AVIATION SAFETY

FAA Efforts Have Improved 

Safety, but Challenges 

Remain in Key Areas

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, 

U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT

Thursday, April 16, 2013

GAO-13-442T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-442T, a report to 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation, U.S. Senate

April 16, 2013

AVIATION SAFETY

FAA Efforts Have Improved Safety, but Challenges 

Remain in Key Areas

Why GAO Did This Study

Even with nearly 80,000 flights each 

day within the national airspace 

system, there has not been a fatal 

commercial aviation accident in more 

than 4 years. The U.S. airspace 

system is arguably one of the safest in 

the world, with key aviation 

stakeholders—the FAA, airlines, 

airports, aircraft manufacturers, and 

the National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB)—working together to 

ensure these results. 

As the federal agency responsible for 

regulating the safety of civil aviation in 

the United States, FAA is responsible 

for, among other things: setting aircraft 

certification standards, collecting fleet 

and flight activity data, conducting 

safety oversight of pilot training and 

general aviation operations, and safely 

integrating aircraft into the national 

airspace. As the aviation industry 

evolves, FAA must remain diligent in 

its efforts to ensure the continued 

safety of aviation. In 2010, Congress 

passed the Airline Safety and Federal 

Aviation Administration Extension Act, 

which, in part, called for FAA to better 

manage safety risks.

This testimony focuses on (1) FAA’s 

aircraft certification process and (2)

FAA’s use of data to enhance safety 

and improve aviation oversight. The 

testimony is based on GAO’s previous 

work and updated with industry reports 

and information provided by FAA 

officials.

GAO has previously recommended 

that FAA address several data quality 

weaknesses. FAA concurred with most 

of these recommendations and has 

taken steps toward addressing some. 

What GAO Found

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for approving the 

design and airworthiness of new aircraft and equipment before they are 

introduced into service. FAA approves changes to aircraft and equipment based 

on evaluation of industry submissions against standards set forth in federal 

aviation regulations and related guidance documents. In September 2011, we 

reported that, overall, FAA did a good job following its certification processes in 

assessing the composite fuselage and wings of Boeing’s 787 against its 

airworthiness standards. However, the approval process—referred to as 

certification—presents challenges for FAA in terms of resources and maintaining 

up-to-date knowledge of industry practices, two issues that may hinder FAA’s 

efforts to conduct certifications in an efficient and timely manner. FAA is currently 

assessing its certification process and identifying opportunities to streamline it.

FAA plans to continue analyzing data reactively to understand the causes of 

accidents and incidents, and to augment this approach through implementation 

of a safety management system (SMS). SMS is a proactive approach that

includes continually monitoring all aspects of aviation operations and collecting

and analyzing appropriate data to identify emerging safety problems before they 

result in death, injury, or significant property damage. FAA has put in place 

various quality controls for its data; however, GAO has identified a number of 

areas where FAA does not have comprehensive risk-based data or methods of 

reporting that capture all incidents. The following are among the key areas GAO 

identified as needing improved data collection and analysis. 

• Runway and ramp safety. Additional information about surface incidents 

could help improve safety in the airport terminal area, as data collection is 

currently limited to certain types of incidents, notably runway incursions, 

which involve the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on a 

runway and certain airborne incidents, and does not include runway 

overruns, which occur when an aircraft veers off a runway or incidents in 

ramp areas, which can involve aircraft and airport vehicles. 

• Airborne operational errors. FAA’s metric for airborne losses of 

separation—a type of operational error—is too narrow to account for all 

potential risk. 

• General aviation. FAA estimates of annual flight hours for the general 

aviation sector, which includes all forms of aviation except commercial and 

military, may not be reliable. 

• Pilot training. FAA does not have a comprehensive system in place to 

measure its performance in meeting its annual pilot school inspection 

requirements. 

FAA has taken steps to address safety oversight issues and data challenges in 

many of these areas. For example, FAA is planning to develop a program to 

collect and analyze data on runway overruns, but it will be several years before 

FAA has obtained enough information about these incidents to assess risks. 

