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S. HRG. 110–1222 

SAFETY AND SECURITY OF 

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSPORTATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 24, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Ranking 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

MARGARET L. CUMMISKY, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director 

CHRISTINE D. KURTH, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

PAUL NAGLE, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on September 24, 2008 ..................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Carper .................................................................................. 26 

Statement of Senator Ensign .................................................................................. 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Statement of Senator Inouye .................................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 86 

WITNESSES

Ballard, Ph.D., James David, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, 

California State University, Northridge (CSUN); Director, CSUN Intelligence Community Center Academic Excellence (IC–CAE); Consultant, Nuclear Waste Project Office, State of Nevada ...................................................... 53 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55 

Crowley, Ph.D., Kevin D., Senior Board Director, Nuclear and Radiation 

Studies Board, National Research Council, The National Academies ............. 46 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

Hamberger, Edward R., President and CEO, Association of American Railroads ...................................................................................................................... 77 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 78 

Pritchard, Edward W., Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, 

Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation .......... 16 

Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from Nevada ....................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Schubert, Sandra, Director, Environmental Working Group ............................... 29 

Prepared statement of Kenneth A. Cook, President, Environmental Working Group ....................................................................................................... 32 

Sproat III, Hon. Edward F., Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management, U.S. Department of Energy ......................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

Weber, Michael, Director, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .............................................................................. 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Willke, Dr. Theodore ‘‘Ted’’, Associate Administrator, Hazardous Materials 

Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation ................................................................................. 18 

Written Statement of Ted Willke, Associate Administrator for Hazardous 

Materials Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, and Edward Pritchard, Director, Office of Safety Assurance and 

Compliance, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of 

Transportation .............................................................................................. 19 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted to Kevin Crowley by: 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 105 

Hon. Harry Reid ............................................................................................... 105 

Response to written questions submitted to Edward R. Hamberger by: 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 108 

Hon. Harry Reid ............................................................................................... 108 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to: 

Dr. James David Ballard ................................................................................. 107 

Ken Cook ........................................................................................................... 104 

Response to written questions submitted to Edward Pritchard by: 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 100 

Hon. Harry Reid ............................................................................................... 100 

Page

IV 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Harry Reid to Ted Willke .... 102 

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Edward F. Sproat III by: 

Hon. Barbara Boxer ......................................................................................... 91 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 91 

Hon. Harry Reid ............................................................................................... 93 

Response to written questions submitted to Michael Weber by: 

Hon. Barbara Boxer ......................................................................................... 96 

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye ...................................................................................... 95 

Hon. Harry Reid ............................................................................................... 97 

(1) 

SAFETY AND SECURITY OF 

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSPORTATION 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII 

The CHAIRMAN. Accomplishing the safe and secure transportation 

of nuclear waste is one of the more complex challenges facing our 

government. Spent nuclear fuel is the byproduct of the nuclear 

power industry that supplies electric energy to millions across the 

country and also is created by our armed forces. This fuel retains 

its radioactive qualities for thousands of years and is currently 

stored at 77 commercial and government sites across the country. 

We are not here to discuss the merits of the Department of Energy’s selection of Yucca Mountain, Nevada as a site for a permanent 

underground geological repository to store nuclear waste or its current license application. Rather, we must ensure that all shipments 

of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste are held to the highest 

safety and security standards. 

Today nuclear waste is transported by rail, truck, and barge, all 

of which are under the jurisdiction of this Committee, and the risks 

of transporting nuclear waste must be fully understood and evaluated and a system of transportation must be designed to fully address these risks. 

In this hearing, we will examine the current regulatory regime 

for nuclear waste transportation and hear from researchers and a 

representative of the rail industry in order to more fully understand the challenges of transporting nuclear waste. It is this Committee’s obligation to evaluate these challenges and to ensure that 

spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste is transported 

in ways that minimize the safety and security risks to the general 

public. 

With that, may I first welcome the delegation from Nevada, but 

I will call upon Senator Ensign. Afterwards he will come up here. 

Senator Ensign? 

2 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA 

Senator ENSIGN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding 

this hearing. As you know, the Nevada delegation has been unified 

as Nevadans, as most Nevadans are in opposition to the Yucca 

Mountain project, and part of that project is the whole idea of 

transporting nuclear waste. I realize that that is what this hearing 

is about today, but we also need to educate Americans what this 

means—where is this nuclear waste going to be transported, and 

what are the parameters in studying how safe this nuclear waste 

is to transport. 

But we also have to look at the costs associated. I remember a 

few years ago, Senator Reid and I saying when the cost estimates, 

about 5 years ago, for Yucca Mountain were about the mid-$50 million range, and Senator Reid and I testified that the cost is going 

to go at least to $100 billion, and probably north of $100 billion 

would be the cost of Yucca Mountain. People kind of said, no, that 

is not right. Those are way over estimate. Well, now the most recent cost estimate for Yucca Mountain is $96 billion. 

What a lot of people do not realize, especially those who want to 

get the nuclear waste out of their state, which then leads to the 

transportation, is Yucca Mountain, the way it is currently being 

constructed, will only handle the nuclear waste that has been produced by this country up to this point. It does not handle any nuclear waste that this country will be producing into the future. 

And so I think that while we are studying transportation issues 

and talking about the transportation issues, we should also look at 

whether we need to transport it at this point. We need to look at 

other technologies that other countries are doing, like France, and 

the amount and how they transport their waste, but also what they 

do with their waste. Basically they recycle their waste, and they 

have a lot smaller volume. 

But we also have to tell the American people, who have nuclear 

powerplants in their state that think that they are getting rid of 

all of their nuclear waste, that that in fact is not the case. I remember when Spence Abraham was the Secretary of Energy and 

he came and he was talking about—this was right after 9/11—and 

the safety, that we need one repository. So we bring all the nuclear 

waste to one repository. 

Well, the fact is that when you have a spent nuclear fuel rod, it 

needs to cool for several years in cooling pools before you can actually transport it, before you could take it to a repository, if that is, 

indeed, what you wanted to do. So there is going to be nuclear 

waste or partially spent nuclear fuel rods all over the country. 

Those are just some of the issues I believe that are important to 

talk to the American people and to be honest with the American 

people. Is this a policy that we should continue? I do not believe 

it is. I believe that we should catch up with the rest of the world 

on some of the modern recycling technologies, and in doing so, we 

can address the transportation issues. But we should be honest 

with the American people what the transportation issues are, 

where those transportation routes are and be honest with them 

and look at other countries and what they have done with it. 

3 

But we also, in light of that, need to look at whether or not 

Yucca Mountain is the place that we want to take very valuable 

fuel, whether we want to look at onsite dry cask storage, which is 

good for 100 to 200 years, which, by the way, would obviate the 

need for transporting nuclear waste, and then we should look at 

the recycling efforts as well. 

So I have a formal statement and would ask that that be made 

part of the record. 

But, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you holding this hearing today 

and listening to two concerned Nevadans who happen to represent 

a lot of other Nevadans on this important issue to our state. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Ensign follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on 

behalf of the people of Nevada. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to be clear: Yucca Mountain is not an issue that affects just the residents of Nevada—it is an issue that affects every American. I am 

here today to explain that the plan to store spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain 

is not a solution. The storage of spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain is a plan 

plagued by unrealistic assumptions about cost, poor transportation and waste management planning, and insufficient scientific testing to ensure the safety of our communities. I believe that we can do better. 

I have bad news for those of you with working nuclear reactors in your states who 

think that the opening of Yucca will rid your state of nuclear waste—you’re wrong. 

You see, even if it were possible to immediately and magically remove all of the existing spent fuel from commercial nuclear power plant locations, there would still 

continue to be spent fuel stored at each and every operating reactor in the country. 

That’s because nuclear waste is highly radioactive and thermally hot and must be 

kept at the reactor sites in water-filled cooling pools for at least 5 years. The only 

way spent fuel storage can be eliminated from a reactor location is to shut down 

the reactor. And that isn’t an option. 

Mr. Chairman, let’s also consider the long-range cost of Yucca Mountain. The 

most recent estimates of the cost of Yucca Mountain are nearing $100 billion—and 

I am pretty certain it will go higher. What do we get for our money? The same problem we have today. We will have 65,000 metric tons of commercial nuclear waste 

by the time Yucca Mountain is scheduled to open. We produce 2,000 metric tons of 

nuclear waste a year. The DOE plans to transport 3,000 metric tons a year. Just 

do the math. We won’t get rid of the nuclear waste backlog for nearly a century 

and Yucca Mountain will be filled long before then. 

And under the Department of Energy’s plan, there is no requirement for the oldest and most thermally cool, spent fuel to be shipped first. Without this sort of requirement, nuclear facilities will have the incentive to ship out more recently spent 

fuel that is hotter and more dangerous to transport. Unfortunately, this is just another hole in DOE’s plan for Yucca Mountain. 

And Mr. Chairman, the NRC hasn’t even conducted full-scale physical tests on actual spent fuel casks. I wouldn’t put my children in a car that hadn’t been crash 

tested, but I’m supposed to put them on a highway next to a truck with casks of 

nuclear waste that haven’t been adequately tested. In fact, experts from the National Research Council have examined this issue and strongly endorse the use of 

full-scale testing to determine how packages will respond to real-world conditions. 

These casks are going to be traveling by homes, schools, and churches. And at this 

time we can’t be sure they will survive real-world conditions. For example, the casks 

have not been tested in fully engulfing long-duration fires. The testing is for 30 minutes at 1475 degrees Fahrenheit. The temperature in the Baltimore tunnel fire 

reached 1500 degrees Fahrenheit, and the fire burned for hours. 

It doesn’t seem to me that the proponents of the Yucca Mountain have done 

enough to prove that the plan is safe, and the entire Nevada delegation has concerns. To address this, the Nevada Congressional delegation will be sending a letter 

to the Surface Transportation Board outlining our concerns regarding the construction and operation of a rail line from eastern Nevada to the proposed nuclear waste 

repository at Yucca Mountain. 

So if Yucca Mountain isn’t the answer, what is? 

4 

Mr. Chairman, we should keep that waste right where it is, safely stored for the 

time being. The Federal Government should offer to take title and liability to the 

waste stored on site, just as it did in Pennsylvania under the PECO settlement. The 

NRC has stated fuel can be stored safely on site for at least 100 years in dry cask 

storage. That leaves plenty of time to continue to develop new technologies at our 

National Labs to recycle the waste without producing weapons-grade plutonium as 

a byproduct. 

I believe that we need to do what this country does best: innovate and lead the 

world in cutting edge technologies. Unfortunately, with Yucca Mountain, we have 

been way behind the curve on how we manage our spent nuclear fuel. For instance, 

the French store their spent fuel byproducts in above-ground repositories—this 

model seems to make more sense for a country as large as ours. It seems to me that 

we should be using $100 billion in Yucca funding to develop new recycling technologies and make a dent in the challenge of managing spent fuel. 

And managing spent nuclear fuel is a serious challenge we face. As a legislator, 

like all of you, I need to be fully informed about the effects of legislation on my constituents before I vote. I know that Yucca Mountain will be bad for both the people 

of Nevada and the United States. It comes down to this: you are being asked to risk 

the health and safety of your constituents for a scheme that will leave this country 

looking for another nuclear waste storage site 24 years after Yucca Mountain opens. 

It’s just not worth it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much, Senator, and your statement will be made part of the record. If you will join me. 

Now it is my pleasure to present a most distinguished American, 

the Leader of the Democratic majority in the U.S. Senate, the Honorable Harry Reid. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA 

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much. I very 

much appreciate you chairing this meeting. Your service to the 

country is well known and being Chairman of this most important 

Committee is also part of your legacy. 

Senator Ensign and I are speaking for Nevadans, but we are also 

speaking for people all over this country. And there will be testimony today by those on Panel II that will talk about the dangers 

to the American people outside Nevada of transporting the most 

poisonous substance known to man. 

We have not looked at this for some time, the issue of nuclear 

waste. I have said and I believe without any question that Yucca 

Mountain is dead. The money being spent on it is a big waste of 

taxpayers’ dollars. 

Now, this is a busy week, but this hearing is necessary because 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has just docketed the Department of Energy’s application to be in construction at Yucca Mountain. 

Like its application, the Department of Energy’s nuclear waste 

shipping plans are grossly—grossly—incomplete. Yet, the Department wants to spend over $3 billion to start building a 300-mile radioactive railway through Nevada. They want to do this before they 

even have permission to build the dump. Anything to divert attention from the dump is what they are involved in. 

It amazes me and people who have watched this Yucca Mountain 

project since the early 1980s how long the Department of Energy 

has pushed this Yucca project with having no transportation plan 

in place. They have not made public its proposed shipping routes. 

They have not finalized the national transportation plan. Their 

5 

draft transportation plan is barely a crude sketch of the comprehensive planning that should actually be done for a massive nuclear waste shipping program. 

Equally shocking is that the transportation of aging disposal 

casks the Department of Energy plans to use have not been designed yet. The Department says that 90 percent of the nuclear 

waste will be shipped using these transportation storage canisters, 

but they have absolutely no reason to believe that this is true. 

There is no guarantee that nuclear utilities are actually willing to 

pay for these canisters, especially those that already use dry cask 

storage to securely store their waste. 

Not from here is the Calvert Hills nuclear generating facility. 

They have for years stored the stuff onsite, saving millions and 

millions of dollars, and certainly it is safe. 

After 9/11, the thought of shipping this poisonous substance on 

highways and railways across the country is at the very least very 

scary. But these untested, yet-to-be-designed canisters are part of 

the foundation of the Yucca plan. The key defense against a transportation disaster—one of the Department of Energy’s primary barriers against radioactive leakage from the nuclear waste dump. But 

that is not important to the Department now because the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission has made the decision that the Department of Energy’s license application for Yucca was complete. 

In order to get all the nation’s nuclear waste at Yucca, the Energy Department is proposing between 3,000 and 11,000 rail shipments and as many as 10,000 truck shipments twice a week for the 

next 24 years. Trains loaded with this substance would traverse 

the country traveling to Nevada. Some of the distances would be 

as much as 3,000 miles. Many of these shipments would go right 

by the world’s destination resort, Las Vegas, the Strip. Trains 

would pass within a half mile of hundreds of thousands of visitors 

on any given day to Las Vegas that hosts tens of thousands of 

workers. 

Texas could host up to 308 nuclear waste shipments alone. All 

these shipments would go through Arizona communities just from 

Texas, collecting even more waste perhaps even in Arizona. 

The Department of Energy and nuclear industry lobbyists will 

tell you that the risk of accident is low. What they do not tell you 

is the risk is a relative risk. Let us say it is 98 percent successful, 

even 99 percent. That means there would be 5,000 botched surgeries each year. 99 percent gets us to 200,000 wrong drug prescriptions each year. 99 percent gets us to 20,000 lost pieces of mail 

each hour. The point is simple. More nuclear waste on the road will 

certainly involve more accidents. Accidents will happen. It is only 

a question of where and when. It will put the lives of millions of 

Americans at risk. So I would ask the Department not to be throwing around the 99 percent number because that is not valid in light 

of what could happen with that 1 percent. 

One of the things I fear is that the Department of Energy is not 

going for 100 percent success. They are not even trying to eliminate 

the risk. One of the most glaring examples is their refusal to consider shipping the oldest, less radioactive nuclear waste first, a 

basic measure that could reduce radiological hazards by 85 percent. 

6 

The Members of the Committee should ask the Department of 

Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Academy of 

Sciences about this issue. Both the Academy and the Government 

Accountability Office told the Energy Department that they should 

ship older nuclear waste first. The state of Nevada, which understands the risks, has urged the Department to consider shipping 

the oldest first. But the Department of Energy has made up its 

mind. The answer is no. It is not logical, but the answer is no. 

The nuclear power industry wants to get rid of its more expensive and most radioactive waste first. The question is why has the 

Department of Energy not even considered shipping the oldest 

first. They do not mention it in their environmental analysis for 

transporting waste to Yucca. They do not consider it in their draft 

national transportation plan. It is unfortunate that the Department 

of Energy once again is refusing to let logic get in the way of building its waste dump at Yucca. 

We all know that nuclear waste cannot be stored at Yucca safely, 

but it can be stored safely for a very long time in secure dry cask 

storage containers. If allowing nuclear waste to cool for 50 to 100 

years improves the safety of shipping in the future, the Department should be seriously considering onsite storage, which they are 

not, even though scientists say it is the way to go. I say a majority 

of the scientists. 

Storing waste at nuclear reactors not in the earthquake-prone 

Yucca Mountain would give us the time needed to develop secure, 

scientifically sound, long-term solutions for nuclear waste. Senator 

Ensign and I have been saying this from the beginning. 

As Senator Ensign said, Yucca’s price tag is now approaching 

$100 billion. This is $49 billion more than the Department of Energy’s 2001 estimate. The cost of Yucca increases at a rate of $7 billion a year. The annual payments to the nuclear waste fund are 

only a fraction of how much Yucca’s cost is increasing. The $22 billion nuclear waste fund will never ever come close to covering the 

price of Yucca. The taxpayer will be on the limb for that. 

Terrible risks of transporting nuclear waste is yet another reason 

that this project is going to be stopped. That is why I appreciate 

very much the Appropriations Committee cutting back the money 

this year. It will be cut back at least $70 million from last year. 

Mr. Chairman, let me finally say that there has been a lot of 

cheerleading recently because this matter has been sent to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Their information they sent is incomplete. They have nothing dealing with transportation. This is a 

hoax and it will never happen. Yucca Mountain will never come to 

be. 

Could I be excused, Mr. Chairman? 

[The prepared statement of Senator Reid follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY REID, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

I want to thank Chairman Inouye, Senator Hutchison, and the Members of the 

Committee for scheduling this important hearing. It has been a long time since the 

Senate has looked closely at plans to ship nuclear waste to Nevada. 

This is a very busy week. But this hearing is necessary now because the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission has just docketed the Department of Energy’s application 

to begin construction at Yucca Mountain. 

7 

Like its application, the Department of Energy’s nuclear waste shipping plans are 

grossly incomplete. Yet, the Department really wants to spend over $3 billion to 

start building a 300-mile radioactive railway through Nevada. They want to do this 

before they even have permission to build the dump. 

It amazes me how long the Department of Energy has pushed the Yucca project 

without having a real transportation plan in place. The Department has not made 

public its proposed shipping routes, and they still haven’t finalized their National 

Transportation Plan. Their draft transportation plan is barely a crude sketch of the 

comprehensive planning that should actually be done for a massive nuclear waste 

shipping campaign. 

Equally shocking is that the Transportation Aging and Disposal casks the Department of Energy plans to use have not even been designed yet. The Department says 

that 90 percent of nuclear waste will be shipped using these transportation-storage 

canisters, but they have absolutely no reason to believe that this is true. There is 

no guarantee that nuclear utilities are actually willing to pay for these canisters, 

especially those that already use dry cask storage to securely store their waste. 

Yet these untested, yet-to-be designed canisters are part of the foundation of the 

Yucca plan. They’re the key defense against a transportation disaster, and they’re 

one of the Department of Energy’s primary barriers against radioactive leakage 

from the nuclear waste dump. But that’s not important to the Department now, because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has made the unexplainable decision that 

the Department of Energy’s license application for Yucca was complete. 

In order to get all of the nation’s nuclear waste to Yucca, the Energy Department 

is proposing between 3,000 and 11,000 rail shipments, and as many as 10,000 truck 

shipments through Nevada. Twice a week for the next 24 years, trains loaded with 

the most dangerous substance known to man would traverse the country to Nevada. 

Some of these shipments would go right by the Las Vegas Strip. Radioactive 

trains would pass within one-half mile of 95,000 residents and 34 hotels that employ 

and host 40,000 workers and visitors. Texas could host up to 300 nuclear waste 

shipments. All of these shipments will go through Arizona communities too, collecting even more waste at the Palo Verde nuclear plant. 

The Department of Energy and nuclear industry lobbyists will tell you that the 

risk of an accident is low. 

What they don’t tell you is that risk is relative—99 percent success gets us 5,000 

botched surgeries each week. 99 percent gets us 200,000 wrong drug prescriptions 

each year. 99 percent gets us 20,000 lost pieces of mail each hour. My point is simple—more nuclear waste on the road will involve more accidents that will put the 

lives of millions of Americans at risk. I don’t want to see what 99 percent gets us 

when nuclear waste is involved. 

What I fear most is that the Department of Energy is not going for 100 percent 

success. They are not even trying to eliminate all the risk. One of the most glaring 

examples is their refusal to consider shipping the oldest, less radioactive nuclear 

waste first—a very basic measure that could reduce radiological hazards by 85 percent or more. 

I urge the Members of the Committee to ask the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Academy of Sciences about this issue. Both 

the Academy and the Government Accountability Office have told the Energy Department they should ship older nuclear waste first. The state of Nevada—which 

understands the terrible risks—has urged the Department to consider shipping the 

oldest waste first. 

But the Department of Energy made up its mind. The answer was no. 

No, because the nuclear power industry wants to get rid of its more expensive and 

most radioactive waste first. 

My question is why hasn’t the Department of Energy even considered shipping 

the oldest waste first? They don’t mention it in their environmental analyses for 

transporting waste to Yucca and they don’t consider it in their draft National Transportation Plan. 

It’s unfortunate that the Energy Department once again is refusing to let logic 

get in the way of building its nuclear waste dump at Yucca Mountain. 

We all know that nuclear waste cannot be stored at nuclear reactors for eternity. 

But it can be safely stored for a very long time in secure dry storage casks. If allowing nuclear waste to cool for 50 to 100 years improves the safety of shipping it in 

the future, the Department of Energy should be seriously considering on-site dry 

cask storage. 

Storing waste at nuclear reactors, not in the earthquake-prone Yucca Mountain, 

would give us the time needed to develop secure, scientifically sound long-term solutions for nuclear waste. Senator Ensign and I have been saying this all along. 

8 

Yucca’s price tag is now $96 billion, almost $49 billion MORE than the Department of Energy’s 2001 estimate. As the cost of Yucca increases at a rate of $7 billion 

a year, the annual payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund are only a fraction of how 

much Yucca’s cost is increasing. The $22 billion Nuclear Waste Fund will never 

come close to covering the price of Yucca. 

The terrible risks of transporting nuclear waste is yet another reason that we 

need to stop the government from hemorrhaging any more money on this failed 

project. It’s time to keep Americans safe by keeping nuclear waste where it is. 

Again, thank you Mr. Chairman, Senator Hutchison and Members of the Committee for this opportunity. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I thank you very much for your testimony, 

sir. 

Now may I call the first panel, which consists of the following: 

the Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy, the Honorable Edward Sproat; 

the Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mr. Michael Weber; 

the Director of the Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Mr. Ed Pritchard; and the Associate Administrator for Hazardous 

Material Safety of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Mr. Ted 

Willke. 

Gentlemen, welcome, and may I begin with Director Sproat? 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD F. SPROAT III, DIRECTOR, 

OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. SPROAT. Well, good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

very much for the invitation to appear and represent the Department in front of the Committee to talk about the transportation of 

spent nuclear fuel. 

I ask that my formal testimony be entered into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will be made part of the record. 

Mr. SPROAT. Thank you very much. 

I am going to keep my verbal comments very brief because we 

have a number of folks to speak this afternoon. 

First of all, I would like to say that, obviously, there is a lot of 

misinformation about this whole issue of transportation of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste. And I hope that in my comments 

I try and help the Committee understand some of those misconceptions and try and straighten out some of the information. 

First of all, the concept of—as you pointed out in your opening 

statement, the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 

waste in this country is not something new. We have been shipping 

that hazardous material across the country by both rail and truck 

for over 40 years. And to be specific, just in the U.S. alone in the 

last 40 years, there have been over 3,000 shipments of spent nuclear fuel and over 6,000 shipments of transuranic waste by truck 

to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project in New Mexico since it opened. 

So there is a huge experience base in this country on how to transport radioactive materials safely and effectively. And in all those 

shipments, there has never once been any release of any radioactivity in the public environment. 

There have been accidents, but none of those accidents have ever 

resulted in any releases because of the very robust containers and 

9 

the very robust regulations that the Department of Transportation 

and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission places on that transportation. And I will let the representatives of those organizations talk 

a little bit more about that in their presentations. 

For Yucca Mountain, which obviously is one of the issues at the 

heart of this discussion in this hearing, I just want to make a comparison that compared to the 3,000 spent nuclear fuel shipments 

made so far in this country, at its peak of operation at Yucca, we 

are expecting that approximately 320 rail cars, which is two to 

three trains per week of shipments, will go from other places in the 

country to Yucca, and over 25 years, it would be 320 rail cars, or 

about two to three trains per week is what the total number of 

shipments would be to Yucca via rail and approximately 90 truck 

shipments per year. That compares to the existing transportation 

today in the U.S. of all hazardous materials of approximately 1 million rail cars of shipments in this country of hazardous materials, 

as classified by the Department of Transportation. So when you 

take a look at the total environment of hazardous waste transport 

in this country, radioactive materials is a very, very small percentage, and Yucca Mountain would be an even smaller percentage of 

that. So that is just to give you some kind of a context relative to 

the other hazardous material transportation this country already 

does and already accepts on a daily basis. 

Dr. Crowley will talk later this afternoon about the National 

Academy of Sciences study which really addressed this whole issue, 

I think, very, very well. And it concluded that the risks to the public from shipping spent nuclear fuel are orders of magnitude less 

than the risks associated with a number of other hazardous materials like chlorine and like some of the other gases and chemicals 

that are shipped across the country, whose risks we routinely accept. And so I think the National Academy study, when you hear 

from Dr. Crowley, will put this in a little more perspective in terms 

of comparative risks of nuclear material shipment versus other 

hazardous waste shipment. 

We at the Department of Energy have been working since 1992 

with states, county, tribal, and local governments in what we call 

our Transportation External Coordination Working Group to start 

to work together with these various entities about the transportation issues associated with Yucca Mountain, both by rail and by 

truck. We have a very good working relationship with them, and 

we are committed to continuing that working relationship with 

them. We know that any successful transportation campaign in the 

future will require a very strong working relationship with those 

local communities. 

So in summary, as we have the opportunity to talk about this a 

little bit more this afternoon, I would like to leave the Committee 

with the sense that, number one, this has been going on for a long 

time, the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. 

The risks, as assessed by the National Academy of Sciences, are 

significantly lower than the risks associated with the existing 

transportation of hazardous materials in the U.S. 

There are significantly more shipments of hazardous materials in 

the U.S. than nuclear materials, and we believe we have a very 

10 

strong and successful regime of regulation, both from the NRC and 

the Department of Transportation, which DOE is committed to adhering to as we go forward with the Yucca Mountain transportation 

campaign. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sproat follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD F. SPROAT III, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Edward F. Sproat III, Director of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM). I appreciate the invitation to appear before the Committee to 

discuss the safety and security of transporting spent nuclear fuel. 

Since the early 1960s, more than 3,000 shipments of spent nuclear fuel have been 

conducted safely and securely in the United States, having traveled more than 1.7 

million miles. There has never been a spent nuclear fuel transportation accident 

that has resulted in any release of radioactive material harmful to the public or the 

environment. The use of robust casks certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and strict regulatory standards for every aspect of logistics, including 

material characterization, packaging, loading, marking, equipment inspections, routing, training, security, and shipment monitoring, have all contributed to this outstanding safety record. 

In 2006, the National Academy of Sciences published a study on the safety of 

spent nuclear fuel shipments titled: Going the Distance? The Safe Transport of 

Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States. In that 

report, the Academy concluded that from a technical viewpoint, these shipments 

present ‘‘. . . a low-radiological-risk activity with manageable safety, health and environmental consequences when conducted in strict adherence with existing regulations.’’ The plans to ship spent nuclear fuel to the Yucca Mountain repository in the 

2020 time-frame are building on this successful experience base. 

Roles and Relationships 

The Department of Transportation (DOT) and the NRC have established safety 

and security regulations for transport of spent nuclear fuel. DOE has committed to 

meet or exceed these regulations for shipments to Yucca Mountain. The Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA) explicitly requires the Department 

to ship spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to a repository in transportation casks certified by the NRC. Under the NWPA, the Department must also 

comply with NRC notification requirements prior to conducting such shipments. In 

addition, the NWPA requires the Department to provide states and tribes technical 

assistance and funds for training local public safety officials in safe routine transportation and emergency response procedures. The Department has selected mostly 

rail as the preferred mode of transport both nationally and in the state of Nevada 

for shipments to Yucca Mountain. The Department also has made the policy decision to use dedicated trains as the usual mode of rail service to enhance operational 

efficiency. 

As the planning process for the Yucca Mountain transportation system evolves, 

we are continually looking for opportunities to further enhance the safety and security of these shipments. Post 9/11, the NRC has also imposed additional security 

measures for its licensees transporting spent nuclear fuel and other materials, many 

of which were measures DOE had put in place for its shipments years before. We 

are and will continue to coordinate our planning closely with NRC, DOT, and the 

Department of Homeland Security. 

Once routes and shipment schedules are established, advance notification will be 

provided to individuals that have appropriate security clearance in each Governor’s 

office in compliance with NRC regulations. All shipments will be accompanied by 

armed escorts and will be continuously monitored and tracked via satellite. We anticipate that most rail shipments will be conducted on dedicated trains, meaning no 

other materials will be transported on the same train, allowing for greater operational control of such shipments. Highway and rail shipments will be thoroughly 

inspected in accordance with standards of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance 

or the Federal Railroad Administration, as appropriate, prior to departing from 

their points of origin. 

11 

1 National Research Council of the National Academies, Going the Distance? The Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States (Washington, 

D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2006), pp. 174–182. 

Challenges and Issues 

In their report on the safety of spent nuclear fuel shipments referenced above, the 

National Academy of Sciences addressed the relative risks of these shipments compared to other hazardous materials commonly transported in this country. Their 

findings demonstrate that each spent nuclear fuel shipment is thousands of times 

less risky than shipments of other commonly transported hazardous materials. This 

level of safety is the direct result of the stringent regulatory standards and robust 

packages used for such shipments.1

In addition to the lower risks for each shipment of spent nuclear fuel, there are 

far fewer of these shipments per year than shipments of other hazardous materials. 

In 2006, American railroads transported hazardous materials 111 billion ton-miles 

in over 1,000,000 rail cars. Of this total, less than 0.025 percent were spent nuclear 

fuel shipments. 

The National Academy of Sciences, the transportation industry, the state of Nevada, and a broad spectrum of other stakeholders advocated strongly for a transportation system based on mostly rail shipments. Over the life of the repository, fewer 

than 3,000 trains can transport the same amount of spent nuclear fuel that would 

require more than 48,000 truck shipments. In addition, the use of Transportation, 

Aging, and Disposal canisters, which weigh up to 180 tons in their transportation 

configuration, requires the use of rail transport. 

A significant fleet of transportation casks has to be developed to support shipments to Yucca Mountain. That process has started with funding for the design and 

certification of the Transportation, Aging and Disposal canisters and their transportation overpacks. Funding to support development of a fleet of approximately 150 

transport casks that meet the stringent safety requirements of the NRC is needed 

as part of the transportation system. In addition, the Department needs to develop 

a fleet of rail cars with the best available safety technology. These rail cars will 

meet the new requirements established by the Association of American Railroads. 

The Department is collaborating with the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program on development of the next generation of security escort rail cars designed to this new 

standard. 

Current Status and Steps Moving Forward 

In a 2004 Record of Decision, the Department selected mostly rail as its mode of 

transport, both nationally and in the state of Nevada. In June 2008, the Department 

completed the ‘‘Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Rail Alignment for the 

Construction and Operation of a Railroad in Nevada to a Geologic Repository at 

Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada’’ (Rail Alignment EIS). The Rail Alignment 

EIS analyzes the environmental impacts associated with a range of potential alignments for constructing and operating a railroad in Nevada to Yucca Mountain. 

There was considerable public involvement in the development of the EIS and a 

Record of Decision is anticipated this fall. 

As we move forward the Department will continue its ongoing collaborations with 

States, Tribes and stakeholders as we fulfill our commitment to establish a safe and 

secure transportation system for shipments to Yucca Mountain. I appreciate the 

Committee’s interest on this important aspect of the Department’s Yucca Mountain 

Program. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much, sir. 

Our next witness is Director Weber. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL WEBER, DIRECTOR 

NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS 

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. WEBER. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Senator Ensign. 

It is my pleasure to appear before you today to represent the staff 

of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission concerning the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s role in ensuring the safety and the security of potential transportation of spent fuel, including the potential 

transport of that spent fuel to the proposed repository at Yucca 

Mountain. 

12 

As you know, the NRC staff has accepted for technical licensing 

review the application from the Department of Energy to construct 

a geologic repository for high-level waste at Yucca Mountain. 

Spent nuclear fuel can be safely and securely transported. This 

conclusion is based on over 35 years of experience with spent fuel 

transportation both here in the United States and around the 

world. It is also based on the application of a comprehensive regulatory framework and effective oversight by the NRC working in 

partnership with other agencies such as the Department of Transportation. 

Within the United States, there have been over 1,500 commercial 

shipments of spent fuel since 1979. All of these shipments have occurred without a single package failure or a radiological release, 

thus protecting workers and members of the public that live and 

work along the shipment routes. 

The safety and security of spent nuclear fuel shipments are guided by a comprehensive regulatory framework. NRC’s primary role 

is in the review and certification of transportation package designs. 

NRC would maintain this role for spent fuel transport to the proposed repository. Spent fuel is required to be shipped in extremely 

robust transportation packages that are designed and fabricated to 

withstand both normal transportation and hypothetical accident 

conditions. 

Now, rather than become complacent with the existing safety 

record, the NRC continually examines the transportation program 

to ensure that our standards provide a high level of safety and security. The Commission published transportation risk studies in 

1977, 1987, and again in 2000. These studies indicate that the risk 

of shipping spent nuclear fuel is very low. We are currently reexamining the spent nuclear fuel transportation risks that are likely 

to be encountered in potential shipments to the proposed repository. 

In 2002, the NRC cosponsored an independent safety assessment 

of spent fuel transport by the National Academy of Sciences entitled Going the Distance. The NRC takes this study’s recommendations very seriously and has addressed them in the program. 

NAS recommended that full-scale testing of transport packages 

be used as part of an integrated approach along with technical 

analysis, computer simulation, scale-model, and package component testing. The study’s recommendations are consistent with 

NRC’s plans to perform a full-scale demonstration test involving realistic rail transport and fire scenarios. 

NAS recommended that the NRC undertake additional analyses 

of transportation accidents involving long-duration, fully engulfing 

fires. The NRC has completed two such studies on the performance 

of representative spent fuel packages in severe rail and highway 

tunnel fires since the NAS made its recommendations and these 

studies confirmed that the spent nuclear fuel packages would not 

be expected to release any radioactive materials during the fire 

even under severe accident conditions. 

More studies are underway and will be completed next year in 

2009. 

Finally, the NAS recommended an independent examination of 

the security of spent fuel and high-level waste transportation. In 

13 

light of the elevated threat that followed the terrorist attacks on 

September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted security assessments of 

transportation which were completed after the publication of the 

NAS report. These assessments evaluated transportation package 

designs against a variety of credible land-based and air threats. 

The results of the security assessments demonstrate that the current requirements, combined with security enhancements put in 

place after September 11, provide adequate safety and security. 

In late 2009, the NRC intends to issue a proposed rule for public 

comment that would revise the requirements for secure transport 

of spent nuclear fuel, including additional security measures found 

necessary. 

In addition, we believe that security measures for future shipments must defend against the threat that exists at the time of 

that shipment and take advantage of enhancements in technology 

which are constantly evolving. If the Yucca Mountain repository is 

approved, any shipments of spent fuel to this site would not begin 

until 2020 at the earliest based on current DOE estimates. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to conduct such an independent 

examination closer to the time of the actual shipments. 

Although the NRC is responsible for overseeing the security of 

commercial spent fuel shipments to an interim storage facility, the 

Department would be responsible for implementing and overseeing 

the security of Yucca Mountain shipments because the Department 

plans to take title to the commercial spent fuel at the nuclear reactor sites. Therefore, any comprehensive security assessment would 

require participation of both the Department and the NRC, as well 

as the resources necessary to support such a study. 

In conclusion, spent fuel can be safely and securely transported, 

including potential transportation under the existing regulatory 

framework. This conclusion is supported by the outstanding safety 

and security record for spent fuel shipments and numerous safety 

and security assessments conducted by the NRC and others such 

as the National Academy. Nevertheless, NRC staff remains committed in continually examining our transportation program to ensure safety and security are achieved and that the program remains effective in protecting people and the environment. 

I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 

today, and I look forward to answering any questions that you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weber follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL WEBER, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY

AND SAFEGUARDS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Introduction 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today to testify on behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff 

concerning the NRC’s role in ensuring the safety and security of the potential transportation of spent nuclear fuel, including the potential transport to the proposed geological repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. As you know, the NRC staff has accepted for technical review the application from the Department of Energy (DOE) 

to construct a geologic repository for high-level waste at this site. 

Spent nuclear fuel can be safely and securely transported, including from its current location at operating and decommissioned nuclear power plants to a permanent 

geologic repository. This conclusion is based on over 35 years of experience with 

spent nuclear fuel transportation both here in the U.S. and around the world. It is 

14 

also based on the application of a comprehensive regulatory framework and effective 

oversight by the NRC, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Energy (DOE), States, and Tribal governments. Within the U.S., there have 

been over 1,500 commercial shipments of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors 

since 1979. All of these shipments have occurred without a single package failure 

or radiological release. This means that there have been no radiological releases or 

injuries to workers or the public who live and work along these shipment routes. 

It is our understanding that the transportation safety record also extends to the approximately 30,000 international spent fuel shipments made primarily by Japanese 

and European companies engaged in the reprocessing of spent fuel. 

Regulatory Framework 

The safety and security of spent nuclear fuel shipments are guided by a comprehensive regulatory framework that includes the NRC, DOE, DOT, the States, 

and Tribal governments. This regulatory framework is informed and closely aligned 

with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Transportation Safety Standard to ensure international alignment of transportation package performance standards and requirements. The NRC’s primary role in ensuring the safety and security 

of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste shipments is the review and certification 

of the package designs that are to be used for shipment. NRC would maintain this 

role for the proposed high-level waste repository. Spent fuel is required to be 

shipped in extremely robust transportation packages that are designed and fabricated to withstand normal transportation and hypothetical accident conditions. 

The certification process requires a comprehensive technical review by the NRC 

staff of the package’s expected performance under hypothetical accident conditions. 

The specific conditions have been derived from and are intended to envelope the impact forces and thermal environments experienced in severe, ‘‘real world’’ accidents. 

To be certified by the NRC, a vendor must demonstrate that a transportation package design will prevent the release of radioactive material and the loss of radiation 

shielding when subjected to the hypothetical accident conditions. 

