Food Information Systems

February 1976

NTIS order #PB-258172
CONTENT S

WEDNESDAY , SEPTEMBER 24, 1975

*

Statement of Richard E. Bell, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs

and Commodity Programs, U.S. Department of Agriculture. - ___ -----

Statement of Dr. Dale E. Hathaway, Director, International Food Policy

r Research Institute---- _ _ _ -- _ ----- _ -- -.. _ - _ --- ___ - ______ ------------

Statement of Howard W. Hjort, John Schnittker Associates ------ -------

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1975

Statcment of Dr. Don Paarlbcrg, Director, Agricultural Economics, U.S.

Department of Agriculture __ ----. --- -- ---- ------ --- - --- -- --- -----

Statement of David L. Hume, Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Ser\”-

ice, U.S. De artment of Agriculture_ _ _ ------------------ --- -------

Statement of !3r. Quentin M. West, Administrator, Economic Rese:lrch

Ser\.ice, U.S. Department of Agriculture_ -- _ ------ ___ ----- ___ - _ ----

Statement of Hosea Harkness, director of planning, Agri-Products Group,

Cook Industries, inc., Memphis, Term_ ------ _ -- _ ---- _ - _ -- _ _ - _ _ - _ _ -

Statement of Mel\’in S. Sjer\xm, senior editor, Markets, Milling & Baking

News, Kansas City, Mo-- -- _ - _ -_. - _ - ---- - _ -- _ - _ _ ---- -_.. -- --- ----

Statement of David Keefe, Lmnson Bros. Chicago, Ill_ --- -_ -----------

Statement of Reuben Johnson, National f?armers Union ------ - ---- --- --

Statement of Charles L. Frazier, director, IVashington staff, National

Farmers Organization-- - _ - ---- ------ --- - _ _ - _ - _ ___ ----- ___ --------

Statement of W. E. Hamilton, chief economist, American Farm Bureau

Federation ----- - _ -------------- --- - _ ---- -- --- --- -- --- -- ---- -----

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975

Statement of Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey, a U.S. Senator from the State

of Minnesota_ _ _ _ ------ _ - _ - _ -- _ - _ - _ -- _ - _ --.- _ _ ---- --- - ------ - ___

Statement of Ed A. Jaenke, president, E. A. Jaenke & Associates, Inc----

Statement of Willard IV. Cochrane, professor of agriculture economics,

University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn----- ------ -- ---- -------

Statement of Lauren Seth, writer-economist, chairman, National Plan- * ning Association Agriculture Committee, and member of the OTA Food

Advisory Committee Des Moines, Iowa ----- -- _- ______ -_ --- --- - --- -

Statement of Luther ‘l!weeten, professor of agricultural economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Okla_ ---------------------- -----

< WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1976

Statement of Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey, a U.S. Senator from the State of Minnesota --- - _ - _ ---- ---- ---- ------ --- - -------- ______ ---- ___ --- -

Statement of Charles Mathews, Associate Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration- _ ------------------------- -------

Statement of Dr. Robert White, Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce_ _ -- _ ------ ---- -

Statement of Dr. John DeNoyer, Director, EROS, U.S. Geological Survey,

Department of the interior____ - ____ --- --- _____ ______ - _ _ _ ---------

Statement of Dr. Howard Hill, Project Manager, LAC113, L-.S. Department

of Agriculture---- -_ - _ _ ----- ----- -------- _ -- _ --- _ - _ --- - _ -_ -- --- --

Statement of Dr. Archibald Park, Earth Satellite Corp--- _ _ -- _ _ _ -- _- -- _

Statement of Dr. Martin Abel, director, Economic Development Center,

University of hlinnesota, Minneapolis, Minn ----- --------------- --- -

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337”
FOOD INFORMATION SYSTEMS

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1975

●

CONGRESS OF THE UNitedD STATES,

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSME nt BOARD,

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT ,

& washington D.C.

The Technology Assessment Board met at 2 :55 .m., -pursuant to

notice, in room 324, Old Senate Office Building, % on. Hubert H.

Humphrey (member, Technology Assessment Board) presiding.

Present: Senator Humphre and Senator Kennedy.

Staff present: Mr. Emdio . J Daddario, director; Mr. Daniel V. De

Simone, deputy director; Mr. ,J. B. Cordaro, food program manager;

Dr. Walter W. Wilcox, consultant; Ms. Ellen Terpstra, research associate; Ms. Ann Woodbridge, administrative assistant.

STATEMENT OF HON. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, A U.S. SEMATOR

FROM THE STATE OF MINMESOTA

Chairman HUMPHREY. G“ood afternoon. 1 vvould like to welcome

everyone to the first day of hearings on food information systems. We

have three witnesses with us today-Assistant Secretary of A@culture for International Affairs and commodity Programs, Richard

E. Bell, Dale Hathaway, Directoq, International Food Policy Research Institutet and Howard W. Hjort, ,John schmittker Associates—

who will begin the Office of Technolo~ Acsssrnent% hearings on

the accuracy and timeliness of world and IJ.S. food, agriculture, and

nutrition information systems. Through this hearing process, we will

additionally hear comments on the OTA Food Advisory Committee)s

- repoti, entit]ed ‘LFood, Agriculture, and Nutrition Information SyStems: Assessment and Recommendation.” 1

It is a privilege for me to chair the first hearings the Office of Technology Assessment has held on a specific assessment area.

- In early 1974 I requested, with the endorsement of the ch’airman of

the Senate &riculture and Forestry Committee, Senator Herman

Talmadge, that OTA make an assessment of agriculture and information systems and their adequacy for policy planning. The numexwus

events that occurred in 19’72 and 19’73 to trigger the necessity for this

assessment have been well chronicled. Althou@ these events may be

elated, their consequences and effects am still being felt today.

There has been increased attention given to the importance of agricultural information in recent years. In 1972 Senator Bellmen and I

visited the Soviet Union, and our report, “Observations on Soviet and

1 See p.4

(1)
Polish

2

Agriculture,” offered a number of recommendations such as

increasing the number of agricultural attach& assigned to the Soviet

Union.

The World Food Conference of November 1974 was intimately

concerned with this issue, and I wrote to Ambassador Edwin Martin

urging our delegation to support the establishment of a World Food

and Agricultural Information Center.

These hearings come at a most opportune time. The recent Russian grain purchases, their impact cm food prices, and their disruption of our agriculture marketing processes have again underscored

how fragile our information systems are to deal with unexpected -

events. Many have asked:

Why did the U.S. food and agriculture information systems

fail during the 1972-’73 period? What are the defects in our

system ?

In view of this and subsequent developments, do existing food

and agricultural information systems meet today’s needs? What

improvements should be made to correct the deficiencies in the

system ?

A report submitted to the Office of Technology Assessment by OTA’S

Food Advisory Committee detailed several options for the Congress

to consider. These hearings follow through on the options in the committee’s report. The committee, a distinguished roup of academicians,

scientists, and industry and media leaders, wi 1 participate in hear- Y

ings scheduled for February 4, 1976.

Because Congress is intrinsically dependent upon outside sources

for information upon which it bases decisions, it is necassary to focus

on these sources, especially the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These

hearings will underscore the importance of this subject area, explore

ways in which the options identified by the Food Advisory Committe~ might be implemented, and clarify them.

The importance of the% hearings grows out of the recent depletion

of world food reserves. As long as apparently limitless reserves were

available, there seemed little need to gather exact information on the

world food situation. Emergencies could always be met. .

That is no longer the case. Only through adequate planning and

careful coordination of national food policies in the light of systematic ~

and timely information on the current food situation can the world

overcxune the present crisis.

We must diminish the realm of the unpredictable. We must take

some of the guesswork out of agricultural policymaking. Only in this . .

way can we provide a sound basis for world food policy.

Systematic information on the world food situation is particularly

important for the United States, the world’s major food exporter,

because of its open, free market system.

In view of recent and prospective Soviet grain purchases in U.S.

markets and the great uncertainties that have been created for U.S.

producers and consumers, I decided that the first 2 days of hearings

be devoted to an evaluation of the accuracy and timelmess of information on U.S. and world agricultule in 1975.

It was the Soviet grain purchases in 1972, and the chaos in U.S.

grain markets which resulted from these purchases} which led me to

request an assessment of our food and agricultural information systems for food policy planning.
3

I am pleased that President Ford has taken the initiative in negotiati

T

a long-term grain purchase agreement with the soviets. 1n

these earings 1 plan to probe the information demands that a sound

agreement must address. If we are to depend primarily on the free

n]arket system, 1 believe our producers should learn of the soviet

intentions to buy specific quantities of grains in united states and

world markets at the same time that private traders are informed,

rather than weeks later. I hope to learn that the Soviets have agreed

to space their purchases throughout the marketing year> rather than

creating meat market uncertainties by making large annual purchases * during the harvest season before the full domestic and export requirements for the marketing year are known.

These hearings substantially implement option No. 6 of the Food

t Advisory Committee’s report., which states:

We recommend that the Agricultural Committees of the Congress schedule

hearings to determine what improvements in the Foreign Agricultural Service

and the Economic Research Service have been made since 197!2-73, and what

further improvements are feasible.

I note that there has been a substantial increase in the number of

reports issued by both the Foreign Agricultural and the Economic

Research Services. It no longer is possible to separate the domestic

from the world food situation. Yet my contacts with staff and constituents who depend on the Department of Agriculture for current

information question the continued lack of integration of the staff

which gather and analyze the world and the domestic information.

They question whether this administration is placing as high a priority

on economic intelligence as current conditions warrant.

Our first witness will be Assistant Secretary Richard Bell, who will

bring us up to date on the improvements in our information on a~icultural production and food import requirements of the Soviet Union

resulting from the information exchange agreement entered into with

the U.S.S.R. in June 1!)73. We find our U.S. grain markets in the

summer of 1975 disrupted again, much as they were in 19’72, by

rumors as to the Soviets> buying plans.

I hope filr. Bell will be able to report on the progress of the U.S.

effort to negotiate a long-term grain sales a~eement with the U.S.S.R.

\ I hope it meludes a provision which rcqmres that prior to entaring

negotiations with private grain exporters, U.S. informational agencies

will be informed as to the amount of the planned purchs.

It is my hope that as a result of these hearings, the people will learn

G how much of the confusion regarding Soviet food recpnrements that

occurred these past few weeks can be avoided in the future.

After reviewing the current situation with respect to information

available on food and agriculture in the Soviet Umon and the People%

Republic of China, we will look into the improvements in the informational activities of the international agencies in response to the

resolutions of the 1974 World l?ood Conference.

Tomorrow afternoon we will have a panel from the Department of

Agriculture relriew the Department’s world information gathering

and analytical capabilities, followed by several witnesses from the

private grain trade and industry who wdl report on their experiences

m to the accuracy and timeliness of the information needed by their

firms in con(~uet ing their business operations.
4

Information is a precious commodity. To be useful, it must be objective, timely, and reliable. Such information will not automatically

ensure better decisions, but it will expose those decisionmakers who

fail to use these resources.

[The following material was referred to on p. I]

FOOD, AGRICULTURE , AND NUTR.ITIO~ INFORMatiON Systems:

ASSESSMENT AND REmMMENDATIONS

(Report of the Food Advisory Committee, Congress of the United -

States, Office of Technokqgg Assessment)

Food Aiihhory Committee

Dr. Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., president of Michigan State University, 

is the committee chairman.

Dr. .Mm-tin 11. Abel, University of Minnesota.

Dr. W. D. Buddemeier, director of international agriculture pro-

~l~::i~and associate dean, College of Agriculture, University of

Dr. “David 4X1, director of cooperative extension, Cornell

Univemity.

Dr. D. @le Johnson, vice president and dean of faculties, University of Chicago.

Arnold Mayer, legislative representative., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butober Workmen of North America.

Dr. Chester O. McOorkle, executive vice president, University of

California (committee member through May 19’75).

Dr. Max IMilner, Department of Nutrition and Food Science, Massachuetks 1n~itute of Technology.

Dr. Robert Nesheim, vice president, research and devdopment,

@~aker Oats CO.

Esther Peterson, president, Nyational Consumer League, and consumer advisor to the resident, Giant Food, Inc.

Prof. Roger Reve le, director, Center for Population Studies, Har- l!?

vard University.

Leon Schachtir, international vice president, Amalgamated Meat ~

Cut’tmw & Butcher Workmen of North America (commitie member

through May 1975).

Txumen Seth, editor of the editorial page, Des Moines Register and

Tribune. .

Dr. E. T. York, Jr., provost of the University of Florida.

Preface

The growin~ world interdependency has highlighted the information

systems describing that interdependency, Nowhere is this need clearer

than in the mwas of food, Wriculture, and nutrition.

The U.S. Congress recognized the centrality of this problem for

some ~ime. But @he events of reeent years led them to make this area

the fiti ptiority for the attention of the newly organized Food Advisory (“ommittee of the Office of Technology Assessment.
5

As work in this area began, the committee realized that information systems, even when limited to food, agriculture, land nutrition, is

a broad topic. The current information system was never designed

as a total system but represents an historical accretion based upon

multiple uses and purposes---often conflicting. While the committee

recognized the ideal would be to address the needed improvements in

the total system, we realistically concluded that an adequate assessment of the total information systems would have retumed greater

resources and more time than was available. The committee therefore

chase to concentrate its attention on a limited set of recommendations. # Two criteria were employed: Those areas which are most amenable

to congressionnl action and those which in the committee's judgement

most urgently require attention.

Our focus was also limited to the information systems rather than ?

the analysis of the information gencrated by the systems, even though

past problems often have been more clue to poor analysis than deficient

information.

Tho twelve major recommendations are devoted to the need for:

greater analytical capability, correction in data obsolescence, improved

timeliness and reliability, better fertilizer information, strengthening

the economic Research service. Statistical Reporting service and the

I’oreian Agriculture Service, utilization of new information gathering

technolo~~’, improvement in nutrition information systems, and improvements in the international food and agriculture information

systems.

The work of the Food Advisory Committee was considerably aided

by the detailecl studies of three contractors: Michigan State University: Sidney M. Cantor Associates, Inc.; and The Futures Group, Inc.

While these reports were not a formal part of the committee%

report, the person seeking greater depth and breadth of coverage will

find them highly rewarding.

Various members of the OTA staff were most helpful to the committa in preparing base documents, summary statements and preliminary drafts. In this process we would especially single out Mr.

,T. ~. Cordaro and Dr. Walter Wilcox. Responsibility for the final

document is,”of course, the committee’s alone.

We sincerdy hope that our recommendations will prove valuable *

to the Congress and worthy of serious consideration.

Crmrro~ R. WIIAR~N, Jr.,

Chairman, Food Advisory Committe e

+ JUNE 19’75.

Introduction and Sumnwy of Reco9n7nendation9

Within 2 months in mid-1972 the world food situation changed

suddenly. This was due chiefly to poor crop conditions over much of

~~sia and large purchases of U.S. wheat by the Union of Soviet ScP

cialist Republics. The phenomenal and unexpected increases in prices

of wheat, feedgrains, and soybeans after October 1972 disrupted the

U.S. livestock economy and within a few months retail food prices

were rising rapidly. These developments tuok place in con-junction

with a less visible, longer run reduction in stock due to the rapid
6

growth in per capita income in a large number of developing and

developed countries.

As world grain production dropped sharplyin 1972-73 and world

demand surged upward, world food stocks were reduced to historically

low levels In some of the developing countries, there was less bread

and rice for poor people. In some developed countries, there was less

grain and protein feed for livestock, and consumers experienced

smaller supplies of meat and sharply higher retail food prices. The

increases in retail prices of U.S. farm products and food from October

1972 to August 1973, were by far the largest experienced since 1945-48.

The magnitude of the increase in farm product and food prices in -

the United States was not publicly predicted by authoritative sources

inside or outside government. Members of Congress were concerned

about the sharp increases in the cost of food and farm inputs and by

shortages of production supplies, especially fuel, protein meals, and ‘

fertilizers. Why had the U.S. food and agriculture information systems failed to warn them of the impendmg shortages?

Underlying the dramatic events of the 1972–73 period have been

recent fundamental changes in the world food situation. These include

continued rapid increase in world population, the rise in consumer

consumption expectations including increased demands for livestock

products, sharply increased international trade in food, an increased

dependence of t. e U.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic of China on h

world grain markets, wide shifts in monetary exchange relationships,

widespread inflation> and now widespread economic recession.

In view of these developments, are current food and agriculture

information systems adequate ?

Do the food and naviculture information systems, with their emphasis on food production and disappearance, which yield only fragrnentary information on nutritional status of specific groups, prmude

adequate information about the nutritional status and food habits of

all consumers ?

How well do these current information systems meet today’s needs?

This report is an assessment of the food, agriculture, and nutrition

information systems which now serve Congress, executive departments

and agencies, State and local governments, researchers, and private

citizens. It focuses primarily on information concerning national and

world food production, trade, stocks, prices, and disappearance, and *’

on information needed for policy decisions made by Congress, Federal agencies, State governments, and a~ibusiness.

The existing agricultural information system, for the most part, .

measures output and its various ramifications. It is basically an imr

ersonal, production oriented system. What happens to food after it

eaves the final point of sale is not included in this system. A food and

nutrition information system should also be a consumer oriented system that builds upon the nutritional needs of the consumer. It should

relate food to the nutritional needs of the individual.

International and national nutrition information systems are considered primarily from the viewpoint of their adequacy for providing

policy guidance to Congress in the areas of food and nutrition. There

1s no attempt to assess the many subsectors of the food, agriculture

and nutrition information systems, each of which may be important to

other clientele.
7

Summary Recommendations

MORE ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY NEEDED

More complete and more reliable information is needed on world

agriculture; the recognized need for an effective food and nutrition

surveillance system has not been met. Con gress greatest need, however,

is for more analytical services and capaility for dealing with the %

burgeoning information flow on the rapidly changing food, agricultural and nutrition situation.

1. We recommend that the Congress increase the analytical capa- *

bility of the staffs of its agricndtural committee.~, and of the agricultural specialists in the Congressional Research Service A group of

several compertent analysts of making its studies should

5 be available to Congress.

Congressional committees and subcommittees now call on the USD.4

Economic Research Service and land grant universities for analytical

reports on issues of concern to them. A part of the increased analytical

ca]x~bilities needed by ~longrcss could be provided by a closer worl~-

ing relationship with executive agencies and other institutions, inc~nding in some cases, additional financing for specific studies.

Z ?~re aho recommend that the Congress develop clo8er i&~i80n with

the exeeut?’ve agencie8 and the ~and grant wniver8u%e8 requesting thcm

to devote more of tllez’r analytical capabiWe8 to the analy8i8 of

$;)f ommztion f or Congress.

Obsolescensce in data correcito n

WC find serious obsolescence in many food and fiber data series. In

addition, many new dccisionmnking demands arc being imposed on

data systems which were not designed for such purposes. Although a

distin~lishecl committee of the American Agricultural Economics

.~~s oclntion urged action in ~iealing with these issues as long ago as

I!)7z., efforts on the part of responsible administrators lool<in~ toward

the Improvement of these data series has been frustrated by laclc of

public concern and support.

,3. We recommend that eifher the Joint I?COnQrnr

iC Committee? or one

or both of the Agrz”cwltwe Committees, rejnwt the Secretary of Agri- ‘; mdtwe to establish cm. ogricwdturul statistical review com?m’ttce

charged with responsibility of making recommendatibna to the Con-

~rem and appropriate executive agencies for zwodernizin~, coord~~af -

W kng and ~tandardizi~ the food and fiber data aert”ea. Thi8 agricuh.wa~

8tati.~ti$a.l rem%w committee 8hcwld include member8 from the van”ou8

discipline~ and groups who utilize food and agricultural data.

IMPROVEMEN”’I’ 1>- TIMELIN”ESS .4ND RELIABILITY OF DATA NEEDED

llfost national food and agricultural data series arc released

promptly. There was, however, an excessive time lapse before the last

agricultural census data were available.

The timely collection and release of reliable agricultural data by

the Census Bureau has encountered serious problems in recent years.

In order to reduce costs, the Census Bureau is conducting the agricultural census in 19T5 with primary reliance on the return of mailed

quest ionnaires.
8

A private consultant group, American Agribusiness Associates,

found that more accurate benchmark data could be provided by the

USDA. Statistical Reporting Service at the same or lower cost than

by the continuation of the 5-year agricultural censuses conducted by

the Census Bureau. Other users of agricultural census data believe

that both the reliability and timeliness of such data could be improved

if the responsibility for providing such data were transferred to

the Statistical Reporting Service.

4. We recomnnend tltat the congremioruzl c0nwnittee8, which have

juridictwn ovor the Depa.rtnumt of Agriculture and the %ureau of

Lfen8u8 actiuitie8, study the de8irabiZity and feasibility o integrating “

the 8tajl’ and activitie8 of the Agricultural Uensm into tL ~tdi8tih d

~eporting Service. #uc?b a study, with hearin 8 if needed, 8hou2d be

8chcdu~ed w~thin the rwxt calendar year. If tL re8dt8 8U~#WTt 8uch

a .trazwfer, a Propriatc @@$ation 8hould be t?nwtea? providing for ‘

tran8fer of t e re8ponMdzty for agtiltura7 benchmark data to tb 1

il!ltati~tical Reportinq Service when the procemhtg of the J9Y5 agricultural cen8us data ;S completed.

IMPROVEMET’ IN’ FERTILIZER INFORMATION SYSTEM NEEDED

The collection of fertilizer information and its anal sis and dissemination are shared by ten governmental agencies an at least two ci!’

industry-financed trade associations. There is substantial consensus

among the users of this ‘information that important improvements

are possible, especially in terms of the timeliness of t e reports,

increased reliabdity, and the publication of the scattered information in comprehensive monthly and annual reports.

,5. We recommend that the 8everal congressional committee,~ having

responsibility for the executive agencies which correct and public the

various series of data dating to fertilizer conduct studies and hearings

to determine ways, means, and costs of improving fertilizer informtion systems.

STREXGTHENING OF TIIX? ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL

SERVICES NEEDED

In fiscal year 1972-73, when the failure in the international food z

information system occurred, the Government was spending $61

million annually on the four basic national agricultural information

agencies: the Statistical Reporting Service, the Economic Research

Service, the Market News Service, and the Foreign Agricultural _-

Service.

Since early 1972, the Economic Research Service has been reorganized, and minor reorganizations occurred in the other agencies.

Additional funds were requested by the agencies to permit them to

collect additional data and to provide for more analyses.

In part, as a result of these actions, appropriated funds for these

four agencies were increased to $73 million in 1974-75 and appropriations of $80 million are being requested for the 1975-’76 fiscal year.

In terms of purchasing power, however, the $80 million requested is

slightly less than them agencies received in 1972-73.

Important steps have been taken since 1972 to improve the quality

and timeliness of the information available on world agriculture and
9

agricultural requisites. We believe, how-ever, that additional improvements are needed.

The Foreign Agriculture Service should improve its information

collection capability by: Giving its attach& basic training in information gathering expanding its reporting capabilities in the critical

developing countries; improving Its data transmission and the timeliness of its summaries; improving its reports for the major commodities, talking into account probable requirements of the importing

countries; and improving its reports on world agricultural requisite

supplies and requirements, especially fertilizer.

.

The economic research Service should improve its world information analysis capability by: Strengthening its ability to analyze, evaluate, and interpret current world information on a monthly basis durS ing the crop growing and early harvest season; increasing its abilitv

to analyze current world weather data and interpret its significance,

in terms of probable crop production in the current season; and developing world models of production, utilization, trade, and prices

for the more important agricultural commodities, especially grains,

which would permit timely evaluation of new data on a monthly basis

du ri ng the growing and early harvest season.

6’. We recommend that the Aqriculture Committees of the Congress

schedule hearings to detcmine what improvements in the Foreign,

Ayriculturol Service and Economic Research Service have been made

since 1972-73, and what further improvements are feasible.

Such hearings should focus on: Additional data series to be collected by the Foreign Agricultural Service; steps to increase the timeliness of reports issued; steps to improve the quality of the data obtained from abroad; and appraisals by the administrators of these

sin-ices concerning additional improvements that could be made in

existing information systmxs, and the probable cost of achieving the

improvements.

DEVELOI’MENT OF IMPROVEMENT TECHNOLOGY

We, note with approval that the Department of Agriculture has

joined with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and

* the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to detemine

whether data gathered by satellite and analyzed with the aid of computers can improve the timeliness and accuracy of major crop fore

casts. We also note with approval that the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration is cooperating with the Statistical Reporting Service in the analysis of weather data as related to crop

yields.

7. We believe ~t is urgent that experimwtf9 mid analy8ef9 utilizing

nwo tc~hnologi~s for obtaining and andy.zin,q data go forward o~I on

e,rpm~dinq SWJC as preliminary rcswlt~~y inc7wling cost efectirtw~ss

or)a7ytw.s7 justify.

NCTRITION IXFOR3f.iTION SYSTEMS N? RIOUSI,Y DEFI(’IEh-T

~~e find that although the I?ederal Government appropriated $6.1

billion for food stamp and related food distribution pro~rams in tlm

1975 fiscal year, it has not conducted adequate, objective pro~~am
10

evaluation studies to determine the extent to which these programs

are achieving the goals set for them by Congress.

8. We recommend that Congress request the Food and Nutrition

Service which administerd the food assistance programs to expand substantially its program evaluation studies. These studies should be integrated to maximize their cost effectiveness and ensure getting the

quality and type of information necessary to make appropriate

evaluations.

Meaningful food and nutritional surveillance information is far

more difficult and costly to obtain than comparable information on

food production. This is because of the difficulty of measuring food ●

consumption and nutritional deficiencies. In part the cost is related

to survey methods which require clinical evaluations as a part of a

comprehensive evaluation of an individual’s nutritional status. Nutri- -

tional scientists also are not fully agreed on the significance and reliability of specific tests for nutritional deficiencies. Even though the

White House Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health in December

1969, emphasized the need for a national nutritional status monitoring

or surveillance program, little progress has been made in establishing

such a program. The Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs has held many hearings and issued many reports since that

time but, thus fax, has made little progress in developing a national

nutritional status surveillance program.

9. We recommend, as a first step developing a national nutritional

status monitoring ,and surveillance program, that the Select Committee hold hearings on the adequacy of design and integration of the

onqoing nutrition suweys being conducted by Department of Health,

Education, and Welfare, and the planned Household Food Consumption Survey to be conducted by the Department of AgriouZture.

The Food Advisory. Committee plans to consult further with leading nutritional Scientists, and make recommendations for establishing a continuing nutritional status surveillance program.

IMPROVEMENTS INTERNATIONAL FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

INFORMATION SYSTEMS MERIT SUPPORT

Resolution XVI of the 19~4 World Food Conference recommends .

a greatly expanded global lnformat:on and early warning system

on food and agriculture..FAO is now m the process of improving and

expanding its information collection and dissemination activities as

directed by the resolution. It will be limited in its expansion plans -

both bv funds and by a shortage of technically competent staff.

10. We recommend that the United States strengthen its own agricultural information agencies, but, in addition, the United States

can and should provide increased financial and technical assistance

for FAO information activities

It could perhaps help guide development of FAO information

activities by making financial grants and/or loaning the technically

qualified staff to accomplish specific, agreed-upon tasks in the information field.

At present, the FAO staff, and the staffs of other international

agencies which issue information on world food conditions, often

are limited by the data supplied by member countries. Sometimes
11

other information indicates that the official reports are out of date

or have been politically motivated. This is a serious handicap for

international information agencies.

11. We recommend that Congress request the United States representatives with supervisory and liaison responsibilities for internationail information agencies to support the development of rules and

regulations for the international professionul staffs which would authorize and direct these staffs to use the most reliable information

available to them when compiling their reports.

FAO, in implementing World Food Conference Resolution XVI,

concerning the improvement of basic data, reports that it plans to

provide more technical assistance to individual countries for improving the methods of reporting on current harvests and crop conditions. This is an area where the United States has made important

contributions in the past through technical assistance activities of

the Agency for International Development. Congress in its authorization for AID has given a high priority to food and agriculture.

12. ‘We recommend that Congress direct AID to increase its technical assistance for the improvement of agricultural infmvnatiun

systems, including the introduction of advanced information technology, in the developing cowntries most deficient in their agricultural {

statistical institutions.

ADDITIONAL NUTRITION STUDIES PLANNED

The implementation of these 12 recommendations would result in

eliminating the major existing gaps in the world food and agricultural data series and make substantial improvements in the national

series.

If implemented, these recommendations also would greatly increase

the range of analyses of current information available to Members of

Congress. The need for an improved food, agricultural and nutritional

information system growing out of the growing world interdependency

would be substantially met. The danger of some future failure of the

system similar to the 1972–73 occurrence would be lessened.

The assessment of the nutritional information system indicates

that little if any progress has been made toward establishing a na- * tional nutritional status surveillance program. The need for such an

informational program was outlined by the 1969 White House Conference on Food, Nutritionj and Health. The need for such a program

was reemphasized in hearings held by the Senate Select Committee

-

on Nutrition and Human Needs in June 1974 and detailed in their

May, 1975 report entitled ‘(Towards A National Nutrition Policy.”

Many complex issues are involved in established a cost-effective

surveillance program. The Food Advisory Committee plans to continue its assessment in this area, consulting further with leading nutritional scientists and make specific recommendations in the near future.

A subcommittee has been appointed for this purpose.

Food, Agricultural, and Nutritional Informtion Needs of Congress

This section explores the food, agricultural, and nutritional information needs of Members of Congress as a prelude to assessing the

deficiencies and suggesting changes.
\12

CONGRESSIONAL WORKLOAD

The Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in the 93d

Congress had 177 bills and resolutions dealing with food, agriculture,

and nutrition referred to it for consideration and possible legislative

action. The Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives in the same period received 565 similar bills and resolutions.

Another 1,089 bills and resolutions dealing with food agriculture,

or nutrition were introduced by Members of the 93d Congress and

referred to other committees having jurisdiction over the particular

issues addressed in the ‘bills. b

The number of bills and resolutions dealing with food, agriculture, and nutrition introduced in the 93d Congress, and referred to

each of 13 committees in the Senate and each o f19 committees in the

House of Representatives is shown in the accompanying table. w

TABLE I.-Bills and resolutions dealing with food, agriculture, and nutrition

introduced in the 2d session of the 93d Congress1

Number of Wlu

Referred to Senate Committee on: and re601uti6na

Aeronautical and Space Sciences ----------------------------------

Agriculture and Forestry --------------------------------------- -_ 177:

Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs _____________________________ 17

Commerce Committee --------------------------------------------- 16

District of Columbia _____________________________________________ - 1

Foreign Relations ------------------------------------------------

Finance --------------------------------------------------------- 2:

interior and insular Affairs--------------------------------------- 5

Judiciary -------------------------------------------------------

Labor and Public Welfare ------------------------------------- ---- 55

Post Office and Civil Service ------------------------------------ ___ 4

Public Works ---------------------------------------------------- 1

Rules Committee ----------------------------------------------- -- 8

Total Senate ---------------------------------------------- -----

Referred to House Committee on:

Administration ------------------------------------------------- -

Agriculture --------------------------------------------------- ----

Appropriations --------------------------------------------------

Armed Services----------------------------------------- -----------

Banking and Currency ------------------------------------ --------

District of Columbia --------------------------------------- -------

Education and Public Welfare ------------------------------------

Foreign Affairs ---------------------------------------------------

Government Operations ------------------------------------ --------

Interior and Insular Affairs -------------------------------------- --

Interstate and Foreign Commerce -------------------------------- --

Judiciary -------- ----------- ----- --------- ----------------- -------

Merchant Marine and Fisheries ------------------- _________________

Post Office and Civil Senile ------------------------------------ ---

Public Works ------------------------------------------ -----------

Rules -----------------------------------------------------------

Sciences and Astronautics------------ r

---------------------------

Veterans --------------------------------------------------------

Ways and Means~------------------------------------------------

330

565

7

1

116

Total House---------------------L------------------------------ 1,501

I

From the House Bill Status Office.

Each year Congress also must approve appropriation bills authorizing Federal Government expenditures of billions of dollarsfor Federal food assistance, farm income support, research, education, and
13

regulation in fields of food, agriculture, and nutrition. The more

important food, agriculture, and nutrition issues in ‘the 93d Congress,

other than the level of funding of the already authorized Federal

programs in these fields, dealt with the desirability and feasibility of:

Additional export restrictions to reserve adequate domestic food

supplies for domestic consumers;

Modifying energy price control and allocation regulations to assure

adequate energy supplies for the production of fertilizer, crop drying,

and related agricultural activities;

Making additional quantities of limited supplies of our food available, through the Food for Peace Public Law 480 program, to developing countries that are unable to purchase their food requiremenents in

the commercial markets;

s

Increased regulation of trading in commodity futures markets to

safeguard the rights of the traders and to improve the efficiency of

the markets;

Providing emergency credit for livestock producers who are suffering from the squeeze of sharply increased feed costs while livestock

and livestock product prices failed to increase or declined;

Modifying the peanut, rice, and tobacco price support and supply

adjustment programs, to reduce governmental program costs, and

increase their market orientation.;

Amending legislation regulatmg the use of agricultural chemicals

and feed additives ‘by reducing the scope of specific regulations which

sharply increase production costs yet provide only limited benefits to

society;

Amending the Agricultural Act of 1973 to give farmers increased

economic protection, in view of the sharp increases in production

costs: and to provide adequate incentives for increased food production;

Explorinnumerous rural development issues through ‘(oversight”

hearings held by both the House and Senate subcommittees on rural

development in the 93rd Congress.

In addition to these major food, agricultural, and nutritional issues

which were debated in the 93d Congress, there were hundreds of constituent requests for congressional assistance which required Members of Congress and their staffs to acquire up-to-date in information in 7

order to be able to respond to them.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION”

Although a Member of Congress, or his staff, seldom has as much

information as he would like to ‘have on a particular issue, Congress

does not suffer from a dearth of information. Rather, the Members7

offices are almost overwhelmed by the volume of reports, letters, news

items, and telephone calls coming into their ofice each day.

They depend heavily on the statistical and related reports of the

cxecutive department agencies, the news media, constituent mail and

reports, lobbyists, and the Congressional Research Service.

The screening of this massive flow of information is an enormous

job. The pressures for immediate action within Congress me severe

and little time is available for analysis and synthesis of the information streams. This is especially true for analysis and planning with

68- S77—76—2
14

respect to the longer term problems in the food, agricultural, and

nutritional areas. Ideally

h

congressional policy should be backstopped

with informational systems w ich have three equally important components: 1

‘Statistical measures which provide an “early alert’ system

of problem identification; measures to provide adequate description

of the problem and allow the formulation of policy options; and

reformulation of technical statistics into measures that can be communicated in a form to allow ready interpretation and understanding

by busy members of Congress who are not fully familiar with many

food, agricultural, and nutritional issues. *

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

The Congressional Research Service with its automatic data processing facilities and other research resources is the only agency which has “

m its primary goal the organization of information specifically to meet

the day-to-day requests of Members of Congress. It maintanns a corps

of analysts in most subject matter fields, and news clipping services

ready to respond to requests by Members of Congress for in ormation f

on speoific issues.

In recent years, increasin

h

amounts of information most commonly

requested by the Congress ave been accumulated in computer data

banks available on a moment’s notice. Automatic data processing of

information for congressional use is in its infancy. Some of the greatest progress in the next few years will be made in this field.

MORE ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY NEEDED

We conclude from this assessment that more reliable information is

needed on world agriculture and the nutritional status of the people.

Congress greatest need, how~ver, is for more anal tical ca ability for

deahngwlththe burgeonm~ ?nform:atlon flow on t e rapid y changing I f

food, agricultural, and nutritional wtuation.

We reconwnend that the Congres8 increaxe the analytical capai%lity

of the 8ta#8 of it8 Agm”cultural C

1

onwnittee8, and o the agricwttural

8pem”ali8t8 in the Congre88iuna~ Re8earch ~ervhe. group of 8everaZ

competent analy8t8 capabk of making it8 own 8tua?ie8 8how?u? be available to Congre88. *

Congressional committees and subcommittees now call on the USD.~

Economic Research Service and land grant universities for analytical

reports on issues of concern to them. Fart of the increased analytical

capability needed by Congress could be provided by developing a closer

working relationship with executive agencies and other institutions,

including, in some cases, additional financing for specific studies.

We &o recommend that the Congre88 develop do8er Uai80n with

the executive agen.&e8 and the land gramt univer8itie8 requesting thenb

to devote more of t?wir andyttiaZ capabWtie8 to the anaZy8h of infor-

?n&on for congre88.

1 Maver, Leo V., and Ahalt J. Dawson, “Public Policy Demands and Statistical Measures of Agdeulture,” Amer#cu?$ Jourwd ot Agrkwlturai fh?ono?nb?, vol. 66, No. 5, December

1074, pp. 98+988.
15

Each year, the U.S. Department of Agriculture publishes a volume

entitled C’Agricultural Statistics’> containing over 800 statistical tables

including new data for the previous year. The introduction to one of

these recent volumes states:

“Agricultural Statistics$’ is published each year to meet the diverse needs for a

reliable reference book on agricultural production, supplies, consumption, facilities, costs, and returns. * ● * Most of the data were prepared or compiled in the

U.S. Department of Agriculture. * * * Its tables of annual data cover a wide

variety in forms suited to most common use.

STATISTICAL REPORTING SERVICE

In addition to this annual publication, the Statistical Reporting

Service of the Department of Agriculture-with a budget of $27 million in 1975—publishes a series of monthly and quarterly reports on

crop and livestock production, supplies, and prices. It publishes other

reports at specific times once or twice during the year, such as farmers>

crop planting intentions published in March.

It is probably best known for its monthly forecasts of crop production as the growing season progresses. These reports are based primarily on careful counts and measurement, at the beginning of each

month, of the plants growing in specific sample plots in all parts of the

United States, selected on the basis of probability sampling. Each

month estimates are made of the probab e crop outturn, taking into y

account the condition of the crop at that time, and assuming normal

weather will prevail for the balance of the crop growing season.

Fifty years ago, estimates of acreages planted of the various crops

crop production, and livestock numbers of farms were based on voluntary reports sent in by cooperating farmers, and observations of State

and Federal employees who drove through key farming communities.

Today they are based primarily on enumerative probability samples

from both area and list frames; basically area samples for crops and

multiframe sampling procedures for livestock. Precise acreage measurements and livestock counts are taken for the sample areas. In addition to its estimates of crop acreage and production and livestock

numbers on farms, the Statistical Reporting Service issues reports on

stocks of grains and oilseeds on farms and in warehouses, cold storage

stocks of selected products, cattle on feed in fattening lots, broder G chicks hatched, milk production, prices received and rices paid by

farmers, and other similar reports. For each report, t e Service has

developed a system for information, which is as accurate and reliable

information as possible for a reasonable expenditure of funds. Resulting national estimates for major crop acreages and livestock inventories have sampling errors of 2 percent or less.

All periodic and annual estimates are subject to revision over a

period of approximately 5 years as data from marketing, processing

plants, and other sources become available.
16

ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE

The Economic Research Service of the Department of Agriculture,

with a budget of $22 million in 1975, analyzes the data reported by the

Statistical Reporting Service, by the Agricultural Census, the Agricultural Marketing Service, the Foreign Agricultural Service, and by

other agencies of the Department of Agriculture as well as data from

financial institutions and agribusiness. It is best known for its situation, and outlook reports for specific farm commodities such as wheat,

feedgrains, livestock, and dairy products, which are issued several

times during the year. ●

In addition to publishing the national situation and outlook reports issued at regular intervals, ERS participates in regional outlook

conferences, and the various ‘branches of the Service issue a wide range

of analytical reports. Among these are found economic development ●

activities in rural areas, analyses of employment of migratory and

other hired farm labor, economic developmental activities in forei=-

countries, and summaries of the financial assets of farmers. It has

developed a national agricultural production model, which is used in

the evaluation of alternative farm program proposals and for a large

number of similar analyses.

The agriculture committees and subcommittees of the House and

Senate occasionally request the Economic Research Service to prepare

special analytical reports, such as the report, “The U.S. Food and

Fiber Sector: Energy Use and Outlook,” a Ill-page report prepared

for the Subcommittee on Agricultural Credit and Rural Electrification of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in September 1974.

AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE

The Agricultural Marketing Service of the Department of Agriculture is charged with the responsibility of administering a large number of inspection, grading, and other marketing regulations. It is a

major source of information on products processed and marketed. Its

Market News Service (with a budget of $11 million in 1975) provides

daily, monthly, and annual information on market supplies and prices

in the principal markets of the United States.

FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE

The Foreign Agricultural Service (with a budget of $13 million in

1975 for its information services) collects and disseminates information on world agriculture. In 1974, it had attach& stationed in 63 foreign countries spending approximately 40 percent of their time reporting agricultural information from more than 100 countries. In 1973,

these attach& sent in 3,091 reports. The Foreign Agricultural Service

also receives over 2,500 foreign agricultural publications annually.

Frequent highlight reports covering agriculture generally are received

from attaches stationed in the 27 more important developed and developing countries.2

2 Foreign Agricultural Service, in interview with Walter W. Wilcox, October 1974.
CENSUS BUREAU

Since 1840, the Census Bureau, now located in the Department of

Commerce, has taken an agricultural census at least every 10 years and,

since 1930, the agricultural census has been taken eve 5 years. At

one time, local census takers were employed and trained by the Federal officials and directed to visit all farmers in their districts and

obtain accurate reports on the acreage farmed, the acreage owned and

rented, and the production of crops and livestock products in the previous year.

However, the 1969 and 19’74 agricultural censuses, which were taken

in the early months of 1970 and 1975, were done by means of mailed

questionaires sent to lists of farmers and farming corporations

obtained from the Internal Revenue Service and other sources.

Three different questionnaires were used: A short one for small and

part-time farmers, a more detailed set of questions for medium-sized

and larger farmers and an even more extensive questionnaire for farming corporations. For the large farms, followup telephone calls were

made if the completed questionnaires were not returned as requested.

In the past, the agricultural census reports have been taken as reliable benchmarks and all annual estimates of crop acreages and livestock numbers have been revised as necessary to conform to them. In

recent years, however, incompleteness in coverage by the agricultural

census and technological advances by the Statistical Reporting Service have resulted in the SRS providing the more dependable national r

estimates.

Informtion on materials used in agricultural production is supplied for the most part by the biennial census of manufacturers and by

other periodic reports compiled and issued by the Census Bureau. In

the case of fertilizer production, utilization, and prices, however, several different agencies participate in supplying the information. The

Census Bureau issues monthly reports on the production of inorganic

fertilizer materials, the Bureau of Mines issues reports on potash,

phosphate rock and sulfur production, and the U.S. Tariff Commission issues reports on production of organic fertilizer materials,

especially urea. The Statistical Reporting Service collects fertilizer

* utilization information from State fertilizer regulatory agencies and

publishes monthly fertilizer utilization reports. Twice a year, it also

collects and publishes ‘information on prices paid by farmers for the

various fertilizers. Finally, the Bureau of Labor Statistics collects and

publishes monthly data on prices paid for fertilizer at wholesales The

adverse effect of this fragmentation will be discussed later.

OTHER SOURCES (DOMESTIC)

A continuing flow of research information also is provided by the

Agricultural Research Service, the land grant universities, and the

State agricultural experiment stations. Most of the reports issued by

s WjlcOx, Walter w., ‘assessment of National and International Fertilizer Information

Systems,” Assessment of Food, Agriculture and Nutrition Information Systems-workiw

papers from Michigan State Unlveroity, June 1975.
18

these research bodies are primarily of interest to other researchers or

to a limited number of producers who are concerned with the problem

researched. They are indexed by the Department of A “culture in a

computerized information retrieval s stem called CR S. A Member

of Congress ma use this service an quickly learn whether or not d

there are resea.rc reports on a problem of interest to him. t

FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION (FAO)

The international food and a agriculture information available to

Members of Congress and othe readers in the United States is sup- -

earlier, by the Food and Agriculture rganization of the United

Nations, and by the news media

One hundred and thirty-one countries are members of the Food and ●

Agricultural Organiztiion. Each member of FAO is obligated to forward to the FAO statistical staff all national data on food and fiber

production, utilization, and related information as soon as it is published. The member countries have agreed also to forward to FAO

headquarters in Rome other periodic information on food, agriculture, and nutrition. On the basis of these country reports, the FAO

publishes an annual World Agricultural Production Yearbook, a

Trade Yearbook, The State of Food and Agriculture an Annual Fertilizer Review and a Monthly Bulletin of Econonucs and statistics.

Some 15 commodity subgroups also prepare regular and special

reports on commodity problems.

FA0 data are less accurate than desired in many cases since the official statistics of many nations lack an objective basis and are f requentl y

influenced by political considerations.

In 1968, the FAO also began the development of an early warning

system. Under this system, monthly reports on food, crop Conditions,

and the food situation are collected by FAO and the world food program field staff for over 70 developing countries. This early warning

program is aimed at obtaining advance indications of possible emergency food and food aid needs. It is in addition to the estimates of

current and prospective crops collected regularly as a part of FAO

commodity market intelligence service which has been functioning for

many years. Elsewhere in this report, recommendations for expanding ‘

this service, which were made by the 1974 World Food Conference, are

discussed.

INTERNATIONAL WHEAT COUNCIL

Another international agency which compiles and publishes world

wheat reduction and trade information is the International Wheat

Council , located in London, with a membership made up of 10 export- r

ing countries and 42 importing countries. In April, 1972, it began

issuing monthly world market reports on wheat, which were authorized and reviewed by its advisory subcommittee on market conditions.

In 1973, it issued its first annual forecast of the world wheat, supply

and demand situation for the ensuing marketing year, 1973–74.

INTERNATIONAL COTTON ADV1SORY COMMITTEE

Since 1939 the major cotton producing and consuming countries

have supported an International Cotton Advisory Committee, which,
19

with a limited staff, compiles world information on cotton production,

trade, stocks, and prices. This International Cotton Committee located

in Washington, D. C., has 46 member countries. It issues a monthly

review of the world cotton situation and quarterly bulletins containing

world information on cotton production, imports, exports, prices, and

stocks.

OTHER SOURCES (INTERNATIONAL)

In addition to these three international agencies, world information

on sugar production supplies, and prices is compiled and published

by the Licht Corp. in Germany. World information on oilseed production, supplies, and processing is compiled and published in “Oil

World,” by ISTA Mielke & Co., Hamburg, Germany. World information on grains is published by the Commonwealth Secretariate, London.

World Information on fertilizer production capacity is compiled and

published by the British Sulfur Corp. of London. Several other private

institutions supply information on specific aspects of the world food

industry.

Technical and Institutional Obsolescence of National Food and

Agriculture Information System

OBSOLESCENCE

Many of the data series now being maintained by the Statistical

Reporting Service and the Economic Research Service were designed

40 or 50 years ago. They were designed to provide information about

food and agriculture at that time. To the extent that the structure of

our food and agriculture industry has changed since then, these older

data series are based on obsolete concepts, definitions, and measurements.

The nature and extent of this problem are described in some detail

in a report of an American Agricultural Economics Association Committee in 1972 entitled, ‘(Our Obsolete Data Systems: New Directions

and New Opportunities.)) 4

Examples of this obsolescence are found in two of the older established series. ‘(Prices Received by Farmers and Cash Receipts From

the Sale of Crops and Livestock.” What was the average price received

for broiler chickens last month? How much did broiler chicken sales

contribute to farm income last month? Almost all broilers are raised

under contract by local growers or are produced by integrated corpora- Z

tions engaged in all aspects of broiler production, from the production

of the feeds used, to the marketing of the broilers. Under these conditions statisticians are forced to improvise.

The statisticians compute equivalent farm prices for broilers from

prices reported for dressed broilers and from limited survey reports.

These equivalent prices are applied to the weight of broilers slaughtered each month to obtain equivalent farm income from the sale of

broilers.

This is only one example of the obsolescence in our older data series.

The failure of administrative officials, charged with the collection and

publication of these series to bring them up to date is closely related

A American Journal of Agricultural Economic&, vol. 54, No. 5, 1972, pp. 867–S75.
20

to interests that data users have in the continuity of a data series. Any

proposed change in the series is seen as an advantage by some users but

as a disadvantage by others.

Professor Bonnen of Michigan State University, who has studied

this problem for several years observes that “* * * the great improvements in statistical methodology and data processing techniques over

the last generation cannot offset failures at the conceptual level, for no

matter how well quantified one is still measuring the wrong thing. * * *

Management of a systems has grown far more sophisticated. But d

none of this is sufficient to offset the debilitating effect of being forced

to measure something that in some major degree no longer exists.’ 5 -

We are concerned that, although a distinguished committee of the

American Agricultural Economics Association urged action in dealing with these issues as long ago as 1972, efforts on the part of responsible administrators looking toward the improvement of these older

data series have been frustrated by lack of public concern and support.

We recommend that either the Joint Economic Committee, or one

or both of the Agriculture Committees, request the Secretary of Agriculture to establish an agricultural statistical review committee charged

with the responsibility of making recommmdations to the Congress

and appropriate executive agencies for modernizing, coordinating, and

?

standardizing the older food and fiber data series. This agricultural

8tatistical review committee should include members from the various

disciplines and groups who utilize food and agricultural data.

TIMELINESS

Most national food and agricultural data series are released

promptly. This has not been true, however, in recent years for the

agricultural census. The first reports from the agricultural census of

1969 were not available for more than 2 years after the data were

collected; the final reports were not issued until more than 4 years after

the data were collected.

Fertilizer production data series also suffer from a lack of timeliness.

The timeliness of other data series also could be improved. Usually

when a data series is developed by an agency, which has little interest

in, or need for, the data in its program operation:, the tabulation and

release of the data are relegated to a second or thmd order of priority ‘

in its work schedule. For example, the administrator in charge of one

of the fertilizer data series indicated his willingness to arrange for

earlier scheduling of the tabulation and release of the data if the appropriate congressional committee chairman made such a. request.8

The collection of fertilizer information and its analysis and dissemination are shared by 10 governmental agencies and at least 2 industry-financed trade associations. There is substantial consensus

among the users of this information that important improvements are

possible, especially in terms of timeliness of the reports, increased reliability, and the publication of the scattered information in comprehensive monthly and annual reports.

● Bonnen, James T., “Problema of the Agricultural Information Systems of the United States.” Assessment of Food. Agriculture, and Nutrition Information Systems—working papers from Michigan State University, June 1975, pp. 7 and 15.

e Wilcox, Walter W., personal communication, December 1974.
21

We recommend that the several congressional committees having

responsibility for the executive agencies which collect and publish the

various series of data relating to fertilizer conduct studies and hearings to detemine ways, means, and cost of improving fertilizer infomation systems

AGRICULTURAL CENSUS

The timely collection and release of reliable benchmark data such

as the 5-year agricultural census provided in the 1930s, 1940’sj and

1950s has become a serious problem in the 1970s. In part, this is be-

. cause of the changing structure and increased specialization in agriculture. Also, the labor costs involved in recruiting and training a

field force sufficient to interview all farm families in the United States,

as was done earlier, are almost prohibitive today.

As mentioned previously, the 1969 and 1974 censuses of agriculture

were taken by use of mailed questionnaires with a heavy dependence

on telephone calls to assure an acceptable response. This method was

chosen primarily to reduce costs after preliminary tests indicated that

such a method would give reasonably satisfactory results

In view of the shift to large probability samples by the Statistical

Reporting Service, and the shift by the census Bureau from a complete enumerative agricultural census to a mailed questionnaire survey,

the desirability of adding the census function for detailed and county -

level data to t e responsibilities of the Statistical Reporting Service. K

should be reviewed y Congress. An analysis of the feasibility and

probable cost of making such a change, by a private consultant group,

indicates the probability of obtaining more accurate benchmark data

at no higher cost if the responsibility for collecting benchmark agricultural data were assigned to the Statistical Reporting Service.7

We recommend that the congregressional committees, which have jurisdiction over the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Census

activities study the desirability and feasibility of integrating the staff

and activities of the Agricultural Census into the Statistical Reporting

Service. Such a study, with hearings if needed, should be scheduled

within the next calendar year. If the results support such a transfer

appropriate legislatiion should be enacted providing for transfer of the

responsibility for agricultural benchmark data to the Statistical Re-

. porting Service when the processing of the 1976 agricultural census

data is completed.

FORECASTING DEFICIENCIES

The phenomenal increases in prices of grains and soybeans in the

1972-73 crop year were not predicted by analysts in the Economic

Research Service or at the land grant universities. It appeared that

the food supply and price forecasting system had failed to provide

reliable information for planning and decisionmaking. what were the

causes of this failure? What can and should be done to avoid the

danger of another similar failure in the future?

Lack of information regarding stocks and the size of the 1972 world

grain crop was a factor. Unexpectedly large Soviet purchases in world

T American Agribusiness Associates, “New Agricultural Data System Needed,” duplicated. 1973, 15 pp.
22

grain markets sharply reduced market supplies. Domestic price controls influenced beef cattle marketing and the complex of oil seed

products in ways that were not fully anticipated. There insubstantial

agreement however, that the primary failure was analytical. The economic models and supply-demand-price equations> which had performed satisfactorily in the 1950’s and 1960’s, had little value when

applied to the more dramatic changes that occurred in the domestic

and world markets in the 1970’s, such as the size of the 1972 world

grain crops

The lesson of the failure of the food and agriculture information .

system in 1972-73 is that we must have more information on food production and market demand in other parts of the world and our

analytical capabilities must be increased.

STRENGTHENING OF THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL

.

SERVICES ~NEEDED

In fiscal year 1972–73, when the failure in the international food

information system occurred, Government was spending $61 million

annually on the four basic national agricultural information agencies;

the Statistical Reporting Service, the Economic Research Service, the

Market News Service, and the Foreign Agricultural Service. Since

early 1972, the Economic Research Service has been reorganized and

minor reorganizations occurred in the other agencies. Additional funds

were requested by the agencies to permit them to collect additional

data an to provide for more analyses. d

In part, as a result of these actions, appropriated funds for these

four agencies were increased to $73 million in 1974-75, and appropriations of $80 million are being requested for the 1975-76 fiscal year.

In terms of purchasing power, however, the $80 million requested is

slightly less t an these agencies received in 1972-73. h

The General Accounting Office recently studied USDA’s plan for

an automatic data processing system and equipment to be acquired.

It concluded USDA had not made needed cost-benefit analyses and

should complete studies of data processing and communication requirements” %before investing in additional computers. USDA also was

criticized for inadequate consideration of security to protect personal

or other sensitive inormation. 7

USDA might better use additional funds for improving agricultural data and its analysis before investing in additional processing

equipment. g

Important step s have been taken since 1972 to im rove the qualit -y

and timeliness o the information available on worl agriculture an d $

agricultural requisites, We believe, however, that additional improvements are needed.

The Foreign Agriculture Service should improve its information

collection capabili~y by: Giving its attach4s basic training in data

collection; expanding its reporting capabilities in the critical developing countries; improving its data transmission and the timeliness of

S FOX, Karl, “An Appraisal of Deficiencies in Food Price Forecasting for 1973, and Recom- mendations for Improvement,$

’ prepared at the request of Gary Seevers, member of the

Council of Economic Advisers, 26

‘Comptroller General of the Wri~~$p\;~;;$’ %;~~!;~9g?anning-A Must Before a Departmentwlde Automation Data Processing $ystem Is Acquired for the Department of .N@?ulture,” LCD 75-108, June 3, 1975.
23

its summaries; improving its reports for the major commodities on

probable import requirements of the importing countries; and improving its reports on world agricultural requisite supplies and requirements, especially fertilizer.

The Economic Research Service should improve its world information analysis capability by: Strengthening its ability to analyze, evaluate and interpret current world information on a monthly basis during the crop growing and early harvest seasons; increasing its ability

to ‘analyze current world weather data and interpret its significance

in terms of probable crop production in the current season; and developing world models of production, utilization, trade and prices for

the more important agricultural commodities, especially grains, which

permit timely evaluation of new data on a monthly basis during the

growing and early harvest season.

We recommend that the Agriculture Committess of the Congress

schedule hearings to determine what improvements in the Foreign

Agriculture Service and the Economic Research Service have been

made since 1972–73, and what further improvements are feasible.

Such hearings should focus on: Additional data series to be collected by the Foreign Agriculture Service; steps to increase the timeliness of reports issued; steps to improve the quality of the data obtained from abroad; and appraisals by the administrators of these

services concerning additional improvements that could be made in

existing information systems and the probable cost of achieving the

improvements.

INFORMATION METHODOLOGY

Automatic data processing has contributed grcatly to both the timeliness of most statistical series and to the analytical capabilities of

those engaged in the analysis of information relating to food and

agriculture. The Economic Research Service maintains a national

agricultural model which it uses to analyze alternative national agricultural program proposals. This model is also utilized to provide

estimates relative to regional adjustments and to provide estimates for

groups of commodities. It also maintains less comprehensive models

for analytical purposes in preparing its periodic situation and outlook

reports for the various commodities.

Members of the agricultural economics staffs at several State agricultural experiment stations, utilizing automatic data precessing, have

developed models for one or more of the more important agricultural

products in their States, none of which have been very useful thus far.

The University of California, Case-Western Reserve University,

Iowa, State University, and Michigan State University, have developed models, in some, cases, for the United States, in some cases for the

entire world, and in other cases for specific foreign countries.

The 1972 failure of the agricultural information system indicates

the need and desirability of building and maintaining international

modcls on a selective basis dealing with the problems of relevance to

the Congress.10 International market forces of demand and supply are

continually changing due to changes in population, income distribution, weather, governmental policies, and other factors. These market

1° Johnson, Glenn, “Technology of Information Systems,” Assessment of Food, Agriculture, and h-utrition Systems—working papers from Michigan State University, June 1975.
24

forces need to be modeled for individual countries so that both the executive agencies and the relevant committees of Congress can formulate appropriate policies. The need for building international models has increased as world trade in food has increased in recent years.

The need will increase even more in the years ahead.

The Department of Agriculture has joined with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to test whether the use of data gathered

by the second Earth Resources Satellite (ERTS-B)ll launched in

January 1975, and analyzed with the aid of computers, can improve

the timeliness and accuracy of major crop forecasts. This project,

large area crop inventory experiment (LACIE), at the outset will concentrate on wheat grown in North America.12 It will combine crop

acreage measurements from ERTS-B data and meteorological infor- .

mation from NOAA satellites and from ground stations. It is designed

to relate weather conditions to yield assessment and ultimately to

production forecasts.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is also cooperating with the Statistical Reporting Service in the analysis of

weather data as related to crop yields in the major agricultural areas

of the United States. One of the objectives of such analyses is to

discover weather-yield relationships which can be applied in those

parts of the world where reliable information from other sources is

not available.

We note with approval the plans for expanding weather-crop yield

research. We believe it is urgent thut the experiments and analyses

utiliizing new technologies for obtaining and analyzing data go forward on an expanding scale as preliminary results, including cost

effectiveness analysis justify. These newer technologies offer great

promise for the years ahead.

Reliabnility and Timeliness deficiencies of International Food and

Agriculture Information Systems

THE 1972–73 INFORMATION SYSTEM FAILURE

The failure in the world food information system in 1972-73 was ~

caused partly by gaps in the information on world grain production

and trade and partly by a failure to analyze adequately the information which was avalable. In a report prepared for the Ford Foundation, by the former deputy director general of FAO, several gaps

in world food information systems, as they existed in mid-1972, were

identified:

1. The U.S. had no current reporting system on sale of grain for export.

2. The absence of current estimates of probable grain production as well as

stocks for the U.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic of China.

3. The need for better estimates, or at least qualitative evaluations of current

crop conditions or prospects in most of the developing countries.

4. The need for better stock statistics in most commercial importing countries,

including U.S. S.R. and the People’s Republic of China,

5. The need for more current and better information on the availability of

production requisites for the developing countries, especially fertilizer.

11 sf~~ renamed ~ndsat.

I’d Nati~~al Aer~nautlcs and space AUrn~ni8tratiOn, press release, ?~zoh, November &

1974.
25

6. The need for more reliable indications as to the probable flexibility of production in some of the main producing countries, especially for the United States,

India, Brazil and the U. S. S. R.~

This report also states that:

* ● * most of the failure to forecast or understand the seriousness of the

world food situation in the summer of 1972 and again in the summer of 1973

was more a matter of analysis and political desire than of statistical intelligence.1’

These findings were preliminary to the major conclusion of the

report:

The consultant recommends that the foundations and related institutions in-

.

terested in the world food situation should give serious consideration to the establishment of an autonomous International Food Policy Institute * ● * which would

give attention to the development and dissemination of food policy and food situation analyses with especial reference to the immediate operating needs of the

underdeveloped world.m

It was proposed that such an institute should prepare a series of

reports, seminars, and conferences on the food problems of the less

developed countries.

The World Bank, FAO, and other international agricultural agencies have pledged their cooperation and have endorsed the establishment of such an institute. Plans for an institute, financed by a consortium of private foundations in the United States, Canada, and other

countries, have progressed to the point that an acting director has

been appointed and organization activities are underway.

When this new autonomous International Food Policy Institute

begins to function it should eliminate a current weakness of the other

international agricultural agencies: their inability to publish information and analyses, other than those approved by member governments. %

FAO TIMELINESS PROBLEMS

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations is

recognized as the major source of information on world agriculture.

Expectations for improving the world’s information system must be

based upon an assessment of international capability. There are several generally recognized deficiencies in the information collected and

published the FAO.

& The time apses between the collection of data in the various countries

and their availability in the FAO publications is so peat that most

series are only of value for historical research. The Information reported in the monthly bulletins of Economics and Statistics are more

timely than those published in the annual yearbooks, yet even in these

publications there is usually a lag of 6 months or more between the

collection of the country data and the availability of the regional and

world summaries in the monthly bulletins.

CENTRALLY PL.4NNED COUNTRY DATA GAP

Another deficiency is the gap in world food and agriculture information created by the failure of U.S.S.R. and other centrally planned

countries to supply accurate national data to FAO on a timely basis.

18 Wells, O. V., “Improvin World Food Situation Outlook Information and Analysis,” phase 11 report. Ford Founda ion, f April 1974 (duplicated), pp. 4 and 5.

‘

4 Jbid., p. 6.

IC Ibid., p. 7.
26

Acreage data are released on a timely basis by the U. S.S.R., but thus

far little information on either acreage or production is made available from the People’s Republic of China.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ PROBLEMS

In perhaps 100 or more of the developing countries, the national information systems are so poorly staffed that the data supplied by FAO

is lacking in reliability.” There is great variation in the agricultural

information systems found in these less developed countries. Many

countries lack even a recent census of agriculture. Others have agri- “

cultural census data collected at regular intervals supplemented by

sample surveys and by reports of knowledgeable people at regular

periods throughout the year.

Each year or the past 10 years or more the FAO has stationed 25 -

to 40 technically trained experts in underdeveloped countries for the

purpose of helping the national governments improve their statistical

services. The technically trained FAO staff member is usually stationed in a country for a full year or more to enable ‘him to train local

personnel in the collection and dissemination of agricultural information.”

Even though this program has been in operation for a number of

years, and the United States through its AID financing has provided

training for personnel from many underdeveloped countries, agricultural information systems in many of these countries continue to be

inadequately staffed and poorly financed.

The inadequacies of the food and agricultural information systems

in the developing countries create serious problems for international

agencies, which attempt to assemble world food and agricultural statistics. This is an area where the United States has made important

contributions in the past through AID-financed technical assistance

activities. Congress has given a high priority to food and agriculture

in legislative authorizations for AID.

We recommend that Congress direct AID to increase its technical

assistance for improvement of agricultural information systems, including the introduction of advanced information. technology, in de -

veloping countries now most deficient in their agrcultural statistical

instititutions .

FAO and other international agencies also encounter the problem of

national governments which are sometimes unwilling to release unbiased data because of the fear of encountering problems with an important segment of their citizens. Situations have occurred where the

national government believed it to be to its advantage for example,

not to release its best estimate of national crop production in a drought

-year. Rather, the government released estimates which were believ eto

best suit its political purposes. FAO and other international agencies

including the USDA, usually must accept the data supplied by the national governments. This is a potential weakness in all data gathered

and released by international organizations and a serious handicap to

all who use the data.

We recommend that Congress request the U.S. representatives with

supervisory responsibilities for international information agencies to

10 Ibid., p. 10.

17 Ibid., p. 21.
27

support the development of rules and regulations for the international

professional 8taff which would authorize and direct these Staffs to use

tbe most reliable information available to them wlien compiling their

reports.

FAO : EARLY WARNING SYSTEM

In 1968, recognizing the lack of timeliness in most of its data series,

FAO began the development of an early warning system. Under this

system, monthly reports on food crop conditions and the food situation

are collected by FAO and the world food program staff for over 70

developing countries. This early warning program is aimed at obtaining advance indications of possible emergency food aid needs. These

early warning reports are in addition to estimates of current and

prospective crops collected regularly

?

as a part of an FAO market

intelligence service, which has been functionmg for many years

The 1973 FAO conference authorized funds for an expansion of

the early warning system.18 An expanded program was established in

March 1974, but even the new program failed to meet the needs in this

area and, as will be reported more fully later, the World Food Conference in November 1974, adopted resolutions calling for its further

improvement.

Although the early warning reports of FAO have been helpful

in providing information at an ear y date on food crop conditions in

countries in danger of requiring emergency food aid, the reports have

been in qualitative terms. They seldom have contained quantitative

estimates and seldom have been sufficiently documented to provide a

basis for estimating the food import requirements of the countries.

This early warning food information system, stalled by the FAO

and the world food prqgram, provides the most timely information

available during the crop growing season for some 7O developing

countries. The FAO commodity intelligence service collects similar

crop progress information m the developed countries, and as a followup to the 1974 World Food Conference, is developing timely information during the growing and early harvest season for all countries on

a regional and world basis.

INTERNATIONAL WHEAT COUNCIL

The International Wheat Council, located in London, with 10 exporting members and 42 importing members, began issuing monthly

and annual reports on the world wheat supply and demand situation

in 1972. These reports are issued on a time y basis and appear to be

comprehensive. The Soviet Union, although not a member of the FAO,

is a cooperating member of the International Wheat Council.

The monthly and annual reports, including forecasts for the marketing year ahead. are prepared by the Council's advisory committee or a

subcommittee on market conditions under the guidance of the executive committee of the council. Before a final report is released, each

country represented on the executive committee has an opportunity to

review it. Thus far the Council has not adopted procedures to guard

against possible exercise of undue influence on the content of a report

by some member of the executive committee.

n Ibid., p. 5.
28

WORLD WEATHER DATA

At the present time, the field staff of the FAO and the world food

program prepare qualitative re ports on the weather as it has affected

crop production in the country or which they are making early warning reports. The U.S Foreign Agricultural Service also receives and

assesses weather data for impotant agricultural areas of the world

in developing its current estimates of world production of the major

foodstuffs.

A current major problem encountered in the use of weather data is .

that the global telecommunications systems was designed primarily to

service aviation. Data important for a “cultural assessments particularly precipitation, are not required to e transmitted regularly and on

a timely basis. There is also a lack of uniformity in codes and fre- .

quency of sending precipitation data between various regions.lg

FAO, in its proposals for national and international action at the

November 1974, World Food Conference proposed requestin the

World Meteorological System to provide regular assessments o cur- f

rent and recent weather data assembled by the World Weather Watch

to identify agriculturally significant changes in weather patterns and

related information. These assessments by the World Meteorological

System, when they are undertaken, should improve our information on

the progress of crops m those sections of the world where gaps now

exist.

AERIAL PHOTO/REMOTE SENSING~~

FAO is now cooperating with national governments in the experimental use of aerial photography to collect more accurate and timely

informatl~n on crops and livstock numbers. Its staff is also studying

the feasibility of remote sensing as a means of obtaining agricultural

data in countries where gaps now exist. Serious political problems in

the collection and release of remote sensing data, as well as t e high cost

of processing them, make it unlikely that remote sensing will close

existing information gaps in the near future.

IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED

More comprehensive, more accurate, and more timely information on ‘

world food and agriculture is needed now and wil continue to be l

needed in the years ahead. In a later section the resolutions relating to

these issues, which were adopted by the 1974 world conference, will be

discussed. Because of the sensitive political considerations of its membership, however, FAO may be una le in the near future to achieve its b

goals in the improvement of the world food and agricultural

reformation system.20

~ Wilcox, Walter W., “Technical Assessment of International Food and Agriculture Infor- mation Sy6tem&” Asessment of Food Agriculture, and Nutrition Information 8y8temeworking papers from Michigan State U’niverslt June 1975.

m Sorenaen, Vernon L., and Ferris, John, b’ 1’ mpact of International Food Production and Trade on U.S. Agriculture System and Needs for Develo ment of the Relevant Information

System,” Assessment of Food, Agriculture, and Nutrit on Information Systems-working !

papers from Michigan State University, June 1975.
29

International and National Nutrition Information Systems

FOOD DISAPPEARANCE DATA

Throughout the world food disappearance data are utilized as an

indirect measure of the nutritional adequacy of food consumption.

Most developed countries have reliable information on food disappearance and also have substantial information on the nutritional status

of their citizens. In the developing countries, however, credible food

and agriculture data often are lacking. Nevertheless, these questionable

.

food data are relied on as almost the only indication available of the

nutritional status and the extent of undernutrition in these countries.

limited numbers of nutrition surveys have been conducted by United

Nations and U.S. AID agencies such as the National FOOd and Nutrition Survey” of Barbados 21 and ‘(The Tamil Nadu Nutrition Study”

in India.22 For the most part, however, nutritional status information

is inferred from food availability and disappearance data. Largely

from such data the FAO Preliminary Assessment of the World Food

Situation for the 1974 World Food Conference concludes, that at

least 400 million people in 1970 were suffering from malnutrition.23

In the United States there is a plethora of information relative to

food availability and disappearance. The Department of Agriculture

each year publishes in Agricultural Statistics” information on (1)

quantities of 12 food nutrients available for consumption per capita,

per day, (2) percentage of total nutrients contributed by major food

groups, (3) index of per capita food consumption major food

groups, and (4) per capita consumption in retail weigh t equivalent,

by major food groups. It also publishes a 25- to 30-page National Food

Situation four times a year. This publication contains information on

food prices, current trends in food spending and income, per capita

food consumption (disappearance) by 3-month periods, and aggregate

food supply and utilization information. There also is much research

information available relative to the nutritive content of specific foods

and diets.

FOOD AND NUTRITION BOARD

One of the first national nutritional status studies was that of the pnational Nutrition Conference for Defense convened in 1941 by the

Food and Nutrition Board of the Nationa] Research Council and several governmental agencies. It reported findings of poor diets and nutritional deficiencies at all socioeconomic levels the lower the levels of

income and education, the more frequent and the more serious the

problem. The groups noted to be especially vulnerable at that time were

preschool children, pregnant women, nursing mothers, and adolescent

girls. This 1941 conference report was based on dietary and clinical

T s ~l(,~t ~fie p“blie~tjn~ No. 237, Pnn Arnerlr.~n Health org&n!zation, 1972.

w I/oT}ort t. TT.SC AID On contr~ct No. AID/nesa-399 by Sidney M. Cantor Associates,

Inc.. .J1lIY 6.1973. -’~ I’rof. T~nmm T. Pol~m~n, discusses the inadequacy of Information On food consumption

1;1 fho low developed countries, in “World Food: A Perspective,” Science, May 1975. 1)1). ~1~–~ls.

6S–S77—76—3
30

nutrition studies during the Great Depression of the 1930’s and examinations of men called up for military service.

Following the 1941 National Nutrition Conference, the Food and

Nutrition Board made studies and issued reports on nutrient requirement, food composition, enrichment of grain products industrial

feeding , nutritional survey techniques an their value, composition

of milk, “ heat injury to protein, maternal and child nutrition, and other matters of health importance related to food and nutrition. It is

perhaps best known for its ‘(Recommended Dietary Allowances”

(RDA) first issued in 1941 and continuously revised as more evidence

becomes available on the nutrient requirements of man. The eighth -

edition of the allowances was published in 1974.2*

HUNGER AND NUTRITIONAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE 1960’S

Food consumption studies conducted by the Department of Agriculture in 1945 an 1955 indicated that diets had improved substantially. f

The 1965 surveys

u l

however, indicated that the nutritional status of

important population groups had deteriorated. This survey was followed in 1967 with several reports of large pockets of hunger and f

nutritional deficiencies among the poor in America.

A Senate Subcommittee on Manpower, Employment and Poverty

held hearings in Jackson, Miss., and visited the home of poverty

stricken rural families in the summer of 1967. The evidence of hunger

and nutritional deficiencies observed by the Senators led the Field

Foundation to take the leadership in creating a “National Council

on Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States.” The activities of

this National Council led to a public airing of the hunger problem

by the news media. It also led to the creation in theSenate of a !$

Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs.

As a result of this new concern, Congress, in December 1967, authorized the Public Health Service to conduct a survey of the nutritional status of Americans living in low-income areas. This survey

was conducted in select low-income sections of 10 States and New York

City . Information from this survey and from other related activities,

includmg the hearings of the Select Senate Committee on Nutrition r

and Human Needs, was used to support the expansion of governmental

food assistance and nutritional education programs. The widespread .

interest created in these problems led to the convening of a White

House Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health in December 1969.

This conference made numerous recommendations for improving the

government food assistance programs and for the expansion o nu- --

trition research and educational activities. It also recommended that

the commercial food industry improve the nutritional content of processed foods.

FEDERAL FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Since Congress each year must provide the funds for the food assistance program for special groups, and for nutrition research and

education programs, its first interest is in information for the evaluation of the effectiveness of these programs.

~ Food and Nutrition Board, National Academy of Sciences, pamphlet, March 1975, 25 PP.
31

Congress has authorized a substantial number of food assistance

programs: Food stamps: commodity donations for needy families,

for institution?, and for feedng programs for the elderly; other supplemental feeding programs including a program for pregnant women

and infant children; special school milk program; school lunch and

school breakfast programs; and day care and Head Start feeding

programs.

The appropriations for these programs, including the Federal Government’s share of administrative expenses in fiscal year 19’75, were

$6.1 billion. Appropriations for nutrition research and educational ac-

.

tivities of the Federal Government also exceed $50 million annually.

The Food Advisory Committee found that to date only limited and

fragmentary program evaluation studies have been made by the adW ministering agencies. It noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals in June

1975, ruled that the Department of Agriculture is not complying with

the legal requirements of the 1971 amendments to the Food Stamp Act

which in effect, directs the USDA to provide food stamp allotments

which will assure low-income households the opportunity for an adequate diet.25 Additional program evaluation studies are urgently

needed to improve the administration of Food Stamp and related food

assistance programs.

We recommend that the Congress direct the Food and Nutrition

Service which administers the food assitance program to expand

its program evaluation studies. These studies should be integrated to

maximize their cost effectivenes and ensure getting the quality and

type of information necessary to make appropriate evaluation8.

NUTRITIONAL STATUS MONITORING PROGRAM NEEDED

As part of a national food and nutrition policy, a national nutritional status monitoring and surveillance program is needed. A total

of 906 bills dealing with food and nutrition were introduced into the

93d Congress. The principal nutrition issues appear to be: Poverty

as the principal correlate of hunger and nutritional deficiencies; the

extent of nutritional deficiencies associated with distorted food behavior, including overconsumption, found at all social and economic

levels in the United States; food and nutritional needs of special

groups, such as pregnant women, preschool children, ethnic minorities, and the aged; the effects of a major transfer of food preparation

and service responsibilities to the commercial sector; and the quality

and safety of the food supply.26

A panel of the 1969 White House Conference considered the need

for a continuing monitoring system of dietary and nutritional evaluation. It reported:

All members of the Panel agreed there are two basic objectives for which we

should strive:

1. Monitor: Evaluate and re-evaluate nutritional status of samples of Americans to measure effectiveness of programs being applied to improve nutritional

status.

s ROawa~ v. u.8. Department of Agriculture, D.C. Circuit, docket No. 7!&1303, decided

June 12, 1975.

~ Sidney M. Cantor Associates, Inc., Preliminary Technology Assessment of U.S. Food, Nutrition, and Agricultural Information Systems—good Consumption and Nutrition Statua Contract Report OTA-C-7, November 1974.
32

2. Surveillance: Comprehensively evaluate the population at large to identify

potential problems before many people are affected and to provide a continuing

reference base * * *

The role of nutritional surveillance and monitoring systems must be to gather

data that will serve as the basis of applied nutrition programs aimed at the

improvement of the nutritional status of the American population with emphasis

on the poor. * * *

To date little followup action has been taken on these White House

Conference recommendations. The Nutrition and Special Groups

Panel of the June 1974, National Nutrition Policy Study was concerned by the failure to make progress in this area. They reported, .

‘(Since World War II there have been hundreds of studies done of

the nutritional status of Americans. These included dietary, biochemical and clinical assessments * * *

What is of particular concern to us is that results of the most recent studies -

add little to our knowledge and completely ignore questions which we feel must

be answered if the United States is to develop a sane and equitable nutrition

policy. =

Meaningful food consumption and nutrition surveillance information is far more difficult and far more costly to obtain than comparable

information on food production. This arises primarily because of the

difficulty of measuring nutritional deficiencies and related food consumption. In part, the high cost is because existing technologies require

clinical analysis as a, part of a comprehensive evaluation of an individnal’s nutritional status.

Nutrition scientists also arc not fully agreed on the significance and

rcliability of specific tests for nutritional deficiencies. Information on

nutritional status also involves consideration of nutritional-related

public health issues, where in many instances cause and effect relationships are not clearly established. It is because of these problems that

little progress has been made in establishing a monitoring and surveillance program as recommended by the 1969 White House Conference.

INTEGRATION OF HEALTH AND NUTRITION- AND FOOD Comsummo~

SUR~’ElS

The National Center for Health Statistics, HEW, is now carrying

Out Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys to obtain data of .

epidemiological quality for use in national health program planning.

The small samples used in these surveys and the time elapsed between

gathering the data and publishing the results limit their usefulness.

Plans also have been substantially completed by the Consumer and

food Economics Institute of the Agricultural Research Service to

conductl a nationwide household food consumption survey in 1977. This

survcy using improved design and methodologies would be a continuation of similar surveys started in 1935, the last one occurring in 1965

In previous household food consumption surveys, the design of the

schedule has been so deficient that the nutrition data could not I)e

related to important economic and social characteristics: these surveys

lmte been limited in their usefulness, a deficiency which can be corrected in future surveys.

n t{Wh!te House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health, Final Report, 1969,”

“pp. 24–25. * I !parin~s before the Senate Select Committee on N’utrltlon and Human h“eeds, pt. 3—

Nutrition and Special Groups, June 19, 1974, p. S40.
33

Statisticians and automatic data processing specialists are helping

the consumer and food economics staff develop plans which will utilize

the latest developments in sampling theory, automatic data processing

and information transmission.

Current planning, which is being monitored by the Office of Management and Budget, revolves the active cooperation and participation on

the part of the Food and Nutrition Service, the Economic Research

Service, the Social Security Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Marine Fisheries Service. Food consumption data for the individual members of the household will be .

placed in data banks, where they will be available for research use at

the land grant universities and elsewhere within a year after the data

are collected.

This survey, if adequately planned and carried through, should

provide the food consumption data base for a continuing nutritional

status surveillance program. If the Health and Nutrition Surveys of

HEW were expanded on a probability sample basis, and methods of

handling the data improved, these data, combined with relevant food

consumption information, could be organized and analyzed by a competent staff to serve as a minimum national nutrition surveillance

system.

We recommend that, as a @8t step in o?evelo~”nrg a nationut wuttitz’oruzl monitoring ad 8urveiUance program the A’enut.e &’eZect Com -

mittee on IVutrition and? Human iVee~8 hoki heam”ng8 on tti az?equaoy

of design and integ~atbv of the ongm”ng nutm”.twn 8uwe 8 conducted

by the Department of Health, Education, and Weifarean1the planned

howehold food corwwnptwn 8urvey to be conducted by the Department

of Agriculture.

The administrators responsible for these surveys should be asked to

report on their current activities and plans for the next few years. They

should be asked to report on how data from one survey supplements

that obtained from the other, and how the information from both surveys taken together might ‘be analyzed to determine more adequately

the nutritional status of population groups. Questions also should be

raised regarding plans for analyzing the data and relating them to the

economic and social characteristics of the individuals in the households. Are research staffs in HEW, USDA, or the land grant universities making plans to analyze data from both surveys as they relate to each other?

The Food Advisory Committee plans to consult further with leading

nutrition scientists and at a later date make recommendations for

establishing a continuing nutritional status surveillance program.

World Food Conference Recommmuiatioms for Improving

SCOPE OF RESOLUTION

Resolution XVI of the 1974 World Food Conference is entitled

‘

(Global Information and Early-Warning System on Food and agriculture.>’ Its first paragraph states that the capacity of governments to

take prompt and appropriate measures to deal with food shortages

would be enhanced if all countries could receive timely information

concerning the current and prospective world crops and food situation.
34

It then stresses the urgent need for a global food information system

which would provide early warning by (a) identifying countries and

regions where acute food shortages and malnutrition problems are

expected before another crop is harvested and (b) by monitoring world

food supply-demand conditions. It emphasized the important role

played by comprehensive and timely information relative to prospects

for agricultural production, import requirements, export availabihties,

livestock health, and inputs in meeting the requirements of world food

security and market stability.2

*

The opening paragraphs also recognize that the areas most severely .

affected by food shortages, and those where timely and adequate information is most needed, often do not possess the necessary resources

and data collection institutions to provide the information needed.

The resolution then states that all major food producing and con- .

suming countries have expressed their willingness in principle to participate in expanding the existing information arrangements into a

more comprehensive and global system and Resolves that a global

information and early warning system on food and agriculture should

be established and agrees that FAO is the most appropriate organization to operate and supervise the system. * * * Requests FAO, in

cooperation with other concerned international organizations, particularly the International Wheat Council, to formulated arrangements necessary for the establishment of the system, and to submit

them for final approval by governments participating in the system.”

It requests that the information collected be fully analyzed and disseminated periodically to all participating governments for their exclusive use; it being understood that, where requested. certain information provided by governments would be disseminated only in aggregate form to avoid possible unfavorable market effects.

The final paragraphs of the resolution are devoted to requests for

cooperation on the part of all participating governments and other

international organizations. These requests cover three broad areas.

(1) Cooperation of all national governments in supplying on a

voluntary and regular basis current information and forecasts on the

basic food products in particular, and on all other relevant aspects

of food and agriculture in their country.

(2) Cooperation on the part of FAO, the World Meteorological -

Organization, the World Health Organization, and other multilateral

and bilateral sources to assist interested governments, both technically

and financially, in strengthening their data collection and dissemination in the fields of food production, nutrition levels at various income -

levels, input supplies, meteorology, and crop/weather relationships.

(3) Cooperation on the part of the World Meteorological Organization and the FAO in expanding their regular assessments of current

and recent weather data assembled through the World Weather Watch

by: establishing joint research projects, particularly in the arid and

semiarid areas; strengthening the global weather monitoring and

data processing systems, making them more directly relevant to agricultural needs; and undertaking investigations of the probability of

adverse weather occurring in various agricultural areas and obtaining

a better understanding of the causes of climatic variations.

m FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food nnd Agriculture-Pro.

posed Working Arrangements, Annex 13, FAO (duplicated), March 1975.
35

POSTCONFERENCE ACTIONS

The FAO Council at its regular meeting in November 1974, a greed

that the Global Information and Earl Warning System on F

Agriculture as recommended by the orld Food Conference should

be established in FAO and requested the Director General to set up

the system as soon as possible.

A statement of proposed working arrangements was prepared by

the staff for review and approval of the council at a special session

in March 1975.s0 

. The proposed working arrangements were then

transmitted to the FAO and U.N. member states with an invitation

to each to participate in it. FAO proposes to put the new system in

full operation by the end of June 1975. The expenses of putting the

system into full operation are to be met in 1975–76 out of the regular

budget.

Organization and scope of current plans

The senior officer in the Commodity and Trades Division of the

Economic and Social Policy Department, FAO, will be responsible

for the preparation of the reports issued and for relations with participating governments.

The new system will operate through an interdepartmental food

outlook board. The food outlook board will preview the FAO outlook statements and periodically advise on the operation of the system

with a view to improving its effectiveness. A number of divisional and

regional offices will be involved in servicing the system, primarily b

expanding their traditional activities. Information on fertilizers will

come from estimates of the working party on fertilizer statistics and

information supplied from other sources. Each participating government will be invited to appoint a liaison officer to facilitate t e transmission of national data to the FAO and to expedite distribution of

the reports to the countries.

As currently proposed, the new system will produce four types of

reports :

(1) Monthly food situation reports, a quarterly food outlook

report, and s special reports on urgent food situations;

(2) Month y early warning reports containing the latest information on basic food crop conditions and food deficits or food

availabilities in over 90 developing and developed countries;

(3) Quarterly food aid bulletin on bilateral and multilateral

food aid and status and evaluation reports on world food stocks

and storage capacity;

(4) Reports on fertilizer and pesticide supplies, deficits, prices,

contracts and capacities which will be issue on a quarterly basis

if feasible.

Long-term improvement of basic data

The plans for implementing the Global Information and Earl

Warning System on Food an Agriculture, approved by the FAO

Council in March 1975, included a section on improvement of basic

data. W
36

FAO proposes to provide more technical assistance to individual

countries for improving methods of reporting on current harvests and

crop conditions, utilizing funds made available by U.N. development

programs and bilateral donors.

FAO and WHO staffs are currently considering ways of carrying

out joint research projects to investigate weather-crop relationships.

FAO plans to extend its work in the field of remote sensing. It will

explore the feasibility of organizing international cooperative action

in this field with a pilot project on wheat.

FAO and WHO staffs, as requested by the World Food Conference,

are currently working on the development of a global nutrition sur- -

veillance s stem. Possibilities will be explored of linking food information an nutrition surveillance systems. J

The FAO may not be able to achieve all the goals it has set for itself -

in the next few years in its plans for implementing the World Food

Conference resolution, If this roves to be true, the staff should be encouraged to consult with mem er governments and establish priorities b

among the goals and adjust its development plans in line with this

appraisal.

we ?’ecomlnw no? that the United 8tafe8 strengthen it$ own infornuztion agencie8, but, in a&Wbn7 the firniteii ~Ytate8 can and 8bu.M prow%% incmxwea? fkuw”ai? arul teclinicul aa8&tance for FAO infownation

actimWe8.

The USDA @aff together with other members of the American

delegation to the 1974 World Food Conference prepared background documents that were of substantial value to the conference and

FAO. The Secretary of Agriculture should continue to cooperate fully

with FAO and assist it in solving technical problems encountered in

implementing the World Food Conference resolution and provide increased financial assistance for this purpose. 7J.S. representatives stationed in foreign countries might well be given instructions to assist

the F.40 liaison officers to the extent possible in supplying reliable

information to F.40.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Mr. Bell, before you begin I would like to

make a few points. .

It seems to me that the one key issue with respect to Soviet purchases of U.S. agricultural commodities is their insistence on buying

secretly and buying big. This causes disruptions in the market. It also

in a very real rense, limits competition, as only a few firms can really

sell in such big orders. And it means higher prices and a higher than

normal degree of interest in the sales on the part of the public and the

press.

In looking over some of the purchases last year, the Chinese actually

bought more wheat and corn from the United States than the Russians.

But the fact is that there is hardly any notice of this, except in some

specialized agricultural publications. This is because the Chinese

bought into our market in an orderly way, purchasing four, five, or six

shiploads every week or two, rather than millions of tons at a time.

The Russians are the only importers who insist on these one-time

high-volume purchases. If they were to buy in an orderly fashion like

the Chinesez the Brazilians, and even the Indians-who last year were

one of our biggest customers-there would be more competition among
37

U.S. exporters. For example, the co-ops such as the Grain Terminal

Association in Minnesota, would be able to complete. Actually. I believe

the Soviets pay a higher price by buying huge amounts all at one

time.

According to my information—and this is subject to some variables—

there are about 18 U.S. companies that can handle four or five cargo

sales per week But there are only three companies that can put together 5-million-ton sales.

one-term agreements, such as those being discussed in connection

with the United States-Soviet grain trade, really are more windowdressing than solid substance.

If the Russians have a short crop, they are going to buy. If we have

a good crop we are going to sell. And if we don’t have a good crop, we

can't sell.

1t seems to me we need to take a look at the overall marketing system. This system, as I am sure Sir. Bell will concur, is to a very large

measure based on adequate information as to availabilities, crop

plant ing intentions, and predictions.

At this point Mr. Bell, let us hear your testimony.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD E, BELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND COMMODITY” PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Mr. BELL. Fine, Mr. chairman. I, like you, would like to present

for the record my formal statement and make a few brief comments

about it.

I do appreciate the opportunity to be here this afternoon to talk a

bit about what, we arc doing to improve our data in terms of the analysis of soviet agriculture. You had also asked us to talk about the

People’s Repubhc of China.

And in that respect I wonld like to say at the beginning that we are

vel~ limited on our information and our information exchange with

China at the present time.

We have no formal agreement like w-e do with the Soviets. We do

have a few teams which have bcen out there and library and exchange

e of teams and seed and so forth. We also lately have been able to get

our agricultural officer in Hong Kong to make a visit to china and

prepare us a series of reports.

We do hope soon. partly through your efforts, to be able to say that

we have an agricultural officer at the Liaison office in Peking.

Chairman Humphrey. Is that being negotiated now?

fr. ~ELI,. yes; it is. }y7e ha}”e had extensive discussions with the

~el)artnwnt of State and we have basical]y agreed on the format and

I would hope that that would happen witfiin the next several months.

so that ?W the end Of 1!)Ts we wi]l have someone on the staff in the ~iaison office ’in ~>

e

liing W11O will k ]ooking after a~riculture most of the

tinier.

Now, with respect to the Soviets themselves, the Soviet Union and

our analysis of that, I would like to mention two things which I think

are si~lficant developments in the past couple of years.

one of them is our agricultural cooperation a~reement vvhich vms

signed in June 1973 with the l!?ioviets. And, second, about some of tho
38

efforts we are making to improve our efforts to work better within the

various agencies within the Government itself.

In the agreement that was signed in June 1973, there are two parts.

There is a technology exchange section and then there is an information exchange agreement. We from the United States were more interested in the information exchange, the Soviets were more interested

in technology exchange.

We move soon after the signing of the agreement in late 1973 to

establish the form for the work under that agreement. It takes the form

of a working group on exchange of economic information. We now

have almost 2 years of work under our belts on that. We believe it has -

been useful. We still have a couple of areas which we think we still

need to make improvements.

In the beginning we asked the Soviets to supply us on a regular basis

each month with 10 categories of data regardingdevelopments in their

own economy . They have been quite responsib e in supplying us with f

those data. hey have arrived generally maybe a month to 6 weeks.

late. They generally have arrived and they have been what we have

asked for.

It has enabled us to get information on what is going on in the Soviet farm economy sooner than it was before that. We get data that

is not published m the Soviet Union itself 3 or 4 months in advance. And that has been useful to us, particularly in trying to decide

how the Soviet economy is going.

We have also been a e to get some data which are new data, which )

are not published on a r eglar basis or at all, particularly on oil see.’

production, on livestock s slaughter by months, and on the use of fertilizer by crops. They have been cooperative in that.

One of the areas which we have not been successful in is in getting

the Soviets to provide us data on forward estimates. This is crop forecasting and the implications for trade. We have had meeting after

meeting on that and we have at this sta e made no progress.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Why do you t ink that is, Secretary Bell?

Mr. BELL. I think it comes about in part because of the system they

are involved in. They, of course, have 5-year plans, which are made

up of annual plans. The annual plans, of course, are always quite

ambitious. And when we ask for forward estimates, they say, well, ,

this is what the plan says. And not until the year has been completed

will they admit that the plan was not fulfilled. And it gets involved in

how the system works.

1 am confident, though, that there are regular data which are flowing toward Moscow on the crop conditions and the crop situation during the harvest. How this is put together and who it goes to we have

been unable to really find out, though we did have a team over there

that did look at how they gather statistics and so forth.

Hopefully, some day we will be able to tap into that system and get

something. But as of now we have not.

We have attempted to replace our lack of availability of that data by

sending in teams. In the early days we had resistance on the part of the

Soviets on that, but this year we have been able to get a winter wheat

team in, we have been able to get a spring wheat team into the Soviet

Union, and now we have a sunflower team which is just about to return.

The winter wheat team was very useful to us this year. They in fact

got far enough east in the country to be able to see the drought area in
39

the Volga Valley, which was our real confirmation from the other

data that we had that there was a drought going on.

So in general the agreement has been useful to us; it enables us to

understand the Soviet economy a lot better than we did; it enables us

to meet many more Soviet people than we had ever before—we have

people constantly going in and out.

I think, though , that the area that we have done as much as anything

that has helped our analysis in the past 2 years has been the efforts

taken on our own to organize ourselves better. We have in particular

moved to use the weather data which is available to us. We have a

system set up with the U.S. Air Force where we get computerized

raw data from the Air Force every 10 days, which gives us data on

precipitation, data on temperatures, and a computation of what we

call soil moisture.

Chairman HUMPHREY. You used to have a system in which it came

over to Virginia and would sit there for 2 or 3 weeks.

Mr. BELL. We now get that 5 days after the decade for the decade.

Chairman HUMPHREY. You know that Senator Bellmen and myself

traveled to the Soviet Union right after the 1972 wheat sale and discussed these matters with the Soviet Chairman of the Council of

Ministers, Mr. Kosygin, and with Mr. Matseyevich, at that time the

Minister of Agriculture. He has been replaced since then.

It was during those discussions that we were able to have Mr.

Kosygin agree t at he would be prepared to enter into a bilateral arrangement. We wired Secretary Butz from the Embassy that we hoped

they would proceed. We also brought great pressure to bear to increase

the number of U.S. agricultural attaches. At the time, you remember, we had only one attache there. Now we have two, I believe.

Mr. BELL. We have an agricultural attache and we have two assistants. And the main thin that that enables us to do is to have the

attaches traveling more. The Ambassador insists, and I think right -

fully so, that one man be in the Embassy all the time for hishelp. his

meant with only one additional man, you Couldn’t cover much of the

country. So with two we can actually have two out at the same time

and still one to cover the office itself.

So we appreciate the help that you and Senator Bellmen gave us on

that, as you have done here in the case of Peking, and it as been a

lot of help.

These weather data that we are getting from the Air Force, we have

put them into a model, as we call it which we use now to begin to estiG mate the grain production in the Soviet Union early in the year. It is

not an econometric model, it is really a model which is jud gmental.

But it does go into fine detail by regions and by crops. An it was

obvious to us in the early part of June that from the model just about

the same time the spring wheat was being planted that there was going

to be a weather problem.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Is this from our weather satellite or from a

reconnaissance satellite ?

Mr. BELL. As I understand it, Senator, it is basically from the monitoring—it is two parts. There 1s a regular international exchange of

weather data, and, second, there is a monitoring of radio stations by

the Air Force themselves, who bring this data together in a computerized system and make the final material available to us.

Chairman Humphrey. Are you using any LANDSAT data?
40

Mr. BELL. We do have some information that comes to us from

ERTS. At this stage it is quite limitedl and its usefulness-you are

aware, though, of our project we have which we call LACIE, which

is using the satellites to try remote sensing. Mr. Hume and Dr. West

are going to talk a bit more about that tomorrow.

There is still at this stage a difference of opinion within the Department about the effectiveness of that. I tend to be ‘(pro” on it. I think

that in 4 to 5 years from now, the remote sensing will be very beneficial

to us for crop forecasting, not only in the Soviet Union but in other

places.

It is interesting, within the past several weeks, there has been an “

interest on the part of the Soviets themselves to want to cooperate in

this effort. And NASA has talked with us in the last couple of weeks

about the degree of cooperation on technique, which really is outside .

of us in the USDA—it is something that they will have to do.

There will be a team here from the Space Institute of the Soviet

Union in October to look at some areas and discuss this. So I think

that is encouraging, too, that we will be able to get a joint project

eventually going in this area.

We do get some limited information from the satellites now that

has been helpful, but it certainly is not definitive enough to provide us

with the same type of information we get from our analysis of the

weather data itself.

Chairman HUIMPHREY. I hope you can encourage the negotiations

with the Soviets on space technology that relates to weather information and to the LANDSAT technology.

I think for the record I should say during the time I was chairman

of the Space Council, it was the Department of Agriculture and the

Department of the Interior that insisted we continue to develop remote

technology sensing satellite-now known as LANDSAT.

Mr. Bell. If I might, Mr. Chairman, comment just briefly on your

earlier remarks about what we are trying to accomplish in the longterm agreement with the Soviets on gram.

Many of the elements that we are trying to put in the agreement

you have already touched upon, and that is that we would like for

them to become a regular buyer where they would have spaced purchases and we would know in advance, within a range at least! what .

they intend to buy. And I have hopes that that type of agreement

will be worked out and relatively soon.

With respect to your question about participation of firms in the

export trade with the Soviet Union, we have urged the Soviet’s buyers .

to try to broaden the number of people that they deal with. We particularly mentioned to them the farmer cooperatives. And we have had

some interest on the part of the farmer cooperatives in trying to do

business with the exporters who have buying agencies-but, as you have

rightfully pointed out, their technique of buying very large quantities makes it very difficult for a co-op who does not have the same

type of information-gathering system to compete effectively with the

five or six large grain export firms.

Chairman HUMPHREY. And some of the co-ops are not oriented toward direct export. They are the accumulators.

Mr. BELL. That is right. They originate the grain and mak~

Chairman HUMPHREY. They are not in the export business.
41

Mr. BELL. And then they say they have made an export sale, that

usually means that they have made an export sale to a ship, to Continental or Louie Dreyfus or someone who ends up making the sale

to the foreign country.

Chairman HUMPHREY. The Russians seem to like to do business

with the biggest possible firms. They are always talking about monopoly capitalism and they end up aiding and abetting.

Mr. BELL. Again, I think, Mr. Chairman, that that comes about,

because of their system where they want to plan far ahead and they

. want to know what is going to be coming in 3 or 4 months from now

and they want it in specifics. They are such a vast country, the quantities are so large-this is the system they go to.

At the same time, I appreciate what you said about India, and I also

could add Japan. India this past year bought 41/3 million tons of wheat

from the United States.

Chairman HumPHREY. That is commercial sales.

Mr. BELL. There was a little bit of Public Law 480 in there, about

half a million tons. The other 4 million tons were commercial purchases.

That in fact also was done through a monoPoly buying agency,

known as the Food Corp. of India. And they have a man who is a

wheatbuyer located here in Washington in the Indian supply mission.

He bougt his 4 to 4.5 million tons on a day-by-day basis as he went

through the season. And, as you have rightfully pointed out, by this

type of technique, no one said anything about the Indian purchases.

Chairman HUMPHEREY. Most people didn’t even know they were

buying.

.Mr. BELL and I also would think, from what I know about buYing operations. that he was a very effective buyer. And he probably

ended up paying a better price than the Soviets would have done

by their swooping technique, as I call it. The Japanese in the case of

wheat also have a monopoly buying agency, called the Food Agency,

as you are probably familiar with. They ‘buy on a tender system.

Again, they do not cause the ripples in the marketplace as we do by

this rushing in and buying the large quantity all at once that the

Soviet Union has used.

. Now, we have pointed those examples out to the Soviets within the

past several weeks and hopefully we can persuade them that there is

some merit in that type of buying.

Chairman HUMPHREY . I am one that happens to believe that it is

important, for us to have this export trade with the Soviet Union.

However, the issue is, how do we regularize the trade is the context of

an orderly marketing system?

Mr. BELL. The objectives of the long-term agreement is to embody

the same principles you are talking about.

Chairman HumPHREY. What kind of information coordipation do

you have on an international basis? What information is collected,

how reliable is it, and what sources is it obtained from ? Let’s take, for

example, one crop, wheat, which is always the key crop.

Mr. BellJ

. We have one prime international source of information

on wheat which is probably our best source of information.

Chairman HUMPHREY. London?
42

Mr. BELL. The International Wheat Council in London. It is by far

the most effective international body in the gathering and analyzing

and dissemination of information.

Under the current agreement, we have a meeting in London of the

10 major countries where the information is supplied and put together

by the staff and a report is distributed to member countries.

And I think it has been very useful in terms of providing a degree of

stability to world trading in wheat. When it comes to the other. commodities, like rice and coarse grain and meat, we do not have that effective a system, We do have information which comes from the FAO.

in Rome. It tends to be less prompt and it is not, in my judgment, as

accurate and as useful as the information coming out of the International Wheat Council-or as up to date as the information from the

International Wheat Council. There has been an effort, though, within .

the past year to year and a half, mostly as a result of the World Food

Conference, I believe, to improve that system. And the FAO staff is

putting out a monthly bulletin now on the outlook for grains. We find,

of course, that a lot of that is our own information coming back to us.

But we do not necessarily quarrel with that if it goes to other countries

and it helps in their decisionmaking-we think it is useful.

But the Intonational Wheat Council and the FAO are the two

prime sources of data from international organizations.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I have a few questions at this point I would

like to ask you.

First, what steps can you tell us are being taken by the administration to have a unified U.S. grain policy? There seems to be so many

participants right now, with the USDA, the State Department, the

Labor Department, and the special representatives of the White House,

Are we really arriving at a policy or is this just an ad hoc business

that we are going through ?

Mr. BELL. We in fact do have what we call an International Food

Review Group, which was established b a memorandum issued by

Secretary Kissinger following the World Food Conference, which

Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Butz are the chairman and vice

chairman of.

And under that International Food Review Group, which is at the

Cabinet level, we have a working group which is generally chaired by .

Tom Enders, Assistant Secretaryof , which is an effort to try State

to bring together the views of all the departments on international

food poicies. We have worked consistently on that in trying to develop l

our positions for an international food reserve system, which we finally

agreed on here the middle of last week, in order to present it at a meetin in London on Monday.

With respect to the recent events e

through this formalized review group .

Senator KENNEDY . Mr. Chairma n ?

Chairman HUMPEREY. Yes Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. I must leave soon to attend another meeting.

There are a couple of areas I would like to cover before leaving.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Please

have

right ahead.

Senator KENNEDY. You may covered this in your earlier remarks; I regret I was unable to be here.
43

During a recent meeting of the Joint Economic Committee, Mr. McElvoy was asked what impact the Soviet grain agreement would have

on consumers. He responded that he thought the impact would be

rather negligible; however Arthur Burns testified to the contrary.

When Secretary Butz testified before the Agriculture Committee, his

testimony was contrary to Mr. Burns.

The President stated last week that he thought the agreement itself

would be in the interest of both consumers and producers. I wonder if

you can clarify what the basis of the President’s remarks was and how

. the agreement will be in the interest of consumers.

Mr. BELL. Fine, Senator. If I might go back and

scenarios which took place regarding the comments by C airman Burns

and subsequent Secretary

f

Butzo. Several month ago, when we had

• the first sales o about 10 million tons of grain to the U.S.S.R., the

U.S. Department of Agriculture at that time estimated that 10

million tons would perhaps raise the price of food at retail about 1 to

11/2 percent.

Subsequently, Chairman Burns testified that the sales of grain to

the Soviet Union during the entire year would raise the cost of food

about 2 percent.

From those two figures, there seems to be an inconsistency where

in fact there is not. In the calculations by the Federal Reserve Board,

they took into account probably further sales. Our calculations did

not take into account, except where we had sold— . .

Senator KENNEDY. Is this a total increase of 2 percent in terms of

the Consumer Price Index ?

Mr. BeLL. It is the food component of the consumer price index and

the food component makes up about 20 percent of the CPI.

Senator KENNEDY. But just this one deal amounts to anywhere from

a n/2 to 2 percent increase in the Cost of food?

Mr. BELL. The 10 million tons that we have sold and reported to

date, we estimate will increase the retail price of food by 1 to l1/2

percent. Further sales which will be made will probably raise it another half a percent, which is a total maybe of 2 percent, resulting

from sales which we probably will make during the course of the

1975 to 1976 crop year.

Now, you ask how do we view that as being in the interest of consumers. I, for one, look upon the Soviet Union now as being a regular

buyer of grain and other products from the United States. We have

been selling grain to the Soviets every year since 1971. Our real prob-

• lem with the Soviets is their buying pattern. They have bought large

amounts one year, small amounts the next year, large amount% the

next year, small amounts the following year. This has tended to add

a degree of instability to the market.

And the purpose of the long-term agreement we are now discussing

with them is to try to smooth out that buying pattern and bring more

stability to the market.

But, Senator Kennedy, we must have the Soviet market if we are

going to continue to run American agriculture at full capacity. We

still have more resources available to us under our system of agriculture than we can adequately use to feed our own people and generally

Western allies and the developing countries.
44

So I think the main benefit we get from selling grain to the Soviet

Union is that we run American agriculture at full capacity. In the

longer term, that means lower food prices for everyone.

Senator KENNEDY. Yet in the immediate term it results in a 2 percent price increase.

Mr. BELL. That is right. In the short term, there maybe some higher

food prices than there would have been without the sales, but in the

longer term it is our feeling that it will mean lower food prices.

Senator KENNEDY. How much do you anticipate selling to the Soviet Union over a longer period!

Mr. BELL. I look upon the Soviet Union to be a market on a yearly -

basis of around 8 million tons a year, including about 5 million tons

of feed grains and three million tons of wheat.

And if you look at the figures over the past several yearn, we have .

average

P

sdmg them about 6 to 7 million tons. and from all couna factor in the market.

Smm60r KENNEDY . Wh&~ is going to be the impact over the next

3 yoam in terms of increased costs to American wmmuners? When does

your curve turn around ?

Mr. BELL. I would say that it will begin to turn around by 1977 to

1978. Without. the Soviet market, I would think that by 1977 or 1978

we would be back into what we call the land set-aside program, we

would be asking the farmers to restrict production, which in turn

eventually means higher prices for food.

Senator KENNEDY. Is this based upon what your understanding of

what production would be over any period of time ?

Mr. BELL. Yes; it is.

kkm’ator K~NED~. It seems to me khat there has been, quite frankly,

a woeful kwk of aocurac~ in agricultural pr@dtions. To a great extent

this is due to a lot of chfferent factors whmh people don’t have any

control over. In view of this lack of ‘accuracy, I am interested in how

you am able to make these projections that you have been discussing

with such cmtwimty.

Mr. BELL Senator, that if you go back and study our rerwrd in the

longer term sense, that our rwmrd is fairly good. Our difficulty has

been in the current l-year forecast, where the weather factor comes .

into effect and is much more difficult to deal with.

In our new projections which we have made, I would like to say that

we have taken into account some new factors, which we think will put

a restraint on the increasing of American agricultural production in .

the years ahead.

I think the increments in productivity that we have had in agriculture will be more difficult as we move into the next 4 to 5 years for

a, number of factors, One of those beingj of cour~, the higher cost of

ener=, which is very important to farming, the higher cost of energy -

related fertilizer, which again is important, and then just the cost of

machinery which is involved in mechanization and the cost of credit.

All of,tiwjt+ I,think, would: tend to slow us down in the gains which we

h4ve h~ @ri~~ the pa~ 15 years, but I am confident that there will

be ~i~, av~ ~h@ we will continue to increase our production, with

a lot of the increase going into the export market.
45

Senator KENNEDY. I have to leave in a moment. May I ask just one

final question? Why is there such variation between the information

that we have on the Soviet Union from the Central Intelligence Agency

and that from the Department of Agriculture ?

I don’t know what the chairman’s experience has been, but,

when you ask Soviet officials to provide information about their grain

production, they say, “Well, you have your satellites, which take pictures of our agricultural areas. These satellites can pinpoint exactly

what our production is. Why do. you people make such a big point

. about making these statistics public ?“

Then when we have the difference in the figures that are reported by

the Department of Agriculture and those reported by the Central

Intelligence Agency, how do you explain the discrepancy? Are we

• using the satellite ? Are we getting accurate information? If we are, Y

why the difference between the two agencies?

Mr. BELL. The data which is used to make the various estimates

among the various Government agencies are basically the same data,

and it is basically the weather data which I guess I discussed before

you came in.

There is a judgement factor involved in making those estimates. And

at times there can be wide variances in the judgment—

Senator KENNEDY. Why is it just weather data? Why aren’t satellites used to photograph the crops to give us better production

estimates ?

Mr. BELL. The Soviet Union becomes much more hazardous in terms

of trying to estimate than our own count , because of where it is

farther 

muchs shorter, it is very subject to change very quickly.

And this is true also in the case of the northern Great Plains region,

it is also very true in the case of Canada. If you go back and follow

the Canadian crop estimating and their a-merit of the crop, they

are much more uncertain about the size of them crop right into the very

end than we are in the United States, where we are much more southerly located and we have a much broader production pattern.

We are using the satellites to give us information on the Soviet

crop situation. At this stage, the usefulness is quite limited.

• We do have a rather large-scale project which we initiated last year 1

with NASA, which is about a 3-year project, and I believe that at the

end of the 3 years that it will probably turn out to be very useful. But

we are going to have to run through the series. 

• And, as I was telling Senator Humphrey before you came in, here

within the past several weeks we have had some interest on the part

of the Soviets themselves in cooperating with us on that type of project.

And NASA has a team coming into the United States at the end of”

October to discuss about the techniques of what is called remote sensing, which is the use of the satellite.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Isn’t it a fact that about 90 percent of the

arable land in the Soviet Union is north of Minneapolis ?

Mr. BELL. Yes; that is true.

Chairman HUMPHREY. That means the variation in temperature in

this part of the Soviet Union is significant.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6S–S77—76-4
46

Chairman HUMPHREY. About 2 years ago the temperature in Minnesota dropped down to 23 degrees-a sharp frost--in late August. This

August It was as high as 95 degrees. Trying to predict frosts in these

northern climates depends 98 percent on good luck. f

Secretary BELL. I have just a few more observations.

I notice in the Wall Street Journal yesterday that further sales of

U.S. grain to Poland have been suspended until the United States concludes negotiations on a long-term grain sale agreement with the

Soviet Union.

Isn’t this just another example of where a bilateral arrangement

with one country such as the Soviet Union tends to disrupt the pattern -

of sales with another country? We have been selling to Poland quite

regularly over the years.

Mr. BELL. Since the end of World War II.

Chairman HUMPHREY. They have been a good long-term customer. “

Mr. BELL. We in fact, Mr. Chairman, have an agricultural a -

ment with Poland for the exchange of information. And the roles

have been very good in terms of providing the data that they have been

asked. They in fact have been giving us before the beginning of the

season a

h

general idea about what their import requirement is going

to be by t e type of commodity, and they have pretty well stayed with

that.

What hapened to them this year is thattheynormally depend upon

the U.S.S. . R to supply them about 2 million tons. Around early

August, they were told, by the Soviets that they would not get an

from the U.S.S.R. and they should be on their own. And the Polish

officials, if I may say so, faithfully reported that to us under the terms

of the agreement, and that they would be buying more and that they

hoped that they could,

I

d

, in fact, told the Polish officials that we had expected that would

generally happen when the Soviets were short an that we had no

problem meeting their requirements. So I was a bit taken by surpise

when the State Department approached them and asked them to delay

their purchases for awhile. Because in m judgment they in fact were

doing a very orderly job of buying in t e market; they had kept us i

posted generally about what they intended to do; and it was coming

into the reporting system, as it should have.

