DEFENSE 

FORENSICS

Additional Planning 

and Oversight Needed 

to Establish an 

Enduring 

Expeditionary 

Forensic Capability

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2013

GAO-13-447

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-447, a report to 

congressional requesters

June 2013

DEFENSE FORENSICS

Additional Planning and Oversight Needed to 

Establish an Enduring Expeditionary Forensic 

Capability 

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD used expeditionary forensics for 

collecting fingerprints and 

deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) to 

identify, target, and disrupt terrorists 

and enemy combatants in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. The increased incidence 

of improvised explosive devices and 

other asymmetric threats has 

increased demand for expeditionary 

forensic capabilities. Many of DOD’s

expeditionary forensic activities are 

resourced through DOD's Overseas 

Contingency Operations funds. DOD 

estimates that it cost between $800 

million and $1 billion of these funds 

from 2005 through 2012 to support 

expeditionary forensics activities in Iraq

and Afghanistan. However, as military 

operations are projected to draw down 

in Afghanistan, this funding is expected 

to substantially decline by the end of 

2014. Consequently, DOD is taking 

steps to establish expeditionary 

forensics as an enduring capability in 

DOD’s base budget. GAO was asked 

to examine DOD’s expeditionary 

forensic capability. This report 

assessed the extent to which DOD has 

taken steps to establish an enduring 

expeditionary forensic capability. To 

address this objective, GAO reviewed 

relevant policy, plans, and budget 

estimates, and interviewed cognizant 

DOD officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four recommendations 

to DOD, including incorporating key 

elements in its strategic plan, 

periodically reviewing and evaluating 

DOD components’ proposed forensic 

budget estimates—including 

expeditionary forensics, and issuing 

guidance on collecting and reporting 

forensic budget data. DOD concurred 

with all four recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken some important steps to establish 

an enduring expeditionary forensic capability by issuing a concept of operations 

in 2008, followed by a directive in 2011 to establish policy and assign 

responsibilities. As required by the directive, DOD has drafted a strategic plan to 

guide the activities of the Defense Forensic Enterprise, including expeditionary 

forensics. Although the plan includes a mission statement, and goals and 

objectives—two of the five key elements identified by GAO as integral to a welldeveloped strategic plan—it does not identify approaches for how goals and 

objectives will be achieved, milestones and metrics to gauge progress, and 

resources needed to achieve goals and objectives. GAO’s prior work has shown 

that organizations need a well-developed strategic plan to identify and achieve 

their goals and objectives effectively and efficiently. Officials in the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(OUSD(AT&L)) said that they decided to create a concise, high-level strategic 

plan and that they plan to issue guidance tasking the DOD components to 

develop individual implementation plans that include milestones. However, 

approaches, metrics, and resources needed to accomplish its goals and 

objectives were absent from the draft guidance. GAO discussed this omission 

with OUSD(AT&L), and in response, this office plans to revise its draft guidance. 

Also, the forensic strategic plan has been in draft for 2 years having undergone 

multiple revisions, and is still undergoing DOD internal review with no publication 

date set, and by extension, a publication date has not been set for the proposed 

DOD component implementation plans. The lack of an approved strategic plan 

and associated implementation plans limits DOD’s ability to prioritize its efforts to 

develop an enduring expeditionary forensic capability by the end of 2014. 

Moreover, OUSD(AT&L) has not reviewed and evaluated the adequacy of DOD 

components’ expeditionary forensic budget estimates for fiscal years 2013

through 2018, as required by DOD’s directive. OUSD(AT&L) officials said that 

they were waiting for the DOD components to finalize their budget estimates for 

fiscal years 2013 through 2018, and waiting for the Joint Capabilities Integration 

Development System to validate their forensic requirements. Regardless, 

reviewing and evaluating the DOD components’ proposed budget estimates 

allows OUSD(AT&L) to advise the DOD components on their resource allocation 

decisions with respect to expeditionary forensic capabilities. OUSD(AT&L) 

officials cited several factors that also affected their ability to review and evaluate 

the DOD components’ forensic budget data, such as aggregation of components’ 

forensic budget estimates with other costs. Moreover, these officials said the 

directive does not provide guidance to DOD components on how to collect and 

report forensic budget data. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government notes that agencies should provide policy and guidance to 

determine the effectiveness and efficiency of operations. Until OUSD(AT&L) 

reviews and evaluates the adequacy of DOD components’ forensic budget 

estimates, and guidance is in place to inform forensic budget collection and 

reporting, OUSD(AT&L) will continue to experience challenges with identifying 

View GAO-13-447. For more information, the costs associated with DOD’s expeditionary forensic capabilities.

contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov
Page i GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

Letter 1 

Background 4

DOD Has Taken Steps to Establish an Enduring Expeditionary 

Forensic Capability, but Additional Actions Are Needed 9

Conclusions 15

Recommendations for Executive Action 16

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 16

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 20

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 23

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 26

Related GAO Products 27

Tables

Table 1: GAO’s Assessment of DOD’s Draft Forensic Strategic Plan 10

Table 2: DOD Organizations Contacted 20

Figure

Figure 1: Examples of Expeditionary Forensic Laboratory Modules 5

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

Abbreviations

DNA deoxyribonucleic acid

DOD Department of Defense

OUSD(AT&L) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

 Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

 Technology, and Logistics

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Page 1 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 27, 2013

Congressional Requesters

U.S. military forces have used expeditionary forensics to identify, target, 

disrupt, and detain terrorists and enemy combatants in recent and 

ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to support host nation rule 

of law and capacity building in those areas and others such as the Horn 

of Africa. DOD defines forensics as the application of multi-disciplinary 

scientific processes to establish facts that may be used for the collection, 

identification, and comparison of materials such as deoxyribonucleic acid 

(DNA) and latent fingerprints.1 For the purposes of this report, 

expeditionary forensics refers to the employment of forensic applications 

by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. 