Sustained attention to these data collection and analysis issues will be necessary 

to ensure that FAA can more comprehensively and accurately assess and 

manage risk. 

View GAO-13-442T. For more information, 

contact Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. at (202) 

512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-13-442T 

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, and Members of the 

Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s (FAA) efforts to oversee aviation safety. Even with nearly 

80,000 flights each day within the national airspace system (NAS), there 

has not been a fatal commercial aviation accident in more than 4 years, 

and although hundreds of fatalities continue to occur each year in general 

aviation,1

As the federal agency responsible for regulating the safety of civil aviation 

in the United States, FAA is responsible for, among other things, setting 

aircraft certification standards and ensuring that manufacturers and 

suppliers meet those standards, collecting fleet and flight activity data, 

conducting safety oversight of pilot training and general aviation 

operations, and safely integrating aircraft and equipment into the national 

airspace. With air travel projected to increase over the next 20 years and 

agencies governmentwide experiencing budget reductions as part of the 

2013 sequestration, it will be critical for FAA to apply its limited resources 

in a manner that will allow it to maintain and enhance the safety of the 

NAS. In 2010, Congress passed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation 

Administration Extension Act (Airline Safety Act),

the number of overall general aviation accidents has trended 

downward. The U.S. airspace system is arguably one of the safest in the 

world, with key aviation stakeholders—FAA, the airlines and other aircraft 

operators, airports, aircraft manufacturers, and the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)—working together to achieve these 

results. Nevertheless, we must not become complacent because of the 

extraordinary safety record that has been achieved to date. Congress, 

FAA, and other stakeholders must remain diligent in their oversight of 

aviation safety.

2

 

1

General aviation includes all forms of aviation except scheduled air carriers and military. 

which, in part, called 

for FAA to better manage safety risks. While FAA and other stakeholders 

continue to address safety concerns in a reactive fashion by analyzing 

and investigating accidents and incidents, they have also begun to 

address safety issues in a more proactive fashion—before accidents or 

incidents occur. This proactive approach involves identifying, analyzing, 

and managing safety risks that are inherent throughout the system, and is 

being undertaken by FAA as part of its implementation of safety 

2

Pub. L. No. 111-216, 124 Stat. 2348 (2010).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-442T 

management systems (SMS). This risk-based oversight approach is 

becoming the standard throughout the global aviation industry and is 

recognized by aviation leaders, such as the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO), as the next step in the evolution of safety. In 

addition to SMS, FAA’s certification process attempts to ensure that 

safety is built into the aircraft and equipment used in the NAS.3

My statement today highlights two areas that are important to FAA’s 

safety efforts: the certification process and the collection and analysis of 

risk-based data as part of SMS. This statement is drawn from a body of 

work that we have completed from June 2009 to October 2012 regarding 

FAA’s safety oversight efforts. We have updated this information through 

a review of FAA documents and interviews with FAA officials. A list of 

related GAO products is included at the end of this statement, along with 

footnoted references to these products throughout the statement. The 

reports and testimonies cited in this statement contain more detailed 

explanations of the methods used to conduct our work. This body of work 

was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

While the 

agency has taken steps to improve its oversight approach, challenges 

remain in key areas.

Among its responsibilities for aviation safety, FAA issues certificates that 

approve the design and production of new aircraft and equipment before 

they are introduced into service; these certificates demonstrate that the 

aircraft and equipment meet FAA’s airworthiness requirements. FAA also 

grants approvals for such things as changes to air operations and 

equipment. Certificates indicate that the aircraft, equipment, and new air 

operators are safe for use or flight in the NAS. While industry 

stakeholders have expressed concerns about variation in FAA’s 

interpretation of standards for certification and approval decisions, 

 

3

FAA issues certificates for new air operators, new aircraft, and aircraft parts and 

equipment, and approvals, based on the evaluation of aviation industry submissions 

against standards set forth in federal aviation regulations and related FAA guidance 

documents.

