RAIL SAFETY

Preliminary Observations 

on Federal Rail Safety 

Oversight and Positive Train 

Control Implementation

Statement of Susan A. Fleming, Director 

Physical Infrastructure Issues

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, U.S. 

Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10 a.m. EDT

Wednesday, June 19, 2013

GAO-13-679T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-679T, a testimony

before the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate 

June 19, 2013

RAIL SAFETY

Preliminary Observations on Federal Rail Safety 

Oversight and Positive Train Control 

Implementation 

Why GAO Did This Study

The rail network is one of America’s

safest modes of transportation, 

although several recent rail accidents 

have reinforced the need for 

constant effort from the private and 

public sectors to ensure safety for 

rail passengers, the public, and

railroad employees. FRA, the 

federal agency responsible for 

railroad safety, works with freight, 

commuter, and intercity passenger 

railroads and certain states to ensure 

the safety of the U.S. railroad 

network. 

In 2007, FRA developed and 

implemented a risk-based approach 

to its safety inspections of the 

railroad network. In 2008, RSIA was 

enacted and, among other things, 

reauthorized FRA’s rail safety 

program and included several new 

rail safety provisions, such as the 

implementation of PTC and creation 

of rail safety risk reduction plans.

This statement discusses GAO’s

preliminary observations about 1) 

how FRA oversees rail safety, 2) 

challenges to rail safety, and 3) PTC 

implementation by the U.S. rail 

industry. GAO examined FRA’s 

overall rail safety framework and 

interviewed state rail safety officials 

and officials from FRA; selected 

Class I, II, and III railroads; and 

Amtrak on rail safety and PTC 

implementation. 

GAO plans to issue reports on 

reviews of rail safety and PTC in the 

fall of 2013.

What GAO Found

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) primarily monitors railroads’ 

compliance with federal safety regulations through routine inspections by 

individual inspectors at specific sites on railroads’ systems. Thirty states also 

employ railroad safety inspectors, who participate in a partnership program with 

FRA to conduct supplemental safety oversight activities based on FRA rail safety 

regulations and enforce state railroad safety laws. FRA applies a quantitative, 

risk-based approach, the National Inspection Plan, to inform its rail safety 

oversight efforts using analyses of past accident and inspection data and other 

information to target inspections in each region. FRA also uses a planning and 

evaluation tool, the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), to distribute its inspection 

resources across each FRA region. However, according to several FRA regional 

administrators that GAO spoke with, the staffing decisions based on SAM results 

do not necessarily align with their perspectives on the inspector needs for their 

regions. 

Based on GAO’s work to date, there are several potential challenges affecting 

FRA’s rail safety oversight. First, the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) 

required FRA to issue regulations requiring certain railroads to submit risk 

reduction plans within 4 years. FRA has not yet issued a final rule on the plans. 

Second, FRA does not have a specific plan to replace its aging inspector 

workforce. According to FRA officials, in the next 5 years, about 32 percent of 

FRA inspectors will be eligible to retire. Although FRA officials said that they 

anticipate being able to replace inspectors, it can take 1 to 2 years to find, hire, 

train, and certify a new inspector. Finally, FRA faces other ongoing and emerging 

safety challenges like addressing adverse weather conditions and their impact on 

railroad operations and equipment, educating the public on the potential hazards 

of rail-highway crossings, accommodating changes in rail safety risks including 

new freight flows that affect the need for inspections, and hiring and training a 

specialized inspector workforce to provide adequate safety oversight for 

emerging technologies including positive train control (PTC), a communicationsbased system designed to prevent train accidents caused by human factors.

GAO’s work to date indicates that railroads may not be able to fully implement 

PTC by the 2015 deadline established in RSIA. This is because of the many

interrelated challenges caused by the complexity and breadth of PTC

implementation. For example, PTC components, such as the back office servers, 

which are needed to communicate vital information between locomotives and 

wayside signals, are still under development. In addition, the need to integrate 

PTC components and field test the system is a time- and resource-consuming 

process. Finally, some railroads had concerns with FRA’s limited resources and 

ability to verify field testing and certify the system once it is fully implemented. 

Officials from freight railroads and FRA stated they will not compromise PTC 

safety functions and will ensure PTC is implemented to meet the requirements of 

the RSIA mandate. However, in attempting to implement PTC by the 2015 

deadline, railroads may be making choices that could introduce financial and 

operational risks. For example, freight railroad representatives told us that 

without adequate time for field testing, PTC systems could potentially malfunction 

or fail more frequently, causing system disruptions.

