DEFENSE 

HEADQUARTERS

DOD Needs to 

Periodically Review 

and Improve Visibility 

Of Combatant 

Commands’ Resources

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2013

GAO-13-293

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-293, a report to 

congressional committees

May 2013

DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS

DOD Needs to Periodically Review and Improve 

Visibility Of Combatant Commands' Resources

Why GAO Did This Study

To perform its missions around the 

world, DOD operates geographic 

combatant commands each with 

thousands of personnel. In response to 

direction from the congressional 

committees to review the resources of 

the combatant commands, GAO (1) 

identified the trends in the resources 

devoted to DOD’s geographic 

combatant commands and their

service component commands, and (2) 

assessed the extent that DOD has 

processes in place to manage and 

oversee the resources of the 

combatant commands. For this review, 

GAO obtained and analyzed data on 

resources, to include authorized 

positions and mission and 

headquarters-support costs, for five 

regional combatant commands’ and 

their service component commands, 

excluding U.S. Central Command. 

GAO also interviewed officials 

regarding commands’ manpower and 

personnel policies and procedures for 

reporting resources.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends DOD: require a 

periodic evaluation of the combatant 

commands’ size and structure; use 

existing systems to manage and track 

all assigned personnel; develop a 

process to gather information on 

authorized manpower and assigned 

personnel at the service component 

commands; and require information in 

the budget on authorized positions, 

full-time equivalents, and funding for 

each combatant command. DOD nonconcurred with GAO’s first 

recommendation, but GAO believes it

is still needed to add rigor to the

manpower requirements process. DOD 

concurred with GAO’s three other 

recommendations. 

What GAO Found

GAO’s analysis of resources devoted to the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

geographic combatant commands shows that authorized military and civilian 

positions and mission and headquarters-support costs have grown considerably 

over the last decade due to the addition of two new commands and increases in 

authorized positions at theater special operations commands. Data provided by 

the commands shows that authorized military and civilian positions increased by 

about 50 percent from fiscal years 2001 through 2012, to about 10,100 

authorized positions. In addition, mission and headquarters support-costs at the 

combatant commands more than doubled from fiscal years 2007 through 2012, 

to about $1.1 billion. Both authorized military and civilian positions and mission 

and headquarters-support costs at the service component commands supporting 

the combatant commands also increased. Data on the number of personnel 

performing contract services across the combatant commands and service 

component commands varied or was unavailable, and thus trends could not be 

identified. 

DOD has taken some steps to manage combatant commands’ resources, but its 

processes to review size and oversee the commands have four primary 

weaknesses that challenge the department’s ability to make informed decisions. 

• DOD considers the combatant commands’ requests for additional positions, 

but it does not periodically evaluate the commands’ authorized positions to 

ensure they are still needed to meet the commands’ assigned missions.

• DOD tracks some assigned personnel; however, all personnel supporting the 

commands are not included in DOD’s personnel management system and 

reviews of assigned personnel vary by command. 

• The service component commands support both service and combatant 

command missions. However, the Joint Staff and combatant commands lack 

visibility and oversight over the authorized manpower and personnel at the 

service component commands to determine whether functions at the 

combatant commands can be fulfilled by service component command 

personnel. 

• Each military department submits annual budget documents for operation 

and maintenance to inform Congress of total authorized positions, full-time 

equivalents, and mission and headquarters-support funding for all combatant 

commands that they support. However, these documents do not provide 

transparency into the resources directed to each combatant command. 

GAO’s work on strategic human capital management found that high-performing 

organizations periodically reevaluate their human capital practices and use 

complete and reliable data to help achieve their missions and ensure resources 

are properly matched to the needs of today’s environment. Until DOD effectively 

manages the resources of the combatant commands, it may be difficult to ensure 

that the commands are properly sized to meet their assigned missions, or to 

identify opportunities to carry out those missions efficiently.

View GAO-13-293. For more information, 

contact John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 

or pendletonj@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Letter 1 

Background 4

Geographic Combatant Commands’ Resources Have Grown 

Considerably over the Last Decade 9

DOD Has Taken Steps to Manage Combatant Commands’ 

Resources, but Its Processes to Review Size and to Oversee 

Commands Have Weaknesses 21

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 34

Agency Comments and our Evaluation 35

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 38

Appendix II Mission and Headquarters-Support Costs in Nominal Terms 42

Appendix III Resources at U.S. Africa Command and its Service 

Component Commands 43

Appendix IV Resources at U.S. European Command and its Service 

Component Commands 46

Appendix V Resources at U.S. Northern Command and its Service 

Component Commands 50

Appendix VI Resources at U.S. Pacific Command and its Service 

Component Commands 54

Appendix VII Resources at U.S. Southern Command and its Service 

Component Commands 58

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Appendix VIII Areas of Responsibility and Headquarters Locations of the 

Geographic Combatant Commands and Some of Their 

Components 61

Appendix IX Comments from the Department of Defense 63

Appendix X GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 66

Tables

Table 1: Combatant Commands, Subordinate Unified Commands, 

and Their Combatant Command Support Agents 7

Table 2: Mission and Headquarters-Support Costs at Five 

Geographic Combatant Commands in Fiscal Years 2007 

through 2012 42

Table 3: Mission and Headquarters-Support Costs in Fiscal Years 

2007 through 2012 for the Service Component Commands 

That Support Five Geographic Combatant Commands 42

Figures

Figure 1: Areas of Responsibility and Headquarters Locations of 

the Geographic Combatant Commands, and some of Their 

Subordinate Unified Commands, and Their Service 

Components Commands 6

Figure 2: Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions at 

Five Geographic Combatant Commands in Fiscal Years 

2001 through 2012 11

Figure 3: Combatant Commands’ Number of Authorized Military 

and Civilian Positions in Fiscal Years 2004 through 2012 13

Figure 4: Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions in 

Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012 at the Service Component 

Commands That Support Five Geographic Combatant 

Commands 16

Figure 5: Mission and Headquarters-Support Costs at Five 

Geographic Combatant Commands in Fiscal Years 2007 

through 2012 18
Page iii GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Figure 6: Mission and Headquarters-Support Costs in Fiscal Years 

2007 Through 2012 for the Service Component Commands 

That Support Five Geographic Combatant Commands 20

Figure 7: Process to Review and Validate Proposed Increases in 

Positions at Combatant Commands 24

Abbreviations

AFRICOM U.S. Africa Command

DOD Department of Defense

e-JMAPS Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System

EUCOM U.S. European Command

NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command 

PACOM U.S. Pacific Command

SOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

May 15, 2013

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

To perform its variety of missions around the world, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) operates geographic combatant commands, and each 

has thousands of headquarters personnel who assist in coordinating the 

department’s military operations combating transnational terrorism, 

building foreign partner nations’ military capabilities, and conducting 

international disaster-relief efforts and noncombatant evacuations, among 

other missions.1 The geographic combatant commands provide unity of 

command over all the United States forces in a specific region. Generally, 

the commander of each combatant command has the authority to 

organize the structure of each command as necessary to carry out 

assigned missions and maintain staff to assist in exercising authority, 

direction and control over subordinate commands and other assigned 

forces.2 These subordinate commands include dedicated service 

component commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task 

 

1

DOD has nine combatant commands with an assigned geographic region or assigned 

function. The six geographic commands, which have defined areas of operation and have 

a distinct regional military focus, are U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. 

European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. 

Southern Command. Our review focused on the geographic combatant commands, but 

excluded U.S. Central Command. The three functional commands, which have unique 

capabilities and operate worldwide, are U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic 

Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. 

2

See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 164; Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, Functions of the 

Department of Defense and Its Major Components, (Dec. 21, 2010).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

forces, each with its own staff, which support the combatant commands in 

conducting their operational missions.

In January 2012, the Administration released defense strategic guidance 

to direct defense priorities and spending over the coming decade.3 It is 

intended to help guide decisions in determining the size and shape of the 

department for the future, with a global presence emphasizing the AsiaPacific and Middle East regions of the world. One of the principles 

outlined in the guidance is the need to examine the existing campaign 

and contingency plans in the context of the new strategy so that more 

limited resources may be better aligned with current mission 

requirements.4 Further, it states that DOD must continue to reduce the 

cost of doing business, which includes reducing the rate of growth in 

personnel costs and finding further efficiencies in overhead and 

headquarters, in its business practices, and in other support activities. At 

a time of growing economic and fiscal constraints, it is critical that DOD 

ensure the geographic combatant commands, their subordinate unified 

commands and other activities, and respective service component 

commands have the appropriate levels of resources to meet current 

mission requirements in the most efficient and effective manner possible.

In response to direction from the congressional committees to review the 

resources of the combatant commands,5 this report (1) identifies the 

trends in resources devoted to DOD’s geographic combatant commands 

and their service component commands, and (2) assesses the extent that 

DOD has processes in place to manage and oversee the resources of the 

combatant commands. 6

 

3

Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 

Defense, (Jan. 3, 2012). 

4

Campaign and contingency plans include a series of related military operations aimed at 

achieving objectives within a given time and regional area, and any major contingencies 

that can reasonably be anticipated.

5

See H. Rep. No. 112-479 (May, 11, 2012) and Conf. Rep. No. 112-705 (Dec. 8, 2012) 

accompanying H.R. 4310 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

6

For purposes of this report, we use the term “resources” to refer to authorized military 

and civilian positions, assigned personnel, personnel performing contract services, and 

mission and headquarters-support costs.
 

Page 3 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

To conduct this work we identified sources of information within DOD that 

would provide data on the resources at the geographic combatant 

commands, to include their subordinate unified commands and other 

activities, and corresponding service component commands. We focused 

our review on five geographic combatant commands—U.S. Africa 

Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. 

Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command. Our review excluded 

U.S. Central Command and its corresponding service component 

commands due to their responsibilities to support military operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan during the past several years. To identify trends in 

resources devoted to DOD’s geographic combatant commands, to 

include their subordinate unified commands and other activities, and their 

service component commands, we obtained and analyzed available 

authorized positions and actual assigned personnel (military, civilian, and 

contractors) data and operation and maintenance obligations data for 

each of the five geographic combatant commands, and their 

corresponding service component commands from fiscal years 2001 

through 2012.7 We focused our review on operation and maintenance 

obligations—as these obligations reflect the primary mission and 

headquarters-support costs of the combatant commands, to include their 

subordinate unified commands and other activities, and their 

corresponding service component commands—to include the costs for 

civilian personnel and service-support contracts.8 Our review excluded 

obligations of operation and maintenance funding for DOD’s overseas 

contingency operations not part of DOD’s base budget. Since historical 

data was unavailable in some cases, we limited our analysis of trends to 

authorized military and civilian positions at the combatant commands 

from fiscal years 2001 through 2012 and authorized military and civilian 

positions at the service component commands from fiscal years 2008 

through 2012. Due to the availability of data, we similarly limited our 

analysis of trends in operation and maintenance obligations at the 

combatant commands and service component commands to fiscal years 

 

7

For purpose of this report, authorized positions refer to military and civilian positions that 

have been approved by DOD components for funding for a specific fiscal year. Also, 

assigned personnel refer to military and civilian personnel assigned to fill authorized or 

temporary positions, and other personnel performing contract services.