Chairman HUMPHREY. So they were cooperating in terms of providin information.

Mr. BELL. All the way.

Chairman HUMPHREY . From planting intentions to predictions, crop ,

estimates to the consumption or use of grains?

Mr. BELL. The had basically been sup lying us the data that we

asked for under t e Soviet agreement but h had not been able to getforward estimates and trade estimates.

We also completed an arrangement like this with Romania a week

ago last Friday. And it will provide the same type of information. Romania becomes interesting to us in that it is one of the countries in

Eastern Europe that moves from year to year from an exporter to

an importer. And that can affect the trade between regions. Hopefully

we can be as successful with the Romanians as we have with the Poles.

If we are, then we will feel pretty good about it.
47

We still have some holes in our information system in Eastern Europe, particularly with East Germany. we have just recently established relationship with East Germany. We are just now beginning

to find out who the key people are and beginning to meet them. Hopefully, that’s-we will be able toChairman HUMPHREY. They are already buying from our markets.

Mr. BELL. In fact they have been a much larger buyer than have the

Poles. As of the middle of last week, our reporting system showed that

we had sold Eastern Europe about 4.7 million tons of grain, including

about 2 million to Poland and about 2.3 to East Germany and the re-

• mainder, 300,000 to 400,000 tons, to Romania.

Chairman HUMPHREY. And those are in smaller sales; aren’t they?

Mr. BELL. That’s right.

Chairman HUMPHREY . They are not in big lump sum sales. Ž Mr. BELL. Right.

Many of the purchases by Poland in fact were of the 50,000-ton size

or less and did not even show up in the daily reporting requirement

that we have in which we have to report sales of 100,000 tons in a week.

The came in the weekly report.

Chairman HUMPHREY . What I am trying to emphasize for the record is that approximately 41/2 million tons has been purchased, and

the media has hardly mentioned it.

Mr. BELL. That’s right.

Chairman HUMPHREY. It has only been noted in the professional

agricultural journals. But when the Soviets make a 3-million-ton purchase at one time, it is like falling off the ledge of the Grand Canyon. F

Right away someone says a major decision is being made.

Let me ask you one other question. If we maintain this hold on exports to the Soviet union, is there any reason that the Dutch can't

buy from us and transship?

Mr. BELL. There is no reason that they couldn’t. I look upon it as

highly unlikely. It would have to be done through transshipment out

of Rotterdam in what we call coasters.

Chairman HUMPHREY. That's what I mean.

Mr. BELL. Again, the Soviets generally have not been interested in

that type of trade.

Chairman HUMPHREY. But let's say for example that they must •

get the commodity. The Russians are not buying from us because suddenly they decide that Bell and Humphrey are two of their best

friends. They are buying because they need it.

• If we persist in holding back exports to the Russians, isn’t it likely

that they will be able to buy through the Dutch or another count .

Mr. BELL. I have looke dat this question, of course, Senator Humphrey. In my judgment, the ‘transshipment capabilities of the Soviet

Union out of the Rotterdam-Antwerp-Amsterdam area is quite limited. That is very much a part of the West European trading system.

Most of the grain which goes into the United Kingdom now comes

through the transshipment business. It would be impossible for very

large quantities to be transshipped into the Soviet Union out of

that -

Chairman HUMPHREY. What about the possibility of rail shipments

across and out of France.
4$

Mr. BELL. There are two things that prevent that from happening.

The Soviet canal system does not interlock with the East EuropeanWest European system, and the railways in the U.S.S.R. are a different

size gage than they are in Eastern Europe and into Western Europe.

We have looked at this question in respect to the possible transshipment of purchases from the East European satellite countries into the

U.S.S.R. and are confident that that is not being done.

I do think, though, that in terms of the hold that we have at the

present time on sales, that in time that the Soviets would be able to

meet their requirements by buying the Argentine spring 1976 corn ●

crop, sorghum crop; there will be sorghum from Australia at that time.

There will be other supplies which eventually can fill the gap if our

hold continues.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Right. That’s what my farmers say.

Mr. BELL. And what will happen is that we will end up then supplying the grain probably to the other markets in larger quantities t han

we normally would. S0 the hold, in terms of insulating ourselves in

the market. really doesn’t do that much. The purpose of the hold is

to try to give us time to work out a system which will have a more

adequate framework in which to deal in the future. And if I understood what you said, you concur in that attempt.

Chairman HUMPHREY. The reason I mention this is because of a

commodity news service report that says the following:

Although U.S. grain export firm representatives recently have. been shuttling

in and out of MOSCOW, none has notified the Agriculture Department of serious

negotiations for the sale of more U.S. grain to the USSR. Assistant Agriculture

Secretary Richard Bell said at the weekend that he is aware that a number

of export representatives visited Moscow recently and may be there now, but

indicated he is confident none is trying to sell U.S. grain to the USSR while

such sales are prohibited.

You don’t think they are just over there for a visit, to look at the

walls of the Kremlin ?

Mr. BELL. In fact, they are attempting to sell other origins.

There is no difference between the American export firms and the

international trade firms. They are all the same. And they have been

into Moscow lately selling Argentine, Brazilian, Eastern Canadian

grain. And that’s what they have basically been working on.

Chairman HUMPHREY. So what they are really doing is selling other

countries' grain to the Soviet Union, even though they may be multinational American companies?

Mr. BELL. That’s right.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Is it not possible that, as in the past, we -

always have a certain number of export sales of uncertain destination.

Mr. BELL. It would be unknown destination.

Chairman HUMPHREY. These American multinational firms export

American wheat to another exporting country, which becomes a foreign

exporter as far as we are concerned, and the-y in turn export American

wheat directly to the Soviet Union.

Mr. BELL. Now, we have-within the reporting system at the present

time, Senator Humphrey, the reported sales to unknown destinations

are not large. We have though taken—

(Chairm HUMPHREY. That's what I said. This practice was much

more than a year ago.
49

Mr. BELT.. And we have taken the precaution, though, of not only

talking with the export, firms about this question. But we have used

our audit authority under the act to make audits of the records of

the companies on which the reports are based. And we are satisfied

that there is not, any business going on which is inconsistent with the

request we have made to them.

Most of their activity, in other words, has been related to the selling

of other origins.

(Chariman HUMPHREY. Of other origins?

. Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Is it not possible that an importing country

becomes accustomed to buying from other origins? We always used to

say in Humphrey’s Drug Store that if we could get a customer from

• one of our competitors just once, we would have a chance to hold him

for a while.

Mr. BELL. I think that’s true. that one of the ways of building markets and maintaining them is being a reliable, steady supplier; and

that once you have worked and built the market and then you are out

of it for awhile, and the new one who moves in has a much-an advantage over you.

It is my feeling though at the present time, despite the problems we

have had on the grain standards and the grading, that when it comes

to quality, that the Soviet buyers would prefer our grains over the

other origins, and that although the contracts today may be made for

Argentine corn, as we go later in the year, there could be amendments

to those contracts where perhaps our corn would be used. You can’t tell

at this stage.

(Chairman HUMPHREY. I think that's basically true. But I am a suspicious fellow—not of you, sir—but, in this competitive world where

there is a dwindling supply, I think that every time we lose a market,

we lose a chance.

Mr. BELL. I agree with you.

Chairman HUMPHREY. What concerns me is the disruption of the

marketing system.

What iS tile world grain supply situation this year as compared to

last year and the year before?

• Mr. BELL. Looking into the 1975-76 season, a few months ago, we

thought we were going to have quite a bit more grain from our 1975

crops and that we would actually build stocks ‘during the 1975-76

Season .

.

. At the present t i me, I do not think that there will be much of it built

up in the world stocks at all.

(Chairnman HUMPHREY. Will there be less ?

Mr. BELL. I think we will end up about where we are now. There

may be some modest buildup. I think that the buildup that does occur

will be in the coarse grains or the feed grains area; and this is basically-we still have problems with the European and Japanese economy not quite recovering to the degree that they are using as much

grain for animal feeding as they were a few years ago.

I look upon the wheat market though as being more potentially

tight: that is milch more finely in balance. And I believe at the present

time that we will have a world wheat stocks (decline in the 1975-76 season: but, we in the United States will go up because our size or crop

being so much larger than-
50

Chairman HUMPHRRY. The recession has in a sense dampened some

of the consumption, hasn’t it ?

Mr. BELL. It has dampened consumption in the European community and in Japan, maybe by as much as 3 to 4 percent, or maybe 5 percent; but it has certainly not dampened the usage of feed to the same

degree as it (did in the United States. This in part is related to the types

of ivestock economies they have. In the case of Japan, two-thirds of l

the grain is still fed to poultry, and you can’t put the poultry out on

grass.

Chairman HUMPHREY . They don’t have much grass for their cattle.. .

Mr. BELL. Right.

Chairman HUMPHREY. We can put them out on grass and feed them

much longer.

This is such a complex subject. For example, consider the problem

of accurately forecasting weather. Now, using scientific analysis, we

are able to monitor the weather pretty well. But I am a South Dakota

boy originally, and I remember those good crops we used to have in

July that were not worth much in August.

Mr. BELL. Right.

Chairman HUMPHREY. We would have 2 weeks of blistering sunshine and drought, and all would be lost. When the Russians in 1972

had a bad crop, it was those July and August winds and drought that

destroyed it.

Mr. BELL. The deterioration in the case of 1972 in the Soviet Union

occurred almost within a 4-week period.

Chairman HUMPHREY. That’s right. I lived there about 6 or years

and we never had a crop from 1929 to 1937. I remember it always

looked good in June. We used to lookup in the sky and see those great

big clouds and my father said, "Son, there’s nothing in those; those are

empties coming back.”

In those days, we used to have reusable bottles, you know.

In the Polish situation, do you have maximum and minimum trade

targets on the grain?

Mr. BELL. We have a spread; yes, it is a range.

Chairman HUMPHREY . So you have an agreement, an understanding?

Mr. BELL. Yes; we do. We have an agreement for the exchange of”

information and then we have some generally agreed targets spread .

over a 3-year period.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I understand that your department gets information regularly from the CIA, is that true?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Do you think there would be any chance

that we could get this information on a timely basis ?

Mr. BELL. It is my understanding that Members of Congress who

ask for it receive their finished product.

a

Chairman HUMPREY. Do We get that ?

Mr. THORTON. Yes, 1 believe we do, sir.

Chairman HUMPHREY. We have been getting it ?

Mr. THORNTON. Yes, sir.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Do we get it regularly ?

Mr. THORNTON . Well, we have to take the initiative.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Why don’t we just get this information on

regular basis?
51

Mr. THORNTON. Well, they handle it rather sporadically.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Just a few more questions.

These agreements we are working on, such as the Soviet agreement,

may provide U.S. grain producers with a degree of price stability and

price support, actually—

Mr. BELL. Hopefully, sir.

Chairman HUMPRHEY. During periods of abundant production.

But how do such agreements provide, any supply or price protection

for U.S. buyers, such as livestock producers, consumers, or other forŽ eign buyers, with whom we have not signed an agreement, during

periods of short supply?

Mr. BELL. Part of the theory behind the Soviet long-term agreement is that they would couple, the Soviets, their purchases, their

• regular purchases from us, with a more effective storage system on

their own.

As you know, in 1973, they had a very large crop in the Soviet

Union but in fact we estimate they have lost somewhere around

35 million tons of that because they were unable to store it.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I know it.

Mr. BELL. And they do have plans in the current new—in the draft

5-year plan for 1976-80, to construct about 40 million tons of storage

capacity. That seems very ambitious. If they can just do part of that,

I think it will be helpful.

We do hope though that they will couple their regular purchase

program by a more effective storage program so that when they run

into a situation like they have in 1975, that they can destock some and

continue to buy the regular amount from us And by doing that, we

feel that it will bring a degree of stability to our domestic livestock

economy and also will add a degree of certainty to our other traditional buyers like the Japanese, the West Europeans, and so forth.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I want to say I noticed we have been selling

off most of our bins.

Mr. BELL. We have sold off the bins from the government; but the

bins in fact are still out there, sir.

Chairman HUMPHREY. We haven't sold them ?

Mr. BELL. We have about-well, not all of them.

• We have about 300 million tons of storage capacity here in the

United States.

Chairman HUMPHREY. We do?

Mr. BELL. And—

• Chairman HUMPHREY. You mean available now with the terminals ?

Mr. BELL. We have 300 million tons of storage capacity, half on

farms and about half off farms; and in a good year, we would produce somewhere around 290 to 300 million tons of grains and oil seeds.

Chairman HUMPHREY . So we have a storage capacity equal to a

good year’s crop?

Mr. BELL. That’s right. A little bit above that.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Well, that’s very good information.

What worries me is that in a very real sense we have so politicized,

so traumatized these sales, that it IS causing a range of reactions.

For example, what’s the price of spring wheat now?

Mr. BELL. Spring wheat would be aroundChairman HUMPHREY. $4.50.
Mr. BELL.

Chairman

Mr. BELL.

it's —

Chairman

52

Yes. I was going to say $4.40.

HUMPHREY. $4.40, $4.50, depending on grade.

That’s right. And the protein is very low this year, and so

HUMPHREY. It is down some.

Mr. BELL. Yes. Almost everything is sold on a protein basis.

Chairman HUMPHREY. About a year ago, around the 5th of September, wheat was about $5 a bushel.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. It’s about 50 cents lower today.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Now, that $5 wheat of a year ago went down .

in February to about $3.70.

Mr. BELL. That’s right.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Isn’t that correct ?

Mr. BELL. That’s right; $3.70,$3.75.

Chairman HUMPHREY. During that period of time the price of *

bread went up 9 percent. Why can’t we get that information out? Here

wheat is going down from $5 to $3.70, and in that same period of

time, the price of bread in the market went up approximately 9 percent

a loaf.

Farmers that had to sell wheat at $3.70, won’t get rich. Now the

price of wheat is up to $4.50—it varies between $4.35 and $4.60, depending on grade. And everyone is talking about how inflationary that

is.

Mr. BELL. That's exactly right.

Chairman HUMPHREY. But we can’t get that message across. I think

one of the reasons we can’t is that the President and the Secretary

of State have been scared out of the export business. Now. you don't

have to respond to that, because I know what your position is.

Mr. BELL. Thank you.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Just another question.

How did Secreatary Butz learn of the Soviets’ grain-buying plans

in July? Did a senior U.S. official ask Soviet officials regarding their

grain import plans when rumors of such buying plans were reported in

the news ?

Mr. BELL. Well, basically from two sources.

As I had said earlier, we had watched the Soviet crop situation from

the beginning of the spring and were aware that deterioration was -

setting in in the Volga Valley and in that general region.

At the same time we were aware that they did not have a very large

crop last year and that the-y actually were below their procurement

target, which meant that they were probably going to be short if they

did not meet the plan.

our first information, though, regarding the Soviet purchase intentions, in fact, came to us through the export firms.

The export firms for the past year have been almost in constant

contact with the Soviet buyers; and they go in and out of Moscow

almost weekly, and there is someone there generally every day.

We have asked them to keep us posted on the Soviet attitudes and

information. They have done a good job of doing that. They have

generally given us a report on every trip in and every trip out and in

June, they began to tell us that they felt the Soviets were showing an

interest and were probably going to buy. Not until the first week in

July did we get a call from one of the export firms, who said that they
53

felt that they had in their sense opened negotiations for the sale of

grain to the Soviet Union. Whithin the same day we got a second call.

Chairman HUMPHREY. About the 10th or llth of Jul y, around there?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

And at that stage, they kept us informed of the quantities they were

talking about; each firm told us the quantities they were working

on; we kept that information generally to ourselves about what each

company was doing, but if you go back and follow the information

put out by the Department, you will find Secretary Butz in the early

Ž

part of July talking about potential sales of 5 or 10 million tons.

Chairman HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. BELL. And then when we got to the 10-million-ton sales level,

the next step was, we asked-we felt that we were getting into an area

Ž which was more slippery, and we asked that they begin to contact us

before they began what we considered negotiations. And in fact as

you know there have not been any sales since that time.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Do the agricultural representatives plan to

include a provision in the long-term grain purchase agreement now

being negotiated to require Soviet authorities to notify our Government of the quantity of purchases planned for the current marketing year in advance of negotiations with private grain companies?

Mr. BeLL. Yes; first, of all, I think that there will be a general

range that they will buy within each year. If they are going to gO

above the top of that range, then they would be required to consult

with us at the government level before they move ahead.

We have also-we are intending to include in the agreement a section requiring advance information. I’ll be quite frank with you

though, Senator Humphrey. I have not much more hope of getting

any more information out of that section than we do out of the current agricultural agreement. I think that the safety features are really

in fact—is this range, and then their having to come to us before they

go above it.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Be persistent in trying to get that information. It takes time.

You have talked to the Soviets you say about their distributing

purchases throughout the marketing year—

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. • Chairman HUMPHREY . And the Soviet weather bureau service is

considered one of the best in the world, from what I understand.

Mr. BELL. As far as we can tell, it’s always accurate and very much

.

. o n -

Chairman HUMPHREY. Do we get information regularly on this?

Mr. BELL. Yes; we do. We actually get it through the NOAA. You

can call NOAA at any time and get a fairly current report on the

weather situation in the U.S.S.R.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Do we have information as to how they use

that weather information in their agricultural planning? Do they

produce long-range forecasts that they rely on?

Mr. BELL. We find that they actually have a very detailed system

of long-range weather forecasting. We have been told by them it is

correct about one-third of the time.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Have we ever thought about the feasibility

of a cooperative research project with Soviet scientists for the develop-
54

ment of regional models, regional crop yields, based on weather information?

Mr. BELL. Yes; we have. We actually have a project under the exchange agreement called forecasting; and this is-we have had one

workshop on that with them and we intend to do further work in this

general area.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Now, the United States has a trade target

agreement with Japan, sort of a gentleman’s agreement, as I understand it.

Mr. BELL. Best endeavor efforts, I call it.

Chairman HUMPHREY . IS it siged? Is it a formal document!

Mr. BELL. We have a press release and they have what they call

a communique.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Now we have one being negotiated with the .

Soviets which will formally commit the United States to a long-term

supply agreement totaling approximately 25 million tons of grain, or

about one-third of our grain exports; is that correct?

Mr. BELL. Well, we are talking, sir, in the Soviet agreement of

somewhere between five and eight.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Five and eight per year?

Mr. BELL. Which would be around 10 percent of our annual exports

of grain, which is around—

Chairman HUMPHREY. How many million tons do the Japanese

import ?

Mr. BELL. The Japanese requirement is 14 million tons, including

11 of grain and 3 million of—

Chairman HUMPHREY. That equals between 22 and 24 million tons

between the two.

Mr. BELL. And our West European exports in fact are up around

15 to 20 million tons. Again, you never hear anything about that.

Chain-mm HUMPHREY. That’s right. How formally binding are these

agreements ?

Mr. BELL. Well, the one with the Japanese, as I have said, is the

best endeavors. It in fact is not a binding agreement. I think in the

case of the Soviet Union, it will probably be a more formal agreement

and there will be a degree of binding commitment. How much, I think,

we don’t know at this stage.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Do you think other potential importers will

seek similar agreements ?

Mr. BELL. Yes; I do. We have already had a number of countries

which have come to see us in the past several days asking when they

can begin negotiations for their long-term agreements. Most of the

countries that have come have been from the Western world and we

in fact have told them, you know, that we don’t really see a need for

this with everyone. We do want to develop a system for the exchange

of information; that we still believe in the multilateral world, not a

bilateral world.; the Soviet Union is unique; it is vast; it has concentrated purchasing power; they are not members of the general agreement on tariffs and trade; they are not living by the same trading

rules, and so we think there needs to be something different there, but

not, with everyone eke.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Are they a member of the International

Wheat Council ?
55

STATEMENT OF RICHARD E. BELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE FOR

INTERNAT IONAL AFFAIRS AND COMMODITY PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Technology

Assessment Board—and to discuss efforts being made to improve the data going

into our analysis of agriculture in the Soviet Union.

Since the Board also expressed interest in information exchange between our

country and the People’s Republic of China, let me say that this exchange is very

limited. We have no formal arrangement to exchange production data with the

PRC. There is, of course, the exchange of library materials and a limited ex-

● . change of agricultural teams and technicians.

For example, the Agricultural Officer at the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong visited

the People’s Republic in the fall of 1974, and this was very useful. This Agricultural Officer and his assistant are both Chinese specialists, fluent in the language,

and Hong Kong is an important listening post for us. • We also receive information through the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, although we do not have an agricultural officer in that mission. We hope that our

formal reporting of agricultural and trade data from the PRC can be strengthened

in the near future through addition of an Agricultural Officer there.

We have in recent times been able to improve the Department of Agriculture’s

analysis of agricultural conditions in the USSR. This improvement is the result

of two inclusions-data provided by the Soviets under the June 1973 Agreement

on Agricultural Cooperation, and increased use of corroborative data from other

sources, in particular U.S. programs to gather weather data.

In the past, USDA analysis of Soviet agricultural conditions, as for other nations, relied most heavily on reporting from the U.S. agricultural attache, reports

from Soviet and other press outlets on agriculture, and publications provided

by the foreign government. While these steps continue to play an important role,

progress with the Soviets since 1973 is enabling the United States to obtain some

information more quickly, and to expand our data bases. There remain, however,

some areas in our analytical work, particularly in forward forecasting, where we
56

have not been able to implement the cooperation with Soviet officials which we

desire.

The June 1973 Agreement on Agricultural Cooperation between the United

States and USSR calls for the following:

“Regular exchange of relevant information, including forward estimates, on

production, consumption, demand, and trade of major agricultural commodities.”

The exchange of data is one of the activities under the Economic Information

project, which was one of three (now four) established in November 1973 under

the Joint Working Group on Agricultural Economic Research and Information.

In November 1973, the USSR agreed to provide to the United State 10 categories of data on a regular reporting schedule. Additional requests for data were

made at the May 1974 Working Group meeting and the Soviets responded by

providing a reporting schedule for 8 categories of data at the October 1974

meeting.

On the whole, the Soviets have followed the reporting schedule rather closely

for the initial 10 categories of data. Allowance must be made, of course, for

delays in transmittal. The first-of-month livestock count, for example, which the

Soviets have agreed to provide at mid-month, typically arrives in the USDA -

analysts’ offices during the first week of the following month. The usefulness of

new data series has been limited in several instances because the Soviets frequently have not provided historical data in the series. In addition, there has

been some feeling that the Soviet data are less detailed than was expected. More

detailed data were shown to the U.S. delegation at the November 1973 Working

Group meeting. The data that have been provided, however, technically appear

to meet the specifications of the written reporting schedule that was included in

the appendix to the protocol of that meeting.

Data received under the Agreement generally make a contribution in one of

three categories. The first. is quicker access to data on actual values (but not

forward estimates) of commodity production or related information for the

current or most recent year. For example, detailed crop production statistics are

made available in February, whereas official publication generally does not occur

before April. Likewise, monthly production and inventory data for livestock and

poultry on state and collective farms enable a more frequent assessment of output possibilities in the food industry and in the livestock sector. Quicker access

to data is helpful in the compilation of periodic statistical reports by USDA and

research is facilitated by the rapid availability of data (as opposed to unofficial

estimates) on production and utilization.

The second contribution is the receipt of some data not previously published

on a systematic basis by the USSR. The reporting schedule provided by the Soviets in October 1974, in particular, contains several instances of new types of

data. These include, for example, numbers of livestock slaughtered, oil meal

production, and fertilizer use by major crops. These data will be quite useful in

long-term quantitative research on the Soviet feed-livestock economy.

A third but—at this point—lesser contribution of the data is information of a

very current nature that will enable a better assessment of foreign trade prospects in grains and feeds. These data now essentially are limited to the sown .

area statistics provided in August, which make a small contribution to current

estimates on the supply side, and to the monthly data on collective and state

farm livestock inventories, which make some contribution to evaluations of current feed demand.

Despite the relatively good performance of the Soviets in providing data in

those categories for which a program has been worked out to implement provi-

.

sions of the Agreement, there has been 1ittle progress in acquiring data to enable

an improved assessment of current production and foreign trade prospects. The

Soviets have not yet demonstrated willingness to implement the forward estimates provision of the Agreement. Efforts by the United States to attain implementation of this provision, on the whole, have thus far not been successful in

attaining either the forward estimates or a schedule for their future supply.

Efforts are continuing, Data acquired under the agreement probably will continue to make only a marginal contribution to current situation and outlook

work on grains and feeds until a program is worked out to implement the provision of forward estimates.

Aside from the data requests, some additional progress has been made in the

exchange of economic information under the Agreement. In 1975, three separate

U.S. teams visited the USSR to tour growing areas and analyze production conditions for winter wheat, spring wheat, and sunflower. In addition, a U.S. team
57

on livestoek and feed use went to the Soviet Union in early 1975. Although these

teams had some itinerary difficulties, their acceptance was a considerable

improvement over the one such team (winter wheat.) in 1974. These teams facilitate, but are not adequate for, estimates of Soviet crops.

Also, the Soviets have begun to accept the idea of regular bilateral discussions of agricultural production and trade at meetings under the Agreement,

although Soviet presentations rarely have included outlook information. Perhaps most important, the range of contacts with Soviet officials in a wide variety

of organizations dealing with agriculture has increased greatly under the current Agreement. The development of these relationships throughout the Soviet

Government could eventually lead to a much wider exchange of information.

Inter-agency cooperation in the U.S. Government also makes an important

• contribution to USDA analysis of the Soviet situation. A prime example is in

the gathering and application of weather data both to confirm Soviet reports

and to assist in estimates of current Soviet crop prospects. Weather data are used extensively in making forecasts of Soviet grain production. The principal source of weather data used by Soviet analysts in the • Department of Agriculture is the Air Force Environmental Technical Application Center (ETAC). ETAC computerizes and processes raw weather data and

provides average information on 27 regions within the USSR on precipitation

(absolute and percent of average), temperature (absolute and departure from

average ), and calculated soil moisture (absolute and percent of average). Data

are summarized and made available each 10 days, with the data generally

avaliable within 5 days at the end of the period, In addition, cumulative monthly

and seasonal averages also are provided.

The ETAC weather data are supplemented by other sources. For example,

more current, but less processed weather information is available daily through

NOAA facilities. This information is checked to supplement ETAC data at critical stages of Soviet crop development.

The Soviets also publish 10 day weather and crop reports in their daily agricultural newspaper. The information in these reports generally is available in

Washington within not more than one week of the end of the reporting period.

The Soviet weather and crop reports are very selective in regional coverage,

contain few data, and do not give crop forecasts. However, they are of some use

in evaluating the stage of crop development and the probable impact of varying

weather conditions on crops.

Reserchers in tile Department of Agricu1ture evaluate the weather data

to estimate regional weather indexes of grain crops. These weather indexes are

weighted by the regional area distribution and multiplied by trend yields of

individual grains to estimate national grain yields. While results of statistical

models are considered in constructing the regional weather indexes the indexes

largely are judgmental. All other available information, however, is considered

in the process of reaching these regional judgments. Although other information, such as Soviet press commentary on local grain conditions, is important, the

weather data are by far the most important source of information used in mak-

.

ing Soviet grain forecasts as the crop progresses.

In addition to improving the quality of data available to us on the Soviet

Union, we have considerably strengthened our analysis of the data. This analysis,

particulary crucial in this year of expanded Soviet import needs, has been

helped a great deal by the work of an interagency task force, which we estab-

.

. lished in early 1973.

This task force on Soviet agriculture has provided a means of coordinating

information on the Soviet Union and making this information public on a prompt

and systenmatic basis. It includes representatives of four USDA agencies—the

Foreign Agricultural Service, the Economic Research Service, the Agricultural

Marketing Service, and the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service.

During the principal production and marketing season, it meets every two weeks

under the chairmanship of the Director of the FAS Grain and Feed division.

Discussions within the Task Force have brought together information which

has provided the basis for policy decisions within the Government this year,

relative to the Soviet trade. It was this group that first alerted people within

Government to the drought developing in the Soviet spring grain areas this

year-and then made this information public in a series of reports and releases.

AS a result of the work of the Task Force, we believed quite early that the

Soviets’ 1975 grain production would frill below their goal of 21.5.7 million tons.

In mid-April, about the time spring grains were being planted in the Soviet Union,
58

we projected the total 1975 grain crop of the Soviet Union at 210 million tons.

Then, as crops were affected by hot weather and drought in major producing

areas east of the Volga, we progressively lowered that estimate.

On June 9, we dropped the estimate to 200 million tons. And as the crop situation continued to decline, we reduced our estimate on July 9, again on July 24,

and again on August 11. Our current estimate of 175 million tons was made

on August 29. All of these estimates were immediately made public.

I should make the point that in the USSR—unlike the United States-spring

grains make up from ‘two-thirds to three-fourths of total grain production in

most years. Continuous and careful evaluation is necessary though the summer

and early fall, in order to keep us on top of the total grain situation. I believe

that the Department of Agriculture has done an extremely good job in staying

abreast of spring grain developments in the Soviet Union, and that the work of’

the USSR Grains Task Force has had a great deal to do with this.

Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to respond to questions.

BACKGROUND STATEMENT ON U.S.-U.S.S.R. AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION FOR THE

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD

(Prepared by Foreign Agricultural Service)

The Department of Agriculture’s analysis of Soviet agricultural conditions’

has improved as a result of two new inclusion-data provided by the Soviets

under the June 1973 Agreement on Agricultural Cooperation, and increased use

of corroborative data from other sources, in particular U.S. programs to gather

weather data.

In the past, USDA analysis of Soviet agricultural conditions, as for other

nations, relied most heavily on reporting from the U.S. Agricultural attache,

reports from Soviet and other press outlets on agriculture, and publications provided by the foreign government. While these steps continue to play an important

role, progress with the Soviets since 1973 is enabling the United States to obtain

some information more quickly, and expand our data bases. There remain, however, some areas in our analytical work, particularly in forward forecasting,

where we have not been able to implement the cooperation with Soviet officials

which we desire.

The June 1973 Agreement on Agricultural Cooperation between the United’

States and USSR calls for the following:

“Regular exchange of relevant information, including forward estimates, on

production, consumption, demand, and trade of major agricultural commodities.”

The exchange of data is one of the activities under the Economic Information

project which was one of three (now four) esablished in November 1973 under

the Joint Working Group on Agficultural Economic Research and Information.

In November 1973, the USSR agreed to provide to the United States 10 categories

of data on a regular reporting schedule. Additional requests for data were made

at the May 1974 Working Group meeting and the Soviets responded by providing .

a reporting schedule for 8 categories of data at the October 1974 meeting.

On the whole, the Soviets have followed the reporting schedule rather closely

for the initial 10 categories of data. Allowance must be made, of course, for

delays in transmittal. The first-of-month livestock count, for example, which

the Soviets have agreed to provide at mid-month, typically arrives in the USDA ●

analysts’ offices during the first week of the following month. The usefulness

of new data series has been limited in several instances because the Soviets

frequently have not provided historical data in the series. In addition, there

has been some feeling that the Soviet data are less detailed than was expected.

More detailed data were shown to the U.S. delegation at the November 1973 Working Group meeting. The data that have been provided, however, technically appear

to meet the specifications of the written reporting schedule that was included

in the appendix to the protocol of that meeting.

Data received under the Agreement generally make a contribution in one of

three categories. The first is quicker access to data on actual values (but not forward estimates) of commodity production or related information for the current

or most recent year. For example, detailed crop production statistics are made

available in February, whereas official publication generally does not occur before

April. Likewise, monthly output of inventory data enable a more frequent assessment of output possibilities in the food industry and in the livestock sector.
59

Quicker access to data is helpful in the compilation of periodic statistical reports

by USDA and research is facilitated by the rapid availability of data (as opposed

to unofficial estimates) on production and utilization.

The second contribution is the receipt of some data not previously published

on any systematic basis by the USSR. The reporting schedule provided by the

Soviets in October 1974, in particular, contains several instances of new types

of data. These include, for example, numbers of livestock slaughtered, oil meal

production, and fertilizer use by major crops. These data will be quite useful in

long-term quantitative research on the Soviet feed-livestock economy.

A third, but—at this point—lesser contribution of the data is information of

a very current nature that will enable a better assessment of foreign trade

prospects in grains and feeds. These data now essentially are limited to the sown

• area statistics provided in August, which make a small contribution to current

estimates on the supply side, and to the monthly data on collective and state farm

livestock inventories, which make some contribution to evaluations of current

feed demand.

Despite the relatively good performance of the Soviets in providing data in

• those categories for which a program has been worked out to implement provisions of the Agreement, there has been little progress in acquiring data to enable

an improved assessment of current production and foreign trade prospects. The

Soviets have not yet demonstrated willingness to implement the forward estimates provision of the Agreement. Efforts by the United States to attain implementation of! this provision, on the whole, have thus far not been successful in

attaining either the forward estimates or a schedule for their future supply.

Efforts are continuing. Data acquired under the agreement probably will continue to make only a marginal contribution to current situation and outlook

work on grains and feeds until a program is worked out to implement the provision of forward estimates.

Aside from the data requests, some progress has been made in the exchange of

economic information under the Agreement. Three separate teams to tour growing areas and analyze production conditions for winter wheat, spring wheat, and

sunflowers visited the USSR in 1975. In addition, a team on livestock and feed

use visited in early 1975. Although these teams had some itinerary difficulties,

their acceptance was a considerable improvement over the one such team (winter

wheat) in 1974. These teams facilitate, but are not sufficiently adequate for,

estimates of Soviet crops. The Soviets also have begun to accept the idea of

regular bilateral discussions of agricultural production and trade at meetings

under the Agreement, although Soviet presentations rarely have included outlook

information. Perhaps most important, the range of contacts with Soviet officials

in a wide variety of organizations dealing with agriculture has increased greatly

under the current Agreement. The development of these relationships throughout the Soviet bureaucracy could eventually lead to a much wider exchange of

information.

Inter-agency cooperation in the U.S. Government also makes an important

contribution to USDA analysis of the Soviet situation. A prime example is in

the gathering and application of weather data to both confirm Soviet reports

• and assist in making estimates of current Soviet production prospects.

Weather data are used extensively in making forecasts of Soviet grain production. The principal source of weather data used by Soviet analysts in the

Department of Agriculture is the Air Force Environmental Technical Application

Center (ETAC). ETAC computerizes and processes raw weather data and provides average information on 27 regions within the USSR on precipitation

(absolute and percent of average), temperature (absolute and departure from

average), and calculated soil moisture (absolute and percent of average). Data

are summarized and made available each 10 days, with the data generally

available within 5 days at the end of the period. In addition, cumulative monthly

and seasonal averages also are provided.

The ETAC weather data are supplemented by other sources. For example, more

recent, but less processed weather information is available daily through NOAA

facilities. This information is checked to supplement ETAC data at critical stages

of Soviet crop development.

The Soviets also publish 10 day weather and crop reports in their daily agricultural newspaper. The information in these reports generally is available in

Washington at least within one week of the end of the reporting period. The

Soviet weather and crop reports are very selective in regional coverage, contain

few data, and do not give crop forecasts. However, they are of some use in
60

evaluating the stage of crop development and the probable impact of varying

weather conditions on crops.

Researchers in the Department of Agriculture evaluate the weather data to

estimate regional weather indexes of grain crops. These weather indexes are

weighted by the regional area distribution and multiplied by trend yields Of

individual grains to estimate national grain yields. While results of statistical

models are considered in constructing the regional weather indexes, the indexes

largely are judgmental. All other available information, however, is considered

in the process of reaching these regional judgments. Although other information,

such as Soviet press commentary on local grain conditions, is important, the

weather data are by far the most important source of information used in make

ing Soviet grain forecasts as the crop prowesses.
61

TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 7650

COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURE

Agreement Between the

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

and the UNION OF SOVIET

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Signed at Washington June 19, 1973

68-877 O—76----5
NOTE BY THE

62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Pursuant to Public Law 89-497, approved

July 8,1966 (80 Stat. 271; 1 U.S.C. 113)—

1 4

. . . the Treaties and Other International Acts

Series issued under the authority of the Secretary of

State shall be competent evidence . . . of the treaties,

international agreements other than treaties, and proclamations by the President, of such treaties and international agreements other than treaties, as the case

may be, therein contained, in all the courts of law

and equity and of maritime jurisdiction, and in all the

tribunals and public offices of the United States, and

of the several

authentication

States, without any further proof or

thereof.”
63

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Cooperation in Agriculture

Agreement signed at Washington June 19, 1973;

Entered into force June 19, 1973.

(1) TIAS 7%50
64

AGREEMENT BETWEEN

THE GOVE RNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURE

The Government of the United States of America and the

Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Taking into account the importance which the production o f

food has for the peoples of both countries and for all of mankind ;

Desiring to expand existing cooperation between the two

countries in the field of agricultural research and develpment;

Wishing to apply new knowledge and technology in agricultural

production and processing;

Recognizing the desirability of expanding relationships in

agricultural trade and the exchange of information necessary

for such trade;

Convinced that cooperation in the field of agriculture will

contribute to overall improvement of relations between the two

countries;

In pursuance and further development of the Agreement between

the Government of the United States Of America and the Government

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the

Fields of Science and Technology of May 24, 1972, and in accordar [1]

with the Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific,

Technical, Educational, Cultural and other Fields of April 11,

1972,[

2

] and in accordance with the Agreement on Cooperation in the

Field of Environmental Protection of May 23, 1972;[ 8

]

Have agreed as follows:

.

TIAS 7630
65

3

ARTICLE I

The Parties will develop and carry out cooperation in the

field of agriculture on the basis of mutual benefit, equality

and reciprocity.

The Parties will promote

beneficial cooperation in the

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Regular exchange of

ARTICLE II

the development of mutually

following main areas:

relevant information, including

forward estimates, on production, consumption, demand

and trade of major agricultural commodities.

Methods of forecasting the production, demand and

consumption of major agricultural products, including

a conometric methods.

Plant science, including genetics, breeding, plant

protection. and crop production, including production

under semi-arid conditions.

Livestock and poultry science, including genetics,

breeding, physiology, nutrition, disease protection

and large-scale operations.

Soil science ,

water, gases,

Mechanization

including the theory of movement of

salts, and heat in soils.

of agriculture, including development

and testing of new machinery, equipment and technology

as well as repair and technical service.

Application, storage and transportation of mineral

fertilizers and other agricultural chemicals.

Processing, storage and preservation of agricultura l

commodities, including formula feed technology.
66

4

9. Land reclamation and reclamation engineering, including

development of new equipment, designs and materials.

10. Use of mathematical methods and electronic computers

in agriculture, including mathematical modeling of

large-scale agricultural enterprises.

Other areas of cooperation may be added by mutual aqreement.

ARTICLE III

Cooperation between the Parties may take the following forms:

1. Exchange of scientists, specialists and trainees.

2. Organization of bilateral symposia and conferences.

3. Exchange of. scientific, technical and relevant economic

information, and methods of research.

4. Planning, development and implementation of joint

projects and programs.

5. Exchange of plant germ plasm, seeds and living material.

6 . Exchange of animals, biological materials, agricultural

chemicals, and models of new machines, equipment and

scientific instruments.

7. Direct contacts and exchanges between botanical gardens.

8. Exchange of agricultural exhibitions.

Other forms of cooperation may be added by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE IV

1. In furtherance of the aims of this Agreement, the

Parties will, as appropriate, encourage, promote and monitor

the development of cooperation and direct contacts betwee n
67

5

o

Ž

governmental and nongovernmental institutions, research and

other organizations, trade associations, and firms of the two

countries; including the conclusion, as appropriate? of implementing

agreements for carrying out specific projects and programs under

this Agreement.

2. To assure fruitful development of cooperation, the

parties will render every assistance for the travel of’ scientists

and specialists to areas of the two countries appropriate for

the conduct of activities under this Agreement.

3. Projects and exchanges under this Agreement will be

carried out in accordance with the laws and regulations of the

two countries.

ARTICLE V

1. For implementation of this Agreement, there shall be

established a US-USSR Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation

which shall meet, as a rule, once a year, alternately in the

United States and the Soviet Union, unless otherwise mutually

agreed.

2 . The Joint Committee will review and approve specific

projects and program of cooperation; establish the procedures

for their implementation; designate, as appropriate, institutions

and organizations responsible for carrying out cooperative

activities; and make recommendations, as appropriate, to the

Parties.

3. Within the framwork of the Joint Committee there shall

be established a Joint Working Group on Agricultural Economic

Research and Information and a Joint Working Group on Agricultural

TIAS 7650
68

6

Research and Technological Development. Unless otherwise mutuall y

agreed, each Joint Working Group will meet alternately in the

United States and the Soviet Union at least two times a year. The

Joint Committee may establish other working groups as it deems

necessary.

4. The Executive Agents for coordinating and carrying out

this Agreement shall be, for the Government of the United States

of America, the United States Department of Agriculture, and for

the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the

Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR . The Executive Agents will,

as appropriate, assure the cooperation in their respective

countries of other institutions and organizations as required for

carrying out joint activities under this Agreement. During the

period between meetings of the Joint Committee, the Executive

Agents will maintain contact with each other and coordinate and

supervise the development and implementation of cooperative

activities conducted under this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

Unless an implementing agreement contains other provisions,

each Party or participating institution, organization or firm,

shall bear the costs of its participation and that of its personne l

in cooperative activities engaged in under this Agreement.

1.

prejudice

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to

Or modify any existing Agreements between the Parties.

TIAS 7650
69

7

2. Projects developed by the US-USSR Joint Working Group

on Agricultural Research which were approved at the first session

of the US-USSR Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical

Cooperation on March 21, 1973, will continue without interruption

and will become

on Agricultural

the responsibility) of the US-USSR Joint Committee

Cooperation upon its formal establishment.

ARTICLE VIII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature

and remain in force for five years. It will be automatically

extended for successive five-year periods unless either Party

notifies the other of its intent to terminate this Agreement not

later than six months prior to the expiration of this Agreement .

2. This Agreement may be modified at any time by mutual

agreement of the Parties.

3. The termination of this Agreement will not affect the

validity of implementing agreements

between institutions, organizations

DONE at Washington, this 19th

concluded under this Agreement

and firms of the two countries

day of June, 1973,

in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts

being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

TIAS7650
70

Chairman HUMPHREY. Dr. Hathaway, we welcome you. In light of

the time that we have you might want to summarize your statement;

and we, I can assure you, will read it very, very carefully.

STATEMENT OF DR. DALE E. HATHAWAY, DIRECTOR, INTERNTIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Dr. HATHAWAY. Thank you, Senator.

I thought I might just make it clear at the outset that I do not speak

for the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations -

nor the United States or any other government; but I represent a

newly formed research institute and thus what you have are my views

of the FAO food information system. I have described the components

of the much improved FAO system in the paper that I will submit for

the record.

In view of the time, I would just like to go directly to the recommendations that might be related to the U.S. role relative to FAO’S

food information system. It seems to me that, first, the United States

should actively cooperate in continuing to supply FAO the information that the U.S. Government, has available to it. The problems that

may be involved in this can best be discussed by some of the people

that will be appearing before you tomorrow and subsequently.

Second, since the FAO system, like every other system in the world

that is available in general, is totally inadequate because of the lack

of accurate information on the U.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic

of China, I believe, strongly that, we should use our persuasive powers

as an exporter and as a major supplier of food aid to encourage those

countries which withhold information from the international system

to provide that information so that it is available to everyone.

Third, I strongly suggest the U.S. Government ought to increase

its support for the improvement of statistical systems in developing

countries, and to use our advanced technology, and to put a good deal

of cooperative research effort in the application of that technology

to the particular problems of crop reporting in developing countries.

These problems are of a substantially different nature than they might

be in the U. S. S. R.: because there is a difference between satellite technology in half-acre rice paddies and 10,000-acre wheat farms; and I

am not sure that the technological problems are fully realized in the

case of developing countries, and yet the statistics are really very poor

there, as I pointed out.

Fourth, as a major contributor to the FAO and other United Nations -

organizations concerned with food information systems, I think the

U.S. Government should take leadership in insuring that such activities receive the funds that the-y need to develop an adequate international food information system. One of my fears is that our Government, because it does have one of the best reformation systems in the

world, may pay too little attention to the food information system for

the world, which is really the FAO) food information system. In so

doing, the U.S. may leave the rest of the world, and particularly the

developing countries, with totally inadequate information and, as a

result, they may make large, erroneous policy decisions based on inaccurate or incomplete information. Basically, this brings me to a question directly related to Mr. Bell’s testimony; and it relates to the in-
71

formation the U.S. Government is obtaining or will obtain under some

kind of agreement with the U.S.S.R. and other countries which are

now not generally releasing good information. I think there is a major

question as to whether the U.S. Government should maintain that information for its exclusive use or make it available to the world. I

feel very strongly it should be available to the world, so that other

nations also know what is likely to happen in terms of supplies, availability, et cetera.

Chairman HUMPHREY . I thoroughly agree with that. I think it is

• information of interest to everyone. And it is vital for every country

that has to do its own planning in terms of imports, exports, crop planning, and eveything involved with agricultural production.

Dr. HATHAWAY. I will end my comments and submit this longer

• statement, which outlines the FAO information system, for the record.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Could you give us the elements, of that FAO

information system as it is now constituted?

Dr. HATHAWAY . Well, basically, it consists of four elements. It is a

food situation and outlook series, which now include monthly and

quarterly bulletins, an early warning of food shortages, an information system on foodstocks and food aid, and fertilizer and pesticide information.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Is this information current? Is the FAO getting this information?

Dr. HATHAWAY. There has been a very substantial improvement in

the FAO’s timeliness; particularly with the development of their early

warning and food shortage system. It is not qualitative in terms of

precise estimates, but it gives early indications of major trouble spots

in the world. I think it is of special importance in terms of timeliness

of information regarding potential world trouble spots, particularly

for the developing countries which may require massive food aid from

national or international sources.

No organization that I know of has antything a preaching an adequate information system on fertilizing and pesticides. This is of major

importance to the United States and to U.S. farmers, and to other countries. It is a very complex situation. I think the information is neither

timely, not very accurate, and the coverage is not very good.

Ž Chairman HUMPHREY. That’s on fertilizer?

Dr. HATHAWAY. That’s on the fertilizer part. But my feeling on the

food information and the early warning, the FAO system is substantially improved in terms both of its coverage and its timeliness. • Chairman HUMPHREY. Your feeling is that as a reserve food country

and one that significantly contributes to agricultural trade, that the

effectiveness of FAO’s system should be of vital concern to us?

Dr. HATHAWAY. I do, indeed. Because as you pointed out in opening,

India last year was the largest purchaser of wheat. As one looks at the

potential developments in the world over the next decade, it is increasingly likely that the developing countries, some of them with ample

foreign exchange reserves, will become increasingly major customers

of the United States. And it is important that they have this information, just as vice versa.

And equally important, I think, that we put pressure on their governments to do a better job of crop reporting and a more realistic

job of estimating their needs.
72

Chairman HUMPHREY. All right.

Mr. Cordaro, do you have any questions you want to ask to Mr.

Hathaway?

By the way, Dr. Hathaway, we are very appreciative of getting

your statement early so that we summarize and digest it. We are

getting very close to finishing this assessment, aren’t we?

Mr. DADDARIO. Once these hearings are over with, Senator Humphrey.

Chairman HUMPREY. And the emphasis that you can bring to us

is most helpful.

Mr. CORDARO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one question. It’s

very relevant to the foreign assistance bill that is now pending.

Dr. Hathaway, is it possible to be more specific about what kind

of technical assistance or training or use of technologies that AID,

through our foreign assistance program, should emphasize in working with developing countries to improve their information systems

capabilities ?

Dr. HATHAWAY. Well, as I state in here, the gathering of accurate

and timely information is just not a glamorous job wherever it's done.

It generally does not get a very high priority in an-y country, including our own; because until you get in a crunch and the decisionmakers

need it, information gathering does not get high priority. It seems to

me that in our foreign assistance program, we should repeatedly remind the decisionmakers in other countries that they cannot make

rational food policy without better information about their own food

situation and the world food situation, and then work either directly

with them, or through the international organizations to provide

the technical expertise that will provide it.

We also have a question of some countries which, for their own

reasons, will not, disclose, to FAO even thouogh they are members and

cooperating members, all of the data and their crop estimates. And my

impression in that we ought to put more pressure on such countries

to be fully cooperative in terms of projections.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Would it be desirable to ask the United

states to have copies of agricultural attache reports sent directly to

FAO at the same time they are sent to Washington?

Dr. HATHAWAY. I believe that there is some exchange of information,

in fact, a good deal of exchange of information from the attache reports to FOA now. I do not know as to what the timing of that flow

is. Dr. West or Dr. Paarlberg, I think, could inform -you on that.

But it seems to me that it is pretty important that the United States

cooperate fully because in many cases, our attache estimates, I believe, are some of the best estimates in the developing countries.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I think that’s perhaps the best information

that we are able to get.

I’d like to make sure that for the report on the bill we get a statement about the cooperation of AID in the agricultural title of the

act. to em emphasize the development of information capability along

with the productive capability of those countries. We tied in a new

title on our Foreign Assistance Act, as you know, on the land-grant

colleges. They could be very helpful.

Dr. HATHAWAY. Yes, indeed.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Dr. Wilcox, do you have any questions?

.
73

Dr. WILCOX. Well, since Dr. Hathaway represents a new institution,

wouldn’t it be beneficial to have him put in the record a statement

describing it?

Chairman HUMPHREY. Could you give us some idea of the purpose

and objectives of the International Food Policy Research Institute?

Dr. HATHAWTAY. Basically, if you don’t object, I have a very short

statement I would put in the record; and to summarize, we are a

newly organized—

The International Food Policy Research Institute l—nonprofit re-

• search and education institution, located here in Washington, to do

research on the major food policy issues, international in nature,

concentrating on certain key issues relative to the potential problems

faced in feeding the population of the developing world.

• Mr. DADDARIO. Dr. Hathaway, you made what I believe is a very interesting point on the. need for the United States to take the lead in

developing the statistics and the ways and means by which the statistics are developed in the developing countries, because they don’t have

the capabilities.

What are the problems that you see in stating that we should take

the lead ? Perhaps that’s an easy thin to say. But what do you see as

the problems in their willingness to o that, a concern about the size

of the U.S. involvement in what they do, and in the problems in getting

us to the point where that could be effectively done?

Dr. HATHAWAY . Basically, it would seem to me that one would approach it, if you are going to do it on a bilateral basis, by picking some

countries which clearly are open and friendly and concerned about

such matters, and entering into some kind of collaborative research as

to what can be done with these advanced technologies under these

conditions.

If you then can produce some results that prove that it can be done

and that it is useful for the developing countries to have it done, then

either through the international organizations or-other countries I

think will then become interested.

Right now I think part of the skepticism rests, in the countries

that I have been working in, which is largely Asia, is that we are

flying satellites around and looking at them, but they don’t see any-

• thing coming out of that that tells them anything they want to know.

And I think you have to start by saying: We believe we can produce

information of importance to you in a collaborative way, and do it a

piece at a time. It involves some fairly sophisticated research in the

 • use of high-level technology under very difficult conditions.

Mr. D ADDARI O. You foresee, then, posibilities in this order: Relationships with countries, with a country or two countries which were

friendly, where some of the same problems exist in all types of developing countries, building a prototype of some kind which, over the

course of a period of time, would show its effectiveness and show our

own goodwill, something of that order?

Dr. HATHAWA Y. And then possibly, for those countries which d o

have concerns about the United States, its size, its policy positional

and so on, essentially make this technology available to one of the international organizations which other countries cooperate with on a

continuing basis. But right now the international organizations do

1 See p. 80.
74

not have the high-level technology and the funds to carry on largescale experimentation on some of these things.

Mr. DADDARIO. And even though that large-scale experimentation

would be quite costly, If you take into consideration your concerns,

if it would be able to be done, what would be your guess as to the ultimate tradeoff in cost?

I)r. HATHAWAY. It might be very positive, because if one finds that

a country with a very large population suddenly discovers that it has

a massive shortfall and we are either forced to step in with large-scale

foreign aid or the countries that can have a major impact on the

market, if they have the foreign exchange--It seems to me that

we can avoid the kinds of fluctuations in our market and the unplanned actions that have been a concern since the shortfall in the

Asian rice crop. It can easily, in a bad monsoon year, be roughly the

equivalent of the shortfall in the Russian wheat crop; and many people

in those countries are living on a margin of subsistmce and somebody

in the world is most likely going to have to make that up, and that

means the United States, in large part under the current situation.

Chairman HUMPHREY . This is valuable information. I wish that

every Member of Congress could know this. You would be surprised

at the problems we have trying to convey the sensitive nature of the

food supply situation.

Just as you have indicated, it is entire] y probable in the riceconsuming areas, to have a bad crop. It is not unknown. In fact, it is

more common than uncommon. The American rice crops often provides the necessary reserve. Fortunately, we have a big rice crop again

this year.

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, if we were to follow this suggestion and develop this prototype, would the development. of this be useful ?

Dr. HATHAWAY . I think the technology itself-and I am not well

informed at all on this-but the technology itself, of getting accurate

estimates on very small farms which are under water, anywhere from

4 inches to 4 feet, is something else from getting accurate estimates in

Kansas or the Ukraine, that’s all.

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, it is a use of the technology in a different way

than we are presently using it.

Dr. HATHAWAY. Much more complex. Multiple crops on the same

land at the same time in different growing stages. I think it is a technological problem as much as a—as an international problem of the

use of such technology if it were available.

Chairman HUMPHREY. When you see multiple cropping in China,

for example, you see two or three crops in the same row and all at

different growing stages. It is remarkable. I don’t think any satellite

is going to pick that out very well. Someone must. walk around to see

this and feed that information in at this particular time. We are just

beginning to experiment with double cropping.

Thank you very much.

Dr. HATHAWAY. Thank you, Senator.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hathaway follows:]

STATEMENT OF DR. DALE E. HATHAWA Y, DIRECTOR , INTERNATIONAL F OOD P OLICY

R ESEARCH INSTITUTE

.

Senator Humphrey, members of the Technology Assessment Board, I am pleased

to be able to appear before you to comment on the world food, agriculture, and
75

nutrition systems, a matter of significance to all concerned with food policy decisions at the national and international level. Since others will be discussing the

information and analytical systems of the U.S. Government, as requested by

Chairman Teague in his letter of August 29, 1975, I will concentrate my comments

on the expanded Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and

Agriculture of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

(FAO). At the outset, 1 should like to make it clear that 1 speak as the director

of a newly formed, independent research institute keenly interested in, and dependent upon the statistics available from such sources; and not as a representative of any government or the FAO. I have, however, had the full cooperation of

the North American Office of FAO and of FAO officials in Rome regarding the

nature of and plans for their food information system ; but, they have no respon- Ž sibility for my comments.

First, it should be noted that the FAO took the initiative in this area prior to

the World Food Conference in November 1975. FAO recognized that an adequate

World Food Security Programme required accurate and timely information on

• world food conditions. Thus, the improved system called for by the World Food

Conference in Resolution XVI was already being planned before that Conference,

and it was endorsed in principal by the FAO Council in its November 1974 session

immediately following the World Food Conference. Thus, the system we are discussing is not merely a hasty reaction to a current crisis, but expansion and improvement of a system that has evolved from FAO’S long history of dealing with

food problems and the related policy decisions.

Second, it should be noted that most of the problems and deficiencies I shall

mention later are largely those faced by any attempt at collection and dissemination of data from a large number of governments with diverse information assembling capabilities and dissemination policies. Partially these deficiencies can be

attributed to the limitations on FAO action inherent in an international or intergovernmental organization.

At the outset, I should like to comment on the use of information and analysis

in policy making. I shall start with the obtaining and disseminating of information and later discuss analysis and use of the available information.

Presumably we are talking about current information that is of value to policymakers in current policy decisions.

Information for policy making purposes ideally must be timely, adequate in

coverage, and accurate. On the face of it, this seems to be obvious, but a failure to

distinguish among these characteristic and their importance can cause confusion,

malallocation of scarce resources in the information-gathering field, and a failure

to recognize where the major efforts for improvement should be placed. Let me

illustrate the difference.

Timeliness is the most obvious and widely recognized attribute of information

for policy makers. It is of little help to tind out that the grain crop in a major

producing country has failed some time after they have entered world markets

and made major purchases. It is of no great help to find that a portion of the

population in a country, large or small, faces starvation due to crop failure when

• it is too late to effectively mobilize national or international emergency relief

programs.

The adequacy of the information is a different matter entirely. Adequacy relates both the items covered in the information system and the extent of the

coverage. Moreover. adequacy must be judged relative to the policy actions con-

 • templated. From the standpoint of international production, trade and aid policies, it is completely unrealistic to talk of an adequate food information system

that does not have timely and reasonably accurate information on agricultural

conditions in the world’s second and third largest grain-producing countries—the

USSR and the People’s Republic of China. On the other hand, the absence of such

data from a country whose population or food production is small is not of major

significance to world markets and to other countries’ well-being. Thus, the adequacy of data for countries with small production and consumption levels is primarily their concern, and if they choose for one reason or another not to provide

such information, they are more likely to be harmed as a result than is the rest of

the world. On the other hand, timeliness of information provided is just as important for small countries as large ones when issues of food aid, disaster relief

and similar matters are involved; a starving person in a small country is just as

badly off as one in a very large country if food aid arrives too late. Thus, timely

information is essential for the effective operation of world food programs or a

bilateral aid program,
76

Accuracy of information is always of importance to policy makers, but here

again it relates to magnitude of the populations and production involved. A ten

percent error in production estimates for large countries such as India, the USSR

China or the USA creates substantially greater problems for world policy makers

than a 50 percent error in the production estimate of a country that produces or

consumes a few hundred thousand tons of grain annually. Unfortunately, statisticians are often more concerned about estimating errors than policy implications

of such errors and thus may be overly concerned with accuracy in some cases.

Thus, for a food information system to serve the needs of policy makers it

needs to be timely for all countries; to be adequate, it needs to provide a wide

range of information for those countries whose actions and/or needs can have a

major impact on world markets; and it needs to be accurate in most respects for

those countries that can or are likely to affect world markets. Of course, for national purposes all countries would benefit from timely, adequate and accurate

information; but from the point of view of international policy makers the importance of adequacy and accuracy of food information regarding other countries

varies greatly depending upon the nature of the policy issue involved.

With these comments as background, let me review briefly the status and plans

of FAO for its Global Information and Early Warning System. In the past the

FAO and the U.S. Government were the two major sources of world food information. The FAO statistics were published annually in The State 01 Food and Agriculture, and their various statistical publications. The statistics were generally

a year to eighteen months old and thus failed to meet the criterion of timeliness.

The Monthly Bulletin on Statistics, the Early Warning System, and commodity

publications provided more current data, especially in recent years on particular

commodities and commodity groups. The new food information system represents

a step forward in providing a greater emphasis on a more coordinated and timely

approach.

The new FAO food information system has four basic types of output: 1) the

food situation and outlook series, 2) an early warning of food shortages, 3) information on food stocks and food aid, and 4) fertilizer and pesticide information. Let me comment on each.

THE FOOD SITUATION AND OUTLOOK SERIES

This now consists of monthly, quarterly and ad hoc reports. They cover the food

supply-demand outlook in light of changes in production prospects, prices, policies, sales, stocks and the availability and prices of key inputs such as fertilizer,

pesticide, shipping, etc.

The Food Outlook Quarterly has now been published twice, the last dated

August 25, 1975 and the next scheduled for release November 28, 1975.

The monthly Food Situation Report presents, more briefly, developments during each preceding month on factors affecting the world food situation, covering

much the same material as the Quarterly, updating those items which have

changed from the previous report.

My appraisal is that this new series will solve the timeliness problem to a large

extent. Its gaps are in adequacy and accuracy, neither of which is the fault of the

persons who produce the reports. In terms of the range of information covered,

the adequacy is excellent; but in terms of world coverage, it is inadequate be

cause the USSR is not a member of FAO and has thus far been no more cooperative with them than others regarding this information. The People’s Republic

of China, although a member of FAO, has not yet seen fit to provide the information requested for the system. Thus, the FAO food information system, in common

with others which are generally available to most governments, is totally inadequate in terms of coverage of two of the world’s largest agricultural producers

and consumers. Until these countries choose to cooperate, no system can be adequate in terms of coverage.

Moreover, at the insistence of some Member Governments, statistics for a country may be, at the request of that government, only shown as part of area or

world totals. This, again, limits the adequacy if the country is significant in world

production, consumption and trade.

The problem of accuracy is two-fold. The first and most significant is the sheer

inability to produce accurate information in developing countries with present

indigenous technology. Despite the large quantities of technical assistance from

FAO and national governments, the problem of producing reasonably accurate

estimates in developing countries is enormous and far from solved. Hopefully,

improved technology and more assistance can improve this situation. The World

.

•
77

Food Conference Resolution XVI establishing the Global Information and Early

Warning System specifically requested governments to take steps to improve their

data collection and dissemination services. Regular assessments of the effects of

current weather on crop production was also emphasized.

Another accuracy problem arises because some countries simply do not want

to admit that their agricultural economy is performing badly, and they do

not report or are slow to report the facts regarding agricultural producion. However, since FAO is governed and financed by its Member Governments, it must have a substantial basis to modify the official estimates of the

Member Government, estimates that in the absence of objective statistics may

represent hopes rather than actual achievements or expected performance. The

reasons for such actions on the part of governments are varied and sometimes

valid, but they reduce the accuracy of world food information.

EARLY WARNING OF FOOD SHORTAGES

A monthly summary of the latest information on crop conditions, weather

and plant diseases, food deficits and availabilities in some 90 countries is published in Foodcrops and Shortages. This contains largely qualitative estimates

of conditions including a rating scale of crop conditions, plantings, progress of

harvest, and rainfall, plus comments or observations from FAO representatives, project specialists, World Food Programme officers and other sources.

The most valuable attribute of this portion of the system is its timeliness. The

reporting of adverse weather conditions, natural disasters and other events

which may affect crop availabilities and demands is a great aid to those who

must make rapid policy decisions in advance of the final quantitative estimates,

The adequacy of information available in this part of the system varies

greatly from country to country. This is partly a lack of an adequate support

system and, in some cases, lack of country cooperation.

In the case of the early warning system, quantitative accuracy is almost

impossible by definition. As yet the relationships between weather or insect

and disease appearances are not well quantified, nor is a direct and stable

relationship likely to be found in the near future. Thus, the qualitative estimates now used probably are as good as can be devised given the state of

knowledge regarding these relationships.

FOOD STOCKS AND FOOD AID INFORMATION

World food stocks: status and evaluation reports were authorized by the

FAO Conference of 1973; they include assessment of national stock targets and

policies and the adequacy of world cereal stocks in the context of world food

security ; they also include data on storage capacity and facilities. The latest

one was issued for the coming October meeting of the FAO Group on Grains

The FAO Food Aid Bulletin issued quarterly since July 1970 provides information on bilateral and multilateral food aid transactions and food aid availabilities, based on notifications made by governments to FAO and data especially

provided by international agencies concerned.

FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE IN’ FORMATION

The FAO fertilizer and pesticide information is an off-shoot of their newly

established International Fertilizer Supply Scheme. Information on supplies,

deficits, prices, contracts and capacities are monitored for the purposes of

emergency operations under the scheme. A new quarterly fertilizer survey and

other information-gathering activities have been initiated. Steps are being taken

to develop a similar information system on pesticides.

In this area of key inputs, I must judge that the information is neither timely,

accurate, nor adequate. The reasons for this vary. First, the production and distribution of these products are carried on by a mix of private and public enterprises, sometimes within the same country. Some countries, for their own reasons,

do not divulge their current statistics on current status or plans even though

they presumably have them. The private firms involved often are reluctant to

disclose information which they believe may affect their competitive position.

All in all, the situation is totally unsatisfactory in both current estimates and

forecasts and the problem of accurate information an exceedingly difficult one.

As an illustration, in the months just prior to the World Food Conference in

1974, a series of estimates on world fertilizer production, use, avilability and

potential capacity in the short and longer run were prepared by several national

68–877 O—7&6
78

and international organizations. They varied widely in several aspects and

changed markedly during a short period of time. The situation regarding pesticides appeared equally confusing.

It is clear that governments and the FAO need to spend much more time and

money in devising and implementing an improved information system for this

important area relating to agricultural production. I would expect it to be a difficult process, leaving aside the fact that some major countries may not wish to

cooperate.

One final point on the FAO information system. By action of Member Governments it is a closed system. By that I mean certain of the materials are

limited in distribution only to participating countries and cooperating international organizations for their exclusive use. This includes the monthly Food Situation Reports, the reports on crop conditions and food situations by countries

and the special reports. The Food Quarterly Outlook is distributed to participating governments, to nonparticipating governments which are members of

FAO, and to cooperating international organizations.

Thus, most of the material produced by the FAO food information system

is not available to the general public and media. This condition was imposed by

some Member Governments which believe that a disclosure of such information

would give an advantage to private traders and speculators.

My own view is that such restrictions on the FAO system are wrong and that

more and better information widely shared would reduce the advantages of those

who cause concern. First, the large private international traders have their own

complex’ information system that gives them an advantage that better public information would reduce or remove. Second, the major destabilizing forces in the

market are governments that operate state trading operations in secrecy. But,

right or wrong, these restrictions on the FAO system do exist and are likely to

persist.

I hope I have not appeared overly critical of the FAO food information system.

It represents a marked improvement over what has existed, and if it were adequately financed and received the full cooperation of Member Governments, it

would be of significant aid to national and international policy makers.

It appears, based entirely on an examination of FAO budget documents, that

far too little budget priority is given to such work by FAO. For the system to

work as effectively as it could, it needs at least regional, and generally country

statistical representatives, to provide information and reports to the Rome

headquarters. This is in addition to the persons at the regional level who work

with countries on upgrading the timeliness and accuracy of country data. Given

the magnitude of their task it would appear that the Rome staff needs to be

expanded. But, this again is a matter for decision on FAO’S program of work

and budget, a decision made by Member Governments and, unfortunately the

provision of timely, adequate, and accurate food information is less visible and

glamorous than other activities that compete for scarce funds.

THE ANALYSIS PROBLEM

Thus far I have commented upon the data base for the food information system of FAO. But, even if all the data were timely, adequate, and accurate the

utility depends upon its use in policy analysis. Facts without analysis often are

not much more use than analysis without facts. And as we have seen recently,

even within the U.S. Government, the same facts can be interpreted differently

and different policy conclusions reached.

Essentially competent policy analysis should present an in-depth analysis of

policy options and their implications for the parties concerned. At this point one

enters the area of who gains and loses by certain policies or lack thereof. Such

areas are sensitive in that they involve national political decisions, and that may

at times have adverse effects upon others.

In this area FAO faces a problem created by the nature of the organization.

The reporting of facts is a much less sensitive area than analysis of what

actions need to be taken by whom. Here FAO directly encounters sensitive problems of national sovereignty. It is one thing to point out that there is a serious

gap between the food and needs of the Most Seriously Affected Nations and another to suggest to the U.S. Government or to the EEC that they should do

more in providing food aid. As I understand the rules of the game in international organizations, it is acceptable for one nation to publicly question another’s

.
79

countries.

WHAT CAN AND SHOULD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DO TO IMPROVE THE WORLD FOOD

INFORMATION SYSTEM ?

The prime interest of the Technology Assessment Board, as I understand it,

is to assess the food, agriculture, and nutrition information systems and recommend action that can be taken by the United States to improve them. I shall

confine my comments to U.S. Government actions which would be of aid in

strengthening the FAO food information system, assuming that others will concentrate on the U.S. system.

First, of course, the United States Government should continue to actively

cooperate with FAO in exchange of information available. Possible problems

involved in that cooperation can be best discussed by U.S. Government representatives who will appear before this group.

Second, I suggest the U.S. Government should use its power and influence

as the world’s largest grain exporter and the largest supplier of food aid to

try to persuade other governments to cooperate with the FAO in the provision

of the information necessary to make the FAO food information system more

timely and adequate in terms of country coverage.

Third, I suggest that the U.S. Government efforts be increased to aid developing countries improve their food information systems. This aid should include

the development of and training for the provision of standard, statistical report

procedures ; but, equally important it should involve the increased development

of new and better information based upon the most advanced technologies. The

U.S. capabilities in satellites, weather monitoring, and related fields needs to be

more fully used in the food information field. To do so will require a substantial

investment in research on weather-crop relationships. the use of satellites in

conditions of small, fragmented, multiple-crop areas, and similar problems. This

also involves sensitive problems of national sovereignty, and will require full

cooperation with other nations and international organizations, Funding, and

encouragement and leadership in that cooperation should be forthcoming.

Fourth, as a major contributor to the FAO and other United Nations organizations concerned with improved food information systems, the U.S. Government should take the leadership in ensuring that such activities receive the

funds that an improved FAO food information system requires to become more

effective. I am concerned that since the food information system of the U.S.

Government is so good and also is undergoing substantial improvements there

may be a tendency on the part of this government to have less concern for an

effective international system. If my concern is correct, then an important point

is being missed. Until and unless a large portion of the policy makers in all

countries have equally good information, there is a continuing likelihood that actions on the part of others, possibly acting on the basis of inadequate information, will continue to be a major destabilizing force in world markets, food

trade, and inhibit effective food aid actions.

In summary, great progress has been made in recent years in providing an

improved world food information system. Much more needs to be done in order

to make the system adequate to meet the needs of policy makers in the U.S.

and all other governments. The actions of the IT. S. Government in this area

can be an important factor in making the needed improvements.
80

[The following information was referred to on p. 73.]

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY

RESEARCH INSTITUTE

In response to a recommendation of the Technical Advisory Committee of the

Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research of June 1974, entitled

Proposal For A World Food Policy Institute, the international Food Policy

Research institute (lFPRI) has been established.

The purpose of IFPR1 is to undertake research on selected policy problems

affecting the production, consumption, availability and equitable distribution of

food in the world with particular emphasis on the needs of the low income countries and especially the needs of the vulnerable groups within those countries.

.

Specifically IFPRI will work:

(1) to identify major opportunities for expanding world food production with

particular emphasis on the development actions and policies best suited to remove

present constraints to production and to establish the framework for the sustained use of the potential agricultural capacities existing in low-income nations;

(2) to determine and publicize those actions which could be undertaken and

those policies which could be adopted by governments, regional and international agencies, to effect a continued increase in the quantity and quality of food

supplies available to all people through enhanced food production, wider trade

opportunities, and improved effciency and equity in food distribution; and

(3) to provide information, an expanded base of knowledge and objective analysis of world food problems, and to indicate the opportunities and options open

for their solution.

IFPRI has been established as a non-profit research and education institution

under the laws of the United States of America. It is governed by an international

board of trustees. The Board of Trustees currently includes the following persons:

Sir John Crawford, Chairman; Ojetunji Aboyade, University of Ibadan, Nigeria;

David Bell, The Ford Foundation, United States; Norman Borlaug, international

Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, Mexico; Ralph Kirby Davidson, The

Rockefeller Foundation, United States; Mohamed E1-Khash, Arab) Center for the

Study of Arid Zones and Dry Lands, Syria; Nurul Islam, Bangladesh Institute of

Development Studies, Bangladesh; Affonso Pastore, University of Sao Paulo,

Brazil; Andrew Shonfield, Royal institute of international Affairs, England;

Ruth Zagorin, International Development Research Centre, Canada.

In addition to the above trustees invitations have been issued to others, primarily from developing countries, to join the Board of Trustees.

The trustees met July 21 and 22, 1975, in Washington, D.C. to discuss the initial

plan of work and staffing pattern of the Institute.

The Board of Trustees invited Dr. Dale E. Hathaway to serve as the first

Director of IFPR1. He offcially assumed that position on a full-time basis effective August 1, 1975.

SOURCE OF FUNDS

The initial funds for the Institute’s core budget have been provided by a grant

from the International Development Research Centre of Canada. It is anticipated

that the Rockefeller Foundation and Ford Foundation also will participate in

the funding of the core budget. IFPRI has the legal authority both to receive

contracts and to contract with other organizations for research. It is planned that,

once the major staffing has been accomplished and the program of work developed, IFPRI will both accept and let contracts which are consistent with its

mandate and the collaborative working relationships it wishes to establish at the

national and international level.

THE STAFFING PATTERN

The staffing pattern that is planned for IFPRI is unique compared to most

research organizations. The staff will consist of both social scientists and agricultural production scientists who will individually or cooperatively be responsiMe for research problem areas within IFPRI’s areas of concentration. The longterm professional staff is expected to consist of 7–8 persons drawn from the international community.

In addition to the long-term staff the core budget provides for l&12 short-term

staff, drawn primarily from developing countries, who will have appointments

from one to three years duration. This portion of the staff is expected to vary in
81

seniority and also will consist of a mix of policy-oriented social and production

scientists. It is hoped that these individuals will return to their home institutions

and provide a continuing collaborative link between national agricultural research

and policy analysis and the IFPRI program.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

The success of IFPRI in achieving its mission will depend upon the building

and maintenance of contacts with research organizations and policy makers

at the national, regional and international level. Thus, the active cooperation

of such groups is being and will be sought.

Discussions have already begun regarding cooperation with FAO, the World

Bank, the Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment, the World

Food Council Secretariat, and the network of International Agricultural Research

Centers. As staffing and program development proceeds similar collaborative

arrangements will be sought with national and regional organizations.

Although IFPRI will periodically assess the world food situation, both short

and long-run, and analyze its policy implications, IFPR1 does not intend to generate primary statistics on food output. Instead, the Institute is intended to

provide an independent source of research and analysis of the major food policy

issues in both the current and long-run context.

THE FUNCTIONS OF IFPRI

The functions of IFPRI are research, analysis, and dissemination of information relevant to improving world food policy. At present it is not anticipated

that ‘the Institute will undertake a formal training program. As its competence

in such research and analysis develops, it is hoped that its training function will

be fulfilled through (a) the experience gained by short-term participants in the

program and (b) the conduct of seminars and consultation on the major policy

issues within the Institute’s competence in response to specific requests from

policy makers and researchers.

IFPR1 FACILITIES

The offices of IFPRI are located at 1776 Massnchusetts Ave., N. W., Washington,

D.C. The address for communication purposes is: International Food Policy

Research Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20036,

telephone: (202) 833-1821, cable address: IFPRI, Washington, D.C.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Mr. Hjort, you are with John Schnittker and

Associates here in Washington. Were you formerly with Secretary

Freeman as well?

Mr. HJORT. Yes, indeed

Chairman HUNPHREY. Good, he would be happy to know that I have

an old associate of his around. Orville is one of my closest friends.

You have listened here today and you also have a very extensive

statement—one, that our staff has analyzed in considerable depth.

First, let me say we are very much indebted to you for the amount

of work you have put into this statement, analyzing the information

system, some of its needs, and structural weaknesses.

We will publish your entire statement, in the record. Could you

please summarize it?

STATEMENT OF HOWARD W. HJORT, JOHN SCHNITTKER

ASSOCIATES

Mr. HJORT. In view of that and since I have recently-prepared a dei ailed report, I will just highlight four or five major points.

The criteria I relied heavily upon for judging the strengths and

weaknesses in the world agricultural information system were objectivity, reliability, timeliness, adequacy-in terms of coverage--efficiency and effectiveness.
82

When these criteria are applied it soon becomes evident that we don’t

have a world agricultural information system that ranks well in terms

of all of them.

The main reasons, it seems to me, that our world information systems are held below potential are, first the deficiencies in the national

agricultural information systems-—several have already referred to

such deficiencies of today.

Second, the adequacy of the information obtained by and reported

to USDA and FAO through our attache network. These reports clearly

are a primary source of intelligence for a world information system,

but they are weak in some respects.

.

Third, the adequacy of the analytic ability to process the information, to trace its implications and to be able to get information on a

timely basis to all those who need it for policy purposes or action programs or whatever.

Fourth, USDA operates both a national agricultural information

system and a world agricultural information system. In my view, the

manner in which the responsibility for those systems is assigned places

objectivity in jeopordy, unnecessarily so.

Fifth, I believe that the organizational structure used by the Department of Agriculture in operating those systems seriously impedes

the efficiency and effectiveness under which those two systems operate.

Now, going back over each point and being just a bit more specific

about what I mean in each case. National information systems have

deficiencies and will continue to have them for a long time. FAO has

been working for years to help developing countries establish systems

that can collect basic agricultural information and develop reliable

supply demand estimates.

But that is a long-term task. We should continue to provide support

to that effort, but we have to recognize that, it will take a great deal

of time to bring all national systems up to the kind of standard that

we will have to have for a reliable world system.

The near term alternative is to use analytic techniques where you

take agricultural statistics, process them through a formal analytic

model, verify it by seeing how well it performs historically, and then

using model estimates to replace deficient ones from national systems.

An example of this is both the Central Intelligence Agency and the .

Department of Agriculture have a model, an analytic model, that they

use to develop estimates of production in the Soviet Union. Neither

one of those models has been sufficiently verified yet, but they are on the

right track.

At the present time neither FAO nor USDA have the analytic car

pability to develop a sufficient model building and testing system. But

the main point is that there is an alternative way of developing reasonably reliable estimates for a world system.

My second point, on reports from the attaches. First, I want to make

clear that I recognize that USDA has been making serious efforts to

improve the quality of those reports. But the fact of the matter is that

few attaches are specialists in the collection of data- in analysis.

And their mission, the attaches’ mission, is not perceived to be the

collection and analysis of data.

In addition, attaches are reposted frequently.
83

Now, these factors reduce efficiency and effectiveness and, in some

cases, even reliability of the estimates that come from the attache.

We have two alternatives there, it seems to me, one is a long term,

the other a near term selection. Over time the attaches can be replaced

with a corps of specialists-people that are trained in the collection of

statistics and in the analysis of agricultural information.

But in the short run, the only alternative is to obtain from the attaches sufficiently precise information so that it can be analyzed by

analysts in Washington, more reliable estimates can be developed and

reports to the world on the agricultural situation released.

We don’t have anywhere near enough information coming from the

attaches on the agricultural input situation. If you don’t have information on inputs, it is very hard to get reliable information on outputs.

The other major weakness in the present USDA system, as far as

analytic capability is concerned, is over the imbalance between their

focus on production and Supply on the one hand, and the relative weak

performance in terms of analysis of factors on the demand side.

The final point on the assignment of responsibility for operating

the two USDA systems and need for reorganization, I believe that

objectivity is presently threatened and efficiency and effectiveness

clearly is held below potential.

Responsibility for the agricultural information systems is assigned

to two different officials in USDA’S office of the Secretary-the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, who was here earlier today,

and Don Paarlberg, the Director of Agricultural Economics.

There are three separate agencies in the Department that share the

responsibility for the operation of those two systems. The world system is operated in part by the Foreign Agricultural Service and in

part by the Economic Research Service.

The Foreign Agricultural Service has a mission and a set of program responsibilities that makes it unnecessarily difficult for them to

be able to maintain the objectivity of the system. The analyst in that

organization is placed in a difficult position, because of the mission

of the organization and its action program responsibilities. FAS has responsibilities for export programs which gives them a vested interest

in the export estimates.

I would recommend, to protect the objectivity and improve efficiency and effectiveness, that the responsibility for USDA’s world

and national agricultural information systems be clearly assigned. I

would recommend that it be assigned to the Director of Agricultural

Economics, who already has the responsibility of the U.S. system and

shares the responsibility for the world system, and that the agencies

that report to the Director should have no other responsibility except

providing economic intelligence-providing economic intelligence on

U.S. and world agriculture.

There is another problem. The chairmanship of the committees that

develop estimates of the U.S. supply-demand situation should rest

with those agencies that have the responsibility for economic intelligence. There is, in my view, a very fatal flaw at the present time,

because the fact is that the chairmanship of the committees that develop

supply-demand estimates for U.S. agriculture rests with the Agricultural Stabilization Conservation Service. That organization does not
84

have the overall responsibility for assessing and responding to the

situation and outlook for U.S. agriculture.

There is a Crop Reporting Board that reviews and put its stamp of

approval on the estimates coming through the Statistical Reporting

Service. And I want to emphasize that in my view the Statistical Reporting Service in USDA is without parallel in the world with respect

to the collection and reporting of agricultural statistics.

The Economic Research Service has an Outlook and Situation

Board that reviews and approves U.S. agricultural situation and outlook reports.

The world assessments, either world production estimates or world

trade estimates or assessments of the supply-demand balance that are

made by FAS do not go through or to an overall board for review

and approval. That also, I think, unnecessarily jeopardizes the potential objectivity of the systems.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you. We have heard quite an extensive

critique.

I didn’t quite understand the reason to cut the Agricultural Stabilization Service out of the evaluations on production and demand.

Mr. HJORT. No; I would not cut them out, but at the present time

they have the chairmanship for these committees. And the Economic

Research Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service are the

men hem.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Do you think the Economic Research Service should be in the chairmanship position while the others provide

the input ?

Mr. HJORT. Right. We have this flaw in the system at the present

time where the agency that has the responsibility for the overall

assessments does not have the authority for the estimates. Now, to

follow up on that, I fully agree that, the action agencies should be

members of interagency commodity estinmate committees, because it is

important to know about the action programs.

But the chairmanship should rest with the agency that has the overall responsibility for the assessment and for reporting.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Do you feel that the Crop Reporting Board

and the Outlook and Situation Board perform useful functions?

Mr. HJORT. Absolutely. I think it is essential to Have a body of

senior experienced people that review the estimates and approve them

before they are released for public consumption.

Chairnman HU M PH REY. So you feel that a board to approve estimates of world agricultutml production and trade would be useful?

Mr. HJORT. I think it would be highly desirable.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Tomorrow we will hear from Hosea Harkness of Cook Industries. He recommends that a world crop reporting board be set up within the, USDA to review all sources of country

production information, attache reports, foreign-released statistics,

weather-yield analysis, check data, et cetera. Based on this, in a timely

manner, the board would forecast or estimate what would be acknowledged within the Government as the best figure. Thus, we would

eliminate duplicate numbers floating around the Government.

This would eventually lead to more credibility for the private user.

Do you concur in that basic suggestion?

.
85

Mr. HJORT. Yes; I think it is a very good recommendation that he

has made to you and I believe that-you will note from m own

statement that his recommendation fits very well with what I have

recommended. I think it is essential to have a board to review these

estimates before they are released.

Chairman HUMPHREY. 1)0 you recommend that senior analysts assume responsibility for issuing monthly digests of world agriculture

for general distribution ?

Apparently, now, junior staff issue these reports for internal use

only.

Mr. HJORT. Yes. I think here again we are circling around the same

kind of question, With junior staff only involved, I don't believe the

product is going to be as good as if you use senior staff and review

boards and processes set up for the overall reports.

There is another weakness in the material that is being referred to,

and that is because it is essentially unanalyzed information. They are

reporting facts as they come to the junior analysts, but the implications of the information is not analyzed or discussed.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Dr. Wilcox, what do you think about the

suggestions that have been made here for the evaluation and analysis ?

Dr. Wilcox. 1 personally am very happy that these are the kind

of recommendations that are coming to you from outside the

Gvernment.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Very good. We thank you very much. This

will all be very helpful. As you know, we are getting down to the

point where we will be making some recommendations, I think these

hearings will be of considerable help.

Mr. Hjort, you feel that the ERS is a well-organized instrument of

the Department, is that right ?

Mr. HJORT. I have in my main report some reorganizational alternatives. The important point, in m

J

mind, is to have the organizations

with responsibility for tile world and national systems reporting to

the Dirertor of Agricultural Economnics.

That comes out of my assessment and it comes from personal experience. I have worked very closely with every person that has ever

filled that position since it was created, including one of the persons

sitting in this room at the present time and including Don Paarlberg-I served with him for nearly a year after he came in.

That position, ever since being established, has been filled with a

professional of high integrity. And that, to me, is the most essential

point to have in any world information system.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Many of the smaller developing countries

could certainly benefit from a more, reliable information system. The

fact is, as one of the witnesses indicated, that even if the system wasn’t

too good in a small country with limited production and a small

population, it is tile larger developing countries that really determine

the major degree of accuracy of your reports.

Mr. HJOR T. Absolutely. But, of course, even in the big ones, we have

unreliable or unavailable data. The Soviet Union, People's Republic

of China, India—we didn’t mention here and I didn’t highlight it,

but it is in my report again—there are certain countries that bias their

estimates. They believe it to be in their interest from a political standpoint.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes, we know that is a concern.
86

Mr. HJORT. And it another reason, then, why you have to have people

of high integrity, because whoever is operating the world system has

to be able to change that estimate and put in one that is unbiased.

Chairman HUMPHREY. What is your view of the FAO system that

is now being developed ?

Mr. HJORT. I am very gratified by the way FAO is moving to improve their system. Their major deficiency y far has been the lack t

of timeliness.

Chairman HUMPHREY. That is what I keep hearing.

Mr. HJORT. But they are moving, with their quarterly reviews and

monthly updates, they are moving very well, in my mind, toward more

timely information. The have a long way to o and they will have to

work very hard to develop the analytic capability needed to operate

their system.

But, in any event, they are moving in the right direction.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you very much. We are most grateful

to you. And may be tapping your brain power a couple of times more,

Mr. HJORT. Thank you.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you. This concludes the first day of

OTA hearing.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hjort follows:]

STATEMENT OF HOWARD w. HJORT, JOHN SCHNITTKE R ASSOCIATES

AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Summary and Conclusions

1. World supply-demand estimates are the summation of country supplydemand estimates. Therefore, the performance of the world agricultural information system depends upon the availability and reliability of national estimates.

Unfortunately, current supply-demand estimates obtained from national agricultural information systems vary from timely and reliable to nonexistent. Only

the former can be used in the world system. FAO has been working with menlber governments for years to help them establish agricultural information

systems and improve the reliability of agricultural statistics. These efforts must

continue to be supported, but under the best of circumstances it will take years

to bring all national systems to an acceptable standard. While this long-range

program moves forward to generate analytic models of proven validity, the only

alternative is to use timely and reliable estimates.

2. Neither USDA nor FAO possess the analytic capability to generate sufficiently timely and reliable supply-demand estimates for all commodities and

countries where national systems are unreliable. In consequence, all too frequently estimates based on past trends, sometimes adjusted by judgment, are

used instead of more reliable estimates from formal analytic models that take

into account the full range of factors influencing the supply of and demand for

agricultural products. A deeper analytic capability must be developed to improve

the reliability of current world supply-demand estimates and assessments of

the world situation and outlook for food and agriculture,

3. Reports received from USDA’S attache network are the primary source of

foreign agricultural information for the world agricultural information system.

Attaches prepare many reports and provide much information, but few are specialists in the collection or analysis of agricultural data. and these tasks are

usually not perceived to be their primary mission. Frequent reposting of attaches

adversely affects the quality of the information they provide. These weaknesses

can be overcome by employing specialists in the collection and analysis of agricultural information who would be posted for extended periods, but this is a

long-range and partial solution. The near-term solution is to require attaches to

provide more precise data and information on the use of land, agricultural

inputs, human and animal populations, income, prices, and other supply and

demand factors so that analysts covering the world situation and outlook are

in a better position to assess these factors, develop more reliable supply-demand

estimates, and report more fully and frequently on the world food and agricul-
87

ture situation and outlook. Since inadequate analysis of available data already

is a more serious constraint than inadequate data, the overall improvement of

the world systems depends mainly upon how many and how effectively analysts

are employed.

4. In the final analysis, objectivity is the essential attribute of an agricultural information system. The objectivity of USDA’s world and national agricultural information systems is threatened, and effciency and effectiveness held

far below potential by the organizational structure used to operate the systems

and the manner in which the responsibilities for them are assigned. The responsibility for the world agricultural information system is shared by two officials

in the Office of the Secretary and the system is operated by two completely

separate agencies, one with a mission and action program responsibilities that

make it unnecessarily difficult to maintain objectivity. The responsibility for

reporting on the U.S. agricultural situation and outlook rests with the Economic

Research Service and the Outlook and Situation Board, but the chairmanships of

the U.S. supply-demand estimates committees have been given to an agency

that has responsibility for administering farm programs. To protect objectivity

and improve efficiency and effectiveness, the responsibility for USDA'S world and

national agricultural information systems should be clearly assigned, The Director, Agricultural Economics, who already has the responsibility for the U.S.

system and shares the responsibility for the world system, should be assigned

the responsibility for both systems, and the agencies that report to the Director

should have the sole mission of providing economic intelligence on U.S. and world

agriculture. Chairmanship of interagency commodity estimates committees

should be provided by the agency that has the responsibility for the estimates

and assessments of the situation and outlook. Reorganization is a necessary

condition to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the agricultural information systems operated by USDA. The reorganization alternative that promises

the highest efficiency and cost effectiveness is one that combines world and

national commodity analysts in a manner that eliminates unnecessary duplication.

WORLD AGICULTURAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

Introduction

On August 21 I was asked by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to

prepare a report containing “a critical evaluation of the world agricultural information system . . .“ The objective of the report is to assist in the formulation

of specific subject areas to probe, and questions to be explored during the forthcoming OTA hearings on food information systems. The report concentrates on

specific gaps or weaknesses in the system that can be corrected within the short

run at minimum cost, especially those where corrective measures can be taken

unilaterally by the United States. Other improvements that should be made but

that will take longer to implement and that require cooperation from others

are identified and an implementation approach outlined.

A world agricultural information system must have the capacity to develop

world supply-demand estimates for all agricultural commodities and be able to

accurately assess and interpret their implications. Agricultural statistics and

analysis are the ingredients of the system; forecasts of the outlook are the

outputs.

Agricultural statistics are the raw material-the basic input—for an agricultural information system. Agricultural statistics, collected either by taking a

census or sampling a population, tell us what is happening or what has happened.

An agricultural census, taken once every several years, provides the benchmark

for the world agricultural information system. Estimates for the current and

intervening years are developed either by sample surveys or through analytic

methods that use statistics and interrelationships from the past to generate

current estimates. World supply-demand estimates are now being developed from

a combination of sample survey data and analysis. The basic data requirements

for an agricultural information system are identified and alternative procedures

for developing them outlined in Appendix I.

While agricultural statistics and supply-demand estimates are essential to

an agricultural information system they, alone, are of limited value, These statistics must be carefully analyzed by specialists who can interpret their signifi-
88

cance. Finally, the results of their assessments must be made available to those

who need to be informed about the world food and agricultural situation and

outlook, and used by the policy ofiicials. The ability to analyze and interpret

agricultural statistics depends upon the number of analysts, their training and

experience, and the analytic techniques they employ. Since agricultural production is influenced greatly by weather patterns and is, therefore, inherently unstable, the analysts and managers of the world agricultural information system

must have the time and ability to continually reassess the situation and outlook

for world agriculture.

In order to operate a world agricultural information system, it is necessary

to maintain historic data, have the capacity to develop and publish reliable

supply-demand estimates, possess the ability to trace the implications of the

current situation, and to make those implications known to the world. While .

there are a number of private and public organizations that operate partial

world agricultural information systems, only two operate full-fledged systemsthe United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). USDA and FAO collect, maintain, and publish world agricultural statistics; develop and maintain world,

regional, and country supply-demand estimates for agricultural commodities;

continually analyze the supply-demand balances and the factors or events influencing supply and demand; and release reports containing the results of their

assessments of the current situation, near-term and longer range outlook for

food and agriculture. Both USDA and FAO depend heavily upon national agricultural information systems of varying sophistication and reliability, but both

have the analytic capability to develop current supply-demand estimates in

those situations where the national agricultural information systems fail to

generate timely or reliable estimates. USDA and FAO draw upon sources outside

their own system for agricultural information and intelligence.

Evacuation Criteria

The factors that must be taken into account in developing judgments about

the relative strengths and weaknesses of a world agricultural information system

are objectivity, reliability, timeliness, adequacy in terms of coverage, efficiency,

and effectiveness. The ideal is a system that provides users timely, unbiased

interpretations of the current situation and outlook based upon estimates of

known reliability for all commodities and countries through the use of the most

cost effective procedures known to mankind.

Objectivity

Objectivity is the essential attribute of an agricultural information system, and

the most difficult to ensure or measure. To be useful, the products of the system

must be as free of bias as the state of the art will permit. Users must be convinced that the results are not tempered to prevent an outcome that is more

or less favorable than is the real situation. In theory, the objectiveness of a system

can be measured by comparing supply-demand estimates with the final outcome

after adjusting the latter for changes in the estimates due to events that took place

after the estimates had been prepared. In practice, it is extremely difficult to

make such measurements. There are guidelines, however, that can be followed

to help ensure objectivity. Objectivity is more likely to be obtained when the

organization with responsibility for the information system has the operation

of the system as its sole mission. Suspicions about objectivity automatically

arise whenever an organization that has multiple missions or action program

responsibilities also has the responsibility for operating the agricultural information system. The temptation to modify estimates is ever present, and some

estimates are always biased for political purposes. In this circumstance, the

organization operating a world agricultural information system must reject

the biased estimate in order to maintain the integrity of the system. In order

to protect the system, the responsibility for it should be assigned to an organization that has no other responsibilities and that is directed. administered, and

operated by persons of high integrity.

Reliability

The reliability of an agricultural information system refers to the confidence

that one can have in the supply-demand estimates developed within the system.

It is easy to confuse the terms objectivity and reliability. In simple language,

objectivity means to tell it like it is, while reliability means to find out what the
89

situation is and what it is likely to be. The reliability of the estimates is indicated why the methods used to develop them. Those of known statistical reliability developed from a representative sample of a population and those

from analytic models of proven validity are superior to estimates developed

from non-representative samples or from samples drawn from unknown populations, or through the use of untested or weak analytic techniques. Some

national agricultural information systems develop and release current supplydemand estimates that can be relied upon by those operating worldwide systems;

others generate current estimates of unknown statistical reliability that must be

subjected to consistency checks before being used in the world system. Some

countries never develop or release current estimates, so those operating the

● world system must use analytic techniques to develop the necessary estimates.

Finally, some national systems are essentially without capability to generate

agricultural statistics, which means those operating the world system must rely

entirely upon analysis of factors influencing supply and demand for current

estimates. The reliability of a system can be indicated by comparing estimates

Ž with final results.

Timenliness

Timeliness refers to the time that lapses between receipt and release of agricultural information, A system that can assess and report the implications of a

changing situation days after the change becomes known is more useful than

one that takes weeks or months. A system that releases unanalyzed information immediately upon receipt is more effective than one that delays release. A

system that generates an estimate of, say, crop production ten days after data

were collected from farmers is more timely and effective than one that takes

thirty days to prepare the estimate for release. The timeliness of the national

agricultural information systems is extremely variable. USDA’s national system

is without parallel in this regard in that estimates are released after a lapse

of as few as ten days. There are others that do not even bother to collect agricultural statistics until after the season has ended. In order to provide timely

information, therefore, those operating world agricultural information systems

must be prepared to develop and release their own estimates.

Adequacy

The adequacy of a system refers to the scope and uniformity of coverage. A

system that provides detailed coverage of the crops, but superficially covers

livestock is less adequate than a system that provides uniform coverage of both

crops and livestock. Similarly, a system that provides detailed coverage of

agricultural production, but fails to adequately cover consumption is inadequate.

Further, a system that covers some countries, but fails to cover others, is inadequate.

Efficiency and Effectivenesss

Efficiency and effectiveness can be judged by determining if obsolete data

are being collected, reviewing the methods used to collect and analyze data,

● the number and qualifications of analysts employed in operating the system, the

number of organizational units involved in collecting and analyzing agricultural

data, and the organizational structure used to operate the system. Collecting

obsolete data is, at best, a waste of money and can lead to inappropriate and

misleading conclusions. Reliable estimates can be generated by sampling a •

relatively small proportion of a population, a procedure much more cost effective than drawing larger than necessary samples. Sophisticated analytic

models and computers can systematically handle more variables, but they

cost more than less sophisticated techniques. The task is to use the analytic

technique that generates reliable results at minimum cost. Too few analysts

keeps the system’s efficiency low, as does too many. A system operated by well

trained, experienced analysts and statisticians will be more cost effective than

one operated by poorly trained or inexperienced employees. Efficient use of

manpower and cost effectiveness of the system are influenced by the organizational structure. When the responsibility for the system rests with a single organizational unit, efficiency and cost effectiveness are highest, all else being

equal.

General Comparison of USDA’s and FAO’s Systems

USDA’s world agricultural information system is backed by a larger field

staff and has been providing information more timely than FAO’S. The statistical

reliability of supply estimates appears to be about the same, in part because
90

they both rely heavily upon national systems, but USDA releases eatimates and

assessments more frequently. FAO allocates more resources to improving national

data collection and processing capabilities than USDA. FAO provides compre

hensive coverage of agriculture, including forestry and fisheries, and is the major

source of comprehensive historical agricultural statistics. FAO seems to probe

more deeply into factors influencing the situation and outlook for world food

and agriculture, but takes more time to do so and tends to limit coverage to

Specific issues. Both USDA and FAO are relatively weak in assessing current

consumption requirements. Serious efforts are king made both by USDA and

FAO to improve their systems. Both have given increased attention to the number and frequency of reports and FAO is in the process of augmenting staff

to handle the broader responsibilities assigned them after the World Food

Conference of last November. While they both have increased the number and

frequeney of reports on various aspects of world agriculture, most of the additional information from USDA’S system is data for analysis instead of the

results of analysis.

Inadequate analysis appears to be a more effective constraint on both systems than inadequate data. FAO’S mission and organizational structure suggest

it is easier for them to maintain objectivity, and to make more progress in

improving the reliabilty of agricultural statistics collected through various

national systems. The major weakness in the FAO system has been the inability

to provide information on a timely basis. This weakness is being overcome

by the series of monthly and quarterly reports now being released. FAO’S system is constrained by a serious lack of qualified analysts, especially in view of

the additional tasks they were assigned last fall. The field staff is extremely

limited and data from non-member countries difficult to obtain. However, they

now obtain reports prepared by the U.S. agricultural attaches to augment reports

from traditional sources. FAO does have a sensitive problem when it becomes

necessary to adjust member government estimates that have been biased for

political purposes, but they can and do substitute their own estimate for the

“official” estimate when necessary. All in all, USDA’S system clearly has been

superior with respect to timely assessments of the current situation and nearterm outlook, but unless steps are taken soon to improve USDA’s system, the

most reliable system will he the one operated by FAO.

USDA’s World Agricultural Information System

Responsibilitiy for the System

USDA operates a national and a world agricultural information system; here

our focus is upon the world system. The rationale for USDA’s world agricultural

information system has never been clearly specified. In consequence, no one

person, office, or agency has the responsibility for operating USDA's world agricultural information system. Presently, the responsibility for the system rests

with two USDA agencies-the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) and the

Economic Research Service (ERS). FAS’S agricultural attache network provides

foreign agricultural statistics and intelligence and the Foreign Commodity Analysis Unit maintains, analyzes and Publishes world agricultural stitistics and

reports on the situation and outlook for major commodities. ERS’S Foreign

Demand and Competition Division reports their assessment of the world and

regional agricultural situation and outlook, The Administrator of FAS reports

to the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs and Commodity Programs,

while the Administrator of ERS reports to the Director of Agricultural Economics. The Assistant Secretary and the Director both report to the Secretary

of Agriculture.

The mission of FAS “is to expand foreign markets for U.S. farm commodities.”

In support of that mission, FAS administers commercial export, food assistance, and foreign market development programs, participates in the development

of agricultural trade policy, and collects, analyzes, and disseminates information on foreign agriculture. Agricultural attaches located in most major agriculturally important countries have, along with other duties, responsibility for

reporting information of importance to local and U.S. agriculture.

Collecting Foreign Agrircultural Information

Reports from the attaches are the heart of USDA’S world agricultural information system. They are scheduled, coverage specified, and reporting procedures

standardized by officials in Washington. The reports include assessments of the

overall agricultural situation and the factors influencing production, consump-
91

tion, and trade such as prices, price and non-price policies and programs, and

input supply availabilities. Monthly highlight reports provide updates to previous reports. Quarterly (grains for example), semi-annual (fats and oils for example), or annual (agricultural situation for example) reports are prepared on

various aspects of the agricultural situation and outlook. Faster means are used

to report events of major significance.

The objectivity of the estimates transmitted by the attache depends upon the

objectiveness of the estimates released by the host government and the the attache.

When governments believe it to be in their vested interest to release biased

estimates, the attaches report the “official” estimates but make their own when

they have reason to believe the estimate is biased. Sometimes attache estimates

are biased in the opposite direction, requiring consistency checks by analysts in

Washington.

The rliability of the estimates attaches transmit is a function of the methods

used to collect agricultural statistics and to assess them. The reliability of estimates from national agricultural information systems varies significantly from

●

one country to another, as previously indicated. When the host country fails to

collect or publish agricultural statistics, the attache is required to develop them.

When estimates of known reliability are available on a timely basis, the attache’s

task is relatively simple-till he need Do is transmit them along with brief explanatory notes. Estimates of questionable reliability must be subjected to consistency criteria and modified to make them internally consistent, either by the

attache or the analytic staff in Washington. When estimates are not available,

the alternatives are to conduct a judgmental type survey or use analytic models

that have been verified by comparing model estimates with actual historic results

to develop the necessary estimates. In general, the attaches submit estimates

based upon their own and local staff’s judgment, after reviewing the estimates

with others on the scene. The reliability of the estimates transmitted by the

attaches from countries who fail to provide reliable current estimates depends

heavily upon their judgment, a function of experience, interest, analytic capability. and the importance they attach to the task of developing estimates. These

attributes obviously vary significantly from one attache to another, but in general

are influenced by what they perceive to be their mission and the length of time

they are posted in a country. Few attaches perceive the collection of agricultural

statistics and the development of supply demand estimates to be their primary

mission; instead, just as is the case for FAS, the attache’s primary mission is to

expand foreign markets for U.S. farm commodities. The task of developing numbers and drafting reports is usually assigned to assistants or local staff, many

of whom are more familiar with the data anyway. Attaches seldom are selected

for their analytic capability ; instead, it is their ability to represent U.S. agriculture that is the guiding criteria. Relatively short tours of duty may be advisable

in the larger picture, but is a distinct disadvantage with respect to the development of reliable estimates.

Timeliness of agricultural intelligence depends upon directives from Washington, the initiative of the attache, and the ability of national systems to generate

timely information. As previously indicated, there are a number of countries

where estimates are never released in a timely manner. Most national systems

rank poorly in terms of timeliness. Attaches must submit supply-demand estimates when scheduled and, therefore. frequently send “post” estimates. Attaches

cable information of significance immediately.

The scope of the intelligence system operated by the attaches is broad, but

adequacy is impaired by the lark of uniformity of coverage, both in terms of content and geography. Various efforts are under way to improve adequacy by requesting attaches to give greater attention to the factors that are or will influence

supply-demand balances for agricultural products. Their discussion of the factors

that influenee production and supply tend to be more complete and frequent than

on the factors Influencing the demand for agricultural products. Analyses of these

factors by attaches or their staff are based upon extremely simple analytic techniques or pure judgment, instead of formal models that generate results of known

reliability. The adequacy of the intelligence system operated by the attaches is

held below potential due to inadequate coverage of several important agricultural

countries. The most notable gap is the lack of an attache in the People’s Republic

of China, but the intelligence gathering in many centrally planned economies is

weak to nonexistent,

The efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence system operated by the attaches is lower than it would be if specialists in data collection and analysis with
92

no other duties were located in the country and if they were part of an organization whose sole mission was to operate a world agricultural information system.

Assessing and Disseminating Information

FAS’S Foreign Commodity Analysis Unit and ERS’S Foreign Demand and Competition Division share the responsibility for analyzing and disseminating information on world agriculture. Both rely manly upon attache reports but obtain

intelligence from numerous other sources, including the Central Intelligence

Agency.

FAS publishes world agricultural production and trade estimates for agricultural commodities, releases revised foreign estimates weekly, prepares reports on

developments of importance to world agriculture, publishes a series of circulars

that contain assessments of the current situation and near-term outlook for major

groups of commodities such as the grains or fats and oils, and maintains historic

supply-demand estimates for selected commodities.

ERS conducts a program of research and analysis that results in reports containting assessments of the current world and regional agricultural situation and

near-term outlook, the longer range outlook for world agriculture, and the implications of changes in the international monetary situation, world agriculture

and trade policies, and economic development and trade patterns. ERS also monitors and publishes foreign agricultural trade statistics of the United States.

Since the basic source of data for analysis is the same for both FAS’s and

ERS’s analytic units, improvements in the objectivity, reliability, timeliness, and

adequacy of the information released by them depend upon the other sources of

intelligence they draw upon, their own analytic capability, and the consistency

checks they employ prior to releasing information and reports. Estimates from

the field are subjected to consistency checks, using data from prior years to improve reliability, and in some cases estimates are developed by the analysts using

analytic models that have generated reasonably reliable results in prior years.

For example, estimtites of grain production for the Soviet Union are developed

by specialists in the Foreign Demand and Competition Division of the Economic

Research Service. FAS’s analysts rely more upon simple consistency checks, experience, judgment, and trend analyses than upon models or sophisticated techniques of analysis in checking or developing estimates. They do not conduct indepth analyses or issues of factors influencing supply and demand. The FAS analyst is a commodity specialist. The ERS analyst is a country specialist. ERS is

more research oriented than FAS. ERS’s analysts have received deeper training

in research methodology and have more experience in the use of sophisticated

analytic techniques and models, They conduct the in-depth analyses of issues and

factors influencing supply and demand. ERS is the source of agricultural intelligence; FAS tile source of agricultural statistics and commodity information. In

recent months the flow of unanalyzed data from 17 USDA’S system has increased

significantly, much more than the increase in reports containing carefully reasoned assessments of the current situation and outlook.

ERS’s world and regional agricultural situation and outlook reports are approved by the Outlook and Situation Board; FAS’s reports on the world situation

and outlook for the various commodities are not, Attempts to ensure objectivity

and reliability are more evident with respect to the world agricultural information developed and released by ERS than is the case for the information developed

and released by FAS.

Weakness in USDA’s Systems and Means of Overcoming Them

Weaknesses Due to Poor National Systems

The supply-demand estimates produced by a few national agricultural information systems lack objectivity. To prevent this problem from impairing the objectivity of USDA’s system. USDA’s analysts must develop a deeper capacity to

generate unbiased estimates for the country of concern and those managing the

USDA world system must be prepared to defend the revised estimates.

The supply-demand estimates produced by national agricultural information

systems vary greatly in reliability, timeliness, and adequacy. To prevent this

variation from keeping the reliability, timeliness, and adequacy of USDA’s world

system below potential, there are two alternatives: provide additional technical

and financial assistance to help improve national agricultural information systems with respect to these attributes, or strengthen the analytic component of

USDA’s world system so that more reliable and timely national estimates can be

generated within the system. Both approaches must be pursued, but the former

.
93

will take longer to accomplish than the latter. In the near-term, the @y alternative is to improve the analytic capability of USDA’s world system.

When countries fail to provide current supply-demand estimates, the only

alternative is for USDA’s analysts to develop reliable estimates through the use

of analytic techniques. The longer-range solution is to encourage and assist these

countries in the development of a reliable national agricultural information

system.

Weaknesses Due to Collecting Inadequate Data

For various reasons, the reliability of the supply-demand estimates forwarded

by attaches varies significantly. In addition to the problems with national systems

previously discussed, reliability is reduced due to the low priority given the

development of estimates by some attaches, the lack of knowledge about the ●

country due to frequent reposting, and inadequate training or interest in the use

of analytic techniques. In order to keep these problems from holding the reliability of the system's estimates below standard, there are two broad choices: replace the attaches with specialists in collecting and analyzing agricultural statis8 tics, or requiring attaches to submit more precise statistics and information on

the factors that determine production, supply, consumption requirements, and

trade according to standardized formats so that the analysts in Washington can

develop more reliable estimates. The latter is the alternative being pursued and

must continue to be relied upon for the near-term. It must be pursued more

vigorously.

Weaknesses in Analytic Component

The analysts in FAS rely almost exclusively on experience, judgment, and

trend analyses in making initial forecasts of supply-demand balances for the

commodities. As we have learned in recent years, trend analyses fail to provide

reliable results. More detailed analyses of the factors that determine production and consumption are required to improve the reliability of USDA’s world

estimates.

There is a clear imbalance in USDA’s system—more data for analysis are

being provided from the field and other sources than are being adequately analyzed. In part, this imbalance stems from insufficiently precise data; in part, due

to an inadequate analytic capability; and is partially a function of the organizational structure USDA uses to operate the world system. There is need for

more precise reporting from the field on the input situations and outlook, and

on the factors influencing consumption requirements. These field reports must be

standardized as the data are the raw material for analysis and reports from

USDA. Better data from the field is a necessary prerequisite to better reports

from USDA on the farm input situation and outlook and on consumption requirements, but unless USDA possesses a deeper analytic capability and uses analysts

more efficiently and effectively than now, better field data will be largely wasted.

The present imbalance can only be corrected by reorganizing and by augmenting the analytic staff as necessary.

Weaknesses Due to Organizational Structure Ž

The organizational structure used by USDA to operate the world agricultural

information system impedes efficiency and effectiveness. It is extremely difficult

to use analysts efficiently and effectively when the responsibility for the outputs

of a system is assigned to two completely separate agencies.

• Permitting the responsibility for the world agricultural information system

to be shared by two different agencies, one with a mission, policy, and program

responsibilities that makes it unnecessarily difficult to ensure objectivity, weakens the system appreciably. The mission of FAS is to expand foreign markets

for U.S. farm commodities. The mission of ERS is to develop and carry out a

program of economic research designed to provide economic intelligence for users.

FAS has responsibility for administering action programs; ERS does not. The

mission of FAS, and the vested interest that FAS thereby has in U.S. and world

estimates, makes it difficult for those in the Foreign Commodity Analysis Unit

or the attaches to maintain objectivity with respect to assessments of the world

situation and outlook. It will be essentially impossible for USDA’s world agricultural information system to reach potential under the present organizational

setup.

In order to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and objectivity of USDA’s

world agricultural information system, the responsibility for it must be clearly

assigned. Using these criteria, the position of Director, Agricultural Economics

is the logical choice for the assignment. The Director would then have the overall

68--877-76-7
94

responsibility for both the world and national agricultural information systems

operated by USDA ERS, the agency with responsibility for reporting on the situation and outlook for U.S. agriculture, and the Statistical Reporting Service

(SRS), the agency with responsibilities for collecting, processing, and publishing U.S. agricultural statistics, report to the Director of Agricultural Economics.

Further, the Economic Research Service shares the responsibility for the operation of USDA’s world agricultural information system. The Director, therefore,

already has the responsibility for the national agricultural information system

and shares the responsibility for the world system. Third, the position of Director has been filled, ever since being established, with a professional agriculturalist

of high integrity, a necessary condition for objectivity.

There are alternative means of accomplishing the necessary reorganization.