View GAO-13-679T. For more information, 

contact Susan A. Fleming, 202-512-2834, 

flemings@gao.gov
Page 1 GAO-13-679T 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the 

Committee:

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing to discuss the 

Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) rail safety oversight activities. 

The rail network is one of America’s safest modes of transportation, 

although several recent rail accidents, including the Metro-North 

commuter rail accident in Bridgeport, Connecticut, the collision of BNSF 

and UP trains in Chaffee, Missouri, and the collision of a CSX train and a 

truck in Rosedale, Maryland, have reinforced the need for constant effort 

from both the private and public sectors to ensure that rail transportation 

remains safe for passengers, the public, and railroad employees. My 

statement will discuss our ongoing reviews of FRA’s rail safety oversight 

and the implementation of positive train control, a communications-based 

system designed to prevent train accidents caused by human factors.

This testimony provides our preliminary observations from our ongoing 

work, being performed at the request of this committee and other 

Members of the Senate, regarding: (1) FRA’s framework for safety 

oversight, (2) existing and emerging challenges to rail safety, and (3) PTC 

implementation. Our preliminary assessments of FRA’s rail safety 

framework and the quantitative tools FRA uses to implement that 

framework are based on our reviews of FRA documentation and 

interviews with FRA headquarters and regional officials. In addition, we 

interviewed state rail safety officials and freight railroad officials from 

selected Class I, II, and III railroads.1 We selected the railroads based on 

the class of railroad (as a proxy for size), types of railroads (long distance 

versus local service or a railroad that serves a small area such as a port 

or rail yard), and type of ownership (publicly held, privately held, or owned 

by a public agency) to get a range of different kinds of freight railroads.

For our assessment of PTC implementation, we reviewed documents and 

interviewed officials from FRA and railroad associations, the four largest 

freight railroads, commuter railroads that were selected based on PTC 

implementation status and ridership levels (among other things), and 

Amtrak. We also selected PTC suppliers and independent PTC experts 

 

1

The Surface Transportation Board classifies railroads based on annual revenues. As of 

2011 (the last year of data available), Class I freight railroads are those railroads that earn 

more than $433 million annually, Class II earn from about $35 million to $432 million 

annually and Class III railroads earn less than about $35 million annually.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-679T 

based on their involvement with PTC and recommendations from FRA, 

industry associations, and others.

We conducted our ongoing work in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. We provided a draft copy of this 

statement to FRA for their review. The agency had no comment. We plan 

to report the final results of our reviews in the fall of 2013.

According to FRA data, 2012 was the safest year in railroad history.

Overall, rail safety—measured by the train accident rate per million train 

miles—has improved markedly since 1980, as shown in figure 1. In 

addition, the accident rate dropped by almost 50 percent from 2004 to 

2012.

Figure 1: Train Accident Rates per Million Train Miles, 1980 to 2012

Even with the significant reduction in accident rates, however, roughly 

300 people were injured and 10 people were killed in train accidents on 

Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-679T 

average each year, from 2003 to 2012.2 Further, recent rail accidents 

underscore the importance of continued, consistent efforts to ensure rail 

safety.

FRA provides regulatory oversight of the safety of U.S. railroads, both 

passenger and freight. FRA develops and enforces regulations for the 

railroad industry that include numerous requirements related to safety, 

including requirements governing track; signal and train control systems; 

grade-crossing warning device systems; mechanical equipment, such as 

locomotives and tank cars; and railroad-operating practices. FRA also 

enforces hazardous materials regulations that relate to the safe 

transportation of such materials by rail.

The Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008 was the first 

authorization of FRA’s safety activities since 1994 and is due to be 

reauthorized in 2013.3 RSIA overhauled federal rail safety requirements 

by directing the FRA to, among other things, promulgate additional new 

rail safety regulations and guidance in areas such as railroad risk 

reduction plans, track inspections standards, and highway-rail grade

crossing safety.

RSIA also required railroads to develop and submit a plan to FRA for 

implementing a PTC system on rail lines that carry intercity or commuter 

passengers or toxic-inhalation-hazard cargo by December 31, 2015.4

Under RSIA, FRA is responsible for approving railroads’ PTC 

implementation plans and certifying PTC systems prior to installation.

PTC is a communication-based system designed to prevent some 

accidents caused by human factors, including train-to-train collisions and 

derailments caused by exceeding safe speeds. It is also designed to 

prevent incursions into work zones and movement of trains through 

switches left in the wrong position. By preventing trains from either 

entering a segment of track occupied by another train or moving through 

an improperly aligned switch, PTC could prevent accidents such as the 

 

2

These figures do not include highway-railroad grade crossing or trespasser accidents.

