States; that the United States still has the responsibility and the incentive 

to be an advocate for free trade; and that the U.S. government should not intervene in what should be a 

market-driven process. 

I applaud this Committee for avoiding another acrimonious debate on the pros and cons of LNG exports 

by spending more time with both the implications of LNG exports and discussing some specifics reforms 

that might help rationalize the permitting process while clearly protecting the public interest. 

I Charles Ebinger. Kevin Massy, and Govinda Avasarala. "Liquid Market: 

Natural Gas Ii'om the United States," The May 2012. 

the Case for Exports of Liquetied 

2012) 
33 


Insert offset folio 19 here 80386.019

Part 1: Implications 

Any discussion surrounding the implications of U.S. LNG exports will focus on several considerations 

including the implications for domestic natural gas and electricity prices, the impact on other consumers 

of natural gas, and the impact on international prices and geopolitics. 

Wellhead Prices 

There have been a number of studies that have examined the impact of U.S. LNG exports on domestic 

prices. When analyzing them, policymakcrs should identify which study's assumptions most resemble 

the existing natural gas market and its likely direction, and which models are most reflective of the 

complex nature of domestic and global natural gas trade. For instance, assuming realistic volumes of 

natural gas exports as well as a reasonable supply response by natural gas producers are two critical 

considerations. It is also important to note that the supply curves in the various studies reflect different 

interpretations of the economics of marginal production. 

Under the most reasonable assumptions (in this case assuming 6 bcf/day of exports), most reports 

forecast that natural gas prices will be between 2 and I J percent higher in 2035 than if the U.S. did not 

export LNG2 There are a number of factors that insulate domestic prices from dramatic increases in 

price as a result of exports. First, as will be discussed later, there is a market-determined limit on how 

much the United States can economically export, depending on domestic prices, the international gas 

market. and the global market for competing fuels. Second, the size of the resource base is substantial, an 

important factor because the E[A estimates that roughly 63% of the gas required to meet demand for 

LNG export will come from increased domestic production3 Finally, the domestic natural gas sector is 

very efficient and producers are able to respond rapidly to marginal increases in the domestic price. 

2 Brookings 2012, pg. 33; Pricing studies include "Effect ofIncreased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy 

Markets," Energy Information Administration, January 2012; "Made in America: the economic impact of LNG exports 

from the United States," Deloitte, December 2011; "Resource and Economic Issues Related to LNG Exports," ICF 

International, August 17,2011; "Market Analysis for Sabine Pass LNG Export Project," Navigant Consulting, August 

23,2010.; and "Jordan Cove LNG Export Project Market Analysis Study," Navigant Consulting, January 2012. Note that 

Navigant Consulting's study of the Sabine Pass LNG project forecasted the pricing implications of2 bcf/day. 

'Brookings 2012, pg. 33 

2 
34 


Insert offset folio 20 here 80386.020

Figure 1: Study-by-study comparison oftbe Average Price Impact from 2015-2035 of6 bef/day of 

LNG exports (unless otherwise noted) 

* Price impact figure for EIA study reflects the reference case, low-slow export scenario. 

Navigant (20 I 0) did not analyze exports of 6 hef/day. 

Navigant (2010 and 2012) and ICF lntcrnational studies are based on Henry Hub price. 

Source: EIA. Defoiffl!, Naviganf, fer International 

!'ower Sector Implications 

I,NG exports are likely to have a modest impact on elcctricity prices as well. In the power sector, natural 

gas has historically been used as a baek up to coal and nuclear base-load generation. For such gas used at 

the margin, the increase in electricity prices as a result of LNG exports will he limited hy its 

competitiveness relative to other fuels: as soon as it becomes more expensive than the alternative for 

back up generation. power producers will move away from gas. According to feF International, a 

$O.64/MMBtu increase in the price of natural gas will result in an electricity price increase of between 

S 1.66 and $4.97/megawatt-hour (MWh), depending on how often gas is used as the marginal fuel for 

electricity. Deloitte estimates that the price increase of electricity will not be more than $I.65iMWh. EIA 

estimates that electricity price impacts will be marginal as well (between $L40/MWh and $2.90/MWh) 

except in the "high rapid" export scenario. By contrast, the EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2013 estimates 

thaL in its reference scenario, the average price of electricity (across all fuels) in 2035 will be 
35 


Insert offset folio 21 here 80386.021

$10 I/MWh, showing clearly the small impact that the rise in domestic electricity prices will have on 

consumers.4 

Industrial Sector Implications 

I am similarly skeptical about the negative consequences of exports on our industrial sector, Some of the 

more vocal industry opponents to LNG exports contend that price increases will reverse the trend of 

manufacturing investment returning to the United States, I firmly disagree with this assessment. For 

starters, I don't believe that multi-billion dollar industrial investments in factories that will be a part of 

the capital stock for decades will be rendered unprofitable by single-digit percent changes to natural gas 

prices. As one analyst put it, "if your margins are so thin that [modest price increases] could break them, 

then there isn't much benefit to putting up a plant here. Conversely, ifit is so beneficial to do it here, 

then a small change in price probably won't undermine those benefits,'·5 

For the petrochemical sector, the picture is even more positive. The prospects of large volumes of new 

supply suggest that the industrial sector's competitiveness is stable regardless of U.S. export policy. 

Today the ratio of the price of oil to the price of natural gas is over 25: I. This is well over the 7: 1 oil-togas price ratio at which the American Chemistry Council (ACC) believes U.S. petrochemical and plastics 

producers to be globally competitive. European and Asian petrochemical producers use oil-based 

products such as naphtha as a feedstock, as they lack access to cheap natural gas liquids (NGLs). 

Increased drilling will likely result in the greater production of the NGLs. This is one of the principal 

reasons why petrochemical producers are looking to return to the United States, after spending much of 

the previous decade relocating facilities overseas. According to a March 2011 report by the ACC, a 25 

percent increase in ethane-a natural gas liquid-production will yield a $32.8 billion increase in U.S. 

chemical production6 To the extent that increased gas production linked to exports results in increased 

production of natural gas liquids, they will benefit the petrochemical industry. 

International/Geopolitical Implications 

Before diving too deep into the international pricing and geopolitical implications of U.S. LNG exports, 

it is worth reviewing the structure of the global LNG market, which is informally separated into three 

markets: North America, the Atlantic Basin (mostly Europe), and the Pacific Basin (including Japan. 

South Korea, Taiwan, China, and India). These markets are separated because of important technical 

differences that impact the pricing structure for LNG in each market. The North American natural gas 

market is competitive and prices are traded in a transparent and open market. The Atlantic Basin is 

dominated by European LNG consumers such as the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Italy, and is a 

hybrid ofa competitive U.K. market that was liberalized in the mid-1990s and a Continental European 

market that is partially dependent on oil-linked, take-or-pay contracts. In recent years, the U.K. hub, the 

National Balancing Point (NBP). has traded at a premium to the U.S. hub, known as the Henry Hub. The 

4 Brookings 2012. pg. 34. 

5 Comment by Kevin Book, Managing Director, Research. ClearVicw Energy Partners, at "Liquid Markets: Assessing 

the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas," on May 2, 2012 at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. 

(http://w\vw.brookings,edu/ -/mcdia/events!20 12!5102~'o201ng%20exports!20 120502 log exports.pdD 

6 American Chemistry Council, "Shale Gas and new Petrochemicals Investment," March 2011. 

4 
36 


Insert offset folio 22 here 80386.022

Pacific Basin is a more rigid market that depends heavily on oil-indexed contracts that are more 

expensive than those used in the Atlantic Basin. While they have no central trading hub, the Pacific 

Basin consumers such as Japan and South Korea currently import LNG based on a pricing formula 

known informally as the Japan Crude Cocktail, the average price of custom-cleared oil imports into 

Tokyo. Many Pacific Basin contracts have a built-in price floor and price ceiling depending on the price 

ofoil. 

Without exporting any natural gas, the U.S. shale gas "revolution" has already had a positive impact on 

the liquidity of global LNG markets. Many LNG cargoes that were previously destined for gas-thirsty 

U.S. markets were diverted and served spot demand in both the Atlantic and Pacific Basins. The 

increased availability of LNG cargoes has helped create a more competitive LNG market for other 

consumers. This in turn has helped apply downward pressure to the terms of oil-linked contracts 

resulting in the renegotiation of some contracts. [n 201 0 short-term and spot contracts represented 19 

percent of the total LNG market, up from only a fraction one decade earlier. This trend is particularly 

prominent in Europe, where in 2012 nearly half of its gas supply came on a spot-price basis (see Figure 

2). As will be discussed later, this trend in the European market towards cheaper oil-indexed rates and 

increased spot consumption has not only benefited European economies but is also helping loosen the 

stranglehold of Gazprom, Russia's state gas company, on our east and west European allies and trading 

partners. 

Figure 2: European Gas Supply by Contract Type (%), 2012 

III UK Market (spot) 

o Other spot (inc!. 

Gazprom. Norway) 

IIIGazprom (oil) 

lII$onatrach (oil) 

o Norway (oil) 

o Gasterra (oil) 

III Other oil indexed 

Source: Societe Genera/e 

Although increases in domestic gas production have initiated some changes within the international gas 

market, any dramatic alterations to the existing structure will depend on the volume that is actually 

exported. With roughly 37 bcf/day of liquefaction capacity in the global market today, it is unlikely that 
37 


Insert offset folio 23 here 80386.023

the will cxport a significant portion of the }O bcl/day worth of applications currently 

proposed to the Department of Energy. Building an LNG facility requires billions of dollars in 

investment and years of planning, Prospective exporters must also undergo an intricate and thorough 

regulatory process and must be reasonably certain that the economic opportunity for investment 

for two IJr more decades. 

these sobering realities, I don't many LNG projects-our estimates prediet4-6 bef/day's 

worth-being constructed bel()fe their economic opportunity and early-mover advantage is eroded 

increased domestic (resulting from more gas consumption in the electricity and industrial 

sectors, sources of demand that arc emerging faster than export facilities), decreasing inkrnational gas 

prices, and a more balanced global LNG market This last point about LNG market equilibrium 

critical, Our t(lrccast suggests that from 20] to 2020, the global LNG market will svving to surplus, 

mostly aided by the Australian projects that already have or are close to reaching investment 

decision (see Figure 3) as well as other new supplies li'om and West Africa. Further, pipeline 

(particularly into China). and stubborn coal market will also compete with gas in global energy 

markets, paniculariy thosc in Asia. Furthermore. as we move beyond the possibility of other 

countries~agai!), China in particular-.... dcvcloping their own shale gas reserves could begin to have an 

impncl on international gas track 

Figure 3: Global LNG SllpplylDemaud Balance, 2015-2020 (bcf/day) 

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 

2015 Esiimated Spare Capaciiy _ 

i 

- North America LNG Supply 

Australia LNG Supply 

China Pipeline Imports 

E.U. Pipeline Imports 

China Local Gas Production 

Indio Dornestlc Gos Production 

Others 

China Gos Domand 

-

au, 

U.S. Demand 

----- EU. Power Demond 

Indio Gos Demond 

APAC/Oihel·s LNG Demand 

E.U. Local Production 

Indonesia Capacity Decline _ - LNG Spare Capocily in 2020 _ 

Source Brookings, [FA, ,Horgan ,)'runfey,,!P Alorgan, Credit S'UiS5;C 

-• 

-

35.0 

u.s. exports will therefore have a beneficial hut not transformational impact on international LNG 

prices. The market is still largely dependent on long-term contracts and much of the liqucfaction 
38 


Insert offset folio 24 here 80386.024

capacity emerging in the next decade (largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oilindexed rates 7 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at floating Henry Hub rates 

will be small in comparison. Indeed, importing U.S. LNG at IIenry Hub rates includes a number of other 

costs, such as the cost to liquefy the gas and the cost to ship it on specialized tankers. (Depending on the 

type of contract, regasification is another cost that can be borne by either the buyer or the seller.) These 

costs range depending on the transportation distance and the size of vessel. As a reference point, it is 

estimated that shipments of LNG from the U.S. Gulf Coast to Japan will cost $5-6/MMBtu.8 These 

additional costs dramatically reduce the arbitrage opportunity available to exporters. 

There is also no guarantee that all U.S. exports will be supplied at floating U.S. prices. LNG export 

facilities are multi-billion dollar investments that require revenue certainty. Moreover, many of the 

export facilities arc owned by producers of natural gas. John Watson, Chevron's Chief Executive, said 

earlier this week that his company's investments in LNG export facilities does not mean that natural gas 

will be available to consumers at U.S. rates. 9 Most producers prefer selling long-term supply contracts to 

reduce the price risk to their investments. 

A large increase in U.S. LNG exports will have the potential to increase U.S. foreign policy interests in 

both the Atlantic and Pacific basins. Unlike oil, natural gas has traditionally been an infrastructure 

constrained business, giving geographical proximity and political relations between producers and 

consumers a high level of importance. Issues of "pip cline politics" have been most directly visible in 

Europe, which relies on Russia for around a third of its gas. Previous disputes between Moscow and 

Ukraine over pricing have led to major gas shortages in several E.U. countries in the winters (when 

demand is highest) 0[2006 and 2009. Further disagreements between Moscow and Kiev over the terms 

of the existing bilateral gas deal have the potential to escalate again, with negative consequences for E.U. 

consumers. The risk of high reliance on Russian gas has been a principal driver of European energy 

policy in recent decades. Among central and eastern European states, particularly those formerly aligned 

with the Soviet Union such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the issue of reliance on imports 

of Russian gas is a primary energy security concern and has inspired energy policies aimed at 

diversification offuel sources for power generation. From the U.S. perspective such Russian influence in 

the affairs of these democratic nations is an impediment to efforts at political and economic reform. The 

market power of Gazprom, Russia's state-owned gas monopoly, is evident in these countries. Although 

they are closer to Russia than other consumers of Russian gas in Western Europe, many countries in 

Eastern and Central Europe pay higher contract prices tor their imports, as they are more reliant on 

Russian gas as a proportion of their energy mixes. 

7 Brookings 2012, pg. 39 

, For two estimates. see Ken Medlock, "U.S. LNG Exports: Truth and Consequences," James A. Baker III Institute/or 

Public Policy. Rice University, August 10, 2012 (http://bakerinstitute.org/publicationsiUS%20LNG%20Exports%20-

~:;'20Truth%20and%20Consequence%20Final AugI2-l.pdD; and Robert Smith, "Asian Natural Gas: A Softer Market is 

Coming," Presentation to the U.S. EIA International Natural Gas Workshop, Washington, D.C., August 23, 2012. 

9 Ed Crooks, "Chevron explores first Canada gas exports," Financial Times, March 12,2013. 

(http: ·jwww.ft.comiintl/cmsjsj()/aaa6Id84-8b3e-Jle2-b1a4-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2NeqtOvnR) 

7 
39 


Insert offset folio 25 here 80386.025

In the larger economies of Western Europe, which consume most of Russia's exports, there are efforts to 

diversify thcir supply of natural gas. The E.U. has formally acknowledged the need to put in place 

mechanisms to increase supply diversity. These include market liberalization approaches such as rules 

mandating third-party access to pipeline infrastructure, and commitments to complete a single market for 

electricity and gas by 2014, and to ensure that no member country is isolated from electricity and gas 

grids by 2015. 

Despite these formal efforts, there are several factors retarding the E.U.'s push for a unified effort to 

reduce dependence on Russian gas. National interest has been given a higher priority than collective, 

coordinated E.U. energy policy: the gas cutoffs in 2006 and 2009 probably contributed to the acceptance 

of the subsea Nord Stream pipeline, which carries gas directly from Russia to Germany. Germany's 

decision to phase out its fleet of nuclear reactors by 2022 will result in far higher reliance on natural gas 

for the E.U.'s biggest economy. The environmental imperative to reduce carbon emissions--i:odified in 

the E. U.'s goal of essentially decarbonizing its power sector by the middle of century-mean that natural 

gas is being viewed by many as the short-to medium fuel of choice in power generation. Ironically, in the 

near term the phase out of nuclear power has lead to greater reliance on both domestic coal as well as 

imported coal from the United States. 

Finally, the prospects for European countries to replicate the unconventional gas "revolution" that has 

resulted in a glut of natural gas in the United States look uncertain. Several countries, including France 

and the U.K., have encountered stiff public opposition to the techniques used in unconventional gas 

production, while those countries, such as Poland and Hungary, that have moved ahead with 

unconventional-gas exploration have generally seen disappointing early results. Ukraine is also at a very 

early stage in developing its potential shale reserves. Collectively, these factors suggest that the prospects 

for reduced European reliance on Russian gas appear dim. 

The one factor that has been working to the advantage of advocates of greater European gas diversity has 

been the increased liquidity of the global LNG market, discussed above. Russia's dominant position in 

the European gas market is being erodcd by the increased availability of LNG. Qatar's massive 

expansion in LNG production in 2008, coupled with the rise in unconventional gas production in the 

United States as well as a drop in global energy demand due to the global recession, produced a global 

LNG glut that saw many cargoes intended for the U.S. market diverted into Europe. As mentioned 

previously, with an abundant source of alternative supply, some European consumers, mainly Gazprol11's 

closest partners, were able to renegotiate their oil-linked, take-or-pay contracts with Gazprom. 

Increased LNG exports will provide similar assistance to strategic U.S. allies in the Pacific Basin. By 

adding supply volumes to the global LNG market, the U.S. will help Japan, Korea, India, and other 

import-dependent countries in South and East Asia to meet their energy needs. The desire on the part of 

Pacific Basin countries for the U.S. to become a gas supplier to the region has been underlined by the 

efforts of the Japanese government, which has attempted to secure a free-trade agreement waiver from 

the United States to allow exports. As with oil price-linked Russian gas contracts in Europe, U.S. LNG 

8 
40 


Insert offset folio 26 here 80386.026

exports-to the extent they occur on a floating Henry Hub basis, have the potential to weaken the market 

power of incumbent LNG providers to Asia, increasing the negotiating power of consumers and 

decreasing the price, As U.S. foreign policy undergoes a "pivot to Asia," the ability ofthe U.S. to 

provide a degree of increased energy security and pricing relief to LNG importers in the region will be an 

important economic and strategic asset. 

Beyond the basin-specific considerations of U.S. LNG exports, they will provide a source of predictable 

natural gas supply that is relatively free from unexpected production or shipping disruption. With Qatar 

representing roughly one-third of the global LNG market, a blockade or military intervention in the Strait 

of Hormuz or a direct attack on Qatar's liquefaction facilities by [ran would inflict chaos on world 

energy markets. While the United States government will be unable to physically divert LNG cargoes to 

specific markets or strategic allies that are most affected (gas allocation will be made by the market 

players), additional volumes of LNG on the world market will benefit all consumers. Further still, even if 

the volumes exported from the United States aren't large, there is an ideological geopolitical benefit to 

U.S. LNG exports. Exports will provide certainty to allies and economic partners around the world that 

the United States is a steadfast advocate for free trade. 