For example, in 2012 the Department of Defense (DOD) provided 

forensic support to about 120 Afghan court cases linking latent 

fingerprints and DNA evidence to enemy combatants, resulting in a 97 

percent conviction rate. DOD has traditionally used forensics for law 

enforcement and medical purposes, such as identifying and prosecuting 

criminals and determining the identification of human remains. However, 

DOD’s concept of operations notes that the increased incidence of 

improvised explosive devices and other asymmetric threats that U.S. 

military forces have encountered has created an increased demand for 

expeditionary forensic capabilities across the full range of military 

operations.2 According to a 2011 Army Audit Agency report, the conflicts 

in Iraq and Afghanistan have helped revolutionize the department’s use of 

expeditionary forensics in general, and latent fingerprints and DNA in 

particular,3

 

1

Latent fingerprints are images left on a surface touched by a person.

and a 2012 DOD Office of the Inspector General report noted 

that U.S. forces in Afghanistan have used latent fingerprints and DNA to 

2

DOD, Capstone Concept of Operations for Department of Defense Forensics 

(Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2008). 

3

U.S. Army Audit Agency, Workforce Requirements for Expeditionary Forensics, Audit 

Report No. A-2012-0031-FFD (Alexandria, VA: December 27, 2011) (For Official Use 

Only).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

link known enemy combatants to captured enemy material such as 

improvised explosive devices.4

Many of DOD’s expeditionary forensic activities are currently resourced 

through DOD’s Overseas Contingency Operations funds—appropriations 

provided by Congress outside of the department’s base appropriations 

process. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)), said that from 2005 through 

2012, DOD estimated that it cost between $800 million and $1 billion in 

Overseas Contingency Operations appropriations to support 

expeditionary forensic activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. These funds 

covered such capabilities as the Army’s Expeditionary Forensic 

Laboratories, the Navy’s Combined Explosives Exploitation Cells, and 

Special Operations Command’s expeditionary forensic activities. 

However, as U.S. military operations are projected to draw down in 

Afghanistan by the end of 2014,

 

5 Overseas Contingency Operations 

funding for expeditionary forensics is expected to decline substantially. 

While DOD maintains base funding for traditional forensic applications 

and Special Operations Command’s sensitive site exploitation program,6

To date, we have issued four reports related to DOD biometrics (e.g., the 

measurement and analysis of an individual’s unique physical or 

behavioral characteristics that can be used to verify personal identity) and 

forensics. (These reports are listed in the Related GAO Products section 

DOD officials said that base funding levels are not adequate to cover the 

additional costs of current and emerging expeditionary forensic activities. 

Moreover, Army officials noted that it would cost considerably more in 

time and resources to recreate the Army’s expeditionary forensic 

capability to support any future mission if current capabilities are allowed 

to expire. Consequently, DOD is taking steps to establish expeditionary 

forensics as an enduring capability prior to the projected drawdown of 

operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

 

4

Department of Defense Inspector General, Semiannual Report to the Congress 

(Washington, DC.: April 1, 2012 – September 30, 2012). 

5

GAO, Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues, GAO-13-218SP (Washington, D.C.: February 

11, 2013).

6

The Special Operations Command established a base funding account to cover a 

majority of its sensitive site exploitation program, which includes support for expeditionary 

forensic activities. 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

at the end of this report.) Building on our body of work examining DOD 

biometrics and forensics, as requested, we examined DOD’s 

expeditionary forensic capability. Specifically, this report addresses the 

extent to which DOD has taken steps to establish an enduring 

expeditionary forensic capability. 

We narrowed the scope of our review to laboratory applications of 

expeditionary forensics, and focused on latent fingerprints and DNA —the 

two most prevalent forensic disciplines U.S. forces have relied on in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Concurrently, OUSD(AT&L) contracted with CNA’s 

Center for Naval Analyses to assess the department’s overall forensic 

activities, to include expeditionary forensics, and issue a report for the 

Secretary of Defense by the summer of 2013. We met with officials from 

OUSD(AT&L) and CNA’s Center for Naval Analyses to ensure our work 

did not overlap with this assessment. 

To assess the steps DOD has taken to establish an enduring 

expeditionary forensic capability, we analyzed relevant policy and 

guidance that describe DOD’s plans to organize, train, and equip forces 

to sustain expeditionary forensic activities. We also interviewed planning, 

operations, and resource management officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, each of the four military services, all six geographic 

combatant commands, and Special Operations Command to discuss the 

status of planned and ongoing initiatives related to expeditionary 

forensics. We reviewed and analyzed DOD’s forensic strategic plan7

We also reviewed and analyzed the military services’ and Special 

Operations Command’s current and projected forensic budget data to 

determine if the budget data were sufficiently reliable and met the 

department’s requirements in the DOD forensic directive.

to 

determine if it included key strategic planning elements that are 

consistent with our previous work on developing and implementing 

strategic plans.

8

 

7

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, DOD 

Forensic Enterprise Draft Strategic Plan (as of February 2013).

