IMMIGRATION 

ENFORCEMENT

Preliminary 

Observations on 

DHS's Overstay 

Enforcement Efforts

Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director

Homeland Security and Justice

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Border 

and Maritime Security, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Tuesday, May 21, 2013 

GAO-13-602T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-602T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives

May 21, 2013

IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

Preliminary Observations on DHS’s Overstay 

Enforcement Efforts 

Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, millions of visitors come to 

the United States legally on a 

temporary basis either with or without a 

visa. Overstays are individuals who 

were admitted into the country legally 

on a temporary basis but then 

overstayed their authorized periods of 

admission. DHS has primary 

responsibility for identifying and taking 

enforcement action to address 

overstays. Within DHS, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection is tasked with

inspecting all people applying for entry 

to the United States. U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement is 

responsible for enforcing immigration 

law in the interior of the United States. 

In April 2011, GAO reported on DHS’s 

actions to identify and address 

overstays and made recommendations 

to strengthen these processes. DHS 

concurred and has taken or is taking 

steps to address them. Since April 

2011, DHS has reported taking further

actions to strengthen its processes for 

addressing overstays.

This testimony discusses GAO’s

preliminary observations on DHS’s 

efforts since April 2011 to (1) review

potential overstay records for national 

security and public safety concerns, (2) 

improve data on potential overstays 

and report overstay rates, and (3) plan 

for a biometric exit system. This 

statement is based on preliminary 

analyses from GAO’s ongoing review 

of overstay enforcement for this 

subcommittee and other congressional 

requesters. GAO analyzed DHS 

documents and data related to 

overstays and interviewed relevant 

DHS officials. GAO expects to issue a 

final report on this work in July 2013. 

DHS provided technical comments, 

which were incorporated as 

appropriate.

What GAO Found

Since GAO reported on overstays in April 2011, the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) has taken action to address a backlog of potential overstay 

records by reviewing such records to identify national security and public safety 

threats, but unmatched arrival records remain in DHS’s system. In April 2011, 

GAO reported that, as of January 2011, DHS’s Arrival and Departure Information 

System (ADIS) contained a backlog of 1.6 million potential overstay records. 

DHS uses ADIS to match departure records to arrival records and subsequently 

close records for individuals with matching arrival and departure records. 

Unmatched arrival records—those that do not have corresponding departure 

records—remain open and indicate that the individual is a potential overstay. In 

the summer of 2011, DHS reviewed the 1.6 million potential overstay records. As 

a result, DHS closed about 863,000 records and removed them from the backlog. 

Since that time, DHS has continued to review all potential overstay records for 

national security and public safety concerns. However, as of April 2013, DHS 

continues to maintain more than 1 million unmatched arrival records in ADIS. 

GAO’s preliminary analysis identified nonimmigrants traveling to the United 

States on a tourist visa constitute 44 percent of unmatched arrival records, while 

tourists admitted under a visa waiver constitute 43 percent. The remaining 

records include various types of other nonimmigrants, such as those traveling on 

temporary worker visas.

DHS has actions completed and under way to improve data on potential 

overstays and report overstay rates, but the impact of these changes is not yet 

known. DHS has streamlined connections among databases used to identify 

potential overstays, among other things. Although these actions have resulted in 

efficiencies in processing data, they do not address underlying data quality 

issues, such as missing land departure data. Further, because many of these 

changes were implemented in April 2013, it is too early to assess their effect on 

the quality of DHS’s overstay data. DHS continues to face challenges in reporting 

reliable overstay rates. Federal law requires DHS to report overstay estimates, 

but DHS or its predecessors have not regularly done so since 1994. In 

September 2008, GAO reported on limitations in overstay data that affect the 

reliability of overstay rates. In April 2011, GAO reported that DHS officials said

that they have not reported overstay rates because DHS has not had sufficient 

confidence in the quality of its overstay data and that, as a result, DHS could not 

reliably report overstay rates. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security testified that DHS plans to report overstay rates by December 2013. 

DHS faces challenges planning for a biometric exit system at air and sea ports of 

entry. Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an 

integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals. As of April 2013, 

DHS’s planning efforts are focused on developing a biometric exit system for 

airports, with the potential for a similar solution at sea ports. However, in October 

2010, DHS identified key challenges as to why it has been unable to determine 

how and when to implement a biometric air exit capability, including challenges in 

determining what personnel should be responsible for the capture of biometric 

information. 