Part 2: Policy Solutions 

In that context, I believe a prudent policy is to continue to allow exports. However, there will be a need 

to reform the existing rules pertaining to LNG exports in order to reduce the risk and uncertainty that is 

hurting both producers and consumers. 

So what does such a policy look like? For starters, [ disagree with the two most eXlreme proposals of a 

volumetric cap, 01' a policy where the U.S. automatically approves all applications. Both are treacherous 

to implement and may increase, rather than decrease uncertainty. A balanced approach is one that doesn't 

increase the cost of exporting, but accurately rei1ects the cost of building a facility at the beginning of the 

process. I suggest a policy that requires a prospective exporter 10 have successfully gone through FERC's 

pre-filing process and have a portion of its supply contracts signed before being eligible to be considered 

by DoE lor an application to export to non-PTA countries. Both requirements are costly and will 

encourage only serious projects to move forward. 

There will also need to be more clarity on the "public interest" determination, which is currently too 

vague and creates investor uncertainty. One possibility is to allow the "public interest" to be dependent 

on the arorementioned two stipulations. In other words, if a company completes its pre-filing process and 

contracts out a given percentage of its capacity, the exports are deemed to be in the public interest. 

One final consideration is to have an audit of natural gas export policy every five years. This would be an 

important information-gathering exercise. Such an audit would identify what happened to domestic 

natural gas supply, demand, and prices, and international markets during each five-year period. 

9 
41 


Insert offset folio 27 here 80386.027

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for giving me the opportunity to provide my views on this 

important issue, particularly in helping move the debate forward, I look forward to taking the 

Committee's questions. 

10 
42 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you. 

After 30 minutes of talking about DOE, it will be great to hear 

from DOE. We are honored that you are here and glad you are a 

part of this conversation. 

Mr. Smith, we are pleased to receive your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF CHRIS SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Chairman Lankford, Ranking Member Speier and 

members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of Energy’s program regulating the export of 

natural gas, including liquefied natural gas. 

The boom in domestic shale gas provides unprecedented opportunities for the United States. Over the last several years, domestic 

natural gas production has increased significantly, outpacing consumption growth, resulting in declining natural gas and LNG imports. Production growth is primarily due to the development of improved drilling technologies, including the ability to produce natural gas trapped in shale gas geologic formations. 

Historically, the Department of Energy has played a critical role 

in development of technologies that have enabled the United States 

to expand development of our energy resources. Between 1978 and 

1992, public resource investments managed by the Department 

contributed to the development of hydraulic fracturing and extended horizontal lateral technologies that spurred private sector 

investments and industry innovation, unlocking billions of dollars 

in economic activity associated with shale gas. 

Today, domestic natural gas prices are lower than international 

prices of delivered LNG to overseas markets. As in the United 

States, demand for natural gas is growing rapidly in foreign markets. Due primarily to these developments, the Department of Energy has begun to receive a growing number of applications to export domestically produced natural gas to overseas markets in the 

form of liquefied natural gas. 

The Department’s authority to regulate the export of natural gas 

arises from the Natural Gas Act which provides two statutory 

standards for processing applications to export LNG from the 

United States. By law, applications to export natural gas to Free 

Trade Agreement nations are deemed to be consistent with the 

public interest and the Secretary of Energy must grant authorization without modification or delay. 

For applications to export natural gas to non-FTA nations, the 

Secretary must grant the authorization unless after opportunity for 

hearing, the proposed export is found to be not consistent with the 

public interest. 

The Department’s review of applications to export LNG to nonFree Trade Agreement countries is conducted through a publiclytransparent process which includes full public interest review. To 

date, the Department of Energy has granted one long term application to export domestically-produced, lower 48 LNG to non-Free 

Trade Agreement countries. 

In the Sabine Pass Order, the Department of Energy stated that 

it would evaluate the cumulative impact of the Sabine Pass authorization and any future authorizations for export authority when 

43 

considering subsequent authorizations. Following issuance of that 

order, the Department undertook a two-part study of the cumulative economic impacts of LNG exports. 

The first part of the study was conducted by the Energy Information Administration and looked at the potential impact of additional natural gas exports on domestic energy consumption, production and prices under several prescribed export scenarios. The second part of the study, performed by NERA Economic Consulting 

under contract to the Department of Energy, evaluated the macroeconomic impact of LNG exports on the U.S. economy with an emphasis on the energy sector and natural gas, in particular. 

To date, the Department has received 188,000 initial comments 

and about 2,700 reply comments on these two studies. Now that all 

comments are received regarding the LNG export studies, the Department will take into consideration the studies, the comments 

and the record of the proceedings of the 19 non-FTA LNG export 

applications. The Department will then make a public interest determination and act on each of these applications on a case by case 

basis. 

Due to the adjudicatory nature of this process, I will be unable 

to comment today on issues that are presently being addressed in 

our opinion proceedings. Those issues include but are not limited 

to the merit of pending applications, the validity of the two-part 

macroeconomic study, the study’s adequacy as the basis for decisions and the appropriate scope of environmental review. 

I can, however, speak to DOE’s statutory authority, our process 

to review applications to export LNG to non-FTA countries, our 

two-part LNG export studies, the comments we have received on 

those studies and other recent developments in LNG export. With 

respect to those topics, the Department and I are committed to 

being as responsive as possible to any questions the committee may 

have today. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that the 

Department of Energy is committed to moving this process forward 

as expeditiously as possible. The Department understands the significance of this issue as well as the importance of getting it right. 

With that, I would be happy to answer any questions the committee may have. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:] 

44 


Insert offset folio 28 here 80386.028

Statement of 

Christopher Smith 

Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy (Acting) 

Office of Fossil Energy 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Before the 

Oversight and Government Reform Committee 

Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Health Care, and Entitlements 

United States House of Representatives 

The Department of Energy's Program Regulating Liquefied Natural Gas Export 

Applications 

March 19,2013 

Thank you Chairman Lankford, Ranking Member Speier, and members of the Committee; I 

appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy's (DOE) 

program regulating the export of natural gas, including liquefied natural gas (LNG). 

Recent Developments in LNG Exports 

The boom in domestic shale gas provides unprecedented opportunities for the United States. 

Over the last several years, domestic natural gas production has increased significantly, 

outpacing consumption growth, resulting in declining natural gas and LNG imports. Production 

grO\vth is primarily due to the development of improved drilling technologies, including the 

ability to produce natural gas trapped in shale gas geologic formations. 

Historically, the DOE has played a critical role in the development of technologies that have 

enabled the United State to expand development of our energy resources. Between 1978 and 

1992, public research investments managed by the Department contributed to the development 

of hydraulic fracturing and extended horizontal lateral technologies that spurred private sector 

investments and industry innovation, unlocking billions of dollars in economic activity 

associated with shale gas. 

Today, domestic natural gas prices are lower than international prices of delivered LNG to 

overseas markets. As in the United States, demand for natural gas is growing rapidly in foreign 

markets. Due primarily to these developments, DOE has begun to receive a growing number of 

applications to export domestically produced natural gas to overseas markets in the form of 

LNG. 

DOE's Statutory Authority 

DOE's authority to regulate the export of natural gas arises under section 3 of the Natural Gas 

Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. § 717b, and section 301(b) of the DOE Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
45 


Insert offset folio 29 here 80386.029

7151. This authority is vested in the Secretary of Energy and has been delegated to the Assistant 

Secretary for Fossil Energy. 

Section 3(a) of the NGA sets forth the standard for review of most LNG export applications: 

fN)o person shall export any natural gas from the United States to a foreign country or 

import any natural gas from a foreign country without first having secured an order of the 

[Secrctary of Energy) authorizing it to do so. The [Secretary) shall issue such order upon 

application, unless after opportunity for hearing, [he 1 finds that the proposed exportation 

or importation will not be consistent with the public interest. The [Secretary] may by [the 

Secretary's] order grant such application, in whole or part, with such modification and 

upon such terms and conditions as the [Secretary) may find necessary or appropriate. 

Section 3(a) thus creates a rebuttable presumption that a proposed export of natural gas is in the 

public interest. Section 3(a) also authorizes DOE to attach terms or conditions to the order that 

the Secretary finds are necessary or appropriate to protect the public interest. Under this 

provision, DOE performs a thorough public interest analysis before acting. 

In the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress introduced a new section 3( c) to the NGA. Section 

3(c) created a different standard of review for applications to export natural gas, including LNG, 

to those countries with which the United States has in effect a frec trade agreement requiring the 

national treatment for trade in natural gas. Section 3( c) requires such applications to be deemed 

consistent with the public interest, and requires such applications to be granted without 

modification or delay. 

Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Countries 

There are currently 18 countries with which the United States has in place free trade agreements 

that require national treatment for trade in natural gas for purposes of the Natural Gas Act. 

These 18 countries include: Australia, Bal1rain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican 

Republic, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, 

Panama, Peru, Republic of Korea, and Singapore. 

There also are two countries Israel and Costa Rica - that have free trade agreements with the 

United States that do not require national treatment for trade in natural gas for purposes of the 

Natural Gas Act. 

Because complete applications under section 3(c) must be granted without modification or delay 

and are deemed to be in the public interest, DOE does not conduct a public interest analysis of 

those applications and cannot condition them by the insertion of terms which otherwise might be 

considered necessary or appropriate. 

DOE Process to Review Applications to Export LNG to non-FTA Countries 

2 
46 


Insert offset folio 30 here 80386.030

DOE's review of applications to export LNG to non-fi·ee trade agreement countries is conducted 

through a publicly transparent process. Upon receipt of an application, DOE issues a notice of 

the application in the Federal Register, posts the application and all subsequent pleadings and 

orders in the proceeding on its website, and invites interested persons to participate in the 

proceeding by intervening and/or filing comments or protests. Section 3(a) applicants are 

typically given an opportunity to respond to any such comments or protests and, after 

consideration of the evidence that has been introduced into the record, DOE issues an order 

either granting the application as requested, granting with additional terms or conditions, or 

denying the application. 

Under the Natural Gas Act, DOE's orders are subject to a rehearing process that can be initiated 

by any party to a proceeding seeking to challenge DOE's determinations. Court review is 

available as well after the rehearing process is exhausted. 

Public Interest Criteria for NGA Section 3(a) Applications 

For applications requesting authority to export LNG to countries that do not have free trade 

agreements requiring national treatment for trade in natural gas, DOE conducts a full public 

interest review. A wide range of criteria are considered as part of DOE's public interest review 

process, including, inter alia,: 

Domestic need for the natural gas proposed for export 

Adequacy of domestic natural gas supply 

U.S. energy security 

Impact on the U.S. economy (GDP), including impact on domestic natural gas 

prices 

International considerations 

Environmental considerations 

These non-statutory criteria have been developed over several decades and supplemented and 

refined by subsequent agency adjudication. It is important to emphasize, however, that these 

criteria are not exclusive. Other issues raised by commenters and/or interveners or DOE that are 

relevant to a proceeding may be considered as well. 

Sabine Pass Authorization 

To date, DOE has granted one long-term application to export domestically-produced lower-48 

LNG to non-FTA countries. That authorization was issued in Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, 

(Sabine Pass) DOE/FE Order Nos. 2961 (May 20, 2011), 2961-A (August 7, 2012), and 2961-B 

(January 25, 2013). In the first of the Sabine Pass orders, DOE stated that it will evaluate the 

cumulative impact of the Sabine Pass authorization and any future authorizations for export 

authority when considering subsequent applications. 

LNG Export Study 

o 

., 
47 


Insert offset folio 31 here 80386.031

Following issuance of that order DOE undertook a two-part study of the cumulative economic 

impact of LNG exports. The first part of the study was conducted by the Energy Information 

Administration (EIA) and looked at the potential impact of additional natural gas exports on 

domestic energy consumption, production, and prices under several prescribed export scenarios. 

The second part of the study, performed by NERA Economic Consulting under contract to DOE, 

evaluated the macroeconomic impact of LNG exports on the U.S. economy with an emphasis on 

the energy sector and natural gas in particular. The NERA study was made available on 

December 5. 2012. 

On December 11, 2012, DOE published in the Federal Register a Notice of Availability of the 

EIA and NERA studies, and inserted both parts of the study into 15 then-pending LNG export 

application dockets for public comment. An initial round of comments on the study ended on 

January 24,2013, and reply comments were due February 25, 2013. DOE does not take a 

position regarding the findings from either the EIA analysis or the NERA analysis at this time, 

and DOE will make no final decisions on currently pending license applications until it has 

evaluated both the study and the comments. 

Comments to the LNG Study 

In response to the Notice of Availability, DOE received over 188,000 initial comments and 

approximnately 2,700 reply comments. Proponents of LNG exports generally endorse the 

results of the two-part study, particularly the conclusion of the NERA study that increasing 

levels of exports will generate net economic benefits for the United States. On the other hand, 

comments filed by opponents of LNG exports have raised a number of issues, including 

challenges to the assumptions and economic modeling underlying the two-part study and 

assertions that the two-part macroeconomic study should have further examined regional, 

sectoral, or environmental issues. DOE continues to review the comments that have been 

received as part of its public interest analysis of the pending non-FTA LNG export applications 

and will address those comments when it issues decisions on the applications. 

LNG Export Applications Status 

Consistent with the NGA, as of March 7, 2013, DOE has approved 23 long-term applications to 

export lower-48 LNG to free trade agreement countries equivalent to 29.41 billion cubic feet per 

day of natural gas from 19 new liquefaction facilities. 

Most of the applicants seeking authorization to export LNG from proposed facilities to free trade 

agreement countries have also filed to export LNG to non-free trade agreement countries in the 

same volume from the same facility to provide optionality on the final destination country. The 

volumes of the applications to export to free trade agreement countries and non-free trade 

agreement countries are therefore not additive. 

As of March 7, 2013, DOE has approved one long-term application to export lower-48 LNG to 

non-free trade agreement countries equivalent to 2.2 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas 

from the proposed Sabine Pass liquefaction facility. DOE also currently has 19 applications 

4 
48 


Insert offset folio 32 here 80386.032

pending to export LNG from facilities, including the 15 that were pending at the time that DOE 

issued its Notice of Availability of the EIA and NERA studies. These 19 applications seek 

authority for the export of an additional 26.10 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas to non-free 

trade agreement countries. 

DOE Path Forward 

Now that all comments are received regarding the LNG Export Study from the comment period 

that ended February 25, 2013, the Department will take into consideration the Study, the 

comments, and the record of the proceedings of the 19 non-FTA LNG export applications. The 

Department will then make a public interest determination and act on pending applications on a 

case-by-case basis. 

Conclusion 

Due to the adjudicatory nature of this process, I will be unable to comment today on issues that 

are presently being addressed in our pending proceedings. Those issues include but are not 

limited to the merits of pending applications, the validity of the two-part macroeconomic study, 

the study's adequacy as a basis for decision, and the appropriate scope of environmental review. 

However, I can speak to DOE's statutory authority, our process to review applications to export 

LNG to non-FT A countries, our two-party LNG export study, the comments we have received on 

those studies, and other recent developments in LNG export. With respect to these topics, the 

Department and I are committed to being as responsive as possible to any questions you or the 

Committee may have. 

In conclusion Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that DOE is committed to moving this 

process forward as expeditiously as possible. DOE understands the significance of this issue 

as well as the importance of getting it right. 

5 
49 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you. 

I ask unanimous consent to place in the record the statement of 

Dr. David Montgomery, the Senior Vice President of NERA Consulting. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

50 


Insert offset folio 33 here 80386.033

Prepared Testimony of 

W. David Montgomery, Ph.D. 

Submitted to the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Healthcare, and Entitlements 

United States House of Representatives 

The Benefits of LNG Exports to the United States 

March 19,2013 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am honored by your invitation to present testimony to the Committee on the economic benefits 

of free trade in natural gas. I am an economist and Senior Vice President ofNERA Economic 

Consulting. I had the privilege ofleading the study of the "Macroeconomic Impacts of U.S. 

LNG Exports" that was issued by the Department of Energy in December 2012. This was one of 

the most gratifying experiences of a vcry long career in policy analysis. I worked with a great 

team at NERA that developed the model of the U.S. economy and the model of world natural gas 

markets on which the study was based. I appreciate them but I have that privilege every day. 

What made this a unique experience was the quality, thoughtfulness, and open-mindedness of the 

people we worked for in the Department of Energy. They asked us for an objective and 

independent study and they published exactly what we wrote without spin or alteration. 

Statements in this testimony represent my own opinions and conclusions and do not necessarily 

represent opinions of any other consultant at NERA or any of its clients. I do not speak for the 

Department of Energy. in particular, but only for myself. 

Major Findings of the Macroeconomic Study 

I will start with a quick summary of the findings of the NERA study, taken largely from what I 

think was a rather good executive summary. 

Across all the scenarios that we examined in which the global market would take exports from 

the U.S, there were net economic benefits to the U.S. from allowing LNG exports. Moreover, 

for everyone of the market scenarios examined, net economic benefits increased as the level of 

LNG exports increased. In particular, scenarios with unlimited exports always had higher net 

economic benefits than corresponding cases with limited exports. There was no "sweet spot," 

and no point where any "balance" was required to gain the greatest benefits. 

In all of these cases, benefits that come from export expansion would more than outweigh the 

costs of faster increases in natural gas production and slower grov.ih in natural gas demand, so 

that LNG exports have net economic benefits in spite of higher domestic natural gas prices. 

This is exactly the outcome that economic theory describes when barriers to trade are removed. 

Net benefits to the U.S. would be highest if the U.S. becomes able to produce large quantities of 

gas from shale at low cost, if world demand for natural gas increases rapidly, and if LNG 

supplies from other regions are limited. If the promise of shale gas is not fulfilled and costs of 

producing gas in the U.S. rise substantially, or if there are ample supplies of LNG from other 

regions to satisfy world demand, the U.S. would not export LNG. Under these conditions, 
51 


Insert offset folio 34 here 80386.034

allowing exports of LNG would cause no change in natural gas prices and do no harm to the 

overall economy. 

U.S. natural gas prices increase when the U.S. exports LNG. But the global market limits how 

high U.S. natural gas prices can rise under pressure of LNG exports because importers will not 

purchase U.S. exports if U.S. wellhead price rises above the cost of competing supplies. In 

particular, the U.S. natural gas price does not become linked to oil prices in any of the cases 

examined. 

Natural gas price changes attributable to LNG exports remain in a relatively narrow range across 

the entire range of scenarios. Natural gas price increases at the time LNG exports could begin 

range from zero to $0.33 (201O$/Mcf). The largest price increases that would be observed after 

5 more years of potentially growing exports could range from $0.22 to $1.11 (201 O$/Mcf). The 

higher end of the range is reached only under conditions of ample U.S. supplies and low 

domestic natural gas prices, with smaller price increases when U.S. supplies are more costly and 

domestic prices higher. 