3

Pub. L. No. 110-432, div. A, 122 Stat. 4848.

4

Failure to complete PTC system installation on track where PTC is required prior to the 

deadline is subject to a $16,000 penalty per violation and $25,000 per willful violation. See 

49 C.F.R. Appendix A to Part 236. 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-679T 

one in the Chatsworth neighborhood of Los Angeles, California.5

Railroads that are required to implement PTC can choose different PTC 

systems; however, railroads’ PTC systems must be interoperable. This 

means that the components of different PTC systems must be able to 

communicate with one another in a manner to provide for the seamless 

movement of trains as they cross tracks owned by different railroads that 

may be using different PTC systems.6,7

 

5

In September 2008, a commuter train operator missed a red signal, causing the train to 

collide with a Union Pacific freight train, resulting in 25 deaths and over 100 injuries. 

6

Major freight railroads in the United States are implementing Interoperable Electronic 

Train Management System (I-ETMS) and Amtrak, which provides intercity passenger rail 

and predominantly owns the Northeast Corridor track that runs from Washington, D.C., to 

Boston, is implementing Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES). Although 

ACSES and I-ETMS are functionally the same, they represent different technical 

approaches.

7

GAO, Rail Safety: Federal Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the 

Successful Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology, GAO-11-133 (Washington, 

D.C.: Dec. 15, 2010) and Federal Railroad Administration, Report to Congress: Positive 

Train Control Implementation Status, Issues, and Impacts (August 2012).
 

Page 5 GAO-13-679T 

Figure 2: Basic Operation of a Positive Train Control (PTC) System

a

Train location information is determined through various methods depending on the specific PTC 

system, including through satellite-based positioning systems and sensors installed along the track.

b

Although RSIA does not require PTC systems to issue such warnings, the PTC systems that most 

railroads are implementing will do so.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-679T 

Our work to date indicates that FRA primarily monitors railroads’ 

compliance with federal safety regulations through routine inspections by 

individual inspectors at specific sites on railroads’ systems. This 

inspection approach focuses on direct observations of train components, 

related equipment, and railroad property—including the track and signal 

systems—as well as operating practices to determine whether they meet 

FRA’s standards. Inspectors also examine railroads’ inspection and 

maintenance records. FRA’s inspectors generally specialize in one of five 

areas, called inspection disciplines: (1) operating practices, (2) track, (3) 

hazardous materials, (4) signal and train control, and (5) motive power 

and equipment.8 Inspectors typically cover a range of standards within 

their discipline during inspections. FRA’s policy is for inspectors to 

encourage railroads to comply with federal rail safety regulations 

voluntarily. When railroads do not comply voluntarily or identified 

problems are serious, FRA may cite violations and in certain instances 

take enforcement actions, including the assessment of civil penalties, to 

ensure compliance.9

Our preliminary work has found that thirty states also employ railroad 

safety inspectors, who participate in a partnership program with FRA to 

 

8

Inspectors in this specialty inspect railroad locomotives, passenger and freight cars, and 

their safety appliances such as air brakes.

9

For fiscal year 2012, FRA’s final civil penalty assessments and settlements totaled about 

$16.6 million for about 6,400 violation reports.

FRA’s Rail Safety 

Framework 

Includes Data to 

Inform Its Rail Safety 

Oversight Efforts but 

Faces Potential 

Oversight Challenges

FRA’s Oversight 

Framework Primarily Uses 

Federal and State 

Inspectors to Oversee 

Railroad Safety Efforts 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-679T 

conduct safety oversight activities, supplemental to FRA’s activities, 

based on FRA rail safety regulations and to enforce state railroad safety 

laws. FRA trains and certifies state inspectors and includes them in its 

inspection planning efforts. However, FRA’s relationship and coordination 

with each state is unique. For example, according to one state rail safety 

administrator we talked to, the federal and state track inspectors have 

divided one state’s territory to ensure that the inspectors’ territories do not 

overlap. In addition, an FRA regional administrator mentioned that while 

his FRA and state inspectors’ territories overlapped, effective coordination 

between inspectors avoids duplicative inspections. According to FRA 

officials, while state inspectors ensure compliance with state 

requirements, state inspectors are also responsible for ensuring 

compliance with federal safety regulations.

In addition to federal and state inspectors, the railroads have their own 

inspectors who are responsible for ensuring that railroad equipment, 

track, and operations meet federal rail safety standards. Each railroad 

has its own inspectors or contracts with third parties to conduct the 

required inspections depending on the railroad’s resources and FRAmandated inspection responsibilities.