For commercial shipments of spent nuclear fuel by NRC licensees, the NRC also 

approves the Quality Assurance (QA) programs that apply to the design, fabrication, 

use and maintenance of transportation packages and requires that shipments comply with NRC regulations for the physical security of spent fuel in transit (10 CFR 

Part 73). NRC’s QA and security regulations do not apply to DOE’s shipments to 

the proposed high-level waste repository. 

In general, DOT regulates the transport of all hazardous materials, including 

spent nuclear fuel, and has established regulations for shippers and carriers regarding radiological controls, hazard communication, training, emergency response, and 

criteria to determine preferred routes for hazardous material shipment. The states 

and tribal governments bear primary responsibility for responding to accidents and 

incidents within their jurisdictions and in many cases the states have enacted additional requirements for carrier inspections and escorts. For potential shipments to 

the proposed high-level waste repository at Yucca Mountain, the DOE would be responsible for ensuring the security of the shipments, because DOE plans to take 

title to commercial spent fuel at nuclear reactor sites. Congress has also directed 

DOE to abide by NRC requirements for providing advance notifications of shipments 

to State and local governments. 

NRC’s Efforts to Maintain Safety and Security of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Transportation 

Rather than be complacent with existing safety performance of transportation 

packages, the NRC continually examines the transportation program to ensure that 

our standards provide a high level of safety and security. The Commission published 

transportation risk studies in 1977, 1987, and 2000. These studies indicate that the 

risk of shipping spent nuclear fuel is very low. To supplement previous efforts, we 

are currently re-examining spent nuclear fuel transportation risks to account for the 

spent nuclear fuel, shipping cask and shipment characteristics likely to be encountered in potential shipments to the proposed geologic repository. 

In 2002, the NRC co-sponsored an independent safety assessment by the National 

Academy of Science’s (NAS’s) Board on Radioactive Waste Management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW) transportation, entitled Going the Distance which was published in February 2006. The NRC takes this study’s recommendations very seriously and addressed them in our program. 

The principal finding of the NAS study was: 

The Committee could identify no fundamental technical barriers to the safe 

transport of SNF and HLW in the United States. Transport by highway (for 

small-quantity shipments), and by rail (for large-quantity shipments) is, from 

15 

a technical viewpoint, a low-radiological-risk activity, with manageable safety, 

health, and environmental consequences, when conducted with strict adherence 

to existing regulations. 

The NAS study recommended that full-scale testing continue to be used as part 

of an integrated approach, along with technical analysis, computer simulation, scalemodel, and package component testing programs, to confirm that transportation 

packages perform acceptably under both regulatory and credible conditions that exceed regulatory requirements. The study also concluded that ‘‘deliberate full-scale 

testing of packages to destruction through the application of forces that substantially exceed credible accident conditions would be marginally informative and is not 

justified given the considerable cost for package acquisitions that such testing would 

require.’’ The study’s recommendations are consistent with NRC’s current plans in 

the Package Performance Study (PPS) to perform a demonstration test involving a 

realistic rail impact and fire scenarios. We believe that the NAS study also supports 

NRC’s decision not to test a full-scale transportation package to destruction in the 

PPS. Work on the PPS has been deferred by the NRC and DOE until the final 

transportation cask designs, including the transport, aging, and disposal (TAD) canisters, are deployed. We are currently working with international counterparts in 

Japan and Germany to learn from their full-scale and model testing to prepare for 

full-scale testing in the U.S. 

NAS recommended that NRC undertake additional analyses of transportation accidents involving very long-duration, fully engulfing fires to determine whether 

there is a need for regulatory change or additional operational controls during spent 

nuclear fuel shipments. The NRC has completed two studies on the performance of 

representative spent nuclear fuel packages in severe rail and highway tunnel fires: 

‘‘Spent Fuel Transportation Package Response to the Baltimore Tunnel Fire Scenario,’’ NUREG/CR–6886 (published December 2006), and ‘‘Spent Fuel Transportation Package Response to the Caldecott Tunnel Fire Scenario,’’ NUREG/CR–6894 

(published February 2007). These studies confirmed that the spent nuclear fuel 

packages would not be expected to release any radioactive material from the spent 

fuel, even under these severe accident conditions. 

Through this work, the NRC identified an additional operating control for rail 

shipments that could be implemented to prevent or mitigate the consequences of 

long-duration fires: to prohibit a train carrying flammable gases or liquids from 

being in a tunnel at the same time as a train carrying spent nuclear fuel. Because 

the NRC does not have regulatory authority over rail carriers, we requested in 

March 2006, that the Association of American Railroads (AAR) consider revising 

AAR Circular No. OT–55, Recommended Railroad Operating Practices For Transportation of Hazardous Materials. As a result, the AAR did issue a revision in July 

2006 (AAR Circular No. OT–55, Revision I) which states ‘‘. . . when a train carrying 

SNF or HLW meets another train carrying loaded tank cars of flammable gas, flammable liquids or combustible liquids in a single bore double track tunnel, one train 

shall stop outside the tunnel until the other train is completely through the tunnel.’’ 

Finally, the NAS study also recommended that, ‘‘. . . an independent examination 

of the security of spent fuel and high-level waste transportation should be carried 

out prior to the commencement of large-quantity shipments to a Federal repository 

or to interim storage.’’ In light of the elevated threat that the U.S. experienced following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC issued safeguards 

advisories and orders to enhance transportation security of spent nuclear fuel and 

other large quantities of radioactive material. The NRC issued these security enhancements in coordination with DOT, the Department of Homeland Security, State 

agencies, and other Federal agencies. The NRC security assessments of transportation, which were completed after the publication of the NAS report, evaluated a 

number of representative transportation package designs against a variety of credible land-based threats and a deliberate plane crash. The results of these security 

assessments, which we have shared with DOT, DOE, and other organizations that 

have a ‘‘need to know,’’ demonstrate that the current requirements, combined with 

the security enhancements put in place after September 11th, provide adequate protection of public health and safety, and the environment, and common defense and 

security. These safeguards advisories and orders are only an interim solution and 

will not be relied on indefinitely. In late 2009, the NRC intends to issue a proposed 

rule for public comment that would revise the requirements for secure transport of 

spent nuclear fuel. The proposed rule would include additional measures to address 

the current threat environment. 

In addition, we believe that the security measures for future shipments must defend against the threat that exists at the time of shipment and take advantage of 

enhancements in technology, such as shipment tracking and monitoring techniques, 

16 

which are constantly evolving. If the Yucca Mountain repository is approved, any 

shipments of spent nuclear fuel to this site would not begin until 2020 at the earliest, based on current DOE estimates. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to 

conduct an independent examination of shipment security closer to the time of actual shipments, if needed. 

While the NRC is responsible for overseeing the security requirements for commercial shipments to an interim storage facility, DOE would be responsible for implementing and overseeing the security requirements for Yucca Mountain shipments. Therefore, a comprehensive independent security assessment that encompasses both potential shipments to Yucca Mountain or to an interim storage site 

would require the participation of both NRC and DOE as well as resources to support such a study. 

In an effort to further inform our program, the NRC is also examining two recent 

transportation accidents involving severe highway fires. One is the MacArthur Maze 

(Interstate I–880) accident in Oakland, California that occurred on April 29, 2007, 

in which a gasoline tanker truck with a capacity of 32,500 liters (8,600 gallons) of 

gasoline crashed and overturned on an interstate highway. The resulting fire was 

intense enough to cause the collapse of a highway overpass located above the overturned tanker truck. The second accident being studied occurred on October 12, 

2007, within the southbound ‘‘truck only’’ bypass tunnel at the I–5/14 interchange 

in northern Los Angeles County (Newhall Pass). In this accident, multiple commercial trucks were involved in a severe fire occurring in a short, well-ventilated tunnel. 

We expect the results of these studies to be published in early 2009. 

Summary 

In conclusion, spent nuclear fuel can be safely and securely transported from its 

current location at operating and decommissioned nuclear power plants, including 

potentially to a permanent geologic repository, under the existing regulatory framework. This conclusion is supported by the outstanding safety record for spent nuclear fuel shipments to date and numerous safety and security assessments conducted by the NRC, the NAS, and other agencies. Nevertheless, the NRC staff is 

committed to continually examining our transportation safety and security program 

to ensure that it remains effective in protecting people and the environment. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss NRC’s transportation safety and security 

program for spent nuclear fuel. I look forward to answering any questions you may 

have. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much, Director Weber. 

And now may I call upon Director Pritchard? 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD W. PRITCHARD, DIRECTOR, 

OFFICE OF SAFETY ASSURANCE AND COMPLIANCE, 

FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. PRITCHARD. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Senator Ensign and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation, 

Mary Peters, and the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration, Joseph Boardman. I am Edward Pritchard, Director 

of FRA’s Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance. 

Part of FRA’s role in protecting the American public from the 

risk inherent in rail transportation includes promoting the safe and 

secure transportation of spent nuclear fuel. With the Department 

of Energy’s decision that 80 percent or more of the nuclear materials to be stored at Yucca Mountain should be transported there 

by rail, it is important to consider the safety and security of these 

new shipments during rail transportation. FRA’s role is important 

in this regard and we are up to the challenge. 

FRA has been hard at work to assure the safe transportation of 

radioactive materials since the formation of the U.S. Department 

of Transportation. We formalized our program for these shipments 

in the late 1980s and we are taking steps to ensure the continued 

17 

safety of such shipments as they move through the Nation’s rail 

transportation system. We do this in two main ways, giving technical assistance to other agencies and carrying out our comprehensive safety enforcement and rulemaking program. 

First, we provide technical expertise and assistance to other 

agencies. We actively work with our partner agencies, including the 

Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and 

the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, and 

the Transportation Security Administration. Our cooperative efforts 

with DOE include all rail-related aspects before the plan moves to 

Yucca Mountain. This cooperation includes vigorously participating 

in their external stakeholder working groups and contributing technical and operational expertise regarding the rail operating environment, mechanical equipment requirements, and track construction and maintenance. 

I am proud to say that the same degree of coordination exists 

throughout the various modal administrations within the DOT, as 

well as with the NRC and TSA, in regard to issues, concerns involving the security of rail movements and routing, package integrity and securement in the rail operating environment. These relationships are strong, and together our work is progressing to ensure that any shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported to the 

Yucca Mountain repository by rail is conducted in a way that 

assures not only the safety and security of these tasks with transporting the shipment, but also the safety and security of the American public as a whole. 

Second, FRA provides technical and regulatory oversight to ensure that the rolling equipment and railroad infrastructure used 

for the movements are safe. FRA’s efforts are focused on ensuring 

the rail cars that will move the casks of spent nuclear fuel are the 

safest possible and utilize the most advanced technology. We have 

developed and instituted a comprehensive safety enforcement program that ensures that the tracks and other rail infrastructures 

conform with the extensive body of Federal railroad safety regulations. 

We are working with our sister agency, PHMSA, to implement 

PHMSA’s new routing regulations that require rail carriers to analyze potential routes for transporting these shipments and to select 

the most safe and secure routes. 

But these efforts are not the only ways in which FRA works to 

advance rail safety. FRA and the administration are strong supporters of positive train control technology, are active advocates for 

the continued development of positive train control, and we share 

the desire of the National Transportation Safety Board and Congress to see that the positive train control becomes a reality on 

more railroads. 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss FRA’s program to assure 

the safe and secure transportation of spent nuclear fuel by rail. 

Thank you. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may 

have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Director Pritchard. 

And may now I call upon Associate Administrator, Mr. Willke? 

18 

STATEMENT OF DR. THEODORE ‘‘TED’’ WILLKE, ASSOCIATE 

ADMINISTRATOR, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY, 

PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY 

ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Dr. WILLKE. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Senator Ensign. 

I am Ted Willke, Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials 

Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 

PHMSA, the U.S. Department of Transportation. Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear today to briefly discuss PHMSA’s role in the 

safe and secure transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 

radioactive waste to the proposed geological repository at Yucca 

Mountain, Nevada. 

For some 50 years, some 1,500 domestic shipments of spent nuclear fuel have been transported within the United States with a 

solid safety record. It is our firm belief that this fuel can be safely 

and securely transported from its current location at operating and 

decommissioned nuclear power reactors to a permanent repository. 

Our confidence is based on the application of a comprehensive regulatory framework that includes DOT, the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, and State and tribal governments. We have a commitment to continually reexamine the transportation program to 

ensure that the current level of safety and security is maintained. 

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the Department of 

Energy has primary responsibility to plan for and arrange the 

transportation for spent nuclear fuel to a geological repository. The 

act requires all transportation to be conducted in accordance with 

the transportation regulations issued by DOT in transport casks 

approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Within the Department of Transportation, several agencies are 

involved in regulating the transportation of spent nuclear fuel. 

PHMSA maintains a national program designed to protect life, 

property, and the environment from risks inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce, including spent nuclear 

fuel and high-level radioactive waste. To carry out this role, 

PHMSA identifies and evaluates safety risks, develops and enforces 

standards for transporting hazardous materials, educates shippers 

and carriers, investigates transport and packaging incidents and 

failures, conducts research, and awards grants to improve emergency response to incidents. 

PHMSA’s regulations, issued under the Federal hazardous materials transportation safety laws, establish commodity-specific 

standards for the classification, packaging, marking, labeling, and 

documentation of hazardous material shipments by rail, highway, 

vessel, and air. PHMSA’s hazardous regulations also prescribe 

standards for the loading and unloading of transport conveyances, 

training of transportation employees, and the security of hazardous 

materials in transportation. 

While PHMSA is proud of its contributions to the safe transportation of spent nuclear fuel, the true strength of this program lies 

in the shared responsibility and cooperation between our Federal, 

State, and local partners. Within the Department of Transportation, responsibility for enforcement of the hazardous material 

regulations is shared with the Federal Railroad Administration and 

19 

the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. We also share 

enforcement responsibilities with the United States Coast Guard 

and State law enforcement officials. For all radioactive shipments, 

particularly spent nuclear fuel, PHMSA works closely with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure consistent and uniform 

packaging and transport regulations. 

Because our State partners have the primary responsibility for 

responding to accidents and incidents within their jurisdiction, 

PHMSA will continue to support effective training to prepare first 

responders for a possible transportation accident or incident involving spent nuclear fuel through their jurisdictions and that will include financial assistance to states and localities for emergency response, planning and training. PHMSA will continue to coordinate 

with local responders and ensure that they receive the advance 

shipment notifications and general hazard communications they 

need to respond to transport incidents. 

As planning for the repository progresses, PHMSA will continue 

to work with the Congress, the nuclear industry, the transport 

community, and appropriate Federal, State, tribal governments, 

and local agencies to review and improve existing safety standards, 

promote the development of risk-reducing technologies, strengthen 

the preparation of emergency responders and otherwise enhance 

the system of safety controls for spent nuclear fuel transportation. 

With continued vigilance, PHMSA is committed to maintaining the 

strong record of safety and security. 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss PHMSA’s transportation 

safety and security program. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pritchard and Dr. Willke follow:] 

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF TED WILLKE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, HAZARDOUS

MATERIALS SAFETY, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY

ADMINISTRATION; AND EDWARD PRITCHARD, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SAFETY

ASSURANCE AND COMPLIANCE, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Introduction 

Chairman Inouye, Ranking Member Hutchison, and Members of the Committee, 

we want to thank you for the opportunity to appear today on behalf of the Department of Transportation (DOT). We are pleased to discuss DOT’s role in the safe and 

secure transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste 

(HLRW) to the proposed geological repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. 

The Safety Record 

SNF and HLRW have been transported within the United States for more than 

50 years, with a solid record of safety and security. More than 1,500 shipments of 

commercial SNF from nuclear power reactors have moved by road and rail without 

a single incident resulting in an injury, death, or release of the material from the 

packaging. Likewise, numerous military shipments of SNF; thousands of non-commercial spent fuel and HLRW shipments by the Department of Energy (DOE); and 

approximately 30,000 international shipments of SNF have occurred without serious 

incident. 

Regulatory Roles 

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, DOE has primary responsibility to 

plan for and arrange the transportation of SNF to a geological repository. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for licensing the geological repository and whatever interim facilities may be needed. Transportation will be conducted, in accordance with hazardous materials transport regulations issued by 

DOT, in transport casks approved by the NRC. States will bear primary responsibility for responding to accidents and incidents within their jurisdictions and in 

20 

many cases have enacted additional requirements for carrier inspections and escorts. DOE, DOT, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency have provided 

grants, courses, and course materials for emergency responder training and preparedness related to this transportation. Because DOE plans to take title to the 

SNF at nuclear reactor sites, that department will be responsible for ensuring the 

security of the shipments. 

DOT Role in Promoting Transportation Safety 

Within DOT, several agencies are involved in overseeing the transportation of 

SNF. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) administers a national program designed to protect life, property, and the environment 

from risks inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials, including SNF, in 

intrastate and interstate commerce. To these ends, PHMSA identifies and evaluates 

safety risks; develops and enforces standards for transporting hazardous materials; 

educates shippers and carriers; investigates transport and packaging incidents and 

failures; conducts research; and awards grants to improve emergency response to incidents. PHMSA regulations, issued under the Federal hazardous materials transportation safety laws (49 U.S.C. ch. 51), establish commodity-specific standards for 

the classification, packaging, marking, labeling, and documentation of hazardous 

materials shipments by rail, highway, vessel, and air. PHMSA’s Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) also prescribe standards for the loading and unloading of 

transport conveyances; training of transportation employees; and security of hazardous materials in transportation. 

PHMSA shares responsibility for enforcement of the HMR with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 

(FMCSA), the United States Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Administration, and 

state law enforcement officials. 

For shipments of SNF, PHMSA also works closely with the NRC. PHMSA’s regulations incorporate rigorous packaging standards that are developed and overseen 

by the NRC. Pursuant to a 1979 Memorandum of Understanding, with PHMSA, the 

NRC has lead regulatory responsibility for the review and certification of the shipping casks used to transport SNF. These casks are performance-tested to assure 

they can survive ‘‘hypothetical’’ accident scenarios. The tests, which include impact, 

puncture, thermal and immersion testing, also assure that the casks provide excellent radiation protection to transportation workers who load, unload, or carry SNF 

and to any member of the general public who may come into proximity with a shipment of nuclear material during its movement in transportation. Because the time 

that it takes to move a shipment from origin to destination directly affects radiation 

exposure, the NRC requires that shipments of SNF be planned to avoid intermediate stops to the extent practicable. PHMSA’s regulations also prohibit unnecessary delay in the transportation of hazardous materials. 

FRA enforces the HMR applicable to rail shipments as part of a national safety 

program covering all aspects of railroad operations. FRA regulations issued under 

the Federal railroad safety laws (49 U.S.C. ch. 201–213) govern the design, maintenance, and inspection of track, equipment, signals, and train control systems and 

prescribe standards for employee qualifications, training, and operating practices. 

FRA also advises PHMSA on rulemakings involving the rail transportation of hazardous material and enforces the HMR in the rail mode. Railroads are required to 

conduct their own inspections to ensure that these safety standards are being met. 

Approximately 500 Federal and State safety inspectors monitor the railroad companies’ own inspection forces to verify compliance with applicable Federal safety 

standards. FRA and State inspectors accomplish this task by conducting routine inspections and programmed focused inspections of railroad properties and comparing 

their findings to a railroad’s own inspection records, as well as conducting compliance investigations. Thus, while primary responsibility for inspecting the railroad 

property and operations rests with the railroads themselves, FRA’s inspection strategy is to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of the railroads’ own inspection programs in complying with applicable Federal safety regulations and standards. In the 

case of SNF shipments, as set forth in the following section, FRA and rail carriers 

have taken a number of actions to further strengthen safety and security controls. 

Although rail will be the primary mode of transportation for SNF shipments to 

the repository, some motor carrier movements also will be necessary. In addition to 

the HMR, these movements will in accordance with FMCSA regulations governing 

vehicle condition, driver safety, and security. Under FMCSA’s regulations, a motor 

carrier transporting SNF must hold a safety permit issued by FMCSA, and a pretrip inspection of the shipment must be performed by an authorized State or Federal law enforcement official. In addition, states may designate preferred routes for 

highway shipments of SNF, in accordance with FMCSA’s regulations. Preferred 

21 

routes are interstate highways and alternate routes designated by a State routing 

agency. An interstate bypass or beltway around a city, when available, must be used 

rather than an interstate route through a city. Under these regulations, a State or 

locality may not designate (or restrict the use of) routes that ‘‘export’’ transportation 

risks to a neighboring jurisdiction or unnecessarily delay the transportation of hazardous materials. 

Emergency Response 

Effective response to a transportation accident or incident involving SNF is enhanced through Federal requirements and resources, including financial assistance 

to states and localities for emergency response planning and training. DOE maintains regional emergency management field offices that can dispatch qualified response teams to an incident involving nuclear material, but first responders are primarily local fire departments and law enforcement agencies. (In the event of a radiation emergency, emergency response is typically handled by the appropriate state 

radiation control agency and first responders are trained to stay clear and call the 

state radiation control officer.) PHMSA’s hazard communication requirements (shipping papers, package marking and labeling, and vehicle placarding) inform these responders of the hazards involved. For shipments of SNF, coordination with local responders is also enhanced by the NRC’s physical protection requirements that provide for advance notification to the State Governor (or his representative) of each 

shipment to or through the state and advance arrangements with local law enforcement agencies for response to an emergency or a call by escorts for assistance. Local 

emergency response capabilities are strengthened by PHMSA’s planning and training grants to States, who in turn pass at least 75 percent of the grants through to 

local communities. 

Rail Transportation of Radioactive Materials 

With regard to rail transportation of SNF and HLRW in particular, FRA conducts 

inspections to verify that shipments are properly prepared for rail transportation 

and in compliance with all applicable provisions of the HMR. FRA also helps to ensure that the track, signal systems, grade crossings, bridges, and rail vehicles used 

for these shipments are in safe condition and that responsible railroad employees 

involved in these movements are trained, briefed, and properly performing their 

jobs. In these activities, FRA works very closely with the railroads, their employees, 

and the affected communities. Ultimately, the safe movement of SNF and HLRW 

depends on the application of sound safety regulations, policies, and procedures. 

This requires extensive planning and coordination among Federal agencies, State 

and local governments, and commercial transportation companies. 

Since the mid-1980s, FRA has implemented a basic focused inspection policy for 

all known rail shipments of SNF and HLRW. In 1998, with the advent of a significant potential for increased SNF and HLRW by rail, FRA recognized the need to 

enhance the existing policy to ensure that the railroad industry’s outstanding safety 

record for nuclear material shipments could continue unabated. This updated policy, 

the Safety Compliance Oversight Plan for Rail Transportation of High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, known as SCOP, set forth an enhanced FRA 

policy to address the safety of rail shipments of SNF and HLRW. FRA applies this 

enhanced policy to ensure the safety of all known rail shipments of SNF and HLRW. 

The SCOP is a ‘‘living document’’ periodically requiring modification and update as 

needed based on new regulations, technologies, and procedures. 

The development of the SCOP involved a coordinated effort among FRA, DOE, the 

Association of American Railroads (AAR), railroad labor organizations, and representatives of affected states and Native American groups, and FRA acknowledges 

the invaluable contribution of each of them. Key elements of the SCOP include the 

following: (1) coordinated planning for selecting the most appropriate and viable 

routes, (2) ensuring appropriate training of railroad employees and emergency responders, and (3) enhancing and focusing FRA’s safety inspections and monitoring 

activities on all facets of the rail shipments of SNF and HLRW. 

Under current route-selection requirements, FRA works with DOE, utility companies, or other shippers, and the involved railroad companies in planning and selecting the routes, emphasizing the selection of the highest classes of track. (Under 

FRA’s regulations, each higher class of track has a greater permissible operating 

speed and more stringent safety standards.) Additional requirements for selecting 

the safest and most secure routes for transporting SNF and other high-hazards materials were also adopted in PHMSA’s interim final rule, ‘‘Enhancing Rail Transportation Safety and Security for Hazardous Materials Shipments,’’ published on 

April 16, 2008. Under these requirements, a rail carrier must analyze the routes 

over which these materials may be transported and, based on that analysis, select 

22 

the safest and most secure route to be used. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is also engaged in a rulemaking that includes proposals to enhance 

the security of rail shipments of certain hazardous materials, including SNF, by requiring carriers to designate a security coordinator, report security concerns to TSA, 

establish a chain of custody for shipments, and advise TSA of the location and other 

specific information regarding shipments within 1 hour of a request from TSA. 

FRA also coordinates with Operation Lifesaver, Inc., a private safety organization, 

to increase grade crossing safety awareness and education in communities along 

routes. FRA works with appropriate agencies of the Department of Homeland Security, the NRC, and DOT’s Office of Intelligence and Security in identifying security 

issues and measures. FRA assists with coordination among the shipper, Federal and 

local law enforcement representatives, and intelligence communities on security 

matters. Finally, FRA reviews the security and emergency response plans of the 

shipper and the rail carrier to ensure that they adequately address the transportation security risks and the actions to be taken along the route in the unlikely 

event of an accident or incident. 

Another important element of the SCOP is training. It is FRA’s policy to assist 

DOE and other shippers in the development of emergency response training and 

safety briefings and to monitor the rail carrier and the shipper to verify that requisite training and briefings have been performed. FRA also conducts reviews to ensure that train crews who operate the trains in which nuclear materials are transported are properly certified, trained, and experienced in running over the routes. 

Finally, FRA checks to see that these crews have received specific training concerning the nature of the shipments. 

Federal regulations for shipment of nuclear material by rail are augmented by a 

series of safety and security protocols and special operating restrictions that have 

been agreed upon by DOE and the railroads. These protocols and operating restrictions, AAR Circular OT–55–I, Recommended Railroad Operating Practices for 

Transportation of Hazardous Materials and AAR Standard S–2043, Performance 

Specification for Trains Used to Carry High-Level Radioactive Material, for example, have evolved over the years and are often tailored to the particular needs of 

these types of shipments. Under these protocols, a train carrying SNF or HLRW 

would typically include the cask cars, at least two buffer cars, and an escort car. 

One buffer car is before and one is after the cask cars; the buffer cars are required 

by regulation and not only provide separation from the occupied locomotive and 

from the escort car but also act as a cushion against direct impacts on the cask cars 

in the event of a collision. The escort car would be staffed with appropriate nuclear 

safety and security personnel. Special operating restrictions have included limitations on the maximum speed of trains carrying nuclear materials, requirements to 

stop opposing trains on adjacent tracks when they meet a train carrying nuclear 

materials, and requirements that cars carrying nuclear material be switched only 

with an attached locomotive rather than allowing them to roll to a stop on their own 

during switching. 

Another convention involving the shipment of SNF and HLRW by rail concerns 

the use of dedicated trains. Until the mid-1970s, most rail shipments of these radioactive materials were handled in regular service trains that carried a wide variety 

of other freight in addition to radioactive materials. However, in 1974, the railroad 

industry adopted a strong position that radioactive materials shipments should 

move in dedicated trains that transport only the radioactive material. Under a congressional mandate, FRA engaged the services of the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to conduct a thorough study of the safety implications surrounding the transportation of SNF and HLRW in dedicated trains versus regular 

service trains. In September 2005, FRA transmitted its March 2005 report containing the study’s results to the Congress, ‘‘Use of Dedicated Trains for Transportation of High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel.’’ The report concluded that dedicated train service offers the lowest accident probability and can reduce radiation exposure in the event of an accident by mitigating the consequences 

and simplifying wreck clearance. The report also stated that additional research is 

needed to fully assess the costs and risks of transporting SNF. The Department is 

conducting additional research to assess conditions for the transportation of SNF 

and expects to issue a responsive notice of proposed rulemaking in Fiscal Year 2009. 

The security of rail shipments of radioactive materials has long been a priority 

even before the tragic events of September 11. Some of the protocols described above 

contain stringent security measures to protect against terrorist threats, including 

the accompaniment of these shipments by armed security forces, direct liaison with 

State and local law enforcement and first responders, and requirements to protect 

the cars when sitting in rail yards or sidings. 

23 

Conclusion 

Through its comprehensive safety programs, and key partnerships with other Federal, State, and local authorities, DOT is prepared for the additional shipments of 

high-level radioactive materials associated with the opening of a proposed new geological repository for SNF. As planning for the repository progresses, DOT will continue to work with the Congress, the nuclear industry, the transport community, 

and appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies to review and improve existing 

safety standards; promote the development of new risk-reducing technologies; 

strengthen the preparation of emergency responders; and otherwise enhance the 

system of safety controls for SNF and HLRW transportation. With continued vigilance, DOT is committed to maintaining the strong record of safety and security established over the last 50 years. 

We appreciate the opportunity to discuss DOT’s transportation safety and security 

program for SNF. Thank you. We would be pleased to answer any questions you 

may have. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much, Secretary Willke. 

Circumstances require my absence here. I have another assignment, and the chair will be relinquished to Senator Ensign. But before I go, I would like to thank all of you for participating in this 

hearing. 

I would like to just note something. I know that all of you have 

testified that the transport of hazardous material, especially spent 

fuel, is safe under the present technology. But yet, you have noted 

that there have been accidents but no leakage. And one of the witnesses compared spent fuel with chlorine. But I recall that chlorine 

is poisonous, but I do not think it lasts for a thousand years. On 

the other hand, spent radioactive fuel as a dangerous element in 

that would live for thousands of years. And if you can get into an 

accident, some day it may leak. So I just want to make that notation. 

Mr. Chairman? 

Senator ENSIGN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just 

have a few questions for the panel. 

Mr. Sproat, if you could answer the question on transportation 

timing. When is the earliest that DOE could—not when you expect 

when they will but when is the earliest that you actually could 

start shipping waste to Yucca Mountain? 

Mr. SPROAT. Senator, in order for us to be able to accept the nuclear waste and begin shipment, we would need a license from the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission to receive and possess that nuclear fuel whether it is at Yucca Mountain or some other interim 

storage site. The earliest, if everything went right and the funding 

was not an issue, which we both know is an issue with Yucca, that 

could be would be 2020. How long the licensing proceeding is going 

to last, what the outcome of the licensing proceeding is going to be 

remains to be seen, but the earliest would be 2020. So really it is 

12 years in the future. 

Senator ENSIGN. You could not ship it earlier? 

Mr. SPROAT. No, Senator, we cannot because we need that license 

to receive and possess, to be able to take it. And not only the license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but by the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act, the repository needs to have a license to operate 

in order for us to accept the fuel and take title to it by the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act. 

Senator ENSIGN. I thought that DOE was going to accept title to 

the waste beforehand while it was still at the sites. 

24 

Mr. SPROAT. As of right now, we are not able to do that. 

Senator ENSIGN. Does there have to be a change in the law for 

you to do that? 

Mr. SPROAT. Yes, sir. 

Senator ENSIGN. It was mentioned 9/11, and Mr. Weber, I think 

you were the one who kind of mentioned 9/11. That day when we 

were watching those buildings go down and a lot of engineers 

around the country were watching those buildings go down and 

certainly people who had designed those buildings never—you 

know, they thought about earthquakes. They thought about a lot 

of things, but when people were watching those things, very few 

people I think understood that those buildings could actually collapse. 

Have those types of extreme circumstances—you know, the fire 

was much more intense where it melted the metal. Have those 

kind of extreme circumstances been taken into account? For instance, you mentioned air attacks. Have those kind of really extreme circumstances, however unlikely, still possible, been taken 

into account studying the potential casks and being able to transport these containers? 

Mr. WEBER. Yes, sir, they have. 9/11—that night I spent in our 

emergency operations center. So I watched the replay of the video 

over and over and over again. 

But it is important to point out that security is not something 

that we discovered after 9/11. We have been putting these packages 

through their paces well before 9/11. When NRC was created, safeguards and security was a big deal with the American public, and 

that is why my office, in part, was created. So well before 9/11, we 

have been conducting destructive experiments. We have been doing 

computer simulations. We have been doing modeling. 

Senator ENSIGN. Have you done actually—instead of just computer modeling, have you done actual to where you have gotten the 

temperatures up for potential—what we just talked about, a plane 

crash coming in, jet fuel burning, train crashes where you can have 

some different types of fuels burning at extreme temperatures for 

long periods of time? Have you actually done that not just with 

computer models, but with life-sized models of what the transportation containers would be? 

Mr. WEBER. Not for the spent fuel containers, the packages that 

are currently being planned for use. We have done it for other type 

B packages and it has been tested overseas by other countries. Germany, for example, has done full-scale testing. 

One of our standard tests that the packages have to withstand 

a test involving a pool of aviation fuel that is burned for a prolonged period of time, and the package has to withstand that kind 

of extreme test in order to meet our requirements. 

Senator ENSIGN. If you could give me just a documentation on 

what those temperatures reach, the type of materials, and how 

long they were required to do that for the record, I would very 

much appreciate that. 

Mr. WEBER. If I could, Senator, this requirement that is in our 

regulations is for 1475 degrees Fahrenheit for at least 30 minutes. 

That is our standard fire test that the package has to withstand. 

Now, since then we have been proactive—— 

25 

Senator ENSIGN. I was going go to say some of these fires are 

going to last a lot longer than 30 minutes. 

Mr. WEBER. Oh, yes. And since then we have been proactive in 

reaching out around the country, as we see additional extreme accidents not involving radioactive material, but we use those incidents 

to understand the physics, the mechanics, what actually occurs because our objective is to reconfirm the safety of the transportation 

packages. 

Senator ENSIGN. You mentioned Germany. Has Germany done 

those—you said they have done those studies. Have theirs just 

been for 30-minute fires? You said they have done full-scale. Can 

you get the information on what Germany’s studies have shown so 

that we can see the parameters? 

Mr. WEBER. Certainly. 

Senator ENSIGN. OK. I appreciate that and we will do that for 

the record as well. 

[The information referred to is retained in Committee files.] 

Senator ENSIGN. Mr. Willke, if you could answer, how prepared 

are states today to deal with the thousands of rail and truck shipments of nuclear waste? How prepared are the states today? And 

what additional steps must be taken to make sure that their first 

responders, their emergency responders, are prepared to deal with 

a potential accident involving a radioactive release? 

Dr. WILLKE. Senator, that is a difficult question because of the 

1.2 million fire fighters in this country who do the primary response to accidents for hazardous materials, about 800,000 are volunteers, and many of these folks will go through their entire career 

without ever seeing a hazardous material accident. 

We do our best to provide training for emergency responders, to 

fire fighters. We provide grants to states and tribal governments to 

allow for community planning for hazardous material accidents and 

to do training of their local fire fighters. We also work with every 

fire service organization, national organization, to provide training 

for fire fighters. We work closely with our multiple partners. 

But it is also true it is very difficult to plan for the full range 

of hazardous material incidents that could occur, and we are lucky 

that we have not seen an incident that required that kind of response in the transportation of spent nuclear fuel. 

Senator ENSIGN. As part of the transportation to a facility, are 

we requiring states to have certain types—at least certain teams 

trained to be able to respond? And if so, where is that training? 

Dr. WILLKE. I cannot speak for the training that might be required. 

Senator ENSIGN. I guess, should it be? In your opinion, should it 

be required? 

Dr. WILLKE. There should be planning for hazardous materials 

incidents. We believe that all fire fighters should receive that kind 

of training. We are doing everything that we can to get—— 

Senator ENSIGN. Should it be specific to nuclear materials? 

Dr. WILLKE. To the extent that materials are flowing through 

those communities, yes, Senator, I believe that there should be 

training. 

Mr. SPROAT. Senator, if I can just add. 

Senator ENSIGN. Yes. 

26 

Mr. SPROAT. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, there is a section called 180(c) which requires the Federal Government to provide grants to State, local, county governments and first responders, including Indian tribes, specifically to provide the training for 

responding to radiological accidents during the transportation campaign. 

Senator ENSIGN. Do you know when that is going to happen? 

Mr. SPROAT. Well, as a matter of fact, we just recently put out— 

yes, we are about revise and put out a Federal Register notice on 

the process for applying for the 180(c) grants. And we have laid out 

a schedule of when that is to start based on the 2020 start of shipment date, and that training would start a minimum of, I believe, 

6 years—5 years prior to the start of the first shipment. So that 

is in our overall game plan, but we are talking about—— 

Senator ENSIGN. Is there going to be some kind of certification 

process? In other words, OK, you provide a grant, you provide some 

training, how do we know that they are adequately trained? Is 

there some kind of a measuring process? I think that most police 

forces, most fire fighters are trained to meet a certain standard and 

they are certified at the end of it. Is there going to be a certification 

process that, yes, this fire fighter has been certified, this first responder has been certified to be able to respond to a potential nuclear accident like this? 

Mr. SPROAT. I am not sure whether or not there will be a—— 

Senator ENSIGN. Can you get that answer for me for the record? 

Mr. SPROAT. Can I take that question for the record, please? 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The local emergency response employer is the entity that will determine the appropriate level of training for their local responders and will determine the certifying process. While the Department of Energy will provide funding for training, 

State and Tribal governments will have flexibility to decide those activities for 

which they will request financial assistance under Section 180(c) of the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act. 

Senator ENSIGN. Please do. 

I want to ask my colleague if he has any questions for this panel. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, sir. Is it Mr. Chairman? 

Senator ENSIGN. It is right now. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. I know you are Mr. Chairman in one regard. I 

was not sure if you had taken over fiefdoms or not. 

Senator ENSIGN. You can have that other Mr. Chairman job if 

you want it. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. I think the people in your caucus would think 

it is strange for me to become their Chairman. Well, I am a bipartisan guy, but that is probably stretching it a little bit. 

To our panel, thank you for joining us today. I just have one or 

two short questions, if I could. 

The safe transportation of spent nuclear fuel depends on the 

interaction between a number of folks, but particularly the three 

agencies that we have here today, DOE, and the Department of 

27 

Transportation, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. You may 

have already discussed this before I got here, but just give me an 

idea how your agencies are interacting with one another. 

Mr. SPROAT. If I can take a first cut at that, Senator, the relationship between the Department of Energy and DOT and NRC in 

the transportation realm—essentially the Department of Transportation has responsibility for setting the regulations for the safe 

transport on the rails and highways of hazardous waste. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the responsibility to set the regulations for the containers, the radioactive material containers, that 

we will use, design, certify, and buy to ship spent nuclear fuel and 

radioactive waste. So in that sense, they are our regulators in 

terms of setting the regulations that we have to meet for rail shipments, truck shipments, and the NRC sets the regulations that we 

need to meet for the containers in which we will ship the radioactive materials. That is probably a very quick, simple answer. 

Senator CARPER. OK, thanks. 

Mr. WEBER. I would add on NRC’s behalf that certainly we are 

in a regulator mode with the Department of Energy now that we 

have accepted the Yucca Mountain license application. So it is an 

arm’s length relationship, but I think it is a constructive relationship and we will see, as we enter into the licensing review and 

begin sending our requests for additional information to the Department of Energy as part of our licensing review. 