I would like to comment at this point on the findings of the report about resource rents versus 

changes in capital income and wages. To be very conservative in our analysis, so that any 

findings about net economic benefits would be as robust as possible, we attributed all the 

increased income associated with natural gas exports to owners of natural gas resources. But 

natural gas in the ground is not the only factor of production required to produce and export 

additional natural gas. Some of what we called resource income would go to workers with the 

specialized skills required in natural gas exploration and production, and in infrastructure and 

liquefaction facility construction, in the form of higher hourly wages. Some would go to existing 

investors in businesses that explore for, produce and transport natural gas, and more broadly to 

firms that build the facilities needed for expanding the natural gas industry. If we had included 

these wage increases and higher investment returns it could well have turned out that there was 

no loss in labor income or the average return on capital, and still a net overall economic benefit. 

Basic principles ofthe economics of international trade make 

this conclusion inescapable 

There should be nothing surprising about the conclusion that the U.S. economy is better off with 

unrestricted trade in natural gas than with any restrictions. The same specific conclusion is 

reached in recent studies by Charles Ebinger of the Brookings Institution and Kenneth Medlock 

of Rice University, despite many differences in details of the level of exports and price impacts. 

It is also the logical consequence of the basic economic theory of international trade. The 

economics of international trade are based on the principle of comparative advantage. This 

principle states that free trade countries will tend to export those goods and services which they 

are better at producing and will import those that others are better at producing. Extensive and 

rigorous theoretical analysis and also on observation of economic progress during periods of free 

trade and periods with major trade restrictions support the finding that free trade leads more 

robust economic growth. 

There are of course some conditions. The major one that matters in this debate is whether a 

country is subsidizing exports as China is frequently accused of doing. LNG exports from the 

United States do not need government subsidies to be desired by just about every country that is 

2 
52 


Insert offset folio 35 here 80386.035

now importing natural gas natural gas has become so cheap in the United States because of the 

investment and technical knowhow of our oil and gas industry, which has made previously 

unusable natural gas resources economic to produce in abundant quantities. Under these 

conditions, economic theory and practical experience clearly support the conclusion that free 

trade in natural gas is better for the U.S. economy than any system that restricts natural gas 

exports. 

The textbook exposition of this point is based on a fairly simple diagram or two. To explain the 

general economic theory of trade it is useful to begin with a simple illustration of the natural gas 

market with a closed economy where no trade exists. Consumers and producers interact in the 

natural gas market with demand and supply establishing a market equilibrium that determines the 

market price and quantity exchanged. 

Figure 1 shows a supply and demand diagram where demand for natural gas is represented by a 

downward-sloping line, D, characterizing decreasing willingness to pay as consumption 

increases, and supply by an upward-sloping line, S, characterizing increasing marginal cost of 

production as output increases. For illustrative convenience, we employ straight lines for 

demand and supply.! 

Demand and supply cross at point E, which denotes market equilibrium or competitive 

equilibrium. At the competitive equilibrium, consumers' willingness to pay is equivalent to 

producers' cost of production. Neither side of the equilibrium is stable. Producers incur losses if 

they choose to produce additional output, which costs more than consumers' willingness to pay; 

to the left of the equilibrium, producers can cam more on additional output given that consumers 

are willing to pay more than what it costs to produce. Therefore, the market stabilizes at the 

equilihrium with associated equilibrium price P a and quantity Qa. 

Figure 1: Market Equilibrium in a Closed Economy 

p 

Q 

Economic surplus refers to monetary gains or "welfare." Consumer surplus denotes the value 

consumers receive from consumption for which they did not pay. Graphically, this is the red 

triangle in 

Iso-elastic curves characterize demand and supply more realistically. There is always some demand when 

price is low and marginal cost grows at increasing rate. 

3 
53 


Insert offset folio 36 here 80386.036

Figure 1 which sits above the price and below the demand line. Likewise, producer surplus 

represents the value producers gain in excess of the cost of production. The area below the price 

and above the supply line (blue triangle) in 

Figure 1 denotes the producer surplus. Total surplus or social welfare is the sum of consumer 

surplus and producer surplus. Social welfare should also include tax revenue or quota rent, if 

any is involved. 

Free trade equates domestic prices with world prices. When an economy has a comparative 

advantage and thus can produce at a lower cost than the rest of the world, moving from a no 

trade to a free trade position implies an increase in domestic price. Analogously, the domestic 

price falls when the country becomes an importer and substitutes more costly domestic 

production with cheaper imports. 

For the case of U.S. natural gas industry, we include a diagram for the export market along with 

the one for the domestic market to illustrate the changes when the U.S. moves from a no trade to 

a free trade position (see 

Figure 2). The export market is represented by the U.S. excess supply of natural gas and the 

world excess demand for the U.S. natural gas export. The competitive equilibrium in the export 

market finds a price (Pt

) that equates the world excess demand with the U.S. excess supply and at 

which the excess supply, the amount of natural gas U.S. producers are willing to produce in 

excess of the amount of domestic consumption (Qs - Qd), is equal to the equilibrium export in 

the export market (Qr). 

Domestic Market 

P 

F 

Pr 

Qd .,-Q •• -_ Qs 

Export ~~.~~~.~.~ ~ .. -

p 

Export Market 

World Excess Demand for 

U.S. Natural Gas Export 

... __ .. Qr Q 

Export 

Social surplus changes along with the price movement. When a country becomes an exporter, a 

domestic price increase reduces domestic consumption, resulting in a loss of consumer surplus. 

In the domestic market diagram of 

Figure 2, consumer surplus shrinks from PaEF to PtGF. Producers receive more profit on every 

unit of output sold to both the domestic and world market, generating a gain in producer surplus, 

which not only offsets the loss in consumer surplus (the trapezoid PaEGPr) but also adds a net 

4 
54 


Insert offset folio 37 here 80386.037

gain on each unit sold to the world market (the triangle EHG). From the social welfare 

perspective, part of consumer surplus transfers to producer surplus and producers gain more 

profits from exporting. It is worth noting that the net gain, shown as the triangle ElIG in the 

domestic market diagram, is equivalent to the blue triangle in the export market diagram that 

represents the gain to exporters. It is earned by producers who are able to export and obtain a 

higher netback price than would be available in the domestic market without exports. These 

references to producers, consumers and exporters, by the way, should not be taken to imply that 

these are distinct people as the NERA report discussed at length, through stock ownership both 

producers and exporters contribute to the income of households (not to mention paying taxes). 

A Natural Gas Theory of Value 

The loud dissent from this basic principle that has been heard since December repeats an old and 

repeatedly exploded economic fallacy. For example, a recent study commissioned by the 

leading opponent of free trade in natural gas claims that every Btu of natural gas used to 

manufacture basic chemicals generates 8 times the GDP that is generated by exporting that same 

amount of natural gas. This is completely bogus, and is so far off base that any refutation sounds 

like lecturing to first year economics students. So here it goes. Value added in manufacturing is 

created by the labor and capital at work in the industry, not by physical inputs like natural gas. 

The value of natural gas is fully captured by the willingness of customers to purchase the natural 

gas - and if overseas purchasers are willing to pay more for natural gas than domestic producers 

from whom some gas might be bid away, then clearly natural gas generates more value as an 

export than when used domestically. That is the basis for NERA's conclusions, and it is true 

whether or not there was some rcvolutionary change in the structure of industry over the past few 

years. 

If~ indeed, it were only possible to produce enough natural gas to meet domestic needs and 

natural gas were more valuable here than abroad, then there would be no exports even under free 

trade because foreign buyers would be unable to bid it away from U.S. suppliers. This is in fact 

one of the scenarios we discussed in the DOE report the reference case for global demand 

combined with low EUR (e.g. low estimated ultimate recovery of natural gas) from EIA's 

scenario for U.S. supply. Exports were not causing higher prices or problems for the chemicals 

industry in this scenario, because there were none. However, because of the limited supply 

natural gas prices were much higher (not due because of exports), and therefore more threatening 

to the chemicals industry, than they would be with ample supply and free trade. In those cases, 

there was ample gas for both exports and the chemicals industry at reasonable prices. 

The claim that morc GDP will be lost in chemical manufacturing than gained from natural gas 

exports is based on the fallacy that every Btu of gas that is exported will be taken away from the 

chemicals industry, and that there is a fixed proportion between chemicals output and natural gas 

input. Neither is true but both types of claims have been made by Cassandras of disastrous 

shortages since at least the 1950s, where my knowledge of the subject begins. We called this in 

the 1970s the "energy theory of value," that there was a fixed, lockstep proportion between 

energy use and GDP. This led to numerous predictions of the collapse of Western Civilization 

when energy ran out, as the Club of Rome and others were sure it would. Y ct somehow we now 

consume only a fraction of the energy per dollar of GDP that was needed in 1970 and we have 

more goods and more energy. 

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Another way to see the fallacy of the proposition that trade in basic materials like natural gas 

should be restricted in order to provide cheap feedstocks for downstream industries is by asking 

which downstream industry should be allowed to export freely? Chemicals are intermediate 

goods made with natural gas as one component but then used in several subsequent 

manufacturing steps to make plastics, manufactured goods, and then consumer products like 

cars, computers, and houses. Since some of those final goods have far greater value added per 

Btu of natural gas used, why should not trade in all intermediate goods be restricted to maximize 

the GDP produced by natural gas? The answer is not that there is a sweet spot, but that all 

restrictions on exports of natural gas will prevent natural gas from reaching its highest valued use 

and deprive the U.S. economy of the benefits of using its resources in the most advantageous 

way for the people of the United States. 

Trade Restriction is Self-Defeating 

The Department of Energy has authority to withhold permission only for exports to countries 

with which the U.S. does not have a free trade agreement. Canada and Korea are two countries 

with which we do have free trade agreements, and that fact implies that the only cffect of 

restricting exports to non-Free Trade Area countries will be that the U.S. will bear all the costs of 

doing so but get none of the benefits. In particular, Canada has just authorized a major LNG 

export facility in British Columbia and both the Federal and Provincial governments are firmly 

behind exports. There is no restriction on exports of natural gas to Canada, and indeed at least 

one pipeline has already been reversed to send shale gas from the U.S. to Eastern Canada. If the 

U.S. is successful in producing cheap and plentiful natural gas but prohibits LNG exports to nonFTA countries, a most likely outcome is that Canada will ship its domestically produced natural 

gas west by pipeline and export it to the coveted Asian markets, and import natural gas from the 

U.S. for its domestic use. This will drive up the price of natural gas in the U.S. just as much as 

would free LNG exports, but the U.S. will get none of trade advantages of participation in the 

profits from selling to the higher valued market in Asia. 

Korea's discussion of the possibility of creating an Asian hub for LNG trade also suggests that 

U.S. exports to Korea could through displacement and transshipment also meet a much larger 

market, with little benefit to the U.S. from the high prices at which it might be sold in Asia. 

The administrative nightmare that any attempt to restrict trade would cause should also be seen 

as a self-defeating outcome for the nation as a whole, if not for the specific industries that would 

benefit from restricting the ability of their suppliers to sell to higher valued uses. Even if a limit 

is intended to be non-binding, it will still be necessary for DOE to devise some method of 

deciding which applicant should get a permit, thus substituting administrative action that will 

encourage rent-seeking behavior and political influence on the process that has not yet warped 

outcomes. The result of using administrative action as a substitute for the due diligence of 

private investors has become quite clear in the failures of the DOE loan guarantee programs. 

Based on this history, administrative allocation of export licenses would likely lead to politicallysignificant developers getting permits evcn if they could not pass scrutiny by private sector 

investors, leading in turn to project failures, wasted resources, and sacrifice of even the export 

opportunities that are allowed as U.S export capacity falls further and further behind our 

competitors for the world LNG market. 

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Simple Exaggerations 

Three of the claims made in opposition to free trade in natural gas are simple exaggerations: 

1. The US will not have exports equal to 25 50% of domestic natural gas use in the near 

future 

As DOE officials themselves explain, it is easy to apply to DOE for a license and necessary to 

have one in order to start the approval process at the FERC. But only three projects have 

officially begull the FERC process, and no expert familiar with the industry expects even a small 

fraction of the total capacity that has made application to DOE will be built in the next decade. It 

is an exaggeration that ignores the role of the market to talk about exports on the scale of 25 to 

50% of domestic demand by 2030. 

2. U.S. prices will not rise to levels now seen in Asian markets, or even to the netback price 

based on current prices in Asian markets 

First, there will always be a difference of $6 to $8 between Asian prices and U.S. prices, since 

that represents the cost of inland transportation, liquefying, shipping, and regasifying natural gas 

to get it from the U.S. to Japan or Korea. Asian buyers have no incentive to buy gas in the U.S. 

if it is not cheaper than their prevailing domestic price by that amount. 

Assuming that current, larger LNG pricing dilIerentials will persist in a world in which LNG 

exports increase at a rapid rate ignores everything we know about supply and demand, and is the 

fallacy that has led to thc demise of many bubbles of energy investment. Increasing LNG 

exports will exert a downward pressure on Asian prices and raise prices in exporting countries, 

so that the current premium that Asian buyers now pay is likely to be unsustainable. But even 

then, prices in exporting cOUlltries will be lower than in importing countries by the cost of 

liquefaction, shipping and regasification. NERA's analysis used a comprehensive model of 

global natural gas supply and demand to investigate many scenarios for how much LNG could 

be exported by the U.S. and how the netback to the U.S. would vary with the level of exports. 

Many competing suppliers are better positioned to serve growing LNG demand in Asia than the 

United States, and the prices they offer in the future in response to market competition will 

determine U.S. netbacks. These are the efTects that NERA's analysis captures and that are 

ignored by any comparison to current Asian pricing. 

3. Growth of the chemical industry and manufacturing as a whole will not end because of 

increases in natural gas prices that might be attributable to market-determined levels of 

LNG exports 

Economists who analyze how changes in energy costs affect energy-intensive, trade-exposed 

industries have reached a consensus that only narrowly-defined segments of manufacturing are at 

risk from higher energy costs. These sectors have relatively small employment and value added 

compared to manufacturing as a whole, so that even large impacts on these narrow segments 

translate into negligible impacts on manufacturing and the U.S. economy as a whole. The only 

chemical sector that is held out as evidence of widespread harm from higher natural gas prices is 

the nitrogenous fertilizer industry, which employed approximately 3,920 workers in 2007. This 

subsector of chemicals is not typical of the chemicals sector as a whole, it is a unique outlier 

7 
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based on turning cheap natural gas into cheap fertilizer with low profit margins and little 

significance for the overall economy. It has experienced ups and downs in the past as natural gas 

prices rose and fell, with no detectable benefit to the rest of the economy whcn it grew or harm 

when it declined. 

Moreover, claims of the vulnerability of any chemical sector to increased U.S. prices appear to 

ignore the fact that even with unrestricted trade, U.S. natural gas priees will be lower than in 

countries that must import natural gas, including Europe, China, India and other Asian 

economies. The basis differential that will be sustained by the cost of transportation, liquefaction 

and regasification of LNG will maintain a clear natural gas price advantage for U.S. chemical 

manufacturers over these competitors. 

As to manufacturing as a whole, as prior NERA studies have shown, the real threat for 

manufacturing is growing government regulation, of which export restrictions would be another 

part. The one thing about LNG exports that is certain is that they will grow slowly, and that any 

difference tbey make will be a small change in the rate at which manufacturing expands. With 

the possible exception of a very small slice of the chemical industry, there is no chance that LNG 

exports could tum robust growth into decline. 

Natural gas price risks 

The scenarios examined in the NERA report that yielded high natural gas prices even without 

exports remind us that natural gas prices have been volatile and will remain uncertain even under 

the most restrictive export policy. However, the one thing that we should have learned over the 

past thrce decades is that except for localized problems (like the lack of capacity to ship gas to 

California in 2000) there will not be generalized natural gas shortages. The flip side of price 

volatility is that markets have the flexibility to respond to and eliminate potential shortages, and 

that curtailments have not been necessary since we eliminated regulation of the wellhead price of 

natural gas in the 1980s. 

Thus even finn all-events contracts to supply natural gas to foreign buyers are not at all likely to 

produce natural gas shortages in the U.S., even if some groups are successful in their efforts to 

prevent us from using our immense shale gas resources. Natural gas price uncertainty will 

remain, and cannot be removed by banning LNG exports. Prudent investors will consider all the 

scenarios for how natural gas prices might evolve in evaluating investments in any project whose 

economics are sensitive to natural gas prices. Fortunately, these investors have the same 

opportunities to hedge price risks and obtain firm supply commitments as do purchasers of 

natural gas for export. 

8 
58 

Mr. LANKFORD. We have a vote that has been called at this point. 

It is a single vote, so that makes it rapid to go over and come back. 

We will take a momentary recess. 

I would like to reiterate something Mr. Smith asked, a personal 

privilege for the members of the committee when they go through 

the asking of the questions. I would like for us not to get into a 

specific application from a specific company, where they are in the 

process, how they can move in the process. I think that is unfair 

to be able to ask Mr. Smith. 

Obviously, each of us can choose what we ask on our own time 

and on questions, but I would ask that out of respect for DOE for 

being here to be able to honor them in that, process questions rather than a specific company and whether they are moving a specific 

permit. 

With that, we will stand in recess for a single vote. We will return. As soon as two of us get back here, we will continue with our 

questions. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you for being able to recess for a short period, have the votes and jump back into it. 

I would like to recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Speier, for 

a quick motion. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to ask unanimous consent that the written testimony by the American Public Gas Association be submitted for the 

record. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 

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Insert offset folio 41 here 80386.041

TESTlMOl'l'Y OF DAVE SCHRYVER 

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT 

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC GAS ASSOCIATION 

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVER."'MENT 

REFOR.'1 

MARCH 19,2013 

Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings and Members ofthe Committee, I appreciate this 

opportunity to testify before you today and I thank the Committee for calling this important 

hearing on liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. My name is Dave Schryver and I am the 

Executive Vice President for the American Public Gas Association (APGA). 

APGA is the national association for publicly-owned natural gas distribution systems. There are 

currently approximately 1,000 public gas systems located in 36 states. Publicly-owned gas 

systems are not-for-profit, retail distribution entities owned by, and accountable to, the citizens 

they serve. They include municipal gas distribution systems, public utility districts, county 

districts, and other public agencies that have natural gas distribution facilities. 

As non-profit utilities, public gas systems' primary focus is on providing reliable and affordable 

service to their customers. As a trade association that represents public gas systems, APGA 

ultimately represents the interests of natural gas consumers. Our members have a vested interest 
60 


Insert offset folio 42 here 80386.042

in working towards long-tem1 affordable energy prices and allowing citizens to keep their dollars 

in the community as opposed to flowing upstream via high energy prices. 

Overview of Policv Implications of LNG Export Issue 

This nation is at an energy policy crossroads. Today, for the first time in a very long time, natural 

gas prices are affordable and stable, as contrasted with the price volatility experienced for most 

of the past 20 years during which time prices for natural gas bobbed up and down from $15 to $5 

to $10, with little rhyme or reason in terms of market fundamentals. Our nation now has a 

unique opportunity to eliminate that price volatility and to pursue a longstanding goal- energy 

independence - with optinllsm. Today, for the first time in almost forever, the United States has 

an opportunity to be able to foresee the day when it can conduct foreign policy without being 

preoccupied by Middle East oil and hence Middle East politics. 