One would be simply to transfer the Foreign Commodity Analysis Unit from -

FAS to ERS and make it another division of that agency. Another would be

to combine the Foreign Commodity Analysis Unit from FAS with the Foreign

Demand and Competition Division from ERS into a new agency, one with the

sole mission of providing economic intelligence on world agriculture. The third

alternative would be to combine the foreign commodity analysts from FAS with “

the U.S. commodity analysts from ERS and the foreign and national analysts

from ERS into a single economic intelligence agency with responsibility for assessing and disseminating information on world and U.S. agriculture.

Objectivity criteria would be satisfied under either reorganization alternative.

Overall efficiency and effectiveness would be highest under the third alternative,

next highest under the second, and lowest under the first alternative. It would

be higher, however, under the first alternative than at present, simply because

it would become possible for the first time for a single agency to plan and carry

out a coordinated program of analysis. Efficiency and effectiveness would be

higher under alternative two because the system’s operation would be directed

by more senior professionals. The third alternative promises the highest efficiency and effectiveness. It provides the opportunity to eliminate the duplication

associated with the operation of two systems. It is not necessary to have one group

of commodity analysts for the world and another for the U.S. The U.S. analyst

cannot perform his duties unless he takes the world situation and outlook into

account; the world analyst cannot performhis duties unless he takes the U.S.

situation and outlook into account. Efficiency and effectiveness would obviously

be improved by combining the knowledge of these analysts.

Under either reorganization alternative, the responsibility for collecting foreign agricultural information would have to remain with FAS’s attaches until

arrangements can be made to relieve them of the responsibility by employing and

posting specialists in the collection and analysis of agricultural statistics. But

the responsibility for the content, frequency, and format of attache reports would

have to be assigned to the agency with responsibility for operating the world

agricultural information system. As soon as feasible, a separate agency under

the Director’s guidance should be created, or the responsibility for collecting,

processing, and publishing world agricultural statistics should be assigned to

the Statistical Reporting Service.

SRS is among the premier agencies in the world with responsibility for collecting, processing, and reporting agricultural’ statistics. It is the world’s best with

respect to timeliness, and among the very best with respect to statistical reliability of the results. SRS is a professional organization whose sole mission is to

collect, process, and report agricultural statistics. They never attempt to inter- ●

pret the results; they do run elaborate consistency checks before the results are

released they are constantly trying to improve methodology; and the security

procedures they employ are exceptional. In short they take their mission seriously and constantly strive to improve the quality of the information they generate. They must be relied upon for at least advising those with responsibility

for collecting statistics to be used in USDA’s world system.

As previously indicated, it is necessary to develop a deeper capability for analysis of the factors influencing world agriculture. It may be necessary to employ

additional analysts, but doing so and using them inefficiently, the present approach toward improving the world and national agricultural information systems. is not a cost effective solution to the problem; reorganizing is. It may be

necessary to increase the number of analysts and field staff of the new or augmented agency, but the potential from reorganization must be tapped first. The

need for developing, verifying, and using more sophisticated analytic techniques

is evident, but this need not increase the number of analysts. Instead. the task

is to make more effective use of the analysts and positions now available.
95

Weakness in USDA’s National Agricultural Information System

This report has focused on USDA’S world agricultural information system.

There is, however, a serious flaw in the national agricultural information system

operated by USDA. The responsibility for outlook and situation reports rests

with ERS and the Outlook and Situation Board, but the authority for U.S. commodity supply-demand estimates is outside ERS. The reliability of the U.S. agricultural information system is, as a result, seriously impaired. U.S. supplydemand estimates are developed by Interagency Commodity Estimates Committees (ICEC) chaired by the Agricultural Stabilizatition and Conservation Service.

Members of the committees are drawn from the Economic Research Service and

the Fore&n Agricultural Service. Responsibility for foreign trade estimates rests

with the member from the Foreign Agricultural Service; the responsibility for •

domestic estimates rests with the representative from the EconomicResearch

Service. The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service has the responsibility for administering price support programs for farmers, and the Foreign

Agricultural Service has responsibilities for administering export expansion

Ž programs. Both, therefore, have a vested interest in L’. S supply -demand estimates.

USDA’s Outlook and Situation Board approves outlook and situation reports on

U.S. agriculture, but the ICEC’S supply-demand estimates are taken as given by

the Board. USDA’S supply-demand estimates for the United States have been

wide of the mark in recent years. While both domestic and foreign demand estimates have been in error, the magnitude of the error in the export estimate has

been much larger, either due to changes in the basic situation, faulty analysis,

or bias. Investigations of the reasons for errors in the estimates have centered

upon ERS, the agency with responsibility for the estimates but without authority. This flaw must be corrected. It is necessary to take program operations into

account, when developing supply-demand estimates but the responsibility for the

estimates must rest with the agency with responsibility for them. That is, the

Chairmanship of the ICEC’s should be assigned the agency with responsibility

for operating the agricultural information system and the members should he

drawn from the agencies with responsibilities for programs that have an impact

on supplies or demand.

The creation of an economic intelligence agency, and combining commodity

analysts from FAS and ERS into one unit provides the opportunity for improving reliability of U.S. supply-demand estimates, but this major flaw in USDA’s

national agricultural information system will continue to impair reliability unless

the Chairmanship of the ICEC’s is taken from ASCS.

Longer-Range Improvements That Require Cooperation

FAO has concentrated on improving the quality of agricultural statistics

through standardization of census procedures and the use of proven statistical

methodology in developing estimates from samples. FAS has not been able to

help host governments improve the statistical reliability of their agricultural

statistics and estimates. The United States has an interest in relialble agricul-

.

tural statistics and the world agricultural information system operated by USDA

has its effectiveness reduced and costs increased by unreliable statistics and estimates and the lack of data. The United States should provide financial support

to FAO’S program of improving agricultural statistics. The alternative is to

encourage the Statistical Reporting Service and the Economic Research Service

Ž to develop an expanded technical assistance program for, respectively, the collection and analysis of agricultural statistics.

Note on Recommendations Contained in Report of the Food Advisory Committee

I am in full agreement with recommendation three, on eliminating obsolescence

in food and fiber data series. Maintaining obsolate data series is wasteful.

Analyzing obsolete data is, at best, unproductive, and is of negative benefit when

reliance on obsolescent data leads to inappropriate conclusions. For these reasons

the place to start improving the national system is by removing excess and outdated information prior to overloading the system with additional data.

Recommendation four, on the integration of staff and activities of the Agricultural Census and the Statistical Reporting Service, has considerable merit,

but probably should be broadened to include data collection activities in addition

to the Census. The Statistical Reporting Service, in my view, is the premier

government data collection and processing agenecy. They obtain high marks with
96

respect to reliability and the high&4 marks with respect to bliness. I am

convinced SRS could significantly reduce the time lag between collation and

release of agricultural data now being collected by the Census Bureau.

The situation with respect to the fertilized information system is an example

of how difficult simple tasks can be made. We find it far easier to obtain reliable

information on fertiliser stocks, production, supplies, prices and consumption for

India or Pakistan than we do for the United States. Obviously, I support recommendation five.

For reasons given in the report, I am in full support of recommendation ten,

concerning assistance for FAO information activities, and especially recommendation twelve, providing for increased technical assistance to improve agricultural information systems in the developing countries. .

APPENDIX I

.

AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

BASIC REQUIREMENTS AND ALTERNATE PROCEDURES

I. Land Use Pattern:

A. Area used to produce crops:

1. Cropped area.

2. Idle/fallow area.

B. Area used to produce livestock.

C. Nonagricultural area.

II. Crops:

A. Crop Production:

1. Area planted to each crop:

a. Sample survey.

b. Analysis of factors influencing plantings:

i. Area available for crops.

ii. Policies of goverments.

iii. Price relationships between various crops and

between inputs and outputs.

iv. Input supply availabilities.

c. Area for harvest.

2. Yield per unit:

a. Objective yield survey.

b. Judgmental yield survey.

c. Analysis of factors influencing yields:

i. Quantities of inputs applied and their relationship to yield.

ii. Weather patterns.

3. Production estimate (area times yield).

B. Stocks:

1. Old crop stocks at beginning of crop year:

b. Analysis of supply-demand factors.

2. Old crop stocks remaining at end of crop year.

C. Consumption requirements:

1. Food use:

a. Food consumption surveys.

b. Food processing industry surveys.

c. Analysis of factors influencing demand for food:

i. Growth in population.

ii. Change in income and its distribution.

iii. Change in product price and its relationship

to prices of substitute foods.

iv. Government policies and programs--food distribution and regulations.
97

2. Feed use:

a. Feed user surveys.

b. Feed processing industry surveys.

c. Surveys of stocks.

d. Analysis of factors influencing demand for feed:

i. Demand for animal products (population,

prices, policies, and programs).

ii. Animal units to be fed.

iii. Price relationships between livestock product

prices and feed prices.

iv. Price relationships between feeds.

3. Industrial use:

a. Survey data.

b. Analysis of factors influencing industrial demand.

4. Seed use:

a. Estimate of area to be planted in subsequent year.

D. Exports or imports:

1. Export availability or import requirement:

a. Beginning stocks plus production less consumption

and ending stocks requirement.

2. Exports or imports:

a. World supply-demand-price prospects for crop of concern and for substitutes.

111. Livestock:

A. Introduction:

1. Number of animals by class of livestock:

a. Sample survey or census.

b. Analysis of factors influencing animal population:

i. Government policies and programs.

ii. Area available for livestock.

iii. Price relationships between various classes of

livestock.

iv. input-output price relationships and returns

prospects.

2. Production per animal:

a. Sample survey.

b. Analysis of factors influencing productivity:

i. Slaughter weight and carcass yield.

ii. Feed conversion ratios,

iii. Weather patterns.

iv. Supply of feeds.

3. Production estimates:

a. Meat production (number slaughtered times carcass

yield).

b. If ilk. eggs, etc., production (production units times per

unit yield ).

B. Stocks:

1. Beginning of year:

a. Survey.

b. Analysis of supply-demand.

2. End of year:

a. Analysis of supply-demand.

b. Policy considerations.

C. Consumption requirements:

1. Food use:

a. Food consumption surveys.

b. Processing Industry data.

c. Analysis of factors influencing food use (same as

II. C. 1. c. i-iv above).

2. Industrial use:

a. and b. (Same as II. C. 3. a. and b. above. )

D. Exports or imports (same as II. D. above).

Chairman HUMPHREY. Mrs. Holt, a member of the Technology

Assessment Board has a prepared statement she would like to insert.

[The statement follow:]
98

STATEMENT OF HO N. MABJORIE S. HO L T, REPRESENTATIVE IN C ONGRESS FROM T H E

F O UR TH C ONGRESSIONAL D ISTRICT or MARYLAND

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present my views on the report

entitled “Food, Agriculture and Nutrition.” I intend to make my remarks as

concise and as precise as possible.

My basic observation is that while the report contains some positive and

workable suggestions, it is very weak in other areas.

Let’s start with the positive side.

The recommendation on page 20 to move toward the “modernization, coordination and standardization of older food and fiber data” seems to me to be a

good one.

If there is anything that we have now as legislators, it is too much information.

Reams and reams of reports come to us every day. Most of this material goes

unread and eventually is discarded. The basic problem is not having enough

information; it is having enough useful information.

Therefore, I believe the present “information industry” both within and outside government would more fully serve itself and those it professes to assist by .

beginning to ask itself just how much of what it generates is really useful and

relevant.

I hope also that these hearings will direct more effort toward mining the

existing mountains of informational literature, rather than generating additional

volumes of what is basically irrelevant trivia that only confuses, in the words

of the report on page 14, “busy members of Congress who are not familiar with

many food, agricultural and nutritional issues”.

A second constructive idea in the report discussed at page 21 is the merger of

the Agricultural Census with the Statistical Reporting Service of USDA.

I would point out that this effort was attempted several years ago by the

Administration, but it was blocked by Congress in Public Law 93-80, the Omnibus Farm Bill of 1973. I hope therefore that our colleagues will now take to heart

this suggestion.

Another good idea is the suggestion on page 24 to improve our use of satellite

and other new technologies. The LACIE program promises to be very useful in

measuring crop output throughout the world and should be most beneficial to

all concerned.

Now, some negative aspects of this report:

In its general thrust the report seems to concentrate on one word . . . and

that word is “MORE.” It calls for—

More expenditures on information systems;

More staff in the Congress and in the Executive Branch;

More foreign aid; and

More paperwork.

As I mentioned earlier, I would hope we would be able to use what is already

in the Department of Agriculture and related agencies of the Executive Branch

more efficiently rather than to go off on new tangents. The same is true of the

Congressional Committee staffs, all of which are ballooning in size already. The

last thing we need to do, it seems to me, is to expand them further.

I also question whether OTA should get itself in the position of telling the

various committees of the Congress how to organize their internal affairs anyway.

On the foreign side of the equation the United States now pays 25 percent of

the (lost of operating the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. That is one reason why I disagree with the recommendations on page 10

and page 36 for the United States to increase its contribution to FAO which, as

everyone knows, is basically a statistics-gathering organization. I think it’s about

time some of the other 130 countries of the world contribute a little more to the

UN and its operation anyway.

My final criticism lies with the thrust of the report which is aimed at a socalled “ National Food Policy.”

To start off, the evidence cited in the report for such an effort is at best

meager.

On page 11 the report blandly states that the “need” was reemphasized in

hearings held by Senator McGovern’s Nutrition Committee in June 1974.

It would be interesting to know who the witnesses were who established this

“need”, wouldn’t it?

But regardless of who they were, I don’t believe the OTA should embrace such

a radical policy without arriving at its own independent decision. And I would
99

like to state that OTA again appears to be making recommendations contrary to

its legislative authority.

I note also from a Washington Post news story that Herbert Stein, the former

chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, pointed out last week to the

Joint Economic Committee that “National economic planning could tend to change

the operation of government and the economic system away from the interests

of efficiency and democracy.”

Stein said the bill would likely result in more inflationary policies that would

do nothing to solve the problems of unemployment and commodity shortages.

“I don’t think the bill will be passed, and I suspect the sponsors don’t either,”

he said. “1 see it more as an educational platform.”

I would only add the observation that one, if not the single most important, Ž reason that Russia buys wheat from us is because of that nation’s dedication to

central economic planning on grain.

I hope we don’t embrace that same economic philosophy, because if we do there

won’t be anyone around from whom to buy grain.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I urge that this report not go forward unchal-

• lenged, Instead, it should be noted for its positive aspects, and then be stored in

that mountain of curious but basically irrelevant literature that already overwhelms us all.

[The hearing was adjourned at 5 :20 p.m., to reconvene at 2:30 p.m.,

September 25, 1975.]

Ž
FOOD INFORMATION SYSTEMS

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1975

Congress OF THE U NITED S TATE S,

T ECHNOLOGY A SSESSMENT B OAR D,

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WASHINGTON,D.C.

The Technology Assessment Board met at 2:30 p.m., pursuant to

notice, in room 324, Russell Senate office Building, Hon. Hubert H.

Humphrey (member, Technology Assessment Board) presiding.

Present: Senator Humphrey.

Staff present: Mr. Emdio Q. Daddario, director; Mr. Daniel V. De

Simone, deputy director; Mr. J. B. Cordaro, food program manager; Dr. Walter W. Wilcox, consultant; Ms. Ellen Terpstra, research associate; Ms. Ann Woodbridge, administrative assistant.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Good afternoon, gentlemen.

I see we have my friend, Don Paarlberg here with us today. We are

anxious to hear from you.

Dr. Paarlberg, you know what the purpose of our hearing is, namely

to look at the system of agriculture information gathering and

analysis.

Dr. PAARLBERG. Right.

Chairman HUMPHREY. We had a productive hearing yesterday and

we gained a good deal of information from our witnesses. Today, we

have a number of representatives of USDA.

Dr. Paarlberg, you are Director of Agricultural Economics. Yesterday one of our witnesses indicated to us that it would be most

helpful to have the entire information service of our Department of

Agriculture under the overall supervision of the Economic Research

• Service of the Department of Agriculture.

You have a prepared statement which will be made part of the

record. Would you please go ahead and summarize it for us.

Dr. PAARLBERG. Well, I’ll just talk to you from the statament, Senator Humphrey.

Chairman HUMPHREY. All right.

STATEMENT OF DR. DON PAARLBERG, DIRECTOR, AGRICULTURAL

ECONOMICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Dr. PAARLBERG. First of all, I would like to introduce some of our

men from the Economic Research service whO are here; John Stovall

and Gaylord Worden, and Bill Gusser, and Dave Hume will introduce

some of his people when you hear from him.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Fine.

(101)
102

Dr. P AARLBERG . In my statement, Senator Humphrey, I am commenting on a number of the major recommendations in the study.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes; this is the draft proposal that we have.

Dr. PAARLBERG. Quite so. And I will comment just very briefly and

then follow whatever particular interest you may have.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Fine.

Dr. PAARBERG. Now, the first two recommendations in this draft

report have to do with providing better analytical capability for the

Congress with regard to information and statistical services, and we

support the idea, of course. The analytical capability of the Congress

should be enhanced and we will work with the congress in any effort

directed to that end.

The second major topic in the report has to do with the problem

of obsolete data series; and the point made there is well taken. Agri- .

culture changes rapidly and it is important to keep our statistical series

updated, and some of them are frankly a bit out of date.

We have had the review committees come in and work with us on

this from the American Agricultural Economic Association, and the

American Statistical Association. We have reviewed several of our

specific series, particularly the farm income series. We are updating

the definition of a farm which I think will bring us more current

with regard to the present nature of the farm. We have worked with

the Bureau of Census on that.

The third, major topic, Senator Humphrey, has to do with the timeliness and the reliability of data, and in this recommendation the

question is raised regarding the agricultural census.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes.

Dr. P AARLBER G. Including the possible transfer of that function

from the Bureau of Census to the statistical reporting service. Now,

we consider the agricultural census enormously important, and we

frankly feel that it has not been given the importance that it deserves

in the Bureau of Census, and there has been much delay in coming out

with the data.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Do you work on the questions for the agricultural census ?

Dr. PAARLBERG. Yes; we do.

Chairman HU M PH R E Y. In other words, you have professional in- --

put with the Census Bureau?

Dr. PAARLBERG . Yes; we do.

Chairman HUMPHREY. As you know, we receive a number of complaints from farmers out home on this. They’re concerned about this

probing into their private affairs, because you ask questions as to the

size of the farm, the value, and all that sort, of thing. In fact, this was

a topic of considerable discussion in our legislature in the State of

Minnesota, and I believe they passed some resolution concerning it.

I’m not positive, I know there was a resolution to call upon the Census Bureau to do away with that kind of question. But you look upon

it as a vital part of the economic and social data that you need?

Dr. P AARLBERG . Yes; we do. We think that it could be improved and

could be made more timely, and the questionnaires could be made
103

more brief if they were targeted at the particular groups that must

respond. We think it would be possible to update the techniques and

use a probability sampling technique.

We are not ambitious to take over that service. If the Census could

be given greater importance, and brought out more quickly, we would

be very happy to see it stay where it is. But if it is not being afforded

the importance it deserves, then frankly we would look with favor

on seeing that it was afforded that importance.

Chairman HUMPHRREY. When you say the importance, are you speakŽ

ing about the timeliness of it?

Dr. PAARLBERG. No, the time for processing.

Chairman HUMPHREY. You mean it needs to be processed more

quickly ?

• Dr. PAARLBERG. Right.

chairman HUMPHREY . This is something we might want to write

to the Department of Commerce about. I would suggest we at least

inquire of the Department of Commerce whether or not they would

be willing to give it a higher priority.

Dr. PAARLBERG. On the recommendation in the report with regard

to their information on fertilizer—this is a very important question,

of course, and we have tried to improve our work in this area. There

is an interagency fertilizer task force recently constituted, and they

are focusing more attention on the subject. We work with TVA and

the FAO, and we think we have improved our work in this area.

The Statistical Policy Division of the OMB is working to bring

about a better coordination in that area. We think we're making progress in that area.

My final comments are on recommendations 10, 11, and 12 of the

report. These refer to ways of making basic, long-term improvements

in the foreign agriculture information system, and we are in accord

with all three of these recommendations.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Are you aware that in the Foreign Assistance

Act we have some provisions for the International Fertilizer C’enter

and in Huntsville. and the TVA area ?

Dr. PAARLBERG. I'm generally aware of that, yes.

Chairman HUMPHREY. We have made a recommendation of authori-

• zation of funds for our contribution to the International Fertilizer

Center. Senator Sparkman has taken a great interest in that.

Dr. PAARLBERG. Well. we are in accord with your recommendation

there regarding improving our foreign agriculture information systems as a matter of importance to both Dave Hume, who is Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Serveice, and Quentin West, of the

Economic Research Service, and Administrator of that agency, who

has responsibilitv for much of the analysis in that area.

And there I'll stop, and perhaps you'll want to hear from these

other gentlemen.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes; I still want, to ask all of you some questions, and maybe we should just go down the line first. How shall we

proceed?

Dr. WEST. Have has a time problem.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Dave, would you like to go ahead ?
104

STATEMENT OF DAVID L. HUME, ADMINISTRATOR, FOREIGN

AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Mr. HUME. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would mention

also that I appreciate the opportunity to be here at the hearing before

you and to ma e comments. k

I think you do have my statement which is intended to be responsive

to the many questions in the draft report itself. I would like to just

go through this quickly, and point out the areas that should be brought

to our attention.

Now, as you know, 3 or 4 years ago statistics in agriculture from

overseas were not nearly as important as they are today. Agriculture

has been more and more dependent upon agriculture exports and we

are quite aware of the upgrading of intelligence gathering, and

analysis, and putting that information in the form which it can be

understood and the speedy diffusion of it among the people who are

interested in it. This is highly important, and it will become increasingly important as we go on.

Now, before I make my brief remarks here I would like to introduce my colleagues; Mr. William Horbaly, who is Assistant Administrator for Agricultural Attaches, and he supervises that area; with

him also is Mr. Philip Mackie, who is the Deputy Assistant Administrator of our Foreign Commodity Analysis; and Mr. Clark Ison, who

is from the large area crop inventory experiment project and has a

wide crop estimating experience, and that is the activity in which

remote sensing was based.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. H UBIE. It is usually referred to as LACIE. And Mr. Ison is

here to answer any questions that you should have on that.

Now, I'd like to a dress myself d to three areas.

About 2 years ago the Foreign Agricultural Service was reorganized and one of the principal reasons it was reorganized was to try

to upgrade the intelligence and the reporting and information functions.

To understand what we did let me describe the Commodity Division

within FAS as part of the reorganization. The earlier division had

two responsibilities. It had a Foreign Marketing Branch, it had a

Foreign Commodity Analysis Branch, and it had a Foreign Competition Branch. Marketing was the area that was somewhat competitive

with the other side, so what we did was split off the marketing and

put a specialized line of supervision and delegation to the marketing

side, and at the same time we had left the intelligence side or the

analysis side also with a specialized line, so we have upgraded specialization as far as analysis of commodities is concerned within the Foreign Agricultural Service.

This, we believe, has enabled us, and will continue to enable us to

build up quality as well as quantity and timely dissemination of information in these areas.

Now, you might ask what we are trying to do. Now, Mr. Chairman,

I am a layman, and I have set a rule. I have to understand what they

are doing. If I can understand what they are doing, then probably

evreybody else can.

Chairman HUMPHREY . I work on that basis too.
105

Mr. HUME. There are two major areas that we are giving emphasis

to, and I would call it first the return of fundamentals. We are gathering information on a country-by-country basis, and on a commodityby-commodity basis under a supply-utilization format. In addition,

we are adding outlook and forecasting information.

Now, it seems to me that if we can determine what supply is and

those things that go with it, such as production, and consumption,

carryover, export, and so on, for each country, for each commodity, we

will eventually be able to come forward with information which we

•

don’t, have now or which will be vastly improved and we are working

in that direction.

For example, Dr. Meeker has told me this morning that in programing the computer, and they are focusing on this, almost threequarters of a million separate pieces of information for dairy and

poultry production in selected countries went into that computer to

provide the 10-year history base against which the future operations

will take place.

So this has all been done within the last year and a half. In addif ion, the other major approach that we are making is we are in the

process of developing what we call a world trade system, and this

simply will put in the computer export-import information by country source. In other words, if we ask ourselves, take Germany, Japan,

or any country, what kind of commodities are they receiving, and

where are they receiving them from, and in what quantities. NOW,

in our opinion if you can fine tune this supply-utilization format with

forecasting of production, if we can develop this world trade system,

and we think we can, particularly in FAS, we will be able to give the

agricultural community and others in this country information that

they haven’t had and that is almost the ultimate at this stage in the

Foreign Agricultural Service.

I mentioned timeliness, and this is one of the problems that we have,

to get information out, and to be sure that it gets into the hands of

people that need it. We are conscious of the fact that we first represent

farmers, and one of our missions is to get information into the hands

of farmers on a timely basis and in the quantity that’s needed so that

they know as much about the market as some o the people in this city f

do, whether the-y are big or small, or in New York or here, and this

•

is a difficult job, and we have started several new reports.

One is the weekly one, and this came about as a result of discussions with Senator Bellmen, in which we are putting out a press release updating pertinent foreign information. • Chairman H U MPHREY. Yes; I recall one discussion that we had here

on that.

Mr. HU M E. And this seems to be a very popular thing, Senator

Humphrey, and we are picking up the multiplier effect of this information, and it has been gratifying to us.

We have established a world grain situation report which we put

out frequently during the growing season, and it has been very popular.

Here again, we are conscious of the fact that we need to be more timely

in gathering and publishing information. This world grain report has

been well received. I think Mr. Bell may have mentioned yesterday

that we established within the Department two specially identified

groups, one which monitors the general situation as best it can; and
106
107

adjusted, and wheher or not additional funding should be made

available.

This is not, a very politically sexy subject, as you know. This is sort

of the Lord's work that you’re doing here, and nobody really gets

excited about it,

Mr. HUME. We”re already doing a lot of thinking on that 1ine.

Thank you.

Chairman HUMPHREY. David. do you have to leave urgently? If

you do I have two or three additional questions that I'd like to ask

you.

Mr. HuME. Not until 3 :30.

Chirman HUMPHreY. All right. We’ll get Quentin in here first then.

Dr. West ?

Dr. West. Thank you, Senator. It is a pleasure to be back, to talk

with -you. The Economic Research Service is charged with supplying

analytical information on the whole agricultural system. We work

closely with FAS in putting together that informtion on the foreign

side which impacts on not only our domestic system, but our whole

foreign policy. So we have quite a wide charge As the new Administratator in 1972. I felt that we needed to take a fundamental look at

our research, and how we were organizing it to bring ERS up to the

]evel of performance we thought was needed. Two of, our divisions

had existed since ERS was organized, and another one had existed

since the thirties without too much change in the basic program. One

problem was that our coverage of the commodities was divided into

two different research divisions and one more division for the situation and outlook for the markets. So we brought in some people from

the Departments, other Governrment agencies, and from t e universities, to look at what was ERS' role and how we were organized to carry

it out.

Unfortunately that should have been done earlier because about

the same time it began in 1972, some tremendous changes in agriculture and the economy broke upon us. The way we were set up and the

flow of data that we had w-as satisfactory back in the 1920's and up

through the 1960’s. As you know, if you look at the chart of commodity prices and their variation, they go along fairly steady all dur-

* ing those decades, and suddenly in the seventies they become very

volatile.

Chairnmn Humphrey. Yes.

Dr. WEST. So the way we were organized and the procedures which

we used were acceptable during the earlier time period. But, they just

did not serve as well when we got into the seventies when our tremendous surplus, which had insulated us from the world conditions

had disappeared.

For example, we had been estimating farmers’ seasonal pattern of

selling their products on what they sold on the average for each

month of the 3 preceding years. That was the information we had for

making estimates of farm income. And for previous decades that

worked quite well, because they had maintained similar patterns.
108

But as you know very well, the farmers don't follow the same marketing patterns that they did some years ago because prices are so

much more volatile today .

Chairman Humphrey. Yes.

Dr. West. But we did get major changes in ERS underway early

in 1973, with emphasis on refocusing of our research priorities. We

also combined our outlook and situation work with the research function, and greatly strenghened this work by shifting some $600,000 and

19 people internally. We also asked Congress for some additional

money, and we were given a half-million dollars to further improve . ’

our work in outlook and short-term forecasting. So we have substantially strengthened this work.

Not only have we put more people there, but we’ve changed our

analytical approach. We have instigated what we call a quarterly mem- *

orandum that we use each quarter to run through the whole agricultural situation, what we think is going to happen in the area of production and how that relates with exports, or what the carryover will

be of commodities and how that impacts on farm prices, and therefore on the farm income, and also how it impacts on food prices. It

is quite a complex system.

In addition we look at the following crop year with what we call a

contingency analysis In it we say, what happens if the weather is

good, or if it's bad or what happens if economic conditions are bad, or

other alternative assumptions.. We get several contingencies, and we

look at them, and say what will be the impact on the food and agricultural system if these things happen.

We also meet quarterly with representatives from the Council of

Economic Advisers, the Federal Reserve System, the Library of Congress, the Treasury, and OMB, to go over these analyses, We inform

them of the way we see the outlook and also get their feedback on it—

and how they see the impacts. A lot of this goes beyond the agricultural part of the economy.

Chairman HUMPHREY. How often do you do that, Dr. West?

Dr. West. Every quarter.

Chairman Humphrey. After you have gone though that exercise

in the execuive branch of Government and the Library of Congress,

would You be willing to do a similar exercise for the Joint Economic

Committee!

Dr. West. We certainly would.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I think that committee has been derelict and

negligent over the years on agricultural economics, which is so vital .

to the economy. I’m going to make note of this. When do you do your

next briefing.

Dr. West. In the middle of October.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I’ll keep that in mind since we’re trying to

get a better picture of the economic developments.

Excuse me for interrupting, go ahead, sir.

Dr. WEST. Let me mention again, just for the sake of information,

that we are looking very carefully at our whole methodology. Now

I think we have not had a bad record in our forecasting. But, we ran

into so many forces in 1973 which—

Chairman HuMPHREY . A combination of events, yes.

Dr. Wm. Thus, we were low in our estimates of farm prices and

the food price increase. Actually though as we look at forecasting we
109

do not expect to hit it on the nose. In fact, if forecasts are unfavorable

for example, then either the farmers or the administration ought to

do something about the situation through policy changes or program

changes and so on, and therefore invalidate the forecasts.

But the thing we were not doing was to document what assumptions we used and to trace the course of events that canned our major

assumptions and thus our forecasts to change. We have now set up a

group to follow that through and to track and improve our forecasts

and our methodology. This work is really moving forward.

Also as part of this effort we are trying to handle the large volumes

of data more rapidly. It used to be that we only ran through this

analysis once a year, but now we are doing it quarter. We intend

within 6 months to be able to run through this month y so that wc

. do not have to wait for new quarterly analyses.

‘To do that, we have centralized our data system at the agency level

and we have placed a high priority on improving the data flow. We

first worked on our analytical capability and set up our structure and

our methodology for improving our analysis ~ and then the second

priority was put on our data flow. It really amazed me when I took

over the agency that with our responsibility to provide data to the

whole agricultural economic community, we had never had our own

survey data to provide our kind of needs. We had always relied on

others in piecemeal fashion.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes.

Dr. WE S T. We had a couple questions on an SRS survey, we got

Census to add a couple of questions, and we had a little information

from the Internal Revenue and so on. SO our first priority on this was

to put together some resources that ERS and SRS had and request

some additional resources which Congress is in the process of approving. We will start this year with an annual economic survey of farming that will give us a flow of needed information.

Also we do not want to limit this to just farming, because a real

impact on this farming can come from the farm input sector such as

for fertilizer use. And we need to know more about what goes on beyond

farming in terms of processing, and distribution, and also in retail.

Chairman HumPHREY. Yes.

Dr. WE S T. For a long time, of course, the public and Congress have

had a concern about where the consumer dollar is going, and how much

of it is going to the farmer. We have programs to estimate this that

have existed for a long time, but we need a lot more information on

just what happens on the structure and the costs in the input industries

and in the processing and distribution industries. So we asked for some

additional resources this year and this request has been approved by

both Houses of Congress. We expect to get underway in this new program very soon. These are the principal places we started on our flowof-data needs.

To put out this information on a more timely basis we reviewed our

whole flow of outlook and situation reports. There are many of these,

the wheat situation, the livestock and meat situation, and so on.

Chairman HUMPhREY. Oh, Yes.

Dr. WE S T. As a result we have started publishing the Agricnltural

Ontlook. This is a monthly publication in which we try to synthesize

all the information, and try to bring it up to date each month.

GS– Sii—i’6-S
110

Chairman HUMPHREY-. Does every Member of Congress get one of

these ? , .

Dr. WEST. Yes.

Dr. P AARLB e rG. I am sure we have provided them to the House and

Senate Agriculture Committees.

Chairman HUMPHRE Y. I want to make sure that they do.

Dr. WE S T. We had quite a nice letter from Mark Andrews on this

new monthly publication.

Chairman HUMPHREY . I talked to Mark on the plane going back to

Minnesta and North Dakota about this. I’ve heard it’s an excellent

publication that summarizes the most important information of the

month.

Dr. WE S T. That's right. After our next quarter] in-house analysis,

we will summarize it in the Agricultural Outlook. We have not released to the public previously this analysis. It has been internal. The

“Agricultural Outlook" will include the essence of our quarterly review. And as I say. hopefully within 6 months we will be in a situation

where we can run this analysis through once a month. So each month we

can update our evaluation of the production, the supply, and the exports, and the impact on the prices, on income, and so on.

Chairman HUMPHRE Y. I suggest most respectfully that you send

a copy of this to every Member of Congress.

Dr. West. Very well.

Chairman HUMPHREY . It’s only 535 copies, and I think it would do a

lot of good.

Dr. WE S T. Right.

Chairman HuMPHREY. Around here you have to be sort of a general

practitioner with the appetite of a centipede to be able to live.

Dr. WE S T. Well, another publication is ‘agriculture Supply and

Demand Estimates:" which is put out monthly, following the crop reports that come out, from SRS. We run through an analysis in cooperation with analysts from ASCS, FAS, and others on the Interagency

Commodity Committees. We sit down and run through this analysis

of what they. see in the new crop report, what this means in terms of

production, and what adjustment might be made in exports and carryover. and so on. This has been, I think, a very valuable Instrument.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Sort of an analysis of the crop report, and .

what its meaning is in reference to the total supply situation?

Dr. WEST. Yes. We do this right after the crop production and grain

stocks reports come out, and planting intentions reports. It's really a

quantification of all the different things.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Oh, yes. it has beginning stocks, That's the -

kind of thing that Dave was talking about. Does anyone from the

newspapers ever get these?

Dr. WEST. Oh, yes. There are lots of them.

Chairmnn Humphrey. Well. why don’t they use some of that ?

Dr. PAARLRERG . Well, they do increasingly now.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Are they using more of it ?

Dr. PAARLbE R G. Yes.

Chairman HUMPHREY . There is so much misinformation when I go

home to our great agricultural State, and for example, speak to the

chamber of commerce of a town. They have been reading, and listening to radio and TV, and it seems the local paper gets so much mis-
111

information. Maybe it is because they don't understand it. This is a

complex matter.

Dr. West. We also put together in name form all of the information that flows to us weekly. I think that comes up to you. If not we

could provide that to you.

Dave is doing something similar on the foreign side, and we try to

combine some of that, with what’s happening on the domestic side.

This weekly - highlights memo includes reports that come out during

tile week t at relate to the outlook situation, even the weather for h

example.

Chairman HUMPhrey. Yes.

Dr. WEST. As we look ahead, some of our questions right now are

to review our data series. Don mention@ that we have had this group

.

in, including people from the universities, and the American Agriculture Economic Association to kind of coordinate this review with us.

Jim Hildreth was chairman of one group, and he had someone from

Commerce who looked at our farm income statistics and came up with

some recommendations on how we might improve not only the data

that we use to do this, but also some of our concepts. This is important

because some of these concepts are reaching back to the small farms,

which are much different from the typical farm situations. This is a

copy of that task force report.

Chairman HUMphREY. Thank you.

Dr. West. We have one currently underway under the leadership

of George Brandow looking at the farm retail price spread data.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes; we’ve had George doing a study for us

in the Joint Economic Committee as well.

Dr. PAArlBERG. Yes.

Chairman H UMPHRE Y. We are are to publish that study when it

is completed. That doesn’t interfere with anything he's doing for you?

Dr. PAARLBERG . No.

Chairman HUMPHREY . No ?

Dr. WE S T. In fact, we think we will do this type of review at least

once a year, and take a look at some of these areas to make sure that

they are relevant for the present situation in agriculture.

We need to pursue our data and needs in our long-term plans. We need

. to look at the consumer, for example, through a consumer panel to get

the data and information on What happens in what people buy, and

as this is reflected by prices and by income, or different goups, and

so on. Also On how consumers shift from one commodity to another as

- price changes. because we need to update some of our demand estimates

and what causes shifts in demands.

In the long term we are looking for an improved data base for all

of our research programs and we feel a need to put proper emphasis on

this. For example. I already mentioned the structnre and performance

of input industries and food processing and distribution. We have

money for starting a first step in this. and if that's successful we’d like

to move on to get more data in this area.

Also we need to get some more data on land use, land and water use,

and changes in the cost of improving our lands so that we can get a

better estimate of what our capacity is to produce for future demands.

I mention other things in my statement, but I think these are most

important.
112

Chairman Humphrey. We will include your complete prepared

statement in the record.

I hava few general questions, end David, since” you're going to

have to get away. I'll ask you first.

Why are world agriculture production and estimates not subjected to broad review similar the crop reporting board review

in the Statistical Reporting Service, and the Outlook Situation Board

in the Economic Research Service?

Why don't you give the world agriculture production and trade estimates the same kind of review?

Mr. HU ME. Well, they do get a broad review. It’s not a situation -

outlook board.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Do you participate in that ?

Dr. West. Yes.

Mr. Hume And there is an interagency group that does review these. “

I don't think there would be any objection to what we have. I think it

raised some questions as to time, an the situation rewiew takes a little

time, and once in a while we feel that we ‘are—accomplishing the same

thing under our system as it exists, but it does take time to improve

that.

Chairman HUmpHREY. We’ve had some suggestions to create a World

Crop Reporting Board within USDA that would review all sources

of country production information—attaché reports, foreign release

statistics, weather yield analysis, other data, from all departments of

the Government on a timely basis. This Board would produce a forecast or estimate that would be acknowledged within the Government;

that is, with all our department USDA, State, et cetera, as the best

number. Thus we would eliminate duplicate numbers floating within

the Government.

What’s your view on that?

Mr. HUME. Well, I will give you my view, and then I will ask Dr.

Paarlberg to comment on that. But my view is that this would inevitably slow up the providing of this information. If I understand what

you am talking about, it would bean interagency or an interdepartmental type of board.

Chairman HUMPHreY. Right.

Mr. Hume. And you would raise a committee and I’m sure that there

would be differences of views, there would be headaches with language,

and they would be arguing over semantics, and tins is a very big order

to take in the whole world.

I would think that-maybe-I would just say that there would be

too much bureaucracy in that to make it practical. I can see the idea.

and I would support the idea if it could be organized and operated

with the assurance that it would do so on a timely basis. I wouldn’t

object to the idea, but I don’t see the operation being practical.

Chairman HUmPHREY. You feel the factor of delay here is vital and

important here?

Mr. HUMe. Well, to put it bluntly, Senator, I think I would compare

this with trying to get a State Department clearance to clear some of

our agricultural cables. We sometimes take a month to do that, and

only a few words are involved. Now, if I understand it correctly, this

kind of clearance would be much more complex than even that. So I

would have to ask first, what are you going to get out of this kind of

an operation that you don't have now.
113

Chairman HUMPHREY. The only thing you’d get out of it is an agreement upon the statistics and figures and analysis of projections.

Mr, HUME. Maybe we could publish it and let this take place in

retrospect. They either confirm it or they correct it.

Chairman HUMPhREY. I tell you what I’d like to do. I just wanted

to raise these questions because no one knows more about these things

than you men.

Mr. Hume. We appreciate that.

Chairman HUMPHREY. You might want to take a look at that.

Mr. HUME. All right.

Chairman HUMrHREy-. Our aim is to get an idea of the ‘big picture

in a timely fashion.

Dr. WEST. Could I respond to that ? We do this on an informal basis.

I am sure that CIA doesn’t come out with a review, and we do discuss

this, but there is no attempt to force the position.

Chairman Humphrey. To formalize it ?

Dr. WEST. Well, to reconcile the figures. For example, we have not

been in agreement! all this year on U.S.S.R. and for a long time they

held out for a much higher level. For U.S.S.R. grain production this

year they were holding at 210 million metric tons and we had the estimate clown to 180, and they suddenly dropped to-well, first 165 and

then 170. and they arc still at 170 while we’re at 175. So the point you

made is important. For this whole season we have not seen eye to eye

on just how we’ve interpreted conditions in the U. S. S. R., but we do

know what each other is doing.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I understand that. I’m not suggesting this all

be clone by one agency. It’s just like the intelligence services of the

Government.

Dr. WEST. Right.

Chairman HUMPHRE y. I don’t like to have all of it concentrated in

one hand. I think it’s important to get different people looking at the

same. situation. They have different perceptions and estimates.

Dr. West. See, we feel that in agriculture with our extensive attaché

system, we have people out there who know the countries, and thus we

have the best system in agriculture.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Right.

. Dr. West. Now to set up something, for example, that would have

to be approved by the State Department and approved by CIA, before

we could get any information would get us into a very difficult

situation.

Chairnmn Humphrey. I’m afraid you’re right.

Dr. PAARLRERG . If we had to all agree it would be less efficient.

Chairman Humphrey. I see.

Dr. WEST. If we could analyze the reasons why there is a little different interpretation on the situation, it might be more clear to people like

yOU as to why, for example, CIA held at 210 for sometime, and then

dropped down to 170. or why we are still differing. of course, we aren’t

estimating that close anyway, butChairman Humphrey. Yes; that was a considerable variance

Dr. WEST. That was a variance which has impacted on our policy.

Chairman Humphrey. Indeed. The CIA indicates that major communication barriers within USDA have been somewhat overcome

since 1973, but some barriers they say remain-namely economic and

food intelligence information. This only reaches top level USDA deci-
114

sionmakers. The information that passes to the working level is well

filtered. Not all senior analysts in the Economic Research Service are

cleared to receive it, is that correct?

Dr. WEST. Well, on the foreign side, all of them are cleared to receive

it. Not all of them on the domestic side are.

Chairman Humphrey. Likewise, what flows to Congress undergoes

more interpretation from USDA. There are two lines that we might

pursue here. one is to explore with USDA, the accuracy of CIA reports regarding the kind of information received from the CIA, the

frequency, the quality,: the flow; and second, explore how the Congress .

can obtain access to this intelligence data on a regular basis.

What we’re really talking about here is the fact that the CIA is

obtaining worldwide information through various means, which may

or may not be as accurate as the Foreign Agricultural Service attache

system. I think the use of electronics has limitations in providing this

information.

Dr. WEST. Our relationship with CIA is quite close, and in normal

analyses we have no problem in talking to their people and getting

information. There have been certain times when there has been sort of

a clamp put on things. The working relationship is very good at several levels. It’s only sometimes when they learn things only at the top

level and they come out saving this is sensitive.

Chairman HUMPHREY . What concerns us is not only assuring that

the government has the most accurate information as possible, but

timely market information. This means so much to our farm producers, since our farm people today are capable of holding the crop for

a period of time in order to wait for better marketing conditions.

I’m essentially concerned about the producer in this area. I talk to

many of our young farmers out home and they are well educated

and really want accurate and timely data. The-y are not interested in

reading last week’s St. Paul Pioneer Press, I predict that within 10

years we will have computer printout services providing this information to many farm homes.

Dr. WEST. This is one thing that I had in my statement that I didn’t

mention. We have set up an arrangement with the extension service

that provides our current information as soon as it’s released. We put

it on the computer and the outlook extension people can take that off

immediately by tapping into the computer. So they don't have to wait

for the mail service to get it.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Great.

Dr. WEST. And as you say, I think a lot of farmers will move in tlmt .

area, and there’s no reason why they couldn't tap into this very same

information.

Chairman Humphrey. It’s vital to the credit system too. The banks

make loans on projections as well as on reality. Don, you and I should

turn the clock back about 20 years and we'd have a great time.

Dr. PAARLBERG. I think we’ve got that much time left.

Cairman HUMPHREY. I think we have too. We could get these kids

all shaped up.

Dr. PAARLBERG. Right.

Dr. WEST. With the kind of price fluctuations we’ve been getting, a

person if he sells right, can make as much as a year’s crop, if he just

sells at the right time.
115

Chairman HUMPHREY. David, I’ll send you any other questions.

Mr. HUME. May I express my appreciation for your time.

Chairman HUMPHREY. It’s good to have you here.

Mr. HUME. It's nice to be here. Thank you.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Dr. West. I'd like to ask you a few questions.

How is the responsibility for estimates of export demand divided

between ERS and FAS commodity analysts

Dr. WEST. We work with them and they have the final responsibility.

We have an interagency commodity committee and we provide a lot

of information and analysis, and we discuss this, but they have the

final authority.

Dr. PAARLBERG . We take their inputs and perhaps have some influence or carry some weight.

Dr. WEST. We do, there’s no quest ion about that.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Do you have any plans for issuing monthly

digests of world agriculture for general distribution?

Dr. WE S T. We have a regular section on world agriculture in

agricultural outlook, But also this past year we have moved from

putting out the more comprehensive world agriculture situations once

a year to three times a year.

Chairman HUMPHREY. That is very, very helpful.

Dr. WEST. Also four times a year we’re putting out in conjunction

with FAS an outlook for U.S. agricultural exports.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Do FAS and ERS worth together on this

world agricultural outlook ?

Dr. WE S T. We work very closely with them, but we do have the

responsibility for, the world agricultural outlook.

Chairman HUMPHREY. You have prime responsibility ?

Dr. WEST. Right; on this outlook for U.S. agricultural exports, we

work in conjunction with them,

Chairman HUMPHREY . Is it correct that only the fibers and tobacco

analysts have clearance to receive classified information?

Dr. WEST. That could be true, for our domestic. analysts but I am

not sure on that.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I think 1 know why, but go ahead.

Dr. WEST. In our foreign area. we just haven’t had enough resources

. to cover all the commodities.

Chairman HUMPHREY . And my friends from the South have very

powerful positions on the, Committee on Agriculture and they do see

that cotton and tobacco are taken care of.

* Dr. WEST. Our domestic commodity analysts do more of the analysis

on tobacco and on cotton across the board including the foreign areas,

so there's more reason for them to have a clearance. We have quite a

group on the grains and the livestock products in our foreign demand

and competition division. so there is less need for our domestic

analysts in the commodity economics division to be cleared. Howeverq

I am quite sure that the program leader, Jim Naivet is cleared. Do

you know. Mr. Gasser ?

Mr. GASSER. I think that's right.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I think you should find out why there aren’tclearances at more levels. There’s no reason for this.

Mr. GASSER. From the foreign division we do have all Our analysts

who are cleared for at least confidential and all the program leaders

are, cleared for secret and higher.
116

Chairman HUMPHREY. That’s in the foreign area?

Mr. GASSER. That’s right, in the foreign demand and commodity

division.

Dr. WEST. This now runs up to about $1,000 to clear someone for

secret. If they don’t need that clearance then that’s money you save.

Chairman HUMPHREY . I agree. But I think the question for you,

Dr. West, is to determine if more people could benefit by having this

clearance.

Dr. WEST. We’d be very glad to have more of them cleared,

Chairman HUMPHR EY. I want to emphasize that you know whether -

or not your work is in any way limited by this restriction..

Dr. WEST. It has not come to my attention that there is any problem in lack of clearances, because we do have the authority to clear

who we want to.

Chairman HUMPHREY. OK.

*

Dr. WEST. So that has not been an issue that’s been bought to my

attention.

Chairman HUMPHREY . This is just another question that has been

brought up in discussions by the OTA Food Advisory Committee

which is headed by Dr. Wharton of Michigan State..

How are the reports of the Interagency Commodity Estimates Committee integrated with the ERS agricultural supply and demand

instruments ?

Dr. WEST. They are one and the same thing.

Chairman HUMPHREY. They are?

Dr. WEST. This publication called ‘agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates” is really the result of the interagency commodities

committees. It goes through the Outlook and Situation Board which

is in ERS. SO we do most of the analytical work, but these committees

are chaired by representatives from ASCS.

Dr. PAARLBERG. I have overall responsibility, Senator Humphrey.

I chair the entire operation. Each one of the commodities has its own

chairman, and they report to me, so this is cleared through me, both

the supply and demand estimates that are published here, and the

interagency group that makes projections regarding yield and so on

for the various crops.

Chairman Humphrey. Would it be feasible or desirable to organize .

a food and agricultural intelligence unit made up of key commodity

specialists from ERS, FAS. and ASCS ?

Dr. WEST. Well, we have that in each of the commodities, but not

for food, per se.

Chairman HUMPHREY. The point would be to unify it into one panel. -

Dr. PAARLBERG. Really they are here. There’s a committee for each

one of the major commodities, and they are integrated under my overall chairmanship and each one of these groups does, in effect, contain the experts on these commodities from ERS, FAS, ASCS, and

AMS. when that’s needful.

Chairman HUMPHREY. So you in a sense have a working unit?

Dr. WEST. We really have that.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Very good.

This has been a good review. Dr. Paarlberg. we would be happy to

have any suggestions you would like to contribute to this report. By

the way, I haven’t mentioned today what you’re doing to buttress
117

the FAO. We heard yesterday that the FAO is doing a better job,

for example, on some of its projections, and on gathering agricultural

information at the international level, Are you of that opinion?

Dr. PAARLBERG. We are. They are improving in their work and they

work cooperatively with us. They can do some ‘things that we can't

do. and we can do some things that they cannot.

Dr. WEST. Could I mention a speific example ?

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes.

Dr. WEST. We used to do food balances by country, for which we

9 tried to get all the information on the crops that are produced, put

together the total Consumption, and come Up with a number of calories

per capita. We did this in the middle 1960’s as a basis for what we

called the world food budget.

. Chairman HUMPHREY Yes. I remember that.

Dr. WEST. This was a most comprehensive analysis of the level of

consumption around the world. Now, we had not used FAO too closely

up to that time, because they were pretty much restricted by what

the Government said they could do. But as a result of the indicative

world plan, that whole exercise, they set up a much better system of

statistics in which they kind of filled in the gaps. Some of their information came from us. We had a struggle to put this out on the African

countries, and then a few years later FAO crone out with some food

balances for Africa, and I thought we could thus update ours. our

food balance on Africa, and we looked at them and they were the food

balances we had prepared earlier. They got theirs from us.

But anyway, they are putting out on a regular basis these food

balances. and we felt that it would be best to put our resources on those

things that are most critical in our whole export program. Rather than

trying to periodically dig in to solve the many problems of other commodities that go into making up these food balances, we would let

FAO do it.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Right.

Dr. WEST. So we are not now doing these comprehensive food

balances.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Instead you rely on FAO ?

Dr. WEST. That’s right, because I think theirs now is as good as we

could do, and I might say, that’s not too good, because you don’t know

how many bananas there are produced, -so all this has to be pretty

much of an estimate. Unless we get a real breakthrough on some of

these minor crops, you will still be estimating at the same levels, or

increasing it by population growth. or something like that. This is

the best you can do, and so we thought it was better to concentrate on

other commodities. Grains, of course, make up a big part of the diet

of most people in the world. Grains are important in the trade and

I think they are the best indication of what’s happening in world

food consumption.

The last time we did Asia. for example, we ran through all this

exercise, and we came out with some results that we couldn’t believe.

After looking at it and discussing it we decided, to estimate for India

here, and put all the countries in this relative order. and go back and

adjust it to come up with these estimates. Because India was the best

information we had. Information on minor crops was not that goodl

so we concentrated on the groins.
118

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Dr. PAARLBERG. Thank you. We appreciate coming up here, and we

think this is a constructive report, and it gives a fresh look from the

outside of our operations, and it provides the occasion for us to review

this whole matter with you, which we are happy to do.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you very, very much.

[The prepared statements of Dr. Paarlberg, Mr. Hume, and Dr.

West follow:]

STATEMENT OF DR. DON PAARLBERG , DIRECTOR OF A GRICULTURAL ECONOMICS ,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF A GRICULTURE

I believe that we in food and agriculture have one of the best information

systems of any sector in our economy. And we have, without a doubt, the best

food and agriculture information system in the world.

You have asked the administrators of USDA agencies dealing in world agricultural information to also appear at these hearings. I don’t intend to duplicate

their comments but I would like to make a few brief remarks in response to

major recommendations in the report, “Food, Agriculture and Nutrition Information Systems: Assessment and Recommendations” made for the Office of

Technology Assessment.

I believe the report is quite comprehensive and serves the very useful purpose

to highlight concerns about inadequate information. Evaluation and assessment

reports are always needed, especially when they also contain recommendations

on what to do.

The first two recommendations address the question of how to obtain more

analytical capability for Congress. We support the idea that Congress needs

more help in dealing with the large information flow on food and agriculture.

And we support both recommendations as reasonable ways to provide the increased capability.

More analytical capability on the staffs of the agriculture committees and

in the Congressional Research Service should help to make the current information system more useful to the specific needs of Congress. In addition, we stand

ready in the Department to be as responsive to analysis of information for Congress as our resources will allow. Recent examples of our response to these needs

are testimony on various issues by top staff people plus reports on fertilizer,

energy, transportation, and the structure of the food and fiber sector.

At the same time the effectiveness of additional analytical staff in the Legislative Branch or of our staff to address specific issues is dependent on our doing

well in our basic mission. That is to develop and maintain a capital fund of

knowledge on which economic intelligence for program and explicit policy

analysis can draw at any time.

There are also a large number of very capable analysts in the land grant university system. I’m sure that Congress could benefit from increased liaison with

these people and I believe you would find them to be very responsive to your

needs.

A second major topic in the OTA report addressed the problem of obsolete

data series. This is a pertinent problem, primarily caused by changing structure

and changing flow of economic activity in our food and agriculture system.

However, the solution lies not with more general statistical review committees but -

with action by the agencies having responsibility for our food and agriculture

information system.

‘The Department has a statistical review committee made up of members of

the American Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA) and the American

Statistical Association (ASA). Top staff people in ERS and SRS are members

of the economic statistics committee of AAEA and have association with many

other important users of agriculture information through membership on the

Census Bureau’s advisory committee on agriculture statistics. These are useful

activities but not major agents for change.

We think the solutions to these problems are going to be very difficult at best.

Thus the managers of the key agencies. those who know the data problems and

the difficulties of change most thoroughly, and who must carry through on commitments for change. are in the best position to modernize, coordinate, and

standardize the food and fiber data series.

In addition to the normal program evaluation process. our staff has been

involved in a number of special activities toward this purpose. We worked a
119

long time with the Census Bureau to develop what we thought would be a more

appropriate definition and classification system for describing today’s agricultural producers. Other discussions with census staff will lead to improved information on corporations and partnerships involved in farm production, on identification of other major economic activity of large corporations involved in farming, and on the use of contracts and agreements in production and marketing.

Another approach we have taken to this problem has been to select a specific

data series and have an ad hoc task force evaluate the series and recommend

improvements. We had such a task force of university, foundation, and government personnel look at the farm income estimates series last fall. Currently we

have university, industry, and government people on a task force studying the

farm-retail price spreads, market basket, and market bill data series. We believe

.

this ad hoc approach has been very useful.

The third major topic of discussion in the OTA report concerns the timeliness

and reliability of data, especially as it relates to the Census Bureau. The question

of needed changes in the Agricultural Census including possible transfer of the

operation to SRS is a complex issue without an immediately clear answer.

What is clear is that the Agriculture Census program needs to be modernized

to use current data gathering techniques, to more nearly meet the data needs

in today’s more specialized agriculture, and to develop ways to produce the

results in a more timely fashion. It is also clear that much closer coordination

between Census and SRS needs to take place and if the activities remain in two

separate Federal Departments, there should be a greater provision for efficiencies

of planning and operation.

The Census of Agriculture has a long history of providing useful data on the

farming industry. At one time, the census figures were used by the Department

to benchmark and revise our crop and livestock estimates. However, implementation of improved modern probability survey methods in SRS has resulted in

crop and livestock statistics that surpass the quality of Census data. In fact, the

Census Bureau has used SRS statistics in its 1969 and 1974 programs to measure

incompleteness in the Census data.

The Census of Agriculture provides needed county data and other information

beyond that produced by the Department of Agriculture. This includes detail

on structure and organization of the sector that is becoming increasingly important. But we don’t feel that a complete census of farms is the most cost-effective way to conduct the program, nor is continuing to get all the data once every

five years the way to get the figures published in a timely manner. We believe

that the Census should be replaced by sample surveys and that much of the

Census data would be better obtained annually over a five year period with

emphasis once each five years on generating county estimates.

The Department is prepared to enter into full collaboration and joint study

of this issue with the Census Bureau.

I have only a brief response to the issue of a more fully coordinated fertilizer

information system. We are participating in an Interagency Fertilizer Task

Force that was established by the President’s Economic Policy Board. This has

been a useful activity and a forum for discussing problems in information on

fertilizer. Our analysts have given quite a lot of thought to what gaps there are

in this information system. They have had discussions with TVA, FAO and others

and laid out plans to improve the information. This includes more detailed data

on fertilizer inventories consumption and prices, data on the structure, costs

and practices of the fertilizer industry to help in analysis of fertilizer supplies.

Beyond this, we look to the Statistical Policy Division in OMB as having

the authority to bring about closer coordination in information that is scattered

across several agencies of Government.

My final comments are on recommendations ten, eleven, and twelve in the OTA

report. These refer to ways to make basic, long term improvement in foreign

agricultural information system% We support all three of these recommendations

since improvement in foreign statistics is so vitally important.

We believe that the Department’s role in AID funded technical assistance

programs has been very productive. This type of direct assistance is probably

the best way to improve statistics in countries eligible for AID funds. AlD, FAO,

tile Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, among others, have also

had an active and useful program of financing short-term training for foreign

agriculture statisticians in the United States.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I'll respond to any questions you may have.
120

STATEMENT OF DAVID L. HUME ADMINISTRATO R, Foreign AGRICULTURAL SERVICE,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin by posing three propositions:

Sound Intelligence and competent analysis are increasingly important to

a world agriculture being called upon to’ feed more people better.

The reporting and analysis system carried on by the Foreign Agricultural Service-covering more than 130 countries and more than 200 commodities the world’s best recognized and most used.

We have strengthened that system substantially in the past three years—

and have work in progress to strengthen it further.

The Foreign Agricultural Service consists of 850 people, including 125 sta- -

tioned overseas. It includes the Agricultural Attaches at American Embassies

and Consulates in 63 foreign posts. FAS functions include food aid (PL 480),

market development, international trade policy and negotiations, the (CCC Export Credit program, intelligence gathering, and export reporting. Commodity

analysis is basic to all these operations.

The task of FAS commodity analysis is the collection, analysis and dissemination of agricultural commodity situation and outlook information relating to

our foreign market and competitor countries. The emphasis is relating to our foreign market and competitor countries. The emphasis is on historical data series,

analysis of the current commodity situation and short-term forecasts. The

“model” in which we handle this information is ‘the concept of supply-utilization

balance. That is, beginning stocks plus production plus imports equal total supplies less consumption and exports equals ending stocks. This is the framework

within which we approach all our commodity work albeit with some modifications to fit individual situations.

There are many users of FAS information-each with somewhat different

needs. As we plan our work, we are constantly aware of these various users and

their changing requirements. Their interest in FAS information continues to

expand and intensify. They are progressively more demanding in their requests

for information. Essentially, we can group these users into four types:

1. The general public; that is, farmers, the private trade, consumers and

researchers.

2. U.S. Government agencies; that is, the administration policy and program decision makers, the Congress, and analysts of the overall domestic

and international economic situation.

3. International or animations and foreign governments. FAS, along with

the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), is recognized as a primary

source of world agricultural data. Pick up any foreign publication which

includes data on world agriculture and chances are this data will have come

originally from FAS or FAO.

4. Internal FAS action offices; that is, Market Development, Trade Policy,

P.L. 480 and CCC Credit. Here, the support work for the multilateral trade

negotiations has placed a substantial burden on the Commodity Analysis -

area, and we expect this load to continue for the foreseeable future.

The product of FAS reporting and analysis is published in a number of forms

to meet the needs of different users. The traditional “bread and butter” outlets

are still basic to our operation-Foreign Agriculture Circulars, Foreign Agriculture Repents, the monthly World Agricultural Production and Trade, and the

weekly Foreign Agriculture magazine.

In FY 1975, we published 117 FA circulars and distributed them on 25 specialized commodity mailing lists open to anyone free upon request. Foreign Agriculture magazine carried 68 major articles originating in the FCA area and nearly

1,000 short items during the year. This magazine has a circulation approaching

10,000 and receives wide secondary circulation as source material for trade

publications and the mass media.

Information generated by FAS analysis is also published by other USDA agencies, including the Economic Research Service, the Extension Service, the Agricultural Marketing Service, and the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation

Service. A primary outlet is the Outlook and Situation series of ERS, We also

contribute, primarily in a review nature, to the publications of the Foreign

Regional Analysis Division of that agency.
In addition--in order to get wider distribution of current information on a

more timely basis-FAS has undertaken a number of new services:

The export sales Report issued weekly by FAS, summarizing reports

received from exporters. This Report carries considerably more analysis and

interpretation than was the case when publication was first begun by the

Statistical Reporting Service.

The World Grain Situation issued at intervals of one or two months—

an FAS publication that is unique in the world and which is greeted with

intense interest by press, trade, and agricultural organizations.”

Increased use of field information outlets of the Extension Service, and

the Agricultural ‘Stabilization and Conservation Service, and the centralized

w press and broadcast facilities of the Department, including a regular weekly

roundup in the Agri-Tape service to about 600 radio stations.

A new weekly summary of developments in foreign agriculture and trade

initiated last June in order to provide more timely information to farmers.

This is issued as a Department press release and given wide distribution.

* FAS information is reprinted and reported worldwide in the general, business, and trade press-with and without attribution. It becomes part of analysis

●nd interpretation developed by research staffs in industry, other government

agencies, and international organizations. It is built into the planning of farmers

processors, exporters, importers, railroads and shipping companies.

Our goal in the coming year is to review FAS publications with the objective

of elimiminating duplication and at the same time providing more timeliness of

information and improved analytical input. In conjunction with the FAS management, the Commodity Analysis area has reviewed publications of the Tobacco

Division and is currently reviewing those in the area of Oilseeds and Products.

The review in these two areas has the objective of determining end-user use and

acceptability, and the ideas generated will be incorporated in our general review

of FAS publications.

In addition to published information, FAS analysis provide major support

to internal USDA and FAS operations. This work includes briefing and studies;

spot reports on developing commodity problems; support of the CCC and P.L. 480

areas in determination of commodity availability, usual marketing requirements and prices; support of requests which come directly from our attache

offices overseas; support to the Market Development area in preparing an analysis of day-to-day commodity trade problems which come up with our trading

partners, and in support of the multilateral trade negotiations. In the area of

MTN support, the commodity divisions have been involved in preparing offer

and request lists, including item-by-item, country-by-country analysis of trade

restrictions. They also provide the administrative support and analytical backup for the Technical Advisory Committees pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974.

The backbone of FAS information collection is the system of Agricultural

Attaches stationed in 63 overseas posts and reporting on 82 countries. In the

past 3 years, we have undertaken a substantial strengthening of their organization. We have enlarged the professional Attache staff in Moscow and in other

.

posts where political and economic change is altering the nature of world agricultural trade. We placed one Attache in Vienna with responsibility also for

Hungary and Czechoslovakia, although we had to reduce our staff in The

Hague. We also have expanded the Attache’s work in Yugoslavia to include

Romania. We have endeavored to place an agricultural officer in the U.S. Liai- m son Office in Peking, and are hopeful of positive results, Ambassador Bush and

the Department of State have expressed interest in having an agricultural

representative assigned to the team in Peking. We are now discussing with

the Department of State the conditions under which such an officer could effectively represent U.S. agriculture in the People’s Republic of China. We have

also requested assignment of an Agricultural Attache to our Embassy in Cairo.

We have also expanded and strengthened the reporting by Agricultural Attaches

already assigned.

Most attache posts are covered by a scheduled reporting program for the

attaches on a commodity-by-commodity basis, The number of these scheduled

reports has increased dramatically in the past two years from about 1,400 in

early 1973 to over 1,900, currently. The number, frequency and intensity of the

individual commodity reports vary by country depending on the importance of

the commodity and the particular country involved in terms of its world importance in production and trade. Our emphasis in the past two years has been
122

to revise these reports along the lines of the supply-utilization format, and

to increase the emphasis on the current situation and the outlook for the coming season.

As an example. we receive regularly scheduled reports on the grain and livestock situations from major countries on a quarterly basis, but regularly scheduled, detailed reports from minor countries are due only on an annual basis. In

addition to the detailed commodity reports we also receive numerous special

reports on a frequent basis-for example, weekly grain prices in Rotterdam

and weekly livestock prices in Tokyo.

Besides the scheduled reporting system, attaches are constantly alert to

developing commodity problems in their areas, and they submit cabled reports

on these situations. Our cable communication system facilitates constant interaction between Washington analysts and attaches in the field with respect to

specific commodity problems and special requests.

This year we will be undertaking a detailed review of the attache reporting

system with the objective of consolidating and refining it to tie information

more closely to the needs of information users and to our analytical system. .

information from the attaches is supplemented in Washington from other

sources. For example, attache reports provide leading indicators of foreign

trade for major commodities and countries but detailed and complete statistics

are compiled primarily from government publications of foreign countries. These

are submitted directly to Washington, thereby saving the time of the attaches,

while still enabling us to provide the detailed information which is so important

to many of our users.

We also cooperate and share information with international organizations

such as FAO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD), and the International Wheat Council and other U.S. agencies such

as the Census Bureau, which collects detailed data on U.S. trade; ERS, which

analyzes the domestic agricultural situation and international questions of a

longer-term nature; and the State Department, which provides general economic

information on foreign countries.

There is an exchange of Information and views between FAS and economic

analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency’s Office of Economic Research Service provides us with certain classified documents-specifically the

weekly economie intelligence report, the petroleum report, and other special

reports. Analysts in our commodity division-for example, those having responsibility for data from the USSR—have informal contacts with their counterparts in the CIA. These are not regular contacts, but intermittent and personal.

They are nevertheless helpful to both agencies.

Another major source of FAS data is the private trade, Our commodity analysts

review a large number of domestic and foreign trade publications. Personal contact with farm groups and business people is also very useful,

In addition to a constant refinement and strengthening of these techniques

and services, we have assumed major new functions:

We have within FAS the Secretariat responsible for leadership in the U. S.-

USSR Agreement on Agricultural Cooperation, signed in June 1973. This work

will involve the exchange of about 25 economic and technical teams between the

two countries during this calendar year. It is work that requires patience and

endurance, but it has the promise of substantial mutual benefits as time goes on.

A more detailed treatment of this effort is presented by Assistant Secretary Bell.

FAS has within the past year taken on the export sales reporting responsibility

required by Section 812 of the Agricultural Act of 1970 as added by the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973. For a time last fall and winter, we

also carried on a system for the voluntary prior approval of large export sales of

grains and soybeans. The export sales reporting system is providing the basic

information for decisions now being made with respect to grain sales to the

USSR.

FAS is also the lead USDA agency in the new experimental program aimed at

assessing crop conditions by remote sensing afforded by the operation of satellites and analyzed with the aid of computers. This program is known as the

Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE).

This is an operational test of an information system which could significantly

improve the continuity and content of international crop forecasts, using satellite

data, meteorological and climatological data and historical trend data. Previous

studies established the potential of using computer processing techniques of remotely-sensed data provided by satellites to classify crops, thus distinguishing

among various crops grown in the same area. The LACIE project is a follow-up
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of these studies, which will aid in determining the utility and cost effectiveness

of using satellite and surface derived data to monitor wheat production over large

areas.

The experiment will combine crop acreage measurements obtained from LANDSAT data with meteorological information from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration satellites and ground stations, and will relate weather

conditions to yield assessment and ultimately to production estimates. The utility

of the information produced will be evaluated on the basis of its objectivity, timeliness and accuracy, and its expected value for policy and program decision

making. We are presently 6 months into the 3 1/2 year experimental program.

Such a system could provide a new capability for the United States and other

countries in making agricultural production and marketing decisions; to inform

. us of the spread of crop diseases and insect infestations which could affect world

food supplies; flash an early alert if crop shortfalls are expected from adverse

weather; and provide improved production estimates to international organizations.

Whatever the sources of FAS data, raw information becomes useful only when * it is put together in a form that makes sense and that is easily understood. That

is our objective. Putting information together in this way requires both economic

training and commodity knowledge on the part of the analyst. In the past two

years we have brought into the Commodity Analysis area 24 well-trained, mainly

young (in their 20’s) economists. These numbers do not, of course, represent a net

gain. There is an offset through retirement and rotation out of the Commodity

Analysis area. We have lost something in experience, but the people we are hiring

are well-trained in economic techniques and the use of computers.

We have instituted a program to rotate our junior professionals through at

least two different areas of the agency in Washington before sending them to the

field. We feel that this program will provide better training for junior attaches.

And if all of the young people whom we send to the field have had experience in

Washington’s Commodity Analysis divisions, the commodity information furnished from the field should he improved.

Most of our analytical work is currently based on simple trend models, experience and commodity knowledge, and common sense. We think this has given us

a pretty good track record and with the re-emphasis on reporting, etc., we have

shown improvement over the past two years. This is not to say, however, that

we have achieved perfection. We have been criticized at times for shortcomings

in providing timely data and for a lace of sophisticated, econometric input to

our analysis. We think that with these new professionals we will be able to move

forward in this area but we feel we should add a note of caution in that there

are severe limitations in econometric modeling and in the data requirements for

these models. Progress and improvement from this source will be slow.

We are moving forward in other areas as well. To date, most of our work has

been on the production and trade side. We are now moving to emphasize the

demand side. We have added a specialist in macro-economics to provide our

commodity specialists with forecasts and analysis of the general demand situation in major countries.

. We are moving to improve our automatic data processing facilities which are

important to improving the timeliness and accuracy of the information we provide and we hope will result in a saving of clerical input. This should release

personnel for additional analysis. While on the subject of data processing, it

should be pointed out that the Reports and Statistics Office included in our Com-

- modity Analysis area provides the data processing and computer support for the

total agency. We have recently established an ADP Steering Committee at the

Deputy Assistant Administrator level to coordinate this function.

I thank the Committee and the Chairman for the opportunity to discuss the

reporting and analysis work of FAS. With me are several others of the FAS staff;

we will be pleased to respond to questions.

S T A TEMENT OF DR. QUE N TI N M. WE S T, A D MI N I STRATO R , ECONOMIC R ESEARC H

SERVICE, U. S. DEPARTMENT oF AGRICULTuRE

I am very pleased with this opportunity to tell you about things we have done

to improve the Economic Research Service (ERS ). The last three years have

been very dynamic for our Agency, just as they have been for agriculture.

We develop economic information for use by public and private decisionmakers, and provide it in a variety of ways to a diverse audience.
124

The audience is wide because our information covers many subject matter

areas including farm inputs, farm production, and food processing and distribution as major components of the U.S. food and fiber systems; foreign agriculture

production and trade; development and use of land and water resources; and

the principal social and economic factors affecting life in rural America.

Thus a major part of our program is devoted to providing information on the

subjects that were focused on in the Office of Technology Assessment’s (OTA )

report, “Food, Agriculture and Nutrition Information Systems: Assessment and

Recommendation.” More specifically, this is “information concerning national

and world food production, trade, stocks, prices and disappearance, and on information needed for policy decisions made by Congress, , Federal agencies, State

Governments, and agribusiness.” (page 3 of OTA report)

The Economic Research Service and its predecessor agencies have a long his- -

tory as a vital part of food and agriculture information systems. We are proud of

our accomplishments and optimistic about the future. We believe that timely,

accurate, and objective information on this important segment of our economy

will continue to be in great demand for making sound decisions and policies.

We look forward to meeting future demands for economic information. ~.

But in the past few years, our task has become increasingly difficult. Many

contributing factors have been converging: the depletion of surplus stocks of

farm products, increasing concerns about meeting world food needs, rising demand, changes in the structure of agriculture, increased complexity of relationships with the rest of the economy, and scarcity of raw materials.

To highlight how we have been reacting to such challenges, I would like, first

to discuss the improvements we have been making in the conduct of economic

analysis. Then I will focus on improvements in the timeliness and type of information we provide and on our efforts to improve the flow of data as raw material

or input to our analytical process. Finally I will touch on further improvements

that we feel are most urgently needed,

IMPROVEMENT IN ANALYTICAL CAPACITY

Our basic contribution to the food and agriculture information system is economic analysis. To strengthen this role, we have placed our first priority on improving our analytical capabilities, especially in our major economic situation

and outlook programs. This is because we felt the primary problem in 1972–73

was analytical, a conclusion also reached by Dr. Karl Fox in a special report to

the Council of Economic Advisers. The OTA report also agrees with this conclusion and further clarifies the problem by stating “the economic models and supply-demand-price equations, which had performed satisfactorily in the more

stable conditions of the 1950’s and 1960’s had little value in the light of the

changes which occurred in the domestic and world markets when the size of the

1972 world grain crop became known” (page 40, OTA report).

We have taken three major steps to improve our analytical capabilities. The

first was to reorganize the agency so that our resources were more clearly focused

on important subject matter areas and to bring the research program into more

direct support of the situation and outlook work. A second step was to reallocate

close to $000,000 and 19 staff positions to the situation and outlook work and

longer term projections program. The third major step was to request and receive

about a half-million dollars in additional resources to provide an increased number of highly capable, quantitatively oriented economists.

We have used these additional resources to strengthen the commodity situation .

and outlook staffs and to establish forecast support units. These units have

become the focal point for development of commodity, cross-commodity, and

foreign country models that are becoming increasingly operational as a part of

our forecasting work. These units are also developing a forecast information

system in which documentation and evaluation of our forecasts are an integral

part.

Some of our reallocated resources were used to strengthen our capabilities

for making longer term projections in agriculture. We now include projections

to 1980, 19$5 and beyond as a regular part of the economic information produced

by ERS.

- Another important change we made during the past three years was in forecast procedures, We have developed a regular program of producing new forecasts each quarter on what we consider to be the most likely assumptions for the

three to four quarters ahead. Then we supplement this forecast with contingency

analysis using alternative assumptions on such key variables as weather and
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levels of exports. The results of these analyses and the underlying assumptions

are then discussed in group meetings with other key staffs from USDA, Council

of Economic Advisers, Federal’ Reserve Board, Treasury Department, and Library

of Congress. This interaction helps test the soundness of our assumptions and

analysis.

Most of these changes may sound like they are focused on U.S. agriculture.

But we have also placed increased emphasis on evaluating the foreign outlook

and its impact on the domestic economy during the past three years. As. Dr.

Clifford Wharton, Jr. pointed out in his preface to the OTA report, “the growing

world interdependency has highlighted the information systems describing that

interdependency. Nowhere is this need clearer than in the areas of food, agriculture and nutrition.” (p.v., OTA report)

- Our domestic and foreign analysts work very closely together on many subjects.

In addition, ERS analysts work closely with the Foreign Agriculture Service

on questions of foreign agriculture demand, production and trade. Analysts from

both agencies serve on Department level commodity estimates committees as

well as more recently established committees that focus on the questions of m production, demand and trade in Russia and The People’s Republic of China. Our

analysts have also been fully cooperative with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N. in its development of an early warning information system.

Two specific questions you asked us to respond to concern the use of remote

sensing and weather data to estimate agriculture production in those areas of the

world where other information is lacking and how we work with CIA information. Since 1972 we have established a separate research area in world weather

and crop production. The focus of our recent work here has been to strengthen

the use of world weather information in situation and outlook reports and conduct a few selected studies such as forecasting wheat production in Turkey,

analyzing the effects of weather on spring and winter wheat yields in the USSR,

and studying trends in weather and grain yields in 25 world regions.

Weather data are also used extensively by our analysts in making forecasts of

Soviet grain production. Weather indices are estimated and combined with trend

yields of individual grains and estimates of areas planted to produce grain

production forecasts.

The use of weather data and remote sensing to measure crop production

prospects is the major focus of an experimental project our Department is

conducting jointly with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. This project, called the

Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment, is a study of the degree to which computer assisted analysis of data acquired from space can contribute to crop forecasting. ERS participation includes the assignment of six people to the project

and other support activities such as the preparation of crop production calendars to be incorporated into computerized yield models.

Our analysts specializing in such areas of the world as the Soviet Union

maintain regular, informal communications with units In CIA working on Soviet

agriculture, food, and trade. Much of the information available to the CIA

is also available directly to Soviet analysts in the Department, Usually there is

. general agreement between ERS and CIA analysts on principal agriculture estimates. When different estimates arise, the [differences are examined and discussed

informally but there is no attempt to force a common position.

IMPROVEMENTS IN OUTPUT OF INFORMATION

-

A major improvement has been in our publication program. Most conspicuous

is our new monthly “Agricultural Outlook” situation report. This serves as an

outlet for brief reporting on our continuing appraisal of the situation for

commodities, farm income. farm inputs. foreign production and trade, transportation. and farm-retail price spreads. Our target is to furnish through this new

publication frill updates of our forecasts each month to provide our best assessment of the agricultural situation. This would also meet one of the OTA report

recommendations that “the Economic Research Service should improve its world

information analysis capability by strengthening its ability to analyze, evaluate,

and interpret current world information on a monthly basis during the crop

growing and early harvest season” (page 9, OTA report).

Other changes in publications to provide more timely information include issuing the report. “Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates” containing updates

about monthly on important basic commodities, going from once a year to three

times a year in publishing “World Agriculture Situation” and from annual to

68-877—76—9
126

quarterly assessment and publication of “Outlook for U.S. Agricultural Exports."

This latter one is done cooperatively with FAS.

We have also worked to improve the timeliness of our information through

closer cooperation with the Federal Extension Service. The State extension outlook economists can now obtain the most important data in “Agricultural Supply

and Demand Estimates” and other situation report summaries through a computer hookup on the same day that we release the estimates. This has made the

information far more useful to these outlook economists than when they had to

wait to receive the printed publication in the mail,

One of the comments in the OTA report was that our food and agriculture

information system is “basically an impersonal, production oriemted system’”

(page 6). Although we don’t integrate nutrition information into our analysis.

we have made a couple of other improvements in the past three years that we

think are consumer oriented. The first was to greatly increase the detail of our

information on price spreads and components of marketing costs. This is an

effort to explain more fully the reasons for changes in food prices, who gets what

from the consumer’s food dollar, and to identify areas of research for improving

the efficiency of the system. ,

A second effort to communicate to consumers is our recent introduction of a

monthly TV news service on current agriculture information. We have been successful in getting these outlook oriented features used on prime-time evening

news shows in most major television markets.

One area of improving information that is of common interest to ERS and

FAS is a more rigorous and systematic appraisal of foreign demand for U.S.

agricultural products. We have requested additional resources to establish such

a program of continuing information and analysis of the longer term prospects

for foreign trade. Our current information on foreign demand is far less rigorous and comprehensive than information on the supply side.

Dr. Paarlberg has already commented about the Department’s concerns on

obsolescence of agricultural data systems. ERS and the economics profession in

general have become increasingly concerned about this problem. We feel that

ERS should take the lead in reviewing and changing data series that no longer

provide the most meaningful descriptions of food and agriculture. As Dr. Paarlberg has already mentioned, we have had special task forces to assess the farm

income and price spread, market basket and market bill statistics and make

recommendations for improvement.

IMPROVEMENT OF DATA FLOW AS AN INPUT TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

My third major topic is a brief discussion of what we have been doing to improve the flow of data needed to conduct timely and objective analysis. After

setting our first priority on improving our analytical capacity, the second priority logically was to develop a flow of data that would fill our most major gaps

in data available to conduct analysis with. We set about to identify these major

data gaps, determine agency priorities for meeting these needs, and develop

plans for meeting these needs. This has included joint planning with other agencies who are major suppliers of the data we use. We added resources in the Office

of the Administrator to lead this planning effort and to be in more continual

contact on data problems with other agencies.

In looking at our most important data gaps we decided that the first priority

was to combine some programs of ERS and the Statistical Reporting Service,

add some resources, and implement an annual economic survey of the farming s

sector. This would provide data for improving our supply response analysis, farm

income estimates, capital accounts, consumption of major inputs, and some

environmental impact analysis.

A second priority was to start obtaining data that would allow significant improvements in our analysis of the structure costs and performance of the farm

input food processing, and food distribution industries. The final implementation of these two plans awaits Congressional approval of the Department’s appropriations for FY 197&

Our staff has also done a lot of work in planning how to meet some of our other

major data problems. One of these is a continuous survey of consumer food purchases so we can improve our forecasting and analytical capability with respect

to food prices through better measures of price and income elasticities and demand shifters. A second longer range plan is to fill in the many economic and

social data needs on the use, the changes in use, and potential capacity of our
127

land and water resources. Analysis of the capacity of the U.S. agriculture production sector depends on obtaining more of this type of data.

A third longer range plan is further improvement in the data to analyze the

structure, performance, and costs of the input, Processing, and distribution

industries. Many important questions on the supply and costs of farm inputs

and the costs, services performed, economic concentration, and efficiency of the

food processing, wholesaling and retail industries need this type of data.

We still have work to do in improving data on foreign agriculture. We have

worked closely with FAS to establish a more complete data base on world production of grains. We have also worked with FAS and FAO to improve informiltion on fertilizer. We are continuing discussions with FAO about more access

and use of an extensive supply-utilization information system they have been

. developing over the past four years. We will be giving more emphasis to this

area of data needs in the months ahead.

An increasingly important part of our effort for improving data flow is to more

frilly apply current computer technology and capabilities in managing and

m analyzing the large volume of data we work with. We believe that this will free

more of our resources for analyzing the important questions and issues. It will

also make our staff more flexible and our work less vulnerable to turnover in

key staff positions. We recently centralized our data processing activities to facilitate this area of improvement.

FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS MOST U RGENT L Y NEEDED

These highlights of our improvement activities demonstrate that ERS has

been a dynamic agency in the last three years. We have been doing these things

at the same time that there has been a sharp increase in the magnitude and complexity of economic issues to be analyzed. We believe that despite the problems

we are a much stronger agency then we were three years ago.

So what are the major areas for further improvement? Our first priority is

to bring to fruition the plans we have laid out for improving the flow of data.

‘This includes both the plans for getting more of the data we need and for more

effectively managing and analyzing the data we already use. Our ability to produce timely, objective economic information will be greatly improved when we

fill the data needs identified in our longer range plan. Our ability to minimize

obsolescence in agricultural data systems is also dependent on having the flow

of data to draw on for making necessary changes.

I already discussed several of these important data needs. Our most immediate needs are for a continuous survey of food purchases by consumers, a flow

of data on the economic aspects of land and water resource use, and data on the

structure, costs and practices of the farm input, food processing and distribution industries.

To improve the flow of foreign data, we plan to critique the grains data base

improvement work we have been doing with FAS. This should lead to discussions with FAS on undertaking more of this type of work which is primarily

to develop a more consistent set of data out of the numbers available.

Three recommendations in the OTA report refer to improving foreign information through more support of international agencies such as FAO and through

more AID funds for technical assistance in developing data collection programs. We fully support these recommendations as a way to bring almost longer-term

improvement in foreign data. But we believe that more immediate improvements are also needed. We plan to enter into more comprehensive discussions

on this problem in the near future with FAS and others.

Our priority on improving the management and computer assisted analysis of

data will he largely handled by redirection of our current resources. We believe

this improvement is needed to free our analysts from some of the more routine

aspects of the research process.

As I already indicated, we have placed priority on more complete monthly

analysis of the world agricultural situation. Our target is that six months from

now this more complete monthly analysis will be the basis for material in the

‘“Agricultural Outlook.” We are also planning to devote more resources to the

weather-crop production research and continue with our involvement in the

Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment.

Our forecast support units are already heavily involved in developing economic models on production, trade, utilization and prices. These are models on

major commodities and on countries that are important foreign markets. We
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plan to move this work along rapidly and add to it the work we will be initiating to provide more systematic and comprehensive analysis of foreign demand.

Other initiatives we have taken in the past three years also continue to be

high priority. These include hiring top quality, quantitative economists for our

staff, periodic examination of economic and statistical data series for ways to

improve their quality and relevance, and continued improvement in the ways

we make information available to decisionmakers.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to respond to any questions.

[The following questions were submitted by Senator Humphrey to

the U.S. Department of Agriculture and their answers thereto:]

Question 1. At the present time the Digest of World Agriculture is a “monthly -

overview” prepared by junior staff members of the ERS and FAS for internal

use only. What, if any, plans do You have for issuing monthly digests of world

agriculture under the supervision of senior staff for general distribution?

Answer. The Digest of World Agriculture is used to disseminate information

and preliminary analyses of international agricultural subjects to USDA analysts *

and officials without the full review that is required of formal publications. As

such some of the conclusions may be very tenuous and may not have been adequately reviewed in the Department for release to the general public. Some articles have been included even after serious objections from specialists of the

subject.

The Digest provides a broad preliminary picture of the current international

agricultural situation. Much of the material is issued in official publications of

ERS and FAS with very little delay. Agricultural Outlook, a new ERS monthly

publication, has a section on world agricultural developments. Moreover, international events are given consideration whenever appropriate in the analyses of

the domestic economy.

Foreign Agriculture and a news release on important events in world production and trade issued weekly and Foreign Agriculture Circular issued frequently

by FAS give general distribution to information on world development that

affect U.S. agricultural trade. World Agricultural Situation, which is published

three times a year, and the annual agricultural situation reports giving more

detail by regions of the world provide more comprehensive treatment of world

agriculture.

Other possible ways to provide world agriculture information on a timely

basis are being considered as part of a continuing review of the ERS publication

program.

Question 2. Would it be feasible and desirable to organize a current food and

agriculture intelligence unit made up of key commodity specialists from the

Economic Research Service, the Foreign Agriculture Service, and the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service and have them issue monthly world

crop reports from the planting season until harvest in the major producing areas

of the world?

Answer. At the present time the world outlook and situation activities are

performed in two separate agencies. FAS has the dual role to expand foreign

markets for U.S. farm commodities and provide information on the world agriculture situation. ERS has the role of conducting a Program of economic research

to provide information on both domestic and foreign agriculture.

With the increased interdependence between the U.S. and world economies, it

has become very important for domestic and foreign analyses to be closely ●

integrated. Analysts from ASCS, FAS, ERS and SRS serve on commodity estimates committees to assess the total supply and demand picture which is then

cleared and released through the Outlook and Situation Board. This is an effort

to integrate the foreign and domestic analyses. Currently these committees do

not give detailed attention to the world agricultural situation except as it implies

changes in U.S. exports.

Other Departmental working groups such as the task forces on USSR and

PRC and ERS-FAS working groups provide some of the t’ecus needed on current

world intelligence. These groups meet frequently concerning information and

statistics on world production, trade consumption, and stocks of grains and other

commodities.

Mechanisms already exist in the Department, such as the Outlook and Situation Board, to Provide timely information in world agricultural conditions. Some

further clarification and coordination of the three Agencies roles and activities

coupled with improved data and information systems are appropriate.
Question 3. In order to assure the accuracy and timeliness of information on

world commodities, would it be feasible and desirable to create a joint FAS-ERS

Board with responsibility for approving the information included in these reports?’

Answer. USDA has an Outlook and Situation Board responsible for reviewing

and approving outlook and situation material for the Department. This Board

reviews and approves the release of the outlook for U.S. agricultural exports

on a quarterly basis. The World Agricultural Situation, which is issued three

times a year, is also cleared by the Outlook and Situation Board. Since the Outlook and Situation Board consists of members from agencies throughout the

Department creating a new ERS-FAS Board would mainly duplicate the functions this Board is already responsible for.

. At the present time, much of the information and statistics on world commodity production, trade, consumption. and stocks are also discussed on a

regular basis between ERS and FAS. A statistical review committee has frequent

meetings to clear statistics on grains. During the very active times of grain

production, these meetings are held on a weekly basis. And there are regularly

m scheduled meetings for clearing statistics of the other major commodities.

USDA task forces have been created to review the agricultural situations in

the USSR and the People’s Republic of China. The USSR task force makes

periodic releases on agricultural conditions and grain production and trade

estimates of USSR, generally in Press Release.

Question 4. To what extent have recently increased current economic intelligence activities of international agencies improved the data base for FAS and

ERS reports on world agriculture?

Answer. The recently increased economic intelligence activities of international

agencies have helped improve the FAS and ERS data base primarily by providing supplementary information about certain countries and commodities which

USDA does not collect directly. The international agencies provide a useful check

on USDA data as well as provide a different perspective in analysis. Recently

increased focus by international agencies on early warning and outlook and

situation type of information also provides another perspective that is useful

to USDA analysts. The USDA also benefits indirectly in those cases where international organizations have assisted individual countries in issuing new types

of data or in improving the reliability and timely distribution of existing data.

ERS hopes to develop a more comprehensive and timely data base on world agricultural trade by extracting agricultural trade data from computerized U.N.

trade data and thus avoid the complicated and lengthy process of compiling

and reconciling trade data from individual country sources.

At the present time, ERS relies most heavily on international organizationsalthough not necessarily new activities--for— international monetary and financial

information such as balance-of-payments, foreign exchange, financial flow, price

index, and national ‘account data from organizations like the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Question 5. There is general agreement that estimates of world demand for

food are far less satisfactory than estimates of supplies. What new programs

have FAS and ERS undertaken in recent months to improve forward estimates

of tile demand for agricultural commodities by countries and regions? What are

your plans for strengthening this area in the next year or two?

Answer. The Foreign Demand and Competition Division of ERS has recently

undertaken work to improve and expand its effort for making forward estimates

of foreign agriculture demand and U.S. agricultural exports. .4 new trade forecast group has been established to develop analytical methods to forecast the

aggregate level and commodity composition of U.S. agricultural exports. Further

realignment of resources and programs to strengthen country and commodity

demand analyses is under consideration. This improved research capability in

collaboration with commodity intelligence and expertise of FAS will improve our

capacity to make forward demand and trade estimates. These forecasts are in

turn imcorporated into domestic commodity and aggregate economic models.

We will continue to improve our trade forecasting capability. ERS and FAS

have held discussions on how to improve the longer term forecasts of foreign

demand and have implemented some plans toward this objective. For fiscal 1976.

ERS requested an increase in its budget of $790,000 to do in-depth studies of

demand for U.S. agricultural exports in major country markets. This new research effort was proposed to develop basic economic relationships that affect

agricultural production, consumption and trade of food and fiber in foreign

countries. This research will contribute directly to forecasting and projecting

U.S. agricultural exports by country and commodity. However, Congress reduced
130

our request for foreign market studies from $790,0000 to $290,000, thereby significantly cutting back our proposed research. Although, the new appropriation

will allow us to make some improvements in our demand studies, additional resources are needed to expand the needs of the type of research.

The Foreign Agricultural Service is also taking steps to improve its capability

of making forward estimates of U.S. exports. Recently FAS combined its livestock commodity work into a single division, so that it will be easier to generate

and coordinate foreign import demand estimates of feed grains and oilseeds in

U.S. exports markets.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Next we have Mr. Hosea Harkness, director

of planning, agri-products group, Cook Industries; Mr. Melvin Sjer- .

v enj senior editor, Milling& Baking News; and Mr. David Keefe, head

of commodity group, Lamson Bros. They will comment on the timeliness and accuracy of United States and world information on Agriculture, based on private -industry experience.

This panel is of very significant importance to us. You can evaluate

agricultural information as to whether it's useful, accurate, and of

assistance to you in your daily work.

Each of your statements will be printed in its entirety in the record.

Plase summarize these in the interest of time.

Mr. Harkness, go right ahead, sir.

STATEMENT OF HOSEA HARKNESS, DIRECTOR OF PLANNING, AGRIPRODUCTS GROUP, COOK INDUSTRIES, INC., MEMPHIS, TENN.

Mr. HARKNESS. I would like to emphasize just a few highlights,

Senator. Frost of all, you made a statement yesterday in your opening

comments that "A man’s judgment is no better than his information,”

and this holds very true to the private sector, a company’s judgment

is no better than the information that it has.

But this information, to benefit everyone, must be timely, and it must

be, if not—if it cannot be collected on a comparable basis it must be

disseminated on a comparable type basis, so that it is comparable.

I think that in this country one of our greatest problems is the fact

that we have the most sophisticated agricultural data collection service

that exists in the world in the Statistical Reporting Service. We are so

well informed in this country and have been through the years that we

try to compare the world, and I’m not saying we don’t need the world

data. We need it badly, and this is the problem.

I would like to emphasize the outlook and situation board in the

ERS, that their reports are the only economic type information that a

large segment of private industry has.

Now, we as the company I represent, we have our own staff of econ-

.

omists, and we are doing our own economics work, but we must recognize that there are many people, and companies and organizations

which are smaller than we are, who cannot afford to have this type of

personnel on their payroll, and ERS is very essential to them.

And once again I want to emphasize, which has been emphasized

over the last 2 days, that FAS does do the best job in the world of

putting the world statistics together, which doesn’t mean that we can’t

look ahead though to types of improvements.

I would like to just very quickly read through my recommendations.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS. And to maybe make another comment or two as I

go along.
131

‘There is definitely a need for better world statistics on livestock numbers. In a sense, this is a very, very weak area, and the European countries, with Russia, the Chinese, people throughout the world want to

put protein on the tables of the populations, and livestock numbers

throughout the world become much more important.

There needs to be a continued effort for speeding up dissemination

of foreign statistics. They have to be timely and they have to be

quick. There has to be more timely release of printed copies of reports.

The timelag is too great from the time that the press release is made

and the printed copy is available.

Chairman HUMPHREY. That’s due to the Government Printing Office.

I don’t think that we have updated the technology of the Government

Printing Office to take care of the tremendous additional requirements.

You know, every report that you people have to fill in they have to

print up there. We should take a look at what Mr. Harkness has said

about the printing of material.

Mr. HARKNESS. OK, I would like to see an effort to encourage USDA

personnel to better understand statistical agencies in other countries,

I will point out that just a little bit later.

I would like to see-I think that it is for the benefit if there would

be an elimination of some of the apparent duplication of effort by the

ERS foreign analysis group with FAS taking over this total function.

And this stems from even myself as an individual asking questions

and finding-and I think they are coming closer together in acknowledging that each other exists, but in years past, asking questions, and

one saving, "Well, we have our own series of data and we don’t agree

with the other." There was a duplication of effort where they didn’t

get together.

OK, support for continued research methods in understanding and

supplying timely intelligence for world information.

Continued support of SRS sampling and yield research, especially

methods for improved techniques for early season forecasts.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS. And support of continued investigation of remote

sensing such as the LACIE program, so that when remote sensing is

an operational tool, the USDA will be able to utilize it on the domestic

and foreign scene.

And then my last point, which you have read a couple of times concerning the world crop reporting board, and I would like to give a

little bit more detail here of what I am proposing here, or more why I

am Proposing it.

First of all, I do not think this is a time-consuming thing. I think

we can look at SRS and if you lock people in a locked room at 5 o’clock

in the morning, they are going to get the job done by the end of the day.

In other words, in SRS and the crop reporting board, there’s a difference of opinions inside those locked doors, ‘but that report comes out,

find comes out quickly, and it one number, and you do not hear one

individual saying, I believe such a number and another one saying I

believe there’s one number and this is one of the chief things I’m after

here. is that we do not need a State Department number, we do not need

a CIA number, we do not need an FAS number, we need one number.

If we would go back and take the 180 and the 210 on Russia and we

would have been better from a user community to have had a number
132

half-way in between, or had them come to an agreement on which

number was best.

Chairman Humphrey. I think that it greatly depends upon the

clearance procedures that you have. If the Secretary of Agriculture,

were chairman of the World Board, and the clearance procedure

required that within 24 hours all documentation must be cleared, this

would eliminate the business of having everyone initial the report.

Have you ever seen one of these documents that clears the Government ? Everybody from the fellow that’s emptying the wastepaper

basket up to the man that’s going to call on the visiting head of state -

has to get his little initials on the side, and of course, they are out of

town half the time. That’s been the problem with clearance procedures.

Go ahead, I’m on your side.

Mr. HARKNESS: I have one last item— .

Mr. DESIMONE. Before we go to that, Mr. Chairman, may I suggest

that the wording in the recommendation-((we could eliminate duplicate numbers floating around in the Government’’- is confusing.

I think perhaps part of the problem that Dr. Paarlberg and others

have had, is that what you really mean is that there are confiding

numbers, not duplicate numbers.

Mr. HARKNESS, YES, OK. .

One other point I’d like to bring out under No. 9, and this is No. 4,

and the reason I put No. 4 about understanding statistical agencies in

other countries is I have traveled in other countries and I hunted out

the person who was the administrator of SRS-type persons in other

countries and tried to understand their statistics system, and they

then—I know what their official number is, and I know in my opinion--and this is strictly my own opinion—how much confidence I

would put in that number, and some of these countries that have very,

very high confidence in their statistical repenting systems-but when

the FAS report comes out, which has been based on attaches’ analyses

and so on and so forth, it would be a number entirely different, because

they don’t believe it.

I think that there is not an understanding hereof what makes a good

statistical system within a country, and we have some systems in the

world which have-which are as good as the United States. They are

not as timely, but they are as good. They may be 1 or 2 years getting -

the information out, but the data, as it was collected, was collected

with very, very sound statistical bases.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I think that’s a very worthwhile recommendation.

All right, are you through with your statement ?

Mr. HARKNESS. I’m through, yes.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harkness follows:]

STATEMENT OF HOSEA S. HARKNESS , DIRECTOR OF PLANNING, AGRI-P RODUCTS

GROUP, COOK INDUSTRIES , INC., MEMPHIS , TENN.

We, as an international trading company, live day by day with the agricultural

statistical information which is available from all sources we can locate worldwide. Plus, we continuously attempt to verify by our own intelligence where

data is being released untimely or is totally lacking.

Data, to be of the most benefit, must be collected in a comparable manner and

must be released in a timely manner. Both of these factors play a key role with

the organizations under discussion at this hearing.
133

I would like to take these organizations one at a time and begin with the Statistical Reporting Service. This organization is the most sophisticated agricultural data collection service in the world. Reports are released with a timeliness

that exists nowhere else. Quality of the forecasts and estimates are unsurpassed.

The most criticism expressed against SRS is by individuals or groups who, in

my opinion, don’t understand the system. Improvements undoubtedly can be

made but these become minor when you look at other informational areas worldwide which lag far behind.

On the domestic scene, let’s look at the Economic Research Service. Prior to

late 1872, the Situation Board issued scheduled reports that would spell out the

situation when released but generally did not look ahead and were quickly outdated. As a result, the Situation Board and staff were frequently lagging far

● behind the current events and had no reason to catch up until the next regular

Situation report was due for release. A large segment of private industry depended on this service, and as a result were not being kept up to date on the

domestic situation. Since 1972, the Supply-Demand estimates released when

there was a new major crop number published have forced the Situation Board m to become more realistic and to keep up to date. As a result, these analyses have

become much more useful to the public.

Each Supply-Demand Report needs to be broadened to give further explanation

of the component parts of the supply-demand balance tables. For example, when

changes are made in domestic usage, they need to be quantified. We need to

know if that domestic change was the result of livestock feeding or was it

because of a change in mill consumption or other non-feeding reasons. Such as,

on September 12, 1974, the Supply-Demand report indicated that the feed usage of

corn for the 1974-76 season would be 3,73%3,859 million bushels. On October 11,

1974, following the October 1 crop report, the Supply-Demand Report indicated

1974-75 corn feed usage at 3,487-3,607 million bushels, which represented a change

of 250 million bushels from September. The October report made the inference

the reduction was the result of declining production. However, the report did

not state if the reduction was concerning the number of livestock on feed or the

rate of feed the livestock would receive. Livestock number and rate of feeding

are both a basic part of the corn market.

Now for the Foreign Agricultural Service, it does the best job in the world of

putting world statistics together on a comparable basis. They have speeded up

their release of data considerably since 1972. Prior to. the 1972 crop season, information on a given country might be two-three months old before released. Information supplied in attache reports might be a month old when submitted,

then the FAS circular was released one to two months later. Statistics are almost

meaningless if a report indicates the corn crop in a given country is doing excellent but by the time the information is released two months later, the crop

has deteriorated sharply due to a severe drought or crop infestation, To a certain

degree, these problems have been overcome. The development of country balance

tables have been a major improvement in giving a more comparable picture of

the world situation. The analysis of the USSR situation haS been good information for public consumption; however, a reluctance to change as quickly as con-

. ditions might indicate has been noted. All in all, we feel good effort is being

made to feed information quickly to the public.

The export commitment reports are overall fairly good except for Western

Europe, where speculative buying by countries keeps the actual numbers less

certain.

Recommendations, as we see them, for improvement of agricultural information systems are:

1. The need for better world statistics on livestock numbers.

2. Continued efforts for speeding up dissemination of foreign statistics.

3. More timely release of printed copies of reports. The time lag is too great

from the press release to the printed report release.

4. Encourage an effort for USDA personnel to better understand statistical

agencies in other countries.

5. Elimination of some apparent duplication of effort by the ERS Foreign

Regional Analysis Group with FAS by combining these functions under FAS.

6. Support for continued research methods in understanding and supplying

timely intelligence for world information.

7. Continued support of SRS sampling and yield research, especially methods

for improved techniques for early season forecasts.
134

8. Support of continued investigation of Remote Sensing such as the LACIE

Program, so that when Remote Sensing is an operational tool, the USDA will

be able to utilize the system both on the domestic and foreign scene.

9. A World Crop Reporting Board be set up within the USDA that would

review all sources of country production information (attache reports, foreign

released statistics, weather-yield analysis, check data, etc. ) from all departments of government on a timely basis. This Board would set a forecast or

estimate that would be acknowledged within government (USDA, State Department, etc. ) as the best number. Thus, we would eliminate duplicate numbers

floating within government. This would eventually lead to more credibility

for the private user.

Chairman HUMPH REY. You may proceed, Mr. Sjerven. .

STATEMENT OF MELVIN S. SJERVEN, SENIOR EDITOR, MARKETS,

MILLING & BANKING NEWS, KANSAS CITY, MO.

.

Mr. SJERVEN. I am Melvin Sjerven. I don't suppose there is a publication outside of Government, outside the Government Printing Office, that uses more of the crop reports and the information of the

Department of Agriculture than we do, and I want to say that some

of the misgivings that we have about information, as mentioned in

my statement are being corrected, and I think the people in the Department should be commended for what they are doing to correct

errors.

And the other thin that hasn’t been mentioned is the openness. If

there’s information that they can tell us, we can talk to the people

in the department, and discuss with them how they arrive at a certain evaluation.

I certainly agree with both of these witnesses, and what they have

to say about the information services. From our point of view I did

want to touch on domestic utilization a little bit, and I did that at

some length in referring to the study which I won’t even go into, but

it’s an example, I think, of the important informational service on

the domestic side. I think it’s easy for us to get all tied up in looking

at export projections and carryover projections and not to pay any

attention to nutrition and the domestic side of business.

The study itself, entitled the Schnake-Leath Study, recognizes one

limitation, and there is another study of the household food consumption survey which incredibly comes out every 10 years, and it ranks .

with the Bureau of census and Manufacturing as being an untimely

report, and hopefully something will be done about that on the domestic side, or at least that these kinds of studies will be done in

some particular place other than the household consumption survey.

But certainly once every 10 years is not enough to publish that kind

of domestic utilization information. About the number of reportsif there was in 1972 a scarcity of information about what was going

on, we may have a surplus of information now, and maybe the effort

is to eliminate all surprise., and if that’s the case, we question whether

that in itself is a desirable goal, unless uncommon confidence prevails

in the accuracy of those projections.

While we would commend FAS and ERS for their data, there is

one report that causes a lot of problems-one conflict of reports, and

that is the conflict between the exports as reported by the Foreign

Agricultural Service in their Weekly U.S. Export Sales, and actual

inspection as reported by Agricultural Marketing Service. There was
135

a 53 million bushel discrepancy at the end of the crop year. Well, anyone who is using one or the other of those reports, you could see what

it would do to your carryover.

I notice this year’s total, the first 2 months of the crop reporting

that those two figures are very close together. Now, maybe somebody

has already corrected that, I’m not sure.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes; that is something we should check into.

Mr. SJERVEN. The things that I have in my statement are exclusive

of flour.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. SJERVEN. Flour is even worse, but it's a smaller amount. Flour

is even worse though. Flour is 40 million bushels exported, and I

think the export sales show them much higher than that.

m So that becomes difficult. And in defense of FAS, I guess I can say

that they always put a cautionary statement on there saying that it’s

a mistake to add these things together and come up with that, but

then they proceed to do it themselves in the report. And we do that.

Getting back to what Mr. Harkness said, too, if you have conflicting

numbers floating around, both numbers have the imprimatur of the

Department of Agriculture and any newspaper, any publication like

our own that picks it up and uses it, we explain it, but I’m not sure

really how many people read the explanation. They look at the tables,

and this is a figure that has imprimatur of the Department of Agriculture and that’s what they accept it as. And that much of a gap is

too much.

We certainly hold a high regard for the integrity of the Statistical

Reporting Service, and nothing was detracted from the intense interest in the reports, but I do have one interesting and almost amusing

little objection from our friends in our part of the country, Mr.

Humphrey.

Arizona is probably going to replace Montana as the second largest

producer of durum in 1976, and it isn’t even listed as a durum-producing State in the crop report.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I would like to include this in the questions

we’ll be sending to the Department officials, and tell them I am doing

this on behalf of Barry Goldwater.

Mr. SJERVEN. There is enough acreage contracted in Arizona this

past year so that it was very close to Minnesota in durum, but it’s

probably going to replace--and it’s fall-seeded durum.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. SJERVEN. And our macaroni manufacturers wouldn’t like it very

well, but the Italians would like it and the exporters are selling it.

Here’s another problem; you see durum is a small crop, and here

is durum that is not produced according to the production report,

but it is exported according to export reports.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Very interesting analysis. This is the kind

of thing that we should bring to the attention of the Department.

Mr. SJERVEN. The Census of Manufactures, as was discussed, is untimely. It is a fine benchmark report, I can't say enough for it, but it

just is untimely when you get it.

This is not in my statement. It has come up since I issued the statement, and is a matter of concern to me in the area of information, and

that is the manner in which the ban on exports was extended to Poland
136

without the knowledge of the Department of Agriculture. What in

the world does it do to our understanding of the flow of information if

we have a projection of what exports are going to be in another department of the Government, and it can intervene or does intervene and

say that this is the way it’s going to be. The same thing applies, to

some extent, to the negotiations of long-term agreements. If that is a

State Department function without coordination or equal status for

the Department of Agriculture, we worry about what it does to the

flow of agricultural in ormation. f

Chairman HU MPHRE Y. Also, I think it poses the problem in refer- .

ence to what we call regular customers. If we have a decline in production, and we have an agreement on the fulfillment of certain levels of

a crop, or of exports, what do we do? Is this amount taken out of the

domestic market at the expense of the American consumer? Or are

the amounts sold to regular customers like Brazil, Japan, and the

United Kingdom reduced ?

Mr. SJERVEN. Well, Senator, I guess the first thing you do in negotiations is negotiate an escape clause in it. In 1974-75 we couldn’t have

exercised the 10-million-ton minimum agreement with the Soviet

Uniono

Chairman HUMPHREY. That’s right.

Mr. SJERVEN. Look what we’ve done to the carryover of wheat and

corn, and if we had a 10-million-ton agreement with the Soviet Union

in 1974-75 we would have had to use an escape clause, and I assume

if we have that kind of an escape clause, they would want an escape

clause for when their crop is too big.

In other words, the only time this kind of agreement really works is

when you don't have to use it.

But it does affect information. because, as you say, if we have that

agreement, then what about those other customers, those other traditional customers, what about the American consumers.

And it affects our total information system. And one other point

quickly and that is Dr. Paarlberg also gave a very important speech,

I thought, last week in which he indicated that the agricultural establishment has lost the ball in establishing farm policy, and the agricultural establishment he described as the Department of Agriculture, the

congressional committees on agriculture and that the new agenda on

agriculture has as its No. 1 item, food prices, and specifically how to -

hold them down.

Now, if that be true, what effect does that have on what projections

really mean. because in my mind that means that somebody back here

is going to be sitting there with a price limit in mind” to the farmer,

and when it reaches that level we have to do something about it.

Chairman HuMPHREY. Well, if that’s going to be the policy, at least

it should be debated and decided upon. If we're going to have a maximum on price, as well as a minimum on price, and a maximum on

production as well as a minimum, these are things that should be

decided on as policy issues by the Congress of the United States in

consultation with the appropriate departments of Government.

Mr. SJERVEN, Thank you, Senator.
137

 [The preparedst@=t of Mr. Sjerven follows:]

STATEMENT OF M ELVIN S. SJERVE N, SENIOR EDITO R MABKETS , MILLING & BANKING

NEWS, KA NSAS CITY, M o .

My name is Melvin S. Sjerven. I am senior editor for markets of Milling &I

Baking News, a weekly trade magazine for managers in grain, billing and baking’

industries.

In addressing the question of what improvements in the Foreign Agricultural Service and the Economic Research Service have been made since 1972--

1973, and what further improvements are feasible, we would want to state at the

outset that we have been very much impressed with improvements over that span

of time, and that commendation is accompanied by strong urging of further improvements. A case in point claimed much attention in our publication in recent

weeks and I would like to discuss it in some detail as one example of the kind

of improvement we have noted. -

Rarely are editorials in Milling & Baking News continued beyond a single

page and in nearly all issues two editorials make up that page. But, scheduled

for publication in our issue of Oct. 7 is an editorial entitled “A Landmark Study.”

That this editorial will fill the page plus half of another gives some indication

of the significance we attach to the study. May I read the introductory paragraphs of that editorial?

“Consumption analyses recently issued by the Economic Research Service of

the U.S. Department of Agriculture fill a void in data about flour and baked

foods usage that rank publication of the information as an important turning

point in breadstuffs knowledge. Published in detail in the August 26 and Septemher 2 issues of this journal, the study provides facts about past and current

flour consumption trends of a type and of a value never before available. Of

even greater importance than the information about the past and present are

the clues that the study presents on future flour consumption trends. When

combined with the information ‘mined’ from the 1972 Census of Manufactures

for flour milling and baking, which have been extensively reviewed in a number

of earlier issues, it would appear that breadstuffs marketing managers have

more reliable and more productive statistical tools available to them currently

than ever before.

“On this score alone, the industry owes a great debt of gratitude to the study’s

authors, both young holders of doctorate degrees in agricultural economics. Dr.