GAO is assessing DHS’s plans and efforts in these areas and plans to report on 

its results in July 2013.

View GAO-13-602T. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov. 
Page 1 GAO-13-602T 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to provide our preliminary observations on 

the actions that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken 

since April 2011 to address overstays.1 Each year, millions of visitors 

come to the United States legally on a temporary basis either with a visa 

or, in some cases, as visitors who were allowed to enter without a visa.2

Overstays are individuals who were admitted into the country legally on a 

temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of 

admission.3 We have reported that most overstays are likely motivated by 

economic opportunities to stay in the United States beyond their 

authorized periods of admission.4

DHS has primary responsibility for identifying and taking enforcement 

action to address overstays. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) is tasked with, among other duties, inspecting all people 

applying for entry to the United States to determine their admissibility to 

the country and screening Visa Waiver Program applicants to determine 

their eligibility to travel to the United States under the program. U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the lead agency for 

enforcing immigration law in the interior of the United States and is 

However, overstays could pose 

homeland security concerns—for example, 5 of the 19 September 11, 

2001, hijackers were overstays.

 

1

GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, and 

Sharing Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs, GAO-11-411

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2011).

2

Visitors who are allowed to seek admission without a visa include citizens of Canada and 

the British Overseas Territory of Bermuda (and certain residents of other adjacent islands, 

such as the Bahamas) under certain circumstances, as well as Visa Waiver Program 

participants. This program allows nationals from certain countries to apply for admission to 

the United States as temporary visitors for business or pleasure without first obtaining a 

visa from a U.S. consulate abroad. Currently, there are 37 participants in the program.

3

In this statement, we include out-of-status students—student visa holders who fail to 

meet certain requirements, such as enrolling in a qualified education program—in our 

definition of overstays. In general, foreign students remain in status and therefore eligible 

to stay in the United States under their student visas as long as they are enrolled in and 

attending a qualified education program. 

4

GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of Homeland Security’s Plan to 

Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals, GAO-08-458T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2008). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-602T 

primarily responsible for overstay enforcement. Within ICE, the 

Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) and the 

Overstay Analysis Unit are primarily responsible for overstay 

investigations. The Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), 

within DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate, supports the 

identification of overstays by managing the Arrival and Departure 

Information System (ADIS), which tracks and matches arrival and 

departure records for the purpose of identifying potential overstays, and 

the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which maintains 

biometric information, such as fingerprints, collected from nonimmigrants 

upon their entry into the United States.5

In April 2011, we reported on DHS’s actions to identify and take actions to 

address overstays and made recommendations to the department to 

strengthen these efforts.6

This testimony discusses our preliminary observations on DHS’s efforts 

since April 2011 to (1) review potential overstay records for national 

security and public safety concerns, (2) improve data on potential 

overstays and report overstay rates, and (3) plan for a biometric exit 

system. My statement is based on preliminary analyses from our ongoing 

review of overstay enforcement for this subcommittee and other 

congressional requesters. We expect to issue a final report on this work in 

July 2013. To conduct this work, we analyzed DHS documents and data 

related to overstays and interviewed relevant DHS officials. Specifically, 

we analyzed DHS planning documents and reports on processes to 

DHS concurred with our recommendations and 

has taken or is taking steps to address them. Further, since April 2011, 

DHS has reported taking additional actions to strengthen its processes for 

identifying and taking enforcement action against overstays.

 

5

The Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) also contains fingerprints 

collected by the Department of State to establish and verify the identities of visa 

applicants. Both the Overstay Analysis Unit and OBIM were formerly part of the U.S. 

Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT) within DHS’s 

National Protection and Programs Directorate. DHS initiated US-VISIT in 2002 to develop 

a comprehensive entry and exit system to collect biometric data from aliens traveling 

through U.S. ports of entry. In 2004, US-VISIT initiated the first step of this program by 

collecting biometric data on aliens entering the United States. Pursuant to the fiscal year 

2013 DHS appropriations act and its accompanying explanatory statement, DHS 

realigned US-VISIT’s overstay analysis function into ICE and created OBIM effective 

March 27, 2013. 