Why is our nation in this most fortuitous situation and what can we do to realize these obtainable 

goals? 

The key reason we are in this posture is that suddenly, due to advances in technology relating to 

the acquisition of gas reserves from shale rock, it appears reasonable to prognosticate that the 

United States will not have to look abroad for natural gas supplies to supplement waning gas 

reserves in this country. This has obvious ramifications for natural gas policy; but even more 

importantly, it has huge potential ramifications for national energy policy (and therefore our 

national security) and for domestic manufacturing (and hence jobs). 

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Pursuing energy independence means dramatically reducing our reliance on foreign oil. The 

major reason for oil imports into the United States is our use of oil and its derivatives in all forms 

of transportation - cars, trucks, busses, planes, and the like. By converting our transportation 

sector to greater reliance on alternative energy sources - including Compressed Natural Gas 

(CNG), electricity, hybrid vehicles using CNG or LNG, and the like - we can reduce oil imports 

dramatically to the point where foreign oil no longer dictates events in this country - be it 

foreign policy or consumer grousing about skyrocketing prices at the gas pump. 

What other benefits will this nation reap from substituting natural gas for oil products? One 

answer, of course, is greatly reduced C02 emissions. While natural gas is a fossil fuel and not to 

be confused with renewable energy sources, it is far superior to oil in terms of its impact on the 

environment. In addition, natural gas in fast-ramping power plants is essential for reliable power 

supply in connection with renewable resources such as wind and solar due to their intermittent 

nature. 

What is the single greatest threat to the scenario just described? Assuming that the shale gas 

revolution is real, a subject we will address in our comments below, and assuming that 

substantial amounts of natural gas can be extracted from shale rock deep in the earth in an 

environmentally acceptable fashion, which seems a reasonable assumption based on experience 

to date, the only road block to success is that the natural gas that we should be using 

domestically for transportation, enhanced residential, commercial and industrial use, and power 

plants, is exported abroad and that we become part of a global and unstable natural gas market, 

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just as we have with oil. What seems clear beyond cavil is that if we export significant quantities 

of natural gas (in the form of LNG), in order for short-term profits to be made by the affected 

producers and exporters, we will become part of an international market for natural gas, just as 

we are today part of an international market for oil. Long-term the effects will be predictable 

and disastrous - the price increases and price volatility of the past will return, and our 

opportunity to displace foreign oil will be forfeited - all for the short-term profits of a few in the 

producing sector. You must not permit that result; but without action by Congress, that is the 

almost inevitable result of current Department of Energy (DOE) policy on LNG exports. 

Natural Gas Supply 

Over the past several years, technological advances in natural gas drilling techniques have made 

access to vast domestic natural gas reserves possible. In 2000 shale gas provided only 1 % of 

U.S. natural gas production; by 2010 it was over 20%; and the Energy Information 

Administration predicts that by 2035, 46% of the United States' natural gas supply will come 

from shale gas. The price response to this supply-side development has been dramatic: gas 

prices have stabilized at under $4!dth. The energy landscape of the u.s. appears to have been 

forever altered. 

APGA certainly hopes that the prospects for shale gas in this country are as bright as have been 

reported. However, as stated by ElA, there remains "considerable uncertainty about the ultimate 

size of the technically and economically recoverable shale gas resource base in the onshore lower 

48 States and about the amount of gas that can be recovered per well, on average, over the full 

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extent of a shale gas fonnation: d EIA notes that some of the uncertainties associated with shale 

gas fonnations include the fact that "most shale gas wells are only a few years old, and their 

long-tenn productivity is untested" and that "[i]n emerging shale fOImations, gas production has 

been confined largely to 'sweet spots' that have the highest known production rates for the 

fonnation," which means that "[w]hen the production rates for the sweet spot are used to infer 

the productive potential of an entire fonnation, its resource potential may be overestimated:,2 

Articles appearing in the national press indicate that there may be other troubling concerns at 

EIA about the shale gas phenomenon that are not being advertised in EIA's fonnal publications.3 

In addition to the technical issues noted by EIA, there are serious environmental concerns being 

raised at the state and national level about the technology associated with hydraulic fracturing, 

now commonly known as "fracking." While these concerns do not affect EIA's projections, 

which are based on technical and economic data, they should not be ignored by those making 

policy decisions on applications that depend entirely for their viability on ample future natural 

gas from shale formations. While it is true that there has been much extreme rhetoric on both 

sides of the "fracking" issue,4 there can be no doubt that the affected states and the Federal 

1 ErA, Annual Energy Outlook 2011 

Id.; see also, Rodney White, Professor: AT Shale Reserves May Disappoint, Gas Daily (July 7, 2011) (reporting 

that Marcellus Shale gas reserves in New York may not be nearly as lucrative as already developed locations in 

Pennsylvania). 

Ian Urbina, "Behind Veneer, Doubt on Future of Natural Gas," N.Y. Times, June 26, 2011; 

http://www.nytimes.coml2011/06/27/us/27gas.htm!? J'=2&hp 

The newspapers are replete with articles chronicling the uncertain future of shale gas exploration. See, e.g., ran 

Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells' Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y. Times Online (Feb. 26, 2011); Ian 

Urbina, Wastewater Recycling No Cure-All in Gas Process, N.Y. Times Online (March 2,2011); Ian Urbina, 

Pressure Limits Efforts to Police Drillingfor Gas, N.Y. Times Online (March 4,2011); Darryl Fears, Sitting 

Atop Huge Gas Reserve, Md. Debates Drilling Practice, Washington Post Online (March 28, 2011); ran Urbina, 

Insiders Sound an Alarrn Amid a Natural Gas Rush, N.Y. Times (June 25,2011). Contrary views also abound: 

e.g., http://;ohnhanger.blogspot.com/2011/06/statement-about-todavs-nvt-front-page.html. 

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Government are taking the health-related issues seriously.5 The outcomes of those investigations 

are not now known, and will not be for some period of time. Thus, to draw any policy 

conclusions based on the "shale gas revolution." as some call it would be a mistake of immense 

proportions - especially when those decisions have the very real potential to affect our national 

security. 

The history of the fossil fuels industry is replete with miscalculations regarding supplies. For 

example, not too long ago many of the corporate parents of those now pursuing LNG export 

approvals predicted that the U.S. natural gas market would benefit significantly from the import 

ofLNG.6 Billions of dollars were spent on projects that are now charitably referred to as white 

elephants. In addition, the nation's first LNG export facility in Kenai, Alaska is slated to 

terminate exports sooner than expected because drilling activity in Alaska's Cook Inlet has not 

offset declines in production rates, making it unfeasible to continue LNG exports.? 

If the U.S. has less recoverable gas reserves than projected, it certainly should not exacerbate the 

situation by approving export applications premised on a domestic over-supply. Additionally, 

In its Fiscal Year 2010 Appropriation Conference Committee Directive to EPA, the U.S. House of 

Representatives ordered the EPA to conduct a study of hydraulic fracturing. That study is currently underway. 

Seehttp://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uiclclass2Ihydraulicfracturinglindex.cfmhttp://water.epa.gov/type/gro 

undwater/uiclclass2Ihydraulicfracturing/index.cfm.; On May 5, 2011, U.S. Secretary of Energy Stephen Chu 

impaneled a group of environmental, industry, and state regulatory experts to study and make recommendations 

to "improve the safety and environmental perfonnanee of natural gas hydraulic fracturing from shale 

formations." See http://www.energy.gov/news/10309.htm. Platt's Gas Daily for July 14,2011, contains an 

article entitled "DOE Panel Questions Fraeking's SDWA Exemption." 

See, e.g., EG LNG Services, LLC, Application ofBG LNG Serdces, LLC for Long-Term Authorization to 

Import Liquefied Natural Gas from the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Docket No. FE 03-76-LNG (November 3, 

2003) (application for import authority through the Lake Charles LNG terminal related to 20-year LNG 

purchase agreement). 

Isabel Ordonez, Conocoto Stop LNG Exportsfrom Kenai Plant in Alaska, Wan Street Journal Online (Feb. 10, 

2011). 

6 
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Insert offset folio 47 here 80386.047

lower than projected amounts of recoverable gas would worsen exponentially the risks inherent 

in tying U.S. natural gas prices to volatile international markets. 

LNG Export 

To date, 25 applications have been filed for the export of domestic LNG from the contiguous 

United States to Free Trade Agreement (FTA) or non-FTA Nations. Many of those applicants 

own or are affiliated with companies that own existing or previously planned LNG import 

terminals. The total export capacity applied for to date is 29.69 Bc£'d and 28.30 Bc£ld to FTA 

and non-FTA Nations, respectively. Total marketed natural gas production was approximately 66 

Bcf/d in the U.S. in 2011; therefore, based on current marketed production data, the total appliedfor export capacity would have the effect of increasing the demand for natural gas by 

approximately 45%. This level of exports would have serious adverse implications not only for 

domestic consumers of natural gas but also for U.S. national security. 

When applications are filed at DOE, there is a public interest test that must be met - but not by 

the applicants. In cases where the application is specific to identified countries with which the 

U.S. has a free trade agreement, the application is deemed to be consistent with the public 

interest and granted without modification or delay. In cases where an application is seeking 

exportation of LNG to countries with which the U.S. does not have free trade agreements, the 

burden is on those opposed to the application to demonstrate that the application is not consistent 

with the public interest. The structure of this process under which opponents of an export must 

7 
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Insert offset folio 48 here 80386.048

prove a negative is counter-intuitive on its face and makes it extremely difficult, ifnot 

impossible, for opponents to defeat an application for thc export of LNG. APGA supports the 

passage of legislation that places the burden of proof where it should be, on the applicant to 

demonstrate to DOE how the approval of that application is in the public interest. Legislation 

was recently introduced in the House of Representatives, entitled The American Natural Gas and 

Consumer Protection Act, that would help establish a thorough public interest review process by 

the DOE. APGA strongly supports this legislation. 

It is also important to note that shale gas formations are not unique to the United States this is 

not a U.S, phenomenon; it is a world-wide phenomenon8 The State Department launched the 

Global Shale Gas Initiative ("GSGI") in April 2010 in order to help countries identify and 

develop their unconventional natural gas resources9 To date, partnerships under GSGr have 

been announced with China, Jordan, India, and Poland. 10 The big energy players, including 

s 

10 

E.g" "Shale Gas: Global Game Changer," by Dallas Parker, Oil and Gas FinancialJournal (Feb. 8, 2011), 

http://www.ogti.com/index/article-tools-template/ printArticle/articles/oil-gas-tinancialjournallunconventional/shale-gas globaLhtml; "Worldwide Gas Shales and Unconventional Gas: A Status 

Report," Vello A. Kuuskra and Scott A. Stevens ("The final segment of this "paradigm shift" - - the worldwide 

pursuit of gas shales and unconventional gas - has only just begun, with Australia, China and Europe in the 

lead. Europe's gas shale geology is challenging, but its resource endowment and 

potential are large.") 

http://www.rosea.orgiattachmentslarticlesI239fKuuskraaHandoutPaperExpandedPresentWorldwideGasShalesPr 

esentation.pdf. Debajyoti Chakraborty, Asia's First Shale Gas Pool Found Near Durgapur, Times of India 

Online, (January 26, 2011); Hillary Heuler, Shale Gas in Poland Sparks Hope a/Wealth, Energy Security, 

Voice of America Online (June 11, 2011) (Reporting on efforts by U.S. and other western gas companies to 

develop gas from shale deposits). "The Shale Gas Run Spreads Worldwide," by Mark Summor IPS, Deccan 

Herald (Aug. I, 20 II )(" Recent discoveries of deeply buried oil shale layers containing natural gas or oil are 

being reported in Australia, Canada, Venezuela, Russia, Ukraine, Poland, France, India, China, North Africa 

and the Middle East. Taken together, say some energy analysts, these 'plays' could become a game-changer, 

making Australia and Canada into new Saudi Arabias,"). 

See htlp:l/www.state.gov/s/ciealgsgi/ 

Id. see also, Rakleem Katakey, India Signs Accord with US to Assess Shale-Gas Reserves, Bloomberg News 

(November 8, 20 I 0) (The US signed a memorandum of understanding with India to help it asses its shale gas 

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Insert offset folio 49 here 80386.049

ExxonMobil, Che\Ton, Shell, BP, etc. are spending billions world-wide to pursue shale gas 

plays. I I The point to be made, of course, is that the United States, which is at the forefront 

technologically of the development of shale gas reserves, should be exporting its technology and 

expertise - not spending billions of dollars to build facilities in order to export a commodity that 

can play such a vital role in contributing to our national well-being and that also may be 

abundant world-wide before the LNG export facilities can even be completed, 

Impact on Consumers 

US. natural gas prices are now among the lowest in the developed world. The large-scale export 

of natural gas via LNG will play havoc with the current supply/demand situation and hence the 

price of natural gas, Even supporters of LNG exports acknowledge that such exports will 

increase prices and price volatility in the domestic natural gas market 12 

Exporting domestically produced LNG will tie U.S, natural gas prices to international markets 

that, today, yesterday and likely for the foreseeable future, will demand higher prices and 

undermine current domestic natural gas price stability. In Europe and Asia, natural gas markets 

are less liquid and prices are higher and often indexed to international oil markets, which are 

reserves and prepare for its first shale gas auction at the end of this year.); Kate Andersen Brower and Catherine 

Dodge, Obama Says US, Poland Will Cooperate on Economy, Energy, Bloomberg News (May 28, 2011) 

(Reporting on President Obama's pledge to share U.S. shale gas extraction expertise and technology on a recent 

trip to Warsaw); see also, Energy in Poland: Fracking Heaven, The Economist (June 23, 2011). 

II "Big Oil Betting on Shale Gas," by Ken Silverstein, EnergyBiz (July 31, 2011) 

" See, e.g., The BWMQ Energy Advisory, Volume 7, Issue I dated October 2011 (at page 4): "As we return to the 

world market, consumers will have to pay the higher world price because that is the minimum price that U.S. 

producers can get by offering their entire supply to the world market. The higher price will also increase price 

volatility. More exports will result in a tightening of domestic natural gas supplies in the future." 

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substantially more volatile and less transparent than our domestic market. Exporting 

domestically produced natural gas from the United States in any real quantities will link 

domestic commodity prices to international fluctuations. 

The current domestic natural gas market is competitive, liquid and transparent while 

simultaneously, since it is a North American market, less susceptible to unstable regimes, 

rapacious cartels, and distant events than foreign natural gas markets, which are tied to the global 

energy market. J3 At present, the U. S. natural gas market benefits from the security and political 

stability in North America. United States policymakers should act to preserve rather than 

undermine the stability of domestic commodity markets 

In addition to tying U.S. natural gas prices to international volatility, LNG exports would inflate 

demand and prices by forcing U.S. consumers to compete with end-users in other nations that are 

required to pay more for natural gas. This would incontrovertibly increase the price for natural 

gas in the domestic market, especially in times of supply shortfall and further undermine efforts 

to maintain domestic gas prices at competitive levels. 

Job Creation 

Because of the high unemployment rate in this country today, some LNG export advocates argue 

that their projects are in the public interest because they will create jobs. However, what we 

II See IFandP Newsroom, Commodities: Oil Price Volatility Up On Libya Rumours, US Natural Gas Continues its 

Slide, Industrial Fuels and Power Online (March 3,2011) (reporting on rising prices and volatility in the 

international market for crude oil and unperturbed, declining prices for domestic natural gas). 

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should be looking for is real, durable job growth in the transportation sector due to infrastructure 

construction and related activities, rather than ephemeral job gro\Vth in a sector (LNG exports) 

that will likely disappear almost overnight when foreign countries begin to exploit their own 

shale gas reserves, making our LNG export facilities as potentially useless as our LNG import 

facilities. 

APGA respectfully submits that any national plan for durable job growth should prioritize 

investment in the domestic use of natural gas in the U.S. transportation fleet, in manufacturing 

and in electric power generation. The U.S. transportation fleet is almost wholly dependent upon 

petroleum, which impelils our energy and national seculity. APGA submits that domestic 

investment in transforming our transportation fleet to eNG vehicles will provide significant job 

creation while also improving our national security. 

Energy Security 

A government that has the pursuit of energy independence as its declared national policy should 

not authorize exportation of a valuable commodity whose value at home is incalculable and 

whose supply is unknown with any degree of certainty at this point in time. Policymakers should 

seize this window of opportunity to implement our long-declared (but never seriously pursued) 

policy of striving towards energy independence. The pursuit of energy independence requires 

that the United States wean itself off of imported oil, which accounts for approximately 50% of 

our domestic use. 

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Insert offset folio 52 here 80386.052

The two major consumers offoreign oil in the United States are the transportation sector and the 

industrial sector. Instead of exporting domestic natural gas, the United States should maximize 

its use domestically in order to displace the current reliance on imported petroleum products and 

on carbon-intensive coal. For instance, as the Secretary of Energy has made crystal clear, 

domestic natural gas should playa much larger role as a transportation fuel. I4 Currently, the 

U.S. imports billions of dollars worth of oil from around the globe, a great deal of which is used 

for gasoline to fuel vehicles. The replacement of current gasoline-powered fleets with natural gas 

vehicles (and support infrastructure) would significantly reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil, 

and thereby enhance U.S. security and strategic interests and reduce our trade deficit. 

Policymakers should also encourage the direct use of natural gas for residential and commercial 

end uses such as space heating, water heating, and the like where the greater efficiency and lower 

emissions of natural gas (on a source to site basis) has been amply demonstrated. 15 

Manufacturing 

The U.S. should promote policies to continue the manUfacturing renaissance that has been driven 

by stable and affordable natural gas prices. Using natural gas for manufacturing provides a 

value-added benefit to the economy because industry multiplies the value of every dollar it 

14 "The most direct way to reduce our dependency on foreign oil is to simply use less of it, starting with the cars 

and trucks we drive. Nearly 70 percent of our oil use is for transportation, and more thim 65 percent of that 

amount is for personal vehicles ... energy independence means changing how we power our cars and trucks from 

foreign oil to new American-made fuels and batteries." Nobel Physicist Steven Chu, U.S. SecretaI)' of Energy, 

Pulling the Plug on Oil, Newsweek, April 4, 2009. 

15 Review of Site (point-of-Use) and Full-Fuel-Cycle Measurement Approaches to DOEIEERE Building Appliance 

and Energy Efficiency Standards, National Academies of Sciences (May 27, 2009) available at 

http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record id=12670. 

12 
71 


Insert offset folio 53 here 80386.053

expends on natural gas for energy or as a raw material. Rather than investing in natural gas 

exports, which squeeze out investments from other sectors of the economy, the U.S. should 

pursue policies that allow industry to invest in natural gas dependent manufacturing. Energy and 

natural gas-intensive manufacturing produces chemicals, metals, cement and other materials that 

may be low-value adding but create positive ripple effects up the value-chain and throughout the 

economy. Rather than exporting natural gas as a raw natural resource, the U.S. could export 

processed materials, such as steel, or higher value-added goods at more competitive prices, with 

greater benefits to the U.S. job market and GDP. 