8

For purposes of this report, we refer to these operation and maintenance obligations as 

mission and headquarters-support costs. Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect 

the costs for civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs. This does not 

include the costs for military personnel.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

2007 through 2012. We assessed the reliability of the data given these 

and other limitations, and we determined it was sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. To determine the extent to which DOD has processes in place 

to manage and oversee the resources of the combatant commands, we 

obtained and analyzed documentation on DOD’s policies, procedures, 

and systems used for determining and validating manpower 

requirements9 and managing personnel at the combatant commands, to 

include their subordinate unified commands and other activities, and 

corresponding service component commands. We also interviewed 

officials at DOD, the Joint Staff, the geographic combatant commands 

and some of their respective subordinate unified commands, and the 

service component commands to obtain documentation on any steps 

DOD had taken to reexamine the size and structure of its combatant 

commands and the processes that the combatant commands and their 

components use to determine, track and report their manpower and 

assigned personnel (military, civilians, and contractors) and mission and 

headquarters-support costs.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to May 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

The department’s Unified Command Plan sets forth basic guidance to all 

combatant commanders and establishes the missions, responsibilities, 

and areas of geographic responsibility among all the combatant 

commands.10 There are currently nine combatant commands—six 

geographic and three functional. The six geographic combatant 

 

9

A manpower requirement is defined as a human resource needed to accomplish 

specified workloads of an organization broken out by command, activity, skills, grade and 

location. 

10DOD’s Unified Command Plan is a key strategic document prepared by the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff is required by 10 USC § 161 to review the Unified Campaign Plan not less often 

than every two years, and to recommend any changes to the President through the 

Secretary of Defense.

Background 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

commands have responsibilities for accomplishing military operations in 

regional areas of the world. The three functional combatant commands 

operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide unique 

capabilities to the geographic combatant commands and the military 

services. In addition, each geographic combatant command is supported 

by multiple service component commands that help provide and 

coordinate service-specific forces, such as units, detachments, 

organizations and installations, to help fulfill the commands’ current and 

future operational requirements. Figure 1 is a map of the areas of 

responsibility and headquarters locations of the geographic combatant 

commands, to include some of their subordinate unified commands and 

their respective service component commands.
Page 6 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Figure 1: Areas of Responsibility and Headquarters Locations of the Geographic Combatant Commands, some of their 

Subordinate Unified Commands, and their Service Component Commands

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

South Pole

PACOM

AFRICOM

North Pole

NORTHCOM

EUCOM

U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM)

U.S. Southern 

Command 

(SOUTHCOM)

U.S. Africa

Command (AFRICOM)

U.S. Pacific Command 

(PACOM)

U.S. European Command (EUCOM)

U.S.

Central 

Command 

(CENTCOM)

Interactivity instructions: Roll over the combatant command name to see headquarters locations. See appendix VIII for the non-interactive, printer-friendly version. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

According to DOD Directive 5100.03, Support of the Headquarters of 

Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands, the military 

departments—as combatant command support agents—are responsible 

for programming, budgeting, and funding the administrative and logistical 

support of the headquarters of the combatant commands and subordinate 

unified commands. On an annual basis the three military departments 

assess needs and request funding as part of their respective operation 

and maintenance budget justification to meet this requirement to support 

the combatant commands and subordinate unified commands. The 

directive assigns each military department responsibility for specific 

combatant commands and subordinate unified commands. Table 1 

provides a listing of the combatant commands, their subordinate unified 

commands, and the military departments that support them.

Table 1: Combatant Commands, Subordinate Unified Commands, and Their Combatant Command Support Agents 

Command and Subordinate Commands (indented) Support Agent

HQ U.S. Africa Command Secretary of the Army

HQ Special Operations Command Africa Secretary of the Army

HQ U.S. Central Command Secretary of the Air Force

HQ Special Operations Command Central Secretary of the Air Force

HQ U.S. Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command Secretary of the Air Force

HQ U.S. European Command Secretary of the Army

HQ Special Operations Command Europe Secretary of the Army

HQ U.S. Northern Command Secretary of the Air Force

HQ U.S. Pacific Command Secretary of the Navy

HQ U.S. Forces Korea Secretary of the Army

HQ U.S. Forces Japan Secretary of the Navy

HQ Alaskan Command Secretary of the Navy

HQ Special Operations Command Pacific Secretary of the Navy

HQ Special Operations Command Korea Secretary of the Army

HQ U.S. Southern Command Secretary of the Army

HQ Special Operations Command South Secretary of the Army

HQ U.S. Special Operations Command Secretary of the Air Force

Joint Special Operations Command Secretary of the Army

HQ U.S. Strategic Command Secretary of the Air Force

HQ U.S. Cyber Command Secretary of the Air Force

HQ U.S. Transportation Command Secretary of the Air Force

Source: Table presented in DOD Directive 5100.03 Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Note: According to DOD Directive 5100.03, arrangements for administrative and logistical support of 

the headquarters of other joint activities established within a particular combatant command shall be 

resourced through agreements developed between the combatant command and other DOD 

components or as otherwise directed.

Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, 

the commanders of these combatant commands are given authority to 

organize the structure of their commands as they deem necessary to 

carry out assigned missions and maintain staff to assist them in 

exercising authority, direction and control over subordinate unified 

commands and other assigned forces. The commands’ structure may 

include a principal staff officer, personal staff to the commander, a special 

staff group for technical, administrative, or tactical advice and other 

groups of staff that are responsible for managing personnel, ensuring the 

availability of intelligence, directing operations, coordinating logistics, 

preparing long-range or future plans, and integrating communications 

systems.11 The commands may also have liaisons or representatives from 

other DOD agencies and U.S. government organizations integrated into 

their staffs to enhance the command’s effectiveness in accomplishing 

their missions. While the commands generally conform to these 

organizational principles, there may be variations in a command’s 

structure based on its unique mission areas and responsibilities.

The staff of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or a 

joint task force is generally composed of military and civilian personnel 

drawn from the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps, personnel from 

other DOD components, interagency personnel, and other personnel 

associated with contracted services.12 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Instruction 1001.01A, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program, 

outlines the process for determining and documenting requirements for 

manpower at joint organizations, including the combatant commands.13

The instruction states that commands should be structured to the 

minimum essential size required to meet approved missions and average 

workload expected for at least the next 36 months. The commands are to 

consider a number of factors when determining manpower requirements, 

 

11Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (March 2009) 

states that staff organization generally should conform to these organizational principles. 

12Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

13Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A, Joint Manpower and 

Personnel Program, (Oct. 1, 2010).
 

Page 9 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

including the total number of positions needed and the mix of military, 

civilian, and contractor support needed.14 After the commands’ manpower 

requirements have been determined and validated, the requirements are 

documented on each command’s manning document, called the Joint 

Table of Distribution, which contains permanent authorized positions for 

military, civilians and other personnel responsible for managing the dayto-day operations of the command.15 Other processes exist to identify 

additional manpower that commands’ may require to shift to a wartime, 

contingency or mobilization footing, and that may be required to fill 

temporary organizations that are established to meet short-term mission 

requirements.

Since fiscal year 2001, the number of authorized military and civilian 

positions and mission and headquarters-support costs devoted to the five 

geographic combatant commands that we reviewed substantially 

increased. In our analysis of data provided by the commands, we found 

considerable increases in the number of authorized military and civilian 

positions—about 50 percent from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 

2012—and in the costs for mission and headquarters-support—more than 

doubling from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2012—at the five 

combatant commands that we reviewed.16 Data on the service component 

commands also indicated that authorized military and civilian positions 

increased by more than 30 percent from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 

and mission and headquarters-support costs increased by more than 40 

percent from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. In addition to data on 

authorized military and civilian positions, we found that the data on the 

number of personnel performing contract services across the combatant 

 

14According to Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for 

Determining Workforce Mix (Apr. 12, 2010), DOD’s workforce shall be established to 

successfully execute missions at a low-to-moderate level or risk. The instruction 

establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for determining the 

appropriate mix within the department of military and civilian manpower and contractor 

support.

15The Joint Table of Distribution is a manpower document that identifies positions and 

enumerates the spaces that have been approved for each organizational element of a 

joint activity for a specific fiscal year and those spaces which have been accepted for 

planning and programming purposes for the subsequent five fiscal years. 

16We included positions at the commands’ subordinate unified commands and joint task 

forces for purposes of our analysis, since these positions are part of the commands’ 

authorized structure that is documented on its Joint Table of Distribution.

Geographic 

Combatant 

Commands’ 

Resources Have 

Grown Considerably 

over the Last Decade
 

Page 10 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

commands and service component commands varied or was unavailable, 

and thus trends could not be identified.

The authorized number of military and civilian positions for the five 

geographic combatant commands that we reviewed rose from about 

6,800 in fiscal year 2001 to more than 10,100 in fiscal year 2012, 

primarily due to the addition of new organizations and missions. Our 

analysis of data showed that the establishment of U.S. Northern 

Command in fiscal year 2003 and U.S. Africa Command in fiscal year 

2008 drove the increase in the total number of authorized military and 

civilian positions since fiscal year 2001. U.S. Northern Command was 

established in fiscal year 2003 to provide command and control over 

DOD’s homeland defense mission and to coordinate defense support of 

civil authorities. U.S. Africa Command was established in fiscal year 2008 

to focus U.S. security efforts within the African continent and strengthen 

security cooperation with African countries, which had been primarily the 

responsibility of U.S. European Command.17 At the remaining combatant 

commands, our analysis showed growth in the number of authorized 

positions in each command’s theater special operations command, which 

further drove overall position increases. For example, from fiscal years 

2001 through 2012 the number of authorized positions at U.S. Pacific, 

European, and Southern Commands’ theater special operations 

commands increased by almost 400 positions, largely to fulfill increased 

mission requirements. Figure 2 shows the increases or changes in total 

authorized military and civilian positions at the five geographic combatant 

commands that we reviewed.

