2022 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices 

considered the impact of the residual 

radioactivity at the Facility and 

concluded that the proposed action will 

not have a significant effect on the 

quality of the human environment. 

Environmental Impacts of the 

Alternatives to the Proposed Action: 

Due to the largely administrative nature 

of the proposed action, its 

environmental impacts are small. 

Therefore, the only alternative the staff 

considered is the no-action alternative, 

under which the staff would leave 

things as they are by simply denying the 

amendment request. This no-action 

alternative is not feasible because it 

conflicts with 10 CFR 30.36(d), 

requiring that decommissioning of 

byproduct material facilities be 

completed and approved by the NRC 

after licensed activities cease. The 

NRC’s analysis of the Licensee’s final 

status survey data confirmed that the 

Facility meets the requirements of 10 

CFR 20.1402 for unrestricted release. 

Additionally, denying the amendment 

request would result in no change in 

current environmental impacts. The 

environmental impacts of the proposed 

action and the no-action alternative are 

therefore similar, and the no-action 

alternative is accordingly not further 

considered. 

Conclusion: The NRC staff has 

concluded that the proposed action is 

consistent with the NRC’s unrestricted 

release criteria specified in 10 CFR 

20.1402. Because the proposed action 

will not significantly impact the quality 

of the human environment, the NRC 

staff concludes that the proposed action 

is the preferred alternative. 

Agencies and Persons Contacted: NRC 

provided a draft of this EA to the State 

of Hawaii for review on October 23, 

2006. On November 6, 2006, the State of 

Hawaii responded by letter. The State 

had no additional comments. 

The NRC staff has determined that the 

proposed action is of a procedural 

nature, and will not affect listed species 

or critical habitat. Therefore, no further 

consultation is required under Section 7 

of the Endangered Species Act. The 

NRC staff has also determined that the 

proposed action is not the type of 

activity that has the potential to cause 

effects on historic properties. Therefore, 

no further consultation is required 

under Section 106 of the National 

Historic Preservation Act. 

III. Finding of No Significant Impact 

The NRC staff has prepared this EA in 

support of the proposed action. On the 

basis of this EA, the NRC finds that 

there are no significant environmental 

impacts from the proposed action, and 

that preparation of an environmental 

impact statement is not warranted. 

Accordingly, the NRC has determined 

that a Finding of No Significant Impact 

is appropriate. 

IV. Further Information 

Documents related to this action, 

including the application for 

amendment and supporting 

documentation, are available 

electronically at the NRC’s Electronic 

Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, 

you can access the NRC’s Agencywide 

Document Access and Management 

System (ADAMS), which provides text 

and image files of NRC’s public 

documents. The documents related to 

this action are listed below, along with 

their ADAMS accession numbers. 

1. NRC, ‘‘Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement in Support of 

Rulemaking on Radiological Criteria for 

License Termination of NRC-Licensed 

Nuclear Facilities,’’ NUREG–1496, July 

1997 (ML042310492, ML042320379, 

and ML042330385). 

2. NRC, ‘‘Consolidated NMSS 

Decommissioning Guidance,’’ NUREG–

1757, Volume 1, Revision 1, September 

2003 (ML053260027). 

3. Title 10 Code of Federal 

Regulations, Part 20, Subpart E, 

‘‘Radiological Criteria for License 

Termination.’’

4. Title 10, Code of Federal 

Regulations, Part 51, ‘‘Environmental 

Protection Regulations for Domestic 

Licensing and Related Regulatory 

Functions.’’

5. Miyake, Nancy, University of 

Hawaii, Queen’s Tower 

Decommissioning Report, January 19, 

2006 (ML0604106581). 

6. Whitten, Jack E., Acknowledgment 

of Receipt of Final Status Survey, June 

21, 2006 (ML061740111). 

7. Whitten, Jack E., Request for 

Comments on Draft Environmental 

Assessment for Decommissioning of the 

University of Hawaii, School of 

Medicine, Queen’s Medical Center, 

University Towers, October 23, 2006 

(ML0629803480). 

8. Takata, Russell S., Concerning the 

Request for Comments on Draft 

Environmental Assessment, November 

6, 2006 (ML063340094). 

If you do not have access to ADAMS 

or if there are problems in accessing the 

documents located in ADAMS, contact 

the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) 

Reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–

415–4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. 

These documents may also be viewed 

electronically on public computers 

located at the NRC’s PDR, O 1 F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR 

reproduction contractor will copy 

documents for a fee. 

Dated at Arlington, Texas, this 8th day of 

January, 2007. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

D. Blair Spitzberg, 

Chief, Fuel Cycle & Decommissioning Branch, 

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region 

IV. 

[FR Doc. E7–507 Filed 1–16–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Notice of Availability of Technical 

Specification Improvement To Modify 

Requirements Regarding Control 

Room Envelope Habitability Using the 

Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Process 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of Availability. 

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that 

the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has prepared and is 

making available a model safety 

evaluation (SE) and a model nosignificant-hazards-consideration 

(NSHC) determination relating to the 

modification of technical specification 

(TS) requirements regarding the 

habitability of the control room 

envelope (CRE) for referencing in 

license amendment requests (LARs). 

The NRC staff is also making available 

an associated model LAR for use by 

licensees to prepare such LARs. The TS 

modification is based on NRC staff 

approved changes to the improved 

standard technical specifications (STS) 

(NUREGs 1430–1434) that were 

proposed by the pressurized and boiling 

water reactor owners groups’ Technical 

Specifications Task Force (TSTF) on 

behalf of the commercial nuclear 

electrical power generation industry, in 

STS change traveler TSTF–448, 

Revision 3 (Rev 3). Previously, on 

October 17, 2006, drafts of the model 

SE, model NSHC determination, and 

model LAR were published in the 

Federal Register for public comment (71 

FR 61075). Based on its evaluation of 

the public comments received in 

response to that notice, the NRC staff 

made appropriate changes to the 

models, and is including the final 

versions of the models in this notice. 

This notice also contains a description 

of each public comment and its 

disposition by the NRC staff. Based on 

its evaluation of the public comments, 

the NRC staff has decided to announce 

the availability of the model SE and 

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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices 2023 

model NSHC determination to licensees 

for referencing in LARs to adopt TSTF–

448, Rev 3, using the consolidated line 

item improvement process (CLIIP). An 

LAR that references the model SE and 

model NSHC determination will permit 

the NRC to efficiently process a license 

amendment that proposes to adopt the 

changes in TSTF–448, Rev 3. Licensees 

of nuclear power reactors proposing to 

adopt these changes should follow the 

guidance in the model LAR and confirm 

the applicability of the model SE and 

model NSHC determination to their 

reactors. 

DATES: The NRC staff hereby announces 

that the attached model SE and model 

NSHC determination (which differ only 

slightly from the versions previously 

published) may be referenced in plant 

specific applications to adopt the 

improved CRE habitability TS 

requirements. The staff has also posted 

the model LAR (which also differs only 

slightly from the versions previously 

published) on the NRC web site to assist 

licensees in using the CLIIP to apply for 

the proposed TS change. The NRC staff 

can most efficiently consider 

applications based upon the model 

application if the application is 

submitted within a year of this Federal 

Register Notice. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: C. 

Craig Harbuck, Mail Stop: O–12H2, 

Technical Specifications Branch, 

Division of Inspection and Regional 

Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, telephone 301–415–3140. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Background 

Regulatory Issue Summary 2000–06, 

‘‘Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Process for Adopting Standard 

Technical Specification Changes for 

Power Reactors,’’ was issued on March 

20, 2000. The consolidated line item 

improvement process (CLIIP) is 

intended to improve the efficiency of 

NRC licensing processes by processing 

proposed changes to the improved 

standard technical specifications (STS) 

(NUREGs 1430–1434) in a manner that 

supports subsequent license amendment 

requests (LARs) from licensees. The 

CLIIP includes an opportunity for the 

public to comment on a proposed 

change to the STS after a preliminary 

assessment by the NRC staff and a 

finding that the change will likely be 

offered for adoption by licensees. The 

CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate 

any comments received for a proposed 

change to the STS and to either 

reconsider the change or announce the 

availability of the change for adoption 

by licensees. Licensees opting to apply 

for this TS change are responsible for 

reviewing the staff’s evaluation, 

referencing the applicable technical 

justifications, and providing any 

necessary plant-specific information. 

Each LAR made in response to the 

notice of availability will be processed 

and noticed in accordance with 

applicable rules and NRC procedures. 

The present notice makes available for 

adoption by licensees a change to 

establish more effective and appropriate 

action, surveillance, and administrative 

TS requirements related to ensuring 

CRE habitability. This change was 

proposed for incorporation into the STS 

by the owners groups participants in the 

Technical Specification Task Force 

(TSTF) and is designated TSTF–448, 

Revision 3 (Rev 3). TSTF–448, Rev 3, 

can be viewed on the NRC’s Web page 

at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/ 

operating/licensing/techspecs.html. 

Applicability 

This proposal to modify the TS to 

establish more effective and appropriate 

action, surveillance, and administrative 

requirements related to maintaining 

CRE habitability, as proposed in TSTF–

448, Rev 3, is applicable to all licensees. 

To efficiently process incoming 

license amendment requests (LARs), the 

staff requests that each licensee 

applying for the TS changes proposed in 

TSTF–448, Rev 3, use the CLIIP. The 

CLIIP does not prevent licensees from 

requesting an alternative approach or 

proposing the TS changes without the 

requested TS bases and TS bases control 

program. Variations from the approach 

recommended in this notice may require 

additional review by the NRC staff, and 

may increase the time and resources 

needed for the review. Significant 

variations from the approach, or 

inclusion of additional changes to the 

license, will result in staff rejection of 

the application. Instead, licensees 

desiring significant variations and/or 

additional changes should submit an 

LAR that does not request to adopt 

TSTF–448, Rev 3, using the CLIIP. 

Evaluation of Public Comments on the 

Model Safety Evaluation, Model No 

Significant Hazards Consideration 

Determination, and Model License 

Amendment Request 

The NRC staff evaluated the public 

comments received on the model safety 

evaluation (SE), model no significant 

hazards consideration (NSHC) 

determination, and model license 

amendment request (LAR) published in 

the Federal Register on October 17, 

2006 (71 FR 61075–61084). Comments 

were received from Progress Energy (PE) 

(Agency-wide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) 

Accession No. ML063260063), Strategic 

Teaming and Resource Sharing (STARS) 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML063340340), 

and the pressurized and boiling water 

reactor owners groups’ Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML063260064). 