Electric Generation 

Moreover, given its clean burning nature, it is logical to assume that natural gas will also playa 

role in distributed and other power generation to decrease reliance on coal and complement 

clean, albeit intennittent, energy sources such as wind and solar. APGA observes that most 

electric generation built since 2000 is fueled with natural gas, and the ElA projects that most new 

electric generation plants will be fueled by natural gas, 16 which has obvious significance for the 

demand for natural gas in the immediate and long-tenn future. Finally, APGA observes that 

increased use of natural gas domestically in lieu of oil imports will benefit the u.s. economy by 

reducing our trade deficit. 17 

16 ErA, Annual Energy Outlook 2011 at 41 (Finding that in each cost scenario considered by the EIA, the majority 

of new electric generation capacity will be natural gas-fired.); see also, Mark Watson, Gas Generation to 

Double by 2020; Report, Electric Power Daily (July 12,2011) (Reporting on an rCF International forecast that 

coal plant retirements, increased reliance on intermittent power sources, and the availability of shale gas will 

cause gas-fired electric generation to more than double between 2010 and 2030). 

!7 For example, as recently reported, "[tlhe trade deficit in the U.S. widened in May to the highest level in almost 

three years, reflecting a surge in the cost of imported crude oil. The gap grew 15 percent to $50.2 billion, 

exceeding all forecasts of 73 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News and the biggest since October 2008, 

Commerce Department figures showed today in Washington." Alex Kowalski, Trade Deficit o/US 

Unexpectedly Surges on Increase in Crude-Oil Imports, Bloomberg News, (July 12,2011). 

13 
72 


Insert offset folio 54 here 80386.054

However, to accomplish our goal of energy independence, natural gas in the United States must 

remain plentiful and reasonably priced. Today U.S. consumers enjoy natural gas prices that are 

the product of both the new available supplies of natural gas and the fact that our natural gas 

market is largely limited to North America. If this trend is permitted to continue, then there is 

light at the end of the energy independence tunnel. The export oflarge quantities of domestic 

gas threatens our ability to obtain this goal because the key to greater use of natural gas in all 

sectors is that it remains affordable and avoids the volatility pitfalls of the past. That will only 

happen if we remain de-linked from the international market. We know that from experience; we 

should learn from that experience. The cost of ignoring that experience will be a lost ?Pportunity 

to advance this Nation's essential energy independence and national security goals. 

Conclusion 

APGA is not against free trade, but when important policies collide, nations must make choices. 

U.S. policymakers must carefully consider and prioritize the use of domestic resources according 

to the national interest over both the short and long-terms. APGA submits that the decision to 

export LNG should be thoroughly vetted in the context of a national energy policy, and the wise 

policy choice by our elected officials, at this critical time in our history, is to limit exports of 

natural gas so that we may realistically pursue the greater goal of energy independence. Those 

who argue that this matter is not an either-or situation are wagering our long-term national wellbeing on short-term profits. We urge the Committee to carefully consider the adverse impact 

14 
73 


Insert offset folio 55 here 80386.055

that exporting LNG will have on millions of homes and natural gas consumers in the U.S. who 

will feel the impact of higher prices resulting from exposure to the global export market. We 

thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony and look forward to working with the 

Committee on this important issue. 

15 
74 

Mr. LANKFORD. I would like to recognize myself for five minutes 

of questioning. Then we will move back and forth and allow members to ask questions. If we have an opportunity, schedule allowing, 

we would like to be able to do a second round if time permits for 

both the witnesses and us as well. 

We are at a 14 year low of actually gas well producing rigs and 

1999 was the last time we had this small a number of rigs out 

there producing natural gas. It is an interesting dynamic to see 

very little production coming into the stream but because we have 

so much currently being produced in the wells that are out there 

and makes this conversation about the cumulative impact and the 

decision is very difficult for DOE. 

The first export facility has been permitted. They are in the process of construction and will be done some time in two years from 

now. When you begin to evaluate, from the DOE perspective, cumulative impact, how will that work process-wise? Because obviously we have one facility and will not really know the impact of 

that truly for maybe four or five years as we go through the process. You have the two studies in hand, now what on determining 

cumulative impact? 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. 

Essentially the way the Department has handled this, when we 

issued the permit for Sabine Pass, in that permit we noted for future applications, since we were looking at queue of applications 

that were building up, we would have to consider the cumulative 

impact of each of those applications and going through our public 

interest determination. 

The first step we did was to commission a study. The first part 

was conducted by EIA and the second part was conducted by 

NERA Economic Consulting. The idea of doing the studies and offering the studies for public comment was to provide some sort of 

analytic rigor to looking at what the production capability of the 

natural gas industry in the United States and the capability of the 

global gas market to absorb gas in the United States. 

That was the process we undertook. The NERA study is now 

back and has been put out for public record. We have entered a 

public comment and reply comment period and have received responses. It is our job now to evaluate not only the study we received, which was done for the Department, but also the cumulative comments that we received from stakeholders and individuals interested in the process. 

Mr. LANKFORD. How does that work from here? Is the cumulative 

impact an economic impact, a forecasting, is it a matter of they 

have to function for a while before that is determined or can you 

do that off the study and the responses? 

Mr. SMITH. That is the process we are going through right now. 

We have something around 200,000 comments and reply comments 

that we are evaluating. Our job is to take the studies that have 

been provided, that have been put out for public comment, evaluate 

the rigor of the studies and also the opinions we received from the 

stakeholders. 

Mr. LANKFORD. I understand. Once it comes back, is the issue 

really just the evaluation from the studies or will you have to wait 

to permit numbers two, three or whatever may be, if you permit 

75 

two and three, until after the existing facility that is under construction is done and is actually exporting? When will that decision 

be made? Will it be before the export begins two years from now 

or after? 

Mr. SMITH. The answer to that question is going to be determined by the analysis we are currently undergoing. The reply comment period just ended three weeks ago. We are now looking at a 

tremendous amount of information we just received. 

Mr. LANKFORD. That is the reply on the initial. You had the initial that went out, all those comments went out and then there was 

reply. That is really the second phase of it, correct? 

Mr. SMITH. There were two periods. The reply was 45 days and 

the reply comment was 30 days. 

Mr. LANKFORD. The question in making the decision is do you 

forecast the decision, what to do with applications to and on after 

the facility under construction is already exporting or before? 

Mr. SMITH. That is going to be determined by our analysis of the 

comments. 

Mr. LANKFORD. It could be four years from now before the second 

decision is made? Is there a time period you are looking at of when 

to make the next decision or is it that wide open, could be ten 

years or two years? 

Mr. SMITH. I am not in a position to opine on something that is 

going to be based on a determination or analysis we are currently 

conducting. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Does DOE feel at all an economic pressure of 

what happens globally on these contracts? By the way, I do not intend to pressure DOE. I am just trying to figure out what is going 

on with this one way or the other. 

Globally, the contracts are going out. As I mentioned, there are 

eight export facilities being constructed currently in Australia and 

other countries are ramping up for this. There is a limited amount 

of time that we have to be able to compete in the global market 

and be able to fulfill contracts that are out there. 

If this is going to be ten years before the next facility is constructed, that is a significant lag to try to get those contracts. The 

guess is where do we go as a nation? How big is that window you 

anticipate before a decision is made? 

Mr. SMITH. Again, Mr. Chairman, I am not in a position to put 

out a timeline for making decisions because that timeline is going 

to be based on the very analysis that we are in the middle of right 

now. 

Mr. LANKFORD. When do you think you will have concluded your 

analysis? As you go through all the comments, you are in the second phase of that, do you think that is another 45 days, another 

six months, another year? Give us a best guess on how that moves. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, it would be inappropriate and irresponsible for me to make a guess. 

Mr. LANKFORD. I would have to disagree, it is inappropriate to 

have an indefinite period of time to decide when you are going to 

decide. At some point, there has to be something in your forecasting to think we are going to decide by this point and then the 

decision will be out from there. 

76 

Mr. SMITH. The comment period ended three weeks ago. We are 

currently going through an immense volume of input. Many of the 

commenters have made comments very consistent with the points 

you are making, so I understand the sense of urgency and the importance of this decision. 

Mr. LANKFORD. It has to be right. 

Mr. SMITH. But we have to make the decision in a way that is 

consistent with public interest and that withstands the scrutiny it 

is certainly going to receive. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you. 

I will recognize Ms. Speier for five minutes. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Smith, let us get to what your challenge is, which is to determine whether or not approving or authorizing the process to move 

forward for liquid natural gas to be exported is consistent with the 

public interest. Can you be more specific about the criteria you 

have to include in that evaluation? 

Mr. SMITH. The statute essentially creates a rebuttable presumption that exports are in the public interest. It is our job to look at 

each application to make that determination. The law gives the Department of Energy considerable latitude in determining what that 

means. In fact you opined that when the law was written, one was 

not envisioning the export of natural gas from shale gas resources. 

That was just not something that was on the horizon. 

Our job has been to come up with a standard which we are going 

to have to defend when we write the order. We are looking at a 

wide range of factors that Americans care about, everything from 

balance of trade, creation of jobs, GDP, impact of prices on consumers and American families, impact of prices on American industry, energy security and environmental issues. We have a wide 

range of factors we have to consider. 

For me, it is illustrative to be sitting next to Mr. Ebinger, Mr. 

Cicio and Mr. Choi, all professionals whose work I am familiar 

with outside of this hearing, but all who have somewhat divergent 

views on what this means. 

Ms. SPEIER. Let me ask, Mr. Cicio, in your statement you said 

any level of exports will increase cost of natural gas for consumers. 

That was pretty blanketed in that statement. Can you express that 

more specifically? 

Mr. CICIO. I am referring to the two studies, the EIA study done 

in January of last year and the NERA study. Both of them used 

a broad number of volume of exports. Under every scenario, prices 

of natural gas rose. That is where our comment came from. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Choi, you make evaluations based on whether 

or not they are good investments for the oil and gas industry, is 

that correct? 

Mr. CHOI. We have a model that looks at producer decisions 

based on a profit maximization objective for the producer. 

Ms. SPEIER. When you speak up, you are speaking from a perspective of it being advantageous for the producers as opposed to 

whether it is advantageous for domestic manufacturers or the domestic consumers, correct? 

Mr. CHOI. Yes. We have a model of the NASR gas industry in 

which we represent producer decisions and also consumer deciVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 Apr 18, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\80386.TXT APRIL
77 

sions. Our model is different from most other models in that we 

represent the individual incentives by each of the parties. It is not 

purely looking at the incentives for one particular sector but rather, representing the industry by looking at how each individual 

agent would make decisions. 

Ms. SPEIER. Dr. Ebinger, I actually read your report. One of the 

things you stated in the report is that there would be harm or impact, I should say, to low income consumers with the exportation 

of LNG and that there should be some set aside of whatever sales 

tax or revenue the Federal Government gets to make sure low income people would have some form of subsidy because of the increased cost to consumers, is that correct? 

Dr. EBINGER. Yes. We did not go into great detail in looking at 

what that real impact would be but it was certainly our conclusion 

that low income consumers would have some price impacts. Again, 

I would like to emphasize that taken in the wide sweep of the benefits of exports, however those needs are met for the low income consumers, we believe overall, the nation would be much better off 

with exports. 

Ms. SPEIER. I will yield back, Mr. Chairman, until the second 

round. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Dr. Gosar. 

Mr. GOSAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Cicio, the rates are artificially low right now, are they not? 

Mr. CICIO. Natural gas prices are low, yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. So we are not really being truthful to the American 

public, as the Ranking Member mentioned. We are going to see a 

natural increase because if we do not, we are not going to see production, true? 

Mr. CICIO. That is true. In fact, the NIMEX price between now 

and 2020 increases 44 percent. 

Mr. GOSAR. Mr. Ebinger, you just heard Mr. Smith’s comments 

about timelines. How do you view that timeline from your perspective? 

Dr. EBINGER. I view that timeline as very deleterious to the U.S. 

natural gas industry because, according to our analysis by 2020, if 

you are not in the marketplace by one of our first few LNG plants, 

you are going to have very serious competition. The Chairman has 

mentioned the projects coming out of Australia. By the early 2020s, 

we will see major new gas projects arising in east Africa, Algeria, 

Angola and many other places. 

We also remind people in our report that in the Asian power 

market, coal remains extremely competitive with LNG and despite 

our efforts to curtail global warming, we see massive new coal deposits coming into the international market. Coal is going to be 

competing directly against gas. 

As we move into the 2020 period, particularly the ten year time 

frame that was potentially mentioned, I think we can assume there 

will be at least a handful of additional countries that come up with 

their own shale gas development, be that in China, South Africa 

or Argentina. We are going to have more shale gas, more LNG with 

the prospect of big pipelines coming from eastern Siberia and Russia to the Asian market which will also compete against LNG. 

78 

It is not going to be easy to finance a big LNG project when the 

competition is so great and you have to get your buyer to take a 

huge proportion of the sales in order to get the project financed. 

Mr. GOSAR. From what you have seen of our previous history in 

this country about getting projects like this online, give me an estimate of getting it online by 2020. My dad is a geologist, so 30 days, 

60 days, 90 days, 120 days, three months, six months. They all 

come at cost and within the bureaucracy of government. What is 

your best estimate of getting it done? 

Dr. EBINGER. I think it is an impossible question to answer because DOE and FERC do have statutory responsibilities. 

Mr. GOSAR. Isn’t there a way to streamline the process? 

Dr. EBINGER. I would certainly think we could have some additional plants in the market by 2020, 2022, if we were able to get 

the process moving beyond the first Cheniere project that we could 

probably see two or three projects in the marketplace by 2025, say. 

I think anybody who thinks we are going to have more or the 

fearmongers that list all the projects before DOE and FERC argue 

that all these were built, we would collapse the international LNG 

market. We see no scenario where that is going to happen. 

Mr. GOSAR. I agree. 

Do you see, Mr. Smith, in regards to the protocol? Looking at 

timelines, it is very, very frustrating to America, by not having a 

timeline that is equivocally pretty close to an outline. Does that 

make sense? 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that Congressman. One think I would 

like to emphasize is it is our job to get to a defendable, transparent 

a decision as expeditiously as possible. We have a tremendous 

sense of urgency for this process. Many of the points that have 

been made by members of the committee and by my friends on the 

panel have certainly been made multiple times on both sides of the 

fence in the numerous comments we have received in our public 

comment period. 

Our job is to move forward as expeditiously as possible, but in 

a way that is open, transparent and which yields a decision which 

will withstand the scrutiny that it is certain to receive. A point we 

emphasize as we go through our own internal adjudication is that 

a decision that does not withstand scrutiny is not going to be useful 

for the concerns you have and it will be a wrong decision for the 

country. 

This is something that is important. We are talking about a period of analysis that we discussed here but this is infrastructure 

that will be in place, if built, for decades. These are long term decisions and are going to lead to long term investments that will be 

important for our economy. We have to get this right. 

Mr. GOSAR. That is only if you do them within the time frame 

that makes it economically feasible. If you don’t, you are done. 

Mr. SMITH. On that, I would state I spent 11 years in industry 

before I came to the Department of Energy. I actually worked at 

Chevron when Chevron was working on the LNG import terminal 

at Sabine Pass and I worked on that terminal. I did a lot of that 

commercial work. 

Industry will move forward to build what it decides to build. Certainly falling into a window where you think the market is open 

79 

sometimes is good for the shareholders of that company, sometimes 

it is not. It is not our job to opine on what the company should be 

doing. 

We have to make sure that our process is managed in the public 

interest to make sure we are looking out for the public interest of 

American businesses and families, that it is consistent, open, transparent and will withstand scrutiny. 

Mr. GOSAR. Thank you. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Mrs. Lujan Grisham. 

Mrs. LUJAN GRISHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am actually going to reverse my order of questions because this 

is what happens when you are nearly last on a panel. 

Mr. Smith, given your now testimony and description of a pretty 

in-depth process to make sure we get it right in terms of the public 

interest and considering that we have trade agreements with our 

Allies and we are mindful and watchful about those compliance 

issues, are you reaching out to those other federal agencies and 

stakeholders when you are talking about those folks you are working with in the public interest to get this right? 

Mr. SMITH. We are trying to be as open and transparent as possible, so we like input from a diverse field of stakeholders. 

Mrs. LUJAN GRISHAM. I appreciate that, but are you also reaching out? Are you in a position to maintain objectivity where you are 

waiting for people to come to you? 

Mr. SMITH. The process works such that we have an open comment period, 45 days for entities to make comments and there is 

a reply comment period. Anything we are going to consider as part 

of the adjudicatory process has to be entered in the public record, 

so that is our primary vehicle for making sure we have an open 

and diverse group of stakeholders who are opining on the process. 

Mrs. LUJAN GRISHAM. I would just encourage you on that note 

that without interfering with the due process required here and to 

get it right, and I am mindful and appreciative of the fact that the 

public interest issues are paramount and get this right so that we 

make the right decisions going forward, that you are also reaching 

out and coordinating with our other administrative partners who 

are going to have similar issues and interests. I appreciate that 

and encourage you within the context of that process to do that. 

Mr. Choi, I am from New Mexico and very excited about the positive potential here for natural gas and exporting liquid natural gas. 

In my home State, it accounts for one-tenth of the U.S. total and 

the San Juan and Permian Basins, neither of which by the way are 

in my district, but create really the economic foundation for our 

State. 

Unfortunately, as you all have indicated, the low price of natural 

gas has led to a drop off in natural gas production and it has negatively impacted many parts of New Mexico’s economy, especially 

our State tax revenues that depend heavily on severance taxes and 

other revenue raisers from gas production. 

In the context of difficult economic times, the prospect that we 

can increase natural gas exports and increase economic activity 

and create jobs in my State is particularly encouraging. As you discussed, we need to examine the issue carefully and ensure that we 

80 

are protecting consumers, domestic manufacturing jobs and the environment as we consider exporting our surplus natural gas. 

Without reading the rest of that statement, the issue I am getting to, you talked about in the short term, I am really interested, 

given the low price of natural gas today and the supply and demand influences, I want you to talk to me a bit about whether the 

processes we are undertaking today can bring stability in the long 

term for natural gas in terms of the price indexes? 

Mr. CHOI. Are you talking about the regulator process or the 

market process? 

Mrs. LUJAN GRISHAM. Both. 

Mr. CHOI. I am more familiar with the market process, having 

worked with a number of companies. I can tell you that they are 

undergoing a very deliberate and careful process because a lot of 

the companies seeking to export LNG are the same companies that 

have been burned by building import terminals in this country. 

They are not going to rush towards anything that puts their investments at risk. 

Part of the interest in exporting LNG is the abundance of natural gas that we have in this country. U.S. gas production has continued to increase. You might have seen a bit of decline in your 

home State because some of the production has shifted from dry 

gas areas to more liquid rich areas. The total U.S. production continues to grow. 

At the present time, I believe the market is more demand constrained than it is supply constrained. There are wells that have 

been completed but not yet connected just because there is a lack 

of demand or possibly because of lack of infrastructure to take the 

gas away to markets. I believe the market is well equipped to determine how much LNG export would be economic. 