6

GAO-11-411. 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-602T 

review potential overstay records and collect additional data to improve 

overstay identification. We analyzed DHS’s unmatched arrival records as 

of November 2012, the most recent date for which DHS had compiled the 

records at the time we began our review. We also reviewed statutory 

requirements and a May 2012 DHS report on the status of efforts to 

implement biometric exit capabilities at airports. To analyze the reliability 

of data on previously unreviewed potential overstay records and DHS’s 

current set of unmatched arrival records, we reviewed documentation 

regarding the databases used to collect these data and interviewed DHS 

officials familiar with the data. We determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted this work in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We provided a draft of this 

statement to DHS for review and incorporated its comments where 

appropriate.

DHS has taken action to address a backlog of potential overstay records 

we previously identified in April 2011. Specifically, in April 2011, we 

reported that, as of January 2011, ADIS contained a backlog of 1.6 million 

potential overstay records, which included prior nonpriority overstay leads 

that had not been reviewed, nonpriority leads that continued to accrue on

a daily basis, and leads generated in error as a result of CBP system 

DHS Continually 

Reviews Potential 

Overstay Records, but 

Unmatched Arrival 

Records Remain

DHS Reviewed a Backlog 

of 1.6 Million Potential 

Overstay Records
 

Page 4 GAO-13-602T 

changes.7 DHS uses ADIS to match departure records to arrival records 

and subsequently close records for individuals with matching arrival and 

departure records because either (1) the individual departed prior to the 

end of his or her authorized period of admission and is therefore not an 

overstay or (2) the individual departed after the end of his or her 

authorized period of admission and is therefore an out-of-country 

overstay. Unmatched arrival records—those records in ADIS that do not 

have corresponding departure records—remain open and indicate that 

those individuals are potential in-country overstays.8

In the summer of 2011, DHS completed a review of the 1.6 million 

records against various national security and law enforcement databases 

to determine if the subjects of these records had already left the United 

States and to help identify if the subjects posed any potential national 

security or public safety threats.9

 

7

ICE prioritizes potential overstay leads for possible investigation. The specific criteria ICE 

uses to rank the priority level of overstay leads are determined triannually based on 

current threat information by the Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel, an interagency 

panel of intelligence experts assembled by ICE for the purpose of determining these 

criteria. CBP system changes had resulted in multiple arrival and departure records being 

inadvertently created for a single individual.

As a result, DHS closed approximately 

863,000 records for individuals who had departed, were in status, or had 

adjusted status, and removed them from the backlog. Second, DHS 

reviewed the remaining 757,000 records against national security and law 

enforcement databases to identify potential national security or public 

safety threats. As part of this national security and public safety review, 

DHS also reviewed approximately 82,000 additional records identified by 

CTCEU that were unresolved or had not yet undergone full review 

because they did not meet ICE’s enforcement priorities (a total of 

approximately 839,000 combined records). As a result of these reviews, 

DHS reprioritized 1,901 of the 839,000 records because the subjects of 

the records could pose national security or public safety concerns and 

8

Enforcement actions for in-country and out-of-country overstays differ in that the focus of 

enforcement against in-country overstays is to remove them from the country if they pose 

a threat, whereas enforcement against out-of-country overstays is to prevent possible 

readmission to the United States.

9

To determine whether an unmatched arrival record is likely to be an in-country overstay, 

DHS agencies review multiple databases to determine if any information is available to 

document a departure or a change in immigration status. For example, the review process 

includes both automated searches, such as searching for immigration benefit application 

information through a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services database, and manual 

searches, such as determining whether the individual applied for refugee or asylum status.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-602T 

provided them to CTCEU for further review and consideration for 

enforcement action. Table 1 describes how CTCEU resolved these leads.