The NRC staff also had one comment. 

The NRC staff’s disposition of each 

comment follows. 

1. (PE) Reference: Model SE Section 

2.3, Paragraph 8 (71 FR 61078). 

Comment: ‘‘Other Technical 

Specifications currently exist that are 

directly related to control room 

habitability (e.g., NUREG–1430, TS 

3.3.16, ‘‘Control Room Isolation—High 

Radiation,’’ NUREG–1431, TS 3.3.7, 

‘‘CREFS Actuation Instrumentation,’’

and NUREG–1432, TS 3.3.8, ‘‘Control 

Room Isolation Signal (CRIS)’’). It is 

recommended that the paragraph be 

revised as follows: Prior to 

incorporation of TSTF–448, Revision 3, 

the STS requirements addressing CRE 

boundary operability resided only in the 

following CRE ventilation system 

specifications: 

Disposition: The NRC staff accepted 

the comment and incorporated the 

recommended change into the model 

SE. 

2. (PE) Reference: Model SE Section 

2.4, Paragraph 1 (71 FR 61078). 

Comment: [The SE] characterizes the six 

year surveillance frequency for 

demonstrating unfiltered leakage into 

the control room envelope (CRE) is 

within limits as a relatively long test 

interval (frequency). When compared 

with the 15 year test frequency justified 

for the integrated leak rate test of 

containment, the six year frequency 

seems exceedingly short. This is 

particularly true given the safety (risk) 

significance of containment relative to 

the CRE boundary. Therefore, the bases 

for the six year frequency should be 

included in the model safety evaluation. 

Additionally, the model safety 

evaluation should allow sites the option 

to justify a site specific test frequency 

based on unique site characteristics 

using a risk-informed approach. (e.g., 

Regulatory Guide 1.177—An Approach 

for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed 

Decisionmaking: Technical 

Specifications) 

Disposition: The NRC staff 

determined that explicitly suggesting in 

the model LAR that an applicant 

propose longer test intervals based on 

risk considerations is inappropriate 

because such a request would exceed 

the scope of changes covered by TSTF–

448, Rev 3, would require staff 

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2024 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices 

evaluation beyond that described in the 

model SE, and could not be considered 

under the CLIIP. The proposed TS Bases 

for the in-leakage surveillance gives the 

basis for the six-year frequency by 

referencing the TS CRE Habitability 

Program, which requires this 

surveillance to be performed ‘‘in 

accordance with the testing methods 

and at the Frequencies specified in 

Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory 

Guide 1.197.’’ However, the phrase 

‘‘relatively long’’ in the model SE is 

potentially misleading and has been 

removed. 

3. (PE) Reference: Model SE Section 

3.4 Paragraph 1 (71 FR 61081). 

Comment: [The] model safety evaluation 

states: The program shall ensure that 

adequate radiation protection is 

provided to permit access and 

occupancy of the CRE under design 

basis accident (DBA) conditions * * * 

The control room envelope boundary 

and programs to maintain it are 

providing the necessary radiological 

protection for occupancy of the control 

room. The program is independent of 

any ability to ‘‘access’’ the control room. 

Therefore, it is recommended that the 

sentence be revised as follows: The 

program shall ensure that adequate 

radiation protection is provided to 

permit occupancy of the CRE under 

design basis accident (DBA) conditions 

* * * 

Disposition: Occupancy of the CRE 

must account for any radiation sources 

encountered outside the CRE while 

accessing (going to and from) the CRE. 

The proposed CRE Habitability Program 

TS states, ‘‘The program shall ensure 

that adequate radiation protection is 

provided to permit access and 

occupancy of the CRE under design 

basis accident (DBA) conditions 

* * * .’’ The recommendation is not 

accepted. 

4. (PE) (TSTF) (STARS) Reference: 

Model LAR Section 3.2 (71 FR 61084). 

Comment: Section 3.2 of the model LAR 

requires that the applicant make three 

commitments. Commitments 2 and 3 

state: 

• 2. [LICENSEE] will revise procedures to 

implement the new surveillance and 

programmatic TS requirements related to 

CRE habitability. 

• 3. [LICENSEE] commits to Regulatory 

Positions C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 

1.197, ‘‘Demonstrating Control Room 

Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power 

Reactors,’’ Revision 0, May 2003, with the 

following exceptions: [Add descriptions of 

proposed exceptions.] 

In the case of commitment 2, 10 CFR 

50, Appendix B, Criterion V, 

‘‘Instructions, Procedures, and 

Drawings,’’ already requires that, 

‘‘Activities affecting quality shall be 

prescribed by documented instructions, 

procedures, or drawings, of a type 

appropriate to the circumstances and 

shall be accomplished in accordance 

with these instructions, procedures, or 

drawings.’’

In the case of commitment 3, the 

commitment is specifically addressed 

by the wording that will be included in 

Technical Specifications per Technical 

Specification Task Force 448 (TSTF–

448) Section 5.5.18c (5 .5.15c for boiling 

water reactors) which states: 

Requirements for (i) determining the 

unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE 

boundary into the CRE in accordance with 

the testing methods and at the Frequencies 

specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of 

Regulatory Guide 1.197, ‘‘Demonstrating 

Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear 

Power Reactors,’’ Revision 0, May 2003, and 

(ii) assessing CRE habitability at the 

Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 

of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0. 

[The following are exceptions to Sections 

C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, 

Revision 0: 1.; and] 

Therefore, upon approval of the 

licensee’s amendment request, proposed 

commitments 2 and 3 will be addressed 

through legally binding regulatory 

obligations (i.e., 10 CFR 50, Appendix B 

and Technical Specifications) making 

regulatory commitments duplicative 

and an unnecessary burden on the 

licensee. It is recommended that 

commitments 2 and 3 be deleted from 

the subject model LAR. 

Disposition: The NRC staff accepts the 

recommendation and has removed 

commitments 2 and 3 from Section 3.2 

and Attachment 4 of the model LAR. 

5. (TSTF) Reference: In the Notice 

under ‘‘Applicability,’’ the last sentence 

(71 FR 61076). Comment: Should a 

licensee submit an application that 

requests adoption of TSTF–448 but 

includes significant variations or 

additional changes, it would facilitate 

the NRC’s review for the licensee to 

acknowledge that the change is based on 

TSTF–448 so that the NRC may use the 

model safety evaluation to the extent 

possible. We recommend revising the 

[last] sentence as follows: ‘‘Instead, 

licensees desiring significant variations 

and/or additional changes should 

submit a license amendment request 

(LAR) that does not request to adopt 

TSTF–448, Rev 3, under the 

Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Process.’’

Disposition: The NRC staff accepted 

the comment and incorporated the 

recommended change into the present 

notice. 

6. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR, 

Section 2.2 (71 FRN 61083). Comment: 

We recommend that the NRC modify 

Section 2.2 of the Model Application, 

‘‘Optional Changes and Variations,’’ to 

request that licensees describe which 

optional portions of the model Safety 

Evaluation are applicable. 

Disposition: The NRC staff accepted 

the comment and incorporated the 

recommended change as a note at the 

end of the first paragraph of Section 2.2 

of the model LAR. 

7. (TSTF) Reference: Model SE 

Section 2.3, first paragraph (71 FR 

61077). Comment: Section 2.3, 

‘‘Regulations Applicable to Control 

Room Habitability,’’ lists General Design 

Criteria from 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. 

Many licensees are not committed to the 

General Design Criteria and the wording 

of this section may result in many 

plants proposing an unnecessary 

variation in response to the required 

verification that the published safety 

evaluation is applicable in Section 2.2 

of the model application. We 

recommend adding the following 

sentence to the first paragraph prior to 

the last sentence, ‘‘Any licensee 

commitments to these criteria are 

described in the plant’s licensing basis 

documents.’’

Disposition: The following optional 

sentence is added to the first paragraph 

for use by applicants whose facilities are 

not licensed under the General Design 

Criteria from 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. 

‘‘[Facilities not licensed under the 

General Design Criteria from 10 CFR 

Part 50 are licensed under similar plantspecific design criteria, as described in 

the facility’s licensing basis 

documents.]’’

8. (TSTF) Reference: Model SE 

Section 3.3, Evaluation 5 (71 FR 61080). 

Comment: Remove Mode 4 from the 

sentence about the applicable 

operational modes for new Action B of 

TS 3.7.[4] because the BWR/4 and BWR/ 

6 Applicability does not include Mode 

4 for this action requirement. 

Disposition: The NRC staff replaced 

the subject sentence with ‘‘This new 

condition in Action F is needed because 

proposed Action B will only apply in 

Modes 1, 2, and 3.’’

9. (TSTF) Reference: Model SE 

Section 3.3, Evaluation 6 (71 FR 61081). 

Comment: In Evaluation 6, the next to 

the last sentence is overly specific 

concerning the wording of the licensee’s 

Generic Letter 2003–01 response about 

the adequacy of existing surveillance 

requirements to verify CRE boundary 

operability, and may lead to many 

plants proposing an unnecessary 

variation in response to the required 

verification that the published safety 

evaluation is applicable in Section 2.2 

of the model LAR. The acceptability of 

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the deletion of SR 3.7.[10].[4] is not 

dependent on the licensee’s Generic 

Letter response, but on the findings in 

the Generic Letter. We propose revising 

the sentences to be consistent with the 

statements in Section 1.0 of the model 

Safety Evaluation, such as ‘‘In Generic 

Letter 2003–01 (Reference 1), licensees 

were alerted to findings that the 

differential pressure surveillance is not 

a reliable method for demonstrating CRE 

boundary operability. Based on the 

adoption of TSTF–448, Revision 3, the 

licensee’s proposal to delete SR 

3.7.[10].[4] is acceptable.’’

Response: If the language of the model 

SE is not consistent with the wording of 

the licensee’s Generic Letter 2003–01 

response, the licensee should explain 

the inconsistency in its LAR to facilitate 

evaluation of the inconsistency by the 

staff in the SE for the license 

amendment. To account for the 

possibility of an inconsistency, the 

model SE is revised by surrounding the 

sentence in brackets. 