There could be some increase in price, but according to economic 

theory, any increase in demand will have some increase in price. 

Just because there is a price increase is really a pretty innocuous 

statement; the question is how much of a price increase will there 

be? According to our study, that price increase will be fairly modest 

because of how dynamic the market is and because of how much 

domestic resources we have in this country. 

Mrs. LUJAN GRISHAM. Given the huge fluctuations in the market, 

it would be nice if there was a sense given that the potential here 

for broadening our exports, that we might be able to have a little 

more long term stability in the market by the appropriate effort between the two, market supply and demand, a response and an appropriate regulatory environment so that you do not have these 

huge fluctuations. You could then get to a place where we can do 

consumer protection by some other model if necessary in that case. 

Mr. CHOI. I agree with that. Just because we have exports, I 

don’t believe necessarily means that price volatility would increase 

in this country. In addition to exporters securing long term markets through long term supply contracts, they would also have supply contracts or supplies that are ready to support their export terminals. The supply will respond to the increase in demand. 

Mrs. LUJAN GRISHAM. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. [Presiding]. Thank you very much. 

81 

At this point, I think I am next on the list right at the time I 

take the center chair, so perfect timing for me. I will now recognize 

myself for five minutes. 

Mr. Choi, you talk about an abundance of natural gas and not 

a whole lot of price volatility with the addition of exports. Can you 

give us an idea just how much natural gas we think there is in 

some of these new shale finds? 

Mr. CHOI. It is not just shale finds, it is the total domestic resource base which includes conventional supplies, shale gas, coal 

bed methane and other types. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Assuming projected growth in world demand, 

how many years supply are we looking at? 

Mr. CHOI. By most accounts, we have over 2,000 bcf of natural 

gas in the United States. At our current production levels, that is 

equivalent to about 100 years. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. In shale gas, we only recover with our fracking 

technology about a third of what is there with today’s technology? 

Mr. CHOI. The technology is constantly improving and we are 

able to recover more. The shale gas comprises a growing share of 

our total U.S. production. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Mr. Smith, are you familiar with the concept 

of being in the right place at the right time? That is where you 

want to be, right? 

Mr. SMITH. You would have to clarify that question. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I guess what I am getting at is I don’t know 

whether it is coincidence or divine providence or whatever, but to 

me it looks like our technology in the energy industry is pulling 

this country out of a recession kicking and screaming. I am going 

to mix my metaphors here, strike while the iron is hot. If the blacksmith industry had to go through a burdensome regulatory process 

while the tire industry was developing, we would miss the ability 

sell a lot of horseshoes because cars come into existence. 

I guess what I am getting at is the Federal Government is spending a lot of money on alternative energies. I think a breakthrough 

in battery technology makes a whole lot of alternative energies 

work a whole lot better. Are we not possibly at a unique time in 

history where we have a lot of natural gas, there is a market for 

it and we could make some money off it if we did something now? 

Mr. SMITH. Congressman, what I can say is that there are certainly a large number of commenters of the 200,000 comments we 

are going through now that have made exactly the point you are 

making. We certainly have a sense of urgency to as expeditiously 

as possible get to a open and transparent. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I know that Chairman Issa showed this slide 

where you can actually see in the dark the Balkan field and the 

Eagle Ford Shale in Texas which I am blessed to have touch the 

district I represent. 

I am also going to show you a map, a Baker Hughes map, that 

shows all the rigs currently in production. The red ones are gas, 

the blue ones are oil. There is no gas being produced in the Balkans because there is no market for it and at the current prices, 

they cannot afford to build a pipeline. They basically are just burning it. It is a huge waste of what potentially is a very valuable resource. 

82 

We are seeing gas prices that are just above $3.00, $3.25 or so, 

in Texas. It is great for us. We have steel plants coming in, we 

have plastic plants coming in, we have LNG companies looking to 

come in and export. We have some red ones because we have the 

pipeline infrastructure to do it and market. 

What we hear from producers is in addition to having to get 

pipelines, which are expensive to build and another regulatory burden, I only need say the word Keystone, that is a problem. 

Then you zoom in down here and see there are also gas wells offshore in Louisiana. These are traditional, horizontal wells. You are 

not seeing the development of the gas wells because you cannot 

produce a horizontal gas well at $3 gas. The gas we are getting out 

of these horizontal wells is being produced along with oil or other 

liquids. It is not economical to even pursue it. We could lose this 

boom if we do not get a market. I guess I want to make sure you 

all are aware of the urgency of getting this done. 

Then you look at what is going on now in Japan after the terrible 

tragedy there, they are looking to decommission their nuclear facilities and go with natural gas. Wouldn’t it be cool to actually have 

something to sell back to them for all those electronics we are 

bringing over here to get the balance of trade? This is the time. I 

just want to make sure you guys understand that. There really is 

that sense of urgency. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for those comments, Congressman. Those 

are all factors we are considering. I grew up in Ft. Worth, Texas 

in the Labar Neck Shale. I have seen firsthand the difference that 

some of these developments can make. 

We also understand all the other balancing factors. We want to 

make sure we make a good public interest determination and we 

need to move forward as quickly as possible in a way that is open 

and transparent. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I appreciate that. I am a relatively newcomer 

in Washington but I do know one of the best ways to kill something 

is delay. I hope any delay we are doing is necessary and not intentional. 

My time has expired. Mr. Horsford, you are next for five minutes. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 

panelists for being here today. 

I am from Nevada and we also have natural gas facilities in our 

State. It is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, prices 

are at an all time low. These low prices have benefitted the manufacturers, the consumers and household users. On the other hand, 

these low prices are at adversely affecting many producers of natural gas. 

Going forward, as policymakers, we have difficult questions to 

answer. One of the areas I feel we have to address beyond corporate profitability also pertains to our security, jobs and households. I would like to ask the panel, Mr. Cicio, you say in your testimony your organization is not opposing LNG exports but you ‘‘remain very concerned that exports could negatively impact manufacturing competitiveness and U.S. jobs.’’ Why is that and is there a 

way to calculate how many U.S. manufacturing jobs could be lost 

or not created if LNG exports are allowed to proceed? 

83 

Mr. CICIO. It is difficult to answer the second part of you question. What I can do is tell you that these prices have clearly started 

the manufacturing renaissance. There are upwards to $95 billion 

of new capital investments by chemical companies, nitrogen fertilizer for plastics, steel, glass and these new facilities are going to 

create upwards to six to eight bcf a day. With those announcements, we are talking about a 10 percent increase in demand for 

natural gas. 

Every month, there are new announcements. In our view when 

I talk to my companies, in my view this is the first wave. The commodity, as we call them, the building blocks, the kind of companies 

I mentioned they supply energy intensive block products to every 

manufacturer in the country. As this new capacity for this building 

block material—the plastics, chemicals and nitrogen fertilizer— 

comes on stream, our customers will be expanding. 

We are quite optimistic about the demand side, but it is very difficult, other than to do a study much like the DOE has done, to 

determine what negative impact it would have at a specific price 

going forward. 

Mr. HORSFORD. As we have heard, those in the oil and gas sectors believe that failure to permit foreign exports of LNG could severely undermine that industry and would ultimately affect current 

and future jobs. Do they have a valid concern, do you think? 

Mr. CICIO. Manufacturers have a valid concern, yes, they do. 

Higher prices, just from 1999, natural gas prices doubled, then tripled and peaked in 2008. In that time period, I saw almost 55,000 

manufacturing facilities shut down. A lot of it was related to high 

prices of natural gas. There is an absolute relationship between the 

price of natural gas, the price of electricity and manufacturing competitiveness. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Is there the proposition of you said the kind of 

winner take all where it is to the benefit of one sector and to the 

detriment of another? 

Mr. CICIO. No. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Can there be a balance? 

Mr. CICIO. That is correct. Our testimony bears this out. If we 

have a process at the Department of Energy that takes into consideration the public interest and balances, we should be able to export and we should be able to provide affordable prices of natural 

gas for domestic consumers. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Mr. Choi, what do you say about that? 

Mr. CHOI. First of all, I think we need to realize that between 

2004 and 2008, U.S. natural gas prices rose to unprecedented sustained levels. Prices during that time ranged from about $7 to $10 

per mmbtu. Nobody I am aware of is saying exports will bring 

prices up to those levels. 

The advent of the shale gas revolution, which used the hydraulic 

fracturing and horizontal drilling to make vast amounts of shale 

gas economical, has fundamentally changed the picture. Even with 

exports, we are not going to see prices at that level in the future. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will wait for additional questions. 

84 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you. It is interesting where we see this 

side of the aisle agreeing with the DOE and Brookings and not always with the industry. 

At this point, I need to ask for unanimous consent for the gentleman from Louisiana, Dr. Fleming to sit as a member of this subcommittee. Without objection, so ordered. 

Up next is Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner, you are recognized for five 

minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate our panelists because it is certainly an important 

discussion as we look to the issue of job creation and energy policy. 

In Ohio alone, it is expected that Utica Shale would have a $5 billion economic impact and create or supply nearly 66,000 jobs in 

Ohio by 2014. I appreciate the discussion that we have great opportunity to export and that the price spikes we had in the past were 

the result of the fact we did not have the access to or the abundance of supply that we are now seeing. 

Dr. Ebinger and Mr. Choi, in your reports you both touched on 

the issue of the geopolitical implications of exporting U.S. natural 

gas. I would like to speak to that for a minute and ask you a question. 

When we look to the U.S. interests and certainly domestic economic benefits, we also need to look to the issue of the geopolitical 

implications of our being able to export. As both of you have noted, 

Russia has a major role as a supplier of natural gas and is a nonreliable exporter to the European countries. They use it as a political tool, punishing our European allies, especially eastern Europe, 

and use it to try to divide the EU and NATO countries as they put 

pressure on individual countries to adopt policies favorable to Russian positions. 

I have a bill, H.R. 580, the Expedited LNG for American Allies 

Act, that would expand the ability to export LNG to our NATO 

partners and to Japan to allow expedited approval for that export. 

This is a bill that initially had been championed by Senator Lugar. 

It is a bipartisan and bicameral piece of legislation. I think it 

would be very important to give that expedited opportunity, not 

only increasing our markets, lowering the overall bureaucratic 

process for export, but also have an impact in the Pacific region 

with respect to Russia’s export. 

Dr. Ebinger and Mr. Choi, would you please elaborate on your 

positions and thoughts as to the geopolitical effects of U.S exports 

to those regions? 

Dr. EBINGER. Thank you, Congressman. 

Yes, I would thoroughly agree with your characterization of what 

LNG cargoes diverted from the U.S., since we no longer need them, 

have played in the European market. The big reason for that is 

that in most of the world outside the United States, petrochemicals 

are derived from naphtha, an oil-based product, rather than from 

natural gas, making them much more costly. 

We have seen LNG cargoes allow the Europeans, as some of their 

longstanding contracts with Gazprom have come up for renegotiation, to use the availability of natural gas to delink a large portion 

of their supply from Russia and in some cases, get significant price 

concessions from the Russians. 

85 

My only concern about your bill, I think it is very admirable and 

we certainly support our NATO and European allies, is that one 

has to be very careful because having just returned from a significant gas conference in Amsterdam, it does appear, listening to the 

Europeans, that they believe for the next ten years the European 

gas market is saturated. 

Part of that is, of course, the depressed economic condition prevailing in Europe, which obviously can switch around at some point 

in time, we hope, but I will only caution that if we were to direct 

U.S. LNG cargoes there, it might be good that we could drive prices 

down further but it might not necessarily be good for our own exporters if they found that to penetrate that very glutted market, 

they had to significantly redirect it. 

Mr. TURNER. The bill doesn’t redirect it, but streamlines the bureaucratic process for those who are doing that. 

Mr. Choi? 

Mr. CHOI. In our latest paper, we looked at the global implications of U.S. LNG exports. In order to understand what the impacts would be, you have to look at each market and examine what 

the marginal source is. The marginal source might not be just what 

is currently being exported, it could also be future supplies. These 

supplies could be marginal either because they have high production costs or high transportation costs, or possibly because of political hurdles that make these supplies effectively more costly to 

come to market. I am talking about the supplies such as from Iran 

or possibly Venezuela. 

You mentioned Russia. Russia is the largest gas exporter to Europe. They are vulnerable, according to our study, because not only 

do they have the largest volumes, but they are also the highest cost 

contract supplied to the European market. We believe if the U.S. 

exports to Europe, which is one of our scenarios, Russian supplies 

would be vulnerable. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you, very much. 

We will now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Dr. Fleming, for five minutes. 

Mr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the committee 

for allowing the courtesy today to sit in and I appreciate the panel 

here today. 

I come from the 4th District of Louisiana which has the 

Haynesville Shale. The Haynesville Shale, as you know, in the period around 2007 to 2008, we had nothing less than a revolution 

in marrying the old technology of hydro-fracking and the new technology of horizontal drilling, which has released tremendous wealth 

and economic activity which has really sustained my district 

through difficult economic times. 

We are victims of our own success, unfortunately. As a result of 

that, as you know, the price has been well displayed here, and has 

been depressed because of all of the production, so we have gone 

from excessive demand and little supply to excessive supply and 

relatively the same demand, which is kind of interesting because 

our friends on the other side of the aisle assure us the high cost 

of gasoline and oil has nothing to do with supply and demand, it 

is speculation. 

86 

We would like to have a little speculation in natural gas if that 

would be okay with you gentlemen just to get that price up a little 

bit because we have had a number of actual drilling sites that we 

have not moved forward on because it is just not economically viable. 

The other piece is in Lake Charles, we have the Cheniere plant 

which is an incoming supply depot for LNG because we have been 

net importers. Now they are spending $10 billion to make it a net 

export facility and we are glad about that. We will be well positioned for the future not only to take care of our own needs, but 

to take care of the needs of the world when it comes to this revolution. 

I have a couple of questions today. Mr. Smith, what are the criteria for approving one terminal over another? Is geography a factor, a region already has a facility or other projects that may be 

less advantageous? How do you decide about that because we are 

waiting on final permitting and approval with our plant? 

Mr. SMITH. As you are aware, and as you stated in your comments, we have already approved one export facility and that is the 

Sabine Pass facility in Louisiana. Subsequent to that, now that we 

are looking at cumulative impact of another additional 28.2 billion 

cubic feet a day of potential exports, one of the things we have announced as we go through our process is we do have a queue, we 

have a sequence we are going to use in order to determine the 

order in which we are going to evaluate the export opportunities. 

We took all of the applicants before the Department and divided 

them into two categories, ones which had submitted their FERC 

pre-filing application, the process where you start spending more 

significant quantities of money, and those who had no filed for prefiling. Within those, it is on a first come, first serve basis. 

There is a list. There is a pdf on the DOE website and you can 

see the next applicant we are going to consider and you can see the 

last applicant. We are going to work through that queue looking at 

all the factors we have announced as part of our public interest determination, everything from jobs, balance of trade, economic impact on consumers, prices, impact on industry, international issues, 

economic and environmental issues, a wide range of factors we are 

going to use in order to evaluate each one of those applicants. 

Mr. FLEMING. Do you do some en bloc or are they all one on one? 

Mr. SMITH. We are compelled by statute to evaluate each of these 

on an individual basis. 

Mr. FLEMING. What about the non-FTA countries? What is the 

policy towards them? Are they still in the queue? 

Mr. SMITH. The law breaks up applicants into two categories, 

FTAs and non-FTAs. Free Trade Agreement countries essentially 

are approved without delay or modification by the Department. 

There is no discretion that is exercised, under statute, by the Department. Those are being approved as we receive them. It is the 

non-FTA applicants we are evaluating. 

Mr. FLEMING. Is that there to say there is going to be difficulty 

in approving them? What are going to be the challenges in getting 

approvals for them? 

Mr. SMITH. There is a process. As I mentioned earlier, it is illustrative that even on this panel you have individuals who think 

87 

should be approved immediately and all of them should be approved; there are a lot of voices who think there are concerns with 

exporting LNG in terms of rising prices. There are lots of arguments being made. 

We received somewhere on the order of 200,000 comments in addition to the studies we received, some of which we requested. It 

is our job to look at all the factors so that as expeditiously as possible as transparently as possible and as quickly as possible, we get 

to a public interest determination that is going to inspire the right 

type of confidence in terms of its ability to withstand the scrutiny 

it is certain to attract. That is the process we are in right now. 

Mr. FLEMING. I certainly want to underscore that we should encourage approval of non-FTA countries as well. It will be good for 

the global economy, it will help our prices. You just heard that we 

have more natural gas now than we ever thought we had in the 

past and probably with newer technologies coming online, we will 

have even more in the future. 

It is not that we want to drive up prices; we want prices to be 

at real market rates. That is going to be the sweet point for consumers and for jobs. 

With that, I yield back and again, I thank you for your courtesy. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. 

At this point, we will start a second round of questioning. I will 

recognize myself for five minutes and then move across the aisle. 

Mr. Cicio, the gist of your concern is that as we start to export 

natural gas, there will either be a shortage or an increase in cost 

of natural gas that is used either as a raw material or feedstock 

for domestic manufacturing and to keep domestic electricity prices 

low as natural gas, certainly in Texas, is a major source of energy. 

Is that a reasonable summary of what you are saying? 

Mr. CICIO. No. Natural gas is different. That is what makes this 

public interest determination so critical. Natural gas is very influenced by the public process. There is legislation and regulation that 

can impact the access to natural gas in terms of whether it is in 

a moratorium or not, and Congress can deal with the intangible 

drilling cost tax benefit and that is going to change the economics. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Intellectual property is highly regulated and 

with music, their ability to profit is determined almost entirely on 

government regulation of copyright. We could go in and regulate almost any other industry. 

Mr. Choi, do you agree with that characterization that natural 

gas is unique over any other product or commodity? 

Mr. CHOI. No, I would not. First, I would note that at the margin, there are some regulations that affect the amount of drilling, 

but for the most part, we have deregulated the supply markets and 

the market determines how much to produce. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you. 

Mr. Cicio, let me ask you this. As we get more natural gas 

through pipelines to our ports doesn’t that make the liquids that 

are oftentimes produced with natural gas more available to your 

industrial customers to use for other products? 

Mr. CICIO. Drilling for natural gas, drilling for oil, it increases 

potentially natural gas liquids, so the answer would be yes. 

88 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Using your argument that natural gas is special, does that mean we should add regulations to the export of 

other basic chemicals like ethylene and propylene? 

Mr. CICIO. I will say it again, natural gas is different because let 

us say if DOE approves a terminal, they are approving it for up 

to 30 years. The terminal operator then negotiates long term contracts that are mostly take or pay. That locks in demand for a 30 

year time period. Meanwhile, consumers are exposed to the risk of 

public policy on the production side and on the demand side of natural gas. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Can any consumer, whether an electric company generating for the public, negotiate a long term contract the 

way exporters can? 

Mr. CICIO. No. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Why not? 

Mr. CICIO. There are very, very few long term natural gas contracts negotiated. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. At $3.00 and something, I might be negotiating long term ones myself. 