Table 1: Preliminary Analysis of Results of DHS’s 2011 Review of Backlog of 

Potential Overstay Records

Outcome

Number of records (percentage of 

total) 

Individual had departed the United States 711 records (37.4 percent)

Records forwarded to ICE’s Enforcement and 

Removal Operations (ERO) as potential public 

safety threats

481 records (25.3 percent)

a

Individual was in status (e.g., the subject filed 

a timely application to change his or her status 

or extend his or her authorized period of 

admission in the United States)

302 records (15.9 percent)

Individual could not be located 266 records (14.0 percent) b

Individual was arrested 9 records (0.5 percent)

Other 132 records (6.9 percent) c

Total 1,901 records (100 percent)

Source: ICE CTCEU.

a

CTCEU refers information on nonpriority potential overstays to ICE’s ERO, which is responsible for 

identifying and apprehending aliens who are subject to removal from the country, detaining these 

individuals when necessary, and removing aliens subject to removal from the United States. ERO 

personnel may encounter overstays in the course of their work but they do not directly focus on 

overstay enforcement.

b

An ICE contractor’s system automatically queries these records against various databases on a 

weekly basis for new information relating to the location of the suspected overstay. If such information 

is identified, CTCEU will reopen the investigation.

c

Other includes the following outcomes: (1) ICE determined that information indicating a possible 

national security or public safety threat was false (73 leads, 3.8 percent); (2) the subject of the lead 

was in removal proceedings, previously arrested, or the subject of an investigation (43 leads, 2.3 

percent); (3) the lead is open for continuous review (13 leads, 0.7 percent); and (4) the subject of the 

lead is the subject of an ongoing investigation at an ICE Homeland Security Investigations field office 

(3 leads, 0.2 percent).

Since completing this review of the backlog of potential overstay records 

in the summer of 2011, DHS has continued to review all potential 

overstay records through national security and law enforcement 

databases to identify potential threats, regardless of whether the subjects 

of the records meet ICE’s priorities for enforcement action. This occurs on 

an ongoing basis such that DHS may identify threats among individuals 

who were not previously identified as such when new information 

becomes available in various national security and law enforcement 

databases.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-602T 

As of April 2013, DHS continues to maintain more than 1 million 

unmatched arrival records in ADIS (that is, arrival records for which ADIS 

does not have a record of departure or status change). Some of these 

individuals are overstays, while others have either departed or changed 

immigration status without an ADIS record of their departure or status 

change. For example, the individual may have departed via a land port of 

entry without providing a record of departure or the individual may have 

applied for immigration benefits using a different name. In addition, these 

records include those from the previous backlog of unmatched arrival 

records that were not prioritized for enforcement in the summer of 2011 

and have not subsequently been matched against a departure or change 

of status record. As part of our ongoing work, we are analyzing these data 

to identify various trends among these unmatched arrival records. For 

example, our preliminary analysis shows that 44 percent of the 

unmatched arrival records are nonimmigrants traveling to the United 

States on a tourist visa, while 43 percent are also tourists but were 

admitted under the Visa Waiver Program. Figure 1 presents our 

preliminary analysis of the breakdown of unmatched arrival records by 

admission class.

Figure 1: Preliminary Analysis of Unmatched Arrival Records by Admission Class, 

as of November 2012

Note: Other includes those nonimmigrant visa categories otherwise not listed in the figure, such as 

temporary workers with specialty occupations and spouses and children of temporary workers. The 

nonimmigrant classes established by the Immigration and Nationality Act generally refer to aliens with 

no intention of abandoning their foreign residences, and they are each given specific designations 

DHS Has More than 1 

Million Unmatched Arrival 

Records 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-602T 

according to regulation. The B-1 and B-2 designations refer to nonimmigrants who are visiting the 

United States temporarily for business or pleasure, respectively. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B). The 

H-2B designation refers to nonimmigrants who are coming temporarily to the United States to perform 

temporary, non-agricultural service or labor if unemployed persons capable of performing such 

service or labor cannot be found in the United States, and the H-2A designation refers to 

nonimmigrants who are coming temporarily to the United States to perform agricultural labor or 

services of a temporary or seasonal nature. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b). For a listing and 

descriptions of all nonimmigrant classes, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(1)-

(2) for the corresponding designations. The Visa Waiver tourist and business categories in the graph 

include admissions of both visitors from Visa Waiver Program countries and other visitors for whom a 

tourist or business visa was waived, such as certain citizens of Canada and the British Overseas 

Territory of Bermuda. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 41.2(a)-(b).

We also analyzed the records to assess the amount of time that has 

elapsed since travelers were expected to depart the country, based on 

travelers’ “admit until” date. CBP assigns certain nonimmigrants an “admit 

until” date, by which they must leave the country to avoid overstaying.10

 

10In general, foreign students remain in status and therefore eligible to remain in the 

United States as long as they are enrolled in and attending a qualified education program. 