With respect to our co-regulators, the Department of Transportation, I have never seen such close coordination between an agency and a Department. When my staff have questions, they are frequently on the phone with the Department of Transportation staff. 

These people represent the United States of America on international standards committees. They are respected around the 

world for their expertise in transportation safety and security. So 

I cannot describe for you how positive the relationship is between 

the agencies. 

Dr. WILLKE. Mr. Chairman, PHMSA and the Department of 

Transportation work very, very closely with other agencies. 

PHMSA sets the packaging standards for shipments of all hazardous materials. In this case, we depend upon the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to set the design standards and the performance 

qualifications for those shipping containers. 

We also work within the Department of Transportation. While 

we set the rules within PHMSA for all hazardous material transportation, enforcement responsibilities are shared with the Federal 

Railroad Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the United States Coast Guard, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

We have a national program to ensure the protection from all 

hazardous materials. We also coordinate internationally. We work 

closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency on the establishment of standards across the world. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Pritchard, I am not sure what the deal is, 

if you are just to be here for looks or if you respond to questions 

or what. But I noticed they skipped right over you. I do not know 

if you are offended by that. 

28 

Mr. PRITCHARD. Well, we are joined at the hip, sir. We are both 

with the Department of Transportation and just to show you the 

cooperativeness that we have together. 

Senator CARPER. When he spoke, I could barely see your lips 

move. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. It was pretty impressive. 

That was a pretty positive response, but are there any ways that 

you all think the cooperation could be facilitated or enhanced? 

Mr. PRITCHARD. I think I will answer that, sir. No. We are really 

joined at the hip, all three of us, and we continue to work very 

close together. 

Mr. SPROAT. I would say, Senator, as a proof of that, one of the 

points I tried to make in my oral testimony was that we, the country, have had over 3,000 successful spent nuclear fuel shipments 

already in the last 40 years with no release of radioactive material. 

And I think that demonstrated safety record we have is a testament to the regulatory structure that these agencies have put together and the way that the Department of Energy and the private 

transportation sector works with them and within those regulatory 

structures to assure the safety of the transportation of hazardous 

waste—hazardous materials on the roadways and railways. 

Senator CARPER. Anybody else? Is it Mr. Willke? Are you trying 

to say Willke or Willke? 

Dr. WILLKE. Willke. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Willke, do you want to add anything to 

this? 

Dr. WILLKE. We have very close cooperation. We work weekly, 

daily, monthly in coordination with all of the various agencies, including the Transportation Security Administration on security 

issues. 

Senator CARPER. Do you all work on weekends? 

Mr. PRITCHARD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SPROAT. Yes, we do. 

Senator CARPER. I was just checking. 

Can I have one more minute, Mr. Chairman? 

Is it Mr. Sproat? 

Mr. SPROAT. Yes. 

Senator CARPER. Would you take your name tag in front of you 

and raise it and turn it around so the audience can see it just for 

a second? You see, it says, H-o-n. Sproat. Right? 

Mr. SPROAT. Yes. 

Senator CARPER. I had a phone call. You know, we are supposed 

to have these do-not-call kinds of things. We are on this Do Not 

Call List. But I was at home one night not long ago, and the phone 

rings. And I looked at the number. We have caller ID, and I looked 

at the number and did not recognize it. It was out of state, and I 

thought, well, maybe I should just ignore it, but I went ahead and 

answered it. And the person at the other end of the phone said, I 

am calling Mr. Carper. I said this is Mr. Carper. And they said, 

Hon? Like H-o-n. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. They were calling from some organization, a 

good charity that we had supported before. They said, Hon, we are 

29 

calling to thank you for your support. And we were just calling. It 

is the end of the year. We are doing our annual fund drive and 

wanted to ask you to help more. They said, this is Hon, isn’t it? 

And I waited for a moment and I said, this is Hon. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. Anyway, it became clear that they were interested in more money. This person gave their pitch, and I said, Hon 

have no money. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. Not to be deterred, they came right back, same 

pitch, even harder. I said, Hon have no money. Not to be deterred, 

one more time, the third time, they came back to me again with 

their request. And I said, Hon have no money. Call Hon. Castle. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. Congressman Mike Castle. I said, Hon. Castle 

have much money. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. I gave them his number and said good night. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. Hon. Sproat, welcome. To all of you, thank you. 

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you for that story. I am not sure what 

it has to do with transporting nuclear waste, but I liked the story. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ENSIGN. I want to thank the witnesses of this panel. We 

have to get going to the next panel. So I want to thank all these 

witnesses and call the next panel. 

Sandra Schubert will testify for the Environmental Working 

Group, to substitute in for Ken Cook. I understand he is sick. Dr. 

Kevin Crowley, Senior Board Member, Nuclear and Radiation 

Studies Board, National Academy of Sciences. Dr. James D. 

Ballard, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, California 

State University, Northridge. And Mr. Ed Hamberger, President, 

Association of American Railroads. 

Since we have no Hons on the panel, we will start with Ms. 

Schubert and just go right down the line. And all of your full testimonies will be made part of the record. 

STATEMENT OF SANDRA SCHUBERT, DIRECTOR, 

ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP 

Ms. SCHUBERT. Thank you, Chairman Ensign, for the opportunity to testify today on the safety and security of nuclear waste 

transportation. As you mentioned, Ken Cook, the President of the 

Environmental Working Group had been asked to testify. He is 

very sick today and has laryngitis, so he asked me to express his 

regrets and step in for him. 

My name is Sandra Schubert. I am the Director of Government 

Affairs for EWG, which is a nonprofit research organization that 

uses the power of information to protect public health and the environment. We have offices in Washington, D.C.; Oakland, California; 

and Ames, Iowa. 

Since 2002, EWG has produced analyses to help educate the public about the implications of transporting radioactive waste from 

nuclear powerplants around the United States to Yucca Mountain, 

should the proposed waste repository there become operational or 

30 

nuclear plants continue to be relicensed or expand and to inform 

Congress, as it debates energy and climate change legislation. 

Today we would like to make three points. 

First, the American public’s fundamental right to understand the 

full implications of shipping thousands of tons of extremely deadly 

hazardous nuclear waste across this country should be central to 

the Government’s process for licensing Yucca Mountain, for operating any other repository for this material, and for all decisions 

to relicense existing nuclear reactors or build new ones. The Federal Government has not respected that right to know. 

It makes no sense to generate more nuclear waste when we have 

not figured out what to do with the tens of thousands of tons already on hand. Our Government has ignored that common sense 

precaution. 

The Government is rushing to approve the license application for 

Yucca Mountain before rudimentary, life and death questions have 

been resolved about transportation, storage, and a truly protective 

radiation public safety standard. We should not burden our children and their children with unacceptable risks. 

I would like to start with one vivid illustration that we prepared 

that reflects Ranking Member Hutchison’s home state of Texas. 

And it reflects clearly our point on right to know. There is a map 

on page 3 of the testimony. We have it reproduced up here. We 

have a smaller map up here of Dallas, Texas, but what you will see 

on the map, page 3, is the official nuclear waste transportation 

map buried in the Department of Energy’s Environmental Impact 

Statement. 

As you will notice, this is more cartoon than cartography. This 

illustration depicts only one major city in Texas, the capital, Austin, as well as facilities from which lethal radioactive waste could 

be shipped and a few highway designations and unnamed rail 

lines. Unlike on the map we have up here and which is reproduced 

in the testimony, you will not find Houston, Dallas, San Antonio, 

or any other major Texas cities on the map. However, DOE’s prospective routes for shipping nuclear waste go through or near every 

one of these cities or suburbs or around them and countless other 

communities in Texas. 

If folks did somehow find their way to the EIS and the proper 

appendix, they would not find any helpful details about how the potential routes might wind their way through towns and cities or 

their communities. For instance, Texans probably do not realize 

that 2.336 million Texans live within 1 mile of DOE’s proposed 

Yucca Mountain routes or that there are more than 599 schools 

and 76 hospitals within a mile of those very same routes or that 

everyone agrees that there will be accidents if nuclear waste is 

transported as proposed. 

And, I would like to shift my statement here a little bit to cite 

a report that talks about nuclear waste shipment accidents around 

the United States over the last 40 years. 

According to the CRS and others, there have been 72 reported incidents involving radioactive waste shipments. This contradicts Mr. 

Sproat’s figures where he asserted no radioactive waste accidents 

have occurred. According to them, in four cases, radioactive contamination has gone beyond the vehicle. In four cases, it stayed 

31 

within the vehicle. In 13 incidents, there was absolutely no release, 

and in 49 incidents, actual surface contamination of radiation that 

required cleanup. Now, mind you, this was 9,000 shipments over 

40 years versus a possible 2,700 per year truck shipments to Yucca 

Mountain under DOE’s scenario. So those are the accidents we see 

over 40 years under a much lighter travel load on our roadways. 

What would a crash mean for a city like Houston? A moderately 

serious crash that would crack the casks and cause cesium leaks 

but not puncture or penetrate the cask could expose tens of thousands of people to radiation, dangerous levels, in less than 10 minutes. Contamination plumes would range from 300 to 750 chest Xrays equivalence and would extend up to 1 mile from the wreck. 

Closer in, people would be exposed to the equivalent of thousands 

of chest X-rays in the first hour after the accident. Based on Government data and models, we estimate that in Houston 525 people 

would ultimately suffer and die from latent cancers associated with 

this exposure. In addition, the economic costs would be enormous 

with the cleanup costs alone are estimated to range from $10 billion to $150 billion, depending on the accident. And this is just one 

scenario. 

As you will notice on the charts we have put up, we tried to focus 

on transportation routes in major cities for members of the Commerce Committee. We can also provide, if you guys are interested, 

estimates of the risk for death for many of these cities, not all of 

them, but many of them. 

Prior to recent license extensions, DOE has estimated that it 

would take about 10,000 rail shipments or 50,000 truck shipments 

of nuclear waste through our communities to fill Yucca Mountain’s 

capacity. Yet, if all reactors receive 10- to 20-year license extensions, DOE’s estimate of the total amount of waste generated in the 

U.S. would go up significantly, meaning additional nuclear waste 

shipments through our neighborhoods. If rail were the primary 

means of transporting the waste, which DOE is leaning toward, the 

10-year license extension scenario would require more than 22,000 

cross-country shipments, or about 580 per year. 

Now, maybe constituents, knowing all of this, would still decide 

that it makes sense to put radioactive waste on their highways or 

they would make the decision knowing that there would still be 

much radioactive waste left onsite, as Senator Ensign pointed out. 

Or maybe residents of your states would conclude that reactors in 

the states or reactors in states surrounding you that might be shipping the waste through your state should operate for an additional 

20 more years. Or maybe they would approve of new reactors and 

new license extensions. Or maybe if they really understood the 

ramifications of these decisions, they would not. 

Our point is that the people of every state have the right to know 

and fully understand the implications for them of the transportation of nuclear waste in their communities, of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository, the construction of new reactors before licenses go forward, the permits are granted, or the plans are 

approved. Decisions made hundreds of miles away will have profound implications for the shipment of high-level, deadly nuclear 

waste through neighborhoods for decades to come. 

Thank you. 

32 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cook follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. COOK, PRESIDENT, 

ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP

Chairman Inouye, Ranking Member Hutchison, distinguished Members of the 

Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on crucial issues surrounding the safety and security of the transportation of lethal, long-lived nuclear 

waste across the United States. My name is Kenneth Cook and I am President of 

Environmental Working Group (EWG), a non-profit environmental research and advocacy organization that uses the power of information to protect public health and 

the environment. EWG has offices in Washington, D.C.; Oakland, California; and 

Ames, Iowa. 

Since 2002, EWG has produced analyses to help educate the public about the implications of transporting deadly radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants 

around the United States to Yucca Mountain, should the proposed nuclear waste repository there become operational. 

Today I want to emphasize three points: 

1. The American public’s fundamental right to understand the full implications 

of shipping thousands of tons of extremely hazardous nuclear waste across this 

country should be central to the government’s process for licensing Yucca Mountain, for operating any other repository for this material, and for all decisions 

to relicense existing reactors or build new ones. The Federal Government has 

not respected that right to know. 

2. It makes no sense to generate tons more nuclear waste when we have not 

figured out what to do with the tens of thousands of tons already on hand. Our 

government has ignored that common sense precaution. 

3. The government is rushing to approve the license application for Yucca 

Mountain before rudimentary, life and death questions have been resolved 

about transportation, storage, and a truly protective radiation safety standard. 

We should not burden our children and their children with unacceptable risks. 

Let me start with a vivid illustration of my first point. 

33 

Right to Know Ignored 

Government’s Nuclear Waste Route Maps 

Texas 


924COOK1.eps
34 

1The maps reproduced herein appear identical to those used in the Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel 

and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada Volume I Impact 

Analyses, Chapters 1 through 13, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive 

Waste Management, DOE/EIS–0250F–S1D, October 2007, Section G–11. 

EWG Nuclear Waste Route Map 

Houston, Texas 

Chairman Inouye, you are lucky, nuclear waste transportation is not an issue in 

Hawaii. However it is for nearly every other state and its citizens. Let’s take a look 

at this map depicting Ranking Member Hutchison’s home state of Texas. 

This map of Texas is the official transportation map, buried in Appendix J of the 

Department of Energy’s (DOE) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository.1 It is a nuclear waste transportation route map for Texas. More cartoon than cartography, this illustration depicts 

only one major city in your state—the capitol, Austin. It also shows the location of 

facilities from which lethal radioactive waste would be shipped to Yucca Mountain 

if it is ever made operational, along with a few highway designations and some 

unnamed rail lines. 


924COOK2.eps
35 

2Federal Transportation Safety Board, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Safety Analysis, ‘‘1.01—Accident/Incident Overview,’’ January to June, 2008. 3Wiles, Richard and James R. Cox, Environmental Working Group, Nuclear Waste Route 

Maps: What If A Nuclear Waste Accident Scenario in Houston, TX, June 2002. 

You will not find Houston, Dallas, San Antonio, Amarillo, Houston, or any other 

major Texas cities on this map of nuclear waste routes to Yucca Mountain. But the 

Department of Energy’s prospective routes for shipping deadly nuclear reactor waste 

go through or near every one of those cities, or the suburbs around them, and countless other communities in Texas. 

If Ranking Member Hutchison’s constituents did somehow find their way to Appendix J of the EIS for Yucca Mountain, they would not find any telling details 

about how the potential highway or rail routes might wend their way through the 

towns and cities and communities of their state. 

The people of Texas probably do not realize that 2,336,290 Texans live within a 

mile of those routes, or that there are more than 599 schools and 76 hospitals within a mile of those routes. 

A nuclear transportation accident is not unlikely or unheard of. From January 

through June 2008, there were 1,203 train accidents. Thirteen, or 1.08 percent, of 

these resulted in the release of a hazardous material and the evacuation of 3,959 

people. Nearly 34 percent of these were attributable to human error, more than 13.5 

percent to equipment defects. Notably, these numbers do not include train-highway 

collisions.2

Everyone agrees that there will be accidents if nuclear waste is transported by 

train and truck through 45 states for 38 years to the repository at Yucca Mountain 

in Nevada. DOE predicts that there will be about 100 accidents over the life of the 

project. The state of Nevada predicts about 400 accidents during the same time period. 

What would a crash mean for a city like Houston, TX? A moderately serious crash 

that would crack the cask and cause cesium leaks, but not puncture or penetrate 

the cask, could expose tens of thousands of people to dangerous levels of radiation. 

EPA’s acceptable dose of radiation is 15 millirem, equal to about 1.5 chest x-rays 

per year. In less than 10 minutes, contamination plumes ranging from 300 to 750 

chest x-rays would extend up to 1 mile from the wreck. Closer in, people would be 

exposed to the equivalent of thousands of chest x-rays in the first hour after the 

accident. Based on government data and models, we estimate that in Houston 525 

people would ultimately suffer and die from latent cancers associated with this exposure. In addition, the economic costs would be enormous, with the cleanup costs 

alone estimated to range from $10 to $150 billion.3

Now, maybe, Texas constituents, knowing all that, would still decide that it makes 

sense to put lethal radioactive waste on Texas’s highways and rail lines, right near 

their homes and through their communities, en route to Yucca Mountain. Maybe 

Texans would come to that decision knowing that plenty of waste would still remain 

to be dealt with at reactors in the state once Yucca Mountain is filled to its current 

statutory limit. Maybe residents of Texas would still conclude that reactors in the 

state, or in states to the north and east that might route waste through your state, 

should operate for an additional twenty years, generating more nuclear waste and 

more shipments for decades. Maybe the people of Texas would approve of new reactors being built, creating yet more waste at reactor sites, and on highways and railways, for generations to come. 

Or maybe they would not approve at all if they really knew what approval meant. 

Texans and all other citizens have a right to know the implications of shipping 

waste to Yucca Mountain, or of expanding nuclear power and waste production, before decisions are made for them. 

36 

Government’s Nuclear Waste Route Maps 

Missouri 


924COOK3.eps
37 

EWG Nuclear Waste Route Map 

Kansas City, MO 


924COOK4.eps
38 

Government’s Nuclear Waste Route Maps 

Washington, D.C. 


924COOK5.eps
39 

EWG Nuclear Waste Route Map 

Washington, D.C. 


924COOK6.eps
40 

Government’s Nuclear Waste Route Maps 

California 


924COOK7.eps
41 

EWG Nuclear Waste Route Map 

Los Angeles, CA 

There is only one operating nuclear power reactor in Missouri, yet under DOE’s 

nuclear waste transportation plan Missouri would become a major thoroughfare for 

the transportation of nuclear waste from around the country heading to the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump. EWG estimates that 933,724 people live 

within 1 mile of the DOE’s proposed routes for the shipment of high-level nuclear 

waste across Missouri from out of state; some 2,780,602 people live within 5 miles. 

Our geographic information system analysis also finds an estimated 368 schools 

within 1 mile of the DOE’s proposed high-level nuclear waste transportation routes 

and 1,004 schools within 5 miles. We also estimate that 28 hospitals are within 1 

mile and 55 hospitals are within 5 miles. 

Again, localized, community-specific information of this sort might or might not 

affect the opinions of Missourians regarding the shipment through their cities and 

their communities of nuclear waste from other states. The only way we will know 

if this information is important is if we entrust it to the people of Missouri before 

decisions that affect them are made. 


924COOK8.eps
42 

4 Halstead, Robert, Transportation Advisor, Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects, Testimony 

Before U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, May 22, 2002 (hereafter 

Halstead 2002). 

There are many examples of how government is violating people’s right to know 

how the transportation of nuclear waste will affect them. The Department of Energy 

and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have not: 

• Implemented the safety recommendations of the National Academies of Sciences 

February 2006 report Going the Distance? The Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States; 

• Addressed the security threats posed by the transportation of spent nuclear 

fuel; or 

• Planned for full scale physical testing of spent fuel transportation casks to determine basic safety issues, such as crash failure thresholds. 

We have seen the damage that terrorists, natural disasters and failing infrastructure can wreak. Imagine the catastrophic nature of those events if nuclear waste 

were involved. We must address the public’s questions about the safety and security 

of nuclear waste and its transportation through our neighborhoods. 

People in every state have a right to know and fully understand the implications 

for them of the transportation of nuclear waste in their communities, the Yucca 

Mountain nuclear waste repository, and the construction of new reactors before the 

licenses go forward, the permits are granted, or the plans approved. Decisions made 

hundreds of miles away will have profound implications for the shipment of highlevel, deadly nuclear waste through their neighborhoods for decades to come. 

Nuclear Relicensing and Increased Transportation Risks 

A little-noticed surge in relicensing of nuclear reactors will put thousands of metric tons of high-level nuclear waste on our railways and roadways. The relicensing 

through 2007 alone will add about 16,500 metric tons to the Nation’s inventory of 

spent nuclear fuel, increasing transportation of radioactive waste through our neighborhoods and prolonging storage problems through the middle of the century at reactor sites across the country, effectively transforming over a dozen power plants 

into long term nuclear waste dumps. 

Yet, nuclear power plant licenses are being extended, largely in response to the 

congressional approval to move forward on the proposed nuclear waste dump at 

Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and the administration and Congressional leaders’ push 

for a nuclear ‘‘renaissance,’’ and these licenses are being extended for longer than 

DOE has ever predicted in any of their analyses of Yucca’s overall capacity. 

An EWG Action Fund analysis of relicensing of nuclear facilities found that the 

48 reactors at 26 nuclear power plants relicensed from 2000 to 2007 (see attached 

table) would generate a projected 16,500 metric tons of high-level nuclear waste over 

the 20-year period of their license extensions. Eighteen more reactors at 13 power 

plants with license extensions pending (no application to date has been denied) 

would add another 6,000 metric tons of waste to this, for a total of 22,500 additional 

metric tons of nuclear waste traveling through our communities. 

Prior to recent license extensions, DOE estimated that it would take about 10,000 

rail shipments or 50,000 truck shipments of nuclear waste to fill the nuclear power 

industry’s share of Yucca Mountain, or about 90 percent of its federally limited capacity of 70,000 metric tons. Relicensing through September 2004 alone has added 

about 5,700 more truck shipments, or 1,050 rail shipments to that total. It would 

require a formal expansion of the Yucca repository to dump this nuclear waste in 

Nevada. 

Further, if all reactors receive 20-year as opposed to 10-year extensions, DOE’s 

estimate of the total amount of waste generated in the U.S. would increase to approximately 135,000 metric tons. 

Those 20,000 metric tons would mean even more cross-country shipments of nuclear waste than are projected for DOE’s worst-case scenario. In that worst-case scenario, based on 10-year license extensions, transporting our Nation’s nuclear waste 

mostly by truck would require about 108,900 shipments over 38 years, or about 

2,870 per year. If rail were the primary means of transporting the waste, the 10- 

year license extension scenario would require more than 22,000 cross-country shipments, or about 580 per year.4

The rail transport scenario does not include barge and heavy haul truck shipments from 24 nuclear reactors that lack rail access. Thousands of such shipments 

would be required. This analysis also does not include the proposed Nevada rail extension, the Caliente Corridor, which would be the largest rail project in decades. 

43 

5 Halstead 2002. 

In addition, DOE’s analysis does not include the heavy haul truck shipments required within Nevada if there is no rail spur to connect to Yucca Mountain. Ten 

to nineteen thousand additional shipments would be required.5

This result of the government’s push to license the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump and its subsidization of the nuclear industry while ignoring the 

public health, environmental and economic costs of these activities virtually guarantees that: 

• Nuclear power plants would be transformed into long-term nuclear waste 

dumps. The recent surge in reactor relicensing ensures that hundreds of metric 

tons of extremely hazardous, high-level nuclear waste would remain in place at 

reactors around the country, as more waste is produced long after the proposed 

Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump would be full. 

• The proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump would have to be expanded 

or a second repository opened to accommodate the additional waste. By law, 

Yucca Mountain is limited to 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste, which is almost equal to the amount of nuclear waste that will be stored on-site at reactors 

around the country in 2010, well before any repository could be opened. 

• If rail were the primary means of transporting the waste, the security and 

health risks inherent in these shipments are enormous, and preparedness is 

minimal. 

• The public would be unaware of, and unprepared for, the implications of policy 

decisions regarding nuclear power and nuclear waste and its transportation 

through its neighborhoods. 

People of every state have a right to know and fully understand the implications 

for them of shipping nuclear waste to the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository 

before shipping begins or the license for the facility goes forward. And they have 

the same right to know what expansion of nuclear waste generation will mean for 

transportation through their state if reactors around the country are relicensed for 

10 to 20 additional years of operation, or new reactors are constructed. They may 

or may not know that decisions made hundreds of miles away will have profound 

implications for the shipment of high-level, deadly nuclear waste through their 

neighborhoods for decades to come. 

Concluding Observations 

I think we are all aware that the U.S. nuclear industry would not split an atom 

without a subsidy. They never have, and they never will. 

Nuclear energy companies never hesitate to lean on American taxpayers for 

money to conduct nuclear research, for indemnification in the event of horrific nuclear accidents, for money to clean up industry’s lethal waste and cost overruns, or 

for the collateral of the public’s purse—loan guarantees—something the companies 

are seeking today to coax investors out of their sober reluctance to put money into 

new nuclear reactors. 

But the ultimate subsidy for the nuclear industry may well be our government’s 

scandalous failure to fully inform our own people about the potential consequence 

of the transportation of nuclear waste through their communities until it is too late 

for the people to do anything about it but accept the risk, the expense, or the unthinkable. 

I thank you, Chairman Inouye, Ranking Member Hutchison, and Members of the 

Committee for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering any questions or providing additional information at the pleasure of the Committee. 

44 

Nuclear Plants Where Reactor Licenses Have Been Extended 

Plant State 

Number 

of 

Reactors 

Projected Waste 

Per Year 1996–2011 

(Metric Tons) 

Additional Waste 

During 20-year 

Relicense Period 

(Metric Tons) 

Browns Ferry AL 3 68 1,365

Joseph M. Farley AL 2 33 663 

Arkansas Nuclear One AR 2 29 583 

Millstone CT 2 47 936 

St. Lucie FL 2 26 524 

Turkey Point FL 2 29 573 

Edwin I. Hatch GA 2 43 865 

Dresden IL 2 37 738 

Quad Cities IL 2 29 580 

Calvert Cliffs MD 2 31 626 

D.C. Cook MI 2 41 820 

Pallisades MI 1 15 309 

Monticello MN 1 18 350 

McGuire NC 2 45 906 

Brunswick NC 2 28 560 

Fort Calhoun NE 1 10 196 

Ginna NY 1 11 225 

Nine Mile Point NY 2 39 519 

Peach Bottom PA 2 40 806 

Catawba SC 2 43 854 

H.B. Robinson SC 1 15 299 

Oconee SC 3 48 959 

Summer SC 1 19 376 

North Anna VA 2 38 766 

Surry VA 2 33 668 

Point Beach WI 2 22 434 

Total 48 838 16,498

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE Yucca EIS Table A–7). 2002. Final Environmental Impact Statement for a 

Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, Appendix A, Table A–7. February 2002. 

Nuclear Plants With Reactor License Extensions Pending 

Plant State 

Number 

of 

Reactors 

Projected Waste 

Per Year 1996–2011 

(Metric Tons) 

Additional Waste 

During 20-year 

Relicense Period 

(Metric Tons) 

Vogtle GA 2 47 931 

Wolf Creek KS 1 25 505 

Pilgrim MA 1 13 251 

Prairie Island MN 2 22 435 

Harris NC 1 16 315 

Oyster Creek NJ 1 20 406 

James A. FitzPatrick NY 1 19 384 

Indian Point NY 2 30 608 

Susquehanna PA 2 41 810 

Beaver Valley PA 2 36 726 

Three Mile Island PA 1 15 295 

Vermont Yankee VT 1 14 278 

Kewaunee Power Station WI 1 11 211 

Total 18 308 6,155

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE Yucca EIS Table A–7). 2002. Final Environmental Impact Statement for a 

Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, Appendix A, Table A–7. February 2002. 

I wish to thank colleagues at the Environmental Working Group for the research 

and analysis underlying my testimony today: Richard Wiles, Sandra Schubert, Sean 

Gray, and Chris Campbell; and former colleagues John Coequyt, Jon Balivieso, and 

Tim Greenleaf. We are also grateful for technical assistance provided over the years 

by experts at the Nuclear Information And Resource Service and in particular by 

45 

Kevin Kamps, now on the staff of Beyond Nuclear. EWG is responsible for the contents of this testimony. 


924COOK9.eps 924COOK10.eps
46 

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you. 

Dr. Crowley? 

STATEMENT OF KEVIN D. CROWLEY, PH.D., SENIOR BOARD 

DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR AND RADIATION STUDIES BOARD, 

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES 

Dr. CROWLEY. Good afternoon, Chairman Ensign and Senator 

Thune. My name is Kevin Crowley. I am the Director of the National Research Council’s Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, 

and I also directed two National Research Council studies that are 

directly relevant to the subject of this hearing. I would like to talk 

a little bit about some of the principal findings and recommendations from those. The reports were entitled ‘‘Going the Distance? 

The Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States’’ and ‘‘Safety and Security of 

Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage.’’ 

I will focus my oral summary on the key findings that relate to 

transportation safety, transportation security, and Yucca Mountain 

challenges. 

With respect to key transportation safety challenges, the Committee that authored the Going the Distance report found that it 

could identify no fundamental technical barriers to the safe transport of spent fuel and high-level waste in the United States. From 

a technical standpoint, transport is a low radiological risk activity 

with manageable safety, health, and environmental consequences 

when conducted in strict adherence to existing regulations. 

The packages that are used to transport spent fuel play a crucial 

role in transportation safety by providing a robust barrier to the 

release of radiation and radioactive material. The Going the DisVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:56 Apr 17, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\80371.TXT JACKIE

924COOK11.eps
47 

tance report noted that current international standards and U.S. 

regulations are adequate to ensure containment effectiveness of 

transport packages even in severe accidents. 

However, there may be extreme accident conditions involving 

very long duration fires that could compromise package containment. The report recommended that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission undertake additional analyses of such accident conditions 

and implement operational controls and restrictions as necessary to 

reduce the chances that such conditions might be encountered during transport. 

With respect to key transportation security challenges, the National Research Council study on Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage examined the consequences of sabotage and terrorist attacks on spent fuel in storage at civilian nuclear plants. This work is relevant to spent fuel transport security 

because some storage packages can also be used for transportation. 

The unclassified report from the study notes that all storage package designs are vulnerable to some types of terrorist attacks for 

which releases of radioactive material would be possible, although 

the magnitudes of such releases are predicted to be small. However, it is important to recognize that storage packages at fixed 

sites, such as nuclear plants, are easier to protect from certain 

kinds of terrorist attacks than spent fuel packages in transport on 

the Nation’s highways and railways. 

The Going the Distance report recommended that ‘‘an independent examination of the security of spent fuel and high-level 

waste transportation should be carried out prior to the commencement of large-quantity shipments to a Federal repository or to interim storage. This examination should provide an integrated evaluation of the threat environment, the response of packages to credible malevolent acts, and operational security requirements for protecting spent fuel and high-level waste while in transport.’’ 

I have a longer write-up in my written testimony about the 

Yucca Mountain challenges. Let me close by just highlighting a few 

findings and recommendations from my longer testimony. 

The Going the Distance report strongly endorsed DOE’s decisions 

to ship spent fuel and high-level waste to a Federal repository by 

mostly rail using dedicated trains. The report recommended that 

DOE fully implement these decisions before commencing largequantity shipments to the repository. 

The report also recommended that DOE should identify and 

make public its suite of preferred highway and rail routes for 

transporting spent fuel and high-level waste to a Federal repository 

as soon as practicable to support State, tribal, and local planning. 

DOE should negotiate with commercial spent fuel owners to ship 

older fuel first to a Federal repository or to interim storage. Should 

these negotiations prove to be ineffective, Congress should consider 

legislative remedies. 

DOE should initiate transport to the Federal repository through 

a pilot program involving relatively short, logistically simple movements of older fuel from closed reactors to demonstrate its ability 

to carry out its responsibilities in a safe and operationally effective 

manner. 

48 

1The National Research Council is the operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences, 

National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, 

chartered by Congress in 1863 to advise the government on matters of science and technology. 

The Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board is responsible for oversight of National Research 

Council studies on safety and security of nuclear materials and waste. 2This report is available online at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordlid=11538. 3The unclassified report is available online at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record 

lid=11263. 

4Safety refers to measures taken to protect spent fuel and high-level waste during transport 

operations from failure, damage, human error, and other inadvertent acts. 

And finally, the Secretary of Energy and the U.S. Congress 

should examine options for changing the organizational structure of 

DOE’s program for transporting spent fuel and high-level waste to 

a Federal repository to increase its chances for success. 

I will stop there. I will be happy to elaborate on any of my comments during the Q&A. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Crowley follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KEVIN D. CROWLEY, PH.D., SENIOR BOARD DIRECTOR, 

NUCLEAR AND RADIATION STUDIES BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

Good afternoon, Chairman Inouye and Members of the Committee. My name is 

Kevin Crowley, and I am the Director of the National Research Council’s Nuclear 

and Radiation Studies Board.1 I also directed two National Research Council studies 

that are relevant to this hearing on the safety and security of spent nuclear fuel 

transportation: 

• Going the Distance? The Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level 

Radioactive Waste in the United States 2

• Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage 3

Both of these reports were published in 2006. The latter report, which has classified 

and unclassified versions, was the product of a congressionally mandated study. 

That study examined the safety and security of dry storage of spent nuclear fuel 

at civilian nuclear power plants. Some of the results of that study have informed 

my comments on transportation security. 

My testimony is provided in three parts: transportation safety challenges, transportation security challenges, and the challenges associated with transportation of 

spent fuel to the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. 

Transportation Safety Challenges 

My comments on the safety 4 challenges associated with transporting nuclear 

waste will focus specifically on the transportation of spent nuclear fuel generated 

by civilian nuclear power plants. Spent fuel is highly radioactive and can cause severe harm to humans and the environment, if not properly managed. Immediately 

after its discharge from a power reactor, for example, the radiation emitted from a 

single spent fuel assembly would be lethal to a nearby unshielded person for exposure periods on the order of minutes. Spent fuel becomes less radioactive with time, 

but even after several years of storage it is still highly radioactive and can cause 

both immediate (i.e., radiation sickness and death) and delayed (e.g., cancer) effects 

in exposed populations if not properly managed. 

There are at least three factors that promote the safety of spent fuel transportation in the United States: 

• Storage before shipping: Civilian spent fuel must be stored for at least a year 

before it can be transported, and current industry practice is to store this fuel 

for at least 5 years before transporting it. This provides time for radioactive 

decay in the spent fuel, which helps to reduce its hazard. 

• Transport packages: Spent fuel is transported in packages (also referred to as 

shipping casks) that are designed to shield the radiation that is emitted by the 

fuel and also to prevent the release of radioactive material, even in severe accidents. 

• Conduct of transport operations: There are strict regulatory requirements for 

selection of shipping routes, advance notification of state authorities before 

shipments are made, and for shipping operations. 

49 

5 Committee on Transportation of Radioactive Waste. Dr. Neal Lane, a physicist at Rice University and former director of the National Science Foundation and Presidential science advisor, 

chaired this study. 6The Going the Distance report identified two general types of transportation programs, 

small-quantity shipping programs and large-quantity shipping programs. The former involve 

shipment on the order of tens of metric tons of spent fuel or high-level waste, while the latter 

involve shipment on the order of hundreds to thousands of metric tons. The program to transport spent fuel to the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain would be an example of a largequantity shipping program. 7That is, the ability of a transportation package to contain its radioactive contents and maintain its radiation shielding effectiveness during routine use and under severe accident conditions. 8The USNRC requires that packages be designed to maintain containment effectiveness in a 

30-minute fire that is fully engulfing. A very long duration fire is a fire that burns for much 

longer periods, for example, hours to days. 

The National Research Council’s Going the Distance report provides a detailed discussion and analysis of the safety of spent fuel transportation, focusing on the design and testing of packages used to transport spent fuel and on the historical 

record of spent fuel shipments. Based on this analysis, the expert committee 5 that 

conducted this study found that it 

‘‘. . . could identify no fundamental technical barriers to the safe transport of 

spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in the United States. Transport by highway (for small-quantity shipments 6) and by rail (for large-quantity 

shipments) is, from a technical viewpoint, a low-radiological-risk activity with 

manageable safety, health, and environmental consequences when conducted in 

strict adherence to existing regulations. However, there are a number of social 

and institutional challenges to the successful initial implementation of largequantity shipping programs that will require expeditious resolution. . . . Moreover, the challenges of sustained implementation should not be underestimated.’’ 

I want to emphasize that this finding focused on the technical aspects of spent 

fuel and high-level waste transportation—for example, the design, fabrication, and 

maintenance of the packages and conveyances used for transporting spent fuel and 

the conduct of transportation operations. This finding is predicated on the assumption that these technical tasks are being carried out with a high degree of care and 

in strict adherence to regulations. The finding also is based on an assessment of 

past and present transportation programs and would apply to future programs only 

to the extent that they continue to exercise appropriate care and adherence to applicable regulations. Continued vigilance by all parties involved in these transportation 

programs, including planners, shippers, and regulators, will be required to ensure 

that transportation operations in the United States continue to be conducted in a 

safe manner, especially if and when the large-quantity shipping program to Yucca 

Mountain is initiated. 

The packages that are used to transport spent fuel play a crucial role in transportation safety by providing a robust barrier to the release of radiation and radioactive 

material. In fact, the robust design of these packages helps to minimize the impacts 

of human error on transport safety. The committee that conducted the Going the 

Distance study found that current international standards and U.S. regulations are 

adequate to ensure package containment effectiveness 7 during both routine transport and in severe accidents. However, the study committee noted that recently published work suggests that there may be a very small number of extreme accident 

conditions involving very long duration fires 8 that could compromise package containment effectiveness. The study committee recommended that the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (USNRC) undertake additional analyses of very long duration fire scenarios that bound expected real-world accident conditions. Based on the 

results of these investigations, the study committee also recommended that the 

USNRC implement operational controls and restrictions on spent fuel and high-level 

waste shipments as necessary to reduce the chances that such conditions might be 

encountered in service. The study committee further recommended that transportation planners and managers undertake detailed surveys of transportation routes 

to identify and mitigate the potential hazards that could lead to or exacerbate extreme accidents involving such fires. 

50 

9Security involves measures taken to protect spent fuel and high-level waste against sabotage, attacks, and theft while it is in transport. 10This study examined both wet storage of spent fuel in pools and dry storage in casks. My 

comments in this testimony are focused only on dry storage. 11 Committee on Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage. The committee was chaired by Dr. Louis Lanzerotti, a geophysicist and member of the National Academy 

of Engineering. 

Transportation Security Challenges 

Let me now turn to the security 9 of spent fuel transportation. Many of the regulatory requirements that are in place to promote the safety of spent fuel transport 

also help to promote security. For example, the robust shipping packages that are 

used to protect spent fuel in the event of a severe accident would also help to protect 

spent fuel against some types of sabotage and terrorist attacks. There are additional 

regulatory requirements that also help to promote security of spent fuel shipments: 

for example, the USNRC conducts route inspections to identify potential security 

vulnerabilities as part of its route approval process; it has established requirements 

for armed escorts when shipments pass through highly populated regions; and it has 

established other requirements for equipment security and communications. Some 

of these regulatory requirements were revised after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and some specific requirements have not been disclosed to the public 

to protect national security. 