We assessed 

the reliability of the budget data by interviewing knowledgeable officials 

and reviewing related documentation and written responses to our 

8

Department of Defense, DOD Forensic Enterprise, DOD Directive 5205.15E (April 26, 

2011). 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

questions on data reliability. We identified several issues concerning the 

reliability of the budget data obtained from OUSD(AT&L), the military 

services, and Special Operations Command, including the sources from 

which the budget data were derived, the consistency in how the budget 

data were compiled, and the manner in which the budget data were 

verified. As a result, we determined that the budget data were not 

sufficiently reliable. Therefore, we are making a recommendation that 

addresses OUSD(AT&L)’s ability to review and evaluate the DOD 

components’ forensic budget data by calling for the development of 

budget collecting and reporting guidance. 

More detailed information on our scope and methodology can be found in 

appendix I of this report. We conducted this performance audit from May 

2012 through June 2013 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Improvised explosive devices have caused numerous injuries and 

fatalities among U.S. and coalition forces while carrying out operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. To mitigate this threat, DOD has taken a number of 

actions, such as deploying its expeditionary forensic capabilities. In 2003, 

DOD established the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cells to provide 

technical intelligence on improvised explosive devices and render safe 

these devices and other combustible materials so that they can be 

forensically analyzed to obtain, among other things, latent fingerprints of 

the individuals responsible for manufacturing and placing the devices. In 

2006, DOD further expanded its use of expeditionary forensics by 

establishing the joint expeditionary forensic facilities to analyze materials, 

such as ammunition and clothing items collected on the battlefield, to help 

identify enemy combatants through latent prints and DNA analysis, 

among other things. In 2011, DOD consolidated the Combined Explosives 

Exploitation Cells and the joint expeditionary forensic facilities to form 

Expeditionary Forensic Laboratories under the purview of the Army in 

order to realize efficiencies and minimize redundancies. These combined 

laboratories, like their predecessors, are modular, deployable, 

containerized units that can operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and 

Background 

DOD’s Expeditionary 

Forensic Capabilities
 

Page 5 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

provide the capability to forensically analyze material such as latent 

fingerprints, DNA, explosives, drugs, and firearms and tool marks in 

response to warfighter needs. Figure 1 shows three of the Expeditionary 

Forensic Laboratory modules operating in Afghanistan.

Figure 1: Examples of Expeditionary Forensic Laboratory Modules

The Army also established a reachback operations center to oversee the 

deployment of Expeditionary Forensic Laboratories and to provide 

forensic expertise and analytical capabilities to process any overflow of 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

forensic cases from Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to the Army’s 

expeditionary forensic capabilities, the Navy has provided staff support to 

the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cells through its Explosive 

Ordnance Disposal Technical Division. The Marine Corps has relied on 

the Army’s Expeditionary Forensic Laboratories to forensically analyze 

material that the Marine Corps has collected on the battlefield for 

subsequent targeting and prosecutions. The Special Operations 

Command has developed expeditionary forensic toolkits and exploitation 

analysis centers as part of its sensitive site exploitation program to collect 

latent fingerprint and DNA samples, among other things. The Air Force 

focuses on digital and multimedia forensic applications to support 

operations such as counterintelligence to process, analyze, and translate 

data collected from electronic devices. We did not include the Air Force in 

our review because we focused on the forensic disciplines of latent 

fingerprints and DNA. 

In 2008, DOD issued a concept of operations that identifies existing, 

emerging, and future forensic capabilities, and calls for the department to 

plan for robust, fully-coordinated, and well-resourced forensic applications 

across the full range of military operations. The concept of operations 

states that integrating forensics—particularly expeditionary forensics—is 

necessary to meet current and emerging requirements. The concept of 

operations identifies several areas that the department needs to address 

to develop an enduring expeditionary forensic capability, including the 

following:

• Doctrine—forensic doctrine to address the multiple uses of 

information, varying timelines, and scientific challenges across the 

strategic, operational, and tactical levels;

• Training, Leadership and Education—forensic training and education 

for all levels of operations, and to ensure leadership understands the 

value of forensics;

• Materiel—equipment and systems for the collection, transfer, 

exploitation, dissemination, and storage of forensic material and 

information; and

• Facilities—deployed and institutional forensic laboratories to meet 

mission requirements.

In an effort to address the areas identified in the concept of operations, in 

2009, DOD initiated a capabilities based assessment, which includes 

DOD Policy Governing Its 

Forensic Enterprise
 

Page 7 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

validating expeditionary forensic requirements as an enduring capability 

within the department, through the Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System. This system guides the development of capabilities 

from a joint perspective, to help identify capability gaps and validate the 

requirements of proposed capability solutions to mitigate those gaps. As 

part of this process, from 2011 to 2013, DOD developed and validated an 

initial capabilities document that contained information on those 

capabilities needed to support current and future forensic activities across 

the department—including expeditionary forensics. Furthermore, in early 

2013, DOD initiated a change recommendation9

In April 2011, DOD issued a directive that, among other things, 

established policy and assigned responsibilities within the department to 

develop and maintain an enduring, holistic, forensic capability to support 

the full range of military operations—including law enforcement, medical, 

intelligence, and expeditionary forensics.

that will lay out specified 

required forensic capabilities and projected costs. The process to review 

and approve the change recommendation is scheduled to begin in 

January 2014. 