Individuals traveling on student visas are generally not issued a specific date until which 

they are authorized to remain in the United States, but instead are admitted for what is 

referred to as duration of status. This means that they may remain in the country until they 

complete their approved program of study, provided they otherwise maintain their student 

status. 

Figure 2 presents our preliminary analysis of the breakdown of the 

amount of time elapsed, as of November 2012, since the “admit until” 

date. The average amount of time elapsed for all unmatched arrival 

records was 2.7 years.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-602T 

Figure 2: Amount of Time Elapsed since Travelers Were Expected to Depart the 

United States, as of November 2012, Based on Preliminary Analysis of Unmatched 

Arrival Records

As of April 2013, DHS has not analyzed its unmatched arrival records to 

identify whether there are any trends in these data that could inform the 

department’s overstay enforcement efforts. We will continue to evaluate 

these data as part of our ongoing work.
 

Page 9 GAO-13-602T 

Since April 2011, DHS has taken various actions to improve its data on 

potential overstays. In April 2011, we reported that DHS’s efforts to 

identify and report on overstays were hindered by unreliable data, and we 

identified various challenges to DHS’s efforts to identify potential 

overstays, including the incomplete collection of departure data from 

nonimmigrants at ports of entry, particularly land ports of entry, and the 

lack of mechanisms for assessing the quality of leads sent to ICE field 

offices for investigations.11

First, DHS has taken steps to enhance connections among its component 

agencies’ databases used to identify potential overstays and reduce the 

need for manual exchanges of data. For example:

Since that time, DHS has taken action to 

strengthen its processes for reviewing records to identify potential 

overstays, including (1) streamlining connections among DHS databases 

used to identify potential overstays and (2) collecting information from the 

Canadian government about those exiting the United States and entering 

Canada through northern land ports of entry.

• In August 2012, DHS enhanced data sharing between ADIS and 

IDENT. This improved connection provides additional data to ADIS to 

improve the matching process based on fingerprint identification. For 

example, when an individual provides fingerprints as part of an 

application for immigration benefits from U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services or a visa from the State Department, or when 

apprehended by law enforcement, IDENT now sends identity 

information, including a fingerprint identification number, for that 

individual to ADIS. This additional source of data is intended to help 

allow ADIS to more effectively match the individual’s entry record with 

 11GAO-11-411. 

DHS Has Actions 

Completed and Under 

Way to Improve Data, 

but the Effect of 

These Changes Is Not 

Yet Known

DHS Has Begun Collecting 

Additional Data and 

Improved Sharing of Data 

among Its Databases to 

Help Identify Potential 

Overstays
 

Page 10 GAO-13-602T 

a change of status, thereby closing out more unmatched arrival 

records.

• Beginning in April 2013, ICE’s Student and Exchange Visitor 

Information System (SEVIS) began automatically sending data to 

ADIS on a daily basis, allowing ADIS to review SEVIS records against 

departure records and determine whether student visa holders who 

have ended their course of study departed in accordance with the 

terms of their stay.12

• Also in April 2013, DHS automated the exchange of potential overstay 

records between ADIS and CBP’s Automated Targeting System 

(ATS), which is intended to allow DHS to more efficiently (1) transfer 

data between the systems for the purpose of identifying national 

security and public safety concerns, and (2) use matching algorithms 

in ATS that differ from those in ADIS to close additional records for 

individuals who departed.

Prior to this date, DHS manually transferred data 

from SEVIS to ADIS on a weekly basis. According to DHS officials, 

these exchanges were unreliable because they did not consistently 

include all SEVIS data—particularly data on “no show” students who 

failed to begin their approved course of study within 30 days of being 

admitted into the United States.

These changes have resulted in efficiencies in reviewing records for 

determining possible overstay leads; however, they do not address some 

of the underlying data quality issues we previously identified, such as 

incomplete data on departures through land ports of entry. Furthermore, 

because many of these changes were implemented in April 2013, it is too 

early to assess their effect on the quality of DHS’s overstay data.