However, transportation security differs from transportation safety in at least one 

important respect: safety problems arise from human error and equipment malfunctions that are amenable to quantitative analysis, whereas security problems arise 

from intentional malevolent acts that generally do not lend themselves to such analysis. Transportation safety analyses, for example, rely heavily on the historical 

record for shipping other types of hazardous materials. This record allows analysts 

to identify severe accident scenarios that might be a concern for spent fuel transport—for example, train collisions or derailments that expose shipping packages to 

large impact forces or severe fires—and also provides analysts with reliable data on 

the frequency of occurrence of such accidents. These accident scenario and accident 

frequency data can be used to quantitatively model the safety consequences of severe accidents involving spent fuel. 

There is no comparable historical record that can be used to develop quantitative 

estimates of sabotage or attack scenarios or their frequency of occurrence. Instead, 

analysts must rely on expert judgments about the threat environment and terrorists’ access to technical means and opportunity for attacking or sabotaging spent 

fuel shipments. I should note that this security challenge is not unique to spent fuel 

transportation, but is also faced by owners and operators of other critical infrastructure. 

A great deal of work has been carried out in the United States and in some other 

countries to understand the potential consequences of sabotage and terrorist attacks 

on spent fuel shipments. Most of this work is classified or otherwise restricted from 

public release. The National Research Council study on Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage examined some of the relevant work that has 

been carried out by Sandia National Laboratories and others to estimate the consequences of sabotage or terrorist attacks on spent fuel being stored at civilian nuclear plants.10 This work is relevant to spent fuel transport security because some 

of the packages that are used to store spent fuel at civilian nuclear plants can also 

be used for transportation. The study committee’s 11 detailed analyses of the consequences of various terrorist attack scenarios are classified; however, the study 

committee’s unclassified report notes that all storage cask designs are vulnerable to 

some types of terrorist attacks for which releases of radioactive material would be 

possible, although the magnitudes of such releases are predicted to be small. However, it is important to recognize that storage casks at fixed sites such as nuclear 

plants are in principle easier to protect from certain kinds of terrorist attacks than 

spent fuel packages in transport on the Nation’s highways and railways. 

The National Research Council’s Going the Distance study was organized before 

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. It was focused primarily on the safety of spent fuel and high-level waste transport because this issue 

was receiving the most public attention when the study was organized. Once the 

study was begun, however, it soon became clear that transportation security had established itself in the public’s consciousness as a top concern along with transportation safety. The study committee was not able to conduct an in-depth review of 

transportation security because of information access constraints. However, the 

study committee found that ‘‘malevolent acts against spent fuel and high-level waste 

shipments are a major technical and societal concern, especially following the SepVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:56 Apr 17, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80371.TXT JACKIE
51 

12The Yucca Mountain EIS noted that DOE plans to make up to 9600 rail shipments of spent 

fuel and high-level waste to the repository. The Going the Distance study estimates that about 

540 rail shipments of spent fuel were made in the United States between 1964 and 2004. The 

actual number of rail shipments to Yucca Mountain would depend on how DOE conducts its 

transport operations. 13 Even under the ‘‘mostly rail’’ scenario, DOE estimated in its Yucca Mountain EIS that 

about 1100 truck shipments would be made to the repository. 

tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.’’ The study committee also 

recommended that 

‘‘An independent examination of the security of spent fuel and high-level waste 

transportation should be carried out prior to the commencement of large-quantity shipments to a Federal repository or to interim storage. This examination 

should provide an integrated evaluation of the threat environment, the response 

of packages to credible malevolent acts, and operational security requirements 

for protecting spent fuel and high-level waste while in transport. This examination should be carried out by a technically knowledgeable group that is independent of the government and free from institutional and financial conflicts of 

interest. This group should be given full access to the necessary classified documents and Safeguards Information to carry out this task. The findings and recommendations from this examination should be made available to the public to 

the fullest extent possible.’’ 

I want to emphasize that this recommendation was not made because the study 

committee had specific knowledge of vulnerabilities of spent fuel shipments to sabotage or terrorist attacks. Instead, it was motivated primarily by concerns that were 

expressed to the study committee about whether such shipments could be made in 

a secure fashion in spite of reassurances from Federal agencies. The study committee recognized that the Federal agencies were in a difficult position on this issue 

because as much as they might like to share security-related information that might 

help to inform the public, there were legitimate national security reasons for not 

doing so. The study committee judged that an independent review would help to improve the technical soundness of the agencies’ security programs for spent fuel 

transportation and also help to reassure the public that the agencies’ programs were 

proceeding on a sound technical basis. 

Transportation Challenges for Yucca Mountain 

The primary challenges for the Yucca Mountain transportation program arise 

from at least three factors: the large number of shipments that are planned; the 

two-decade-plus-time period over which the transportation program must be operated in a safe and secure manner; and the long lead times and large expenditures 

that will be required to put the necessary transportation infrastructure in place. 

The National Research Council’s Going the Distance report noted that the planned 

number of rail shipments to a repository at Yucca Mountain under the Department 

of Energy’s (DOE’s) ‘‘mostly rail’’ scenario is approximately 18 times the number of 

rail shipments that have occurred in the United States between 1964 and 2004.12

In other words, previous spent fuel transport experience in the United States is 

small compared with the numbers of shipments that will be needed to move spent 

fuel and high-level waste to a Yucca Mountain repository. 

The National Research Council committee that authored the Going the Distance 

report provided several findings and recommendations for improving the Yucca 

Mountain transportation program; these are summarized below: 

• The study committee strongly endorsed DOE’s decisions to ship spent fuel and 

high-level waste to the Federal repository by ‘‘mostly rail’’ using dedicated 

trains. This approach would reduce routine radiological exposures; provide for 

greater physical separation from other vehicular traffic and reduced interactions 

with people along transportation routes; and simplify operational logistics. It is 

also the approach that is preferred by the public. The study committee recommended that DOE fully implement this approach by completing construction 

of the Nevada rail spur and making other necessary arrangements before commencing large-quantity shipments to the repository. The study committee also 

recommended that DOE examine the feasibility of further reducing its needs for 

cross-country truck shipments 13 of spent fuel. 

• DOE should identify and make public its suite of preferred highway and rail 

routes for transporting spent fuel and high-level waste to a Federal repository 

as soon as practicable to support state, tribal, and local planning, especially for 

emergency responder preparedness. DOE should follow the practices of its forVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:56 Apr 17, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80371.TXT JACKIE
52 

14The Going the Distance report contains a detailed discussion of routing regulations for spent 

fuel shipments. 15Shipping older fuel first would help to reduce transportation worker exposures to radiation 

from the spent fuel and high-level waste shipments. 16Social risks arise from social processes and human perceptions. Social processes shape the 

communities in which people live by, for example, influencing choices about where to purchase 

or rent a home, where to work, and where to send children to school. Social perceptions can 

have a strong influence on peoples’ behavior, whether or not such perceptions are an accurate 

picture of reality. 

eign research reactor spent fuel transport program of involving states and tribes 

in these route selections.14

• DOE should negotiate with commercial spent fuel owners to ship older fuel first 

to a Federal repository or to Federal interim storage.15 Should these negotiations prove to be ineffective, Congress should consider legislative remedies. 

Within the context of its current contracts with commercial spent fuel owners, 

DOE should initiate transport to the Federal repository through a pilot program 

involving relatively short, logistically simple movements of older fuel from 

closed reactors to demonstrate its ability to carry out its responsibilities in a 

safe and operationally effective manner. 

• DOE should begin immediately to execute its emergency responder preparedness responsibilities defined in Section 180(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 

The study committee recommended several approaches for carrying out this recommendation. 

• DOE, the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, 

and USNRC should promptly complete the job of developing, applying, and disclosing consistent, reasonable, and understandable criteria for protecting sensitive information about spent fuel and high-level waste shipments. They should 

also commit to the open sharing of information that does not require such protection and should facilitate timely access to such information, for example, by 

posting it on readily accessible websites. 

• DOE should take early and proactive steps to establish formal mechanisms for 

gathering high-quality and diverse advice about social risks 16 and their management on an ongoing basis. 

• The Secretary of Energy and the U.S. Congress should examine options for 

changing the organizational structure of DOE’s program for transporting spent 

fuel and high-level waste to a Federal repository to increase its chances for success. The following three alternative organizational structures, which are representative of progressively greater organizational change, should be examined: 

(1) a quasi-independent DOE office reporting directly to upper-level DOE management; (2) a quasi-government corporation; or (3) a fully private organization 

operated by the commercial nuclear industry. 

The study committee found that successful execution of DOE’s program to transport spent fuel and high-level waste to a Federal repository will be difficult given 

the organizational structure in which it is embedded, despite the high quality of 

many program staff. As currently structured, the program has limited flexibility 

over commercial spent fuel acceptance order; it also has limited control over its 

budget and is subject to the annual Federal appropriations process, both of which 

affect the program’s ability to plan for, procure, and construct the needed transportation infrastructure. Moreover, the current program may have difficulty supporting 

what appears to be an expanding future mission to transport commercial spent nuclear fuel for interim storage or reprocessing. In the study committee’s judgment, 

changing the organizational structure of this program would improve its chances for 

success. 

This concludes my testimony to the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to 

testify on these important issues. I would be happy to elaborate on any of my comments during the question and answer period. 

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you. 

Dr. Ballard? 

53 

STATEMENT OF JAMES DAVID BALLARD, PH.D., ASSOCIATE 

PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, CALIFORNIA 

STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE (CSUN); DIRECTOR, CSUN 

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CENTER ACADEMIC 

EXCELLENCE (IC–CAE); CONSULTANT, NUCLEAR WASTE 

PROJECT OFFICE, STATE OF NEVADA 

Dr. BALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am a professor at California State University, Northridge. My 

specialty is terrorism. I am in the Sociology Department where I 

run a center funded by the ODNI, which is to help our students 

do analysis of just such projects as these. I have been engaged in 

this enterprise of looking at Yucca Mountain security risks for 14 

years and have worked with the State of Nevada over that time. 

I thank you very much for allowing me to come here today. 

I do have three points that I would like to make, and these reflect my own personal opinions and not those of any of the agencies 

that I may have affiliation with. 

First, number one, the Yucca Mountain project as it is conceived 

presents a target-rich environment and we should consider the 

shelter-in-place option that Senator Reid discussed earlier. The 

Yucca Mountain transportation program is a security risk in and 

of itself. This is a large-scale Federal program that will draw attention from a wide variety of adversaries. Adversaries that may not 

exist for many of the other hazardous materials that are transported daily would possibly be interested in these shipments. Yucca 

Mountain will necessitate the movement of large numbers of shipments over an extended period of time. It allows the adversary to 

chart the movement of these shipments in a predictable way. It is 

exacerbated by choices that agencies like the DOE makes. For example, decisions to allow hotter fuel to be shipped may increase the 

radiological consequences of an attack. And it will entail lengthy 

shipment routes that average over 2,000 miles since many of the 

shipment origin sites are east of the Mississippi. 

The safety and security program that DOE will need to engage 

in for Yucca Mountain must face one fact. The shipments will provide this target-rich environment, which means we need to consider 

the totality of the shipment routes as the battle space, the 

attackers as potential adversaries with their choice of weapons and 

tactics, the shipments themselves as poorly defended, high-value, 

symbolic targets, and the perpetuation of an attack against these 

shipments being a highly symbolic statement by the adversaries. 

Spent nuclear fuel is safe where it exists. Placing them in the 

transportation corridors increases risk from a variety of means, accidents, human-initiated events, and so on. And it would be better 

to shelter them in place until such time that we have better options. 

Point number two. There are a series of existing issues that 

many of the panelists have alluded to and I would like to summarize for the panel. 

First of all, shipping older fuel first is a primary consideration 

that we should insist on. 

Second, shipments should be mostly rail, but truck shipments are 

necessary to complete the task given the physical limitations of the 

origin sites and the current physical limitations of Yucca Mountain. 

54 

We need to use dual-purpose casks, dedicated trains. 

We need to conduct full-scale cask testing, not just regulatory 

testing, but extra-regulatory testing. 

We need to engage in a meaningful national level transportation 

NEPA process, including the selection of a rail spur, if that is the 

decision to go ahead with for Yucca Mountain. 

We need to use the WEIB ‘‘straw man’’ routing process. 

We need to start the section 180(c) program rulemaking. 

We need to allow for State regulatory enhancements both for the 

safety but also public perception. 

We need to rethink the assumptions about terrorism and sabotage in light of 9/11. 

These issues constitute the most basic foundations for the development of a preferred transportation system. Since today’s hearing 

is directly related to the last issue, the balance of this testimony 

will deal with that. 

So, point three, human-initiated events and systematic risk assessment looking at these from a different perspective. The sabotage-related attacks in areas evaluated in NRC and DOE analyses 

have changed little over the decades and assume a single spent fuel 

shipping cask is attacked at one location by one group of attackers 

and typically using one weapon. The basic analyses also assumed 

that the attack breaches the cask and releases a small fraction of 

the contents. The threat environment has changed since the start 

of the Yucca Mountain debates decades ago. Yet, DOE has failed 

to adopt an alternative perspective on the risk of these attacks. 

They can engage in a different process to identify those risks and 

perhaps bring them into the regulatory framework. First and foremost, we need to engage in a meta-analysis of the risk as defined 

across the world. Second, we need to develop a systematic, multilevel assessment process for these risks. That includes existing 

methodologies like security surveys, risk management techniques, 

the design basis threat, but most importantly, we need to consider 

the use of adversarial vulnerability assessments. 

One critical omission for all three of the techniques I just mentioned is to bring the motives, mind set, and creativity of the adversary into the risk equation. To accomplish that task, we need 

to do a mental coordinate transformation. This means that when 

assessing the risk for spent nuclear fuel transportation and the infrastructure to move that material, it is necessary to think like the 

perpetrators, not like security professionals, not like energy company officials, and not like oversight agencies. AVA is one proven 

method that can help accomplish that task. 

When we are done with this, using all four of these techniques, 

we can create a matrix of potential threats against these shipments. In my written testimony, there is a mock matrix that we 

can refer to. 

Take-aways from today, or a conclusion. 

Point number one, Yucca Mountain transportation is risky and 

will present a target-rich environment for our adversaries. The 

shipments are symbolically important and represent a radiologically significant target. The solution is to shelter the shipments in 

place at their sites of origin. As noted by the NRC, energy industry 

55 

officials, and others, they are safe and secure at those facilities. 

Why expose these wastes to risk if we do not have to? 

Point number two, DOE has systematically neglected to address 

the laundry list of concerns brought forth by stakeholders. These 

actions increase the likelihood of attacks, the consequences of those 

attacks, and the resultant social dislocations if these attacks succeed. The solution here is to compel the DOE to engage in a meaningful, national level NEPA process that addresses these stakeholder concerns and that will be documented over the decades of 

Yucca Mountain transportation. 

Last point, DOE, in consultation with stakeholders, should engage in a systematic assessment of risk using the AVA process. The 

solution here is just to do this and will allow the DOE to avoid the 

potentially fatal flaw of being reactive to threats and become more 

proactive in relationship to human-initiated events. In the post-9/ 

11 world, almost all Federal agencies with a significant homeland 

security role have had to rethink their assumptions on how best to 

serve the public interest. The DOE must likewise abandon the engineering-based bureaucratic paradigm they hold dear to reconsider 

how to identify risk from the perceptions and ideas of the adversary. 

In conclusion, Yucca Mountain transport is risky, movement of 

radioactive materials potentially dangerous, and failing to recognize human-initiated events in a post-9/11 world can be deadly. Alternatives exist, alternatives like shelter-in-place, truly listening to 

the stakeholders, and using systematic risk analysis. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Ballard follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES DAVID BALLARD, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE

(CSUN); DIRECTOR, CSUN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CENTER ACADEMIC

EXCELLENCE (IC–CAE); CONSULTANT, NUCLEAR WASTE PROJECT OFFICE, STATE OF

NEVADA

Introduction 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for asking me to testify at these hearings. My name is Dr. James David Ballard and I am 

currently employed as an Associate Professor of Sociology at California State University, Northridge (CSUN).1 As part of my academic appointment I am also the 

campus director for the ODNI funded Intelligence Community Center for Academic 

Excellence (IC–CAE) program.2 In an effort toward full disclosure, you should also 

know that I have had an on-going relationship as a consultant to the state of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects (NANP) since 1995.3

Over the last fourteen years I have been privileged to specialize in studying issues 

associated with human initiated events, defined as terrorism, sabotage, etc. that 

may impact transportation efforts for the proposed Yucca Mountain shipments of 

spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high level radioactive wastes (HLRW). The statements 

made today reflect my own individual opinions and are not necessarily those of any 

of these institutions I am associated with, nor do my comments necessarily reflect 

the opinions of my co-authors, research teams and/or colleagues. 

The foundations of my testimony arise from fourteen years of study on the issues 

surrounding potential terrorist attacks against shipments. During that time I have 

been privileged to be part of several multi-disciplinary teams of researchers that 

have studied the risk of terrorism attacks on nuclear waste shipments to the proposed Yucca Mountain storage facility.4 In particular, we as a body of scholars, 

study the changing nature of terrorism and the terrorist tactics that could be employed against radioactive waste shipments. As part of this on-going effort we have 

identified a range of risks associated with transportation of these materials. On two 

56 

previous occasions I have testified before the House/Senate on the issues we discuss 

today.5

I appreciate the opportunity to brief this body on our work regarding the potential 

of terrorism attacks against the shipments of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and highlevel radioactive wastes (HLRW) that may be sent to the proposed Yucca Mountain 

facility. I hope the following discussion will help you and the agencies involved in 

regulating the potential shipments to better understand the value of a social scientific perspective on SNF transportation. I will begin by discussing an issue that 

has been neglected in the debates since it was introduced nearly 10 years ago—the 

target rich environment that these shipments represent. Second, I will concentrating on several other pressing issues not yet addressed in any adequate form by 

the DOE relative to the Yucca Mountain project. Following this summary of neglected issues, this testimony will offer a systematic risk assessment protocol that 

can help overcome some of the deficiencies that the DOE has in their DEIS, EIS 

and SEIS documents, one critical basis of their planning efforts to date on Yucca 

Mountain shipments. Last, this presentation will suggest several ways that you may 

wish to review the transportation planning from an alternative perspective than 

that presented by the DOE. These alternatives are a way you may gain insightful 

evidence into the terrorism related threats these shipments face. 

Target Rich Environment 

The DOE has for decades tried to find a way to manage the terrorism risks associated with the proposed Yucca Mountain project with little overall programmatic success. Over that extended time-frame the expenditures of rate payer and taxpayer 

funding for this agency and its efforts have produced some less than stellar social 

scientific results with respect to the risks of human initiated events. Make no mistake, what we take about when discussing the transport of SNF and HLRW shipments are potentially very dangerous cargos and highly symbolic targets. They are 

a danger to the transportation infrastructure, to the public health and to the long 

term economic viability of the location(s) where an accident and/or terrorist attack 

may transpire. This is a social fact, no matter the rhetoric used by the industry and/ 

or DOE to obscure this reality. Listen carefully to what is said and ask yourselves 

if it designed to obscure the issues from law makers, the public and the many stakeholders who are concerned about the shipment campaign necessary to stock the proposed Yucca repository. 

In contrast to the DOE and nuclear industry perspectives, what the critics say 

is typically designed to see any Yucca Mountain transportation program conducted 

in a manner consistent with NEPA requirements. That is, the suggestions made by 

these critics compel the DOE to follow the spirit and letter of this law when looking 

at the transportation planning for this particular large scale Federal program. 

One critical issue typically neglected by the DOE is the recognition of this shipment campaign as a danger to the public. In other words, any Yucca Mountain 

transportation program that becomes necessary to transport the Nation’s stockpiles 

of highly radioactive waste is a security risk in and of itself. What DOE seemingly 

fails to understand is that this large scale Federal program will draw the attention 

of a wide variety of adversaries because of its symbolic value—briefly it is nuclear, 

it is Federal and it is controversial. The choice of a geographic location far distant 

from the production sites where SNF and HLRW are generated assists the adversaries since it: 

• Necessitates the movement of large numbers of shipments. 

• Allows for the adversary to chart movement of these shipments in a predictable 

way. 

• Is exacerbated by choices the DOE makes. For example, decisions that allow for 

hotter fuel, thus higher potential harm, to be sent along these predictable corridors. 

• Will entail lengthy shipment routes that average over 2,000 miles of open, unprotected terrain where an adversary can pick and choose the attack site. 

Collectively these and other avoidable/manageable risks can be discussed as constituting a target rich environment.6 The idea of a target rich environment is derived from military parlance. In this case we should consider: 

• The totality of the shipment routes as the battle space. 

• The attackers as potential adversaries with their choice of weapons and tactics. 

• The shipments themselves as poorly defended, high value, symbolic targets. 

• The perpetration of an attack against these shipments being a highly symbolic 

statement by the adversaries. 

57 

Under this definitional schema the DOE’s transportation choices become increasingly important. This issue alone may suggest that sheltering the wastes in place,7

at their point of origin, may be a more optimal safety and security strategy since 

the highly radioactive wastes will be protected from entering the target rich environmental battle space. The next section of this testimony reviews ten more critical 

issues that should prompt reconsideration by this body when deliberating the logic 

of the Yucca Mountain project and its potential to present a target rich environment 

to adversaries, both foreign and domestic. 

Pressing Issues 

Recently Nevada summarized a top ten list of issues of concern during a presentation at the foremost nuclear industry conference, Waste Management 2008.8 Since 

enactment of the NWPAA, and adoption of Assembly Concurrent Resolution 8 by the 

Nevada Legislature in 1987, NANP has consistently made recommendations to DOE 

regarding transportation safety and security, including many in this listing. The top 

ten measures are summarized below. 

1. Ship the Oldest Fuel First. Nevada has recommended that DOE ship the oldest SNF first. This recommendation is supported by NAS and GAO since they 

also recommend shipping older fuel first. For example, shipping SNF that has 

been ‘‘aged’’ 50 years out of reactor, compared to shipping 5-year-cooled SNF, 

could reduce radiological hazards significantly and assist in lowering the risks 

of human initiated events. 

2. Shipments should be by Rail. Nevada has recommended that DOE utilize rail 

as the preferred mode of transportation, while acknowledging the serious impediments to developing rail access to Yucca Mountain and from 24 of the 76 

shipping sites. Based on shipping site current capabilities, the share of SNF 

that could realistically be shipped by rail may be 65–75 percent, not the 90 percent projected by DOE. Thus, DOE must first admit to the realities of the proposed shipment campaign and start planning for large numbers of truck shipments under the ‘‘mostly rail’’ shipment scenario. This would entail a serious 

reconsideration of the safety and security requirements necessary to protect 

shipments. 

3. Use Dual-Purpose Casks. Nevada has recommended that DOE base its transportation system on use of dual-purpose (transportable/storage) casks of a 

standardized design, with a range of capacities resulting in loaded cask weights 

of about 125, 100, and 70 tons. In 1995, Nevada endorsed a previous DOE 

transportation plan that would have used a multi-purpose canister (MPC) system for transport and storage. DOE’s current proposal to use the TAD (Transport, Aging and Disposal) canister system does not fully address this issue. This 

operational choice by the DOE may actually complicate and further constrain 

the transportation system. 

4. Use Dedicated Trains. Nevada has recommended that DOE use dedicated 

trains for all rail shipments. Until DOE commits to only using dedicated trains, 

DOE routing studies and risk analyses must evaluate use of both dedicated and 

general freight rail shipments. This policy choice by the DOE adds to the complexity of any analysis, but more importantly without the commitment of dedicated trains, the safety and security of shipments may be compromised since 

securing SNF/HLRW shipments in general freight poses significant challenges 

and greatly increases the risk of terrorism or sabotage during transport. 

5. Commit to Meaningful Cask Testing. Nevada has recommended that DOE 

and/or NRC conduct a meaningful full scale cask testing program. DOE or NRC 

should conduct full-scale regulatory tests on each cask design (or in cases of 

similar designs, test one cask from each representative grouping). DOE or NRC 

should also conduct a combination of extra-regulatory, full-scale testing, scale 

model testing, component testing, and computer simulations to determine cask 

failure thresholds. In addition, DOE and/or NRC must ensure meaningful stakeholder participation in all aspects of the cask testing program. Last, DOE and/ 

or NRC should also couple this testing with new insights into the potential for 

human initiated events like sabotage and terrorism (extra regulatory testing). 

Understanding the potential releases from casks that could result from a 

human initiated event rests on knowing how these casks react to a variety of 

attack conditions. 

6. Use a meaningful NEPA process for all transportation activities. Nevada has 

recommended that DOE use a credible National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) process to select a preferred Yucca Mountain rail access corridor and 

rail alignment in Nevada. Likewise the DOE should be compelled to immeVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:56 Apr 17, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80371.TXT JACKIE
58 

diately conduct a national level transportation specific NEPA document. This 

seems to be a necessary, sufficient, logical and warranted step given the consequences of attacks and the need for states input on such transportation decisions. As the end point of a national transportation program, the proposed Nevada rail corridor is critical in the overall performance of the Yucca planning, 

so articulation of that plan prior to consideration of the rail spur makes policy 

sense. The safety and security challenges that arise from building an extensive 

rail spur into the Yucca facility demand a robust dialogue on the issues, one 

that NEPA requires and to date DOE seems unwilling to offer any realistic approaches to studying. 

7. WEIB ‘‘Straw man’’ Shipment Routes. Nevada has recommended that DOE 

select routes for the national transportation system using a reasonable transportation methodology developed by stakeholders. Transportation safety and security require that DOE first plan what routes will be used so that meaningful 

stakeholder input can be focused on the planning. The DOE should follow a 

three-step process proposed by the Western Interstate Energy Board (WIEB): 

a. DOE would designate ‘‘straw man’’ routes, preferably in a national level 

transportation NEPA document. 

b. Member states would individually and collectively evaluate the DOE 

routes, and then designate preferred routes on a regional basis. 

c. DOE would then formally adopt the routes selected by WIEB, and designate these routes (allowing exceptions for use of designated alternative 

routes in emergency situations) in DOE contracts with rail and highway 

carriers. 

8. Start the Section 180(c) process. Nevada has recommended that DOE implement the transportation planning and emergency response training program, 

required under Section 180 (c) of the NWPAA, through formal rulemaking. Absent rulemaking, the State of Nevada believes that congressional action might 

be needed to implement the program, as was the case with the Waste Isolation 

Pilot Plant (WIPP) DOE-State cooperative transportation planning program. 

The connection to safety and security is especially important here, without systems of well funded emergency response training the transportation program is 

seriously flawed. One of the critical safety and security issues states would be 

facing is this program becoming an unfunded Federal mandate that requires 

them to provide 50 years of training, protection and response capabilities for the 

Yucca program. In terms of transportation program oversight, response capabilities and organizational capacity, the proposed Yucca program would entail 

three or perhaps four generations of emergence response professionals, human 

capital and their institutional memory, being imbued with relevant experience 

and knowledge of the program’s operational parameters. 

9. Respect State, Local, and Tribal Regulation. Nevada has recommended that 

DOE support state regulatory enhancements to manage transportation risks 

and address public perceptions of transportation risks. These would include, but 

not be limited to: 

a. Port-of-entry inspections and state escorts for DOE shipments at DOE 

expense. 

b. States, in conjunction with local governments, may also impose seasonal, 

day-of-week, and time-of-day restrictions on DOE to address unique local 

conditions. 

c. Tribal governments may also regulate DOE shipments. 

10. Address issues associated with Terrorism and Sabotage. Nevada has recommended that DOE address acts of sabotage and terrorism against repository 

shipments. DOE has acknowledged, in the Final EIS for Yucca Mountain, the 

potential vulnerability of shipments to such attacks. Analyses by Nevada contractors have concluded that the releases and consequences could be many 

times greater than reported by the DOE, resulting in catastrophic cleanup and 

recovery costs. NRC has likewise neglected its mandate as a regulatory body 

with respect to this issue. Specifically: 

a. DOE needs to systematically address terrorism issues and risks in development of repository transportation operational protocols. 

b. NRC has yet to respond to the specific terrorism risks and impacts documented in Nevada’s 1999 petition for rulemaking (Docket PRM 73–10). 

59 

Since today’s hearing is directly related to the last issue of concern, the next section of this presentation will offer a methodology that could be used by the DOE, 

if it proceeds with the Yucca project, to assess and mitigate the risks of human initiated events like terrorism, sabotage, large scale protests and similar risk inducing 

events. 

Human-Initiated Events and Systematic Risk Assessment 

Given stakeholder concerns and the threat of terrorism, this testimony recommends the development of a comprehensive human initiated event threat assessment process for the proposed Yucca Mountain transportation system.9 This process 

could be used by DOE to assess repository transportation impacts as part of its 

NEPA requirements, and in responding to the Western Governors Association 

(WGA) resolution on terrorism and sabotage. 

The following discussion identifies ways to improve current risk assessment techniques to meet the challenges of human initiated events, including terrorism, sabotage, induced or deliberate accidents, and violent protests. The recommended threat 

assessment process is presented as a series of industry standard methods and concludes with exemplar scenarios. The testimony is based only on open source data 

to develop these ideas, concepts and methodologies.10

Shipment Vulnerability Debate 

For three decades, risk analysts have debated the vulnerability of spent nuclear 

fuel shipments to acts of terrorism and sabotage. The details of the debates are documented in studies prepared for the State of Nevada in 1998 and 2005.11 The sabotage related attack scenarios evaluated in NRC and DOE analyses have changed little over the decades. The DOE/NRC analyses assume that a single spent fuel shipping cask is attacked at one location, by one group of attackers, using one weapon. 

The basic analyses assume that the attack breaches the cask and releases a small 

fraction of the contents. In general the agency sponsored analyses differ in estimates 

of the amount of radioactive material released, the details of the release and dispersal, the area contaminated, the population exposed, the resulting human casualties and the economic impacts. 

The first NRC regulations requiring physical protection of spent fuel shipments 

were issued in response to a 1977 draft assessment by Sandia National Laboratories 

(SNL). That assessment, and a follow-up study by SNL in 1980, indicated that sabotage of a shipment in an urban area could cause hundreds to thousands of casualties, and billions of dollars in economic losses and cleanup costs.12 The NRC issued 

interim physical protection requirements for spent fuel shipments in 1979, and 

adopted the current system of regulations (10CFR73.37) by rulemaking in 1980. 

Subsequent studies sponsored by NRC and DOE sharply reduced the estimated 

causalities and economic losses from this original scientific work product. The debate over the consequences of a successful terrorist attack resumed in 1984, when 

the NRC, acting on the new sponsored studies, issued a proposed rule eliminating 

physical protection requirements for most spent fuel shipments. The NRC had concluded that the expected consequences of a successful attack in ‘‘a heavily populated 

area such as New York City would be no early fatalities and less than one (0.4) latent cancer fatality.’’ This NRC proposed rule was opposed by state governments, 

environmental groups and some nuclear industry sources. Three years later, the 

NRC terminated the proposed rule, without explanation. Throughout the 1990s, 

however, the NRC continued to downplay attack consequences. At the same time, 

public discussion of vulnerability and consequences temporarily subsided. 

The controversy re-emerged nationally in 1995 as the DOE began the NEPA 

scoping process for the proposed Yucca Mountain geologic repository. State governments and other parties urged DOE to more directly address terrorism and sabotage 

in the Yucca Mountain environmental impact statement (EIS). In its role as a stakeholder, the state of Nevada filed detailed scoping comments on the impacts of terrorism against repository shipments during 1995, and published several supporting 

studies between 1996 and 1998. Based on these studies, Nevada’s Attorney General 

filed a petition for rulemaking with the NRC in June 1999. The Nevada petition 

documented the vulnerability of shipping casks, and argued that shipments to a national repository would create greater opportunities for terrorist attacks and sabotage. The petition, which requested strengthening of the current regulations and a 

comprehensive reexamination of radiological sabotage, was endorsed by the Western 

Governor’s Association (WGA). More than 8 years later, the NRC has still not officially responded to the Nevada petition. 

DOE acknowledged that shipping casks are vulnerable to terrorist attack in the 

1999 Draft EIS for Yucca Mountain.13 In support of the Draft EIS, DOE sponsored 

a 1999 SNL study of cask sabotage, which demonstrated that high-energy devices 

60 

(HEDs) were ‘‘capable of penetrating a cask’s shield wall, leading to the dispersal 

of contaminants to the environment.’’ The SNL study also concluded that a successful attack on a truck cask could release more radioactive materials than an attack 

on a rail cask, even though rail casks would contain, on average, up to six times 

more SNF than truck casks.14

In the 2002 Final EIS for Yucca Mountain, DOE updated its sabotage analysis, 

assuming more highly radioactive SNF, a larger respirable release, and a higher future average population density for U.S. cities.15 In this document the DOE estimated that a successful attack on a truck cask in an urbanized area under average 

weather conditions would result in a population dose of 96,000 person-rem and 48 

latent cancer fatalities. For a successful attack on a large rail cask, DOE estimated 

a population dose of 17,000 person-rem and 9 latent cancer fatalities. In neither 

case did DOE evaluate any environmental impacts other than health effects, and 

ignored the social-economic impacts of a successful act of sabotage. While the DOE 

did not specifically estimate cleanup costs after such an attack, the FEIS states that 

clean-up costs following a worst-case transportation accident could reach $10 billion. 

Analyses prepared for the state of Nevada by Radioactive Waste Management Associates (RWMA) calculated that sabotage impacts could be considerably greater.16

RWMA replicated the DOE Final EIS sabotage consequence analyses, using the 

RISKIND model for health effects and the RADTRAN model for economic impacts, 

the SNL study average and maximum inventory release fractions, a range of credible values for the gap inventory of Cs–137 and considered a range of population 

densities and weather conditions. 

RWMA concluded that an attack on a truck cask using the same common military 

demolition device assumed in the DOE analysis could cause 300 to 1,820 latent cancer fatalities, assuming 90 percent penetration of the cask by a single blast. For the 

same device used against a large rail cask, RWMA estimated 46 to 253 latent cancer 

fatalities, again assuming 90 percent penetration. The major radiological health impacts of an attack would be caused by the downwind dispersion of respirable material (mainly particles with a diameter less than 10 microns) that could be ejected 

from the damaged cask. Depending upon the meteorological conditions present at 

the time of an attack, the respirable aerosol of radioactive materials could affect an 

area of 10 square kilometers (3.9 square miles) or more. RWMA estimated cleanup 

costs ranging upward from $668 million for the rail incident, and $6.1 billion for 

the truck incident, to more than $10 billion. Full perforation of the truck cask, likely 

to occur in an attack involving a state-of-the art anti-tank weapon, could cause as 

many as 3,000 to 18,000 latent cancer fatalities, and cleanup and recovery costs 

could far exceed $10 billion. 

In October 2007, DOE published the Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact 

Statement for Yucca Mountain (DSEIS) and the Draft Rail Alignment Environmental Impact Statement (RA DEIS).17 Both the DSEIS and the RA DEIS address 

the impacts of sabotage against repository shipments. In both volumes DOE states 

that it has ‘‘analyzed plausible threat scenarios, required enhanced security measures to protect against these threats, and developed emergency planning requirements that would mitigate potential consequences for certain scenarios. DOE would 

continue to modify its approach to ensuring safe and secure shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, as appropriate, between now and the time 

of shipments. For the reasons stated above, DOE believes that under general credible threat conditions the probability of a sabotage event that would result in a 

major radiological release would be low’’ (DSEIS, p. 6–22; RA DEIS, p. 4–314, emphasis added). 

Acknowledging ‘‘the uncertainty inherent in the assessment of the likelihood of a 

sabotage event,’’ the DSEIS and RA DEIS evaluated events in which ‘‘a modern 

weapon (high energy density device)’’ is used to ‘‘penetrate a spent nuclear fuel 

cask.’’ DOE evaluated the consequences of events occurring in representative urban, 

suburban, and rural areas. Based on new research by Luna (2006) 18 and on European studies, the DSEIS assumed that the single weapon attack studied would result in a smaller release of respirable material than DOE assumed in the 2002 

FEIS. For a sabotage event against a truck cask in an urban area, the DSEIS reports consequences about half what DOE estimated in the 2002 FEIS—a population 

dose of 47,000 person-rem, and 28 latent cancer fatalities. For an attack on a large 

rail cask in an urban area, the DSEIS reports consequences about double what DOE 

estimated in the 2002 FEIS—a population dose of 32,000 person-rem, and 19 latent 

cancer fatalities. 

The DSEIS does acknowledge the aforementioned State of Nevada analyses under 

the heading ‘‘Transportation Sabotage: An Opposing Viewpoint.’’ Despite this note 

in the document, and as in earlier DOE analyses, the DSEIS does not provide specific information on: 

61 

• The land area contaminated. 

• Economic losses due to disruption of normal activities. 

• The cost of cleanup. 

As of 2008, the State of Nevada is preparing its own detailed reassessment of 

transportation sabotage impacts. To date, Nevada has submitted comments on the 

DSEIS sabotage consequence analyses (January 10, 2008). In those comments, Nevada emphasized that the DSEIS continues to ignore the consequences of a terrorist 

attack using one or more weapons that completely perforate the shipping cask, or 

a combination of weapons specifically designed to breach, damage, and disperse the 

cask contents. Such an attack could result in impacts more severe than those evaluated by DOE. 

The new DOE-sponsored research does not address such impacts. In fact, the Venturi effect created by full perforation of a shipping cask would likely negate the reduction in impacts claimed in the Luna (2006) study. In its key conclusion, DOE 

asserts that the factors identified by the State of Nevada ‘‘could affect the chances 

of success but not the outcome of the sabotage event.’’ 19 DOE presents no evidence 

in the DSEIS, the RA DEIS, or any of the cited references to support that assertion. 

Moreover, the DSEIS ignores evidence, including terrorism studies funded by 

DOE, that this agency’s activities may be particularly attractive symbolic targets for 

sabotage or terrorist attacks. The DSEIS also ignores past instances in which 

human errors in cask fabrication and cask loading actually occurred during NRClicensed shipments, and created conditions that could have compromised cask performance in the event of a sabotage event. Likewise, the DSEIS ignores Nevada’s 

argument that unique local conditions such as proximity of the existing mainline 

railroads to urban location like downtown Las Vegas and Reno-Sparks must be 

factored into consequence assessments, resulting in potential multi-billion dollar 

cleanup costs and business disruption impacts. 

