United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 01-2073

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

DARREN JOHN HAWKINS,

A/K/A DARREN WOOD, A/K/A/ DARREN ALLEN,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. George Z. Singal, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Boudin, Chief Judge,

Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Torruella, Circuit Judge.

Stephen C. Smith, for appellant.

Margaret D. McGaughey, Appellate Chief, with whom Paula D. Silsby,

United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

February 6, 2002
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant, Darren John

Hawkins, appeals the district court’s refusal to grant his suppression

motion. This motion sought to exclude the contents of a jar, which the

district court held had been opened and its contents examined pursuant

to a standardized inventory. Because we hold that it was not clearly

erroneous for the district court to conclude that the police inventory

procedures contained an unwritten addendum that officers should remove

all contents from a container when inventorying that container, the

search of the jar and its contents was permissible as an inventory

search. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision denying

appellant’s motion to suppress.

I.

On July 14, 2000, Officer Christopher Hashey observed

appellant driving his motorcycle erratically. Officer Hashey began

following appellant, and the pursuit became a high-speed chase which

resulted in appellant crashing into a semi-tractor trailer truck.

Appellant ended up unconscious on the road, partially under his

motorcycle, which was, in turn, partially under the truck.

When paramedics arrived on the scene, they removed appellant

from the road and placed him inside the awaiting ambulance. At some

point, the paramedics began removing appellant’s garments because they

were soaked with gasoline. One of the paramedics, Andrew Fish, noticed

that appellant had a transparent plastic baggie in his sock that
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contained a green leafy substance. Fish called out to Officer Hashey,

who came over, took possession of the bag, and identified the substance

as marijuana. The ambulance departed a short time later.

Another officer, George Spencer, Jr., was sent to the Eastern

Maine Medical Center with a "blood kit" to perform a blood analysis on

the appellant. After the paramedics arrived with appellant, Fish began

collecting appellant's clothing from inside the ambulance. It is

standard procedure to collect any personal belongings left in the

ambulance and deliver them to the hospital staff. As Fish was doing

this, he noticed that appellant's cut-up leather jacket was unusually

heavy. He observed half of a glass jar protruding from the jacket

pocket. Fearing that the jacket might also contain a weapon, Fish took

the jacket inside the hospital where he hoped to find a police officer.

He found Officer Spencer and turned the jacket over to him.

Officer Spencer, accompanied by Fish, took the jacket into

the hospital’s EMT room and removed all of its contents. This included

the jar, an electronic scale, and a black glove. The jar was about

five or six inches tall, about three or four inches in diameter,

partially covered by a peanut butter label, and topped with a yellow

screw-on lid. Officer Spencer opened the jar and reached inside, where

he felt a plastic bag with something solid inside. He then deposited

the jacket, jar, scale, and glove in the trunk of his police cruiser.
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Meanwhile, two agents from the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency

("MDEA") arrived. Spencer turned over the jacket and its contents to

these two officers, Robert Hutchings and Mark Leonard. These agents

then searched the jar. Hutchings, who is also a member of the Bangor

Police Department, removed the opaque plastic bag from the jar, untied

it, and found three transparent plastic bags containing white powder.

Agent Hutchings believed this to be cocaine, and a field test confirmed

that belief.

The Bangor Police Department has a written policy instructing

its officers on how to treat property and evidence that they find.

Nothing in the policy tells officers what to do when inventorying

containers, such as whether to open those containers. The MDEA also

has policies regarding inventory searches which do not address the

proper procedures for dealing with a closed container.

At the suppression hearing, Agent Hutchings testified that

there is no written policy on how to inventory closed containers.

Agent Hutchings also testified that if he found a coat from a citizen

on the street, "It would be the same as in the situation here.

Anything -- the jacket and its contents within it would be logged and

labeled and placed into evidence for either safekeeping or for . . .

court preparation or for analysis."

II.
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Generally, our review of a district court’s denial of a

suppression motion is plenary. See United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d

1306, 1311 (1st Cir. 1994). Moreover, we will uphold a district

court's decision to deny a suppression motion provided that any

reasonable view of the evidence supports the decision. See United

States v. Charles, 213 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2000); see also United

States v. García, 983 F.2d 1160, 1167 (1st Cir. 1993). However, we

review the factual findings of the district court for clear error. See

United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 529 (1st Cir. 1996). "A clear

error exists only if, after considering all the evidence, we are left

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

Id.; see also United States v. McLaughlin, 957 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir.

1992). "This deference to the district court's findings of facts

'reflects our awareness that the trial judge, who hears the testimony,

observes the witnesses' demeanor and evaluates the facts first hand,

sits in the best position to determine what actually happened.'"

Charles, 213 F.3d at 18 (quoting United States v. Young, 105 F.3d 1, 5

(1st Cir. 1997)).

A.

The district court held that the contents of the jar were

properly obtained during a standardized inventory. To reach that

holding, the district court made a crucial factual finding: that both

the MDEA and the Bangor Police Department have unwritten addenda to
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their inventory policies which require officers to open closed

containers.

Here Agent Hutchings testified that any jacket and its

contents would be treated similarly, regardless of the circumstances

under which the police obtained custody of the jacket. Therefore, it

was not clear error for the district court to find an unwritten policy

requiring officers to open and investigate all closed containers when

performing an inventory.

A warrantless search is permitted under the Fourth Amendment

if it is carried out pursuant to a standardized inventory policy. See

Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1983). Such a

standardized inventory policy may be unwritten. See United States v.

Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 503 (1st Cir. 1994); see also United States

v. Macera-Londono, 912 F.2d 373, 375 (1st Cir. 1990). Because the

district court found that there was a standardized, albeit unwritten,

inventory policy compelling officers to open containers to determine

their contents during an inventory, the drug evidence was properly

obtained.

B.

Appellant also challenges the search saying that the

inventory was clearly a "ruse" used to search for drugs. Regardless of

what appellant suggests, the law is clear. The subjective intent of

the officers is not relevant so long as they conduct a search according
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to a standardized inventory policy. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.

367, 373 (1987). Because the inventory was conducted in accordance

with standard procedure, it was valid.

III.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s

denial of the appellant’s motion to suppress.