Second, DHS is implementing the Beyond the Border initiative to collect 

additional data to strengthen the identification of potential overstays. In 

October 2012, DHS and the Canada Border Services Agency began 

exchanging entry data on travelers crossing the border at selected land 

ports of entry. Because an entry into Canada constitutes a departure from 

the United States, DHS will be able to use Canadian entry data as proxies 

for U.S. departure records. We have previously reported that DHS faces 

challenges in its ability to identify overstays because of unreliable 

 

12SEVIS contains biographical and immigration status information for nonimmigrant 

foreign students and exchange visitors.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-602T 

collection of departure data at land ports of entry.13 This effort would help 

address that challenge by providing a new source of data on travelers 

departing the United States at land ports on the northern border. In the 

pilot phase, DHS exchanged data with the Canada Border Services 

Agency on third-country nationals at four of the five largest ports of entry 

on the northern border.14 These data covered entries from September 30, 

2012, through January 15, 2013. DHS plans to expand this effort to 

collect data from additional ports of entry and to share data on additional 

types of travelers. According to DHS officials, after June 30, 2013, DHS 

plans to exchange data for third-country nationals at all automated ports 

of entry along the northern border.15 At that time, DHS also plans to begin 

using these data for operational purposes (e.g., taking enforcement action 

against overstays, such as revoking visas or imposing bars on 

readmission to the country based on the length of time they remained in 

the country unlawfully).16

 

13

After June 30, 2014, DHS plans to exchange 

data on all travelers, including U.S. and Canadian citizens, at all 

automated ports of entry along the northern border.

GAO-11-411. 

14These ports were Pacific Highway (Blaine, Washington), Peace Arch (Blaine, 

Washington), Lewiston-Queenston Bridge (Lewiston, New York), and Rainbow Bridge 

(Niagara Falls, New York). For the purposes of this pilot, third country nationals are 

individuals who are not citizens of Canada or citizens or nationals of the United States. 

The pilot phase included the exchange of biographic data on permanent residents of 

Canada and lawful permanent residents of the United States. 

15For the purposes of the Beyond the Border initiative, an automated port of entry refers to 

a port of entry on the shared Canada-U.S. land border with a primary processing capacity 

to capture traveler (land, ferry, and pedestrian) passage as an electronic record. This does 

not include large cruise vessels deemed to be sea crossings under the laws of Canada 

and the United States.

16Since these data include only individuals who have departed the United States, all of the 

overstays identified would be out-of-country overstays. In general, nonimmigrants, such as 

those traveling under temporary visas for business or pleasure, who were unlawfully 

present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year and 

voluntarily departed the United States prior to the commencement of legal proceedings to 

remove them from the country, are inadmissible for 3 years. In addition, aliens who were 

unlawfully present in the United States for 1 year or more, and who again seek admission 

within 10 years of the date of their departure or removal from the United States, are 

inadmissible. For nonimmigrants whose overstay violations fall below 180 days, their visas 

are void and the State Department has the discretion to determine whether to issue them 

new visas, and CBP has the discretion whether to readmit them into the country.
 

Page 12 GAO-13-602T 

DHS has not reported overstay rates because of concerns about the 

reliability of its data on overstays. According to federal law, DHS is to 

submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of the 

number of aliens from each country in each nonimmigrant classification 

who overstayed an authorized period of admission that expired during the 

fiscal year prior to the year for which the report is made.17 Since 1994, 

DHS or its predecessors have not reported annual overstay rates 

regularly because of its concerns about the reliability of the department’s 

overstay data. In September 2008, we reported on limitations in overstay 

data, such as missing data for land departures, that affect the reliability of 

overstay rates.18 In April 2011, we reported that DHS officials stated that 

the department had not reported overstay rates because it had not had 

sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data. DHS officials 

stated at the time that, as a result, the department could not reliably 

report overstay estimates in accordance with the statute.19 Although the 

new departure data DHS is collecting as part of the Beyond the Border 

initiative may allow DHS to close out more potential overstay records in 

the future, these data are limited to land departure at northern border 

ports of entry, and as the initiative has not yet been fully implemented, it 

is too early to assess its effect on helping strengthen the reliability of

DHS’s overstay data for reporting purposes. In February 2013, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS plans to report 

overstay rates by December 2013.20 As of April 2013, DHS was working 

to determine how it plans to calculate and report these overstay rates. As 

part of our ongoing review, we are assessing how the changes DHS has 

made to its processes for matching records to identify potential overstays 

may affect the reliability of overstay data and DHS’s ability to report 

reliable overstay rates.