10. (TSTF) Reference: Model NSHC 

determination (71 FR 61082). Comment: 

In the evaluation of Criterion 2, add the 

word ‘‘Accident’’ before the word 

‘‘Previously’’ in the title, and change 

‘‘an accident’’ to ‘‘any accident’’ in the 

last sentence to match the wording of 

Criterion 2 in 10 CFR 50.92(c)(2). 

Disposition: The model NSHC 

determination was revised as suggested. 

11. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR 

title, second sentence (71 FR 61083). 

Comment: Revise the sentence by 

inserting the phrase ‘‘Plant Technical 

Specifications’’ after the phrase ‘‘to 

Revise’’ and changing ‘‘Tstf-448’’ to 

‘‘TSTF–448.’’

Disposition: The model LAR was 

revised as suggested. 

12. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR, 

Section 2.2, third paragraph (71 FR 

61083). Comment: Change the date 

‘‘June 2003’’ to ‘‘June 2001.’’

Disposition: The model LAR was 

revised as suggested. 

13. (TSTF) (STARS) Reference: Model 

LAR, lists of Attachments in cover 

letter, and Attachment 3 cover page title 

(71 FR 61083 and 4). Comment: Place 

brackets around references to the 

revised TS pages in the LAR cover letter 

and the Attachment 3 cover page title, 

and replace ‘‘Proposed’’ with ‘‘Revised’’

in the Attachment 3 cover page title. 

Providing smooth revised TS pages 

should be optional in the LAR. Also, 

make the Attachment 4 cover page title 

consistent with the title as stated in the 

LAR cover letter by removing ‘‘list of.’’

Disposition: The model LAR was 

revised as suggested. Finally, because 

the revised model LAR contains no list 

of regulatory commitments, the NRC 

staff added brackets around appropriate 

text in the model LAR to indicate that 

including regulatory commitments is 

optional. 

14. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR 

cover letter, next to last paragraph (71 

FR 61083). Comment: Revise the oath or 

affirmation statement to match the 

phrasing contained in Regulatory Issue 

Summary (RIS) 2001–18, ‘‘Requirements 

for Oath or Affirmation.’’

Disposition: The model LAR was 

revised to match RIS 2001–18. 

15. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR, 

Section 3.2 (71 FR 61084). Comment: 

Commitment 1 states, ‘‘[LICENSEE] 

commits to the guidance of NEI 99–03, 

Revision 0, ‘‘Control Room Habitability 

Assessment Guidance’’ dated June 2001, 

which provides guidance and details on 

the assessment and management of 

control room envelope (CRE) 

habitability.’’

This commitment should be deleted. 

A licensee general commitment to NEI 

99–03, Revision 0, is not relied upon in 

TSTF–448 or the model Safety 

Evaluation as a basis for finding the 

proposed changes acceptable. The 

analysis in the model Safety Evaluation 

does not support a conclusion that the 

NRC Staff has a ‘‘significant interest’’ in 

the matter to warrant a commitment. 

There are only two references to NEI 

99–03 in TSTF–448 and in the model 

Safety Evaluation: 

a. The model SE, Section 3.4, ‘‘TS 

5.5.[18], CRE Habitability Program,’’

refers to NEI 99–03, Revision 0, as one 

of two documents (with Regulatory 

Guide 1.196) containing guidance 

related to configuration control and 

maintenance of the control room 

envelope boundary. TSTF–448, 

Revision 3, proposed Specification 

5.5.[18], ‘‘Control Room Envelope 

Habitability Program,’’ paragraph b, 

requires that the licensee’s Control 

Room Envelope Habitability Program 

include requirements for maintaining 

the control room envelope boundary in 

its design condition including 

configuration control and preventive 

maintenance. NEI 99–03, Revision 0, 

discusses configuration control and 

maintenance in Section 9.4, 

‘‘Configuration Control,’’ which 

contains only generic guidance 

applicable to any configuration control 

program and which encompasses less 

than 2 pages of a 177 page document. 

A generic commitment to all of NEI 99–

03, Revision 0, for this purpose is 

unnecessary and unjustified. The 

appropriate control is already provided 

by the Technical Specifications and NEI 

99–03, [Revision 0, Section 9.4] is only 

one method of meeting the Technical 

Specification requirement. 

b. The proposed Bases for SR 

3.7.[10].[4] (the inleakage test) state, 

‘‘Compensatory measures are discussed 

in Regulatory Guide 1.196, Section 

C.2.7.3, (Ref. 5) which endorses, with 

exceptions, NEI 99–03, Section 8.4 and 

Appendix F (Ref. 6).’’ This very specific 

reference in the Technical Specification 

Bases to portions (8 pages of the 177 

page document) of NEI 99–03, [Revision 

0] do not justify a generic commitment 

to the entire document. 

Disposition: The NRC staff revised the 

model application to remove the 

commitment as suggested. 

16. (STARS) Reference: Model LAR 

cover letter (71 FR 61083). Comment: 

After the sentence ‘‘Attachment 4 

provides a summary of the regulatory 

commitments made in this submittal.’’

insert ‘‘Attachment 5 provides the 

existing TS Bases pages marked up to 

show proposed change and is for 

information only.’’ For completeness, 

this adds information related to 

Attachment 5 in the cover letter. 

Disposition: The model LAR was 

revised by adding the sentence 

‘‘Attachment 5 provides existing TS 

Bases pages marked up to show the 

proposed changes.’’ The NRC staff 

expects that a licensee adopting a TSTF 

change to the STS will also adopt 

associated changes to the STS Bases or 

provide in its LAR a justification for any 

deviation. 

17. (STARS) Reference: Model LAR, 

Attachment 1, Section 1.0, paragraph 1 

(71 FR 61083). Comment: Place the title 

of TS Section 5.5 in brackets to account 

for the possibility that some facilities 

may have a different title. 

Disposition: The model LAR was 

revised as suggested. 

18. (STARS) Reference: Model LAR 

cover letter (71 FR 61083) and 

Attachment 5 cover page (71 FR 61084). 

Comment: Include the phrase ‘‘(For 

Information Only)’’ to the title of 

Attachment 5. 

Disposition: As noted in the 

disposition of Comment 16, the NRC 

staff expects that a licensee adopting a 

TSTF change to the STS will also adopt 

associated changes to the STS Bases or 

provide in its LAR a justification for any 

deviation. Consequently, the suggested 

phrase is not appropriate and is not 

adopted. 

19. (NRC staff) Reference: Model SE 

Section 3.1, last paragraph (71 FR 

61079); model LAR, Section 2.2, third 

paragraph (71 FR 61083); model LAR 

Section 3.2 and Attachment 4, first 

commitment (71 FR 61083). Comment: 

Remove option to follow guidance in 

March 2003 version of NEI 99–03 

contingent upon showing that 

differences with the June 2001 version 

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2026 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices 

do not conflict with staff positions in 

Regulatory Guide 1.196, because the 

NRC has not endorsed the March 2003 

version. 

Disposition: The model SE and model 

LAR have been revised to remove the 

option of referencing the March 2003 

version of NEI 99–03, as described in 

the disposition of Comment 15. The 

NRC staff recommends that 

implementation of any guidance in NEI 

99–03, Revision 0, dated June 2001, that 

a licensee elects to follow, be consistent 

with the NRC staff positions in 

Regulatory Guide 1.196. 

Adoption of TSTF–448, Rev 3 

Licensees wishing to adopt TSTF–

448, Rev 3, must submit an LAR in 

accordance with applicable rules and 

other regulatory requirements. For each 

LAR, the NRC staff will publish a notice 

of consideration of issuance of 

amendment to a facility operating 

license, a proposed NSHC 

determination, and a notice of 

opportunity for a hearing. The NRC staff 

will also publish a notice of issuance of 

an amendment to a facility operating 

license to announce the modification of 

TS requirements related to CRE 

habitability, for each plant that receives 

the requested change. 

Model Safety Evaluation 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

Consolidated Line Item Improvement; 

Adoption of Changes to Standard 

Technical Specifications Under 

Technical Specifications Task Force 

(TSTF) Change Number TSTF–448, 

Revision 3 Regarding Control Room 

Envelope Habitability 

1.0 Introduction 

By application dated [ ] [as 

supplemented by letters dated [ and ]], 

[Name of Licensee] (the licensee) 

requested changes to the Technical 

Specifications (TS) for the [Name of 

Facility]. [The supplements dated [ and 

], provided additional information that 

clarified the application, did not expand 

the scope of the application as originally 

noticed, and did not change the staff’s 

original proposed no significant hazards 

consideration determination as 

published in the Federal Register on 

[Date (PM/LA will fill in FR 

information)] (XX FR XXXX).] 

On August 8, 2006, the commercial 

nuclear electrical power generation 

industry owners group Technical 

Specifications Task Force (TSTF) 

submitted a proposed change, TSTF–

448, Revision 3, to the improved 

standard technical specifications (STS) 

(NUREGs 1430–1434) on behalf of the 

industry (TSTF–448, Revisions 0, 1, and 

2 were prior draft iterations). TSTF–448, 

Revision 3, is a proposal to establish 

more effective and appropriate action, 

surveillance, and administrative STS 

requirements related to ensuring the 

habitability of the control room 

envelope (CRE). 

In United States Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) Generic Letter 2003–

01 (Reference 1), licensees were alerted 

to findings at facilities that existing TS 

surveillance requirements for the 

[Control Room Envelope Emergency 

Ventilation System (CREEVS )] may not 

be adequate. Specifically, the results of 

ASTM E741 (Reference 2) tracer gas 

tests to measure control room envelope 

(CRE) unfiltered inleakage at facilities 

indicated that the differential pressure 

surveillance is not a reliable method for 

demonstrating CRE boundary 

operability. Licensees were requested to 

address existing TS as follows: 

Provide confirmation that your technical 

specifications verify the integrity [i.e., 

operability] of the CRE [boundary], and the 

assumed [unfiltered] inleakage rates of 

potentially contaminated air. If you currently 

have a differential pressure surveillance 

requirement to demonstrate CRE [boundary] 

integrity, provide the basis for your 

conclusion that it remains adequate to 

demonstrate CRE integrity in light of the 

ASTM E741 testing results. If you conclude 

that your differential pressure surveillance 

requirement is no longer adequate, provide a 

schedule for: (1) Revising the surveillance 

requirement in your technical specification 

to reference an acceptable surveillance 

methodology (e.g., ASTM E741), and (2) 

making any necessary modifications to your 

CRE [boundary] so that compliance with your 

new surveillance requirement can be 

demonstrated. 

