IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON

LAWRENCE TUC KER , ) ) Petitioner, ) C. C. A. NO. W1999-02396-CCA-R3-CD ) vs. ) SHELBY COUNTY ) STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) No. P-21350 ) Respondent. )

O R D E R

This case came to be heard on the moti on of the State of Tennessee for an affirmance of the judgment of the trial c ourt pursuant to Rule 20 of the Ru les of the Court of Criminal Appeals. In November 1997, the petition er pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. P ursuant to his plea agreement , he was sentenced to one year at thir ty percent (30%), w

ith this sentence to be serv ed consecutively to a s

entence from Texas. The petitioner w as apparently returned to Texas following his guilty plea, but Tennessee authorities have lodged a detainer against him providing

for his return to serv

e his Tennessee sentence upon completi on of his Texas sentence.

In May 1999, the petitioner filed a pro se “Origi nal Petition Post Convi ction Writ of Habeas Corpus.” Through this peti tion, he contends that his gui lty plea was involuntary in that he understood its terms to be di fferent than he has since learned they are. He also contends that defense counsel and the assist ant district attorney general co ntribute d to his mi sunderst anding, t hereby am ounting t o ineff ective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.

Based on our review o

f the record in this case, w e conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed the petition. The petitioner has not presented cognizable grounds for habeas corpus relief. The claims asserted would rende r the petitioner’s conviction voidable rather than void. It is well-settled that the purpose of a habeas corpus petition, in contrast to a post-conviction petition, is to contest void, not merely voidable, judgments. Archer v. State , 851 S.W.2d 157, 16 3-64 (Tenn. 1993). If a court rendering judgment has j urisdiction of the person and th e subject matter, as wel l as the authority to make the chall enged judgment, any such j udgment is voidable rath er than



# FILED
February 2, 2000 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Cou rt Clerk2

void. Passarella v. State , 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). As i s evident from the petition and the brief bef ore this Court, the petitioner clearly does not contest the jurisdiction or author ity of the original tr

ial court. According ly, we conclude that the petitio ner is n ot entit led to habeas cor pus rel ief.
Furthermore, the petitioner is also not entitled to post -conviction relief. A

s stated above, the petitioner pleaded guilty in Nov ember 1997. There was apparentl y no direct appeal from his plea ag reement. He filed his “Ori ginal Petition Post Conv iction Writ of Habeas Corpus” in May 1999. C onsidering the petition asone for postconviction relief, it is clear that relief is not available because the peti tion was filed after the expiration of the one-y ear statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 202(a).

For the reasons stated abov e, we conclude that the petitioner’s petition does not state grounds upon w hich habeas corpus relief may be granted. In addition, the petitioner is not entitl ed to post-conviction r elief because his petition w as filed after the expiration of the post-c onviction statute of limita tions. We therefore conclude that the trial court correc

tly dismissed the petit ion.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Crimi nal Appeals. Since the recor d reflects the petitioner is indigent,costs shall be taxed to the state.

________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, JUDG E

________________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE

________________________________ JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE