F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT July 21, 20 06 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1132 9

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 0 3- 80 09 4- CR-DTKH UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us NATHAN DESHAW

N FAUST, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J ul y 21 , 200 6) Be fo re BL A CK , BA RKE T T and C O X , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. BL ACK , C ircuit Judg e:2

N athan D es haw n F au st a ppe al s hi s c onvi ct ionand 2 10- m onth se nte nc e fo r po ss es si on wit h i nt en t t o d is tri bu te co cai ne , in vi ol at io n o f 21 U.S.C. § 8 41 (a)( 1) . H e ar gue s: (1 ) the re is ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce to supp ort hi s c onvi ct ion ; ( 2) the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in adm itt ing e vid en ce und er F ed er al Ru le of

E vid en ce 404 (b ) because the G overnm ent failed to provide adequate noti ce of its intent to introduce suc h e vid en ce ; and ( 3) the dis tr ic t c ourt vi olate d hi s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o a jury tria l b y

en ha nc in g h is sen te nc e b as edon co nd uc t fo r whi ch he was a cqui tt ed . F o r th e r e a s o n s s e tf

o rth mo r e f

u l l y b e l o w , w e a f

f i rm. I. BACKGROUND O n June 12, 200 3, pol ic e re spon de d to a911 c al l at a r es ide nc e in W es t Palm Beac h, Florida. Joy

Wright openedthe door but in sisted sh e had not called 911. She did not allow the officer s insid e. Shortly thereaf ter, Faust appeare d at the doo r, and Wri ght

ide nti fi ed

him a s he r husb an d w ho l ive d th er e. A ft er le av ing , th e o ffi cers in fo rm edth e n arco ti cs un itof s us pi ci ou s b eh av io r atth e res id en ce. Narcotics office rs returned to the residence later that night. Soon after ar ri vin g, the y

w itn es se d F au st l eavin g th e re sid en ce in a bla ck r en ta l c ar

and observed a red Cam aro parked outside. T hey then searched the tra sh at the curb out sid e the r es ide nc e. T his “ tr as h pu ll” unc ove re d 17 a lum inum bakin g pans, se ve n or e igh t of w hic h c ont ai ne d sc or ing m ar ks and whit e pow de r re sid ue , and aSpe c if ic a lly , F a us t w a s c ha

rg e d w ith : ( 1) po sse ssi on wi th t he int e nt t o d ist

ri bute 1 ecsta sy , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); ( 2) possession with the intent to distribut e coc aine, i nv i o l at i o no f

2 1 U . S . C . § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) ; ( 3 ) p o s s e s s i o no f a f i r e ar man d / o r am mun i t i o nb y a convicted f

elon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) (1) a nd 924(e) ; and (4) posse ssion of a firea rm in further ance of a dr

ugtraff ickingcrime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 942(c) (1)( A)(i) and (ii). 3 sm al l pl as tic ba g a lso c ont ai nin g w hit e pow de r re sid ue . Atr as h pu ll co nduc te d a fe wday s late r unc ove re d a ddi tio na l pl as tic ba gs w iththe sam e re sid ue . T he res idue on th e it em s t es te d p os it iv e fo r co cai ne ba se d o n a n i ni ti al fie ldtes t. Po lic e obt ai ne d ase ar chw ar rant and s earc he d th e re sid en ce on June 25, 20 03 . Wrig htwas n otat h om e, bu t fo urot he rs , in cl ud in g F au st , were p res en t. The off icers f ounda bag containing 3 1.6 gram s of cocaine on top of a kitchen ca bin et ne xt t o an un ope ne d le tte r ad dr es se d to F au st, and a bakin g pan be ar ing sc or in g m ark s s im il ar t o t ho se on th e p an s fo un d i n t he fir sttra sh pu ll . T hr ough out

the hou se , the y

a lso f ound 94 g ram s of m ethy le ne dio xym etham

phe tam ine ( ec sta sy ), f

our f ir earm s and am

m uni tio n, $27 00 in cash, and w hat was believed to be incense, a known cutting agent. A digit al sc al e that F au st l at er

a dm itt ed w as his , m en ’ s c lothin g and c olo gne , and f am ily p h o t o g rap h s i n cl u d i n g Fau s twe re al s o fo u n di nth e h o u s e. Fo l l o wi n g Fau s t ’s ar re st, $74 5 insm al l bi lls w as f ound in his pants poc ke t. Fa ust w as c harg ed

in a fo ur -c ount

sup er ce din g in dic tm en t. A t tri al , the 1 G ove rn m en t pr es en te d te sti m ony f ro m the landl or d of

the r es ide nc e, w ho s ai d bo thF e de ra l Ru le of Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) state s, in p e rt ine nt p art : “ Ev ide nc e of oth e r c ri me s, 2 wr on g s, or

a c ts i s n ot a dmi ssi ble to p ro ve the c ha ra c te r o f a

pe rs on in o rd e r t o s ho w a c tio n in confor mity there with. I t may , howeve r, be a dmissibl e for other purpose s, such as proof of

. . . inte nt . . . .” Th e Go ve rnme nt c onte nd s it int ro du c e d Co ole y ’s te sti mony re g ard inghis pa st drugdealing s with Faust to prove Fa ust intended to distribute the coca ine found in the re sidence .

4 Wright and Faust origin ally signed th e lease, but on ly Wright sig ned the renew al ag re em en t. H e al so t es tif ie d th at F au st o w ne d ar ed