If your facility does not currently have a 

technical specification surveillance 

requirement for your CRE integrity, explain 

how and at what frequency you confirm your 

CRE integrity and why this is adequate to 

demonstrate CRE integrity. 

To promote standardization and to 

minimize the resources that would be 

needed to create and process plantspecific amendment applications in 

response to the concerns described in 

the generic letter, the industry and the 

NRC proposed revisions to CRE 

habitability system requirements 

contained in the STS, using the STS 

change traveler process. This effort 

culminated in Revision 3 to traveler 

TSTF–448, ‘‘Control Room 

Habitability,’’ which the NRC staff 

approved on [month dd, 2006]. 

Consistent with the traveler as 

incorporated into NUREG–143[0], the 

licensee proposed revising action and 

surveillance requirements in 

[Specification 3.7.10, ‘‘Control Room 

Envelope Emergency Ventilation System 

(CREEVS),’’] and adding a new 

administrative controls program, 

[Specification 5.5.18, ‘‘CRE Habitability 

Program.’’] The purpose of the changes 

is to ensure that CRE boundary 

operability is maintained and verified 

through effective surveillance and 

programmatic requirements, and that 

appropriate remedial actions are taken 

in the event of an inoperable CRE 

boundary. 

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation 

2.1 Control Room and Control Room 

Envelope 

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.196, 

‘‘Control Room Habitability at Lightwater Nuclear Power Reactors,’’

Revision 0, May 2003, (Reference 4) 

uses the term ‘‘control room envelope 

(CRE)’’ in addition to the term ‘‘control 

room’’ and defines each term as follows: 

Control Room: The plant area, defined in 

the facility licensing basis, in which actions 

can be taken to operate the plant safely under 

normal conditions and to maintain the 

reactor in a safe condition during accident 

situations. It encompasses the 

instrumentation and controls necessary for a 

safe shutdown of the plant and typically 

includes the critical document reference file, 

computer room (if used as an integral part of 

the emergency response plan), shift 

supervisor’s office, operator wash room and 

kitchen, and other critical areas to which 

frequent personnel access or continuous 

occupancy may be necessary in the event of 

an accident. 

Control Room Envelope: The plant area, 

defined in the facility licensing basis, that in 

the event of an emergency, can be isolated 

from the plant areas and the environment 

external to the CRE. This area is served by 

an emergency ventilation system, with the 

intent of maintaining the habitability of the 

control room. This area encompasses the 

control room, and may encompass other noncritical areas to which frequent personnel 

access or continuous occupancy is not 

necessary in the event of an accident. 

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.197, 

‘‘Demonstrating Control Room Envelope 

Integrity At Nuclear Power Reactors,’’

Revision 0, May 2003 (Reference 5), also 

contains these definitions, but uses the 

term CRE to mean both. This is because 

the protected environment provided for 

operators varies with the nuclear power 

facility. At some facilities this 

environment is limited to the control 

room; at others, it is the CRE. In this 

safety evaluation, consistent with the 

proposed changes to the STS, the CRE 

will be used to designate both. For 

consistency, facilities should use the 

term CRE with an appropriate facilityspecific definition derived from the 

above CRE definition. 

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2.2 [Control Room Envelope 

Emergency Ventilation System 

(CREEVS)] 

The [CREEVS] provides a protected 

environment from which operators can 

control the unit, during airborne 

challenges from radioactivity, hazardous 

chemicals, and fire byproducts, such as 

fire suppression agents and smoke, 

during both normal and accident 

conditions. 

The [CREEVS] is designed to maintain 

a habitable environment in the control 

room envelope for 30 days of 

continuous occupancy after a Design 

Basis Accident (DBA) without 

exceeding a [5 rem whole body dose or 

its equivalent to any part of the body] 

[5 rem total effective dose equivalent 

(TEDE)]. 

The [CREEVS] consists of two 

redundant trains [subsystems], each 

capable of maintaining the habitability 

of the CRE. The [CREEVS] is considered 

operable when the individual 

components necessary to limit operator 

exposure are operable in both trains 

[subsystems]. A [CREEVS] train 

[subsystem] is considered operable 

when the associated: 

• Fan is operable; 

• High efficiency particulate air 

(HEPA) filters and charcoal adsorbers 

are not excessively restricting flow, and 

are capable of performing their filtration 

functions; 

• Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, 

and dampers are operable, and air 

circulation can be maintained; and 

• CRE boundary is operable (the 

single boundary supports both trains 

[subsystems]). 

The CRE boundary is considered 

operable when the measured unfiltered 

air inleakage is less than or equal to the 

inleakage value assumed by the 

licensing basis analyses of design basis 

accident consequences to CRE 

occupants. 

2.3 Regulations Applicable To Control 

Room Habitability 

In Appendix A, ‘‘General Design 

Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ to 10 

CFR Part 50, ‘‘Domestic Licensing of 

Production and Utilization Facilities,’’

General Design Criteria (GDC) 1, 2, 3, 4, 

5, and 19 apply to CRE habitability. A 

summary of these GDCs follows. 

[Facilities not licensed under the GDC 

from 10 CFR Part 50 are licensed under 

similar plant-specific design criteria, as 

described in the facility’s licensing basis 

documents.] 

GDC 1, ‘‘Quality Standards and 

Records,’’ requires that structures, 

systems, and components (SSCs) 

important to safety be designed, 

fabricated, erected, and tested to quality 

standards commensurate with the 

importance of the safety functions 

performed. 

GDC 2, ‘‘Design Basis for Protection 

Against Natural Phenomena,’’ requires 

that structures, systems, and 

components (SSCs) important to safety 

be designed to withstand the effects of 

earthquakes and other natural hazards. 

GDC 3, ‘‘Fire Protection,’’ requires 

SSCs important to safety be designed 

and located to minimize the effects of 

fires and explosions. 

GDC 4, ‘‘Environmental and Dynamic 

Effects Design Bases,’’ requires SSCs 

important to safety to be designed to 

accommodate the effects of and to be 

compatible with the environmental 

conditions associated with normal 

operation, maintenance, testing, and 

postulated accidents, including loss-ofcoolant accidents (LOCAs). 

GDC 5, ‘‘Sharing of Structures, 

Systems, and Components,’’ requires 

that SSCs important to safety not be 

shared among nuclear power units 

unless it can be shown that such sharing 

will not significantly impair their ability 

to perform their safety functions, 

including, in the event of an accident in 

one unit, the orderly shutdown and 

cooldown of the remaining units. 

GDC 19, ‘‘Control Room,’’ requires 

that a control room be provided from 

which actions can be taken to operate 

the nuclear reactor safely under normal 

conditions and to maintain the reactor 

in a safe condition under accident 

conditions, including a LOCA. 

Adequate radiation protection is to be 

provided to permit access and 

occupancy of the control room under 

accident conditions without personnel 

receiving radiation exposures in excess 

of specified values. 

Prior to incorporation of TSTF–448, 

Revision 3, the STS requirements 

addressing CRE boundary operability 

resided only in the following CRE 

ventilation system specifications: 

• NUREG–1430, TS 3.7.10, ‘‘Control 

Room Emergency Ventilation System 

(CREVS);’’

• NUREG–1431, TS 3.7.10, ‘‘Control 

Room Emergency Filtration System 

(CREFS);’’

• NUREG–1432, TS 3.7.11, ‘‘Control 

Room Emergency Air Cleanup System 

(CREACS);’’

• NUREG–1433, TS 3.7.4, ‘‘[Main 

Control Room Environmental Control 

(MCREC)] System;’’ and 

• NUREG–1434, TS 3.7.3, ‘‘[Control 

Room Fresh Air (CRFA)] System.’’

In these specifications, the 

surveillance requirement associated 

with demonstrating the operability of 

the CRE boundary requires verifying 

that one [CREEVS] train [subsystem] can 

maintain a positive pressure of [0.125] 

inches water gauge, relative to the 

adjacent [turbine building] during the 

pressurization mode of operation at a 

makeup flow rate of [3000] cfm. 

Facilities that pressurize the CRE during 

the emergency mode of operation of the 

[CREEVS] have similar surveillance 

requirements. Other facilities that do 

not pressurize the CRE have only a 

system flow rate criterion for the 

emergency mode of operation. 

Regardless, the results of ASTM E741 

(Reference 2) tracer gas tests to measure 

CRE unfiltered inleakage at facilities 

indicated that the differential pressure 

surveillance (or the alternative 

surveillance at non-pressurization 

facilities) is not a reliable method for 

demonstrating CRE boundary 

operability. That is, licensees were able 

to obtain differential pressure and flow 

measurements satisfying the SR limits 

even though unfiltered inleakage was 

determined to exceed the value assumed 

in the safety analyses. 

In addition to an inadequate 

surveillance requirement, the action 

requirements of these specifications 

were ambiguous regarding CRE 

boundary operability in the event CRE 

unfiltered inleakage is found to exceed 

the analysis assumption. The ambiguity 

stemmed from the view that the CRE 

boundary may be considered operable 

but degraded in this condition, and that 

it would be deemed inoperable only if 

calculated radiological exposure limits 

for CRE occupants exceeded a licensing 

basis limit; e.g., as stated in GDC–19, 

even while crediting compensatory 

measures. 

NRC Administrative Letter 98–10, 

‘‘Dispositioning of Technical 

Specifications That Are Insufficient to 

Assure Plant Safety,’’ (AL 98–10) states 

that ‘‘ the discovery of an improper or 

inadequate TS value or required action 

is considered a degraded or 

nonconforming condition,’’ which is 

defined in [NRC Inspection Manual 

Chapter 9900; see latest guidance in RIS 

2005–20 (Reference 3)]. ‘‘Imposing 

administrative controls in response to 

an improper or inadequate TS is 

considered an acceptable short-term 

corrective action. The [NRC] staff 

expects that, following the imposition of 

administrative controls, an amendment 

to the [inadequate] TS, with appropriate 

justification and schedule, will be 

submitted in a timely fashion.’’