10

• USD(AT&L) is the principal staff assistant for the Defense Forensic 

Enterprise and Chair of the Forensic Executive Committee. The 

USD(AT&L) is responsible for, among other things, coordinating and 

publishing a Defense Forensic Enterprise strategic plan, and 

reviewing the adequacy of forensic-related acquisition programs and 

associated budget submissions to ensure they meet the Enterprise’s 

program requirements and objectives.

DOD refers to this holistic 

effort as the Defense Forensic Enterprise. The directive assigns roles and 

responsibilities for the following key DOD entities:

11

• The Secretary of the Army is designated as the DOD Executive Agent 

for Forensics for disciplines relating to, among other things, DNA and 

 

9

Also referred to as a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 

Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy Change Recommendation. 

10Department of Defense, DOD Directive 5205.15E. The directive does not cover unique 

forensic applications that support technical nuclear or technical chemical and biological 

disciplines, and specialized intelligence collected through reconnaissance programs.

11In October, 2011, USD(AT&L) appointed a Director, Defense Biometrics and Forensics, 

to oversee his responsibilities for the Defense Forensics Enterprise.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

latent fingerprints.12 The Secretary of the Army also is responsible for 

coordinating with the DOD components13

• The Secretary of the Air Force is designated as the DOD Executive 

Agent for Digital and Multimedia Forensics relating to computer and 

electronic devices, audio analysis, image analysis, and video analysis. 

The Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for coordinating with the 

DOD components to program and budget sufficient resources for 

digital and multimedia forensics, and designating a Center of 

Excellence for these forensic disciplines.

to program for and budget 

sufficient resources to support common forensic requirements, and 

designating a DOD Center of Excellence to promote collaboration of 

best practices for forensic capabilities.

14

• DOD components are required to support various programs and 

policies related to the Defense Forensic Enterprise, such as 

consulting and coordinating with USD(AT&L) on the establishment of 

forensic programs and policies; coordinating and integrating 

strategies, concepts, capabilities, and requirements to prevent 

unnecessary duplication of forensic activities; and formulating and 

executing budgets for forensic activities.

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to coordinate 

combatant commanders’ forensic requirements with the DOD 

Executive Agent for Forensics across the full range of military 

operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is also required 

to develop operational joint doctrine related to forensic capabilities, 

 

12The Secretary of the Army also is responsible for forensic disciplines relating to 

serology, questioned documents, drugs, trace materials, firearms and tool marks, as well 

as forensic medicine disciplines such as forensic pathology, forensic anthropology, and 

forensic toxicology. 

13DOD’s forensic directive defines DOD components as the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Office 

of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, military departments, combatant 

commands, defense agencies, field activities, and all other organizational entities within 

the department. Based on the scope of our review, for the purposes of this report, the 

phrase “DOD components” refers only to the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Special 

Operations Command. 

14We did not examine digital and multimedia forensics because it is outside the scope of 

our review. 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

validate joint requirements for forensic capabilities for the joint force, 

and coordinate theater-specific requirements for forensic capabilities.

DOD has taken some important steps to establish an enduring 

expeditionary forensic capability by issuing a concept of operations, and a 

directive that calls for a strategic plan addressing DOD’s enterprise-wide 

forensics, including expeditionary forensics, but has not completed its 

strategic plan or reviewed and evaluated the adequacy of DOD 

components’ budget estimates. DOD has drafted a forensic strategic 

plan;15 however, it does not include three of the five key elements 

identified by GAO as integral to a well-developed strategic plan. 

Specifically, the plan does not include approaches for how the goals and 

objectives will be achieved, milestones and metrics to gauge progress, 

and resources needed to achieve the goals and objectives. Also, the 

forensic strategic plan has been in draft for 2 years without a scheduled 

completion date. OUSD(AT&L) officials stated that the draft is still 

undergoing internal review within the department. DOD plans to capture 

some of the elements of a strategic plan in implementation plans to be 

developed by DOD components; however, the timeframe for issuance of 

these implementation plans is unknown since they will follow publication 

of the strategic plan. In addition, according to DOD’s forensic directive, 

USD(AT&L) is to review the adequacy of DOD components’ forensicrelated acquisition programs and associated budget submissions to 

ensure they meet DOD’s overarching forensic requirements and 

objectives. However, at the time of our review, OUSD(AT&L) had not 

reviewed and evaluated forensic budget estimates for fiscal years 2013 

through 2018 to ensure they meet the Defense Forensic Enterprise 

requirements and objectives. OUSD(AT&L) officials said that they had 

difficulty identifying forensic activities that are not specifically cited within 

the DOD components’ forensic budget estimates. Further, OUSD(AT&L) 

officials said that while the DOD directive calls for OUSD(AT&L) to 

conduct a review of forensic-related programs and budget submissions, it 

does not provide guidance on how forensic budget data should be 

collected and reported by the DOD components.

 

15Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,

Forensic Enterprise Draft Strategic Plan (as of February 2013).

DOD Has Taken Steps 

to Establish an 

Enduring 

Expeditionary 

Forensic Capability, 

but Additional 

Actions Are Needed
 

Page 10 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

DOD has taken some important steps to establish an expeditionary 

forensic capability by issuing a concept of operations in 2008 and a 

directive in 2011 to establish policy and assign responsibilities. Consistent 

with the directive, DOD has drafted a strategic plan to guide the activities 

of the Defense Forensic Enterprise, including expeditionary forensics. 

However, DOD’s strategic plan does not include three of the five key 

elements identified by GAO as integral to a well-developed strategic plan. 

The plan includes a mission statement and goals and objectives, but does 

not include approaches for how these goals and objectives will be 

achieved, milestones and metrics to gauge progress, and resources (e.g., 

funding and personnel) needed to achieve these goals and objectives. 