Certification is a Key 

Component of FAA’s 

Aviation Safety 

Oversight 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-442T 

stakeholders and experts that we interviewed for our 2010 report 

indicated that serious problems occur infrequently.4 In addition, in 

September 2011 we reported that FAA did a good job following its 

certification processes in assessing the composite fuselage and wings of 

Boeing’s 787 against its airworthiness standards.5

The certification process also provides an example of how FAA is 

attempting to use a more proactive approach in finding solutions to a 

potential problem. In the case of flammability regulations that govern 

transport type aircraft, FAA has primarily developed its regulations on a 

reactive basis. That is, as accidents and incidents have occurred, their 

causes have been investigated, and the findings used to develop 

regulations designed to prevent the future occurrence of similar incidents 

or accidents. To supplement this oversight method, FAA has proposed a 

new, threat-based approach for flammability regulations that will base the 

flammability performance for different parts of the aircraft upon realistic 

threats that could occur in-flight or in a post-crash environment.

FAA recognizes the value of certification as a safety tool, however the 

agency faces some significant challenges, including resources and 

maintaining up-to-date knowledge of industry changes. According to a 

report from the Aircraft Certification Process Review and Reform Aviation 

Rulemaking Committee,6 these certification challenges will become 

increasingly difficult to overcome, as industry activity is expected to 

continue growing and government spending for certification resources 

remains relatively flat. As one means of responding to its certification 

workload, FAA relies on designees,7

 

4

See GAO, Aviation Safety: Certification and Approval Processes Are Generally Viewed 

as Working Well, but Better Evaluative Information Needed to Improve Efficiency,

however, our prior work has shown 

that there are concerns that designee oversight is lacking, particularly 

with the new organizational designation authorities in which companies 

GAO-11-14 (Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2010). 

5

See GAO, Aviation Safety: Status of Action to Oversee the Safety of Composite 

Airplanes, GAO-11-849 (Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2011).

6

“A Report from the Aircraft Certification Process Review and Reform Aviation 

Rulemaking Committee to the Federal Aviation Administration: Recommendations on the 

Assessment of the Certification and Approval Process,” May 22, 2012. 

7

FAA delegates many certification activities to FAA-approved individuals and 

organizations (called designees) to better leverage its resources. FAA’s designees 

perform more than 90 percent of FAA’s certification activities.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-442T 

rather than individuals are granted designee status. There are also 

concerns that, when faced with certification of new aircraft or equipment, 

FAA staff have not been able to keep pace with industry changes and, 

thus, may struggle to understand the aircraft or equipment they are 

tasked with certificating.8 SMS implementation within FAA should reduce 

certification delays and increase available resources to facilitate the 

introduction of advanced technologies. In response to a provision in the 

2012 FAA Reauthorization, FAA is assessing the certification process and 

identifying opportunities to streamline the process.

As we stated above, FAA plans to continue using data reactively to 

understand the causes of accidents and incidents, and is implementing a 

proactive approach—called an SMS approach—in which it analyzes data 

to identify and mitigate risks before they result in accidents. FAA is also 

overseeing SMS implementation throughout the aviation industry.9 Safety 

management systems are intended to continually monitor all aspects of 

aviation operations and collect appropriate data to identify emerging 

safety problems before they result in death, injury, or significant property 

damage. Under SMS, which FAA began implementing in 2005, the 

agency will analyze the aviation safety data it collects to identify 

conditions that could lead to aviation accidents or incidents and to 

address such conditions through changes to FAA’s organization, 

processes, management, and culture. As we reported in September 

2012, according to FAA, the overarching goal of SMS is to improve safety 

by helping ensure that the outcomes of any management or system 

activity incorporate informed, risk-based decision making. FAA’s business 

lines, such as the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety 

Organization, are currently at different stages of SMS implementation and 

it is likely that full SMS implementation will take many more years.10

 

8

GAO-11-849. 

9

FAA is undertaking the transition to SMS in coordination with the international aviation 

community, working with the ICAO, an agency of the United Nations that promotes the 

safe and orderly development of international civil aviation worldwide, to adopt applicable 

global standards for safety management. ICAO requires SMS for the management of 

safety risk in air operations, maintenance organization, air traffic services, and airports as 

well as certain flight training operations and for organizations that design or manufacture 

aircraft within its member states. 

10See GAO, Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance Safety Risk 

Management, GAO-12-898 (Washington D.C.: September 21, 2012).

Better Quality and 

More Complete Data 

Could Help FAA 

Further Improve 

Safety Oversight
 

Page 5 GAO-13-442T 

SMS relies heavily on data analysis and, while FAA has put in place 

various data quality controls, it continues to experience data challenges 

including limitations with some of its analyses and limitations to or the 

absence of data in some areas.11 Data limitations and the lack of data 

may inhibit FAA’s ability to manage safety risks. For example, we found 

that some FAA data used in risk assessments may not be complete, 

meaningful, or available to decision makers. We have also reported that 

the agency currently does not have comprehensive risk-based data, 

sophisticated databases to perform queries and model data, methods of 

reporting that capture all incidents, or a level of coordination that 

facilitates the comparison of incidents across data systems. Furthermore, 

technologies aimed at improving reporting have not been fully 

implemented.12

Our recent work on aviation safety and FAA oversight issues has 

identified a number of specific areas where FAA’s risk-based oversight 

could be improved through improved data collection and analysis, 

including: runway and ramp safety, airborne operational errors, general 

aviation, pilot training, unmanned aircraft systems, and commercial 

space. FAA has taken steps to address safety oversight issues in many of 

these areas, including making changes to or committing to make changes 

to its data collection practices in response to our recommendations in 

most of these areas. Nonetheless, sustained FAA attention will be 

necessary to ensure that the agency’s ability to comprehensively and 

accurately assess and manage risk is not impaired.

As a result, aviation officials managing risk using SMS 

have limited access to robust FAA incident data. Implementing systems 

and processes that capture accurate and complete data are critical for 

FAA to determine the magnitude of safety issues, assess their potential 

impacts, identify their root causes, and effectively address and mitigate 

them.

• Runway and ramp safety. Takeoffs, landings, and movement around 

the surface areas of airports (the terminal area) are critical to the safe 

and efficient movement of air traffic. In a June 2011 incident at John 

F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, for example, a jumbo jet 

 

11On November 8, 2012, FAA signed a memorandum of agreement with NTSB that will 

allow for greater sharing of safety data between the two organizations. 

12See GAO, Aviation Safety: Enhanced Oversight and Improved Availability of Risk-Based 

Data Could Further Improve Safety, GAO-12-24 (Washington, D.C.: Oct 5, 2011).
 

Page 6 GAO-13-442T 

carrying 286 passengers and crew almost collided with another jumbo 

jet, which reportedly missed a turn and failed to stop where it should 

have to avoid the occupied runway. Safety in the terminal area could 

be improved by additional information about surface incidents, which 

is currently limited to certain types of incidents, notably runway 

incursions and certain airborne incidents, but does not include runway 

overruns or incidents in ramp areas. Without a process to track and 

assess these overruns or ramp area incidents, FAA cannot assess 

trends in those areas and the risks posed to aircraft or passengers in 

the terminal area. FAA is planning to develop a program to collect and 

analyze data on runway overruns, something we recommended in 

2011, but it will be several years before FAA has obtained sufficient 

information about these incidents to be able to assess risks.13

• Airborne operational errors. Operational errors –also referred to as 

losses of separation—occur when two aircraft fly closer together than 

safety standards permit due to an air traffic controller error. We 

reported that FAA’s risk-based process for assessing airborne losses 

of separation is too narrow to account for all potential risk and 

changes in how errors are reported affect FAA’s ability to identify 

trends. For example, FAA’s current process for analyzing losses of 

separation assesses only those incidents that occur between two or 

more radar-tracked aircraft. By excluding incidents such as those that 

occur between aircraft and terrain or aircraft and protected airspace, 

FAA is not considering the systemic risks that may be associated with 

many other airborne incidents. FAA has stated that it is planning to 

include these incidents in its risk assessment process before the end 

of 2013, something we recommended in 2011.