Licensees that have found unfiltered 

inleakage in excess of the limit assumed 

in the safety analyses and have yet to 

either reduce the inleakage below the 

limit or establish a higher bounding 

limit through re-analysis, have 

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2028 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices 

implemented compensatory actions to 

ensure the safety of CRE occupants, 

pending final resolution of the 

condition, consistent with RIS 2005–20. 

However, based on GL 2003–01 and AL 

98–10, the staff expects each licensee to 

propose TS changes that include a 

surveillance to periodically measure 

CRE unfiltered inleakage in order to 

satisfy 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3), which 

requires a facility’s TS to include 

surveillance requirements, which it 

defines as ‘‘requirements relating to test, 

calibration, or inspection to assure that 

the necessary quality of systems and 

components is maintained, that facility 

operation will be within safety limits, 

and that limiting conditions for 

operation will be met.’’ (Emphasis 

added.) 

The NRC staff also expects facilities to 

propose unambiguous remedial actions, 

consistent with 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2), for 

the condition of not meeting the 

limiting condition for operation (LCO) 

due to an inoperable CRE boundary. The 

action requirements should specify a 

reasonable completion time to restore 

conformance to the LCO before 

requiring a facility to be shut down. 

This completion time should be based 

on the benefits of implementing 

mitigating actions to ensure CRE 

occupant safety and sufficient time to 

resolve most problems anticipated with 

the CRE boundary, while minimizing 

the chance that operators in the CRE 

will need to use mitigating actions 

during accident conditions. 

2.4 Adoption of TSTF–448, Revision 3, 

by [facility name] 

Adoption of TSTF–448, Revision 3, 

will assure that the facility’s TS LCO for 

the [CREEVS] is met by demonstrating 

unfiltered leakage into the CRE is within 

limits; i.e., the operability of the CRE 

boundary. In support of this 

surveillance, which specifies a test 

interval (frequency) of 6 years, TSTF–

448 also adds TS administrative 

controls to assure the habitability of the 

CRE between performances of the 

ASTM E741 test. In addition, adoption 

of TSTF–448 will establish clearly 

stated and reasonable required actions 

in the event CRE unfiltered inleakage is 

found to exceed the analysis 

assumption. 

The changes made by TSTF–448 to 

the STS requirements for the [CREEVS] 

and the CRE boundary conform to 10 

CFR 50.36(c)(2) and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3). 

Their adoption will better assure that 

[facility name]’s CRE will remain 

habitable during normal operation and 

design basis accident conditions. These 

changes are, therefore, acceptable from 

a regulatory standpoint. 

3.0 Technical Evaluation 

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed 

changes against the corresponding 

changes made to the STS by TSTF–448, 

Revision 3, which the NRC staff has 

found to satisfy applicable regulatory 

requirements, as described above in 

Section 2.0. [The emergency operational 

mode of the [CREEVS] at [facility name] 

[pressurizes] [isolates but does not 

pressurize] the CRE to minimize 

unfiltered air inleakage.] The proposed 

changes are consistent with this design. 

3.1 Proposed Changes 

The proposed amendment would 

strengthen CRE habitability TS 

requirements by changing TS [3.7.10, 

CREEVS] and adding a new TS 

administrative controls program on CRE 

habitability. Accompanying the 

proposed TS changes are appropriate 

conforming technical changes to the TS 

Bases. The proposed revision to the 

Bases also includes editorial and 

administrative changes to reflect 

applicable changes to the corresponding 

STS Bases, which were made to 

improve clarity, conform with the latest 

information and references, correct 

factual errors, and achieve more 

consistency among the STS NUREGs. 

[Except for plant specific differences, all 

of] these changes are consistent with 

STS as revised by TSTF–448, Revision 

3. 

The NRC staff compared the proposed 

TS changes to the STS and the STS 

markups and evaluations in TSTF–448. 

[The staff verified that differences from 

the STS were adequately justified on the 

basis of plant-specific design or 

retention of current licensing basis.] The 

NRC staff also reviewed the proposed 

changes to the TS Bases for consistency 

with the STS Bases and the plantspecific design and licensing bases, 

although approval of the Bases is not a 

condition for accepting the proposed 

amendment. However, TS 5.5.[11], ‘‘TS 

Bases Control Program,’’ provides 

assurance that the licensee has 

established and will maintain the 

adequacy of the Bases. The proposed 

Bases for TS 3.7.[10] refer to specific 

guidance in NEI 99–03, ‘‘Control Room 

Habitability Assessment Guidance,’’

Revision 0, dated June 2001 (Reference 

6), which the NRC staff has formally 

endorsed, with exceptions, through 

Regulatory Guide 1.196, ‘‘Control Room 

Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear 

Power Reactors,’’ dated May 2003 

(Reference 4). 

3.2 Editorial Changes 

The licensee proposed editorial 

changes to TS [3.7.10, ‘‘CREEVS,’’] to 

establish standard terminology, such as 

‘‘control room envelope (CRE)’’ in place 

of ‘‘control room,’’ except for the plantspecific name for the [CREEVS], and 

‘‘radiological, chemical, and smoke 

hazards (or challenges)’’ in place of 

various phrases to describe the hazards 

that CRE occupants are protected from 

by the [CREEVS]. [The licensee also 

proposed to correct a typographical 

error by replacing ‘‘irradiate’’ with 

‘‘irradiated’’ in TS 3.7.10 Condition E.] 

These changes improve the usability 

and quality of the presentation of the 

TS, have no impact on safety, and 

therefore, are acceptable. 

3.3 TS [3.7.10, CREEVS] 

< Evaluation 1—for facilities that have 

adopted the [CREEVS] TS LCO Note and 

Action B of TSTF–287, Rev. 5 > 

The licensee proposed to revise the 

action requirements of TS [3.7.10, 

‘‘CREEVS,’’] to acknowledge that an 

inoperable CRE boundary, depending 

upon the location of the associated 

degradation, could cause just one, 

instead of both [CREEVS] [trains] to be 

inoperable. This is accomplished by 

revising Condition A to exclude 

Condition B, and revising Condition B 

to address one or more [CREEVS] 

[trains], as follows: 

• Condition A One [CREEVS] [train] 

inoperable for reasons other than 

Condition B. 

• Condition B One or more 

[CREEVS] [trains] inoperable due to 

inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 1, 2, 

[or] 3[, or 4]. 

This change clarifies how to apply the 

action requirements in the event just 

one [CREEVS] [train] is unable to ensure 

CRE occupant safety within licensing 

basis limits because of an inoperable 

CRE boundary. It enhances the usability 

of Conditions A and B with a 

presentation that is more consistent 

with the intent of the existing 

requirements. This change is an 

administrative change because it neither 

reduces nor increases the existing action 

requirements, and, therefore, is 

acceptable. 

The licensee proposed to replace 

existing Required Action B.1, ‘‘Restore 

control room boundary to OPERABLE 

status,’’ which has a 24-hour 

Completion Time, with Required Action 

B.1, to immediately initiate action to 

implement mitigating actions; Required 

Action B.2, to verify, within 24 hours, 

that in the event of a DBA, CRE 

occupant radiological exposures will 

not exceed the calculated dose of the 

licensing basis analyses of DBA 

consequences, and that CRE occupants 

are protected from hazardous chemicals 

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and smoke; and Required Action B.3, to 

restore CRE boundary to operable status 

within 90 days. 

The 24-hour Completion Time of new 

Required Action B.2 is reasonable based 

on the low probability of a DBA 

occurring during this time period, and 

the use of mitigating actions as directed 

by Required Action B.1. The 90-day 

Completion Time of new Required 

Action B.3 is reasonable based on the 

determination that the mitigating 

actions will ensure protection of CRE 

occupants within analyzed limits while 

limiting the probability that CRE 

occupants will have to implement 

protective measures that may adversely 

affect their ability to control the reactor 

and maintain it in a safe shutdown 

condition in the event of a DBA. The 90- 

day Completion Time is a reasonable 

time to diagnose, plan and possibly 

repair, and test most anticipated 

problems with the CRE boundary. 

Therefore, proposed Action B is 

acceptable. 

< End of Evaluation 1 > 

< Evaluation 2—for facilities that have 

not yet adopted the [CREEVS] TS LCO 

Note and Action B of TSTF–287, 

Rev. 5 > 

The licensee proposed to establish 

new action requirements in TS [3.7.10, 

‘‘CREEVS,’’] for an inoperable CRE 

boundary. Currently, if one [CREEVS] 

[train] is determined to be inoperable 

due to an inoperable CRE boundary, 

existing Action A would apply and 

require restoring the [train] (and the 

CRE boundary) to operable status in 7 

days. If two [trains] are determined to be 

inoperable due to an inoperable CRE 

boundary, existing Action [E] specifies 

no time to restore the [trains] (and the 

CRE boundary) to operable status, but 

requires immediate entry into the 

shutdown actions of LCO 3.0.3. These 

existing Actions are more restrictive 

than would be appropriate in situations 

for which CRE occupant 

implementation of compensatory 

measures or mitigating actions would 

temporarily afford adequate CRE 

occupant protection from postulated 

airborne hazards. To account for such 

situations, the licensee proposed to 

revise the action requirements to add a 

new Condition B, ‘‘One or more 

[CREEVS] [trains] inoperable due to 

inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 1, 2, 

[or] 3[, or 4].’’ New Action B would 

allow 90 days to restore the CRE 

boundary (and consequently, the 

affected [CREEVS] [trains]) to operable 

status, provided that mitigating actions 

are immediately implemented and 

within 24 hours are verified to ensure, 

that in the event of a DBA, CRE 

occupant radiological exposures will 

not exceed the calculated dose of the 

licensing basis analyses of DBA 

consequences, and that CRE occupants 

are protected from hazardous chemicals 

and smoke. 

The 24-hour Completion Time of new 

Required Action B.2 is reasonable based 

on the low probability of a DBA 

occurring during this time period, and 

the use of mitigating actions. The 90-day 

Completion Time is reasonable based on 

the determination that the mitigating 

actions will ensure protection of CRE 

occupants within analyzed limits while 

limiting the probability that CRE 

occupants will have to implement 

protective measures that may adversely 

affect their ability to control the reactor 

and maintain it in a safe shutdown 

condition in the event of a DBA. The 90- 

day Completion Time of new Required 

Action B.3 is a reasonable time to 

diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and 

test most anticipated problems with the 

CRE boundary. Therefore, proposed 

Action B is acceptable. 