GAO’s prior work on strategic planning has shown that organizations 

need a well-developed strategic plan to identify and achieve their goals 

and objectives effectively and efficiently.16

Table 1: GAO’s Assessment of DOD’s Draft Forensic Strategic Plan 

Table 1, below, lists the key 

elements of a strategic plan and indicates those that are and are not 

included in DOD’s draft strategic plan for the Defense Forensic 

Enterprise.

Key elements of a strategic plan Key elements included 

Mission statement Yes

Goals and objectives Yes

Approaches for accomplishing goals and objectives No

Milestones and metrics to gauge progress No

Resources needed to meet goals and objectives No

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Data are from DOD’s draft strategic plan for the Defense Forensic Enterprise.

Consistent with these criteria, the draft strategic plan includes a mission 

statement and four broad goals that outline DOD’s intent to meet the 

department’s overarching needs for the Defense Forensic Enterprise. 

These goals are to (1) provide forensic information that is accurate and 

 

16GAO, Defense Logistics: A Completed Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed to Guide 

DOD’s In-Transit Visibility Efforts, GAO-13-201 (Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2013); 

GAO, Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That Army and 

Marine Corps Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements, GAO-09-865 

(Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2009); and GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: 

Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations, 

GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

DOD Has Issued Guidance 

but Its Draft Strategic Plan 

Does Not Include Some 

Key Elements
 

Page 11 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

timely, (2) develop cost-effective methods for providing forensic 

capabilities, (3) maximize the availability and accessibility of forensicrelated information, and (4) invest in forensic research and technology. 

The strategic plan also includes a number of subordinate objectives that 

are linked to the four goals. However, the strategic plan does not include 

some key elements, such as approaches for how the objectives will be 

achieved, milestones and metrics to gauge DOD’s progress, and the 

resources needed to meet its goals and objectives. For example, the two 

objectives under the plan’s third goal—to maximize the availability and 

accessibility of forensic-related information—call for creating and 

promoting a forensic information-sharing culture that supports multiple 

users within DOD as well as with interagency and international partners. 

However, these objectives neither describe an approach for 

accomplishing them, nor include milestones, metrics, and resources. 

Without these key elements, DOD will be unable to measure its progress 

and adjust its approach when warranted, and identify the resources 

necessary to achieve the goals and objectives outlined in the strategic 

plan. Consequently, DOD may not have the information it needs to make 

well-informed decisions about forensics, including setting priorities for 

expeditionary forensic capabilities in an increasingly constrained fiscal 

environment.

The April 2011 DOD directive assigned OUSD(AT&L) responsibility for 

coordinating and publishing the DOD enterprisewide forensics strategic 

plan. An OUSD(AT&L) official stated that his office decided to create a 

concise, high-level strategic plan that included broad goals and 

subordinate objectives, but not milestones. According to this official, this 

decision was consistent with several other DOD strategic documents 

including the National Defense Strategy. OUSD(AT&L) officials said that 

after the strategic plan is issued, their office plans to issue guidance that 

will task the DOD components to develop individual implementation plans 

that include milestones. However, neither the draft strategic plan nor the 

proposed implementation plans would include approaches for how the 

goals and objectives will be achieved, metrics to gauge DOD’s progress, 

or the resources needed to accomplish its goals and objectives. Based on 

our observations of the draft guidance, OUSD(AT&L) is revising its 

guidance to direct the DOD components to include approaches and 

metrics, in addition to milestones, in their proposed implementation plans. 

OUSD(AT&L) officials explained that resource information will continue to 

be omitted because OUSD(AT&L) does not have the authority to direct 

the DOD components on how to allocate their resources. However, 

OUSD(AT&L) can advise DOD components’ resourcing decisions in a 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

manner consistent with the goals and objectives articulated in the 

Defense Forensic Enterprise strategic plan.

The concept of operations, forensic directive, and strategic plan are 

important actions DOD has taken to establish expeditionary forensics as 

an enduring capability since 2008. However, the forensic strategic plan 

has undergone multiple revisions and has been in draft for 2 years. An 

OUSD(AT&L) official said that a publication date has not been set for the 

strategic plan, and by extension, a publication date has not been set for 

the proposed DOD component implementation plans. OUSD(AT&L) 

officials stated that the draft is still undergoing internal review within the 

department. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government notes that organizations must have relevant, reliable, and 

timely information to achieve their goals and objectives.

17

In the absence of an approved forensic strategic plan, and in accordance 

with DOD’s forensic directive, several of the military services and 

combatant commands have been independently developing guidance and 

plans to address their specific expeditionary forensic needs as shown in 

the following examples.

Otherwise, their 

ability to achieve their goals and objectives can be adversely affected. 

• The Army, as the DOD Executive Agent for Forensics, is developing 

guidance that includes a process for identifying and prioritizing DOD’s 

expeditionary forensic requirements and capabilities that are common 

to all of the DOD components.

• The Marine Corps issued an identity operations strategy that includes 

a discussion of expeditionary forensic force structure and equipment 

considerations.18

• The Special Operations Command established a program with 

funding and issued guidance on sensitive site exploitation that 

includes training and education, and equipment such as forensic 

 

17GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

18U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Marine Corps Identity Operations Strategy 2020 

Implementation Plan (August 14, 2012). The Navy has not developed guidance on 

expeditionary forensics, but Navy officials have stated that they plan to develop a strategy 

that mirrors the Marine Corps identity operations strategy.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

toolkits for expeditionary forensic activities.