 

17U.S. Africa Command reached initial operating capability in fiscal year 2008 and 

reached full operating capability in fiscal year 2009. Approximately 420 positions 

authorized for U.S Africa Command were transitioned out of U.S. European Command 

during fiscal years 2006 through 2008, prior to U.S. Africa Command becoming fully 

operational.

Number of Authorized 

Military and Civilian 

Positions Has Grown at 

Combatant and Service 

Component Commands
 

Page 11 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Figure 2: Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions at Five Geographic Combatant Commands in Fiscal Years 2001 

through 2012

Note: Authorized military and civilian positions represent approved, funded manpower requirements 

at the geographic combatant commands and do not include personnel performing contract services.

U.S. Africa Command was established in fiscal year 2008, although it did not become fully operational 

as an independent command till fiscal year 2009, and therefore its authorized positions are not 

reflected in fiscal year 2008. 

The geographic combatant commands have also become much more 

reliant on civilian personnel. We found that the number of authorized 

civilian positions at the combatant commands almost doubled from about 

2,370 in fiscal year 2004 to about 4,450 in fiscal year 2012. In contrast, 

the number of authorized military positions decreased about 9 percent 

from approximately 6,250 to 5,670 in the same period. This changed the 

composition of the commands markedly. In fiscal year 2004, military 

positions made up about three-quarters of total authorized positions 

supporting the combatant commands that we reviewed; however, due to 

the substantial increase in the number of authorized civilian positions the 

proportion of military positions at the combatant commands is now just 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

over half. According to DOD officials, the increase in authorized civilian 

positions is due in part to DOD-directed efforts to convert positions filled 

by military personnel or contractors to civilians. As part of the Secretary of 

Defense’s 2010 efficiency initiative, baselines were established for the 

number of authorized civilian positions at the combatant commands for 

fiscal years 2011 through 2013.18 In June 2011, the Secretary of Defense 

directed a series of initiatives designed to more effectively manage 

combatant command manpower and funding, which further set baselines 

for civilian manpower at the combatant commands for fiscal years 2013 

through 2017.19 Any growth above these baselines in fiscal years 2013 

through 2017 has to be revalidated by the Joint Staff and military 

services, and must be based on workload and funding considerations. 

This baseline in civilian positions is reflected in our analysis of the number 

of authorized positions at the five geographic combatant commands, with 

growth in civilian positions slowing significantly from fiscal years 2011 

through 2012. Figure 3 shows changes in the combatant commands’ 

number of authorized military and civilian positions from fiscal years 2004 

through 2012.

 

18The Secretary of Defense’s 2010 efficiency initiative directed the department to take a 

number of steps to limit personnel growth across the department, including instituting caps 

on authorized civilian personnel, which included civilians at the combatant commands and 

service component commands. 

19Secretary of Defense, Combatant Command (COCOM) Civilian and Contractor 

Manpower Management, (June 29, 2011).
 

Page 13 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Figure 3: Combatant Commands’ Number of Authorized Military and Civilian 

Positions in Fiscal Years 2004 through 2012

Note: We limited our analysis of authorized military and civilian positions to fiscal years 2004 through 

2012 because an unclassified breakout of U.S. Pacific Command’s authorized military and civilian 

positions for fiscal years 2001 through 2003 was unavailable. Authorized military and civilian positions 

represent approved, funded manpower requirements at the combatant commands and do not include 

personnel performing contract services.

The availability of data on the number of contractor personnel or full-time 

equivalents20 varied across the combatant commands, and thus trends 

could not be identified. DOD officials stated the department generally 

tracks and reports expenditures for contract services, and that the 

combatant commands were not required to maintain historical data on the 

number of contractor personnel. We found that the combatant commands 

had taken initial steps to collect data on contractor full-time equivalents 

and reliance on personnel performing contractor services varies across 

the combatant commands. For example, U.S. Northern Command 

 

20Full-time equivalent employment is the basic measure of the levels of employment used 

in budgeting and is the total number of hours worked (or to be worked) divided by the 

number of compensable hours applicable to each fiscal year.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

reported having 460 contractor full-time equivalents at its command in 

fiscal year 2012, whereas U.S. European Command reported having 169 

contractor full-time equivalents supporting the command in fiscal year 

2012. Our work over the past decade on DOD’s contracting activities has 

noted the need for DOD to obtain better data on its contracted services 

and personnel to enable it to make more informed management 

decisions, ensure department-wide goals and objectives are achieved, 

and have the resources to achieve desired outcomes. In response to 

GAO’s past work, DOD has outlined its approach to document contractor 

full-time equivalents and collect manpower data from contactors. 

However, DOD does not expect to fully collect contractors’ manpower 

data until fiscal year 2016.21 The Secretary of Defense, as part of his 

2010 efficiency initiative, directed the department to reduce funding for 

service-support contracts by 10 percent per year across the department 

for fiscal years 2011 through 2013. In June 2011, the Secretary of 

Defense established limits on service support contract expenditures at the 

combatant commands in fiscal years 2011 through 2013.22

Our analysis of data provided by the military services showed that total 

authorized military and civilian positions at the service component 

commands supporting the geographic combatant commands we reviewed 

increased by about one-third from about 5,970 in fiscal year 2008 to 

about 7,800 in fiscal year 2012.23 The increases in authorized military and 

civilian positions at the service component commands supporting U.S. 

European Command account for more than one-third of the total increase 

in authorized positions across all the service component commands. 

Among the services, the Army’s service component commands saw the 

greatest increase in authorized positions, accounting for about 85 percent 

 

21See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Further Actions Needed to Improve Accountability for 

DOD’s Inventory of Contracted Services, GAO-12-357, (Washington, D.C. Apr. 6, 2012); 

Defense Headquarters: Further Efforts to Examine Resources Needs and Improve Data 

Could Provide Additional Opportunities for Cost Savings, GAO-12-345, (Washington, 

D.C.: March 21, 2012); and Defense Acquisitions: Further Action Needed to Better 

Implement Requirements for Conducting Inventory of Service Contract Activities, 

GAO-11-192 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2011). 

22Secretary of Defense, Combatant Command (COCOM) Civilian and Contractor 

Manpower Management. 

23Each combatant command is supported by multiple service component commands that 

help provide and coordinate service-specific forces—such as units, detachments, 

organizations and installations—to help fulfill the command’s current and future 

operational requirements. 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

of the total increase in authorized positions. The service component 

commands fulfill dual roles: organizing, training and equipping assigned 

service-specific forces while also assisting the combatant commands in 

their employment24 during military operations. According to DOD officials, 

service component commands with assigned forces such as Pacific Air 

Forces and Army Europe, are likely to have larger staffs than service 

component commands that do not have assigned forces, such as Marine 

Forces Africa. Figure 4 shows the increase in authorized positions at the 

service component commands that we reviewed. Similar to the data on 

the number of personnel performing contract services at the combatant 

commands, we found that the data on the number of personnel 

performing contact services at the service component commands varied 

or was unavailable, and thus trends could not be identified. We found that 

some service component commands do not maintain data on the number 

of personnel performing contract services and others used varying 

methodologies to track these personnel, counting the number of 

contractors on hand or the number of identification badges issued.

 

24DOD defines “employment” as the strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Figure 4: Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions in Fiscal Years 2008 

through 2012 at the Service Component Commands That Support Five Geographic 

Combatant Commands

Note: One of the Navy’s service component commands supports both U.S. Africa and European 

Commands and the authorized positions are reflected in the totals for U.S. European Command’s 

service components. The Air Force’s service component for U.S. Africa Command was disestablished 

in fiscal year 2012. U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa now supports both U.S. Africa and 

European Commands and its authorized positions are represented in totals for U.S. European 

Command’s service components. Total authorized military and civilian positions represent approved 

funded manpower requirements at the combatant commands’ service component commands and 

does not include personnel performing contract services.

When adjusted for inflation, total mission and headquarters-support costs 

from fiscal years 2007 through 2012—including costs for civilian pay, 

contract services, travel, and equipment—more than doubled at the five 

geographic combatant commands we reviewed. The cost growth, from 

about $500 million in fiscal year 2007 to about $1.1 billion in fiscal year 

2012, primarily was due to increases in contract services and civilian 

Mission and HeadquartersSupport Costs Have Grown 

for Combatant and Service 

Component Commands
 

Page 17 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

pay.25 For example, U.S. Southern Command’s mission and 

headquarters-support costs more than quadrupled from about $45 million 

in fiscal year 2007 to about $202 million in fiscal year 2012; more than 

half of the increase was attributable to contract services, and 20 percent 

of the increase was attributable to civilian pay.26 In addition, U.S. Pacific 

Command’s mission and headquarters-support costs increased from 

about $175 million in fiscal year 2007 to about $246 million in fiscal year 

2012; about 65 percent of these cost increases was attributable to civilian 

pay.27 Figure 5 shows the overall increase or changes in the mission and 

headquarters-support costs at the five geographic commands that we 

reviewed from fiscal years 2007 through 2012.

 

25All mission and headquarters-support costs in this report are in constant fiscal year 2012 

dollars unless otherwise noted. Costs were adjusted for inflation using the deflator for 

DOD total obligation authority by appropriation title-operation and maintenance, excluding 

the defense health program.

26According to U.S. Southern Command officials, the increase in mission and 

headquarters-support costs was due to the following four areas: the command’s support of 

Operation Unified Response; the military’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake; the 

outfitting and continuing costs of U.S. Southern Command’s new headquarters building; 

and the integration of costs for U.S. Special Operations Command South and for Detainee 

Operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, into U.S. Southern Command’s operation and 

maintenance budget.

27According to U.S. Pacific Command officials, part of the increase in mission and 

headquarters-support costs was due to support for the Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative; an 

environmental study for Guam; and mission growth at Joint Prisoners of War/Missing in 

Action Command. 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Figure 5: Mission and Headquarters-Support Costs at Five Geographic Combatant 

Commands in Fiscal Years 2007 through 2012

Note: Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance 

reported by DOD components and is represented in constant fiscal year 2012 dollars. These costs

include compensation of civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs. This does not 

include the costs expended by other components such as the Defense Intelligence Agency or U.S. 

Special Operations Command or the costs for military personnel. See Appendix II for nominal 

obligations.