FRA is a small agency relative to the railroad industry, making the 

railroads themselves the primary guarantors of railroad safety. Based on 

our work to date, FRA has about 470 inspectors in its headquarters and 

regional offices, in addition to about 170 state inspectors.10 In contrast, 

the U.S. railroad system consists of about 760 railroads with about 

230,000 employees and 200,000 miles of track in operation. FRA is also 

responsible for developing and enforcing regulations for commuter 

railroads and Amtrak.11 Amtrak and commuter railroads operating outside 

of the Northeast Corridor operate largely over freight railroad tracks and 

carry over 670 million passengers a year over 23 billion miles. The FRA 

works with railroads to get their input on proposed regulations and rules 

through the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) process.12

 

10Six of these states (California, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia) 

comprise over 50 percent of the total number of state inspectors.

11There are currently 28 commuter railroads.

12FRA established the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) in 1996 to develop 

new regulatory standards, through a collaborative process, with all segments of the rail 

community, including railroads, shippers and other stakeholders, to fashion mutually 

satisfactory solutions on rail safety regulatory issues.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-679T 

Several railroad officials we spoke with thought that the RSAC process 

was an improvement over the prior process, that they believe had been 

less collaborative and did not promote discussions among FRA, the 

railroads, and labor unions to share and understand each other’s views 

on proposed federal railroad safety regulations.

In 2006, FRA implemented a risk-based approach, using its National 

Inspection Plan (NIP), to allocate its limited inspection resources to 

ensure rail safety. The NIP consists of three elements: (1) a baseline plan 

that establishes safety goals for each railroad and state, (2) review and 

adjustment by regional administrators, (3) monitoring and evaluation of 

inspection activity.

The NIP’s baseline plan attempts to minimize the predicted number and 

severity of railroad accidents given the number of available FRA 

inspectors in each FRA region. The quantitative model uses data 

including: 1) the most recent 3 years of accident data from reports that 

railroads are required to file about accidents that occur on their tracks; 2) 

data from FRA’s inspection activity; and 3) information on railroad 

activities such as train miles and other data, to determine the scope of 

what FRA’s inspectors should inspect in a given year.13 In the middle of 

each calendar year, FRA updates the NIP with new accident data to 

estimate where the highest safety risks are and uses the results to create 

annual inspection targets for each inspector.

Our preliminary work indicates that after the baseline is established, 

FRA’s regional management propose modifications to the inspection 

targets produced for each region using their judgment and knowledge of 

which railroads or disciplines may require more FRA oversight than the 

NIP’s model indicates. Subsequently, FRA allows for a mid-year 

correction of the NIP, based on input from FRA’s regional management. 

FRA regional administrators we spoke with indicated that this flexibility 

allows them to accommodate new or emerging rail safety risks by 

deviating from the original NIP targets. For example, they stated that they 

sometimes re-allocate inspectors to railroads that have had recent 

accidents, or because inspectors indicate a need for more oversight at a 

 

13Railroads are required to report monthly accident data within a month of the accident 

occurring and it may take 2 to 3 more months for FRA to review the information and make 

it available for use in the NIP. The NIP excludes highway-rail grade crossing and 

trespasser accidents from its analysis. 

FRA Targets Its Inspections 

Based on Analyses of Past 

Accident and Inspection Data 

and Other Information
 

Page 9 GAO-13-679T 

certain railroad based on assessments made during their regular 

inspection duties. Additionally, the effects of hurricanes, storms, or 

prolonged periods of adverse weather, such as heat or cold that could 

cause track failures, may require the reallocation of inspection resources.

Throughout the year, FRA headquarters and regional management 

monitor the inspection activities against the modified inspection baseline 

to determine if the inspection targets are being met.

FRA has also developed the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), which is a 

planning and evaluation tool used to assess its inspection resources from 

a nationwide perspective. Our work to date shows that FRA uses the 

SAM to establish targets for the number of inspectors in each FRA region 

and inspection discipline. In using the targets to help allocate and balance 

staff among disciplines and regions, FRA expects to minimize the 

resulting casualties and estimated costs of train accidents. FRA uses the 

SAM results to determine where they may need to adjust the number of 

inspectors in a given region and discipline. FRA rebalanced its workforce 

using the SAM model in 2007 and officials stated that more recent SAM 

results have not indicated the need for major movements of inspectors 

between regions or disciplines. However, FRA officials stated that when 

the SAM has shown a change in the distribution of their inspectors they 

are somewhat constrained from implementing the model’s results due to 

budget constraints. FRA officials also told us that while the SAM model 

has been refined based on what they have learned from making 

improvements to the NIP, the SAM is not designed to take into account 

certain changes—such as increasing freight train volume or accidents in a 

particular region—as the SAM uses past accident data to provide a 

baseline for the nationwide distribution of its inspectors. FRA officials 

stated that they handle those types of changes on an as-needed basis 

through temporary detail assignment of FRA inspectors from other 

regions or headquarters.