• Africa Command issued guidance to support requests for conducting 

forensic activities on behalf of foreign partners in Africa.

• European Command published guidance on using forensic 

capabilities to support operations in Europe.

Additionally, the DOD forensic directive established a Forensic Executive 

Committee,19 in 2011, to, among other things, facilitate the coordination of 

forensic activities throughout DOD. At the time of our review, the Forensic 

Executive Committee had not met because, according to an 

OUSD(AT&L) official, there had not been any significant issues on 

forensic activities that required the attention of OUSD(AT&L) senior 

leadership. OUSD(AT&L) created a Coordination Steering Group in 2011 

as a forum for DOD components to collectively identify and prioritize 

issues, analyze alternatives, and develop recommendations for approval 

by the Forensic Executive Committee. The Coordination Steering Group 

has created working groups to examine performance metrics, research 

and development efforts, and policy related to maintaining an enduring 

expeditionary forensic capability. OUSD(AT&L) officials stated that the 

Coordination Steering Group has reviewed the draft strategic plan and 

provided its comments. Nonetheless, the lack of an approved strategic 

plan, and associated implementation plans, limits DOD’s ability to 

effectively and efficiently prioritize its efforts to develop an enduring 

expeditionary forensic capability by the end of 2014.

OUSD(AT&L) has not reviewed and evaluated the adequacy of the DOD 

components’ expeditionary forensic budget estimates for fiscal years 

2013 through 2018. As required by the directive, USD(AT&L) is to review 

the adequacy of forensic-related acquisition programs and associated 

budget submissions to ensure they meet the Defense Forensic Enterprise 

requirements and objectives. At the time of our review, OUSD(AT&L) 

officials stated that they had most recently reviewed the DOD 

components’ fiscal year 2012 forensic budget estimates, which includes 

 

19The Forensic Executive Committee shall be chaired by OUSD(AT&L) or a designated 

representative, and consists of one senior general or flag officer or civilian equivalent from 

each of the DOD components that provide or require forensic capabilities and support, as 

well as those making strategic management decisions related to forensic activities.

OUSD(AT&L) Has Not 

Reviewed and Evaluated 

the Adequacy of

Expeditionary Forensic 

Budget Estimates for 

Fiscal Years 2013 through 

2018
 

Page 14 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

expeditionary forensic budget data. In addition, OUSD(AT&L) officials 

said that they had requested the DOD components’ forensic budget 

estimates for fiscal year 2013, but had not reviewed and evaluated these 

estimates to ensure they meet the Defense Forensic Enterprise 

requirements and objectives because the department was operating 

under a continuing resolution and therefore was adhering to fiscal year 

2012 budget levels. However, OUSD(AT&L) officials stated that they had 

not reviewed and evaluated the adequacy of the DOD components’ 

expeditionary proposed forensic budget estimates for fiscal years 2014 

through 2018, and had not issued a data call to obtain this information 

from the DOD components until our formal request in September 2012 in 

order to conduct our review. Based on the data from our formal request, 

OUSD(AT&L) officials estimated that the DOD components need about 

$363.5 million to fund expeditionary forensic capabilities from fiscal years 

2013 through 2018; however, this conclusion was drawn without 

OUSD(AT&L) evaluating the data. OUSD(AT&L) officials said that they 

had not reviewed and evaluated DOD components’ forensic budget 

estimates because, among other things, OUSD(AT&L) was waiting for the 

DOD components to finalize their proposed budget estimates for fiscal 

years 2014 through 2018, and waiting for the Joint Capabilities Integration 

and Development System to validate their forensic requirements. 

Regardless of not having validated forensic requirements, reviewing and 

evaluating the DOD components’ proposed budget estimates allows 

OUSD(AT&L) to advise the DOD components on their resource allocation 

decisions with respect to expeditionary forensic capabilities and ascertain 

whether the proposed funding is adequate to meet the department’s 

overarching requirements and objectives. Moreover, DOD officials have 

noted the need to establish base funding for expeditionary forensic 

capabilities in advance of expected reductions in Overseas Contingency 

Operations funding. Given the competition for limited resources within 

their base budgets, DOD officials said that if the department does not 

take proactive measures to reprogram funds for expeditionary forensic 

activities from Overseas Contingency Operations to base budget 

accounts, the military services will experience a significant funding gap 

that could limit their ability to respond to current and future warfighting 

requirements. 

OUSD(AT&L) officials cited several factors that also affected their ability 

to review and evaluate the DOD components’ forensic budget data, 

including expeditionary forensics. For example, the DOD components’ 

budget estimates for expeditionary forensics are often aggregated with 

other costs and distributed across numerous budget accounts that are not 

explicitly identified as forensic activities. As a result, these officials noted 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

the difficulty in being able to identify forensic activities within operation 

and maintenance accounts. In addition, these officials cited issues in 

determining which types of forensic-related costs to identify, such as 

training, research and development, and information systems. We also 

identified similar issues concerning the reliability of the forensic budget 

data.

OUSD(AT&L) officials said that if DOD components were instructed to 

collect budget data on forensic activities, such as Expeditionary Forensic 

Laboratories, training, personnel, and research and development, then 

OUSD(AT&L) would be better positioned to review and evaluate their 

forensic budget estimates. However, OUSD(AT&L) said the DOD 

components do not have guidance on collecting and reporting their 

expeditionary forensic activities. Furthermore, the DOD directive does not 

include instructions on collecting and reporting forensic budget data. 