When adjusted for inflation, total mission and headquarters-support costs 

increased by more than 40 percent at the service component commands 

we reviewed from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. The costs grew from

about $430 million dollars in fiscal year 2007 to about $605 million in 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

fiscal year 2012.28 The increase primarily was due to the establishment of 

U.S. Africa Command’s supporting service component commands, which 

first reported costs in fiscal year 2009. U.S. Africa Command’s mission 

and headquarters-support costs were $71 million in fiscal year 2012. In 

addition, the service component commands at U.S. European and Pacific 

Commands experienced cost increases from fiscal years 2007 through 

2012 of about $53 million and $54 million respectively, which accounted 

for the majority of the remaining increase in mission and headquarterssupport costs. Figure 6 shows the increase in the mission and 

headquarters-support costs at the service component commands that we

reviewed from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. The Army’s service 

component commands accounted for more than half of the total increase 

in mission and headquarters-support costs across all service component 

commands over the period. Across the service component commands the 

Air Force components account for the majority of the mission and 

headquarters support–costs. Air Force officials explained that some of 

their service component commands have assigned forces and that the 

higher costs at these commands reflect support for the military service’s 

organize, train, and equip mission.

 

28All mission and headquarters-support costs in this report are in constant fiscal year 2012 

dollars unless otherwise noted. Costs were adjusted for inflation using the deflator for 

DOD total obligation authority by appropriation title-operation and maintenance, excluding 

the defense health program. 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Figure 6: Mission and Headquarters-Support Costs in Fiscal Years 2007 Through 

2012 for the Service Component Commands That Support Five Geographic 

Combatant Commands

Note: Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance 

reported by DOD components and is represented in constant fiscal year 2012 dollars. See Appendix 

II for nominal obligations. These costs reflect the costs for civilian personnel and contract services, 

among others costs. The Navy’s service component commands’ mission and headquarters-support 

costs reflect support of both U.S. Africa and European Commands, and these costs are reflected in 

the totals of the U.S. European Command’s service components. The Army was unable to provide 

mission and headquarters-support costs for Army Africa prior to fiscal year 2012; therefore costs may 

be understated for U.S. Africa Command’s service components for fiscal years 2009 through 2011.
 

Page 21 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

While DOD has taken some steps to review the combatant commands’ 

size and structure and to identify the commands’ resources, DOD’s 

processes have four primary weaknesses that challenge its ability to 

make informed decisions: (1) the absence of a comprehensive, periodic 

review of the size and structure of the combatant commands, (2) 

inconsistent use of personnel management systems to identify and track 

assigned personnel across the combatant commands, (3) lack of visibility 

by the combatant commands and Joint Staff over authorized manpower 

and personnel at the service component commands, and (4) lack of 

transparent information identifying each combatant command’s personnel 

or mission and headquarters-support funding in the military departments’ 

budget documents for operation and maintenance. Our prior work on 

strategic human capital management found that high-performing

organizations periodically reevaluate their human capital practices and 

use complete and reliable data to help achieve their missions and ensure 

resources are properly matched to the needs of today’s environment.29

Without regularly assessing the size and structure of the combatant 

commands and without complete information on all of the resources 

supporting the combatant commands, DOD cannot ensure that the 

combatant commands are properly sized and structured to meet their 

assigned missions and cannot ensure that commands are managing 

resources efficiently.

Recognizing that there has been significant growth in the size of the 

combatant commands since 2001 due to increases in their assigned 

missions, DOD has taken some steps to slow the growth in command 

personnel and associated mission and headquarters-support costs. In 

November 2007, to improve the links between mission, manpower 

requirements, and resource decisions, the Joint Staff was tasked by the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense with reviewing the authorized positions 

supporting the combatant commands. The review resulted in the 

establishment of baselines in the number of major DOD headquarters 

activity positions30 at each of the geographic and functional combatant 

 

29GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).

30Personnel performing major DOD headquarters activities primarily oversee, direct, and 

control subordinate organizations or units. Their responsibilities may include developing 

guidance, reviewing performance, allocating resources, conducting mid-to-long-range 

budgeting, and in the case of combatant command headquarters, planning for the 

employment of the U.S. military forces. 

DOD Has Taken Steps 

to Manage Combatant 

Commands’ 

Resources, but Its 

Processes to Review 

Size and to Oversee 

Commands Have 

Weaknesses 

DOD Has Taken Some 

Steps to Manage Growth in 

Personnel and Costs at the 

Combatant Commands
 

Page 22 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

commands that could be adjusted based only on the approval of new 

missions.31 However, these baselines apply only to positions performing 

major DOD headquarters activity functions, and our prior work found that

DOD’s major headquarters activity data is not always complete and 

reliable.32 In addition, as part of the Secretary of Defense’s 2010 

efficiency initiative, the combatant commands, along with other 

organizations within the department, were asked to identify efficiencies in 

headquarters and administrative functions, support activities, and other 

overhead. Specifically, the combatant commands were directed to 

perform organizational assessments to identify any disconnects between 

the commands’ priorities and their allocation of resources. Based on 

these assessments and the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the 

combatant commands reduced seven Standing Joint Force 

Headquarters33 to two global Standing Joint Force Headquarters, 

decreased their reliance on individual augmentees34 at two commands, 

and consolidated joint task forces at several commands.35 These changes 

eliminated a total of about 530 authorized positions and about 470 

temporary personnel in total. In addition, some commands, such as U.S. 

European Command and U.S. Northern Command, were directed to 

reduce personnel and consolidate staff functions to better align their 

available resources with their current missions. Other commands, 

however, such as U.S. Africa Command, did not make specific reductions 

as part of the Secretary of Defense’s efficiency initiative.

In 2011, DOD announced that it was studying the regional structure of the 

combatant commands, estimating that it could save $900 million from 

 

31The authorized position baselines were implemented in fiscal year 2010 at U.S. Africa 

Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Southern Command 

and U.S. Pacific Command. Later, in fiscal year 2011, baselines were implemented at 

U.S. Central Command and the functional combatant commands.

32GAO-12-345. 

33A Standing Joint Force Headquarters is an organization that provides a combatant 

command with a full-time, trained, joint command-and-control element focused on 

contingency and crisis-action planning. 

34An individual augmentee is an individual placed to meet the unfunded, temporary 

manpower requirements of a combatant command to augment permanent staff while 

participating in operations that are directed or approved by the President or Secretary of 

Defense. 

35The estimated savings for these reductions were to be achieved between fiscal years 

2012 through 2016. 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

fiscal years 2014 through 2017 by considering alternatives to the current 

construct of regional geographic combatant commands. To achieve the 

estimated cost savings, the Joint Staff considered several alternatives to 

the current structure that involved merging geographic combatant 

commands. However, the Joint Staff has since reviewed and rejected the 

proposed options, in part because they believed that merging commands 

would not achieve the estimated savings. According to Joint Staff officials, 

DOD has reduced funding across all of the geographic and functional 

commands by about $881 million during fiscal years 2014 through 2018, 

as part of the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2014. As part of 

the reductions, officials stated the department plans to reduce civilian 

positions at the combatant commands and Joint Staff by approximately 

400 positions over 5 years through fiscal year 2018. DOD officials stated 

that they would continue to seek additional savings at the combatant 

commands in any subsequent directed reviews.

DOD has an ongoing process to assess the combatant commands’ 

requests for additional positions, but does not periodically evaluate 

whether authorized positions at the combatant commands’ are still 

needed to support their assigned missions. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Instruction 1001.01A, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program, 

outlines a process for determining and validating requirements for 

additional manpower at the combatant commands. According to the 

instruction, requests for additional positions should be mission driven, 

supported by the combatant commands’ priorities, and based on studies 

of the capabilities and readiness of the commands’ personnel. 

Furthermore, the combatant commands should consider other options 

prior to requesting additional positions, such as internally realigning 

personnel, using internal funding for contract positions, and utilizing 

temporary personnel. As part of their request, the combatant commands 

may also rely on manpower studies to support their requests for 

additional positions. For example, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Pacific 

Command are currently undergoing manpower studies to review their size 

and structure as part of DOD’s emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and Middle 

East regions of the world. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Instruction 1001.01A, requests for additional positions are to be 

drafted by the commands and submitted to the Director of the Joint Staff. 

A team made up of representatives from the Joint Staff and the military 

services is then convened to evaluate the request, based on the 

DOD’s Process for 

Managing Combatant 

Commands’ Size and 

Structure Is Focused on 

Proposed Increases and 

Does Not Periodically 

Evaluate Requirements
 

Page 24 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

command’s mission drivers, capability gaps, internal offsets, and 

manpower assessments.36 This team makes recommendations to the 

Director of the Joint Staff and the operations deputies of the military 

services, who decide whether or not to endorse the request for additional 

positions to support each command’s mission. If the request for additional 

positions is endorsed, the authorized positions are initially documented on 

the combatant command’s joint table of distribution and the positions get 

evaluated, along with DOD’s other resource requirements, to determine 

whether or not it will be funded. The combatant commands may also 

submit requests to the Joint Staff for minor changes in their authorized 

structure to meet changing missions as long as they do not affect the total 

number of authorized positions at the command. Figure 7 describes the 

process for reviewing and validating proposed increases in authorized 

positions at the combatant commands.

Figure 7: Process to Review and Validate Proposed Increases in Positions at Combatant Commands

Note: The operations deputies of the military services include the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations and Plans; Navy Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations); Air 

Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations; and Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for 

Plans, Policies and Operations.

 

36Representatives within the Joint Staff directorates for manpower and personnel, 

operations, plans, and force structure, resources and assessments are responsible for 

reviewing each command’s request for additional positions. 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

While DOD and some military services have policies on manpower 

management, we found that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction 1001.01A does not specify a process for reviewing the 

combatant commands’ size and structure and focuses on requests for 

additional positions or nominal changes in authorized positions. 

Specifically, some military service regulations that guide manpower 

requirements at the service component commands require manpower to 

be periodically evaluated to ensure they still meet assigned missions.37

For example, Army Regulation 570-4, Manpower and Equipment Control, 

Manpower Management, suggests that Army components’ manpower 

requirements be reevaluated by Army commanders and agency heads 

every two to five years, and optimally every three years. In addition, DOD 

Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management states that 

manpower policies, procedures, and structures should be periodically 

evaluated to ensure efficient and effective use of manpower resources.38

In contrast, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A 

suggests that manpower requirements at the combatant commands be 

set based on the projection of workload over three years, but it has no 

provisions for reevaluating this determination. DOD officials confirmed 

that there is no periodic evaluation of the commands’ authorized 

positions, in part because there is no process in place to review 

authorized positions when there is a change in roles or missions. Our 

prior work on strategic human capital management found that highperforming organizations stay alert to emerging mission demands and 

remain open to reevaluating their human capital practices in light of their 

demonstrated successes or failures in achieving the organization’s 

strategic objectives.39 In addition, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction 1001.01A does not address personnel associated with 

contracted services. As previously stated, DOD Instruction 1100.22, 

Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, requires DOD’s 

workforce, which includes military and civilian manpower and contractor 

support, to be structured to execute missions at a low-to-moderate level 

or risk. The purpose of DOD Instruction 1100.22, among other things, is 

 

37Army Regulation 570-4, Manpower and Equipment Control, Manpower Management, 

(Feb. 8, 2006), and Air Force Instruction 38-201, Manpower and Organization, 

Management of Manpower Requirements and Authorizations, (Sept. 26, 2011).