L. D. Schnake is stationed at the Grain Marketing Research Center at Manhattan, Kansas, the federally-funded facility charged with studying all aspects

of grain and products markets. Dr. Mack N. Leath is with the Prairie Village,

Kansas, office of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, where

he is project leader for systems analysis in the Grains Program, Area. Many

people probably need to be thanked on behalf of the industry for encouraging

this pioneering work. Right at the top are Dr. Quentin M. West, administrator

of Economic Research Service, and Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz. GratiV tude for the study is accompanied by voicing of the hope that the work will be

funded for continuation.”

Obviously, the Schnake-Leath study struck a responsive chord in the editorial

offices of our publication, which we reflected in the amount of coverage we gave

to it. The innovative efforts involved, in our opinion, go right to the point of

these hearings into the timeliness and accuracy of current information on agriculture. This study recognizes the limited usefulness of the Household Food

Consumption Survey, which has been the major source of information on wheat

products consumption, but which is published only once every 10 years. Our

excitement over this study also reflects the importance to domestic users of

grain and to the growers of the data provided by the various branches of the

Department of Agriculture.

Also in the domestic utilization area, we see the need for more attention to

wheat feeding in particular and animal feeding in general, instead of treating

such usage as residual.

In milling and baking, there is considerable discomfort over whether we have

a problem of iron deficiency anemia in this country, or whether that situation
138

has been politicized. We suggest that the measurement of nutritional well-being

ought to be assigncd to somone.

Turning to the issuance of projections, estimates and reports generally, in

our opinion it can be said that if there was a scarcity of information in 1972

there is almost a surfeit of information in 1975. Once issued, forecasts tend to

become subjective and, with an increased number of forecasts, sometimes i t

appears that the forecasts themselves have a multiplier effect on any problems

involved. We sometimes wonder if the issuers of a proliferation of projections

at times are not under pressure to eliminate all surprises. We question whether

that in itself is a desirable goal unless uncommon confidence prevails in the

accuracy of the projections.

With a few notable exceptions, we find the current informational reports of .

the Department of Agriculture to be timely and accurate.

We do have a few significant problems.

One of the more troublsome is the conflict between wheat export inspection

data as provided by Agricultural Marketing Service and accumulated exports

as reported by Foreign Agricultural Service in its weekly issuance of ‘*U.S. Export sales.” Export inspections data as published in “Grain Market News”

showed July 1974-June 1975 wheat exports, exclusive of flour, at 993,236,000

bus. The total shown in “U.S. Export Sales” was 1,045,900,0(M) bus., also exclusive of flour. That disparity of 53 million bushels is enough to throw out of kilter

evaluations of data using one or another of the reports. Careful reading of the

report reveals that Grain Market News figures are inspections as reported by

A.M.S. and that U.S. Export Sales figures are reports by exporters to F.A.S.

Nevertheless, both are published with ‘the imprimatur of the Department of

Agriculture. We have noted that thus far in the new crop season the two figures

are closer together.

The seriousness of the kind of problem I have just described is that the conflict in Information, even though it can be explained as coming from different

sources, has a deleterious effect on the credibility of other information issued

by U. U.S.D.A. We think a need exists to coordinate information derived by the

various agencies before releases are made.

We hold in high regard the integrity of the publications of Statistical Reporting Service. Nothing has detracted from the intense interest concentrated on

its monthly estimates of crop production. Those estimates are based on the con.

dition of crops at the time of the S.R.S. survey, “and assuming normal weather

will prevail for the balance of the crop growing season.” Recent yearn have shown

that the assumption of normal weather is often misleading and perhaps weather

technology will provide an alternative.

Crop production data also do not reflect the expanded durum crop of Arizona.

Based on reports of contracted acreage, it appears that Arizona could emerge in

1976 as third or even second largest producer of durum after North Dakota.

We find very valuable the situation and outlook reports of Economic Research

Service. We would encourage expansion of studies dealing with domestic wheat

utilization by class and, again, treating livestock feeding in greater detail.

Census of Manufactures reports as issued by the Bureau of Census provide

valuable benchmark information, but they would be much more valuable if

issuance were more timely. We are aware of advanced technologies, such as remote sensing and analysis of

weather data and urge more research and applications, but thus far we have seen

few timely reports emanating from utilization of the technologies. We find the World Grain Situation publication of Foreign Agricultural Service

of great interest and of improving value. Sometimes its evaluations differ significantly with the international Wheat Council, but we find the data of special interest. Tracing the deterioration of the U.S.S.R. grain crops claimed special

attention this season. Question arose from time to time whether F.A.S. lowered

the Soviet estimate as much as its information indicated because of concern over

the credibility of a report sharply lower. But certainly it must be said that

information on Soviet grain production-and grain production around the

world—was made available much more quickly than in any previous year and for

this the Department should be commended.

"Certainly advances in information technology should be pursued and utilized

to a maximum in view of the tightening of the world food situation in recent

years. We feel that government agency responsibilities should shift from providing a proliferation of projections and estimates to a coordination of information

with special emphasis on consumer needs. In the process, some shifting of respon-
139

sibilities among the agencies would undoubtedly be in order. Certainly, conflicting

data should be reconciled as much as possible.

Our best hope is that hearings such as these will lead to further refinements

in information systems. We feel that great progress has been made since 1972,

Thank you for providing us this opportunity to express our views.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Mr. Keefe, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF DAVID KEEFE, LAMSON BROS., CHICAGO, ILL.

Mr. KEEFE. Since you are talking about a shortage of time, I'll try

. to be brief. Actually, several good suggestion have already been made

in the information submitted by m fellow witnesses. Alsol to be very

frank, the presentation by key USDA officials yesterday and today

confirms that they have already aggressively initiated programs to m improve on the accuracy and timeliness of reports on the world food

situation.

One thing I’d like to submit in which we have put together on this

world food situation is a graph depicting a gradual decline in world

carryover of food and food grains stocks since 1969. We have found a

great deal of interest in this at seminars in the Midwest, especially

among grain dealers and farmers you referred to earlier. I would like

to pass out a few copies of this graph to show that if one does put a

limit on exports, and in effect a limit on price, a potentially dangerous

situation could develop within the next few years regarding world

food supplies.

JK

14(

12(

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4

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140

Just real quickly, since 1969 the world food and feed grain supply

has basically been trending downward to a point where last year, corn

went to a record price of $4 a bushel and so beans went to $9 because it

looked like we were going to have the smallest carryover in recent history, certainly on a per capita consumption basis. The things that

helped avoid this and caused grain prices to eventually decline were the

tremendous reduction of livestock feeding and a few other abnormal

developments such as the limitation on export business with Russia.

Also of major significance was the prospects of a record crop this

year which looked like it was going to bring up this low carryover of

roughly 85 million tons up to about 125 million tons, hopefully ending

this downtrend in world stocks.

However, with the recent cuts in the 1975 crop in U.S.S.R. or U.S.A.,.

you are back down to what Assistant Secretary Bell said yesterday,

"to a point where stocks probably won’t increase this year.” Frankly,

I think some people feel that if prices stay at the current relatively

cheap levels you may even have a further decrease in stocks by next

summer.

Then the point comes up, what if you put an upside limit on prices

and we do not expand production next spring? If you get another bad

crop, what is going to happen? We do not have another 80 million

tons to lose now in the food reserve like back in 1969. Hopefully we’ll

have good crops next year to build back up the reserve that Assistant

Secretary Bell has indicated is likely to happen, if not next year, by

1977-78.

‘“But there is, as you've probably heard, some strong predictions from

some prominent meteorologists that you may have trouble again next

year ‘with weather in the major world crop areas. If we do, I think

putting a limit on exports and therefore on prices in this area, is

extremely dangerous. I would much sooner pay a higher price for foodj

And be able to, than have someone put a limit on price and discourage

production here.

That’s, about all I have except to say that the USDA is doing a

tremendous job in surveying and reporting on this rapidly changing

and complex world agricultural situation. The one thing I would

suggest is that maybe more of this voluminous data be presented in

graph form, such as the one submitted here. It would be more easily -

and quickly understood by the grain trade as well as the general

public, which needs to have a better understanding of this situation,

.

*

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1

.
141

Incidentally, one other graph that is a way of looking at this thing,

.

is that world production has been expanding and even with that, the

carryover stock is going down because per capita consumption is increasing. We personally have had a lot of talks with farmers and

grain elevators and feed and food processors and users. They all tend

68-877-7*1O
142

to say that before we, as a nation, agree on something like export

controls which will discourage next year’s crop production let’s look

what is happening to food reserves; and let’s get this reserve built up,

before we tell the farmers we’re not going to allow further exports,

and thus reduce or eliminate their profits, which is kind of what sounds

like might be happening at high levels here in Washington.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes, you mean the limitation on price?

Mr. KEEFE. The limitation on exports which has a bearish impact

on price. If corn prices go up should Government be able to cut off

exports. My own judgment would be that an adequate supply of

agriculture-food-commodities is too critical a factor in the life of

society throughout the world for any group, however smart they

might be, to decide whereto place a price limit on food.

Chairman HUMPHREY . I want to say that I have the greatest respect

for the people who try to manage and conduct our foreign policy, but

to understand agricultural economics is not exactly a simple trick, and

it isn’t something that you get by being in the diplomatic sections of

our Government and the State Department. This requires a great deal

of experience and also keen insight into the makeup of the farmer.

Mr. SJERVEN. Senator you’ve preached the gospel of reserves for

how many years at the annual GTA meeting in St. Paul? I don't know

how many years.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I started in the 1950’s.

Mr. SJERVEN. And you—

Chairman HUMPHREY . And I tell you, we are coming closer. You

would be surprised. I had a meeting yesterday with Senator Bellmon

about this. We’ve been sitting on two sides of the table here arguing

about reserves, and now we’re just about that far apart right now.

You can just about slip a little piece of paper in between, When we

get it locked together we’re going to put a high and low block on this

government, and we’re going to finally get a reserve program. It

would basically be farmer held, The only time the farmer has to pay

that interest charge is when he sells his crop. We’ll have a trigger

mechanism where he can sell his crop, let’s say, at 150 percent of a

good loan rate, or so.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Chairman HUMPHREY. When he gets the price, then he’s capable of

paying for storage charges and interest. The only time that the Secretary could release any of that crop under the loan program is when

there is 200 percent of the loan rate. I don’t trust Secretaries that are

under constant political pressure to pull the skids out from under our

producers

We’ve got a big battle going on here about this, I’ve got friends on

both sides. Our friends that are in what they call strictly consuming

States, assume that the protection of the consumer is by the protection

of the price.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, right.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Well, that is a protection for the consumer,

if you can get anything to consume.

Go ahead.

Mr. KEEFE. Excuse me, Senator. Just one example of that is the current hog situation. We have the smallest per capita hog supply since

the depression.
143

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes .

Mr. KEEFE. Bacon is now $2.50 a pound, and partly because of this

price control thing of the past 2 years. Especially the farmer, he will

react so strongly against that. If he was less independent. I guess it

would be different. But he has reacted so strongly against price controls we now have a meat problem in this country, and we could have

a problem in grain if we restrict exports and if we don’t get good

weather next year. Hopefully everything is going to be OK, but I’m

just saying we're approaching a minimum supply situation which

● suggests we have t o be very careful.

Chairman HUMPHREY, We also have the problem of feed prices for

farmers. After all, farmers are the greatest consumers of feed grains.

one of the reasons that I’ve always advocated some kind of a reserve

was that it gave the farmer, who uses the feed grains, an assurance

that there was a supply.

Mr. KEEFE. Correct.

Chairman HUMPHREY . The biggest problem for these farmers is

they get up on the mountain and then someone pulls the trap down

below and down he goes into the bottom.

I believe that there are some questions we wanted to ask these

gentlemen.

Mr. CORDARO. I have one question, Senator Humphrey.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I will have to leave in a few minutes but I

want you to continue. And I want to thank Charles Frazer of the

National Farmers Organization, Jerry Rees, of the National Wheat

Growers Association, Gene Hamilton of the American Farm Bureau,

and Reuben Johnson of the National Farmer% Union for being with

us today. You all have prepared testimony, do you not?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, sir.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Your prepared testimony will be made a

part of the record. I would like you to know that we will pass on to

USDA your concerns.

Go ahead, Mr. Cordaro. Is it all right with you if we proceed that

way ?

Mr. DADDARIO. If you would like us to, Senator, we certainly shall.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I think we should. I have to be on the floor of

the Senate, but you may proceed under my authority. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keefe follows:]

STATEMENT OF DAVID K EEF E, LA MS0N B ROTH ERS, CHICAGO , IL L.

I am David Keefe. general partner and head of Lamson Commodity Group.

Lamson Brothers is a 101 year old New York Stock Exchange member firm,

headquartered in Chicago, with branch offices throughout the corn belt. Approximately half of our total revenue is derived from commodity futures business,

which is predominantly grain and livestock due to our geographic location and

long history in the cash grain business.

Our primary objective is to service our large commodity clientele via proper

execution of commodity futures orders and timely information regarding pertinent developments affecting commodity markets. Any comments I make regarding the timeliness and accuracy of agricultural information are my own and are

to be considered in the light of Lamson’s primary objectives. Please understand

that I am not a spokesman for the Chicago Board of Trade.

A. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS

1. The analysis and publication of outlook information should be consolidated

under one agency, probably ERS.
144

(a) World food feed grain summaries and outlook reports should be updated

monthly.

(b) The complexity and extent of data required in the commodity area is such

that many observers are unable to benefit from it. Therefore, more simplified

graphs or charts should be used to summarize pertinent changes that may occur

on a monthly basis, for marketing participants and consumers via various news

media.

2. The USDA has done an admirable job of adapting to the dramatic changes

that have occurred in the world food/feed grain situation in the last three to six

years.

(a) However, these changes have created a situation in the commodity markets where risks have increased significantly.

(b) Therefore, staff, organization and budget changes to meet this new need “

should receive high priority in the months ahead. Far too few people understand

the serious changes in our world food supply situation that has occurred in the

last few years.

Mr. CORDARO. I would like to introduce Mr. Daddario, who is the

Director of the Office of Technology Assessment and Mr. De Simone,

who is the Deputy Director. I just have one question that I would like

to ask you all to comment on.

There seems to be a general feeling that the private sector is better

able to estimate what's actually happening in the world. I know that

many people felt Milling and Baking News was on top of the 1972 and

1973 wheat sales long before they were being reported by USDA. There

are also many people that feel that the five or six top grain companies

have a much better idea of what the supply and demand situations are

because of the analytical techniques that they employ.

We are interested not only in how you use USDA’s information,

but if their analytical techniques are devices that you employ, such as

the computers.

Mr. SJERVEN. We have spies.

Mr. CORDARO. It’s that simple?

Mr. SJERVEN. The reason that Milling and Baking News was ahead

of the Department of Agriculture and we were telling the Department

of Agriculture what was going on if they would listen, is that the

Department of Agriculture at that time had a hands-off policy. They

had surpluses and they were paying subsidies and they wanted to get

rid of the grain, and they had no idea that these sizes were there. Now,

I’m convinced absolutely that no one in the Department of Agriculture,

no. one in the government had any idea how much grain the Soviets

were going to buy in 1972. We were paying subsidies and once the

business was underway, there was contrary to-almost a 180 degrees

difference from the current situation and there was at that time not a

special desire to know what was going on.

 There was the feeling that we’ve got all the grain we need, and the

reserves and bins are full all over the country, why worry about it.

Just let the business get down, the subsidy payments will tell us how

much is done, and we’ll know.

There was just a real desire to avoid knowledge about the grain

business and what was going on. Now, of course, it is just the opposite?

and you have the Department of Agriculture doing a fine job of fine

tuning and orchestrating what is going on, and whether it be monitoring. or whether it be approving or disapproving of it.

Mr. CORDARO. As a reporter, when you are confronted with conflicting estimates--one from USDA and another from CIA—what kind

of analytical techniques can you employ to try to resolve the

discrepancies?
145

Mr. SJERVEN. Well, we have to rely on incoming information. We

don't have computer technology and that sort of thing. We use Mr.

Harkness' computers. No, we have contacts with—I really don't mean

that. That shouldn’t go in the record.

We have very close contacts with everyone in any kind of business

having to do with grain and flour, and so we get our information from

them, and I assume that they are gathering it through their different

ways of doing it and we rely very heavily on the Department of Agriculture. We think very highly of the information which the Depart-

* ment puts out.

Mr. CORDARO. Do you feel that there is any information that the

I)epartment is disseminating that is redundant or should be

eliminated ?

- Mr. SJERVEN. Yes; I had in my statement some specific items. A

couple of places there I think I suggested that rather than more proliferation of reports, that somehow more important to me right now

is to be sure that the reports are reconciled, where you don’t have these

conflicting numbes.

Mr. CORDARO. Then you would support Mr. Harkness’ recommendation?

Mr. SJERVEN. Yes, right.

The other thing is that once a report is made it becomes subjective

and that’s in my report as well. And then when a regular report comes

out and an agricultural supply and demand report follows it, then

maybe it’s timely. But then comes a wheat situation, which has already

been made out of date by the agriculture supply and demand estimates

which were put out 2 days earlier, or something like that. This was

al ready,. you know, the data was gathered earlier, there’s too much.

I think it’s too much.

I think that there’s a great deal of pressure put on unfairly on some

of the people. They didn’t complain to me, but I just think that they

are unfairly asked to analyze too quickly a significant crop report,

and to come out with the supply and demand estimates the next day.

That seems to me to be asking a lot of’ an analyst. Maybe you don’t

agree with me on that, but I think that is true.

Mr. CordARo. I would like to get Mr. Harkness’ comments on what

the effect of the long-term trade agreements might be on the grain

industry.

In other words, would Cook Industries, Inc. or the other four or

five major companies favor or oppose such an agreement!

Mr. HARKNESS. I’m not--I guess I’m not in a position to speak for

the company on that. I’m not fully sure of management’s feeling on

that.

Mr. CORDARO. We appreciate that.

Mr. HARKNESS. All I could do would be to go back and to support

Mel’s comment earlier about the fact that how is an agreement of this

type going to work, and the only time it works is when it’s not needed,

when it’s totally not needed. If we've got scarce supplies how do we

shut off if we can’t ship 10 million tons? If they’ve got surplus supplies

why how do they shut off not taking it in?

Mr. CORDARO. Could you comment on the analytical techniques that

Cook Industries, Inc. and other grain companies utilize, such as the

computer models for growing crops, and how you make use of weather

and remote sensing information ?
146

Could you elaborate on how useful that is as an addition to the information that USDA supplies?

Mr. HARKNESS. Well, our techniques we mainly probably geared for

timeliness. In other words, any time a number comes out from USDA,

and let’s say, especially a crop report comes out, that’s a base, and at

3 o’clock in the afternoon when that report is released, at 3:01 p.m.

no matter what our thinking was beforehand, our thinking is that, as

of the first of the month, that's what it was.

And this is the attitude that we take on most Government statistics

is that this is the base, but there's a timeliness here and it's a—SO we .

find techniques which will indicate ahead of time what something

else is going to say. And one point I would like to make along this

line is t e fact that I repeatedly hear out of FAS, Well, we haven't

heard from the cable we’ve sent 2 weeks ago.” If we want to know -

something today we pick up the phone and we call. We don’t wait to

send a cable, and because these kinds of things you need to know now,

and you don’t need to know 2 and 3 weeks from now. And I don’t know

if this can work within the Government, that you pick up the phone

and call, but by the same token this is one solution we have to the

timeliness problem.

Mr. CORDARO. When the August 11 crop report comes out, you know

that reflects the conditions as of August 1. By that time, you’ve already

accounted for what’s happened during those 10 days.

Mr. HARKNESS . Yes.

And we’re continuous analyzing all the known components of what

makes a crop report. We, with public knowledge, or things that are

most public, are--our actual precipitation data and temperature data.

Mr. CORDARO . Do you think the Department could decrease this 10-

day lag? You obviously do it.

Mr. HARKNESS . We do it, but I think that’s our job to do. In other

words, on the 10th of September when they come out with the report,

no, I don’t think they should be asked that that report be as of the

10th of September.

I don't think that it's their commission. Their commission is to come

out September 1. Now, if some kind of a—I'm not necessarily advocating this, but if we within the United States need some kind of an update system, you still leave that report as of September 1, and Wine- .

body in Government determines a way to update and try to shoot toward the next one, but I’m not advocating anything.

Mr. CORDARO . What kind of premium does Cook Industries, Inc.

place on information? Is 1 percent of the total budget spent on re- .

sources and techniques, or 5 percent?

Mr. HARKNESS. I am not sure. because I, as an information source of

Cook Industries, have an unlimited budget. I mean, in other words, if

there's a job to be done, I’m there. So I don’t even known what my

budget is as part of the total.

But I think to emphasize one point though of the priority that is

put on, in mid-August I was standing in a cornfield in Iowa one day,

and 48 hours later I was standing in one in France. We had a drought

in Iowa and we had a drought in France, and they had to be assessed.

It’s just a matter of timeliness, because these things can’t wait.

Mr. CORDARO . Thank you very much, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS. Yes.
147

●

Mr. CORDARO. Mr. Daddario do you have any questions?

Mr. DADDARIO. No. Thank you very much, gentlemen

Mr. CORDARO . Thank you very much.

As our nexi panel of witnesses, we have Mr. Frazier, Mr. Hamilton,

and Mr. Johnson.

In the interest of time, please summarize your statements. What

we’re principally interested in here is finding out what the end user’s

prospective is. There’s a great deal of information that the Department of Agriculture collects, analyzes, and disseminates. There’s a

good deal of information that comes out of the Congress. Congress is

intrinsically dependent upon that information which comes from the

executive branch . They are also intrinsically dependent upon information that come to them from the various farm groups and farmers.

Congress in this case has asked OTA to make an assessment, to identify ways to improve its capacity to analyze this information and to

make independent analyses of the validity of the information coming

on a timely basis.

Could we begin with Mr. Johnson?

STATEMENT OF REUBEN JOHNSON, NATIONAL FARMERS UNION

Mr. JOHNSON. First let me commend very highly the colloquy that

Senator Humphrey carried on with the representatives of the Department of Agriculture. Certainly the line of his questioning and discussion with the USDA witnesses demonstrated his deep understanding

of the function of the whole bureaucracy and particularly the Department of Agriculture and its statistical gathering operations.

Let me also say that I appreciate deeply the pressure of time the

Senator is under because I was at a hearing this morning regarding

our grain inspection system which he chaired most effectively and is

one of the important developments in the. testimony that I’ve heard

in regard to the grain inspection system.

Second, I may shock a few people for making this statement-but

we in the Farmers Union generally find the Department of Agriculture’s statistical information and related resources to be highly

useful to us.

As I reviewed the areas of concern in my organization I would make

several comments in terms of some general areas that we follow quite

closely in terms of agricultural reporting.

The first one of these I’d mention would be what we call the costprice squeeze.

* We are constantly reading the indicators on price levels and what

movement they are taking. In this connection when we talk about costprice squeeze, we relate directly to measurement provided by the parity

formula. This formula is set forth in the basis agricultural statutes.

Statutory law and I stress this point, relating to agriculture, and dating back to 1938.

The parity formula dating back to the 1938 Agricultural Act has

been amended on several occasions-it’s been modernized. It still functions, we think, to accurately portray how well farmers are doing—

relating the prices they receive to the prices they pay in the calculation

of the ‘(parity ratio,” We are greatly dismayed by the fact that Secretary Butz never uses the term. He completely ignores it, and it is a

tragedy that we have a Secretary of Agriculture who ignores a con-
148

gressional mandate that sets forth the most realistic measurement that

we could possibly have to reflect how well farmers are doing.

And I hope someday we’ll get that situation turned around. ’

The Department of Agriculture could devote more of its energy to

reporting on the relationship between price that the farmers receive

and the price that they pay, and they could do a much better job than

they do of reporting on what that parity ratio is, which is calculated

on the basis of movement of these indexes. That's the first area of our

concern.

The second area I'd mention is the area of supply and demand. In .

our Farmers Union News Service, we provide our States through a

TWX operation, which is the Western Union Wire Service, information regarding supply-crop projected supplies. Hopefully, we’re getting information to our editors in the country that they can use effec- .

tively to give some guidance, at least, to members in terms of the

“market forces relating to supply and demand.

The third area that I'd like to mention that we constantly are looking at, and need information with regard to, are the marketing margins. We do have a sincere interest in our organization in seeing that

consumers get a fair break. We therefore need to have more information in terms of economic concentration in the processing and r&ailing establishments> and -just what marketing. margins mean in terms

of the interest not only by farmers, but consumers also.

The fourth area that I'd like to refer to relates to the crop report-

‘ing, crop and livestock reporting information of the Department. I

know that there have been criticisms made of inaccuracies in the

Departrnent, and vet I think when we really get down to it, we've got

the best, system of livestock and crop reporting of any nation in the

world. It “is a forecasting system, and you can’t always come out right

on target.

Incidentally, let me say I do support the views of those who indicated that there should be some attempt in the Government to resolve

differences when they occur, just as they hammer out differences in

the crop reporting board before they. make their forecast.

I believe that that kind of interaction—it may take time-but that

kind of interaction would be useful in terms of getting the numbers

that are more reliable. Where there are differences and there is some

procedure here to resolve them, we’re going to get more accurate -

projections. I'm glad to be here. That’s all I've got to say.

We have a lot of concerns with Secretary Butz and his policies,

but this is not the kind of hearing where we should air those concerns.

You are here examining the informational processes, and I’m saying

that they function well. There are obviously some areas that we would

like to see stressed against others, and these I’ve mentioned.

I’d be happy to respond to your questions, I look forward to my

two illustrious colleaques and their comments.

Mr. CORDARO. Thank you.

Why don’t we go on to Mr. Frazier?

STATEMENT OF CHARLES L. FRAZIER, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON

STAFF, NATIONAL FARMERS ORGANIZATION

Mr. FRAZIER. Mr. Cordaro, I'd like to comment briefly on three areas

of interest, and I should preface those remarks by pointing out that
149

our commodity departments in Corning, Iowa, of course, have daily

interest in the products of the various reports that you have under

consideration.

From another standpoint we are interested in the effect of these

various Government reports and projections on markets that seemingly at-times have nothing to do with the facts.

In other words, I believe there are two aspects of this whole area of

concern that are very significant to farm people. Now, thinking of the

facts I want to join others in expressing a sense of admiration for Dr.

● West, Mr. Hume, and Dr. Paarlberg, the men from the Department

who must struggle with these things year in and year out. Those of

us who have been close to that Department for a number of years

know that it’s most difficult to resolve variations in reports, reach *

compromises, and come to some conclusions for a public statement.

We appreciate their difficulties.

In all of their fine work they may have difficulty today in assembling

timely information on the consumer end of the market. In other words,

I wonder whether they have an opportunity to get current data on

consumer preferences, trends, and changes that will be reflected

months or a year later in the type of government analysis that is

always so safe to make on an after-the-fact basis.

One can well imagine that they may need if not new methods, at

least some new access to data of this type. By the same token those

of us working with legislation are all too well aware, as Mr. Johnson

just pointed out, that the data available in the Department with

respect to the cost of farm inputs may also be rather outdated by the

time it can be worked into parity price reports, cost of production

indexes and similar data that are rather important in the decision

process, both in the Department and here in the Congress.

I have in mind things which relate more to the ability to gather

and assemble this data in a timely manner. I rather suspect that their

major sources are the industries, they may, be well worked out and

quite honest in the final analysis, but it’s a matter of timeliness and

availability y of the data that is of concern to some of us.

In the second subject area, I do support the thoughts of Mr. Harkness and others that spoke of a world crop reporting board. I quite

. frankly am a little skeptical of what might be done in a formal board.

The data, of course, would be only. as valuable as the capabilities and

the honest-y of the people, assembling and submitting it for the various areas of the world. Nevertheless we do like the idea if it can be

. developed. 

That one leads me to the third point, and this is even a little more

difficult to express. I like to think of it this way: I wish we had in this

(government perhaps at subcabinet level, the willingness to be a little

more daring in the use of such statistics as are available.

In other words, all of us understand quite well that in each of these

commodity areas in USDA, for example, there will he one, two. or

three persons that are well recognized as specialists in their field. They

know the overall picture with respect to a given commodity area,

whether it be feed grains, or hogs, or cattle. oils. or what have you.

Now, I’m only asking that your group consider that the fine formal

USDA reports that are made available to us generally under the

three categories: Situation reports, crop reports, and supply and d e -
150

mand situations are outdated by the time they are released. I do not

mean to suggest skullduggery or illicit action of any type but we must

realize there are a few people who can afford the type of intelligence needed to make good market decisions. Most of them are the international trading corporations.

I don’t think that it’s necessary for a government officer to be absolutely safe in his backup data, and have all the charts perfectly

drawn, to make a commodity statement reflecting estimates of market

probabilities based on intelligence reports from attaches and others.

We have a number of people both in the trading world and in our

farm organizations who must make their best guesses in sales and bargaining programs. Individual farmers must take whatever they may

have an make decisions. They are sufficiently mature to understand d

very well that an projections representing crop conditions, markets -

or foreign demand in 15 or 20 countries scattered around the world is ’

a specu ative matter. They do not expect the Government officials l

to have it in the form of a final accounting report but they would like

to be advised of what is available from time to time.

So I just want to make a little plea for some type of action that

would draw together the intelligence not now available to farmers;

I don’t care if it’s from the Department, CIA, the attaches, trade

sources for that matter, if somebody is willing to get them in and

pull them together, and willing to take a risk by putting out their best

estimates of world demand and market conditions.

Mr. DADDARIO . You are really asking that there be a way to regularize the informal information that is brought together which some people are using to good advantage, but are using it for their specific

interests.

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DADDARIO . It works quite well wherever it's worked, but if you

try to regulate it, it might become so perfect it’s not useful. Is that

your point ?

Mr. FRAZIER. By the time it’s a perfect figure you can see it’s already too late. Well, I’m doing a poor job of articulating my point of

view perhaps. I’m only asking for such intelligence as we have in this

Governmentj from week to week, as month to month, relating to supply

and demand situations be summarized and put out. Let the people -

have them, and let the little commodity division traders that must be

working in cooperatives and in my organization understand them and

argue about them. I think we’d all be better off-I think Congress,

and for that matter, the Secretary of Agriculture, would be safe- -

guarded against criticism at later dates if this data could be made

available in more timely manner.

Mr. DADDARIO. Understood for that purpose?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, they can put at the top and bottom of every page

that this is a projection—this is an estimate, and safeguard themselves

carefully.

Mr. CORDARO. Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hamilton, would you care to comment on that?
151

STATEMENT OF W. E. HAMILTON, CHIEF ECONOMIST, AMERICAN

FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

Mr. H AMILTO N. Well, I would make the comment that since we have

a supply and demand estimates report which is issued on a regular

basis, after any new development such as a crop report, or a stocks report, tile situation is much better than it used to be.

I’m not quite as sure, as Mr. Frazier is, that the Department can

escape criticism if they put out information hurriedly and make mis-

● takes .

Mr. CORDARO. OK.

Mr. JOHNSON-. May I make a comment there ?

We are constantly making an interpretation of these USDA reports

* of our own, our crops, our big regional grain terminals, those in the

Twin Cities, I'm sure have a battery of people who are constantly

looking at the market forces that they have right before them all the

time. We have a national secretary who has some competence in the

area of analytical work—Robert G. Lewis-and Bob does an interpretive analysis once in a while in which he takes some issue with the

USDA report based on information that he may have picked up.

Mr. FRAZIER. That gentleman sat right here and told us how and

why he was able to make the projections.

ill. JOHNSON . He said he was doing just exactly what you said the

USDA should do. Further we have all kinds of reporting service

letters around that do attempt to update, and bring more current data

to farmers and the Department.

I’m not really arguing with the basic premise that we need to cut

the time of USDA reporting. I think obviously there is room for

improvement.

Mr. HAMILTO N. We do need to cut the time from when a report is

mentioned until it reaches the desk out in the country. Sometimes you

get these reports in a day or two, and at other times it may be 2 weeks.

Now, this may be partly due to delays in the printing office as was

mentioned earlier or the postal service; but delivery is often slow.

Mr. DADDARI O. The point you -just made is quite interesting. The

reason I asked the question was that I thought there was a correlary

relationship between what Milling and Baking News had to say and

Mr. Frazier’s suggestion—that somehow they can work through this

process and come to certain conclusions which they did publish. But

because for some reason it wasn't made generally available or under-

. stood, some people believed it, other people did not, and there were a

lot of conflicting activities that went on during that period of time.

If 1 understand Mr. Frazier's point to be that if you could somehow

reglarize that so the people would know what it was and give it wide

distribution, that more people might be accurate. Although you make

the point that more people could be wrong too, more people might be

right because they would develop an ability to deal with it as you

went on.

It's something like reporting intelligence under very tight circumstances. The people who are the boldest and who develop the capa-
152

bility usually are much more right than others. People keep looking

to them constantly for the information by which the corporate develop tactics and strategy.

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, every farmer himself is somewhat of an armchair forecaster. He goes out and wets his finger and puts it up in the

wind, and he—

Mr. DADDARIO. And it’s to those people Mr. Frazier is appealing,

because they do have the capability, and they will be able to judge

where it’s right and where it’s wrong. *

Mr. JOHNSON. I think one of the things I agree with Chuck on, if I

understood what he’s saying, instead of having to wait, for the fancy

type from the Government Printing Office, in a properly stapled,

publication of some kind, we would do just as well with some mimeo- ‘*

M

graph sheets.

r. FRAZIER. No, no, let me be sure I’m understood properly. I’m not

saying, you know, run down with this crop report at 9 o’clock at night

and pass it out on 14th Street-that’s not the problem area I’m trying

to address. The Government Printing Office has another problem, and

I’m not worrying about that.

I’m worrying about the fact that attaches are constantly writing

h

reports, and people in FAS have a certain feel in intelligence for

w at’s shaping up ‘in Western Europe, and there area number of individuals that know very well what’s happening in the wheat crop in

Australia and Canada. This year we’ve heard a lot of conversation

about soybeans in Brazil and the statements that are made.. Impressions created about the Japanese interest in soybeans in Brazil depends

“almost entirely on the speaker and his point of view.

My point is that material of that type along with our own crop

reporting information and our own supply and demand type of work.

could be well drawn together and someone could put his neck out a

little bit and say, look, if these things happen, this is going toward a

tighter supply and a higher or lower market price. and put it out.

Mr. DADDARIO . Mr. Johnson, maybe this will be helpful. I think

this discussion is important because we run into in other areas as we

do our work in asessments. It’s an additional step that is a preceding

step. Rather than to eliminate that as you go to a final step. You have

to take that step anyway, don't you?

.

Mr. FRAZIER. ,That’s right.

Mr. JOHNSON. That's providing, I would say, more flexibility in

terms of the reporting procedure. *

Mr. DADDARIO. And because you proceed further you can judge how

you’ve done.

Mr. JOHNSON. That’s right. And I think Chuck made this point

very well, but it has to be kept in mind that this type of information

when it’s put out by a Government agency, it has to be done in such

a way that everybody has an even start, and that this information becomes public information. It should be known when it’s going to be

released. The press should stand behind that "white line” and every

one over at the Department of Agriculture when those crop estimates are made. Currently, the reporters stand behind the white line,

and at 3 o’clock some USDA staffer hands them a piece of paper and

they walk across the white line to a telephone. Now, that procedure
153

is sound and it gives everybody an even chance to take advantage

of the intelligence if you want to call it that, the information that’s

available.

Mr. HAMILTON . Well, I think the Department of Agriculture basically does as Mr. Frazier suggested, but perhaps they don’t do it to

the degree that he would like. They publish estimates, they publish

projections, and they change the terminology as the basis for these

figures becomes more firm, and they do frequently put out new reports. We have had several reports this year on the Russian wheat crop, but

● there was some confusion due to the fact that there apparently were

reports from other agencies which were substantially lower than the

USDA’S estimate.

Mr. JOHNSON. I might say that I’m happy to be able to report here

that the Department of Agriculture is more accurate than the Central Intelligence Agency. That gives me hope in the future. ,

Mr. CORDARO. Mr. Hamilton, I noticed that in your statement, you

commented on the recommendations, findings, and conclusions of our

Food Advisory Committee’s report.

We would appreciate it if you would summarize your comments for

us now.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, Mr. Cordaro, I realize it’s late, and I don’t

want to take unnecessary time, but if you wish, I can summarize my

statement, or if you prefer, I will submit to questions on the basis of

your having read the statement.

Mr. CORDARO. Well, could you just give us a minute or two so that

other people have some information ?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, to give the others the flavor of my statement,

I would like to say that I did not receive -your report until late yesterday evening, so I’ve had only a limited opportunity to study it, and

even less time to confer with my associates in the Farm Bureau and

like the Government, the Farm Bureau does have a clearance procedure. As a consequence my statement is a rather preliminary reaction

from the standpoint of a person who uses Government statistics, but

who does not profess to be an expert. With some reservations I think

that most of the recommendations developed by the Food Advisory

Committee are acceptable to me.

I would. however. like to stress the complexity of the subject, and

the difficulty of satisfying the people who want better agriculture

data. The very nature of agriculture makes it difficult and costly to

collect reliable data, and this, of course, is much more difficult in less

developed countries.

host agriculture statistics are estimates, and you have to recognize

that all estimates are subject, to a margin of error. but the big problem is that the factors affecting these estimates constantly change.

We’ve already had some discussion of his problem.

A report, can be quickly outdated by developments subsequent to

the date on which the survey was made, and I agree with Quentin

West, that certain types of forecasts. for example. a forecast on the pig

crop may cause farmers to reassess their plans. The very fact that the

report was made. ma-y prevent, the estimate from being right, because

it stimulates adjustments and that's one of the functions of these

reports.

. .
154

On the whole I think the Department of Agriculture and its statistical agencies do an excellent job. We’re all aware that they make

errors, but given the difficulty of the job some errors are to be expected. And while I’m certainly in favor of improvements, I think the

Department’s batting

E

average is very good, and I’m also impressed

with the fact that a bad estimate attracts a great deal more attention

than dozens of good ones. I never hear anyone say anything about the

fact that a forecast was right, but I hear a lot about the ones that were

wrong.

In evaluating proposals for improvements we have to consider the

difficulty of the job. what is possible and the relationship of probable

costs to the probable benefits. I believe this is known as cost effectiveness.

And then we should always remember, as has already been noted in a

little different context, that any projection or analysis which can be

outdated by unforeseen events may fall to be a prediction of the future.

I think this is pretty well illustrated by what happened in 1972.

Many of the events which combined to make the sales to the Soviet

Union look like a bad deal for the United States happened not only

after the grain was sold, but over a period of months. I have cited some

of these developments here, and if I had had more time to research

the timing of other events that I'm familiar with, I would have included them. There was an extremely extraordinary combination of

events following the 1972 Russian sales which combined to tighten

supplies and raise commodity prices.

And I don’t think it should be surprising that in the words of the

Advisory Committee, "The economic models and supply and demand

equations which had performed satisfactorily in the more stable conditions of the fifties and sixties had little value in light of the changes

which occurred in the domestic and world markets when the size of

the 1972 world grain crop became known.”

I’m not familiar with these models and equations, but I am sure

that they almost certainly reflect observations based on periods during

which exporting countries had large surpluses; exchange rates for

major currencies were more or less fixed; and some of the large potential importers, including the Soviet Union and the PRC, were more

likely to tighten their belts than to buy large quantities of grain in

the world market.

Now, I come to the recommendations in the Food Advisory Committee’s report. The idea of increasing the analytical capability of

the staffs. of the Congressional Committees on Agriculture and the

Congressional Research Service has obvious merit. Certainly you need

capable staff members to serve the Members of Congress.

It seems to me, however, that this increase in analytical capabilities

should be used primarily to analyze information produced by research

and statistical agencies such as the ERS and the land grant universities rather than to do original research. Regardless of the quality

of the research that might be done on the Hill, it would be hard for

a political body such as the Congress to avoid suspicion that at least

some of its researchers were selected for their opinions rather than

their analytical capabilities.

I would like to say that I favor Recommendation No. 2 which calls

for Congress to develop closer liaison with executive agencies and the

land grant universities.

. . . . .

.
155

I also support Recommendation No. 3 which calls for the Secretary

of Agriculture to establish a Statistical Review Committee, and 1

would add that this committee should include some representation

from farm organizations.

I have a little section that deals with the desirability and the

feasibility of integrating the staff and activities of the Agricultural

Census into the Statistical Reporting Service. Certainly this should

be explored, and coordination improved. I think, however, there are

some questions that need to be asked.

For example, I would raise a question with regard to the effect

●

the separation of the Census of Agriculture from the Census Bureau

might have on the coordination of agricultural data with other national

statistical series produced by the Department of Commerce. And I

* would raise a question as to whether the burden of producing detailed

county statistical reports would impair the ability of SRS to reduce

high quality national estimates on a timely basis. County data can

tie up a computer and this is one of the reasons, as I understand it,

that the publication of data was so slow after the 1969 census. It was

a problem of getting time on the computer and the sheer mass of data

that had to be produced.

Improvement of the information collection capability of the FAS

certainly is a desirable objective, but we shouldn’t expect too much of

our agricultural attaches. We should expect attaches to be well qualified observers, but we should recognize that no individual or small

group of people can provide complete statistical reports from a foreign

country of any size on the basis of personal observations.

The attaches necessarily depend on host governments for much of

their information. The improvement of information on foreign agriculture is highly dependent on the improvement of foreign agricultural

information systems, and increased ‘international cooperation.

I certainly would not favor the suggestion that attache reports be

sent, directly to FAO at the same time they are sent to Washington. I

absolve the Food Adivisory Committee from having made this suggestion but it was in some of the papers that I read in preparing my

statement.

My objection is that I feel such a procedure could lead to serious

problems between the attaches and their host governments, and it

might cause attaches to be less forthright than they otherwise would

be. I think they can feel some security in reporting to--Washington

but not in reporting to FAO. I am afraid the reports would be channeled back to the host governments and this could cause problems. m I agree that responsibility for statistical and analytical work should

be kept separate from responsibility for operating programs. And 1

agree with the statement made by a previous witness that chairmanship of the interagency commodity estimate committees should be provided by the agency that has the responsibility for the estimates and

assessments of the situation and outlook,” rather than by an operating

agency.

Since the Food and Nutrition Service is an operating agency, I

question the portion of recommendation No. 8 which recommends that

this service expand its program evaluation studies.

I am not sure that the improvement of agricultural information

requires a consolidation of the economic intelligence activities of FAS

and ERS. As the gentleman from the Department said, they do work
155

together now. Consolidation may be a good idea; but with the limited

knowledge I have I do not want to tell the Secretary how to run the

Agriculture Department this afternoon. I do agree that FAS and

ERS should be coordinated and that they should work together, and

I think they do now.

I would agree that some agricultural data series are obsolete. This

is well illustrated by the Food Advisory Committee’s discussion of

broiler prices. Broilers are not priced at the farm level in the sense

that this series reports. The Farm Bureau has long been aware of this

particular problem, and has recommended that USDA initiate a series

of reports on contract payments to broiler growers. .

I think Dr. Paarlberg said that they also need to review some of the

concepts in the farm income series. I could go on and on, but time is

short.

Thank you very much.

Mr. CORDARO. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

Dr. Wilcox, do you have any questions?

I should say that Senator Humphrey is always reminding us that

Dr. Wilcox could probably. forget in 15 minutes more than we young

staff people will ever learn in agriculture. OTA has a high respect and

regard for Dr. Wilcox and we appreciate the help that he's given us

in the preparation of the hearings and our assessment report.

Mr. HAMILTON. I’d like to report that I have known Dr. Wilcox since

I was a student at Iowa State back in the early 1930's and Dr. Wilcox

was a very young professor there. He was one of my first economics

professors. I don’t know whether he accepts any responsibility for my

views, but I have been associated with him for a long time.

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me say that I don't guess I’m as old as Gene

Hamilton because I was in school-Gene, you say you were in school

when ?

Mr. HAMILTON. Early 1930's.

hr. JOHNSON. Gene, I thought you were younger than I am. I have

known Dr. Wilcox since I’ve been in Washington with the Farmer's

Union. I guess that's 21 years, and one of the things I learned even

before I was dry behind the ears, about 20 years ago, if you wanted to

get anything done on the Capitol Hill you first had to get Walter’s

signature on a letter with-"Library of Congress" written across the

top of it. He's been very helpful to me on many occasions.

He never would compromise his stubborn objective streak, however.

He always was honest and objective and Walter we are very happy

to know that you’re associated with this group.

Dr. WILCOX. I didn’t realize. that Gene had been a student of mine.

Mr. JOH NSO N. He's kind of giving-your age away, isn’t he?

Dr. WILcox. Yes. They know it around here.

Having listened to you and other witnesses. and thinking of the

conversations I had with other people, it seems that due to the current

world food situation and recent supply problems. much more attention has been given to putting out reports on various items. USDA

publishes statistics about so many supply and demand situations. We

have quarterly situation outlook reports on wheat at one time and

feed grains at another time. Perhaps what would be more useful is a

monthly report on the world agriculture situation and outlook. Then

the other reports would relate to it in some organized way. This would
157

assure better organization among the various reports and place more

emphasis on the senior staff preparing the monthly reports that contain the very latest information.

The SRS has a very regularized procedure for getting out reports.

The trade knows it and the trade depends on it. Maybe that’s what we

need to go through in the rest of our economic intelligence reporting.

That’s what I’ve been hearing from various people. We're really producing too many numbers now, and not enough analysis.

Mr. FRAZIER. I think you have expressed very well another side of

that many sided little thing I was trying to deal with a moment ago.

●

There’s a need for appraisal, a wrapup believe the newsmen would

call itl the need to draw together some of these things. Quite frankly,

our business people do not have time to do this, and organozations

large enough to have a whole staff devoted to economic analysis and

projections, they have got a regular means of absorbing and using this

material. There are a lot of highly involved individuals and an awful

lot of money committed out therein the count by people who do not

have access to that type of information, and they need some form of 1!

drawing this together. I think that is what I’m trying to plead for.

Mr. HAMILTON. I think that it’s less true today that it was 3 years

ago. What Walter says was certainly true 3 yearn ago. These reports

were published on a regular schedule and some of them were not very

frequent. A crop report would be issued, and major changes made in

tile estimate of production, or major changes would occur in export

demands, and it might be 2 or 3 months before a situation report

would come out with revised supply-and-demand estixnates.

In the meantime different people made their own estimates. Now,

that situation has been improved, by the supply-demand estimates

which are issued promptly after major changes in basic information.

I think this new publication is intended to do a art of what has been

suggested here. Now, it may not do it adequately; it’s experimental,

at least we haven’t had it very long, but I think it is something to

work on. I also think that the Department realizes that the old type

situation reports were not doing the job. To take a horrible example,

I think the Sugar Situation was only issued once a year, and trying

to get anything current on sugar is still difficult.

Mr. JOHNSON. I have another one in this connection. Walter, you

mentioned the release procedures over there. and it seems that you

get more press coverage of the crop board information that’s released

across that white line at 3 o'clock on August 11j or whenever, than you

do if you just get a regular commodity situation report mailed out once

every so often.

And we turn our heads more to those types of situations where the

Department releases data. Is it because we have more confidence in it,

or is it because of the procedure where ever body meets each other

there at the white line? I don’t really know. Maybe there’s an element

of both involved, but anyway I think we could dramatize the importance of numbers that would get the press involved.

We need the media. I might add we get out all the economic data

we can through several avenues in the Farmers Union, including our

Washington Newsletter, but certainly we need the media too. We need

a wide use of the information coming out of the Department by the

people, and any way you could attract the media to use that informafis .s77—7&—--ll
158

tion as a part of the educational process I think we ought to examine.

Senator Humphrey mentioned that earlier today.

Mr. D ADDARI O. Walter, you are saying something here that could

be very important. It strikes me that what you’re saying is not just a

way to get better information out in a timely manner, but that conditions have changed so that the structure through which you get the

information perhaps ought to be adjusted in order to meet these

changed circumstances.

Dr. WILCOX . Yes. It has been indicated that the structure of the

Government was set up at an earlier date and hasn't changed aS much -

as it should have. We need this board to review world data just as we

review other data. The witnesses today said it is done in an informal

may. As long as it's informal and no one is responsible for it, it's not

as valuable as one board with responsibility for the U.S. and world

situation. World information is as important as domestic information,

and it ought to be given a higher priority.

Mr. HAMILTON. We are on the world market now to a greater extent

than in any other period with which I am familiar. I just haven’t

studied the 19th century, but you are right, world information is becoming increasingly important because we are in a world market to an

extent that we haven't been in the past.

Mr. DE SIMONE. There% a very interesting graph in this issue of the

Agricultural ‘Outlook which dramatizes that. Mr. Hamilton, this perhaps can be made part of the record. It shows the share of exports of

major U.S. crops; that is, the. percentage of U.S. production that becomes export’$. It's really startling for me as a layman to see that we

had exported most of “our wheat and most of our rice. This is terribly

important to the economy. Producers and consumers should be aware

of this information

Mr. JOHNSN. .I might say that I have great difficulty interpreting

the USDA reporting currently of the exports. I have not mastered tile

system and the procedures used by the Department. I also feel that

the time lag too creates quite a problem, and there’s just got to be some

better way to do it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I would like to comment that the reports on

export sales are in a sense raw, unevaluated data. I don’t pay too much

attention to them. I have a lot more confidence in the USDA’s estimates

which use these reports as raw material and I like to have the USDA

tell me what their experts in the Department think is going to happen.

In an earlier day this type of raw data would not have been published, and would only have been made available to USDA for evalu- -

ation. I recognize in the present situation people are going to insist

that the export sales report be published and it's probably useful to

some people who are in the trade.

My feeling is that for the average user, the Department’s estimates

are more valuable, more reliable, and the Department does publish its

own estimates, in a column adjacent to the undelivered export sales.

So we have the information both ways, and you can use it any way

you want to.

Mr. CORDARO. Unless Mr. Daddario, Mr. De Simone or Dr. Wilcox

has anything to ask, I’d like to thank you. I would also like to add the

Office of Technology Assessment is just now starting to get our food
159

activities going .

F

You can rest assured that we will be calling on you

more frequentand asking you to assist us in our activities.

Thank you very much.

Mr. FRAZIER. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, sir.

[The following letter was received from Mr. Frazier:]

NATIONAL FARMERS ORGANIZATION,

Washington, D, C., September 29, 1975.

Hon. HUBERT H. HU MP H RE Y,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, D.C.

DE AR SENATOR H UMPHRE Y: We appreciate very much your invitation to participate in the panel with other representatives of farm organizations to comment on the handling of data in public reporting by the Department of Agriculture as such work relates to food and nutrition.

First, let me compliment you on undertaking this challenging assignment.

Despite the controversies that have developed over food supplies and prices in

the last three years and the vicissitudes related to the political handling of some

of these issues, there are many very capable people in USDA who provide a wide

range of commendable services. I am confident that they are able to keep the

country better informed and possibly reduce the public confusion and the controversy surrounding this whole subject area.

My suggestions touch on three matters of concern:

TIMELY DATA

It is quite possible that responsible administrators do not now have access to

timely information on consumer food preferences and developing trends in the

public’s purchasing habits. Some type of continuing survey that would supply

appropriate data on a weekly or monthly basis could be very helpful.

By the same token, those of us in farming who have faced rapidly rising costs

of production since 1972 often believe that the costs of farm input items incorporated in the USDA reporting system are out-of-date when they are used. Without going into great detail, I believe it is fair to assume that a substantial part

of this data comes from industry sources. If these sources are not biased, they

are at least reluctant to disclose the bad news to the government. Again, if resources were so arranged that USDA personnel could be well advised on prices

actually paid by farm and ranch operators, the judgments to be made both in the

executive branch and in legislative considerations might more accurately reflect

the actual farm situation.

WORLD CROP REPORTING

Mr. Harkness’ recommendation for a world crop reporting board is construc- -

tive. Although we have some reservations about the possibility of requiring or

eliciting responsible estimates from the representatives of sovereign nations, the

prospects of coordinating such crop reporting efforts with estimates of quantities

to be moved annually in foreign trade are of such significance that an effort along

. this line should be made.

One note of caution is offered for your consideration. If one should undertake

to follow the broad suggestions under Food Assessments in the annual report of

OTS and also to implement the recommendations outlined in the report of the

Food Advisory Committee, substantial resources would be committed and it is

possible that the rewards would not be commensurate with the increased cash

outlays for such widespread efforts. It is suggested that a small number of individuals who are capable of the task be asked to establish priorities that would

more clearly promise a payoff in the form of better data and more intelligent

decisions relating to our national policy on food and agriculture.

COORDINATION AND RELEASE OF ESTIMATES

It should be emphasized that there are many individuals in positions of responsibility in our organization as well as a number of well-educated farmers and

ranchers, who must make crop decisions at various times in the year relating to

financial commitments on production items, determine when to sell and estimate
MO

what price they may expect on their commodities after harvest. Under the current structure, international o~anizations, institutional economists ahd a few of

tlwse on t%e lloveimnetft payroll who are ~oncerned wi#h %hwm dsta may tive

time to comb through Situation Reports, Crop Repor&, the &nppi# and demand

e+timates and the press release type of statemtmts made mxxwionalty at the

cabinet oflicer level. Most of us, however, do not have the 4Ane or the eapaihility

to adequately predict what will happen both in mark-t @rires and production

item costs.

!.1’he probhxn is tixbbed cmhplicatwd by the &act that a large proportion of our

crops now move in international trade. In most nations of the world this trading

is supervise? and handled or otherwise controlled by the central government.

I th}nk it is a fa’tr al~alysis to assume that international traders with contacts in

those governments and our own government representatives are the only ones -

who are equipped to be well informed in a timely manner.

So the suggestion is this—that the Iikwcutive Branch assume the r@xmdMi5ty,

perhaps at aubcabinet derei, to Woduce summary reviews and speculative cmn~-

rmenta on new mxrp prospects, pu~hasing intentions -and the poBtle%l pressunes -

involved in other eount~s. This ~~ issuance an a particular commodity

would make available to the public the ‘best .gmesa’ on ma~kets and pnicsw :baaed

on intbmnatinn gaMbd’thron&li intelligence souncerd and other informartion.gathering services awikrbie wIy thmmgh the government. This type .of opinion is ocaskmaily lmdtectml now in very ‘brief press mleaae statements forthoorning from

the Secnetary of Agrlcultu14?, Imt such statements fgenermll~ relate omlyto smail

isolalwd even!ti$ mmh ‘as a poszi~ purchase by one or another nation, one which

constihtw OWIY apontion of our totai ma.rk@t.

I\’hat I have in mind would be entirely saparate from the mgrdar crop ~orbs

or other t~-pes of estimates that are issued periodictdty. ll%mse are publlahed with

supporting tables of data to allow for cliscussion in the normal bureaucratic

manner.

The only people capable of offering the opinions or projections on a speculative

basis such as 1 suggest, other than the personnel in a few large international

corporations, are in governmen~ They could be of real service by sharing their

best guesses with the rest of us. Of course, those of us outside government would

have to realize that these e$timated projections of demand and pmce on xqajor

comtiitieswould be @@i.iy speculative; we would have tQ be will.lng to accept

them at face value without any guarantees of cert$tude. ICven under thoke circumstances, however, we would have more information upon Which to base our

operating decldhnm.

It is hcmxl that these comments will be helpful to you and your SWP. If we

may be ‘helpfdl In the future, please don’t hesitate to call on us.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

CHAItLES L. I?!SAZXEIL

Director, 7Va8hingtofi Btafl.

[Whereupon, at 5 :25 p.m., the meeting was adjourned, to reconvene

December 10,1975, at 9 :30 a.m.]

.
FOOD INFORMATION SYSTEMS

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975

CoNGRESS oF THE UNI TED STATES,

T E CHNOL OG Y A SSES SM E NT BoARD ,

OFFICE OF T E CHNOL OG Y AS SE SS ME NT,

Washington, D.C..

The Technology Assessment Board met at 9:30 a.m., pursuant to

notice, in room 6202, Dirksen Senate Office Buildingz Hon. Hubert H.

Humphrey (member, Technology Assessment Board) presiding.

Present: Senator Humphrey and Congressman Brown

Staff present: Mr. Emilio Q. Daddario, director; Mr. Daniel V.

De Simone., deputy director; Mr. J. B. Cordaro, food program manager; Dr. Walter W. Wilcox, consultant; Ms. Ellen Terpstra, research

associate; Ms. Ann Woodbridge, administrative assistant. ,

Mr. BROWN. The bearings will come to order. The purpose of these

hearings is to discuss the information requirements for a national

food policy. Senator Humphrey has been detained, but I would like

to insert his opening statement into the record at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, A U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE 0F MINNESOTA

Chairman HUMPHREY. Today is the third day of hearings that I have

chaired for Congress’ Office of Technology Assessment. Before we begin today’s dialog with our distinguished panel of experts. I would

like to review the purpose of these hearings and share some of our

earlier findings.

In 1974 I requested, with the endorsement of Chairman Talmadge % of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, that the OTA

make an assessment of food information systems and their adequacy

for policy planning. The combination of world events that occurred in

1972, 1973, and since, have underscored the necessity for this assess- 0 ment. These events have been well chronicled, and their consequences

and effects are still being felt today; and the recently revised Soviet

harvests-down from 215 million metric tons to 137 million: metric

tons—further support this critical need.

Increased attention has been given to the importance of agricultural

information:

(161 )
162

In 1972 Senator Bellmen and I visited the Soviet Union. Our

report, "Observations on Soviet and Polish Agriculture;’ recommended among other things increasing the number of agricultural attaches assigned to the Soviet Union.

The 1974 World Food Conference recognized the vital role

of adequate, timely, and objective information. I wrote to the

U.S. Food Conference Coordinator urging that our delegation

support the establishment of a World Food and Agricu tural l

Information System. I was pleased that the U.S. delegation did

give strong support- to my request. The Conference adopted a .

resolution calling for the establishment of a worldwide "Global

Information an Early Warning System.” d

Numerous other reports and experts have brought to the public’s

attention the urgency of correcting the deficiencies that exist in .

U.S. and worldwide information systems.

Today’s hearings are especially timely. We no longer know from da

to day what the next food policy pronouncement will be or who will

make it. The capricious food policy decisions and statements of Government officials in the past 6 months have seriously affected farm

prices, created uncertainties in the markets, and demonstrated to Congress that anew and stable food policy structure is urgently needed.

As long as apparently limitless reserves were available, there seemed

little need to gather exact information on the world food situation.

Emergencies could always be met. However, that is no longer the case,

since administration policy has allowed food reserves to dwindle from

a 90-day supply to less than a month.

This hearing will explore proposals for a more pragmatic, more consciously planned approach to developing and implementing a national

food policy. OTA’s Board will weigh and balance these differing appreaches in order to frame options or congressional consideration. f

We need a national food policy. We need to make significant changes

in our food, agriculture, and nutrition programs and policymaking

process.

As one of our experts today will state, a comprehensive and consciously coordinated national food policy should be framed in terms of

a body of broad general objectives which would:

(1) Provide adequate supply and reasonable price stability to consumers;

(2) Assure fair returns to farmers;

(3) Provide assured supply for a continuing high level of commercial exports;

(4) Provide an available supply for feeding programs or disaster -

relief at home or abroad;

(5) Enable the United States to fulfill its international commitments and attain its objectives in food matters;

(6) Improve nutrition at home and abroad.

These six goals are well reflected in the two most significant elements

that must be addressed within the framework of a national food policy,

which are: (1) the need for the United States to improve its resource

production and management activities and policies; and (2) the need

for the United States to be equally concerned with the postproduction

elements of the food system, especially those which affect nutritional

status and health of consumers.

A national food policy created to meet these objectives is not only

possible and desirable but essential. The United States must utilize
163

its food production capability to maximize the economic, political,

and social benefits. Only an organized, coordinated, and well-integrated national food policy can accomplish this. To state the goals

and the need is the easy part.

The difficult part is to design or fit the elements into a systems concept and the development of programs within each component. I have

asked OTA to accept the responsibility in this task They will explore

tile total food system from the viewpoint of (1) production, (2) marketing and processing, (3) retail distribution, and (4) consumption

* and nutrition.

Only through adequate planning and careful coordination of national food policies, in the light of systematic and timely information

on the current food situation, can the world improve its present

● condition.

We must reduce the realm of the unpredictable and eliminate somo

of the guesswork in agricultural policymaking . Only in this way can

we provide a sound basis for developing world food security.

Information is a precious commodity. To be useful, it must be objective, timely, and reliable. Such information will not automatically

insure the right decisions, but it will improve the tools available to

decisionmakers.

The report submitted to the Office of Technology Assessment by

OTA’s Food Advisory Committee in June made 12 recommendations

to improve food information systems. Today's hearings are designed to

expand the content of these recommendations and explore ways in

which these options might be implemented by the Congress.

OTA's Food Advisory Committee will hold a further session which

is scheduled for January 15, 1976.

Because Congress needs to obtain outside information u on which

to base its decisions, it was necessary to focus on some of the main

sources of information and especially the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

We also had, at our earlier hearing, the opportunity to hear from

representatives of the farm organizations and the private grain trade

and review the food and agricultural organization’s plans for an expanded global information and early warning system. These materials will be used in the preparation of OTA’s final report to Congress.

Today’s hearings provide an opportunity to go one step further, to

consider the informational requirements for a national food policy.

I am pleased to have with us such a distinguished panel of experts.

- Each individual has a prepared statement, but in the interest of

time, he will present a short summary, with the full statement made a

part of the record.

Present with us today are:

Willard Cochrane, professor of agricultural economics at the University of Minnesota;

Lauren Seth, chairman of the Agriculture Committee of the National Planning Association;

Luther Tweeten, professor of agricultural economics at Oklahoma

State University; and

E. A. Jaenke, of the agricultural consulting firm, E. A. Jaenke &

Associates.

Mr. BROWN. Our first witness this morning will be Mr. Ed Jaenke of

E. A. Jaenke&Associates.
164

STATEMENT OF ED A. JAENKE, PRESIDENT, E. A. JAENKE &

ASSOCIATES, INC.

Recent developments have increased the complexity and importance of U.S. and world food problems. The conflicting responses and

approaches of the man interests involved have made clear the need

for a national food policy, a Government structure to effectively coordinate its implementation, and the need for improvements in the

U.S. and international food and agricultural information systems.

This report, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment of

the U.S. Congress, assesses alternative governmental structures and

their informational requirements for the United States to formulate

and administer a national food policy designed to cope with uncertain supply/demand situations likely to occur in the decade ahead. -

This report has been prepared by the consulting firm of E. A. Jaenke

& Associates, Inc. Major contributors have been Quentin Bates, Malcolm Maclay, and E. A. Jaenke.

The report is divided into four major sections. The first traces the

supply/demand situation for food and identifies the economic, political. social, and informational factors that have contributed to changes

in the overall food situation. It summarizes the current information

and the most comprehensive projections as to world food developments in the medium-term future.

The second section assesses current agriculture policy, its legislative

authorities, and administration and presents goals and guidelines for

a national food’ policy.

The third section presents a survey and assessment of present

institutions.

The fourth section offers three alternative governmental structures,

the advantages and disadvantages, and the informational requirements

of each.

I. W ORL D’ S F OOD S UPPL Y- PA S T, PRESEN T, AND P ROJECTTON S

ROOTS OF THE RECENT FOOD CRISIS

Complacency and overconfidence..—The food crisis of the past few ,

years erupted suddenly and unexpectedly on a world that had become

complacent about its chronic food problem. True, some 400 million

people were chronically malnourished, but the developed countries

salved their consciences and helped alleviate suffering by large food .

aid programs made possible by surplus grain production.

In spite of food aid programs and production restrictions during

and slightly beyond the 1960’s, grain reserves in the major producing

countries remained uncomfortably high and easily absorbed the leap

in import demand created by the U.S.S.R, and Asian droughts of

1965 and 1967. Grain prices had been relatively stable for two decades

and real prices had actually declined rather significantly. Considerable confidence was felt that the potential for production expansion

in the developed countries, combined with the "Green Revolution”

in the developing economies, would easily match the growth of effective demand for the foreseeable future. With what are now recognized as low fuel and fertilizer prices and a steady rise in produc-
165

tivity, grain prices were expected to remain stable at relatively low

levels.

In 1972, a bewildered world suddenly found itself entering into an

extremely unstable food situation, with supplies temporarily tight and

prices gyrating wildly.

The ostensible reasons for this abrupt change in direction are well

known; that is, abnormally poor crops in several key. areas—a shift

in the Humboldt Current-unexpectedly large Soviet, imports--widespread inflation-us. dollar devaluation-to cite only the most imS portant. However, with the benefit of hindsight, we can now clearly

see that this crisis had its roots in largely unnoticed developments in

grain supply and demand during the years of apparent stability.

Demand pressures build. —Social, economic, and political factors

● contributed over a period of years to a strong upward pressure on effective demand for food in the early 1970's. Food consumption in the

developing countries was rising faster than their food production, resulting in growing dependence on imports from the developed countries. However, grain production in the developed countries was rising

faster than consumption. Consequently, a major concern during the

1950’s and 1960’s had been the management of surpluses. This concern

led to large food aid programs and to tighter grain production controls which by the late 1960’s had substantially reduced the large reserves that had traditionally given stability at low price levels to the

world grain markets.

Meanwhile, several centrally planned economies which had ‘been

traditional net grain exporters were steadily moving toward an import

deficit position.

Reinforcing the upward pressure of rising population and income

on demand was a marked shift, both in official government policies

and in public attitudes. toward a greater awareness of and sympathy

for the problems of hunger and malnutrition in the world. This shift

in approach has been developing on both international and national

levels. The following are a few recent examples:

The World Food Conference in November 1974 effectively focused

international attention on food problems, and a climate of unexpected

cooperation surrounds the followup activities.

- The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and

other U.N. agencies are presently devoting much greater resources to

food and agricultural development than previously.

Bilateral aid programs are giving top priority to agricultural

development.

While food aid appears to have been cut back from earlier -years.

especially by the United States. because food aid programs are now

more nearly divorced from surplus disposal, multilateral food aid for

purely humanitarian purposes is probably at an alltime high.

It is with individual nations, however, that this shift in policies

and attitudes is probably most significant and least recognized. Inmost

(Developing countries. hunger and malnutrition were endemic and were

often viewed fatalistically as insoluble problems. Surplus food producing countries and developed countries often were either genuinely unaware of their own hunger problems or unwilling to admit them publicly. The general public in the ‘United States reacted with a combinat ion of shock, anger, and disbelief a few years ago when a Senate in-
166

vestigation revealed the extent and seriousness of hunger in this country. This played no small part in the relatively unpublicized but truly

astonishing growth in recent years of our domestic Federal food assistance programs from about $1 billion in fiscal year 1969 to an estimated

$9 billion in fiscal year 1976. In addition, substantially liberalized welfare programs have steadily boosted nutrition levels for the needy.

This development is less apparent among many other developed

countries mainly ‘because most of them, particularly in Western

Europe, have long had liberal social programs. The centrally planned

economies, however, are showing greatly increased concern for im- .

proving and upgrading the diets of their peoples, whose incomes are

rising and who are insistently demanding more livestock products

and greater variety. The OPEC countries are devoting an important

share of their "instant riches>> to food imports and agricultural -

development.

Many developing countries as well are making greater efforts to provide more adequate food supplies. Last season when her crops were

small, India imported about 6 million tons of grain-she reportedly

plans to import about the same quantity this season even though her

grain harvest this year is excellent. Indonesia, South Korea, and Bangladesh are among other LCD's that are straining to step Up food

imports.

By 1972, the world had become highly vulnerable to even a moderate

reduction below trend in food supply. Developing countries had a large

and growing dependence on imports because their own production,

which had been inhibited by low prices and reliance on food aid, had

not kept pace with demand. The centrally managed economies were

subsidizing food consumption and were also unable to increase production sufficiently to satisfy their people% insistent demands for upgraded diets. In the developed countries, demand for livestock products had turned sharply upward, lifting feed grain requirements with

it. Rising export demand and production controls had reduced reserve

stocks in the surplus producing countries to levels that were only about

50 million metric tons over pipeline requirements. This compares to

the normal annual increase in world consumption of about 25 million

to 30 million metric tons.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1972, the world’s grain producers,

particularly those in the United States, were still very worried about

grain surpluses. In the United States, carryover stocks had increased

by 18 million tons over those of the previous year. Although the U.S.

export outlook was good, partly due to the devaluation of the U.S. .

dollar, the size of these grain stocks kept prices at low levels, and both

farmers and the administration were eager to expand exports even

more.

From surplus to 8hortage in 1972.—The drought that struck the

U. S. S.R., Argentina, Australia, and South Asia did not reduce world

grain production by more than 2 1/2 percent from that of the previous

year, but consumption jumped by 35 million metric tons, exports by

15 million metric tons, and carryover reserve stocks fell by about 30

million metric tons.

The principal swing factor in this picture was the Soviet decision to

make up its entire shortfall in grain supplies with imports. In 1963,

1965, and 1967, Russian grain production had fallen substantially be-
167

low the previous year--and also below trend-—-by an average of about

30 million metric tons. Yet in each of those years, the Soviets pulled

in their belts, drew down stocks, slaughtered some livestock, and made

do with imports of 10 million metric tons in 1963-64, the year they

were worst hit; 9 million metric tons in 1965-66; and only 1 million

metric tons in 1967-68. The change in import policy in 1972 seemed

astonishing at the time, but we now know that the Soviets felt they

must make good on their commitment in the 1971-75 5-year plan to increase livestock production by 25 percent. They therefore imported 22

0 million metric tons of grain in 1972-73 when their production had

dropped only 13 million metric tons from the previous year—net imports were 19 million metric tons, as compared to the 197l-72 net of

1.4 million metric tons. This policy is obviously still in effect as the

● massive Soviet purchases of this year bear witness.

The Soviets would not have been able to buy up such a substantial

portion of the world% grain reserves in 1972-73 at low prices had it

not been for the failure of our intelligence systems to furnish adequate

and timely information on Soviet crop prospects and ‘buying intentions. In addition, the lack of coordination and exchange of information between various Government agencies and departments handicapped effective action by the appropriate U.S. officials.

Without pointing the finger of blame at anyone since the Soviets

went to great lengths to conceal this information, we wish to point up

this excellent example of the importance of establishing more effective

and better coordinated information systems.

The story of developments in the world grain situation since 1972 is

well known. Prices have fluctuated violently but from a much higher

base. Stocks dropped precipitously and carryover stocks have been

at little better than pipeline requirements since that time. World

crops were good in 1973. but, below trend in 1974 and again in 1975,

when record crops in the United States were counterbalanced by a

near crop failure in the U.S.S.R. In the United States, the administration yielded to consumer pressure and embargoed or restricted exports on three occasions-on soybeans in 1973, on corn to the U.S.S.R.

in 1974. and on all oilseeds and grains to the U.S.S.R. and to Poland in

1975. These steps were violently opposed by U.S. farmers, who had

- been requested to go all out for production. Hindsight has demonstrated that none of the actions had really been necessary.

PROJECTIONS—THE NEXT 10 YEARS

-

The world outlook.—The sudden shift from abundance to scarcity

in world grain supplies has revived echoes of Malthus in the current

rash of predictions that we have finally reached the limits of our abil -

ity to increase food production sufficiently to match population growth.

One school takes the somber view that we are on the verge of widespread and growing famine conditions in which the per capita supply

of food will progressively decline. Others feel that we can provide

adequate food supplies only if the affluent reduce their consumption of

grain-fed livestock. It is significant, however. that most of the major

research studies that have analyzed the situation in depth reach much

more optimistic conclusions. Their forecasts of production. consumption, and prices for at least the next decade or so vary somewhat. But
168

they agree that most of the recent supply problems are transitory and

should and can be corrected and that production can and probably

will manage to keep ahead of population and income growth, although

with frequent and possibly severe temporary shortages.

The major recent studies on projections of world grain reduction

and demand have been made by Iowa State University-197 3 but with

a late 1960’s base the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization—1974 with a 1969-71 base, the USDA’s Economic Research

Service-1975 with a 1969-71 base, and the Brookings Institution—

still in progress. .

Following are a few general conclusions on which most of these

studies are in agreement..

In their view, the problems of the past few years, to some extent,

carry within themselves the seeds of their own solutlons. Food prices

were too low and too often artificially restrained in the late 1960’s

and early 1970’s, and low prices discouraged fertilizer production. The

anticipated higher level of grain prices will stimulate production and

inhibit the rate of growth of livestock feeding. Fertilizer prices should

remain high enough to stimulate an increase in production of that

vital input. Perhaps most importantly, the nations of the world recognize better than ever before the seriousness of the situation and the

determination of their peoples to improve their diets. Thus, they are

making an unprecedented effort to raise more food and distribute it

more equitably.

In the short and medium term, all agree, the developing countries

will probably continue to increase their dependence on food and fertilizer imports. For years their own food production remained below

Potential due to such deterrents as low food price ceilings, availability of food aid, and cheap food imports. The recent jump in prices will

stimulate food production, although high fuel and fertilizer prices

and shortages of foreign exchange may, for the moment, inhibit rapid

development. Temporary increases in food aid provided by affluent

countries will be necessary, along with longer range development assistance programs.

These researchers reach other general conclusions about the next 10

years :

(1) Real food costs will remain high temporarily, but will probably

decline relative to other goods to somewhere between the excessively

low pre-1972 level and the 1973–74 levels.

(2) World food resources are adequate to permit continued per

capita increases in food production for at least the rest of this century, &

if not well beyond.

(3) Instability of food supplies and prices will continue unless adequate reserve stocks can be built, up.

(4) Little evidence exists that global shifts in climate of a longrange nature will adversely affect production.

(5) The serious reconsideration of agricultural policies and their

adaptation to changing conditions which is underway in most countries must continue to be carried out if these reasonably optimistic

projections are to be fulfilled.

A few of the keu projections made by their studies may help bring

these conclusions into focus. Both FAO and ERS take as a base the

1969–7l average. altough they use a slightly different mix of com-
169

ponents. FAO forecasts the net annual import deficit of developing

countries will jump from 16 million metric tons in 1969–’71 to 85 million metric tons by 1985-this would rise to 100 million metric tons

if net exporters are eliminated. ERS uses several alternative sets of

assumptions, but under the first two ‘alternatives the 1985 forecasts

would be for deficits of 49 million and 68 million metric tons—66 million and 88 million metric tons, eliminating the LDC exporters-Thailand and Argentina. Another ERS alternative assumes annual usage

of an additional 1 1/2 to 2 percent of fertilizer and related inputs, which

m would reduce the annual import deficit to 36 million metric tons 10

years hence.

While food deficits of this magnitude could be met by surplus production from developed countries, the developing countries would

● probably have serious difficulties in financing them. The United States

and other exporters may be faced with hard decisions as to whether

to greatly expand development assistance or to increase even more

their programs of food aid~through grants and credits. The importance

of having an integrated food policy as a basis for making such decisions is again evident.

The U.S. outlook.— As to the prospects for U.S. agriculture during

the next 10 years. an ERS study is currently underway on projections

to 1985, for which preliminary and as yet unofficial figures have been

released, Two sets of assumptions were used to make projections. The

first, called “Baseline Demand,>’ assumes: (1) GNP’ growth at 3.98

percent (in 1958 dollars) annually, equal to the rate during 1960-74,

(2) the Census Bureau’s series :E’ > population projection (see table

I), and (3) a moderate export assumption, with continued restrictions

by the EC, greater participation than previously by the U.S.S.R. and

China as grain buyers in the world market, and steadily increasing

imports by developing countries.

The report also made a “high demand>> projection based on higher

population levels, income. and export assumptions, which would show

a boost of about 9 percent in prices received and in net farm income

of nearly 20 percent from the baseline projection. The second projection assumes: (1) GNP growth (1958 dollars) 4.1 percent, (2) Census

series "D" population growth, (3) export demand assumptions-(a)

slightly higher imports by U.S.S.R. and China, (b) somewhat liberalized EC trade policy, (c) faster than trend growth by the developing countries’ livestock economies, particularly in OPEC countries.

Source: Unpublished report of ERS’S eurnornic Ism@tions barn.

.

By comparing these two projections, we can see the’ dramatic effect

that, even a moderate shift in world demand can have on prices and

incomes of U.S. farmers. For example, U.S. wheat exports under the
170

"high demand projection would go up by more than one-third and

the U.S. farm price would jump from the baseline projection $3.73

to $6.24 per bushel! The increase in feed grain exports would be less

dramatic, but as noted total farm exports would go up by 15 percent

and farm incomes by 20 percent.

TABLE II.-U.S. CROP FORECASTS BY 1985

[In millions of bushels]

Production Exports Price (1974 dollars) *

High High Baseline

Commodity demand

High

demand demand demand

Wheat ----------------- 2,059 2,530 1,165 1,610 3.73 6.24

Corn ------------------- 6,561 6,741 1 9 5 1,735 2.33

Grain sorghum ---------- 1,078 1, 087 239 2.10 2.38

Barley ----------------- 479 472

806

2.04

Soy beans -------------- 1,778 1,829 812 7.03 7.36

Source: Unpublished report of ERS’S economic projections program.

On the other hand, although no specific projection was made for an

assumption of ‘below-trend world demand, the logical conclusion is

that U.S. farm prices and incomes could fall disastrously, using the

same elasticities of demand.

Our critical need for a better information system could not be better

demonstrated than by these projections. The price inelasticity of U.S.

farm products dictates some fine economic tuning in the coming years,

but as of now our economists simply do not have the necessary data.

The scope of the information problem on a worldwide basis is overwhelming indeed. Think for a moment of the sophisticated crop data

gathering system we have in the United States. It is far and away

the best in the world, but monthly revisions of crop forecasts have

frequently been large enough to make front page news. Now imagine

trying to make sophisticated world crop forecasts from data which

at best is provided by a country whose information gathering system

is of a much lower caliber or at worst where countries outrightly

refuse to provide any information. We have relied far too long on

the educated guesses of agricultural attaches.

SUMMARY

The major new elements in the United States and the world agricultural outlook that have vastly increased uncertainty and instability

are:

(1) The rapid dissipation of world food reserves to minimum pipeline levels and the disappointing progress in the ongoing negotiations

for an agreement to rebuild them.

(2) A continued upward trend in the productive capability of developed countries, leading to potential short-term surplus, price-depressing conditions.

(3) A growing, but erratic and unpredictable increase in import

demand from the developing countries, as well as the centrally managed economies.
171

(4) A U.S. commitment to eliminate hunger from the United States

and to take the lead in eliminating it from the world. Howeverj there

appers to be a reluctance to provide the funds required.

(5) The sharp upturn in the rate of increase in the costs of producl-ion of farm products, which in the case of livestock feeders includes

feed prices themselves, that makes U.S. farmers vulnerable to serious

losses when prices move wildly in either direction.

(6) The increased tendency of retail food prices to move like a

ratchet, upward quickly and easily but with great resistance to down8 ward movements when farm prices decline—due partly to inflating

handling and processing costs.-This will cause great concern and real

economic hardship to consumers, particularly those in middle- and

low-income categories.

● (7) The failure of the existing U.S. and world information systems

to provide the inputs necessary to cope with the far more interrelated

anti complex food problems facing the world today and tomorrow.

(8) The increasingly strident demands of the developing countries

for a "new economic policy" that would seek out programs for redistributing wealth from the affluent countries to the poor ones.

(9) The runaway inflation of the past few years that even worldwide recession has failed to arrest.

II. CURRENT AGRICULTURAL POLICY—ITS LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND

ADMINISTRATION

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

In the light of these new elements in the U.S. and world food situations, we need to examine the current legislative authorities, policies,

and institutional structures. They were primarily created and shaped

to deal with the problems associated with surpluses. A review of the

(Compilation of Statutes administered by the U.S. Department of

Agriculture emphasizes this point. Many of the basic authorities

regarding various commodities relate back to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. The Agricultural Adjustment Acts of the 1950's and

1960’s, in most cases, tie back to that 1988 act. The mechanism for

accomplishing needed adjustments is the Commodity Credit Corporation, a unique Government Corporation with comprehensive commodity and funding authority. Parts of man-y other programs administered by the Department of Agriculture such as conservation, credit,

research, quality standards, or special export programs are basically

geared back to the adjustment function.

Many of the existing legislative authorities are not ideally suited

to deal with an unstable situation of closely balanced food supply.

As examples, no effective measures were readily available to ease the

impact on consumers and livestock ‘producers when soybean and grain

in’ices soared in recent years. Later, when the costs of producing grain

soared as prices declined, grain producers felt the pinch. Again, the

legislative authorities and Government structures were not sufficient

to deal with the problems.

It is helpful to review the major changes that occurred in legislative authority and agriculture policy in recent decades. The most sig-
172

nificant changes occurred in the 1960's when loan and purchase rates

were lowered to estimated world levels and supplementary payments

were provided for cooperating producers who agreed to restrict production. The two recent legislative changes, the Agriculture Act of

1970 and the Agriculture and Consumers Protection Act of 1973, while

modified and improved over the programs of the 1960's, were nevertheless patterned in the same theoretical mold.

ADMINISTRATIVE PHILOSOPIIY

Despite the consistent legislative authority, the divergent philosophies of its administrators resulted in sharply differing outcomes.

The current administration defines its national food policy as one

directed toward the efficient production and distribution of the agri- .

cultural output in a completely free U.S. and world competitive market with only minimal government involvement.

The current administration has given modern expression to the 18th

century laissez-faire, laissez-passer economic philosophy of Adam

Smith and the French economists, which involved opposing all government interference in economic affairs except to maintain property

rights. This classical economic approach relies on an assumed automatic coordination with competitive market prices providing the appropriate incentives or discouragements to producers of goods and

services to thereby create (TheWealth of Nations.>>

The Secretary of Agriculture has not only voiced this laissez-faire

philosophy in numerous speeches but has gone as far as the law allows

to eliminate or hold down

f

agricultural price supports to a point where

they have no meaningful effect on free market price adjustments. The

Department’s internal directive on program goals and objectives makes

very clear indeed the policy of minimizing Government intervention

an emphasizing a market-oriented approach. 1

However, the administration apparently forgot its devotion to the

laissez-faire free market concept in those cases where the result of

that free market has caused political problems from the public, consumer sector. The recent embargo actions are examples.

The mind-set, and active striving toward the goal of coordination and

adjustment of food production and distribution through market prices,

with no Government interference, left the country. unprepared to trike

timely and appropriate action to cope with the serious crises and pressures that have recently been encountered.

The hard economic facts of world shortages and skyrocketing prices .

caused by weather, sea current shifts, policy changes in non-free-trade

countries and other unpredictable events combined with such known

factors as world population increases, U.S.S.R. detente, Red China

rapprochement a rising consumer movement. and the divergent interests of feed grain and livestock producers forced sudden price and

export controls in June 1973 from a reluctant administration.

The importance in theorv and usefulness in practice of the competitive market price system for making adjustments in production, exports. imports, domestic use, and stock levels is fully recognized. It

works relatively well for most agricultural commodities most of the

time. However. recent events have made clear that unduly wide quantity and price fluctuations will not be acceptable in our domestic society

either to consumers or to farmers. The power of the consumer move-
173

ment, which was reflected in the administration’s reluctant market

control actions of 1973, 1974, and 1975 will surely grow and become

more potent in any future crises. On the other hand, when agricul -

tural prices fell precipitately from October 1974 through March 1975

while production costs rapidly rose. the need to protect farmers became

expressed in the near override of the President% veto of the farm bill

passed by the Congress in the spring of 1975. This farm bill primarily

would have increased the target price support for feed grains, wheat,

and cotton to their approximate cost of production levels and would

w have reestablished a support program for soybeans.

APPRAISAL

● A total market-oriented-laissez-faire-approach to food today just

is not sufficient. It is acceptable in our present U.S. society and world

situation only within reasonable market price changes. It ails to touch z

or provide answers for many of the most pressing problem as aspects,

responsibilities for which and decisions on which reach into nearly all

our existing governmental departments and agencies. The various

Presidential and interagency committees established to effect some

coordination in limited spheres are insufficient to properly meet the

overall coordination required. What is needed is a flow of up-to-theminute data, information, and analyses from all the agencies concerned with food to a centralized organization. This organization

should be charged, on a continuing basis, to exercise judgment and

reach decisions reflecting all input aspects and approaches and possess

authority to effectuate coordination. ,.

GOALS FOR A NATIONAL FOOD POLICY

This paper proposes a broader, more pragmatic, more consciously

planned approach to developing and effectuating a national food policy. Such an approach involves weighing andbalancing the varied, f

often conflicting, group interests and attitudes in terms of broadly

conceived general welfare. It involves the international status, obligations, and policies of the United States. It involves and leans heavily

on a greatly improved flow of data and information to enable human

judgment to coordinate all these factors in ways which best meet our

national interests and which are acceptable to the Congress and to the

public as a whole.

A comprehensive and consciously coordinated national food policy

9 should be framed in terms of a body of broad general objectives which

would :

(1) Provide adequate supply and reasonable price stability to

consumers;

(2) Assure fair returns to farmers;

(3) Provide assured supply for a continuing high level of commercial exports;

(4) Provide an available supply for feeding programs or disaster relief at home or abroad;

(5) Enable the United States to fulfill its international commitments and attain its objectives in food matters;

(6) Improve nutrition at home and abroad; and
174

(7) Develop improved information and evaluation systems to

better achieve the above objectives, including effective informational flow back to the American people.

GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING A NATIONAL FOOD POLICY

A national food policy created to meet these objectives is not only

possible and desirable, but essential. If the United States is to fully

utilize its food supply capability in order to maximize not only the

economic benefits but also the political and social benefits, we must .

come forward with an organize , coordinated? planned national food d

policy. This can and must be coordinated with our free enterprise,

market-oriented economy. This policy must help to guide that free

market economy. It must set parameters so as to minimize economic

disruption and hardships to all segments of our society.

A national food policy would involve an assessment of the total food

requirement for a 10-year period. This would include domestic commercial demands, domestic food assistance programs, commercial exports, food aid exports, and contingency stockpiles.

In several of the above requirements, basic policy questions are evident, and congressional action would be needed. It is proposed that the

Congress would ratify or ‘approve the 10-year national food policy

prior to its implementation.

Given these national food requirements, the executive branch would

then determine the conditions and inputs to obtain the matching supplies. This would involve: (1) Price and income incentives; (2) basic

and applied research in production, marketing, and nutrition; (3)

adequate credit; (4) adequate transportation; (5) availability of production inputs, such as energy, labor, and chemicals; and (6) efficient

processing and marketing systems.

The development of such a 10-year national food policy within the

framework of a basically free and market-oriented society must involve many facets of our economy. It must include the inputs and best

thinking of farmers, agribusinessmen and researchers, et cetera. But

only government can provide the catalytic action, the leadership, and

the coordination to bring the best points of view into a decisionmaking

process. Congress and the executive branch must accept this .

responsibility.

The primary purpose of this paper is not to fully develop the concept and applcation of a national food policy. Hence, we have only

outlined a skeletal approach to provide the necessary background for .

evaluation of the alternative government structures for carrying out

such a food policy.

III. A NALYSIS OF P RESENT INSTITUTION S

PROLIFERATION OF DECISIONMAKING

Preceding sections of this paper give some insight into why, until

recently, there has been little or no consideration given to developing,

proclaiming, and explaining a well-enunciated national food policy

and a coordinated approach to handling matters relating to food. United

recent years, we have struggled with a very real supply control or
175

farm problem. Now we face what appears to be also a very real and

long-term food problem. The rapid-fire events and changes of recent

years, the need ● for more exacting data and analyses, and dire consequences of inaction now dictate a bold new approach.

With a very thin supply/demand margin, we can no longer leave the

welfare of consumers and farmers to a widely fluctuating free market,

especially when central governments can exert such strong market influences. The United States, in particular, and other producing and

consuming countries have a vital stake in the rationalization of the

food picture.

As each crisis emerged in recent years, a new short-range patchwork decisionmaking procedure was quickly inaugurated, generally at

the White House level. The effect has been to give to others rather

than the Secretary of Agriculture greater and eater responsibility

for food policymaking. In addition, it has resulted in an almost unbelievable number of councils, boards, agencies, and committees—

many overlapping and duplicating, but all designed to pull together the

necessary information for high-level decisionmaking. Not only the

White House has been responsible for this proliferation of decisionmaking and coordinating %0dies. Several have been spawned by the

Congress. This whole situation is reflected in the Washington cocktail

joke that agriculture and food have become too important to be left to

the Secretary of Agriculture.

TWENTY-SIX DECISIONMAKERS

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to indicate each and every

organization, department, bureau, agency, council, board, and committee that has by law or executive oder been given some significant re- r

sponsibility for at least one aspect relating to food. Many involve the

inputs to agriculture, some involve the production process itself.

Others involve marketing, distribution, and quality control. A number

affect the overall supply and utilization of food-particularly when

consumers and voters are up in arms over food prices.

This paper will attempt to enumerate the major agencies, departments, or Government bodies that have some significant input in the

- total food equation.

(1) Department of Agriculture, with its 23 agencies, has the prime

responsibility for many aspects of foodz its production, and use.

(2) Department of Labor, through its Rural Manpower Service of

- the U.S. Employment Service, its Office of Manpower Development

programs, its national migrant workers program, and its administrative responsibility for occupational safety and health, is deeply involved in a number of aspects relating to food.

(3) Department of State, with its Under Secretary for Economic

Affairs, its Under Secretary for Political Affairs, its Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, and, of course, its semiindependent Agency for International Development and its coordinator of the food for peace program, is likewise involved.

(4) Department of the Interior has inputs in the food area through

its Bureau of Land Management which controls livestock production

cm Federal lands; its Bureau of Commercial Fisheries; its Bureau of

Reclamation; and its Office of Land Use and Water Planning.
176

(5) Department of Commerce and its Domestic and International

Business Administration works with businesses involved in the processing, handling, exporting of food products.

(6) Department of Army, Corps of Engineers with its jurisdiction

over the Nation's water resources envelopment actually has tremendous

effect on agriculture.

(’i) Department of Health, Education, and Welfare plays an important role particularly through its Food and Drug Administration.

(8) Department of Transportation has at least seven entities directly involved in transportation matters which have major impact on

the supply of productive inputs or the transportation of raw or processed agricultural commodities.

(9) Federal Energy Administration. with programs of allocation

of energy supplies to agriculture, is deeply involved. Its decisions

affect the ability of farmers to produce food and its proper handling

and processing.

(10) Treasury Department plays an important role particularly under the current Government organization which brings the Secretary

of Treasury into nearly all economic decisions.

(11) Farm Credit Administration, supplying nearly one-third of

the capital needs of agriculture, is involved .

(12) Central Intelligence Agency, with its analyses of world production, has become a significant part of the decisionmaking process.

(13) Environmental Protection Agency, with its rulemaking authority in the agricultural field, can greatly increase the cost of food

production as well as affect the ability of farmers to produce the quantities of food needed.

(14) Federal Trade Commission, with its responsibilities over legislation affecting competition. is involved in food policy.

(15) Federal Maritime Commission is concerned with the conditions of export of product~including food products.

(16) Federal Reserve, with at least six of its banks located in heavily productive agricultural areas and with its decisions so intricately

interwoven with national economic policy, is a key factor in the food

decisionmaking process.

(17) Commodity Futures Tradinq Commission, recently established

to relate futures trading, has a significant role or effect.

(18) International Trade Commission, with its enforcement of im- -

port and export policies, affects food reduction and distribution.

(19) Office of Management and Budget plays a major role in determining food production and utilization through its influence on policy

and expenditures.

(20) Domestic Council, charged with long-range planning and with

making Presidential and legislative recommendations is involved.

(21) Council of Economic Advisers provides significant analyses

and inputs into decisionmaking processes involving food.

(22) Council on Wage and Price Stabilization, particularly during

its most active period of the early 1970's, had tremendous influence on

agricultural policy.

., . , ,
177

(23) Office of Special Representative for Trade Negotiations is a

key actor since agricultural trade is the largest single item involved in

our balance of payments and, as a result, greatly affects how much

farmers will be paid to produce food.

(24) National Security Council is involved in all major international political and economic affairs.

(25) Council on International Economic Policy was created by

Presidential memorandum in January 1971 to improve the coordination of U.S. Government agencies in the field of foreign economic afW fairs. With food playing so important a role, the CIEP becomes part

of the decisionmaking process.

(26) President% Economic Policy Board, established to advise the

President concerning all aspects of national and international eco- S nomic policy * * * and serve as a focal point for economic policy decisionmaking, has an important effect on food availability.

Each of the above has some responsibility for decislonmaking in

matters that affect food policy. In many instances, a decision by some

of the above can have not only short-range but very important long-

, range effects. As an example of this, decisions in the field of energy

have major impacts in the energy-intensive modern agricultural plant.

WHITE HOUSE INVOI.VEMENT

Since so man Government organizations are involved in one way or

another in food policy and food policy implementation, it is only natural that one must look to the White House, which is the area of reconciliation and coordination, for the man-y, many inputs into the decisionmaking process. The following chart outlines the Executive Office

organization for food issues. In addition to the groups, boards, and

committees outlined in this chart, the Domestic Council and the National Security Council are, as noted above, both involved in many

matters related to food.

The complexity of the issue—the emerging importance of food—is

well indicated in the timing of the creation of various of these overlapping ~ groups, committees, and boards. On September 30, 1974 the

president created the Economic Policy Board. On October 30 l974,

the President established an executive committee of the Board, modifying his June 18, 1974, organization of the Presidents Committee on

Food. That committee was charged with “reviewing governmental activities significantly affecting food costs and prices and provides coordination for the Nation’s policies relating to domestic and interna- .

tional food supplies and relating to food costs and prices.” The October 30 memo also classified the position of the Food Deputies Group.

In addition to this and not shown on the attached chart is a “Monitoring Group" which will daily review agricultural export orders. The

most significant export, orders are to be submitted to the Deputies

Group for decision.
178

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179

On November 10, 1974, the Secretary of State established, under

Presidential direction, an international food review group shown in

the upper left-hand corner “to coordinate the implementation of the

U.S. decisions and initiatives stemming from the World Food Conference * * * and make recommendations on further actions to be taken

to implement the measures announced at the Conference.” This followup group is also required to ‘(coordinate” with the executive committee of the Policy Board. With the six groups as indicated in the chart,

plus the Monitoring Group plus the National Security Council, plus

w the basic responsibilities of the Secretary of Agriculture, it is quite

clear that there is no coordinated decisionmaking process on matters

related to agriculture. Given this organization, one is tempted to suggest that a new organization be established to coordinate the coordinat-

● ing groups. It is clear that Government structures must be changed

and that change be accomplished in the immediate future if the asset

we have in the area of food is to be developed and maximized to the

best interests of the United States and the world.

IV. ALTERNATIVE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES

In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that our decisionmaking

process with regard to food is highly unsatisfactory. With the growing

worldwide demand for food, our entree process of food production,

marketing, and distribution-both domestically and internationally—

dictate the need for a more precise, better coordinated informationgathering structure and decisionnmking process. The tolerance of error

is so small that the system of compartmentalized and independent decisionmaking on the part of the several Government bodies is no longer

viable.

This paper presents three alternatives to this problem. Each is

designed to focus into a single decisionmaking forum all of the inputs,

information, intelligence, provisions, and policy choi ces-whether relating to political, economic, or social factors. The three alternatives

represent a progression from simple to complex, from minimum

change to major restructuring, from mere coor ination to monolithic d

policymaking and implementation, from minimum Presidential action

to full congressional consideration.

ALTERNATIVE NUMBER ONE—A NATIONAL FOOD COUNCIL, HEADED BY

A SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR FOOD

- Under this alternative, a special assistant--or counselor-for food

would be designated by the President. A food council involving the

Cabinet officers from appropriate departments would be established

by the President. No new legislative authority is necessary. Presidential authority clearly exists to reorganize White House staff

functions.

A special assistant to the President for food would have the

responsibility to formulate recommendations for a general, long-range

national food policy. He would have the power to convene the food

council and to coordinate inputs from various departments and agencies pertinent to the problem at hand, to request studies, analyses, et

cetera, from any department or agency of Government. He would

serve as a catalyst, coordinator, and convener. He would structure the

agenda and cause the council to focus on issues at hand, whether long-
180

ran e policy or short-range urgent decisions. Actions or considerations

of the national food council would be relayed to the President, who

would direct appropriate Cabinet officials accordingly. In short, the

special assistant for food would gather facts, analyses, viewpoints, and

form these into recommendations for the President. Individual Cabinet

officers would have the clear opportunity to present differing recommendations directly to the President

The council, under the chairmanship of the special assistant for

food, would be empowered to deal with any matter relating to the

total food picture. This could include matters relating to basic research .

in production, use, or distribution of food, the availability of inputs

required in basic production policy, recommendations as to domestic

or international policies relating to the production incentives or deterrents, consumption patterns, etcetera.

O rating through and with the council, the special assistant for

food would coordinate food aid programs, allocation or embargo programs in commercial sales recommend new legislation and coordinate

varying legislative and policy positions. Operating independently or

through the oouncil, he would have the authority to use public ad- %

visory committees. He wouldl when appropriate~ brief members of Congress—Committee leadersj et cetera-but would not normally appear directly before congressional committees. The appropriate Cabinet officer would car out this function. Neither the council nor the

special assistant would have final decisionmaking authority and all

implementation would be accomplished through the independent

agency or department. While the President would decide the membership of the food council, it is likely that he would at least designate

the Secretaries of Agriculture (perhaps as vice chairman), State.

Commerce, and Transportation. The Council of Economic Advisers,

Office of Management and Budget, AID, National Security Council,

and Central Intelligence Agency and Domestic Council might also be

represented.

The special assistant for food would have a small core staff, probably no more than 10. In addition, there might be a second echelon

working level group from the member departments or agencies designated to flush out problems, pending issues, etcetera, for consideration

by the food council. It is anticipated that the council would meet at

least monthly: with the second echelon group meeting more frequently.

The "coordinating concept" here envisioned has been used on previous occasions. As the energy issue developed: President Nixon designated a special assistance for energy policy, with a similar coordinating,

convening, and catalytic role. The existing White House organization -

is not as clearly structured for obtaining inputs from all concerned

Government officials and departments.

ALTERNATIVE NUMBER TWO--NATIONAL, FOOD AGENCY, HEADED BY

A CABIN-ET-LEVEL FOOD ADMINISTRATOR

This agency would have policymaking authority in any matter relating to food. The administrator would have overriding authority, subject only to the President or the Congress. on policy matters relating

to food. Implementation of decisions would remain with the various

departments as appropriate. Under existing authority, the President

could create this new agency, but legislative concurrence, authority,

and the necessary appropriations would be congressional actions.
181

It is envisioned that this organization would involve up to 100 technical experts in each and all facets relating to food from research to

intelligence and assessment of food requirements of peoples throughout the world. The administrator wouldhave full authority to call on

various agencies and departments of Government for analyses, studies,

et cetera. He would report directly to the President,.

A Cabinet-level food committee or board would be established involving those agencies that have direct and significant inputs as relate

to food. Clearly, the Departments of Agriculture, State, Commerce,

* and Transportation would be involved. but additionally AID, the

Council of Economic Advisers. National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and Office of Management and Budget would probably be included.

● This Cabinet-level food committee would assist the Administrator

in developing national food policy. It should meet at least monthly,

with second echelon Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, or Administrator’s representatives meeting more frequently, Staff representatives from the NFA would work closely wit their technical and i

designated policy counterparts in each of the agencies. The NFA staff

would likwise have responsibility for followup to assure that policy

decisions of the Administrator are being carried out by the appropriate departments. Individual Cabinet officers would have the opportunity to review and appeal NFA decisions to the President.

The Administrator of NFA would have the authority to use public

advisory committees, but would most likely work through the individual departments in developing national food policies. The agency

would be responsible for establishing all policies relating to food, coordinating their implementation through Presidential directives to

existing agencies. The Administrator would brief and report to the

appropriate congressional committees and would present official administration testimony in the area of national food policy.

ALTERNATIVE NUMBER THREE-.~ NEW DEPARTMENT~ OF FOOD

The increasing importance of food suggests the advisability of considering a basic reorganization of the governmental structure. Such

a new food department would gather’ together the responsibility and *

authority for a variety of functions now scattered in several departments, agencies commissions, boards. and committees that have a

direct bearing on our total food supply, its price, its quality, and its’

-

availability for domestic consumption, including food assistance, and

commercial and food aid exports.

From within the existing USDA structure, the new agency would

assume the functions now performed by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Foreign Agricultural Service, Commodity Credit Corporation, Agricultural Research Service Packers

and Stockyard Administration?, AgricuItural Marketing Service, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Food and Nutrition Service,

Federal Crop Insurance Administration, and Farmer Cooperative

Service. Portions of other agencies such as Economic Research Servire, Extension Service. Statistical Reporting Service, and Farmers

Home Administration would be included as would some other minor

functions from other agencies. The remaining functions currently in

USDA involving the Forest Service, rural development, rural elec-
182

trification, conservation, et cetera, would be involved in a separate

reorganization plan.

At least the following functions from other departments would be fo

included in this new Department of Food: The Department of Laborthose that deal with farm labor; the Food and Drug Administrationthose dealing with the health, safety, and wholesomeness of food; the

Department of State-those primarily responsible for international

negotiations involving food; AID—those t at involve food aid; the h

Department of the Interior—those in the Bureau of Land Management relating to the use of Government-owned lands for grazing; and .

the Department of Commerce-those relating to food processing and

marketing.

There would be cases where a particular function logically fall

in either of two or three departments of Government. In these cases, -

should the decision be to not include the function in the Department

of Food, then appropriate and close liaison procedures would have to

be worked out so that the Secretary of Food would have full input

into the decisionmaking process affecting food production, distribution, and utilization.

Two examples where the advantages and disadvantages are approximately equal involve energy and transportation. Few other industries

are so dependent upon energy in the entire chain of production and

utilization than is agriculture. Natural gas is, of course, a basic ingredient in nitrogen fertilizer production. Supplies must be made

available on a timely basis for efficient production. Likewise, perishable commodities must be moved promptly when ripe and read for

harvest. Sufficient supplies of appropriate fuels must be available for

planting, and harvesting, and process* . Likewise, in the case of

transportation, farm to market roads, effective rail systems, barge

transportation, are all part of the process of moving commodities to

the farm, to the processor, to the market, and to the consumer, at home

and abroad. The Secretary of Food must have an input in these areas,

whether through his own organization or through a very carefully

designed liaison procedure.

In other cases where national economic policy is involved that could

affect food production, a new Secretary of Food would, of course, sit

on Cabinet-level committees. The implications affecting food could

be raised and considered through that approach.

This third alternative involves basic reorganization of ‘the executive

branch.. It would require Congressional action. Its total bud would

be somewhat larger than the Department of Agriculture budget now, .

but considering that costs for other departments would be reduced and

greater efficiencies would likely result, the total cost to taxpayers

should be reduced. obviously, the Secretary of Food would present

legislative proposals to Congress, make reports, and testify on food

policy. He would have the benefit of public advisory committees. He

would report directly to the President and would be part of the President’s top decisionmaking team. In this way, the necessary information and inputs concerning agriculture would be included in final

decisions made by the President.

RELATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVES

While each of the three alternatives has certain advantages and

disadvantages relative to the other two, it should be noted that any
183

of the three three would be preferable to the existing conglomeration 01

boards, commissions, councils, and departments. Even the first alternative, while somewhat similar to the existing system, offers a much

more clearly structured and delineated method of coordination.

From a management standpoint, the assignment of total responsibility relating to food, inherent in alternative No. 3, is preferred. The

public, the Congress, the President would all know who is responsible

for matters relating to food either in the policy or implementation

area. The straight and clear-cut lines of responsibility are a distinct

* advantage. Decisions are likely to come quicker, since the tools of research and analysis will be readily available. Duplication of effort in

various departments, bureaus, and agencies should be minimized, if

not eliminated.

On the other hand, the extensive governmental reorganization process that is embodied in alternative No. 3 could offer serious obstacles.

These are likely to occur first within the administration where there

probably would be great reluctance on the part of an Cabinet and

agency head to give up his independent role. Also wit “ the executive, this reorganization would create considerable disruption Morale

could suffer while changes are being made until individual employees

understand their roles in the new organization. In addition, the legislative reorganization would not just involve the executive branch but

would require approval by Congress. Here, built-in special interest

public groups could and likely would create considerable opposition.

At best, a great deal of time would be lost in an area where immediate

action is necessary. At worst, opposition might result in nothing being

done.

Comparing the ease of implementation, alternative No. 1 stands

nighest. A Presidential order can be issued within a matter of weeks

setting up a Special Assistant for Food and a National Food Council, and a degree of coordination so desperately needed could begin almost immediately.

However, the Food Coordinator or Special Assistant for Food would

not have final decisionmaking responsibility. He could only recommend. Hence, from an efficient management standpoint, considerable

time and effort would be lost while the President, or others at the White

House, considered the validity and desirability of a particular set of

recommendations. Likewise, several Cabinet officers or agency heads

could be appealing to the President with different viewpoints. It would

be difficult to hold responsible the Special Counselor for Food without

.

the authority to carry out the job. Since the Coordinator would be

limited to consideration of top policy matters, and since the extent of

coordination is limited to top officials of appropriate departments and

agencies, many worthwhile ideas and effective evaluations from

middle-level Government management could be lost.

Alternative No. 2, a Cabinet-level Food Administrator, with clearcut authority for decisionmaking at the policy level, ameliorates some

of the disadvantages in either No. 1 or No. 3 but unfortunately also

loses some of the efficiency and effectiveness of No. 3. In terms of timeliness, alternative No. 2 could begin almost immediately by Presidential order, although governmental legal advice indicates that congressional ratification would be desirable, if not essential.

The decisionmaking authority in alternative No. 2 is clearly more

desirable than what can be envisioned under No. 1 and perhaps has
184

an advantage over No. 3. The reason for this is that, in alternative

No. 2, the decisionmaking officials would be relieved of operating and

implementation responsibility. While there are pluses and minuses,

this alternative does permit the top policymakers to devote full time to

those decisions requiring their attention.

If Congress is to perform its full role in policymaking, alternatives

No. 2 or No. 3 are preferable to No. 1. Under alternative No. 1, the Special Assistant for Food is a member of the President’s staff. In alternative No. 2 or No. 3. the Food Administrator or Secretary would have

independent status and must look to the Congress for appropriations .

and oversight.

Considering governmental cost or burden on the taxpayer, we find

no significant difference among the three alternatives. But any of the

alternatives would be preferable to the existing structures when measured on a cost-effectiveness basis.

As the preceding sections made clear, there are advantages and disadvantages to each alternative. Beyond these, the final choice would

be heavily influenced by a variety of circumstances existing at the time

of decision. For example, if a President desired a major government?

reorganization and felt the congressional and public mood was supportive, he would probably lean towards alternative No. 3. If, on the

other hand. he felt that the fight involving reorganization would, be so

lengthy and disruptive as to delay complete coordination, he could turn

to alternative No. 2. If the Chief Executive felt that there would be

insurmountable difficulties in obtaining congressional concurrence with

his changes, whether they be No. 2 or No. 3, and recognized the need to

bring about more effective coordination and efficiency immediately, he

would begin with alternative No, 1.

Likewise with Congress-the circumstances and conditions would

determine their action. It would be most difficult to force a President

into alternative No. 1 through legislative action. On the other hand,

Congress could create an independent agency headed by a Cabinetlevel official as in No. 2 and could reorganize existing governmental

structure as in No. 3. It would be ’hoped this would be a joint decision by

the executive and legislative branches with the best inputs from the

private sector, from academia, and from within the career Governnment

the congressional employee ranks. In this manner, the best choice .

could be made based not only on short-range but long-range consideration. ‘,

Thank you, Mr. Brown.

[The following questions were submitted by Senator Humphrey to .

Mr. Jaenke and his answers thereto:]

Question 1. Do you anticipate that in the future, Government Administrators

will have to deal with both problems of excess supplies and threatened shortages ?

Answer 1. We indeed anticipate that in the future Government administrators

will have to deal with problems of excess supplies and also of threatened shortages. There appears to be, rather uniform agreement that population will continue

to outrun production in the LDC countries during the next ten years and that

there will continue to be a significant world-wide expansion in livestock and livestock feeding. It is anticipated that the U.S. will increase its production more

rapidly than its consumption and become more dependent on exports. The whole

world’s climatic and economic variations can be expected to impinge more and

more greatly on. the U.S. as the world’s major food grains and feed grains

supplier.
185

Question 2. In your opinion is the legislative authority for dealing with threatened shortages, or occasional surpluses, adequate for supplementing our free

free market system ?

Answer 2. In our opinion, the curreut legslative authority is inadequate for

dealing either with surpluses or with threatened shortages.

The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 established target prices

for corn of $1.38 and for wheat of $2.05 for the 1874 and 1975 crops and limited

increases in the target prices for the 1976 crops to the cost increases in calendar

year 1975 and for 1977 crops to the cost increases in calendar year 1.976. The

period of the greatest increase in cost of production occurred in, the latter part

of calendar 1978 and in calendar 1974. The target prices for the 1976 crops wiil

w soon be determined. These are certain to be unrealistically low and will provide

little or no protection against a surplus.

There is no specific legislative protection for threatened shortages. The 1973

Act established a reserve to be acquired under the price support program. But

supports are so unrealistically low-with none for soybeans--that this provision

● is ineffective. President Nixon applied export embargoes in the 1973 protein shortage situation as “national emergency” measures, and there have been subsequent

export embargoes imposed on shipments to Russia and Poland by President Ford.

Not only has legislative authority for these actions been debatable, but they have

proved in many ways counter-productive both to our long-term export interests

and to important farmer interests within the country.

Question 3. If it is not adequate, what additional legislative authorities or

restrictions on government officials are needed?

Question 4. I understand that most of your clients are farm cooperatives and

farm producer groups who are opposed to the establishment of a grain reserve

program as proposed by the other members of the panel. Do you believe that a

grain reserve program could be developed and administered in a manner which

would benefit producers as well as consumers and traders?

Answer 3 and 4. The Agriculture and Consumer Protection ‘Act of 1973 needs

to be revised to provide protection to both farmers and consumers. Such legislation should include meaningful target and loan supports for wheat, feed grains

and cotton and also for soybeans. The appropriate legislation for a reserve program for food groins, feed grains and soybeans that can benefit producers, consumers (including livestock farmers), and traders needs the most careful consideration and the input of all these groups. It must also take into consideration

our country% international obligations and relationships. We believe that such

legislation can he framed and that such a program can be developed and administered with general support from all groups, including producers.

Question .5. If you believe a reserve program could be administered in a manner to benefit producers, what are the key guidelines needed to assure that producers would benefit from a national or international grain reserve program?

Answer 5. You ask for the key guidelines needed to assure that producers

would benefit from a national or international grain reserve program.

AS we view it, a suitable grain reserve program should be interrelated with a

* suitable support program to the long run mutual benefit of grain producers, livestock farmers and consumers. While each group has its special short-term divergent interests over price there is an underlying basic mutual long-term economic

interest. No one, except a few speculators, benefits from a roller-coaster boom

and bust pattern of commodity prices.

. A rise in meat prices so substantial as to give rise to a consumer boycott hurts

the livestock industry and then the grain farmer. A rise in feed grain prices that

bankrupts livestock farmers is tragic for that group and subsequently hurts consumers and grain producers. These very developments have occurred in the last

three years.