According to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, agencies should provide policy and guidance to determine 

the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, including the use of 

resources needed to achieve their goals.

20 Without collection and 

reporting guidance, OUSD(AT&L) will continue to experience challenges 

with reviewing and evaluating the costs associated with DOD’s 

expeditionary forensic capabilities.

DOD recognizes the value of expeditionary forensics for identifying and 

targeting enemy combatants and terrorists, and has taken actions to 

establish expeditionary forensics as an enduring capability across the full 

range of military operations by the end of 2014. To achieve a coordinated, 

holistic approach across the department, DOD has issued a forensic 

directive that requires, among other things, USD(AT&L) to publish a 

strategic plan and review the adequacy of forensic-related acquisition 

programs and associated budget submissions. However, the strategic 

plan has been in draft for 2 years with no publication date set—and by 

extension, no publication date has been set for the proposed 

implementation plans. Further, without key elements, such as 

approaches, milestones and metrics, and identification of needed 

resources, DOD will be unable to measure its progress and adjust its 

approach and resourcing as necessary to achieve the goals and 

 

20GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

Conclusions 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

objectives outlined in the forensic strategic plan. In the absence of an 

approved strategic plan, several military services and combatant 

commands have been independently developing their own guidance and 

plans to inform their specific forensic activities. Further, because 

USD(AT&L) has not reviewed and evaluated the adequacy of the DOD 

components’ expeditionary forensic budget estimates, there is no 

assurance that these proposed budget estimates are consistent with one 

another and with the department’s overarching goals and objectives. As a 

result, DOD’s ability to fund its expeditionary forensic requirements in the 

most efficient and effective manner may be adversely affected.

As DOD establishes an enduring expeditionary forensic capability prior to 

the projected drawdown of operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to take the following 

four actions:

• Incorporate key elements in its forensic strategic plan, implementation 

plans, and other associated guidance that are currently absent 

including approaches for achieving goals and objectives, milestones 

and metrics to gauge the department’s progress, and resources 

needed to meet its goals and objectives.

• Set a date to publish the strategic plan for the Defense Forensic 

Enterprise.

• Periodically review and evaluate the DOD components’ proposed 

forensic budget estimates—including expeditionary forensics—to help 

ensure the department’s overarching requirements and objectives will 

be met, in accordance with the DOD Defense Forensic Enterprise 

directive.

• Issue guidance on how DOD components are to collect and report 

their forensic budget data—including expeditionary forensic budget 

data.

In written comments on this draft, DOD agreed with all four of our 

recommendations and discussed steps it plans to take to address these 

recommendations. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in their entirety 

in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments, which we have 

incorporated into the report where appropriate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

DOD concurred with our first recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics to incorporate key elements which are 

currently absent in its forensic strategic plan, implementation plans and 

other associated guidance. DOD stated that upon approval of the 

Defense Forensic Enterprise Strategic Plan, it will begin drafting the 

forensic strategy’s implementation plan to include specific priorities and 

tasks that support the goals and objectives of the strategic plan. The 

forensics implementation plan also will assign an office of primary 

responsibility to accomplish each task, propose milestones, develop 

success metrics, and estimate required resources.

DOD concurred with our second recommendation to the Secretary of 

Defense to direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics to set a date to publish the strategic plan for 

the Defense Forensic Enterprise and stated that it anticipates publishing 

the Defense Forensic Enterprise Strategic Plan prior to the end of fiscal 

year 2013.

DOD concurred with our third recommendation to the Secretary of 

Defense to direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics to periodically review and evaluate the DOD 

components’ proposed forensic budget estimates—including 

expeditionary forensics—to help ensure the department’s overarching 

requirements and objectives will be met in accordance with the DOD 

Defense Forensic Enterprise directive. DOD said that the Under 

Secretary, Comptroller, the Joint Staff, and the military services will 

coordinate to identify mechanisms to more efficiently and reliably review 

DOD components’ proposed forensic budget estimates against validated 

requirements. While we are encouraged with DOD’s decision, we believe 

that it is important that DOD schedule its reviews at regular intervals, in 

accordance with the Defense Forensic Enterprise directive. 

DOD concurred with our fourth recommendation to the Secretary of 

Defense to direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics to issue guidance on how DOD components 

are to collect and report their forensic budget data—including 

expeditionary forensic budget data. DOD stated that the Under Secretary, 

Comptroller, and the military services will coordinate to develop and issue 

guidance on reporting forensic budget data prior to the beginning of the 

fiscal year 2016 budget planning cycle.
 

Page 18 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. In addition, this report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO Website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4523 or at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix III.

Brian J. Lepore

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
 

Page 19 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

List of Requesters

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Jim Langevin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats 

and Capabilities

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jeff Miller

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 20 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

To assess the steps DOD has taken to establish an enduring 

expeditionary forensic capability, we analyzed relevant policies and 

guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such as the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) forensic directive,1 draft strategic plan for 

the Defense Forensic Enterprise,2 and the capstone concept of 

operations for forensics.3 In addition, we analyzed relevant Army, Marine 

Corps, and combatant command plans, policies and guidance that 

describe DOD’s efforts to organize, train, and equip forces to carry out 

expeditionary forensic activities. To understand DOD’s current 

expeditionary forensic capabilities, including those of the Expeditionary 

Forensic Laboratories, we visited the Army’s Criminal Investigation 

Laboratory at Fort Gillem, Georgia, which is primarily responsible for 

conducting both traditional and expeditionary forensic activities for the 

department and is known as DOD’s forensic science center of excellence. 