38Department of Defense Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management, (Feb. 

12, 2005).

39GAO-02-373SP. 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and prescribe procedures for 

determining the appropriate mix of manpower within the department.

While DOD is aware of the growth in missions and authorized positions at 

the combatant commands since 2001 and has undertaken some efforts to 

manage and assess the size and structure of the combatant commands, 

these efforts did not constitute a comprehensive and periodic bottom-up 

review of the combatant commands’ total workforce. Without a 

comprehensive, periodic evaluation of the commands’ authorized 

positions, DOD will not be able to ensure that the combatant commands 

are properly sized and structured to meet their assigned missions or 

ensure that the commands identify opportunities for managing personnel 

resources more efficiently.

DOD has an electronic system to document and review information about 

authorized positions and assigned military and civilian personnel at the 

combatant commands, but the commands are not consistently inputting 

complete information on all assigned personnel. All of the combatant 

commands that we reviewed use to some extent the Electronic Joint 

Manpower and Personnel System (e-JMAPS) to manage their 

commands’ manpower and personnel; however, we found differences 

across the commands in how they use the system to manage their 

assigned personnel. DOD has identified e-JMAPS as the system of 

record to document the combatant commands’ organizational structure 

and according to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 

1001.01A, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program, the system should 

be used to track the manpower and personnel required to meet the 

combatant commands’ assigned missions. The instruction states eJMAPS should provide visibility over joint personnel by allowing the Joint 

Staff and combatant commands to maintain, review, modify, and report all 

personnel actions in the system, to include changes in authorized 

positions or updates to personnel arriving at or departing from the 

command. In January 2012, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff issued a 

memo identifying e-JMAPS as the authoritative data source for DOD and 

for congressional inquiries of joint personnel, stating that e-JMAPS must 

accurately reflect the manpower and personnel allocated to joint 

organizations, such as the combatant commands, to provide senior 

leaders with the necessary data to support decision making in a fiscally 

Combatant Commands Are 

Inconsistent in Their Use 

of the Existing Personnel 

Management System to 

Identify and Track Their 

Total Assigned Personnel
 

Page 27 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

constrained environment.40 According to Standards for Internal Control in 

the Federal Government, policies, procedures, and mechanisms to 

effectively manage an organization—including accurate and timely 

documentation of an organization’s transactions and resources and 

effective management of an organization’s workforce—are important 

factors in enabling an organization to improve accountability and achieve 

their missions.41

Our review found that the commands vary in the types of personnel that 

each enters into e-JMAPS and that some commands exclude certain 

personnel from the system when managing personnel who support the 

command. All of the combatant commands we reviewed said that they 

use e-JMAPS to manage and track authorized military and civilian 

positions within the command, and where appropriate, other temporary 

personnel. To fulfill temporary or short-duration mission requirements, 

additional personnel—such as activated reservists, civilian overhires, and 

interagency personnel—may be needed to support the commands’ 

authorized manpower.42 However, the commands varied in their use of eJMAPS to track these additional personnel because Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A does not clearly state that temporary 

personnel, such as civilian overhires and activated reservists, should be 

accounted for in e-JMAPS, resulting in the differences in what is tracked 

by the commands. While U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern 

Command track their civilian overhires and activated reservists in eJMAPS, U.S. European Command does not, and U.S. Pacific Command 

tracks only activated reservists in e-JMAPS. In addition, officials at most 

of the combatant commands that we reviewed noted that they do not 

account for temporary personnel, such as interagency personnel, in 

eJMAPS, and that they primarily use the system to manage personnel 

filling authorized positions at the command, which may not include all 

command personnel. For example, during the course of our review, U.S. 

European Command officials identified approximately 172 civilian 

 

40Vice Director, Joint Staff, Use of the Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System 

(Jan. 31, 2012).

41GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AMID-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

42Overhires are civilians who are not assigned to fill an authorized, funded position at the 

combatant command and may be used to support command-directed new missions or to 

respond to critical mission requirements.
 

Page 28 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

overhires and activated reservists supporting the command in fiscal year 

2012 that are not accounted for in e-JMAPS. U.S. Africa Command is the 

only command that inputs all assigned personnel, to include civilian 

overhires, activated reservists, and interagency personnel, into e-JMAPS 

regardless of whether they are filling an authorized position, reflecting 

about 250 additional personnel at the command in fiscal year 2012. Our 

review also found that 4 out of the 5 geographic combatant commands do 

not account for personnel performing contract services in e-JMAPS. 

According to DOD officials, personnel performing contract services are 

not required to be accounted for in e-JMAPS and those personnel would 

be included in the costs reported for contract services. As part of a 

department-wide plan to account for contractor services, DOD has begun 

efforts to collect contractor-manpower data directly from contractors, but 

DOD does not expect to fully collect data on personnel performing 

contract services until fiscal year 2016.

Furthermore, according to Joint Staff officials, the combatant commands 

do not always input personnel information in a timely manner and civilian 

personnel may not be tracked as diligently in e-JMAPS as military 

personnel. While Joint Staff officials stated that the accuracy of personnel 

data in e-JMAPS has improved, there is no specific guidance requiring 

the combatant commands to periodically review and update data on 

personnel assigned to the command to ensure that data in e-JMAPS is 

accurate and up-to-date. According to some combatant command 

officials, command staffs input personnel information in e-JMAPS when 

personnel arrive at the command. However, our review confirmed that 

there are differences across the combatant commands in how often they 

update and review personnel information to ensure its accuracy, and 

officials at one command confirmed that while e-JMAPS is their primary 

personnel management system, they also rely on military service 

personnel systems to track personnel because the service systems are 

more accurate and capture more personnel information than e-JMAPS.

While the combatant commands use e-JMAPS to manage some of their 

assigned personnel and review personnel data periodically, there is no 

DOD guidance requiring that all personnel supporting the commands be 

tracked in e-JMAPS or that reviews of personnel occur within specific 

timeframes to ensure assigned personnel data is accurate. Without 

guidance to require complete and accurate information on all personnel 

supporting the combatant commands, and the consistent and timely 

review of assigned personnel data in e-JMAPS, DOD and the combatant 

commands cannot be assured that e-JMAPS will provide comprehensive 

data to inform their personnel decisions.
 

Page 29 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

In addition to not having complete information on the personnel assigned 

to the combatant commands, DOD and the combatant commands do not 

have oversight or visibility over authorized manpower or the number of 

assigned personnel at the service component commands. As stated 

previously, the service component commands often fulfill dual-roles: 

organizing, training, and equipping assigned service-specific forces while 

also assisting the combatant commands in their employment during 

military operations. Some service component commands, such as U.S. 

Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa manage large numbers of 

assigned forces and operational units, while others, such as Marine 

Forces South, manage few, if any, assigned forces. While these service 

component commands provide support to the combatant commands, the 

service component commands use service-specific personnel 

management systems to account for their authorized manpower and 

personnel, and DOD does not have a formal process to gather this 

information. A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publication identifies 

the importance of having reliable data on all personnel within a 

geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility for visibility of 

personnel and for effective planning.43 Further, our previous work has 

highlighted the need for agencies to have valid, reliable data and be 

aware of the size of their workforce, its deployment across the 

organization and the knowledge, skills and abilities needed for the agency 

to pursue its mission.44

Even though the combatant commands rely on the service component 

commands’ personnel to support their missions and operational 

requirements, they do not have oversight or visibility into the service 

component commands’ authorized manpower or how the components 

determine the size and structure of their staff to support the combatant 

commands’ missions. Based on our analysis of data that we gathered, in 

fiscal year 2012 there were 7,795 authorized positions at the 

headquarters of the service component commands, which was more than 

double the 3,817 authorized positions at the headquarters of the

combatant commands. Moreover, the service component commands are 

generally structured to perform staff functions that are similar to those of 

the combatant commands, such as collecting intelligence, coordinating 

operations, performing strategic planning and policy, and supporting 

 

43Joint Publication 1-0, Joint Personnel Support (Oct. 24, 2011).

44GAO-02-373SP. 

DOD Does Not Have a 

System or Formal Process 

to Gather Information on 

Authorized Manpower and 

Assigned Personnel at the 

Service Component 

Commands 
 

Page 30 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

communications. For example, at U.S. Pacific Command, there are about 

650 authorized positions dedicated to gathering, analyzing, and 

performing intelligence support, while there are about 175 additional 

authorized positions within U.S. Pacific Command’s service component 

commands dedicated to the same staff function. According to DOD 

officials, since headquarters personnel at service component commands 

with large numbers of assigned forces are more likely to be focused on 

the components’ organize, train, and equip function rather than on solely 

supporting the combatant commands missions, these positions may not 

necessarily be redundant. However, given the similarities in mission 

requirements and staff functions at the combatant and service component 

commands, it is important for the combatant commands to have visibility 

over the service component command’s authorized manpower to be able 

to determine whether these similarities at the combatant and service 

component commands are necessary or duplicative.

Moreover, the combatant commands do not have complete information 

on personnel assigned to their service component commands. Officials at 

the combatant commands and Joint Staff stated that they do not have 

visibility over personnel at the service component commands or access to 

the service-specific personnel management systems that the service 

component commands use, and if they need information to determine 

whether personnel at the service component commands can support the 

combatant commands’ mission requirements they have to request it from 

the service component commands. For example, several combatant 

commands we spoke with did not identify any specific processes that they 

use to regularly gather information on personnel at their service 

components, while officials at U.S. Africa Command stated that they had 

only recently begun requesting this information on a monthly basis. 

However, as part of the process for validating new manpower 

requirements, the combatant commands are required to identify whether 

the functions and tasks that they are requesting additional positions for 

can be fulfilled by personnel at the service component commands. 