In addition, our preliminary review indicates that FRA regional 

administrators also can provide input on the model’s results based on 

their views on how many inspectors the region needs. However, FRA 

regional officials we talked to stated that the staffing decisions based on 

SAM results do not necessarily align their inspectors with their 

perspective of the needs in their region nor does it take a region’s 

geography into account. While FRA headquarters officials anticipate that 

there may be minor variations from SAM’s targets as a result of natural 

turnovers of inspectors (e.g., retirements), they do not believe that these 

variations will have long-term impacts on FRA’s safety activities in the 

regions. However, regional administrators expressed concern over the 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-679T 

staffing pressures this can create. For example, one FRA regional 

administrator stated that when the staffing decisions did not provide for a 

replacement for a certain discipline, he was forced to cover that 

discipline’s inspection load with inspectors from other states for 3 years 

until a replacement could be approved, hired, trained, and qualified.

As we continue our on-going work on rail safety oversight, we will further 

assess how FRA officials use these tools to accommodate changing rail 

safety risks and allocate inspectors across regions and inspection 

disciplines.

Based on our work to date, we have identified several potential 

challenges affecting FRA’s rail safety oversight, including lack of a final 

rule requiring the submission of Risk Reduction Plans by specified 

railroads, lack of succession planning to ensure sufficient staff numbers 

and expertise, and other ongoing and emerging challenges.

RSIA required FRA to develop a rulemaking requiring certain railroads to 

submit risk reduction plans, within 4 years of enactment, which was 

October 2012.14 Our preliminary work has identified several reasons why 

a final rule has not yet been issued, according to FRA, including the need 

to resolve the issue of protection of sensitive business and safety 

information in the railroad’s risk reduction plans. FRA officials told us that 

these plans would allow them to have a more proactive view of rail safety 

for these railroads that will complement FRA’s current compliance-based 

approach. FRA officials also told us that they anticipate issuing a final rule 

in September 2014 and that they expect that the railroads will have risk 

reduction plans in place by 2016.

Our work to date has found that FRA does not yet have a specific plan to 

replace its aging inspector workforce. According to FRA officials, in the 

next 5 years, 150 of FRA’s 470 inspectors (about 32 percent) will be 

eligible to retire. FRA officials told us, however, that they have been able 

to find and hire qualified candidates in the past. However, other FRA 

 

14Specifically, RSIA required all Class I freight, intercity passenger, and commuter 

railroads (as well as any railroad whose safety performance was determined to be 

inadequate by the Secretary of Transportation) to develop and submit plans for DOT to 

review that would identify and propose to manage the rail safety risks on the railroad, such 

as rail safety technology and human fatigue management.

FRA Faces Several 

Potential Challenges to Its 

Rail Safety Oversight 

Mission

Risk Reduction Plans

 

Succession Planning
 

Page 11 GAO-13-679T 

headquarters officials and regional administrators we spoke with stated 

that replacing qualified inspectors is difficult, especially for the signal 

discipline, and getting inspectors fully qualified takes time. For example, 

FRA regional officials stated that it takes about 1 to 2 years to find, hire, 

train, and certify a new experienced inspector and 3 to 4 years to get an 

inexperienced trainee certified by FRA as a qualified inspector.

Additionally, FRA officials stated that budget constraints may prohibit their 

current practice of hiring new inspectors before retiring inspectors leave 

so that some overlap can occur to facilitate the transfer of knowledge.

Our preliminary work has identified several other ongoing and emerging 

rail safety challenges that FRA faces.

• The effects of weather on railroad operations are an ongoing 

challenge. FRA and the railroads continuously keep abreast of 

adverse weather conditions that can cause accidents, such as high 

temperatures that can cause tracks to go out of alignment and cause 

a derailment. FRA has issued several weather-related regulations 

concerning tracks, operating practices, and railroad equipment, and 

the railroads we spoke with adjust their operating practices to account 

for adverse weather.

• All rail safety stakeholders face the continued challenge of trying to 

reduce highway-rail grade crossing and trespasser incidents.