Cam ar o. T he G ove rn m en t the n c al le d af

ing er pr int e xpe rt w ho t es tif

ie d th at one of the bakin g pans f

ound in the f ir st tra sh p ull c ont ai ne d F au st’ s f ing er pr int . A nothe r expe rt

te sti fi ed that the ite m s f ound in the r es ide nc e, a s w el l a s th e sc or ing m ar ks o n th e bakin g pans, w e r e c o n s i s t e n tw i th th e c o o k i n g , c u t t i n g , an dd e a l i n g o f c r a c kc o c a i n e . T h e s a me expe rt te sti fi ed that the $27 00 f

ound in the r es ide nc e w as bande d in“ de al er f old s” an d th at dr ug d ea le rs pr ed om inate ly ke ep pr ope rty

in the nam e of

oth er ind ivi dua ls to i sol at e the m se lve s f

ro m the ir dr ug d ea lin g a ct ivi tie s. F ina lly , the G ove rn m en t offer ed testim ony

from Dw ay ne Cooley

under Federa l Rule of E vidence 404(b). 2 Cooley said he had a history

of purchasing crack coca ine from Faust and had seen Fa ust c ooki ng c ra ck

c oc ai ne . I n de fe nse , F au st arg ue d he did not li ve a t the residence and had no kno wledge of the drugs or guns foun d there. T he j ury co nvi ct ed F au st o f poss es sio n w ithint en t t o di str ibu te c oc ai ne , but a cquitte d hi m on th e rem ai ni ng th ree c ou nt s.This statutory maxi mum was based on a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)( C), and the 3 Gover nment havingfiled a notice of enha nceme nt pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. 5 T he pr e- se nte nc e inv es tig at ionr ep ort ( PS I) c al cu la te d F au st’ s ba se of fe nse le ve l at 20 pur suant t o U . S. S. G . § 2D 1. 1( a) (3 ) an d ( c) (1 0) due to his r es pons ibi lity for 31.6 gram s of cocaine and 94 gram s of ecstasy . Tw o levels wer e added under § 2D 1. 1( b) (1 ) be ca

use he pos se sse d adange ro us w ea pon. H ow ev er , be ca

use Fa ust w as ac ar ee r of

fe nde r unde r § 4B 1. 1( a) and the statut or y m ax im um f or his co nvi ct ed of fe nse w as 30 y ears , his of fe nse le ve l w as se t at 34 pur suant t o 3 § 4 B 1 . 1 ( b ) . Wi th ac r i mi n a l h i s t o ry c a t e g o ry o f V I , h i s G u i d e l i n e r an g e b e c a me 26 2 t o 3 27 m on th s’ im

pr is on m en t. Fa ust w as se nte nc ed

a ft er the S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n in United States v. Booker , 543 U . S. 220 , 125 S . Ct . 738 ( 2005 ). A t se nte nc ing , he r en ew ed his obj ec tio ns t o th e PS I, arg uin g hi s se nte nc e shou ld n ot b e enhanc ed ba se d on poss es sio n of

e cs ta sy and w ea pons be ca

use he w as a cquitte d of

that c ondu ct . T he district court overruled the objection because it had considered the Guidelines as advis or y and h ad ba se d it s c al cu la tio ns o n apr ep onde ranc e of the e vid en ce . T he dis tr ic t c ourt, how ev er , gr an te d F au st’ s m oti on f or adownw ar d de part

ur e be ca use his c ri m ina l hi sto ry

c at eg or y se ri ousl y ove r- re pr es en te d hi s c ri m ina l hi sto ry . W ith a ne wc ri m ina l hi sto ry

c at eg or y of I V , F au st’ s Guid el ine r an ge be cam e 210 to 2 626

m onth s’ im

prisonm ent. T he court considered the factors in 18 U. S. C. § 355 3(a), an d s en te nc edFau stto 21 0 m on th s’ im pr is on m en t an d 6 y ears ’ supe rv is edrel eas e. T his appe al f

oll ow ed . II. DISCUSS ION A. Suffi ciency of the E vidence Fa ust f ir st arg ue s th er e is i nsuf

fi ci ent e vid en ce on whic h to sus ta in h is co nvi ct ionbe ca

use the G ove rn m en t c annot sho whe pos se sse d th e co ca ine f ound atth e res id en ce. We revi ew su ffi ci en cy of t he ev id en ce cl ai m s d e n ov o. United Sta tes v . M

cD ow el l , 250 F . 3d 1 354, 136 1 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) . T o de te rm ine if ev ide nc e is s uf

fi ci en t t o su

ppor t a c onvi ct ion , w e m

ust vie wthe e vid en ce in the lig ht m ost

f av or ab le to the G ove rn m en t and d ec ide w he the r a re as ona ble j ur or co ul d h av e rea ch eda co nc lu si on of g ui ltbe y on d areas on ab le do ub t. United Sta tes v . Ca lde ron , 127 F. 3d 13 14, 1324 (11t h Cir. 1997 ). “ It is not necessary that the e vid en ce e xc lud e ev er y r ea sona ble hy pothe sis of

inn oc en ce or

be w hol ly inconsi stent with every

conclusion except that of guilt.” U nit ed Sta tes v . H

arr is , 20 F.3d44 5, 4 53 (11 th Cir . 19 94 ). T o su ppor t a c onvi ct ionund er

21 U . S. C. § 84 1( a) (1 ), the G ove rn m en t m ust es ta bli sh the de fe ndant “ (1 ) know ing ly ( 2) pos se sse d c oc ai ne ( 3) w ithint en t t o distribu te it.” Id

. Pos se ss io n m ay

be eit he r actua l o r co ns tru ct iv e. Id. “ T he7

governm ent m ay

prove constructive po ssessio n if it shows a defendant m aintained dom inion or control over the drugs or over the prem ises where the drugs are located.” Id. Co nstru ct ive pos se ssi on c anbe e sta bli she d by

e ith er dir ec t or ci rc um stanti al e vid en ce and b y inf er en ce s ari sin g f

ro m the sur ro undi ng ci rcu m st an ces . Se e U

nit ed Sta tes v . Prui tt , 76 3 F .2d12 56 , 12 64 (11 th Cir . 19 85 ). T he G ove rn m en t pr es en te d su ff ic ie nt e vid en ce a t tri al to supp ort the co nc lu si on th atFau stco ns tru ct iv el y po ss es se d t he co cai ne fou ndat t he res id en ce. Inthe f ir st tra sh p ull , pol ic e unc ove re d 17 bakin g pans, m any c ont ai nin g c oc ai ne residue and scoring m arks consistent with the cuttin g of crac k cocaine. Faust wa s seen leaving the residence on the nigh t of the trash pull, and his fingerprint was found on one of the baking p ans that contained cocaine residue. More over, when ex ec uti ng the se ar chw ar

rant, pol ic e dis co ve re d an un ope ne d le tte r ad dr es se d to Fa ust ne xt t o th e ba g of

c oc ai ne and an a ddi tio na l bakin g pan be ar ing sc or ing m arks. Thr ough out th e house, the offic ers also found $27 00 in cash, a digital scale, and incense, a

known cutting agent. In addition , $745 in sm all bills was fo und on F au st’ s pe rs on. T his e vid en ce , bol ste re d by D w ay ne Co ole y ’ s te sti m ony re gard ing his pa st dru g de al ing s w ithF au st, c oul d, and d id, c onvi nc e a re as ona ble j uror bey ond a reasonable doub t that Faust participated in the produ ction of crack co cai ne an d p os se ss edth e co cai ne fou ndat t he res id en ce fo r th atpu rp os e.8