On the other hand, the drastic fall in grain and soybean prices in the fall of

1974 and spring of 1975 was only arrested by the drought in the USSR and Western Europe and in the Western U.S. corn belt. Had rains occurred in these areas,

grain prices, lacking meaningful support, and soybean prices, lacking any support, would probably now be well below cost. Quite obviously, grain and soybean

farmers cannot be expected to continue to produce for consumers and livestock

producers at below cost, This was recognized in the broad support aecorded the

Farm Bill passed by the Congress last spring but vetoed by President Ford.

Factors other than meaningful supports needed to assure producers are:

A. Government purchase at the “meaningful” target price up to the desired

reserve quantity.
186

B. A sufficiently wide margin between the acquisition (i.e., target.) price and

‘the minimum sale price.

C. Arrangements to store on the farm or through farmer cooperatives if facilities are available and producers so desire.

D. A loan program at not less than a certain percent of target with reseal

privilege and with conversion privilege for purchase at the target price” whenever

the reserve is less than the desired quantity.

E. Clear understanding on either eliminating or greatly Waiting (Russia)

export embargoes when reserves at protective levels are available.

Question 6. Your suggested alternative Government structure No. 2 appears to

have advantages over the other two alternatives. What are the major advantages

of this alternative Government structure over the existing situation in

Government ?

.

Answer 6. Not everybody agrees with your conclusion that Alternative No. 2 is

more advantageous than the other two alternatives. We ourselves however, do

tend to agree with you in that No. 2 would more effectively coordinate the varied

and conflicting interests and approaches than would Alternative No. 1 and could

more feasibly and quickly be established and become operative than No. 3.

The advantages of Alternative No. 2 over the existing situation are:

A. Emphasis on the flow of information and data so that all aspects of food

problems and all the interests, both domestic and foreign, can be weighed and

taken into consideration.

B. Coordination of the decision-making process which is Row pulled in many

different directions.

C. Improvement in decisions in that information on all aspects would be available to be considered and weighed in each decision made.

D. Improved coordination of the operating programs of the many agencies

dealing with national and international food problems.

E. Improved and broader information flow on all aspects back to U.S. producers, processors, traders, and consumers and to foreign peoples.

Question 7. How would the responsibilities of the Secretary of Agriculture be

changed by your proposed alternative No. 2?

Answer 7. The responsibilities of the Secretary of Agriculture would change

very little under Alternative No. 2 from the present. He would, however, regain

the active role in the decision-making concerning food that he has recently lost

to officials from various other department and agencies.

Question 8. What in your opinion, are the major deficiencies in our current

food information systems?

Answer 8. The major deficiencies in our current food information system

involve:

A. The need for more complete and more up-to-date world information and

analysis thereof on production, trade consumption and stocks.

B. The need for improved techniques of relating weather information to production potentials.

C. The need for improved information on domestic consumption and on stocks

in the United States Stocks in presently unreported positions vary greatly with

price swings.

D. Better coordination of the data now available, both within the Department

of Agriculture, i.e., ASCS, FAS, SRS and ERS, and of Agriculture with Census.

E. Improvement in the present export sales reporting system furnishing breakdowns by quarters if not by months and improvement in the breakdown by type

of contracts.

F. Improved analysis and forecasting through a better coordination of theoretical model development with practical knowledge of the industry and with the

insight to spot changes.

Question 9. Do you favor an integration of the Census of Agriculture and the

activities of the Statistical Reporting Service?

Answer 9. Yes. Now that the Census is using the sampling technique rather

than attempting to cover the universe of the data, we think the SRS could do a

better job. The SRS has developed better cross-check devices.

Question 10. What is the relationship between the Secretary of Agriculture

and the Food Administrator?

Answer 10. We visualize a relationship between the Secretary of Agriculture

and the Food Administrator somewhat similar to that which existed between the

War Food Administrator and the Secretary in World War II. The Food Administrator would prepare and recommend food policy supported by all available data

from all sources to the committee on which the Secretary of Agriculture, the Sec-
187

retaries of State, Labor, Transportation, etc., would serve but chaired by the

Food Administrator. The policy so determined would be carried out by the various

departments and agencies.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you very much, Mr. Jaenke. Your presentation

has contributed a great deal to my own understanding of this situation,

as I am sure it would every Member of Congress, and we appreciate

it very much.

I am going to defer questioning until we hear the additional presentations an hopefully Senator f Humphrey will be here also to partici-

. pate in the questioning by that time.

I understand the next presentation represents a joint paper prepared by Professor Cochrane and Mr. Seth.

If I am correct in that, Dr. Cochrane, you may proceed and make

- your statement.

STATEMENT OF WILLARD W. COCHRANE PROFESSOR OF AGRICULTURE ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, MINNEAPOLIS,

MINN.

Dr. COCHRANE. Thank you.

We are going to divide the paper in the following way. I am going

to talk about what we think are two great problems and what the

policy solutions to them are.

Mr. Seth is going to talk or focus more on what the Government

organizational needs of these problems would be.

Chairman BROWN. Do you have copies of your papers there?

Dr. CochrANE. Yes.

Chairman BROWN. You may proceed.

Dr. CoCHRANE. As I said, I would like to talk about what I consider

to be two great problems confronting U.S. consumers and reducers

of food. To an important degree, these problems arise in t e United h

States from developments taking place around the world and, hence,

make the policy confronting U.S. consumers and producers of food

different from what we have been used to in the past and these

problems are somewhat more difficult to deal with.

The first problem I would mention is what I call the food price trend

9 problem. I expect the real price of food to increase over the next 25

years. This is in somewhat contradiction to the summary of reports

that Ed Jaenke reported, and it is somewhat different than Professor

Tweeten is going to say.

e The other problem is the price variability problem, particularly the

grains that Mr. Jaenke emphasized.

I think the position of Mr. Seth and myself on this variability

problem and grains is almost exactly as our colleagues see it.

The price elasticity of demand for grains is very inelastic. We have

weather fluctuations and fluctuations in growing conditions around

the world. Small changes in supply create very great price movements.

Since the United States is linked to this world market-I read where

now we are supplying 50 percent of the grain moving in international

trade—anything that happens in the Soviet Union or India in the

way of variation in production is immediately reflected in price movements in the United States.
188

It seems to me that there is an increasing agreement that the problem is here, and it is not going to go away because weather is not going

to become more stable. It is generally reed that private trade cannot

deal with this kind of problem and the elasticity of demand is not

likely to change.

So, although we cannot predict within any certainty whether the

prices are going to go up or down next year, we can predict with

almost certainty that this short-run variability problem will be with

us and prices can and will move in the extreme.

I will not say more about this problem.

With regard to the long-run price problem, trends problem, there is

a great deal more disagreement in this area.

We argue in our paper that the real price of food is likely to increase

in the long run. We have not, in our paper, done elaborate economet- *

ric analysis of this. I am greatly impressed with the ones I see around

the world because, basically. what everybody is doing isassumingthat

what happened m the 1960's is going to continue in the 1970s and

1980’s. I you put into your econometric model the growth trends of’ f

the 1960's, you get out of it as results in the 1970’s the same as you had

in the 1960%.

So if per capita food consumption around the world remained almost constant as it did in the 1960's, and if that is the stuff you put

into your estimating models, that is what you get out in the 1970's

and 1980’s.

I will argue that the real price of food is going to increase for three

different kinds of reasons. Two, I think, are certain as the sun coming

up--well, not quite that certain, but pretty certain-and one quite

conjectural, but I would like to raise it.

The first consideration are the supply considerations. It is commonly

said there is plenty of land around the world.

With that I would agree, there is a lot of land around the world.

The problem is that there is damn little land around the world that is

readily available for cultivation. Even in our own country, when we

bring in any new land, it is typically going to be low-yielding land or

we have got to invest heavily. into it to make it high-yielding land,

which means lands will come into production, if and only if product

l

rices rise. The price of the product must rise enough to bring the poor

and into production. You can make any acre productive if you will

spend enough money on it.

The same holds true with regard to water. In I@@ you have got

to pump it from lower depths. Here., you have got to move it longer .

distances.

Water is short. It can be obtained. You can convert sea water into

fresh water if you want to spend enough money on it.

The point I wish to make is that both of those resources are becoming increasingly scarce and are going to be scarce, and the only way

you can bring more of them into production is to pay more for them.

Turning to the demand considerations. In the 1960”s we were all surprised, impressed, and pleased with the great increase in the demand

for grains in Western Europe. and in Japan to produce more meat in

those areas. So our commercial exports of grains increased significantly in that period.

During the early 1970”s, we have seen Eastern Europe and the

Soviet Union moved from exporters in grain to very large importers
189

of. grain. Why? For the reasons Mr. Jaenke said, they want to maintain their livestock herds. They want to increase their per capita meat

consumption.

What many people do not realize is that as development is occurring in the developed world, what is happening is that people in the

developed world want to eat like people in the United States eat. They

want to eat more meat) and they are importing grais from North

America to do it.

Thiss has been a very important factor, tightening the international

grain market. And aS long aS development occurs in the Western

World, there is going to be increased demand for our grains to produce

that meat.

The other demand factor is that the world population is going to

double in the next 25 years. The young people who are already on the

Earth are going to reduce the babies. So we are going to have to

double our food production in the next 25 to 27 years, These factors are

going to be very important demand factors, increasing demands for

grain.

‘ The two conjectural considerations that I would mention that make

the future tenuous are as follows: Farm technological advance is sputtering. I use that word "sputtering" advisedly. We have had no

technological development recently comparable to hybrid seed corn

in the United States of two decades ago.

What is going on around the world now is that we are refining many,

many things. All of these refinements are helping to increase production. These refinements are slowly increasing food production per acre.

But there has been no dramatic breakthroughs m the last 5 years.

Maybe one will occur next year.

Maybe we will learn how to double the yield of soybeans. I will not

say we will not. All I am saying is that farm technological advance

is presently sputtering.

It is not pushing yields up with the regularly and persistence that

occured in the 1950'sr the 1960’s. That is one conjectural element of

the future.

The second conjectural element is with regard to the weather. The

Northern Hemisphere is cooling. It has been cooling for the last 25

years. These trends can run anywhere from 50 to 200 years in duration. I do not know whether the Northern Hemisphere is going to

continue to cool, and a little ice age is going to come along in the

next 100 years or not. All I know is it has been cooling for the last

25 years,

History suggests that these waves go in long movements. We also

know that with the cooling of the Northern Hemisphere, that weather

and crop growing conditions become more variable in the monsoon

areas—-where the rains come in off the ocean. My guess is, or my judgment is, that on the basis of changing climate, that crop growing conditions over the next 10 or 20 years are not going to be any better than

the last 10 or 20 years. And they could be a lot worse.

I admit these last two points are conjectural.

But I think there is enough substance to them that they need to

be taken into consideration. They do not lend credence to the fact that

you predict by- just projecting the trends of the 1960’s into the 1970’s

and 1980’s and expect development to be the same.

6S–S77—76-—1 3
190

Now, how do you deal with these problems?

With regard to the variability problem—there has been enough

work in the last 5 years to suggest how you deal with a shortrun variability problem. We need to develop an international grain reserve

program to deal with this problem. It can be done by the United

States alone. The quantities involved are no more than we held in 1960.

It could be done by the U.N. if the U.N. had the administrative capacity to do it, which I doubt.

And, as Senator Humphrey has heard me say in the past, I think it

will most likely be done, if it is going to be done, by four, five, or six

of the leading importing and exporting nations of the world getting

together and forming an international agreement to stabilize gram

prices.

How would this occur ? .

One formulation could involve the stability of grain prices within a

plus or minus 10 percent of trend. I am going to publish a document in

the near future, probably within the next 2 months, which is going to

suggest that we can stabilize world grain prims within 10 percent, plus

or minus of trend, with an average reserve grain stock of 60 to ’70 million tons, with 90 percent probability of achieving the stabilization

objective.

You cannot make sure that you always hold the prices within a

range, plus or minus 10 percent, without carrying a very large stock.

This means that in 1972 or 1973 if such a program had been in operation, it would not have completely held prices within 10 percent of

trend, but it would have kept prices from rising in the extreme fashion

that they did.

So my first point is that we need an international reserve stock

program.It is feasible in terms of the quantities. It is feasible inn terms

of achieving reasonable prices stability. The only thing that is lacking

is wise and strong leadership from some of the leading nations.

If we can get some wise leadership from countries like Japan,

United States, Germany, Australia, an Canada, such a program can d

be brought into being.

It seems to me that the United States, in light of our key position in

the world, should provide the leading part of that wise leadership.

And we are not getting the kind of leadership that I think we need to .

deal with this problem.

Mechanically, it is feasible. That is the point I want to make. It is

not, out of the question. The people around this table could provide the

administrative and type of economic advice that is needed to run such

a thing. It is the leadership that is lacking.

With regard to the long-term problem-we have a very much more

difficult, problem. To deal with it two things must happen. Or we must

make them happen.

One is we have got to have a worldwide research and development

program. an R. & D. program, with the capacity to bring about rapid

technological advance again, not only in agriculture, but also in

energy.

Because much of the technological advance in the last 30 or 40 years

has been the substitution of cheap energy

’

for human labor, we must

have an effective worldwide research an development program that

can step up the rate of technological advance in the energy field.
191

I think this is possible; the trained personnel in the world exists

with respect to agriculture. The pattern of international research is

established. I think again what we have to have here is more imaginative leadership on the part of the production scientists and more

money in the worldwide research and development complex, But this

is possible. We don’t have it yet, but we can if we want it.

The other half of we have got to do-and when I say we, I am talking about the world now-is achieve a stable world population in 35

years. If we do not, then everything we are talking about here will be

.

for naught.

In this connection I am very pessimistic because I do not see any of

the countries where the rapid increases in population are taking place

doing anything effective about it. In fact, they are saying quite the 0

contrary. They are saying you are rich, and if we want tobreed, that

is our privilege and you should help us support ourselves.

I know some studies that are going on in the new International

Research Institute located here in Washington that suggest that the

food gap in the less developed world will double in the next 10 years.

I am involved in some work which suggests that in the next 20 years,

if we cannot stabilize world population, the amount of grain we will

need to transfer to the LDC)S is so great that you cannot even contemplate it.

Therefore, I am arguing that the long-run trend problem, is a very

difficult problem, and it is not going to be easily resolved.

The short-run fluctuation problem is important, but here we know

what to do about it. It is just a question of having the courage to do it

and some political leadership that can get us moving.

Thank you, Congressman Brown and Senator Humphrey.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you.

Lauren Seth, do you have some comments you wish to make?

STATEMENT OF LAUREN SOTH, WRITER-ECONOMIST, CHAIRMAN,

NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE,

AND MEMBER OF THE OTA FOOD ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DES

MOINES, IOWA

* Mr. Sorer. Well, my colleague, Dr. Cochrane, has explained our

paper so lucidly and extensively that I do not think there is much for

me to say. But I would like to make a couple of points.

First, Senator Humphrey and Congressman Brown, the National

e Planning Association Committee on Agriculture will have a statement

on national and agricultural policy released about, the 7th or 8th of

January. I think you might be interested in it, it does not deal with

international aspects as much as this hearing, but has some suggestions

on adjusting our acreage bases for possible future use, and on price

supports, commodity loans, and soon.

Chairman HUMPHREY. You will see we get a copy of that?

Mr. SO T H. Yes, I will get you a copy.1 It was prepared by Prof.

Harold Breimyer, University of Missouri, and there is a committee

statement accompanying it.

1 The statement of the National Planning Association Committee 1s retained in committee

files.
For the purpose of this hearing I should like to emphasize again, as

I have many times before, ‘and I know Senator Humphrey is interested

in this, the importance of national planning and goals in a

I think I mentioned to you onetime before, Senator Humphrey

that I would like to see more direct mention of agriculture in the bill

by you and Senator Javits on agriculture; particularly m this world

food situation that Mr. Jaenke and Dr. Cochrane have described so

ably , it is essential that we set some production targets each year for

leading commodities. We should have been doing t at all along. We h

can do that under present legislation.

In order to have an

.

agriculture plan that means anything, of course,

you need the best available political and economic intelligence, and

we can see in this current year that we certainly are not getting very

good intelligence. In the middle of the summer, the Department of -

Agriculture was I think estimating a Russian crop of around 180 million tons——

Chairman HUMPHREY. Actually, higher.

Mr. JAENKE. The Soviet goal was initially 215 million.

Mr. SoTH. TIM Soviet goal was over 200 million. The first estimate

by the U.S. Department of Agriculture was around 180 million.

Mr. SOTH. Then down to 180 million. Now, the latest guess is around

140 million. That is not all the fault of our people, of course, but it is

the inadequate of the Russian reporting system. I mention that just

to show that if you are going to plan a reserve program, a reduction

program in this country, we obviously need far better intelligence on

what is going on in our own country and around the world.

We have the ‘best reporting system in the world. I know Harry Trelogan, recently retired Director of the USDA Crop Reporting Service,

is in the room here, and he would be the first to agree that it could be

improved.

We do need to put more emphasis on this matter of getting the best

information available. My colleague and I have suggested toward the

end of this paper that some reorganization and coordination of information-gathering and analysis in our Government would be helpful.

The responsibility for world food information now is split among

three agencies in the Department of Agriculture. We believe there is

some confusion of function in this setup. We could do abetter job of it.

The foreign commodity analysis unit of FAS, we thinkt might well be

transferred to the Economic Research Service. It is logical to combine

those two staffs and place them under an agency which has no action

responsibility. FAS does have a sales responsibility and as earlier state- .

ments before this committee have indicated, there is at least a suspicion

of some conflict of interest there.

Necessarily, under our present setup, we have to get information on

other countries to the agricultural attaches until such time that specialists in crop and livestock reporting might be substituted for these

people. I stress again the importance of getting better information for

our own policymaking.

We also need better analysis of the available data. And the logical

agency for that is ERS, where most of the analysis goes on now.

If we are going to run this international reserve program that all

three members of this panel agree upon, I think the first step is to take

action to get better information and to insist, if we can, more effec-
193

tively on better information out of the Soviet Union, the biggest single

grain producer in the world.

Thank you, Senator Humphrey and Mr. Brown.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you.

[The material referred to follows:]

[The following paper was submitted by Dr. Cochrane and Mr.

Soth :]

(By Williard W. Cochrane and Lauren Soth2

)

(A Paper Prepared for the Office of Technology Asessment)

.

The United States needs changes in its food and agriculture policies and in

government agencies to cope with urgent world food problem%

The recent agreement with the Soviet Union providing for a minimum annual

level of grain exports to that country could become a significant stabilizing factor

in world grain markets. But much more needs to be done to dampen down and

moderate wide and unpredictable swings in agricultural prices-a problem that

has been accentuated in the 1970’s.

Tremendous pressures are placed on the American free market system by

the lack of a free market system in most of the world. U.S. consumers and farmers have been absorbing most of the instability in the commercial food markets

of the world.

All the other major agricultural export countries, including Canada, Australia,

Argentina, and Brazil, maintain various kinds of governmental controls over

exports. All export sales of grain by Canada, for example, are made through the

Canadian Wheat Board, a quasi-governmental body established in 1935.

The European Economic Community has established internal price support

policies for farm products and levies countervailing duties on imports equal to

the difference between the world price and the internal support price. Another

major importer, Japan, buys wheat and barley through a government food

purchasing agency and closely supervises private imports of corn, grain sorghum,

and soybeans. The U.S. S. R., China, and other Communist countries of course

make all their import purchases through government agencies.

Thus the major food exporting and importing countries have policies to

shield their farmers and consumers against extreme variations in prices. Without

such stabilizing policies in this country, American producers and consumers are

left to take much of the shock of changes in world supplies. .

Projections by experts of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and of the U.N.

Food and Agriculture Organization indicate that worId trade in grains will

grow in the future. ‘Demand for food in the developing Countries is likely to

●

increase faster than production, requiring increased imports. USDA projections

up to 1985 indicate that grain production in the developed countries will grow

faster than demand, leaving a sufficient quantity available for export to less

developed countries.

But there is likely to be considerable fluctuation “from year to year’ in the * total world grain supply. Since the United States is fully integrated into this

world grain market (about 56 percent of the world trade in feed grains in

recent years, 50 percent of the trade in soybeans and soybean products,. and

45 percent of the trade in wheat), it is essential that this country consider means

of dealing with world instability.

The short world grain crops of 1972-73, intervention of the giant Communist

countries into world markets for grain on a large scale, the sudden quadrupling

of the price of imported oil and the incidence of famine, and near-famines in

several countries have altered the world setting for U.S. food-agriculture policy.

Famines are not, unfortunately, uncommon to this earth; in fact, the latest

ones are mild compared with many of the past. Nor is the finite character of

fossil energy supplies, especially petroleum, something previously unknown;

warnings have been sounded for decades by geologists.

I Professor of agricultural economics, University of Minnesota.

~ Writer-eeonomist: chafrman, National Planning Association Agriculture Committee, nnd

member of the OTA Food Ad~kory Committee.
194

But the magnitude of recent changes in grain prices and world trade and the

coincidence of these with the energy price hike delivered a shock to world consciousness about food. The steep rise of prices of basic foodstuffs in 1973 and

1974, along with the plight of undernourished people in Bangladesh and the Sahel

region of Africa, gave common currency to the term “food crisis.” Governments

took stock of food prospects, and a World Food Conference to consider remeflial

measures was held in Rome in late 1974 under sponsorship of the United Nations.

The food shortages in the early 70’s have revived long-range fears of population

outrunning food production capacity in the world. These fears had been quieted

for several decades as food output per person gradually rose, and success stories

about agricultural progress flourished in the less developed countries. New seed

strains, more fertilizer, better irrigation, and new disease and insect controls,

with technological help and capital from the wealthy countries promised steadily

improving rations for hungry people in the future. Then the rapid disappearance

of the large grain reserves carried for many years in the United States and

Canada roused the old fears of gradually worsening food scarcity.

In this new atmosphere of panic, we often hear predictions of calamity and .

proposals for radical "solutions.” For example, some prophets of disaster have

proposed what they’ call the “lifeboat” system of meeting the food problem. Only

the most promising of the poor countries would be aided by the rich to seats in

the lifeboat, abandoning the others to extinction by starvation, because there

aren’t enough seats in we boat for everybody. Another version of this idea is

called “triage,” a French army term for rescuing the wounded who have the

best chance of survival, rather than using limited medical manpower in a futile

effort to save all.

We reject such an apocalyptic view of the world food situation. We do not

minimize the problem of the long run-of humankind increasing faster than the

means of sustenance. But neither do we want to foster an attitude of hopelessness,

such as the “lifeboat” concept implies. We believe wise policy and intelligent

action can bring about a resumption of steady gains in food nutrients per person

in the poor countries, gains which continued until the recent short harvests in

several key production areas.

In the revival of ancient fears about the food-population equation, people

tend to overlook another good-agriculture problem we regard as critical to food

security. This is the problem of instability of supplies and consequently of prices.

Some of the errors in food-agriculture policy have come from projecting shortterm swings in supplies and prices. (The current doomsday predictions contain an

element of this. )

In this respect, we want first to look at this nagging problem of instability. Let

US assume that the real cost of producing grains and hence of food a will rise

over the next quarter-century. We will have something to say about possibilities

for changing this trend later, but for now let us project a gradual rise in the

prices of grains for these reasons:

(1) The supply of new conventional productive resources-land and water—

as a source of increased food output will become scarcer as more of the easily

developed land is developed.

(2). Energy resources will become scarcer, especially easy-to-use petroleum -

and natural gas.

(3) Weather conditions in the temperate zones best suited to cereal production may gradually worsen, as some climatologists believe, in the next quarter

century.

(4) Population will continue to grow rapidly in the less developed areas of 

the world.

(5) Demand for grain for production of livestock products will continue to

grow in the more highly developed, richer areas. The consumption of livestock

products has been growing as economic development progresses and countries are

willing to put more resources into agriculture to get more livestock products.

~ Grains make up by aII odds the most important direct food for mankind and are the raw material for much of the meat and other livestock producta consumed as human food. Gralne

make u nearly SO pezwmt of the crop acreage in America and are the balance wheel of the

agricul rural economy.
195

.

D

/

/

/
196

THE PBICE INSTABILITY PROBLEM

U! this gradual upward trend occurs in prdces of food, due to slightly declining

output per person, it certainly will not be a smooth configuration. Prices of cereal

grains will fluctuate widely and unpredictably. We show this in a symbolic graph

in Figure 1.

Instability of prices is likely to be a more serious problem in meeting the world

food needs of the next quarter century than the trend of total food output.

The reasons we can predict instability with confidence are straightforward

and indisputable.

(1) Demand for grains is highly inelastic small change in supply results

in a big change in price. If the supply is short, people will bid up the price trying .

to maintain their consumption, but if the supply is long, people will not increase

consumption much, even at a low price.

(2) Production of grain is unstable and unpredictable because of unpredictable

weather conditions.

(3) Demand for grain in international commerce is unpredictable and erratic, .

because of policy changes in importing countries, primarily the state-trading

countries. Here, for example, are the imports of grain into the Soviet Union in

the last three years and the estimated total for 1975:

Tear:

Million

metric tons

1972---------------------------------------------------- --------- 20. 8

1973__ ---------------------------------------------------------- - 10. 5

‘1974 _________________________________________ -------------------- 4.9

1975---------------------------------------- --------------------- 25.0

This in-and-out buying on the world market jolts commodity distribution patterns and prices.

(4) Countries are closely linked in a network of grain trade today, where

conditions in one importing or one exporting country are quickly reflected in

prices the world around. The United States is the leading exporter, by far, and

its markets are extremely sensitive to the factors” mentioned above.

(5) The prices of individual food products may be expected to zip and zoom

in wider swings than the average price of all foods. Variation will depend on

the lags in production of livestock products and the degree of substitutibility for

some individual foods. Food-agriculture policies in different countries also vary

for particular foods. On the whole, however, food prices for any country will not

stray far from the general movement of prices (dashed line in Figure 1) unless

that country is willing to isolate itself from the world trading system.

To sum up, the United States is confronted with a critical problem of instability in food and agriculture in the next quarter century. The forces causing this

instability arise in large measure outside this country.

Consumer groups and humanitarians who have been focusing on the perils of

long-term growth of world population in relation to food output would be wise

to look more closely at the consequence of year-to-year changes in supply and

demand. Fluctuations such as those of the 1972-75 period harm consumers by .

causing extreme advances in food prices which tend to become anchored into the

structure. Rigidities in costs of processing and distribution tend to keep retail

prices from falling when supply increases as much as they rise in time of short

supply.

Farmers and their organizations and U.S. Government policy have given relatively little attention to the stability’ question. In most of the last forty years,

the central issue for farmers was to maintain a high, profitable price level in a

time of surplus production capacity. It is difficult for a farmer to see the

advantages of stability or leveling out the peaks and valleys of prices. That

process implies limits on the upswings of prices, as well as limits on the downswings. A farmer can readily see the benefits of the latter but does not like to

face up to the economic and political necessity of the former.

Political realism, however, requires farmers to recognize that they cannot

claim protection against disastrously low prices without also yielding to the

claim of consumers for policies to protect against disastrously high prices.

Obversely. consumers cannot claim protection against soaring food costs without

also yielding to the claim of farmers for protection against damaging declines in

their prices.

Although the U.S. has not developed a deliberate policy of food-agriculture

supply and price stabilization, the functioning of price-support and commodity

loan programs did, prior to 1972, provide a measure of such effect, as a by-
197

product of other policy. Large accumulations of grain under government control

in the late 1830’s (called “burdensome surpluses”) became valued reserves for

the extra demands of World War II. Unquestionably, Americans had better diets

and were able to supply their allies more fully because of this grain reserve.

Similar inadvertent reserve stocks were beneficial in maintaining reasonable

food prices in the 50’s and 60’s Livestock producers were not faced with such

sharp rises in feed coats as would have occurred without t.@ stockpiles of grain.

In 1972-73 and 1974-75, by contrast, we have seen financial crisis and violent

disruption of the livestock Industries from short feed supplies and steep rises in

feed costs, stemming from the combined effects of world drought Russian-Chinese

imports and inflation Livestock price rises added to inflationary pressure on the

entire economy.

In the light of this experience we recommend a national food-agriculture

policy to deliberately stabilize the supplies and prices of grains.

PRODUCTION TARGETS

We believe the place to begin is to set production, target each year for the

leading agricultural commodities. Under the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture is required, in effect, to make

such calculations in determining whether to establish crop acreage

and if so, how much. So what we are calling for here is not a new planning system

but the effective employment of a system now on the lawbooks.

The target for each commodity would be constructed from five components :

(1) Domestic commercial requirments; (2) Domestic food assistance requirements; (3) Commercial export demand; (4) Non-commercial exports; that is, a

food-aid commitment for poor countries; and (5) A requirement to replenishh the

U.S. share of an international grain reserve.

In order to make the best possible estimates of these aggregates, the Department of Agriculture needs the best possible political and economic intelligence

about world supply and demand. The U.S. Government ought to take the leadership in helping to improve crop and livestock reporting services for other countries, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, and the new World

Food Council.

The least predictable element in the above list of five production requirements

is No. 3, the estimate of commercial exports. International cooperation in scheduling grain exports and imports, better crop estimating in major producing countries, and forward contracting for grain by importers would help stabilize this

element of total demand.

The United States and the Soviet Union have an agreement to exchange agricultural data, but it has not been carried out as well as it might be. We urge the

U.S. Government to press for full cooperation in the furnishing of information on

production, rise, and stockpiling of food commodities, especially grain. Investment by the United States in improving the fundamental data base both home

and abroad for projecting commodity requirements would pay a high return in

terms of reducing surprise, uncertainty, and speculative price gyrations:

We believe that establishment of national production targets or goals each year

would provide improved guides for individual farmers in planning their own

operations. It would formalize a public commitment on the part of the U.S. 

Government as to the food needs of consumers and other claimants to America’s

● agricultural abundance.

Setting production targets--and going through the process of collecting information and analyzing it in the public arena--is in itself a valuable contribution

to wiser matching of output and needs. But to be most effective the Government

must back up production targets by realistic incentives for producers. And Government must, of course, carry out objectives in food aid at home and abroad

and in the acquiring and distributing of grain reserves.

Government programs already exist for purchase of commodities to supply

food aid and to build reserves. (Later in this paper we propose improvements in

these mechanisms. ) We emphasize that these programs should be used on a

planned, rational basis, with understood procedures and upper and lower limits

for executive action.

Although the experience of the last few years would seem to rule out a return

to crop acreage adjustment as a backstop to supply stabilization, a longer view

indicates that such programs may be needed when there is a probability of price

depressing surpluses. We believe the cropland set-aside system now in the law

is the most workable method. But the bases for these set-asides could be and

should be improved. The historical base system would produce wide inequities
198

among farmers if set-asides were reinstated. We recommend a revision of bases

on a formula of resource conservation. Now is an excellent time to set about this

reformulation, in a period of full production and non-use of incentives to reduce

output.

The Government ought to be prepared to’ assure farmers needed inputs, at subsidized prices if necessary, for commodities for which an expansion of output

is sought. This iS being done from time to time, with regard to propane for

examplef and could become essential in other respects as the energy problem

becomes more acute .

Incentive prduction payments may needed at times to reinforce the market

in inducing expansion’of output in - needed communities. In the main, however,

we believe a vigorous program of outlook and production information for farmers

can be relied upon for serving such objectives.

It will be noted that we do not mention price-supporting action by Government

as a tool for helping achieve production goals. Our overall policy seeks to stabilize

prices-that is, reduce fluctuations--and we believe it would be contradictory

to intervene in markets in another context. (More about this later. )

 . . . ,,

There are advantages and disadvantages to each of the three organizational

forms we have suggested. The U.S. handling the program alone, as the biggest -

single producer and exporter, could probably do the most effective job. But the

cost would. be on one country. The United Nations system is the most logical from

the viewpoint of world politics and of sharing the cost equitably. Ultimately, we

would hope this could be the way to run a grain supply stabilization plan. But

there are obvious difficulties in administering such a program in the U.N. today,

with its antagonisms and consequent incapacity to make decisions on rational

economic grounds.

We. conclude that the most practioal system at this time is an organization

with a small group of countries (say the U. S., Japan, Britain Germany, Canada,

and one or two others). Such a group, we feel could work together effectively.

World grain prices can be stabilised at plus or minus 10 percent of the trend,

we believe, with 90 percent probability of’ achieving this range, with an average

grain reserve of 60 to 70 million tons. This is manageable; it is not more than

the stocks held in the United States in the 1950’s. Such a stock program, properly

managed, would provide the mechanism for evening out supplies flowing into

consumption and consequently prices for both consumers and producers. (See

symbolic diagram; Figure 2.)

A Canadian Wheat Board odlcials recently have ex reased Interest in cooperation with the U.S. and Australia in managipg the export trade an reserve J’ stocks of grain. (See article by f%orce Anthm. “Canada Eyes Cartel with U.S. on Grain,’+ Dea Jfoinea fknda~ RegWer, October 26, 1975.)
199

 

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200

In operating the price stabilization program, we would let the price trend

unfold itself through a moving three-year average of market prices. The price

stabilization objective for, say, 1976, would be plus or minus 10 percent of the

average of the last three years. Other methods of establishing abase for stabilization operations are, of course, possible, and the best guide would be several years

of experience. But for a start, we think the Wee-year base would be best.

It is operationally feasible and, we believe, economically and socially desirable

to link U.S. domestic farm stabilization and support programs to the international

stabilization concept. We recommend a system of target prices and deficiency

payments, with payment scaled so as to favor smaller farmers, with a ceiling

on total payments per farmer. This is the basic framework of the 1973 law.

Commitment on target prices would be limited to one year, to permit maximum

flexibility in policy. - -

The target prices would be used only to compute the size of the deficiency

payment set to yield a "parity" income for small farm families. We define parity

income as a return to a farmer for his labor and investment equal to what he

could earn in employment in a comparable non-farm job, for example as a

plumber.

These payments would be made to the farm family and would not be tied to

the land or other productive asset, so as to avoid capitalization of the income

payment into the market price of the capital asset.

A price support level or commodity loan rate would be established at the

lower boundary of the price stabilization range. This would guarantee price

stability to all farmers but not peg U.S. prices above world levels. It would make

U.S. grains competitive in world markets. Export markets are vital for U.S.

agriculture. Any income support for farmers must be separated from commodity

prices if the U.S. is to retain its position in world trade in grain.

In the event of a series of bountiful harvests, acreage set-asides might be

needed to keep the reserve stock bins from overflowing. Incentive payments for

holding land out of grain production would be needed.

To sum up, the unpredictability of short-run developments in crop production

and world demand for grains requires this flexible machinery for world price

stabilization and for U.S. adaptation to it. The international grain regime and

U.S. national farm policy must be flexible, ready to adapt to famine, overproduction or other unforeseen developments.

LOOKING AT THE LONG BUN

Early in this report we expressed the view that the trend of world food supply

in relation to population is likely to be toward scarcity in the next few decades.

What policies should the United States follow in an effort to prevent such a trend

or turn the per capita food supply trend the other way?

We Americans must recognize, first of all, that we are part of a world where

we cannot isolate ourselves. The U.S. will remain the principal exporter of food

commodities for as long as we can see into the future. This does not lessen the

self-interest of the United States in increasing food output in the less developed

countries. No matter how much U.S. food production might increase, it would -

be inadequate to supply the needs of the fast-growing poor countries.

(1) We believe the United States should invest more money, public and private, in agricultural research and energy research both at home and abroad.

Agricultural production research needs to be geared more to technology suited

to small farms in America and in other countries. The low productivity of land

and people on small farms is one of the unexploited sources of added food production. In addition, the human welfare benefits from greater emphasis on small

farming should impel us to such a research orientation.

(2) It may well be sound economics to subsidize certain farm inputs, especially for small farmers, in order to maximize food output. Most of the technologies which have resulted in the remarkable increases in agricultural output

per man and per acre in the last 30 years are adaptable to small farms as well

as large--fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides, better seeds, irrigation. (There has

been a lag in development of machinery suited to small farms, however. ) Educational and financial help to small farmers to apply these improved technologies

might be the investment with the highest payoff in greater food output at this

time.

(3) We recommend the continuation and expansion of domestic food-aid programs, especially the Food Stamp Plan and the School Lunch Plan, to help

assure the availability of good nutrition to all Americans.

(4) We endorse the confirmation of foreign aid to help those poor countries
201

willing to help themselves. The foreign aid effort of the U.S. should be directed

increasingly through international agencies, as recommended by Secretary of

State Henry Kissinger in his September address to the United Nations. As part

of the U.S. foreign aid program, we favor continuation of food aid.

The limited resources available for foreign aid, including food, should be

concentrated in areas where local self-help efforts make the aid most productive. We mean by this that effective agricultural development by the recipient

country is essential, as well as effective population limitation programs, if American contributions are to be well used. We should consider limiting foreign aid

to those less developed countries that undertake and sustain effective programs

of agricultural development and population control.

(5) In the event of continued critically short food supplies, the United States

might need to institute an event export control policy in its own and the world’s

interest. This would be a supplement to the international grain reserve we have

recommended above. The policy might take the following form:

The U.S. would announce to the world its domestic requirements, the requirements of its regular foreign customers, and the necessary reserve allocation. It

would then state that these supply requirements would be protected.

Periodically, perhaps every three months, the U.S. would report the drawdowns in supply and indicate the extent to which domestic requirements and

those of regular foreign customers would be met without imposing export

controls.

Foreign food aid for less developed countries on confessional terms would

be adjusted to the situation, with guarantees for those countries dependent on

the U.S.

Sales of grain to the state-trading countries would be negotiated by the U.S.

Government, covering the total volume, range of prices, and other considerations. Actual sales and handling of the grain would be conducted by the private

grain firms as before. But the U.S. Government would be in position to monitor

and regulate the outflow consistent with other requirements.

If the world shortage continued and was of such extent that free exports

from the U.S. would endanger the fulfillment of guarantees to American consumers and those countries long dependent upon us, the U.S. would impose

export controls. This would be done after informing the world grain trade.

Regular foreign purchasers would be exempt from the controls.

This, however, should be a policy of last resort in a critical world food

situation.

If the above policies were carried out, we believe the swings in grain prices

Would be substantially moderated and that the long-run trend toward food

scarcity could be turned around.

It is most important that Congress and the Administration appraise the longrun food situation, make long-run policy commitments, and stick to them.

Many, perhaps most, of the policy changes recommended here could be accomplished under existing legislation, with minor alterations. However, a legal

mandate and authority are needed if the U.S. is to help create and participate

● in an international grain reserve plan.

To carry out the proposals in this statement, a number of changes in government organization are needed, in our opinion.

The crises in food affairs in recent years have demonstrated in the iadequacy

of information available to U.S. policy makers. The Congress and the executive

branch have been caught short on knowledge about world supplies and prospective demands. The report of the Food Advisory Commitee of the Office of Technology Assessment and testimony by a number of witnesses in earlier hearings

on food information systems have clearly shown the gaps in information and

the lack of adequate analysis of the facts available.

The responsibility for world food information in the U.S. Department of Agriculture is now split among three agencies: the Economic Research Service, the

Foreign Agricultural Service, and the Statistical Reporting Service. There is

a confusion of functions in this setup and a potential conflict of interest that

may contaminate the quality of the information and analysis.

The FAS has a primary responsibility to expand foreign markets for U.S.

farm products. This makes suspect the assessments of world commodity situations and outlook prepared by the Foreign Commodity Analysis Unit of FAS.

One way to overcome this apparent conflict of interest would be to transfer

this analysis unit to the ERS. Commodity specialists in ERS already perform

much of the same kind of analysis of foreign commodity situations. It is logical

to combine the two staffs and to place them under ERS, which has no “action”
202

responsibility. Its duty is to provide economic intelligence for users of its

reports and for government policy makers.

FAS also has a responsibility to collect facts and collate information about

world food and agriculture conditions. TO achieve the maximum objectivity, it

would be desirable to separate this fact-gathering function from the sales promotion agency and to assign it to SRS, which has the sole function of preparing

factual reports on agricultural data. However, the responsibility for collecting

foreign agricultural data necessarily must remain with the agricultural attaches

under FAS until such time as specialists in crop and livestock reporting can replace them.

The Food Advisory Committee and others who have examined the world food

information problem agree that better analysis of available data is needed. We

believe the logical agency in which to center responsibility for this function is

IRS and that it should be provided funds to increase its staff for this purpose.

In general, the important statistical and analytical services in USDA have

been neglected compared with other services. It is true, we believe, as is often

claimed, that these services in SRS and ERS are the best of their kind in the .

world and the most objective and reliable. Nevertheless, the vital importance

of a world food intelligence system for this country and for the world makes

it essential that these services be improved as much as possible.

It has been suggested that a separate world food intelligence agency be established, separate from the USDA Outlook and Situation Board. This is a reasonable proposal, but we believe improving the present Board’s operation and

strengthening ERS and SRS would accomplish the same result and should be

tried first.

The Interagency Commodity Estimates Committees now are responsible for

developing supply-demand estimates used by the ERS Outlook and Situation

Board. The ICEC is chaired by an official of the Agricultural Stabilization and

Conservation Service, an action agency. Here, as in the case of FAS, there is

a potential conflict of interest, in appearance if not in fact. We find this undesirable and a handicap to achieving the most objective food situation analysis.

We agree with Howard J. Hjort, who testified before this committee on

September 24, that the chairmanship of the ICEC should be removed from ASCS.

Further, responsibility for foreign trade estimates should be removed from FAS

and representation of that agency on the supply-demand estimates committees

should be removed.

With these alterations, and additions to staff, ERS and its Outlook and Situation Board could perform more reliably as a world food intelligence unit.

[The following questions were submitted by Senator Humphrey to

Mr. Seth and his answers thereto:]

Question 1. If I understand your paper, you indicate a reserve stock program,

accumulating stocks when prices fall 10 percent below the three year world average and releasing them when prices rise 10 percent above this average, would

contain the market fluctuations within these limits in 9 years out of 10. IS this a

correct reading of your paper? How confident are you of these frequencies, in

view of our recent experience?

Answer 1. The calculations on the amount of stocks needed to stabilize grain

prices within a range 10 percent above and 10 percent below a three-year average

are based, necessarily, on the experience of recent decades. In the perspective of

the whole century since 1875, the last three decades have been a period of remark- -

ably stable temperature and rainfall in the major grain-producing areas.

There is some reason to believe, according to Louis Thompson of Iowa State University, that weather will be less favorable in the next quarter century. If this

occurs, the instability of production in the early ’70s may continue. Then our

estimate of the steps needed to stabilize prices would require modification.

Question 2. Would you place any limit on the physical size of the stocks, or

would you accumulate stocks as long as the market price remained below the

announced stabilization level?

Answer 2. I would not place any arbitrary limit on size of stocks. However, if a

series of big crops resulted in a situation comparable to that of the 1950s, then

the acreage-adjustment features of the 1973 farm act should be brought into

play. We recommended a revision of the acreage bases to make this program

feasible if the “surplus” circumstances should arise.

Question 3. How would you have the Government and the producers share in

holding the reserve stocks?

Answer 3. The Government needs sufficient stocks to meet its responsibilities

quickly in any international reserve plan. Beyond this, maximum storage on
farms, with storage payments to farmers, is desirable, especially in the case of

feed grains. The practical working out of a storage program could guide the

ratio of government to farmer stockholding. The main thing is to have an overall target for the reserve program and to see that it is reached, totaling government, commercial and on-farm storage.

Question .4. If stocks are acquired in excess of some agreed minimum desirab1e

level, would you release the excess before market prices reach the upper stabilization level?

Answer 4. No. Stocks should not be released until the upper price limit is

reached-and in certain circumstances perhaps not then. This range of stabilization is not always likely to be the perfect range. In at least one out of 10, we

figured, the ranges might be exceeded. However, the problem is likely to be to

maintain sufficient stocks-not the problem of surplus and over-accumulation.

Question 5. What is the merit of continuing target prices and deficiency payments, if price supports are maintained at 90 percent of the three year average

world price level (or some similar level) ?

Answer 5. Target prices and deficiency payments should be continued in the law

for possible use whenever prices to producers sink below a “parity” level. Our

plan is for stabilization around a long-time trend, with no income-support for

farmers. But it is possible that another series of good crops could lower income

to the point where some income protection would be needed. In that situation, we

prefer the payment system to price support. The payments should be the means

of providing farmers with some guarantee in return for a full production program. Price supports above a long-term trend would handicap the United States

in foreign trade.

Question 6. We have resorted to voluntary export controls several times in

the last 3 years. You expect the world food supply per capita to trend down

rather than up in the next 25 years. In view of both recent experience and this

outlook, is existing statutory export control authority adequate?

Answer 6. Existing export control legislation seems adequate. It should be resorted to, as we said in our paper, only in extreme circumstances. Normally,

Cochrane and I would expect that “export control’) would be achieved by the

managing of the reserve stockpile. That is, the government by its buying and

commodity loan policies would assure that sufficient reserves were maintained to

fulfill our international commitments and to meet stabilization requirements.

Question 7. If it is not adequate, how should it be modified?

Answer 7. See answer to 6.

Question 8. What Government agency should have the responsibility for administering food export controls?

Answer. 8. The Commodity Credit Corp. or other agency assigned responsibility

for managing the U.S. grain supplies.

Question 9. You seem to advocate combining aspects of a welfare program with

aspects of a commercial agriculture policy (page 198 and again on page 200). Why

not restrict policy in agriculture to commercial agriculture policy and let welfare

programs be labeled as such?

● Answer 9. If the United Stakes wants to maintain a healthy rural economy,

and the Rural Development Act indicates that it does, then some measures need

to be taken to preserve family-type farm operations. "Loading” any deficiency

payment plan slightly in favor of smaller or intermediate-size farmers would be

one way of doing this. It would remove some of the advantage that large-scale

firm operations now have. Favoring the family farm in farm income support

programs has long been conventional doctrine-in rhetoric. But Cochrane and

I believe firmer action is needed to stop the trend toward industrialized farming.

Welfare programs, such as food stamps, should be 1abeled as such, but we are

talking here about income protection for commercial farmers.

Question 10. Page 200, paragraphs (1) and (2) : These points seem to contradict. In paragraph (1) you say we need technology oriented to small farms; in

paragraph (2) you say most technology developed is equally advantageous to

any size farm ! Which is correct?

Answer 10. It is true that the major advances in farm technology. fertilizer,

seeds. chemicals, are equally adaptable to small and 1arge farms. But, as we

mentioned, machinery development has favored large farms and little effort has

been made to improve machinery for small farms. Methods of using new technology have not been well adapted to small farms, and maybe this is a matter of

education or extension as much as of research. What is needed is social science

research to enable the farm technology revolution to become effective on Small

firms especially in less-developed countries.
204

[The following questions were submitted by Senator Humphrey to

Dr. Cochrane an answers thereto:]

Question 1. If I understand your paper, you indicate a reserve stock program

accumulating stocks. When priced fall 10 percent below the 3-year world average

and releasing them when prices rise 10 percent above this average, would contain

the market fluctuations within these limits in 9 years out of 10.

Is this a correct reading of your paper?

How confident are you of these frequencies, in view of our recent experience?

Answer 1. Your reading of our proposed reserve stock program is correct. With

a stabilization price range of plus or minus 10 percent of the S-year moving average, we argue that worldwide market price fluctuations would be contained within

that range 9 years out of 10, with one qualification. This probability holds only -

after the program has been in operation a few years and the reserve stock has

been built up to the average of 60 to 70 million tons.

You ask how confident are we of these frequencies. If the long-run trend price of

grain turns out to be flat and the 3-year moving average trends neither upward or

downward, I would be most confident of the probability of containing worldwide -

market price fluctuations in the grains within limits of plus or minus 10 percent,

9 years out of 10. But if the long-run trend in grain prices is upward, reserve

stocks would be persistently pulled down and the program would lack the capacity

to contain upward market fluctuations. If, on the other hand, the long-run trend in

grain prices is downward, reserve stocks could accumulate persistently and

become greatly in excess of stabilization needs and hence require some means

of curtailing the continuous inflow of stocks. To keep the 3-year moving average

of prices from declining steadily and the reserve stock bins from overflowing, the

nations party to the international grain reserve stock program would need to

adopt effective production controls for the grains. Long-run upward or downward

trends in world grain prices would, without doubt, complicate the effective operation of an international reserve stock program for the grains.

Question 2. Would you place any limit on the physical size of the stocks, or

would you accumulate stocks as long as the market price remained below the

announced stabilization level ?

Answer 2. As I intimated in my reply to Question 1, if the long-run trend in

world grain prices is downward, it would become necessary to find a means of

reducing the inflow of stocks. But the answer could not be a limitation on the

acquisition of stocks; such a limitation would break the stabilization program

by letting market prices fall below the lower boundady of the stabilization range.

Continuous overproduction and a long-term downward trend in world grain prices

would need to be corrected by production controls in the commercial exporting

nation. However, it should be recognized that the downward movement in the

3-year moving average of world market prices would itself moderate the problem

of accumulating reserve stocks greatly in excess of stabilization needs. Thus, I

would certainly not advocate the establishment of a physical stocks limitation in

the beginning years of the stabilization program. If long-run grain price trends in

the 1970’s and 80’s are reasonably flat, we may expect the reserve stocks accumulated and held under the 10 percent decision rule to average 60 to 70 million tons. ●

Given this general world supply, and demand situation, the program itself will

generate the desired quantity of reserve stocks. If the general world supply and

demand conditions generate either long-term upward or downward grain price

trends, then we would need to experiment with export policies and input subsidies on one hand or production controls on the other—hut not physical limitations on stock acquisitions.

Questions 3. How would you have the Government and the producers share in

holding the reserve stocks?

Answer 3. I have not given a great amount of thought to the question posed

under number 3, but for starters I would suggest that the government and producers share the holding of the United States portion of the international reserve

on a 50-50 basis above some minimum amount which the government must hold

at all times, if it is able. The United States government must have stocks which

it can release quickly and readily at all times; thus I suggest that government

hold some minimum amount of the U.S. stock, plus 50 percent of the amount above

that minimum. But contracts with producers would also need to be flexible. Contracts with producers would have to contain a clause in which the government

could obtain the stocks held by producers with, say, one-month’s notice. Such a

provision would be necessary in contracts with producers in order to replenish

the government stock, as it released stocks into the market. I am sure that ar-
205

rangements could be worked out wherein producers held an important part of the

reserve stock provided the storage contracts with producers could be terminated

within a reasonable time, say one month, if and when the government stocks become too low to enable the United States government to fulfill its commitment to

the international reserve stock program.

Question 4. If stocks are acquired in excess of some agreed minimum desirable

level would you release the excess before market prices reach the upper stabilization level?

Answer 4. Stocks should never be released except in response to the established

decision rule for releasing stocks. The decision rule might say that some stocks

will be released before market prices reach the upper limit of the stabilization

range. But such a formula for releasing stocks before the market prices reach

.

the upper boundary of the stabilization range would need to be defined precisely

and known to all. Stocks should never be released in response to their accumulation to some excessive quantity; if stocks were so released, confidence in the stabilization program would quickly erode. Excessive stocks might call for production control on the part of the nations party to the #stabilization agreement but

not for the arbitrary imposition of a limitation to the accumulation of stocks.

Question 6. What is the merit of continuing target prices and deficiency payments, if price supports are maintained at 90 percent of the three year average

world price level (or some similar level) ?

Answer 5. As a part of our internal agricultural policy, the United States might

wish to continue a system of target prices and deficiency payments to protect the

incomes of small and medium sized farmers where the 8-year moving average of

world prices is declining persistently and significantly. Internal price supports at

90 percent of the 3-year moving average would provide price stability and price

certainty to producers in their production planning. But it would not guarantee

producers a fair income, Thus, to repeat, we might as a matter of national policy

wish to make deficiency payments to small and medium sized family farmers to

support and enhance their income.

Question 6. We have restorted to voluntary export controls several times in

the last 3 years. You expect the world food supply per capita to trend down rather

than up in the next 25 years. In view of both recent experience and this outlook,

is existing statutory export control authority adequate?

Answer 6. If the world per capita food supply trends downward over the next 25 years and the real price of food trends upward, it may well be necessary for

the United States to have an export policy to protect its consumers in years when

market prices are not contained within the stabilization range by the stabilization program. I am not sure whether existing statutory export control is adequate,

since I don’t know its exact provisions, but I would doubt that it is. Seth and I

outline in our paper what we deem to be a desirable export policy on page 201

of our paper. This policy we believe should be enacted into law. If the international reserve stock program for the grains is operating satisfactorily, the control

features of the export policy outlined on page 201 would not become operative. But

in years in which world supplies were exceedingly short and world market prices

were not contained within the stabilization range, the control features of the policy outlined on page 201 would become operative. And to become operative in such

years, it should be placed on the legislative books now or in the immediate future.

Question 7. If it is not adequate, how should it be modified?

Answer 7. I have already answered this question in my answer to Question 6.

Question 8. What Government agency should have the responsibility for administering food export controls?

Answer 8. In my judgment the present United States Department of Agriculture should be expanded and restructured with three principal missions: (1) the

provision and distribution of adequate food supplies to all persons in the United

States; (2) the promotion of a prosperous, productive, commercial agriculture;

and (3) the promotion of rural development and a high quality of living in rural

areas. The administration of the food export policy described under Question

6 would logically fall under the first mission of this expanded and restructured

Department of Food, Agriculture, and Rural Welfare.

Question 9. You seem to advocate combining aspects of a welfare program

with aspects of a commercial agricultural policy (page 198 and again on page 200).

Why not restrict policy in agriculture to commercial agriculture policy and let

welfare programs be labeled as such?

Answer 9. We are not talking about social welfare as it is usually viewed

in the United States on page 198 of our paper. In the first paragraph of page 200,

we are talking about a system of deficiency payments, or income supplements, to

68-877-76-14
206

small and medium sized commercial farmers to help those farmers achieve a

parity of income. We are talking about an income policy for small and medium

sized commercial farmers in paragraph. 1 of page 200, not a welfare program as

welfare programs are typically construed in the United States.

Question 10. Page 200, paragraphs (1) and (2). These points seem to contradict. In paragraph (1) you say we need technology oriented to small farms; in

paragraph (2) you say most technology developed is equally advantageous to any

size farm ! Which is correct.

Answer 10. The points noted by your office with respect” to our paper on page 200

are somewhat contradictory. Let me make the following comments with respect

to technology and small farms: (1) Biological technologies as they have been

developed in the United States over the past 30 years are usually neutral with

regard to size of farm; in a technical sense, small farmers can use hybrid seed

corn as effectively as large farmers. (2) The development of farm machinery

in the United States, in my judgment, has been large-farm oriented and has

contributed to the expansion in the size of farms in the United States. It is my

view that an effort should be made to induce farm machinery manufacturers to

develop machinery which is more adapted to the needs of small farms than exist-

.

ing lines of machinery. In my judgment a great deal could be achieved in the

way of developing mechanical equipment oriented toward the needs of small

farms and small farmers if we had a policy designed to bring about this development. (3) Small farmers are often in need of technical assistance both with,

regard to biological technologies and mechanical technologies to enable them to

remain efficient and survive. In the main, we in the United States have failed

to provide the extra amount of technical assistance required by small farmers

This failure could and should be remedied by the Congress.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Dr. Tweeten, we will hear from you next

and then will follow the procedure that the Congressman indicated.

STATEMENT OF LUTHER TWEETEN, PROFESSOR OF AGRICULTURAL

ECONOMICS, OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY, STILL WATER,

OKLA.

Dr. TWEETE N. Thank you, Congressman Brown and Senator

Humphrey. My presentation is divided into two principal sections;

one deals with the future supply-demand prospects for agricultural

commodities, and the second deals with policies appropriate to the

situation emerging in the next decade.

It has been my good fortune to spend approximately 3 months looking at the long-term outlook for agricultural supply and demand in

the world. I have gone to some of the best experts in the various areas

to t the latest information available.

I have supplemented this information with my own judgment.

It is very important, in the context of the previous presentations, to

separate need from effective demand. In discussing what will happen

to U.S. exports, I am talking about effective demand rather than need. -

The need for food is vast, but from the standpoint of prices to the

domestic consumer and the farmer, it is effective demand that is important. My best estimate of the average increase in effective demand

for U.S. farm commodities through 1985 is about 1.5 percent a -year.

My estimates of supply are based on very exhaustive studies of

technology in American agriculture. Productivity of agriculture increased at the rate of over 2 percent Per year in the 1950. That

has slowed considerably. Productivity, I project, will increase a little

over 1 percent a year to 1985. Alternate projections are also included.

The highest projection, 2.1 percent a year, includes unprecedented

technologies that are on the horizon. These include twinning in cattle,

bioregulators and photosynthesis enhancement.
207

The best estimate is that demand will increase faster than productivity will increase supply.

This is good news for #arm income, but bad news for consumers. Unfortunately for farmers, inflation is going to consume gains in prices

received so that the ratio of prices received to prices paid is going

to hold roughly steady according to best estimates for 1985.

Current dollar net farm income will rise substantially to 1985, but

real dollar income, or buying power, will decline.

The two principal problems facing farmers in the next decade are

instability and inflation.

My paper deals at considerable length with how to cope with instability. The first priority is to build commodity stocks. Either Government or the private trade can do it. The rise of the consumer as an

important participant in national food policy precludes the private

trade holding adequate stocks. The risks are too great.

The private trade holds stock when anticipated prices increases will

cover their costs. When these price rises are in danger of being

truncated by capricious consumer action, the private trade will not

hold adequate stocks. So that turns us to the Government.

Current loan rates do not reflect the social value of accumulating

stocks.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I was at the Committee on Agriculture and

Forestry hearing this morning talking to Mr. Knebel, the newly appointed Under Secretary of Agriculture, on this very point.

Dr. TWEETEN. Senator Humphrey, if current loan rates continue,

the Nation may dissipate the opportunity to accumulate stocks. Potential stocks will instead be exported, fed to livestock, or not be produced

because of cutbacks by farmers to low prices. My suggestion is that

loan rates be raised at least to nonland cost of production.

Farmers now are opposed to participation in this program. They

properly see that in the past high stocks were associated with low

prices. Some inducement is needed to get the farmer to go along. I

suggest that we encourage the farmer to store commodities paying

him 25 to 35 cents a bushel per year to store grain. As a condition for

payment, the farmer would agree not to release those stocks at less

than 150 percent of the loan rate.

This procedure would require the private trade to carry working

stocks because farmer held stocks receiving payment would not be

released until price gets to 150 percent of the loan rate. Private storage would hold down Government cost.

Once stocks accumulate to optimal levels, which I place at about 45

million tons of feed grain, 600 million bushels of wheat, and 150 million bushels of soybeans, then farmers would not receive payment for

additional stocks. If they wanted to hold them, that is fine.

Once stocks reach desirable levels (here I refer to desirable stocks

on the average for a period of years; stocks might be higher or lower

in some years), then I suggest forsaking production controls. Controls

are increasingly less tolerable in an atmosphere where the consumer is

a rising influence in farm policy, where we realize that production

controls have not been very effective in the past and have been very

extensive.

The market price might be allowed to fall without any overt effort

on the part of the Government to accumulate additional stocks. A
208

direct payment be made to farmers equal to the shortfall of the market

price below the nonland cost of reduction support rata.

A payment limitation would restrain growth of large corporate

type farms and would preserve family-sized farms .

Furthermore, I would make this direct payment on normal yields

times 80 percent of acreage allotment tied to 1973-75 acreage. The

old allotment system is obsolete.

The farmer receives the market price for his additional output. This

would have a strong restraining influence on output. The overall plan

gives farmers flexibility to make proper adjustments in how much output to produce; and at the same time provies for adequate stocks. The

plan can promote stability for consumers as well as for farmers.

Inflation has often been overlooked as a very serious problem for

farmers. Inflation has been masked in recent years because the farming -

industry has experienced a very favorable demand for output. Undesirable effects of inflation will become more apparent in the years

to come.

How do we protect farmers against this?

In the paper which you per aps have before you, one of the sug- h

gestions I have is that we institute a wage supplement.

Chairman HUMPHREY.. I saw your proposal.

Dr. TWEETEN. I think some of you are familiar with that concept.

In the interest of brevity I will not go into it in detail unless people

have questions about it.

Thank you very much.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you.

Let me pose a general question. I am chairman of the Foreign Agriculture Subcommittee, chairman of the Foreign Assistance and International Economic Policy Subcommittee of Foreign Relations Committee, and chairman of the Joint Economic Committee. All my activities are in this field.

I want to ask you gentlemen if you would be willing to make yourselves available for presentations to these other subcommittees and

especially the Joint Economic Committee,

I say the latter because I think, Dr. Cochrane, you were right that

our planning bill did not give the specific emphasis that might be

necessary for agriculture.

I held Joint Economic Committee hearings for the first time since

1957 in which any person with agricultural expertise appeared

In addition, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry

does not in any way tune itself in to what is happening in the rest of

the economy. I listened to what you said regarding the rising power

of the consumer. We are attemptmg to stonewall that, you see, as if

you could prevent it. It is like old King Knute holding back the tides.

Temporarily? you are able to do it, off and on, by bringing together

certain coalitions in the Congress. But the long term is another issue.

I do not know how to explain it to you except to say that if you look

around this room, there are some very interesting people here. But the

press table is empty.

Now, why do I tell you that? Unless there is an investigation of the

grain shipment or export scandal, there is no press. Seldom any media.

I can tell you I have been on the committee for 18 years. The only time

we have any media coverage is when we have a first-class knockdown

dragout fight with the Secretary of Agriculture.
209

Yet, I think it is fair to say that what you gentlemen have been discussing is more basic to the long-term economic well being of the

United States and the world than the oil crisis. People can get along

with less oil, but there is no substitute for food. Yet this is a subject

matter that only is peripheral in terms of its national interest. When

an issue is internationalized then you attract some media attention.

You hear about farm prices, but no one hears about inflation as it

affects the farmer.

We had before the Joint Economic Committee every one of the pub.

lic opinion institutes of this country. We use them regularly: Cadell,

Hart, Roper, Gallup, Harris, Michigan, public opinion surveys. They

found that people identify inflation as the following:

No. 1, food prices; No. 2, fuel; No. 3, rent; and No. 4, interest.

Inflation was identified as food 68 percent—running between 65

and 72 percent—of the time in every survey. In other words, as far as

Mr. and Mrs. America are concerned, inflation is the price that they

pay in the supermarket.

You can raise the rice of a quart of milk a penny, and you will

have a veritable revolution. You can raise the price of a glass of beer

a nickel and no one notices.

The only thing people complain about is whether Coors is as good

as Olympia,

Dr. Tweeten?

Hamms, or Budweiser.

Dr. Tweeten. Looking at parity ratio, the figure for November 1973,

based on 1910-14 equal to 100. That is below the same parity ratio

in the 1960's and early 1970's, and still I think a lot of consumers are

saying, “Aren't food prices high because farmers are getting too

much ?"

Chairman HUMPHREY. No doubt about it.

And concern about food prices is the same in Minnesota. Even

though agriculture is the industry in my State, you would never know

it by reading the local paper.

Mr. Soth. You should read the Des Moines Register.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I know it.

May I say I wish we had it. I say this respectfully, because I happen

to think we have a good newspaper, but the emphasis is not the same.

If 5,000 people were laid off at Honeywell in Minneapolis-St. Paul,

every economist at the university, every preacher, every social worker,

every do-gooder, every liberal, would be up in arms saying something

has got to be done about it. But we've lost 5,200 diary farmers in the

last 2 years and no one said anything. These farmers not only lost

their jobs, but they lost their assets, too.

[The following paper was requested by OTA from Dr. Tweeten:]

FORMULATING A NATIONAL FOOD POLICY FOR THE NEXT DECADE

(By Luther Tweeten)*

Formulating a national food policy for the next decade requires an understanding of (1) the setting including trends in supply, demand, prices and incomes and (2) alternative policies to deal with emerging problems consistent

with the interests of farmers, taxpayers and consumers at home and abroad.

*Regents Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater. Professional Paper P-248 of the Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station, prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment. Comments of Daryll Ray. MiIton Ericksen and Walter Wilcox were very helpful. The author retains sole responsibility for short- comings of this paper.
210

This paper begins with economic projections of the farming economy to 1985.

The paper then examines policies, institutions and data requirement to cope

with emerging, circumstances.

THE ECONOMIC SETTING TO 1985

Scenarios define the conditions under which supply, demand, prices, costs,

receipts and net farm income are projected to 1985. The scenarios depict the

range of conditions judged most probable. It is cautioned that the projections

do not encompass transitory shocks such as annual variation in grain purchases

for export to the Soviet Union, weather, commodity stock adjustments and other

factors which will bear heavily on short-run conditions but not on long-run .

trends. Critical components discussed below of the 

(population, income and exports) and supply

scenarios are demand shifters

shifters (productivit, inflation)

Suppl y

elasticites. Supply cab be expressed with two principal parameters: shifters and price The SIMPASS agricultutal projections system devised by Quance

and Tweeten (1972) and improved by Chung J. Yeh of the Economic Research

Service performed well in predicting the 1967-74 period with aggregate supply

elasticities of .2 in the short-run (l-2 years) and 1.0 in the long run (many

en) Qquance, 1969, ajusted for the increasing short-run elasticity caused (years). These parameters are consistent with past econometric estimates (Tewee-)

by rising propoertions of price responsive inputs such as fertilizer and falling

proportions of price-unresponsive inputs such as operator and family labor.

The supply curve is shifted leftward by inflation and rightward by technology

through greater productivity of arming resources.

Productivity.— The productivity index is the ratio of aggregate output of the

farming industry to aggregate production inputs. The most recent and comprehensive analysis of agricultural productivity response to research (R) and

extension (E) outlays was, performed by Lu and Cline (1975]. Additional

agricultural extension and research outlays raise the amount of farm output

available from any given amount of far production inputs. Effects of increasing R and E are not immediately apparent but are spread over many years. The

farm outputs from public R and E outlays in any given year reach a peak at

6 years and decline to near zero in 13 years because of obsolescence of technology-an effect often ignored in payoffs from such outlays. Depreciation or obsolescence sets in as new crop varieties become vulnerable to damage from pests,

as insects become immune to pesticides and as new technologies make old technologies obsolete. This means that substantial R and E maintenance outlays are

necessary just to keep farm productivity from falling. An additional dollar spent

on production-oriented R and E raises agricultural output approximately $4.30.

Since the increments In output are. distributed over time, they must be discounted to exrpess them in present value. The present value of a one dollar investment in R and E expenditures for a 10 percent discount rate was found by

Lu and Cline to be $2.21. . .

The internal rate of return is that discount rate which equates the stream of

the future marginal products with the initial investment of one dollar. The internal rate of return shows the highest interest rate that coul d be paid on

investment in public R and E to just break even on the investment. The internal

rate of return based on national data from 1939 to 1972 is approximately

26.5 percent. This rate has declined over time: it was 30.5 percent from

1939 to ,1948, 27.5: percent from 1949 to 1958, 25.5 percent from 1959 to 1969

and 23.5 percent from 1969 to 1972. The rate of return in the most recent

period remains substantially above returns on the average of alternative public

and private investments and public R and E contributes to a more equitable

distribution of income (Tweeten, 1973). Strong justification can be made for

increasing investment in R and E.

A one percent increase in R and E will, over its lifetime, bring about a .037

percent increase in productivity. The increase is small despite highly favorable

rates of return because public R and E comprises less than 2 percent of all farm

inputs. Using estimates from Lu and Cline, three alternative levels of R and E

expenditures and resulting changes in productivity for the 1975-85 period are

considered in this study:

T.: Maintain a zero rate of growth in R and E expenditures, holding real

outlays for extension and public research at the 1974 dollar value—incre-
211

ments in dollar outlays only keep up with inflation. This leads to a 1.10 percent annual growth in productivity of conventional farming inputs for

1975-85.

T3

: Continue the observed rate of real growth in R and E during the

1939-72 period, 3 percent per year. This leads to a 1.14 percent annual

growth in farming productivity in the 1975-85 period.

T4: Continue the average rate of real growth in R and E during the M144-

50 period, 7 percent per year; also include productivity gains from unprecedented technologies. This leads to a 1.21 percent annual growth in farming

productivity in the 1975-85 period.

The above percentage rates refer to real (constant) dollar increments from

a 1974 base. If inflation averages 4 percent per year, then the current dollar

increments for the respective alternatives are T0

, 4 percent; T37 percent and

T7+ 11 percent. Unprecedented technologies include breakthroughs which are

likely to occur at specific times as judged by agricultural scientists but are not

included in conventional productivity indices. Technology index T7+ includes

effects of three such technologies: Twinning in cattle, bioregulators, and photosyntheses enhancement. Other practices such as minimum tillage are not explicitly included but also offer potential for greater output from a given dollar

volume of production resources. Emerging unprecedented technologies are

judged to be most widely used with greater R and E outlays, hence their impact

is only included with annual real increments on R and E outlays of 7 percent,

the highest rate used in this analysis.

As indicated above, the estimated annual average- increases in productivity

range from 1.10 for TO to 1.21 for T7+ fro-m 1975 to 1985. Historical annual increases

in productivity averaged 2.33 percent from 1950-59, .92 percent 1960-69

and 1.19 percent from 1963-72. Historical productivity indices vary widely from

year to year because of weather. Weather also influences the long-run productivity trend to the extent that weather cycles influence domestic farm production.

No provision for weather cycles is made in productivity projections herein. This

is not to deny existence of weather cycles, but rather to recognize that thes e

cycles cannot be predicted with sufficient reliability to include in productivity

projections.

Inflation.- Inflation in the national economy can be gauged by alternative

measures including the Consumer Price Index, the Wholesale Price Index and

the implicit price deflator of the Gross National Product. The latter is the

most comprehensive in coverage of goods and services and historically has increased at a rate similar to that of prices paid by farmers, including interest,

taxes and wage rates. From 1960 to 1969 both indexes increased by 24 percent.

From 1972 to 1974, however, prices paid by farmers increased 32 percent while

general prices increased 18 percent. Tire more rapid increase in prices paid by

farmers is in part attributed to high energy prices, which carry,a larger weight in

farm input prices that in general prices, and by the interfarm sales component of

prices paid by farners, which increased in price commensurate with the rapid

gain in prices received by farmers for crops and livestock. In the future the

rate of gain in farm prices paid is expected to return to the historic pattern in

relation to the rate- of national inflation. In the empirical analysis, three alternative inflation rates are examined: I0 a benchmark of zero annual inflation;

I4 the standard case of 4 percent annual inflation; and I8 an 8 percent:annual

inflation rate in prices paid to farmers.

The latter rate is considerably higher than the rate prior to the 1970's but

lower than rates experienced in the 1970’s by farmers. Inflation in prices paid

by farmers influences prices received by farmers in the empirical analysis in

conformity with the theory outlined elsewhere (Tweeten, 1975c).

Demand 

The projected demand for farm output is expressed by price elasticities and

by three demand shifters: exports, population and per capita real disposable

personal income. Based on previous econometric studies, and ability to predict

historically the 1967-74 period, the price elasticity of aggregate demand was

selected to be -.15 in the short run and -.21 in the long run.

Population.— U.S. population growth rates are series I, II and III projections

from the Bureau of the Census. With population increasing at the rate of .85 percent annnally from 1970-74 and by .7 percent in 1974 and in light of falling

birth rates, series III with growth rates of .68 percent from 1975 to 1985 was

selected as the standard case (Table 7). Alternative rates are also used because
212

trends in birth rates cannot be accurately anticipated as evident by past projections. Accordingly, three projections are included in Table 1 to allow for

possible changes in birth rates, migration and other factors that influence

domestic population growth.

TABLE L-PROJECTED ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN FARM OUTPUT DEMAND, WITH ALTERNATIVE IN.

CREASESIN DOMESTIC POPULATION, PERSONAL PER CAPITA REAL INCOME, AND AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS ,

UNITED STATES, 1975-85

Population,* years 1975-85
213

It is noted that several combinations of export, income and population alternatives project the same shift in total demand for farm output. The very highest

rates of growth in income and population seem unlikely to occur. Excluding the

highest growth rates in income and population and thereby temporarily confining

alternatives to 16 demand growth rates for 1875-85, the highest rate of growth

in demand is 2.1 percent and the lowest rate is 1.2 percent. These rates coupled

with a standard case estimate of 1.5 percent (which conforms with standard case

export growth of 3.5 percent population growth of .68 percent and per capita

real disposable personal income growth of 2.7 percent) constitute the three alternatives simulated and are designated as D2.1, D1.5 and D1,2. It is apparent that

these shift correspond to several combinations of components. For example,

D1.5 with a 1.5 percent annual growth in demand can result from population

series II, medium income, and 2.7 export growth; or from population series III,

low income, and 4.4 percent export growth. Demand growth D2.1 can result from

population series I, high income and 4.4 export growth; or from population

series 11, high or medium income, and 6 percent export growth in the 1975-85

period.

SIMPASS System

The SIMPASS system as modified by Jung J. Yeh projected annually from

1975 to 1985 the farming industry economic outcomes including prices received by

farmers, the’ ratio of prices received to prices paid by farmers, gross receipts,

expenses, net income and output. Parameters were initially selected for the

system for the previous econometric studies, then finally selected based on the

values of parameters which predicted most reliably the 1967-74 historic period.

Equilibrium

Economic outcomes under various scenarios were projected for each year from

1975 to 1986 in the absence of production controls or price and income supports

by government. To save space’ and because annual changes were along a fairly

uniform trend, only values for 1980 and 1985 are shown (Table 2). Although

prices received by farmers are projected to be 264 percent of the 1967 average

in 1985 in the standard case (1.5 percent demand growth D1.5. 3 percent growth

in R and E outlays T3, and 4 percent inflation T4), the terms of trade for farmers

as measured by the price ratio (prices received divided by prices paid) trends

slightly downward because of inflation in prices paid. Current or nominal income

measured in dollars of the future years shown in Table 2 trends upward, but

real income trends slightly downward in the standard case.

Recognizing the possible errors in the projections, the most, realistic interpretation is that farm economic health will be very similar to that in 1967 on the

average to 19$5 under the standard case scenario. But results ‘could be quite

different if other scenarios become reality.

TABLE 2.–PROJECTED, ECONOMIC OUTCOMES FOR EQUILIBRIUM UNDER A FREE MARKET, UNITED STATES, 1980

AND 1985

Standard case: D1.5 T 3 I4 .. 104 224

Productivity:

High D1.5T 7 +I -------- 222 224

Inflation:

High DM Ts IIJ---------- 261

LOW DLJ Ta 1o-----------

Demand:

190

Low DL1 TI 1~-.....--..

$24.2 $19.1

23.7 18.7 24.4 19.3

22.2 14.0

25.2 25.2

29.9 23.6

21.5 17.0

101 264

357

192

287 253

$26.9

25.0

27. 6

22.6

27.7

38.6 21.9

$17.4

16.2 17.9

25.1

14. 2

1 Ratio of index of prices received by farmers for crops and livestock divided by index of prices paid by farmers for production items, including interest, taxes and wage rates.

~ 1974 dollars.

Source: See text.

Note: Preliminary actual 1974 values for the vice ratio was 106, for prices received was 183 and net farm income

was $27,000,000,00 .
214

It is of interest that results change little with alternative rates of increase

in outlays for research and extension. Farm income and price ratios are less

favorable with greater investments, indicating once again that such outlays benefit consumers rather than farmers. Although R and E outlays have favorable

rates of return and are a major economic benefit to consumers, they are not very

effective in changing productivity rates for various reasons. As stated earlier,

they comprise a small portion of all farm inputs and a change in volume is

dwarfed by the effects of price changes on conventional inputs. Also, considerable time lapses before R and E inputs are reflected in farm output. A 25 percent

increase in R and E inputs increases farm output only 1 percent over its lifetime.

A 25 percent increase in the ratio of prices received to prices paid by farmers

increases output 5 percent in 2 years and by 25 percent in the long run.

With no inflation (T0), the ratio of prices received to prices, paid by farmers -

could be considerably higher by 1985 than in 1967, 1974 or 1980. Continued high

inflation seriously threatens income of the farming economy, but does not seriously undermine ability of farmers to produce enough to meet food needs at

home and abroad.

The high rate of growth in demand of 2.1 percent annually can result in a price -

ratio and real net farm income at nearly the same level in 1985 as in 1974. Such

a rapid growth in demand seems unlikely, however. On the other hand a slow

growth in demand of 1.2 percent annually could lead to chronically depressed

farm prices and net farm income. And a combination (not shown in Table 2)

of rapid growth in productivity, high inflation and slow growth in demand would

create very serious economic problems for farmers which in turn would lead to

powerful pressures for government intervention or perhaps to farmer bargaining

power.

Results in Table 2 provide no evidence whatsoever that the ability of American

agriculture to meet demands placed upon it will be seriously threatened. No

evidence points to chronic shortages or suggests that an increasing proportion

of income will have to be devoted to purchase of farm food ingredients by American consumers.

OPTIONS FOR COPING WITH ECONOMIC INSTABILITY

Projections to 1985 revealed no strong upward or downward trend in farm

real prices and incomes for the foreseeable future. The overriding issue facing

farmers and consumers is economic instability caused by variation in weather

at home and abroad. Major means to reduce instability include commodity stock

reserves, export and import controls, production controls and direct payments.

Commodity Stock Reserves

Establishing a commodity reserve program is the number one priority in establishing a national food policy. In the absence of reserves, farmers could receive

stable prices and incomes by transfer payments from nonfarmers, consumers

could receive stable prices by restricting exports, or foreign customers could receive stable supplies if domestic consumers reacted to widely “fluctuating prices

by tailoring their food use to absorb all the adjustments in farm output. But

more stable total supplies from year to year made possible by adequate reserves

can avoid reliance on these distasteful alternatives.

Current farm’ legislation will not provide adequate public or private reserves.

Emergence of consumer interests as a powerful and capricious force in national

food policy has preempted reliance on the private trade to hold adequate stocks—

the risks are too great. The private trade holds stocks when anticipated price -

gains more than offset storage costs, including a charge for risk. Fear that government action will truncate price rises injects uncertainty that leads to excessive

private discount rates and to private stocks far below socially optimal levels.2

Inability of the private trade to obtain capital and assume risks of holding stocks

large enough to meet the requirements of a national food policy calls for public

involvement. We know much about an economically efficient stock program. Research

suggests that carryovers of approximately 600 million bushels of wheat, 45

million tons of feed grains, and 150 million bushels of soybeans are optimal

on the average. Stocks below these levels result in considerable price instability. Although reserves of the above amounts or greater create stability

in commodity prices, the prices are considerably below current levels and are

unpalatable to farmers (see Tweeten, 1974b).

2 An economically efficient program is one that maximizes the benefits less costs to society, with the private discount rate equal to the social discount rate at the margin:
In addition to optimal carryover levels, research suggests guidelines for

release and acquisition of stocks. The optimal reserve management rule devised by Tweeten, et al. (1971) was to change stocks by the formula .85 (Q-Q*).

That is, 85 percent of production Q in excess of equilibrium Q* would be stored,

and stocks would be released (if available) equal to 85 percent of the shortfall of production below equilibrium. The percentage can be changed to as

low as 70 without much loss in efficiency. A similar optimal formula was devised by Richard Just (1975), but with price rather than quantity the decision

variable, i.e. the change in stock is given by the formula k (P*-P) where P*

is equilibrium price and k is a constant which Just did not estimate. The change

in storage stocks from year to year is some proportion of the difference between

the actual market price and the equilibrium price. Expressing P in cents per

bushel and Q in million bushels of wheat production in a linear demand function

for wheat, and substituting Q into Just’s formula, then the change in wheat

stock is expressed simply as 2(P*-P ). If equilibrium wheat price is 300 cents

per bushel and the market price is 200 cents per bushel, then 200 million bushels

would be taken off the market and placed in storage. If the price were 400, then

200 million bushels would be taken out of storage (if available) and placed

on the market.

These rules may be economically optimal but politically inexpedient. Our

research indicates that other guidelines such as acquisition and release of stocks

when prices achieve respective low and high thresholds generate social benefits

from price stabilization that are nearly as favorable as the optimal rule

(Tweeten, et al., 1971). In part, this robustness of storage outcomes to storage

rules is an outgrowth of increased private stock operations as government

stock rules allow wider price fluctuations before intervention. The intervention

prices must, of course, include the intermediate to long-run equilibrium price

within the interval. Thus a fairly operational. rule is for the government to

purchase stocks when prices fall 25 percent below equilibrium and sell stocks

when prices rise 50 percent above equilibrium.

The socially optimal average carryover for the U.S. (nearly 60 million tons

of all grains) appears not only to be consistent with the U.S. market but also

with world contingency reserve needs. It requires fewer resources to maintain a single reserve system to accomplish the dual goals of stabilizing prices

and responding to world emergency food needs than to have separate reserves

for each goal. Rather than have a special grain reserve (a suggested level is

12 million tons, but more recent pronouncements go up to 60 million tons) solely

for world emergency needs, it would be less expensive to accomplish the same

objective by allowing countries experiencing acute food shortages to receive

development dollar credits which could be used to purchase food wherever such

food could be acquired at least cost. Commodity stocks are most efficiently

stored in countries where they are produced rather than in potential foodshort areas, but this idea is difficult to “sell” potential food-short countries.

I am pessimistic about the ability of nations to agree on an adequate world food

reserve policy, and feel that humanitarian considerations compel the U.S.

to establish on its own a reserve policy capable of responding to emergency

world food needs-at least until an international system is devised.

Farmers have observed correctly that small stocks have been associated

with high, if unstable, commodity prices They oppose accumulation of reserves by the Commodity Credit Corporation because commodity prices would

be low, although more stable.3 To overcome farmers’ opposition to reserves, a

national food reserve policy must contain features attractive to farmers. One

proposal is that stocks be held by farmers provided economic incentives by

the government to acquire, hold and release stocks in the public interest.

Notable legislation to implement this proposal is authored by Senator Henry

Bellmen (Senate bill S 2275).

Senator Bellmen’s proposed legislation gives producers an option whether

to participate in the set-aside program or a stock program. If the producer

elects the latter, he is authorized a nonrecourse loan equal to 80 percent of the

cost of production, including land cost. The loan is for 5 years and is repaid

with interest when the grain is sold. The grain can not be sold until the market

price exceeds 150 percent of the loan, and the Secretary of Agriculture has

the option of requiring loans to be paid off when the price of grain reaches

3 This statement applies to grain farmers but not necessarily to livestock producers. Stable grain prices are of benefit to livestock producers and reduce livestock price variability. Spe- cialized livestock feeders can adjust to consistently low or consistently high feed prices, but it is difficult for them to remain economically viable with highly variable grain prices.
216

200 percent of the loan. Thus the farmer’s selling option is essentially in the

range of 150 to 200 percent of the loan rate. To illustrate with an example,

if wheat production cost Is $3.06 per bushel, the loan rate is $2.45. The farmer

has the option to hold the grain or to sell the grain and repay the loan with

interest when the market price is between $3.67 and $4.90 per bushel. The loan

is called when the price exceeds $4.90.

Other approaches can induce farmers to hold appropriate levels of storage

stocks. One proposal is for the government to exempt farmers from payment of

interest on the nonrecourse loan if farmers sell grain when the price is between

150 and 200 percent of the loan rate. Farmers would pay storage costs other than

interest on the commodity. Another proposal is for the government to offer no

nonrecourse loan but to pay farmers 25-35 cents per bushel to defray interest and

storage costs up to 60 million tons of all grains. No storage payment would be -

made on stocks in excess of 60 million tons. Farmers would be free to acquire

stocks as they see fit, but could release stocks only when the market price exceeded 150 percent of the support price. Because the grain industry requires working stocks which would not be readily accessible, the private trade would carry .

a significant amount of stocks. Payments for holding stocks would be terminated

when market prices exceeded 150 percent of the support rate but would be

reinstated when prices return to 150 percent of the support rate. If stocks failed

to average. desired levels over a period of “normal" years, incentives would be

raised or lowered as necessary. The storage incentive rates indicated above are

only illustrative. The important principle is the use of government, payments

to reduce private costs of storage to the level of retail social costs by compensating farmers (or others) for storage.

A third alternative is to establish a schedule of loan rates, with higher loan rates

associated with lower reserves. The schedule would also include release rates,

with higher release prices associated with smaller reserves. Farmers who stored

grain would be exempt from interest charges (or would receive a storage incentive fee) if they sold grain in conformity with the release schedule, but would

be required to reimburse the government for all interest charges if they elected

to hold for higher prices. Direct payments or production controls would be

used to maintain farm prices and incomes if stocks reached excessive levels.

Export controls

Opportunities for importers of American farm products to go elsewhere for

supplies, the central importance of maintaining access to world markets to earn

reserves to purchase petroleum and other products, fear of reciprocal trade

barriers and other reasons have for the most part deterred demands for export

controls. 4

The Soviet Union has been in large part responsible for variation in U.S.

exports and we feel much less obligated to assure supplies to them than to regular customers in Japan and Western Europe. But effectiveness of export controls or agreement with the Soviets should not be overestimated and viewed

as a substitute for other measures to promote stability. In years of short Soviet

supplies, their import needs in excess of what the U.S. is willing to supply can be

purchased in Western Europe, (Canada, Australia, or Argentina. Customers

normally purchasing from these countries but facing no U.S. embargoes or agreements can switch purchases to us. Or the Soviets can purchase soybeans, grain

sorghum, barley and oats rather than embargoed wheat and corn. In years of

abundant Soviet supplies, their commitment to buy 6 million tons of grains

annually can be circumvented by their selling of domestically grown wheat to

other countries. Possibilities for deferred delivery and other means also reduce

the effectiveness of grain agreements to stabilize markets. Furthermore, because

many farmers feel that commitments by the U.S.S.R. to purchase 6-8 million

tons represent an export maximum in “the minds of U.S. officials, export controls

or agreements cannot be viewed as a permanent instrument to stabilize markets

by a nation committed to open trade channels and dependent on” access to world

markets.

One way to remove the highly destabilizing impact of foreign markets on U.S.

commodity prices is to restrict total exports, not just those to the U.S.S.R. and

Poland. And the stabilization can be most effective if carried out in concert with

other major exporters. Such policies, although potentially highly effective in

4 Attempts to obtain supplies elsewhere effects long-run as well as short-run markets. For example, stimulation of soybean production in Brazil by the Japanese undermines American soybean market outlets for many years.
217

removing export instability, can also raise export revenues from farm commodity

sales.

In the past, some economists in the Economic Research Service have contended

that the export demand far U.S. farm products is price inelastic. If this contention were correct, the U.S. could raise farm export earnings by unilaterally

restricting exports. My estimates reveal an elastic demand for agricultural exports except in the very short run. Thus export revenue is lost by unilateral

export controls but revenue is increased at least slightly if the U.S. restricts

exports in concert with other exporters.5

Comprehensive, effective export control entails substantial costs. It would

require either a single public grain board to replace current private export firms

or powerful controls over private firms that would make such firms essentially

an arm of the state. Whether the current grain export system comprised largely

of private, mostly multinational, firms should be replaced by a single public

corporation is an open question. While it is true that single state co orations

predominate in major grain exporting countries, the advantages over reliance on

private firms is not clear. A single public corporation would have served the U.S.

better in the seriously mismanaged sale to the soviets in 1972. On the other hand,

the Canadian Wheat Board missed the market in 1974-75. It held wheat anticipating exhaustion of U.S. supplies, only to face later a much depressed market

price while holding substantial stocks. Under any circumstances, it is essential

that the federal government monitor export sales, requiring prior approval for

sizable sales. In my judgment, a national food policy with an adequate commodity reserve program can provide adequate stability without export controls.

In other words, the cost of export controls (in foregone sales, ill-will, etc. )

exceeds potential gains in the form of domestic price stability. But if export controls are to be used, the conditions under which they will go into effect should be

carefully defined and advertised so that all participants in national food policy

know the rules of the game in advance.

Production Controls

Production controls can enhance stability by reducing output and increasing

prices and farm incomes in times of excess supplies and by increasing output

and dampening prices and farm incomes in times of excess demand. Past programs have demonstrated that voluntary production control programs can in fact

restrain output, provide a highly useful reserve of resources and serve secondary

objectives such as conserving the soil and encouraging farmers to do what a more

nearly perfect market would do (convert farmland to grass or trees, encourage

alternative uses for farm labor, etc. ) in times of excess Supplie.6 If administered

properly, production controls such as the set-aside program can maintain farm

income, and can provide an intermediate-run reserve to back up short-run commodity stock reserves.

The shortcomings of production controls are many and accumulating. It is

well to review them:

1. Ericksen and Ray (1975) state that “. . . land withdrawal may not be an

acceptable remedy [for low farm income] since other parts of the world may still

face shortages. The U.S. could face strong adverse world opinion if production

were curtailed to support prices and farm income."

2. The balance of power in food policy has tilted toward consumers, and faced

with the option of low-cost food or production controls, they can be expected to

favor lower food costs.

3. Diverted acres were not very productive. At best, 2 out of 3 diverted acres

return to production and those that return are no more than three-fourths as pro-

,.::ie::::::;::;;m::;”rf;’’’;;:’;:;:::c:::fS:;:: entln that a 1 percent restric on on emorta ralae8 qort Prices .67 ereent but ZoWerU =.83 reent. Slmm the foreign demand an 6UPPI elasticities are of somewhat eomp;rable abso ute ma tin be multiplied by the ratio of foreign rain pro uc % 9!n iu8 consumption to esprt~ to the export elastlcit for one coun ry or a carte o several countries. Ths ra 10 ‘la approxi- xnately 21 for the d.s. and is 13 for a cartel composed of the U.S., Canada, Australia ;n~ Argentina. The cartel price elasticity of export demand is approximately %1 times —1.5, or --.93. Thus a 1 percent restriction on grain exports by tbe cartel would raise prices 1.1 percent and would raise receipts by 1 +1/ —.93=.1 percent. The conclusion 18 that grain export

earnings will be lowered by export restraint by the U.S. acting alone but will be raised by a cohesive export cartel which restricts grain exports in coueert. 6 Although in theory long-term whole farm retirement of marginal cropland is most cost- effwtive la removing ~roduetion’ per Treasury dollar spent on the program, an Oklahoma study ( Carr and Twee en, 1974) revealed comparatively little difference among programs in Treasury costs to divert a given volume of farm output.
218

ductive as average cropland ; combining these two effects suggests diverted acres

were only half as productive as average land in production. Although nearly onefifth of cropland acres were diverted several years, this constituted a comparatively small reserve capacity of no more than 5 percent of farm output. Diverted

land has little value for use other than farm production, and hence is virtually

costless in real terms for producing farm output.

4, Reserve capacity is much greater from response to price than from bringing in diverted acres. The short-run price elasticity of aggregate supply of farm

output appears to be approximately .2 for the 1967-74 period compared to .1 in

earlier years. This suggests that the potential to respond to price doubled. A 25

percent increase in farm prices can generate as much production capacity in approximately 1 year as release of 60 million diverted acres. Alternatively, a 5 per- -

cent increase in prices received by farmers sustained for several years can generate 5 percent additional capacity.

5. In part because land now accounts for only about 15 percent of farm output

and fertilizers and other purchased inputs are good substitutes for land, it is

becoming increasingly difficult to control production by restricting the use of land.

6. Allotments are now obsolete, inequitable and an inadequate foundation for

administering farm programs (see Schnittker, 1975).’ Conserving bases have been

eliminated in many states and allotments are inequitable within as well as among

states. Farmers who responded to demands for greater output in 1973-75 by investing in land clearing, drainage, irrigation or other means to expand crop acreage do not wish to be penalized by a return to obsolete allotments used to distribute benefits of future government programs.

Direct payment programs have been criticized because they provide more funds

to large than to small farms. This criticism may be much more applicable to setaside programs, since, if production is to be controlled, large farms must be included to avoid diverting large portions of small farms. A direct payment program properly administered with payment limitations could maintain a family

farm structure while providing disincentives to huge, industrial-type corporate

farms. In combination with a commodity reserve program providing short-term

price and supply stability, a direct payment program could give farmers “insurance” against economic and natural disaster at lower real cost than other types

of programs.

Farm Price Supports

Price supports can serve objectives of equity and efficiency. By assuring farmers of at least a minimum return if things do not work out as anticipated, price

supports can provide forward pricing that enables farmers to plan and produce

more efficiently and provide any given output with fewer resources. Many

economists agree that price supports can contribute to efficiency, but caution

against the dangers of supporting prices above the long-term equilibrium (70-75

percent of 1910-14 equilibrium on the average according to Table 2). Higher

prices escalate land prices, generate surplus output or entail high Treasury costs

for production controls, support payments and storage of excessive reserves.

In July 1975, target prices were 45 percent of parity for wheat and corn while

loan rates were 30 percent of parity for wheat and 36 percent of parity for corn. ‘

A considerable amount of production is not revered by target prices. Farm income

would be cut in half compared to 1973 if prices fell to loan levels and would

be inadequate to avoid a major financial disaster-eliminating many young,

efficient farmers who have much to contribute.

Many feel that loan and/or target prices should be raised. The high value of

-

building stocks should be reflected in high prices paid for reserves so that incremental output will not be channeled into production of mea? exports and other

less valued uses. The current loan rate is too low to encourage production and

bring commodities into storage. Alternative bases for setting loan or target prices

include (1) the index of prices paid by farmers, (2) the index of prices paid by

farmers adjusted for yields, (3) a moving average of past prices, (4) cost of

production, or (5) a price necessary to bring production consistent with desired

stocks.

Setting price supports according to the index of prices paid by farmers fails

to account for productivity gains which enable farmers to obtain a fair return

7 Requirement that farmers rotate set-aidde land from one field to the next each year until

over a perfod of time every field on their farm ham been diverted at one time or another can he successful In obtaining di~ersion of “average” cropland, but la of unequal succew in humid comnared to arid areas. In the latter, rotation of set-aside land may be little more than a fallow system that has no impact on total farm production.
219

even as price supports rise a little less rapidly than prices paid by farmers. Price

supports tied only to prices paid by farmers eventually cause problems of excessive production.

Setting price supports at a moving average of prices over the last, say, 3 years

allows prices to adjust to market conditions but without tying prices to an absolute period of “parity” which creates rigidity in prices. Because of high crop

prices in the past three years, a past 3-year average support price could induce

overproduction if excess demand quickly ‘turns to excess supply in the later

1970’s. Also a sustained period of excess supply can lead to very low price supports. Target prices are currently inflated by the index of prices paid by farmers

and deflated by past 3-year yields. The latter adjustment unduly reduces support

w levels because yields include output gains from added conventional inputs as

well as technology, hence overestimate productivity gains and overdeflate supports. Yield adjustments also are inappropriately sensitive to weather. Despite

expected continuing inflation in prices paid, target prices are projected to fall

in the late 1970’s because of recovery of yields after unfavorable weather in the

9 mid-1970’s ( Ericksen and Ray, 1970, p. 17). (It is possible that the Secretary

of Agriculture will not reduce supports even if the prices mid and yield adjustments call for such action. )

Cost of production support prices are not receiving greater attention. Recently

proposed legislation would support prices at 80 percent of the cost of production,

including a land charge calculated from crop-share rent. An ‘alternative to not

validate escalating land prices caused ‘by speculation is to support prices on the

basis of non-land costs of production, with appropriate adjustment for spatial

demands so that production would not move out of areas with a comparative

advantage to high cost areas. Supporting prices at the non-land cost of production in the major area of comparative advantage with the cost of transportation

added to supports for other was has considerable appeal.8

A final approach is to set the support price a year in advance based on expected

supply and demand. Flexible loan rates could be geared tO build desired carryover. Estimates would be made of expected utilization and beginning year supplies. Loan rates would then be set at that level which would bring expected

production to a level that, when added to beginning year supplies less utilization, results in desired carryover. Market price is mainly a function of expect@

carryout, hence market price and utilization would remain quite stable. But

price supports could vary widely from year to year, and the government might

reimburse farmers the amount the support price exceeds market price. The

Treasury cost of the program would be considerable, but the real cost, measured

by output deviating from that of an ideal system would be small.

Whether stocks would be held by the government, farmers or the private grain

trade is a separate issue. But if farmers and the private trade are expected

to hold and release stocks in the public interest, incentives such as government

payments of all or some fraction of storage costs could be built into the program. Price supports discussed above can be a nonrecourse loan rate (at that

support price, fanners can place commodities under CCC loan; if market prices

fail to rise they can turn in the commodity as full payment of loan) or as a

- basis for setting direct payments.

As stated earlier, the current first priority when production (supply) exceeds demand at long-term equilibrium prices is to accumulate stocks. But

suppose stocks become excessive and farm prices appear headed for low levels.

one approach would be to invoke production controls at such levels that ex-

- pected diversions would hold reserves to desired levels. Another approach is

to have no production controls but provide farmers a direct payment equal to

the difference between the market price and a minimum support rate based

on non-land costs of production or other criteria listed above. It might be

well to compute per unit payments on the basis of normal yields on allotment

acres, with allotments some fraction (say 80% ) of updated 1973-75 acreages.

This procedure would discourage overproduction because additional farm output would receive the low market price. Payment limitations to say $20,000

or less per recipient would help keep down program costs, make the program

more palatable to taxpayers and would provide a diseconomy that would restrain

growth of large, corporate farms and help preserve family farms.

S Preliminary estimates of 1975 non-land costs of production (full costs, including onP- third share rent for land, in parentheses) in areas of com arative advantage were as fol- 10WR : corn $1.55 ($2.06) per bushel. wheat $2.30 ($3.86) per bushel, soybeans $2. S5

($3.79) Per bushel and cotton $.45 ($.60) per pound lint.
220

NATIONAL MONTETARY-FISCAL POLICY AND NATIONAL FOOD POLICY

National food policy cannot be separated from monetary and fiscal policy for

the nation because the economic vitality of farmers is seriously threatened by

inflation as apparent in Table 2. The chief failure of our economic system. is

that it is “lumpy”—it concentrates economic activity temporally (business and

inflation cycles), spatially (inequitable income geographically) and inter-personally (case poverty within neighborhood, village, etc. )

Inflation is caused in no small degree by overheating the economy with excessive expansion in money supply and deficit spending to reach an unattainable

full-employment target. Inflation not only reduces real prices and incomes for

farmers, it also reduces farm output for consumers. Inflation also demoralizes

consumers-although the farm parity ratio was considerably lower in 1975 than -

in the decade preceding 1973, consumers are deeply concerned about “high”

food prices and place some blame on farmers although the principal source of

high prices is general inflation.

Although jobs are moving to low-income rural areas, substantial pockets of

low income remain. One reason more jobs do not locate is because industry must -

pay more than the real wage to locate. That is, industry pays the minimum

wage, union wage or socially acceptable wage which is considerably greater than

the real cost of hiring workers measured by lost output when underemployed

persons leave old “jobs” for more productive new employment. Millions of

workers including many farm workers and part time farmers are in poverty

because their contribution to the value of employers’ output is less than the wage.

In short, it does not pay to hire them.

A wage supplement would increase national output and employment by allowing workers with low productivity to receive a socially acceptable total wage

while being paid the “low” wage at which they can become employed. One proposal is that workers be paid 50 percent of the difference between a target wage

of, say, $4.00 per hour and what the worker could receive from the market. For

example if a worker could obtain only $1.00 per hour from an employer, the supplement would be .50 ($4.00-$1.00) =$1.50 per hour for a total wage of

$2.50. If 2000 hours are worked per year, total income is $5000. A worker who

received $2.00 per hour from his employer would receive a supplement of $1.00

bringing total wage to $3.00 per hour. Thus workers who receive the higher

wage rate from employers earn more, encouraging workers to be employed

at the highest wage rate. Competition among employers for workers would also

keep wages from falling to very low levels. The plan unlike several other welfare reform proposals would encourage substitution of labor for leisure, would

encourage family solidarity by reducing incentive for the father to desert his

family to make them eligible for public assistance and would help raise incomes

of the working poor (over 50 percent of all poor families in rural areas) to

the level of incomes of persons on welfare. Unlike other major welfare reform

proposals which would reduce national income, the wage supplement would

increase national income and expand jobs especially in labor intensive industries.

In short, a wage supplement can help to alleviate inflation, regional poverty

and reduce “case” poverty among farmers and hired workers.

Treasury cost would depend on several elements including unemployment

\

rate but would probably range from $5-$10 billion per year. For any given

outlay, a wage supplement would generate more jobs, more real output and

would target more specifically on the disadvantaged than would a public service

employment program. u

Many existing programs to end underemployment in rural areas are costineffective and poorly funded. Studies (Nelson and Tweeten, 1957) show how

underemployment can be alleviated efficiently in depressed rural areas with major

benefits to hired farm workers and part-time farmers by generating more jobs

locally. Furthermore, the mix of public programs that accomplishes development targets most efficiently is consistent with local citizens’ goals and values

based on a survey of residents in the areas studied (Tweeten and Brinkman, 1976;

Tweeten, 1975d).

ADDITIONAL NEEDS FOR GOVERNMENT POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND INFORMATION

SYSTEMS . .

This paper has focused main on programs for economic stability. The programs also are consistent with efficiency, but many other changes could contribute

to a more efficient and effective national food policy. Several are discussed briefly

below.
221

Research Administration

Our system of publicly supported research has a long and very distinguished

record, and great caution must be used in tampering with the system. It currently

combines elements of mission-oriented research focused on specific goals, commodities, etc. (notably in the Agricultural Research Service of the U.S. Department of

Agriculture) and research permitting a great deal of Individual initiative and

responsiveness to local needs (notably in State Agricultural Experiment

stations}.

Yet in view of the declining productivity of publicly supported research,

some hard questions should be asked of the research establishment: Is undue

duplication (some replication is desirable) of research occurring among State

D Experiment Stations? Are imaginative, productive scientists being rewarded and

provided resources while unproductive research resources are culled? Are

research funds slanted toward applied research at the expense of basic research

on altering genetic structures, etc. ? Are research funds being used to support

>

teaching of inefficient, small classes? Do Experiment Station advisory committees

w represent those being served including consumers, commercial farmers, small

farmers and minorities? What are the procedures for allocating research funds,

and can they be improved?

Marketing Efficiency

Substantial marketing research resources have been devoted to uncover alleged

exploitation of farmers and consumers by the marketing sector. After several

decades of searching with little success for the bogeyman, it is time to turn more

attention elsewhere. Opportunities exist for increasing marketing efficiency by

fostering more competition among transportation carriers (e.g. eliminating backhaul and route restrictions, allowing greater flexibility in transportation rates to

meet competition and permitting easier entry of new firms) removal of differences

in subsidy rates between truck, rail and barge transportation, and making foods

which require fewer resources (“synthetic” foods, bull meat, etc. ) more palatable

and accessible to consumers.

Foreign Aid

Foreign aid programs have been closely tied to the availability of grain surpluses in the United States. More efficient and equitable means can be devised

to stimulate progress in developing countries, After evaluating foreign aid programs, Tweeten (1970, ch. 15) proposed that foreign aid be provided in cash or

credit form, requiring only that imports purchased with aid funds be confined to

items such as fertilizer plants, irrigation equipment, technical assistance and

food purchases that contribute most to development. If U.S. food supplies are

excessive, unit discounts would be offered equal to the cost per unit of paying

farmers not to produce, if that is the alternative. Aid would be committed for up

to five years in advance so that efficient development plans could be made.

Because controlling population growth is vital to meet long-run world food

needs, the U.S. should withhold aid to developing nations until appropriate

family planning is assured. Channeling aid through multilateral agencies such

w as the World Bank has great merit, but is unlikely to bring much pressure for

population control.

Occupational Safety and Environmental Programs

Numerous regulations and controls are being imposed on the food industry

*

without adequate assessment of costs in terms of foregone output, resource waste

and inconvenience. Where issues of agricultural production and environmental

protection collide, those who favor increased agriculture production frequently

are overruled by environmental impact statements which show environmental

damage from undertaking the project. Impact statements should show output

and employment foregone under various environmental protection options so that

full benefits and costs can be assessed before decisions are made. Risks of causing

people to receive inadequate food supplies must be balanced against the risk of

using pesticides, growth stimulants and loss of wildlife from drainage of wetlands, for example.

Information Systems

The information system required for a national food policy is composed of institutions, data and analytical systems. Each component is deficient in some

respects, and failures in one component can cause deficiencies in other components.

Useful recommendations to improve the agricultural information system have

6S--877-76— 15
222

been set forth by Harkness (1975) and Hjort (1975) for the 0ffice of Technology

Assessment. Improvement is overdue in the statistical capabilities of the agricultural attache system. Though helpful, this in itself has limited scope to improve the supply-demand data from the Soviet Union and Peoples Replublic of

China, which have been the principal sources of unstable world markets in

agricultural products. The Soviet Union itself seems to lack adequate data on

commodity production and utilization. In part this stems from failure of its statistical reporting system, which can be improved. But in part the inadequate data

stems from changes in production late in the crop season including failure to

harvest grain in the fields because of inclement weather.

My simulation analysis as well as analysis by Blakley (1974) suggests that

lack of data rather than inappropriate parameters was the principal source of

inability to predict farm commodity price changes in 1973 and 1974. We appear ‘

to be a long way from predicting in advance poor harvest weather in the U.S.

or the Soviet Union, failure of the anchovy harvest, changes in exchange rates

and political decisions in centrally planned countries so that we can alter our

production in the current year to keep supplies and prices reasonably stable.

Improved information systems supplement rather than substitute for alternative w

measures such as commodity stock reserves to bring stability to the food system.

Economic theory, statistical techniques and computer capacity are adequate

to obtain much more information out of available data. Data are adequate to

formulate a simulation model of world agriculture that will supply preliminary

answers to such questions as when and where should buffer stocks be acquired

for a world food reserve, how large should stocks be on the average, where should

they be stored and under what conditions should they be released? Many other opportunities to improve or add to modeling capabilities exist.

In analyzing production capacity, I was impressed with the lack of data on

supply functions for critical inputs such as land and fertilizers. Some such information can be obtained from surveys proposed by the Economic Research

Service. We can also obtain more information about the structure of U.S. agriculture by moving resources now used in the agricultural census to the Statistical

Reporting Service (SRS) as proposed by Hjort (1975) as well as others. The

agricultural census currently is processed much too slowly and is all too reluctantly made available in detail to analysts for policy research. Because SRS

data are more reliable than those of the agricultural census which is no 1onger

a census but a mailed sample survey, much can be gained by moving census resources to SRS to obtain economies of size, timeliness, reliability and increased

responsiveness to data needs.

Program evaluation is an Important element of national food policy and rural

development. It is not possible to evaluate the impact of proposed programs

without objective evaluation of past programs, For the most part, agencies rely

on their own personnel or hire consultants to evaluate their own programs. A

large number of such evaluations contain substantial bias in the expected direction, overestimating effectiveness or benefits and underestimating costs. Agencies

are understandably self-serving, and treat those (inside or outside evaluators)

who provide unfavorable evaluations as ancient Greeks treated bearers of bad

news-they remove the bearer from any further opportunity to bring unfavorable 

reports. Until a quasi-independent agency (or agencies) is established to evaluate major federal food, fiber and rural development programs without fear of

being destroyed, public policy formulation processes will be inadequately served.

GAO performs a useful role, but its coverage is limited.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The first priority in a national food system is to establish a commodity stock

reserve policy. The emergence of capricious consumer-oriented actions to hold

down prices has eliminated the option of relying on the private trade to hold

adequate reserves.

Analysis of long-term trends in supply and demand strongly suggest that we

will have future periods of excess supply that bring unacceptably low prices

to farmers as well as periods of excess demand. If the Soviet Union had experienced normal weather in 1975, market prices would now be low. If normal weather

prevails in the world in 1976, the opportunity will arise to accumulate reserves

to avoid very low farm prices and provide stocks to hedge against unfavorable

weather in subsequent years.

The loan rate can be used as in the past as the threshold price at which to

accumulate reserves. But the current loan rate is far below the value to society
223

of accumulating reserves. The opportunity to acquire buffer stocks could be

squandered in using added supplies for domestic livestock feed, exports and

as cutbacks in production by farmers in response to low prices. Continuation of

the current policy leaves world food markets highly unstable in response to

uncontrollable weather.

One proposal is that the loan rate be raised to the level of nonland production

costs. This proposal would set the stage for accumulating reserves. But it is very

important that guidelines be established for stock release as well as accumulation

so that all participants are clearly aware of the policy and are less likely to

interfere with it out of narrow political partisanship. Suggestions for appropriate

stock levels and release policies (such as a 150 percent of the loan level) are

discussed in the text. Analytical capabilities exist to simulate stock policies

and have been used with success to examine the implications of the proposal

by Senator Humphrey (Ray, Richardson and Collins, 1975) as well as others

(Tweeten, Kalbfleisch and Lu, 1971).

If stocks are to be in the hands of farmers as proposed by Senator Bellmen,

then incentives need to be provided farmers to acquire and release stocks in

the interests of all participants in a national food policy. The government might

pay farmers 25 cents per bushel of corn and 35 cents per bushel of wheat per

year of storage, with the provision that payment cease when prices reach 150

percent of the support rate.9 Carrying costs would again be available when the

market price falls below 150 percent of the support rate, thereby retaining some

reserves for subsequent years. Or the government might not charge interest

on nonrecourse loans to farmers who follow preset stock release guidelines.

The nest issue is what to do when stocks accumulate to appropriate levels.

A suggestion in the text is that farm prices be allowed to adjust to the market

clearing level and direct payments (with limitations of $20,000 per recipient)

be made equal to the shortfall of the market price below the support rate. The

payment base would be acreage allotments revised to some proportion (say 80

percent ) of 1973-75 acreage times normal yields. This latter procedure would

mean that marginal output would receive the market price, which would strongly

encourage necessary adjustments in output.

Emphasis is on buffer stocks because it is the only positive sum game for

economic stability in an unstable world. With export controls to lower prices,

farmers and foreign consumers lose. Price controls to reduce inflation discourage

output required to meet excess demand and are self-defeating. With production

controls to raise farm prices, consumers lose the output from farm land and

labor resources committed to agriculture and of 1ittle benefit to society unless

used in producing food. Although reserve policies emphasize crops, such policies

also benefit meat producers and consumers. Recent experience has demonstrated

that unstable crop prices seriously damage the livestock economy and cause

sharp gyrations in livestock prices.

Some economists point to the insolation of producers and consumers in ‘Japan,

Western Europe and elsewhere from 1972–75 price gyrations because they have

very high fixed commodity price supports. They go on to point out that Americans

unfairly bore the brunt of the price roller coaster. This is a vast oversimplifica-

● tion. Given the choice between high food prices some of the time (U. S.) and high

food prices all the time (e.g. Western Europe, Japan ), clearly U.S. consumers

would opt for the former.