Mr. CICIO. We would like to do so. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Mr. Ebinger, would you like to comment on 

this line of questioning? 

Dr. EBINGER. Congressman, I would only say I am old enough to 

remember when we could not burn natural gas in industrial boilers 

or powerplants because ‘‘it was a noble fuel’’ and we should not do 

that. We have made major disastrous decisions through the years 

whenever we tried to not allow market forces to work. It is precisely for that reason that in our analysis, we see plenty of NGOs 

being available for the American industrial renaissance and used 

the dry gas for export. 

As I said in my formal testimony, I think we have to be careful 

because this idea that Dr. Fleming seems to think, and I would 

agree with you, sir, I would love to see more natural gas exported 

but we think the realities of the marketplace are not going to allow 

all these projects before DOE to ever be developed in any time 

frame any of us can reasonably foresee here. 

As a result, we find some of the arguments put forth by the petrochemical industry and others to be somewhat spurious to the realities of the marketplace. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Let me ask, Mr. Choi, you studied this, what 

is the environmental impact of this? It seems to me as we have low 

cost natural gas that is cleaner burning than oil and in most cases, 

coal, isn’t it a positive net environmental to get more people burning clean natural gas? 

Mr. CHOI. Yes, it is. If you look at the carbon emissions in the 

United States, we are at I believe the lowest point we have been 

in the past decade. Most of it is because we are burning more natural gas than we ever have. 

One other comment I would like to make is that just because 

there is a rush to apply for DOE approval to export doesn’t necessarily mean that all these applications, if approved, would be 

built. 

89 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. I apologize for cutting 

you off but I am out of time. As a courtesy to my colleagues, we 

do need to keep moving. 

I will now recognize Mr. Horsford for five minutes and turn the 

Chair back over to Chairman Lankford. 

Mr. HORSFORD. I want to get back to this issue of who should be 

involved in this process. Mr. Choi, would you agree that all interests, those of the producers and those of the consumers, should be 

considered by the Department of Energy in their determination of 

what is a public interest? 

Mr. CHOI. I would rather not speculate on the role of the Department of Energy but I can say that the market does consider interests of all parties. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Mr. Cicio, from what I understand, you are here 

representing some very large companies that use natural gas as an 

energy source and as an input in their production process. What 

is your view on being able to have a say in this process? 

Mr. CICIO. Absolutely. All interested parties impacted on the producing and consumer sides. Let us take a look at when the DOE 

was confronted with dealing with determination on imports. They 

did a rulemaking process to develop the criteria and allowed for all 

parties to comment, both verbally and in writing, to help develop 

that criteria. It was done in a very transparent way. 

My comments earlier today were that there has not been any 

rulemaking that has allowed for a set of criteria for exports. That 

is what we believe is the best process to move forward. 

Mr. HORSFORD. The fact that your report accurately estimates 

the impact of exportation on your member companies is a concern? 

Mr. CICIO. It is interesting. The NERA report said that energy 

prices go up, wages go down and the return on capital of all industries are impacted in a negative way. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Mr. Chairman I think this hearing demonstrates, 

at least to me, that there are many sides to the question of allowing LNG exports on a scale never before considered in U.S. history. 

The law requires the Department to do what is in the public’s interest. I know none of us want to be motivated to pushing the Administration into picking winners and losers and it is something 

that of course the majority has talked about, not only in this committee, but in others and has objected to that type of consideration. 

The last Congress I know is in the past but I would hope we 

would not do anything to try to push the Administration into selecting winners and losers in this process. 

At this hearing, which concerns something the oil and gas industry wants, federal permission to export LNG and thereby raise gas 

prices and profits, I get the feeling that some members of the majority want the Administration to go in this direction so long as oil 

and gas are the winners. I hope we have the public’s interest in 

mind rather than merely just one industry’s welfare or profit. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LANKFORD. [Presiding] I would recognize myself for the next 

line of questioning. 

Mr. Horsford, I would agree, this shouldn’t benefit one group or 

another, but there are tens of thousands of jobs on the sidelines 

currently that in a 7.6 percent unemployment rate for the Nation, 

90 

we would love to see. The jobs that are happening take an area like 

North Dakota, an area where there are a lot of jobs that are 

$80,000 and above as a starting position for a high school education. It would be great to see this promulgated across the country. A lot of families would enjoy that kind of benefit to see that 

in the days ahead. 

I apologize that I had to slip out for a moment. I need to come 

back to several things on this. I am still trying to process through 

how we make the decision and how we move forward in timing on 

this. 

Mr. Smith, is DOE anticipating setting a numeric number of bcf 

to export a day? Is that an expectation, there will be some moment 

or some decision to be made to say we are going to find a magic 

number of bcf, we are going to limit that? 

Mr. SMITH. I thank you for the question Mr. Chairman. The Department has not made any determination about a volumetric limit 

or cap or any sort of quantified figure, so that is not a determination the Department has made. 

Mr. LANKFORD. That decision has not been made or that decision 

is irrelevant, it is going to be market-based? I am trying to figure 

out will this be centrally determined, that someone in DOE will determine we can do up to 6 bcf a day but that is all we can do economically based on studies or will the market decide? 

Mr. SMITH. The market has made no determination about the imposition of any cap, quantification, the calculation of any caps. That 

is not a decision the Department has made. We have not come to 

that conclusion. 

Mr. LANKFORD. You have made a decision at least 2 bcf are going 

to happen a day because the existing export facility has that capability of 2 bcf a day, correct? 

Mr. SMITH. We have decided to permit 28.2 bcf per day. 

Mr. LANKFORD. I am trying to figure out where does this go from 

here. Is it a situation where we have 19 applicants, we are going 

to let the market decide what is appropriate or will there be some 

decision to say we have two to permit, we are going to allow two 

more, then wait a couple years, allow two more, wait a couple years 

or is there going to be a decision we think eight is the limit and 

try to figure out some process to get us to eight? 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, we simply have not made that determination. We are in the process right now of making this determination. The comment period literally closed three weeks ago, so 

there is a very large volume of analysis the Department still has 

to do. 

Mr. LANKFORD. I do have to have some concern on the large volume because there 186,000 individuals. My understanding is that 

was about 300 actual comments and they all came in in the thousands. Am I right or wrong on that because 300 comments you are 

working through, just a large quantity of the same 300 comments? 

Mr. SMITH. There were a total of almost 200,000 comments. 

Many of those were letter writing campaigns but you also have to 

go through those because any campaign, people write things. You 

have private citizens who are voicing their opinion. 

Mr. LANKFORD. I definitely understand that. We get letter writing campaigns, I assure you, but the comments, as they come in, 

91 

as far as in your decision-making, you have 300 unique comments 

really there, you have thousands to reply to, but as far as your decision-making process, you are really filtering through 300, is that 

correct? 

Mr. SMITH. I do not want to characterize the 300 as being unique 

from the other very large volume because we have to go through 

all those comments. 

Mr. LANKFORD. I understand. I am just trying to figure out the 

decision-making process. As we are trying to process through this, 

the assumption was the decision has been made we are going to 

exports on non-FTA. That decision is done, it is behind us. We are 

going to do it. Now it is how many additional facilities. What will 

be the process and time? That is all that is left at this point to determine. We have already determined we are going to export. 

I am trying to figure out is the timing because there are a lot 

of contracts globally that depend on this, there are a lot of jobs 

here in America scattered across the country. Mrs. Lujan Grisham 

mentioned before, there are areas in New Mexico and other areas 

all across the country that are dependent on job development increasing. 

With a 14 year low in production of natural gas happening right 

now, that is a lot of jobs sitting on the sideline that turn around 

almost immediately if production begins to increase for export if 

there is some sort of advance planning, if we know the timing. I 

am trying to figure out what is the timing and what is the process. 

Mr. SMITH. I can say a couple things, Mr. Chairman. First, we 

are committed to dedicating resources, dedicating personnel, lawyers, to move as quickly and expeditiously as possible to get to a 

transparent and defendable decision. 

Mr. LANKFORD. You still don’t know whether that is a month 

from now or ten years from now? 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, we are in the middle of the analysis 

right now. I could opine on that but I would be making something 

up that is trying to foresee the outcome of the analysis we are currently doing. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Do you have an expectation when you make a decision, will they be made one at a time or based on a set of merits 

where you will say this is the criteria. If your permit application 

meets this set of criteria, we are going to permit you and let the 

market decide or will this be, whatever system it was, we are going 

to permit this company and then three years, six months later or 

whatever it is, we are going to permit another one? Will it be that 

order or will it be open it up and let them go pursue capital, see 

who gets the capital and who gets contracts? How will that work? 

Mr. SMITH. Again, that would be, to a large extent, prejudging 

the analysis we are doing now. I can say we have announced an 

order, we know what the next applicant is going to be, what the 

subsequent applicant is going to be. 

Mr. LANKFORD. How was that determined as far as the order, the 

next one that is going to go down? 

Mr. SMITH. In the Sabine Pass Order, we stated we had to look 

at the cumulative impact of LNG export, since we are looking at 

a total of 28.2 bcf with the number of applicants. 

92 

Mr. LANKFORD. There is no way they are going to build that 

much. There is not that much capital to build that. 

Mr. SMITH. That is not the argument I am making. I am just 

saying that is the total quantity of export applications we are looking at. We took the applicants on a first come, first serve basis, 

with priority given to those that have started the FERC pre-filing 

process. You can go to the DOE website, you can download a pdf 

that shows you the list and the order. That is the order in which 

we will proceed. 

Mr. LANKFORD. So it is a first come, first serve if they have gone 

through the pre-application. That is fine in some semblances and 

I am sure for the company that is number two, they are excited 

about that process and the company that is number 19 is probably 

not as excited. 

I know from being in a high school history class, when tests were 

turned in on Friday, the first person turning in their test didn’t always get the highest grade. A process that says whoever got his application request in first and started with FERC has the highest 

priority seems to pull out some merit issues. 

Again, I am saying that and probably the number two company 

is furious I am saying but there seems to be some need for merit. 

Do they have the capital, do they have contracts, have they had 

communication on this, can they actually fulfill it, is this going to 

economically benefit the Nation? 

If we make the determination to do it, then we need to have 

some economic benefit immediately coming back to America, that 

we know they are actually going to be able to fulfill it and get it 

done. Does that come into play on this at all? 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate the comment. First of all, in order to get 

a permit before the Department of Energy, you need $50 and a fax 

machine, we get the application and it goes into the docket. One 

of the ways we tried to emphasize or measure seriousness or probability of outcome was to first do those applicants that have a prefiling before FERC. That is when you start to spend very large 

quantities of dollars. We pushed those to the front of the queue, the 

rest to the back of the queue. 

There are any number of algorithms one could try to come up 

with to say this company is more serious than that one or they 

have a better project than this one. We opted not to do that. We 

said we were not going to try to judge the seriousness of companies, or their business model or the probability of financing because 

that is not our job. 

We wanted something in terms of fairness to say we think generally the idea that the company first in the queue should go first. 

It was only fair. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Did they know that in advance, that this was 

going to be first come, first serve? 

Mr. SMITH. There was no process in place. This is brand new 

ground. 

Mr. LANKFORD. If someone did more research and took more time 

to fill out their application, they ended up in the back of the line. 

They just didn’t know at that point? 

Mr. SMITH. Again, this is a new process that we are creating. 

93 

Mr. LANKFORD. You have a difficult job in this and I completely 

appreciate this. I know you are working expeditiously but at the 

end of the day, everyone, all of us on the dais, you, everyone is 

going to have to determine and be able to say to people this was 

a fair process that worked as expeditiously as possible. 

I have gone well over time on this. I would like to recognize Ms. 

Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me say to both you, Mr. Smith and you, Mr. Chairman, you 

have done yeoman’s work on behalf of each of your interests here 

this afternoon, you, Mr. Smith, in terms of recognizing that it is 

a judicial process and you cannot really offer a lot of information 

about particular applications and Mr. Lankford for pitching for his 

constituents as well. I compliment both of you. 

Let me just say though on your point about winners and losers 

and whether or not someone has the ability to actually take this 

approval and move forward, it appears they have done just that. 

If you have put them in two categories, those that have already 

done some precertification through FERC, they are in the front of 

the queue you just said, is that correct? 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, that is the case. Those are being considered first. 

Again, that is not a capricious determination. Those were the companies already spending millions and millions of dollars on feed 

and pre-feed and all the other things they have to do in terms of 

determining environmental impact. Those are companies making a 

real investment. They are spending dollars now. 

As I said, we didn’t try to grade each company but we did create 

two categories and we thought that was a fair way to approach it. 

Ms. SPEIER. Let me also ask this question. There are many folks 

in the oil and gas industry that will go out, get the permits and 

just sit on them. That is not what I think any of us are interested 

in. How do we prevent that from being part of this extended evaluation as to the merits of how much is eligible to be exported 

versus not? 

Mr. SMITH. The Department has some flexibility and some leeway in the way it writes its Orders. One thing we emphasize is 

that when we write an Order, when we say yes or no, we don’t 

write yes or no on a sticky and say that is a decision. There is actually a hundred-plus page Order the Department comes out with 

that goes through in a very open, transparent and dependable way, 

the rationale the Department has gone through to get to that 

Order. Also, we have the flexibility and the discretion to put in 

qualifications or requirements for the companies. 

If you look back to how we managed the Sabine Pass Order for 

Cheniere, there was a requirement that by a certain date, they had 

to have first gas going through the terminal which essentially prevents a company from going in for a relatively low price. 

Ms. SPEIER. Fifty dollars? 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, $50, and obtaining an application which they 

can sit on ad infinitum. That is not in the public interest; that is 

not what we wanted to accomplish. That is how we managed that. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Cicio, you have been very helpful and have 

raised some interesting issues. Can you list out some of the companies that you represent? 

94 

Mr. CICIO. Actually, no. We do not list our companies on our 

website, we do not publish them. The reason why is that we work 

on some very delicate environmental issues and many of our companies have retail profiles. We try to protect them from having that 

exposure. IECA represents a trade association and the cumulative 

views and the consensus of those companies. We speak as an organization, not speaking on behalf of a company. 

Ms. SPEIER. I understand that, but for us to evaluate the impact 

on companies making it in America, you talked about the American 

renaissance of manufacturing which we all embrace. We want products made in America. I do a Make It in America forum in my district every year. I just want to get a sense of how many employees 

are we talking about, are these Fortune 500 companies. Play 20 

questions with me. 

Mr. CICIO. Our companies have over $1 trillion in revenues, they 

employ 1.4 million people, have some of the largest manufacturing 

facilities in the United States. These are large companies. They 

produce steel, aluminum, chemicals, plastics, nitrogen, fertilizer, 

glass, cement, food processing companies, these are all name brand 

companies. 

Ms. SPEIER. You said how many employees? 

Mr. CICIO. It is 1.4 million. 

Ms. SPEIER. You also indicated that while the export contracts 

typically are for 30 years, that is not the case for manufacturing 

companies within the United States. Could you elaborate on that? 

Mr. CICIO. Manufacturing companies would love to lock in long 

term, particularly fixed or advantaged natural gas prices but for 

the most part, that is not happening. They are having to buy natural gas prices on the spot market. 

Ms. SPEIER. Typically that is a decision being made by the actual 

utility that is offering you the gas? 

Mr. CICIO. No. This is a negotiation that can occur between a 

manufacturing company and a natural gas producer or marketer. 

Utilities are not part of the equation. 

Ms. SPEIER. So this is a producer basically saying no, we are not 

going to lock in a 30 year contract to you but in an export setting, 

they could? 

Mr. CICIO. When I referred to 30 years earlier, I was referring 

to the DOE approving an application, the terminal owner then is 

going to secure long term contracts and they have that ability for 

30 years. The point I was trying to make earlier is that creates demand that is going to impact domestic consumer prices for a period 

of 30 years. 

My point is still the same. Natural gas is different than other 

trade products because it can be drastically impacted by public policy, by Congress and by the EPA and by the Bureau of Land Management that can impact the production over that 30 years and/or 

drive consumption such as the EPA on utilities, on the industrial 

sector, controlling greenhouse gas emissions or the industrial boiler 

mac. Public policy does drive demand and can impact supply. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I just want to 

thank all of the witnesses for their testimony. It has been, I think, 

a very enlightening hearing. I think what is coming of it, for me 

certainly, is this is a process that has to be done carefully, one that 

95 

probably in my mind should provide for some level of export but 

not to the detriment of manufacturing here in this country or consumers in this country. 

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I have to depart to give a speech. 

I thank you. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Dr. Fleming, do you have another series of questions? 

Mr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will say parenthetically before I get to my question, EPA government policy can have impact on any of these natural resources. 

Certainly coal is a great example where that is happening today. 

Again, I have difficulty seeing where natural gas is unique. 

Mr. Smith, NERA issued a result of their study. I understand 

DOE received that this summer, is that correct? 

Mr. SMITH. That is correct. 

Mr. FLEMING. However, it was released from DOE in December. 

Can you account for that delay? 

Mr. SMITH. First of all, I certainly would not characterize that as 

a delay. This is the NERA study here in my hand. This was a significant and substantial economic study looking at quantifying the 

impact of an unprecedented activity in the United States in terms 

of exporting hydrocarbons in the form of liquefied natural gas. 

This study was received by the Department, as requested by the 

Department, as something to be responsive to our need to be judicious about quantifying public interest so we did need some numbers. 

Once it was received, there was an intense process to understand 

the study, to ensure that it was clear and transparent, to ask clarifying questions to make sure this study, once entered in the public 

record, would be clear and responsive to the types of things we 

need to understand as part of the public interest determination. 

Mr. FLEMING. Who made the decision when to actually release it? 

Mr. SMITH. I made that decision. 

Mr. FLEMING. Nothing that happened perhaps in November could 

have had any impact on that decision at all? 

Mr. SMITH. No. The study was released when I was prepared to 

release it and when we had done the work we needed to do within 

the Department of Energy to make sure it was appropriate. 

Mr. FLEMING. Mr. Ebinger, how do the transportation costs of 

LNG affect the price in the world market compared to domestic 

prices? 

Dr. EBINGER. Transportation costs are, of course, extremely high. 

Right now, if we are looking at what could we deliver gas for example if we were ready to export into the Japanese market, the actual 

transportation costs would be somewhere in the neighborhood of $5 

to $6 per million BTU, that added on to the Henry Hub price plus 

the cost of gasification and regasification, I think most analysts 

would agree we would probably be able to deliver gas to Japan 

today if we could export somewhere between $9.50 to $10 per million BTU, significantly lower, of course, than the Japanese price. 

Mr. FLEMING. How would that compare to other forms of energy 

for Japan? Would that be a favorable price for them? 

Dr. EBINGER. At that price, it would be very favorable for Japan 

because otherwise Japan imports almost everything and since the 

96 

Fukushima accident, the closing of the nuclear powerplants has 

added roughly 4 bcf a day to Japanese demand, killing them because they are importing into a very high cost market. 

Mr. FLEMING. Obviously it is a very marketable concept to sell 

natural gas to Japan up to and including all the delivery costs that 

go with that? 