Furthe rm or e, a lth oughF au st d en ie d li vin g a t the r es ide nc e, the G ove rn m en t presented sufficient evidence for the j ury to infer that he did in fact live there or, at the very least, “ m aintained dom inion or control . . . over the prem ises.” Se e id. Whe n po lic e re spon de d to the 911 c al l and F au st a ppe ar ed a t the doo r, Wri ght identified him

as her husband who lived th ere. D uring the search, police dis co ve re d le tte rs a ddr es se d to F au st, m en ’ s c lothin g and c olo gne , f am ily ph ot og rap hs th atin cl ud edFau st , anda di gi ta l s cal e, whi ch Fau stad m it te d was hi s. Faust also sign ed the original lease and, a lthou gh he didnot sig n the renew al ag re em en t, an e xpe rt

te sti fi ed that su chbe havio r w as c onsi ste nt w iththe a ct ion s of drug dealers. Finally , F aust testified that he couldgain access to the residence at will; indeed, Wright was not at hom e on the nigh t of the searc h, and Fa ust had let him self in. Based on this evid ence, a re asonable juror could have conclu ded be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt tha t F au st m ai nta ine d do m ini on o r co ntr ol o ve r the re sid en ce . A cc or din gly , suf fi ci en t e vid en ce sup ports F au st’ s c onvi ct ionon a co ns tru ct iv e p os se ss io n t he ory . B. Rule 404(b) E

vidence Fa u s tn ex tar g u es th e d i s tri ct co u rterre di nad m i t t i n g Dwa yne Co o l ey’s testim ony . He does not d isput e the content of Cooley ’ s testim ony , but instead co nte nds the G ove rn m en t f ai le d to pr ovi de r ea sona

ble not ic e of

it s in te nt t o9

intro duc e his te sti m ony

a s r equir ed

by F ed er al Ru le of

E vid en ce 404 (b ). T he re co rd dir ec tly c ontra dic ts this a sse rt ion . U nde r Ru le 404 (b ), e vid en ce of pr ior a ct s is not

a dm iss ibl e to p ro ve the defendant’ s charac ter, but is adm issib le for other lim ited purpos es “providedthat uponr eque st b y

the a cc use d, the pr ose cu tio n inac ri m ina l c as e sha ll pr ovi de reasonable notice in advance of trial . . . of the general nature of any such evidence it int en ds t o in tr oduc e at

tr ia l. ” O n Ju ly

30, 200 2, in its f

ir st r es pons e to the standi ng d isc ove ry

or de r, the G ove rn m en t di sc los ed it s in te nt t o of

fe r 404( b) ev ide nc e at

tr ia l. O n January

6, 200 4, m or e than se ve n m onths p ri or to tr ia l, the Governm ent subm itted a suppl em ental response indi cating “ pursuant to [Fe deral Ru le of E vid en ce ] 404 (b ) it m ay of fe r the te sti m ony

of D w ay ne Co ole y

r eg ar din g his narc oti c de al ing s w ithde fe ndant. ” T he sup ple m en ta l r es pons e w en t onto detail the content of Cooley ’ s anticipated testim ony . The G overnm ent’ s notice, giv enm or e than se ve n m onths b ef or e tr ia l, w as c er

ta inl y suf fi ci en t t o satis fy

Ru le 40 4( b) ’s reas on ab le no ti ce re qu ire m en t. C. Six th A m en dm en t C hal le nge Fi na lly , F au st arg ue s th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in enhanc ing his ba se of fe nse level due to its find ing th at he possessed ecstasy and firearm s, beca

use the jur

yF a us t a lso argue s th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in de te rm ini ngthe te rm

“ statut or y maximum ” 4 in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)( B) ref ers to the number

of year s set forth in the substantive statute ra ther than the maximum sentenc e per mitted by the Guidelines prior

to the application of a

ny e nh anc e me nts . T his argume nt i s w ith out me ri t. It is be yon d q ue sti on that “ statut or

y maximum ” ref ers to the maximum s entenc e a de fenda nt can r ece ive, ac cordingto the substantive statute, based on his off

ense of conviction. 10 ac qui tte d hi m

of that c ondu ct . F au st c ont en ds tha t e ve n w he n th e Se nte nc ing

4 Guidelines are a

pplied in an advisory

m anner, the Sixth Am endm ent right to a jury trial prohibits courts from considering relevant condu ct for which a defendant wa s acquitted when m aking senten cing calculations. This Court has alre ady rej ected th atarg um en t. U nde r our

lon g- standi ng p re ce de nt, “ [r ] el ev an t c ondu ct of w hic h a de fe ndant w as a cquitte d no ne the le ss m ay be take n in to a cc ount

in se nte nc ing f

or the offense of c onvi ction, as long as the gov ernm ent proves the acquitted con duct relied upon bya preponderance of the evidence.” U

nit ed Sta tes v . B arak

at , 130 F. 3d 1 448, 145 2 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ; see also United States v. R ivera-Lopez , 928 F. 2d 3 72, 372 -7 3 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) . A s th e Su pr em e Co urt e xpl ai ne d in United Sta tes v . W

att s , 519 U . S. 148 , 154 , 117 S . Ct . 633 , 636 ( 1997 ), “ se nte nc ing enhanc em en ts d o no t punis h ade fe ndant f or c ri m es of

w hic h he w as not co nvi ct ed , but

r athe r inc re as e his se nte nc e be ca use of the m anne r in whic h he co m m itt ed the c ri m e of

c onvi ct ion . ” “ [C ] onsi de ratio n of inf orm at ionabout

the de fe ndant’ s c hara ct er

and c ondu ct

a t se nte nc ing doe s no t r es ult in ‘ puni shm en t’Every other c ircuit to consider this issue has re ache d the same c onclusion. See U nited 5 Sta te s v . H igh El k, 442 F.3d 622, 626 ( 8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vaughn , 430 F.3d 518, 526-27 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Price , 4 18 F .3 d 7 71 , 7 87 -8 8 ( 7th Cir . 2 00 5) ; United States v. Magallanez , 408 F.3d 672, 684- 85 (10th Cir. 2005).