Without access to the service-specific personnel data or a process to 

regularly gather personnel information, it is unclear how this validation 

process can occur expeditiously. According to a Joint Staff official, 

officials in that office discuss the personnel and capabilities available 

within the service component commands when reviewing the combatant

commands’ requests for additional positions, but they also do not have 

direct access to the service component commands’ personnel data 

systems to review the personnel assigned to the service component 

commands’ headquarters staff. Without a formal process to gather 

information on the authorized manpower and assigned personnel at the 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

service component commands, the combatant commands may not have 

the visibility that is necessary to appropriately size themselves to meet 

their assigned missions, and are at risk for unnecessarily duplicating 

functions between the combatant commands and their service component 

commands.

While each military department annually submits budget documents for 

operation and maintenance to Congress—including the total authorized 

military positions, civilian and contractor full-time equivalents, and the 

funding required to support the missions of the combatant commands that 

they are the combatant command support agent for—these documents 

do not provide transparency into the authorized positions, the full-time 

equivalents, or the funding directed to each combatant command. 

According to DOD Directive 5100.03, Support of the Headquarters of the 

Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands, the military departments 

are responsible for funding the mission and headquarters-support costs of 

the combatant commands and their subordinate unified commands.45

Also, volume 2A, chapter 1 of DOD’s Financial Management Regulation, 

7000.14.R states that the military departments must ensure adequate 

visibility over the resources of combatant command-directed missions 

and other costs for each command.46 DOD guidance for the submission of 

the President’s budget justification materials for Fiscal Year 2013, which 

include the military departments’ budget documents for operation and 

maintenance, also states that components should report details on 

contractor manpower/full-time equivalents in addition to military, civilian, 

and reserve manpower data.47 According to Standards for Internal Control 

in the Federal Government, reliable financial reporting, including reports 

 

45According to Department of Defense Directive 5100.03, Support of the Headquarters of 

the Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands, the military departments are 

responsible for programming, budgeting, and funding the administrative and logistical 

support of the headquarters of the combatant commands and subordinate unified 

commands. The directive assigns each military department responsibility for specific 

combatant commands and subordinate unified commands. See Table 1 for the combatant 

commands and subordinate unified commands that each military department supports.

46Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation Volume 2A (Budget 

Formulation and Presentation) Chapter 1 (General Information) (October 2008), (hereafter 

referred to as DOD’s Financial Management Regulation).

47Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget 

Submission (Dec. 16, 2011).

Budget Documents Do Not 

Provide Details on 

Authorized Manpower and 

Funding For Each 

Combatant Command
 

Page 32 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

on budget execution, financial statements, and other reports for internal 

and external use, is important for determining whether agencies’ 

objectives are achieved.48

The military departments’ budget documents for operation and 

maintenance identify the overall authorized military positions, civilian and 

contractor full-time equivalents, and mission and headquarters support 

funding to support the combatant commands, but do not provide details 

on authorized positions, full-time equivalents, or mission and 

headquarters-support costs by command. For example, the Air Force’s 

fiscal year 2013 budget document shows that the combatant commands it 

supports have about 6,550 authorized military positions and civilian and 

contractor full-time equivalents, but it does not separate the data to 

indicate the number of authorized positions or full-time equivalents at 

each of the five combatant commands that it supports.49 Similarly, the 

Army’s comparable budget document shows about 3,200 total authorized 

military positions and civilian and contractor full-time equivalents at all the 

commands that it supports, but does not separate the data to display 

authorized positions and full-time equivalents at each of the three 

commands that it is responsible for.50 In addition, while the military 

departments’ budget documents provide information on the total funding 

that all the combatant commands receive for expenses such as civilian 

pay, contract services, travel, transportation and other supply costs, they 

do not separate these expenses and display them for each command. For 

example, the Air Force’s fiscal year 2013 budget document noted a lump 

sum of about $285 million for civilian pay for all five combatant commands 

that the Air Force supports, and the Army’s comparable budget document 

showed a total of about $38 million for travel costs for all of the 

commands that it supports. Neither of the military departments’ budget 

 

48GAO/AMID-00-21.3.1.

49The military department’s budget documents express authorized positions for military 

personnel in terms of end-strength and civilian and contractor manpower in terms of 

numbers of full-time equivalents. 

50The Navy supports only one combatant command, U.S. Pacific Command; therefore the 

totals it presents in its budget document would reflect those of the command. However, 

the budget document excludes data on the number of military personnel because Navy 

officials stated that the military personnel data in its systems is not maintained in the 

format required for the annual budget submission and would require a lengthy verification 

process to ensure accurate reporting.
 

Page 33 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

documents displayed this cost data for each individual combatant 

command.

In reviewing DOD budget and policy documents, we found that the 

military departments, as the combatant commands support agents, do not 

provide detailed information for each combatant command in their budget 

documents for operation and maintenance because DOD’s Financial 

Management Regulation does not require the military departments to 

identify individual combatant commands’ authorized military positions and 

civilian and contractor full-time equivalents or the mission and 

headquarters-support funding required for civilian pay, contract services, 

travel, and other transportation and supply costs. Without detailed 

information identifying each combatant commands’ authorized positions, 

full-time equivalents, and mission and headquarters-support funding, 

decision makers within DOD and Congress may not have complete and 

accurate data to conduct oversight of the combatant commands’ 

resources.

Given the substantial increase in authorized positions and mission and 

headquarters-support costs at the combatant commands and evolving 

security challenges facing DOD, effective management and oversight 

over the combatant commands’ resources is essential as the department 

balances limited resources with future defense priorities. If DOD 

performed a comprehensive, periodic evaluation of the combatant 

commands’ authorized positions, that review would help the department 

to efficiently manage the combatant commands in its efforts to meet the 

goals and priorities of the 2012 strategic guidance. Moreover, if DOD had 

complete information on all the authorized manpower and personnel 

assigned to support the combatant commands and service component 

commands, the department would have additional visibility into the 

universe of manpower and personnel dedicated to supporting the 

combatant command’s assigned missions. This information would aid 

DOD officials in decisions on requests for additional manpower, reducing 

the potential for overlap and duplication of functions. Further, detailed 

information to identify the authorized military positions, civilian and 

contractor full-time equivalents, and mission and headquarters-support 

funding that each combatant command receives would help decision 

makers in DOD and Congress to balance resource priorities in a fiscally 

challenging environment. As the department realigns itself to address 

new challenges, full awareness of the combatant commands’ authorized 

manpower, assigned personnel, and mission and headquarters-support 

costs would help the department to provide congressional decision 

Conclusions 
 

Page 34 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

makers with the information needed for effective oversight and help 

ensure the efficient use of resources.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four 

actions.

To ensure that the geographic combatant commands are properly sized 

to meet their assigned missions and to improve the transparency of the 

commands’ authorized manpower, assigned personnel, and mission and 

headquarters-support costs, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct:

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to revise Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A to require a comprehensive, 

periodic evaluation of whether the size and structure of the combatant 

commands meet assigned missions. 

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to revise Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A to require the combatant 

commands to identify, manage, and track all personnel, including 

temporary personnel such as civilian overhires and activated 

reservists, in e-JMAPS and identify specific guidelines and timeframes 

for the combatant commands to consistently input and review 

assigned personnel in e-JMAPS.

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the 

combatant commanders and the secretaries of the military 

departments, to develop and implement a formal process to gather 

information on authorized manpower and assigned personnel at the 

service component commands.

• The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to revise volume 2A, 

chapter 1 of DOD’s Financial Management Regulation 7000.14R to 

require the military departments, in their annual budget documents for 

operation and maintenance, to identify the authorized military 

positions and civilian and contractor full-time equivalents at each 

combatant command and provide detailed information on funding 

required by each command for mission and headquarters support, 

such as civilian pay, contract services, travel, and supplies.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 35 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three of 

our four recommendations and non-concurred with one recommendation. 

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IX. DOD also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as 

appropriate. 

DOD did not concur with our first recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense require the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to revise 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A, Joint 

Manpower and Personnel Program, to require a comprehensive, periodic 

evaluation of whether the size and structure of the combatant commands 

meet assigned missions. DOD stated that the combatant commands have 

been baselined twice since 2008, and that the commands have already 

been reduced during previous budget reviews. We describe in our report 

several actions taken by DOD to manage the growth in personnel and 

costs at the combatant commands, including establishing manpower 

baselines and identifying manpower and personnel reductions. However, 

as stated in our report, these actions do not constitute a comprehensive, 

periodic, bottom-up review of the combatant commands’ total workforce in 

part because DOD’s actions have not included all authorized positions at 

the combatant commands. For example, as noted in our report, the 

baseline levels established for the combatant commands apply only to 

positions in major DOD headquarters activities, and our prior work has 

found that the data on such headquarters positions is incomplete and not 

always reliable. Furthermore, not all commands have been included in 

previous efficiency initiatives. The department also noted that any 

periodic review of the combatant commands’ size and structure could 

only be triggered by review of the mission of the command, and stated

that requiring a periodic review was not appropriate for inclusion in 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A. However, the 

department’s response does not fully explain why the Instruction should 

not require periodic reviews to ensure that the resources meet constantlyevolving missions, and we continue to believe that institutionalizing a 

periodic evaluation of all authorized positions would help to systematically 

align manpower with those missions and add rigor to the requirements 

process.

The department concurred with three of our recommendations that the 

Secretary of Defense: (1) direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

to revise Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A to 

require the combatant commands to identify, manage, and track all 

personnel, including temporary personnel such as civilian overhires and 

activated reservists, in e-JMAPS and identify specific guidelines and 

Agency Comments 

and our Evaluation
 

Page 36 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

timeframes for the combatant commands to consistently input and review 

personnel data in the system; (2) direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commanders and secretaries 

of the military departments, to develop and implement a formal process to 

gather information on authorized manpower and assigned personnel at 

the service component commands; and (3) direct the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller) to revise volume 2, chapter 1 of DOD’s Financial 

Management Regulation 7000.14R to require the military departments, in 

their annual budget documents for operation and maintenance, to identify 

the authorized military positions and civilian and contractor full-time 

equivalents at each combatant command and provide detailed 

information on funding required by each command for mission and 

headquarters-support, such as civilian pay, contract services, travel, and 

supplies. In its response to our recommendations, DOD noted that it 

plans to issue guidance to require all DOD components to identify, 

manage, and track all personnel data, including temporary personnel like 

civilian overhires and activated reservists, in e-JMAPS. The planned 

guidance will also identify specific guidelines and timeframes for DOD 

organizations to consistently input and review personnel data in e-JMAPs.