In summary, all of the consequence assessments so far conducted by NRC, DOE 

and the State of Nevada assumed single-phase attack scenarios. None of these consequence assessments have evaluated the effects of an attack involving the simple 

impact-exacerbating tactics identified by the U.S. Army peer review report more 

than two decades ago: namely the combined use of a breaching device and a dispersal device, or use of multiple breaching devices. None of these consequence assessments have incorporated insights obtained from the 1998 testing sponsored by 

International Fuel Containers, Incorporated, at the U.S. Army Aberdeen Test Center in which a newer generation weapon, a TOW II warhead, was used. Most significantly, none of these consequence assessments have evaluated any of the impactexacerbating tactics studied by counter-terrorism experts in the post-9/11 threat environment. Credible hijack and control scenarios, specialized truck bomb scenarios, 

and/or concealed weapons like IED’s (improvised roadside devices), coupled with insider assistance, diversionary attacks, and/or suicide tactics, could potentially result 

in radiological consequences far greater than those previously estimated by NRC, 

DOE or the State of Nevada.20

WGA Resolution 

The primary motivation for this suggest analytical format, prior to publication of 

the DOE’s DSEIS, was the WGA resolution regarding Yucca Mountain transportation. The WGA represents nineteen Western states and three territories. The association allows state political leaders to address critical policy issues in a wide variety of areas. The WGA organization thus helps state leaders develop strategies to 

address complex issues facing western states.21 WGA has been actively involved in 

nuclear waste transportation planning for two decades. In 2007, WGA renewed and 

revised a policy resolution (07–2) on the risks of terrorism and sabotage against repository shipments.22 The original resolution behind this new document had been 

adopted in 1998. 

WGA Resolution 07–2 notes that in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the altered threat environment calls for new, more comprehensive terrorism assessment tools. The resolution calls upon the NRC to ‘‘fully address the 

consequences of attacks against all components of the nuclear waste handling and 

transport system, to include: attacks against transportation infrastructure, the theft 

of a shipment, use of high-energy explosives against a shipment cask, and direct attacks against a shipment cask using antitank missiles or other armament that could 

cause a loss of containment.’’ WGA further requests that NRC ‘‘strengthen its efforts 

to share information with state and local governments regarding spent fuel shipment vulnerabilities and consequences, ‘‘ recognizing that ‘‘sharing of information 

must be conducted within the framework of preventing the release of sensitive or 

classified information to individuals without a need to know.’’ 

62 

The WGA resolution notes that DOE has acknowledged the vulnerability of shipments in the 2002 Final EIS for Yucca Mountain. The resolution states: ‘‘DOE 

should continue to address acts of sabotage and terrorism in its NEPA documents, 

and should incorporate terrorism/sabotage risk management and countermeasures 

in all DOE transportation plans, protocols, and practices relating to operation of a 

repository, interim storage facility, and/or intermodal transfer facility, including liability for costs and damages resulting from terrorism/sabotage against nuclear 

waste shipments. DOE should share security-related information with state and 

local governments to the maximum extent practicable.’’ 23

Comprehensive Threat Assessment 

Driven by regulations and the need to protect the public from catastrophic events, 

the nuclear industry has a continuous quality improvement process for security 

against human-initiated events. The two recently issued DOE NEPA documents, the 

Draft Supplemental EIS and the Draft Rail Alignment EIS, employ only some of the 

methods used by the industry to protect fixed assets like reactors, but the not expressly documented analytical method employed by DOE for the Yucca Mountain 

transportation effort does not use state-of-the-art assessment techniques, nor does the 

assessment effort meet industry standards for fixed site security. 

The problem with the DOE’s approach to the NEPA documents (SEIS’s) is twofold: How to assess the threat of human-initiated events against spent fuel shipments to Yucca Mountain nationally, and second, for the proposed Caliente rail line 

in Nevada. Once again, human initiated events refer to the range of malevolent acts 

that could be perpetrated on the shipments—including such events as terrorism, 

sabotage, deliberate accidents and violent protest movements.24 Shipments refer to 

the various means that will be used to move SNF and HLRW into the national 

transportation system/proposed Caliente rail corridor from their current storage facilities at commercial nuclear power plants, DOE weapons production sites, and 

from other DOE serviced/regulated/owned source facilities. 

This presentation recommends specific and detailed methodologies that are used 

in social science and industry that, that taken together, could constitute a comprehensive threat assessment for the proposed Yucca Mountain transportation system: 

• The identification of relevant human-initiated events by use of Meta analysis. 

• Development of a systematic multi-level assessment of human-initiated event 

risks for the transportation modes, facilities, corridors, etc. 

• A resultant matrix of human initiated events and attack scenario exemplars 

suitable for DOE study and consideration in NEPA documentation. 

Human-initiated Events 

Several large categories of human-initiated events can be identified across the 

major components of the transportation system and relative to the known or expected characteristics of the Yucca Mountain transportation system. These include 

terrorism, sabotage, accidents and protests.25 The table below lists these four event 

categories and notes how they may apply to the four major transportation components derived from the DOE ‘‘Transportation Concept of Operations’’ and DOE 

‘‘Draft National Transportation Plan’’.26

Figure 1: Human Initiated Event and transportation Activity Matrix 

Threat Categories Origination 

Point 

Transport 

Activities 

Transfer 

Facilities 

Destination 

Facilities 

Terrorism Attacks X X X X 

Sabotage X X X X 

Deliberate Accidents X X X X 

Violent Protests — X X — 

Terrorism attacks are defined here as those malevolent actions that are designed 

to cause significant symbolic events, a significant incident that acts as a statement 

in opposition to the shipments or an act that directly attacks the transports, casks, 

facilities for handling shipment casks or the personnel that are involved in the four 

categories of transportation infrastructure noted above. These terrorism acts will 

range on a continuum from symbolic events that are not intended to result in a release of radioactive materials all the way up to sophisticated full-scale assaults deVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:56 Apr 17, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80371.TXT JACKIE
63 

signed to release/disperse the casks radioactive contents. These attacks may be motivated by a political/social/religious agenda, attacks prompted by an anti-Federal 

government agenda, attacks based on the deliberate creation of economic dislocations in the energy sector, or attacks that are inspired by a social issue. These attacks may be perpetrated by foreign nationals, American citizens, or any combination of the two. 

Sabotage is defined herein as those malevolent activities that could interfere with 

the safe and secure loading/unloading and transportation of the nuclear wastes. Examples may include the use of insider information, employee tampering with casks, 

large scale labor problems, and/or deliberate contamination of casks/transports to 

delay shipments. Sabotage can also be defined as activities detrimental to the safe 

and secure transport of these materials. Sabotage acts will also exist on a continuum from attacks not intended to damage a cask up to an act designed to release/ 

disperse the inventory of radionuclides. The motives for such attacks are considered 

to be the same as for the terrorist attacks and acts of sabotage may be perpetrated 

by the same range of adversaries. 

Deliberate Accidents are defined here as those malevolent human-initiated events 

that result in endangerment of the shipments, their casks, or the overall shipment 

campaign. These may come from deliberate acts by an individual or small group 

interfering with shipment operations and from negligent acts of those within the 

transportation system that can create a potential, minimal or significant release of 

the highly radioactive contents. Like terrorism and sabotage, these acts will also 

exist on a continuum from attacks not intended to damage a cask up to an act designed to release the inventory of radionuclides. The motives are considered to be 

the same as for the terrorist attacks and they may be perpetrated by the range of 

adversaries. 

Violent Protests are defined as those potentially malevolent activities that could 

interfere with the safe and secure transportation of the nuclear wastes. These protests may also be used as a rouse to hide the intentions of malicious actors who seek 

to commit acts of terrorism or sabotage by hiding their actions in the larger protest 

group. This category is included to recognize the fact that these shipments will face 

significant opposition from protesters, based on the experiences of other shipment 

campaigns around the world. Such large scale protests may endanger the shipments 

and/or public health by delaying shipments and increasing routine doses to the population. These acts will also exist on a continuum from collective acts not intended 

to damage a cask up to an act designed to release the inventory of radionuclides. 

The motives for such attacks are considered to be the same as for the terrorist attacks and they may be perpetrated by the same range of adversaries. 

Threat Assessment Process 

A range of threat assessment procedures should be conducted prior to commencement of shipments and continued during the shipping campaign, in a way that 

measures risk over time, and enables assessments to be continually updated.27 The 

longitudinal risks may also need to be assessed because of a rise in energy related 

terrorism acts,28 and as part of the on-going DOE obligation to operate under procedures equivalent to the NRC physical protection regulations (10CFR73.37), although 

DOE is not necessarily subject to these particular NRC regulations. 

Meta-threat analysis 

The analysis-in-depth suggested herein starts with consideration of a wide range 

of potential threats and consequences vis-a`-vis shipments. Such a systematic assessment would first involve an exhaustive meta-analysis of the literature relative to 

attacks on shipments of hazardous materials, including SNF and HLRW. This process would need to account for emerging threats and tactics being employed by terrorists/adversaries around the globe. It would also include IAEA (2007) guidance 

documents on the subject and documentation of threats that have arisen in the global theater where terrorists/adversaries operate. This data should then be vetted 

with outside stakeholders, not just internal DOE security personnel, to define the 

various challenges that the Yucca Mountain transportation effort could face over the 

five decade life span of the proposed project. Emerging from this effort would be a 

pro-active catalogue of transportation risks and issues that should inform a NEPA 

analysis, not just cherry-picked scenarios that react to the latest criticisms, from 

Nevada studies, government analysis and/or those generated by the National Academy of Sciences.29

Vulnerability Assessment Process 

Transportation security for a cargo as dangerous as the highly radioactive SNF 

and HLW should prompt planners to use the best available techniques to reduce 

threats from human-initiated events. Typically security professionals use four levels 

64 

of vulnerability assessment techniques to protect nuclear facilities and other critical 

industrial applications.30 Each of several techniques has strengths and weaknesses 

but with the combined (triangulated) use of all of these techniques, taken together 

as a NEPA inspired research strategy, allows for improvements in security and better defines risks. That is, the use of more than one of these offers a more robust 

methodological approach to the task at hand, all of them allows for a form of defense-in-depth, a common principle in nuclear security. 

These four techniques offer a comprehensive risk identification and mitigation potential for security (and safety) issues relative to the proposed Yucca Mountain 

transportation program. In order to use these techniques it is first useful to identify 

where they may apply to the overall transportation effort. The following chart helps 

situate these four techniques relative to the four major components of the transportation infrastructure. 

Figure 2: Transportation analysis-in-depth: Risk reduction strategy 

The examination of how these four identification, reduction and mitigation techniques can be used in the systematic assessment of risk for the Yucca Mountain 

project, the analysis-in-depth risk reduction concept noted above, will require some 

details on what each technique will entail in real world practice. 

First, it is critical that they should be considered an integrated system of analysis, 

albeit one with some level of analytical hierarchy. The following chart demonstrates 

their interrelationship and the preferred hierarchy. 

Figure 3: Analysis-In-Depth Concept; Sub-Components 


924BALLA1.eps 924BALLA2.eps
65 

Security Surveys. Security surveys are the first level in this overall transportation 

risk assessment schema. These surveys represent a physical examination of the 

transportation security arrangements and typically use a check list approach to the 

examination of risks. This allows for the standardization and management of the 

assessment process.31 These checklists aid security efforts and provides for a consistent, albeit unimaginative examination of risks.32 This form of security management is typical for any number of industrial applications and has a long tradition 

in security. At a minimum this survey technique needs to be performed at various 

levels of the proposed Yucca Mountain transportation effort (for example at origination sites, for transportation efforts, at in-transit transfer facilities, and for destination conveyance infrastructures). 

The problem with this technique is that it is typically not focused on the adversaries and does not necessarily encourage thought relative to new countermeasures 

as risks change over time. In fact surveys become reified and represent a binary 

(good/bad, black/white) approach to security and risk mitigation. They seem to imply 

that risks will somehow emerge from the world and show themselves during such 

surveys. Checklists are also fixed lists of observations to be conducted and typically 

closed to emerging risks that have heretofore not been known or overlooked. The 

list becomes what human assets are fixated on, not focusing security personnel on 

the creative protection of the cargoes, rather making them focus on paperwork. 

These surveys are often misused, especially when they come to represent ways to 

manage people and ensure compliance to a security regime or regulations.33

Security surveys have a place in the overall transportation efforts but they are 

not in and of themselves a cure for the risks that transportation efforts to Yucca 

Mountain will face. They represent a tool that should be employed by those involved 

in the transportation effort and at all levels of the transportation infrastructure. 

They are the first line of defense since they are carried out traditionally by line staff 

and management. They also require periodic updates, monitoring and analysis as 

to their ability to meet current challenges and contemporary threats. They represent 

the first line of a transportation specific defense-in-depth concept yet to be adopted 

by DOE. 

Risk Management. The second step in the analysis-in-depth risk assessment process is to use well understood and common place risk management techniques. The 

process of risk management is fairly straightforward. In the first phase of the risk 

management process the analyst begins with identification of the assets in need of 

protection and ends with the identification of safeguards and countermeasures.34

Thus, the organization using the risk management technique should basically follow 

the flow of the following interrelated items: 

Figure 4: Risk Management Process 


924BALLA3.eps
66 

After this largely abstract intellectual task is completed, the organization then 

uses an expert opinion process to rank order priorities and probabilities are assigned to each sub-phase noted above. Typically this involves predominantly quantitative outcomes and these outcomes are summarized in tables, charts, and the 

like. Thereafter the transportation management team would appropriate, and field, 

security resources accordingly. As implied by the chart, the process begins anew 

once this final task is completed and in practice should become a never ending series of assessments designed to improve the overall robustness of security. 

Risk management is not without critics in the nuclear field and elsewhere. Some 

argue that the traditional ways of conducting risk management need to be more 

quantitative or address more aspects than are traditionally used in such analysis,35

while others note the political nature of the use of risk management.36 A systematic 

examination of risk management also reveals some issues of concern.37 Once again 

this technique is typically binary and closed to outside input. For example, there 

is rarely outside input on contemporary threats and vulnerabilities since risk management rests on known (historic) security issues. This means that risk management is reactive, not proactive in mitigating risks. This also usually means that risk 

management is done without the creative spirit that the terrorists/adversaries bring 

to the table. If it is initiated, managed and used by organization staff in agencies 

(for example the NRC and DOE) and represents the collective consensus of these 

sometimes limited perspectives. 

Risk assessment is rarely the creative expression of alternatives. Risk management is management of risks by managers and for managers. It is not done from 

alternative perspectives (for example the adversaries). The assignment of probabilities in risk management is often based on fantasy-like numbers that are created 

out of thin air to placate internal constituencies and/or to serve political purposes. 

Once these probabilities are codified in tables, charts and the like, they become real 

in their consequences as everyone involves start to believe they are real and act accordingly.38 The process itself and especially the documents that emerge create overconfidence in the numbers, a false sense of security that is problematic in the face 

of real world creativity from adversaries. 

Risk management has its place in transportation planning for the potential Yucca 

Mountain program and the problems noted here do not negate its usefulness. As a 

technique it is not a be all and end all in risk assessment. The use of quantitative 

data helps policymakers believe in a program, but that is a two edged sword. 

Design Basis Threat (DBT). The third level of the analysis-in-depth paradigm is 

the DBT. In some respects the DBT is a technique not that unrelated to risk management.39 A DBT is a proxy threat, a hypothetical scenario based on descriptions 

of the threats found at the time of its articulation.40 The DBT sets the standards 

for security personnel by defining the training, weapons and tactics that a terrorist/ 

adversary group could use to attack nuclear facilities. The best practices of DBT 

usage call on its proponents to design security to face the contemporary threats, recognizing vulnerabilities and to allocate resources accordingly.41 DBTs tend to focus 

on infrastructure and physical security hardware, more so than risk management.42

The published DBT details for nuclear power plants serve as an illustration of 

this process and its outcomes. The DBT has been used since the 1970s in the United 

States and is not a single process. It has also been used in various ways by different 

countries as the IAEA seeks to standardize the process around the globe. First and 

foremost it is the basis of physical protection systems (PPS) for fixed sites. It also 

serves as the means by which an evaluation of that PPS is conducted. Since 2000 

the IAEA has promoted the DBT and provides (in conjunction with Sandia National 

Labs) nine steps for the process of development, use and maintenance of a DBT system. Besides the basic facts noted in this paragraph certain scholars 43 suggest that 

a DBT generally includes: 

• Identification of the roles and responsibilities within and connected to the organization. 

• Development of operating assumptions for the usage of the DBT. 

• Identify a range of potential generic adversary threats. 

• Identify a list of threat characteristics. 

• Identify sources of threat information. 

• Analyze and organize threat-related information. (Steps one to six create a 

threat assessment document). 

• Develop threat assessment and gain consensus about said. 

• Create a national level DBT. 

• Introduce the DBT into the regulatory framework. 

67 

The DBT process, and specifically its first six steps, should yield both motivations 

for attacks, intentions of the attackers and characteristics of the attacking force. 

These are then matrixed across a range of adversaries (protesters, activists, extremists, criminals and terrorists). In most cases these are created from assumptions 

based on historic data and firmly rooted in a philosophy that insists that all threats 

must be ‘‘credible.’’ This philosophy is counter intuitive to 9/11 threat realities and 

may blind the creators to new/emerging threats or threats that are evolving as past 

threats change to meet new circumstances. Typically the DBT philosophy does promote the continuation of the status quo. 

The NRC and DOE have updated their DBT in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, 

once in 2003 and again in 2004, both times in a process outside the normative 

framework for such adjustments. Specific details are not known for these classified 

documents but the expectation is that they will take years to implement a new DBT 

and that the final product was diluted as a result of industry concern over costs. 

Likewise, the DBT has been criticized since it does not meet the threat threshold 

the 9/11 attacks presented.44

DBTs have their critics and the criticisms run along similar lines to those for the 

risk management techniques.45 The DBT is a typically binary process and closed to 

outside input, primarily for security reasons like classification of results. Because 

of the closing of discussion for security reasons, there is rarely outside input on contemporary threats and vulnerabilities. Second, like risk management the DBT becomes a reactive device. As a proxy attack strategy it is not proactive in mitigating 

risks. Similar to risk management the DBT process is dominated by the organization staff. The DBT represents the collective consensus of these limited and sometimes self-serving perspectives. It does not represent a creative expression of alternatives and rarely addresses emerging threats. Once the DBT is determined it becomes real in its consequences for the agencies using this technique. The threat is 

what the DBT says it is, nothing more or nothing less. The DBT provides insider 

organizations, although not the public and other stakeholders, with a sense of confidence that may be disproportional to the risks and reality of a changing world. It 

allows an existing organization like the DOE to define what the threats are, and 

once the DBT is constructed, to maintain a faith in their assessments, a self fulfilling belief system that can be dangerous when one is protecting something as potentially dangerous as highly radioactive wastes. 

In some cases critics have argued for a layered approach to DBT implementation, 

a strategy that recognizes financial resource differentials in government’s responsible for implementation.46 This criticism is primarily focused on less developed nations where the resources necessary to protect nuclear assets are not readily available. In the case of advanced industrial nations the AHARA—as high as reasonably 

achievable—principle behind such debate suggests that these nations should achieve 

the IAEA’s goals of securing radioactive materials against human-initiated events. 

These less than reasonable security debates do not apply to the United States, a 

country rich in resources. 

Additionally, as noted DBTs are supportive of the status quo. They seem to say 

to everyone involved we are doing good, look how hard we worked to define the 

threats and our perceptions of the vulnerabilities we face are excellent. It ignores 

alternative threats since they are deemed too improbable or they are not perceived 

at all—they are deemed a very subjective ‘‘uncreditable.’’ The DBT seems to communicate to one and all that whatever terrorists/adversaries can do poses a lesser 

threat than our proxy measure (DBT), a dangerous oversimplification in the post9/11 world of nuclear security. 

DBTs also take time to change, they are not assessed systematically but rather 

on an as needed basis. The DOE mandated and NRC inspired changes in implementation for weapons production facilities and commercial nuclear power plants after 

the 9/11 terrorist attacks illustrate this delay—changes in the DBT were revised in 

2003, changed again in 2004 and are still undergoing implementation as of the seventh anniversary of those attacks with an expected date for completion being in 

2008.47 Supporters argue that a change in the DBT is costly but critics point out 

so too would be a successful attack. 

The DBT is a step forward from past risk assessment practice and one that allows 

transportation managers to create a proxy for security to train against. It is different than security surveys and risk management, but it is not the single magic 

bullet to security. Rather the DBT is one tool in the overall toolbox for risk mitigation. The fourth technique, adversarial vulnerability assessment, helps with some 

of the limitations noted for DBTs. 

Adversarial Vulnerability Assessments (AVA). One critical omission of all three of 

the techniques detailed above is bringing the motives, mindset and creativity of the 

adversary into the risk equation. Those who would wish to perpetrate a human-iniVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:56 Apr 17, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80371.TXT JACKIE
68 

tiated event are far more resourceful than the security surveys, risk management 

and DBT techniques seemingly give them credit for. To accomplish the task of recognizing such creativity Johnson (2005) 48 advises that it is necessary to conduct a 

‘‘mental coordinate transformation.’’ This means that when assessing risks for critical SNF and HLW transportation infrastructure it is necessary to think like the 

perpetrators, not like security professionals, not like energy company officials, and 

not like oversight agency management. 

The major barrier faced by security professionals and risk managers in doing this 

task is that they are rarely prepared for this mental transformation. As a result of 

organizational socialization they cannot, or will not, use the opportunity to actively 

look for threats, to engage in the alternative and/or to think like the terrorist, saboteur or other perpetrator of human initiated events. They have difficulty letting the 

opponent define reality, a reality that is securely planted in their professional lives 

by the very industry they seek to protect—one that for many reasons does not admit 

gleefully to risks, threats or terrorism as a potentiality. Altering Johnson’s (2005) 49

approach for the proposed Yucca Mountain transportation project would entail the 

necessary mental transformation for the NEPA assessment. This is best accomplished by the following steps: 

• Understand the full scope of the transportation effort. This includes all aspects, 

parts, components and variables in the transportation system. This is difficult 

since the totality of the system is enormous and in many cases individuals are 

asked to transform their thinking while working on small parts of the overall 

picture. Still it is necessary since the parts are integrated and the risk synergy 

for the total system far outweighs the singular transportation component risk 

level. 

• Brainstorm in a creative, innovative, and multi-level manner that allows you 

to not just identify a threat, but to focus attention to a range of threats.50 Once 

the totality of the program is recognized, members of a risk focus group are 

gathered to work on the issues, share their insight into the risks, and to brainstorm on threats facing this transportation system. These discussions would reveal attack exemplar scenarios tied to risks, not singular as is the case of a 

DBT, but multiple threats and with multiple consequence profiles. 

• Once attack sceneries are identified, the group starts to edit these down to essential elements and exemplars that demonstrate vulnerabilities of the system, 

not just a single part of this complex transportation effort. This group would 

prioritize potential attacks which represent a range of possibilities, consequences and potential responses. These alternatives must be developed, articulated and vetted with a wide range of constitutes/stakeholders to gain additional insight and to reduce the problems of group think and collective risk 

blindness that sometimes arise in small groups. 

• The last step is to determine the feasibility of these attacks by means of a range 

of attack articulations, analyze radiological consequences of these alternatives 

and devise countermeasures to mitigate these risks. 

Several provisos are offered to those considering adopting AVA methods. First and 

foremost, let those involved be creative.51 In the case of terrorism threats, the 

changes in technology, availability of information and tactical knowledge of adversaries demand that those involved be allowed freedom to achieve this creative approach to risk assessment. Historical data, and historically situated risk perceptions, are less significant in the face of global social challenges like currently are 

transpiring, a point often missed by those who work in formal organizations. AVA 

risk measurement is predicated on creativity which must be combined with organizational experience, technological skills and bureaucratic imagination. All of these 

tasks are difficult for many formal organizations to engage in but the challenges 

they pose are important to overcome. 

Johnson (2005) 52 advises that creativity is the domain of individuals, not formal 

organizations. Good group dynamics can enhance this individual creative spirit and 

groups need to be involved to prioritize and determine feasibility. One of many techniques to help this creative process is to reverse engineer the attacks in an effort 

to solve problems that have yet to arise. This is a particularly cogent piece of advice 

given the elongated timeline for the proposed Yucca Mountain project and points out 

the need for a systematic longitudinal analysis paradigm so that data can be gather 

to inform the processes. 

One of the most interesting advisements offered is that the system conducting this 

analysis must bring in outsiders and not use the typical cast of insider characters 

who have vested interests in the status quo. The use of the same old energy industry insiders and the same supporting industrial infrastructure insiders ensures the 

69 

same old results. It does not offer a creative analysis of threats. Furthermore it is 

necessary to combine these outsiders with creative insiders in the brainstorming 

groups and set ground rules for all the contributors. These ground rules have to 

allow for all manner of input and treats each contribution as significant, be it from 

inside or outside the typical organizational patterns of thought. Johnson (2005) 53

offers some AVA imperatives as guidance. These have been modified to the Yucca 

Mountain project and include: 

• Minimize the conflicts of interest and reduce wishful thinking on the parts of 

group members. 

• To promote creativity in the group processes, the system must not punish those 

who creatively deconstruct its assumptions, bias, and working relationships. 

• The overall group and its work product need to be assessed by a second group 

of outsiders, called assessors. These assessors should be independent from the 

Yucca Mountain project, experienced in finding problems and offering solutions, 

and in no small measure represent the public stakeholders for the project. 

• All parties involved must discard the binary way of viewing risks. This means 

individuals need to be able to work within the gray areas of life, not the rigid 

confines of an engineering perspective or other professional paradigm that promotes the status quo philosophy. 

• The group members are tasked with finding vulnerabilities and risks, which is 

their primary purpose. As such they should not be encouraged to find no 

vulnerabilities or no risks, a philosophy that is counter-productive to the AVA 

process. 

• AVAs are not a pass or fail technique for the group as a whole and the group 

participants must be encouraged to reject this form of thinking. The point is to 

find vulnerabilities and risks, not fix them per se. Thus, finding these 

vulnerabilities and risks is a good outcome, not a negative outcome of the group 

process. 

• The process must be done before transportation planning is fixed in policy, done 

again when plans are finalized but before transport begins, and done periodically thereafter (for example bi-annually or annually). 

• AVAs are a holistic approach to vulnerability identification and risk mitigation. 

They should not be done in isolation (for example for the rail system alone). 

• The conveners, participants and/or the assessors should not be restricted as to 

time, budget or attack possibilities. They should be allowed to creatively face 

the social context of global conditions relative to terrorism, sabotage and other 

human initiated events. 

• The group should be encouraged to never underestimate the resourcefulness, 

creativity or commitment of the adversary. They should remember it is the adversary that defines the threat, not the protectors. 

• The group should establish a hierarchy of threats, simplest to most complex, 

least severe radiological consequences to most severe radiological consequences. 

They need also look at contingencies that would take a second tier threat and 

make it a major radiological event. This is one area where DBTs seem to fail, 

they are based on one threat and do not necessarily account for such upgrades 

and modifications. 

• Everyone should assume that adversaries know what security arrangements are 

in place, have the creativity to overcome these and/or will exploit those instances where the system does not meet its presumed minimum operation levels. Systems fail and human security systems fail to protect even the most critical of assets over time. 

• A range of attacks should be considered by this group: terrorism, sabotage, 

probes of the security system, insider/outsider/insided-outsided threats, social 

engineering, and the many other varieties of human initiated events that could 

transpire. 

• The longer a system is in place, the higher its vulnerability and risk to attack. 

Vigilance decreases with familiarity, hence the systematic reevaluation of risks 

becomes increasingly important over the lifespan of the program. It is equally 

important to note that once an AVA is complete, perhaps even deemed excellent 

by all involved, it is not the end product and cannot stand alone in the face of 

the ever-changing security threats faced. Once the AVA is complete it is then 

systematically and periodically subject to challenges from the original group, 

from new group participants and from new human initiated events/tactics. 

70 

• The group should avoid common nuclear industry fallacies. For example, many 

believe that all vulnerability will be discovered and thus all risk mitigated. 

Likewise they should be cautioned to avoid mindsets that see compliance as 

good security, layers of mediocre security equals good security, and/or that hightech security is the answer for all vulnerabilities and risks. 

AVAs are not the final and best answer to the reduction of risk, just as security 

surveys, risk management and DBTs do not tell the whole risk story. They are also 

not unknown to the nuclear industry. For example, they have already been used in 

the nuclear waste field for low level waste and relative to interim storage.54 They 

also were advocated as one means to increase security after the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, and for use in critical infrastructure sectors like the chemical 

industry.55 These techniques have even been around a sufficient length of time to 

note development in their applications.56 Regarding their use in environmental policy debates, as has been the case with Yucca Mountain, Busenberg (1999) 57 notes 

they are effective in reducing policy disputes, a quality lacking in many suggestions 

for the proposed Yucca Mountain project. Last, these have been used in the energy 

industry for security considerations relative to oil and gas pipelines, a similar security dilemma to that posed by transporting nuclear waste across country to Nevada.58

The AVA is one tool in the overall risk assessment tool set necessary to secure 

the transportation of highly radioactive materials like SNF and HLW. Used in conjunction with the other three techniques it allows a different perspective on the 

problems the system may face, a valuable perspective not offered at any other time 

in the lifecycle of the transportation program. 

Step Three—Scenario Exemplars 

Analysis-in-depth is a management paradigm and an analytical imperative necessary to accomplish the formable task of vulnerability and risk assessment for the 

complex, decades-long transportation effort that would be necessary for the proposed 

Yucca Mountain repository. The following sections provide a risk matrix and corresponding threat scenarios that could emerge from an AVA process, if applied. The 

details and threats noted therein are gleamed from the literature and used to represent best practices in risk assessment for the proposed Yucca Mountain project. 

They do not directly correspond to the issues noted above; rather they examine a 

subset of the overall risk of human-initiated events for transporting nuclear wastes. 

The following matrix shows some of the potential human-initiated events identified 

for further study. 

Figure 5: Potential Human Initiated Events for Further Study 

Potential Events Origination 

Sites 

Transport 

Issues 

In-transit 

Transfer 

Destination 

Facilities 

Labor disruptions with deliberate 

tampering of transports and/or 

casks. (SAB) X X X X 

Deliberate contamination of transports and/or casks. (SAB) X X 

Disabling of shipment safeguards. 

(SAB) X X X 

Actions meant to delay the shipment 

process and creating significant 

media attention. (PRO) X X 

Actions meant to delay transport 

and create increased routine radiological impacts. (PRO) X X 

Actions meant to create a dislocation 

of transport, cask or transportation infrastructure. (PRO) X X 

71 

Potential Events Origination 

Sites 

Transport 

Issues 

In-transit 

Transfer 

Destination 

Facilities 

Use of geographically disadvantageous features along the transportation routes to impact shipments. 

(ACC) X X 

Exploitation of steep grades, tunnels, and bridges to create accident conditions potentially challenging cask integrity. (ACC) X X 

Inducement of inadvertent collisions 

involving toxic, explosive or flammable chemicals. (ACC) X X X X 

Use of man-portable missiles to penetrate the cask and disperse the 

contents into the environment. 

(TER) X X X X 

Use of military weapons/tactics to 

penetrate the cask and disperse 

the contents into the environment. 

(TER) X X X X 

Use of adjacent transportation infrastructure and cargos to augment 

an attack and increase consequences. X X 

Capture of the cargo. X X 

Abbreviations: SAB = sabotage, PRO = protests, ACC= accident, TER = terrorism 

The Risk Matrix 

Considering the Yucca Mountain transportation options identified by DOE, five 

modes of transportation could potentially be used for repository shipments over the 

projected 50-year operations period. These include: 

• Rail Casks Shipped by Rail. 

• Rail Casks Shipped by Barge. 

• Rail Casks Shipped by Heavy Haul Truck. 

• Truck Casks Shipped by Rail. 

• Truck Casks Shipped by Legal Limit Truck. 

These five transportation modes, traveling to Yucca Mountain from 76 shipping 

sites in more than 30 states, with an average shipment distance greater than 2,000 

miles, will be subject to many possible attack strategies over five decades. This approach uses a range of exemplar human-initiated event strategies as an illustration 

of the risks associated with the transportation of these materials. These include: 

• Theft of the Cargo. 

• Transportation Infrastructure Attacks. 

• Anti-tank and/or Stand-off Weapons Attacks. 

• Capture of Shipment and use of High-Energy Density (HED) Weapons. 

These exemplars suggest that a range of consequences must be factored into risk 

assessment since they present a range of potential attack outcomes. These outcomes 

include: 

• Attacks to Disrupt Shipments (Minimum Radioactive Dispersal). 

• Attacks to Disperse the Cask Contents (Moderate Radioactive Release). 

• Attacks for Maximum Consequences (Catastrophic Radioactive Release). 

The following chart allows for the analysis of these various factors simultaneously 

and has estimates of the consequences listed in italics as they relate to the scenario 

analysis that follows. 

72 

Figure 6: Risk Matrix 

Yucca Mtn. 

Risk Matrix 

Rail Casks 

Shipped by 

Rail 

Rail Casks 

Shipped by 

Barge 

Rail Casks 

Shipped by 

Heavy Haul 

Truck 

Truck Casks 

Shipped by 

Rail 

Truck Casks 

Shipped by 

Legal Limit 

Truck 

Theft of the 

Cargo. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Transportation 

Infrastructure 

Attacks. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Anti-tank 

and/or Standoff Weapons 

Attacks. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Capture of 

Shipment. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Disrupt 

Disperse 

Max. Cons. 

Taken together these modes, human initiated event strategies, and hypothesized 

consequence outcomes can be conglomerated into a risk matrix for simplified use by 

risk managers, security personnel and for the specific purposes of risk identification, 

analysis and mitigation. A radioactive dispersal, whether it is considered minimum, 

moderate or catastrophic for the purposes of analysis, depends on many variables, 

including the age of the fuel, the burn-up history of that fuel, the crud inventory 

in the transport cask, the degradation of the cladding, the number of assemblies in 

a given cask, and so forth. However, a properly constructed assessment process can 

address these variables, and recommend appropriate countermeasures and mitigation strategies. 

Conclusion 

First and foremost, the materials in question, huge quantities of highly radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants and weapons production facilities, do not 

have to be transported across America to Yucca Mountain. The energy industry has 

assured the public that power plants are safe and secure, thus sheltering the wastes 

in place at these facilities seems the prudent thing to do. At these secure facilities 

they would not be subject to protests, labor unrest, sabotage or terrorism during 

transit activities, in short they are safer where they sit. 

Likewise, if the program does move forward, alternatives to DOE management 

exist. As the NAS has suggested, DOE could be replaced as the agency of responsibility for the proposed Yucca Mountain project. This action would help the creditability of the proposal since many stakeholders and members of the general public 

have historic reasons to distrust this agency and its claims regarding safety and security. This is another option for you to consider in your oversight role. 

If the program does proceed and DOE is left in charge, the testimony examined 

the current state of risk assessment for human-initiated events against SNF and 

HLW shipments to the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In the process this analysis identified a variety of potential human initiated event scenarios 

for consideration by this agency and its transportation planners. These represent a 

range of creditable threats, consequences and for a variety of transportation components that would be used during a transportation campaign. 

The necessity of this reconsideration is based on the fact that attack scenarios 

evaluated in the Draft Supplemental EIS for Yucca Mountain, and the Draft Nevada Rail Alignment EIS, repeat the methods used by DOE and NRC over the past 

three decades. They are not proactive in response to 9/11 and do not reflect stateof-the-art risk assessment techniques. The DOE/NRC analyses assumed singlephase attack scenarios and other limiting assumptions that may artificially constrain the results. None of these consequence assessments have evaluated impactexacerbating tactics, such as combined use of a breaching device and a dispersal device, or use of multiple breaching devices. None of these consequence assessments 

have evaluated the impact-exacerbating tactics studied by counter-terrorism experts 

in the post-9/11 environment. 

The methodology presented herein advocates use of an analysis-in-depth method 

that uses current risk assessment methods, but adds the well known AVA as an 

extra layer of protection to offset the change in the risk environment due to terrorism. The purpose of the AVA technique is to harness the creatively and ingenuity 

of people outside the formal bureaucratic organization that is the DOE and in doing 

73 

so improve the risk analysis. Such an approach would respond to the WGA resolution on transportation terrorism risks. 

Ways to Review DOE Efforts 

In the post-9/11 world almost all Federal agencies with a significant homeland security role have had to rethink their assumptions on how best to serve the public 

interest. One conclusion suggested from the alternative scholarship on Yucca Mountain transportation risks is that the DOE does not get it—they are stuck in an engineering based bureaucratic paradigm, or if you will, an organizationally dysfunctional way of thinking. This DOE mindset prevents this agency from looking outside 

of their narrowly defined transportation risk assessment agendas. 

In the case of Yucca Mountain, the unwritten ‘‘demand’’ for programmatic progression after years of DOE mismanagement seemingly overrides a systematic and 

serious reconsideration of risks for the transportation of these radioactive materials. 

This committee should consider how to compel reform of the DOE’s work on Yucca 

Mountain in light of the new threat environment. To date a systematic recognition 

of this new threat environment is not evidenced by this agencies continued refusal 

to acknowledge real and pressing issues with their planning for shipments to Yucca 

Mountain. 

The DOE is continually revising their transportation concept for Yucca Mountain 

and could readily alter their current program to adopt the recommended risk reduction process. Considering the currently delayed schedule for the repository and the 

proposed rail line, it seems unlikely that shipments to Yucca Mountain could begin 

earlier than 2020. There is ample time for another agency or if left in charge, for 

the DOE, to systematically address human-initiated events. Revision of such documents as the various Supplemental EIS’s, Transportation Concept of Operations, 

National Transportation Plan, national routing studies, and in its implementation 

of Section 180c technical and financial assistance to affected states and Indian 

tribes would at a minimum be desirable. 

If this testimony could leave this committee with only three points to consider, 

they would be: 

Point One: 

• Yucca Mountain transportation is risky and will present a target rich environment for adversaries. The shipments are symbolically important and represent 

a radiological significant target. 

• The solution is to shelter the shipments in place at the sites of waste origin. 

As noted by the NRC, energy industry and others, they are safe and secure faculties. Why expose wastes to risks during transportation if not necessary? 

Point Two: 

• DOE has systematically neglected to address the laundry lists of concerns 

brought forth by stakeholders. These deliberate choices by the DOE increase the 

likelihood of attacks, the consequences of those attacks and the resultant social 

dislocations if these attacks succeed. 

• The solution is to compel the DOE its mandate to engage in a meaningful national level NEPA process for transport. That process should directly addresses 

stakeholder concerns that have been documented over the decades of Yucca 

Mountain debates. 

Point Three: 

• DOE, in consultation with stakeholders, should engage in systematic risk assessment method of analysis. In particular, it should use the AVA process in 

conjunction with other methods to provide a more robust triangulated analysis. 

• The solution here is to do it and will allow the DOE to avoid the potentially 

fatal fault of being reactive to threats and become more proactive in relationship to human initiated events. 

I wish to thank the Committee for allowing me to offer an alternative perspective 

on this important issue. If you have any questions I will be happy to answer them. 

Endnotes 

1My training at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas was in political sociology, deviance, and 

criminology. 2This educational center is funded by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

(ODNI) as part of a grant to seven CSU’s in the southern California area. The CSUN IC–CEA 

assists students who are considering careers in the intelligence field. 