Reducing these kinds of accidents represents a different challenge to 

FRA’s current rail safety framework. Rail safety stakeholders stated 

that this involves educating the general public about the potential 

safety hazards that trains represent to cars, trucks, and pedestrians at 

grade crossings as well as cooperating with several other federal, 

state, and local government agencies that have responsibility for 

funding road projects or closing those crossings. Changes to freight 

flows, such as the recent increase in train and truck traffic 

experienced due to increased gas and petroleum drilling in the upper 

Midwest, can add train or truck traffic to previously low traffic areas 

increasing the risk of highway-railroad grade crossing accidents.

• New technologies, such as PTC systems, are another challenge that 

FRA will have to incorporate into its rail safety oversight framework.

For example, because PTC systems are extremely complex 

command, control, and communications systems, the FRA believes it 

will require a specialized inspector workforce—which FRA currently 

does not have—to provide adequate safety oversight.

Other Challenges 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-679T 

As we continue our on-going work, we will further assess the extent to 

which FRA is incorporating these existing and emerging challenges into 

its safety oversight framework.

Our work to date indicates that most railroads will not complete PTC 

implementation by the 2015 deadline due to numerous, interrelated 

challenges caused by the breadth and complexity of PTC.15 Of the four

major freight railroads we included in our review,16 only one railroad 

expects to meet the 2015 deadline. Of the three remaining freight 

railroads we spoke to, representatives believe they will likely not have 

PTC fully implemented until 2017 or later. Commuter railroads, which 

primarily operate on routes that are owned and managed by freight 

railroads, generally must wait for freight railroads and Amtrak to roll out 

their PTC systems. Our preliminary analysis indicates that freight and 

commuter railroads’ inability to meet the 2015 deadline is due to a 

number of challenges.

• Developing PTC components and PTC installation: Some PTC 

components are still in development—most notably the PTC backoffice server. One or more of these servers will be installed in over a 

dozen railroads’ back offices and are needed to communicate vital 

information between the back office, locomotives, and waysides. 

According to the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and the 

railroads, back office system delays are due to system complexity, 

interfaces to other systems, and lack of supplier resources. Nearly all 

of the freight railroads included in our review anticipate they will not 

have a final version of the back office system until 2014 and have 

identified it as one of the significant factors preventing them from 

meeting the deadline. In addition, PTC installation is a time- and 

resource-consuming process. For example, railroads collectively will 

have to install approximately 38,000 wayside interface units.17

According to AAR and freight railroads, the volume and complexity of 

installing these units is another significant reason most railroads 

 

15In its May 2013 report, the Association of American Railroads noted that most railroads 

would not make the deadline.

16The four major freight railroads included in our review are BNSF, Norfolk Southern, CSX 

and Union Pacific—the largest Class I railroads based on operating revenue.

17Wayside interface units receive information from signals and in turn communicate signal 

aspect information to the locomotive directly or through railroads’ back offices.

Most Railroads 

Report They Will Miss 

the 2015 PTC 

Implementation 

Deadline Due to a 

Number of Challenges
 

Page 13 GAO-13-679T 

cannot meet the 2015 deadline. Our ongoing work has found that 

railroads have also encountered unexpected delays while installing 

PTC. For example, in May 2013, FRA officials told us the Federal 

Communications Commission (FCC) recently requested railroads to 

halt their construction of radio antennae towers to allow FCC to clarify 

regulatory oversight of the towers being installed for PTC.18 According 

to FRA officials, FCC halted the construction of these towers to 

ensure proper installation procedures were being followed including 

consulting with either the tribal or state historical authorities prior to 

the towers construction and installation. FRA officials told us they did 

not anticipate this issue but are working with FCC to resolve it as 

quickly as possible. However, the impact of halting construction on the 

towers may result in additional delays in railroads’ time frames.

• System integration and field testing: Our work to date indicates that 

successful PTC implementation involves several components working 

together, many of which are first-generation technologies being 

designed and developed. All components must function both 

independently and together, or the PTC system could fail. To ensure 

successful integration, multiple testing phases must be conducted by 

the railroads—first in a lab environment, then in the field—before 

components are installed across the network. Most of the freight 

railroads we spoke with expressed concern with the reliability of PTC 

and emphasized the importance of field testing to ensure the system 

performs the way it is intended. Multiple phases of testing must take 

place to identify any defects, which then must be analyzed and 

corrected, and the system re-tested. One railroad representative with 

whom we spoke said that the PTC system components behaved 

differently in some field tests than in the laboratory tests. Identifying 

the source of such problems, correcting them, and re-testing could 

further contribute to railroads not meeting the 2015 deadline.