We also met with officials from CNA’s Center for Naval Analyses to 

discuss their efforts to review DOD’s overall defense forensic activities.4

Table 2: DOD Organizations Contacted

Further, we interviewed officials from the DOD organizations identified in 

table 2 to discuss DOD’s efforts to establish an enduring expeditionary 

forensic capability.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

a

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing 

Personnel Office

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Defense Intelligence Agency

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering; Defense Biometrics & 

Forensics

 

1

Department of Defense, DOD Forensic Enterprise, DOD Directive 5205.15E (April 26, 

2011). 

2

DOD Forensic Enterprise Draft Strategic Plan (as of February 2013). 

3

DOD Capstone Concept of Operations for Department of Defense Forensics Enterprise

(Jul. 18, 2008). 

4

CNA is a not-for profit research and analysis organization and a Federally Funded 

Research and Development Center. CNA is the parent organization of the Institute for 

Public Research and the Center for Naval Analyses.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 21 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

The Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate; Requirements, Force Protection 

Division 

U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General

Criminal Investigation Command

Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory, Fort Gillem, Georgia

Biometrics Identity Management Agency 

Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager – Biometrics & Forensics, Fort 

Huachuca, Arizona

Headquarters, Office of Operations and Plans, Capabilities and Integration Command

Headquarters, Office of Operations and Plans, Force Management

U.S. Navy Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Anti-Terrorism, Force Protection, Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Office, Surface Warfare Directorate

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information 

Dominance Operational Integration and Capabilities 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Expeditionary Warfare Division, Navy

Expeditionary Combat Branch

Naval Sea Systems Command, Anti-Terrorism Afloat Office

Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Biometrics Division

U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Plans, Policies, and Operations Division, Identity Operations Section 

U.S. Air Force Defense Cyber Crime Center

Office of Special Investigations

U.S. European Command Directorate of Intelligence, Strategy Division, Identity Intelligence Branch, Stuttgart, Germany

U.S. Southern Command Identity Intelligence Program, Miami, Florida

U.S. Special Operations Command Identity Operations Program, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

U.S. Northern Command Risk Management Branch, Force Protection and Mission Assurance Division, Peterson Air 

Force Base, Colorado

U.S. Central Command Joint Security Office Joint Security Force Protection Technology Branch, MacDill Air Force 

Base, Florida 

U.S. Pacific Command Forensic Exploitation Division, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii

U.S. Africa Command Identity Resolution Program, Stuttgart, Germany

Source: GAO.

a

We also reviewed and analyzed the military services’ and Special 

Operations Command’s current and projected forensic budget estimates 

to determine if the data were sufficiently reliable and met the 

department’s requirements in the DOD forensic directive. We assessed 

the reliability of this budget data by interviewing knowledgeable officials 

and reviewing related documentation and written responses to our 

questions on data reliability. We identified several issues concerning the 

reliability of the budget data obtained from Office of the Under Secretary

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)), the 

Unless otherwise indicated, these organizations are located within the Washington, D.C., 

metropolitan area.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 22 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

military services and Special Operations Command, including the sources 

from which the data were derived, the consistency in how the data were 

compiled, and the manner in which the data were verified. As a result, we 

determined that the data were not sufficiently reliable. Therefore, we are 

making a recommendation that addresses OUSD(AT&L)’s ability to 

review and evaluate the DOD components’ forensic budget data by 

calling for the development of budget collecting and reporting guidance.

We interviewed officials from the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, and Department of Homeland Security to obtain their 

perspective on DOD’s efforts to develop an expeditionary forensic 

capability. We also met with officials from the National Science and 

Technology Council within the Executive Office of the President to gain 

an understanding of national policy trends on forensics.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 through June 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 23 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 24 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 25 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 26 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

Brian J. Lepore, Director, 202-512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Marc Schwartz, Assistant 

Director; Grace Coleman; Latrealle Lee; Alberto Leff; Amber Lopez 

Roberts; Tim Persons; Terry Richardson; Amie Steele; Sabrina Streagle; 

John Van Schaik; and Nicole Willems made key contributions to this 

report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 27 GAO-13-447 Defense Forensics

Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues, GAO-13-218SP. Washington, D.C.: 

February 11, 2013. 

Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices: Multiple DOD Organizations Are 

Developing Numerous Initiatives. GAO-12-861R. Washington, D.C.: 

August 1, 2012.

Urgent Warfighter Needs: Opportunities Exist to Expedite Development of 

Fielding of Joint Capabilities. GAO-12-385. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 

2012.

Defense Biometrics: Additional Training for Leaders and More Timely 

Transmission of Data Could Enhance the Use of Biometrics in 

Afghanistan. GAO-12-442. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2012.

Defense Biometrics: DOD Can Better Conform to Standards and Share 

Biometric Information with Federal Agencies. GAO-11-276. Washington, 

D.C.: March 31, 2011.

Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and 

Coordination of DOD’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts. 

GAO-10-95. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2009.

Defense Management: DOD Can Establish More Guidance for Biometrics 

Collection and Explore Broader Data Sharing. GAO-09-49. Washington, 

D.C.: October 15, 2008.

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Establish Clear Goals and 

Objectives, Guidance, and a Designated Budget to Manage Its Biometrics 

Activities. GAO-08-1065. Washington, D.C: September 26, 2008.

Related GAO Products

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