A number of other ancillary proposals to a national food policy are included:

1. A wage supplement would reduce normal unemployment, easing pressures on

● government to overheat the economy in search of greater employment with excessive monetary expansion and deficit spending. The reduced inflation therefrom

would be of great value to the economic health of commercial farmers as well

as others. A wage supplement would provide a socially acceptable income while expanding employment for low income, part-time farmers and hired workers. The

target wage could be $4.00 per hour, the tax rate 50 percent. Hence workers earning $1.00 per hour would receive a subsidy of $1.50 for a total return of $2.50 per

hour. If employed 2000 hours per year, total income would be $5000.

e Supporting prices at non-h+ nil production costs wonld not likely entail large Tre~sury

cmt hf>cause the probability that market prices from 1076 to 1979 would fall below the soybean sllpnort r:lte (see footnote ~) is less than 1 in 100, below the corn support rate is 1 in 5, below the wheat support rate is 1 in 4 and below the cotton sup ort rate is 1 in 3. In fart. non-land production cost support rates, while providing n use /’U1 price cushion and enough leeway to obtain etlicient allocations from the price system, might not generate sufficient commodity reserves. Therefore, I suggested the farmers be paid 25-35 cents per bushel for storing grains to obtain adequate buffer stocks without excess costs and rigidities from high price supports.
224

2. A quasi-independent agency would be established to evaluate federal programs. Each major federal program for rural development environmental protection, occupation safety and other purposes would be systematically evaluated

for full costs, benefits and cost-effectiveness in using public funds to reach program objectives.

3. In recognition that food aid is only a short-run palliative and that increased

indigenous agricultural output and population control are the only satisfactory

long-run solutions to the world food problem, the U.S. needs to provide continuing

economic aid to countries which have or will develop programs to reduce birth

rates.

Foreign aid to less developed countries could be committed in cash or credit

form, with limitations that spending of such credits be confined to development 

purposes. If the major need is food output, the credits could be used to purchase

fertilizers, fertilizer plants, irrigation equipment, technical assistance, and other

resources to expand farming output. The commitment would be a fixed dollar

value for an extended period--say 5 years. If agricultural or other U.S. commodities are in surplus, a discount would be allowed on such purchases. *

4. Information systems can be improved along lines suggested by Hjort (1975)

and Harkness (1975). More and increasingly reliable data are needed on world

food demand and supply outlook, economic health of the farming industry, and

potential supply at alternative prices for inputs (fertilizers, land, irrigation, etc.).

Analytical capabilities need to be improved for examining the implications of alternative world food reserve systems.

5. The appropriate federal structure to administer a national food policy is not

clear. In a recent paper (Tweeten, 1975a) I cited shortcomings in the current

policy formulation system including failure of consumers to enter the dialogue

while farm policy is being formulated. Consequently, farm legislation is vetoed

as consumer interests emerge at the last minute. Consumers of course are very

legitimate participant in policy information but their spokesmen are frequently

ill-informed. While I have no specific recommendations for institutional changes

in the federal structure, I do feel strongly that consumers should be more closely

integrated into national food policy formulation. This integration might well extend into research, extension and information systems as well as into policy

formulation. In part this will be an educational process for producers as well as

consumers

REFERENCES

Blakley, Leo. December 1974 ‘tDomestic Food Costs.” ~rnertian JournuZ of A.gr4-

mbUur’alEOonOmie856 (5) : 1103-12.

Carr, A. Barry, and Luther Tvmeten. 1974. “Comparative Ettlciency of Selected

Voluntary Acreage Control Programs in the Use of Government Funds.” Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station Research Report P-396. Stillwater:

Oklahoma f3tate University.

Ericksen, Milton, and Daryll Ray. 1975. “Policy Issues and Research Results for

U.S. Agriculture.” Oklahoma Cuwefit Farm Ecortomic8 48: 17-27.

Harkness, Hosea. 1975. “Evaluation of Timeliness and Accuracy of the U.S. and -

World Information on Agriculture.” Washington, D. C.: Oflice d Technology

Assessment.

Hjo~ Howard. 1975. “World Agricultural Information System: A Critical Evaluation.” (Report submitted to the OfEce of Technology Assessment. ) Washington, D.C.: Schnittker Associates.

Just, Riehaml. 1975. “A (generalization of Some Issues in Stochastic Welfare

.

Economics.” Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station Research Report

P-712. Stillwater: Oklnhoma State University.

Lu, YwMlhi, and Phillip Cline. 1975. “The Contribution of Research and Extension to Agricultural Productivity Growth.” (Paper presented at summer meeting of American Agricultural Economics Association, Columbns, Ohio. ) Washington, D. C.: Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

N“dson, James, and Luther Tweeten. 1975. “Systems Planning of Economic Development in Eastern Qklahoma.” American JournaJ of Agricultural Econo?nic8

57 (8) : 4MMlS.

Quance, Leroy, and Luther Tweetem 1972. “Excess Capacity and Adjustment Potential in U.S. Agriculture.” A@cuZ#ural IMono?ndcu Re8earch 24 (3) : 57-86.

Ray, Daryll, Milton Erkksen and James Richardson. December 1975. “A Simulation AnaIysis of Alternative Target Price and Eoan Rate Combinations.” Southern Journal of A!MwZtural i!?conOmic8, Vol. 7, No. 2.
225

Ray, Daryll, James Richardson and Glenn Collins. July 1975. “A Simulation

Analysis of a Reserve Stock Management Policy for Feed Grains and Wheat.”

&outhern Journal of Agricultural Economic8 7 (1) : 81-87.

Schn.ittker, John. February 6, 1975. “Desirable Revisiona in the Agricultural

and Consumer Protection Act of 1973.” (Statement before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. ) Washington, D.C. : Schnittker Associates.

Tweeten, Luther. 1973. “Distributions of Benefits and Costs of Agricultural

Research and Education.” Oklahoma Current I’arm Bconomic8 46 (3) : 3-7.

Tvveeten, Luther. 1975a. “Domestic l’ood and Farm Policy Issues and Alternatives.” (Professional Paper P-239 of the Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment

Station. Presented to National Public Policy Education Conference at Clymer,

New York. ) Stillwater: Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma

State University.

Tweeten, Luther. 1975b. ‘The Economic Outlook for Southern Agriculture.” pp.

1lMO. In Agriculture in a World of Uncertainty. U.S. Senate Committee on

Agriculture and Forestry print 4S-012, 94th Congress. Washington, D.C. : U.S.

Government Printing OfEce.

Tweeten, Luther. 1970. Foundations o~ Farm PoZiW. Lincoln: University of

Nebraska Press.

Tweeten, Luther. 1975c. “Inflation and the Farming Industry.” (Professional

Paper No. 226 of the Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station. Presented

at Western Agricultural Economic Association meeting, Reno, Nevada. ) Stillwater: Department of Agricultural Econornhm, Oklahoma State University.

Tvveeten, I.uther. 1975d. “Planning Development in Rural Areas.” (Professional

Paper P–233 of the Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station. Presented at

Virginia State College, Petersburg. ) Stillwater: Department of Agricultural

Economics, Oklahoma State University.

Tweeten, Luther, and George Brinkrnan. 1976 (forthcoming). Micropo?itan

Development. Ames: Iowa State University Press.

Tvveeten, Luther, and Leroy Quance. 1971. “Positivistic Measures of Supply

Elasticities.” Americarz Jou?vwi of Agm”culturat Eccmom4c8 51 (2) : 342-52.

Tweeten, Luther, and Dean Scbreiner. 1970. “Economic Impact of Public Policy

and Twhnology on Marginal Farms and on the Non-farm Rural Population.”

Center for Agricultural and Economic Development, Ben@x and Burden8 o?

Rural Development. Chapter 3. Ames: Iowa State University pr~

Tweeten, Luther, Dale Kalbfleisch and Y. C. Lu. 1971. “Economic Analysis of Carryover Policies for the United States Wheat Industry.” Oklahoma Agricultural

Experiment Station Technical Bulletin T-132. Stillwater: Oklahoma State

University.

[The following questions were submitted by Senator Humphrey to

Dr. Tweeten and his answers thereto:]

Question 1. If an international reserve program is not agreed to within the

next year or two, what would be the maximum desirable level of U.S. reserves?

Answer 1. As indicated in my paper, reserves on the average should be approx-

* imately 600 million bushels of wheat, 45 million tons of feed grain and 150

million bushels of soybeans at the end of each crop year. It is unwise to place

a maximum limit on U.S. reserves, but measures should be taken once reserves

reach optimal levels to restrict supplies. This can be done either by production

controls that would remove sufficient production to maintain reserves at desired

● levels, or by direct payments to maintain farm income while relying on the price

mechanism to restrain production and hold down stocks. In any given year,

because of unpredictable weather and factors, stocks could go above or below

desired levels.

Question 2. Should the maximum desirable level be established by Congress, by

a presidential commission, or by some other means?

Answer 2. I feel that the desirable level of reserves and the mechanism for

obtaining those levels should be established by Congress

Question 3.. Am I correct in believing You favor discontinuing price support loans

when maximum desirable stocks have been accumulated ?

Answer 3. In one of the proposals I presented in my paper (the one discussed in

my presentation to the Board) I suggested discontinuing commodity loans when

desired stock levels are accumulated. The support price would continue, however.

A direct payment would be made to farmers equal to the difference between the

support price and the market price on allotments which would be 30 percent of the
226

1973-75 base acreage. Thus, the government would not continue to accumulate

stocks.

Question 4. Could government costs be lowered by accumulating even larger

stocks, if required, to support market prices?

Answer 4. Once government commodities stocks have accumulated to the levels

indicated above, the real cost of holding additional stocks becomes large. This is

because excessive stocks have little value and are likely to be held several years.

In approximately 4 years the cost of holding stocks is greater than the original

price of the commodities. The chances of releasing the stocks for profit are exceedingly small. Thus it is cheaper to pay farmers not to produce (or to use direct

payments and depend on the price mechanism to restrain production) if stocks

become excessive.

Question 5. Have you estimated the relative cost of stabilizing farm income by

deficiency payments rather than by cropland set asides?

Question 6. If so, how would they compare?

Answer 5 and 6. It is more costly to the Treasury to stabilize farm income by

deficiency payments than by cropland set aside. But this is only one aspect of the *

issue. Social costs can be defined as the reduction in total volume of goods and

services produced in the nation with one program versus another. A direct payment program by this measure is less costly than an acreage diversion program

which removes resources from production ! Furthermore, direct payments are

more flexible and can be made more equitable among farm income groups.

Because acreage diversion programs have been run very inefficiently in the past,

the Treasury cost of direct payments would perhaps be only 50 percent larger than

the cost of a cropland set wide program to achieve the same net farm income.

Costs to consumers would be lower with direct payments, however.

Question 7. What is the estimated cost per bushel, not including land charges, of

producing wheat? Corn? Soybeans?

Answer 7. Preliminary estimates of 1975 non-land costs of production in areas

of comparative advantage are as follows: corn $1.55 per bushel, wheat $2.30 per

bushel, soybeans $2.85 per bushel and cotton 45 cents per pound lint. These nonland production costs apply to Iowa-Illinois for corn, western Kansas and northern Oklahoma for wheat, Illinois for soybeans and the Texas high plains and

Mississippi Delta for cotton. Support rates tied to non-land production costs

would be adjusted for transportation and other factors so that rates would be

higher in other areas of the country than those indicated above. These support

rates are not high, and would not entail large government costs for deficiency

payments. They can be faulted for not being high enough to generate sufficient

commodity stock reserves. Accordingly I suggest that, to obtain needed stocks,

farmers be provided a payment of 25 to 35 cents per bushel to encourage them to

build stocks to desired levels. As a condition for receiving this payment, farmers

would agree not to release stocks at less than 150 percent of the support rate.

Thus working stocks would have to be provided b the private trade.

Question 8. You do not expect much benefit to United States from the recent

Russian grain agreement and you do not propose changes in existing statutory

export control authority. In view of the disturbing effects of recent voluntary restraints imposed by U.S. without consultations, how should an unusually large

export demand by the Soviets, such as occurred this fall, be handled?

Answer 8. AS indicated in my paper, I feel that it would be unwise to expect

too much from the recent Russian grain agreement. It is not a substitute for commodity stocks and other measures to stabilize markets. I feel that exports should ‘

be monitored, with reporting required only for impending sales of significant size.

The purpose is to keep the Soviets or any other nation from exploiting our fragmented export structure by buying from several firms at one time, with no one of

these firms realizing the magnitude of the overall sales and hence, misjudging

price. If commodity stocks were adequate in the U. S., a large export demand such

as occurred in 1975 could be handled without export controls.

Question 9. Have You estimated the cost of a wage supplement Program? HOW

many workers might be affected?

Answer 9. The costs of the wage supplement program would depend on a

number of factors including the degree of unemployment in the economy, the

target wage, and the proportion of the difference between the target wage and

the market wage made up by subsidy. Costs would range from $5 billion to $10

billion per year. Several million workers would be covered and the exact

‘numbers have not been worked out. However, I strongly emphasize that the

cost which I indicated is that to the Federal Government. Again, measured by
227

the real economic costs defined as the reduction of goods and services produced

below that of a perfect market, the wage supplement would be very low cost

because it would increase output of goods and services in the country.

Question 10. How would your suggested quasi-independent agency for evaluating Federal programs differ from the General Accounting Office?

Answer 10. A problem with the General Accounting Office is the limited coverage provided. In a very extensive review of rural development programs, for

example, I found virtually no programs evaluated by GAO. Furthermore, GAO

provides comparatively few benefit-cost analysis—their evaluations are more of a

general nature. The quasi-independent agency I proposed would have much

broader coverage and economic analysis in depth.

. Question 11. Why not reorganize the GAO and have it make cost-effective evaluations of Federal programs?

Answer 11. I have no quarrel with reorganizing the GAO and providing more

funds to more completely evaluate federal programs. Some might raise the issue

. that, just as executive evaluation agencies tend to bias results in favor of programs supported by the President, GAO might be faulted for bias in favor of

programs supported by the Congress.

Question 12. How can United States stimulate increased family planning programs in the developing countries without incurring their ill will?

Answer 12. The United States would incur some ill-will in promoting family

planning programs in developing countries. The amount of ill-will generated I

believe would be a small price to pay for the long-run contribution to the wellbeing of the people that would ensue.

Question 13. What is an “optimal reserve management?”

Answer 13. Optimal reserve management is one which minimizes the social

cost, where social cost again is defined as the deviation of output of goods and

services from that of a perfect market. It has great value as a measure of the

worth of a policy because it does not consider the interest of consumers apart

from farmers or taxpayers. It is the best single measure that economists have

of the contribution of a policy to overall national well-being.

Question 14. How is the “equilibrium price” computed?

Answer 14. The “equilibrium price” in a stock change formula can be computed

from existing analytical tools. In practice, however, we can come close to estimating an equilibrium price simply as the full cost of production, including 1/3

land rent, for any particular commodity. Such estimates can be supplemented

with other more sophisticated devices such as predictions from econometric

models. The equilibrium price need not be estimated exactly; it is only necessary

that the equilibrium price fall within the bounds of stock accumulation and

release prices. If loan prices chronically exceed equilibrium prices, problems

emerge of excess production, burdensome commodity stocks and/or high Treasury

costs.

Question 15. Do you think there should be mandatory public reporting of all

export transactions?

Answer 15. I do not advocate mandatory public reporting of all export transac-

- tions. Only exports for major commodities and of significant magnitudes need to

be reported. This should in no way be conceived of or operated as an export

control device. Rather it is a means of keeping informed in case very large export

transactions are involved. The fundamental problem with our export system is

that large purchases such as the grain sales to the Soviets in 1972 can move us

far up the demand curve to a substantially higher price. But without information

on the degree of sales, the sales price is at a much lower level. Failure to communicate the magnitude of sales allows a monopolistic importer of American

farm products to exploit our fragmented export system.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Congressman, do you want to ask some questions first?

Mr. 13 BROWN. Senator, I have some questions but I certainly would

like to yield to you.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I want to yield to you.

Mr. BROWN. I am a little reluctant to take the time to ask questions

in view of the far greater familiarity’ with this area that Senator

Humphrey has and the great contribution he is making in all its various areas, including the Technology Assessment Board.
However, I have become convinced that there is going to be a need

to stabilize basic commodity prices, particularly grains, which enter

into the export market in far greater degree than any other commodity;

and that only where we do have a degree of stability can we undertake

a reserve program which is equally important.

I note in the testimony of all of you gentlemen comments with regard

to this or comments that relate to it.

For example, Mr. Jaenke has pointed out what he described as the

18th century laissez-faire philosophy which motivates the present

administration of the Secretary of Agriculture, and of course that -

philosophy is not favorable to a program of price stability.

On the other hand, the other two papers contain specific recommendations for stabilization of grain prices. Dr. Cochrane's paper suggesting that a price level could be held within a plus or minus 10 per- -

cent figure; and I gather Dr. Tweeten feels a greater range of price

stability, price levels, would be necessary.

The point being, however, that we need to have both a bottom and a

top. We need to recognize that the one protects the farmer; the other

protects the consumer. And hence they are both essential.

May I ask, and this is preliminary to the question, those of you who

have commented on this problem of stability of price, do you think

that agreement could be reached on a spread, whether it is plus o-r minus

10 percent or some other figure that would do the job, both of protecting

the consumer and protecting the farmer and his income, given an

administration which was not devoted to l8th century laissez-faire economic philosophy ? Is that a possibility ?

Dr. COCHRANE. Let me make two or three comments. Here I will be

quite political because I think the answer is political.

No, I do not think that this administration will push the kinds of

ideas that are necessary to bring it into being, both internationally or

at home. I think, in a 1 fairness, we should recognize that our grain

farmers typically do not like the idea of a legitimate reserve stock program withboth price ceilings and floors. They are quite opposed to any

kind of program that would put any kind of ceiling on prices.

Mr. BROWN. They are not reluctant----

Dr. COCHRANE. They want a floor. The want a “Heads I win, tails

you lose" proposition, which they have become used to over a long

period of time.

TO bring the program into being would take—would take two or

three things, It will take leadership internationally, and it will take

leadership here at home.

I agree with Dr. Tweeten, I am not quite sure of the mechanics, but “

some kind of sweetener is going to have to be offered to farmers to get

them to come along, because I think what farmers really believe, and I

believe it, too, in light of what I said, that there are going to be more

high price years than there are going to be down years in the next 10

years.

If you believe that, then you will be reluctant to put a price ceiling

over yourself. Whereas, consumers, I think, realize that things are not

so happy for them, and hence the pressures typically come from the

consumption side.

So I think a great deal of leadership, both internationally and

domestic, is going to be required to bring into being an effective grain
229

reserve stock program. I think some sweeteners are going to have to be

offered to farmers to keep them from bucking in very hard. I am talking specifically of the grain farmers.

Livestock farmers might be a bit more happy to go along with it.

But this is not a downhill pull, or it would ‘be occurring now.

It is going to take some real leadership to bring such a thing about,

and there is going to have to be something in it for farmers to keep

them from dragging their feet badly. I do not talk to any grain farmers who even want to talk about a grain reserve program.

. Mr. BROWN. Mr. Soth wanted to make a comment.

Mr. SOTH. That is absolutely correct as far as grain producers are

concerned and soybean producers. I hear the same thing that Dr.

Cochrane mentioned.

However, I think that livestock producers, the poultry industry, and

the cattle people particularly, have a somewhat different attitude.

That attitude of livestock men is not being reflected in the policies of

the leading farm organizations. But they understand, I think, better

than the grain farmer this instability problem.

There are lots of cattlefeelders that were wiped out a couple of years

ago, and the poultry industry has been hurt by these gyrations in

prices. I think they would support and welcome an effort of this kind.

I would like to emphasize one more time that an effort at national

planning, where the Government and leading farm organizations and

others sat down together and tried to set forth some goals on production, what we need for reserves and so on, would be a fine educational

process, that we would all have a better basis for looking to the future

and for establishing these reserves than going the way we have been

going.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you.

Mr. JAENKE. I disagree with at least one of the statements, particularly that Dr. Cochrane just made, that farmers do not care about this

whole question, and they only want something at the bottom and do

not want anything at the top.

I work closely with a number of farm groups and from that experience I do not agree that farmers are insensitive to adverse effects on

other groups.

* Mr. BROWN. I believe they were trying to separate elements within

the farm community.

Mr. JAENKE. Let's put this in proper context. Farmers do not have

a floor under their prices. When you talk about $1.37 for a bushel of

wheat as a loan price, well, that does not even cover starting out and

getting the land ready. Farmers have had no experience with any

reserve program, only with surpluses. There has been no leadership

talking about this. There has been no effort to develop the rationale

and logic to show that there are benefits to agriculture, not only livestock people, but there are benefits to grain people, too, of a wellplanned reserve.

They have nob had this full impression of what can happen and

what the benefits of this can be. So what they have is a meaningless,

totally meaningless, support program or floor program. With these

conditions they worry about what level the top cutoff is going to be.

And in those sort of circumstances, I am with those grain farmers in
230

not wanting a reserve. But that is not what we are talking about, I

hope, in this hearing. The consensus of the discussion at the hearing

has been that we are talking about something that combines a meaningful floor with some type of meaningful reserve to protect against

skyrocketing polices.

Right now, we have got grain price ceilings, but they are made b

a luncheon meeting of third level State Department officials with

some foreign government.

Mr. BROWN. Do you think it is possible to achieve some reasonable 

agreement as to the levels of floor and ceiling prices that would be

realistic ?

I was a little bothered at this content of plus or minus 10 percent.

Dr. COCHRANE . Let me speak to that.

What I was talking about was a price stabilization range of plus or -

minus 10 percent, say, for 1976 of the most recent 3- ear average, and

that is a pretty high range. I am not suggesting to armers that they f

go back to a pre-1972 price level for the grains. I have argued, wherever I speak, that the level of price support should be raised—in fact,

what I was suggesting is the following:

That we try to stabilize prices around a moving 3-year average

of prices and it would begin with the last 3 years. The international

program would acquire stocks at the bottom of the range-that is at 10

percent below the 3-year average-to put a floor under the range, and

sell stocks at the top of the range—that is, at 10 percent above the

3-year average-to put a ceiling on the top of the stabilization range.

I have also argued elsewhere that the loan rates for all farmers

in the United States, in such a program, could appropriately be raised

to the bottom of this stabilization range. Maybe if farmers understood

it-maybe if they understood it--they would be more favorable to the

stabilization idea. I am not talking about peanuts f-or them.

Mr. JAENKE. The answer, in my judgment, is yes. I think that this

can be worked out.

Mr. BROWN. There are going to be two kinds of objections to stabilized prices. By stabilized, I mean those that provide a set price range.

First, the objection that that is not the business of a free market

system or a Government that is committed to free market policy.

Second, that whatever prices you set, there will be arguments from -

others who may agree in theory that there ought to be price stability,

but that the prices chosen are wrong, that you have not properly protected the farmer or the consumer.

The consumers will object if the ceiling is too high. The farmer

will object if the floor is too low.

SO I am disregarding the first objection, based on the 18th century

as a fair economics, but I am trying to pinpoint the degree to which

we might be able to reach agreement on the spread between the base

and the ceiling.

Dr. TWEETEN . I wanted to say a little bit on the issue of floor

prices.

One of the problems, when you try to retain the very narrow range

of prices, is that it entails in many cases very substantial resources to

keep prices within that range.

Mr. BROWN. If I may interject. it has been my experience analyzing

productivity figures in many areas that there is a normal difference
231

.

a

in productivity, that is the ability to produce at certain unit costs, and

it is at least 20 percent, and maybe more in many areas.

Dr. TWEETEN. Even more than that.

Take, for example, soybeans. The nonland production cost in Illinois is about $2.85 a bushel. The land cost is nearly 50 percent of nonland cost of production.

If you allow price to rise 50 percent above loan rate, set at the nonland cost of production, and allow it to rise no further, you cut off

chances for a profit. Furthermore, if you raise the loan rate substantialy above what I suggested, then you face a problem of restraining

production, because price supports will encourage overproduction.

I was trying to pick a reasonable compromise on support prices

in light of the fact that I think there are many who feel supports

should be sharply higher while others feel there ought to be considerable market orientation in farm programs.

Mr. BROWN. I think initially any stabilization program is going to

have to be fairly broad in order to give some sort of allegiance to the

effect of the market or some sort of recognition to the effect of the

market. It may be possible to narrow it later as we get further experience with it.

Dr. COCHRANE. Well. I agree and disagree with most things that

have been said recently, but let me comment.

If you had an average price of wheat, of say $4, a range of plus or

minus 10 percent is $3.60 to $4.40, this is an 80-cent range. That is

enough to give people signals about what resource adjustments are

needed.

If the stabilization range gets much bigger, or, if the range is as

big as prices fluctuating anyway, then you are only giving lip service

to stabilization.

I might agree to say plus or minus 15 percent; or you might say

minus 5 plus 10. There are all sorts of price range combinations.

But the point I want to make is that a range of $3.60 to $4.40, is 80

cents, is not a small range.

Mr. BROWN. HOW does that compare with the actual range ?

Dr. COCHRANE. When Mr. Jaenke and I used to be in the Department, that would have been a hell of a big range.

s Mr. JAENKE. Based on recent years, it would look much more too

narrow. I would prefer to see a wider fluctuation within this thing.

The range for wheat has been from $2.90, $3 to nearly $6 a bushel

over the last 24 months.

Dr. COCHRANE. Is that good?

Dr. TWEETEN. Nonland cost of wheat production in western Kansas

and northern Oklahoma is about $2.30 a bushel. And, furthermore,

the total cost with one-third share is $3.06 a bushel. Excess supplies

of wheat will build without production control with the price supports

that Dr. Cochrane is talking about.

Mr. SOTH. What we are talking about, all of us. I think. is stability

around a long-term trend. We are not trying to tinker with the longterm trends in cost and demand and supply.

Mr. BROWN. All of you seem to agree that the long-term trend is

upward.

Mr. SOTH. That is where we are going to argueDr. TWEETEN. Great fluctuations.
232

Dr. COCHRANE. I am going to ask a question of my colleague here.

Mr. BROWN. I encourage you to do so if it will contribute to the

record.

Dr. COCHRANE. I know how much market prices have fluctuated in

the last 2 years.

Were you saying we want a “stability” where prices fluctuate that

much in the future, or do you want to narrow that range down?

I am not sure what you were saying.

Mr. JAENKE. I want to narrow the range but not as much as you .

do.

Dr. COCHRANE . OK.

First, I would like to say, Congressman, that I do not argue that

plus or minus 10 percent is the correct stabilization range. It might .

be plus or minus 20 percent, or there can be other kinds of stocking

rules.

I would like to argue with my colleague, Dr. Tweeten, though, that

I do not think land costs are relevant to this discussion. Land costs

in this context are totally meaningless.

Land costs go anywhere that the price level goes.

What is really important, and I think it is implied in my statement,

is that the nonland costs are important.

Land costs simply rise and fall with price levels. That does not

mean it is easy for farmers. In fact, if we should get a big decline in

prices now, and prices should fall to where they were, one of the

anguishes that farmers would go through would be deflating their

assets to a new price level.

But what happens to land costs does not impress me at all—what

happens to land costs is simply what happens to price levels 2 or 3

years later.

Mr. BROWN. I would think it would be material only if there is

quite a bit of entry into or exiting from—

Dr. COCHRANE People very quickly capitalize increased returns.

You do not have to be ‘buying the land to capitalize the value of the

land sales values into your asset value.

Mr. BROWN. Dr. Tweeten.

Dr. TWEETEN. The only thing worse than viewing what happened

in the 1960's as the guide to the future is to view 1973 and 1974 as. -

the guide to the future. Our analysis indicates that what happened in

1973 will happen only once in roughly 35 years. I submit that if we

had a more intelligent commodity stock program and an acreage diversion program more responsive to emerging events, we could have .

avoided many of the undesirable consequences of the 1972-74 period.

I do not think we would want to pay the price for a security policy

that would avoid any price rise in response to a very rare circumstance such as occurred in 1972-74.

Mr. SOTH. They developed again in 1975.

Mr. BROWN. Let me offer a simple hypothesis, and then please comment after that.

Recognizing the nature of the political process, which makes change

by incremental stages only, would it be reasonable, if we were to propose the introduction of a stabilized agricultural price program, coupled with a reserve program, to look at the fluctuations over a recent

period of history—take whatever you wish, 3 years, 5 years-and

develop price levels, upper and lower, which were less than those
233

swings but which perhaps were not drastically less and that we then

seek to obtain from experience after 1 year or 2 or 3 years of this to

optimize that spread in order to achieve the policy goals of full production and adequate reserves that we are seeking to obtain?

This I am suggesting from a political standpoint as probably being

the way that it would occur anyway. Is there anything wrong with

that ? I would like to hear your comment, Dr. Cochrane.

Dr. COCHRANE. Would you restate the position. I am not sure I

understand exactly.

Mr. BROWN. I am suggesting that we look at the price swings in the

commodities such as wheat or soybeans. They vary in the amount of

the swings, of course. And that we seek at an initial stage in stabilizing prices to confine the upper and lower levels within a range

smaller than those actual fluctuations over some reasonable period of

time on the basis of experience, determine the optimum range that we

want to have as our price stability program.

Dr. COCHRANE . Yes, that might be the way to go about it. I

agree, you begin not by narrowing down the range ‘of fluctuation too

much. You begin gingerly, and as you gain experience with the

program, you could tighten it down. I think that is one way to begin.

I was not trying to sell this 10-percent range. I was only using it to

illustrate. But I think there is an important point to what I was saying: It is that you could do an effective job of holding world prices

in such a range with an average reserve stock of about 60 to 70

million tons, which is considerably less than the U.S. Government

held in 1960. I am using the 10-percent range to illustrate the magnitude o-f the job.

The way to begin might well be to begin with a much wider stabilization goal or objective and then when you have gained experience to

possibly tighten it down. And maybe you would never want to tighten

it down. I do not know.

Mr. BROWN. Let me interject one additional point from my own

information and for the record. Can any of you contribute any information as to what the range of prices has been maintained at in

other countries separating market and nonmarket countries, if you

have that information ? This would provide some sort of basis for

analysis and precedent if we had that kind of information.

Mr. JAENKE. We could certainly provide it, yes. In a nutshell

though, for those importing countries in the commercial market

sector the prices ranged right along with what our prices ranged

m because they were coming into world markets.

Mr. BROWN. Many of those maintained domestic controls.

Mr. ,JAENKE. Almost every country has a much more governmentstructured program for maintaining grain prices, and generally

around the world those grain prices—I am speaking just of grain—

are somewhere between 25 and 75 percent higher than U.S. prices

have been over the last decade.

Mr. BROWN. obviously any program has to start with probably

wheat, and corn and maybe then more control to others——_—

Mr. JAENKE. And rice.

Mr. BROWN_. Yes. I am again looking at it politically. We start with

the highest priority and move down the line.

Dr. Tweeten.
234

Dr. TWEETEN. Some have pointed with approval to the Japanese

and Western European system. They have high fixed support rates.

They largely avoided the gyrations of prices that occurred in 1973

and 1974 in this country. Some people look at this with approbation

because they did not experience instability,

I submit that if American consumers are confronted with the

possibility of high prices once in a while, versus high prices all the

time, as you find in Western Europe and Japan, the will take the

former. On the other hand, we can develop policies that more effectively reduce instability.

Considerable analytic capability using simulation models exists “

to operate on a small scale the farm economy over a period of years

to learn how various policies would work.

One of the complaints among farmers and others is that policies -

keep changing. Farmers like to know the rules of the game, I think

they would even put up with export controls if they knew the rules

of the game. In other words, farmers want a policy established in

advance. They do not want a trial and error system.

Mr. BROWN . I would concur wholeheartedly with that. and yet the

problem basically is that we have in this great democracy of ours

national administrations with widely divergent philosophies, and

this reflects the fact that the people of this country, not being economically sophisticated in general, have widely divergent ideas as

to what is the best kind of program. They tend to see the situation

from their own rather narrow point of view and not with regard to

long-term economic reality.

Mr. Jaenke, we have not dwelt too much with your own proposals

having to do with organizational change, and they pose some rather

interesting possibilities. I would like to invite any of the other

panelists if they would care to comment with regard to the suggestions made by Mr. Jaenke with regard to the restructuring of the

organizational aspects of this matter, and you here have an opportunity to get back at him for what he may have said.

Dr. COCHRANE. I found his comments very interesting. My reactions run as follows: I find his first proposal and his third proposal

the most easy to live with. I cannot visualize this policy organization, the second proposal that had no implementing power, very -

easy to live with. I do not quite see how it would work.

M-y reaction would be first to to his first proposal, namely. that there

bean assistant to the President that has the responsibility of trying to

coordinate these various agencies and have a food council that reported ~

to him. That in my judgment is the place to begin, and it ought to

begin soon.

The Congress then might well want to review his third proposal and

give it some serious thought.

Some of these things can be pulled together very easily but some

cannot. Take transportation—the transport system has got to serve all

kinds of users, and you cannot ever pull all of the transport implications over into this food agency.

So, I would like to see the Government begin with the first proposal

made by Mr. Jaenke. I would like to see the Congress seriously consider

the third alternative. It is rather difficult for me as a sometime bureaucrat, to see how alternative two could be made to work.
235

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Soth.

Mr. SOTH. I have been watching changes in Government organization for quite a, few years, and I take a pretty cynical view about just

shifting agencies around. I am not very sanguine about any organization of this kind, any of the three, that is very useful. I would rather

concentrate on the kind of policy you want to achieve and to set up a

planning organization in the Department of Agriculture. And, as Dr.

Cochrane and I said in our paper, just on the matter of intelligence

information, let us make minor adjustment within the present system

to try to make it work better rather than reshuffling of agencies.

.

Mr. BROWN. Did you have a comment, Dr. Tweeten ?

Dr. TWEETEN . I feel strongly that farmers and consumers need to

improve communication. Farmers have been upset in the last few years

. by actions which they do not favor, and which they feel have been imposed upon them by consumer interests. They feel that agriculture

policy has gotten out of their hands. I think from the consumers point

of view there is also a good deal of distrust.

Greater communication between farmers and consumers is needed in

policy formulation, so that when farm legislation reaches the final

stage consumer interests do not suddenly emerge and say: "We do not

want this.” This opportunity for communication and dialog ought

to be possible within the agencies that formulate food policy. It would

help educate both the farmer and the consumer, neither of which appreciates the other's point of view.

Mr. BROWN. Do you want to respond, Mr. Jaenke ?

Mr. JAENKE . I think it is naive to think that—light of the emerging

importance of food as an important economic factor domestically, as

an important economic factor worldwide, and as a tool in our international structure and in the complex of international affairs-h think

that the Department of Agriculture by and of itself is going to be able

to make isolated decisions. I think what we showed here, the Executive

Office Organization for Food Issues chart, and the 26 Government

agencies that in some way or the other have gotten into this food problem, is not because people wanted it to be that way. It just happened

that way. It developed because of its importance. AID has got a role in

food. State has a role. Treasury has a role. Federal Reserve, et cetera.

Right now we have compartmentalized, divided decisionmaking,

7 scattered around all over. In order to tackle this our Government set

up some White House structures. These expanded and expanded until

we have committees on top of groups on top of boards, I think all

three, four, five, or six of us here to today are saying roughly the same

thing, that we have got to get on top of this total food picture.

I do not think you can do so short of some single coordinating decisionmaking body with all the information and all the facts. Whether

any one of these three alternatives have great preferences or not is

really less important than the point that we have got to get all facets

pulled together. And to say that the Department of Agriculture can do

it or the Department of State can do it or farmers can do it or consumers, is ridiculous. The decisionmaking process must be pulled together to bring about some long-range planning and some coordinated

efforts in this area.

Mr. BROWN. Do you want to pick upon that, Senator?

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes.
236

Mr. BROWN. He said long-range planning.

Chairman HUMPHREY. We need long-range planning in many

things. I have introduced legislation to set u a White House coordinator to pull together the many facets of food policy. We have a

school lunch program, the WIC program and the supplemental feeding program, among others. Then we are faced with the policy arguements that take place between Departments of Treasury State, and

Agriculture. The most recent example is the so-called voluntary embargo on ‘the sale of grains to not on y the Soviet Union but elsewhere.

I think some structural reorganization is in line.

By the way, yesterday at our OTA meeting, we approved a series

*

of proposals for further study, such as on the technology of food

processing. Another approved assessment is on alternate national

food policies and a third one is on the normative function of food -

grading.

Mr. Jaenke, is the legislative authority for dealing with threatened

food shortages or occasional surpluses adequate for supplementing

our free market system ?

Mr. JAENKE. No, sir. The current legislation, Senator, the Agriculture Act of 1973, has ‘had one major—major weakness-and that

is opportunity for adjustment in the loan and target prices was not

able to take effect by law until 1976 and based only on the 1975 cost

conditions. Since mid-1973, there has been somewhere around a third—

a 33 percent-increase in the cost of inputs. But in 1976 because of

the wording of the law, this will reflect itself- for the first time as

probably an 8, 9, 10, or 11 percent increase at the maximum. So,

from that standpoint, it is not adequate.

Second-and ‘Congressman Brown brought this out very well in a

question he asked of us-is there a way in which we could use the

basic concept and add Willard Cochrane's idea of a 3-year average?

Basically yes, but I think maybe we have a little difference as to how

wide should be the range in market play. I personally favor more

than the 10 percent that was suggested in one of the papers.

But the ‘basic concept of a loan level with a target price, coupled

with some reserve legislation, coupled with some overall policy coordination in the information sense and in the international sense,

then I think we can move ahead into the next decade with some -

confidence and some ease.

Chairman HUMPHREY . I have introduced a bill similar to that. I

want you to actively support it, Mr. Jaenke.

Mr. JAENKE. What is that number, sir? [Laughter]

Chairman HUMPHRE Y . Our problem with this sort of thinking is in -

the Committee on Agriculture. I happen to think that if you just

let it run wild, the producer ultimately gets a poorer deal than he

would have if there was some market stability.

From the consumer point of view, once those prices go up, they

just do not come down. Just this morning I said to Mrs. Humphrey,

“HOW much did you pay for that bacon?" because she only gave me

two strips of bacon and I like three. You know, I was just kind of

edgy in the morning, and I said, “HOW come I did not get three strips

of bacon?"

And she said, "Do you know what the price of bacon is?"

I said, "No, I do not. I know the price of hogs has gone down."
237

●

*

And she said, “Well, you go tell that to all your Senator friends

up there, will you." I was getting motherly and wifely advice in the

morning. That is the way that day started.

And I said, “Why, I was just out home. I saw that hog prices had

gone down about 40 percent since August.))

She said, “You go over to the supermarket and see what bacon

prices have done." She said, “This bacon cost $1.99 a pound. This

is the cheap bacon." And she said, “The other bacon is $2.26, $2.19."

I said, "That is what you told me 2 months ago."

She said, “That is right. It has gone up since then."

I said, “In the meantime, the price of hogs has gone down."

Is that right, the price of hogs has gone down, Lauren?

Mr. SOTH. That is right.

Chairman HUMPHREY. My wife did not understand that, and she

told me to take it up with you fellows. But is it not a fact that once

those prices go up, they stay there a long time in the supermarket?

In the meantime, the producer is caught in the ups and downs of the

childlike fever of price fluctuation.

How do you think you can sell that to the farmer?

Dr. TWEETEN. In all fairness to the marketing sector, we must recognize that they did absorb some of the price increases at the farm

level back in 1973 and 1974.

If you will look at the margin Senator, over a period of years, you

will find that this proportion of the consumer food dollar going to

the marketing sector tends to be smaller when farm prices are high

and larger when prices are low. It tends to average about 60 percent.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Meat prices have a difficult time finding their

way into the supermarket structure. I am a merchant at heart, and

I know a little something about inventory. There was not a great

deal of pork product in storage. They just did not have it.

I can understand when you buy high, have your warehouses full,

you have got to liquidate. But when your warehouses or your refrigeration are at a minimum in terms of supply, this ought to be reflected

more rapidly in the finished product.

Anyway, it is hard to explain to your wife.

Mr. JAENKE. We cannot help on that latter one, sir. [Laughter].

Chairman HUMPHREY. It is also hard to explain to the consumer.

. And I think that farm people have to understand the importance of

the consumer here.

Now dairy prices are way up. A pound of butter is over $1. One

of the reasons for this is that dairy production is way down and

consumption did not drop the way USDA said it would.

If you have an economic policy relating to dairy where you do

not worry about the price of feed, where farmers were selling off

their cows because they did not want to feed them and where pasture

was not too good in many places, you are going to have problems

at the consumer level and also at the producer level.

Mr. SOTH. I think that, as you said, when prices shoot up very

rapidlyt farm prices, that that does tend to get ironed into that retail

food cost and it does not come down as much. And, Luther, in that

period you are talking about, you did not mention that there were

price controls on those margins for a while in that period, and they

did not grow as fast then.

68–877—76—16
238

But there is a very sticky quality to most of those margins. They

stay up once they getup there.

Chairman HUMPHREY . We have had two or three proposals on

reserves. As I understand it, Dr. Tweeten, you feel. that a reserve

could beheld by the farmer.

Dr. TWEETEN. Yes; I say that because it is one way of getting a

reserve policy acceptable to farmers who now oppose establishment

of a reserve policy.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I understand the farmers’ concern about a

reserve policy.

I have made a proposal using about the same figures that you out- “

lined--45 million tons of feed grain, about 500 million bushels of

wheat, 150 million bushels of soybeans, and 150 percent release price

of the target price.

I was interested in your proposal of a fee for the farmer storage. My “

reposal would have one-third of that held by the Commodity Credit

Corporation, and two-thirds of it held on the farm. My proposal suggests 2-year nonrecourse loans, for example so that Commodity Credit

Corporation could not demand that the stocks be brought on into the

market, and the farmer could market when he feels conditions are best.

I would like your comments on any of this.

Dr. COHCRANE. I would like to comment on that last point. Those

numbers that you and Dr. Tweeten have been talking about, intuitively

sound pretty good, and I have used numbers like that myself. In fact,

I used to talk about such numbers in the Department of Agriculture

between 1960 and 1965. But you have got to recognize that in using

those figures, we are the leading exporter of grams. We are linked

absolutely, completely, and irrevocably now to the world market,

Therefore, you have now got to talk about the #reck that will be required to stabilize the world market, and those numbers I think will

not do that. U.S. reserve stock, those numbers have got to be viewed

as a part of an international reserve stock program. I think that is very

important.

I also agree-and I see no reason why—that a art of the stock

could not be held by farmers. I know as well as any ody in the room b

how much farmers like to hold stocks and get the storage payments.

That is fine. But you have also got to recognize that the release and

acquisition rules must be integrated into the international reserve stock -

program. So, we can talk about a reserve stock program and a food and

agriculture policy for the United States, but we have got to continually

visualize this stabilization program and food and agriculture policy

of the United States as being consistent with international programs .

because the price instability problem arises largely outside the United

States, and the long-term trend problem, however you visualize it,

arises largely outside the United States.

So, these numbers you are talking about could well be the U.S. share

of an international grain reserve, but you should think of them as the

U.S. share of the international reserve rather than just numbers by

themselves. And you have got to visualize the operating rules for acquisition and disposition as being integrated into the decision rules of

the intentional reserve stock program.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Dr. Tweeten.

Dr. TWEETEN. Prior to 1973, and I do not have data more recent

than that, the biggest shortfall of grain production before the 10-year
239

trend was in 1965 when it was 44 million tons for the whole world. A

reserve of 60 million tons-and that is roughly what we are talking

about for grains-would handle about all but perhaps one out of a

hundred possibilities. I do not think we would want to hold more than

that on the average.

Furthermore, I am pessimistic about soon signing an international

food reserve policy, and I think from a humanitarian standpoint as

well as for our own self-interest--because this 60 million tons works

out from an economic point of view to be ideal for us. The United

* States should establish a food reserve system.

Mr. SOTH. The Canadians, I believe, are interested in talking with

us about a joint United States-Canada reserve program. I recently

talked to a couple of Canadians, and I get the impression that the

* Canadian Wheat Board would be agreeable to at least an international

reserve program to that extent, of Canada and the United States, the

two biggest exporters.

Chairman HUMPRHEY. That would be a great help, and it is the sort

of thing that we need to explore. We will undoubtedly be working

with some of the gentlemen here, will we not, Mr. Cordaro?

Mr. CORDARO. We certainly will.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Ed, you were going to say something. Did

you have a comment?

Mr. JAENKE. I think it has been said.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I have some questions that we will submit

to you for further comment.

Let me just say that I think what we have discussed here is of

immense importance. We are going to try to share this information

as widely as we can with our colleagues. I am going to take the liberty, Congressman, of putting these statements in t e Congressional f

Record.

I think this is of such basic importance that we must attract more

attention to it.

We really need one of these weekends, Dr. Cochrane, that you and

I talked about earlier this summer.

Dr. COCHRANE. Yes, what happened to that lost weekend?

Chairman HUMPRHEY. I do not know. That lost weekend got lost,

I guess. It seemed to me that it would have been of great value to have b an Airlie House-type conference where we could get enough people

together to look at the dimensions of the problem before us, and discuss what tools we have to deal with the food problem and what initiatives need to be taken. The food element in our economy is of *

tremendous consequence, as is the international situation.

HOW many of these countries that we do business with really have

a free market operation?

Dr. COCHRANE . Almost none.

hr. JAENKE. Practically none.

Dr. COCRHANE. None.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I am not opposed to our free market operation. I want to make it operate. I will be honest with you. The

longer I am in government, the more concerned I am about what government tries to operate.

I do not want the Government to get into too much marketing.
240

What is the effect on our system of these Government-managed markets abroad? What does it do to us in our marketing operations? Do

we need to make any basic changes in our system of marketing so that

we can do a better job for our producers? After all, the main thing we

are concerned about here from the economic side is the producer and’

the consumer.

Mr. JAENKE. I do not think there is any doubt we are at a tremendous disadvantage. It is like boxing with one hand tied behind you

There is no question about it. The informational aspects, of course,

come first and foremost. Everything in this count is published. The *

Chicago Board of Trade, the Kansas City Boar of Trade, and so

forth are set up to broadcast marketing conditions around the world.

The intelligence network of foreign governments in this country is

extremely able in knowing about our domestic grain situation, per- -

haps as good----

Chairman HUMPHREY . You do not need to compare it with ours.

Ours has been dismantled.

Mr. JAENKE. Very good at least. And clearly there is a tremendous

disadvantage for American businessmen and cooperatives to try to

compete and compete effectively in the world markets against the

monolithic state trading system, as you have in Japan, you have in

Russia, you have in the EC countries, you have in the developing nations, you have as we said, just everywhere. It is tough.

Chairman HUMPHREY. There are no major countries that have this

sort of free market operation in their agricultural sector. Am I correct ?

Mr. SOTH. We are the shock absorber.

Chairman HUMPHREY. SO, we take all the shock of the instability; is

that correct ?

Mr. JAENKE. Sure.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Does it in any way jeopardize our capacity

to be competitive? I suppose not because we have so much and others

have so little.

Mr. JAENKE. We take a beating. The stories of the “Great Grain

Robbery" in 1972, the prices that grain sold for earlier in the year

because the U.S. marketing system was not able to react fast enough—

our Government agencies were not coordinated enough to do it-and’

some very, very fire sales prices were obtained by the U.S.S.R. and

other countries that were dollars out of every American% pocket, not -

just, farmers' pockets.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Sweden has become an exporter of wheat

during this past year, I understand. Have we lost any markets because of the embargo?

Mr. SOTH. No.

Chairman HUMPHREY, We ultimately have not; is that correct?

Dr. TWEETEN. I would disagree with that.

Mr. SOTH. I do not see how we have.

Dr. TWEETEN. We have lost soybean markets. Japan is making a

tremendous effort to develop soybean production elsewhere, primarily

in Brazil. We have lost corn markets. The Japanese are developing

cotton and corn production in Thailand and other places.

Mr. SOTH. We are exporting more than we should anyway.

Dr. TWEETEN. Over a long period of time export embargoes hurt

us very badly.
241

Chairman HUMPHREY. Dr. Cochrane.

Dr. COCHRANE. What embargo are we talking about, the one that

was on for 6 weeks or a theoretical one? Japan has been trying to develop alternative sources of corn production for 10 years. The effort

to build Brazil into a soybean producer has been going on for 5 years.

These actions are not tied to the last embargo on the Soviet Union.

Sure, we are going to have competitors.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Was it not tied to the embargo in 1973?

Dr. COCHRANE. It had some effect, sure.

- Chairman HUMPHREY. The Japanese have to have soybeans like

they have to have oil.

Dr. COCHRANE. The 1973 embargo really did scare them, and it put

them in motion. But this last embargo has had almost no effect on any- *

body, or anything.

Dr. TWEETEN. But the important point here is not necessarily the

embargoes but the very threat of embargoes. You do not have to put on

an embargo. All you have to do is make it known you are willing to

embargo if things appear to be unfavorable.

The Japanese are a little bit more determined. They have been

developing literally millions of acres of soybeans in Brazil. Is that

not a fact?

Mr. SOTH. Yes, and we ought to encourage them. Our problem is not

whether we can sell our export surpluses m competition for the export

market. Our problem is to increase total world food production.

Chairman HUMPHREY. I think you can do both, but I do not want

to lose a market if we don’t have to.

Mr. SOTH. Should we not encourage agricultural development elsewhere in the world?

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes, very definitely.

Mr. SOTH. Including Brazil.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. JAENKE. But not for the reason, Lauren, that they have been

tricked and misled by U.S. Government actions a la embargoes. We

ought to be encouraging development of food around the world for

different reasons than the embargo of soybeans.

Mr. SOTH. I am not in favor of trickery, no. [Laughter.]

Chairman HUMPHREY . I am glad to see that you plowed against ?

that.

Is there anything else that you would like to add? How about any

of your associates, Mr. Jaenke ?

* Mr. BATES. It has been pretty well covered.

Chairman HUMPHREY. This has been a very informative hearing.

Thank you very much.

[The hearing was adjourned at 12:57 p.m. to be reconvened on February 4, 1976.]
FOOD INFORMATION SYSTEMS

. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1976

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

T ECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT B OAR D,

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

Washington, D.C.

The Technology Assessment Board met at 3 p.m., pursuant to notice,

in room 457, Russell Senate office Building, Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey (member, Technology Assessment Board) presiding.

Present: Senator Humphrey, Senator Kennedy, Congressman

Brown.

Staff present: Mr. Emilio Q. Daddario, director; Mr. Daniel V. De

Simone, deputy director; Mr. J. B. Cordaro, food program manager;

Dr. Walter W. Wilcox, consultant: Ms. Ellen Terpstra, research associate; Ms. Ann Woodbridge, administrative assistant.

Mr. BROWN. The meeting will come to order.

Senator Humphrey has been slightly delayed and has asked that I

insert his opening statement in the record at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, A U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Chairman HUMPHREY. This hearing marks the conclusion of a series

of hearings held by the Office of Technology Assessment on the adequacy and timeliness of food, agriculture, and nutrition information

systems. The OTA food assessment group began work on this subject

at my request early in 1974. In preparation for the 1974 World Food

v Conference, the initial results of this study were instrumental in the

U.S. delegation’s preparation of a proposal of a global early warning

and food information system. This initiative was endorsed by the Conference, and work is progressing to implement this system.

w Last September, the first hearing was held on the adequacy and

timeliness of food information systems. At that time, we heard testimony on improvements needed in U.S. Department of Agriculture

agencies and on the progress made recently. m obtaining reliable data

from the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the Third

World nations, and the progress made by FAO in creating their early

warning system.

(243)
244

At the second in the series of hearings, witnesses discussed the information requirements of alternatives for a U.S. food policy. This

hearing explored proposals for a more pragmatic and a more consciously planned approach to developing and implementing U.S. food

policy. The two most significant elements brought out in that session

were: (1) The need for the United States to improve its resource management activities and policies from input requirements to farm production; and (2) the need for the United States to be equally concerned with the postproduction elements of the food system, especially *

those which affect nutritional status and health of consumers.

Today's hearings will deal with two to topics: The potential uses of

advanced technologies in agricultural in information systems and the

recommendations from the OTA Food Advisory Committee for improving the quality of agricultural and nutritional information made -

available to congressional decisionmakers.

Over the last 5 years, many refinements and improvements have been

made in remote sensing technology. Remote sensing is a process of

photographing measurements of light reflected off the Earth's surface

and analyzing this data with computer systems. By combining this

analysis with meteorological, climatological and historical data, it is

becoming possible to more accurately monitor and forecast crop production. Additional information can be gained, for example, on soil

moisture levels, the spread of plant disease, and water resources on a

global basis. By supplementing computer models and digitized information from aerial and ground holographs with remotely sensed

data, a more accurate estimate often world's resources can be made.

The first Earth resources technology satellite {ERTS], now called

Landsat I, was launched in 1972. Landsat II was launched a year ago.

In the first application of this technology in the agricultural area,

NASA, with the assistance of the Earth Resource Observation Systems

[EROS] program, the U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of

the Interior. and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of. the Department of Commerce, is cooperating with the Department of Agriculture in the large area crop inventory experiment

[LACIE].

In the first phase of the experiment, which has just been completed,

USDA used Landsat capabilities to monitor the production of wheat -

in the United States to see if the current reporting and forecasting

systems could be made more accurate and timely.

our first panel of witnesses today includes representatives of the

Federal agencies involved in this project. They will discuss the progress made in applying remote sensing and other related technologies.

Their review will help us understand both the potential benefits as

well as the Policy and technical obstacles to utilizing these technologies.

As Dr. Fletcher. Administrator of the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration, notes in a paper prepared for this hearings

A world agricultural information system is a fairly revolutionary undertaking

in that it requires the rapid acquisition, processing, and analysis of objective

crop information data gathered on a global basis. Such a system is possible if

current and developing remote sensing satellite techniques are used together

with traditional systems and techniques.

Dr. Archibald Park of Earth Satellite Corp. has been working with

FAO in implementing Resolution 16 of the World Food Conference.
245

In a paper prepared for this hearing, Dr. Park discussed the technical

Imitations and developments and the policy problems of gathering

and utilizing data collected on other nations. He says:

There is a very real concern on the part of many countries about the legal

and institutional issues raised by an international food information system. Even

if national sovereignty were not an issue, the protection of the data would still

need to be considered because of the opportunity for unscrupulous speculation

in the marketplace.

If we are to successfully implement a global system, we must deal

. quickly and effectively with these concerns.

To conclude this series of hearings, Dr. Martin Abel, professor of

agricultural and applied economics, University of Minnesota, and a

member of the OTA Food Advisory Committee, will summarize their

. report entitled, “Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition Information Systems: Assessment and Recommendations)> and additional points made

during the previous hearings.

I want to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the

fine report which this committee has prepared and which triggered

these hearings. It will be printed in the hearing record. This report

makes 12 recommendations for the improvement of food, agriculture,

and nutrition information systems. The committee asks Congress to

consider the following alternatives to improve their information

system by:

(a) Increasing Congress analytical capabilities; (b) eliminating

obsolescence and improving the timeliness and reliability of food and

agricultural data; (c) improving information on key agricultural

inputs such as fertilizer; and, (d) improving nutrition information

systems.

Many of these require congressional committee action for their

implementation. others could be implemented by the Administration

but oversight on the part of Congress would be appropriate and

useful.

I intend to ask Congressman Olin Teabgue, chairman of the Technology Assessment Board, to transmit these recommendations to the

appropriate committees and urge that they be given their prompt

attention.

Mr. BROWN. Our procedure will be to recognize the panel for state-

. ments from each o the members, followed by Dr. Park. Then we f

will have such interchanges as seem desirable in order to get the most

from the presentation made by the previous speakers.

The order of the panel that I have, subject to correction from any *

of you gentlemen, is Mr. Mathews, Dr. DeNoyer, Dr. Hill, and Dr.

White.

Is that right?

Dr. HILL. I think I was last.

Mr. BROWN. Dr. Hill should be last ?

Dr. HILL. Yes.

Mr. BROWN . Whatever is satisfactory to you is satisfactory to us.

You may proceed, Mr. Mathews. We are very pleased to see you

here and have you outline the contribution which NASA is makmg

in this area of food, agriculture, and nutrition information systems.
246

STATEMEMT OF CHARLES MATHEWS, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. MATHEWS. Thank you very much.

The important feature of a space system, of course, is its ability to

cover the entire world and do it extremely rapidly. So as compared to

other types of information-gathering systems, the satellite system is

looked to for timeliness and breadth of coverage.

I think the best way to illustrate that is to talk about something .

which has reached a high level of maturity-communication satellites.

I think we all understand and appreciate their utility because now

telephone communications or television communications can be provided throughout the entire world to nations large and small and can .

be moved rapidly into place as the need arises.

Communication satellites relate very strongly to agriculture in many

ways. We have a very big communications satellite now positioned

over Africa, from where it is broadcasting to very small receivers in

remote villages in the country of India. One of the chief functions of

this cooperative experiment is to provide agricultural-farming type

educational information to 5,000 villages.

Some of these villages are very primitive. I have been there myself.

They do not at this time have electricity in some cases. The power to

run these TV sets is provided by batteries that are charged by bicycle

power.

The response to this educational type program has been exceedingly

enthusiastic on the pant of these villagers and is producing very

marked effects; they continue to ask for educational material as compared to entertainment.

Now, in a very similar way, meteorological satellites have come into

being and are serving their useful purposes. We are all aware of their

employment for warning of hurricanes and other storms. These satellites now provide very sophisticated information. They can measure

temperatures in the atmosphere any place in the world. They provide

indications of moisture conditions throughout the world. Furthermore, the information from these satellites, along with ground-based

information, is fed into a worldwide network through which information about ongoing weather as well as information to predict the -

weather is now being provided on a worldwide basis through the

auspices of the World Meteorological Association.

The value of weather information to agriculture is obvious: When

does the farmer plow ? When does he harvest and so forth? -

But in addition to that, agromet—agricultural/meteorological—

information, used in certain ways, can be fairly effective in predicting the yield of crops: How much of a given crop is likely to be

produced per acre in any particular area of ground.

This is an area that is developing very rapidly and Dr. White, I'm

sure, will have more to say about that when he speaks. Now, the third type of satellite maybe the most important of all as

far as agriculture is concerned.

This particular satellite which we call Landsat looks at the Earth

and discriminates between various colors, even colors that the human

eve cannot sec. T don't want to go into great detail, but it does this an

mere at a time and it can do this every place in the world once every 18
247

days. With this system it is possible to identify crops and measure the

acreage in various regions that are associated with particular crops.

Now, the U.S. Department of Agriculture was involved with this

idea very early in the game. As a matter of fact they helped us to

determine the specifications for the particular satellites that are flying now. Once the first Landsat was up, it was rapidly verified that

crops could be identified.

On the basis of this, Dr. Fletcher, the Administrator of NASA,

proposed to Secretary Butz in 1973 that a very large scale experiment

.

‘be undertaken to determine the utility of LandSat in estimating the

world'S wheat production. We are now involved with that experiment.

It, is an experiment called LACIE—Large Area Crop Inventory Ex-

* periment--and it was initiated in 1974, and includes not only NASA

and the Department of Agriculture, but also the National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration. It is a 3-year program. We have

completed the first year.

I am sure Dr. Hill from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. will

have more to say about LACIE.

In general the results of the first -year are quite satisfactory. Those

results were obtained in the Great Plains region of the United States

which was chosen as a pilot area because w-e have very good information from conventional sources which will serve as a basis for

determining the performance of LACIE. In the next 2 years we will

be moving into foreign regions to make similar estimates.

As a result of this, the Department of Agriculture is commencing

to establish specifications for a system that could operationally provide global production information, assuming the LACIE experiment works out satisfactorily.

In addition, the Department is working in other areas, such as

using the satellite data for help in the domestic estimates as an adjunct to their existing system which indeed is a very good system.

That’s a very direct and understandable use of satellite data in the

area of agriculture. There are many other important agricultural

uses. We can inventory irrigated land. How much land in this country or other countries is under irrigation? We can monitor the change

between the rural and the urban and. How much agricultural land

w is being used up and going into cities and suburbs?

We can monitor the characteristics of water sheds in terms of how

they absorb and flow the water. We can monitor the area] extent of

snow cover which is very important in terms of water availability,

s say. in the western part of this country.

We can monitor seasonal variations and range conditions so that

cattle or sheep grazing can be regulated. We can also use this in terms

of supporting exploration geology in the mineral and energy areas.

Energy is as important a consideration in agriculture as it is in everything else.

So it is obvious that many agencies are involved. I don’t want to

say much more about these uses. I think Dr. DeNoyer will say more

about, that later.

The capabilities of Landsat I believe, have met every expectation,

but just like everything else, it is possible to provide for improvement.

So we in NASA are now moving to the next generation of sensing
248

capabilities where the performance of the instrument will be consi erably improved. For example, instead of being able to look at 1 d

acre at a time, it will be able to look at one-fifth of an acre at a time.

This means we will be able to survey smaller fields where, for instance, crops like rice are grown. Also, we will be able to get more

data on plant stress as well as identification of the crops themselves.

Using radar frequently (microwave) sensors in the future, we will

be able to detect and measure such things as the moisture in the soil.

We will be able to classify soils. We will also be able to look right

through the clouds, something you can't do with an instrument that -

works at visible or infrared wavelengths.

To return again for just a moment to agrimeteorology, our present

basis in the LACIE program for determining the yield of the wheat

crop, we feel has indeed been quite satisfactory, Satellites perform an 0

important role in providing this meteorological information, along

with the very useful ground information that is also available.

I might say the combination of meteorological satellites and Landsats may be a very good way of identifying promising new lands that

are potentially arable; in opening up new lands to increase the world's

potential for agricultural production.

Before concluding, I would like to mention one other area that is

in its very early stages and that is climate research.

It is very obvious that monthly or seasonal predictions of what is

happening to climate are very important to the farmer. Will it be wet

or dry this season as compared to last year at this time?

It is also important in a longer term sense, not from the standpoint

of whether we are approaching an ice age or something like that

again. That's important scientifically. But in terms of considerations

such as desertification of arable lands, like those in the Sahel region of

Africa, for example, and the reasons behind that and what can be

done about it. In fact, the understanding of climate on a regional basis

may well enable the return of desert to farmland.

Now, the only way I really know to develop an understanding of

the climate program is by means of satellite systems that can measure

the radiant energy that leaves the Earth and can measure the incoming radiations from the Sun as it enters the environs of the Earth.

We have systems that are capable of these measurements and we .

intend to initiate activities in the near future to begin to attain an

understanding of this and hopefully a use of this new technology.

So I hope, Mr. Chairman. that I have indicated to you that remote

sensing from space is indeed a very powerful tool.

Satellites can handle global problems. Agriculture now is indeed a 

global problem as you well know.

I think these satellites are certainly a major contributor now to the

efficiency of our agricultural activities worldwide.

Thank you very much.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you very much, Mr. Mathews.

[The following report was requested from NASA by OTA.]
8

REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF

249

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FOOD ADVISORY COMMITTEE ,

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD, BY THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE

ADMINISTRATION

A contribution to the Board’s Assessment of the Application of Advanced Technology to World Agricultural Information Systems

I. INTRODUCTION

The lesson of the failure of the food and agriculture information

system in 1972-1973 is that we must have more information on food

production and market demand in other parts of the world and our

analytical capabilities must be increased. *

The management of food supplies is no longer just a problem on a country to

country basis. It is a global problem, the dimensions of which have only recently

become evident. In order to deal with this problem, better management is needed. * Better management is greatly dependent on the acquisition of much better food

supply and demand data on a worldwide basis, a system to process and analyze

these data to produce useful information on a timely and cost effective basis, and

an organization that can use this information to make decisions to alleviate the

problem. This is a fairly revolutionary undertaking as it involves detailed and

accurate data gathering on an unprecedented scale along with the requirement

for systems to process tremendous amounts of data into useful information so

meaningful decisions can be made. Traditional systems can contribute to the

solution of these problems. But traditional systems were designed to cope with

traditional problems, which the international food crisis is not. To be effective,

contributions from new systems will be required. In this report, we will describe

new systems that can address major requirements for:

1. Worldwide, standardized data collection relating primarily to food supply,

but also to food demand;

2. Rapid data processing; and,

3. Accurate data analysis.

These techniques involve the use of remote sensing satellites to provide large

area, worldwide, repetitive coverage to monitor changes in agricultural crop

acreage as well as weather conditions affecting agricultural field. These satellites utilize advanced sensors which gather data in the most effective regions of

the spectrum (the visible, infrared and eventually, microwave wave lengths),

not just the visual wavelengths to which cameras are essentially limited. Another

advantage of these sensors is that their data can be produced in digital form,

permitting rapid processing and analysis by computer. This is essential both for

handling the large volumes of data acquired and also to get the most information

out of the data. With the marriage of the satellite sensor and computer, and in

conjunction with traditional techniques, a worldwide food information system

is possible.

In this report, we present an overview of the total spectrum of current pro-

-. grams in which NASA is involved and a look at future developments currently in

the planning stage.

At the present time, the satellites primarily being used for such purposes are

Landsats-1 and -2; the information they provide include: acreage devoted to

agriculture both in the U.S. and within other nations, soil classification, the

encroachment of urbanization on agricultural areas, water demand (irrigation),

water supply (snow cover), the carrying capacity of range land, and demography. The Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE), uses data from

these satellites, and from meteorological satellites and existing worldwide meteorological ground data systems, in an experiment aimed at improving global

crop production estimates by the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. LACIE

will provide estimates of wheat production in the major wheat producing regions of the world. LACIE has already made estimates of wheat production in

*Quote from the Report of the Food Advisory (!ommlttee, June 19’75, p. 40.
250

the United States great plains area which compare favorably with USDA/SRS

official estimates. LACIE is described within this report as well as several other

current projects applying satellite technology in food-related applications.

Also discussed is our current thinking concerning future satellites and their

more sophisticated sensors such as the Thematic Mapper which will provide

better information, particularly for crops grown in small fields. Major contributions to yield information are also expected from meteorological satellites.

Also of great importance to our ability to cope with food management problems

of the future is an understanding of the effect of climate on food production and

the effect of man on climate. Well documented, but imperfectly understood,

changes in seasonal weather patterns since the 1960’s, have spotlighted an urgent

national and international need for a climatic research program and for the

development of a climatic forecasting capability. Because of the capability of 9

satellite systems to provide large-scale synoptic views and to acquire the type

of data to assist in understanding and predicting climatic changes, NASA is

strongly pointing towards an expanded climatic research program. This also is

touched upon briefly in this report.

Our initial efforts in food-related activities convince us that space-based tech- -

nology has much to offer as we tackle the formidable problems of the future.

II. CURRENT PROGRAMS AND CAPABILITIES

In this section of the report, we will describe some of the food-related activities

underway utilizing satellite remote sensing data. Sub-section A is devoted to the

Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE). Other current activities are

discussed in Sub-section B.

A. LARGE AREA CROP INVENTORY EXPERIMENT (LACIE)

The current world food shortages and fuel and energy scarcity with their negative impact on future food supplies has focused worldwide attention on the U.S.

in its role as the major exporter of agricultural commodities and has created a

greater need both here and abroad for more accurate and timely knowledge of

current and projected world crop production. This information is required in

planning and affecting crop production and distribution. Exports to other countries, possibly involving millions of tons of grain, could be more effectively

planned with less disruption to domestic markets and with better general economic effectiveness if world crop production could be reliably estimated more

in advance and on a continuing basis. Planting, marketing, aid, and transportation decisions in producing countries are all based on crop inventory information

which is often available only after harvest and is frequently of uncertain

accuracy in many countries. Also, crop disasters can occur anywhere on the globe

and such events must be made known in a timely way and as accurately as

techniques and resources permit.

A crop inventory system utilizing remote sensing technology and the global

meteorological system appears to offer great potential for upgrading existing

information-gathering capabilities and for contributing to a long-range solution

of the food supply problem. The launch of the first earth resources technology &

satellite (ERTS-1, now called Landsat-1) in 1972, and the results of subsequent

experiments utilizing various remote sensing techniques including the digital

analysis of multi-spectral data collected by ERTS-1, indicated that applications supporting the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) information

needs in the area of crop production reporting, were feasible. Based on these .

results, a close working relationship was established between the National Aeronautic and Space Administration and USDA for the purpose of exploiting

Landsat technology.

1. LACIE---WHAT IT IS

As a result of progress made In Landsat-based technology and in the use of

agrometeorological modeling by NOAA and others to predict crop yields, three

agencies of the United States Government (USDA; NOAA of the Department of

Commerce: and NASA) designed a specific project to test these technologies in

a large-scale quasi-operational undertaking called the Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE). A memorandum of understanding among the three

agencies was signed in November 1974. LACIE is intended to demonstrate the

capability of relatively new remote sensing techniques and data processing systems in combination with more conventional techniques and historical data to

forecast the production of an important world crop. LACIE will utilize data
251

gathered by the Landsat earth resources survey satellites in conjunction with

meteorological and climatological data gathered both by satellite and conventional techniques. Wheat was selected as the test crop for the LACIE demonstration. The objective is to provide global wheat production forecasts with an

improvement over existing methods in terms of accuracy, timeliness and

objectivity.

LACIE will extend over three global crop years; the early phases will concentrate primarily on the wheat growing regions of the United States. Then the

experiment will be extended to include other major wheat growing regions of

the world.

2. LACIE TECHNICAL BACKGROUND

(u) Identification of Crops

NASA Landsat satellites have the capability to view each area of the earth

once every 18 days. An electronic sensor carried on the satellite measures the

radiant energy reflected from the earth’s surface in four different wavelength

bands. Two bands measure visible light radiation and two measure infrared

radiation.

Energy arriving at the earth from the sun is absorbed or reflected. The wavelength at which energy is absorbed by the plant for growth is dependent upon

the plant type, plant maturity and overall condition. This makes it possible to

determine the identity of plant communities by the unique way they reflect

energy from the sun.

Just as the eye sees reflected sunlight in visible wavelengths (such as blue,

green, red) electronic sensors measure the reflection. Electronic sensors, however,

are sensitive to more wavelengths than the eye. They can “see” ultraviolet and

infrared wavelengths as well as color visible to the human eye. Electronic sensors

can also be made much more sensitive and precise than the eye. The data are

obtained in a way to make it easier to use in computers which can be used to

extract a wealth of information collected by the sensor and particularly to determine the class of crop (wheat, corn, soybean, etc. ) growing in a specific field.

(b) Prediction of Yield

The Agro-Met models used in the prediction of yield are simply sets of mathematical equations which estimate agricultural (Agro) yields from meteorological

(Met) observations and perhaps other factors affecting the crop throughout its

development. The accuracy of yield models depends upon knowledge of plant

response to the many possible combinations of weather elements, cropping practices, soil fertility, insect and disease damage, and weed control. Generally, these

weather factors are the easiest to include in the model. Although some of the

others can be obtained quite adequately from knowledge of historical trends.

3. LACIE--TECHINICAL APPROACH

The approach in LACIE is to estimate the production of wheat on a regionby-region basis. To estimate wheat production, two components of production

must be determined: yield, the amount of wheat (bushels, metric tons, etc. ) for

a given area (acres, hectares, etc. ) of harvested crop, and the areal extent of that

9 crop. Simply stated, production is area times yield. Both of these components,

area and yield, are estimated for local areas and aggregated to regional and

country levels.

Within a region, the total area planted in a given crop such as wheat and the

yield from that area, will vary from year to year. In the total variation, both

-

items, area planted and yield, are important. The area planted will vary as a

function of economics, weather at planting time, and governmental decisions.

Weather throughout the growing season is the prime factor causing changes in

yield from year to year in a specific area.

(a) Crop Area Information

Multispectral scanner data of the selected wheat growing areas involved in the

LACIE experiment are received from the Landsats and are processed into computer-compatible magnetic tapes at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. The tape reels are shipped to the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, where a computer-assisted analysis of the data is made to identify

wheat crops and to integrate the selected sample areas into an overall regional

acreage estimate, Such information Will be assembled a number of times during

the growing season.
252

The smallest geographical subdivision for which these estimates are made is an

area where similar soils, climatic conditions, and cropping practices usually produce similar wheat crops and yields These small areas, for example, counties in

the United States, are summed or aggregated to estimate the total crop area

within a larger region. The regions are further aggregated to estimate the total

crop area within a country.

The sampled segments measured by the Landsats are also combined with historical patterns for a large area such as a country to obtain the total area currently planted with a specific crop. Historical patterns of crop acreage, cropping

practices, and planting trends are well established for agricultural regions. The

use of sophisticated sampling strategies makes it possible that only 5/10,000 of

the total wheat growing area surveyed is actually subjected to detailed analysis ~

including human interpretation. This is described in Figure 1.

(b) Crop Yield Information

Yield is directly associated with weather, soils, and agricultural technology

and damage factors. The soil moisture at the time of planting, the rainfall

during the growing season, and the temperature are the main weather factors. “

Agricultural technology includes such things as improved varieties of hybrids,

fertilizer usage, insect and disease control, and irrigation.

As already mentioned, agro-met models are used to estimate agricultural yields

based upon a knowledge of historical trends and current meteorological observations. Model development work is done at NOAA’s Environmental Data Service

Center for Climatic and Environmental Assessment (CCEA) at Columbia, Mo.

Weather observations are collected daily by NOAA. Rainfall, temperature, etc.,

are measured from the ground only at certain points, while crops of course

grow continuously over large areas. Therefore, ground sampling of weather permits errors to be induced into the equation. To fill these gaps, the NOAA environmental satellites daily provide total coverage of weather between sampling points.

CLASSIFICATION AND MENSURATION CONCEPT

LACIE WHEAT-GROWING AREA 6,000 SQ Ml

(WlTHIN 8 COUNTRIES) 15,030,000 SQ KM

20% OF THE SAMPLE SEGMENTS

WILL BE IDENTIFIED AS

TRAINING SEGMENTS (ABOUT

1,000 SEGMENTS)

150,000 SQ Ml

385,000 SQ “KM

v

30,000 SQ Ml

77,000 SQ KM

3,000 SQ Ml

7,7OO SQ KM

COMPUTER ESTIMATES TOTAL

AREA IN WHEAT (ACREAGE)

FROM SAMPLING MODEL

COMPUTER EXTENDS CLASSIFICATION TO ALL OTHER SEGMENT!

DATA PROCESSING ANALYST

ASSURES REASONABLE RESULTS .

COMPUTER CLASSIFIES EACH *

PIXEL OF TRAINING SEGMENT

AS WHEAT 011 ANOTHER CATEGORY. DATA PROCESSING

ANALYST ASSURES GOOD

DATA QUALITY .

I

.

COMPUTER iS TRAINED ON

OF TOTAL LACIE AREA.

FIGURE 1

(c) Output Products

Products generated as a result of the LACIE analysis are periodic assessments of the area, yield, and production of wheat from specific regions. The

wheat assessment reports contain the area of wheat that has been identified

as well as the stages of wheat growth and all source data used to derive the

assessments. An estimate of the yield will also be included in the assessments.

The wheat production estimate will be provided with each assessment, but only

the final output assessment will be based upon results after crop maturity
263

occurs across the entire region being reported. Thus, the accuracy of the wheat

assessment reports should improve as the growing season progresses.

The Department of Agriculture is the only agency authorized to publish crop

reports. USDA studies the utilization of these experimentally derived estimates

in its crop reports, which are made public as a routine service to the domestic

and international agricultural community. Comparisons are made with conventional forecasts and against actual production on a selected basis.

NASA, NOAA, and USDA publish retrospective research reports for each phase

of the experiment that describe in general terms the degree of LACIE success.

NASA and USDA publish research results on development of acreage estimation

techniques and statistical sampling strategies, and NOAA and USDA similarly

publish research reports on the development of their agromet models and on the

validity of the derived yield factors.

4. LACIE--STATUS AND OUTLOOK

Emphasis during the first year of LACIE, the 1974-1975 crop year, was placed

upon making acreage estimates in the United States Great Plains States, the

major wheat producing area of the country. Although LACIE is designed to produce information concerning foreign wheat production, it is important to make

estimates also in an area where good standard information already is produced,

because that information is used as the baseline against which LACIE performance is evaluated. Data collection for this first year was accomplish as planned,

and currently we are assessing the results for those nine states. Data is being

collected and analysis has started for the 1975-1976 crop year. In addition to

acreage estimates, yield and production estimates will be made during this second

crop year. The major area of coverage will remain the U.S. Great Plains; however,

Canada will be included, and selected foreign regions outside North America will

be analyzed. It is anticipated that during the third year, the 1976-1977 crop year,

acreage, yield, and production estimates will be made for all the foreign regions

tentatively selected for inclusion in the LACIE demonstration; this will include

most of the major wheat producing countries of the world.

Preliminary indications, based upon our initial assessment of the first year’s

performance, are that the LACIE acreage estimation techniques are generally

adequate, and that with incorporation of certain technical changes, desired

accuracy goals can be achieved. One of our concerns has been the ability to handle

in a routine manner the vast quantities of data required for analysis. This is no

longer a significant concern for adequate data handling rates have already been

attained. Concentration is now being placed upon improving the estimation

accuracies and identifying those techniques requiring further improvement, particularly the extrapolation from one small geographic area to another, a process

known as signature extension.

Although the first year’s focus was upon acreage, as indicated above, considerable effort has been expended, primarily by NOAA, upon the development and

testing of the agro-met yield estimation models and crop calendar adjustment

models. The provisions for operating these models with meteorological data from

the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) network are complete. All the 9 models are operating as intended, and their design and implementation appear

to be quite adequate. In addition, initial attempts to aggregate acreage and yield

estimates into production estimates for meaningful geographical areas have

been successful.

a The new techniques being tested and demonstrated in LACIE, in combination with current crop estimating methods and historical production data, will

benefit both producers and consumers by helping reduce the annual uncertainties

affecting the management and marketing of major crops. Faster, earlier, and

more accurate forecasts should assist in rational planning for the most effective

use of supplies, as well as in emergency food distribution both in the United

States and abroad.

B. OTHER FOOD RELATED ACTIVITIES

1. WATER RESOURCES

Agricultural production is vitally dependent upon the availability of water, as

the Sahelian drought in the early 1970’s vividly demonstrated. Landsat can inventory surface water bodies such as rivers, lakes, ponds and streams and monitor changes over time. Water quality information can be obtained on these water

bodies as well, although it is important to have corollary measurements taken

68–877—76—17
254

at the surface (ground truth) if specific pollutants are to be identified. This

ground truth can be obtained through Landsat by utilizing ground platforms

with in-situ sensors and relaying the data to a central data collection facility

through the satellites’ Data Collection System (DCS). This system serves as a

communications transponder between the ground sensing Platform, which may be

placed in a river or lake to acquire direct water quality data, and a central

analysis laboratory.

Landsat data have been used as well to identify rock formations which serve

as ground water aquifers in arid regions. This work has been performed in

the southwestern United States but the techniques are applicable in other regions.

Other techniques are well under development to measure snow cover and

monitor its depletion in the spring. Vast regions in the Eastern and Western

hemispheres depend on snow to provide water for agriculture. This includes the

+

direct contribution of snow as soil moisture and also the runoff that can be

expected for river flow forecasting and reservoir management. It is expected

that in the future water will become a far more scarce commodity and that

steps will have to be taken to manage its use more efficiently for agricultural -

(irrigation) and other uses. Landsat data can make a real contribution in this

area.

The foregoing relates to water supply problems, but estimating water demand

is also important. A principal requirement for water in agricultural areas is

for irrigation purposes. Landsat’s contribution here can be in identifying and

measuring acreages of irrigated lands, measuring annual changes in these

lands, and helping to determine sources of irrigation water and methods of

irrigation. This demand information gathered on a regional basis can then be

used to project trends important to water supply planning. Steps can also be

taken if necessary to try to reduce the demand based on objective information.

For the future, a great deal of effort is going into developing the capability to

routinely and accurately sense soil moisture from space. This development should

prove to be immensely valuable not only for determining crop yield, but also for

planning agricultural practices such as determining optimum planting and

irrigation times

2. SOIL CLASSICATION

Proper soil classification is essential for optimizing agricultural production.

Yet many nations of the world, including most developing countries, have very

poor soils maps. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United

Nations has had an extensive international program for years to try to alleviate

this deficiency. Yet a tremendous amount of effort remains to be done. A number

of investigations have indicated the value of Landsat data for this purpose. In

one case, a Mexican scientist identified 28 soils groups over most of Mexico

using Landsat imagery. Potential land use maps were prepared based on the

properties of these soil units and yield production statistics.

Soil classification mapping using Landsat data provided more and higher

quality information than previously obtained, even though the previous work

had been accomplished with the assistance of the FAO. The techniques are being

further developed and used by the International Bank for Reconstruction and * Development (IBRD) in an agricultural assistance program with the (government of India. Even in the United States, where soils are relatively well mapped,

Landsat has contributed new and valuable information. Remote sensing techniques can be used to provide considerable benefit in mapping soils for agriculture usage in many parts of the world. .

8. RANGE MANAGEMENT

The production of beef and most other meat products is directly related to

range management decisions which are based on current knowledge of range

conditions. At the present time, only gross information based on limited observations and climatological reports is available for this purpose. Landsat–1

investigators from the Bureau of Land Management, the University of Nebraska,

and the Remote Sensing Center at Texas A&M have shown that an important indicator of range forage conditions, biomass, can be estimated from Landsat data.

In order to be useful, this information needs to be in the hands of range managers

within about ten days after it is acquired by the satellite. This is not

possible with the present, first generation data processing system. However, we

are working to increase our data handling capability in order to meet the

required timing. As an example of a promising development in the range area,

one investigation in the Great Plains Corridor showed that a correlation be-
255

tween measurements made in two of the Landsat spectral bands (visible red and

reflective infrared) and above-ground green biomass and vegetation moisture

content could be obtained and appears to be highly promising for range management purposes. Based on these results, a relatively large scale "Wildland Vegetation Inventory Project” is under development by the USDI/Bureau of Land

Management (BLM) and NASA. One of the objectives of this project is to

develop vegetation-type maps, acreage compilations, production estimates and

trend indications for rangeland under the control of the BLM The participating

agencies are optimistic that positive results will be obtained, which can then be

used in even broader area surveys.

4. DEMOGRAPHY 9

In addition to providing information on food supplies, improved information

is needed as well on the demand for food. This demand is a function of population, which is often not well known, particularly in developing countries. At

least one investigation has shown that Landsat data have been useful in Africa *

to determine the location and size of villages for demographic enumeration.

This information was combined with genealogical census data to provide an accurrate assessment of population density. Further improvement in the techniques

used is possible and could be of considerable value in future international

demographic estimates.

GENERAL COMMENTS

The accuracy of the satellite techniques described above are in most cases

dependent on good supporting surface measurements (ground truth). That is,

the satellite information generally cannot stand alone without good point source

data. The advantage of the satellite is not in replacing the in-situ supporting

measurements, but in generalizing these measurements to areas so vast (country or regional scale or larger) that no other known technique can provide the

integrating information. The amount of surface measurement data required will

vary according to such factors as the application in question, the region in

question and the degree of accuracy required.

While very useful results have been achieved to date, there is no question

that future satellites with high sensing precision and utilizing additional parts

of the spectrum (such as the thermal infrared and microwave) will return data

of appreciably greater value.

Since we are dealing with a rapidly advancing technology, both in terms of

hardware (sensors, satellites and computers) and software (data analysis techniques, etc. ), rapid advances in applications to a food information system can

be expected over the foreseeable future.

III. FUTURE CAPABILITIES

At the present time, Landsats-1 and -2 are functioning in orbit. While both

have a design life of one year, Landsat–1 will be three and one half years old in

January 1976, and Landsat-2 exactly one year old. The two tape recorders on

w Landsat-1 have ceased to function which means that data cannot he obttained

over the many portions of the earth where there are no data readout stations.

(There are three stations in the U.S. at present and one each in Canada, Brazil

and Italy). In addition, one of the two tape recorders on Landsat-2 has failed,

leaving only one recorder to gather worldwide data until the next satellite in 0

the series, Landsat-C, is launched in late 1977. Landsat-C will carry improved

sensors in the form of a Return Beam Vidicon (RBV) system with 40 meters

resolution as compared with the present SO meter capability, and a fifth “thermal”

(heat measuring) band on the multispectral scanner (MSS). These developments

should assist in providing a better agricultural field identification capability as

well as data for improved crop classification. Landsat-C will also carry two tape

recorders to acquire worldwide data. These recorders will have certain reliability

improvements over those carried on Landsats 1 and 2.

About the same time that Landsat-C is launched, a small research oriented

satellite called the HCMM (Heat Capacity Mapping Mission) will be placed in

orbit. Its importance for agriculture is that it will be used to develop techniques

to detect soil moisture utilizing thermal infrared remote sensing data. The

techniques which are developed will be utilized in conjunction with satellites

to be launched in the 1980’s.
266

A most significant activity for the future of a world food information system

is the development of the Thematic Mapper. It is planned that an improved multispectral scanner-the Thematic Mapper—will be the primary instrument for

Earth Resourees surveys after Landsat-C. The Thematic Mapper is to be optimized for vegetation discrimination and for computer assisted analysis.

With a spatial resolution of 30 meters the Thematic Mapper will be able to

resolve an area of .2 acres. This compares to the 80 meter 1.2 acre resolution

capability presently available with the Landsats-,1 and -2 Multispectral Scanner.

Several resolution elements are required to locate and measure individual fields.

Figure 2 indicates the minimum size fields that can be resolved with both the

Thematic Mapper (TM) and the Multispectral Scanner (MSS) as well as an -

indication of the field size distribution as a function of country. In addition to

locating fields, it is of course also necessary to identify what is growing in the

0.1A 1A 10A 100A 1000A 10,000AC

FIELD SIZE, ACRES

FIGURE 2.—World distribution of cropland fields.

.

field. The Thematic Mapper will have seven spectral channels (instead of the

four bands on Landsats 1 and 2 and the five bands on Landsat-C) that have

been selected to meet the vegetation discrimination objective. This, coupled

with an improvement in the ability of the instrument to measure small changes

in the energy level within each band, will improve the identification of crops by

allowing better discrimination among similar crops. This is very important since

the Thematic Mapper will help provide the capability to predict the production

of major crops, such as rice, that are grown in small fields, and to discriminate

among “confusion” crops such as wheat, barley, and rye earlier in the growing

season.

A persistent problem in the Landsats-1 and -2 era has been the timely delivery of data to users. To solve this, the Thematic Mapper data flow will be

streamlined. Data will be relayed real time via satellite from the Landsat

instrument to a ground terminal facility, the TDRS station in White Sands.

There, it will be recorded and then retransmitted in near real time via a domestic satellite link to the Landsat data processing facility. The use of such

satellite links will allow users to receive data within 45-72 hours of data acquisition rather than having to wait a minimum of seven weeks as presently

required.
257

B. SPACE TECHNOLOGY IMPACT ON YIELD DETERMINATION

The utility of remote sensing technology for yield estimation/prediction has

experienced considerable improvement in recent years. The following paragraphs

outline the status of present efforts and take a look at plans and future possibilities to better employ the advantages of space technology for managing

monitoring agricultural products with emphasis on the crop yield component

of agricultural production.

Crops are affected by a variety of environmental factors which eventually

combine to produce the resultant yield. The three principal factors are: a)

moisture; b) warmth or temperature; and c) energy available to the plant.

. The following summarizes future space technology developments in these three

areas.

1. MOISTURE

(a) Soil mosture

Probably the most substantial advances made to date in this area of endeavor have been those in soil moisture monitoring. Thermal infrared measurements taken throughout the day can be related to soil moisture, i.e., the diurnal

amplitude in the surface temperature of soil has been shown to be inversely related to the amount of soil moisture in the upper layers of the soil profile (6 cm).

Passive microwave measurements have also been shown to be responsive to

soil moisture variations. The most effective band is L-band (20 em).

This band has been shown to be responsive even when there are moderate

amounts of vegetation present over the soil.

Future spacecraft will be attempting to implement the concepts demonstrated

in supporting research and technology programs. For instance, HCMM will

measure the diurnal range in surface temperature and relate it to soil moisture.

Geosynchronous measurements can and will be used to measure surface temperature variations and relate it to soil moisture. Skylab L-Band and X-band

data have already been shown to be sensitive to soil moisture variation. Nimbus 5.

Electrically Scanning Microwave Radiometer (ESMR) measurements have been

shown to be sensitive to soil moisture variations over sparsely vegetated

regions.

Future spacecraft missions using the Shuttle Transportation Concept will fly

large antenna instruments that will provide higher spatial resolution, passive

microwave measurements of greater utility to agriculture. Spatial resolutions in

the 10 km range are expected. To improve the spatial resolution of microwave

systems, the Synthetic Aperture Radar approach is now also being actively considered. Present research indicates 25-100 meter resolution is Obtainable with

4-5 GHz and 7-15° depression angles being optimum. Shuttle systems with this

capability can be expected in the early 1980’s pending favorable results from

ground-based and aircraft flights missions presently being analyzed and planned.

(b) Precipitation

The launch of geosynchronous satellites, such as ATS-1 and 111 and SMS-1

and 2, has provided a means to monitor very dynamic cloud features associated s with precipitation event% These approaches can monitor cumulonimbus clouds,

cloud turrets, and motions that appear useful for monitoring the location of heavy

precipitation and augmenting existing rain gauge networks. These data can be

used to augment yield prediction systems employing the moisture budgeting/

● stress concept and its effect on yield.

Precipitation falling as snow and stored in the mountainous regions of the

Western United States serves as valuable stored water for irrigated agriculture.

Present satellite systems such as Landsat are measuring snow-cover and this can

be used as valuable ancillary data in seasonal snow-runoff prediction procedures.

Work is going on to utilize microwave measurements for snowpack moisture

equivalent and wetness estimation. At present, the best combination of spectral

band measurements is not known. However, multi-frequency microwave measurements on the Shuttle should resolve this problem.

(c) Evapotranspiration

Present satellites (Landsat) can locate vegetated areas, and vegetative density

and types within this general category. Making these delineations and monitoring changes with time appears to be a possible tool for separating regions where

relative amounts of evapotranspiration are occurring. This concept is under study

by the University of California. Additionally, many evapotranspiration tech-
258

niques require inputs of net radiation. There are indications that key inputs to

net radiation estimates may be made from satellites such as reflected solar

radiation and emitted long-wave (thermal) radiation. More research is needed,

however, in this key area.

Besides the utility of surface temperature measurements for use in moisture

estimates and plant stress estimates described briefly above it should be emphasized that this information can be used to indicate susceptibility to pest growth

and infestation. The launch of HCMM, Landsat-C, and Landsat-D will enhance

this area of endeavor.

Surface temperature measurements will also be useful for monitoring surface

.

freezing conditions that are critical to the citrus industry, for example. Geosynchronous satellite measurement and properly timed polar orbiting, satellite-radiometric measurements will be useful in this regard.

Satellite measurements of snowcover are also useful for monitoring the extent -

of anomalous conditions such as a lach of snowcover and the freezing/winter-kill

of winter wheat the extent of hail damage, and the extent of flooding.

8. ENERGY

As mentioned earlier, satellites may offer inputs through direct measurements

of reflected solar and emitted radiation or cloud-type identification (for transmission purposes) that give an energy input for plant growth.

G. CLIMATOLOGY

Most of the remarks given above in the discussion of yield determination are

associated with assessing the status of the weather or environment at a particular point in time. Probably the most important and challenging area of technology that will improve or contribute to improved agricultural management is

improved climatology. The remote sensing program in meteorology is concerned

with the causes and effects of long-term changes in climate. It is felt that an assessment of the causes and effects of these changes is necessary in order to assess

worldwide shifts of agricultural productivity. The factors which seem to influence

the earth’s long-term climate are naturally broad in scope and, therefore,

amenable to study from earth-orbiting satellites. These factors are:

1. Variations in the solar constant. It is believed that variations of as little as

170 in the solar constant can significantly alter the distribution of arable lands.

This is because small variations in solar output can have a large effect on energy

input to the earth’s atmosphere with consequent modifications to weather patterns. Satellite measurements on Nimbus-6 have been monitoring this constant.

These measurements will continue, first with the Solar Maximum Mission.

2. Variations in the Earth’s Radiation Budget. Climate is also effected by the

amount of energy which is absorbed by the earth’s surface. The amount of solar

radiation will be determined with a specially-dedicated (Earth Radiation Bud- .

get) satellite. Instruments on Nimbus 5 and 6 have been measuring the snow

and ice cover which reflects a significant portion of the solar energy. In addition,

another instrument on Nimbus 6 is measuring the CO2 content of the atmosphere,

variations in which can result in measurable temperature changes at the earth’s

surface. The ozone composition is currently being mapped using an instrument.

on Nimbus-4. This factor, which determines the amount of ultra-violet radiation

which reaches the earth’s surface, will continue to be monitored by instruments on

Atmospheric Explorer-10 and Nimbus-G.

3. Distribution of thermal energy. The air-ocean interface, which plays such a

large role in our long-term climate will be monitored by satellites which will

measure ocean surface temperatures and current circulations (Nimbus-G and

Seasat).

In addition, satellites can contribute through long-term, global or regional

measurements of changes in vegetation cover and land use. All these areas are

amenable to satellite measurement and will be included in NASA’s planning.

A recent paper prepared by V. V. Salomonson and T. J. Schmugge of the NASA

Goddard Space Flight Center discusses the important relationship among agricultural meteorology, yield estimation and remote sensing. It is included as Appendix 1 to this report.
259

D. DEVELOPMENT OF MICROWAVE REMOTE SENSING

The principal advantage of remote sensing in the microwave wavelengths is

that microwaves penetrate clouds while observations in the visible and infrared

wavelengths do not. Given the fact that a considerable portion of the earth is

obscured by clouds at any given time, the development of an aIl weather capability is important. Other advantages are that sensing can be conducted at night

as well as in the daytime; microwaves can penetrate the earth slightly (important

for soil moisture determination) ; and, microwaves at certain wavelengths can

penetrate vegetation, allowing surface data to be gathered, for example, through

a canopy of trees. For these reasons, a high priority is being given to the development of a satellite microwave remote sensing capability for earth resources surveys. Given the fact that microwave sensing is not as developed as sensing in the

visible and infrared wavelengths, and that the instrument are relatively large,

heavy and complex, it is not expected that dedicated sensors for food information

applications will be available before the latter part of the 1980’s. When they

do become available, they will probably be used in addition to remote sensing at

the other wavelengths, and in conjunction with data from traditional systems,

to provide an optimum world agricultural information system.

APPENDIX I

AGRICULTURAL METEROLOGY, YIELD ESTIMATION AND REMOTE SENSING

(By V. V. Salomonson and T. J. Sehmugge)

Hydrology and Oceanography Branch, Code 913,

Atmospheric and Hydrospheric Applications Division

Applications Directorate,

Goddard Space Flight Center,

Greenbelt, Maryland

(I) BACKGROUND

Agricultural meteorology is the discipline in which meteorological principles and

knowledge are applied to agricultural pursuits. Ultimately all efforts in agrometeorology point toward the possibility of increasing yields. The purpose of

this paper is to explore the utility of remotely-sensed data acquired from aircraft

and spacecraft in improving predictions and estimates of yield. A special emphasis will be placed on the prediction of yield for wheat inasmuch as there

now is considerable involvement of NASA, NOAA, and the U.S. Department of

Agriculture in an effort termed the Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment

(LACIE). The purpose of LACIE is to test and demonstrate the capability of

relatively new remote sensing and data processing systems, in combination with

existing and historical data, to forecast the production of an important world

crop: namely, wheat. Production is defined as the product of crop area and yield.

e While it is conceptually rather easy to see how remote sensing might be applied

to measure acreage, the utility and application of remote sensing for estimating

and predicting yield is less apparent.

Meteorological factors have a considerable impact on wheat yield and,

because of this and as part of LACIE, agromet models employing conventional

data acquired utilizing the World Meteorological organization (WMO) network

will be developed and utilized as the principal mechanism for estimating yield in

the United States and other countries. There is, additionally, considerable interest

in exploring the utility of spacecraft data because it offers a uniform and consistent data set that would provide worldwide coverage and easy access. There is a

considerable challenge involved in that it is not readily apparent how meteorological parameters related to crop yield may be estimated or inferred from remote

sensing or even how the satellite data should be compiled given the relatively

small number of yearn of continuous, computer compatible data that now exist

and the high data volumes involved. The rest of this paper will attempt to offer

a perspective from which to evaluate the possibilities of utilizing remotely sensed

data from satellites and to suggest some approaches using remote sensing that

appear to have the most potential for providing useful contributions to improved

world-wide wheat yield prediction.
2 6 0

(II) CRITICAL PARAMETERS

‘ There have been several studies conducted which had the purpose of delineating

those variables most affecting crop yield and plant response (for example;

Thompson, 1962; Thompson, 1969, Williams, 1969). A review of literature

shows that the principal variables are moisture, temperature. and energy. Other

factors are also involved that include soil type, technological “factors including

fertilizer, pest control, and planting practices, and disease or weather hazards.

A listing of ‘the parameters that should be considered is given in Exhibit 1.

(III) YIELD ESTIMATION APPROACHES

Estimating or predicting crop yields is a difficult and complex problem. Typical -

approaches to this problem often involve the process indicated in Exhibit 2. There

are several agromet models that have been utilized to estimate crop yields but

overall it seems one can identify two main types of models; namely, statistical/

regression models and more deterministic moisture balance models.

(A) STATISTICAL MOTELS

The statistical/regression models normally relate temperature, precipitation,

solar radiation, potential evapotranspiration, and other variables to yield. Critical

to this approach is having a long period of record of high quality, consistent data

for a given area. An example of a typical, but very current statistical model is

provided in Exhibit 3. This model was developed and implemented by the Center

for Climatic and Environmental Assessment (CCEA) In ‘Columbia, Missouri (material furnished by N. D. Strommen, Supervisory Meteorologist, CCEA). The

model used here requires inputs of monthly mean precipitation values, values of

potential evapotranspiration computed using the Thornthwaite Method (Thornthwaite, 1948), and degree days above 90° l?. Besides Kansas. similar formulas

have been applied for Oklahoma, North Dakota, South Dakota, parts of Minnesota, Nebraska, and the Texas-Oklahoma Panhadle area, and Colorado. One may

note that the forecast of yield improves steadily as the harvest time for wheat

approaches.

(B) MOISTURE BALANCE MODEL

Moisture balance models essentially rely on the fact that plant growth and yield

are a function of available moisture. The soil water balance equation can be

written:

(1)

P is precipitation, O is runoff, V is deep drainage, E is evapotranspiration, and

One of the most critical parameters in terms of crop response and eventual yield

is the soil moisture. Many efforts have been made to measure soil moisture directly

but still soil moisture measurement are not readily available. As a result, efforts

have been made to estimate or infer the amount of water available to plants by

accounting for other moisture fluxes as indicated in Equation 1. Precipitation .

values are readily available with usable observational density. Assumptions or

approximate relationships can be used to evaluate the amount of runoff (0) and

deep drainage (V) in agricultural situations. The principal challenge in using this

approach to estimate the moisture available to crops is in obtaining evapotranspiration estimate (E).

With reference to the use of a moisture balance approach and yield estimates -

one of the most successful efforts has been that described by Baier and Robertson

(1966). The details of applying this approach are provided in Baier et al, (1972).

The principal equation used in this method is as follows:

[ (2)

Ei= actual evapotranspiration for day i

j= refers to zones in the soil profile

) =available soil moisture in the j-th zone at the end of day i—1

Si=capacity for available water in the j-th zone

Zi=adjustment factor for different types of soil dryness curves

PEi=potential evapotranspiration for day i

“adjustment function for effects of varying PE rates on the AE/PE

ratio

 ki =coefficient accounting for soil and plant characteristics

PE=long term average daily PE for a month or season
261

By monitoring precipitation input and making adjustments for drainage and

runoff, Equation 2 can permit daily estimates of E and an accounting of soil

moisture that can eventually be related to yield (Baier and Robertson, 1968).

As already indicated, the principal difficulty in using a soil moisture/water

budget approach comes in estimating evapotranspiration or with specific reference to Equation 2, potential evapotranspiration (PE). The most analytical formula for estimating PE is that provided by Penman (1948). This formula takes

the form:

(3)

where

●

In this equation Rn is the net radiation at the surface, A is the slope of the satuV ration vapor pressure curve at air temperature, V is the wind speed, and eO and ea

are the vapor pressures at the surface and at weather shelter height. This formula

requires some data that are not normally available. As a result daily estimates of

PE are commonly obtained by regression techniques using standard meteorological data. Use of the regression techniques makes it more difficult to extend the

estimates over long distances or times.

In both the statistical methods and the moisture balance methods it is still

necessary at some point to regress some variable(s) against yield. At their best,

the two methods are roughly comparable in the level of yield estimates that are

obtained. The statistical methods are certainly less difficult to implement, but

are, in general, less physically related to the growth of the plant. The moisture

balance method, even though more complex and subject to error, has been successful because soil moisture is so critical and related to crop response.

(C) PHENOLOGICAL/CROP CONDITION MODELS

One method by which one can predict yield is to observe the crop at some time,

tl, and use this as an estimator of its condition at some later time, t+ At. This

technique, of course, can be improved by observing the crop at a series of times

so as to monitor its rate of growth and maturation and, thereby, estimate its condition at harvest time and the commensurate yield. An example of work where

the morphology of the plant is related to its development is provided by Haun

(1973) .

A very valuable concept for monitoring crop growth and for relating climatological variables to crop yield concerns the use of the crop calendar concept

or the biometeorological time (BMT) concept. When the average data at various

stages of crop growth is known and documented the result is commonly called

a “crop calendar”. This approach is often amplified wherein meteorological variables are used to predict when significant points in crop growth will be reached.

Robertson (1968) has used this general approach to establish the BMT concept

wherein biometeorological time establishes the rate of development toward ma- w turity as computed from maximum and minimum air temperatures and day length

(photo thermal units). For wheat there are six critical BMT stages namely:

planting, emergence jointing, heading, softdough, and ripe. There has been appreciable success achieved in averaging meteorological and moisture budget variables over the BMT time periods and regressing the results against yield. The disadvantage of this approach as opposed to using monthly averages, for example,

is that more data processing is usually involved. The reason more data processing

is involved is that monthly averages can be obtained directly from the National

Climatic Data Center in Asheville, North Carolina whereas averages for BMT

periods must be constructed from daily data.

(D) CLIMATOLOGICAL MODELS

Many of the techniques just discussed must assume that normal conditions or

present conditions at the time of the forecast will prevail until the harvest is

accomplished. An accurate forecast of the climate to be expected during this

intervening period would undoubtedly allow the predicted yield to be much

more accurate. In places where data may be difficult to obtain, an accurate

climatic model applicable to or encompassing that location or region would permit

yield forecasts to be made using the meteorological variables provided by the

model. Certainly the value of accurate climatic models cannot be underestimated
262

for improvements in yield prediction and better management of world food resources. However, there is much to be done before reliable, accurate models applicable to crop producing regions is realized. An excellent review of the present

state of climate modelling is provided by Schneider and Dickinson (1974).

(E) METEOROLOGICAL EPISODES

Present yield prediction models do not adequately treat anomalous events that

severely limit yield or destroy a crop. Such events or episodes would include

severe drought, freezing, hail, abnormally heavy rains and wind storms, or diseases. These events are probably best accounted for by having a monitoring system that adequately detects anomalous events, surveys the extent of damage to

the crops, and permits an estimate of the effect on yield. A satellite-based remote

.

sensing system allowing repetitive global coverage and thereby permitting crop

condition to be monitored should be very appropriate here. This possibility along

with other remote-sensing applications in yield forecasting will be described

briefly in the next section. *

(IV) THE APPLICABILITY OF REMOTE SENSING

As indicated earlier the primary variables that affect yield are moisture, temperature, and energy. The applicability of remote sensing for monitoring these

parameters as well as others given in Exhibit 1 is conceptually quite clear in

terms of providing high observational density observations on a repetitive basis

over large regions. However, it has not been conclusively demonstrated that these

parameters can be observed with sufficient accuracy from spacecraft or high

altitude aircraft to make this approach a viable tool for yield forecasting, in

particular, and agricultural climatology, in general.

(A) REMOTE SENSING---STATISTICAL MODELS

For input into statistical models exact correspondence with conventional information must be established for remote sensing information so that it can be

directly incorporated into existing models, or a data set sufficiently large for

establishment of statistically viable relationships and yield predictions based on

satellite observations must be available. Exhibit 4 provides a summary that primarily describes the availability of digital data on computer-compatible magnetic

tapes. Overall, the most consistent, nearly continuous digital data is “atmospheric

window” 10-12 urn data obtained by radiometers on the Nimbus series, primarily,

but more recently available from the NOAA satellites and from the Defense

Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). Since these data would reflect variations in cloudiness, surface moisture, and crop cover, there may be a possibility

that some useful statistical relationships could be obtained between some function involving satellite brightness temperature (perhaps just a simple average)

observed at different points in time during the growing season and crop yield.

Another observation from meteorological satellites that is consistently available

since approximately 1966 is cloud cover as depicted in satellite imagery. Because

cloud cover is related to incoming energy, precipitation occurrence, and the general climate prevailing in a given area, data extraction and processing techniques

involving cloud cover estimates from imagery may offer a viable alternative for

improved yield prediction, particularly in regions where data is sparse or difficult

to obtain.

Averages of precipitation amounts, net radiation, or incoming solar energy can

be substantially in error over large regions because of the wide spacing, low

observational density of conventional observations, Huff (1970) describes sampling errors in the measurement of mean precipitation. Existing satellite data,

such as that from the Synchronous Meteorological Satellite (SMS) series, should

be useful in providing, in conjunction with conventional rain gauges, more accurate mean precipitation input over areas of various size extending from

county-sized areas to the state or regional scale. It may also be possible to provide

useful measures of precipitation over data sparse regions using satellite data

alone. This possibility has been studied by Follansbee (1973). A general review

of rainfall estimation methods from satellites is proved by Martin and Scherer

(1973) .

@) REMOTE SENSING---MOISTURE BUDGET METHODS

As indicated previously, the fact that satellite remote sensing observations

offer a high observational density capability with which to augment conventional
263

observations suggests that its utility and the accuracy advantages’ should be explored. There are many yield prediction models which work at a given location

but fail when applied to other areas or over wide regions. These models fail many

times because the conventional data input does not adequately reflect the spatial

variability of parameters such as precipitation, net radiation, soil moisture, and

evapotranspiration. This problem exists not only with the moisture budget

models but also the statistical models. The possibilities of providing improved

model inputs of precipitation and evapotranspiration estimates using the Penman Equation (3) need to be explored in detail. Some recent work by the Earth

Satellite Corporation ● indicates that there is potential for remote sensing in this

area of endeavor with eventual application in the soil moisture accounting apS

preach (Equation 2).

The fact that soil moisture is such a critical parameter for crop growth coupled

with the indications that remote sensing can be applied for this purpose suggests

that substantial research needs to be accomplished to ascertain the exact applicability of remote sensing measurements of soil moisture. Published results

describing the possibilities with albedo data (Idso et al., 1975), thermal infrared

(Idso et al., 1975) and microwave data (Schmugge et al., 1974) are available.

The fact that microwave data provides a soil profile penetrating and vegetation

penetrating capability makes it appear to be a particularly attractive approach

to be explored as rapidly as circumstances may permit.

(C) CROP CONDITION MONITORING

There are several studies that indicate the condition of a crop can be observed

and perhaps used to estimate its condition at a future time such as harvest.

Among the investigators who have described relevant results are Morain (1974),

Rouse (1973), and Wiegand (1974). These reports show that by using ratios of

Landsat bands such relevant features as leaf area index, biomass, and crops

under stress can be observed. The data developed by Dr. K. Ranamasu (Morain,

1974) show that a peak in the value of the (0.5--0.6)/(0.6-0.7) micrometer reflectance ratio is reached approximately 40 days before harvest. The level of this

peak appears to be related to wheat yield. The presence of disease, insect festation, moisture stress, and fertilizer deficiency may also be observable from space

and used to adjust yield estimates.

(D) METEOROLOGICAL EPISODES

Since meteorological conditions such as freezing, hail damage, or the effects of

unusually heavy rains can severely reduce yield and should alter the spectral

appearance of crops, the possibility of monitoring the occurrence and extent of

these phenomena with remote sensing would be explored. The persistence of

snowcover, or below normal, or above normal soil temperature conditions, flooding and other abnormal conditions may possibly be successfully monitored from

satellites alone or in combination with conventional observations. There is a

recognized need to do this kind of monitoring and the opportunity for successful

+ monitoring from space platforms seems quite real.

(V) SOURCES OF COMPARISON AND GROUND TRUTH

The most sophisticated crop production forecasting system available today is

that applied by the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Statistical Reporting Service. The

average error in yield forecasts is about 2% with the standard deviation in the

error being about 8 percent 9 months before harvest (Castruccio and Loats, 1974).

These figures apply to national production forecasts. The error increases as one

goes to smaller and smaller reporting units. The average error at the state level

at harvest is estimated to be 4-6% and the crop reporting district level it is

estimated to be approximately 10%. The yield component contributes about 50%

of the total variance in production.

The accuracies mentioned above are the standards of comparison for new

methods using remote sensing applied in the United States. If comparability between yield forecasting methods employing remote sensing and conventional

methods can be established in the United States, these same remote sensing

methods should provide valuable information concerning crop yield in countries

outside the United States. It should be explicitly pointed out that the first priority goal is to provide national crop production estimates.

● Private communication with Mr. Earl Merritt, Earth Satellite Corporation, Wash- ington, D.C.
264

For national and state or regional estimates of yield the USDA/SRS estimates

serve as a standard of comparison. Because the SRS technique is essentially a small sample technique it cannot serve as a very effective standard of comparison

at the crop reporting district and county level. At present there is not clear

requirement for accurate yield estimates at the county level, but it may be hypothesized that as food supplies become more critical, and if a Capability for

providing such a result can be demonstrated, such information may be quite useful at the local/county level@ improve national and state yield estimates at the

same time A remote sensing system may offer this potential but in order to validate such a system accurate ground truth systems are needed. These ground truth

systems would provide accurate, local yield measurements, and measurements of

soil moisture, precipitation, evapotranspiration, and crop condition that would

validate remote sensing measurements and yield estimates employing remote v

sensing. The LACIE system of ground truth/test sites is a step in the appropriate

direction

(Vi) CONCLUSIONS

There is a clear need to improve the ability of this nation and the world to

predict crop production and manage food resources. Remote sensing from spacecraft and aircraft appears to offer some opportunities for improvement in yield

prediction, but considerable research and data analysis is needed before this apparent potential is substantiated. Conventional methods use readily available

data that is relatively easy to process and provide predictions in the U.S. that are

comparable to nationwide estimates provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Remote sensing may provide a uniform, consistent data source that can be

obtained over all regions without depending on an international network of

ground-based stations. It, furthermore, may provide a means of improving model

input on all scales by capturing more accurately spatial variability in parameters

such as precipitation and net radiation. Additionally, any improvements that are

produced must be evaluated in terms of the greater data processing complexity

associated with models using remote sensing data as compared to methods using

conventional meteorological data.

REFERENCES

Baier, W. and G. W. Robertson, 1966: A new versatile soil moisture budget.

Canadian Journal of Plant Science, 46,299-315.

Baier, W. and G. W. Robertson, 1968: The performance of soil moisture estimates as compared with the direct use of climatologioal data for estimating crop

yields. Agricultural Meteorology, 5, 17-31.

