IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-20331

Summary Calendar

CHARLES L. STRINGER,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

ED PETERS; BOBBY DELAUGHTER; CHARLES KNAUSS; CHARLES

HEDGEPETH; HENRY CLAY, III; ET AL,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:11-CV-1085

Before KING, JOLLY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Charles L. Stringer filed in district court a civil RICO complaint pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. against numerous defendants. The district court

dismissed his complaint with prejudice citing “a variety of reasons, including res

judicata and want of jurisdiction.” The district court also denied Stringer’s

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment and his

motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 13, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 11-20331 Document: 00511785984 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/13/2012
No. 11-20331

Stringer now seeks leave from this court to proceed IFP on appeal. His

IFP motion is construed as a challenge to the district court’s denial of leave to

proceed IFP on appeal. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). 

The district court may deny a motion for leave to appeal IFP by certifying that

the appeal is not taken in good faith and by providing written reasons for the

certification. See id.; FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(2). To comply with the

written-reasons requirement, it suffices that the district court incorporate by

reference its decision dismissing the complaint on the merits. See Baugh, 117

F.3d at 202 n.21. In this case, the district court did not explain whether the

denial of IFP was based upon a lack of good faith or Stringer’s failure to show

that he was indigent. However, the financial affidavit provided by Stringer in

support of his IFP motion in the district court indicates that he is indigent, and

the district court granted him leave to proceed IFP when he filed his complaint. 

The district court’s denial of his IFP motion also did not provide any written

reasons or reference the judgment of dismissal.

In the interests of judicial economy and prudence, we may meld the

decisions regarding an IFP motion and the underlying appeal when appropriate. 

See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202. In this case, the district court’s judgment of

dismissal with prejudice does not provide this court with sufficient information

to permit reasoned consideration of any of the stated or inferred bases for that

dismissal.

Accordingly, Stringer’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED, his

motion to proceed IFP on appeal is GRANTED, the district court’s judgment of

dismissal is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further consideration

by the district court. In doing so, we do not express any opinion as to the

underlying merits of Stringer’s claims.

2

Case: 11-20331 Document: 00511785984 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/13/2012