DOD agreed with our last recommendation regarding DOD’s Financial 

Management Regulation, but requested that we revise the language to 

require the military departments to capture or delineate the type of 

civilians, such as general schedule, foreign service nationals/locally 

employed staff, or principal staff assistants, provided by the military 

services within each combatant command. DOD’s response also 

indicated that the military services suggested the creation of another 

budget exhibit to capture contract and full-time equivalent data in lieu of 

the current depiction in their annual budget documents for operation and 

maintenance. We did not modify our recommendation because, in our 

view, our recommended revision to DOD’s Financial Management 

Regulation reflects our findings and captures the information needed to 

improve visibility over resources devoted to each combatant command, 

which is now unavailable. Taking additional steps to require more detailed 

reporting, such as delineating the type of civilians authorized, would be at 

the department’s discretion but could help to further transparency and 

improve oversight.

We are sending a copy of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretaries of the military 

departments. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov.
 

Page 37 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix X.

John Pendleton, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

We conducted this work in response to direction from the congressional 

committees to review the resources of the combatant commands.1 This 

report (1) identifies the trends in the resources devoted to the Department 

of Defense’s (DOD) geographic combatant commands and their service 

component commands, and (2) assesses the extent to which DOD has

processes in place to manage and oversee the resources of the 

combatant commands.

To conduct this work and address our objectives, we identified sources of 

information within DOD that would provide data on the resources at the 

geographic combatant commands, to include their subordinate unified 

commands and other activities, and corresponding service components 

commands. We focused our review on five of the geographic combatant 

commands within the department: U.S. Africa Command; U.S. European 

Command; U.S. Northern Command; U.S. Pacific Command; and U.S. 

Southern Command. Our review excluded U.S. Central Command and its 

corresponding service component commands due to their responsibilities 

to support ongoing military operations in Afghanistan during the past 

several years, which would have inhibited uniform comparisons across 

the commands.

To identify trends in the resources devoted to DOD’s geographic 

combatant commands, to include their subordinate unified commands 

and other activities, and their service component commands we obtained 

and analyzed available authorized positions and actual assigned 

personnel (military, civilian, and contractors) data and operation and 

maintenance obligations data from each of the five geographic combatant 

commands and their corresponding service component commands from 

fiscal years 2001 through 2012. We focused our review on operation and 

maintenance obligations—as these obligations reflect the primary mission 

and headquarters-support costs of the combatant commands, their 

subordinate unified commands and other activities, and corresponding 

service component commands—to include the costs for civilian 

personnel, contract services, travel, and equipment, among others. Our 

review excluded obligations of operation and maintenance funding for 

DOD’s overseas contingency operations not part of DOD’s base budget. 

Since historical data was unavailable in some cases, we limited our 

 

1

See H. Rep. No. 112-479 (May, 11, 2012) and Conf. Rep. No. 112-705 (Dec. 8, 2012) 

accompanying H.R. 4310 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

analysis of trends to authorized military and civilian positions at the 

combatant commands from fiscal years 2001 through 2012 and 

authorized military and civilian positions at the service component 

commands from fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Due to the availability of 

data, we similarly limited our analysis of trends in operation and 

maintenance obligations at the combatant commands and service 

component commands to fiscal years 2007 through 2012. To assess the 

reliability of the data, we interviewed DOD officials and analyzed relevant 

manpower and financial management documentation to ensure that the 

authorized positions and data on operation and maintenance obligations 

that the commands provided were tied to mission and headquarterssupport. We also incorporated data reliability questions into our data 

collection instruments and compared the multiple data sets received from 

DOD components against each other to ensure that there was 

consistency in the data that the commands provided. We determined the 

data was sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

To determine the extent to which DOD has processes in place to manage 

and oversee the resources of the combatant commands, we obtained and 

analyzed documentary and testimonial evidence from DOD, the military 

departments, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands and their 

subordinate unified commands on the policies, procedures and systems 

used to manage command resources. We interviewed officials and 

obtained documentation on the policies, procedures, and systems used 

for determining and validating the commands’ manpower requirements. 

We also interviewed officials and obtained documentation on any steps 

DOD had taken or planned to take to reexamine the size and structure of 

the combatant commands. We obtained documentation on the systems 

used to track their authorized manpower and assigned military and 

civilian personnel, and contractor full-time equivalents, and also 

interviewed officials on how often assigned personnel within the 

combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, and other 

activities are reviewed to ensure that the data are accurate and up to 

date. In addition, we reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed 

officials from the Joint Staff, geographic combatant commands, and 

service component commands on their processes for sharing information 

on command authorized manpower and assigned personnel. We also 

obtained and analyzed data included in the military departments’ budget 

exhibits for operation and maintenance detailing combatant commands’ 

authorized positions and mission and headquarters-support funding.

We interviewed officials, or where appropriate, obtained documentation at 

the organizations listed below:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Office of the Secretary of Defense

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Joint Staff

• Manpower and Personnel Directorate

• Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate

• Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate

Department of the Air Force

• Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Personnel

• Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Financial Management

• Pacific Air Forces

Department of the Army

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial 

Management and Comptroller, Army Budget Office

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs, Force Management

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs, Military Personnel

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army Manpower and Reserve 

Affairs, Training Readiness and Mobilization

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel G-1, Plans and 

Resources Directorate

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans G-3/5/7; 

Operations and Plans, Force Management Directorate

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans G-3/5/7; 

Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs G-8, Program 

Analysis and Evaluation Directorate

• U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency

• Army Pacific

Department of the Navy

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, (Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs)

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, (Financial Management 

and Comptroller), Office of Budget
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, 

Personnel, Education, and Training)

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, (Integration of 

Capabilities and Resources)

• Fleet Forces Command

• Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

• Navy Pacific Fleet

• Marine Forces, Pacific

• Marine Forces, South

Unified Combatant Commands and Subordinate Unified Commands

• U.S. Africa Command

• U.S. European Command

• U.S. Northern Command

• U.S. Pacific Command

• U.S. Special Operations Command

• Special Operations Command, Pacific

• Special Operations Command, South

• U.S. Southern Command

We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to May 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Mission and HeadquartersSupport Costs in Nominal Terms

Page 42 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Table 2: Mission and Headquarters-Support Costs at Five Geographic Combatant Commands in Fiscal Years 2007 through 

2012

Combatant Command

Fiscal Year 

2007

Fiscal Year 

2008

Fiscal Year 

2009

Fiscal Year 

2010

Fiscal Year 

2011

Fiscal Year 

2012

U.S. Pacific Command $161,199,136 $172,283,486 $194,926,050 $216,203,751 $245,868,077 $245,553,015

U.S. European 

Command $45,743,261 $53,546,523 $91,894,510 $139,808,677 $132,309,784 $130,464,302

U.S. Africa Command $51,100,000 $99,015,000 $201,459,000 $273,844,000 $285,504,000 $276,224,000

U.S. Northern 

Command $158,959,067 $208,481,220 $193,205,905 $210,927,639 $223,140,234 $205,563,963

U.S. Southern 

Command $41,582,889 $54,866,628 $163,271,228 $191,385,016 $209,846,493 $202,316,487

Total $458,584,353 $588,192,858 $844,756,692 $1,032,169,083 $1,096,668,588 $1,060,121,767

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance 

reported by DOD components in nominal terms.

Table 3: Mission and Headquarters-Support Costs in Fiscal Years 2007 through 2012 for the Service Component Commands 

That Support Five Geographic Combatant Commands

Command's Service 

Components

Fiscal Year 

2007

Fiscal Year 

2008

Fiscal Year 

2009

Fiscal Year 

2010

Fiscal Year 

2011

Fiscal Year 

2012

U.S. Pacific Command's service 

components $119,293,017 $125,888,633 $129,535,683 $152,704,950 $154,940,531 $182,945,409

U.S. European Command's 

service components $135,625,430 $136,149,573 $134,535,914 $167,682,416 $200,445,434 $199,639,995

U.S. Africa Command's service 

components $0 $0 $32,999,750 $66,308,162 $54,242,173 $70,503,401

U.S. Northern Command's 

service components $59,529,925 $57,599,160 $45,403,622 $52,856,846 $56,774,955 $57,744,159

U.S. Southern Command's 

service components $80,533,630 $86,947,877 $98,838,857 $87,895,163 $99,432,228 $92,941,127

Total $394,982,003 $406,585,243 $441,313,827 $527,447,537 $565,835,320 $603,774,092

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance 

reported by DOD components in nominal terms.

Appendix II: Mission and HeadquartersSupport Costs in Nominal Terms
Appendix III: Resources at U.S. Africa 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 43 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Note: AFRICOM was established in fiscal year 2008, although it did not become fully operational as 

an independent command till fiscal year 2009. AFRICOM reported some start-up mission and 

headquarters-support costs in fiscal year 2007 and 2008, but could not distinguish which costs were 

specific to headquarters or to other organizations such as Special Operations Command Africa.

Appendix III: Resources at U.S. Africa 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands 
Appendix III: Resources at U.S. Africa 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 44 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

a

Other includes authorized military and civilian positions in Special Operations Command Africa and 

security cooperation organizations.

b

Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance and are 

represented in constant fiscal year 2012 dollars. These costs include civilian pay, contract services, 

and travel, among other costs. The mission and headquarters-support costs for AFRICOM 

intelligence support, security cooperation organizations, and some costs for Special Operations 

Command Africa are programmed and budgeted for by other organizations and those costs are not 

reflected in this appendix.

c

Other includes mission and headquarters-support costs for Special Operations Command Africa, 

Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara, and Special Operation Command and Control Element 

Horn of Africa. While Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara is a contingency operation, its costs 

are funded out of DOD’s base budget.

d

Air Forces Africa was disestablished in April 2012, but reported some mission and headquarterssupport costs prior to its disestablishment. The Navy and Air Force each have one service component 

command that supports both AFRICOM and U.S. European Command. Authorized military and 

civilian positions and mission and headquarters-support costs for these two service component 

commands are represented in Appendix IV.
Appendix III: Resources at U.S. Africa 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 45 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Note: The combatant commanders have broad authority to organize and structure their commands as 

they deem necessary to achieve their assigned missions. The commands’ structure may include a 

principal staff officer, personal staff to the commander, a special staff group for technical or tactical 

advice and others groups of staff who are responsible for managing personnel, ensuring the 

availability of intelligence, directing operations, coordinating logistics, preparing long-range or future 

plans, and integrating communications systems. The commands may also have subordinate unified 

commands, joint task forces, and other activities, each with their own staff, which support the 

combatant commands in conducting their operational missions.
Appendix IV: Resources at U.S. European 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 46 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

a

Other includes authorized military and civilian positions in Special Operations Command Europe, 

security cooperation organizations, the Commander’s Communications Activities, and other 

organizations that have since been disestablished.