 

178 U.S.C. § 1376(b).

18GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Actions Are Needed to Improve Management of the 

Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate Program Risks, GAO-08-967

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2008).

19GAO-11-411. 

20See statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, 

before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D.C.: 

February 13, 2013.

DHS Continues to Face 

Challenges in Reporting 

Reliable Overstay Rates, 

and Recent Changes Have 

Not Yet Been Fully 

Implemented
 

Page 13 GAO-13-602T 

Developing a biometric exit capability has been a long-standing challenge 

for DHS. Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation 

of an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals.21 The 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the 

Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate full 

implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data system that 

matches available information provided by foreign nationals upon their 

arrival in and departure from the United States.22 Since 2004, we have 

issued a number of reports on DHS’s efforts to implement a biometric 

entry and exit system. For example, in November 2009, we reported that 

DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, 

and tracking the work that needed to be accomplished to deliver a 

comprehensive exit solution. We concluded that without a master 

schedule that was integrated and derived in accordance with relevant 

guidance, DHS could not reliably commit to when and how it would 

deliver a comprehensive exit solution or adequately monitor and manage 

its progress toward this end.23 We have made recommendations to 

address these issues, including that DHS ensure that an integrated 

master schedule be developed and maintained.24

DHS has not yet implemented a biometric exit capability, but has planning 

efforts under way to assess options for such a capability at airports and 

seaports. In 2009, DHS conducted pilots for biometric exit capabilities in 

airport scenarios, as called for in the Consolidated Security, Disaster 

DHS has generally 

concurred with our recommendations and has reported taking action to 

address them. For example, in March 2012, DHS reported that the 

US-VISIT office was adopting procedures to comply with the nine 

scheduling practices we recommended in our November 2009 report and 

has conducted training on our scheduling methodology.

 

21Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 110, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-558 to 59.

228 U.S.C. § 1365b.

23GAO, Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, 

but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 

2009).

24GAO-10-13; GAO, Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program’s 

Long-standing Lack of Strategic Direction and Management Controls Needs to Be 

Addressed, GAO-07-1065 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2007); and Homeland Security: 

First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program Operating, but Improvements 

Needed, GAO-04-586 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2004).

DHS Faces 

Challenges Planning 

for a Biometric Exit 

System at Air and Sea 

Ports of Entry
 

Page 14 GAO-13-602T 

Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009.25 In August 2010, 

we reported on the results of our review of DHS’s evaluation of these pilot 

programs. Specifically, we reported that there were limitations with the 

pilot programs—for example, the pilot programs did not operationally test 

about 30 percent of the air exit requirements identified in the evaluation 

plan for the pilot programs—which hindered DHS’s ability to inform 

decision making for a long-term air exit solution and pointed to the need 

for additional sources of information on air exit’s operational impacts.26

According to DHS officials, these challenges have affected the 

department’s planning efforts. In 2011, DHS directed its Science and 

Technology Directorate (S&T), in coordination with other DHS component 

agencies, to research “long-term options” for biometric exit.

According to DHS officials, the department’s approach to planning for 

biometric air exit has been partly in response to our recommendation that 

DHS identify additional sources for the operational impacts of air exit not 

addressed in the pilot programs’ evaluation and to incorporate these 

sources into its air exit decision making and planning. As of April 2013, 

the department’s planning efforts are focused on developing a biometric 

exit system for airports, with the potential for a similar solution to be rolled 

out at seaports, according to DHS officials. However, in October 2010, 

DHS identified three primary reasons why it has been unable to 

determine how and when to implement a biometric air exit solution: 

(1) the methods of collecting biometric data could disrupt the flow of 

travelers through air terminals; (2) air carriers and airport authorities had 

not allowed DHS to examine mechanisms through which DHS could 

incorporate biometric data collection into passenger processing at the 

departure gate; and (3) challenges existed in capturing biometric data at 

the point of departure, including determining what personnel should be 

responsible for the capture of biometric information at airports.

27

 

25Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3668-70 (2008).

In May 

2012, DHS reported internally on the results of S&T’s analysis of previous 

air exit pilot programs and assessment of available technologies, and the 

26GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited Understanding of Air

Exit Options, GAO-10-860 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2010).

27In our previous reviews of DHS’s efforts to pursue biometric exit capabilities, DHS’s 

plans have approached development of a biometric exit system through a phased 

approach that involved conducting pilots to inform eventual planning for long-term 

solutions. Different pilots were created to inform solutions at air/seaports and land ports. 

See GAO-10-13. 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-602T 

report made recommendations to support the planning and development 

of a biometric air exit capability.28 In that report, DHS concluded that the 

building blocks to implement an effective biometric air exit system were 

available. However, DHS reported that significant questions remained 

regarding (1) the effectiveness of current biographic air exit processes 

and the error rates in collecting or matching data, (2) methods of costeffectively integrating biometrics into the air departure processes (e.g., 

matching arrival and departure records based on biometric information 

like fingerprints rather than based on biographic information, such as 

names and dates of birth), (3) the additional value biometric air exit would 

provide compared with the current biographic air exit process, and (4) the 

overall value and cost of a biometric air exit capability. The report 

included nine recommendations to help inform DHS’s planning for 

biometric air exit, such as directing DHS to develop explicit goals and 

objectives for biometric air exit and an evaluation framework that would, 

among other things, assess the value of collecting biometric data in 

addition to biographic data and determine whether biometric air exit is 

economically justified.29

DHS reported that, by May 2014, it planned to take steps to address the 

recommendations in its report; however, according to DHS Office of 

Policy and S&T officials, the department has not yet completed actions in 

response to these recommendations, although DHS officials reported that 

DHS has plans to do so to help support development of a biometric air 

exit concept of operations. For example, DHS’s report recommended that 

DHS develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit and use 

scenario-based testing rather than operational pilot programs to inform 

the concept of operations for biometric air exit. As of April 2013, DHS 

officials stated that they expect to finalize goals and objectives in the near 

 

28DHS, DHS Biometric Air Exit: Analysis, Recommendations and Next Steps, draft final 

report (Washington, D.C.: May 2012).

29The report recommended that DHS take the following actions: (1) develop explicit goals 

and objectives for biometric air exit, (2) leverage improvements in passenger facilitation 

and biometric technology to support a concept of operations, (3) use developmental 

scenario testing instead of pilot programs to validate a concept of operations, (4) establish 

collaborative relationships with airports and airlines, (5) use operational tests to validate 

performance and cost estimates, (6) develop an evaluation framework for biometric air 

exit, (7) employ a holistic approach to assess the costs and benefits of comprehensive 

biometric entry and exit processes, (8) determine whether biometric air exit is 

economically justified, and (9) incrementally deploy biometric air exit to airports where it is 

cost-effective to do so.
 

Page 16 GAO-13-602T 

future and are making plans for future scenario-based testing. In addition, 

DHS’s report stated that new traveler facilitation tools and technologies—

for example, online check-in, self-service, and paperless technology—

could support more cost-effective ways to screen travelers, and that these 

improvements should be leveraged when developing plans for biometric

air exit. However, DHS officials stated that there may be challenges to 

leveraging new technologies to the extent that U.S. airports and airlines 

rely on older, proprietary systems that may be difficult to update to 

incorporate new technologies. Furthermore, DHS officials stated they face 

challenges in coordinating with airlines and airports, which have 

expressed significant reluctance about biometric exit because of concerns 

over its effect on operations and potential costs. To address these 

concerns, DHS is conducting outreach and soliciting information from 

airlines and airports regarding their operations.

DHS officials stated that the goal of its current efforts is to develop 

information about options for biometric exit and to report to Congress in 

time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding (1) the additional 

benefits that biometric exit provides beyond enhanced biographic exit and 

(2) costs associated with biometric exit. As part of our ongoing work, we 

are assessing DHS’s progress in meeting its goals for addressing the 

recommendations in its biometric exit report by May 2014. We plan to 

report on the results of our analysis in July 2013.

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and members of the 

subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 

to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

For information about this statement please contact Rebecca Gambler at 

(202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Other individuals making key contributions included 

Kathryn Bernet, Assistant Director; Susan Baker; Frances A. Cook; 

Alana Finley; Lara Miklozek; Amanda Miller; and Ashley D. Vaughan.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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