Dr. EBINGER. The concern would be, however, the longer we take 

to get some of our projects into the marketplace. I think some of 

the others at the table have different views on this, but if you believe the long run implications of any U.S. LNG going to market 

will be to begin to bring further competition, that the existing 

prices in Japan will begin to fall. They will not fall down to probably $10 but they might fall to $12 or $13, so the competitiveness of the U.S. while still probably 

reasonable is not going to be as great the longer we take to get 

LNG projects into the marketplace. 

Mr. FLEMING. How does that affect U.S exporters compared to 

competitors and the U.S. exports compared to competitors in Qatar 

or African countries? 

Dr. EBINGER. The big loser in this competitive LNG market down 

the road may be Australia, although most of the big projects they 

have coming in they have long term contracts for, but they are an 

extremely high cost producer. It is anticipated Qatar is the low cost 

producer bar none. Although Australia will be volumetrically larger 

than Qatar when all the projects come in, it is anticipated the new 

fields in East Africa will be extremely competitive into the Far 

Eastern market and even some of the West African projects in Nigeria and Angola will probably find a competitive market there. 

The big question in my mind is will the Chinese and the Russians do some very, very large pipeline deals because that would 

be extremely competitive in the Far Eastern market against any 

LNG. 

Mr. FLEMING. What I am really hearing is that we are seeing a 

tremendous worldwide opportunity in natural gas that will allow 

the growth of economies around the world where they will have 

very competitive energy prices, that they can be good producers for 

export/import which will be good for consumers, would that be a 

correct assumption? 

Dr. EBINGER. It will not only be good for consumers, but for those 

of us that do believe in climate change, it offers a unique opportunity to at least use a cleaner fossil fuel. It is not an answer clearly for the long run because it is still a CO2 emitting fuel but we 

do get some breathing space on the carbon front. 

Mr. FLEMING. It is my understanding that just in the last three 

years, carbon emissions have dropped 15 percent across the U.S. 

That is due directly to the conversion to natural gas. Really this 

is a win-win-win. We get better environment on CO2 emissions, we 

get better prices for manufacturing and production so we get better 

job environment, higher paying jobs and consumers get a better 

deal on the cost of energy. I cannot imagine what could be better 

for this Nation or this world. 

Dr. EBINGER. I would agree. The irony is that for those opposed 

to the U.S. signing the Kyoto Protocol, which we did not sign, ironically because of gas backing out; coal, we have actually met the 

97 

reduction targets we would have been obligated to meet had we 

signed the Kyoto Protocol. 

Mr. FLEMING. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I know this 

was a long afternoon. We got interrupted a couple different times 

by votes and other things. I appreciate you coming here and the 

conversation you have had. 

I would like to enter into the record the EIA, the NERA, the 

Deloitte and the Brookings study. Mr. Cicio, we had your study already attached to your testimony, correct? 

Mr. CICIO. My written testimony. 

Mr. LANKFORD. I wanted to make sure that was added. I want 

to be able to add the other studies into the record. 

Mr. LANKFORD. The issue that we have today is we have around 

$40 to $50 billion of private money on the sideline that our economy desperately needs. The best gift we can put into our economy 

is certainty, to know the rules and to fulfill those rules, so there 

is some gift of predictability as we walk through the process. 

Mr. Smith, you have a tall order as we have talked about multiple times and a delicate balancing act. You have somewhere between 300 and 186,000 different comments that have come in that 

we have to sort through, make a decision and predict what the future economy is going to be based off that. That is no simple thing. 

We understand that but dates of when the decisions will be 

made, then a date for how that decision is going to be done and 

a process to expeditiously work through that is a huge difference. 

It is every company that has applied into and how we work 

through the process, whether it be number 2, 19 or 1 to 19 or whatever it may be, to know they are not six years behind the other one 

because they were two days behind them in submitting an application, to know there is some sort of process that is really fair to everyone but is also clearly defined. 

We don’t envy you in that process but we are grateful you are 

taking it on and do look forward in the days ahead to hearing a 

clear timeline and a clear process so we will be able to receive that. 

At any point, if you need to communicate with this committee or 

we can help you in any way, we want to be an asset to you because 

of that responsibility. 

Did you have a final statement? 

Mr. SMITH. I was just going to say I appreciate that comment. 

We are moving forward with all due haste. We understand that 

sense of urgency. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you. 

With that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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Congressman Jim Jordan Opening Statement 

Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Health Care and Entitlements 

"The Department of Energy's Strategy for Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas" 

Thank you, Chairman Lankford, Ranking Member Speier, and members of the 

Committee for holding this hearing to discuss the Department of Energy's proposal for Liquefied 

Natural Gas (LNG) exports. 

The department's plan for exporting LNG would have significant ramifications in Ohio, 

one of the largest LNG exploration statcs in the Eastern US. With technology and drilling 

improvements in recent years, we have seen ajump in our production of LNG, which helps 

reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy. Utica Shale development in Ohio is 

creating high-paying jobs throughout the state in a wide variety of industries. 

Expanding LNG production also allows for new trade opportunities and the jobs 

associated with these opportunities. While the Natural Gas Act of 1938 allows for unfettered 

LNG exports to Free Trade Agreement (FTA) countries, exports to non-FTA nations are more 

cumbersome. I support any and all plans to expand exports of LNG to non-FTA countries if 

these plans are found to be in the public's best interest. Opening new overseas markets to 

American goods leads to economic growth at home and brings us closer to the goal of doubling 

our exports by 2015. 

As our supplies of LNG increase, it is only reasonable that we streamline our export 

process, leveling the field for domestic energy producers and supporting hundreds of thousands 

of jobs in the US. Engagement via free enterprise remains one of the best routes to peaceful, 

stable, and prosperous societies ever devised. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing and for your work on this issue. 

March 19, 2013 
99 


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House Committee on Oversight & Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Health Care and Entitlements 

Hearing on Department of Energy's Strategy for Exporting liquefied Natural Gas 

Chairman James Lankford 

Opening Statement 

Today we are here to discuss the Department of Energy's strategy and process in reviewing applications 

to export Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), specifically to non-Free Trade Agreement countries. 

For countries with which we have a Free Trade Agreement covering natural gas, the Natural Gas Act of 

1938 requires the Department of Energy to grant applications to export LNG. Such export is deemed to 

be consistent with the public interest and the authorization must be granted without modification or 

delay. 

For countries with which we do not have a Free Trade Agreement covering natural gas, the Natural Gas 

Act still presumes the Department of Energy will grant the application to export LNG, unless the 

Department finds the proposed exportation will not be consistent with the public interest. 

The issue we are here to discuss today is NOT if we should export natural gas. 

The US has exported natural gas via pipeline to Canada and Mexico since the 1930s. 

We are also NOT here to discuss if we should export liquefied natural gas. 

The US has exported LNG from the Kenai Peninsula in Alaska since 1969 

Again, by statute, the Department must approve LNG exports to FTA countries and the default 

pOSition of exports to Non-FTA countries is a yes, unless DOE finds such export would not be 

consistent with the public interest. 

And finally, we are NOT here to discuss if we should export liquefied natural gas to non-FTA countries. 

Again, the US has exported LNG from Alaska to Japan, which is not an FTA country, since 1969. 

And in the Lower 48, in May 2011, the Department of Energy granted the first permit to export 

LNG to Non-FTA countries. That facility is currently under construction in Southwest Louisiana 

and it will begin exporting LNG within two years. 

We are not here even to discover for the first time the economic impacts of LNG exports. 

• DOE has already commissioned and released the results of a two-part study. The first part was 

conducted by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the second part was 

conducted by NERA Economic Consulting. David Montgomery of NERA was invited to testify 

today, but due to a last minute scheduling conflict, has submitted written testimony for the 

record. 

• The DOE studies concluded that "for everyone of the market scenarios examined, net economic 

benefits increased as the level of LNG exports increased" and that "exports of natural gas will 

improve the US balance of trade and result in a wealth transfer into the US." 

• Two additional studies have also been commissioned on LNG by Brookings and Deloitte which 

will also testify today on the risks and potential gains for our economy and global relationships. 
100 


Insert offset folio 58 here 80386.058

As a nation, we have already decided exporting is consistent with our public interest and we will 

continue to export natural gas by pipeline and LNG to FTA and Non-FTA countries. 

So really, the only issue here is how and when the Department will process the approximately 20 

remaining LNG export applications in the queue. Every other applicant is now significantly behind the 

first permit holder, which was permitted almost 2 years ago, and it is essential that the process moves 

fairly and expeditiously. 

Today's question is really a narrow and simple set of process questions, although each answer 

has enormous implications for our international economic relationships and capital investments at 

home. 

When will DOE make its determination of "public interest" and what are the specific criteria in that 

decision, especially since the law encourages a default yes answer to exports? The two DOE requested 

studies are complete. They both show a favorable gain for our nation when we export LNG, now the 

comment period and replies are also complete; 

Will the DOE seek to limit the number of billion cubic feet (bcf) that can be exported per day? Has DOE 

already set a certain amount of LNG to export, and if so how was that limit chosen? Will the DOE seek 

to limit the number of export facilities permitted and thus allowed to compete and explore for contracts 

worldwide? What role will the market or geopolitical goals play in these decisions? 

When can potential exporting companies begin competing for contracts? There is not an infinite 

number of contracts that can be acquired worldwide, if we delay making the decision on permitting, 

other countries with a more efficient bureaucracy will beat us. The US has a great head start in terms of 

technology, experience, pipeline infrastructure, and processing. We have developed financial and legal 

systems to support gas development. But these advantages won't last forever. There are massive shale 

gas fields around the world. China and India have invested in the Marcellus Shale in order to learn more 

about our technologies. Currently, Australia has eight LNG export facilities under construction. We 

have one. The demand window is open, we can step through it or delay until it is closed. If DOE intends 

to delay the decision to export to reduce the opportunity for global contracts, that is also something we 

should know. But I don't believe that is the Administration's intent. In December 2012, President 

Obama said to TIME Magazine, "The United States is going to be a net exporter of energy because of 

new technologies and what we're doing with natural gas and oiL" The President also recognized that 

these "energy [developments] could have a huge geopolitical consequence." For decades energy has 

been used as a diplomatic tool against the US. Now with LNG, the US has the potential to flip that and 

be in a position to use energy as a tool to the benefit of our nation's strategic interests. 

Now that DOE has completed its first permit and developed a system - what will be the timing and 

system to permit the remaining applicants? With billions of private capital at stake, how can you make 

the process neutral, fair and expedited? How quickly can that process be released and how can we 

complete the process so our nation can move forward with energy exploration jobs, construction jobs, 

Midstream jobs and the narrowing of our trade deficit? 

Uncertainty destabilizes a free market economy. It is time to provide timelines, decision making criteria 

and show the fairness of the process to everyone involved. I look forward to the answers to the key 

issues today. 
101 


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Opening Statement of Rep. Jackie Speier, Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Health Care, and Entitlements 

Subcommittee Hearing: "The Department of Energy's Strategy for 

Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas" 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

March 19, 2013 

Thank you, Chairman Lankford, for holding today's hearing. I look forward to 

what I hope will be an objective and informative discussion of the Obama 

Administration's process for reviewing the export of liquefied natural gas. 

New technologies in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have led to 

significant increases in U.S. natural gas production, and a huge growth in our 

domestic gas supply. For the first time in modern memory, America has the 

opportunity to become dramatically more energy independent. 

As USA Today reported last year: "[Energy independence] is no pipe dream. The 

U.S. is already the world's fastest-growing oil and natural gas producer. Counting 

Canada and Mexico, North America is ''the new Middle East." Furthermore, at our 

current pace of production, the Energy Information Administration predicts that the 

United States will slash its dependence on foreign oil as low as 36% by the year 

2035, down from 49% in 2010. 
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Many have called natural gas a "bridge fuel" to a clean-energy energy future, due 

to its lower emissions compared to other fossil fuels. Right now, the natural gasproducing and transporting industry wants to cross that bridge in part by exporting 

U.S. natural gas to foreign countries. Those foreign countries will pay a higher 

price for natural gas than it currently sells for domestically. That means higher 

profits, more investment, and more jobs for the oil and gas industry. 

But many natural gas-consuming industries, including many businesses who are 

"Making It in America," want to cross that bridge in a different way. These are 

companies that use gas as a fuel imd as an input to make a variety of products, 

ranging from chemicals to cars. They want U.S. natural gas to be sold into the 

domestic market at current prices, which will enable them to make higher profits, 

and invest in more job creation. 

The domestic manufacturing industry warns that if we permit the export oflarge 

volumes of our domestic natural gas supply, prices for natural gas in the U.S. will 

increase. It is unclear what the consequences of a rush to export would be for 

American manufacturing jobs, as well as for many middle class and lower-income 

citizens. The federal government should therefore proceed deliberately but 

cautiously on LNG exports. 
103 


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In fact, the federal government is legally bound to determine what degree of LNG 

export is in the public interest before moving ahead full throttle on pennitting new 

export facilities. Currently, the Depmtment of Energy is fulfilling its duty under 

the Natural Gas Act of 1938 to evaluate the cumulative impact of allowing the 

natural gas industry to export U.S. natural gas. The Department of Energy 

commissioned two reports, from the Energy Information Administration and 

NERA Economic Consulting, and is now reviewing more than 200,000 public 

comments on those reports, including many that are highly critical of the reports' 

methodologies and conclusions. 

I don't believe it is the job of DOE or the federal government to choose sides in the 

natural gas marketplace. That is not what the Natural Gas Act requires. However, 

it is the job of the Department to hear all sides and determine, on balance, how 

much liquefied natural gas export is permissible within the public interest, and to 

make sure that its decision is informed by the best data and analysis. 

I hope that no one will view today's hearing as an opportunity to influence the 

DOE's process or to push on the scales of what is in the public interest. The 

Department is considering all views, and I would hope that is the interest ofthe 

Oversight Committee as well. Thank you, and I yield back. 
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DEI Opening Statement 

OGR Subcommittee: "The Department of Energy's Strategy for 

Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas" 

• America's natural gas boom has revolutionized our energy and 

economic outlook. In just a few years, dismal projections of 

decline have been replaced by enthusiasm and optimism. 

• This acceleration in availability is helping lead a transition from a 

time of energy scarcity to a time of energy security. 

• A recent study by Price-Waterhouse-Coopers found that the shale 

gas boom has led to a renaissance in U.S. manufacturing. 

• The study specifically concluded that increased domestic gas 

production could result in the creation of one million 

manufacturing jobs by 2025. 

• Unlike many other areas in our economy, cost advantages have 

resulted in manufacturers actually moving plants back to the 

United States from overseas. 

• The natural gas boom will help us achieve two of our most 

important national economic goals - deficit reduction through 

economic growth, and increased competitiveness in the global 

economy. 

• This is a reality that is being acknowledged government-wide . 

• A study commissioned by the Department of Energy found that 

increased domestic natural gas production will support both 

domestic manufacturing and practical exportation. 
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• In his 20lO State of the Union Address, President Obama 

committed to double our exports, and open up new markets by 

2015. 

• The President can realize this goal ifhis bureaucracy enacts the 

policies necessary to unlock all of this potential and move forward 

and partner with those who can help us fully capitalize on the 

resource advantage created by our enormous domestic production 

of natural gas. 

• The economic reality is if we don't, others will. 

• Australia and Canada are also eager to begin exporting LNG, and 

are already building terminals and negotiating contracts. If we lose 

our home-field advantage to other nations, we risk losing out on all 

the benefits of exportation. 

• America competes in the international economy by capitalizing on 

two of our greatest strengths the talent and productivity of 

workforce, and our ability to leverage energy. 

• We have a rare opportunity to achieve this. We shouldn't waste it. 
106 


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Opening Statement 

Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, Ranldng Member 

Hearing on "The Department of Energy's Strategy 

for Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas" 

March 19, 2013 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing. 

Today's hearing focuses on a very important energy policy question: Is it in the public's 

interest to export increasing amounts of natural gas to foreign markets overseas? 

Because of new drilling techniques and other technology advances, the United States is 

now able to produce natural gas in geological formations that were once impossible to tap. This 

new technology has given rise to an emerging industry that is transforming parts of America. 

This recent boom has reduced the price of natural gas, it has saved consumers money on 

their electricity bills, and it is fueling a resurgence in domestic manufacturing. Our natural gas 

has become a competitive advantage in a global market. 

Because so much natural gas is being produced, paradoxically it may be placing the 

natural gas production industry and the jobs in that sector at some risk. As prices fall, some 

producers may be faced with the prospect of suspending operations or even going out of 

business. 

To address that concern, some companies are now seeking to export gas to foreign 

markets. While that could be a very good thing for the U.S. producers, it raises questions that 

must be addressed. 

First, will exports drive up prices for domestic U.S. manufacturers and consumers? 

Multiple studies have shown that they will. That will mean higher gas prices for consumers, 

higher prices for the manufacturers we want to support, and potentially higher prices for goods 

and services for everyone. 

The producers contend that increasing expOlts will increase jobs, and that too must be a 

consideration. By converting import terminals to export terminals, there is likely to be an 

increase in the number of jobs in certain sectors. But we also need to understand whether we 
107 


Insert offset folio 65 here 80386.065

will be supporting this set of jobs-those in the energy sector--at the expense of another set of 

jobs in U.S. manufacturing that rely heavily on natural gas in their operations. 

Another question wc must answer is whether exporting natural gas will more quickly 

deplete U.S. supplies just as the country is moving towards greater energy independence. For 

years, we have heard that the United States must reduce its dependence on foreign energy 

sources. By increasing these gas exports, are we trading part ofthat independence for short-terrn 

profits? 

Third, complex environmental questions regarding some of the techniques used in gas 

production have not been resolved. I believe it critical that we give ample attention to how 

increased production may exacerbate those concerns. 

Mr. Chairman, as we will hear today, it is the Department of Energy's job to detennine 

whether exporting more natural gas is in our nation's best interests. But we will also hear today 

that the studies commissioned by the Department are subject to debate. Some believe that recent 

studies demonstrate a clear benefit from gas exports, while others believe the studies point to the 

opposite conclusion. 

Although we may begin to answer some of these important questions at today's hearing, I 

believe 'will also leam that there are a number of key questions that need more careful study, 

Tharik you again for holding this very important hearing. 
108 

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The following reports submitted during the hearing can be found at the following sites: 

The U.S. Energy Information Administration "Effects of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic 

Energy Markets" as requested by the Office of Fossil Energy: 

http://www.eia.gov/analysis/reguests/fe/pdf/fe Ing.pdf 

Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions "Made in America The Economic impact of LNG exports from the 

United States": 

http://www.deloitte.com/view/en US/us/Services/consulting/9f70ddlcc9324310VgnVCMlOOOOOla56f 

OOaRCRD.htm# 

Brookings Energy Security Initiative "Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of liquefied 

Natural Gas": 

http://www.brookings.edu/N

/media/research/files/reports/2012/S/02%20Ing%20exports%20ebinger/0 

502 log exports ebinger 

NERA Economic Consulting "Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports from the United States: 

http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/reports/nera Ing report.pdf