74 

3The term ‘‘human initiated event’’ comes from Ballard, J.D. (2002). ‘‘Asymmetrical Sabotage 

Tactics: Nuclear Facilities/Materials and Vulnerability Analysis.’’ Publication available at 

www.numat.at. 4 In particular past projects have included Robert J. Halstead, Fred Dilger, Hank Collins and 

Marvin Resnikoff. The testimony herein reflects the authors interactions with, and the decades 

of work, these colleagues have contributed to the debates over Yucca Mountain. Likewise, research teams for the referenced NATO project herein as well as NUMAT conference work should 

be recognized. 5See ‘‘Testimony’’ before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, OneHundredth Seventh Congress regarding S. J. Res. 34 Approving the Site at Yucca Mountain, 

Nevada, for the Development of a Repository for the Disposal of High-level Radioactive Waste 

and Spent Nuclear Fuel, Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. May 2002. Available 

at http://www.yuccamountain.org/leg/ballard052202.html. See also ‘‘Testimony of James David 

Ballard.’’ U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Highways and the House Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure. April 2002. Available at http://gopher 

.house.gov/transportation/highway/04–25–02/ballard.html. 6 Nevada and other scholars have for many years discussed this idea in a variety of forums 

and forms. This section briefly summarizes that body of literature. For more complete details 

see: Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documentation for Petition.’’ Agency petition for Rulemaking pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553 and 10 C.F.R. § 2.800–2.804. Federal Register. September 

1999 and Halstead, R.J., F. Dilger and J.D. Ballard. (2005) ‘‘Planning for an Unpredictable 

Event: Response to Terrorist Attack against SNF Shipment.’’ Waste Management conference proceedings. See also ‘‘Testimony’’ before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, One-Hundredth Seventh Congress regarding S.J. Res. 34 Approving the Site at Yucca 

Mountain, Nevada, for the Development of a Repository for the Disposal of High-level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. May 

2002. Available at http://www.yuccamountain.org/leg/ballard052202.html and ‘‘Testimony of 

James David Ballard.’’ U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Highways and the 

House Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure. April 2002. Available at http://gopher.house.gov/transportation/highway/04–25–02/ballard.html for more specifics on symbolic 

attacks, target rich environments and associated issues. 7See Ballard, J.D. (2002). ‘‘Shelter-In-Place: The Logic of High-Level Nuclear Waste Security.’’ 

Agency paper. State of Nevada’s Agency for Nuclear Projects: Carson City, NV. This agency 

paper was based on a presentation at Stanford University, January 2002. 8See Halstead, R.J., F. Dilger, J.D. Ballard and H. Collins (2008). ‘‘State of Nevada Perspective on the U.S. Department of Energy Yucca Mountain Transportation Program.’’ Paper #8154. 

Waste Management Conference 2008 proceedings. Publisher: Waste Management, Phoenix, AZ. 9 Ballard, J.D., R.J. Halstead, F. Dilger, H. Collins and M. Resnikoff. (2008). ‘‘Assessing the 

Vulnerability of Yucca Mountain Shipments: A Threat Matrix for Human-Initiated Events.’’ 

Paper #8152. Waste Management 2008 Conference proceedings. Publisher: Waste Management, 

Phoenix, AZ. 10The use of open source documents as the basis of this presentation and as the means to 

develop this methodology should demonstrate to the Committee the level of publicly available 

materials that potential adversaries can access. Specific attack details and details on tactics 

have deliberately been left out of this presentation in consideration of safety and security. 11See Halstead, R.J. and J.D. Ballard. (1997). ‘‘Nuclear Waste Transportation Security and 

Safety Issues: The Risk of Terrorism and Sabotage against Repository Shipments.’’ Prepared for 

the state of Nevada, Agency for Nuclear Projects (October 1997; Revised, December 1998). This 

report can no longer be accessed on the web due to security concerns, but can be requested in 

writing from Mr. Joseph Strolin, Administrator, Agency for Nuclear Projects, Suite 118, 1761 

E. College Parkway, Carson City, NV 89706. Also refer to J.D. Ballard, R.J. Halstead, F. Dilger, 

H. Collins, ‘‘Planning for an Unpredictable Event: Vulnerability and Consequence Reassessment 

of Attacks on Spent Fuel Shipments,’’ revised version of a paper presented at Waste Management 2005. The revised paper was not included in the proceedings, but it is available on line 

at http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/trans.htm. Last, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO). Project # SST.CLG.978964, ‘‘Terrorism Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants and Nuclear 

Materials Transports.’’ This large research group was led by Dr. Friedrich Steinhausler, Institute for International Security, Stanford University. October 2001 to July 2004. A final report 

was submitted to NATO but to date has note been released. 12The NRC and DOE continue to use the singular terminology of ‘‘sabotage’’ to designate any 

incident related to human initiated events. The use of the term human initiated events herein 

was originally coined to help move forward the discussions of risks to a more encompassing discussion in the post-9/11 threat environment. 13DOE. (1999). ‘‘Draft Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, 

Nevada,’’ DOE/EIS–0250D, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC (July 1999). 14Luna, R. et al., (1999). ‘‘Projected Source Terms for Potential Sabotage Events Related to 

Spent Fuel Shipments,’’ SAND99–0963. 15DOE. (2002). ‘‘Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, 

Nevada,’’ DOE/EIS–0250. Available on the web at http://www.ymp/gov/documents/feisla/ 

index.htm. 16Lamb, M. et al., (2002). ‘‘Potential Consequences of a Successful Sabotage Attack on a Spent 

Fuel Shipping Container: An Analysis of the Yucca Mountain EIS Treatment of Sabotage.’’ Prepared by Radioactive Waste Management Associates for the State of Nevada, Agency for Nuclear 

Projects. 17 Respectively: DOE. (2007). ‘‘Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for a 

Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste 

75 

at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada’’ DOE/EIS–0250F–S1D and DOE, ‘‘Draft Supplemental 

Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada—Nevada Rail 

Transportation Corridor,’’ DOE/EIS–0250F–S2D and ‘‘Draft Environmental Impact Statement 

for a Rail Alignment for the Construction and Operation of a Railroad in Nevada to a Geologic 

Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada,’’ DOE/EIS–0369D. 18Luna, R, (2006). ‘‘Release Fractions from Multi-Element Spent Fuel Casks Resulting from 

HEDD Attack,’’ Waste Management 2006 conference. Publisher: Waste Management, Phoenix, 

AZ. 19DOE. (2007). See page 6–21 from ‘‘Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for 

a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste 

at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada’’ DOE/EIS–0250F–S1D and DOE. 20See Ballard, J.D., R.J. Halstead, F. Dilger, H. Collins. (2007). ‘‘Yucca Mountain Transportation Security Issues: Overview and Update.’’ Waste Management 2007 conference. Publisher: 

Waste Management, Phoenix. 21WGA. ‘‘Making the West the Best: Western Governors’ Association 2007 Annual Report’’. 

Available online at: http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/annrpt07.pdf. 22WGA. ‘‘Western Governors Association Policy Resolution 07–02: Assessing the Risks of Terrorism and Sabotage against High-Level Nuclear Waste Shipments to a Geologic Repository or 

Interim Storage Facility.’’ 23WGA. ‘‘Western Governors Association Policy Resolution 07–02: Assessing the Risks of Terrorism and Sabotage against High-Level Nuclear Waste Shipments to a Geologic Repository or 

Interim Storage Facility.’’ 24 Ballard, J.D. (2002). ‘‘Asymmetrical Sabotage Tactics: Nuclear Facilities/Materials and Vulnerability Analysis.’’ Publication available at www.numat.at. 25See Ballard, J.D., R.J. Halstead, F. Dilger, H. Collins. (2007). ‘‘Yucca Mountain Transportation Security Issues: Overview and Update.’’ Waste Management 2007 conference. Publisher: 

Waste Management, Phoenix. Also Ballard, J. D. (2002). ‘‘Asymmetrical Sabotage Tactics: Nuclear Facilities/Materials and Vulnerability Analysis.’’ Publication available at www.numat.at. 26DOE. (2006). ‘‘Transportation System Concept of Operations,’’ DOE/RW–0584 and DOE. 

(2007). ‘‘National Transportation Plan,’’ pre-decisional draft dated July 16, 2007. 27 Ballard, J.D. (2002). ‘‘Asymmetrical Sabotage Tactics: Nuclear Facilities/Materials and Vulnerability Analysis.’’ Publication available at www.numat.at. 28Marenko, T. (2007). ‘‘Terrorist Threat to Energy Infrastructure Increases,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, Download date July 28, 2007. Available online at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ 

mat04/mat04.pdf. 29See Halstead, R.J. and J.D. Ballard. (1997). ‘‘Nuclear Waste Transportation Security and 

Safety Issues: The Risk of Terrorism and Sabotage against Repository Shipments.’’ Prepared for 

the state of Nevada, Agency for Nuclear Projects (October 1997; Revised, December 1998). 

Ballard, J.D., R.J. Halstead, F. Dilger, H. Collins and M. Resnikoff. (2008). ‘‘Assessing the Vulnerability of Yucca Mountain Shipments: A Threat Matrix for Human-Initiated Events.’’ Paper 

#8152. Waste Management 2008 Conference proceedings. Publisher: Waste Management, Phoenix, AZ. J.D. Ballard, R.J. Halstead, F. Dilger, H. Collins, ‘‘Planning for an Unpredictable Event: 

Vulnerability and Consequence Reassessment of Attacks on Spent Fuel Shipments,’’ revised 

version of a paper presented at Waste Management 2005. Ballard, J.D. (2002). ‘‘Asymmetrical 

Sabotage Tactics: Nuclear Facilities/Materials and Vulnerability Analysis.’’ Publication available 

at www.numat.at. CRS. (2007). ‘‘Nuclear Power Plants: Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack.’’ RS 

21131. NAS. (2006). ‘‘Going the Distance? The Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and HighLevel Radioactive Waste in the United States.’’ Washington, DC: The National Academies 

Press). R.J. Halstead, F. Dilger, J.D. Ballard. (2004). ‘‘Beyond the Mountains: Nuclear Waste 

Transportation and the Rediscovery of Nevada.’’ Waste Management 2004 Conference, February 

25–March 1, 2004, Tucson, AZ. 30See Johnson, R.G. (2004). ‘‘Adversarial Safety Analysis: Borrowing the Methods of Security 

Vulnerability Assessments,’’ Journal of Safety Research 35: 244–248 and Johnson, R.G. (2005). 

‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial Vulnerability Assessment,’’ 

Presentation at ASIS annual conference, Orlando, FL. Download date: July 23, 2007. Available 

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31 Broder, J.F. (1999). Risk Analysis and the Security Survey. Boston: ButterworthHeinemann. 32 Johnson, R.G. (2005). ‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial 

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date: July 23, 2007. Available at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt. 34See Johnson, R.G. (2005). ‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial Vulnerability Assessment,’’ Presentation at ASIS annual conference, Orlando, FL. 

Download date: July 23, 2007. Available at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt; Kumamoto, H., E. J. Henley. (2000). Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Management for Engineers and Scientists. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley; Roper, C. (1999). Risk Management for 

Security Professionals. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann; Knief, R. (1991). Risk Management: Expanding the Horizons in Nuclear Power and Other Industries, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press; Starr, 

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Nuclear Emergency Management. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing; Rayner, S. and R. Cantor. 

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Risk Analysis, Volume 7. 

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36Pidgeon, N., R.E. Kasperson, and P. Slovic. (2003). The Social Amplification of Risk. New 

York: Cambridge University Press; Slovic, P. (1993). ‘‘Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy.’’ 

Risk Analysis, Volume 13. 37 Johnson, R.G. (2005). ‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial 

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date: July 23, 2007. Available at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt; 

Willis, H.H., A.R. Morral, T.K. Kelly and J.J. Medby. (2005). Estimating Terrorism Risk. Santa 

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www.nrc.gov/; Johnson, R.G. (2005). ‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial Vulnerability Assessment,’’ Presentation at ASIS annual conference, Orlando, FL. 

Download date: July 23, 2007. Available at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt. 40 NRC. ‘‘Design Basis Threat.’’ Download date August 5, 2007. Available online at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/; Blankenship, J. (2005). ‘‘International Standard for Design Basis Threat (DBT).’’ 

Paper presented at the NUMAT Conference, Salzburg Austria. Download Date August 4, 2007. 

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Download Date August 4, 2007. Available online at http://www.numat.at/; Ellis, D. (2005). 

‘‘Training Programs for the Systems Approach to Nuclear Security.’’ Paper presented at NUMAT 

Conference, Salzburg Austria. Download Date August 4, 2007. Available online at http:// 

www.numat.at/. 41 NRC. ‘‘Design Basis Threat.’’ Download date August 5, 2007. Available online at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/; Khripunov, I. (2005). ‘‘Nuclear Security Culture: A Generic Model for Universal 

Application.’’ Paper presented at NUMAT Conference, Salzburg Austria. Download Date August 

4, 2007. Available online at http://www.numat.at/. 42 Johnson, R.G. (2005). ‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial 

Vulnerability Assessment,’’ Presentation at ASIS annual conference, Orlando, FL. Download 

date: July 23, 2007. Available at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt. 43 Blankenship, J. (2005). ‘‘International Standard for Design Basis Threat (DBT).’’ Paper presented at the NUMAT Conference, Salzburg Austria. Download Date August 4, 2007. Available 

online at http://www.numat.at/ 44 IAEA. (2007). ‘‘Requirements for Physical Protection against Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities 

and Nuclear Material during Use and Storage.’’ Download date: August 5, 2007. Available online 

at http://www.iaea.org/; NRC. (2005). ‘‘Design Basis Threat,’’ Federal Register, Volume 70, 

Number 214; Hirsch, D., D. Lochbaum, and E. Lyman, ‘‘The NRC’s Dirty Little Secret: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is Still Unwilling to Respond to Serious Security Problems.’’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Volume 59 (May-June 2003); GAO. (July 26, 2005). ‘‘Nuclear Security: 

Actions Needed by DOE to Improve Security of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material at its Energy, 

Science and Environmental Sites: Statement of Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and 

Environment.’’ Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and 

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Plants Have Upgraded Security, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Needs to Improve its 

Process for Revising the Design Basis Threat: Statement of Jim Wells, Director: Natural Resources and Environment.’’ Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 

Threats and International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives. 45 Johnson, R.G. (2005). ‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial 

Vulnerability Assessment,’’ Presentation at ASIS annual conference, Orlando, FL. Download 

date: July 23, 2007. Available at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt. 46S. Kondratov, F. Steinhausler. (2005). ‘‘Why there is a need to Revise the Design Basis 

Threat Concept.’’ Paper presented at NUMAT Conference, Salzburg Austria. Download Date August 4, 2007. Available online at http://www.numat.at/ 47GAO. (July 26, 2005). ‘‘Nuclear Security: Actions Needed by DOE to Improve Security of 

Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material at its Energy, Science and Environmental Sites: Statement of 

Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment.’’ Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, U.S. House of 

Representatives; GAO. (April 4, 2006). ‘‘Nuclear Power: Plants Have Upgraded Security, but the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Needs to Improve its Process for Revising the Design Basis 

Threat: Statement of Jim Wells, Director: Natural Resources and Environment.’’ Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, 

U.S. House of Representatives. 48 Johnson, R.G. (2005). ‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial 

Vulnerability Assessment,’’ Presentation at ASIS annual conference, Orlando, FL. Download 

date: July 23, 2007. Available at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt. 49 Johnson, R.G. (2005). ‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial 

Vulnerability Assessment,’’ Presentation at ASIS annual conference, Orlando, FL. Download 

date: July 23, 2007. Available at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt. 50 E.G. Bitzer and R. Johnson. (2007). ‘‘Creative Adversarial Vulnerability Assessments,’’ Journal of Physical Security, Volume 2. Download date: August 7, 2007. Available on-line at http:// 

jps.lanl.gov/. 51 Johnson, R.G. (2005). ‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial 

Vulnerability Assessment,’’ Presentation at ASIS annual conference, Orlando, FL. Download 

date: July 23, 2007. Available at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt. 52 Johnson, R.G. (2005). ‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial 

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date: July 23, 2007. Available at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt. 

77 

53 Johnson, R.G. (2005). ‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial 

Vulnerability Assessment,’’ Presentation at ASIS annual conference, Orlando, FL. Download 

date: July 23, 2007. Available at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt. 54Lubenau, J.O. and D.J. Storm. (2002). ‘‘Safety and Security of Radiation Sources in the 

Aftermath of 11, September 2001.’’ Health Physics 83: 155–164 (2002). 55Moore, D.A., B. Fuller, M. Hazzan, and J.W. Jones. (2007). ‘‘Development of a Security Vulnerability Assessment Process for the RAMCAP Chemical Sector,’’ Journal of Hazardous Materials 142: 689–694. 56See Johnson, R.G. (2004). ‘‘Adversarial Safety Analysis: Borrowing the Methods of Security 

Vulnerability Assessments,’’ Journal of Safety Research 35: 244–248 and Johnson, R.G. (2005). 

‘‘Unleashing Your Inner Mother-in-Law: How to do an Adversarial Vulnerability Assessment,’’ 

Presentation at ASIS annual conference, Orlando, FL. Download date: July 23, 2007. Available 

at: http://pearl1.lanl.gov/external/c-adi/seals/images/AVA.ppt. 

57 Busenberg, G.J. (1999). ‘‘Collaborative and Adversarial Analysis in Environmental Policy,’’ 

Policy Sciences 32. Download date: August 8, 2007. Available on-line at: www.springerlink.com. 58 Bettie, J. (2007). ‘‘NRC Takes Two Roads on Terror Review Issue.’’ The Energy Daily, February 27, 2007. 

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you, Dr. Ballard. 

Mr. Hamberger? 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND 

CEO, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune, the Association 

of American Railroads appreciates the opportunity present our 

views on the transportation of spent nuclear fuels. 

Before I address that topic, however, on behalf of the members 

of the AAR, I want to express deep condolences to the victims, the 

families, and friends of those who were hurt and injured in too 

many cases, fatally injured in the commuter rail accident in 

Chatsworth, California last Friday. 

We have been working very closely with this Committee, the corresponding Committee in the House, to help craft legislation to address certain areas of rail safety. We are very pleased that that has 

reached its final step, and I believe even as we meet here today, 

it may be being considered on the House floor. And I hope that it 

will pass the Senate before the end of the week because we believe 

that it will result in meaningful rail safety improvement. 

The freight industry, rail industry does have an excellent safety 

record, in general, in moving hazardous materials, including spent 

nuclear fuel in particular. Since my written testimony and my several appearances before this committee over the past year go into 

great detail on our safety record, I will only note here today that 

2007 was the safest year on record in terms of accident rate per 

million train miles. 

We recognize that special measures are needed to ensure that 

the spent fuel is moved without incident. The railroads believe that 

the safest possible method of transporting spent nuclear fuel is in 

dedicated trains. We are pleased to note that the Department of 

Energy now shares that belief and wish that the Department of the 

Navy would soon join us both in that belief. 

We believe that dedicated trains offer important safety advantages. 

One, they do not require switching in rail yards as do trains in 

general freight service, thus reducing time in transit and potential 

for mishandling accidents. 

Two, dedicated trains allow the train to be equipped with electronically controlled pneumatic brakes and premium suspensions. 

78 

1The AAR takes no position on whether Yucca Mountain is an appropriate site for a repository. 

Three, spent nuclear fuel cars are extremely heavy, heavier than 

any other car in service, thus increasing the potential for an accident because of the different handling characteristics. 

And finally, spent nuclear fuel dedicated trains can be moved 

with greater security. Escorts as required by DOT and the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission would have certainly a less difficult time 

monitoring spent nuclear fuel on dedicated trains than in general 

freight service. 

We are confident that we can transport spent nuclear fuel extremely safely. However, despite all the precautions taken, there is 

clearly some risk in the transport of spent nuclear fuel. No firm in 

any industry and certainly not a rail industry that has an outdoor 

factory floor of some 140,000 miles in length can guarantee with 

complete certainty that no accident or terrorist attack will occur. 

Recognizing this, Congress enacted the Price-Anderson Act which 

provides limited protection for companies from an incident involving the release of nuclear material, including its transport. 

More than 25 years ago, the Interstate Commerce Commission 

ruled that railroads have a common carrier obligation to transport 

shipments of spent nuclear fuel. Partially that ruling came because 

of the liability protections offered under Price-Anderson. 

Freight railroads, alone of all modes, also have a common carrier 

obligation to transport toxic by inhalation hazardous and other 

highly hazardous materials. Chairman Inouye referred to that earlier. Chlorine is certainly one of those and anhydrous ammonia the 

other. Those two represent about 80,000 car loads a year of 100,000 

car loads of TIH materials. However, we do not have any comparable Price-Anderson protections for this transportation, nor can 

railroads fully insure against the multi-billion risks associated with 

these shipments. This places the railroads in an untenable position. 

I submit that if there is a public interest need for railroads to 

be compelled to carry TIH chemicals, just as the ICC determined 

there is for spent nuclear fuel, there is a corresponding public interest for limiting the railroad’s potentially ruinous liability as in 

the case with Price-Anderson. This could be achieved if policymakers enacted a Price-Anderson type solution for TIH shipments, 

and we would be pleased to discuss this with members of the Committee. 

We thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I, of course, 

would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS

The Association of American Railroads (AAR) appreciates this opportunity to address the transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). AAR members account for the 

vast majority of freight railroad mileage, employees, and traffic in Canada, Mexico, 

and the United States. 

Should meaningful amounts of spent nuclear fuel require transportation, it is likely that AAR members would be called upon to handle most of those movements 

(whether it would be to the Yucca Mountain repository 1 or elsewhere), since the Department of Energy (DOE) has indicated that it prefers rail transportation for the 

79 

2See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, A Final 

Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, J–1, February 

2002. 

movement of SNF.2 Why? Safety, predominantly. There has never been a release of 

radioactive materials in connection with the transportation of SNF by rail. 

Overview of Freight Rail Safety 

First of all, on behalf of the members of the AAR, I offer my deep condolences 

to the victims of the recent tragic commuter rail accident in California and their 

families. As many of you know, freight railroads have been working very closely 

with this Committee and others in Congress to draft and pass comprehensive legislation that will address critical areas of rail safety. We are confident that the legislation will result in meaningful rail safety improvement. 

For freight railroads, pursuing safe operations is not an option, it is an imperative. It makes business sense and it’s the right thing to do. Through massive investments in safety-enhancing infrastructure, equipment, and technology; extensive employee training; cooperation with rail labor, suppliers, customers, communities, and 

the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA); cutting-edge research and development; 

and steadfast commitment to applicable laws and regulations, freight railroads are 

at the forefront of advancing safety. 

Freight railroads have an excellent and improving safety record, reflecting the 

extraor-dinary importance railroads place on the safety of their employees, their 

customers, and the communities they serve. As an official from the FRA noted in 

testimony to Congress in February 2007, ‘‘The railroads have an outstanding record 

in moving all goods safely.’’ 

In fact, 2007 was the safest year ever for railroads, according to FRA data, and 

preliminary partial year data for 2008 show continued improvement. In 2007, the 

train accident rate was the lowest ever, down 71 percent since 1980. The grade 

crossing collision rate was the lowest ever, down 77 percent since 1980. And the employee injury rate was the second lowest ever, down 80 percent since 1980. 

Moreover, according to U.S. Department of Labor data, railroads today have lower 

employee injury rates than other modes of transportation and most other major industry groups, including agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and private industry as a whole—even grocery stores. Available data also indicate that U.S. railroads have employee injury rates well below those of most major foreign railroads. 


924HAMB1.eps
80 

Railroads are proud of their safety record, which results from their recognition of 

their responsibilities regarding safety and the enormous resources they devote to its 

advancement. At the same time, railroads want rail safety to continue to improve. 

Railroads are always willing to work cooperatively with Members of this Committee, 

other policymakers, the FRA, rail employees, and others to find practical, effective 

ways to make this happen. 

Railroads Have an Excellent Hazmat Safety Record 

Today, U.S. railroads transport very little spent nuclear fuel. In 2007, there were 

just 14 originations; in the 5-years from 2003 to 2007, there were only 314. Railroads do, however, haul significant amounts of other hazardous materials. In fact, 

each year, 1.7 to 1.8 million carloads of hazardous materials are transported by rail 

in the United States. Materials that present a ‘‘toxic inhalation hazard’’ (TIH)—i.e., 

gases or liquids (such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia) that are especially hazardous if released—are a subset of hazardous materials. Railroads transport around 

100,000 carloads of TIH each year. For perspective, DOE projects that there would 

be, at most, around 400 carloads of spent nuclear fuel transported annually. 

In 2006 (the most recent year for which data are available), 99.996 percent of rail 

hazmat shipments reached their destination without a release caused by a train accident. That equates to one accident with a hazmat release for every 56,000 rail 

hazmat carloads. 

The overall rail hazmat accident rate is down 88 percent since 1980 and down 

39 percent since 1990. And although no firm in any industry can guarantee that 

it will never suffer an accident, the railroads’ overall safety record should give you 

and the public confidence in the rail transport of SNF if the public interest requires 

its transportation. 

How Can the Safety of SNF Transport be Maximized? 

Notwithstanding freight railroads’ excellent safety record, they recognize that 

public concern over radioactive materials requires that all parties involved in the 

transport of SNF take special measures to ensure safe movement. In particular, the 

DOE and Department of Defense (as the shippers of SNF), the Department of 

Transportation (the regulator of the safety aspects of hazmat transport), and the 

railroads must work together to design the safest possible transportation system for 

SNF. 

For many years, the rail industry has urged the use of dedicated trains—i.e., 

trains with no other freight than SNF, traveling from one origin to one destination—to transport SNF. In 2005, the DOE issued a statement that it was DOE polVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:56 Apr 17, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80371.TXT JACKIE

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3Department of Energy Policy Statement for Use of Dedicated Trains for Waste Shipments to 

Yucca Mountain, ilable at p://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news2005/pdf/doe050718rail.pdf. 4 A small minority of rail cars in general service weigh up to 315,000 pounds. In extremely 

rare cases (for example, movements of power plant generators), railroads will haul much heavier 

shipments. 5Truck hunting is an instability at high speed of a wheel set (the ‘‘truck’’ in railcar terminology) causing it to weave down the track, usually with the flange of the wheel striking the 

rail. 6 Excessive lateral rocking of cars and locomotives can occur, usually at low speeds. The speed 

range at which this phenomenon occurs is determined by such factors as the wheel base, height 

of the center of gravity of each individual car or locomotive, and the spring dampening associated with each vehicle’s suspension system. 7 A wheel flat is a flat spot or loss of roundness of the tread of a railroad wheel. 

8 U.S. Department of Transportation, Identification of Factors for Selecting Modes and Routes 

for Shipping High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, p. vi (April 1998). 

icy to use dedicated trains as the usual mode for its shipments to Yucca Mountain.3

The DOE identified important safety, security, and system cost benefits to the use 

of dedicated trains at that time. More recently, the DOE stated, in its application 

to the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to construct a railroad line that would 

serve the Yucca Mountain repository, that it intends to use dedicated trains on that 

line. 

Dedicated trains in fact offer numerous key safety advantages that would reduce 

the already very small possibility of an accident involving SNF transport. 

First, SNF cars in dedicated trains would not have to be ‘‘switched’’ in and out 

of trains at rail yards, many of which are located in or near major metropolitan 

areas. Switching would be required if SNF cars were transported in general freight 

service. Switching increases the amount of handling a freight car receives. All else 

equal, the more a freight car has to be handled, the greater the risk of an accident. 

Second, the weight of SNF cars could increase the potential for an accident if the 

cars were hauled in general freight service. The vast majority of loaded rail cars 

on the U.S. freight rail network weigh no more than 286,000 pounds.4 SNF cars, 

though, would weigh approximately 400,000 pounds. If hauled in general freight 

service, these extremely heavy SNF cars could generate high in-train forces, such 

as slack action (the force exerted throughout the train as trains accelerate, decelerate, and operate over undulating and curved terrain) that could lead to a derailment. Slack action is much easier to control in a short, dedicated train than in a 

long, general service train, especially in trains with extremely heavy cars mixed 

with other normal-weight cars. 

Third, premium suspensions can be incorporated in all rail cars in dedicated 

trains. Premium suspensions are higher-quality freight car wheel assemblies. They 

reduce lateral wheel forces and vertical dynamic impact forces, which can result in 

derailments. If SNF were transported in general freight service, there would be no 

way of guaranteeing that the cars transporting other freight would have premium 

suspensions. More generally, dedicated trains eliminate the possibility of a derailment of an unrelated car having as a side effect the derailment of or damage to a 

car carrying SNF. 

Fourth, dedicated trains are essential if the newest technology designed to lower 

the possibility of a derailment is to be used for SNF shipments. The AAR’s Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive Material, also 

known as S–2043, calls for additional safety requirements and technologies, including on-board defect detection systems, premium suspensions, and electronically-controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes. ECP brakes function only when all cars in a train 

are equipped with them. In addition to providing superior braking performance, 

ECP brakes utilize a communication system throughout a train that can be used 

to transmit train health information to the locomotive crew and security personnel. 

The train health information, obtained from the on-board defect detection systems, 

would include monitoring for known derailment causes such as excessive truck 

hunting; 5 rocking; 6 wheel flats; 7 ride quality; defective bearings; vertical, lateral 

and longitudinal acceleration; and, of course, braking performance. 

Fifth, dedicated trains minimize the time spent in transportation, an important 

factor for security and efficiency.8 It would take longer (possibly significantly longer) 

to transport SNF from origin to destination if SNF were transported in mixedfreight trains instead of dedicated trains, because the switching of rail cars in and 

out of trains takes time and because railroads can more readily schedule dedicated 

trains to move quickly and smoothly through sensitive areas. 

Finally, dedicated SNF trains can be transported with greater security. Escorts, 

which are required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for all SNF moveVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:56 Apr 17, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80371.TXT JACKIE
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9 Use of Dedicated Trains for Transportation of High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel (March 2005), available at www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/safety/reportldedicated ltrains.pdf. 

10 Committee on Transportation of Radioactive Waste, National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, Going the Distance: The Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and 

High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States (2006). 11 In the STB rail construction proceeding concerning the Yucca Mountain line proposed by 

DOE, it has been suggested that DOE should be required, as a condition to approval, to use 

dedicated trains for all transportation of SNF to the Yucca Mountain line. DOE has opposed 

that condition, saying only that it will maintain its policy (cited at footnote 3 above) to use dedicated trains as the ‘‘usual mode’’ for transportation to Yucca Mountain. 12See the AAR’s Senate testimony on May 22, 2007 and July 26, 2007 for details on the many 

ways that railroads are using technological advances, innovative operating practices, and other 

means to enhance rail safety. 

ments, will be able to monitor SNF much more easily in dedicated trains than in 

general freight service. 

The FRA has also determined that dedicated trains for the transportation of SNF 

would reduce accident risks through avoidance of yards, reduced derailment potential, and reduced risk of the involvement of other hazardous materials in an accident.9 Similarly, the National Academy of Sciences has determined that dedicated 

train transportation of SNF has operational, safety, security, communications, and 

planning advantages over transportation in general merchandise trains.10

DOE is planning to build the transportation equipment for the transportation of 

SNF to Yucca Mountain in conformance with S–2043. In addition, the U.S. Navy, 

which currently ships more SNF than any other entity, is currently designing and 

building a new freight car to meet S–2043. The prototype car is currently being tested at the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., an AAR-operated rail research 

and test facility in Pueblo, Colorado. 

The rail industry commends the DOE for recognizing the benefits of dedicated 

trains, and commends the U.S. Navy for agreeing to conform with S–2043. However, 

despite its 2005 policy statement in favor of the use of dedicated trains generally 

and its statement to the STB that it will use dedicated trains on its own Yucca 

Mountain line, DOE has not committed to use dedicated trains for SNF shipments 

on other rail lines, including shipments to Yucca Mountain.11 The U.S. Navy has 

not yet agreed to use dedicated trains for SNF shipments. Railroads respectfully 

suggest that policymakers should strongly encourage the DOE and Navy to do so. 

SNF Liability Protections Offer a Model for TIH Transport 

Railroads are confident that they could transport SNF extremely safely, and they 

are working hard every day to further enhance the safety of their operations.12

However, as indicated above, no firm in any industry—and certainly not a rail industry that has an outdoor ‘‘factory floor’’ that is more than 140,000 miles long— 

can guarantee, with complete certainty, that no accident or terrorist attack will 

occur. 

Despite all the precautions that might be taken, there is clearly some risk involved in the use and handling of nuclear fuel. Recognizing this, in 1957 Congress 

enacted the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act limits the liability of a 

company (including railroads) from an incident involving the release of nuclear material (including in transportation). The Act provides for a fund, to which all nuclear 

power plant licensees contribute when an incident occurs, to cover any damages in 

excess of required insurance levels. 

More than 25 years ago, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the predecessor of today’s Surface Transportation Board, held that the railroads’ common carrier obligation requires them to transport shipments of SNF, whether the railroads 

want to handle such shipments or not. The ICC’s decision at that time was based, 

in part, upon the liability protections that the Price-Anderson Act afforded to the 

railroads. 

I would be remiss if I did not note that, likewise, because of their common carrier 

obligation, freight railroads—alone among all modes of transportation—must also 

transport TIH and other highly-hazardous materials in response to a reasonable request. However, the railroads do not have any comparable Price-Anderson Act protections for this transportation. 

While TIH materials are a small percentage of total rail traffic—they constitute 

only about 0.3 percent of all rail carloads—the transportation of such materials exposes railroads to significantly higher costs and potentially ruinous liability due to 

the extraordinarily dangerous characteristics of the commodities themselves. Indeed, 

an accident involving TIH could cause casualties orders of magnitude higher than 

the casualties that would likely result from an accident involving SNF. Accidents 

83 

13For example, a few years ago in New Orleans, a tank car that railroads did not own containing more than 30,000 gallons of liquid butadiene began to leak. Vapor from the butadiene 

tank car rolled out across a neighborhood until the pilot light of an outdoor gas water heater 

ignited it. More than 900 people were evacuated, though no one was killed or seriously injured. 

The National Transportation Safety Board found that the probable cause of the accident was 

an improper gasket that a chemical company had installed on the tank car. Nevertheless, a 

state court jury entered a punitive damages verdict against the railroads involved in the amount 

of $2.8 billion. 14 Although TIH materials account for only 0.3 percent of rail carloads, the absolute number 

of carloads—some 100,000 per year—is 250 times higher than the number of expected SNF carloads. The use of dedicated trains is feasible for a commodity like SNF where very few carloads 

are involved, but is not feasible for TIH. 

involving TIH on railroads are extremely rare. However, history demonstrates that 

railroads could be subjected to multi-billion dollar claims—even for accidents where 

they do nothing wrong.13

Moreover, the revenues that highly-hazardous materials generate do not come 

close to covering the potential liability to railroads associated with this traffic. Nor 

can railroads fully insure against the multi-billion dollar risks associated with TIH 

shipments.14 This places railroads in an untenable situation. 

Given these points, I respectfully submit that if there is a public interest need 

for railroads to be compelled to carry TIH materials similar to that requiring them 

to carry SNF, there is a corresponding public interest need for the rail industry to 

be able to take into account and protect itself against the increased risk and potentially ruinous liability exposure associated with transporting TIH materials—just as 

railroads (and others) are protected to a limited degree from liabilities associated 

with SNF. 

This can be achieved if policymakers enact a Price-Anderson type solution. The 

AAR has a legislative proposal which would effect a Price-Anderson type solution 

for TIH transport and would be pleased to discuss it further with the Committee. 

Conclusion 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. Nothing is more important to railroads 

than the safety of their employees, their customers, and the communities they serve. 

The railroad industry is committed to working with its employees, Congress, the 

FRA, its customers, and others to ensure that rail safety continues to improve. 

Senator ENSIGN. I want to thank the panel and I will ask a few 

questions and let Senator Thune ask a few questions. And if I have 

other followup, I will continue with that. 

I want to follow up on some of the questions that I asked in the 

first panel about the accidents and a few of you have had some 

comments on that. 

First of all, Dr. Crowley, the National Academy of Sciences, can 

you address the full-scale models versus what DOE has been testing and why you think that full-scale models are important to do? 

Dr. CROWLEY. I would be happy to do that. And it is not testing 

full-scale models. It is actually testing the articles that are used to 

transport the spent fuel. 

There have been many tests carried out on full-scale articles 

around the world. They include the regulatory tests. For example, 

one of the tests that shipping packages are required to pass is a 

drop of 9 meters onto an unyielding surface, which actually, in 

terms of the impact forces on the canisters, is more severe than you 

are likely to see in any kind of a collision. 

In addition, in the 1970s, Sandia National Laboratory carried out 

a number of tests where they crashed casks, full-scale casks, on 

trailers and trucks and trains against unyielding barriers, and they 

actually crashed a canister on a trailer with a train. Those canisters are designs that are no longer used today. So those are not 

really applicable to current-day standards. 

In addition, in the U.K., the Electricity Generating Board in the 

1980s conducted a test where they put one of their canisters on a 

84 

train, on a flat car, turned the flat car on its side, put it across the 

track, and crashed a very heavy locomotive into that canister at 

about 100 miles an hour. 

So those are the kinds of tests that have been carried out. 

Let me make one other comment. From an impact point of view, 

these packages are very robust, and as I said before, the regulatory 

tests that these canisters have to go through are more rigorous 

than what you are likely to see in a real-world accident. 

That is not necessarily the case for severe fires. There is a 30- 

minute, fully engulfing test that is required as part of the regulation. As you pointed out earlier, there are certainly fires that burn 

for periods on the order of much longer than 30 minutes. In fact, 

I forget when exactly it was. It was in the 1970s or 1980s in the 

U.K.. There was a very, very severe tunnel fire with petrol cars 

that burned for several days. 

Senator ENSIGN. Did we not have something in Baltimore as 

well? 

Dr. CROWLEY. We had a Baltimore fire as well, but that only 

burned for a few hours. So this fire was much—— 

Senator ENSIGN. It is still longer than 30 minutes. 

Dr. CROWLEY. It is much longer than 30 minutes. That is right. 

As a consequence of that U.K. fire, the U.K. Department of 

Transport prohibited the carriage of spent fuel trains with flammable materials or passing other trains in tunnels. 

And I should say for the Baltimore tunnel fire, whether or not 

this package is fully engulfed is really important. If you, for example, just have an end of the package that goes into the fire, the 

heat can conduct away. So you really need to put the entire package in the fire and it needs to be maintained for a long period of 

time to see the kind of impact that you might be concerned about. 

Senator ENSIGN. And that kind of testing has not been done. 

Dr. CROWLEY. To my knowledge, it has not been done. 

Senator ENSIGN. Anybody else want to make any comments on 

that? 

[No response.] 