FAA 

still collects no comprehensive data on ramp area incidents and NTSB 

does not routinely collect data on ramp accidents unless they result in 

serious injury or substantial aircraft damage. In 2011, we 

recommended that FAA extend its oversight to ramp safety and FAA 

concurred.

14

 

13

In addition, FAA’s 

changes to reporting policies affect its ability to accurately determine 

safety trends. For instance, we reported in October 2011 that the rate 

and number of reported airborne operational errors in the terminal 

GAO-12-24. 

14GAO-12-24. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-442T 

area increased considerably since 2007.15

• General aviation. General aviation is characterized by a diverse fleet 

of aircraft flown for a variety of purposes. In 2010, FAA estimated that 

there were more than 220,000 aircraft in the active general aviation 

fleet, comprising more than 90 percent of the U.S. civil aircraft fleet. 

The number of nonfatal and fatal general aviation accidents 

decreased from 1999 through 2011; however, more than 200 fatal 

accidents occurred in each of those years. In October 2012, we 

reported that general aviation flight activity data limitations impede 

FAA’s ability to assess general aviation safety and thereby target risk 

mitigation efforts.

However, multiple changes 

to reporting policies and processes in 2009 and 2010 make it difficult 

to know the extent to which the recent increases in reported 

operational errors are due to more accurate data, an actual increase 

in the occurrence of incidents, or both.

16 For example, FAA estimates of annual general 

aviation flight hours may not be reliable because of methodological 

and conceptual limitations with the survey upon which flight activity 

estimates are based. These limitations include survey response rates 

below 50 percent. Without more comprehensive reporting of general 

aviation flight activity, such as requiring the reporting of flight hours at 

certain intervals, FAA lacks assurance that it is basing its policy 

decisions on an accurate measure of general aviation trends, and 

NTSB lacks assurance that its calculations of accident and fatality 

rates accurately represent the state of general aviation safety. 

Lack of comprehensive flight hour data is an issue we have also 

identified in other segments of the aviation industry, including 

helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) and air cargo 

transportation. We recommended in 2007 and 2009 respectively that 

FAA take action to collect comprehensive and accurate data for 

HEMS and general aviation operations.17

 

15The terminal area is the area around an airport extending from the airfield or surface to 

about 10,000 feet vertically and out to about 40 miles in any direction.

In 2011, we confirmed that 

16See GAO, General Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Help Identify and 

Mitigate Safety Risks, GAO-13-36 (Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2012).

17See GAO, Aviation Safety: Better Data and Targeted FAA Efforts Needed to Identify and 

Address Safety Issues of Small Air Cargo Carriers, GAO-09-614 (Washington, D.C.: June 

24, 2009); GAO, Aviation Safety: Improved Data Collection Needed for Effective Oversight 

of Air Ambulance Industry, GAO-07-353 (Washington, D.C.: February 21, 2007); and 

GAO-13-36. 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-442T 

FAA now annually surveys all helicopter operators and requests, 

among other things, information on the total flying hours and the 

percentage of hours that were flown in air ambulance operations. Our 

recommendations to FAA for air cargo and general aviation data 

remain unaddressed. 

FAA’s ability to further reduce the number of fatal general aviation 

accidents is hindered by a lack of key data on pilots. For instance, we 

reported in October 2012 that FAA does not maintain certain key 

information about general aviation pilots, including how many are 

actively flying each year and whether they participate in recurrent 

training in addition to FAA’s voluntary training program. Without this 

information, FAA cannot determine the potential effect of the various 

sources and types of training on pilot behavior, competence, and link 

this to the likelihood of an accident. The lack of pilot data also makes 

it difficult to identify the root causes of accidents attributed to pilot 

error and determine how to mitigate risks. We recommended in 2012 

that FAA expand the data available for root cause analyses of general 

aviation accidents by collecting and maintaining data on each 

certificated pilot’s recurrent training and also that FAA should require 

the collection of general aviation flight hours.18

• Pilot training. There are about 3,400 pilot training organizations in the 

United States. For the most part, all pilot schools must provide training 

that includes both classroom and flight training. FAA has an annual 

inspection program that includes the oversight of pilot schools, pilot 

examiners, and flight instructors—gatekeepers for the initial pilot 

training process. Our 2011 analysis of FAA data indicated that FAA 

completed the large majority of the required inspections for the pilot 

schools that are certified by FAA, which generally supply most of the 

pilots that fly for scheduled commercial airlines.