b

Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance and are 

represented in constant fiscal year 2012 dollars. These costs include civilian pay, contract services, 

Appendix IV: Resources at U.S. European 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands 
Appendix IV: Resources at U.S. European 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 47 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

travel, and equipment, among other costs. EUCOM could not distinguish which mission and 

headquarters-support costs were specific to headquarters or other organizations from fiscal years 

2001 through 2007, so these costs are not broken out across these fiscal years. The mission and 

headquarters-support costs for EUCOM intelligence support, security cooperation organizations, and 

some costs for Special Operations Command Europe are programmed and budgeted for by other 

organizations and those costs are not reflected in this appendix.

c

Other includes mission and headquarters-support costs for Special Operations Command Europe 

and security cooperation organizations.

d

The Navy and Air Force each have one service component command that supports both AFRICOM 

and EUCOM. Authorized military and civilian positions and mission and headquarters-support costs 

for these two service component commands are represented in this appendix.
Appendix IV: Resources at U.S. European 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 48 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Note: The combatant commanders have broad authority to organize and structure their commands as 

they deem necessary to achieve their assigned missions. The commands’ structure may include a 

principal staff officer, personal staff to the commander, a special staff group for technical or tactical 

advice and others groups of staff who are responsible for managing personnel, ensuring the 

availability of intelligence, directing operations, coordinating logistics, preparing long-range or future 

plans, and integrating communications systems. The commands may also have subordinate unified 
Appendix IV: Resources at U.S. European 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 49 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

commands, joint task forces, and other activities, each with their own staff, which support the 

combatant commands in conducting their operational missions.
Appendix V: Resources at U.S. Northern 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 50 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Note: NORTHCOM was established in fiscal year 2003.

a

Other includes authorized military and civilian positions in Joint Task Force North, Joint Task Force 

Civil Support, Joint Task Force Headquarters National Capital Region, and security cooperation 

organizations.

Appendix V: Resources at U.S. Northern 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands 
Appendix V: Resources at U.S. Northern 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 51 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

b

Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance and are 

represented in constant fiscal year 2012 dollars. These costs include civilian pay, contract services, 

and travel, among other costs. The mission and headquarters-support costs for NORTHCOM 

intelligence support and security cooperation organizations are programmed and budgeted for by 

other organizations and those costs are not reflected in this appendix.

c

Other includes mission and headquarters-support costs for Joint Task Force Alaska, Joint Task 

Force North, Joint Task Force Civil Support, and Joint Task Force Headquarters National Capital 

Region.

d

According to Navy officials, Fleet Forces Command has military personnel dedicated to support 

NORTHCOM, but no dedicated civilian support, and its mission and headquarters-support costs 

primarily consist of travel costs that cannot be distinguished from its other costs. As a result, Navy 

officials said they could not provide mission and headquarters-support costs for Fleet Forces 

Command.
Appendix V: Resources at U.S. Northern 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 52 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Note: The combatant commanders have broad authority to organize and structure their commands as 

they deem necessary to achieve their assigned missions. The commands’ structure may include a 

principal staff officer, personal staff to the commander, a special staff group for technical or tactical 

advice and others groups of staff who are responsible for managing personnel, ensuring the 

availability of intelligence, directing operations, coordinating logistics, preparing long-range or future 

plans, and integrating communications systems. The commands may also have subordinate unified 
Appendix V: Resources at U.S. Northern 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 53 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

commands, joint task forces, and other activities, each with their own staff, which support the 

combatant commands in conducting their operational missions.
Appendix VI: Resources at U.S. Pacific 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 54 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

a

Other includes authorized military and civilian positions in Special Operations Command Pacific, 

security cooperation organizations, U.S. Forces Korea, Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action 

Accounting Command, U.S. Forces Japan, Alaskan Command, Joint Interagency Task Force West, 

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management, U.S. PACOM Representative to Guam, and other 

organizations that have since been disestablished. According to PACOM officials, a portion of the 

command’s authorized military and civilian positions support the unique mission of the Joint Prisoner 

Appendix VI: Resources at U.S. Pacific 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands 
Appendix VI: Resources at U.S. Pacific 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 55 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command to account for all Americans missing as result of past 

conflicts. In fiscal year 2012, the Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command 

accounts for approximately 15 percent or 511 of PACOM’s total authorized military and civilian 

positions.

b

Mission and headquarters-support costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance and are 

represented in constant fiscal year 2012 dollars. These costs include civilian pay, contract services, 

travel, and equipment, among other costs. DOD was unable to provide obligations for PACOM prior 

to fiscal year 2007. The mission and headquarters-support costs for PACOM intelligence support, 

security cooperation organizations, U.S. Forces Korea and some costs for Special Operations 

Command Pacific are programmed and budgeted for by other organizations and those costs are not 

reflected in this appendix.

c

Other includes mission and headquarters-support costs for Special Operations Command Pacific, 

Joint Interagency Task Force West, Joint Prisoner of War /Mission in Action Accounting Command, 

Alaskan Command, Center for Excellence in Disaster Management, and some funding for the Joint 

Intelligence Operations Center. In fiscal year 2012, the Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action 

Accounting Command accounts for approximately 39 percent or about $96.3 million of PACOM’s total 

mission and headquarters-support costs.
Appendix VI: Resources at U.S. Pacific 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 56 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters
Appendix VI: Resources at U.S. Pacific 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 57 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Note: The combatant commanders have broad authority to organize and structure their commands as 

they deem necessary to achieve their assigned missions. The commands’ structure may include a 

principal staff officer, personal staff to the commander, a special staff group for technical or tactical 

advice and others groups of staff who are responsible for managing personnel, ensuring the 

availability of intelligence, directing operations, coordinating logistics, preparing long-range or future 

plans, and integrating communications systems. The commands may also have subordinate unified 

commands, joint task forces, and other activities, each with their own staff, which support the 

combatant commands in conducting their operational missions.
Appendix VII: Resources at U.S. Southern 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 58 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

a

Other includes authorized military and civilian positions in Special Operations Command South, 

security cooperation organizations, Joint Interagency Task Force South, and Joint Task Force Bravo.

b

Mission and headquarters support-costs reflect obligations for operation and maintenance and are 

represented in constant fiscal year 2012 dollars. These costs include civilian pay, contract services, 

travel, and equipment, among other costs. The mission and headquarters-support costs for 

Appendix VII: Resources at U.S. Southern 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands 
Appendix VII: Resources at U.S. Southern 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 59 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

SOUTHCOM intelligence support, security cooperation organizations, and some costs for Special 

Operations Command South are programmed and budgeted for by other organizations and those 

costs are not reflected in this appendix.

c

Other includes mission and headquarters-support costs for Special Operations Command South, 

Joint Interagency Task Force South, and costs for the 7th Special Forces Group for travel, supplies, 

and transportation of equipment.
Appendix VII: Resources at U.S. Southern 

Command and its Service Component 

Commands

Page 60 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Note: The combatant commanders have broad authority to organize and structure their commands as 

they deem necessary to achieve their assigned missions. The commands’ structure may include a 

principal staff officer, personal staff to the commander, a special staff group for technical or tactical

advice and others groups of staff who are responsible for managing personnel, ensuring the 

availability of intelligence, directing operations, coordinating logistics, preparing long-range or future 

plans, and integrating communications systems. The commands may also have subordinate unified 

commands, joint task forces, and other activities, each with their own staff, which support the 

combatant commands in conducting their operational missions.
Appendix VIII: Areas of Responsibility and 

Headquarters Locations of the Geographic 

Combatant Commands and Some of Their 

Components

Page 61 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Appendix VIII contains information presented in Figure 1 in noninteractive 

format.

Geographic Combatant Command Headquarters locations

U.S. Africa Command • AFRICOM Headquarters, Stuttgart, Germany

• Army Africa, Vicenza, Italy

• U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa, Ramstein, Germany

• Naval Forces Europe-Naval Forces Africa, Naples, Italy

• Marine Forces Africa, Stuttgart, Germany

• Special Operations Command Africa, Stuttgart, Germany

U.S. Central Command • CENTCOM Headquarters, Tampa, Florida

• Army Central, Sumter, South Carolina

• Air Forces Central Command, Sumter, South Carolina

• Naval Forces Central Command, Manama, Bahrain

• Marine Forces Central, Tampa, Florida

• Special Operations Command Central, Tampa, Florida

U.S. European Command • EUCOM Headquarters, Stuttgart, Germany

• Army Europe, Heidelberg, Germany

• U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa, Ramstein, Germany

• Naval Forces Europe-Naval Forces Africa, Naples, Italy

• Marine Forces Europe, Stuttgart, Germany

• Special Operations Command Europe, Stuttgart, Germany

U.S. Northern Command • NORTHCOM Headquarters, Colorado Springs, Colorado

• Army North, San Antonio, Texas

• Air Forces North, Panama City, Florida

• Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia

• Marine Forces North, New Orleans, Louisiana

U.S. Pacific Command • PACOM Headquarters, Oahu, Hawaii

• Army Pacific, Oahu, Hawaii

• Pacific Air Forces, Oahu, Hawaii

• Navy Pacific Fleet, Oahu, Hawaii

• Marine Forces Pacific, Oahu, Hawaii

• Special Operations Command Pacific, Oahu, Hawaii

• Alaskan Command, Anchorage, Alaska

• U.S. Forces Japan, Honshu, Japan

• U.S. Forces Korea, Seoul, South Korea

• Special Operations Command Korea, Seoul, South Korea

Appendix VIII: Areas of Responsibility and 

Headquarters Locations of the Geographic 

Combatant Commands and Some of Their 

Components 
Appendix VIII: Areas of Responsibility and 

Headquarters Locations of the Geographic 

Combatant Commands and Some of Their 

Components

Page 62 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Geographic Combatant Command Headquarters locations

U.S. Southern Command • SOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida

• Army South, San Antonio, Texas

• Air Forces Southern, Tucson, Arizona

• Naval Forces Southern Command, Jacksonville, Florida

• Marine Forces South, Miami, Florida

• Special Operations Command South, Homestead, Florida

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 63 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

Appendix IX: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 64 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 65 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 66 GAO-13-293 Defense Headquarters

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

include Marie A. Mak (Assistant Director), Richard K. Geiger, Cynthia L. 

Grant, Oscar W. Mardis, Tobin J. McMurdie, Meghan C. Perez, Carol D. 

Petersen, Richard S. Powelson, John Van Schaik, Michael C. 

Shaughnessy, Amie M. Steele and Sabrina C. Streagle.

Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff

Acknowledgments 

(351731)
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