11 for any offense other than the one of which the defendant was convicted.” Id . at 155, 117 S . Ct . a t 63 6 ( quot at ionom itt ed ). F au st r ec ogni ze s th is p re ce de nt, but ar gue s th e Su

pr em e Co ur

t’ s de ci sio n in United States v. B ooker , 543 U . S. 220 , 125 S. Ct . 738 ( 2005 ), c as ts d oubt on i t. In U nit ed Sta tes v . D unc an , 40 0 F .3d12 97 , 13 04 -0 5 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 5) , ce rt. denied , __ U . S. __ , 126 S . Ct . 432 ( 2005 ), how ev er , w e he ld n oth ing in Booker pr ohi bit s c ourts f

ro m c onsi de ri ng r el ev an t a cquitte d c ondu ct w he n th e Se nte nc ing G uid el ine s are appl ie d a s a dvi sor y . A s w e expla ine d: 5 Booker does not s uggest th at the consideration of acquitted cond uct violates the Sixth Am endm ent as long as the judge does not im pose a se nte nc e that e xc ee ds wha t i s auth or iz ed by the j ur y ve rd ic t. T hus, nothin g in Booker

ero de s o urbi nd in g p rece de nt . Booker sug ge sts that sentencing j udges can contin ue to consid er r elevant acquitted co nduc t whe n a

ppl y ing the G uid el ine s inan a dvi sor y m anne r, ‘ fo r when a tr ial j udge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a j ury de te rm in at io n o f th e fac ts th atth e jud ge de em s re le va nt .’ Id. (quot ing Booker , 543 U . S. a t 23 3, 125 S . Ct . a t 75 0) ; see also United States v. Rodriguez , 398 F . 3d 1 291, 130 1 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) ( expla ini ng “ al l ni ne [ j ust ic es ] agreed that the use of extra -verdict enhancem ents in an advis ory guidelin es sy stem12

is n ot unc onst itu tio na l. ”) . I nde ed , in Jus tic e St ev en s’ m aj or ity opi nio n in Booker , he state d “ [n ] one of

our pr ior c as es is inc onsi ste nt w ithtod ay ’ s de ci sio n” and spe ci fi ca lly

dis cu sse d W

att s , a m ong oth er

c as es . B ooker , 543 U . S. a t 24 0- 41, 125 S. Ct . a t 75 4- 55. Thu s, W att s ’ hol din g—“ that a

j ur y ’ s ve rd ic t of

a cquitta l do es not prevent the sentencing cou rt fr om considering con duct und erly ing th e acquitted ch ar ge , so l ong as that c ondu ct ha s be enpr ove d by

apr ep onde ranc e of

the evidence conduct,” W

att s , 519 U . S. a t 15 6, 117 S . Ct . a t 63 8 — sur viv es Booker . W e al so n ote 18 U . S. C. § 36 61, on whic h W att s r el ie d, r em ai ns i nta ct

pos tBooker . U nde r § 36 61, “ [n ] o li m itatio n sh al l be pla ce d onthe inf orm at ion concerning the backgroun d, char acter , and conduct of a person convicted of an of fe nse w hic h ac ourt of

the U nit ed

S ta te s m ay

r ec ei ve and c onsi de r fo r the pur pose of im posi ng an a

ppr opr ia te se nte nc e. ” Be ca use the S upr em e Co urt i n Booker e xc ise d on ly

tw o pr ovi sio ns o f the S en te nc ing A ct , 18 U . S. C. § 35 53( b) (1 ) an d § 37 42 (e), see B ooker , 543 U . S. a t 25 9, 125 S . Ct . a t 76 4, it f oll ow s th at

c ourts m ay still cons ider rele vant facts concerning a defe ndant’s “background , c haracte r, an d c ondu ct ” w he n m ak ing se nte nc ing c al cu la tio ns, e ve n if tho se f ac ts r el at e to acq ui tt edco nd uc t. See M agal lanez , 408 F. 3d at 684 -85. A ccordingly , under an advisory Guidelines schem e, courts can continue to con sider relevant ac quitt ed conduct so long as the facts underly ing th e conduct are proved by a preponderance13

of the evidence and the sentence im posed do es not exceed the m axim um sentence au th or iz edby the jury ve rd ic t. H er e, the dis tr ic t j udge c le ar ly appl ie d th e G uid el ine s a s a dvi sor y , statin g dur ing the se nte nc ing he ar ing , “ I ab sol ute ly und er stand tha t the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s are no l onge r m an da tor y . ” T he j udge the n f

ound the f ac ts unde rl y ing the a cquitte d c ondu ct

by apr ep onde ranc e of

the e vid en ce . A s f

or the e cs ta sy charge, the evidence showed that several bags of ec stasy , totaling 94 gram s, w ere re co ve re d f

ro m the li vin g r oom

on the nig ht o f the se ar ch . T he j udge f ound “ the pr es en ce of

[ ec sta sy ] c er

ta inl y ha s be ene sta

bli she d by

apr ep onde ranc e of

the ev ide nc e, and i ts r el at ion shi p to the D ef en dant a s be ing inv olv ed in the pos se ssi on of tho se dr ugs ha s be ene sta

bli she d by

apr ep onde ranc e of

the e vid en ce . ” A s f

or the w ea pons c harg e, f

our f ir earm s w er e re co ve re d, one ne xt t o aba g of e cs ta sy and thr ee e lse w he re in the r es ide nc e. T he j udge f ound by apr ep onde ranc e of

the ev ide nc e that e ith er

F au st o r a co -c onsp ir at or pos se sse d th e fi re ar

m s. B as ed

on th e s e f i n d i n g s , th e ju d g e e n h an c e dF au s t ’s o f f e n s e l e v e l a c c o r d i n g l y. F i n a l l y, Faust’ s ultim ate sentence, 210 m onth s’ im prisonm ent, w as we ll below the 30-y ear m ax im um se nte nc e au tho ri ze d by

the j ur y ve rd ic t of

c onvi ct ionon the c oc ai ne poss es sio n c harg e. T he dis tr ic t c ourt thus did not e rr in co nsi de ri ng the e cs ta sy an d weapo ns ch arg es as r el ev an t co nd uc t wh en cal cu la ti ng Fau st ’s sen te nc e.14 III. CONCLUSION W e af firm Faust’ s convictio n because it is supp orted by sufficient evidence and because the Governm ent providedrea sonable no tice of its intent to in troduce Co ole y ’ s te sti m ony . W e al so a ff irm F au st’ s se nte nc e be ca

use the dis tr ic t c ourt di d not err in considering relevant acquitted cond uct, e stablish ed by a preponderance of the evidence, when ca lculating h is sentence. AF FIRMED .15