To distinguish new Condition B from 

the existing condition for one [CREEVS] 

[train] inoperable, Condition A is 

revised to state, ‘‘One [CREEVS] [train] 

inoperable for reasons other than 

Condition B.’’ To distinguish new 

Condition B from the existing condition 

for two [CREEVS] [trains] inoperable, 

Condition [E] (renumbered as Condition 

[F]) is revised to state, ‘‘Two [CREEVS] 

[trains] inoperable during MODE 1, 2, 

[or] 3[, or 4] for reasons other than 

Condition B.’’ The changes to existing 

Conditions A and [E] are less restrictive 

because these Conditions will no longer 

apply in the event one or two [CREEVS] 

[trains] are inoperable due to an 

inoperable CRE boundary during unit 

operation in Mode 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4]. 

This is acceptable because the new 

Action B establishes adequate remedial 

measures in this condition. With the 

addition of a new Condition B, existing 

Conditions B, C, D, and E are redesignated C, D, E, and F, respectively. 

The licensee also proposed to modify 

the [CREEVS] LCO by adding a note 

allowing the CRE boundary to be 

opened intermittently under 

administrative controls. As stated in the 

LCO Bases, this Note ‘‘only applies to 

openings in the CRE boundary that can 

be rapidly restored to the design 

condition, such as doors, hatches, floor 

plugs, and access panels. For entry and 

exit through doors, the administrative 

control of the opening is performed by 

the person(s) entering or exiting the 

area. For other openings, these controls 

should be proceduralized and consist of 

stationing a dedicated individual at the 

opening who is in continuous 

communication with operators in the 

CRE. This individual will have a 

method to rapidly close the opening and 

to restore the CRE boundary to a 

condition equivalent to the design 

condition when a need for CRE isolation 

is indicated.’’ The allowance of this note 

is acceptable because the administrative 

controls will ensure that the opening 

will be quickly sealed to maintain the 

validity of the licensing basis analyses 

of DBA consequences. 

< End of Evaluation 2 > 

< Evaluation 3—for B&W CREVS TS > 

The existing TS 3.7.10 condition for 

two control room emergency ventilation 

system (CREVS) trains inoperable 

during refueling, Condition E, is revised 

to also apply during plant operation in 

Modes 5 and 6. It will state, ‘‘Two 

CREVS trains inoperable [in MODE 5 or 

6, or] during movement of [recently] 

irradiated fuel assemblies.’’ This change 

clarifies the applicability of this 

condition for dual unit facilities when 

the unit is in Mode 5 or 6, and the other 

unit is moving [recently] irradiated fuel 

assemblies. Similarly, Condition D, for 

failing to meet Action A during 

movement of [recently] irradiated fuel 

assemblies, is revised to also apply in 

Modes 5 and 6. These changes are 

administrative because they only clarify 

the intended applicability of the 

existing conditions, and are, therefore, 

acceptable. Required Actions D.2 and 

E.1, to immediately suspend movement 

of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, 

ensures that a fuel handling accident 

cannot occur while the unit is in these 

conditions. With only one CREVS train 

inoperable, Required Action D.1 

specifies an alternative to immediately 

suspending fuel movement; it requires 

immediately placing the operable 

CREVS train in its emergency operating 

alignment, or mode, to minimize the 

chance the train will fail to properly 

switch to this mode if called upon in 

response to a fuel handling accident, or 

other airborne hazards challenge. 

< End of Evaluation 3 > 

< Evaluation 4—for B&W, CE, and W 

[CREEVS] TS > 

The licensee proposed to add a new 

condition to Action E of TS 3.7.1[0] that 

states, ‘‘One or more [CREEVS] trains 

inoperable due to an inoperable CRE 

boundary [in Mode 5 or 6, or] during 

movement of [recently] irradiated fuel 

assemblies.’’ The specified Required 

Action proposed for this condition is 

the same as for the existing condition of 

Action E [(revised as discussed 

previously) <for B&W plants if 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES

2030 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices 

Evaluation 3 is used>], which states 

‘‘[Two [CREEVS] trains inoperable [in 

MODE 5 or 6, or] during movement of 

[recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.’’

Accordingly, the new condition is stated 

with the other condition in Action E 

using the logical connector ‘‘OR’’ in 

accordance with the STS writer’s guide 

(TSTF–GG–05–01, ‘‘Writer’s Guide for 

Plant-Specific Improved Technical 

Specifications,’’ June 2005). The 

practical result of this presentation in 

format is the same as specifying two 

separately numbered Actions, one for 

each condition. Its advantage is to make 

the TS Actions table easier to use by 

avoiding having an additional 

numbered row in the Actions table. The 

new condition in Action E is needed 

because proposed Action B will only 

apply in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. As such, 

this change will ensure that the Actions 

table continues to specify a condition 

for an inoperable CRE boundary during 

Modes 5 and 6 and during refueling. 

Therefore, this change is administrative 

and acceptable. 

< End of Evaluation 4 > 

< Evaluation 5—for BWR4 and BWR6 

[CREEVS] TS > 

The licensee proposed to add a new 

condition to Action F of TS 3.7.[4] that 

states, ‘‘One or more [CREEVS] 

subsystems inoperable due to an 

inoperable CRE boundary during 

movement of [recently] irradiated fuel 

assemblies in the [[primary or] 

secondary] containment or during 

operations with a potential for draining 

the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).’’ The 

specified Required Actions proposed for 

this condition are the same as for the 

other existing condition for Action F, 

which states, ‘‘Two [CREEVS] 

subsystems inoperable during 

movement of [recently] irradiated fuel 

assemblies in the [secondary] 

containment or during OPDRVs.’’

Accordingly, the new condition is stated 

with the other condition in Action F 

using the logical connector ‘‘OR’’ in 

accordance with the STS writer’s guide 

(TSTF–GG–05–01, ‘‘Writer’s Guide for 

Plant-Specific Improved Technical 

Specifications,’’ June 2005). The 

practical result of this presentation in 

format is the same as specifying two 

separately numbered Actions, one for 

each condition. Its advantage is to make 

the TS Actions table easier to use by 

avoiding having an additional 

numbered row in the Actions table. This 

new condition in Action F is needed 

because proposed Action B will only 

apply in Modes 1, 2, and 3. As such, this 

change will ensure that the Actions 

table continues to specify a condition 

for an inoperable CRE boundary during 

refueling and OPDRVs. Therefore, this 

change is administrative and acceptable. 

< End of Evaluation 5 > 

< Evaluation 6—for facilities that have 

a CRE pressurization surveillance 

requirement > 

In the [emergency radiation state] of 

operation, the [CREEVS] isolates 

unfiltered ventilation air supply intakes, 

filters the emergency ventilation air 

supply to the CRE, and pressurizes the 

CRE to minimize unfiltered air 

inleakage past the CRE boundary. The 

licensee proposed to delete the CRE 

pressurization surveillance requirement 

(SR). This SR requires verifying that one 

[CREEVS] [train][subsystem], operating 

in the [emergency radiation state], can 

maintain a pressure of [0.125] inches 

water gauge, relative to the adjacent 

[turbine building] during the 

pressurization mode of operation at a 

makeup flow rate of [3000] cfm. The 

deletion of this SR is proposed because 

measurements of unfiltered air leakage 

into the CRE at numerous reactor 

facilities demonstrated that a basic 

assumption of this SR, an essentially 

leak-tight CRE boundary, was incorrect 

for most facilities. Hence, meeting this 

SR by achieving the required CRE 

pressure is not necessarily a conclusive 

indication of CRE boundary leak 

tightness, i.e., CRE boundary 

operability. [In its response to GL 2003–

01, [dated month, dd, yyyy], the 

licensee reported that it had determined 

that the [facility name] CRE 

pressurization surveillance, SR 

3.7.[10].[4], was inadequate to 

demonstrate the operability of the CRE 

boundary, and proposed to replace it 

with an inleakage measurement SR and 

a CRE Habitability Program in TS 

Section 5.5, in accordance with the 

approved version of TSTF–448.] Based 

on the adoption of TSTF–448, Revision 

3, the licensee’s proposal to delete SR 

3.7.[10].[4] is acceptable. 

<End of Evaluation 6 > 

The proposed CRE inleakage 

measurement SR states, ‘‘Perform 

required CRE unfiltered air inleakage 

testing in accordance with the Control 

Room Envelope Habitability Program.’’

The CRE Habitability Program TS, 

proposed TS 5.5.[18], requires that the 

program include ‘‘Requirements for 

determining the unfiltered air inleakage 

past the CRE boundary into the CRE in 

accordance with the testing methods 

and at the Frequencies specified in 

Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory 

Guide 1.197, Revision 0 (Reference 5). 

This guidance references ASTM E741 

(Reference 2) as an acceptable method 

for ascertaining the unfiltered leakage 

into the CRE. The licensee has [, 

however, not] proposed to follow this 

method. [The NRC staff reviewed the 

licensee’s proposed alternative method 

for measuring CRE inleakage to ensure 

it meets the criteria for such methods 

given in RG 1.197.] [Insert plant-specific 

technical evaluation by the staff of the 

alternative method.] [The NRC staff 

finds that the proposed alternative 

method satisfies the criteria of RG 

1.197.] Therefore, the proposed CRE 

inleakage measurement SR is 

acceptable. 

3.4 TS 5.5.[18], CRE Habitability 

Program 

The proposed administrative controls 

program TS is consistent with the model 

program TS in TSTF–448, Revision 3. In 

combination with SR 3.7.[10].[4], this 

program is intended to ensure the 

operability of the CRE boundary, which 

as part of an operable [CREEVS] will 

ensure that CRE habitability is 

maintained such that CRE occupants 

can control the reactor safely under 

normal conditions and maintain it in a 

safe condition following a radiological 

event, hazardous chemical release, or a 

smoke challenge. The program shall 

ensure that adequate radiation 

protection is provided to permit access 

and occupancy of the CRE under design 

basis accident (DBA) conditions without 

personnel receiving radiation exposures 

in excess of [5 rem whole body or its 

equivalent to any part of the body] [5 

rem total effective dose equivalent 

(TEDE)] for the duration of the accident. 

A CRE Habitability Program TS 

acceptable to the NRC staff requires the 

program to contain the following 

elements: 

Definitions of CRE and CRE boundary. 