FAA partially 

concurred with both of these recommendations and stated that it

anticipates addressing these and other data collection concerns by 

September 30, 2014.

19

 

18

However, the extent 

to which FAA undertakes required inspections for the thousands of 

remaining pilot training organizations, which may provide training to 

recreational pilots, is unclear. Our 2011 analysis of FAA inspection 

GAO-13-36. 

19See GAO, Initial Pilot Training: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Improve 

FAA Oversight, GAO-12-117 (Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2011). 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-442T 

data found that, while FAA requires its inspectors to conduct on-site 

inspections of each of these schools and their pilot examiners at least 

once per year, the agency does not have a comprehensive system in 

place to adequately measure its performance in meeting its annual 

inspection requirements. Without complete data on active pilot 

schools and pilot examiners, it is difficult to ensure that regulatory 

compliance and safety standards are being met. In addition, it is 

unclear whether required inspections for pilot examiners were 

completed because FAA’s data system lacks historical information. 

One potential implication is the quality of training that recreational pilot 

candidates receive, which could contribute to the many general 

aviation accidents in which pilot error is cited as a contributing 

factor.20

• Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). FAA and the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA) are taking steps to ensure the 

reliability of both small and large UAS by working on certification 

standards specific to UAS and undertaking research and development 

efforts to mitigate obstacles to the safe and routine integration of UAS 

into the national airspace. Some of these obstacles include 

vulnerabilities in UAS operation that will require technical solutions.

In 2011, we recommended that FAA develop a 

comprehensive system to measure performance of pilot school 

inspections and noted that this recommendation may require 

modifying or improving existing data systems. In responding to our 

recommendation, FAA officials said they agreed that improvements in 

oversight data were needed and indicated that they believe efforts 

already in existence or under way address our recommendations.

21

However, we found that these research and development efforts 

related to overcoming these obstacles cannot be completed and 

validated without safety, reliability, and performance standards for 

UAS operations, which FAA has not developed due to data 

limitations.22

 

20According to our 2012 analysis of NTSB data, the pilot was a cause in more than 60 

percent of the general aviation accidents from 2008 through 2010. 

Standards for UAS operations are a key step in the 

21These obstacles include the inability for UAS to sense and avoid other aircraft and 

airborne objects in a manner similar to manned aircraft and vulnerabilities in the command 

and control of UAS operations.

22See GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Measuring Progress and Addressing Potential 

Privacy Concerns Would Facilitate Integration Into the National Airspace System, 

GAO-12-891 (Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2012). 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-442T 

process of safely integrating regular UAS operations into the national 

airspace.23

• Commercial space. FAA also oversees the safety of commercial 

space launches that can carry cargo and eventually humans into 

space. FAA is responsible for licensing and monitoring the safety of 

such launches and of spaceports (sites for launching spacecraft).

Once standards are developed, FAA has indicated that it 

will begin to use them in UAS regulations; until then, UAS will 

continue to operate as exceptions to the regulatory framework rather 

than being governed by it.

24

However, FAA is prohibited by statute from regulating commercial 

space crew and passenger safety before 2015 except in response to 

a serious injury or fatality or an event that poses a high risk of causing 

a serious injury or fatality.25 FAA has interpreted this limited authority 

as allowing it to regulate crew safety in certain circumstances and has 

been proactive in issuing a regulation concerning emergency training 

for crews and passengers. However, FAA has not identified data that 

would allow it to monitor the safety of the developing space tourism 

sector and determine when to regulate human space flight. To allow 

the agency to be proactive about safety, rather than responding only 

after a fatality or serious incident occurs, we recommended in 2006 

that FAA identify and continually monitor indicators of space tourism 

industry safety that might trigger the need to regulate crew and 

passenger safety before 2015 and use it to determine if the 

regulations should be revised.26 According to agency officials, FAA is 

working with its industry advisory group, the Commercial Space 

Transportation Advisory Committee, to develop guidelines for human 

spaceflight.