BA R KE TT , J. , sp ec ial ly c on cu rr in g: I j ointhe m aj or ity

in af fi rm ing F au st' s c onvi ct ion , but c onc ur in its se nte nc ing de ci sio n on ly

be ca use I a m bound b y

Ci rc uit pr ec ed en t. A lth ough United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 (11th. Cir. ), cert. denied , - -- U.S. --- (2005), expr es sly

auth or iz ed

the dis tr ic t c ourt t o e nhanc e Fa ust ' s se nte nc e fo r co nduc t of

w hic h aj ur

y f ound him inn oc ent, I str ongl y

be lie ve thi s pr ec ed en t i s incorrect, and that sentence enhancem ents based on acquit ted conduct are unc onst itu tio na l un de r the S ixth A m en dm en t, a s w el l a s th e D ue P ro ce ss C lause of the F if th A m en dm en t. T he S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o aj ur y tr ia l i s e ndange re d w he ne ve r a j udge im pose s ase nte nc e that i s no t ba se d so le ly on “ fa ct s r ef

le ct ed in the j ur y ve rd ic t or adm itted by

the defendant.” Blakely v. W ashingt on, 542 U. S. 296, 301 (200 4). In the present case, Faust exerc ised his Sixth Am endm ent right and a jury of his peers re tur ne d an a cquitta l a s to thr ee of f our c harg es in the ind ic tm en t: poss es sio n of ecstacy , possession of a f irear m by a convicted felon, and po ssessio n of a fir earm during a drug trafficking offense. This verdict nece ssarily ref lected the j ury 's specific determ ination that Faust wa s not gu ilty of these statutorily

defined crim es be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt. N one the le ss, the dis tr ic t c ourt i nc re as ed his pr iso n16

te rm be ca use the j udge , and the j udge a lon e, de te rm ine d th at F au st w as gui lty

of them by a m ere preponderance of the evidence. The m aj ority

contends th at sentence enhancem ents based on acquit ted co nd uc t ar e d ire ct ly san ct io ne d b y Uni te d S ta te s v . W at ts , 51 9 U.S. 1 48 (19 97 ). But in United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 224 (200 5), the S uprem e Court dis tin gui she d W atts o n th e sam e, r ea dil y appare nt g ro und that di sti ngui she s W atts fr om the pr es en t c as e: “ [i ] n W atts, r el y ing on W itt e v. U nit ed S ta te s, 515 U . S. 389 (1995), w e held that the Double Jeopardy Clause perm itted a court to consid er acquitted condu ct in sentencing a defendant und er the Guidelin es. In neither W itte nor W atts was ther e any contention that the sentencing enh ancem ent had ex ce ed ed the se nte nc e au tho ri ze d by the j ur y in vio latio n of

the S ixth A m en dm en t. ” Bo oke r, 543 U . S. a t 24 0 ( em pha sis a dde d) . B ec au se F au st b ri ngs a cl ai m und er the S ixth A m en dm en t, not und er the D oubl e Je opardy

Cl au se , “ the iss ue w e co nf

ro nt t oday ” – r el at ing to the sc ope of ade fe ndant' s j ur

y -tri al r igh t –

“ sim ply w as not pr es en te d” in W atts, w hic h po se d “ a ve ry narr owque sti on re gard ing the int er ac tio n of the G uid el ine s w iththe D oubl e Je opardy Cl au se . ” I d. at 240 , 240 n. 4. T hus the hol din g of

W atts, e xpl ic itl y

dis av ow ed

by the S upr em e Co urt a s a m at t ero f S i x th Am en d m en tl aw , h as n o b ea ri n g o nth i s ca s e i nl i g h to f t h e C o u rt ’s17

m ore re cent and relevant rulings in Apprendi v. Ne w Jer sey , 530 U. S. 466 (200 0), Ri ng v . A ri zo na , 536 U . S. 584 ( 2002 ), Bl ak el y , and B ooke r. T he im pa ct of the se de ci sio ns o n th e pr es en t c as e is h ar dly obv ia te d by

the f ac t tha t B ooke r de cl ine d to gr af t on to the S en te nc ing A ct ar equir em en t tha t j ur ie s f ind a ll fa ct s c onsi de re d in se nte nc ing be y ond a re as ona ble doubt, and d ec lin ed

to ex ci se pr ovi sio ns o f the Ac t providi ng for j udicial fact-f indin g as part of sentencing. T houg h true so far a s i tg o es , t h i s o b s erv at i o n , s t an d i n g al o n e, h ar d l y d i ct at es th e p ro p ri et y o f F au s t ’s se nte nc e enhanc em en t f

or a cquitte d c ondu ct . T he re is a vit al c onst itu tio na l di ff er en ce be tw ee n se nte nc ing ade fe ndant f or 100 gr am s of

c oc ai ne w he re he w as c onvi ct ed of pos se ssi ng 5 0 gr am s, and puni shing a defe ndant for 90 gram s of ecstacy wher e the j ury

ref used to con vict him of possessin g even a m illigram of that substance. A s the Ninth Circuit warned fi ft ee n y ears a go, it

“pe rv er t[ s] our sy ste m of j ust ic e [t o] a llo w [] ade fe ndant t o suffer punishm ent for a c rim inal charge for which he or she w as acquitted.” U nit ed S ta te s v. Br ady , 928 F . 2d 8 44, 851 ( 9thCi r. 199 1) . T he sur viv al of thi s principle to the present day wa s explained particularly force fully

in United States v. P im en ta l, 367 F . S upp. 2d 1 43 ( D . Ma ss 2 005) . A lth oughP im en ta l di d no t inv olv e a dr

ug c onvi ct ion , the que sti on i n th at c as e w as no d if

fe re nt f ro m the one pr es en te d he re and i n D unc an– nam el y , w he the r a j udge m ay c onst itu tio na lly

ba se18

a se nte nc e on “ the ve ry

sam e co nduc t tha t [ a] j ur y c onsi de re d” and d ec lin ed to im pute to th e defe ndant. Id. at 145. T here the c ourt reasoned that “ it m akes absolut ely

no sense to conclu de that the Sixth Am endm ent is viol ated whenever f a c t s e s s e n t i a l t o s e n t e n c i n g h a v e b e e nd e t e rmi n e db y aju d g e r a th e r th anaju ry,