This element is intended to ensure that 

these definitions accurately describe the 

plant areas that are within the CRE, and 

also the interfaces that form the CRE 

boundary, and are consistent with the 

general definitions discussed in Section 

2.1 of this safety evaluation. 

Establishing what is meant by the CRE 

and the CRE boundary will preclude 

ambiguity in the implementation of the 

program. 

Configuration control and preventive 

maintenance of the CRE boundary. This 

element is intended to ensure the CRE 

boundary is maintained in its design 

condition. Guidance for implementing 

this element is contained in Regulatory 

Guide 1.196 (Reference 4), which 

endorsed, with exceptions, NEI 99–03 

(Reference 6). Maintaining the CRE 

boundary in its design condition 

provides assurance that its leakmstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices 2031 

tightness will not significantly degrade 

between CRE inleakage determinations. 

Assessment of CRE habitability at the 

frequencies stated in Sections C.1 and 

C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 

0 (Reference 5), and measurement of 

unfiltered air leakage into the CRE in 

accordance with the testing methods 

and at the frequencies stated in Sections 

C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197. 

[The licensee proposed the following 

exception[s] to Sections C.1 and C.2 of 

Regulatory Guide 1.197, to be listed in 

the TS with this program element.] 

[Insert plant-specific evaluation of 

licensee’s proposed exceptions.] This 

element is intended to ensure that the 

plant assesses CRE habitability 

consistent with Sections C.1 and C.2 of 

Regulatory Guide 1.197 [and NRC 

approved exceptions]. Assessing CRE 

habitability at the NRC accepted 

frequencies provides assurance that 

significant degradation of the CRE 

boundary will not go undetected 

between CRE inleakage determinations. 

Determination of CRE inleakage using 

test methods acceptable to the NRC staff 

assures that test results are reliable for 

ascertaining CRE boundary operability. 

Determination of CRE inleakage at the 

NRC accepted frequencies provides 

assurance that significant degradation of 

the CRE boundary will not occur 

between CRE inleakage determinations. 

Measurement of CRE pressure with 

respect to all areas adjacent to the CRE 

boundary at designated locations for use 

in assessing the CRE boundary at a 

frequency of [18] months on a staggered 

test basis (with respect to the [CREEVS] 

trains). This element is intended to 

ensure that CRE differential pressure is 

regularly measured to identify changes 

in pressure warranting evaluation of the 

condition of the CRE boundary. 

Obtaining and trending pressure data 

provides additional assurance that 

significant degradation of the CRE 

boundary will not go undetected 

between CRE inleakage determinations. 

Quantitative limits on unfiltered 

inleakage. This element is intended to 

establish the CRE inleakage limit as the 

CRE unfiltered infiltration rate assumed 

in the CRE occupant radiological 

consequence analyses of design basis 

accidents. Having an unambiguous 

criterion for the CRE boundary to be 

considered operable in order to meet 

LCO 3.7.[10], will ensure that associated 

action requirements will be consistently 

applied in the event of CRE degradation 

resulting in inleakage exceeding the 

limit. 

Consistent with TSTF–448, Revision 

3, the program states that the provisions 

of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the program 

frequencies for performing the activities 

required by program paragraph number 

c, parts (i) and (ii) (assessment of CRE 

habitability and measurement of CRE 

inleakage), and paragraph number d 

(measurement of CRE differential 

pressure). This statement is needed to 

avoid confusion. SR 3.0.2 is applicable 

to the surveillance that references the 

testing in the CRE Habitability Program. 

However, SR 3.0.2 is not applicable to 

Administrative Controls unless 

specifically invoked. Providing this 

statement in the program eliminates any 

confusion regarding whether SR 3.0.2 is 

applicable, and is acceptable. 

Consistent with TSTF–448, Revision 

3, proposed TS 5.5. [18] states that (1) 

a CRE Habitability Program shall be 

established and implemented, (2) the 

program shall include all of the NRCstaff required elements, as described 

above, and (3) the provisions of SR 3.0.2 

shall apply to program frequencies. 

Therefore, TS 5.5.[18], which is 

consistent with the model program TS 

approved by the NRC staff in TSTF–448, 

Revision 3, is acceptable. 

4.0 State Consultation 

In accordance with the Commission’s 

regulations, the [ ] State official was 

notified of the proposed issuance of the 

amendment. The State official had [(1) 

no comments or (2) the following 

comments—with subsequent 

disposition by the staff]. 

5.0 Environmental Consideration 

The amendments change a 

requirement with respect to the 

installation or use of a facility 

component located within the restricted 

area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and 

change surveillance requirements. The 

NRC staff has determined that the 

amendments involve no significant 

increase in the amounts and no 

significant change in the types of any 

effluents that may be released offsite, 

and that there is no significant increase 

in individual or cumulative 

occupational radiation exposure. The 

Commission has previously issued a 

proposed finding that the amendments 

involve no-significant-hazards 

considerations, and there has been no 

public comment on the finding [xx FR 

xxxxx]. Accordingly, the amendments 

meet the eligibility criteria for 

categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(9) [and (c)(10)]. Pursuant to 10 

CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact 

statement or environmental assessment 

need be prepared in connection with the 

issuance of the amendments. 

6.0 Conclusion 

The Commission has concluded, on 

the basis of the considerations discussed 

above, that (1) there is reasonable 

assurance that the health and safety of 

the public will not be endangered by 

operation in the proposed manner, (2) 

such activities will be conducted in 

compliance with the Commission’s 

regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 

amendments will not be inimical to the 

common defense and security or to the 

health and safety of the public. 

7.0 References 

1. NRC Generic Letter 2003–01, ‘‘Control 

Room Habitability,’’ dated June 12, 2003, 

(GL 2003–01). 

2. ASTM E 741–00, ‘‘Standard Test Method 

for Determining Air Change in a Single 

Zone by Means of a Tracer Gas 

Dilution,’’ 2000, (ASTM E741). 

3. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005–20: 

Revision to Guidance Formerly 

Contained in NRC Generic Letter 91–18, 

’’Information to Licensees Regarding 

Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on 

Resolution of Degraded and 

Nonconforming Conditions and on 

Operability,’’ dated September 26, 2005 

(RIS 2005–20). 

4. Regulatory Guide 1.196, ‘‘Control Room 

Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear 

Power Reactors,’’ Revision 0, dated May 

2003. 

5. Regulatory Guide 1.197, ‘‘Demonstrating 

Control Room Envelope Integrity at 

Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ Revision 0, 

May 2003. 

6. NEI 99–03,’’Control Room Habitability 

Assessment Guidance,’’ Revision 0, 

dated June 2001. 

Principal contributors: C. Harbuck. 

Model No-Significant-HazardsConsideration Determination 

Description of Amendment Request: A 

change is proposed to the standard 

technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 

1430 through 1434) and plant specific 

technical specifications (TS), to 

strengthen TS requirements regarding 

control room envelope (CRE) 

habitability by changing the action and 

surveillance requirements associated 

with the limiting condition for 

operation operability requirements for 

the CRE emergency ventilation system, 

and by adding a new TS administrative 

controls program on CRE habitability. 

Accompanying the proposed TS change 

are appropriate conforming technical 

changes to the TS Bases. The proposed 

revision to the Bases also includes 

editorial and administrative changes to 

reflect applicable changes to the 

corresponding STS Bases, which were 

made to improve clarity, conform with 

the latest information and references, 

correct factual errors, and achieve more 

consistency among the STS NUREGs. 

The proposed revision to the TS and 

associated Bases is consistent with STS 

as revised by TSTF–448, Revision 3. 

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2032 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an 

analysis of the issue of no significant 

hazards consideration is presented 

below: 

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Increase in the 

Probability or Consequences of an Accident 

Previously Evaluated 

The proposed change does not adversely 

affect accident initiators or precursors nor 

alter the design assumptions, conditions, or 

configuration of the facility. The proposed 

change does not alter or prevent the ability 

of structures, systems, and components 

(SSCs) to perform their intended function to 

mitigate the consequences of an initiating 

event within the assumed acceptance limits. 

The proposed change revises the TS for the 

CRE emergency ventilation system, which is 

a mitigation system designed to minimize 

unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to 

filter the CRE atmosphere to protect the CRE 

occupants in the event of accidents 

previously analyzed. An important part of 

the CRE emergency ventilation system is the 

CRE boundary. The CRE emergency 

ventilation system is not an initiator or 

precursor to any accident previously 

evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any 

accident previously evaluated is not 

increased. Performing tests to verify the 

operability of the CRE boundary and 

implementing a program to assess and 

maintain CRE habitability ensure that the 

CRE emergency ventilation system is capable 

of adequately mitigating radiological 

consequences to CRE occupants during 

accident conditions, and that the CRE 

emergency ventilation system will perform as 

assumed in the consequence analyses of 

design basis accidents. Thus, the 

consequences of any accident previously 

evaluated are not increased. Therefore, the 

proposed change does not involve a 

significant increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated. 

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not 

Create the Possibility of a New or Different 

Kind of Accident from any Accident 

Previously Evaluated 

The proposed change does not impact the 

accident analysis. The proposed change does 

not alter the required mitigation capability of 

the CRE emergency ventilation system, or its 

functioning during accident conditions as 

assumed in the licensing basis analyses of 

design basis accident radiological 

consequences to CRE occupants. No new or 

different accidents result from performing the 

new surveillance or following the new 

program. The proposed change does not 

involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., 

no new or different type of equipment will 

be installed) or a significant change in the 

methods governing normal plant operation. 

The proposed change does not alter any 

safety analysis assumptions and is consistent 

with current plant operating practice. 

Therefore, this change does not create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated. 

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin 

of Safety 

The proposed change does not alter the 

manner in which safety limits, limiting safety 

system settings or limiting conditions for 

operation are determined. The proposed 

change does not affect safety analysis 

acceptance criteria. The proposed change 

will not result in plant operation in a 

configuration outside the design basis for an 

unacceptable period of time without 

compensatory measures. The proposed 

change does not adversely affect systems that 

respond to safely shut down the plant and to 

maintain the plant in a safe shutdown 

condition. Therefore, the proposed change 

does not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

Based upon the reasoning presented 

above and the previous discussion of 

the amendment request, the requested 

change does not involve a nosignificant-hazards consideration. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day 

of January, 2007. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Timothy J. Kobetz, 

Branch Chief, Technical Specifications 

Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional 

Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

The following model License Amendment 

Request (LAR) was prepared by the NRC staff 

to facilitate use of the Consolidated Line Item 

Improvement Process (CLIIP). The model 

provides the expected level of detail and 

content for an application to revise plant 

technical specifications according to TSTF–

448, ‘‘Control Room Habitability,’’ Revision 

3, using the CLIIP. Each licensee remains 

responsible for ensuring that its actual 

application fulfills its administrative 

requirements as well as Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission regulations. 