Senator ENSIGN. Maybe, Dr. Ballard, you have studied—obviously, based on what the terrorists did on 9/11, they looked for 

weaknesses. I mean, do you not think that they would look—you 

said you have to put the mind of a terrorist on, not the mind of 

a regulator or a government oversight official. The mind of a terrorist is going to look for the weaknesses there. If they are going 

to try to attack one of these, do you not think that would be one 

of the things they would try to replicate? 

Dr. BALLARD. Well, across the United States, we will see lots of 

geographic locations that would enhance an attack, a tunnel, a 

bridge, et cetera. I live in Santa Clarita, and we recently had a 

tunnel fire there that was a very significant incident. It was a series of trucks that on a very rainy day got together in the tunnel, 

and they melted the frames of the trucks. Now, was it a fully engulfing fire? If a cask had been in that tunnel, what would have 

happened? The difference between a rail cask and its robustness 

and a truck cask and its robustness—all of those should be tested 

using full-scale testing models, and we have not done that, as far 

85 

as I know, to date, and I think the testimony today kind of supports that. 

Senator ENSIGN. Ms. Schubert, in your testimony, you have been 

able to find these transportation routes. How easy would it be for 

a terrorist to kind of get these transportation routes and be able 

to set up what they would believe an ideal place to attack? 

Ms. SCHUBERT. It took us just looking at the basic maps and the 

EIS and then going in and getting some GIS data and putting layers on it. So it was not that difficult. It took some time and a little 

bit of effort, but these are the DOE maps just with additional information fleshed out so people have a better idea of what is going 

on. 

And I think it is important to point out, although we are talking 

mostly rail and probably truck, we are also talking barge transport, 

which is very slow-moving barges with large casks on them which 

are going to be very obvious to anybody who is looking for something like that. 

Senator ENSIGN. The last question has to do with on-site storage. 

You mentioned, Dr. Crowley, that onsite storage is a pretty proven 

technology today. The security—obviously, you do not have to 

worry about transportation with onsite storage. I do not know if 

you have expertise in this field, but are you familiar with how long 

is on-site storage or what are the best guesses for how long on-site 

dry cask storage would be safe? 

Dr. CROWLEY. Well, actually my organization has also published 

on that aspect as well, so I can talk about that. 

Senator ENSIGN. I knew they had. I did not know whether you 

were familiar with this. 

Dr. CROWLEY. Yes. I was actually also study director of that report. 

Senator ENSIGN. OK. 

Dr. CROWLEY. First of all, let me say that whether or not you 

store something onsite or you transport it to a repository is a policy 

choice. 

Senator ENSIGN. Correct. 

Dr. CROWLEY. We all understand that. This is not a technical 

choice. It is a policy choice. 

As far as storage onsite, you can in principle—— 

Senator ENSIGN. By the way, some people think it is a technical 

choice. 

Dr. CROWLEY. It is not a technical choice. 

Senator ENSIGN. My colleagues do not understand that. They do 

not understand what you just said. They think it is a policy choice. 

They think you cannot store it safely onsite. That is the reason everybody wants to get it out of their back yards. 

Dr. CROWLEY. Well, let me just make a couple of comments about 

that because the answer to your question is not a simple answer. 

From a technical point of view, you can store that stuff forever 

onsite. From a technical point of view. What you have to worry 

about is loss of institutional control, loss of institutional will to continue to take care of that material. If you put it into dry cask storage technology, which is what you can do after about 5 years, you 

can maintain that on a concrete pad. You have got to keep the 

casks painted, and maybe after 100 years or so, you might actually 

86 

have to bring the fuel out of the cask and replace the cask. You 

could continue to do that forever. 

However, those—— 

Senator ENSIGN. But it probably good for at least 100 years. 

Dr. CROWLEY. That is correct. In fact, we have said that. 

However, the nuclear plants will not operate for 100 years, and 

so after some period of time, those plants will be gone and that 

spent fuel will be stranded at the site. When you have an operating 

plant, the owner of the plant has an economic imperative to take 

care of that fuel. Once the plant is gone, that economic imperative 

is gone. 

Senator ENSIGN. Unless the Federal Government takes title to 

that onsite. That is a policy question, not a technical question. 

Dr. CROWLEY. That would be a policy choice. That is right, yes. 

Senator ENSIGN. Anybody else want to comment on that? 

Dr. BALLARD. Senator Ensign, one of the things that we have 

talked here today about is that transporting the material induces 

or increases the risk. We actually have examples of this. On February 4th, 1985, there was a threat against a shipment campaign, 

and that threat was that they would crash a plane into a shipment 

container. That was called in to a corporate headquarters for the 

power plant. It is reported in the NRC’s SSEL document. So we 

have at least an incident of somebody threatening one of these 

shipments. 

What is not in the SSEL is another significant incident, and that 

was in Golden Valley, Minnesota on October 27, 1986, where a 39- 

foot section of track was removed ahead of a train that was carrying SNF. Fortunately, I should say, the shipment was routed— 

a different train was routed ahead of it. It derailed. It was carrying 

lumber, and so we did not have a significant incident at that time. 

We do think that this is related because right on the wall near 

where this track was removed was the slogan: ‘‘Stop rad waste 

shipments.’’ This incident is not in the NRC’s official SSEL. It is 

not documented as a potential threat. 

So the point here is transporting materials adds new threats. It 

brings out new adversaries with that creative capability of trying 

to stop whatever they wish to. 

Senator ENSIGN. Thank you. 

Senator Thune? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

panel, for your insights and your input. 

I am very interested in the energy issues. I have been involved 

with those since arriving here. And I think it is probably one of the 

big challenges our country faces. It strikes me that there are lots 

of things that we should probably be doing more of to help address 

the issue of energy independence. We get about 19 percent of our 

power from nuclear, about 50 percent from coal. 

And if you consider the various policy goals that are sort of laid 

out as we head into the future, one is increasing the use of electric 

hybrid cars, which means we are going to have additional demand 

for electricity, which is going to stretch the supply that we curVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:56 Apr 17, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\80371.TXT JACKIE
87 

rently have, and it gets into whole other issues of transmission capability and whatnot. But there is also the goal of limiting carbon 

emissions, and that too is something that nuclear energy could help 

address, being a clean fuel. 

So I guess the question I have is we have seen in other parts of 

the world—France, for example, I am told 80 percent of their electric power comes from nuclear. Why is it that it has not taken off 

more in this country? And I think many of the issues that are 

being discussed today are perhaps part of that. 

But tell me, if you can, whoever would care to answer this question who has any experience or knowledge with the issues of transporting spent fuel in other countries of the world where nuclear is 

a much bigger part of the energy supply than it is here in the 

United States and have they experienced some of the same issues 

and how do they address those. 

My number here says 1,500 commercial shipments of spent fuel 

since 1979—I guess, Director Weber had testified to this—without 

incident. How do you compare the logistical and technical challenges that we face with these shipments here in this country with 

those in other places around the world where nuclear is a bigger 

in terms of the power supply? 

Dr. CROWLEY. Well, I will take an initial crack at that. As part 

of our Going the Distance study, we actually went to Europe and 

we talked to officials who were involved with and citizens who were 

concerned about transportation of spent fuel. 

As it turns out, in Europe, at least until recently, there has been 

a great deal more spent fuel transportation. The Honorable Edward 

Sproat talked about 3,000 shipments. There have been on the order 

of tens of thousands of shipments in Europe. And the reason for 

that is that until recently, fuel was not stored very long in the 

spent fuel pools at the powerplants. Rather, that fuel was sent to 

be reprocessed both in the U.K. and in France. And so they have 

very routine shipments of fuel. Those routine shipments go through 

very large cities. And there are citizens over there who are concerned about that, but the consensus in those countries seemed to 

be that that is OK. 

Recently the number of shipments have decreased as the reprocessing activity has gone down, and now more plants are storing the 

fuel on their sites rather than sending it for reprocessing. 

Senator ENSIGN. Why has the reprocessing activity gone down? 

Dr. CROWLEY. Well, there have been a number of reasons. In the 

U.K., one of the plants, the Thor plant which is used to reprocess 

oxide fuel, sprung a leak, and so it has been shut down. 

Germany has encountered a lot of resistance in transporting 

spent fuel actually. At one point, they had to call out 30,000 police 

to protect a spent fuel shipment against protesters. So they have 

made a policy decision to store that material at the powerplant 

sites, and all of the powerplants have been required to build storage buildings for that material. 

Other countries in Europe have just decided that it is too expensive to send the fuel for reprocessing, and they have stopped. Not 

all countries, but some countries have just stopped. 

Senator ENSIGN. What is Japan doing now? Did they not just 

build a reprocessing plant? 

88 

Dr. CROWLEY. Japan has been sending its spent fuel to Europe 

to be reprocessed, but they did just recently build a reprocessing 

facility and they will reprocess their fuel domestically. 

Senator THUNE. Could you answer the question as to—one of the 

issues, of course, with transportation and basically the whole Yucca 

Mountain thing of getting rid of nuclear waste as opposed to storing, all those things we have debated here for a long time—and 

Senator Ensign and his colleagues from Nevada have some strong 

views about the whole Yucca Mountain issue. 

But one of the things that we—I have been working with a bipartisan group of Senators who are trying to develop a comprehensive 

energy policy which includes more incentives for nuclear power in 

this country. And one of the things that we addressed was the 

Carter era ban on reprocessing spent fuel. And basically what we 

called for was a demonstration facility to develop spent fuel reprocessing. 

And I guess my question in that regard is, why is that not something in this country that we have been more acceptant of? That 

is clearly something that in the countries that you just mentioned 

they have supported. Why is it that we cannot be developing more 

nuclear power in this country instead of dealing with it and disposing of it at a place like Yucca Mountain, which is very controversial? And I realize the ban is very controversial too. But I 

would be interested in your thoughts on that, Dr. Crowley, about 

why that is not something that would not be now, it seems to me 

at least, more acceptable in this country. 

Dr. CROWLEY. Well, as it turns out, when the first generation of 

commercial nuclear plants were built in this country, the concept 

was to reprocess the spent fuel, and that is one of the reasons that 

those plants have such small spent fuel pools. The idea was to 

store that fuel in the pools for just some matter of months and then 

send it off to be reprocessed. And there were two or three reprocessing plants that were built or planned to be built in the country. 

They ran into a number of technical problems and none of those 

plants—well, one plant in West Valley was operated for a short period of time, but none of the other plants were operated. 

Carter did in, I think it was, 1977, ban reprocessing. On the 

other hand, Reagan overturned that ban in the early 1980s, and 

yet no reprocessing plants were built. And I think at that point it 

was a matter of economics. 

Right now the price of uranium is fairly inexpensive, and if you 

are an operator of a nuclear plant, it is much cheaper for you to 

buy fresh spent fuel and to store that fuel with the idea that you 

would eventually send it off to be disposed of than it is to reprocess 

that fuel. And I think that is the reason that you are not seeing 

a lot of activity for reprocessing in the United States. 

Now, as you know, there has been recent interest in reprocessing, and I know that one of the French companies has asserted 

that, in fact, it is economical to reprocess. But I have not reviewed 

that material, and so I do not really have an opinion on that. 

But historically it has been false starts early on and now economics. 

Senator THUNE. Well, that is good to know. I did not realize that 

economics played that big of a role in that. It just seems like if that 

89 

is something that we could open up a little bit, but if it is, in fact, 

not going to be economical for companies to do that—it seems to 

me that it bears on the whole issue of transportation too because 

my assumption is if you have reprocessing plants different places, 

it probably limits the amount of transportation that is necessary to 

get everything out to Yucca or someplace for disposal like that. I 

would assume those would be all around the country and would 

minimize the distance that some of the spent fuel would have to 

be transported. 

Dr. CROWLEY. Well, let me make a couple of comments about 

that. Right now, as you know, the owners of nuclear power plants 

are spending a tenth of a penny per kilowatt hour to get their fuel 

disposed of, and it is the Government’s responsibility to dispose of 

that fuel. So I think from the perspective of the commercial spent 

fuel owners, they would say, hey, we have already paid for this. 

Why should we pay twice? 

Reprocessing plants are very expensive. Japan spent over $20 

billion on its reprocessing plant. I forget what its capacity is. Several hundred or a couple of thousand of metric tons per year. So 

it would be very expensive to build a lot of reprocessing plants. 

Senator THUNE. You do not see then multiple reprocessing 

plants. 

Dr. CROWLEY. Certainly not initially, no. 

And then also, reprocessing does not eliminate the need for disposal. You are going to reprocess the fuel. You are going to recover 

its useful components, but the waste still has to go somewhere. You 

could store it onsite at the reprocessing plant. Some of the shorterlived radioactivity would decay away, but there would be a longerlived component that would have to be disposed of eventually. 

Senator ENSIGN. The volume is tremendously less, though. Is it 

not? 

Dr. CROWLEY. Not necessarily. It depends on the reprocessing approach that you use. The current approach, which is based on 

PUREX, would not reduce the volume. The Department of Energy 

is trying to develop advanced reprocessing technologies. They claim 

it would reduce the volume. And the other thing that that would 

do for you would be to allow you to separate out the different kinds 

of radioactivity. So a lot of it you could just store for a couple of 

hundred years to decay. 

Senator ENSIGN. Is that the accelerator technology that they are 

talking about? 

Dr. CROWLEY. Well, they are talking about—instead of PUREX, 

it is called UREX. It is just an advanced reprocessing that allows 

you to take the spent fuel, dissolve it, and separate out its components. 

Now, there is another option when you can take some of the 

long-lived components of the fuel, put it into a reactor or an accelerator, and transmute it to reduce its long-term toxicity. 

Senator ENSIGN. That is more theoretical still. Right? 

Dr. CROWLEY. Exactly. That is not ready for deployment at this 

point. 

Senator ENSIGN. Right. That is what I understand. 

I want to thank the panel. 

90 

Also, just one last comment. Also, it had to do with weaponsgrade plutonium was the reason I think Carter stopped the reprocessing as well, although it looks like Europe and Japan have answered that. From what I understand vitrification takes care of 

that problem. It makes it unusable to ever have weapons-grade 

plutonium. 

Dr. CROWLEY. That is not actually true. What they are doing is 

separating out the fission products, and that material has no use 

other than to a terrorist who might want to build a dirty bomb. But 

the plutonium is actually being separated out and it is being 

stored. And that is a real concern. We are not so concerned when 

countries like France and the UK and Japan do that because they 

are allies, but we would be very concerned if other countries that 

were not allies started to do that. 

Senator ENSIGN. In this issue, we are just talking about it here 

in this country. 

So, listen, it has been a fascinating couple of panels. I want to 

thank both panels for your expert testimony, and we will see where 

this leads. Hopefully, it will not lead to Yucca Mountain. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(91) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

HON. EDWARD F. SPROAT III 

Question. The DOE will have the authority to begin shipments to Yucca Mountain 

if the NRC approves the license application for construction authorization, which 

could very quickly lead to the large quantities of nuclear waste being shipped to 

Yucca Mountain. What steps has the DOE taken to prepare the public for the increase in these shipments? Has the DOE been actively addressing public concerns 

over these shipments? 

Answer. Since passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) in 1982, DOE has 

been working with its stakeholders to identify, address, and resolve issues of concern related to the transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. 

DOE has worked with law enforcement, emergency response, and public safety officials from potentially impacted States, Tribes, and local governments to communicate information about spent nuclear fuel transportation. As specific concerns arc 

identified, DOE has addressed them through outreach programs and in discussions 

at Transportation External Coordination Working Group conferences. DOE has also 

maintained cooperative agreements with State Regional Groups (e.g., the Western 

Interstate Energy Board), public safety organizations (e.g., the Commercial Vehicle 

Safety Alliance), and legislative organizations (e.g., the National Conference of State 

Legislatures), all specifically for the purpose of addressing concerns and helping corridor communities prepare for the planned shipments. DOE additionally has responsibilities under Section 180(c) of the NWPA to provide funding and technical assistance for training to states and tribes and will make such funding available. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

HON. EDWARD F. SPROAT III 

Question 1. When will routes and shipment schedules be established? Will the 

public have access to the route information? If not, why not? 

Answer. The selection of truck routes will be made in accordance with DOT routing regulations set forth in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The selection of railroad routes will be the responsibility of the carriers, as specified in Title 

49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. DOE is working with stakeholders to establish routing criteria and will work in close cooperation with the carriers to ensure 

that routes selected will be safe, secure, and efficient. Authorized officials will be 

provided specific routes and shipping schedules as part of the NRC required prenotifications that will be made before each shipment. Specific routes and shipping 

schedules will not he available to the general public for security reasons. 

Question 2. How much of the spent nuclear fuel are you expecting to be transported over highways rather than rail? Are TAD canisters being developed that can 

be transported by tractor trailers? 

Answer. DOE estimates about 10 percent of the spent nuclear fuel to Yucca 

Mountain will be shipped by truck. The TAD canisters currently being designed will 

be shipped to the repository using rail. 

Question 3. How will the Department of Energy ensure the security of shipments 

to Yucca Mountain? 

Answer. The Department is committed to ensuring the security of shipments to 

Yucca Mountain and will meet or exceed the level of security provided by following 

the current regulations and additional measures put in place by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Department 

of Homeland Security. 

DOE coordinates with these entities to continually assess potential developments 

that could affect security. In addition, DOE will work with Federal, State, Tribal 

92 

and local law enforcement, as appropriate, to fulfill our shared responsibilities for 

spent nuclear fuel transportation safety. 

Question 4. Why has DOE not analyzed which specific rail and truck routes to 

Yucca Mountain have the least risk of accident and/or sabotage and the least risk 

of environmental, economic, and human health impacts in the event of accident and/ 

or sabotage? 

Answer. Under applicable regulations specific routing selections cannot be made 

until nearer to he time of shipments. Nevertheless, in its NEPA documentation relating to the Yucca Mountain repository, DOE has analyzed representative routes 

and has also analyzed the risk of accidents, transportation sabotage considerations, 

and consequences of potential sabotage events. 

Question 5. Why shouldn’t the analysis of the relative risks of specific rail routes 

be done now, prior to licensing, instead of after licensing? When will DOE complete 

such an analysis? 

Answer. Under applicable DOT regulations, specific trucking and rail routing decisions cannot be made until nearer the time of shipments. Under those regulations, 

specific rail routing decisions will be made by the rail carriers pursuant to the regulations in effect at the time of the shipments. 

As a general matter, however, the DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. in coordination with the Federal Railroad Administration and the 

Transportation Security Administration, has recently issued a final rule revising requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations applicable to the safe and secure transportation of certain hazardous materials transported in commerce by rail. 

The final rule requires rail carriers to compile annual data on these shipments, use 

the data to analyze safety and security risks along rail routes where those materials 

are transported, assess alternative routing options, and make routing decisions 

based on those assessments to select the safest and most secure practicable route. 

Under the new rule, the railroad carriers are developing their processes for conducting these assessments, on a national scale, taking into account the many thousands of shipments of toxic gases, explosives, and poisons that must be handled 

safely and securely every day. DOE is monitoring how rail shippers and carriers of 

such toxic materials are implementing this new rule. DOE is also working with 

DOT and the railroads to better understand how such assessments arc to be conducted, and how spent nuclear fuel shipments need to be considered in such analyses. 

Question 6. Will DOE contractually bind carriers it contracts with to use those 

rail routes that DOE has determined to be safest? If not, why not? 

Answer. DOT’s new rail routing rules require the carriers to use the routes the 

carriers consider safest and most secure, subject to DOT’s review. DOE contract incorporate DOE Directives that require DOE contractors to follow these and all other 

applicable DOT regulations when transporting material on behalf of DOE. 

Question 7. When does DOE plan to perform an environmental review under the 

National Environmental Policy Act for its National Transportation Plan and National Operational Plan? 

Answer. In 2002, DOE issued its Final Environmental Impact Statement for a 

Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, DOE/EIS–0250F, and in 2008 

issued its final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at 

Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada—Nevada Rail Transportation Corridor, DOE/ 

EIS–0250F–S–2 and its final Environmental Impact Statement for a Rail Alignment 

for the Construction and Operation of a Railroad in Nevada to a Geologic Repository 

at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, DOE/EIS–0369. These documents analyze 

the potential impacts associated with the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and 

high-level radioactive waste to the Yucca Mountain repository. The National Transportation Plan and National Operation Plan that will be developed are planning 

documents that implement the proposed action which was already analyzed in these 

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents. DOE would conduct supplemental NEPA review if DOE makes substantial changes in the proposed action or 

there are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental 

concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impact. 

Question 8. Will DOE require that all nuclear waste shipped by rail to Yucca 

Mountain be carried in dedicated trains, or will it allow some nuclear waste to be 

shipped in general freight service? Will DOE analyze and compare the risk between 

a dedicated train and general freight service, particularly as to railroad route segments that present particular challenges to longer trains? 

93 

Answer. In July 2005, DOE adopted a policy to use dedicated trains as its usual 

mode of rail transportation for shipments of commercial spent nuclear fuel and 

high-level radioactive waste to the Yucca Mountain repository. In adopting this policy, however, DOE has recognized that such materials can be shipped safely regardless of mode and regardless of type of service due primarily to the stringent regulations in place and the robust nature of the transport packages involved. In adopting 

the policy, DOE has additionally identified the primary benefit of using dedicated 

trains to be the significant costs savings over the lifetime of the Yucca Mountain 

Program. However, there may also be circumstances where general freight service 

would be more appropriate to promote costs savings, operational flexibility and/or 

efficiency for shipments to the Yucca Mountain repository. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. HARRY REID TO

HON. EDWARD F. SPROAT III 

Question 1. If the Department of Energy (DOE) is able to maintain its current 

schedule for licensing and building the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository, 

when is the soonest you could begin transporting nuclear waste? Would the DOE 

consider shipping nuclear waste prior to completing construction at Yucca? 

Answer. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the Department of Energy (DOE) 

could not begin transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to 

the Yucca Mountain repository until the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

issues a construction authorization license and a repository license to receive and 

possess spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste for disposal. Under current planning, the earliest date that DOE anticipates that it would begin transporting waste to the Yucca Mountain repository is 2020. 

Question 2. In 2007, the DOE officially gave Congress draft legislation that would 

abolish Department of Transportation (DOT), Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC), Surface Transportation Board, and state authority over transportation of nuclear waste. Does the DOE still support this legislation? Will the DOE be able to 

ship waste if Congress does not eliminate these other agencies’ authorities over nuclear waste shipments? 

Answer. The Department supports the proposed legislation which would not abolish or otherwise change the existing authority of DOT, NRC, the Surface Transportation Board, states and other entities over transportation of nuclear waste by or 

on behalf of DOE. Rather, Section 7 of the proposed legislation would clarify the 

manner in which the Department may exercise its existing authority to regulate the 

safety and security of transportation of radioactive materials to Yucca Mountain. 

DOE has broad authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), 

to regulate all aspects of activities involving radioactive materials that are undertaken by DOE or on its behalf, including the transportation of radioactive materials. 

DOE exercises this authority to regulate certain DOE shipments, such as shipments 

undertaken by governmental employees or shipments involving national security. In 

most cases where DOE utilizes commercial carriers, however, DOE does not exercise 

its AEA authority but rather relies on regulation of these shipments by DOT, NRC 

and other entities as appropriate. With respect to shipments to Yucca Mountain, 

DOE currently plans to use commercial carriers regulated by DOT. 

As a policy matter and without regard to which agency exercises regulatory authority, DOE requires shipments by it or on its behalf to be undertaken in accordance with the requirements and standards that apply to comparable commercial 

shipments, except where there is a determination that national security or another 

critical interest requires different action. This policy is set forth in DOE Orders 

460.1B, Packaging and Transportation Safety, 460.2A, Departmental Materials 

Transportation and Packaging Management, and 470.4A, Safeguards and Security 

Program, as well as DOE Manual 460.2–IA, Radioactive Material Transportation 

Practices Manual. In implementing this policy, DOE will cooperate with Federal, 

State, local and Tribal entities and utilize existing expertise and resources to the 

extent practicable. In all cases, DOE is committed to achieving a level of protection 

that meets or exceeds the level of protection associated with comparable commercial 

shipments regulated by DOT and NRC. 

Question 3. CSX Transportation recently expressed concern that the DOE could 

be reversing its plan to use dedicated railcars for shipping spent nuclear fuel. CSX 

stated that the DOE is now stressing the need for ‘‘flexibility’’ so they can reserve 

the option of shipping spent fuel together with other commercial items. Is the DOE 

reversing its position and if so, why does the DOE now think it is safe to transport 

commercial and nuclear shipments together? 

94 

Answer. In July 2005, DOE adopted a policy to use dedicated trains as its usual 

service mode of rail transportation for shipments of commercial spent nuclear fuel 

and high-level radioactive waste to the Yucca Mountain repository, and that policy 

has not changed. In adopting the policy, DOE has recognized that such materials 

can be shipped safely regardless of mode and regardless of type of service due primarily to the stringent regulations in place and the robust nature of the transport 

packages involved. In adopting the policy, DOE has additionally identified the primary benefit of using dedicated trains to be the significant costs savings over the 

lifetime of the Yucca Mountain Program. However, there may also be circumstances 

where general freight service would be more appropriate to promote costs savings, 

operational flexibility and/or efficiency for shipments to the Yucca Mountain repository. 

Question 4. The National Academy of Sciences, the Government Accountability Office and even the state of Nevada have recommended that the oldest spent nuclear 

fuel should be shipped first. They claim that storing nuclear waste at the reactor 

for 50 years or more before shipping it can reduce public health risks from radiation 

by up to 85 percent. The Academy also notes that this will reduce the consequences 

of a terrorist attack. So why hasn’t the DOE considered shipping older fuel first in 

its environmental impact statements (EIS)? 

Answer. In developing the impact analyses in its environmental impact statements. DOE used conservative, ‘‘bounding’’ assumptions. This is a standard risk assessment practice to ensure the actual impacts likely to occur will be less than— 

in some cases, much less than—the calculated estimate of impacts. The age and radioactivity level of the fuel is one example. In DOE’s analyses, the Department has 

assumed that every shipment of spent nuclear fuel would have the very highest 

level of radioactivity permissible by Federal regulation, every single time, which in 

reality is not possible (older fuel already exists). DOE’s analysis showed that, even 

if every shipment had the very highest levels permissible, the shipments would still 

pose a very low risk. The fuel in any particular shipment, regardless of age, does 

not present a safety or security issue so long as the material is packaged and transported in accordance with the strict regulations that apply to such shipments. 

Question 5. In May, Holtec International—a firm that submitted a bid to design 

the transportation canisters for the DOE—said that an earthquake at Yucca Mountain would send the casks into a ‘‘chaotic melee of bouncing and rolling juggernauts’’ 

if it were to rely on the DOE’s specifications. The firm said that ‘‘pigs will fly before 

the cask will stay put.’’ Has the DOE taken any steps to respond to Holtec’s concerns? 

Answer. In June 2008, DOE submitted its license application for authorization to 

construct the repository, and in September 2008, NRC docketed and commenced its 

detailed review of the application. The NRC will conduct a thorough and rigorous 

review, pursuant to NRC’s applicable regulations, of DOE’s license application and 

will determine the adequacy and safety of the repository. The NRC will similarly 

conduct a rigorous and thorough review of the applications that will be submitted 

for certificates of compliance for the casks used to transport and age spent nuclear 

fuel onsite. 

Question 6. Why hasn’t the DOE requested an independent assessment of nuclear 

waste transportation security, as was recommended by the National Academy of 

Sciences in their 2006 report? 

Answer. DOE agrees with NRC’s position that security measures for future shipments must defend against the threat that exists at the time of that shipment, and 

take advantage of enhancements in technology then available. Since these factors 

may change over time and shipments to the Yucca Mountain repository are not expected to begin until 2020 at the earliest, it would be more appropriate to conduct 

an independent security assessment closer to the time of actual shipments. DOE, 

nevertheless, is currently a participant in a Multilateral Agreement with Great Britain, France and Germany to conduct classified laboratory tests that would accurately measure the impacts of sabotage events on spent fuel. These tests will inform 

future security assessments. 

Question 7. Has the DOE made public its plan for selecting national rail and 

truck routes, as recommended by the National Academy of Sciences? 

Answer. DOE has addressed routing in its National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) documentation relating to transportation, both nationally and in Nevada, of 

spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain. Truck shipments will be shipped in accordance with DOT regulations, using preferred routes 

that reduce time in transit. A preferred route is an Interstate system highway selected by a State or Tribal routing agency in accordance with applicable DOT regulations. Under those regulations, substantive consultation with affected jurisdictions 

95 

would be required prior to designating an alternative route to ensure consideration 

of all impacts and continuity of designated route. 

Rail shipments would be shipped using routes selected by the rail carriers, which 

have responsibility for selection of rail routes. Railroads are privately owned and operated, and shippers and rail carriers determine routes based on a variety of factors. 

Route selection for shipments to Yucca Mountain would involve discussions between 

DOE and the chosen rail carriers, with consideration of input from other stakeholders. While Federal rules do not prescribe specific routes for spent nuclear fuel 

and high-level radioactive waste shipments by rail, certain factors must be considered in route selection. 

DOE anticipates that it will identify a preliminary suite of national routes 5 years 

prior to shipments in order to identify states and tribes that will be eligible for technical assistance and funds for training under Section 180(c) of the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act. Over the past several years, the DOE has engaged in discussions with 

rail carriers and other stakeholders on issues related to routing. 

Question 8. Has the DOE established a social risk advisory group, as recommended by the National Academy of Sciences? 

Answer. As the National Academy of Sciences recommended, DOE has engaged 

stakeholders on methods to communicate about transportation safety, and is currently exploring the formation of an advisory group chartered under the Federal Advisory Committee Act to provide input on a range of transportation issues, including 

the public perception of risk. 

Question 9. What is the DOE’s contingency plan for transporting waste to Yucca 

Mountain in the event that rail access to Yucca is not available by the time Yucca 

is opened? Was this considered in the DOE’s Rail Alignment EIS? 

Answer. In order to operate efficiently and meet its obligations under the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act, DOE needs to have direct rail access to the Yucca Mountain repository. The facility will be able to accept truck shipments of spent nuclear fuel, 

but rail access will be required to efficiently ship larger transportation, aging and 

disposal (TAD) canisters that are the basis of the repository design. DOE plans for 

the railroad to be available before commencement of shipments of spent nuclear fuel 

and high-level radioactive waste. If the railroad were not initially available, however, DOE anticipates that it would consider shipments of spent fuel in small truck 

casks that are included in the scenarios analyzed in the Department’s NEPA documentation relating to the Yucca Mountain repository. 

Question 10. Out of 72 commercial sites with nuclear waste, 24 of them do not 

have railroad access. That means the DOE will have to haul waste by truck from 

at least one third of nuclear reactors. Does the DOE plan to truck the waste to the 

railroad? Has the DOT approved this approach, given that they are highly concerned about unnecessary stops during transport? 

Answer. Sites without direct rail access will be serviced by heavy-haul trucks to 

transport rail casks to a nearby railhead. If a site were unable to accommodate a 

rail cask. a smaller, truck cask would be used on standard size semi-truck trailers. 

Intermodal transfers are common in the transportation industry, and the logistical 

challenges are well-understood. At this time, more than 10 years before shipments, 

potential site-specific transportation infrastructure issues cannot be known with any 

degree of certainty. DOE also evaluated the use of barge transportation for transporting rail casks to nearby railheads from generator sites near navigable waterways but not served by railheads. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

MICHAEL WEBER

Question. The National Academy of Sciences has recommended an independent 

examination of the security of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste 

transportation prior to the commencement of large-quantity shipments to an interim 

or final repository. Has the NRC had difficulties working with the DOE to request 

this type of examination? Why hasn’t the NRC requested an independent assessment of nuclear waste transportation security? What is the NRC currently doing to 

expand the knowledge base for the secure transportation of nuclear waste? 

Answer. The DOE, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and NRC have 

a long history of working together cooperatively on transportation safety and security issues, including their joint sponsorship of the National Academy of Sciences’ 

(NAS) recent study on the transportation of spent fuel. The principal finding of the 

NAS study was: 

96 

The Committee could identify no fundamental technical barriers to the safe 

transport of SNF and HLW in the United States. Transport by highway (for 

small-quantity shipments), and by rail (for large-quantity shipments) is, from 

a technical viewpoint, a low-radiological-risk activity, with manageable safety, 

health, and environmental consequences, when conducted with strict adherence 

to existing regulations. 

The NRC takes this study’s recommendations very seriously and addressed them 

in our program, including preparations for full-scale testing in the U.S. and additional analyses of long-duration, fully engulfing fires. The NAS study also recommended that, ‘‘. . . an independent examination of the security of spent fuel and 

high-level waste transportation should be carried out prior to the commencement of 

large-quantity shipments to a Federal repository or to interim storage.’’ At present, 

the NRC is not planning to conduct an independent security assessment with DOE 

that would cover both shipments to Yucca Mountain and to an interim storage facility because NRC security assessments have shown that current security measures 

and standards put in place since September 11, 2001, are adequate for the protection of spent fuel and high level waste transportation even in the event of increased 

shipping campaigns. Specifically, in light of the elevated threat that the U.S. experienced following the terrorist attacks on September 11, the NRC issued safeguards 

advisories and orders to enhance transportation security of spent nuclear fuel and 

other large quantities of radioactive material. The NRC issued these security enhancements in coordination with DOT, the Department of Homeland Security, State 

agencies, and other Federal agencies. The NRC security assessments of transportation, which were completed after the publication of the NAS report, evaluated a 

number of representative transportation package designs against a variety of credible land-based threats and a deliberate plane crash. The results of these security 

assessments, which we have shared with DOT, DOE, and other organizations that 

have a ‘‘need to know,’’ demonstrate that the current requirements, combined with 

the security enhancements put in place after September 11, provide adequate protection of public health and safety, and the environment, and common defense and 

security. These safeguards advisories and orders are only an interim solution and 

will not be relied on indefinitely. In late 2009, the NRC intends to issue a proposed 

rule for public comment that would revise the requirements for secure transport of 

spent nuclear fuel; the proposed rule would include additional measures to address 

the current threat environment. 

Physical protection measures for future shipments must match the threat in place 

at the time of shipment. In addition, shipment tracking and monitoring technologies 

are constantly improving. The NRC would be responsible for overseeing the security 

requirements for commercial shipments to an interim storage facility and DOE 

would be responsible for implementing and overseeing the security requirements for 

Yucca Mountain shipments. Shipments to Yucca Mountain would not begin, at the 

earliest, until 2020, based on current DOE estimates. This estimate is tentative, 

given that NRC staff continue to review the DOE license application to construct 

and operate the repository. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to consider 

whether an independent examination of shipment security is needed closer to the 

time of actual shipments. To expand the knowledge base for the secure transportation of nuclear waste, the NRC has recently completed, through contract with 

Sandia National Laboratories, a number of security assessments on representative 

spent fuel transportation package designs. The NRC believes that these spent fuel 

transportation package assessments demonstrate that the stringent safety standards applied to the design of spent fuel packages provide substantial protection from 

security threats. NRC is considering the merits of releasing non-sensitive summaries of current spent fuel transportation package security assessments in partial 

response to the NAS study recommendation. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

MICHAEL WEBER

Question 1. If the Department of Energy is responsible for shipments of waste to 

Yucca Mountain, what will be the role the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? 

Answer. Because the Department of Energy (DOE) plans to take custody of the 

spent fuel at the licensee’s site (i.e., at a nuclear power plant), the NRC’s role in 

the transportation of spent fuel to a repository would be limited to certification of 

the designs for shipping casks used for transport and, in the event of a transportation incident, providing technical expertise, if requested. Section 180(a) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 prohibits the Secretary of Energy from transporting 

spent nuclear fuel or high level waste to a repository or monitored retrievable storVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:56 Apr 17, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80371.TXT JACKIE
97 

age facility except in packages certified for such purpose by the NRC. Physical security and transportation safety for these shipments would be addressed under DOE 

and the Department of Transportation’s requirements. 

Question 2. Is the NRC planning to do an independent security assessment with 

DOE that would cover both shipments to Yucca Mountain and to an interim storage 

facility? 

Answer. At the current time, NRC is not planning to conduct an independent security assessment with DOE that would cover both shipments to Yucca Mountain 

and to an interim storage facility. Current security measures and standards put in 

place since September 11, 2001, are adequate for the protection of spent fuel and 

high-level waste transportation even in the event of increased shipping campaigns. 

Physical protection measures for future shipments must match the threat in place 

at the time of shipment. In addition, shipment tracking and monitoring technologies 

are constantly improving. Shipments to Yucca Mountain could not begin, at the earliest, until 2020, based on current DOE estimates. This estimate is tentative given 

that NRC staff continue to review the DOE license application to construct and operate the repository. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to consider whether 

an independent examination of shipment security is needed closer to the time of actual shipments. 

Question 3. Please explain the NRC’s physical protection requirements for the 

transportation of spent nuclear fuel as they would relate to the transport of spent 

nuclear fuel to Yucca Mountain. What is the process for advance notification of 

State Governors prior to a shipment? 

Answer. As DOE plans to take custody of the spent fuel at the NRC licensee’s 

site, DOE requirements would control the physical security of spent fuel shipments. 

NRC’s physical protection requirements would not apply. 

However, Section180(b) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires that the Secretary of Energy abide by the Commission’s regulations regarding advanced notification of State and local governments prior to transportation of spent fuel or highlevel waste to Yucca Mountain. NRC’s advanced notification requirements in 10 

CFR 73.37(f) require an NRC licensee to notify the Governor or Governor’s designee 

at least 4 days prior to a spent fuel shipment within or through a state. Notifications delivered by mail must be postmarked at least 7 days prior to shipment. 

Question 4. You mention in your testimony that you are examining the MacArthur 

Maze accident in Oakland and the I–5/14 interchange tunnel fire in Northern Los 

Angeles County as part of your efforts to improve the security of commercial shipments of spent nuclear fuel. Will you share a copy of the results when your studies 

are completed? 

Answer. Yes. The MacArthur Maze accident and 1–5/14 interchange tunnel fire 

studies are focused on how spent fuel casks would perform under real world accident conditions involving severe fires. The studies are not specifically focused on security-related scenarios, although the studies could be used to inform the assessment of sabotage or security scenarios involving severe fires. NRC is planning to 

publish the draft reports for the MacArthur Maze accident in Oakland and the 1– 

5/14 interchange tunnel fire in Northern Los Angeles County for public comment. 

We anticipate that the draft reports on both accidents will be published in mid-calendar year 2009. The NRC’s Office of Congressional Affairs will provide your office 

a copy of the draft reports as soon as they are published. The NRC will also notify 

the public of the reports’ availability and seek public comments by Federal Register 

notice and by making the reports available on the NRC’s public website. The final 

reports will be issued after public comments are considered. The NRC’s Office of 

Congressional Affairs will provide your office a copy of the final reports 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. HARRY REID TO

MICHAEL WEBER

Question 1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recorded at least 

four accidents involving spent nuclear fuel shipments over the past 30 years. Please 

tell the Committee about those accidents and how the NRC responded. 