• FRA resources: Although most railroads we spoke with said they have 

worked closely with FRA throughout the PTC implementation process, 

 

18According to the FCC website, new tower construction must go through an FCC 

approval process and also a three stage review process depending on its location which 

includes: 1) environmental impact review, 2) state historical impact review, and 3) tribal 

land impact review. FCC notifies federally recognized tribes, Native Hawaiian 

Organizations, and State Historic Preservation Officers of proposed communications 

towers and allows these organizations to respond directly to the companies about their 

concerns.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-679T 

some railroads cited concerns with FRA’s limited resources and the 

agency’s ability to help facilitate railroads’ PTC implementation. Our 

work to date indicates that these concerns were based around two 

activities: field testing and certification. First, FRA officials must verify 

the field testing of PTC. However, FRA reported that it lacks the 

staffing resources to embed a dedicated FRA inspector at each 

railroad for regular, detailed, and unfiltered reporting on a railroads’ 

PTC progress. To address the lack of staff to verify field testing, FRA 

has taken on an audit approach, whereby railroads submit field test 

results for approval as part of their safety plans.19 Second, a PTC 

system must be certified before a railroad can operate it in revenue 

service. FRA certifies a PTC system by approving a railroad’s safety 

plan. FRA set no specific deadline for railroads to submit the safety 

plans, and according to FRA, to date only one railroad has submitted 

a final plan, which FRA has approved. As FRA stated in its 2012 

report to Congress, FRA’s PTC staff consists of 10 PTC specialists 

and 1 supervisor who are responsible for the review and approval of 

all PTC system certification documentation for 38 railroads. FRA has 

expressed concern that railroads will submit their safety plans to FRA 

at roughly the same time. Our initial analysis suggests that this timing 

creates the potential that FRA’s review of these plans will become 

backlogged, since each of the railroad’s plans will consist of 

hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pages of detailed technical 

information. FRA officials told us that they are dedicated to the timely 

approval of safety plans and that their oversight will not impede 

railroads from meeting the deadline. However, railroads report that 

their time frames are based on a quick turnaround from FRA; if quick 

turnaround does not occur, it could further delay PTC 

implementation.20

Based on our work to date, it appears that commuter railroads face these 

same PTC implementation challenges as well as others. First, because 

commuter railroads are generally using the PTC systems developed by 

freight railroads and Amtrak, they are captive in many respects to the 

 

19The PTC safety plan must include information about planned procedures for testing the 

system during and after installation, as well as information about safety hazards and risks 

the system will address, among other requirements.

20Railroads have developed common portions of the safety plan and submitted drafts to 

FRA for preliminary review to expedite final review. This way FRA staff will be familiar with 

portions of the plan that are common across plans before the finalized plan is submitted. 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-679T 

pace of development of these entities and have few means to influence 

implementation schedules. In addition, commuter railroads also face 

challenges in funding PTC implementation due to the overall lack of 

federal, state, and local funding available to make investments in 

commuter rail. According to the American Public Transportation 

Association, PTC implementation will cost commuter railroads a minimum 

of $2 billion. Commuter railroads are non-profit, public operations that are 

funded by passenger fares and contributions from federal, state, and local 

sources. Economic challenges such as the recession have eroded state 

and local revenue sources that traditionally support commuter rail capital 

expenses, and competing expenses such as state of good repair 

upgrades, leaving the commuter railroads limited in their funding to 

implement PTC.

Finally, commuter railroads report that obtaining radio frequency

spectrum—essential for PTC communications—can be a lengthy and 

difficult process.21 The FCC has directed commuter railroads to secure 

spectrum on the secondary market.

22 According to the FCC, spectrum is 

available in the secondary market to meet PTC needs.23 While freight 

railroads have secured most of the spectrum needed for PTC 

implementation, commuter railroads have reported difficulty acquiring 

spectrum in the 220 MHz band, which is required to operate the data 

radios that communicate information between PTC components.24 In 

particular, railroad officials have said that obtaining spectrum is a critical 

 

21Radio frequency spectrum is the medium for wireless communications and supports a 

vast array of commercial and governmental services. Commercial entities use spectrum to 

provide a variety of wireless services, including mobile voice and data, paging, broadcast 

television and radio, and satellite services.

22Secondary market policies and rules allow spectrum permit licensees to share their 

spectrum resource through spectrum lease arrangements. Users negotiate their own 

terms for sharing spectrum and FCC tracks these secondary market transactions. For 

more information on spectrum markets, see Spectrum Management: Incentives, 

Opportunities, and Testing Needed to Enhance Spectrum Sharing, GAO-13-7

(Washington, D.C.: November 2013).