Baier, W., D. Z. Chapu~ D. A. Russello, and VP. R. Sharp; 1972: Soil moisture

estimator program system. Teehnical Bulletin 78, Agronxeteorology Section, Plant

Research Institute, Research Branch, Canada Department of Agriculture, Ottawa, 55 pp.

C’astruccio, P. A. and H. L. Loats, 1974: The practical utilization of remote

sensing technology for the management and conservation of natural resources,

l}art 1: crop forecasting. A paper prepared for the United Nations Outer Space

Affairs Division, New York, New York, 61 pp. .

Follansbee, W. A., 1973: Estimation of average daily rainfall from satellite

cloud photographs. NOAA Teehnical Memorandum, N’ESS 44, U.S. Dept. of Commeree, National Environmental Satellite Service, 39 pp.

General Iillectric Corporation, 1974: Total Earth Resources System for the

Shuttle Era (TERSSE). Volume 7: User Models-A System Assessment. NASA q

contract NAS9-M401, General Electric, Space Division, Valley Forge, Pa., 8S pp.

Haun. J., 1973: Visual quantification of wheat development, Agronomy Journal,

65,116-119.

Huff, F. A., 1970: Sampllng errors in measurement of mean preeipitatiom

Journal of Applied Meteorology, 9, S5-44.

Idso, S. B., R. D. Jackson, R. J. Reginato, B. A. Kimball, and F. S. Nakayama

1975: The dependence of barefsoil albedo on soil water oontent. Journal of Applied Meteorologyt 14, 109-113.
*

.

0

Idso, S. B., T. J. Schmugge, R. D. Jackson, and R. J. Reginato, 1975: The utility

of surface temperature measurements for the remote sensing of surface soil

water status. Accepted for publication in Journal of Geophysical Research.

Martin, D. W. and W. D. Scherer, 1973: Review of satellite rainfall estimation methods. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 54, 661-674.

Morain, S. A,, 1974: Kansas environmental and resource: a Great Plains

model. Type III Final Report, ERTS Investigation, 52 pp.

Penman, H. L., 1948. Natural evaporation from open water, bare soil, and

grass. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series A, 193,120-145.

Robertson, G. W., 1968: A biometeorological time-peak for a cereal crop involving daylight temperatures and photoperiod. Inst. J. Biometeorology, 12,

191–223.

Rouse, J., 1973: Monitoring the vernal advancement and retrogradation (green

wave effect) of natural vegetation. Type II Progress Reports, A’ASA Contract:

NAS b21857.

Schmugge, T. J., P. Gloersen, T. T. Wilheit and F. Geiger, 1974: Remote

sensing of soil moisture with microwave radiometers. Journal of Geophysical

Research, 79, 317–323.

Schneider, S. H. and R. E. Dickinson, 1974: Climate modeling. Reviews of

Geophysics and Space Physics, 12,447-493.

Slatyer, R. O., 1968: The use of soil water balance relationships in agroclimatology. Agroclimatological Methods, (Edited by R. O. Slatyer), UNIZSCO,

Paris, pp. 73--87.

Thompson, L. M., 1962: Evaluation of weather factors in the production of

wheat. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, 17, 149-156.

Thompson, L. M., 1969: Weather and technology in the production of corn

in the U.S. corn belt. Agronomy .Journal, 61,453-456.

Thornthwaite, G. W., 1948: An approach toward a rational classification of

climates. Geographical Review, 38,85-94.

Wiegand, C. L., 1974: Reflectance of vegetation, soil, and water. Type HI Final

Report, NASA Contract S–70251-AG, 78 pp.

Williams, G. D. V. 1969: Weather and prairie wheat productions. Canadian

Journal of Agricultural Economics, 17,99-109.

EXHIBIT 1

FACTORS IN WHEAT YIELD FORCASTING

)

SECONDARY — .

Light (no. of cloudy days}

Wind (damage)

C 02 (Yield a C 02

)

Soil Type

Date of Planting

Rate of Planting

Depth of Planting

Diseases, weeds

Nutrient s

Leaf area and leaf area index

Variet y
;1

EXHIBIT 2

. .

CROP YIELD ESTIMATION “

.

.
267
268

EXHIBIT 4

DATA AVAILABILITY

DEC. 72- PRESENT

SAME

Chairman HUMPHREY. I want to apologize for my delay in getting

here. We had a battle going on in the Senate. ●

I recall our association during the days of the Space Council. I

am very pleased to have you here.

I gather that we are going to proceed with the witnesses, Dr.

White, Dr. DeNoyer, and Dr. Hill Dr. White, would you proceed “

please.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT WHITE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL

OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT

OF COMMERCE

Dr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, members of the Technology Assessment Board, it is with great pleasure that 1 appear before you today

to discuss the relationship between technology and agricultural productivity as it pertains to the work of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Weather and food productivity are so

closely related that making a point of it only states the obvious.
209

●

The question I wish to discuss today is not what the relationship

is between weather and agriculture, but how emerging technology for

observing and predicting weather conditions can make our agricultural inormation systems more effective in increasing agricultural f

productivity and assist in policy decisionmaking. I would like to talk

about three ways in which weather information can be of great value

in agricultural information systems.

The first deals with the provision of agricultural weather services

directly to the farmer to enable him to carry out his daily tasks

with greater efficiency. Advance weather information a day or two

ahead can affect the way in which he protects, sprays, harvests, or

sows.

The second involves the provision of weather data as part of an

agricultural warning and assessment system. Such weather information from our country and others, plus an understanding of the relationship between weather and crops can enable us to assess the impact of the recent past and present weather conditions on crop production, thus generating a basis on which both operating and policy

decisions can be taken.

Lastly, there are the problems of climate and anticipating its future

changes. An ability to predict changes in average weather conditions

over a period of months, seasons, or years could be valuable in alerting

us to possible adverse or beneficial growing conditions both in this

country and around the world. Such information could be useful in

planning decisions on agricultural production, storage of agricultural

reserves, food export policies, and preparation of disaster assistance.

New technology can assist us in providing such information. Some

of this new technology is available, some requires more development.

Improved basic understanding of weather phenomena is essential for

all applications.

Let me talk briefly about the agricultural weather service. The provision of daily forecasts of the weather specifically geared to serve

the farmer is not a glamorous activity, but it is certainly one that can

most directly affect agricultural productivity. The fruit frost forecasts for the valleys of California, or specialized forecasts for the corn

and wheat growers that enable them to fertilize and spray at the

right time are dependent upon one of the world’s most comprehen-

.

sive and complex environrnental-information-gathering systems. The

system is worldwide, for we need weather information not only from

our own country, but from all countries of the world if we are to

predict the weather even a few days ahead.

Weather information is collected by satellites, aircraft, ships, and

land stations. These data are processed daily by large computers at

the National Meteorological Center in Washington and delivered to

our many field offices via high speed facsimile systems. Our field forecast offices tailor these data and forecasts to the needs of farmers in

various areas of the country.

One might think that such an important service would be in existence in all parts of the Nation. As a matter of fact, since its inception some decades ago, it has been introduced to about 20 percent of

the United States. If we are going to develon agricultural information

systems that will increase our agricultural productivity, it will be

68-877—761 8
270

necessary to extend our agricultural weather service throughout the

Nation.

Secondly, I would like to talk about a weather warning and agriculture assessment system. By this, I mean a system that enables us

to be aware at all times of weather conditions within our country

and in other countries of the world, and being able to understand the

implications of cumulative weather at any point in the growing season

upon the outlook for crops. The Department of Agriculture keeps

close tabs on the status of our crops and we work closely with that

Department in providing detailed weather information accumulated -

from our observational networks both here and abroad.

However, new technology offers the hope that we can do this better.

Earth-orbiting satellites have great potential. The NASA Landsat

which provides multispectral sensing data, may enable us to estimate -

acreage of crops planted and the state of crops. When combined with

the weather satellite information, and other weather information, as

well as a knowledge of the relationship between weather conditions

and crops, we have a potential capability of great value. At the present

time, together with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, we are engaged in an

experiment called the Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment

[LACIE].

Last, I would like to talk about the problems of climate. World food

reserves have now sunk to a point where year-to-year fluctuations in

climate can have disastrous effects upon world food supplies with

serious economic and political consequences. Is there a possibility of

improving our ability to anticipate climate changes better than we

can do today? Our present ability to anticipate weather conditions a

month, season, or a year in advance is very poor. It is poor because

we lack the basic understanding of the causes of changes in climate.

It is also poor because we have not had the technology for acquiring

necessary observations or processing them.

To improve the national capability for anticipating changes in

climate better than we do today, we must bring to bear a new range of

advanced technology. If we are to understand and predict natural

climate fluctuations, there are some fundamental measurements that

we must make.

For example, the climate of the world is related to the state of the ●

oceans. It is necessary for us to have a system for monitoring oceanic

conditions. Such a system must be based upon the use of Earth-orbiting

satellites which have a capability of measuring sea surface temperatures, sea state, and ocean currents, ships of opportunity that may take -

highly automated ocean surface and subsurface observations while

traveling their normal routes, and automatic buoy technology which

can measure the conditions of the oceans at depth. We are experimenting with both of these technologies.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has under

development an ocean satellite to measure many aspects of the conditions of the oceans. The Seasat, in addition to the Landsat and the

environmental satellites of NOAA, offer us opportunities to gather

ocean information that we have not had before.

In the case of buoy technology, we have had a research and development program underway for 5 years aimed at providing buoys which

can remain unattended in the deep oceans for as much as a year, radio-
271

●

ing back their information about oceanic conditions via satellite. Our

buoy developments are at the prototype stage. During the next year we

will deploy a prototype buoy network along our Pacific coast. I cite this

only as an example of the opportunities that new technology opens for

us in the examination of climate.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Do we still have the marine science operation ?

Dr. WHITE. No, we don't. We do have a committee which I chair

called the Interagency Committee for Marine Science and Engineer7 ing. NASA and Interior, are represented.

Central to our ability to move forward is the development of a

capability to simulate the ocean-atmosphere system by mathematical

computer models. For this we will need to move toward new generations of computer systems. In NOAA we employ the largest commercially available computer system. At our geophysical fluid

dynamics laboratory we operate the Texas Instruments advanced

scientific computer, a so-called fifth generation computer which can

execute approximately 40 million instructions per second. We will

need to move even larger computers operating at speeds greater than

100 million instructions per second if we are to model the atmospheric

and oceanic system and use such models to predict the future climate.

Technology will be important to us also in attempting to monitor

and understand the consequences of man's pollution of the atmosphere.

The release of substances such as nitrogen oxides, which come from

supersonic transports and nitrogen fertilizers, or chlorofluorocarbons,

which are used in refrigeration and aerosol spray cans, can affect the

ozone.

While we are much concerned about the impact of a decrease in the

ozone layer on human health and upon terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, we have heard little about the possible effects of a decrease in

ozone upon the climate of the world. Perhaps it is because we do not

understand the consequences, but the ozone layer, because of its special

property, is important in heating the stratosphere. A reduction of the

ozone can have an effect on the temperature of the upper atmosphere

and may consequently influence the lower atmosphere and our weather

as well. It is an impact that we need to understand.

There are other human activities about whose effects on the cli-

● mate we need to be concerned. Burning of fossil fuels adds heat directly to the atmosphere, and it adds car on dioxide. Poor agricultural

practices and industrial activities add particulate matter. These and

other substances can have an impact upon the atmospheric energy

balance and hence upon the climate. We need to understand these

effects better.

In order to do so, we are going to need new technology to monitor

and measure. We will need satellites and aircraft and balloons. We

will need new instrumentation and facilities to measure the rate at

which these contaminants are building up in our ocean and atmospheric system.

Weather information must be an integral part of any agricultural

information system. We can improve the availability of needed

weather information. The key to this improvement is the use of advanced technology.

Thank you.

[The following paper was requested from NOAA by OTA:]
272

ADVANCED TECHNOLGY IN AGRICULTURAL WEATHER INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Automatic data processing and satellites are now and must continue playing

key roles in agricultural weather summaries and forecasts. Both technologies

are used in preparing daily advisories and forecasts for U.S. farmers, in agrometeorological studies, in monitoring and analyzing growing season weather

over major world grain producing areas, and in the Large Area Crop Inventory

Experiment (LACIE). Automatic data Processing also is an essential tool in

developing a capability to interpret long-terrn impacts of growing season weather

in terms of variability of future yields.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is applying

.

these technologies as rapidly as resources and the state of the art permit. Basic

to future progress, however, will be the need for computers of sufficient capacity

and speed to handle the large volume of data required to develop adequate global

climatic model Such modeling research has begun at NOAA’s Geophysical .

Fluid Dynamics Laboratory at Princeton, New Jersey.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) uses automatic data processing and meteorological satellite imagery for its weather forecasting services for agriculture, for agrometeologcal studies in support of

more effective agricultural Practices, and for developing global weather-yield

estimation models.

NOAA National Weather service (NWS) forecasts including agricultural

weather forecasts, are based on activities at an extensively computerized National Meteorological Center (NMC). NMC routinely acquires large amounts of

cloud and temperature data from weather satellites as well as over 20,000 landstation, ship, balloon, and aircraft observations daily. NMC computers process

the raw data and produce weather map analyses, Prognostic charts, and other

guidance material such as quantitative Precipitation forecasts for dissemination to NWS field offices and other subscribers. The NMC guidance is disseminated through. more than 600 facsimile and 800 teletypewriter transmissions

daily. The centralized preparation of data maps, and forecasts is designed to

eliminate most requirement for hand charting and independent meteorological

analysis at field offices. The NWS through combined use of its large computer

facility, numerical forecast methods, and its field forecast offices and service

centers, provides agricultural and other users with daily forecasts and outlooks

out to five days in advance.

Specialized agricultural weather advisories and studies at the state 1evel also

use weather satellite data as well as nearby university computer systems. As an

example, the Environmental Studies Service Center at Auburn, Alabama has

begun a study to use weather satellite data in its real-time agricultural weather

service program. It centers on development of techniques and methods providing

the absolute radiation temperature at the earth’s surface and then incorporating

the thermal data into models for Prediction of soil temperature and moisture.

In addition, the thermal data will have great utility in improving service in areas .

where freeze hazards exist. The thermal data will pictorially portray the realtime development of a freeze allowing growers to sharpen decisions in management of cold protection practices. In addition, a “cold night” climatology can be

produced which will be valuable in land use planning and in improving “spot”

temperature forecasts.

NOAA progress in more timely acquisition of global precipitation and tempera0

ture data for cumulative growing-season assessments was described in the fourth

and fifth paragraphs of Dr. Edward Epstein’s report of September 25, 1975 to

the Technology Assessment Board. For completeness I should add that the Air

Force Global Weather Central at Offut Air Force Base is working with us to

extend and improve the precipitation estimating procedure that systematically

integrates conventional meteorological observations and satellite observations

of clouds over selected areas of the Northern Hemisphere.

NOAA development of weather-yieid estimation models is a part of the NASA/

NOAA/USDA Large Area Crop Experiment (LACIE). The goal of LACIE is to

provide prompt (within 14 days of data acquisition) objective estimates of wheat

production. NASA and the USDA are concerned with developing experimental

demonstration systems, using LANDSAT multispectral data,1 to determine acre1 Data on speetral redectanes of the target of competing crops.
273

●

.

ages of wheat planted in eight nations. NOAA’s Environmental Data Service and

the USDA are concerned with defining and quantifying the relationship between

meteorological conditions and crop yield in the same eight nations.

NOAA weather-yield estimation is accomplished by use of meteorological data

routinely available through the World Meteorological Organization communications links augmented by examination of satellite images from the NOAA polar

orbiting and geostationary satellites. It is not now possible to obtain quantitative

data from satellites on most of the important environmental parameters most

affecting crop yields, e.g. soil moisture and solar radiation. Satellite images are

useful, however, in detecting areas which remain cloud free (hence without

precipitation) for long periods of time resulting in drought conditions. Satellites

are also of considerable use in tracking large storm systems over crop producing

areas to improve estimates of rainfall or call attention to potential flood conditions. It is our intention to incorporate quantitative data derived from satellites

when the data acquisition and processing techniques have been developed.

In our opinion, LACIE has tremendous potential for providing prompt, objective, world-wide information on critical crops. The first year of the program

focused on the Great Plains areas of North America. Preliminary results are

encouraging. Technical problems in acreage estimation have been identified and,

we believe, solved to the point that the three agencies are proceeding with phase

two-an 18 month test of techniques for the Great Plains plus selected areas in

other nations. Preliminary analysis of the yield estimation system used in phase

one is quite encouraging. Phase three will consist of a full scale test on a global

scale and is scheduled to start in about a year.

The continued availability of satellite data is critical to the long term applicability of LACIE-derived technology for operational estimating of global production of wheat and other major crops. This assumes that LACIE proves successful and cost effective. LANDSAT 2 is performing well, with an expected lifetime through 1977 or 1978, and the follow-on satellite (LANDSAT-C), has been

authorized. Continued availability or digital multispectral data beyond the early

1980’s is not certain. Since the central concept of LACIE acreage determinations

is semi-automatic computer processing of multispectral data used in multitemporal analyses: no other known satellite systems can be ‘used.

The weather-yield estimating system, as discussed above, does not depend on

quantitative data from satellites. It is believed, however, that instruments proposed for future experimental or operational environmental satellites will provide quantitative data useful for this purpose, Continued research and development is necessary in NASA and NOAA to develop these instruments and the technology to derive meaningful geophysical data. Likewise, additional efforts are

needed to develop and improve mathematical models which relate meteorological conditions to crop yields. LACIE focuses on wheat acreage, yield and production. Other NOAA efforts are devoted to modeling yield of corn, soybeans, and

other important crops utilizing computer facilities at the University of Missouri

in Columbia.

Advanced computer technology is especially needed in NOAA’s basic meteorological research efforts. Basic understanding and skillful prediction of seasonal

w weather and climate will be achieved only with the aid of computers of very

large capacity and speed. Immense volumes of data must be processed to develop

adequate global climate models which incorporate at least the most significant

of the many complex feedbacks between ocean and atmosphere. Development of

models to simulate possible impact of man’s activities on climate and to study

the dynamics of trace contaminants in the stratosphere similarly require giant

computers. NOAA’s Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) already

is using an Advanced Scientific Computer (ASC) to conduct fundamental investigations in the dynamics of atmospheric processes over a wide range of time

and space scales. These investigations include studies on many scales of motion

and a host of interrelated physical processes.

Of particular interest to agricultural meteorology, GFDL mathematical models

have achieved reasonably accurate simulations of typical seasonal distributions

of wind, temperature, and precipitation. Testing the ability of these models to

predict seasonal weather variations using real atmospheric and oceanic observations has not been done and requires very extensive computer power. Progress

9 Examination of data during two or more critical biological development states (growth stages) of the crop.
274

will be relatively slow as governed by the availability of computing power, and

complementary resources, unless new aproaches to this difficult problem are

found.

In conclusion, I am pleased to have been able to report here on the application

of advanced technology to several agricultural weather research and service

activities. Further progress in understanding weather for agricultural and other

types of weather services require that we continue to use the latest satellite

and computer technology states-of-the-art. NOAA intends to continue its innovative efforts in this area.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you very much, Dr. White.

Our next witness is Dr. John DeNoyer.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN DeNOYER, DIRECTOR, EROS, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR .

Dr. DENOYER. Mr. Chairman and members of the Technology Assessment Board, I am glad to have the opportunity to appearbefore

this Board to discuss remote sensing programs in the Department of

the Interior that relate to food production.

Even though the Department of Interior is not directly responsible

for food production, Interior does have man-y activities in terms of

data gathering, information dissemination, and management responsibilities that relate directly to food production.

Some of these management activities include the leasing and use

of public lands, leasing and monitoring of petroleum production on

Federal lands and the Outer Continental Shelf, operation of systems

of reservoirs for the combined purpose of recreation, power generation, and water availability for irrigation and management of wildlife

resources. Information gathering and distribution of data include

baseline data on water availability and quality, mapping of flood-prone

areas and mapping of actual floods, geologic information to assist in

the exploration for minerals, such as phosphates, needed for agriculture and preparation and distribution of topographic and land-use

maps that are basic tools for planning.

Remote sensing technology has demonstrated capabilities or potential for applications in all of these areas. The Earth Resourses Observation Systems (EROS) program was established in the Department to be a focal point for uses of remote sensing throughout the

various bureaus and to work with other agencies in applying and -

planning for remote sensing capabilities that are needed to carry out

the departmental responsibilities.

The paper I have submitted to the Technology Assessment Board

discusses, in some detail, the ways in which remote sensing is being -

used in the Department and points out the relation of these uses to food

production. I would like to add that similar discussions could be

written with other topics as the central focus. Remote sensing allow

us to make observations and to preserve these observations in a quantitative and objective way. These data are then useful for many purposes.

The fact that so many diverse disciplines are using remote sensing

data sources as tools is having a significant effect on the development

of interdisciplinary natural sciences. The fact that Landsat and

the NOAA satellites have worldwide coverage capabilities is also

encouraging collaboration between scientists in different countries. The
275

9

importance of improving these types of interdisciplinary and international communications cannot be underestimated when problems such

as world food production are considered.

Much has been accomplished since the launch of Landsat-I in

July 1972. The research programs have demonstrated many capabilities. Some of these are already being incorporated into the regular

functions of governmental agencies and industry. We have also

learned a lot in terms of what we should do next.

An improved data processing system that will serve Landsat is

v being implemented by NASA at the Goddard Space Flight Center.

The Department of the Interior is upgrading its capabilities at the

EROS Data Center in Sioux Falls, S. Dak., to accept the improved data

formats that NASA will be producing and to provide for data reproduction and distribution to users.

These complementary capabilities have been made possible through

cooperation in detailed technical planning between NASA and Interior, close coordination at the management levels, and the support of

this Congress. We expect to have these improved data processing

systems in operation to handle the data from Landsat-C. The result

will be that users will be able to obtain much higher quality data

in formats that will be easier to use, and the time between acquisition

by the satellite and availability to users will be reduced from the present 6 to 8 weeks to 2 to 3 weeks.

The Department of the interior is also working closely with NASA

and other participating agencies to define the technical characteristics

of follow-on systems that will be needed in the 1980's. We, like the

other user agencies recognize the importance of continuity to programs

of this type. If there is a single factor that has discouraged full scale

use, it is the lack of assurance of continuity.

The interest in receiving training in the capabilities and methods

of using remotely sensed data by scientists and managers has been

large and is increasing. A full schedule of workshops, structured training courses, and cooperative demonstration projects is being conducted

at the EROS Data Center and at applications assistance facilities

that are operated by the EROS program.

The purpose of these training and demonstration projects is to

transfer technology to organizations and individuals to accomplish m

their missions more effectively through the use of remotely sensed

data. There are also capabilities to satisfy information needs that

may not have been practical or possible in the past but are now

relatively easy to accomplish through the use of remote sensing.

Mr. Chairman, satellite technology has opened the windows of space

to see ourselves as we are and to direct our scientific search for solutions to food and other resource problems. Remote sensing has given

us the capability. to monitor many of our environmental conditions and

to measure, significant changes. The realization of the importance of

these developments is not apparent to all. I am, however, encouraged

that the Technology Assessment Board is familiarizing itself with this

program.

Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Thank you.

[The following paper was requested from EROS by OTA:]
SUMMARY OF THE PAPER--REMOTE

276

SENSING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT

OF INTERIOR THAT RELATE TO FOOD PRODUCTION

(BY John M. DeNoyer)

The Earth Resources Observations (EROS) Program was established in 1906

as a departmental program under the direction of the Geological Survey. As an

integral part of the program, an EROS data center was established at Sioux

Falls South Dakota which maintains remote sensing archives, including retrieval facilities, and conducts training programs on the use of remote sensing

data.

The objectives of this program are: (1) to develop remote sensing capabilities

applicable to solving natural resource problems within the department; (2) to *

conduct and encourage research in remote sensing methods; and (3) to serve

as a focus for technical exchanges with other agencies.

The Department of Interior has primary responsibility for the derivation of

information relating to energy from water, fossil fuels, and the related environ- ~ mental effects of development. Its responsibilities relating to food production

include: (1) Management of public lands, (2) Management of surface water,

(3) Providing baseline information on water availability, quality, and use, (4)

Mapping of flood prone areas and actual floods, (5) Conduct of experimental

programs in weather modification, and (6) Searching for critical minerals such

as phosphates.

Remote sensing data are being used in experimental programs in each of these

areas. Preliminary reports indicate that remote sensing data are useful in

developing improved management plans for the public lands. They also have

been found to be useful in each of the other areas listed.

Many capabilities of remote sensing have been demonstrated. Others are still

in the research stage, More areas of application will be discovered as scientists

become more familiar with the data and with analytical techniques for processing

these data.

The EROS Program has been cooperating with most of the Latin American

countries and with Iceland in the use of LANDSAT and other remote sensing

methods. In each country the remote sensing data have been utilized to provide

information on land use, agricultural development and related areas.

Experience in the EROS program indicates that one of the major deficiencies

at the present time is the delay in obtaining data and analyses after the data

have been recorded. It often has been impossible to get the information to the

program manager at the time he needed it to make his decision.

More emphasis needs to be placed on physical models to turn data into useful

information, and more experience needs to be gained in using this information

for real management decisions.

Agencies are concerned about becoming dependent on LANDSAT data until

there is assurance of continuity beyond 1980. Also too often the data are not

available soon enough to be used in making time-critical decisions; and standard

photographic products contain less than the complete data, thus precluding their

use in some applications.

These latter deficiencies are technical and can be corrected with improved “

technology. An important result of this program, often overlooked, is the unifying influence of a global data base with uniform characteristics that services

scientists in many disciplines in many countries.

REMOTE SENSING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR THAT RELATE

m

TO FOOD PBODUCTION

(By John M. DeNoyer, Director, Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS)

Program, Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Individuals who made major contributions to this report are:

David Carneggie Donald Lauer

William D. Carter Robert Ledzian

Morris Deutsch Charles J. Robinove

William A. Fischer Gene A. Thorley

William R. Hemphill Grover Torbert

Richard S. Williams, Jr.
277

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS) Program is a departmental program, managed by the Geological Survey for the Department of the

Interior. The primary functions are--

to conduct and encourage research in remote sensing technology;

to assist in implementing uses of remote sensing technology to operational

programs;

to provide a mechanism for technology transfer; and

to provide for data archiving, retrieval, reproduction and distribution

of remotely sensed data and related information.

P Some important functions of the Department of the Interior that relate to

food production aremanagement of public lands;

management of surface water;

to provide baseline information on water availability and quality;

mapping of flood prone areas and mapping of actual floods;

conducting experimental programs in weather modification;

searching for critical minerals such as phosphates;

management of petroleum and natural gas production on Federal lands;

management of wildlife resources;

preparation and distribution of topographic maps; and

compilation and distribution of land use maps and related information.

Remote sensing technology has some demonstrated or

to all of these functions.

Significant progress has been made in using remote

demonstrating its applicability for:

water availability;

weather modification;

irrigated land inventories;

impacts of changing land use on agriculture;

rangeland management;

flood mapping;

indications of climatic change:

potential applications

sensing technology or

exploration for phosphates for” fertilizer production; and

energy resources.

Training in the uses of remote sensing technology for agricultural and other

disciplines needs additional attention.

Major problems and deficiencies in the current remote sensing program arelack of assurance of data continuity;

data are not available soon enough for management decisions or environmental and emergency applications;

standard photographic products should be of higher quality;

inadequate physical models to use the remotely sensed data; and

inadequate management models to use information derived from remotely sensed data.

. Global remote sensing hasimproved interdisciplinary scientific communication;

improved international scientific communication; and

made new types of global scientific studies possible.

INTRODUCTION

The Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS) Program was established in 1968 as a departmental program to: (1) develop remote sensing

capabilities applicable to solving natural resource problems within the department, (2) conduct and encourage research in remote sensing methods,

(3) work with the various bureaus of the department in implementing uses

of remote sensing technology into operational programs, and (4) serve as a

focus for interagency technical and programmatic exchange with other agencies, In addition to these functions, the EROS Data Center is a major facility

for remote sensing data archiving, retrieval, reproduction and distribution that

is operated at Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Emphasis is also placed on technology transfer of uses of remotely sensed data through applications assistance, technique development appropriate for operational uses, demonstration

projects and training programs,
278

In the intensive agricultural practices of the United States, the availability

of energy and the production of food are inexorably linked. The Department

of the Interior has a prime responsibility for the derivation of information

relating to energy from water, fossil fuels, and the related environmental

effects of development. In addition, the department has other responsibilities

that relate to food production that include:

Management of public lands.—The Bureau of Land Management is responsible for realty activities on all national resources lands, the Outer Continental

Shelf, and large areas of Federal land under other agency surface management

(e.g., national forests. )

This area comprises more than 182 million hectares (450 million acres) still

in Federal ownership, as well as the publicly owned mineral resources on about

25 million hectares (61 million acres) of privately owned lands, and the Outer “

Continental Shelf.

Management of surface water.—The Bureau of Reclamation and the Bonneville Power Administration are directly responsible for management of major

quantities of water that is used for irrigation of agricultural lands in the western ~ United States.

Providing baseline information on water availability, quality, and use.— The

Geological Survey is the primary agency for collection of water data and for

compiling ground water and surface water data collected by other agencies. The

rapid growth in the use of ground water for irrigation emphasizes the importance

of this activity.

Mapping of flood prone areas and mapping of actual floods.--- The Geological

Survey conducts many of these flood mapping activities. Such maps have direct

applications to agricultural planning and damage assessment to crops.

Conduct experimental proqrams in weather modification.-- The Bureau of

Reclamation is conducting experimental programs in weather modification to increase water availability and for hail suppression. Both of these objectives have

a direct bearing on water availability for irrigation and minimizing crop damage.

Searching for critical minerals such as phosphates.— The use of phosphates to

improve agricultural production is increasing. The location of phosphate deposits

requires basic geologic information of the type that the Geological Survey prepares.

Management of petroleum and natural gas production on Federal lands..-

Petroleum and natural gas have become very important for preparation of fertilizers, operation of farm equipment, processing of agricultural products and

transportation of farm products. The Bureau of Land Management has responsibility for leasing of potential petroleum producing areas on Federal lands, and

the Geological Survey is responsible for technical consultation with the Bureau

of Land Management prior to leasing and supervision of the leases through the

development and production phases. Geologic mapping on land and marine

geologic investigations conducted by the Geological Survey serve as the basis for

most of the more detailed exploration programs conducted by the petroleum

industry.

Management of wildlife resources. —The Fish and Wildlife Service is responsible for the conservation of many types of wildlife and their habitats. The natural -

resources of wildlife contribute directly to food supplies and are also important

for the balance of nature that is essential for future food availability.

Preparation and distribution of topographic maps of the United States.— These

maps are prepared by the Geological Survey and form the basis for most planning and engineering development in the country.

Complicatiom and distribution of land use maps and information-- The GeoIogical Survey is conducting a hind use mapping program that will be completed

for the conterminous states within a few years. Times data will be essential to

the quantitative evaluation of relationships between land use for agriculture and

other competing uses.

Remote sensing can contribute to information gathering and analysis, in terms

of efficiency, timeliness and accuracy for all of these activities. In some cases,

remote sensing is the only way to collect the necessary data and perform an

analysis in a timely manner.

REMOTE SENSING APPLICATIONS

A number of specific research projects, demonstration projects and cooperative programs are in progress within the EROS Program at the present time.

Others have progressed to the point that the participating organizations are continuing the work initiated by the EROS Program. These activities are all con-
279

ducted with the direct participation of the responsible agencies. The participating agencies include Federal, state, local, and foreign governments, and domestic

and foreign organizations. The following discussion will be restricted to uses

of remote sensing technology and related uses of data collection platforms.

Water Availability

The efficient and practical use of water is the key to successful agricultural

production, both of plant crops and meat products. The use of remote sensing

technology, including the use of images from the Landsat Earth orbital satellites,

is proving to be an aid in the agricultural field in three ways: (1) in determining

the volume and availability of water for agriculture, (2) in aiding in the disP tribution and management of the agricultural water supply, and (3) in assisting

in the determination of the quality of water for agricultural purposes.

In many areas of the United States, ground water is “mined” (extracted at

a greater rate than replenished), and information relating to the rates of extraction, the means of replenishment, and the availability of temporary sources of

water, such as playa (temporary) lakes, is currently limited. Promptly delivered

and analyzed satellite images can assist in the inventory af available water

and determining and protecting the most effective points of aquifer recharge.

The volume and availability of water is determined in different ways for different purposes. Mapping of the extent of surface water in lakes, rivers, and

other inland water bodies and in the measurement of the changes in the amount

of water in storage is readily facilitated by periodic analysis of Landsat images.

Recent work by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration has shown that water bodies as small as 1.6 hectares

(4 acres) can be identified and mapped, and changes in area covered by surface

water can be readily discerned over periods of time.

Because irrigated agriculture is primarily supplied from surface water sources,

the assessment of the distribution of such water is of vital importance in determining the areas that can be irrigated during a given year, assessing the amount

of water available at the beginning of an irrigation season, and in determining

the source areas for water which may not now be used for irrigation but which

could possibly be used in the future.

Much of the water available for irrigation and other uses in the western United

States occurs as snow and is released when the snow is melted during the spring

and early summer. Monitoring of the mountain snow pack during the winter and

the melting of that snow during the spring thaw period can aid in the forecasting of water supplies and in determining their allocation during the irrigation season. The U.S. Geological Survey participates in the monitoring of the

mountain snow packs. At present a cooperative project between the USGS, NASA,

and other agencies is being undertaken to demonstrate the feasibility of using

such snow cover mapping and water runoff forecasting in California, Colorado,

Oregon, and Arizona.

Use of ground water for irrigation is on the increase in the western United

“States. Exploration for ground water is aided by the analysis of Landsat images

to locate aquifers, or water bearing formations, that occur just below the surface

● of the land. Such aquifers may be indicated by the pattern of the rocks and

sediments, the vegetative indicators, and by land-use clues, While much of the

exploration for ground water must inevitably rely on drilling and definite proof

of the availability of adequate supplies of water, initial indications of the presence

of ground-water bearing formations may be obtained from the analysis of

Landsat images and may guide efficient programs of exploration and drilling.

The distribution and management of water systems for irrigated agriculture

requires real time decisions, on the present and continual availability of water,

and the means which will distribute water to the users at the appropriate time.

Remote sensing technology allows the water manager access to an up-to-date

inventory of the amount and distribution to irrigated lands as well as availability

of water for irrigation. Measurement of amounts of wateflow in rivers, canals

and distribution systems is monitored by telemetering the data into the water

manager’s office.

Water data is used in two prime ways. The first is in exploration for water.

Knowledge of the amount of water available at a given time and its quality is an

essential factor in planning for the construction for large water distribution and

diversion works and for the decisions on the allocation of financial and other

resources for the production and management of such water. Landsat image

analysis can significantly aid in determining such characteristics of the water
2$0

and the terrain and can aid in the scientific and engineering planning for the

development and in exploration of water resources.

The second, management and regulation of water resources, requires real time

knowledge on the availability of water at various points and time and at various

places. The continuing repetitive nature of Landsat images allows an assessment

by the water manager of availability of water and the ability to have information

on the availability and flow of water at various points telemetered directly to

his office allowing him to make faster and more efficient decisions on the allocation of that resource.

The applications of remote sensing to the study of water resources have been

summarized in a recent report of the Space Applications Boardd of the Academy

of Engineering of the National Research Council. It provides detailed assessments of the types of data needed for management of inland water resources, of

the benefits that may accrue from better management of inland water resources

based on the use of remotely sensed data, and suggests several demonstration

projects that could be undertaken to provide such proof. The Geolgical Survey

has engaged in research on the applications of remote sensing technology to

water resources problems for a number of years and has actively been involved

in a number of water management groups within the United States in such projects. The benefits to be achieved from these applications are potentially large.

Achieving the desired objectives and maximum benefits will require the continued

involvement of management groups and a continuation of the research leading to

the demonstration of feasibility of the specific application.

Weather Modification To Enhance Water Availability

Seven Landsat data collection platforms (DCP’s) have been used by the

Bureau of Reclamation in a major winter weather modification program designed

to determine the feasibility of enhancing runoff into the Colorado River Basin.

The platforms, located in the severe winter environment of the San Juan Mountains of southwestern Colorado, have been operated snee the spring of 1973.

Temperature, precipitation, solar radiation, streamflow, humidity, and snowpack

water equivalent observations are routinely relayed by Landsat to the Goddard

Space Flight Center where they are transmitted to a Denver computer and are

available via teletype terminals within 3 to 8 hours from on-site transmission.

During the 1973-1974 winter season, the platform system proved to be a valuable tool in providing additional and mare rapidly acquired data for weather

forecasting, cloud seeding operations, streamflow forecasting, and evaluation

purposes. Data have been used for near real-time monitoring of meteorological

and hydrological data for control of cloud seeding operations and verification of

weather forecasts. Project experience has shown the Landsat field installations

to be remarkably reliable, weather resistant and cost effective with the capability

of relaying high-quality data in near real time. The availability of such data

contributes to the decision making processes of the Bureau of Reclamation’s

research and development program in precipitation management.

Another study was initiated during the summer of 1975 near Miles City, Montana. This study involves testing the effectiveness of recording rainfall in the

High Plains through use of Landsat. The satellite relays data from 64 rain gages 

and provides reliable, nearly instantaneous rainfall information. The project is

part of the Bureau of Reclamation’s High Plains Cooperative Program, a comprehensive research effort to refine the technology for seeding summer clouds to

increase rainfall over the High Plains States.

An automatic system for the collection of precipitation and other meteorlogi- *

cal parameters from the Miles City cloud seeding site has been developed and

tested. The design incorporates a network of digital precipitation gages operating within a 10-kilometre (12-mile) radius of a Landsat. DCP. The design also

includes a concept for data collection by aircraft from a network of gages operating over an area of several thousand square miles. Two Landsat/Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite ( GOES ) compatible DCP's will also be

installed in the project area. A variety of meteorological data parameters including average wind speed and direction, temperature, and humidity will be relayed

for project control and to evaluate the effect of cloud seeding research.

The use of satellite imagery from GOES is also being considered within the

Bureau of Reclamation's Atmospheric Water Resources Management Program.

The availability of near real-time imagery will provide valuable information on

cloud growth and location for project management. The pictorial record of cloud

events will also be of value for evaluating the results of cloud seeding.

The Bureau of Reclamation is currently providing technical support and laboratory facilities to the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) of the Department of
281

Agriculture for examination of the Upper Rio Grande drainage in the Sangre de

Cristo-San Luis Valley area of Colorado. SCS is developing runoff forecasts based

on snowpack information derived from satellite imagery.

Irrigated Land Inventoried

Inventories of irrigated lands are important for estimating agricultural pro

duction. They are also important in planning of water management. Water management involves both surface water and ground water. Surface water management must include recreation, wildlife habitat, flood control and power generation as well as irrigation requirements, The use of ground water for irrigation

is increasing rapidly in a number of western states. Continued increases in and

widespread use of this resource must consider the impact on the water table and

on the ability of the aquifer to recharge at a rate comparable to rate of water

withdrawal.

Center-pivot irrigation systems we readily observed on Landsat imagery, particularly band 5 (600-700 nanometres), the red band, and in false-color composite

images where contrast between irrigated and nonirrigated areas is marked. In

recent years deployment of center pivots has increased rapidly; Nebraska, for

example, is currently adding about 2,000 per year. In some areas, the increased

deployment could affect the local ground water table. Both the University of

Nebraska and the EROS Program have used Landsat imagery to count the numnumber of center pivots for the entire state during the irrigation seasons of

1972, 1973, and 1$74. Analysis of such imagery shows that the number of center

pivots in part of Holt County, Nebraska, increased from 508 in July 1972, to

552 in July 1973, and to 740 in August 1974.

An inventory of irrigated agricultural lands is being conducted in the Klamath

River basin of Oregon in cooperation with the Oregon Department of Water Resources. This project is designed to demonstrate the utility of multidate Landsat

data and manual analysis techniques for inventorying and monitoring irrigated

land area. The Klamath River Basin Compact between the States of Oregon and

California limits the acreage of land in each state that may be irrigated within

the basin. Compliance with the terms of this compact requires annual inventories

of the irrigated acreage so that regulation can be imposed as the limit is approached. The EROS Program, through the Pacific Northwest Regional Commismission Project, is assisting in a demonstration of the use of 1:250,000 Landsat

color composite prints acquired at two or three dates during the growing season,

together with manual delineation of irrigated land and dot grid sampling procedures to estimate the acreage of irrigated land.

In the Bureau of Reclamation, satellites such as Landsat are revolutionizing

data collection, and the application of remote sensing technology promises to

become increasingly useful as the full range of its potential is explored and

exploited. Consideration is being given to the future use of remote sensing to

assist in obtaining information for the following types of Bureau activities:

(a) Periodic inventory of irrigated lands and cropping patterns to determine

changes in area for improved water use projections; and land use inventories to

identify environmental problems and growth patterns.

(b) Gathering of crop census data on projects more accurately and economically. The potential also exists for determining the state of plant vigor and

associated yield estimates.

(c) Timely and rapid acquisition of basic water resources data to achieve

better conservation. management, and use of existing supplies. A typical example

would be the periodic monitoring of water surface areas at remote reservoir sites

to assist in measurements of water lost to evaporation.

Impacts of Changing Land Use on Agriculture

The availability of Landsat imagery since July of 1972 has provided scientists,

planners, environmentalists, cartographers, geographers, economists, and others

with the data and the means to objectively monitor environmental impact caused

by man’s activities and the attendant changes in land surface cover. Not only is

such monitoring of environmental impact and changes in land surface cover possible for the United States but for all the land areas of the world as well.

In the United States the land classified as agricultural is one of the most variable because it is subject to seasonal change, change in crop type, or conversion

to industrial or residential land. The current Landsat technology, for instance,

could provide each state and the nation as a whole with an annual inventory of

total land under cultivation on a seasonal basis. This information could then

serve as the basis for estimating the amount and distribution of agricultural land

being converted to non-agricultural use.
282

The EROS Program is participating in a demonstration project to measure

the conversion of cropland to urban land. Four specific areas are included in this

project. The areas are: (1) the 10 largest urban areas in the State of South

Dakota, (2) the Atlanta, Georgia, urban area, (3) the Puget Sound urbanized

area, and (4) the Portland-Willamette Valley urban area. In each of these areas,

the analysis is being conducted in cooperation with Federal, regional, state and/

or local agencies to demonstrate the applicability of satellite and aircraft data

to urban land use planning. One of the principal concerns of land use planners

is determining “highest and best use” of a given parcel of land. It follows that, as

property values rise in urban or near-urban areas, the competition between conflicting land uses becomes of major interest to land use planners. Thus, timely,

economical and reliable estimates of the rate of conversion of prime, high-value,

agricultural land to urban uses, is a primary information requirement. Within

each of the study areas, the utility of multitemporal Landsat data and interactive digital image analysis techniques for meeting this information requirement is being demonstrated.

Rangeland Management

The purpose of rangeland management as conducted by private enterprise or

by Federal or state governments is to ensure the highest production of cattle and

sheep commensurate with conservation and maintenance of good condition of’

the rangelands. This is an example of the sustained yield concept or the maximization of production over a long period of years rather than maximization for

only a short term with consequent degradation of the range conditions which

could lessen production in later years. The rangeland manager has two basic

tasks that can be facilitated by remote sensing technology and particularly by the

use of Landsat images. The first is basic assessment of rangeland condition and

determination of the grazing capacity of the range. The second is monitoring of

the range conditions for day-to-day and year-to-year management.

Basic assessment of the range involves mapping and describing grazing lands

so that the soils and water conditions are well known and the type, distribution,

and density of vegetation is well known. From that, the capacity or number of

grazing animals per unit area can be determined. Research, using Landsat

images, in both the United States and Australia is demonstrating that the land

can be subdivided into areas of varying grazing capacity based on the vegetation, soils, and nature of the land surface. The Landsat images are satisfactory

for such an evaluation at small scale over large areas.

Monitoring of range conditions will provide the range manager with information to determine what the grazing capacity of the range should be for a given

year, whether it is wet or dry, whether there has been natural or manmade degradation of the land, and whether or not rangelands have been improved by

management practices. Degradation of rangelands can take place by overgrazing

or erosion. These features can be seen on Landsat images and can be quantified

by digital processing of the images.

It is necessary for the rangeland manager of public lands to set the grazing

capacity of these lands in any given year in such a manner that the land will not

be required to carry too many grazing animals, and thus be degraded, and yet not

carry too few grazing animals so that production may be optimized. The qualities of the Landsat images are such that these decisions can be made. The major

deficiency at the present time is in obtaining data and analyses rapidly enough

to get that information to the manager at the time that he needs to make his

decision.

The Bureau of Land Management and EROS have sponsored a pilot study in

rangeland monitoring in the Susanville district of California. The study, conducted by the University of California, Berkeley, was directed at a large variety

of problems that are of concern to the bureau, and the results are to be made

widely available within the bureau, so that applicable portions can be utilized

operationally in the various regions. Specific demonstrations from this study

include the ability to make rapid regional assessments of range class conditions

to guide release or withdrawal of grazing leases. The capability to monitor change

in water areas of large stock ponds and range reservoirs can be used to guide

decisions concerning grazing leases. Rapid changes in range conditions can occur

as a result of floods, hail, wind, temperature, drought, and disease. The effect

of all of these factors on range conditions can be monitored by use of Landsat

data, but rapid processing and analysis of the derived information is necessary

in order to make timely management decisions.

This study determined and demonstrated the feasibility of utilizing Landsat

data to monitor the seasonal change of range conditions within the annual
283

grassland type of California. The seasonal condition of the forage IS directly

related to the quality and quantity of available forage. Monitoring these changes

provides inputs for determining the relative amount of forage produced, the location of high-quality forage, the timing of livestock movement to and from rangelands, and the fire hazard associated with dry forage.

This study and related investigations have been important considerations by

the Bureau of Land Management in the preparation of a comprehensive, strategic

long-range plan. This plan will adapt the latest in automatic data processing

and remote sensing technologies into a Bureau of Land Management information

system. The strategic plan is designed to point the direction in which the Bureau

of Land Management might go in these areas and to provide a basis for more

.

informed decisions about (1) the acquisition of information system hardware and

software, (2) the automation of system data, and (3) the use of remote sensing

technology.

The integrated approach to using automatic data processing and remote sensing

technology will include the following areas: domestic livestock grazing, fish and

wildlife ecology and habitat development, outdoor recreation, timber production,

watershed protection, wilderness preservation, minerals development, environmental protection and enhancement, river basin planning, and general land use

classification under the concept of multiple use. Resource management and development activities are supported by a construction and maintenance program

which provides and maintains roads, trails, and physical improvements such as

recreation facilities and watershed control structures; and by an active program

to protect the public lands and their resources from wildfires and from all other

forms of public and private misuse.

The EROS program has been cooperating with most of the Latin American

countries in the use of Landsat and other remote sensing methods. Many South

American countries realize that Landsat data can provide them with much of

the information that is needed for natural resource inventory, planning, and

development. Bolivia, for example, has vigorously pursued a multidisciplinary

approach in which geologists, hydrologists, agronomists, and foresters worked together to produce maps in their respective disciplines and then combine these

into what are called “land capability maps.” These maps show where farming,

grazing, irrigation, and other types of development are feasible. State planning

organizations have seen the value of these initial maps and have urgently requested that other areas be done as soon as possible.

Repetitive observations from satellite images have shown that some of the

savannah areas of southeastern Bolivia, being planned for colonization and agricultural development, are periodically inundated by floods and, as a result, safer

areas have been chosen.

In southeastern Colombia Landsat images have shown the extent of slash and

burn development for cattle grazing in the tropical jungle near San Jose de

Guaviare in the western headwaters of the Orinoco River basin. Repetitive images

from Landsat will enable monitoring of the growth and changes in range conditions.

New colonization on the Caribbean side of the volcanic mountain range of Costa

Rica has been partially mapped from Landsat images. Cloud cover has hampered

completion of conventional aerial cadastral surveys. Development has gone on in

this area for more than 15 years but has never been adequately recorded. Consequently, the Costa Rican government has been unable to determine the extent

of this growth, nor estimate its impact on its national economy.

The U.S. Geological Survey participated in a cooperative program between

NASA and Brazil for uses of remote sensing that was initiated in 1968. Brazil

now has its own technical expertise and is able to conduct its own remote sensing

programs. A specific example is the use of airborne side-looking radar (SLAR)

under Project Radam that has completed the mapping over 4.6 million km’ (1.7

million square miles) of the Amazon Basin. Analyses of the SLAR mosaics have

resulted in geologic, hydrologic, forest and soils maps that have demonstrated the

vast resources that are available for development. Brazil is now in a better position to plan orderly development of mineral resources, communities, forest and

farming regions, highways and power sources of the vast Amazon Basin. Satellite

images are now available to monitor such growth. The Government of Brazil has

recently extended SLAR coverage to the entire nation. Neighboring countries.

such as Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru, all aware of the Brazilian

experience, have adopted the method for other parts of the Amazon and Orinoco

Basins.

In Iceland, animal husbandry, particularly sheep and cattle, is an important

element of the economy. Grass, therefore, is an important agricultural resource.
284

Although Iceland was forested at the time of initial settlement in 874 A.D., the

excessive harvesting of timber, the irrtroduction of large, free ranging flocks of

sheep, and the apparent slight deterioration of the climate have resulted in almost total denudation of forested land. Birch, dwarf birch, and willow trees

and various bushes exist in favorable locations, but only two sizeable areas of

true forest still exist, Hallormsstadur in eastern Iceland, and Vaglaskogur near

Akureyri. A cooperative investigation between U.S. and Icelandic scientists

has used Landsat false-color composites to demonstrate that accurate inventories of areas covered by trees and bushes can be made that will assist in

planning future reforestation work. Of greater importance, however, will be

the ability to provide accurate inventoried of grasslands with such imagery. A

preliminary study of MSS false-color composites of various parts of Iceland

has shown that at least five’ vegetation types can be mapped on Landsat imagery. 

These are: (1) bushes, dwarf trees, and shrubs; (2) natural grasslands; (3)

reclaimed land; (4) cultivated homefields; and (5) lichen-covered lava fields.

In addition, barren lands can be delineated by their absence of vegetation.

The agricultural industry of Iceland is heavily dependent on the areal extent,

health, and growth rate of the grasslands. The grasslands are usually divided

into lowlands and highlands. The highlands are used for grazing by sheep during

the summer months. The lowlands are used for cattle and Icelandic ponies during

the late spring, summer and early fall.

The highland grasslands are used in their natural state, while some of the

lowland grasslands have been subjected to extensive ditching to lower the water

table, thus improving the soil properties and increasing the grass yield. On the

homeflelds, the application of fertilizer, ditching, and seeding have markedly

increased the yield. The harvesting of hay from the homefields provides the feed

for the animals kept through the winter months.

Considerable effort is being expended to reclaim the overgrazed lands through

reseeding and fertilizing of barren areas. Many areas are also being reforested

to reverse the post-settlement trend of soil erosion. The reclamation program

is directed at an increase in the area of grazing lands to meet the future resource

needs of a rapidly growing Icelandic population. In 1974, on the occasion of the

1100th anniversary of the settlement of Iceland, the Icelandic Parliament passed

a bill to restore the land to its pre-settlement condition. a costly project which

will encompass decades of effort Landsat imagery could provide an effective

way of monitoring the progress of this land reclamation project, if acquisition

of coverage over Iceland can be assured.

Flood Mapping

A collaborative study of 1920 river kilometres (1200 river miles of the Mississippi flood that occurred during the spring of 1973 was conducted by the U.S.

Geological Survey, NOAA, NASA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Several

investigators developed methods during this study to apply optical and digital

data processing to delineation of the flooded area. The results of these investigations demonstrated important engineering, economic, disaster relief, and planning applications. Landsat data obtained before, during, and after the flood were

essential in conducting these studies.

As a follow on to these earlier research efforts in flood mapping, Landsat-2

imagery was used by the State of Louisiana and the Geological Survey to map

the extent of flooding of the lower Mississippi River, and the Red, Ouachita,

Black, and Atchafalaya Rivers during mid and late April 1975. Through special

arrangement with NASA, Landsat imagery was received from Goddard Space

Flight Center 2 days after the satellite had made its orbital pass. Analysis of

the imagery was performed jointly by personnel of the Louisiana Office of State

Planning; the EROS Program Applications Assistance Facility at Bay St. Louis,

Mississippi, and the Geological Survey Geography Program. By comparing unpublished Land Use Data and Analysis (LUDA) maps with flood-time Landsat

imagery, State officials delineated flooded areas and determined that flood waters

covered approximately 3,200 hectares (8,000 acres) of urban and other highly

developed regions, 120,000 hectares (300,000 acres) of farmland, 43,600 hectares

(109,000 acres) of upland forest, 279,200 hectares (698.000 acres) of wetland

forest, and 1,120 hectares (2,800 acres) of sand land silt areas. These totals

were then broken down in ‘accordance with areas in each parish (county) that

had been flooded. Both the maps and statistics were used by the State for rapid

analysis of flood damage and to document immediately the need for allocation

of Federal disaster relief funds. According to the Louisiana State Planning

Office, the results of the study indicate that Landsat data provide a fast, ac-
285

curate, and a relatively inexpensive method of compiling flood data for disaster

planning and post-flood analysis.

In July, 1975, flooding occurred in the Red River Valley of Minnesota and North

Dakota. The EROS Program, in continuation of its on-going activities in develop

ing remote-sensing technology for flood applications, conducted an investigation

on the flood, which had a profound impact on the rich agricultural lands of this

area.

The Red River flood posed a particularly difficult challenge in that the soils of

the Red River Valley tend to be very dark and hence provide low contrast with

wet soils and standing water, which also are poor reflectors of incident solar infrared radiation. Previous experimentation had demonstrated the capability of

Landsat multispectral scanner data to detect, delineate, and classify not only the

flooded from the non-flooded areas, but to distinguish types of flooding and various

characteristics of the flood plain. Employing digital analysis techniques, Survey

scientists used Landsat data of the Red River flood and successfully separated

areas of overbank flooding from flooded agricultural fields resulting from impeded

precipitation runoff. The processing techniques employed made it possible to increase the contrast between the low reflecting soils in areas affected by flooding

and those not affected by flooding, and between areas of standing water and

saturated soils. Analysis of the post-flood data revealed the extent of crop loss

and damage.

Utilization of Landsat data and optical and digital processing techniques specifically developed for flood assessments makes it possible to automatically depict

the exceedingly complex distribution of the flood waters in a matter of hours,

whereas traditional procedures require many man months of effort employing

manual photointerpretation and depiction of boundaries. Accuracy of mapping of

overbank flooding based on Landsat data has compared favorably with results

obtained by traditional techniques. It is unlikely that the complex distribution

of flooded agricultural fields of North Dakota that were depicted automatically

by digital analysis could have been accurately mapped by traditional practices

employing black and white panchromatic aerial photography.

A serious constraint in the usefulness of flood assessments by any technique is

the timeliness of data availability and analysis. Under the current experimental

Landsat Program, film imagery or computer compatible tapes are not received

routinely by investigators in the field until six weeks or more following imaging

of the study area by the satellite. In terms of flood assessments, historical data

obviously is of little or no value for guiding rescue operations, identifying disaster

areas for governmental or insurance applications, or for monitoring the progress

of the flood wave down the valley.

Flooding in the Susquehanna River Valley occurred following Hurricane

Eloise in 1975. A request was made to the Canada Centre for Remote Sensing to

employ their Prince Albert satellite data reception facility to collect the data

transmitted by Landsat-2 on its first post-flood orbits over the Susquehanna

River basin. Two scenes covering the flooded area between Williamsport and

Harrisburg were imaged by Landsat-2, transmitted to Prince Albert, recorded

on magnetic tape. converted to film and shipped to the United States within 24

b hours of data acquisition. Two additional days were required for shipping and

release from U.S. Customs. The data were in the hands of investigators within 72

hours from acquisition by the satellite. The extent of flooding and the areal extent

of the surface water at the time of imaging and general surface conditions are

clearly depicted on the processed imagery.

Indicators of Climatic Change

It is impossible to work in analysis programs using satellite remote sensing

data without realizing that many of the parameters being measured could be of

importance to understanding climatic change. The direct effects of climate on

agriculture and food production are observed throughout the world.

As the world population increases and greater demands are made on the major

areas of croplands, climatic fluctuations or trends will take on more and more

significance. The recent drouth in the Sahelian region of Africa has caused the

disruption of entire societies. Reduced crop yields in the U.S.S.R. have forced the

Soviet Union to make large grain purchases on the world market. At higher

latitudes, the reduction in length of the growing season impacts on the magnitude

of crop yields and even what crops can be grown,

In the 1960’s sea ice moved into the coastal areas of Iceland and the average

annual temperature was lowered. This had a devastating effect on hay production

in the northern and to a lesser extent in the southern part of Iceland.

68--877-76-1 9
286

Parameters, such as the extent of snow fields, retreat and advance of ice caps,

behavior of glaciers, characters of the “green wave” of vegetation as it moves to

higher latitudes in the spring and the “brown wave” as the vegetation dies or

becomes dormant in the fall, and surface temperature characteristics of large

bodies of water including the oceans, can be measured directly by remote sensing.

Global surveys are needed for climatological research. Satellites provide many

of these capabilities.

Documentation of parameters that are significant to climatic change should

become a standard practice of all scientists who are working with remotely

sensed data. These analyses can then be used by appropriate organizations in

establishing climatic trends and hopefully as a basis for climatic prediction in the

future.

Phosphate for Fertilizer

.

Sedimentary phosphate rock is an increasingly important raw material for

production of agricultural fertilizer, A common problem in prospecting for this

material, however, is that cursory field observation reveals few physical properties which distinguish phosphatic from non-phosphatic beds. Although small -

hand-carried ultraviolet lamps have been used to stimulate luminescing minerals

and rocks, including phosphate rock, these methods of prospecting are limited

because the lamps are low powered, effective range is limited to a metre or less,

and the work must be conducted at night because the low intensity luminescence

is obscured by bright sunlight.

The Fraunhofer line discriminator (FLD) is an airborne optical mechanical

device which permits daylight detection of luminescence several orders of magnitude below the intensity detectable with the human eye. This instrument was

developed through cooperative programs between NASA and the U.S. Geological

Survey., Helicopter tests during 1974 and 1975 have shown that FLD response to

gypsiferous and phosphatic beds of Miocene age northeast of Santa Barbara, California, exceeds nonphosphatic beds ‘by a factor of two. Laboratory measurements of eight phosphate rock samples from the United States, Brazil, and

Colombia show that all appear to luminesce within the sensitivity limits of the

FLD.

Liquid effiuents from processing of phosphate rock commonly contain materials

which can contaminate surface and ground water and be injurious to vegetation.

Laboratory analysis of samples collected from central Florida show that these

effuents are luminescent, exceeding the luminescence of background streams by

more than a factor of five. These results are confirmed by airborne FLD measurement of the luminescence of effluents from several central Florida processing

plants which was performed in early 1975 in collaboration with the Environmental Protection Agency.

Energy Resources

Central to the production of agricultural products is the availability of energy

for field preparation, irrigation, harvesting, drying, transport, and refrigeration;

this, in addition to the derivation of fertilizers from petrochemicals, focuses the

Department of Interior’s energies on the use of new techniques for the inventorying and finding of new sources of energy. ●

Space observations are becoming increasingly important in this search and in

understanding the environmental impacts of energy development. These observations add to our current capabilities of discovery and environmental assessment

by providing an overview that can add to our efficiency in exploration.

In terms of discovery and production, satellites now in orbit can help us in at -

least six ways. These are:

1. Detection of geologic structures that were previously unknown and

may be significant with respect to the localization of hydrocarbons;

2. The possible detection of very subtle tonal anomalies, that may represent alteration of the soils resulting from mini-seeps of gas from hydrocarbon

reservoirs;

3. The potential for detecting natural marine oil seeps with consequent

improvement in efficiency of offshore exploration;

4. The monitoring of ice distributions and movement in Arctic areas, such

as may affect transport of materials in and out of the Arctic; the cost of

seismic exploration in Arctic sea ice areas, and the safety of exploration and

production operations;

5. The monitoring of oil field development and transport facilities, such

as the Alaska pipeline and an assessment of this development upon the

environment;
287

6. The images are useful as base maps in poorly mapped parts of the

world.

Landsat data is being used by international oil firms for exploration in poorly

mapped regions in the headwaiters of the Amazon Basin. Bolivia has used Landsat data to plan a gasline from Sucre to Puerto Suarez, which will eventually

connect with major industrial markets in Sao Paulo, Brazil.

Studies conducted by Chevron Overseas Petroleum, Inc., have demonstrated

how Landsat data have assisted in petroleum exploration in Kenya. The imagery

permitted company scientists to outline the boundaries of the sedimentary basin

that is of interest. This led to more intelligent locations of boundaries to the

concession that was negotiated with the Government of Kenya. Information on

geologic structures in the basin, obtained from interpretation of the Landsat

images is being used as a guide for planning and carrying out the detailed geological and geophysical field investigations.

In Alaska, landform analysis of Landsat images, substantiated by geophysical

data, led Geological Survey scientists to propose a new area for petroleum exploration. The images show that lakes in the Arctic Coastal Plain are dominantly

elongated with the long axes parallel and trending about N 9“ W. Northwest of

the Umiat oil field, an additional strong east-trending regional lineation, not

previously recognized on aerial photographs or in field studies, is expressed by

elongation of some lakes, alinement of others, and by linear interlake areas. The

trend of this lineation is parallel to the trend of deflections in contours of the

magnetic and gravity fields in the area and parallel to westerly deflections in

the northwest ends of northwest-trending folds mapped to the south. In addition, the alinement of many small lakes forms a large ellipse superimposed on

the regional lineation. Sparse seismic profiles show periodic reversals in dip and

regional arching in shallow strata beneath the area. Collectively, these data suggest that heretofore unsuspected deep structures may be concealed beneath the

younger Quaternary Gubik Formation that covers the area of the image. In addition, strata in shallow folds are younger than those tapped by the oil wells of

the Umiat field to the south, and may contain favorable reservoir beds.

Mosaics of the conterminous United States, compiled by the Soil Conservation

Service for NASA, have been analyzed by U.S. Geological Survey geologists interested in linear features that may be of tectonic significance. Mosaics at scales

of 1 :5,000,000 and 1 :1,000,000 were used to evaluate and identify new and to reevaluate previously known geologic features. Studies of smaller regions have

shown that the occurrence of major mineral deposits is closely related to the

intersection of linear features that are major fracture systems. Similar studies

of gas-producing areas in the Appalachians show that the most productive gas

wells are near or within areas of highly fractured bedrock.

Recent petroleum discoveries in the Mobile Bay region of Alabama prompted

Halbouty Oil Company to conduct an independent experiment to determine

whether or not use of Landsat data can provide insight into possible extensions

of petroleum producing areas in a region of active exploration, if these data can

aid in re-evaluation of existing subsurface information, and the importance of

these interpretations for planning subsequent seismic and other geophysical

surveys.

Landsat images of the area were interpreted for linear and curvilinear features. These were compared with a map published by the Geological Survey of

Alabama depicting the general trends of exploration potential extending from

Mississippi into the State of Alabama. The location of producing fields was

superimposed on this information. Significant results of this investigation are:

Landsat interpretations reveal some associations where producing fields are

alined along linear features or are on the flanks of large curvilinear features.

Several major discrepancies between the subsurface maps and features interpreted from Landsat data were noted. For example, the Citronella field, one

of the largest fields producing by artificial lift from depths greater than 10,000

feet is shown on the crest of a dome at depth while the Landsat imagery suggests

that it is in an interdomal area. Also the structural interpretation of the Mobile

graben differs significantly from the interpretation derived from subsurface data.

Landsat interpretations suggest that the structure is much more complex in the

northeastern quadrant of the area than is reflected by the subsurface contours.

Landsat imagery shows promise as a tool to monitor energy-related development in Alaska. Examination of the vegetative cover, on a false-color composite

Landsat image of the Umiat oilfield, revealed only one indication of scarring

of the delicate tundra as a result of the intense oil exploration in this area in the
288

late 1940’s and early 1950’s. This suggested that the environmental effects of oil

exploration were not spreading but rather were healing. This conclusion was

largely substantiated by low-level helicopter surveys undertaken by Geological

Survey scientists in the summer of 1973. One short, clear-dozed, and repeatedly

used trail near Umiat still formed a marked scar.

In response to the increase in coal mining activity in the Appalachians, the

U.S. Geological Survey, in cooperation with other Federal and state agencies,

is assessing the effect of coal mining on water quality, sedimentation, and

streamflow of eastern Tennessee. Aerial thermal infrared imagery is used to

delineate ground water outflow, pending on strip mining benches, storm runoff,

surface water flow, and indications of acid mine drainage. Digitally processed

Landsat imagery is used to delineate land cover categories including forest ,

groups, agricultural land, and bare earth caused by strip mining. The Landsat

analyses are useful for updating geologic maps showing strip mining activity,

and for direct comparison with the status of strip mining in the late 1960’s when

the field mapping was done. An analysis has been completed for the dates of February 19, 1973, March 23, 1974, October 10, 1974, and March 26, 1975, for the -

Duncan Flats Quadrangle at a scale of 1:24,000. The resulting maps show both

active and inactive strip mines, the extensions of bare earth areas, regrowth

of’ vegetation and the effects of strip mining on sedimentation in streams.

The Canadian Centre for Remote Sensing has recently completed a study

showing the importance of meteorological satellite and Landsat data to sea ice

monitoring in the Canadian Arctic. The study projects large benefits for inbound

and outbound shipping in this area. It also considers reduction in damage to ships

by identifying navigation hazards in ice-infested waters, increased productivity

for marine seismic crews, and the types of data needed for operational decisions

to continue drilling or to cease drilling for petroleum in this region. The benefits

for the Canadian Arctic are large. The United States may well anticipate comparable. if not larger, benefits in the next few years in the Beaufort and Chukchi

Seas off northern Alaska as exploration increases in the search for domestic

sources of petroleum. It is imperative that timely Landsat data be provided to

U.S. shipping in the Arctic.

One indication of the importance of Landsat images to energy related industries

can be found by examining the types of organizations that purchase data from

the EROS Data Center. This evaluation indicates that from a Forbes list of the

top 500 U.S. industries, 113 are energy related, and 81 of these have purchased

data from the EROS Data Center. Thirty-four of the 81 energy-related industries

show a highly repetitive ordering pattern, either initiating new orders on approximately a monthly basis, or retaining standing orders for data as they become

available.

EROS DATA CENTER

A major portion of the EROS Program activities are conducted at the EROS

Data Center at Sioux Falls, South Dakota. This Center serves as a central archive

for most Department of the Interior aerial photography, NASA aerial photography and space imagery acquired by NASA. The data base is automated to

allow rapid inquiry for any of the data that are available. This data base is .

generated and maintained through a cooperative effort with the National Cartographic Information Center. Plans call for adding aerial photography and other

remotely sensed data to the data base as it is acquired by the Geological Survey

and NASA and to enter into agreements with other agencies to either archive

their data or to reference it in the data base.

The Data Center has excellent photographic laboratories suitable for large

volume photographic reproduction and special photographic processing. These

photographic capabilities are used to reproduce imagery contained in the data

archives to satisfy individual requests. The data are sold for a price that includes

the cost of materials and labor to make the appropriate copies.

At present the major deficiency in the Data Center is in the inability to process

the large amounts of electronic (high density digital tape) data that are planned

for the near future. This capability is needed to improve the throughput time

between acquisition of Landsat data and the time when users can receive their

copies and to upgrade the quality of the data that is delivered to customers.

The Data Center building was designed with facilities for training. Training

is conducted as a part of an applications assistance and technology transfer

function. The Data Analysis Laboratory at the Center serves as a research, technique development and training facility. This laboratory has state-of-the-art

equipment for analysis of electronic imagery.
289

Data Available

An important activity of the EROS Data Center is archiving, retrieving,

reproducing and distributing remotely sensed data. Data currently archived at

the Center exceeds 6,000,000 images, including over 600,000 frames of Landsat

imagery ; Landsat electronic data in the form of computer compatible tapes; over

40,000 frames of Skylab, Apollo, and Gemini data; more than 1,800,000 frames of

data from the NASA Research Aircraft Program; and almost 4,000,000 frames

of Department of the Interior aerial mapping photography.

The demand for reproduction of these archived data has continued to increase

both in number of frames and dollar value. In FY 73, 165,000 frames of data

were suplied to the user community, data volume grew to almost 300,000 frames *

in FY 74, and has exceeded 400,000 frames in FY 75. At the same time, dollar

income at the Center increased by 91 percent from FY 74 to FY 75, with total

dollar income from the sale of data exceeding $1.6 million in FY 75 (table 1).

TABLE 1.–INCOME FROM VARIOUS DATA PRODUCTS PRODUCED BY THE EROS DATA CENTER DURING FISCAL

YEARS 1973-75

Other

LANDSAT satellite1

Aircraft Total

I Gemini, Apollo, and Skylab imagery and photography.

Approximately 58 percent of the dollar value for products at the Center is

for Landsat data. The customer profile for purchase of all data shows that private industry is the largest single purchaser, with 30 percent of the total dollar

value, and agencies of the Federal Government coming next with 24 percent.

Academic and educational institutions account for 16 percent of data sales, while

foreign customers comprise 12 percent. Individuals, state, and local government

agencies comprise the remainder.

Agricultural Related Training

A primary function of the EROS Data Center is to offer formal training on

the utility of remote sensing techniques. Normally these training sessions are

up to one week in length and stress the use of remotely sensed data in a practical

application. For example, workshops given during 1974 and 1975 included:

(a) Digital analysis of Landsat data to assess spruce budworm defoliation for

the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

(b) Deterioration of rangeland and cropland conversion to rangeland for the

Soil Conservation Service, USDA.

(c) Sampling frame construction using Landsat data for the Statistic Report- 8

ing Services, USDA.

(d) Renewable resource assessment for the Forest Service, USDA.

(e) Irrigated lands inventory for the Bureau of Reclamation. USDI.

(f) Rangeland Productivity estimation for the Bureau of Land Management,

USDI.

Two or three times a year a three to four week course is offered to foreign

nationals, stressing the fundamentals of remote sensing with enphasis on specific applications such as agricultural and soils inventory. To date there have been

132 attendees from 49 countries. Twelve African countries. 19 Asian countries,

9 European countries, 8 South American countries, and Australia have been

represented. The five courses that have been conducted were in June 1973. June

1974, September 1974, May 1975, and September 1975. Also, training in foreign

countries consisting of lectures. workshops. and seminars has been conducted

by EROS Program personnel. Countries visited during Fiscal Year 1975 which

involved agricultural related training included Australia, Algeria. Thailand,

Mali, Mexico. and Ghana.

Data Analysis Laboratory

The Data Analysis Laboratory at the EROS Data Center provides specialized

equipment and qualified personnel to aid users in the analysis of remotely

sensed data, particularly Landsat images, for a variety of purposes. The sophis-
290

tication and cost of image analysis equipment has made it desirable to centralize

such facilities, so that they may be used at their maximum efficiency. Work at

the Data. Analysis Laboratory is not restricted to scientists within the EROS

Program. It is also available to all interested users from Federal, state and

local government agencies. The philosophy under which the laboratory operates

is that it accommodates users on reasonable schedules for demonstrations, experiments, and training in the computerized analysis of remotely sensed data in

order to work out solutions to resource problems and to train users in the methods

of data analysis.

Facilities of the Data Analysis Laboratory include the General Electric Image

100 Multispectral Analysis System, which is used for classification, analysis,

and mapping, of resource environmental features from Landsat digital images and 

images from aircraft multispectral scanners; an Interpretation Systems Incorporated Analysis System, which allows the overlay of up to 73 repetitive

images of a given area for analysis of time changes in natural and manmade

features and a terminal to the computer facilities at the Laboratory for Applications and Remote Sensing at Purdue University for large area classification -

and mapping of land features using the LARS multispectral analysis system.

Users experiment with the various facilities to find methods of solving particular

resource problems of interest and importance to them, to determine the feasibility

of various automated interpretation approaches, and when their experiments

prove successful, they determine the means by which they would use such methods operationally in their resource management responsibilities. Technical assistance by experienced machine operators and resource scientists familiar

with automated analysis is available to assist the investigators. The facilities

of the Data Analysis Laboratory are also extensively used in training courses

conducted at the EROS Data Center both for domestic and foreign users.

Interest in and use of the Data Analysis Laboratory has been widespread and

has required a two shift operation, five days a week. Personnel are available to

assist in the operation of the equipment and in suggesting approaches to the solution of their problems. During the four month period from July 1, 1975, to October

30, 1975, seventy-nine percent of the available time of the Data Analysis Laboratory was spent in working with users and demonstrating the use of the system

to groups of trainees.

The Data Analysis Laboratory is providing users with access to sophisticated

data analysis facilities and basic help on their use. This is a great help in creating a large corps of knowledgeable users of remotely sensed data who can apply

such data to their resource management problems in the future.

CONCLUSIONS

Remote sensing technology has many direct applications to food production.

Examples are crop inventories, plant vigor estimates, range capability and readiness measurements, and adverse effects on agriculture such as floods and disease.

Food production depends on more than directly observable parameters. Climatology, mesoscale meteorological conditions, weather modifications, surface and

subsurface water management, availability of energy, products derived from .

petroleum and other minerals and land use information are also major considerations for a modern food production program. Remote sensing technology has

direct contributions to solving the problems related to each of these additional

information and material needs.

Many capabilities of remote sensing have been demonstrated. Others are in -

the research stage. Still more areas of applications have not been started. The

entire potential for using remote sensing technology cannot be adequately measured at this time. The demonstrated capabilities do, however, represent a major

contribution toward achieving many information needs. More emphasis needs to

be placed on physical models to turn data into useful information, and still

more attention needs to be placed on using this information for real management decisions.

Agencies with operational responsibilities express three basic reasons for

caution in becoming dependent on Landsat data. These are:

(a) Landsat is experimental. There is no assurance of continuity beyond about

1980, or even earlier if a spacecraft or launch vehicle fails.

(b) Data are not available soon enough to be used in making time-critical

decisions.

(c) Standard photographic products contain less than the complete data content of the original digital data, thus precluding their use in some unique

applications.
291

.

The last two of these reasons are technical. The solutions are known, within

the resources available, and NASA and the EROS Data Center are augmenting

their data processing and distribution systems to make the necessary improvements. The first deficiency relates to policy and the intention of the United

States to continue in a leadership role in global Earth resources satellite

programs.

An important factor, that is often overlooked, is becoming more and more

apparent from our experience with the Landsat program. This factor is the unifying influence of a global data base with uniform characteristics that serves

scientists in many discipline. The results are threefold: (1) scientists in different disciplines are communicating better and understanding the relations of

their discipline to other Earth sciences; (2) international scientific communication has been improved, because scientists from all nations can obtain data

of uniform characteristics and compare their results of analysis and analysis

methods. The number of international applications examples using Landsat data

that are discussed in this report illustrates the significance of this international communication; and (3) the availability of repetitive data of dynamic

phenomena permits the establishment of wholly new types of scientific studies,

many of enormous potential value to our understanding of the global environment.

Great possibilities exist for international cooperation on a mutually productive basis. The history of science may well record that the development of the

NOAA and Landsat series of satellites and the ready availability of their data

to all rank as one of the great achievements of the 20th century. These satellites

that provide repetitive environmental and resource data for the entire planet

may rank in the same class as the invention of the telescope or the microscope

in providing man with a completely different view of himself and his planetary

environment. Very few people, scientists included. truly appreciate the revolutionary significance of these satellites. As with all other great steps forward

in technology and exploration, many years will pass before the total significance

is grasped. It is important, therefore, that this gestation time be shortened, so

that we may make more effective use of the environmental information sooner.

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Carter, W. D., 1976, Environmental Assessment of remote areas of Colombia,

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Carter, W. D,, and Brockmann, C. E., 1976, Preliminary Analysis of an Interactive Multispectral Image Analysis System: A study of the Lake Titicaca

Region, Bolivia and Peru: Remote Sensing of the Environment (in press).

u Coker, A. E., Higer, A. L., Sauer, S., and Rogers, R. H., 1975, Remotely-sensed

data used to delineate land-water cover in coal mining regions in eastern Tennessee rabs. ] : N-ASA, L, B. Johnson Space Center, Earth Resources Survey

Symposium, Houston, Tex. 1975, Abs. Paper E-8, p. 84.

Deutsch, Morris, and Ruggles, F. R., 1974, Optical data processing and projected

applications of the ERTS-1 imagery covering the 1973 Mississippi valley floods:

Water Resources Bu1l., v. 10, no. 5, p. 1023-1039.

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Edgerton, A. T., and Wooleverf G., 1974, Airborne oil pollution.

Fischer, W’. A., and Lathram, E. H., 1973, Concealed structures in Arctic

Alaska identified on ERTS–1 imagery: Oil and Gas Jour., v. 71, p. 97-102.

Halbonty, M. T., 1975, Uses of! Landsat Data in Mineral Fuels Investigations,

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Homl, V. A., 1975, A Global Satellite Observation System for Earth Resources—

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Lathram, E. H., 1973. Analysis of state of vehiculn r scars on Arctic tundra,

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McQuillan, A. K., and Clough, D. J., 1973, Benefits of remote sensing of sea

ice: The Dept. of Mines and Resources; Canada Centre for Remote Sensing.

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Moore, B. B., 1971, Subsurface Geology of Southwest Alabama: Geological

Survey of Alabama, Bulletin @ SO p.

Moore, (3. K. and North, G. W., 1974, Flood inundation M the southeastern

United States from aircraft and satellite imagery: Water Resources Bulletin.

v. 10, no, 5, p. 10S2-1096.

National Research Council, 1975, Practical Applications of Space Sy&emsInland Water Resources (Supporting Paper No. 5) : National Academy of Sci” .

ences, Washington, D.IC.

Rango, A. and Anderson, A. T., 1974, Flood hazard studies in the M&&@@

River basin using remote sensing: Water Resources Bulletin, v. 10, no. 5,

p. 1060-1031.

Swertz, E. L, Svehlak, H. T., and Spicer, B. E., 1975, Near real-time ma~pin~ -

of the 1975 Mississippi River flood in Louisiana using Landsat data: Abstrfiets

of the llth American Water Resources Conf., AWRA Proc., Minneapolis, MN.

Watson, R. D., and Hemphill, W. R., in prem, VSe of an airborne Frannhofer

line discriminator for the detection of solar stimulated luminescence: U.S. Geol.

Survey open file report. Weisnet, D. R., McGinnis, D. l’., and Pritschar& J. A., 1974, MissimipPi River

floods by the NOAA-2 satellite: Water Resources Bulletin, v. 10, no. 5, P.

1040-1049.

Willi~S, R. S., Jr., B6dvarsson, &@st, Mdfik,sson, Sturla, ~lma~on, Gudmundur, Rist, S@rj6n, Si@ryggsson, Hlynur, Swmun~sson, Kristj6n, Thmarisson. S@rdur, and Thorsteinsson, Ingvi, 1973, Iceland: Preliminary rpwlts of

WOlogic, h~drologic, oceanographic, and agricultural studies with ERT%l ima~erg: ~n Pm. of Bympoaiu?n of Mtwagement and Utilization of Remote ii%wing

Data, Am. See. of Photogram., Sioux Falls, South ?Mkota, p. 17-35.

Williams, R. S. Jr., B6dvarsson, AgtIst Fridriksson, Stan-la, Pfilmson. Gudmundur, Rist, Sigurj6n, Sigtryggsson, Hlynur, %emundsson, Krfstjfin, Thorarisson, Sigurdur, and Thorsteinsson, Ingvi, 1874, Environmental Studies of Icelnnd

with FJRTS-1 imagery: in Proc, Ninth N~po8ium ?n Remote fleni?ing of Environnwnt. l)niv. of Mich., Ann Arbor, Mich., v. 1. p. 31+-L

TVilliarns, It S. Jr., and Carter, W. D.. Editors, 1$76. ERTS-1, A New Window

on our Planet: U.S. &Ological Survey, Prof. Paper 9Q9, 302 p. (in press).

[The following questions were submitted by Senator Humphrey to

Dr. DeNoyer and his answers thereto:]

.

Question 1. You indicate a number of agencies in the Department of Interior

have found the LandSat information useful in their management programs. Has

the Bureau of Land Management found this information more comprehensive and

more accurate, than comparable information obtained from other sources ?

Answer 1. The Bureau of Land Management has reported that it could make .

extensive use of Landsat imagery for monitoring the condition of grazing grassland, therein permitting re-evaluation of grazing leases and limiting the time

and number of animal-unit months for each lease. The information would permit

the rangeland manager to make a decision of lease or no-lease. This information

would be far more accurate and comprehensive than present estimates based on

visits at intervals of three years or more to some of the more remote regions of the

Federal rangelands.

The Bureau of Land Management is preparing a project plan for an Applications System Verification Test (ASVT). The intent of this ASVT is use of remote

sensing data as one of the data sources for a comprehensive information system

that is being developed by the Bureau of Land Management.

Question 2. Would Landsat information be used primarily to replace information obtained from other sources, or primarily to supplement information from

other sources?

Answer 2. Landsat provides an additional data source for most applications.

Other types of data are often needed to carry out complete investigations. In

some cases. Landsat provides unique capabilities that make new types of assessments possible. In still more cases. the short time required for analysis of Landsat

data make this approach attractive for measuring dynamic characteristic of

surface features. In strip mine monitoring, for example, the Geological Survey of
293

Indiana has used Landsat to monitor change that has occurred in the areal extent

of strip mines since the region was mapped by conventional methods in 1968. In

the analysis of geologic structure, Landsat permits regional landscape features to

be related to regional faults and fractures systems which have been verified by

field and aerial photographic methods. Landsat also permits the delineation of

regional alignments of topography, streams segments, and other features, some

of which are hundreds of kilometers in length and cannot be recognized except on

Landsat imagery. Landsat is being used operationally in Nebraska to monitor the

annual increase in the number of center pivot irrigation systems, which cannot be

practically and economically performed in any other way.

Question 3. What, if any, agencies in the Department of Interior, have indicated a

that they would like to participate in, and share in the cost of, an operational

Landsat program?

Answer 3. We are concerned about funding the space segment of a program of

this type from many sources. The whole program might fail if any one contribu-

* tion of funding failed to succeed in the budgetary process.

The EROS Program of the Department of the Interior would like to participate

by providing for the ground segment of an operational Landsat system. The

ground segment would include archiving of data, reproduction of data, and distribution of data to users. This type of participation will require substantial

budget increases and close coordination through the entire budgetary process to

ensure that both the space and ground segments of the program are funded adequately and on consistent time schedules. Accordingly, the Department of the

Interior presently is reviewing its position regarding the role it might play in

the ground segment of an operational Landsat system. ,

The following Department of the Interior bureaus have indicated that they

would use data from an operational version of Landsat and would underwrite the

cost of data analysis for applications within their bureaus:

Bureau of Land Management; Fish and Wildlife Service; Bureau of Reclamation ; Bonneville Power Administration; and U.S. Geological Survey.

Question 4. Which agencies do you expect in the future to make sufficient use

of Landsat information to justify their sharing in the underwriting costs?

Answer 4. As implied in the answer to question 3, it would be desirable for a

single agency to have implementation and funding responsibility for the space

segment of a Landsat system. Those agencies indicated above, plus the Corps of

Engineers, Department of Defense; Statistical Reporting Service, and Forest

Service, Department of Agriculture; Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce; and the Agency for International Development of the Department of State,

would be users of data and could be expected to fund their own data use programs.

Question 5. What, in your opinion, are the major bottlenecks in the current

Landsat experimental program?

Answer 5. The greatest bottlenecks in terms of operational uses are assurance

of continuity of follow-on satellites similar to Landsat, quality of data provided

to risers, timeliness or currency of data when it reaches the user and transfer of

technology to users.

● Question 6. What actions would eliminate these bottlenecks?

Answer 6. The assurance of continuity would require a commitment by the

United States and appropriate funding levels to support an operational program.

Steps are being taken by NASA and the Department of the Interior to solve the

data quality problem. These steps involve implementing complementary digital

data proressing systems which will permit production of higher quality products

for specific applications, and digital data that retain all the information acquired

by the satellite. Technical solutions to the timeliness problem are known but

actions are progressing slowly because of insufficient fiscal and personnel resources. Limited efforts to transfer the technology to users have been very

successful. Additional efforts could be undertaken to the extent that resources

become available.

Question 7. What plans does the Geological Survey have for continued cooperation with other countries in the use of Landsat information?

Answer 7. Two or three times a year, a 3- to 4-week course is offered at the

EROS Data Center to foreign nationals, stressing the fundamentals Of remote

sensing with emphasis on specific applications. To date there have been 132

attendees from 43 countries. Training in foreign countries consisting of lectures,

workshops. and seminars have also been conducted by EROS Program personnel

at no travel cost to the Department. This is indicative of the international need

and interest in remote-sensing training. Countries visited during FY 75 included
294

Australia, Algeria, Thailand, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Mali, Mexico, and Ghana.

Sources of funding have been the governments of Australia, Algeria, and Mexico,

and Economic” and ‘Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific of the United

Nations (ESCAP), U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Twenty percent of the dollar value of Landsat data produced in FY 75 at the

EROS Data Center was for foreign users, and this level is expected to continue.

To date, 127 foreign countries have procured Landsat data from the EROS Data

Center. In addition a significant part of the Landsat data production for U.S.

industry is for oil and mineral exploration by U.S. companies overseas.

Question 8. Which, if any, countries would be willing to participate in, and

share in the cost of, an operational Landsat program?

Answer 8. We have had many contacts with foreign countries that are inter- -

ested in participating in the Landsat program Any agreements are negotiated by

NASA. NASA can provide the most complete answer at this time. We are aware of

the agreements for two stations in Canada and the stations and plans for stations

in Brazil, Italy, Iran, Zaire, and Chile. The agreements that NASA is signing -

with these countries provide for sharing the cost of follow-on Landsat systems. We are also aware of interest in building ground stations by Upper Volta, Norway,

Australia, India, Japan, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia.

Chairman HUMPHREY. We have one additional witness from the

agencies, Dr. Hill, who is project manager of LACIE, Department of

Agriculture. We will proceed with you now, and then Dr. Park.

STATEMENT OF DR. HOWARD HILL, PROJECT MANAGER, LACIE,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Dr. HILL. Mr. chairman, I welcome the opportunity to report to the

Technology Assessment Board on the application of advanced technologies by the Department of Agriculture. Providing current and

reliable food, agricultural, and nutrition information is a first concern

for the ‘Department of Agriculture. There are many users of this information. They include the general public, Federal and State agencies and the Congress, and international organizations and foreign

governments.

The Department’s primary interest in advanced technology is as a

user of its services. As advanced technologies make more systems available, we are striving to put them to use to accomplish the Department% objectives. The remote sensing user requirements task force

created in 1973, has specific responsibilities to help the Department

to meet its future needs for remote sensed information.

The task force was directed to catalog the Department% require- ‘

ments of earth resources data, determine those requirements that

would return maximum benefits, and develop a coordinated plan for

acquiring processing) analyzing, and distributing data to meet those .

requirerments.

Last year the task force completed its cataloging of the Department% remote sensing information requirements. More than 2,000

items of information were identified as being potentially collectable

by remote sensing techniques that would be useful in carrying out

the Department% program.

The next step was to analyze these requirements in terms of priority of need and available technology. Those requirements which

Show near-term promise of satisfaction and maximum net benefits

will receive first consideration for being filled.

The task force will next study the cost-effectiveness of applications

which are identified as being technically feasible to implement, and

having a potential for significant benefits. Finally, a plan for research,

development, and implementation will be submitted to the Secretary.
295

*

*

Now” I would like to summarize for you the analytic and communication technology already being used experimentally and operationally by USDA agencies with primary concern for preparing and reporting informatlon on food, agriculture, and nutrition.

The Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment—LACIE—is an excellent example of USDA's continuing efforts to exploit advances in

technology in improving its food and agriculture information systems in that it integrates a number of technologies into a comprehensive system.

The LACIE is an experiment to test the technical feasibility and cost

effectiveness of utilizing data from an Earth resources satellite along

with meteorological, climatological and historical data to predict

production of a major agriculural crop. The experiment is being i

carried out jointly by the .National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the

U.S. Department of Agriculture. USDA is participating in this experiment primarily as a prospective user of an operational cropreporting and forecasting system. Wheat was selected as the test

crop.

Within USDA, six agencies are participating in LACIE under

Foreign Agricultural Service—FAS—leadersl~ip.

L.ACIE is being carried out in three phases. Phase 1, carried out

in 1975, tested acreage estimating capabilities in selected wheat producing areas of the United States. Wheat yield models were developed and tested during this phase. Phases 2 and 3 will test LACIE

capabilities to estimate wheat area, yield, and production in the

United States and other wheat-producing regions. Phase 2 began in

October 195 and will continue through this year. Monthly crop forecasts will be prepared during the growing season. Associated research

and development and tests of new techniques for crop identification

measurement and yield estimation will be conducted throughout the

experiment.

It is important to stress that LACIE is an experiment, and recommendations for future program. use will be based on the outcome of

evaluations that are made as the experiment proceeds.

USDA has lead responsibility for evaluating crop estimates in relation to USDA requirements, for analyzing costs and benefits of an “ k improved crop forecasting capability, and for designing a user system for post-LACIE implementation. We foresee application of

LACIE-proven techniques by analyst teams that use readily available

hardware and software.

Design of the user system was started recently with the target of

completing design and testing in time to implement LACIE at the

end of the present schedule, if experimental results support that course

of action. Because of its position as the eventual user agency of an

operational system, USDA has broad responsibility for defining output requirements and for integrating this output, as appropriate,

with ongoing programs.

Although LACIE now is limited to wheat, it is expected that programs and techniques developed during the experiment can be applied to the estimation of other agricultural crops and land use. If

successful and if found to be cost effective, a crop-forecasting system

utilizing the earlier mentioned technologies would provide better and
296

more timely crop estimates as inputs to the Department’s international crop information collection and reporting system.

The Department has several longstanding programs for collecting

and distributing information on food, agriculture, and nutrition.

Each of these programs uses advanced technology where appropriate,

in carrying out that function. The FAS relies heavily on its Agriculturalattache reporting system for information about the supply

and demand for agricultural products in countries around the world.

As the volume of information about foreign production, imports,

exports, consumption, and stocks has grown, FAS has made greater

use of computer services to store and retrieve this information as well

as for analysis. The FAS plans to use advanced technology through

interactive computer terminals in its commodity divisions, thus enabling their analysts to have more current information when it is

needed and facilitate statistical analysis and econometric modeling.

FAS also hopes to be able to employ advanced techniques associated with intercontinental message switching and data transmission

to improve attache information collection and reporting. The actual

use of these technologies. however, will depend upon the outcome of

a future cost-benefit analysis and the avaiability of funds for such l

a project.

Since the launch of Landsat 1 in 1972, the Statistical Reporting

Service-SRS--has studied its potential use for collecting agricultural information. Work to date has been mainly to identify crops

and estimate crop acreage from Landsat imagery.

The approach used by SRS is described at greater length in my full

report, but their work so far shows measurable results using both

Landsat and aerial photography. Potential applications include using

remote sensed information to supplement or verify existing ground

survey procedures.

Timely economic information on the agricultural sector has taken

on greater value to decisionmakers as U.S. agriculture moves away

from controls and comes more directly under the influence of domestic

and foreign economic conditions.

More realistic models of the agricultural economy are being developed by the Economic Research Service applying computer technology

which permits analysis of the complex interrelationships within agri- ?

culture, and between agriculture and the domestic and world economies.

The models are discussed at greater length in the full report but

basically consist of shorti-term commodity-forecast models and longterm economic-projections models.

In summary, we produce information on food, agriculture, and -

nutrition at many points in the Department of Agriculture. Advanced

technology is being used in the production of this information where

it is feasible to do so, as evidenced by greater efficiency or expanded

capability to carry out the function.

Advanced technology offers many opportunities for improving service to information users. Increasingly, utilization of technology requires integrated application of two or more kinds of technologies. The

LACIE is an example of this trend. Meeting the LACIE objective of

accurate and timely crop reports on a worldwide basis will reeqire, the

integration of satellite, computer, and communications technology.

Some of the same technology is being tested for application to domestic crop reporting in con-junction with conventional survey methods.
297

The objective in both instances is to improve the Department’s capability for producing accurate and timely crop reports, and to do so in a

cost-effective manner.

Computer and communication technologies also are being more widely used by the Department. More realistic models of the agricultural

economy are possible by applying computer technology to such uses as

short- and long-term economic forecasts, and evaluation of alternative

future conditions that might occur. These analyses would not be possible without the support of computerized data bases and models.

e These technology applications, and other information activities that

rely on more conventional method, are employed for the purpose of

responding more effectively to pertinent questions about our food and

fiber production and distribution system, and for helping to anticipate

future problems bearing on the system’s performance.

Thank you.

Chairman HuMPHREY. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hill follows:]

STATEMENT OF DR. HOWARD L. HILL, LACIE PROJECT MANAGER, FOREIGN AGRI.

CULTURAL SERVICE, U’. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to expand our remarks regarding

the recommendations presented in “Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition Information Systems: Assessments and Recommendations.” In particular, you have requested that we respond with a detailed description of the relevant activities of

our agency that deal with the application of advanced technologies.

The preparation and distribution of current and reliable food, agricultural, and

nutrition information continues to be a first concern for the Department of Agriculture. Although increased crop production has, to a certain extent, alleviated

the tight supply situation of a year ago, the needs of the future are clear: increased food production in this country and overseas, especially in the developing

world. Reliable information on present agricultural production and markets is

essential for measuring progress toward this goal, and for planning and decisionmaking for future production and distribution, foreign trade and transportation.

The Department’s primary interest in advanced technology is as a user of its

services. Advanced technology, such as computers and modern research equipment, is routinely used by the Department in its research and action programs.

As advanced technologies make more systems available, we are striving to put

them to use to accomplish the Department’s objectives in these areas.

REMOTE SENSING USER REQUIREMENTS TASK FORCE

T

In mid-1973, as part of the Department’s continuing efforts to apply advances

in technology to improving the information available to decision makers both

within and outside the Federal government, the Secretary created a Remote

Sensing User Requirements Task Force with representatives from 8 Department

agencies which use remote sensing (R/S ) in carrying out their programs. Rep-

* resentatives from several other Department agencies and NASA were also appointed to the Task Force to provide technical assistance in such areas as benefit

assessment, information systems requirements, integration with research programs, and technical hardware capabilities.

The Task Force was directed to catalog the Department’s requirements of

earth resources data, determine those requirements that would return maximum

benefits, and develop a coordinated plan for acquiring, processing, analyzing, and

distributing data to meet those requirements. The coordinated plan will evaluate the potential for incorporating R/S-acquired data into ongoing programs and

information systems, and wiIl provide information on benefits and costs, resource

requirements, technology capabilities, and other information needed by the Department on how to make effective use of R/S technology to obtain needed information.

The Task Force has now completed its cataloging of the Department’s remote

sensing information requirements. More than 2000 items of information were

identified as being potentially collectable by remote sensing techniques that would

be useful in carrying out the Department’s program. Included were such diverse
298

items as information on timber species, wildlife migration, volume of sediment

in waterways, soil features, world agricultural crop production, and others. These

requirements were entered in an automated data base which allows the Task

Force to identify commonality of requirements among USDA agencies and to

provide management with information on data essential to decision making.

A Task Force implementation analysis team made up of specialists from the

USDA, NASA, Department of the Interior, and Universities has analyzed these

requirements in terms of priority of need and available technology. Requirements

were grouped according to technological status (research, development, operational). Those requirements which show near-term promise of satisfaction and

maximum net benefits will receive first consideration for being filled.

The Task Force will next study the cost effectiveness of applications which are

identified as being technically feasible to implement, and having a potential for -

significant benefits. Finally, an integrated research, development, and implementation plan will be submitted to the Secretary.

The remainder of this report will focus on remote sensing, analytic and communication technology already being used experimentally or operationally by

USDA agencies with primary concern for the preparation and reportinq of information on food, agriculture, and nutrition. The use of advanced technologies gives

a clear picture of the important. role we attach to these programs.

DEPARTMENT USES OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY

LACIE Program

In recent years, shortages of agricultural commodities have been serious in some

countries and have become a concern to all. Uncertainty about crop prospects has

impacted on livestock production, commodity prices, consumer prices, trading patterns, and trade balances. One outcome of these developments is a sharp increase

of interest in crop forecasting and in exchanging information about crop production conditions.

Emerging technology holds promise of providing the means to quicker, more

accurate assessment of crop production prospects, particularly for foreign countries. In particular, prospects appear strong for assessing crop conditions via

remote sensing of crop growing areas and through analysis of weather and climatic factors affecting crop growth. The Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment

(LACIE) is an excellent example of USDA’S continuing efforts to exploit advances in technology in improving its food and agriculture information systems

in that it integrates a number of technologies into a comprehensive system.

The Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE) is an experiment to test

the technical feasibility and cost effectiveness of utilizing data from an earth

resources satellite along with meteorological. and climatological and historical

data to predict production of a major agricultural crop. The experiment is being

carried out jointly by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Each agency brings its unique capabilities to this project and seeks, in turn, to fulfill some part of its overall mission

responsibilities. USDA is participating in this experiment primarily as a prospec- ,

tive user of an operational crop reporting and forecasting system. Wheat, a food

crop of major importance, has been selected as the test crop for LACIE.

Within USDA, LACIE is a multi-agency effort. Six agencies are participating,

and have contributed professional staff with specialized skills to the experiment.

The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) has been designated as the lead agency;

other participating agencies are Agricultural Research Service (ARS), Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS), Economic Research Service

(ERS), Soil Conservation Service (SCS), and Statistical “Reporting Service

(SRS) .

LACIE will be carried out in three phases. Phase 1. carried out in 1975, tested

acreage estimating capabilities in selected wheat producing areas of the United

States. Wheat yield models were developed during this phase. Phases 2 and 3 will

test LACIE capabilities to estimaite wheat area, yield, and production in the

United States and other wheat producing regions. Phase 2 began in October 1975

and Phase 3 begins October 1976. Monthly crop forecasts will be prepared during

the growing season. Associated research and development and tests of new techniques for crop Identification measurement and yield estimation will be conducted

throughout the experiment. The project is being monitored by the participating

agencies; however, USDA has lead responsibility for evaluating crop estimates

in relation to USDA requirements and for analyzing costs and benefits of an
-9.

299

improved crop forecasting capability. Because of its position as the eventual user

agency of an operational system, USDA has broad responsibility for defining output requirements and for integrating this output, as appropriate, with ongoing

programs.

It is important to stress that LACIE is an experiment, and recommendations

for future program use will be based on the outcome of evaluations that are made

as the experiment proceeds.

USDA also has lead responsibility for designing a user system for post-LACIE

implementation. We foresee application of LACIE-proven techniques by analyst

teams that use readily available hardware and software. Design of the user system was started recently with the target of completing design and testing in time d to implement LACIE at the end of the present schedule, if experimental results

support that course of action.

Although LACIE now is limited to wheat, it is expected that programs and

techniques developed during the experiment can ‘be applied to the estimation of

other agricultural crops and land use. If successful and if found to be cost-effective, a crop forecasting system utilizing the earlier mentioned technologies would

provide better and more timely crop estimates as inputs to the Department’s

international crop information collection and reporting system.

Quicker and better information on world crops could: (1) help the United States

and other countries to manage better agricultural production and to minimize

fluctuations in price and trade volumes; (2) provide earlier warnings of crop

shortages due to adverse weather; (3) provide timely indications of crop diseases and insect infestations which could affect world food supplies; and (4) provide improved production and supply information to international organizations

such as the Food and Agriculture Organization for use in carrying out their

responsibilities.

If a decision is made to make LACIE operational, the requirement of a system

with a capability to provide routine repetitive international crop forecasts would

require a continuing flow of earth resources and meteorological data which are

available to the user within a short time after acquisition, and are repeated at

frequent intervals throughout the growing system, and are suitable for computer

processing and analysis. Of course, a decision to implement a crop forecasting

system at the end Of LACIE is also contingent on a determination that the infer.

mation generated is sufficiently accurate, timely and cost-effective to warrant an

investment in such a system.

LACIE is a large and technically complex undertaking, involving close cooperation between two Departments (Agriculture and commerce) and one independent agency (NASA ) : and several agencies within each of the Departments. The

present experimental approach should, in time, be replaced by a user system

capable Of applying current technology and the advanced technology now planned

for the 1980’s. Thus LACIE is providing an environment both for testing technology-including future technology relevant to crop identification and yield forecasting—and for determining how best to utilize modern analytic capabilities in

carrying out an information function.

● Foreign Agricultural Service

The backbone of the Foreign Agricultural Service information system is its

Agricultural Attache Reporting System, which relies on attaches stationed in 63

posts around the world reporting on 82 countries. In the current world environment of short food stocks and production shortfalls, the intelligence collected by

this network is vital. In many cases, it is the only source of information about the

supply and demand for agricultural products in foreign countries around the

world.

It is necessary to aggregate, process, and summarize to a great extent the high

volume of detailed information concerning foreign production, imports, exports,

consumption and stocks to get a meaningful picture of existing world stocks of

food and feed grains and the potential demand for U.S. agricultural products. The

Foreign Agricultural Service utilizes a computer system for storage and retrieval

of this information as well as for statistical analysis and simple modeling to

support its Foreign Commodity operation.

The Foreign Agricultural Service plans to make future use of advanced technology where it is both cost effective and funded. Plans include making FAS

computerized information systems more readily accessible to economists and

commodity analysts through interactive computer terminals in commodity divisions. This will allow FAS economists to have more current information when it

is needed and facilitate statistical analysis and econometric modeling.
300

FAS also hopes to be able to employ advanced techniques associated with intercontinental message switching and data transmission to improve attache information collection and reporting. The actual use of these technologies, however,

will depend upon the outcome of a future cost benefit analysis and the availability of funds for such a project.

Statistical Reporting Service

Since the launch of LANDSAT 1 (ERTS 1) in 1972, the Statistical Reporting

Service has conducted a continuing research program to investigate the potential

use of this imagery as a tool for Collecting agricultural information. The primary

thrust of the work to date has been in the area of crop identification and the

development of methods to estimate crop acreages from LANDSAT imagery. Key

components of this system under study are: (1) design and development of a

flexible automated computerized data handling system for data conversion, calibration, interpretation, pattern recognition and statistical analysis: (2) development of a multi-stage sampling design that will utilize LANDSAT data, ground

observations and related data in the estimation Process; (3) analyzing data

acquired considering accuracy, data acquisition cost, coverage and availability,

for optimizing number and size of ground sample segments; (4) evaluation of

alternative land use and crop classification systems using LANDSAT data for improving current SRS sampling frames; and (5) comparisons of crop identification and classification results from high altitude aircraft photography and

LANDSAT to determine potential improvements in classification that could occur

with better resolution satellite imagery.

Research results show that LANDSAT classification accuracy for crops is

closely related to field size, field shape and diversity of crops produced. Accuracy

ranges from about 90 percent for Southwest Kansas with 4 crops down to 40 percent for Central Idaho with 12 crops. Classification accuracy was improved, ranging to about 80 percent for 15 crops in Idaho, when higher resolution aerial

photography was used. However, operational problems related to handling large

volumes of data in such a system must be resolved before it can be tested for a

large area.

Computer software has been developed that can match and retrieve LANDSAT

data and corresponding ground truth sample data and estimates. This system

allows LANDSAT information to be correlated with ground truth data obtained

from routine field surveys.

The correlation (R) of LANDSAT data and SRS ground truth data for identical areas ranges from .5 up to .8. We believe that the LANDSAT data can be used

to improve existing acreage estimates. Further study will be conducted to test

this theory for other areas of the country and to develop cost estimates for the

potential improvements using LANDSAT and other survey procedures.

LANDSAT data will be processed on the ILLIAC IV Computer (a parallel

processing system using 64 computers linked together and a separate computer

serving as the Central Processing Unit). This computer can process over 7,000.000

pixels (data points) in about 12 minutes. A digitizer that generates a system

Of coordinates is used to extract sample segment data from LANDSAT frames

(tapes) for correcting classification errors, using ground truth acquired by personal enumeration of sample segments.

Problems that must be resolved ‘before this technology can be put into any

operational system include: (1) earlier availability of LANDSAT tapes, (2)

improvements in the ability to extend crop signatures between LANDSAT

frames, and (3) refinements in specified crop signatures that will improve . 

classification and measurement accuracy.

The use of photography for making orchard tree and fruit counts also is

being researched. A computer model uses digitized information from aerial and

ground photographs. Results show that fruit trees as well as mature oranges,

apples and peaches can be successfully counted from data obtained from photographs. The tree counts can be used in sample surveys to estimate tree populations while the automated fruit counting system can be used in a multi-stage

sampling design to more precisely estimate the number of fruits per tree.

Economic Research Service

The Economic Research Service provides economic information on the agricultural sector to public and private decision makers. The task has become

more difficult as U.S. agriculture moves away from controls and comes more

directly under the influence of domestic and foreign economic conditions. ERS

has recognized the need to apply advanced techniques to problems of data man-
301

agement and it recently centralized its automatic data process ing services into

one unit, consisting of a data storage system linked to a generalized analytical

package for estimating relations, making variable transformations, plotting

data, and conducting statistical analyses. This technology will aid analysts by

reducing the time required to conduct an analysis while increasing the amount

of data which can ‘be analyzed. Quality and timeliness of the analyses will be

improved and other agricultural analysts will be able to more quickly retrieve

data from the system. Ultimately, this will benefit the decision maker through

improved information on which to base decisions,

Agricultural Modeling System

More realistic models of the agricultural economy can be developed by application of computer technology which permits analysis of the complex interrelationships within agriculture, and between agriculture and the domestic

and world economies. To assist in analyzing these interdependencies, ERS is

developing a cross-commodity modeling system of the agricultural sector.

It is composed of commodity subsector models linked through common variables to form a modeling system. Thus, when facts change which influence one

commodity subsector the impact this has on other related commodities can be

measured.

Currently, this modeling system is composed of individual models for beef,

pork, dairy, chickens, eggs, turkeys, corn, oats, barley, grain sorghum, soybeans,

and wheat.

The livestock and grain models have been linked and the others are in the

process of being linked. In addition, models for cotton, tobacco, and selected

fruits and vegetables are being developed and will subsequently ‘be linked.

Such a modeling system will make available an analytical capability previously not available and allow ERS analyses to reflect more of the total impact

of various changes on agriculture.

Economic Projection Program

The ERS is developing a man-machine simulation of the domestic and world

food and agricultural systems of which the principal computerized components

include:

(1) The National Interregional Agricultural Projections system (NIRAP),

which is the core projections capability and point of coordination for all ERS

food and agricultural projections. This system contains basic supply-demand

relationships in domestic food and agriculture.

(2) The world Grains, Oilseeds and Livestock (GOL) trade model which

projects major world trade relationships in food and agriculture. This model

can be run independently or in concert with the NIRAP system.

(3) A linear programming model of interregional transportation of farm

commodities and interregional ‘adjustments in farm production given specified

environmental constraints. This model can be run independently or in concert

with the NIRAP system.

(4) A rural economic development simulation model developed to analyze impacts of different national growth policies on employment and income in rural w America. This model currently operates independently from the NIRAP system.

The program functions in two annual cycles, development and analysis. Feedback from previous ‘analysis cycles provides the basis for changing existing

models or developing new ones.

This information is used to operate component models of the NIRAP system

from which are generated preliminary projections and analysis of alternative

futures, which are reviewed and revised as needed prior to their actual use to

answer futuristic questions in food and agriculture.

SUMMARY

Information on food, agriculture, and nutrition is produced at many points in

the Department of Agriculture. Advanced technology is being used in the production of this information where it is feasible to do so, as evidenced by greater

efficiency or expanded capability to carry out the function.

This report concentrates on Department information activities which utilize

or experiment with advanced technology for collecting, analyzing, and distributing information on food, agriculture, and nutrition. The information thus developed is widely used by the general public, by public agencies for policy and

program decision making, and for analyses of agricultural and resources issues

6s-s77—76—2 0
faced

302

by the Congress. Information produced by the Department also is used by

international organizations and foreign governments. The kinds of information

-

and the principal users are discussed at greater length in reports provided earlier

to the Technology Assessment Board.

Advanced technology offers many opportunities for improving’ service to information users. Increasingly, utilization of technology requires integrated application of two or more kinds of technology. The Large Area Crop Inventory

Experiment (LACIE) is an example of this ‘trend. Meeting the LACIE objective of accurate and timely crop reports on a worldwide basis will require the

integration of satellite, computer, and communications technology in a costeffective manner. Some of the same technology is being tested for application to

domestic crop reporting in conjunction with conventional survey methods. The

objective in both instances is to improve the Department’s capability for producing accurate and timely crop reports, and to do so in a cost-effective manner.

The potential for using remotely sensed information in fulfilling the Department’s responsibilities is being systematically assessed by the Department’s

Remote Sensing User Requirements Task Force. A large number of such uses .

have been identified. The uses vary in their importance. Practical considerations

such as funding, supporting technology requirements, staff expertise, and technical attributes of the collection system, require that priorities be set among the

uses to be met.

Computer and communication technologies also are being more widely used

by the Department. More realistic models of the agricultural economy are possible by applying computer technology to such uses as short and long-term economic

forecasts, and evaluation of alternative future conditions that might occur.

These analyses would not be possible without the support of computerized data

bases and models.

Communication technology plays a large role in the information function as

the need for timely analysis and reporting on a worldwide basis becomes generally accepted. As the potential of the technology is more thoroughly studied

additional applications are expected.

These technology applications, and other information activities that rely on

more conventional methods, are employed for the purpose of responding more

effectively to pertinent questions about our food and fiber production and distribution system, and for helping to anticipate future problems beating on the

system’s performance.

[The following questions were submitted by Senator Humphrey to

Dr. Hill and his answers thereto:]

Question 1. What specific programs of the various agencies of USDA could

be operated more efficiently if remote sensing data were available on a continuing

basis?

Answer 1. Since the Department is a long-time user of aircraft data, we assume

that your question refers to remotely sensed data from space. The Department’s

Remote Sensing User Requirements Task Force is currently examining the Department’s needs for remotely sensed data in the carrying out of its responsi- .

bilities. The Task force assignment is approximately 50 percent complete. Until

the Task Force has completed its assignment and has issued its final report, we

cannot fully answer this question.

However, we believe that a prime beneficiary of the continued availability of

remotely sensed would be the Department’s food and agricultural information

systems. The frequent “looks” at major crops around the world should permit

more timely assessments of major crop area, condition, yield, and expected production as inputs to the Foreign Agricultural Service’s crop forecasts. This improved information in turn could permit more rational decisions by the Department’s program managers.

The Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE) experience should also

help to answer this question.

Question 2. What major improvements in agency programs are anticipated, if

and when such data are available on a continuing basis?