Answer. The NRC is aware of four transportation accidents since 1971 that have 

involved loaded spent fuel casks in transit. These accidents are summarized in the 

table below. When accidents involving spent fuel shipments occur, State and local 

governments have the primary responsibility to respond. Therefore, these accidents 

were handled at the State and local level, with assistance from the carriers and 

shippers. 

98 

Transportation Accidents involving Commercial Spent Fuel Casks (1971–Present) 

Mode Date Location Description 

Truck December 8, 1971 Tennessee Cask thrown free of trailer following 

head-on collision with automobile. 

Minor cask damage and no release. 

Driver killed. 

Truck February 2, 1978 Illinois Trailer collapsed while crossing railroad 

tracks. No cask damage or release. 

Truck December 9, 1983 Indiana Trailer separated from its axles. No cask 

damage or release. 

Rail March 24, 1987 Missouri Train-auto collision at grade crossing. 

Train carrying two casks of Three Mile 

Island core debris. No cask damage or 

release. 

Question 2. While the risk for a major accident involving a nuclear waste shipment is not great, it still exists and one major accident after thousands of successful 

shipments would mean this entire program is a failure. How is the NRC prepared 

to respond to a worst-case scenario situation, in which there is a major radioactive 

release on a railway or a highway? 

Answer. The likelihood of highway or rail accident occurring that results in a 

major release of radioactive material is extremely low. This assessment is based on 

the outstanding safety record of spent fuel shipments during the past thirty years, 

numerous transportation shipment risk assessments completed by both the NRC 

and other Federal Agencies, an independent assessment of spent fuel transportation 

safety published by the National Academy of Sciences in 2006, and the technical 

knowledge gained from the actual physical testing of spent fuel casks conducted 

both within the United States and abroad. 

In the event that an accident involving a spent fuel shipment occurs, State and 

local governments have the primary responsibility to respond. The NRC is prepared 

to respond by providing technical expertise if requested, to support State and local 

governments in their response. In an extremely unlikely accident scenario involving 

a major release of radioactive material on a railway or a highway, NRC would support a coordinated Federal response under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex 

of the National Response Framework. 

In accordance with the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, the Federal Department or Agency responsible for the material involved in the accident would coordinate the response of other Federal Departments and Agencies, including the deployment of specialized equipment and personnel. The Department of Energy (DOE) is 

the coordinating agency for transportation incidents involving DOE materials. 

Therefore, if DOE takes custody of spent fuel prior to shipment to Yucca Mountain, 

DOE would be the coordinating agency for transportation incidents. In this case, 

NRC is prepared to provide technical expertise. For shipments to sites other than 

Yucca Mountain, the NRC is prepared to act as the coordinating agency for transportation incidents that involve the shipment of radiological material by NRC or 

Agreement State licensees. 

The NRC is also prepared to support the Department of Homeland Security in 

those circumstances under which they take a lead role in coordinating the Federal 

response under the National Response Framework. 

Question 3. The NRC reports prepared in the late 1970s estimated that sabotage 

of a spent fuel shipment in an urban area could cause hundreds of early fatalities, 

thousands of latent cancer fatalities and economic losses in the billions. In 1979, the 

NRC promulgated regulations to safeguard shipments from sabotage and terrorism. 

Has the NRC reconsidered these regulations or made any significant changes to 

them over the past 30 years? 

Answer. Yes, the NRC continually evaluates its regulations based on new information. 

With regard to the reports, the NRC published two reports in the mid-1970s: Calculations of Radiological Consequences from Sabotage of Shipping Casks for Spent 

Fuel and High Level Waste, NUREG–0194, February 1977, and Final Environmental Statement on Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other 

Modes, NUREG–0170, December 1977, that estimated the health effects of a radiological release in a non-urban area and determined that the estimated risks were 

not considered substantive enough to warrant regulatory action. Sandia Laboratories also issued a study in 1977, Transport of Radionuclides in Urban Environs: 

99 

A Working Draft Assessment, SAND 77–1927, suggesting that the sabotage of spent 

fuel shipments had the potential for producing serious radiologic consequences in 

areas of high population density. In response to the Sandia study, the NRC issued 

interim safeguard measures for spent fuel shipments in an interim rule published 

on June 15, 1979. The physical protection requirements were subsequently modified 

based on public comments in a final rule dated June 3, 1980. 

The Sandia report (SAND 77–1927) contained estimates which were subject to 

large uncertainties due to lack of technical data. As a result, NRC and the Department of Energy sponsored research programs to yield information about the potential for radiological releases from sabotage events. The research supported a conclusion that the potential releases from sabotage events were a tiny percentage of the 

values estimated in the Sandia report (e.g., no early fatalities and seven latent cancer fatalities). The interim safeguard measures were subsequently modified to reflect the research results and the modified measures were incorporated into NRC 

regulations by public rulemaking on June 8, 1984. 

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC determined that additional security measures were necessary during the transport of spent nuclear fuel and that 

the existing regulations should be enhanced to further protect spent fuel during 

transport. The NRC began issuing orders to licensees shipping spent nuclear fuel 

in October 2002. Only those licensees currently shipping or expecting to ship spent 

fuel in the near future received the initial order. Since 2002, the staff issued additional orders to licensees transporting spent fuel when these licensees indicated 

their intention to ship, The orders imposing additional security measures during 

shipments of spent nuclear fuel are an interim solution, pending rulemaking, as described below. 

The NRC initiated a rulemaking in September 2008 to enhance the in-transit security requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 consistent with the security measures imposed by the post-9/11 orders. These measures include: assuring consistent physical 

protection along the entire shipping route; pre-planning and coordination of a shipment with the states; communications among the transporters, escorts, local law enforcement agencies, and movement control centers; trustworthiness and reliability 

of individuals associated with the shipment; and normal and contingency procedures 

and training of individuals associated with the shipment, The proposed rule is expected to be published in late 2009 for public comment, with the final rule expected 

to be issued in late 2010-early 2011. 

Question 4. Since the attacks against America on September 11, 2001, the NRC 

has studied the vulnerability of nuclear waste transportation containers. Why 

haven’t the results of these studies been made available to the applicable state and 

local governments? If states and local governments are going to be involved in the 

transportation planning process, shouldn’t they have more information about the 

risks involved? What can be done to involve state and local governments in the 

transportation planning process? 

Answer. The Commission understands the importance of this information in enabling State and local governments to plan for the safety and security of spent fuel 

shipments, especially in their emergency response roles and responsibilities, and intends to ensure that they have the information they need to exercise these roles and 

responsibilities. In late 2006, the NRC began a dialogue with representatives of 

State Regional Transportation Groups aimed at sharing information from the NRC 

spent fuel transportation package security assessments with State and local governments to help them prepare more effectively for their emergency response and law 

enforcement responsibilities. This ongoing dialogue includes a discussion of what information (related to the spent fuel transportation package security assessments) is 

needed, how and by whom such information would be used, and how shared sensitive information would be protected. These groups include transportation safety 

task forces established through the Western States Energy Board, the Southern 

States Energy Board, and the Council of State Governments, Midwestern and 

Northeast States Divisions. Collectively, the state regional groups contain state representatives from all of the states that have potential transportation routes to Yucca 

Mountain. 

Question 5. In 2001, 11 train cars derailed while passing through the Howard 

Street Tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland, setting off a fire that lasted for days and was 

1800 degrees Fahrenheit. Could the Department of Energy’s (DOE) proposed multiuse transportation casks withstand such an accident? 

Answer. The NRC staff has extensively evaluated the Baltimore Tunnel fire of 

2001, along with other severe accidents as part of its efforts to ensure the safety 

of radioactive material transportation. In November 2006, NRC released a study 

that focused on how three representative spent fuel cask designs would have perVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:56 Apr 17, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80371.TXT JACKIE
100 

formed if they were involved in the Baltimore Tunnel fire (Spent Fuel Transportation Package Response to the Baltimore Tunnel Fire Scenario, NUREG/CR6886, 

Rev.1., November 2006). The cask designs analyzed included the NAC–LWT truck 

cask, and the HOLTEC HI–STAR 100 and TN–68 rail casks. The study concluded 

that the fire, if it had involved spent fuel casks, would not have caused a release 

of radioactive material from the spent fuel for any of these three cask designs. 

The Baltimore Tunnel fire study did not specifically consider DOE’s proposed 

multi-use transportation casks, as the designs for these casks are still being finalized and have not yet been submitted to the NRC for review. Therefore, it would 

be premature to make a definitive judgment as to how DOE’s proposed multi-use 

transportation cask designs would perform. However, we believe that DOE’s proposed multi-use transportation rail cask designs would be similar in size, weight, 

and configuration to the rail casks we analyzed in our 2006 Baltimore Tunnel fire 

study. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

EDWARD PRITCHARD

Question. The DOE is advocating for legislation that would give the DOE authority to preempt the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) regulation of the transportation of nuclear waste. Is this something you support? Do you think it is necessary 

to preempt DOT regulations to facilitate a massive nuclear waste shipping campaign? How would that affect the safety of such shipments? 

Answer. SNF/HLRW has been successfully shipped by rail for the past 50 years. 

The exemplary safety record associated with these shipments over this time-frame 

leads FRA to firmly believe that SNF/HLRW can be safely and securely transported 

by rail from its current locations throughout the country to Yucca Mountain. FRA 

strongly believes, however, that the cornerstone of this exemplary safety record is 

application of the comprehensive regulatory framework and effective oversight by 

DOT and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and that the true strength of the 

transportation safety program lies in the shared responsibility and cooperation 

among Federal, State, and local partners. Although in the Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act submitted to Congress in 2006 DOE proposed to preempt 

DOT’s regulation of the transportation of radioactive materials in certain circumstances, FRA understands that DOE is not currently advocating for such legislation. Given the success of the current Federal regulatory system governing the 

transport of SNF/HLRW and the safety-critical aspects of such transportation, FRA 

would not support preemption of the comprehensive Federal regulatory process currently governing the transport of SNF/HLRW. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. HARRY REID TO

EDWARD PRITCHARD

Question 1. In comments to the Surface Transportation Board, CSX recently expressed concern that the Department of Energy (DOE) is retreating from its commitment to use dedicated train service for shipping nuclear waste. The DOE apparently hasn’t decided whether it will share its trains or its Nevada rail line with commercial carriers. Does the Federal Railroad Administration take a position about 

whether nuclear waste should be transported in dedicated train service? What are 

the risks of putting nuclear waste on the same trains as commercial freight? 

Answer. In response to Congress’s mandate in the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) studied the safety of using dedicated trains for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel 

(SNF) and high level radioactive waste (HLRW) as compared to other methods of 

rail transportation (i.e., general consist trains transporting benign freight and/or 

other hazardous materials or ‘‘key trains’’ operating at maximum authorized speeds 

of 50 mph). A dedicated train is a train that consists only of equipment and lading 

associated with the transportation of SNF/HLRW. FRA’s research concluded that 

given the comprehensive regulatory scheme applicable to the transportation of SNF 

and HLRW, the risk to employees and the public from such transportation is low 

to begin with, but on a comparative basis, use of dedicated trains would offer several advantages over general consist trains in the rail operating environment. For 

example, because by definition dedicated trains will be routed more directly to a 

destination, the trains will have shorter transit times than general consist trains. 

This shorter transit time reduces the probability of an SNF/HLRW cask being involved in a train accident and the potential hazards that can be associated with frequent yard stops (e.g., increased dwell time and increased handling and switching 

101 

of the cars carrying the casks). The probability of a dedicated train being involved 

in an accident is further reduced by the decreased stopping distance of the shorter 

consist, as compared to general consist trains. In addition, use of dedicated trains 

would reduce the potential radiation exposure in any accident, as accident clearing 

can be expedited since the consist would be shorter than a general consist train, and 

since there are no other hazardous materials in the consist, there would be little 

chance of a fire that would prolong the response and accident clearing duration. Use 

of dedicated trains would also allow more flexibility to avoid higher-risk locations 

and to more easily impose operating restrictions such as lower operating speeds, as 

well as making it possible to further enhance the security of shipments of SNF/ 

HLRW. 

The risks of transporting SNF/HLRW in a general consist train are directly opposite to the advantages cited above. For example, a general consist train will generally be longer than a dedicated train and will not be routed to its end destination 

as directly and expeditiously as a dedicated train. Accordingly, the stopping distance 

of a general consist train will generally be longer than a dedicated train, the transit 

times will be increased, and a rail car transporting a cask in a general consist train 

will be more likely to be subject to additional handling and dwell time in railroad 

yards. If other hazardous materials are present in the train consist, there is an increased risk that in the event of an accident or incident that results in the breach 

of a hazardous materials packaging in the train (e.g., a tank car containing a hazardous material), that other hazardous material could interact with or have an impact on the SNF/HLRW. 

Given the clear advantages of utilizing dedicated trains as compared to general 

consist trains to transport SNF/HLRW by rail, FRA is currently conducting research 

to identify the train dynamics applicable to the configuration of dedicated train consists, as well as whether any additional specialized operational or mechanical measures should be implemented to ensure the safety of such operations. Based on the 

results of this research, FRA plans to initiate a rulemaking proceeding amending 

the Federal railroad safety regulations as necessary. 

In a March 2005 report to Congress titled ‘‘Use of Dedicated Trains for Transportation of High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel,’’ FRA examined in 

further detail the relative safety of rail shipment alternatives for the transport of 

SNF and HLRW. A copy of that report can be accessed at: http://www.fra.dot.gov/ 

downloads/safety/reportldedicatedltrains.pdf. 

Question 2. The DOE is not in the railroad business today. Do you believe that 

the DOE is prepared to not only build and operate the largest new rail line since 

the 1930s, but to launch a nationwide campaign to make thousands of shipments 

of nuclear waste? 

Answer. Over the past 16 years, FRA has actively coordinated with the relevant 

offices of DOE on the infrastructure and planning issues that will need to be addressed to ensure the safe rail transportation of SNF/HLRW to Yucca Mountain. 

Most recently, DOE’s Office of Logistics Management requested FRA’s assistance in 

planning the proposed Nevada rail line. FRA has and will continue to work with 

that office, and other relevant DOE offices, to provide the necessary railroad-specific 

expertise and assistance to ensure that transportation of SNF/HLRW to Yucca 

Mountain will occur safely and securely. In addition, because as currently contemplated, SNF/HLRW will be transported to Yucca Mountain by commercial rail 

lines under contract to the Department of Energy (DOE), these operations will be 

required to comply with the DOT’s comprehensive set of hazardous materials and 

rail safety regulations (49 CFR Parts 107, 171–180 and 49 CFR Parts 209–244). 

FRA will continue working with the DOE, all interested stakeholders, and when appropriate, the carriers responsible for transportation of the SNF/HLRW to Yucca 

Mountain to ensure that such transportation is conducted in the safest and most 

secure manner possible and in compliance with all applicable regulations. 

Spent nuclear fuel shipments are a very minor portion of hazardous cargo movements by the rail industry. In 2006, all radioactive contents shipped by rail were 

only 0.5 percent of the overall hazardous material transported (AAR data). Spent 

nuclear fuel is a minor subset of the radioactive cargo. In this context, the challenge 

presented by these shipments is manageable. 

102 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. HARRY REID TO

TED WILLKE

Question 1. How prepared are states today to deal with thousands of rail and 

truck shipments of nuclear waste? What additional steps must be taken to make 

emergency responders prepared to deal with a potential accident involving a radioactive release? 

Answer. PHMSA recognizes the challenges the emergency response community 

faces in dealing with transport accidents involving spent nuclear fuel. In fact, one 

of our core goals is reaching out to emergency responders and hazardous materials 

stakeholders to ensure the preparedness and response communities are fully primed 

to deal with any type of hazardous material incident. PHMSA is prepared to provide 

its technical expertise to its Federal partners, the nuclear industry and State and 

local governments to ensure the transportation system remains safe. 

While successful hazardous materials emergency preparedness programs exist, 

Congress has recognized additional effort will be needed when spent nuclear fuel is 

transported to a geologic repository. Accordingly, Section 180(c) of the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act directs the Department of Energy (DOE) to provide technical and 

financial assistance to states and Indian tribes for training public safety officials in 

procedures for safe, routine transportation and emergency response situations. As 

transportation planning progresses, PHMSA will be prepared to work with DOE to 

apply its experience with existing emergency preparedness programs in developing 

a Yucca Mountain preparedness program. PHMSA also encourages DOE to conduct 

exercise programs to test and validate State, Tribal, and local officials’ transportation emergency response plans. 

Question 2. Given that Nevada will undergo shipments of nuclear waste from 43 

other states if the Yucca Mountain project moves forward, why has Nevada received 

less Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness grant funding than all except for 

9 states? 

Answer. Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) planning and 

training grant funds are apportioned by formula. The grant allocation formula was 

developed by an interagency workgroup (which is now the National Response 

Team’s training subcommittee) to distribute HMEP grants funds fairly and consistently to states, territories, and Indian tribes for addressing all hazardous material 

shipments. Spent nuclear fuel shipments are as very minor portion of the overall 

hazardous material shipment workload. To ensure a sufficient minimum level of 

planning funds for all grantees, a base amount is divided equally among all states 

and territories, and 3 percent of total planning funds are designated for Indian 

tribes. The remaining planning grant funds are apportioned according to the following risk related factors: 

• One-fifth of the remaining funds are allocated to states and territories on the 

basis of their percentage of total population, with this measure serving as surrogate for risk to the general public. 

• Two-fifths are allocated on the basis of a State’s or Territory’s percentage of 

total hazardous materials truck miles, a surrogate for highway hazmat risk. 

• The final two-fifths are allocated on the basis of a State’s or Territory’s percentage of SARA 302 chemical facilities, a surrogate for fixed facility risk. 

The base amounts plus the risk-related apportionments comprise the total training grant allocations to states and territories. As with planning funds, all but 3 percent of total training funds (the total training funds designated for Indian tribes) 

are apportioned on the basis of these risk-related factors: 

• One-half on the basis of population. 

• Three-tenths on the basis of total highway miles. 

• Two-tenths on the basis of the number of fixed hazardous materials facilities 

that are identified by Census Bureau data. 

In 2007, $12,800,000 was available for HMEP planning and training grants. Of 

this, Nevada received $123,592 using the allocation formula; an additional $98,130 

was awarded to Indian tribes in Nevada. Taking this into account, Nevada ranked 

21st out of 50 states for HMEP grant awards. 

In 2008, $21,300,000 was available for HMEP planning and training grants. Of 

this, Nevada received $210,193, and $109,097 was awarded to Indian tribes in Nevada. In 2008, Nevada ranked 27th out of 50 states for HMEP grant awards. 

Question 3. In 2007, the Department of Energy (DOE) officially gave Congress 

draft legislation that would abolish Department of Transportation’s (DOT) authority 

over transportation of nuclear waste under the Hazardous Materials Authorization 

103 

Act. It would also preempt state and Indian tribes’ transportation requirements. 

While there is no chance Congress will pass such sweeping authority to the DOE 

anytime soon, do you think DOT regulations and state regulations need to be preempted to facilitate a massive nuclear waste shipping campaign? 

Answer. PHMSA believes that spent nuclear fuel can be safely and securely transported to a permanent repository under current law and PHMSA’s existing hazardous materials transport safety program. The current regulatory program—based 

on uniform, federally-mandated safety controls and strong Federal-State partnerships for oversight and enforcement—has achieved an exemplary safety record for 

spent nuclear fuel movements over the past 50 years (1,500 shipments). 

Question 4. The DOT requires that nuclear waste shipments avoid intermediate 

stops to avoid potential accidents and sabotage during stops. What role does or 

would the DOT play in the routing of nuclear waste shipments? 

Answer. DOT has established Federal standards and guidelines for routing of nuclear waste shipments. Rail routes for radioactive materials shipments are determined by rail carriers, subject to Federal standards, including PHMSA’s recent interim final rule requiring that carriers select routes posing the least overall safety 

and security risks. Under PHMSA’s rule, beginning in 2009, rail carriers transporting highway route-controlled quantities of radioactive materials must analyze 

the safety and security risks along rail routes where such materials are transported, 

assess alternative routing options for those materials, and make routing decisions 

based on those assessments. Highway routing guidelines have been developed jointly by PHMSA and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. These guidelines are issued in DOT’s publication ‘‘Guidelines for Selecting Preferred Highway 

Routes for Highway Route Controlled Quantity Shipments of Radioactive Materials.’’ Briefly, these guidelines require carriers to follow ‘‘preferred’’ routes; prepare 

and file route plans; provide driver training; provide emergency response training 

and information; and follow security requirements. They also establish a methodology for determining how a ‘‘preferred’’ route is selected. The methodology includes 

the following: route identification and comparison criteria; criteria to evaluate radiation exposure to personnel and the environment; guidelines for assessing economic 

risk; emergency response evaluation methods; and general highway safety criteria. 

Question 5. How would the DOT ensure that trucks hauling nuclear waste are 

safe during required stops, such as refueling? 

Answer. The same robust design and construction features that make transportation casks safe across transport accident scenarios also limit their vulnerability 

to sabotage, theft, and diversion during transport. In addition to coordinating all 

shipments with states, Indian tribes, and Federal law enforcement agencies, DOE 

will have in place the following standards: 

• Satellite tracking of shipments, with access to tracking information by appropriate Federal, State, and Tribal officials; 

• Notification to relevant Governors and Tribal leaders before transport begins; 

• Special safeguard procedures for the shipper to follow in emergencies; 

• Escort training on threat recognition, response, and management; 

• Advance arrangements with law enforcement agencies along the route; 

• Armed escorts to accompany the shipment; 

• Escorts to maintain visual surveillance of the shipment at all times; 

• Status reporting by the escorts every 2 hours; 

• The capability to immobilize the cab or cargo-carrying portion of the vehicle (for 

highway shipments); and 

• Protection of specific information about any shipment. 

Question 6. Out of 72 commercial sites with nuclear waste, one third of them do 

not have rail access. That means the DOE will have to haul waste by truck from 

these nuclear reactors either all the way to Nevada or to a railway. Does adding 

steps to the transportation process raise security or safety risks? Has the DOT approved this approach? 

Answer. Coordination between the Federal Government and nuclear utilities will 

play an integral role in the planning and implementation of the transportation system. Transporting waste to the repository will begin at the utilities when they prepare transportation casks for DOE-managed shipment. As current owners of the 

fuel, the utilities have the responsibility of training their personnel appropriately 

to ensure the safe transfer of the waste to DOE, pursuant to DOT and NRC regulations. 

104 

It is our understanding that DOE will update both the nuclear site capability assessment data and the data on transportation infrastructure in the vicinity of sites 

that was collected in the early 1990s three to five years before shipments start. Site 

capability data identify the various operating capabilities at and around the utility 

sites that are important to determining cask requirements and site servicing needs. 

Transport infrastructure data provide information concerning the local transportation infrastructure that connects the utility sites with the nearest mainline rail 

or interstate highway system. Both data sets will be used to develop site-specific 

and final transportation requirements. 

DOT’s hazardous materials transport regulations prescribe safety controls providing an equivalent level of safety for all modes of transport and Federal security 

requirements apply equally across all modes of transport considered for spent nuclear fuel. Accordingly, hauling spent nuclear fuel from the reactor site to the nearest railway will not adversely impact its safe and secure transport. As DOE has not 

completed its transportation planning, PHMSA has not issued any transport or 

packaging approval or permit to DOE for the transport of commercial spent nuclear 

fuel. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

KEN COOK

Question. What outstanding questions do you think need to be resolved before the 

shipment of nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain can begin? 

Answer. Chairman Inouye, the crucial issues surrounding the safety and security 

of the transportation and storage of lethal, long-lived nuclear waste in the United 

States must meet the highest scientific standards of objective, rigorous analysis and 

transparency of process. Unfortunately, the rush to approve and build the proposed 

Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository has not met these standards. 

Since 2002, EWG has helped educate the public about the implications of nuclear 

waste, with a particular focus on the implications of transporting deadly radioactive 

wastes from nuclear power plants around the United States to Yucca Mountain, 

should the proposed nuclear waste repository there become operational. The American public’s fundamental right to understand the full implications of shipping thousands of tons of extremely hazardous nuclear waste across this country should be 

central to the government’s process for licensing Yucca Mountain, for operating any 

other repository for this material, and for all decisions to relicense existing reactors 

or build new ones. The Federal Government has not respected this right to know. 

There are many examples of how government is violating people’s right to know 

how the transportation of nuclear waste will affect them. The Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency 

have not implemented the safety and scientific recommendations of the National 

Academies of Sciences 1995 report The Technical Basis for the Yucca Mountain 

Standard, or of its February 2006 report Going the Distance? The Safe Transport 

of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States. 

• EPA has not proposed or set a public health radiation safety standard that is 

protective of people at peak exposure. 

• Both the Government Accountability Office and the Nuclear Waste Technical 

Review Board have questioned basic scientific and work produced by DOE, including its characterization of the physical and chemical characteristics of the 

proposed Yucca Mountain site and the effectiveness of proposed man-made barriers to the spread of lethal radiation. 

• Addressed the security threats posed by the transportation of spent nuclear 

fuel. 

• Planned for full scale physical testing of spent fuel transportation casks to determine basic safety issues, such as crash failure thresholds. 

In addition, the foremost experts on Yucca Mountain have provided extensive detail as to why the proposed nuclear waste dump site is geologically unsuitable. (See 

Yucca Mountain and the Nation’s High-Level Nuclear Waste, edited by Allison M. 

Macfarlane and Rodney C. Ewing, 2006.) 

It makes no sense to generate tons more nuclear waste when we have not figured 

out what to do with the tens of thousands of tons already on hand. Our government 

has ignored that common sense precaution. Yet, the government is rushing to approve the license application for Yucca Mountain before rudimentary, life and death 

questions have been resolved about transportation, storage, and a truly protective 

105 

radiation safety standard. We should not burden our children and their children 

with unacceptable risks. 

This result of the government’s push to license the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump and its subsidization of the nuclear industry while ignoring the 

public health, environmental and economic costs of these activities virtually guarantees that: 

• Nuclear power plants would be transformed into long-term nuclear waste 

dumps. The recent surge in reactor relicensing ensures that hundreds of metric 

tons of extremely hazardous, high-level nuclear waste would remain in place at 

reactors around the country, as more waste is produced long after the proposed 

Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump would be full. 

• The proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump would have to be expanded 

or a second repository opened to accommodate the additional waste. By law, 

Yucca Mountain is limited to 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste, which is almost equal to the amount of nuclear waste that will be stored on-site at reactors 

around the country in 2010, well before any repository could be opened. 

• If rail were the primary means of transporting the waste, the security and 

health risks inherent in these shipments are enormous, and preparedness is 

minimal. 

• The public would be unaware of, and unprepared for, the implications of policy 

decisions regarding nuclear power and nuclear waste and its transportation 

through its neighborhoods. 

People of every state have a right to know and fully understand the implications 

for them of shipping nuclear waste to the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository 

before shipping begins or the license for the facility goes forward. And they have 

the same right to know what expansion of nuclear waste generation will mean for 

transportation through their state if reactors around the country are relicensed for 

10 to 20 additional years of operation, or new reactors are constructed. They may 

or may not know that decisions made hundreds of miles away will have profound 

implications for the shipment of high-level, deadly nuclear waste through their 

neighborhoods for decades to come. 

I thank you, Chairman Inouye, for the opportunity to answer your questions. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

KEVIN CROWLEY

Question. Do you feel that the recommendations for the security and social challenges of transporting nuclear waste in your 2006 National Academy of Sciences report have been adequately addressed by the DOE, Department of Transportation, 

Department of Homeland Security, and the NRC? 

Answer. To my knowledge, the Federal agencies have not addressed the recommendation in the National Academies 2006 report that an independent examination of the security of spent fuel and high-level waste be carried out prior to the 

commencement of large-quantity shipments to a Federal repository or to interim 

storage. The National Academies committee that made this recommendation wanted 

this independent examination to be carried out well in advance of the start of the 

transportation program so that steps could be taken to address any deficiencies that 

were identified. Otherwise, the initiation of the transportation program could be delayed. 

DOE is taking important first steps to address the social challenges identified in 

our 2006 report. It is seeking advice from a social science expert and its external 

advisory group (Transportation External Coordination Working Group) on how to 

address the social challenges. This work is still in progress and it is too soon to 

judge whether it will be successful. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. HARRY REID TO

KEVIN CROWLEY

Question 1. In your view, has the Department of Energy (DOE) adequately addressed recommendations from the Academy’s 2006 report that they make public 

their ‘‘suite of preferred highway and rail routes for transporting nuclear waste’’ to 

support state, local and emergency responder preparedness? What would be the consequences of failing to engage state and local governments in routing nuclear waste 

shipments? 

106 

Answer. In my view, DOE is making good progress in addressing this recommendation by working with state, tribal, and local officials to develop a consultative process for selecting highway and rail routes for transporting nuclear waste 

to a geologic repository. This work is being carried out primarily through DOE’s 

Transportation External Coordination Working Group. However, to my knowledge, 

DOE has not yet announced the specific routes that will be used to ship spent fuel 

and high-level waste to the repository should it be licensed and constructed. 

It is important to consult with state, tribal, and local governments because these 

entities generally have better knowledge of local conditions, for example traffic and 

road conditions, that can affect the safety and security of shipments. Failure to consult with these governments could result in suboptimal route selections, loss of cooperation, and increased public resistance to shipping programs. 

Question 2. The Academy has recommended that the DOE should ship older spent 

fuel before they ship newer, more radioactive fuel. Please describe the public safety 

and security benefits of this approach? Has the DOE ever indicated that they plan 

to follow this recommendation? 

Answer. There are two primary benefits for shipping older fuel first. First, it 

would provide an additional margin of safety, especially for reducing radiation doses 

to transportation personnel who work in close proximity to the shipping casks (the 

casks do not shield all of the radiation emitted by the spent fuel contained within 

them). In the Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain, DOE estimated 

that some transportation workers would receive the maximum annual amount of radiation allowed by DOE occupational administrative limits during each of the 24 

years of the transportation program. That limit is currently 20 millisieverts (2 rem) 

per year. 

Second, shipping older fuel first would reduce the amount of radioactive material 

that could be released into the environment as a result of a severe accident or terrorist attack that breached the shipping cask. The risk of such releases is understood to be very small for severe accidents because of the robust construction of 

shipping casks. The National Academies has not undertaken a detailed assessment 

of transportation security and therefore cannot comment on the risks. 

DOE has not indicated to the National Academies whether it intends to follow the 

recommendation to ship older fuel first. It is important to note, however, that under 

the requirements of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act DOE does not appear to have the 

legal authority to require spent fuel owners to offer their older fuel first for shipment. Consequently, if DOE decided to follow this recommendation it would probably have to negotiate with spent fuel owners. 

Question 3. Would transportation risks be reduced if the United States were to 

store spent nuclear fuel onsite at nuclear reactors for several decades before shipping it? What is the best age for nuclear fuel for transporting it with the least risk? 

Answer. Storing spent fuel onsite for several decades would reduce its radioactivity. Shipping lower-radioactivity fuel would likely reduce transportation risks, especially risks to transportation workers for the reasons noted in my response to the 

previous question. The risks would continue to decrease the longer the fuel was 

stored onsite. However, it is important to note that the risks of transporting spent 

fuel, or storing it onsite for that matter, will always be greater than zero. 

It is interesting to note that if DOE ships older fuel first to the repository using 

its currently planned shipping schedule of 3,000 metric tons per year, most spent 

fuel will have been stored at plant sites for several decades before it is shipped to 

the repository. 

Question 4. In the Academy’s 2006 report, the Academy suggested that the DOE, 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other agencies develop clear criteria for protecting sensitive information while making public less-sensitive information. Has information useful for community and emergency responder planning been 

made easily accessible? 

Answer. The information that would be helpful to community and emergency responder planners include the following: the types and quantities of material being 

shipped, shipping route(s), and shipping schedules. Some general information on the 

types and quantities of materials to be shipped to a repository (if it is licensed and 

constructed) is publicly available in DOE’s Environmental Impact Statement for 

Yucca Mountain. However, to my knowledge, DOE has not yet developed specific 

shipping plans that contain the level of detailed information that would be required 

for community and emergency responder planning. Some of this information is not 

normally released to the public until after shipments have been made for security 

reasons, so sharing this information with local communities could be problematic. 

Both DOE and Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff have expressed an interest in 

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improving the sharing of relevant information with state, tribal and local governments, but I do not know what specific progress has been made in this regard. 

Question 5. What measures could the DOE and NRC take to improve the security 

and safety of nuclear waste transport? Has the DOE responded to the Academy’s 

recommendation that an independent examination of the security of nuclear waste 

transportation be carried out? 

Answer. The National Academies report entitled ‘‘Going the Distance? The Safe 

Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United 

States’’ made several recommendations for improving the safety and security of 

spent fuel transport. These were mentioned in my written testimony and include the 

following four recommendations: 

1. An independent examination of the security of spent fuel and high-level 

waste should be carried out prior to the commencement of large-quantity shipments to a Federal repository or to interim storage. This examination should 

provide an integrated evaluation of the threat environment, the response of 

shipping packages to credible malevolent acts, and operational security requirements for protecting spent fuel and high-level waste while in transport. This examination should be carried out by a technically knowledgeable group that is 

independent of the government and free from institutional and financial conflicts of interest. This group should be given full access to the necessary classified documents and Safeguards Information to carry out this task. The findings 

and recommendations from this examination should be made available to the 

public to the fullest extent possible. 

To my knowledge, DOE has not addressed this recommendation. 

2. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should undertake additional analyses of 

accident scenarios involving very long duration fire scenarios that bound expected real-world accident conditions and implement operational controls and 

restrictions on spent fuel and high-level waste shipments as necessary to reduce 

the chances that such conditions might be encountered in service. 

Steps to address this recommendation have been taken by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission as noted in the testimony of Mr. Michael Weber. 

3. DOE should ship spent fuel and high-level waste to the Federal repository 

by ‘‘mostly rail’’ using dedicated trains. 

DOE’s current plans for shipping to the repository are consistent with this recommendation. 

4. DOE should negotiate with commercial spent fuel owners to ship older fuel 

first to a Federal repository or to Federal interim storage. Should these negotiations prove to be ineffective, Congress should consider legislative remedies. 

Within the context of its current contracts with commercial spent fuel owners, 

DOE should initiate transport to the Federal repository through a pilot program 

involving relatively short, logistically simple movements of older fuel from 

closed reactors to demonstrate its ability to carry out its responsibilities in a 

safe and operationally effective manner. 

As described in my answer to a previous question, DOE has not indicated to the 

National Academies whether it intends to follow the recommendation to ship older 

fuel first. DOE also has not indicated whether it will initiate transport with the 

pilot program described above. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

DR. JAMES DAVID BALLARD

Question. Your testimony contends that too many questions remain regarding the 

security of nuclear waste shipments. What areas need to be researched further in 

order to more fully understand the national security risks of transporting nuclear 

waste? 

Answer. Thank you, Senator Inouye, I am happy to provide additional details on 

specific research projects that should be conducted prior to the commencement of 

any shipments to the proposed Yucca facility. 

Besides the ten items noted in my written and oral testimony that were identified 

by stakeholders as needing to be addressed by the DOE and NRC prior to Yucca 

shipments, the Committee should also consider the following: 

• First and foremost, what I believe is needed is a systematic analysis of realistic 

worse case attack scenarios and their consequences. These could emerge from 

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the AVA process I discussed in testimony. That process expertise already resides in a national laboratory environment—specifically Dr. Roger Johnson at 

Argonne National Laboratory. This analysis would offer usable scenarios, examples of which I tried to illustrate in my written testimony, which could be used 

as the basis of consequence analysis. It is critical that examples are not sanitized by the regulatory agencies that fail to look at such alternatives in their 

published analysis. 

• Next I would suggest a National Academies of Science level assessment of 21st 

century terrorist motivations, tactics and weapons and their consequences/implications for radioactive shipment security and planning. Agencies seem to be approaching this problem from a Cold War mindset—perhaps we should consider 

not just that what will be shipped are ‘waste’ products but rather potential radiological dispersion devices that can be attacked and the contents dispersed into 

the environment. These materials need not be captured but rather we should 

consider how and if it can be used along the transportation routes as a means 

to attack this country, contaminate transportation infrastructure and other dire 

consequences. 

• Once we have listed the worst cases and defined motivations for adversaries 

then we could make more useful comparisons between the proposed shelter-inplace strategy of leaving the waste at reactor sites in secure dry storage facilities and shipping the waste across country to a repository. This would also demand a full accounting of the transportation planning—as it is now the DOE 

has not defined the transportation system in enough detail to even allow for 

such an analysis. To meet that need you should consider requiring the DOE to 

engage in a national level transportation related NEPA process. 

• Lastly, one immediate item that could be undertaken is a organizational level 

study of law enforcement and emergency responder awareness, capabilities and 

needs relative to the unprecedented high-level radioactive waste shipping campaign required for the Yucca Mountain program. No national level study exists 

on what these state and local agencies will need, what they have currently in 

terms of equipment and expertise, and what funding will be necessary in the 

future if Yucca shipments commence. It seems reasonable to establish a baseline now so that transportation planning and financial and technical assistance 

can assist in offsetting any funding impacts this proposed project would entail. 

Thank you again for asking for the opportunity to testify before the Committee. 

If I can be of any additional service please do not hesitate to ask. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

EDWARD R. HAMBERGER

Question. In your testimony, you expressed concern that the DOE has not yet 

committed to using dedicated train service for shipping nuclear waste on all routes 

across the Nation. Do you have any additional comments on why the DOE appears 

to be hesitating in requiring the use of these trains across your system? 

Answer. AAR thinks that DOE should explain why it is hesitating. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. HARRY REID TO

EDWARD R. HAMBERGER

Question 1. Will the AAR oppose the Department of Energy’s (DOE) all-rail transportation plan for nuclear waste if they refuse to commit to dedicated train service? 

Answer. AAR recognizes that because of the safety advantages afforded by rail 

transportation, rail is likely to be the preferred mode for transporting spent nuclear 

fuel. Even though DOE has not committed to dedicated train service, AAR is optimistic that, ultimately, DOE will decide to use dedicated train service because of 

its safety advantages, as discussed in my testimony. 

Question 2. The DOE is not in the railroad business today. Do you believe that 

the DOE is prepared to not only build and operate the largest new rail line since 

the 1930s, but to launch a nationwide campaign to make thousands of shipments 

of nuclear waste? 

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Answer. There is no question it takes a high degree of expertise to build and operate a railroad. DOE, of course, can contract with railroad industry experts to build 

and operate the rail line. 

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