. . . and als o c onc lud e that the f ru its of the j ur y ' s e ff orts c anbe ign or ed

w ith im pu ni ty by th e jud ge in sen te nc in g.” Id. at15 0 (c it in g B la ke ly, 54 2. U.S. 2 96 ). Fo r it is n ot the abstra ct

dig nity of the statut or

y m ax im um that i s at st ak e in the Suprem e Court’ s Sixth Am endm ent j urisprudence, but the integrity of the j ury right itself, the corner stone of our crim inal justice sy stem . See Booker, 543 U. S. at 236 ( de cr

y ing how , a s se nte nc es be cam e le ss t ethe re d to a ct ua l ve rd ic ts,

“ jur[i es ] fin di ng [s ] of

th e u nd erl y in g c rime beca m e le ss si gn ifi can t” ). In sis tin g th at

it s de ci sio ns i n Jo ne s, Appr en di, and B ooke r ar e not

“ m oti va te d by

S ixth A m en dm en t f

orm al ism , but

by the ne ed to pr es er ve S ixth A m en dm en t su

bst an ce , ” id. a t 23 7, the S upr em e Co urt ha s c onsi ste ntl y r et ur ne d to the bedrock principle that crim inal sentences m ust be “ authorized” by

“ the j ury ve rd ic t a lon e. ” S ee Bo oke r, 543 U . S. a t 23 5; B lake ly , 542 U . S. a t 30 5; R ing , 536 U . S. a t 60 4. T he re are a t l ea st tw o r ea sons w hy “ Si xthA m en dm en t su

bst an ce ” is vio le ntl y e ro de d w he n our not ionof ase nte nc e “ au tho ri ze d by the j ur y ve rd ic t” is lim ite d to pun ishm en ts whic h m er el y stay w ith in the statut or

y m ax im um f or the19

crim e of conviction. First, the rea sonable do ubt stand ard is w arranted when im put at ion s of

c ri m ina l c ondu ct

are a t st ak e not

onl y “be ca use of the pos sib ili ty that [ an ind ivi dua l] m ay

los e his li be rty

upo n c onvi ct ion , ” but

a lso “be ca

use of the ce rt ai nty that he w oul d be sti gm at iz ed . . . . ” S ee I n r e. W ins hip , 397 U . S. 358 , 363 (1 970) ( em

pha sis a dde d) ; se e al so M cM ill an , 477 U . S. a t 96 ( “ O nc e a St at e de fi ne s ac ri m ina l of

fe nse , the D ue P ro ce ss C lause r equir es it to pr ove any c o mp o n e n to f

th e p r o h i b i t e dtr an s a c t i o nth a t g i v e s r i s e t o b o th as p e c i a l s t i g ma an da s p ec i al p u n i s h m en tb eyo n da r ea s o n ab l e d o ub t .” ). Ev en th o u g h Fau s t ’s m ax i m u m p o s s i b l e s en t en ce wa s n o ti n cr ea s edb y th e s en t en ci n g ju d g e’s independ ent finding s – three separate findings of actual, crim inal condu ct – they ce rt ai nly do c hange the quanti ty

and qua lit

y of the sti gm a he f

ac es . S ec ond, and ev enm or e im

portantl y , “ to c onsi de r ac qui tte d c ondu ct tr ivi al iz es ‘ le ga l gu ilt ’ or

‘ le ga l i nnoc en ce ’ – whic h is w ha t a j ur y de ci de s – i n aw ay

that i s in co nsi ste nt w iththe te nor

of the r ec en t c as e law , ” Pi m en ta l, 367 F . Su pp. 2d at 15 2, by

“ re du ci n g th e ju ry’s ro l e ‘t o th e r el at i v e i m p o rt an ce o f al o w- l ev el g at ek ee p er .’” Bo ok er, 5 43 U.S. at 2 30 , cit in g J on es v. Un it edSta te s, 5 26 U.S. 22 7, 2 30 (19 99 ). Inse nte nc ing on the ba sis of a cquitte d c ondu ct , ac ourt “ is e xpr es sly c onsi de ri ng facts that the j ury

verdict not onlyfailed to authorize; it considers facts of which20

the j ury expressly

disapprov ed . ” P im en ta l, 367 F . S upp. 2d at 15 2 ( em pha sis added). T he m aj or ity

be lie ve s th at , in a sin gle pr oc ee din g, F au st’ s po sse ssi on o f e c s t a c y m ay b e b o th ane l e men to f ac r i me a n das e n t e n c i n g f a c tp r o v ab l e b y a m er e pr ep onde ranc e of

the e vid en ce . T his anom al y is hard ly j ust if ie d by the ar gum en t tha t “ the j ur

y ‘ onl y ’ de ci de s gu ilt

be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt whil e the j udge de ci de s f

ac ts b y af ai r pr ep onde ranc e of

the e vid en ce . ” I d. T ha t arg um en t m ight b e m ore com

pelling if Booker had indeed returned us to the pre-Guidelin es er a, w he n “ the tr ia l sp he re w as r ule -b ound

and s en te nc ing w as c om parativ el y ru le -l es s. ” I d. B ef

or e the G uid el ine s, “ w ha t the j udge did in se nte nc ing – a specialized, professional functio n – was totally differ ent from

what the j ury

did.” Id . T he S ixth A m en dm en t i m pli catio ns w er e ve ry

dif fe re nt the n, “be ca

use se nt en ci ng fact s d idno t h av e b in di ng an d d et erm in at e co ns eque nc es .” Id . at 1 51 . See a ls o, Un it edSta te s v . Res tre po , 94 6 F .2d65 4, 6 63 (9t h C ir. 1 99 1) (Norris , J., d i s s e n t i n g ) ( p o s i t i n g th a tth e S e n t e n c i n g G u i d e l i n e s g a v e th e d e f e n d an t“a co ns ti tu ti on al ly-pro te ct edin te res t i n asen te nc e le ss th an th e st atut uo ry m ax im um . T his li be rty

int er es t, c re at ed

by the m an da tor

y langua ge of

the S en te nc ingI t is important to note that “ma ndatory -ness” is a question of degree , and that eve n the 1 pre- Booke r Sentenc ing Guidelines g ave judg es some discre tion to depart fr om the mandated punis hme nt r ang e if

the y fo un d c e rt a in a g g ra

vatin gor mit ig atin gc ir c ums tanc e s. 21 G uid el ine s, is pr ote ct ed

by the due pr oc es s c lause . ”) . B ut f ar f ro m r et ur nin g us to 1 the pre-Guidelin es day s when j udges “ exercis[e d] som ething li ke a clinical j udgm en t a

bout the appr opr ia te se nte nc e, ” Bo oke r intro duc ed a“ hy br id” sy ste m

in w hic h se nte nc ing “ is s til l pr of ound ly inf lue nc ed by the r ule s, nam el y

the G uid el ine s. ” P im en ta l, 367 F . Su pp. 2d at 15 1, 152 . T hus, li ke the Co urt i n Booker itself, we are “ face d with the issue of preserving an ancient guarantee under a new ,” rather than age-old and fam iliar, “ set of circ um stances.” Booker, 543 U . S. a t 23 7. T he f

ai r pr ep onde ranc e standard , w hic h “ m ad e se nse ” unde r the re gim e of ind et er m inate se nte nc ing , sim

ply “ doe s no t m ak e se nse in thi s hy br id regim e w here r

ules still m atter, and certa in facts have im portant, if not dispo sitive, co nse que nc es . ” P im en ta l at 15 3. S ee a lso Re str ep o , 94 6 F .2dat 6 70 (Norris , J., dissent ing) (“ Central to any liberty interest analy sis is th e extent to which governm ental discretion to take away liberty has been cabined.”) . More fundam entally

still, I believe F aust’ s sentence enhancem ents are unc onst itu tio na l pr ec ise ly be ca use the y de ri ve f ro m f ind ing s ba se d ona pr ep onde ranc e of

the e vid en ce . O f co ur se I a m aw ar e that M cM ill anv. Pennsy lvania, 477 U. S. 79 (1986 ), held that a preponderance standard atIaddre ss my disag ree ment with McMillian primarily in order to distinguish the due 2 proce ss claim reje cted by the Supreme Court in that ca se fr om the very differ ent and pa

rticular due proc ess problem, discussed inf ra , that arises when a de fenda nt is sentenced on the basis of char g es of whic h he has a ctually been a cquitted. I

note, howeve r, the viewthat McMillan’s own logic is significa

ntly underc ut by

the Court’s more r ece nt decisions in Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) a nd J ones, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). See United States v. Grier , 449 F.3d 558, 581 ( Slovit er, J ., dissenting) (“The holding of J ones that due pr ocess pr otections are require d for of fense definingelements a s distinguished fr om sentencingfac tors was the pr ece dent on which the Sup re me Court ’s de c isi on in A pp re nd i w a s b a se d. . . . App re nd i’ s se nte nc e wa s v a c ate d b e c a us e the sentenc ing judg e in that ca se found f acts that c onstitut e a se parate cr ime by a pre pondera

nce of the e vidence and that findingincre ased the statutory maxi mum to which the defe ndant was exposed. [ Be cause Grier ’s Guidelines ra ng e wa s increa sed on the ba sis of simil arly offe nsedefiningfac ts, his] situation is t hus compara ble to Appre ndi’s . . . Idissent from the holdingthat the District Court may

enhanc e Gr ier’s se ntence based on its deter mination by

a pre pondera

nce of the e vidence , that Grier committed an ag g ravated assault that wa s not admitted nor submitt ed to a jury for de termination by

proof be yond a re asonable doubt.”).

22 se nte nc ing satis fi es due pr oc es s, e ve n w ithr eg ar d to c ondu ct that i n it se lf co nst itu te s ac ri m ina l of

fe nse und er

appl ic ab le law . B ut “ as am atte r of sim ple 2 j ust ic e, ” Bo oke r, 543 U . S. a t 23 0, f ac tua l f ind ing s by

ase nte nc ing j udge oug ht t o re fl ec t the m or al blam ew orthi ne ss o f an alr ea dyc ulp abl e defendant. Rather than puni shing an offender for his guilt o r innocence pe r se , j udicially im posed enhanc em en ts h ist or ic al ly r el at e to c ont ex tua l m atte rs li ke “ the vul ne ra bil ity of the vic tim , the status of

the vic tim , the de fe ndant’ s r ole in the of fe nse , ” or e ve n th e quanti ty of dr ugs in the de fe ndant’ s po sse ssi on. U nit ed S ta te s v. G ri er , 449 F . 3d 558, 583 ( Sl ovi te r, J. , dis se nti ng) . I f the se “ co nte xtu al ” que sti ons can or sho uld be re sol ve d by

ase nte nc ing j udge und er apr ep onde ranc e standard , that i s be ca use our c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m

de viate s f

ro m it s pr ef er en ce f or the hig he st s tandard

of23

pr oof onl y w he n it c om es to fa ct s th at

do n ot – and c oul d no t – go t o th e ba sic que sti on o f le ga l c ulp ab ili ty , tr ad iti ona lly aj ur y ’ s r es pons ibi lity . Whe n a sentencing judge finds facts that could, in them selves, constitute entirely fre estandi ng o ff

en se s un de r the appl ic ab le law– tha t i s, w he n an e nhanc em en t f ac tor co uld have be ennam ed

in the ind ic tm en t a s ac om ple te c ri m ina l c harg e – th e D ue Pr oc es s C lause of

the F if th A m en dm en t r equir es that those f ac ts b e pr ove d be y ond a re as ona ble doubt. S ee W ins hip , 397 U . S. a t 36 4 ( 1970 ) (“ [T ] he D ue P ro ce ss Cl au se pr ote ct s th e ac cu se d a ga ins t c onvi ct ione xc ep t up on p ro of be y ond a re as ona ble doubt o f ev er