 

23FAA is required to issue a final rule for small UAS by August of 2014 at the latest under 

the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(b) (2012).

24The National Aeronautics and Space Administration expects to procure from private 

launch companies two manned launches per year to the International Space Station from 

2017 to 2020. To date, FAA has not licensed any commercial space launches carrying 

humans.

25Sec. 827, Pub. L. No. 112-95. 

26See GAO, Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued Planning and 

Monitoring to Oversee the Safety of the Emerging Space Tourism Industry, GAO-07-16 

(Washington, D.C.: October 2006).
 

Page 11 GAO-13-442T 

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, and Members of the 

Committee, this concludes my written statement. I would be pleased to 

answer any questions that you may have at this time.

For further information on this statement, please contact Gerald L. 

Dillingham, Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or by email at dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who 

made key contributions to this testimony include Heather MacLeod, 

Assistant Director; Brooke Leary; Paul Aussendorf; Russell Burnett; 

Vashun Cole; Laura Erion; Brandon Haller; Dave Hooper; Dan Hoy; 

Delwen Jones; Maureen Luna-Long; Teresa Spisak; Pam Vines; and 

Jessica Wintfeld.

GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 12 GAO-13-442T 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Continued Coordination, Operational Data, 

and Performance Standards Needed to Guide Research and 

Development. GAO-13-346T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2013.

General Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Help Identify and 

Mitigate Safety Risks GAO-13-36. Washington, D.C.: Oct 4, 2012.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Measuring Progress and Addressing 

Potential Privacy Concerns Would Facilitate Integration into the National 

Airspace System. GAO-12-981. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2012.

Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance Safety Risk 

Management.GAO-12-898. Washington, D.C.: Sep 12, 2012.

Aviation Safety: FAA Is Taking Steps to Improve Data, but Challenges for 

Managing Safety Risks Remain.GAO-12-660T. Washington, D.C.: Apr 25, 

2012.

Aviation Safety: FAA Has An Opportunity to Enhance Safety and Improve 

Oversight of Initial Pilot Training. GAO-12-537T. Washington, D.C.: Mar 

20, 2012.

Initial Pilot Training: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Improve 

FAA Oversight. GAO-12-117. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2011.

Aviation Safety: Enhanced Oversight and Improved Availability of RiskBased Data Could Further Improve Safety. GAO-12-24. Washington, 

D.C.: Oct 5, 2011.

Aviation Safety: Status of FAA’s Actions to Oversee the Safety of 

Composite Airplanes. GAO-11-849. Washington, D.C.: Sep 21, 2011.

Aviation Safety: Certification and Approval Processes Are Generally 

Viewed as Working Well, but Better Evaluative Information Needed to 

Improve Efficiency. GAO-11-14. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2010.

Air Ambulance: Effects of Industry Changes on Services Are Unclear. 

GAO-10-907. Washington, D.C. September 30, 2010.

Aviation Safety: Improved Data Quality and Analysis Capabilities Are 

Needed as FAA Plans a Risk-Based Approach to Safety Oversight. 

GAO-10-414. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2010.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 13 GAO-13-442T 

Aviation Safety: Better Data and Targeted FAA Efforts Needed to Identify 

and Address Safety Issues of Small Air Cargo Carriers. GAO-09-614. 

Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2009.

Aviation Safety: Potential Strategies to Address Air Ambulance Safety 

Concerns. GAO-09-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2009.

Aviation Safety: Improved Data Collection Needed for Effective Oversight 

of Air Ambulance Industry. GAO-07-353. Washington, D.C.: February 21, 

2007.

Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued Planning and 

Monitoring to Oversee the Safety of the Emerging Space Tourism 

Industry. GAO-07-16. Washington, D.C.: October 2006.

(540260)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.