23Presentation to the National Transportation Safety Board. “Positive Train Control: Is it on 

Track?” FCC, February 27, 2013.

24Seven freight railroads (Norfolk Southern, Union Pacific, BNSF, CSX Transportation, 

Canadian National, Canadian Pacific, and Kansas City Southern) together comprise PTC 

220 LLC, a company that owns spectrum licenses. According to a PTC 220 LLC 

representative, these seven freight railroads will lease spectrum from PTC 220 LLC and 

will lease spectrum to other railroads based on availability for a fee.
 

Page 16 GAO-13-679T 

challenge in high density urban areas. Based on our preliminary work, 

without acquiring sufficient spectrum, railroads may be unable to 

adequately test their PTC systems, potentially causing further delays in 

meeting the 2015 PTC deadline.25

Our work to date also indicates that by attempting to implement PTC by 

the 2015 deadline, railroads may be making choices that could introduce 

financial and operational risks to PTC implementation. Representatives 

from freight railroads and FRA told us railroads will not compromise the 

safety functions of the PTC system and will ensure that PTC is 

implemented meeting RSIA requirements. However, freight railroad 

representatives also told us that they compressed time frames and 

undertook processes in parallel rather than sequentially— potentially 

increasing the financial and operational risk of PTC implementation. For 

example, railroads took a “double touch” approach to equipping 

locomotives, which involves taking locomotives out of service twice in 

order to begin installation while software was being developed.26 Railroad 

representatives told us this approach is more expensive than installing 

the equipment once after the software is fully developed, as it involves 

more labor hours and more time that locomotives are offline rather than in 

operation. In addition, representatives from all freight railroads we spoke 

to expressed concern regarding the reliability of PTC and noted the 

importance of field testing as much as necessary to identify and correct 

problems. These representatives noted that without adequate testing, 

PTC systems could potentially malfunction or fail more frequently, 

causing system disruptions. FRA officials also expressed concern that if 

pressured to meet the 2015 deadline, railroads may rush through field 

testing and potentially implement a PTC system that is not entirely 

reliable leading to operational inefficiencies through slower trains or 

congestion. 

In its August 2012 report to Congress, FRA identified areas for 

consideration in the event that Congress chooses to amend RSIA. 

Specifically, FRA requested the authority to extend the deadline for 

 

25Amtrak officials also report that securing spectrum has been a major challenge in PTC 

implementation for them and has led to implementation delays.

26“Double touch” installation refers to partially installing groundwork equipment on 

thousands of locomotives, which will later need to be taken out of service to install the 

remaining equipment.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-679T 

certain rail lines, grant provisional certification of PTC systems and 

approve the use of alternative safety technologies in lieu of PTC.27 FRA 

officials told us these authorities could enable them to conduct oversight 

more effectively by acknowledging the current state of PTC 

implementation and better manage FRA’s limited resources. Although to 

date there are few details on how these authorities would be applied, 

according to FRA officials, these authorities could assist in better 

managing resources allowing the agency to oversee and manage PTC 

implementation past the current deadline of December 31, 2015.

Based on our preliminary work, it appears unlikely that PTC will be 

implemented by more than a few railroads by the December 31, 2015, 

deadline. As we have discussed, PTC implementation is a massive, 

complex, and expensive undertaking—with valid challenges to meeting 

the deadline. However, although most railroads will not meet the PTC 

deadline, it does not necessarily suggest that they have not made a 

concerted effort to make progress in the implementation of PTC.

Railroads and FRA both report continuing to search for ways to speed 

progress while maintaining safe rail operations in order to achieve 

complete deployment as soon as possible. Nonetheless, given the state 

of PTC technology and the myriad of PTC components that are required 

to work seamlessly in order for PTC to work reliably, concerns regarding 

the potential risks railroads may be taking in attempting to meet the 

deadline should be considered. Accordingly, FRA has requested 

authorities that could provide railroads the flexibility they need to 

successfully implement PTC.

Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the 

Committee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I am happy to respond 

to any questions that you or may have at this time.

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Susan 

Fleming at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this 

statement include Susan Zimmerman (Assistant Director), Melissa 

 

27According to FRA, this would allow a railroad to apply for provisional certification to 

operate a PTC system pending final submission, review, and approval of the railroad’s 

safety plan by FRA. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-679T 

Bodeau, Richard Bulman, Aisha Cabrer, Robert Ciszewski, Tim Guinane, 

Greg Hanna, Emily Larson, Sara Ann Moessbauer, Faye Morrison, Josh 

Ormond, Sharon Silas, and Crystal Wesco.

(541109)
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