U.S. Nuclear Regular Commission, 

Document Control Desk, 

Washington, DC 20555. 

Subject: Plant Name 

Docket No. 50–

Application To Revise Technical 

Specifications Regarding Control Room 

Envelope Habitability in Accordance 

With TSTF–448, Revision 3, Using the 

Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Process 

Gentlemen: 

In accordance with the provisions of 10 

CFR 50.90 [LICENSEE] is submitting a 

request for an amendment to the technical 

specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT 

NOS.]. 

The proposed amendment would modify 

TS requirements related to control room 

envelope habitability in accordance with 

TSTF–448, Revision 3. 

Attachment 1 provides a description of the 

proposed changes, the requested 

confirmation of applicability, and plantspecific verifications. Attachment 2 provides 

the existing TS pages marked up to show the 

proposed changes. [Attachment 3 provides 

revised (clean) TS pages.] [Attachment [4] 

provides a summary of the regulatory 

commitments made in this submittal.] 

Attachment [5] provides existing TS Bases 

pages marked up to show the proposed 

changes. 

[LICENSEE] requests approval of the 

proposed License Amendment by [DATE], 

with the amendment being implemented [BY 

DATE OR WITHIN X DAYS]. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy 

of this application, with attachments, is being 

provided to the designated [STATE] Official. 

I declare [or certify, verify, state] under 

penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true 

and correct. (Note that request may be 

notarized in lieu of using this oath or 

affirmation statement). 

If you should have any questions regarding 

this submittal, please contact [NAME, 

TELEPHONE NUMBER]. 

Sincerely, 

[Name, Title] 

Attachments: 

1. Description and Assessment 

2. Proposed Technical Specification 

Changes (Mark-Up) 

[3. Revised Technical Specification Pages] 

[[4]. Regulatory Commitments] 

[5]. Proposed Technical Specification 

Bases Changes (Mark-Up) 

cc: NRC Project Manager 

——NRC Regional Office 

——NRC Resident Inspector 

——State Contact 

Attachment 1—DESCRIPTION AND 

ASSESSMENT 

1.0 Description 

The proposed amendment would modify 

technical specification (TS) requirements 

related to control room envelope habitability 

in TS 3.7.[10], [‘‘Control Room Envelope 

Emergency Ventilation System (CREEVS)’’] 

and TS Section 5.5, [‘‘Administrative 

Controls—Programs.’’] 

The changes are consistent with Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved 

Industry/Technical Specification Task Force 

(TSTF) STS change TSTF–448 Revision 3. 

The availability of this TS improvement was 

published in the Federal Register on [DATE] 

as part of the consolidated line item 

improvement process (CLIIP). 

2.0 Assessment 

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety 

Evaluation 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety 

evaluation dated [DATE] as part of the CLIIP. 

This review included a review of the NRC 

staff’s evaluation, as well as the supporting 

information provided to support TSTF–448. 

[LICENSEE] has concluded that the 

justifications presented in the TSTF proposal 

and the safety evaluation prepared by the 

NRC staff are applicable to [PLANT, UNIT 

NOS.] and justify this amendment for the 

incorporation of the changes to the [PLANT] 

TS. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices 2033 

2.2 Optional Changes and Variations 

[LICENSEE] is not proposing any variations 

or deviations from the TS changes described 

in the TSTF–448, Revision 3, or the 

applicable parts of the NRC staff’s model 

safety evaluation dated [DATE]. 

Note: The Applicant should state which 

parts of Section 3.0 of the model SE are 

applicable to its facility, since these sections 

contain variations based on the plant-specific 

design and existing TS requirements. 

2.3 License Condition Regarding Initial 

Performance of New Surveillance and 

Assessment Requirements 

[LICENSEE] proposes the following as a 

license condition to support implementation 

of the proposed TS changes: 

Upon implementation of Amendment No. 

xxx adopting TSTF–448, Revision 3, the 

determination of control room envelope 

(CRE) unfiltered air inleakage as required by 

SR 3.7.[10].[4], in accordance with TS 

5.5.[18].c.(i), the assessment of CRE 

habitability as required by Specification 

5.5.[18].c.(ii), and the measurement of CRE 

pressure as required by Specification 

5.5.[18].d, shall be considered met. Following 

implementation: 

(a) The first performance of SR 3.7.[10.5], 

in accordance with Specification 

5.5.[18].c.(i), shall be within the specified 

Frequency of 6 years, plus the 15-month 

allowance of SR 3.0.2, as measured from 

[date], the date of the most recent successful 

tracer gas test, as stated in the [date] letter 

response to Generic Letter 2003–01, or within 

the next 15 months if the time period since 

the most recent successful tracer gas test is 

greater than 6 years. 

(b) The first performance of the periodic 

assessment of CRE habitability, Specification 

5.5.[18].c.(ii), shall be within 3 years, plus 

the 9-month allowance of SR 3.0.2, as 

measured from [date], the date of the most 

recent successful tracer gas test, as stated in 

the [date] letter response to Generic Letter 

2003–01, or within the next 9 months if the 

time period since the most recent successful 

tracer gas test is greater than 3 years. 

(c) The first performance of the periodic 

measurement of CRE pressure, Specification 

5.5.[18].d, shall be within [18] months, plus 

the [138] days allowed by SR 3.0.2, as 

measured from [date], the date of the most 

recent successful pressure measurement test, 

or within [138] days if not performed 

previously. 

3.0 Regulatory Analysis 

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration 

Determination 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no 

significant hazards consideration 

determination (NSHCD) published in the 

Federal Register as part of the CLIIP. 

[LICENSEE] has concluded that the proposed 

NSHCD presented in the Federal Register 

notice is applicable to [PLANT] and is hereby 

incorporated by reference to satisfy the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a). 

[3.2 Commitments] 

[Note: The Applicant should state 

regulatory commitments proposed in support 

of this LAR, if any, in this section, and restate 

them in optional Attachment 4.] 

4.0 Environmental Evaluation 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the 

environmental evaluation included in the 

model safety evaluation dated [DATE] as part 

of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that 

the staff’s findings presented in that 

evaluation are applicable to [PLANT] and the 

evaluation is hereby incorporated by 

reference for this application. 

Attachment 2—Proposed Technical 

Specification Changes (Mark-Up) 

[Attachment 3—Revised Technical 

Specification Pages] 

[Attachment 4—Regulatory Commitments] 

The following table identifies those actions 

committed to by [LICENSEE] in this 

document. Any other statements in this 

submittal are provided for information 

purposes and are not considered to be 

regulatory commitments. Please direct 

questions regarding these commitments to 

[CONTACT NAME].] 

REGULATORY COMMITMENTS DUE DATE/ 

EVENT 

Attachment 5—Proposed Changes to 

Technical Specification Bases Pages (MarkUp) 

[FR Doc. E7–503 Filed 1–16–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 

Generalized System of Preferences 

(GSP): Notice Regarding the 2006 

Annual Review for Products and 

Country Practices 

AGENCY: Office of the United States 

Trade Representative. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Office of the United 

States Trade Representative (USTR) 

received petitions in connection with 

the 2006 GSP Annual Review to modify 

the list of products that are eligible for 

duty-free treatment under the GSP 

program and to modify the GSP status 

of certain GSP beneficiary developing 

countries because of country practices. 

This notice announces the product and 

country practice petitions that are 

accepted for further review in the 2006 

GSP Annual Review, and sets forth the 

schedule for comment and public 

hearing on these petitions, for 

requesting participation in the hearing, 

and for submitting pre-hearing and posthearing briefs. The list of accepted 

petitions is available at: http:// 

www.ustr.gov/Trade_Development/ 

Preference_Programs/GSP/ 

Section_Index.html. This notice also 

announces closure of the review for case 

003-CP–06 (formerly case 011–CP–05), 

Protection of Worker Rights in Uganda. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Contact the GSP Subcommittee of the 

Trade Policy Staff Committee, Office of 

the United States Trade Representative, 

1724 F Street, NW., Room F–220, 

Washington, DC 20508. The telephone 

number is (202) 395–6971. 

DATES: The GSP regulations (15 CFR 

Part 2007) provide the schedule of dates 

for conducting an annual review unless 

otherwise specified in a Federal 

Register notice. The current schedule 

follows. Notification of any other 

changes will be given in the Federal 

Register. 

February 2, 2007 Due date for 

submission of pre-hearing briefs and 

requests to appear at the GSP 

Subcommittee Public Hearing that 

include the name, address, telephone, 

fax, e-mail address and organization of 

witnesses. 

February 16, 2007 GSP 

Subcommittee Public Hearing, Rooms 1 

and 2, 1724 F St NW., Washington, DC 

20508, beginning at 9:30 am. 

February 22, 2007 U.S. International 

Trade Commission (USITC)’s scheduled 

hearings on whether any industry in the 

United States is likely to be adversely 

affected by the waivers proposed by 

petition.) 

March 9, 2007 Due date for 

submission of post-hearing briefs. 

April 2007 USITC scheduled to 

publish report on products of cases 

2006–01 to 2006–08. Comments on 

USITC reports on these products due 10 

days after USITC date of publication. 

June 30, 2007 Modifications to the 

list of articles eligible for duty-free 

treatment under the GSP resulting from 

the 2006 Annual Review will be 

announced on or about June 30, 2007, 

in the Federal Register, and any 

changes will take effect on the effective 

date announced. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The GSP 

provides for the duty-free importation of 

designated articles when imported from 

designated beneficiary developing 

countries. The GSP is authorized by title 

V of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 

2461, et seq.), as amended (the ‘‘1974 

Act’’), and is implemented in 

accordance with Executive Order 11888 

of November 24, 1975, as modified by 

subsequent Executive Orders and 

Presidential Proclamations. 

A. Petitions Requesting Modifications of 

Product Eligibility 

In a Federal Register notice dated 

June 29, 2006, USTR announced that the 

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