y f ac t ne ce ssary

to co nst itu te the c ri m e w ithw hic h he is charged. . . . It is critica l that . . . every indiv idual go ing abou t his ordin ary aff airs have confidence that his gov ernm ent cannot adjudge him guiltyof a c rim inal of fe nse w ith out

c onvi nc ing apr ope r fa ct fi nde r of his gui lt w ithutm ost ce rt ai nty . ”) ; se e al so R es tr ep o, 946 F . 2d at 67 8 (N or ri s, J. , dis se nti ng) ( as se rt ing that the r ea sona

ble doubt s tandard

is re qui re d f

or “ ane nhanc em en t ba se d on se nte nc ing f

ind ing s th at

appe llant e nga ge d intw o a ddi tio na l sa le s of c oc ai ne which w ere not charged in the ind ictm ent[, because t] hese addition al sales constitu te elem ents of a separate crim e, not tradition al sentencing factors”). The c ondu ct that served as the basis for Fa ust’s c hallenged sentence enhanc em en ts c le ar ly

did not r el at e to “ tr ad iti ona l” se nte nc ing f ac tor s. Appr en di,24

530 U . S. a t 49 3- 94. T he y c onst itu te d w hol ly

se parate c ri m ina l c harg es , and the ir ap pe ar an ce a s su chin the ind ic tm en t leads m e to the last of m y constitu tional objec tions to today ’ s opin ion – n am ely , that sentencing on the basis of acquitted co nduc t no t on ly

vio la te s th e D ue P ro ce ss C lause ’ s sp ec if ic guarante e of

pr oof be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt, but

a lso oth er

a spe ct s of

“ the r equir em en t of fu nd am en ta l fa irn es s” em bo di edin th e co ns ti tu ti on al rig ht to du e p ro ces s o f la w. W ins hip , 397 U . S. a t 36 9 ( H ar lan, J. , c onc ur ri ng) . I n ac as e suc h a s th is, the sp eci fic de m an ds of f

un da m en ta l fa irn es s ar e “ co nt ex tu al , tak in g i nt o a cco un t . . . the pr ac tic al iti es of

the c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m . ” Ri ch ar dsonv. U nit ed S ta te s, 526 U. S. 813, 835 (199 9). T he se nte nc ing pr ac tic e that F au st c ha lle nge s do es m or e than of fe r the gove rn m en t a

se co nd, if

sm al le r, bit e at

the appl e in c ri m ina l pr ose cu tio ns. A nd i t doe s m or e, e ve n, than un de rm ine the “part ic ular sig nif ic an ce ” that l awand s oc ie ty atta chto ana cquitta l. S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. D iF ranc es co , 449 U . S. 117 , 129 (1 980) . Whe n on e loo ks t o “ the pr ac tic al iti es of the c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m , ” it be co m es appare nt tha t the m ost pe rn ic iou s e ff

ec t of se nte nc ing on the ba sis of acquitted condu ct, and the one that m ost ins idiou sly “ violates tho se fundam ental co nc ep tio ns o f j ust ic e w hic h . . . de fi ne the c om m uni ty ’ s se nse of

f ai r play and de ce nc y , ” D ow lin g v. U nit ed S ta te s, 493 U . S. 342 , 353 ( 1990 ), is its im pli ci t and“[T] he g overnme nt's a bility to make its case vastly

exceeds a

defe ndant' s ability

to rebut 3 it. The financ ial resour ces of the prosec ution and the ability of prose cutors to ac cess police , informants, and e x perts usually are much g reater than those of defe ndants' counsel. . . . [P ]resentenc e re ports often re ly excessively

on the prosec utor' s files for the ir information . . . and hear say evidenc e [there]in . . . or from conf idential informants is difficult and c ostly to rebut. The a bsence of equa l liti g ation resour ces thus make s the preponde ranc e of e vidence standard g ener ate e ven more err ors – er rors that fa ll primarily

on the side of de privations of liberty for individuals.” Restrepo, 946 F .2d at 675 (Nor ris, J ., dissenting) . 25 of te n ho pe le ss d em an d th at , in or de r to avoi d punis hm en t f or c harg ed c ondu ct , cr im ina l de fe ndants m

ust pr ove the ir

inn oc en ce und er

tw o dr as tic al ly

dif fe re nt standards at once. S ee W inshi p, 397 U. S. at 367 (em phasizing the practica l

“ dif fe re nc e be tw ee n th e re as ona ble -d oubt and p re pond er an ce standard s” ). C al lin g on a de fe ndant t o c onvi nc e a j ur y of his inn oc en ce be y ond a re as ona ble doubt, even as he m

ust cons tantly

account for the court’ s ability to sentence him

under a pr ep onde ranc e standard , e xa ce rb at es the ve ry dis pari tie s whic h th e re as ona ble doub t st an dard

ha s be ene m

plo y ed to co rr ec t. S ee , e . g. , S antos ky v. K ram er , 455 U. S. 745, 762-64 (19 82) (disparity in litigatio n resources re nders preponderance standard consti tutio nally

inadequate in proceedings term inating parental rights). 3

“ T he re is al w ay s inli tig at ionam ar ginof e rr or , r ep re se nti ng e rr or

in fa ct fi ndi ng, w hic h bo th p ar tie s m ust take int o a cc ount , ” es pe ci al ly in the fo rm ulatio n of tr ia l strate gy . W ins hip , 397 U . S. a t 36 4 ( ci tin g S pe ise r v. Randa ll, 357 U.S . 513, 525 (1958)). Our C ircuit’ s Duncan rule sever ely com prom ises defendants’ ability

to properly

account for this m argin of err or, ta ilor an optim al26

tri al st rat eg y , or i nd eedfor m ul at e an y m in im al ly sati sf

y in g s tra te gy what so ev er. Fa ce d w ithm

ult ipl e al le ga tio ns s uppo rt ed by e vid en ce of

vary ing pe rs ua siv en es s, Fa ust ’ s larg el y

suc ce ssf ul e ff ort t o e sc ap e gui lt be y ond a re as ona ble doubt c oul d not pr ec lud e, and, in its suc ce sss , a ct ua lly m igh t have c ontri but ed

to, his puni shm en t f

or tho se a cquitte d of

fe nse s un de r a le sse r standard of pr oof . I do n ot be lie ve the Co nst itu tio n pe rm its thi s c ru el and p er ve rs e re sul t.