Answer 2. The input of remotely sensed data from space to the Department’s

international crop forecasting system should provide both Federal and non-Federal users with more timely and accurate international crop production forecasts.

Also, we are optimistic that use of remotely sensed data will provide earlier

indications of insect infestations, crop diseases, or weather phenomena, which

could adversely impact world crop production. It is also anticipated that remote
303

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sensing data could be used to supplement the Department’s domestic crop reporting system. We should be able to amplify our response to this question when the

Remote Sensing Task Force Report is available.

Question 3. What new or special problems would USDA expect to have to deal

with to utilize such data?

Answer 3. In an operational use of remote sensing data, some potential problems can be assumed. These include: (1) precise registration of the’ remotely

sensed data to geographic coordinates (ground location), (2) timely delivery of

the remotely sensed data to the user, and (3) problems associated with the rapid

processing and analysis of the extremely large amounts of data contained in

Landsat type scenes.

Upon completion of LACIE, we should be able to provide a more complete

answer.

Qucstion 4. What, if any, institutional obstacles would need to be overcome if

such data were available on a continuous basis?

Answer 4. In general, it would seem that several institutional issues would

include: requirements on existing USDA organizations in order to integrate

remotely sensed data into existing information systems; location and management of remote sensing preprocessing, processing and analysis hardware and

personnel; organizational and management consideration involved in interfacing

special purpose equipment with the Department’s general purpose computers; and

budget allocation to support the remote sensing activities.

Question 5. How would satellite data integrate with the current traditional

data system ? (i.e. Displace, compliment, or supplement) Which data series would

be most affected?

Answer 5. We are able to make some statements about the probable integration

of information from an operational LACIE type system. We foresee opportunities

to both complement and supplement USDA’s crop production information system.

Present non U.. S. crop production data series would be affected by the introduction

of crop data that are collected on a timely basis, and are more accurate than

present data. However, we do not foresee that these data could be produced

entirely from I,ANDSAT information-there would still be dependence on existing data sources and on meteorological data.

Question 6. Has USDA, as a result of the first year of the LACIE experiment,

been able to pinpoint additional research needs to increase the utility of this

technology for USDA’s usage requirements?

Answer 6. Technology areas that need to be strengthened were identified in the

first phases of LACIE, and are intended in the evaluation report of Phase I which

is expected to be appraised and released in the near future. The evaluation was

carried out and reported by a LACIE team made up of staff from USDA, NOAA,

and NASA. USDA resources available to LACIE will be applied to the solution

of these technology problems wherever possible during the remainder of LACIE :

in addition, fundamental problems requiring longer term research attention will

be identified as LACIE continues. There is already a NASA-funded research

program that supports LACIE, and we expect also to identify problems that fall

w within the area of USDA research concern.

Question 7. Could you provide OTA with a copy of the report of the Remote

Sensing Use and Requirements Task Force?

Qiestion 7. It is expected that the Task Force will complete its task and issue

its final report about the first of 1977. Copies will be forwarded to the OTA upon

● publication.

Question 8.. Could you provide OTA with a copy of the first years LACIE

study ?

Answer 8. The LACIE Phase I Evaluation Report, mentioned above, is currently being reviewed for approval. Upon approval and publication, we will

forward copies to the OTA.

Question 9. Are USDA’s cost effective studies taking into account the international elements?

Answer 9. Yes. In evaluating the cost effectiveness of LACIE, among other

elements, we plan to address the question of the value of improved international crop production information to decision makers—both within and outside the Federal Government, consumers, and producers. At this time however,

there are no plans to appraise the value of improved information to non-U.S.

Governments and/or organizations.

Question 10. Your paper deals with several other technologies used in information systems. OTA would appreciate knowing:
304

(a) Which models are being used or drawn upon by USDA for policy

making purposes ? How would YOU suggest the Congress use these models?

(b) What fire the strengths and weaknesses of the principal modeling

tools used by USDA?

(c) How much is being spent on modeling by USDA? What would be

the effects of increase in the order of two-three times?

(d) Does the private sector make better use of modeling techniques than

the U.S. Government ? How?

Answer 10. Testimony before the Office of Technology Assessment by Howard

L.. Hill on F’ebruary 4, 1976, provided some brief overview of economic modeling activity in the Department of Agriculture. Nest of this activity is in the

Economic Research Service (ERS) and is an integral part of their capability .

to provide current forecast, and long range projections information on food

and agriculture. None oil the information provided regularly by ERS depends

solely on economic models but these tools are increasingly important in the work

of this Agency.

Quentin M. West, ERS Administrator, testified before the Office of Technology .

Assessment on September 25, 1975. His testimony provided an overview of what

ERS has been doing in the past three years to Improve their analytical capability

including modeling, improve output of information and improve the flow of

data to use in analysis. Most of the models used in USDA for helping to provide information to

policy makers are developed internally by Department staff or in cooperation

with economists at land grant universities. The primary model of the general

economy being used by the Economic Research Service is the one developed by Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates. The ERS long range projections

activity relies primarily on the National Interregional Agricultural Projections

(NIRAP) System and various university models. These models concentrate on

different subject matter, different levels of detail and aggregation and different

time periods from the next year to the next 20-30 years. The models attempt to

capture the underlying structure and economic relationships of agriculture,

such as the interrelationships between commodity sectors and between general

economic activity and agriculture.

Economic models in the Department use the various modeling tools available.

These include econometrics, statistical analysis, simulation, input-output, and

mathematical programing. These tools have different strengths and weaknesses

and are therefore applicable under different circumstances. In all modeling

efforts, the foundation has to be a well-trained and informed staff and availability of data that allows appropriate use of the modeling tools. Understanding the economic issues and problems, making sound assumptions for significant

factors not included in the models, such as informed opinions of industry

contacts, and objective and clear interpretation of results from the modeling

efforts require the well-trained and capable staff.

Some of the principal weaknesses of current modeling efforts include the

need for more quarterly models, incorporation of some data on such important

factors as weather, and improvement of models on agriculture in foreign countries.

About 15 percent of ERS budget is associated with the development and use

of models. Having a significant increase in funds available for formal modeling

work should have high benefits since a great deal of modeling work remains to

be done.

Private industry uses basically the same modeling techniques as USDA. In

fact, most of the models developed and used by USDA must be more comprehensive than those found in industry. The one area that private industry has

been ahead of USDA is in using current computer technology to manage the

volumes of data needed in economic analysis. ERS is currently making necessary

improvements in this area and developing more powerful automated data management and analysis capabilities. This change was covered in Quentin West’s

testimony of September 25,1975.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Gentlemen, we thought it would be beneficial

to have someone outside of the Government also make a presentation,

We will next hear from Dr. Archibald Park of the Earth Satellite Corp.
305

STATEMENT OF DR. ARCHIBALD PARK, EARTH SATELLITE CORP..

l)r. PARK. Thank you, Mr. chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear here, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Would you tell us a little bit about the Earth

Satellite Corp.; it is private ?

l)r. PARK. Yes. It is a private consulting firm. The bulk of our business is related to remote sensing and the application of it to resource

management. our clients run the gamut from agribusiness both in

this country and abroad to State and local governments here in this

country as well as foreign governments in a consulting capacity.

I have been given a rather enviable task of being able to sit back

and look at the research that has been conducted. And a friend of mine

posed the philosophical question extremely well.

He said we should look at the research from time to time to see if

we have already gone by the answer. In this case, I think there is sufficient evidence in the program of the experiments that have been done

to date to point out that certain results that bear very much on operational go or no-go policy have in fact come to light.

M-y paper is quite long and covers the technology in some detail

based on a system design. That is, an information system design that

covers all aspects of data acquisition, data processing, data analysis,

the various models that are in use today and of course, the decisionmaking process.

The staff asked me to comment on the technical and technological

opportunities and constraints that exist today in the research and

development programs and the opportunities for the future for the

employment of such a system for global agricultural information.

The acquisition covers the three satellite systems that have been

mentioned and I don’t think it is of any use to speak further on them.

The document covers Landsats, Metsats and Datasats. It also covers

collateral observations and measurements both by national governments and by international organizations as well as agribusiness.

It treats the Landsat satellite, I think, with the emphasis that it

deserves since it is a key to this system. In my opinion. the system

really cannot exist in a way that “is both unbiased and independent

without such satellites. And I will have some recommendations at the

end of my presentation that deal with what might go on from here.

There are various categories of data from Landsat. The following

observables are all essential to an agricultural information system:

GROUP 1

1. Agriculture versus nonagriculture.

2. Cereals versus other crops.

3. Wheat versus other cereals.

GROUP 2

1. Soils association maps.

2. Soils reconnaissance maps.

3. Soils survey maps.
306

GROUP 3

1. Vegetation density.

2. Vegetation vigor.

3. Vegetation stress.

The groups are in order of technical difficulty.

My position with respect to the operational decision is based on the

premise that we already know how to make maps of agriculture versus

nonagriculture on a global basis. That is not a R. & D. activity;

Chairman HUMPHREY . You mean agricultural and nonagricultural

lands?

Dr. PARK. Yes, sir; I do.

As Mr. Mathews pointed out, this is going to improve with newer

sensors on future satellites. That is, the precision will improve.

It can detect soil color. It can detect plant stress. It cannot tell you “

what that stress is caused by, but conventionally it is caused by moisture or insects or disease or a combination of those.

It can measure biomass, that is the mass of the vegetation and, of

course, it can say something qualitatively about plant vigor.

In addition to these observable, it is necessary to consider the interpretation of these data by skilled agricultural professionals in the

appropriate scientific discipline. The following are the outputs of the

Landsat and Landsat combined sources of data:

1. Ecological partitioning of the agricultural land of the world.

2. Surface soil mapping.

3. Crop inventory and monitoring.

4. Agricultural land use change detection.

5. Global agricultural data base compilation and update.

The inputs that I see Landsat making to the global system deal only

with crop inventory and monitoring only in the later years. To start

with we need very badly to partition the world ecologically. If we are

going to sample the world statistically. we have to develop those data

on the basis of the productivity potential of the land. Landsat by

virtue of its existing capability can contribute to these right away.

I have a schedule on how long it would take us if we made a decision this spring to produce such data which will in fact support an

operational LACIE concept.

One of the most important attributes of a satellite is the fact that,

it can detect change and agricultural land use change is a very, very

important thing.

I know that you felt as keenly as anyone present at the World Food

Conference about the importance of the agricultural lands of the .

world. I was distressed by the fact that not one word in the technical

documentation dealt with the issue of agricultural land use change.

The fact that thousands of acres of good agricultural lands are going

out of production everyday.

Chairman HUMPHREY. For what reason?

Dr. PARK. Principally because of road construction and urban expansion. But anywhere that one can grow crops, it is often the cheapest
307

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*

land on which to build buildings and roads and that’s an unfortunate

thing.

Finally, I would argue that there is no data base, no conceivable data

base as good as Landsat itself for the global agricultural information

system. For its revision, and its verification, the Landsat pictures

themselves are the ideal base for the system.

In meteorology, Dr. White has mentioned the importance of that

discipline to crop yield, plant growth models and I will not deal with

the specifics.

The models are fairly well in hand and it is appropriate to state

that we should start now. As the research develops better and better

precision, it will certainly be employed. But we have enough proof of

concept that we should decide to go ahead now.

Chairman HUMPHREY. That's the Metsat contribution you are talking about there ?

Dr. PARE. That's right; the meteorological satellite.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Is there a phase-in of the traditional type

of information by the computerization of this data?

Dr. PARK. Yes, sir, and in the case of the crop yield, plant growth

models, what has been done is to quantify these observational data

in numerical form and fit them into numerical models. The level of

sophistication of that technology is quite surprising.

I will only use one of the models in the presentation because it perhaps is the most interesting of all the models. It is the land use management model and represents one more reason for my position that

we can in fact make a decision to proceed.

Land use information is derived in this concept from a multidisciplinary team of scientists who use Landsat data to derive an analytical product on land use. And, of course, in the case of agriculture it is a

product that either deals with agricultural capability which is the

capability of the land to sustain certain types of agriculture or land

use suitability which does take into account the political factors that

present the scientists with given alternatives with respect to the use

of the land and so must be accounted for in the analytical tasks.

The land use analysis to date, that we, as a corporation have found

to be salable in foreign countries is, of course, that which deals with

intensive agricultural development, or the improvement of the range

of that country, or the actual alternatives that they must consider

in the deve!opment of transportation systems.

I mentioned before that land use historically was not an issue in

roads. I feel it should have been. One can build a road anywhere. It

is no longer necessary to use agricultural land to build roads, since

engineering technology is no longer a limiting factor.

When I talk about the rational use of land I do it because the principal interest of these countries and hopefully of our own is the protection of agricultural lands.

This is a chart from the body of my report and I will spend only

a moment or two on it.
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AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION

I have diagramed how products and information would flow into

a system that would produce these products in the order in which I

suggested they were able to be produced by Landsat now.

We would use Metsats, existing air photos, and Landsat data combined with all the collateral information as you said yourself, the .

conventional information that we can get our hands on to produce

Ecozone maps. Ecozone is a word which is apolitical in the sense that

there are lots of other terms around. If you use them you mean a

system that was developed by a certain country.

Landscape mapping is a Soviet term. Land system mapping is an

Australian term. And so Ecozone means all of those things so it is

equally clear to the Soviets and our own people that we are partitioning the world in terms of its biological productivity.

Now, given an Ecozone map, which is rather a scientific document

and given genetic distribution data, an experimental agronomist using

a practical approach to the analyses of these data can produce production potential maps of the world.

The real question is: How long does it take to do that if you started

now ? And where are we in the R. & D. program so that that product

would meet with the current research program in NASA and Agriculture.
309

Using World Meteorological Organization data daily, and satellite

data from the Metsats daily we can produce daily yield forecasts.

These are the numerical equations previously referenced in terms of

the World Food Conference we are addressing the early warning part

of that charge that was given to FAO.

Now, I have-I said that I would propose a timetable of events and

here it is. If the decision is made to implement such a program this

year, there are a variety of milestones. The soil maps of the world are

complete. They are not published by any means, but they are complete.

FAO is continuing this work in terms of soils limitations to agriculture.

Chairman HUMPHREY . When you say “soil maps,” do you mean

just the topography, or are you talking about chemical analysis also?

Dr. PARK. I am talking partially about chemical analysis, but more

accuracy the graphic description of soils and a legend system that has

been completed for the world. They are fairly small in scale but nonetheless they do exist.

And if you take Landsat data and interpret these soils as they must

be interpreted for the models, in my estimation it will be 2 years from

this spring before one is finished with the interpretive process for

wheat for the world.

If you add to that, rice. it will take another year. And if you add to

that, corn, still another year to complete the interpretations of the

soils data as required by the models now in use to produce plant growth

in yield numbers.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Then the information you obtain would be on

productivity, for example ?

Dr. PARK. Yes. sir.

Chairman HUMPHREY. Do you get data on the possibility of disease ?

Dr. PARK. Not yet. That’s several years away. But the stress caused

by soil moisture is a part of it.

If you started this spring to ask, for example, the Department of

Agriculture to develop crop calendars, it would take them a year to

do wheat alone.

This calendar of the biological events descriptive of the growth of

wheat in my opinion would take at least a year.

Chairman HUMPHREY. There are also critical periods in production.

Information on a lack of moisture at one time of the year is more critical than at another time of the year.

Dr. PARK. That's correct.

In the plant growth ancl yield models we literally grow the plant

daily and that’s specifically why the yield data is a daily event. And

as I say. if you want to continue with this work for just the three

principal crops, it is not something that can be done just out. of hand

and in a hurry.

Chairman HUMPHREY . This is what you are saying is now possible

with the current technology?

Dr. PA RK. Yes. sir: I am. If you decide to proceed with the Ecozome
310

Dr. PARK. That is the culmination of an interdisciplinary analysis

of the land which deals with the drainage, surface materials of the

Earth, the geology of the Earth, the soils, and the vegetation. Transportation and cultural features mayor may not be a part of that map

but it gives you the information about the natural land system,

These Ecozone maps which are a result of this complex; analysis,

go together with additional information to produce production potential maps of the world.

Now, production of what? That’s the question. As we have said the

first effort would be to produce maps for the potential, for wheat >

growth. To do this would take 2 years for wheat, 3 years for wheat and

rice, or 4 years for all three.

As for the plant growth models, in my opinion, wheat can be im- .

proved, but I believe the models are adequate.

The models for corn are the most advanced but we decided not to

start with corn. The fact is that corn is not as important as wheat is

in food trade, nor in the food-for-peace program. Wheat is the most

important crop

l

in international trade. And even though the models

are not as wel developed as they are for corn, we all agreed to start

with wheat first.

In the Landsat schedule we know that C is scheduled for the fall

of 1977 and D is not an approved program. Everyone has mentioned

the fact that their programs are hinged on the approval of future

missions and that's a key issue for the committee, in my opinion.

Finally, I believe that Earth observation satellites are the only dependable, unbiased source of data, and that Landsat imagery is the

only consistent base of data. And one that I don't think can be stressed

too hard; and that is that the proposed system benefits by but is not

dependent on international cooperation.

That's another key issue; the system as described is one that can

be conducted with or without international cooperation. It will generate statistics of acceptable accuracy in either case.

Legislation can certainly strengthen USDA or one could create an

independent entity with t is single responsibility. Legislation, I be- h

lieve, should recognize that orbiting resource satellites are the core of

the system.

Am-1 finally, legislation should recognize that no present agency of .

the Government has all of the necessary multidisciplinary skill mix.

I would point out that the Department of Agriculture could bring

to bear the proper skills but no individual agency of the Department

presently has the proper staff.

Thank you very much.

Chairman HUMPHREY . Thank you very much.

[The following paper was requested from Dr. Park by OTA:]
311

A GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

This report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment deals with the

application of advanced technology in the fields of remote sensing of the terrestrial biosphere and the atmosphere to provide inputs to a dynamic analytical

system which produces quantitative estimates on the current status of agricultural production of selected crops on a global basis.

The report will provide a narrative description of the system including an

overview of the design concept. For each element of the system an assessment of

the current state-of-the-art will be made. The contribution that each element

makes to the system will be covered in sufficient detail to provide both understand-

. ing at the system level and to illustrate the tremendous value many of the individual components have in the management of agricultural resources. A brief

description of the status of appropriate research and development will follow. Finally, a review of the gaps and/or deficiencies will complete the technical discussion. A section will then follow which will deal with the institutional issues.

These will include both national and international problems and suggested solutions where appropriate.

INTRODUCTION

The agricultural objective of the United States and other countries is the

alleviation of the world food problem. The major increase in the world’s food

supply must come from increased production of farm crops. Historically, this

has largely been accomplished by bringing additional land under cultivation. More

recently increased food production has been met by increasing the yields on the

land already under cultivation in both the developed and the developing countries.

A major essential for any agricultural management system is the availability

of information on agricultural conditions in a timely fashion, Opportunities for

increasing and sustaining the productivity of the land and facilitating product

flow in agriculture are identified by the availability of accurate, comprehensive,

and timely information on productivity, and on the current and potential use

of the land. The lack of such information can be a major obstacle to the further

economic development of developing countries and a subsequent obstacle to the

formulation of important policies in more fully developed regions.

If one considers the broad base of data required to undertake any major review

of the agricultural potential of a large country, to say nothing of a continental

land mass, it becomes apparent that “on the ground” observations create manpower and logistical problems of overwhelming proportions.

Current earth observing satellites have demonstrated that with the proper

technical. scientific, and institutional support, they can be employed in an operational system designed to provide a continuous overview of agricultural production and agricultural land use on a global basis with the inherent capability to

forecast production in advance of harvest.
312

—-—. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT —

I

FIGURE 1

1.0 The Technology

Figure 1 is a block diagram of an information system concept which was developed by the writer several years ago and which was designed specifically for

use with remote sensing. It is a closed loop model and is centrally oriented in that

information flows to the management decision block and requirements for information flow from that block.

In many organizations both in and out of the government sector data is collected simply because it can be acquired. In the development of remote sensing

devices there was an intensive effort to focus the research on meeting the requirements of management decision makers in the natural resource fields. This was

done because of the high visibility and cost of the acquisition systems, namely

satellites and aircraft.

In the DATA PROCESSING block both conventional photo products and more

sophisticated and quantitative digital products are prepared and delivered to

the analytical group.

In the DATA ANALYSIS block there is a variety of methods available and

many of them are suitable for implementation in an operational system. They

include conventional photointerpretation with simple light tables, machine assisted interpretation, and finally a fully automated approach using a variety

of current computers. The direct recognition of natural resource features based

on their shape alone is the exception rather than the rule. In this field the key

to the analysis of the feature is frequently color, although the literature more

often refers to its “multispectral signature”. In addition the interpretation team

8
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is invariably made up of natural resource scientists rather than a team of trained

technical level personnel. It is the professional background of the team that

makes the interpretation of the data possible.

The MODELS are parallel blocks, but the vertical line between them is meant

to imply that there is an interaction between the science, the economic, and the

management models. The most popular concept of modeling is that one can reduce

all parameters to numerical form for processing in computers. Many natural resource models are numerical in form; many others are not. The term “model” in

this document includes both the numerical form and the iterative form where

there is a prescribed sequence to the ordering of the data so that cause and effect

patterns are produced and conclusions are drawn from the analysis of these

patterns. It is in this way that such difficult abstractions as behavior can be

modeled. In the section dealing with models, an iterative model on the spread of

disease will be shown,

As the figure illustrates, all three of the modeling Mocks may be required to

produce information for the MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES block. This is as

far as the natural resource scientist, in the context of this approach, goes in the

production of information for management decisions. In this concept these alternatives are given to the managers who represent a different entity than the

remote sensing resource scientist; and it is appropriate to consider for the purposes of this paper that those decisions are Congressional management decisions.

The decision process can result in a course of actions, but that is beyond the

scope of this document. However, that process can result in a requirement for

additional data for that or future decisions by the management group.

The DATA REQUIREMENTS block constitutes the feed-back loop of the

information system, and starts the process over again with the acquisition of

data to satisfy that requirement.

If there is a unifying theme to the system concept, it is expressed in the phrase

“the convergence of evidence.” These words describe both the method and the

philosophy of the approach. In merely stating the goal of the technology-to

provide a current assessment of the production of selected crops on a global

basis--it is necessary to realize that one is trying to monitor, and in some cases

predict, the behavior and the interaction between two of our most dynamic

environments, the atmosphere and the biosphere. Many scientists consider both

to be intractable; the atmosphere because of its enormity, and the rates at which

its processes occur, the biosphere because of its complexity and the interdependence between living and non-living components. The convergence-of-evidence approach is not, however, an admission that the science is inexact. Rather,

it is the recognition that it is both complex and dynamic, and that the sources

of input data vary in their precision and their reliability. The concept implies

that there are several input data sources, as indeed there are, and each is expressed in the following subsections.

1.1 Data Acquisition

In a system where one is going to acquire data on a global basis it is necessary

at the outset to consider the issue of national sovereignty and the sensitivity

of many countries concerning access to data about their natural resources. The

attitude of the majority of countries, including the United States, is that

anyone may conduct an inventory, sometimes after the issue of a permit (Australia). The national will is imposed in the exploitation phase. Other countries have very strict laws prohibiting even the inventory (Brazil), while others

are principally concerned with their border areas (India). In any case, the use

of aircraft for the purpose of an agricultural information system seems for the

present to be unacceptable, and because this is so, a concept has been developed

which does not use aircraft, even in the United States.

There are two major sources of information, (a) satellites, and (b) collateral

data. These satellites include (1) LANDSATS, (2) METSATS, (3) DATASATS.

The collateral sources include (1) national governments (Ministries of Agri- culture): (2) international bodies (Food and Agriculture Organization, and

World Meteorological Organization of the United Nations) ; and (3) Agribusiness.

1.1.1 LAND8AT Data

Research conducted to date by a number of investigators has established the

utility of these data in agricultural information systems. There are various

categories of data from LANDSAT.
314

a. The LANDSAT data is the only source of data.

b. The LANDSAT imagery is the primary source of data.

c. The LANDSAT imagery is supporting data to other satellites and other

data sources.

The following list of observable are all essential to an agricultural information system, and each group is structured in order of technical difficulty. Each

observable is followed by one of the letters (a), (b), or (c), as indicated above,

to denote the category of LANDSAT data.

GROUP I

1. Agriculture vs. non-agriculture: (a).

2. Cereals vs. other crops: (b).

3. Wheat vs. other cereals: (c).

GROUP l-s

1. Soils association maps: (a).

2. Soils reconnaissance maps: (b).

3. Soils survey maps: (c).

GROUP III

1. Vegetation density—biomass—leaf area index: (a).

2. Vegetation vigor: (a), (c), *.

3. Vegetation stress: (a), (c), *.

In addition to these observable, it is necessary to consider the interpretation

of these data by skilled agricultural professionals in the appropriate scientific

discipline. The following are the outputs of the LANDSAT and LANDSATcombined sources of data.

1. Ecological Partitioninfl.-Each partition, or geobotanical landscape unit,

represents a synthesis of certain key items of knowledge about the area. These

variables include the regional distribution of landforms, geology, meteorology

and climate, hydrology, and to some extent human activity. The interaction of

these phenomena produce a base to which specific living resources such as vegetation and animal life respond, and upon which natural and deposition, work.

The purpose of the analysis is to partition the region or country into meaningful

ecological units—meaningful in the sense that for a particular crop or group of

crops, for example cereals, the ecological units thus defined will permit samples

of yield data taken randomly from the unit to be truly representative of the entire

area of the unit. The stratification will greatly improve both the reliability and

cost-effectiveness of all kinds of statistics related to productivity, land use, and

natural resources. It also becomes a spatial data base. for the systematic organization of available information about both the natural resources and the dependent society, and it represents a basis for organizing and presenting plans for agricultural programs which are founded on the concept that opportunities and constraints to resource development are usually similar in like ecological regions.

Finally, it provides an improved basis for the development of a total resource

policy for setting priorities and scheduling program implementation because it

gives decision makers at all levels, both administrative and operational, a

perspective of the country or region that simplifies what would otherwise be an

overwhelming body of complex detail about the resource and the area.

2. Soils Association Mapping. —Aside from the basic essential nutrient value of

soils, their most significant role in plant growth equations is the way in which

they handle water relative to the root systems of plants and the evaporation

demands of the atmosphere. For the purposes of the models, particle-size classes

are one of the important groupings. Salinity is also considered, as it is an obvious

factor in plant/water relationships. LANDSAT data is valuable in the soils task

for two reasons: first, the analysis of the LANDSAT data is an agriculture vs.

non-agriculture map. That map is used to determine the soils that are important

to agriculture. Most soils maps have no companion overlay which indicates to

the analyst that he is looking at farmland.

One can infer that certain types of soil are arable, but from the point of view of

partitioning and the production of statistical strata the LANDSAT image pro-

*LANDSAT data Is most often used to verify the conditions of vegetation vigor and stress, since the state, of the vegetation is calculated d@Iy in plant growth models, and the satellite data is mied each 9 days or each 18 days, or even less frequently, to.contkm that these vegetation condition do in fact exist. On the other hand, the (a) on both vieor and

strew indicates that those two conditions can be detected directly OKI the L~~DsAT imagery.
315

.

*

vides the precise boundaries of the arable land and information about surface soil

color patterns which are able to be keyed into the existing soil surveys where they

are available; and second, inferences can be drawn relative to the important

aspects of the soil in the plant growth models, directly from the LANDSAT data

where soil surveys are absent.

3. Crop Inventory and Monitoring.-The repetitive coverage of the satellite

permits one to create, in a temporal sense, an inventory of the crops and an

assessment of crop conditions throughout the growing season. The reason that it

is necessary to conduct a temporal inventory in agriculture is that at certain

times in the growing season it is very difficult to separate the species one from

another. This is true for remote sensing systems both aircraft and spacecraft and

for some crops (cereals) even true for surface observations. Then, at a specific

time during the growing season one crop will become very easy to identify, versus

all the others; a separate time a second crop, and at still a separate time, a third

crop, and so on, so that it requires the repetitive nature of the satellite to build

up a catalog of inventory data. It is expected that, even with the improvement in

both spatial and spectral resolution afforded by future satellite systems, this particular approach to inventory would be the one that will always have to be

followed.

4. Agriculture Land Use Change Detection.—The ability of LANDSAT to monitor land use change, especially in agriculture, is an exceedingly important tool.

As new lands are opened up and as changes occur from dry land farming to irrigation farming, and as different crop types are introduced into the areas, the

repetitive coverage of the satellites permits one to assess change, to introduce that

change into the data base, and to correct the statistics essentially in real time.

5. Global Agricultural Data Base Compilation and Update.—There is no single or multiple source of data on agriculture that is comparable in any respect to

the LANDSAT image itself; and if it takes five or more years to compile the

LANDSAT data base of global agriculture, the task is well worth the effort. The

analysis of that data is quite simple from the point of view of the data base, that

is, agriculture versus non-agriculture, and the monitoring of the changes of

those boundaries. The data is in digital form; it is also in pictorial form. It

is able to be stored in computers. Because each picture element is in fact an

X, Y coordinate in latitude and longitude, it is easy to update the data base, picture element by picture element if that is necessary. Critics of the LANDSAT

program have historically criticized the spatial resolution capability of the satellite system, stating that the 80mm Ground Resolved Distance is far too coarse for

meaningful studies. Without debating that issue in this paper, the point should

be made that for use as an agricultural data base on a global basis, 80 meters

resolution represents far too much data. Proposals have been made to let the

complexity of the land itself determine the spatial character of the data base cell.

In actual practice, most of these data bases in computer form have a 1 kilometer

to 10 kilometer cell size, and when maps are made from this computer base, it is

difficult indeed to tell at a glance that you are looking at data in digital form—

which is to say that the map is made up of a series of very tiny squares.

If LANDSAT is used to create this data base, and if this data base is to be in a

● computer for its ready retrieval and storage capability, a decision will have to be

made on how and where LANDSAT data will be aggregated to provide a realistic

computer matrix cell size.

1.1.2 Present LANDSAT Deficiencies

In a discussion of deficiencies of the LANDSAT system, it is noted that

these deficiencies do not prohibit the use of the satellite in the accomplishment

of the task described. However, improvements can be made, and undoubtedly

will be made, and for that reason they are enumerated.

1. Spatial resolution.—The present Ground Resolved Distance (GRD) or

Instantaneous Field of View (IFOV) is 80 meters. It is convenient to think of

the resolution cell as a square patch on the surface of the earth 80 meters long

and 80 meters wide. It happens that this is very close to an acre. Because the

cell size is that large, it is difficult and in some cases impossible, to see small

fields. Some of the important crop growing areas of the world are long, narrow

mountain valleys, and it is not possible to say with confidence that one can

differentiate anything other than riparian vegetation versus other classes. In

some cases even that is difficult. An improvement in the spatial resolution of

the satellite would permit a more accurate delineation of fields of small size and

more accurate measurement of fields of all sizes. The present measurement cap-
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ability of the satellite is a statistical relationship wherein an array of 3

pixels by 3 pixels is accepted as the smallest field that can be measured. This

takes into account the probability that a pixel can fall on the edge of a field and

thus be made up of partly that field and partly the adjacent field. Thus for area

measurement the data are acceptable only when field sizes are that large (approximately 10 acres) (4 hectares) or larger.

2. Spectral resolution.-LANDSAT operates in four bands, the green, red, and

two bands in the infrared portions of the spectrum. They are broad bands,

being 100 micrometers wide. The multispectral scanner (MSS) was designed to

the state-of-the-art, and because the satellite is operating at the altitude and

at the speed at which it does, it is essential that these bands be 100 micrometers

broad. That permits the detectors in the instrument to record enough energy,

i.e., count enough photons to measure the colors reasonably accurately. On the

other hand, this broad band color discriminant makes it difficult to separate some

plant species from one another. Research conducted over the past decade in

aircraft indicates that if these bands are on the order of 50 micrometers wide as

opposed to 100, it would be much easier to discriminate the plants, one from ●

another.

3, Temporal resolution.-The design of LANDSAT permits it to cover the

earth in 18 days. The swath width of the image is 185 kilometers, and if one

divides the equator into 185-kilometer pieces, one finds that it takes, 18 days to

cover the world at the equator. This is a compromise, and resulted from a

decision which was made during the design phase. The trade-off involved the

question of whether or not to go for global coverage including the equator, or give

up complete coverage in order to give more frequent coverage of just the

United States. The decision was made to go for a global system.

The success of the satellite in collecting data at the equator and 10 degrees

north and south of the equator, where cloud cover has been sufficiently severe

to have caused aircraft data collection missions to have failed has in the

opinion of the writer justified that decision made in the early days of the

program. A large percent of agricultural production grows in that 20-degree

equatorial belt around the world. On the other hand, cloud cover statistics suggest

that there is a 50% probability that any given area can be covered by clouds,

during the growing season: thus the 18-day coverage of the satellite causes

gaps in the data resulting in some areas being covered barely adequately

during the growing season (two or three times), and others with data that

is altogether unsuitable for analysis for agricultural purposes (less than twice).

At the present time there are two LANDSAT satellites in orbit; LANDSAT 2 was

launched so that coverage is every nine days. The experience to date in the

United States where there has been a regular collection of data on that nineday interval, indicates that this may be the ideal data collection cycle.

4. Format.-Approximately 10% of LANDSAT data is able to be processed

as computer-compatible digital tapes. For the analysis of vegetation there is a

requirement for the highest possible radiometric accuracy that is available from

the satellite data. This means that in the analysis of agricultural data it is necessary to use the data in digital form. The decision made by NASA which

resulted in such a small capability has not proven to be supportive of agri- W

cultural applications, and recommendations have been made to NASA to increase this capability considerably.

5. Throughput.--The present minimum time from the acquisition of data in

the United States. of the United States, to the delivery of that data to an

investigator is about three weeks. The same minimum time, where the data is to

be purchased from the EROS Data Center in Sioux Falls rather than be shipped

to the investigator by NASA, is on the order of two months. If you ask for the

data to be delivered as a computer-compatible digital tape rather than a set of

multispectral photographs, that time period can be as long as four months. The

maximum allowable time for the analysis of vegetation, and especially in the

experimental phase where field investigations will result from observations

made in the data, is 48 hours. The desirable time from acquisition to delivery to

the analyst is 24 hours. The throughput is perhaps the most serious deficiency

in the present LANDSAT program, and denies to the serious investigator the

ability to conduct an experiment in anything like real time. It is in every case an

after-the-fact analysis of the data. This has had a serious impact on the experiment program in NASA, and has resulted in a lack of serious agricultural

investigations except in a very few cases.
.

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6. l)epcndability. Although dependability is both a technical and administrative matter, the technological deficiencies in-dependability deal almost exclusively

with the failure of the tape recorders on LANDSAT 1 and 2. This technology has

had a history of failure in the NASA program, and one solution that NASA is

currently studying is the use of data relay satellites to dispense with the use

of tape recorders in future satellites. This is certainly the only sure solution to

this technological problem.

The administrative dependability for the issue results from the fact that

there is presently no approved operational program, and this too has a bad impact on agricultural investigators since the start-up time and the cost associated

with a serious study of the application of the computer-compatible tapes to the

analysis of agricultural data is considerable. The result is that even in the

U.S. Department of Agriculture there has been a minimal interest in the program

and a minimum investment on the part of the Department in this technology.

The current effort among NASA, NOAA, and USDA in what is referred to as

the Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (L.ACIE) is the first intensive investigation by USDA into the value of this satellite for major agricultural

programs.

1.1.3 Current LANDSAT Research and Dcvelopment

In NASA there are two supporting R&D programs in the LANDSAT area.

The first is the Supporting Research and Technology program (SIR&T), and the

second is the Advanced Applications Flight Experiment program (AAFE). In

these programs there is an orderly progression of development from the theoretical or conceptual stage, through laboratory studies, to a field program of measurements, and finally to a test flight program in aircraft at a variety of altitudes,

prior to the decision that feasibility has been established and a space flight

program is requested for that technology whether it be a sensor or another element of the satellite hardware.

Research and development is proceeding on a number of fronts that are appropriate to future LANDSAT vehicles.

1. Better Spatiul Resolution.—There is a Multispectral Scanner development

program which has as its goal the production of an instrument for space that

will have a 40-meter instantaneous field of view (IFOV). It is possible that

this research will lead to an instrument that will have even better resolution

than that; the number “30 meters” has been cited in the literature.

2. Better Spectral Resolution.—The advance in solid state detectors for aircraft and satellite implementation leads to the capability of providing a band

width for each spectral band of 60 micrometers, so that in this particular

respect it is reaching what should be considered to be an operational goal.

3. More Spectral Information.—The multispectral scanner research referred

to in 1 and 2 is in addition looking at the possibility of having one or two additional channels of data added to the LANDSAT C capability. LANDSAT C, or

the third satellite in the LANDSAT series, will have a five-channel multispectral

scanner as opposed to the four-channel scanner on LANDSAT 1 and 2. In

LANDSAT C, the thermal infrared band is to be added which’ will provide additional information important to agriculture and will include a night time capability for the satellite. The one or two additional channels to be added in the

future will be in the reflective infrared; and when added the instrument will

cover all of the infrared spectrum available to a satellite platform in which all

the infrared channels are in all the atmospheric windows. This seven channel

device will be close to meeting the requirements of the operational system in the

visible and infrared portions of the E.M spectrum.

4. Better Temporal Resolution.—It has been stated before that there are two

vehicles in orbit now providing nine-day coverage. That is very likely to be the

operational requirement. There is evidence of course that additional coverage

would be desirable, but if that is to be the case, then it would not be -achieved

by adding another polar orbiter, but rather to going to a geosynchronous orbit

with a Synchronous Earth Observation Satellite ( SEOS ).”

If the design characteristics of SEOS do not change, it would provide the

capability of viewing any place in the United States on a nearly continuous

basis with the same spatial resolution as presently available in LANDSAT I

and II.

5. Format.-NASA is upgrading its digital processing capability currently

and has plans to go to a full digital processing capability for LANDSAT C. If

6S–S77—76—21
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all of the other organizational and technical issues were solved, the planned

launch date of LANDSAT C could be selected as a good goal for the orderly

beginning of a global agricultural information system.

6. Throughput.-The current NASA/U.S. Department of Interior plans include upgrading the capability of both NASA Goddard and the EROS Data Center to provide LANDSAT telemetry from Fairbanks and Goldstone via communications satellite to Goddard. This is in fact a more cost effective solution

to the central collection of conterminous United States coverage from the LANDSAT satellite rather than using the mails to send the tapes. The communications

satellite interface between NASA and the Department of Interior is a link between Goddard and Sioux Falls.

The EROS Data Center does plan to reformat the satellite telemetry to any .

user specification. This includes the packing density on the tape, the organization

of the data on the tape so that it is compatible with the current analytical software in most computers and at the same time lends itself to the production of

imagery directly from the tape.

1.1.4. Research and Development Deficiencies

●

The principal deficiency in the research and development program is one of

goals. The major thrust in the current program is the LACIE effort. The LACIE

effort, however, depends on the success of a very difficult technology task, that

is the identification and measurement of wheat. In my opinion, a tremendous

benefit is technologically possible in the implementation of an agricultural

information system without requiring the technology to solve the species identification problems at the outset. It is clearly possible to provide, as has been

indicated, a global agricultural data base in pictorial form, and then to proceed

with a research program, namely the identification and measurement of the

important food crops. The implementation decision should not be based on

achieving that particular goal before going operational. There is much that can

be done in terms of monitoring the vigor of vegetation, and much that can be

done in terms of partitioning the crops into plant communities without having

to determine the species composition within the community. The Department of

Agriculture and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations

has for years worked with statistical probability and accepted the errors

associated with it. In my opinion, the contribution that LANDSAT data can make

to the existing statistical methods is sufficiently important and cost effective to

justify its employment immediately.

1.2 METSATS

The evaluation of this technology differs from the previous section on LANDSAT in that the satellites that have been used thus far in the agricultural

research program have been the operational satellites. They are the NOAA 3

and 4 satellites of the Department of Commerce and the DAPP satellites of

the Department of Defense. Both systems provide visible and thermal infrared

pictures every twelve hours, thus providing data day and night. However, the

DAPP satellite system has two vehicles in orbit thus giving the data each six

hours. The analysis of the photography is used in the agricultural research

program for precipitation mapping as an input to the agrometeorological models -

that deal with plant growth and yield. The precipitation analysis is based on

the identification of cloud type and cloud brightness and the cloud field analysis

is used to draw a map of the spatial distribution of rain. In some cases where

ground observing stations are not available to the analyst, he must in addition

to drawing a rainfall map, add to that map the amount of precipitation that he

estimates is falling from that cloud system, The meteorological data which are

applicable to crop forecasting are:

1. Precipitation,

2. Maximum and minimum temperatures,

3. Wind,

4. Relative humidity,

5. Cloud cover.

These data are used to develop transformations that relate to plant growth

and yield, these parameter are:

1. net radiation,

2. potential evapotranspiration (ETP),

3. precipitation,

4. degree days,

5. day length.
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Evapotranspiration (ETP) and precipitation are used together with soil and

vegetation data to calculate soil moisture. The soil moisture data can be used

to assess moisture stress in the plant. Degree days assist in determining the

phonological age of the plant. The two together (moisture stress and age) permit

the assessment of the significance of the moisture stress in terms of yield.

Net radiation (RNET) is the net energy gained by the ground through the

processes of insulation find terrestrial radiation losses to space. RNET is a

measure of how energy is available for photosynthesis for heating the ground

and most importantly, for evaporation. RNET shows a pronounced annual cycle

with the highest values in the summer when the days are longest and the sun

is highest above the horizon, and lowest values in the winter when the sun is

lowest. Cloudiness also has an effect on RNET since it depletes both the

incoming solar radiation and the outgoing terrestrial radiation. In addition,

there are in the calculations coefficients which account for atmospheric transmission, latitude, longitude and time of day. An important parameter is cloud type

which affects that portion of the long wave radiation that is lost to space.

Frequently the climatological records do not contain the information necessary

to determine the effects of clouds not only on the long wave terrestrial radiation,

but also the incoming solar radiation. A method has been developed which uses

satellite cloud information and is considered a major innovation in the models.

The form of the precipitation equation is:

where P., t is the satellite rainfall estimate; Cb, Cc, Ns, St are the percentages

of cumulonimbus, cumuluscongestus, nimbostratus, and stratus cloud types

measured from the visible satellite images; B1 and B2 are percentages of

brightest and bright cloud cover occurrences in the infrared images, k. , . . . k6,

are regression constants. For the agromet cells that do not have surface meteorological observing station precipitation reports, the final estimate of precipitation

is calculated by a combination of the satellite estimate Psat and the ground

estimate Pg. The ground estimate is obtained from the precipitation measured

at the surface synoptic station assigned to that cell. The “cell” refers to our

data base which is a map of the crop producing areas of the world divided into

50 or 25 or 12.5 nautical miles squares, depending on the precision desired in the

production statistics.

1,2.1 Metsat Deficiencies

In considering deficiencies in the Metsat data, it is important to note that

we are dealing with operational systems designed to acquire operational data

to meet the needs of the organizational entities that are responsible for their

design and their employment. So to he critical of the deficiencies of that system

when used for an entirely different purpose from which it was designed is

somewhat unfair. Nonetheless, the use of the data for agricultural information purposes would be better served if there was a storage and retrieval system

which would store and from which could be retrieved full resolution data and

similarly if the data was in digital form, that would he preferable.

●

The problem is not that the data is not currently available in digital form

and at full resolution in terms of its use in day to day modeling. .411 of that is possible providing an approved interface is established between NOAA, NESS in

Suitland and the user. However, an important element in the preparation of the’

agricultural information data is the historical analysis of climate and the

value that can be derived in terms of establishing agricultural production

trends in the context of climatological trends. It is exceedingly difficult to

perform a rigorous analysis of the climatology of an area on the basis of the

records, if any, that are kept currently by many national governments. .4

much more useful study can be made by using the satellite data in conjunction

with whatever national data is available.

1.2.2 Metsat Research and Developement

In the field of the development of new meteorological satellites. the advent of

global synchronous meteorological satellites similar to the United States Geosynchronous Orbiting Evironmental Satellite (GOES) will provide synoptic data

over the whole world of agriculture with the possibility of monitoring cloud cover

from pictures sent each 20 minutes, 24 hOUrS a day from such satellites. The

analysis of the contribution of the synchronous satellite to the crop production models is currently under study. The polar orbiting satellites, DAPP, and
320

the NOAA 8 and 4 vehicles have provided the information that has been

principally used in the work that has been done to date. The next generation of operational weather satellites, the TIROS series, will provide both

better spatial resolution but equally important, the data will be fully digital

and calibrated so that the utility to precipitation mapping and radiation mapping

will be enhanced.

In the field of instrument development there is in the NIMBUS program a

microwave sensor development program. This affords direct information on

precipitation from clouds, however for the present these analyses are only

successful over the oceans and not over the land. Some success has been noted

where the topographic influence on the microwave return is minimal. On gently

rolling plains the data are more interpretable than where the topography is

rough. The most important single microwave measurement that can be made

.

which will contribute to an agricultural information system is that of soil

moisture.

There is, in the supporting research and technology program in NASA, a

vigorous effort underway at this time to develop a microwave system that will ●

provide direct soil moisture measurements at a variety of depths. At this point

and time, it seems feasible to expect that we will be able to make soil moisture

measurements to depths of about 5 centimeters. Additional research will be necessary to go below this depth but 5 cms is a very important achievement. The current soil moisture models do project soil moisture estimates to various depths

which in theory match the root zones of plants at various ages. On the other hand,

the rooting systems of plants are not well known in all types of soils and under

all kinds of conditions at various ages. If the research is successful in producing an instrument which can measure soil moisture accurately and directly to a

depth of 5 centimeters, we will have a measurement that is more accurate than

much of the data in the rest of the model and would certainly support the

crop growth and yield models in an early operational agricultural information

system.

1.3 DATASATS

This particular technology although not really an R&D activity on the part

of the Federal Government does have elements in it that have significance to an

operational agricultural information system and which essentially have not been

tested. There are three principal systems involved that can be grouped under

the term DATASATS. The most common, in terms of awareness by the general

public, are the COMSAT/INTELSAT Communication Satellites which are in

use and have been in use for a number of years. A more current and important

from the point of the view of United States agriculture system is the DOMSAT

series which provide the United States with a domestic communication system

with sufficiently wide bandwidth to transmit television pictures in color. The

principal use, aside from watching international events such as the Olympics

on a nearly worldwide basis, for the INTELSAT/COMSAT type of communication system, has been in international telephone traffic largely replacing the

transatlantic cables. The status of communication satellites is that the administration has determined that they are operational and NASA is no longer -

conducting research and development on these particular systems. There, is,

however, a development activity which will produce a communication system

that is important for the future of the information system we are discussing.

This is a wideband satellite to satellite telemetry system. For example, LANDSAT

imagery acquired over Europe could be transmitted directly via communica- -

tion satellites of this type to any receiving station in the United States that was

equipped to handle that particular communication link.

The most significant point in discussing the data relay satellite is that a

country, for example Germany, could build a ground receiving station for

LANDSAT. The satellite could be transmitting pictures to the station of the

entire area under the range of that ground receiving station (approximately a

3000 km radius) and at the same time be transmitting that very same data back

to the United States or to an international station which might be given the

responsibility and authority for the operation of the global agricultural information system. It does away with the single most perplexing technological

problem in current satellites, that being the tape recorders with their attendant

failures. It should be noted that applying the same scenario to the INTELSAT

network, that German ground receiving station could receive the satellite telemetry from a LANDSAT satellite and via a colocated INTELSAT station retransmit that data anywhere in the world that has an INTELSAT receiving
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station. This scenario however requires cooperation on the part of all ground

receiving stations in the world so that the global data is available to either

the United States or to an international body that will conduct the agricultural

information system.

Almost unknown to the general public is the capability of the earth observing

satellites such as LANDSAT and METSATS including GOES to provide a telemetry channel for the transmission of data. This particular capability is not

conventional in the sense that people use it for a voice grade lines, rather ground

base instruments such as stream gauges, rain gauges, thermometers, thermistors,

micrometeorological stations including anemometers and barometers, wet bulb

thermometers, etc., have been instrumented in a way that permits the data to

be recorded in electrical form, digitized and multiplexed and then sent from

that particular platform location to LANDSAT or GOES and then from the

vehicle, which merely acts as a repeater, the data is retransmitted back to a

central location in the United States. The Suitland facility of NOAA is the

receiver of the GOES data and in the case of LANDSAT the Goddard station is

the receiver. Currently other stations in the world including some of the unified

S-band NasCom stations are able to read out the LANDSAT system which is

referred to as the Data Collection System (DCS). The bandwidth is relatively

modest, about the same order as the housekeeping telemetry. The information

that is transmitted over this net is exceedingly important from the point of view

of its compatibility with a potential operational agricultural system. It is

possible for example to equip all of the synoptic weather stations of the world

with the kind of telemetry that is now available to the LANDSAT satellites,

which incidentally is itself compatible with the telemetry systems on GOES. A

single platform can either transmit to LANDSAT or to GOES. It is possible to

take all these measurements from everywhere in the agricultural world using

LA4NDSAT and retransmit these data to a sufficient number of ground stations

so that global acquisition of surface meteorological data is possible. It is a

rather unwieldy system at present, simply because so many ground stations are

involved and so much repeating of the data would have to occur to assemble

it in one place. In the near future when the European, Japanese and Russian

versions of the GOES satellite are placed into their respective orbits, we will

have a global capability with just four satellites and four centers. However, it

will still be necessary to retransmit this data to a central location for processing,

One conceivable organizational entity which might evolve is that regional

agricultural data processing centers would be located in association with the

U. S., European, Japanese and Soviet satellites. It is not necessary that the station

be located in any one of those sponsoring nations but merely within line of

sight of the satellite. In the case of geosynchronous satellite this is a very large

footprint indeed.

In summary then, there has been a good deal of work particularly in the

LANDSAT experiments on the transmission of data that is important in support

of agricultural information system models. None of these data have been transmitted in anything like an operational mode, but the experiments have been

successful. In conjunction with that is the current availability of INTELSAT m facilities which have an extensive worldwide capability. In addition a global

geosynchronous capability will exist sometime between now and 1980. This

will afford a complete capability for the global acquisition and transmission of

data that is supportive and important to the agricultural information system.

In my opinion, no additional technological development is required. The most

important single event will occur when data relay satellites are launched and

placed in orbit so that the imaging satellites can dispense with tape recorders.

It will be possible to go from the surface to satellites to satellite to a single location on the ground where a global agricultural information system can operate.

1.4 Surface 0bservations and Measurements

There are a number of collateral data sources that are important to the

operation of a system which is interested in agricultural production on a realtime

basis. These are somewhat non-numerical in nature in that they deal with the

collection of data from current agricultural research reports, the publication

of agricultural statistics by national governments, the summation and publication of similar statistics by international organizations like the Food and

Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and finally the contributions that

can come in from agribusiness if they choose to cooperate in the operation of

such a system.
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‘The problem that has been cited by both the Department of Agriculture and

by FAO is that with the exception of a very, very small number of countries, the

‘ data are either inaccurate or incomplete or not received in time. At least two

out of the three problem areas are associated with almost all of the countries in

the world. Timeliness is an issue everywhere and in fact timeliness is one of

the strong motivating factors behind the current LACIE research and development program of the NASA/NOAA/USDA team. We need more timely data

and we need it almost on a continuum throughout the growing season in order

to have the information necessary to make policy decisions. International statistical organizations are really victims of national governments in that all they

can really do is publish whatever is provided for them by the national

governments. .

If no information is provided by any particular national government, very

rudimentary estimates are made by professionals on the staff of that organization. Agribusiness finds the current accuracy and availability of statistical data

on agriculture so wanting that they have had to create a staff of employin the important countries where they do business; there to provide them with ●

their own estimates of production so that they can manage their own transportation, warehousing, sales, etc. In the past three years, our dealings with the

Soviet Union have forced us to look at the accuracy, timeliness and completeness

of Agricultural statistics with the same degree of urgency and need that has

always been the case in the industrial side of agriculture.

2.0 Data Processing

Data processing is set out separately because of the impact that this particular

technology has, not only on cost and schedule, but also because of its impact

on the user, It covers that part of the technology that deals with manipulation

of the satellite data in preparation for delivery of a product to the user whether

that be a government agency like the Department of Agriculture or an individual

experiment investigator. The two principal products out of the processing line are

pictures and computer compatible tapes. The scheme that has been developed by

NASA for preparing the data, that is converting the satellite telemetry from a

high density digital telemetry tape to a picture or to a computer compatible tape.

involves a number of steps. In the case of the picture, the digital data goes through

a computer where it is corrected for geometry distortions, referred to as system

corrections, in which the effect of the rotation of the earth under the satellite

is corrected. There is an additional correction possible using the attitude sensor

on the satellite. The attitude of the satellite relative to true vertical is calculated

and those corrections can also be made in the scene. In addition to geometry there

Is a radiometric correction made. This is necessitated by the fact that the detectors in the sensor do degrade with time. One or more can fail, thus it is necessary

to check the calibration frequently and make the radiometric corrections as

required.

The computer compatible tape on the other hand is neither geometrically nor

radiometrically corrected. The data is merely reformatted from high density

digital tape (20,000 bits per inch) to computer compatible tape (conventionally

800 bits per inch. ) It is the responsibility of the investigator to make the -

geometric and radiometric corrections necessary in the tape.

2.1 Deficiencies

The principal complaint on the part of the users of LANDSAT-1 data was the

selected scale of the imagery. The high density digital tape was used to drive

an instrument called an electron beam recorder which wrote an image line by

line at a scale of approximately 1:3,000,000. That particular scale is so small

that essentially none of the users of the data had experience at working at that

scale. The ground data processing facility also produced an image at a scale

of 1 :1,000,000 which was derived from a photographic enlargement of the original 70 mm scene written on 230 mm (9 inch) format, This product was acceptable for a few applications, principally studies that involved regional

geology or studies that involved the mosaicking of a large number of LANDSAT

frames. Where very large regional geologic structures were the subject of investigation, then the scale of 1:1,000,000 and the mosaicking of that format

proved to be a very appropriate tool. However in almost no other case was the

1 :1,000,000 scale useful. The original 70 mm material was merely treated as a

file copy for use in the photographic laboratory and either NASA produced the

imagery at 1:1,000.000 or the user did with his own enlarger. However, where

the user required larger scales, including scales of 1:250,000 or greater, the
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investigators that were most successful were those who made the 1:250,000

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scale enlargements from the NASA product which reached them at a scale of

1:1,000,000. This is a simple 4X enlargement and does not require an expensive

($5,000) enlarger lens. The 4X enlargement was made from nine inch film which

is standard aerial photographic format. There were fortunately many users that

were able to bring this rather simple technology to bear on the problem of

processing the data into a format useful for analysis.

The other problem in the pictures proved to be that of contrast. The photographic rendition in every case contained 100% of the grey scale information

that was available on the satellite telemetry tape. On the other hand, that information was frequently biased at one end of the grey scale spectrum or the

other and the material sent to the field was practically unusable. A good example

is to consider the reflectance that one would expect to get from the desert

during mid-summer where sun angle is highest. The return is very, very bright.

This produces a very, very dark negative and indeed the “dark negatives” from

the NASA ground data handling system created a very difficult problem for

many investigators during the first summer of the data gathering mission of

LANDSAT-1.

In the case of the computer compatible tapes, the principal deficiency is

that of format. Prior to a recent decision by NASA to change the format, a

LANDSAT scene covering an area on the surface of 185 X 185 kilometers was

sent On four tapes. The format was a 25 mile strip of band 1, 25 mile strip of

band 2, a 25 mile strip of band 3, and a 25 mile strip of band 4 each on a separate

tape. The 25 mile strips put together made a 100 nautical miles which is the

equivalent of 185 kilometers. That kind of format is useful for a certain analytical procedure and perhaps those people who are interested in a small portion

of the scene who defend the decision to go with 25 mile strips, but Murphy’s

law would almost guarantee that the area of interest would be on the extreme

edge of two tapes rather than being in the center of one 25 mile swath. Tape

density was principally 800 bits per inch whereas 1600 bits per inch is a more

cost effective format. The current decision of NASA will change to 1600 bits

per inch. The decision also affects format and the combination of changing

to 1600 bits per inch and changing the format will permit NASA to record all

of a LANDSAT scene on one computer compatible tape.

2.2 Rcscarch and Development

There are some important R&D tasks underway that have exceedingly useful

implications for the subject of an operational agricultural system. In the first

place, from the point of view of pictures, NASA is planning to go from the

electron beam recorder to the laser beam recorder. That will mean that the

recording device can have the capability of accepting data from the next generation of multispectral scanners. These have 30 to 40 meter spatial resolution and

seven channels of data as opposed to LANDSAT with 80 meter resolution with

just four channels. In addition the device can be implemented to record in color

as opposed to black and white which is all that is presently available.

However, the most important attribute of the Laser Beam Recorder is that

it has been implemented to write on the large format, that is the 1:1,000,000 scale

format. In analysis done of the information content of LANDSAT 1 indicates

that if the original image is written at a scale of 1:1,000,000, and if further

enlargement is done photographically with reasonably high quality photographic

leases, with careful processing of the data, that all of the resolution of LANDSAT

will be equally available to the photographic interpreter as is now only available

to the analyst who uses computers to aid him in the presentation of the data.

This means that the principal Complaint of the users, that being the very

small scale of the image, will be solved in the very near future. In the digital

field, the research and development is equally encouraging. NASA is acquiring

a facility which will employ the very latest hardware and software as sort of a

model for the users and available to the users for the interpretation of data.

Although this facility is in fact an analytical facility, there will be an opportunity to employ the best and latest software and hardware in the processing

stage as well as the analytic stage. Both NASA and the users can take advantage

of the facility.

2..? Issues

The principal issue facing the community of LANDSAT users between now and

the time when an operational decision will be made is the one of the definition

of the role of the satellite. Is it proper to perform quasi-operational or even
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operational tasks with a so-called experimental vehicle? For many of us, the

experiment phase of the program was finished when NASA demonstrated that

LANDSAT 1 worked successfully in orbit. The satellite provided color-infrared imagery of the earth. The supporting research and technology program

had for the previous five years demonstrated the value of color-infrared imagery

of the earth, and the experiments performed during that phase concerned themselves principally with operational activities of the Federal Government in the

three departments that were the principal interface with NASA, the Department

of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Commerce.

Thus the issue of format and through-put is a very real issue and always has

been. It may on the one hand be correct to avoid spending the money necessary

to achieve what amounts to an operational interface between NASA and the

users during an “experimental” program. The impact of that decision, however, was very negative on a whole body of investigators whose application, by

the very nature of it, required a very fast turnaround time between acquisition

and delivery of data in an immediately useable form.

A second question is related to how far NASA should go in providing rather

sophisticated processing of the data for the group of users that are the general

interface in this program. For example, any data that is going to be delivered

to users in pictorial form can go through a number of preprocessing steps. Each

of these has an impact on the quality of the data, and each of them is characterized by the fact that the more sophisticated the processing step the less sophisticated the user needs to be in the analysis phase. It is very nearly axiomatic

that there is an inverse relationship between the skill of the user and the degree

of complexity required on the part of NASA in the processing stage.

A few examples can illustrate the problem. In addition to the geometry

correction for the earth’s rotation which is called a deskew algorithm, and the

system correction of the radiometry, the image could very well be squared so

that it approaches a map-like quality before that data is delivered to the user.

He then can fit this image to a map of some specified scale without having to

go through any further steps.

Secondly, there is the issue of black negatives discussed previously. The images

can be equalized so that there is a balance between the two ends of the gray

scale spectrum and instead of having a black negative the investigator gets a

negative with very high contrast. In cases where the gray scale content of the

scene is less than the dynamic range of the film, the scene can be stretched

so that even very subtle shades of gray are discernible to the photographic

interpreter.

Third, certain image enhancement algorithms can be performed on the data.

One such algorithm enhances edges and is very useful from the point of view

of the agricultural scientist because linear features, such as field boundaries,

roads, etc., are enhanced, and this increases the interpretability of the data

considerably.

Fourth, it is possible to enlarge the data in the computer so that the delivered

image can be played on an image recorder having been enlarged digitally.

There is no photographic step between the acquisition of the data on highdensity digital telemetry tape, and delivery to the user of a scene as large as

1:100,000. The resulting picture made from such a tape is extremely useable

to any investigator, since there is no loss in image quality when the processing

is done in the computer.

If desirable and necessary, a team could be made up of agriculturalists, hy- .

drologists, geologists, soil scientists, and the like, each of whom would specify

from among the library of programs what the final format should be for each

scene that is going to be analyzed by one of his fellow disciplinarians. A processing recipe book could be prepared for pictorial presentations of the LANDSAT

data for each of the resource areas.

Finally is the issue of budgets. Perhaps the most serious issue with respect

to responsibilities and where those responsibilities cease, is related to the budget.

If for example the Department of Interior budget is the source of let’s say

analytical hardware for the program and that budget is cut, then the entire

earth resources survey program suffers. and not just the Department of Interior

program. Similarly, if the Department of Agriculture budget is cut. it affects

not just the Department of Agriculture, but practically all vegetation-related

studies. NASA has been fortunate in that the designation of the program as

“experimental” has had the advantage of permitting NASA a very wide flexibility in terms of devoting resources to the further development of applications

which might on the face of it be purely the province of the Department of
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Agriculture, or purely the province of the Department of the Interior. For a

number of years now there has been a mechanism for the previous review and

submission of ‘a joint budget. The Administration formed a committee which

coordinated the entire R&D program; they follow the conduct of the research

and development; they approve program content and they approve budgets. The

Office of Management and Budget has cooperated to the extent that the agency

examiners have worked together on the program as an entity. The General

Accounting Office has in fact stated that the Earth Resources Survey Program

was a model of how an inter-agency research and development program should

be conducted, The principal problem related to the project has resided in the

fate of those budgets in the Congress. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the legislative history of this program, but it is possible for the Office of

Technology Assessment to review the inter-agency documentation including the

budget material since the inception of the inter-agency committee responsible

for the program, and then to compare that with the fate of the budget, department by department, over the past several years. The impact of these budgetary

problems has been diffcult and it is in fact a credit to the program managers

that the program enjoys the maturity that it does today.

3.0 Data Analysis

This section can be thought of as being in three parts. First there are the

analytical methods, using only man. These are classical photointerpretation techniques, somewhat modified because of the synoptic view of the data. The conventional aerial photograph is usually acquired at a contact scale of 1:200,000,

although there are lots of newer materials at scales of 1:100,000 and smaller

from high altitude aircraft. The scale of the original LANDSAT material provided by NASA is as stated before, 1:3 million, and much of it provided at a

scale of 1:1 million. One of the most important findings of the extensive experiments that were done with LANDSAT concerning the productivity of the photointerpreters to get a job done is that for agricultural analysis. It was not unusual

to find that the interpretation was able to be done 20 times faster on the

LANDSAT imagery. This is not due to any other intrinsic value of LANDSAT

beyond the fact that it provides a single image on which to work as opposed

to the hundreds of images which would be required to make up a scene as large

as the LANDSAT scenes strictly from aerial photography at almost any acquisition scale. For example, at a contact scale of 1:20,000, it takes more than 6,500

conventional air photos to make a single LANDSAT scene.

The second analysis method is completely automatic. There are a number of

computers that have had LANDSAT analysis performed on them. Among them

are IBM, UNIVAC, CDC, HONEYWELL, Digital Equipment Company, HewlettPackard, XEROX, and finally one of the largest computers the United States

government has ever built, ILLIAC--IV. This machine is in the custody of NASA,

and is at the Ames Research Center in Mountain View, California where it is

shared with the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory as a national facility. Some

rather interesting capability studies have been done concerning the ability of

ILLIAC-IV to provide the operational support for an operational LANDSAT

system. Because ILLIAC-IV has a storage capacity of 1 trillion bits, it is possible

to store the United States in multispectral form, at full resolution, in the

machine, and to perform analytical tasks on the country as a whole. Thus a

national data base would be able to be updated, used, analyzed, measured, etc.

in essentially real time.

The third and last method is the combination of the first two: a man/machine

mode, The concept behind this technique is that one should really let man do

what man does best, and let the machines do what they do best. After some 10

years of working this problem, it is possible now to state what those parameters

are. Man recognizes shape and integrates a scene, coming to a spatial conclusion

about that scene almost infinitely faster than a computer. On the other hand,

man is a very poor judge of color. Man% eyes are logarithmic sensors, which means

that it takes a 10% change in reflectance before man notices that color has

changed. Consider the accuracy of the radiometer that is on the very first

LANDSAT vehicle. The sensitivity of the multispectral scanner is 3%. Expressed

another way, the MSS is 3 times better ‘than man’s eyes and with the potential

to grow much more sensitive than that. The machine does the color analysis,

and separates things on the basis of color, man does the spatial analysis and

separates things on the basis of shape.

In terms of available equipment some of the universities have participated in

the development of this man/machine interface concept. A principal university
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charged with this responsibility from the point, of view of hardware development was the University of Michigan, specifically the Environmental Research

Institute of Michigan, formerly Willow Run Laboratories of the University, of

Michigan. There has been industry support; the Bendix Corporation and the,

General Electric Corporation have produced off-the-shelf analytical man/

machine hardware devices. These are starting to be used. There have been sales,

in this country for sales in Europe, and they are extremely useful machines, most.

of them built on. the same principle, slightly different in terms of complexity and

what each machine can do. Nonetheless, both are candidates for any operational

decision for the analysis of LANDSAT data in an agricultural information

system.

3.1 Data Analysis Deficiencies *

The deficiencies in data analysis stem largely from the small’ support that has

been able to be afforded in the program. LANDSAT is a digital data gathering

machine. It follows that most of the serious investigations should have been

at least man/machine-oriented, or even totally machine-oriented. However, a

review of the some 300 experiments on LANDSAT indicates that relatively few

were supported by proper digital equipment. The supporting research and technology program, however, has created a few university centers of excellence.

Purdue University and the University of Michigan are two of those, and most

of the work that has been done in the digital data analysis has been done by

those two organizations, The work that has been done gives us confidence that

given the proper technical approach to the problem it is feasible to set up a

system which employs both men and machines to perform an agricultural task

on a global basiso

3.2 Research and Development

The principal R&D in the field of data analysis today is in the further exploitation of the man/machine concept and as a refinement, a serious look at

the issue of analog versus digital analytical techniques. Some investigators feel

that the state of research and development in the digital computer field is so

dynamic that it is not wise to spend a great deal of money on analog techniques

in the Earth Resources Survey field. In principle, the analog device is exceedingly

fast, but it is fairly inflexible, and it is somewhat destructive of data. This is

exemplified by the fact that playing an analog tape over and over again does

indeed destroy some of the voltage records on that tape; whereas the repetitive

playing of a digital tape does not destroy the numbers, although there is an error

rate associated with all digital tapes and tape recorders. On the other hand, there

is the issue of a tremendous data volume generated by a multispectral instrument

in space, especially on the global scale, and a desire on almost everyone’s part

to perform the analytical function as fast as possible. Aside from the magnitude

of the data, there is the realization that the satellite is going to repeat its orbit in

18 days and that is a very short time indeed, to complete the analysis of that data.

This is further complicated by the fact that if there are two satellites then we

have twice as much work to do. Therefore, there is a serious look at what is known

as a hybrid device where certain tasks are done in analog fashion and certain

done in digital fashion. The other school of thought holds that digital devices .

are becoming so fast and so cheap that one should not invest in hardwired analog

devices.

The Italian ground station for LANDSAT has two programmable digital microprocessors which can reformat the satellite telemetry in real time and can present

the data in a format that permits the ground station to either go to a photographic

line for reproduction or go right into their analytical line for analysis. It is not

.

necessary there to create computer-compatible tapes although the station is

designed to do that for other users. This digital device, the programmable microprocessor, is sufficiently fast that the high-density digital tape is subjected to a

series of complicated arithmetic steps in real time.
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These devices permitted the Zaire ground station design to employ a two-shift

mode of operation wherein the first shift uses the system to produce photography

and computer-compatible tapes for the customers within the footprint of that

ground station, and the second shift uses the identical equipment to produce

analytical type products including the analysis of data in digital form, and the

production of analyzed photographs in which objects in the scene can be color

coded. This concept is most cost-effective for a country like Zaire or any similar

regional ground station.

These new concepts are solely the result of this new very fast, very flexible,

programmable digital device.

3.3 Issues

The principal issue in data analysis is organizational, and this is related to

cost. It is possible, for example, to design a central data processing facility; if

you will, another Sioux Falls EROS Data Center, this one, however, being de.

signed specifically for the analysis of agricultural data. It is equally possible to

design a central processing station with regional analytical centers. These analytical centers can be of two types. One type could be where the orientation is

geographic, and the center would be located in the geographic area for which

it was responsible. The second orientation could be subject matter, wherein

all of the crops would be clone at one regional center, all of the range and forestry

studies done at another center, and all of the maps made in still a third center.

It is true that cost savings can be accrued by centralization, especially with

systems like LANDSAT and METSAT. One has to determine whether or not

the input to a regional analysis center is in fact repetitious for the data processing

center or whether each is different in nature. Put another way, do the specialized

thematic analyses require the very same data regardless of their task? If they do

then that argues well for centralized data processing and analysis centers where

you have one machine doing processing and feeding a number of stations wherein

the special studies are conducted.

The analysis work done to date tends to further support the centralized

facility. The activity at Purdue University is typical of the success of putting

together a complex, multi-disciplinary group of people who came from a variety

of backgrounds; from mathematics, statistics, physics, computer sciences,

agronomy, soils, forestry, range, meteorology, hydrology, etc.

These scientists came together under one roof. The organizational entity was

not merely a paper chart, but a real physical plant where they were separated

from their otherwise parent institutions and where they learned over a period

of time to work together. The synergism that resulted from that decision was

real and mensurable. The programs achieved in a very short time by the Laboratory

for the Application of Remote Sensing at Purdue was sufficiently important that

NASA recognized Purdue as a center of excellence in the field of digital data

processing.

If the Congress undertakes, or if the Congress directs the Department of Agriculture to undertake, this global food information system, I recommend strongly

that a centralized data processing and analysis facility be created for the staff

that will operate it. The author undertook to do an analysis of a similar situa- b tion for the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. It was

recommended that the data processing and analysis group become a self-contained, separate entity in FAO. In an operational unit, such as the one designed,

that cuts across organization lines, it is useful and certainly desirable for the

unit to have autonomy for at least two reasons: First, the contributing parent

organizations can and will make demands on the time of their personnel assigned

to such a job; and secondly, the value of some of the by-products, such as the

ecozone maps, may create a demand for that product which will interfere with

the larger task which is the creation of an agricultural information system. A

functional organization chart of the data processing and analysis unit is included

as Figure 2.
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AGRlCULTURAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION

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remain optimum until harvest, good estimates are possible. It is important to

point out that the “excellent” accuracies attributed to currently accepted methods

are all based on sample data collected during the period just prior to harvest. In

the case of the agro-meteorological approach, the primary advantage is timeliness. The diagnosis of the plant environment interaction provides daily estimates of yield changes. The application of reasonable skills in short-range forecasts (seasonal or yearly) permit the projection of the evaluated data on

daily yield changes to the end of the growing season. One’s confidence in the

projection grows each day, and one can project that confidence with the same

rational expectancy without mounting the vast manpower that would be required for daily ground sampling. The agro-meteorological approach to crop

forecasting has been used in limited regions of the world for many years. In

recent years the Canadians have applied agro-meteorological approaches to wheat

forecasting with excellent results. These results reflect the fact that given accurate meteorological data and plant stress, wheat is well enough understood

physiologically to permit yield predictions for large areas in spite of the withinfield and field-to-field yield variability that is inherent in ground sampling. A

block diagram of the production model is Figure 3. The model is based on the

simple equation Yield X Hectares= Production. The yield modifiers, including

water, soils, thermal units, and photoperiod, are all numerical inputs from the

LANDSAT and METSAT data in combination with data from the World Meteorological Organization synoptic weather stations.

Hectares are modified by water and physiography, both derivable from

LANDSAT data. All of the other modifiers, both to Yield and to Hectares at

this point in time, are derived from the judgment of professionals in the various

fields. Principally, these inputs are used to weight production, and are provided

by the expert opinion of scientists which must determine, in their best professional judgment, the influence of plant pests and genetics as modified by agricultural practices, and the amount of agricultural technology that is in use and

its effect, and finally the policy of the national government and the impact of

that policy on production.

CROP PRODUCTION MODEL

FIGURE 3

Some technological innovations can have results on both sides of the equation.

Irrigation is a good case in point. New land brought into production because of

irrigation adds to the Hectares side of the equation, whereas there is expected

increase in Yield when irrigation is applied to presently cultivated land. When

all agricultural land is brought under irrigation, any new dry farmland is usually

located on the poorer soils remaining, particularly in those countries where good

agricultural land is scarce. It is recognized that basic data on this subject is extremely poor in nearly every country where it is obvious that irrigation is important. It is another instance best where it is fairly easy to make parametric

statements about technology whereas it is frequently difficult to get accurate

cause and effect statistics.
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4.2 Plant Pests

There are several aspects of the approach to plant pests (insects and disease)

control and eradication that lend themselves to the use of modern remote

sensing and surface observation and measurement. While it is not possible to

inventory the pests themselves, i.e., insects, bacteria, viruses, fungi; .it is possible to inventory the host plants using remote sensing, and in addition, it is t’re-

‘ quently possible to detect the effect of the pest on the plant using this new technology. Similarly, while it is not possible to remotely detect the emergence of an

insect or the onset of the spread of disease, for example a spore shower, it is possible to monitor the environment and in particular those factors that control these

phenomena; temperature, moisture, number of daylight hours, etc. Algorithms .

have been developed which can merge these alphanumeric environmental

parameters, with satellite information, with a spatial precision equal to the

resolution of the imagery itself. This permits surface point measurements from

in situ sensors, for example, hygrometers, thermistors, etc., to be generalized

over very large areas of the image. The conventional approach to the generalization of a point measurement between collecting stations, for example soil

moisture, is to treat it as a continuum between stations, or as a gradient between

stations depending on whether the values at the stations are the same or different. Neither is necessarily correct. The acquisition of full resolution meteorological satellite digital tapes permits one to map rainfall distribution accurately

using the surface meteorological station reports as control. Even in the absence

of ground stations, qualitative maps can be made.

In addition to image processing and image correlation algorithms, software

has been developed to combine plant growth (phenology) models with predictive climatological, equations into an agro-climatology model, admirably suited

to plant insect and, disease modeling and forecasting. Modeling implies numerical

: equations expressing the reaction of the vegetation to energy as either direct

(solar) or converted (nutrient). It is. necessary to consider the total plant environment. Plant growth models are reasonably well advanced and for some

species have progressed to the point where simulation algorithms are very

accurate, reacting precisely to a variety of environmental pressures both supportive and subtractive towards plant growth and the yield of harvestable

material.

Figure 4 represents the structural diagram of the plant pest model and is a

classical epidemiological model used for disease processes in plants and animals

-.——-. — —

L–:-.- l

INTRINSIC FACTORS

● CALENDAR AGE

● PHENOLOGICAL

● GENETIC IMMUNITY

● NUTRITIONAL STATE

• SYMBIOTIC O R G AN IS M S

● SOIL

● ALTITUDE

● SLOPE

● ASPECT

● PROPHYLACTIC TREATMENT

I EXTRINSIC FACTORS ]

FIGURE 4
331

.

as well as man, Note that. there are two groups of factors acting on the host

plant; those called Intrinsic factors which are internal to the plant and over

which there is relatively little or no control, and those that are Extrinsic, or

external to the plant, which are somewhat more variable and in some cases controllable. All of these factors can act in a positive or negative way to either

assist the plant in throwing off the attack of the invading organism or acting in

a negative sense in creating an environment which is very favorable for the

success of the disease organism.

4.3 Management Model

LAND USE

The land use model falls into the category of models which are more descriptive

and narrative than they are numerical. Figure 5 shows the orderly conduct of

an analysis function by a multidisciplinary team of earth resource scientists to

—. - . --- ., . . -- .-—.-.

DRAINAGE - - - — — + WATER YIELD

/

SURFICIAL MATERlALS – – – – - - – - * ENGINEERING

.- -- — — — -- -— — ‘

+ EXPLORATION

—————— — — LIMITATIONS

-— ---- — — + ECOLOGY ‘

——— \

for:

1

2

3.

4.

5

INTENSIVE AGRlCULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

RANGE IMPROVEMEN T

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

URBANIZED AREA DEVELOPMENT

FiguRE 5
332

create any one or all of the five products that can come from this kind of a land

use analysis. As indicated in the diagram the first task performed is an analysis

by a hydrologist of the drainage, in the form of an overlay to a LANDSAT image.

The overlay is then passed to a geologist who uses this analysis to produce two

independent overlays; first the surficial materials, and second the geology overlay. These three products then go to the soil scientist who now has a benefit of

the drainage patterns which show him the transport media for the soils, and

the geologic materials which assist him in the analysis of the parent material of

the soils. These two documents assist him in the preparation of soils maps. All

four of those documents now go to the vegetation analyst. It is at this point in

the analysis that there is a good deal of interplay between the four scientists

who have participated thus far, and the vegetation analyst interacting with the w

soil scientist can improve the soil survey. Similarly, the vegetation analyst interacting with the geologist can improve the geological overlay. The inverse is also

true, that the geologist, hydrologist, and soil scientist participating with the

vegetation analysts can improve the vegetation overlay.

The transportation and cultural features overlays can for the most part pro- a

ceed independently from the first five tasks. Although if the job at hand is the

design of a transportation net or the design of the location of a new town or a

new urban area then the engineers who would be doing the transportation overlay and cultural features overlay in fact need the inputs from the other four

scientists. If, however, it is a case of straightforward production of a national

map series then the job can be done independently.

The team, when finally finished with their independent tasks and with their

joint tasks come together, usually under the leadership of a geographer, and

perform a land use analysis. This analysis is specifically focused. It may be an

intensive agriculture development task or the job at hand may be to improve the

range, or to develop a new transportation system, or an urbanized area, or an industrial site selection.

In the Mock diagram note that there are arrows at right angles to each of the

integrated tasks which are arrayed vertically. This is meant to imply that there

is independent value for each of these overlays.

1. The drainage map combined with topography can be used to create a water

yield map.

2. Surficial materials maps showing sands and gravels by themselves are useful engineering data.

3. The geology map is a useful document for a mineral and petroleum exploration.

4. The soils map, although it has a variety of possible uses, has principally been

used in agriculture to indicate the limitations to agriculture development.

5. In actual practice most ecology maps are in fact vegetation maps. They may

be either natural or man-made ecosystems; nonetheless the principal use for vegetation maps beyond agricultural inventory and development is in the field of

ecology.

 6. The national maps, and in fact most maps available to the average car

driver, contain information on transportation and cultural features.

The reason that this iterative approach is considered a management model is

that in practice the use of this type of analysis has been principally a management decision tool to assist in the prioritizing of development schemes.

4.4 Economic Models

This paper does not deal specifically with economic models. There have been a .

number of cost-benefit studies performed relative to the use of remote sensing and

principally LANDSAT data in the natural resource field. One of the more valid

criticisms of these efforts has been that cost-benefit studies were undertaken before all the answers were in. This is a perfectly legitimate criticism, and in fact

it is quite correct to say that we are still learning what can be done with LANDSAT data. A review of the section on METSATs will show that there are applications cited for METSATs which are not at all what the satellite was designed

to do.

5.0 Management Alternatives

This block is really the end of the function that has been served by the data

processing and analysis group. They have taken the data from the satellite and

from the field and have processed it and analyzed it; they have run it through

numerical models of a variety of types, and the final product is a series of alternative decisions. It is not the purpose of the staff to make those decisions. That is
333

.

*

left to another group, and as is seen in Figure 1, they are the central figure of the

block diagram around which the whole system revolves. They take these management alternatives and make a decision. In the field of natural resources the

decisions are usually associated with the exploitation of the resource or its conservation. From that decision process can also flow a request for additional

information. That takes us through the information requirement block, which is

referred to as the management feedback loop starting the data acquisition system

working, and the entire process repeats itself.

Conceptually this is the final point in the design of an information system.

There is a very large body of technology available. There is much more to learn,

but it is not correct to presume that the decision to go ahead is necessarily dependent on the results of the current efforts, especially in the LACIE program.

There have been enough positive results that are sufficiently important for an

operational system to be designed around the established capability of the LANDSATs and METSATs and the learning process could go on. There is no reason to

delay the decision simply because there is more to learn. There will always be

more to learn, and that process will be enhanced by the fact that there is an operational base to the program.

6.0 Institutional Questions

There is a very real concern on the part of many countries about the legal and

institutional issues raised by a food information system. Even if national sovereignty were not an issue, the protection of the data would still need to be considered because of the opportunity for unscrupulous speculation in the market place.

There are at least two precedents which are instructive concerning the handling

of natural resource data. There are really five issues involved:

1. Giving the owner (the country) the first opportunity to benefit from the

data.

2. Giving everyone in the market place an equal opportunity for fair trade.

3. Providing for the security of the raw data.

4. Providing for the security of national aggregated data.

5. Providing the information necessary for the food information system to

function effectively.

The precedent for (1) is found in a method employed by the U.S. Geological

Survey in conducting geophysical surveys of very large areas. In this case the

owner of the land is provided his copy of the data, derived from his property prior

to the publication of the results. A similar convention for the food information

system can easily be employed. The precedent for (2) Is found in the present

system for handling agricultural statistics by the Statistical Reporting Service

of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The results are released to the public information media at a prescribed time and in a prescribed format in order that

no one in the market place has an advantage over anyone else.

A similar global system can be set up on a north-south hemispherical basis,

crop-by-crop, for the species selected for inclusion in the system. The best security

approach to issues 3 and 4 is to assign the responsibility to an acceptable body

and to permit it to establish criteria and procedures to be approved by the counm tries concerned. Finally, in order to meet the stipulation of issue 5, the responsible

authority would regularly report regional aggregations of these data which would

serve to implement the intent of the early warning part of the system and would

semi-annually report on a north-south hemispherical basis the data which would

implement the food information system as a whole.

It may be undesirable to handle the situation of the secure facility by the usual

method of employee security clearance and by the physical security of the plant

concerned. There are, however, ways of handling the data so as to protect it. It

would be advisable in any case to take measures to provide for the security of

the data base. Since it would be in computer form, it would be necessary to protect it from inadvertent modification and/or erasure. It is an additional step to

provide for complete inaccessibility of the data base via security algorithms.

Thus, changes, updates, etc. become procedures which assure major importance

requiring the assistance and supervision of a security officer.

These issues may at first appear to be somewhat melodramatic. But they are

very real issues which may be the key to cooperation on the part of many countries. Those who remember the first world food conference will recall that the

issue of national sovereignty proved to be the principal cause of its failure.

The recent World Food Conference recommended that Food and Agricultural

Organization and World Meteorological Organizations take the necessary steps to

implement first a global early warning system wherein there would be advance

68–S77—76 —––2 2
334

warning of serious adverse agricultural conditions in countries, and would

provide sufficient warning that the necessary steps can be taken through the

Food Aid Program to provide assistance. Secondly, that FAO improve its existing food information system. The World Food Conference even went so far as to

recommend certain technological steps to achieve these ends, particularly some

of the steps that have been recommended in this paper dealing with crop modeling

and agrometeorology.

It is appropriate that the Office of Technology Assessment consider the charge

given to FAO and WMO in the light of the realization that much of the technology that could be brought to bear on this problem exists only in the United

States; that is, the technological wherewithal is here. There is sufficient scientific

talent and sufficient support staff in WMO and FAO in their international offices to 

provide the manpower required. But the hardware and much of the software

exists only here, and certainly the state of learning on the part of these very

well-qualified agricultural and meteorological scientists with respect to the remote sensing satellite portion of the technology is not comparable to what is

available here in the United States with U.S. scientists.

There is a precedent in part. The World Oceanographic Library is organizationally located in NOAA. It is only partially a precedent because the library itself

has no holdings. That is to say, the actual data is resident in many different locations all over the world, and the library is merely a reference center which

collates and keeps track of and publishes listings of all of this data. The difference

here would be that in addition to an international facility being located in the

United States, it would be a functional facility which would have holdings. It

would keep raw data, and there are therefore a whole variety of new sensitivities

which have to be considered, Finally, however, it should be pointed out that in

debates in the United Nations concerning this program it has been stated that

if the institutional problems are solved, the national sovereignty issues are very

likely to abate.

The principal fear that many of these countries have is that there will be

exploitation of their natural resources by multi-national corporations or extranational organizations who have more information about the resources of the

country than the country has of itself. The fact that this may have always been

true is a non sequitur. The presence of the LANDSAT satellite photography and

the policy that NASA has adopted relative to the open skies and free acquisition

of LANDSAT photography everywhere in the world has raised the issue afresh.

If some method could be evolved wherein these countries would feel that they are

getting as much information about their country as anyone else can get, and that

they are getting it in the same time frame, then the issue of national sovereignty

would become small indeed since the opportunity to exert their national will more

logically comes during the licensing and exploration phase rather than in the satellite inventory phase.

In addition to the institutional questions which are related to the international

acceptance of the program, there are those which concern the missions and roles

of agencies both national and international. Perhaps the most important deficiency

in the system is the current state of surface meteorological observing stations.

They are for the m@ part designed to serve the needs of civilian aviation. It is

difficult in many cases to use the information because of the location of the

station. In all cases it is necessary to do a careful analysis of the terrain around

the station before attempting to extrapolate the measurements made at that

point to the general area. This task is part of the ecozone mapping function. The .

interesting part of this problem is that while it is fairly easy to use an observing

station designed for agriculture to meet the needs of civilian aviation, the reverse

is not necessarily true. WMO has recognized this problem and has assured FAO

that in the future they will recommend to their member governments that the

needs of agriculture be given prime consideration.

The fact that WMO can only recommend, is in itself a problem. The WMO is not

an action agency and does not design and build observing stations. Agricultural

weather forecasting requires many more stations than are presently in the

Synoptic Network. It addition, if the existing climatic stations are going to contribute to agriculture they will have to report at the very minimum each 10 days

instead of each 30 days as they do now. Here again, WMO can only recommend.

United States agencies are for the most part properly structured, staffed and

funded to participate in the system. Agrometeorology is perhaps the most neglected of the contributing sciences. This deficiency is in part related to the lack of

a clearly expressed need at the State and local level, as well as the Federal level,

but also in part because our educational system produces less than 100 agro-
335

meteorologists fit the Ph. D. level per year. It is interesting to note that the USSR

produces 500 such scientists each year. Before one dismisses this as an irrelevant

observation, consider the fact that the USSR has consistently entered the world

marketplace, buying wheat well in advance of their own harvest.

The importance of the program to the developing world, to national governments in the developed world; to the United States Government, in its concern

over its national agricultural programs as well as its foreign aid programs in

agriculture~ are best illustrated by a final review of benefits of the program. These

benefits flow from the successful implementation of a capability to forecast the

production of the important food crops. The expected order in which this could

occur would be Wheat in year 2; Corn (Maize) in year 3; Soybeans in year 3:

.

Rice in year 4; other major crops in the ensuing years as the physiological

models are developed. This information is vital to the following management

problems:

1. Import/Export policy.

. 2. Allocation policy for: Seed, Fertilizer, Pesticides, Fuel, Storage, Transportation, and Port Facilities.

3. Rational land use policies for: Intensive agricultural development. Protective agricultural zoning, Regional development, Industrial site selection, and

Urban expansion.

No other source of data so widely serves the management decisionmaking

process necessary for the wise conservation and use of our renewable and

nonrenewable resources.

SUMMARY

A very brief review has been made of the current state of technology that

could be applied to the creation of a Global Agricultural Information System.

Because of the complexity of such a System, only the highlights have been

documented.

It is the opinion of the writer that such a system is feasible, that both the

requisite hardware and software exist, and that the creation of such an operational system would provide the most appropriate base for the orderly development of foreseeable technological improvement. The creed of such an undertaking might be “It is no handicap to good research to have a purpose in mind.”

[The following questions were submitted by Senator Humphrey to

Dr. Park and his answers thereto:]

Question 1. What is the relationship of the Earth Satellite Corporation to

NASA and to other Government agencies?

Answer 1. Earth Satellite Corporation is a private consulting firm that has

performed a number of studies for NASA in the role “of a principal investigator

in the LANDSAT program. In addition, the corporation has performed a major

cost benefit study under contract to the Department of Interior concerning the

costs and benefits related to the LANDSAT program. All of these procurements

were competitive and Earth Satellite Corporation enjoys no special relationship

with either NASA or other Government agencies.

Question 2. You recommend that a LANDSAT program be made operational.

How would an operational program differ from a continuation of the current

experimental programs ?

Answer 2. The LANDSAT program poses a special problem for the Government.

There is no single operating agency of the Government that has a clear mandate

to become the operational agency. There are equally important applications of this

particular satellite sstem to be found in the Department of Interior, the Department of Ariculture, the Department of Commerce, and the Corp of Engineers.

The term operational, from the point of view of the user agencies, is defined as a

commitment on the part of the Government to provide a continuum of data from

the LANDSAT family of satellites. If the current experimental program, which

is the responsibility of NASA. is supported by that commitment on the part of the

Government, it is not only likely that this would satisfy the rest of the operational

agencies, it may in fact be the preferred mode of operation. The program is

characterized by extremely close interagency coordination which NASA has

sponsored. NASA has implemented engineering studies which emphasized the

in]] 1:1 of engineering alternatives on the several applications that are the respon-

 sibility of the user agency.

The experiment program is sufficiently clearly defined in advance of the flight

of any particular satellite that the operational agencies are able to use the data
336

in their regular program. The documentation provided by the writer for the OTA

Board discusses the difficulties that have arisen in the field of data processing

and data analysis that have occurred in the conduct of the program to date. In

my opinion, the only important function that really should be changed in terms of

the existing program is a commitment by the user agencies to provide an analytical

operational capability that is presently missing in some agencies of the Government.

Question 3. What major U.S. Government management programs would be

served by an operational LANDSAT program?

Answer 3. LANDSAT data, properly interpreted, can provide information

important for decisions made in the management of our water resources, forest

and range resources, our agricultural crop resources, our mineral and petroleum

resources and in part, our marine resources. Perhaps the most important application for LANDSAT is its utility in the rational use of our land resources. It is

correct to say that our concern for the environment can be directly traced in all

respects, whether we are talking about air pollution, water pollution, or land *

pollution, to our use of the land. The capability of LANDSAT to first of all inventory this land use and secondly to monitor it over time represents perhaps the

single most important use of the data.

Question 4. What types of information from LANDSAT would they use?

Answer 4. The type of information varies with the application. For example, in

the case of water, the data are directly interpretable from imagery since the multispectral nature of the imaging system provides a very sharp interface between

water and other surface features, thus permitting direct measurements to be

made. In the case of mineral and petroleum resources, the interpreters conventionally look for linear features in the data. It has been found that the satellite

platform affords a vantage point actually unattainable in any other fashion from

which to see structures on the surface that are not just tens of miles long but in

fact hundreds of miles long. From these linear features the geologists have made

interpretation which has proven to be important to the extractive industries. In

other cases, the linears that are noted are circular rather than straight or broken.

Generically the data yields information on structures. In the case of agriculture,

forestry, and range, the LANDSAT data is used directly since one of the principal

scene components is the vegetation itself. The document provided by the writer

to the OTA Board discusses the vegetation resource in some detail, and notes

that for this purpose the digital data is requisite because of the importance of

being able to discriminate between the various species of vegetation on the surface. In the case of the marine resource, the nature of the information is related

to conditions in the nursery habitat of the ocean fauna. The satellite has demonstrated its ability to monitor estuarian circulation patterns and to map vegetation

in the shore area. In the case of land use, there is a discussion of the nature of’

the multidisciplinary analysis that is necessary to extract this data from.

LANDSAT and it does indeed require the compex staffing pattern as described in

the OTA report.

Question 5. Would it be possible to make better estimates of the crop production in other parts of the world without a cooperative agreement of the countries

involved ?

Answer 5. Unequivocally, yes. The estimates could be even better with cooperation but the lack of such agreement does not prohibit better estimates than are

currently available for many countries of the world.

Question 6. In your report to FAO, what specific information on crop produc- .

tion did you promise in the first year of operation ?

Answer 6. Specifically, we promised to provide the capability to monitor soil

moisture in the monsoon area of India, and the Sahelian zone in Africa. While.

those two areas of the world were stated, it was implied that we would be able to

monitor this parameter on a global basis during the first year.

Question 7. Which countries have indicated their willingness to cooperate in the

global agricultural information project ?

Answer 7. I do not have the answer to this question. I am informed by FAO 

that thus far 45 countries had signed the agreement which was a product of the.

World Food Conference.

Question 8. In your opinion, how could U.S. Government be of greater assistance

to FAO in the establishment of a more effective early warning system?

Answer 8. The U.S. Government has the resources in terms of hardware. software and scientific staff to actually do the early warning system for the FAO. If”

this function could be a part of the U.S. Government obligation to the United

Nations in my opinion it would be one of the very best investments we could make.

in helping to alleviate the world food problem.
337

Chairman HUMPHREY. Gentlemen, I have a time problem this afternoon, and will have to leave shortly. If it would be possible, I would

like to ask Dr. Abel to give us a summary of the OTA Food Advisory

Committee report. I would ask you gentlemen to bear with us for a

little while and permit us to ask you questions later. Dr. Abel, would

you please come forward.

STATEMENT OF DR. MARTIN ABEL, DIRECTOR, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, MINNEAPOLIS,

MINN.

Dr. ABEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The chairman of the Food Advisory Committee, Dr. Clifton Wharton regrets that he could not be here and has asked me to represent

the committee for him.

I would like to make a few comments on the report of the Food

Advisory Committee of the Office of Technology Assessment, Food,

Agriculture, and Nutrition Information Systems: Assessment and

Recommendations. While the views expressed are my own, I have consulted with and benefited from the views of other members of the Food

Advisory Committee in the preparation of my remarks.

The Food Advisory Committee report contains 12 recommendations for improving food, agriculture!, and nutrition information systems. These recommendations deal with (a) ways by which the Congress can strengthen its own capabilities to deal with ever-growing

amounts of information; (b) ways to eliminate obsolescence and improve the timeliness and reliability of food and agricultural data:

(c) the need to improve information on fertilizer, a key agricultural

input; (G?) the need to strengthen information systems dealing with

current domestic and world food and agricultural situations; (e)

development of new technology for improving crop forecasts that

utilizes satellites; (f) improving nutrition information systems; and

(g) improving international food and agricultural information

systems.

The Technology Assessment Board has already heard from several

people who have commented on the Food Advisory Committee report and its recommendations. The recommendations stand by themselves. I shall confine my remarks to actions the Congress might take

to implement in the near future some of the recommendations of the

report that appear to be of vital importance to our information systems, and to the status of further work being done by the Food

Advisory Committee on improving nutrition information.

The first two recommendations deal with how the Congress can

stengthen its own information and analytical capabilities through

(a) increasing the analytical capabilities of staffs of the agricultural

committees and the agricultural specialists in the Congressional Research Service, and (b) making fuller use of the analytical capabilities in the executive agencies and the land-grant universities. We

recommend that the Congress move quickly in Implementing these two

recommendations. Their implementation would provide valuable additional staff capacity to help the Congress implement the other recommendations of the Food Advisory Committee report.

We recommend that congressional action to improve its own staff

capability not be limited to increasing the number of professional
338’

staff members. Attention should also be given to how to make the

professional staff resources more responsive to the needs of the

Congress.

Improved communication and coordination of activities among, the

Congressional Research Service, Office of Technology Assessment,

General Accounting office. Congressional Budget Office, and staffs

of the agricultural committees could eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and achieve a sharper focus of the work of the various,

staffs on the important issues that confront the Congress.

These congressional organizations have the authority and resources

to draw on a wide range of expertise in the executive branch, in universities. and in the private sector. Coordinated use of these respect ii-e

authorities and resources could make more readily available to the

Congress a greater amount of information and expertise than is presently the case.

The, Food Advisory Committee and the testimony by Howard W.

Hjort highlighted the need to improve the analytical capability and

objectivity of the Department of Agriculture in the preparation of

supply-demand estimates nationally and internationally. Mr. Hjort

outlined several weaknesses in the present system related to inadequate data collection. Inadequate analytical work, and the organizational structure responsible for the preparation of supply-demand

estimates with the USDA. Mr. Hjort made several recommendations

as to how the USDA could improve supply-demand estimation work

including reorganization of units of FAS and ERS within the USDA

to achieve better coordination of effort, improved analytical capacity, and greater objectivity.

We recommend that either the Joint Economic Committee or the

agricultural committees hold hearings on what USDA is doing or

plans to do to improve the quality of its supply-demand estimates.

We also recommend that these hearings focus on the need to create

an economic intelligence unit within USDA as a way to improve the

reliability and objectivity of national and international supply-demand estimates. We think it is important that this unit be independent

of the operating agencies of USDA, whose interests may impair the

reliability of the information generated.

With respect to obsolescence-of data. the Food Advisory Committee

recommends that either the Joint Economic Committee or one or both

of the agriculture committees request the Secretary of Agriculture to

establish an agricultural statistical review committee to propose to the

Congress and appropriate executive agencies ways to modernize, coordinate, and standardize data series on food and fiber.

The appropriate committees of the Congress might. early in 1976,

request the Secretary of Agriculture to act on the recommendation.

A report of the statistical review committee established by the Secretary might. be made to the Congress within 6 to 9 months. Information

would then be available to the Congress and executive agencies for

action in 1977 on modernization of our food and fiber data series.

In a similar fashion. the congressional committees which have jurisdiction over the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Census

data activities could in early 1976 request a study of a joint Department of Agriculture-Bureau of Census committee on the feasibility of

integrating the staff and activities of the Agricultural Census into the

statistical reporting services of the Department of Agriculture. There
339

could be a report to the Congress within 6 months on this matter. If

integration of functions is feasible and desirable, legislation to accomplish it could be proposed earl in 1977.

Our committee feels that present division of responsibility for the

data collection seriously impairs the quality and quantity of data being

collected and required to run an effective ‘agricultural information

system. This unhappy situation needs to be resolved as quickly as possible. To date, no action has been taken to reconcile the differences

between the Department of Agriculture and the Agricultural Census.

In a paper prepared for the OTA Board, Dr. Harry Trelogan deals

with the issues and problems involved.1 For example, in the 1969 agricultural census there was incomplete reporting of the magnitude of

17.6 percent and evidence indicates that the problem is as bad if not

worse in the 1974 census.

The inadequacy of data on Soviet food and agriculture continues

to be a problem. While the June 1973 agreement on agricultural cooperation with the Soviet Union has provided the United States with

additional data, as Assistant Secretary Richard E. Bell pointed out,

● bThere has been little progress in acquiring data to enable an improved

assessment of current production and foreign trade prospects. The

Soviets have not yet demonstrated a willingness to implement the forward estimates provision of the Agreement." Yet these are the crucial

data needed to achieve orderly production planning and marketing by

the United States.

The recent long-term grains agreement between the United States

and the Soviet Union is an alternative way of obtaining some information from the Soviets about trade prospects. However, this agreement

is only a partial answer to minimizing the erratic price movements in

grains caused by large changes in Soviet purchases. The Soviets are

free to buy grain from other countries which, like the United States,

do not have accurate and timely information on either Soviet grain

production or trade intentions. Thus, the Soviets can still influence

U.S. markets through their trade behavior with other grain exportin g

countries.

It may be time for the agricultural committees to take another hard

look at just how far we have come in getting needed information from

the Soviet Union, why we are not getting more information, and what

can be done about it. It may be. as some have suggested, that the Soviet

information system does not produce timely information on production and, therefore, trade prospects. If this is the case, it might be

worth considering ways by which the United States might help

improve the timing and reliability of Soviet data. If. on the other

hand, such collaboration is not possible or desirable, then continued

efforts will have to be made to find ways to keep the Soviet Union from

unduly disrupting world grain markets.

Additional recommendations of the report deal with ways by which

the United States can help other countries improve their agricultural

information systems. We recommend that the Congress request the

appropriate executive agencies to encourage and support development

of FAO's efforts to expand its global information and early warning

system on food and agriculture, consistent with resolution XVI of the

1974 World Food Conference.

1 See P. 326.
340

Amen other things, strengthening of domestic food and agricultural in ormation in other countries will be required. The Statistical f

Reporting Service has valuable experience and expertise for doing

this. Consideration might ’be given to the Statistical Reporting Service

playing a bigger role in assisting other countries to improve their food

an agricultural information systems. The United States might also d 

provide financial assistance to these nations for this purpose.

The Food Advisory Committee recommends that the Agency for

International Development be directed to place high priority in its

foreign assistance program on helping less developed countries im- .

rove their information s stems, including the use of advanced information technology. T e appropriate congressional committees Z

might in 1976 explore with AID how it can expand its technical assistance efforts to improve national agricultural information systems.

This exploration could be part of the appropriation hearings for

the fiscal year 1977 budget.

One aspect of the report requires further comment. The Food Advisory Committee indicated their ( plans to consult further with

leading nutritional scientists and ma e recommendations for estab- k

lishing a continuing nutritional status surveillance program.>> The

Food Advisory Committee report quoted the testimony of the Nutrition and Special Groups Panel of the June 1974 national nutrition

policy study, in which concern was expressed that "recent studies

have added little to our knowledge and completely ignore questions

which we feel must be answered if the United States is to develop a

sane and equitable nutrition policy.))

The Food Advisory Committee report went on:

Nutrition scientists also are not fully agreed on the significance and reliability of specific tests for nutrition deficiencies. Information on nutritional status

also involves consideration of nutritional-related public health issues, where

in many instances cause and effect relationships are not clearly established.

It is because of these problems that little progress has been made in establishing a monitoring and surveillance program as recommended by the 1969 White

House Conference.

Since information on the nutritional status of target groups on a

timely and continuing basis is essential to the development of policies

and programs, it is essential that the Congress and other agencies of

government have accurate and timely information on the nutritional

status of target groups in order to develop and implement effective “

policies and programs.

Since other areas of nutritional concern are so dependent upon the

quantity and quality of information concerning the nutritional status

of individuals and target population groups, the Food Advisory Committee plans to review national nutrition surveillance and related

programs and make recommendations on alternative ways to provide

the information required for developing and implementing nutrition

policies and programs.

I have a statement prepared by a subcommittee of the Food Advisor-v Committee that goes into more detail concerning the plans

and activities of the Food Advisory Committee in the nutrition area

and I would like to submit that for the record.

Mr. BROWN. Without objection that will be inserted in the record.

[The above-referred-to statement of Dr. Nesheim follows:]
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v

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT NESHEIM, CHAIRMAN, NUTRITION PANEL OF THE

FOOD ADVISORY COMMITTEE BARRINGTON, ILL.

In June 1975, the Food Advisory Committee (FAC) issued their preliminary

assessment and recommendations on food, agriculture, and nutrition information systems. One of the assumptions underlying their recommendations is the

need for a national nutritional status surveillance program. The FAC indicated their “plans to consult further with leading nutritional scientists and

make recommendations for establishing a continuing nutritional status surveillance program.” The FAC report quoted the testimony of the Nutrition

and Special Groups Panel of the June 1974 National Nutrition Policy Study,

. in which concern was expressed that “recent studies have added little to our

knowledge and completely ignore questions which we feel must be answered

if the United States is to develop a sane and equitable nutrition policy.” The

FAC report went on:

"Nutrition scientists also are not fully agreed on the significance and reliability of specific tests for nutritional deficiencies. Information on nutritional status

also involved consideration of nutritional-related public health issues, where

in many instances cause and effect relationships are not clearly established. It

is because of these problems that little progress has been made in establishing

a monitoring and surveillance program as recommended by the 1969 White

House Conference.”

Thus, one of the results of this report was the development of a nutrition

panel as a sub-group of the FAC, whose immediate goal is to assess the quantity

and quality of the nutritional information necessary and available to Congress and the improvements that can be made in this regard.

The Panel is chaired by Dr. Robert Nesheim, Vice-President of Research and

Development, Quaker Oats Company. The other panel members are Mr. Arnold

Mayer, Legislative Representative, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher

Workmen of North America; and Mrs. Esther Peterson, President, National

Consumer League and consumer advisor to the president of Giant Food Incorporated.

Additionally, in September a nutrition conference workshop was held in conjunction with the Community Nutrition Institute. The workshop report provides

a basis for exploring the impact of food technology on nutritional values of food

and also analyzes the effectiveness of the RDA as a nutritional standard. This

report will provide a sound background for present, proposed, and future assessments.

Nutrition Information Assessment

Although Congress has passed dozens of bills affecting the nutritional status

of Americans, surprisingly little is known about the nutritional status of this

nation. In an effort to alleviate hunger and the manifold problems related to it,

numerous food delivery programs have been legislated and implemented. These

programs are aimed at providing food to the target populations believed to be

most in need of supplemental nutritional assistance. Thus these programs

attempt to provide a level of nutritional sufficiency to the target population.

This assumption raises many poignant questions relating to the quantity and

quality of the information which Congress received prior to making these determinations. How is the target group selected? Who are the nutritionally deficient

in this nation? What are their deficiencies? Why do deficiencies exist in their

diets?

a. Inadequate purchasing power. b. poor selection of food items from money available.

c. Cultural food habits.

d. Inadequate preparation facilities. etc.

What are the nutritional requirements of the population? Are these programs,

in fact, meeting their intended objectives?

Because of the serious implications these questions raise as to the adequacy

of channels of nutrition communication and the quality of information available, the nutrition panel will explore in depth the nature of available and necessary nutrition information and examine how it might be used in Congress.

In an effort to assess the extent and adequacy of nutritional information, it is

essential to study the various components of the nutrition process and the information flow related to it.
342

Although several studies are presently being undertaken or considered which

involve analysis of various components that we will evaluate, it is important

to note from the outset that their thrust is not identical to ours.

The National Center for Health Statistics, HEW, is now administering

Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys (HANES) to obtain data

for use in national health program planning. Although the information is

being collected on a rather small scale, this will be among the information networks that our assessment will evaluate. Furthermore, the Administration is

considering the establishment of a multi-agency federal food consumption data

bank. It is anticipated that our assessment will be of assistance in establishing

and implementing such a system. It should also be pointed out that the Food and

Nutrition Board of the National Academy of Sciences will be updating the

Recommended Dietary Allowance (RDA) guidelines in the near future. Such

an effort, however, will not overlap or infringe upon the nutrition panels proposed undertaking.

This assessment will, in fact, analyze the information input and utility of the

RDA to the consumer and, if necessary, propose improvements. It is anticipated

that our assessment may utilize and analyze other studies being done, but it is

not expected to duplicate the research effort of these studies.

Before Congress makes any decisions regarding food delivery programs,

members should be aware of the nutritional state in this nation, Thus it is imperative that a knowledge of the nutritional status of the population and its

various segments be obtained. Several attempts have been and are presently

being made to accomplish this formidable task.

Presently, there are government agencies gathering varied and often overlapping nutrition information. Both the USDA and HEW are involved in food

delivery programs and have to some extent gathered nutritional information

and statistics relating to the nation’s population. There is, however, no clear,

concise understanding of exactly what or how much information each agency

collects or distributes or whether the frequency of the surveys is adequate. Neither

has there been an analysis of the collection processes. If a national surveillance

System is to be implemented, an evaluation of the information presently being

collected would be a first step. This system should indicate the magnitude and

extent of nutritional deficiencies by geographical area, income level, age group,

ethnic group, and other identifiable characteristics. It would be necessary to

evaluate proposals for surveillance systems considering such questions as: How

should the sample to be monitored be drawn? Are there particular groups which

should be observed because of suspected nutritional problems? Should the information be gathered by a government agency or through a contractual agreement

with a private firm?

How often should the information be reported? How shall it be collected?

Moreover, it would be necessary to consider the type of information which

might be collected: Should the monitoring be conducted on a random sample of

the population or merely on certain specified target groups? Should the existing

food delivery systems be monitored for effectiveness in their ability to reach

their target groups and/or for the nutritional quality of the food delivered?

Nutrition surveys tend to be expensive and time-consuming. Are there innovative -

approaches that can yield timely and useful information on a cost-effective basis ?

These are some of the most obvious questions, the answers to which would help

Congress determine if a survey and surveillance is feasible or even desirable.

our objective will be to explore the questions that would have to be addressed

in establishing a surveillance system, evaluate the information that we have pres- 9

ently and/or need to obtain, and outline the alternative surveillance options

available to Congress.

Food Consumption

Since people require nutrients but eat foods to obtain these nutrients, it is

important that we have sound information on what people eat. First, we must collect and analyze the existing surveys of food consumption, most notably the

USDA’s Household Food Consumption Survey (HFCS). This should be evaluated

with regard to the adequacy of the survey’s consideration of differences between

the total household consumption and the consumption level of individual family

members as well as differences between consumption levels based on age, sex,

ethnic group. income. and geographical areas, Varying food consumption habits

result in deviations in nutrient intake.

Thus. it is essential to monitor food consumption habits to maintain information on the nutritional status of key segments of the population and thus gain
343

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some insight into the nutritional status of the population. In this respect, we

should analyze the differences in quality and type of food consumption for each

group and the effect of these differences on the health of individuals within a

particular group. The end result will be to state the options available for implementing a survey of food consumption with cost and feasibility alternatives.

We will, at the same time, attempt to synthesize the existing information

into a cohesive framework. In doing so, we will gain insight into the quantity

and quality of information that is currently available, how these sources of

information contrast with each other, and how they can be improved.

Food Composition

. Because people eat food but require nutrients, it is essential to determine the

nutrient. composition of specific foods, both processed and unprocessed. Many

recommendations have been made as to possible methods of analyzing food composition. It is important to determine what these theories are, how they relate

to each other, and where they differ Additionally. these must be assessed in terms

of their ability to be implemented in a continuous and consistent manner for

all foods.

The USDA has for years been determining and recording the composition

of a broad spectrum of the foods available for American consumption, Known

as Handbook 8, this volume has been relied upon by all segments of the food

delivery chain for ready reference on food composition. Thus one task before the

nutrition panel will be to examine Handbook S to determine if it provides

a comprehensive analysis in terms of food surveyed and nutrients enumerated

ability to remain current, validity of findings, and dissemination of information

t to the public in a comprehensible manner.

Consideration should also be given to the following:

Which nutrients are or should be included in the analysis?

Does the Handbook properly reflect the influence of processing and storage on nutrient content of foods as delivered to the consumer?

Does the processing and storage technology differentially affect the

nutrient content of food? What are the trade-offs in terms of food availability, nutrient preservation and economic viability ?

Thus the assessment should evaluate whether it is in fact possible to validly

and in a meaningful manner analyze the nutrient content of foods in light of

tile technology applied in the food chain and to summarize it in a meaningful

way which can provide timely and useful information for use by the various users

of this data.

Nutrient Requirenments

Nutrition is intrinsically related to health. It is impossible, however, to recommend nutrient intake levels of individuals without an evaluation of the nutrient

requirements of these individuals. Moreover, an assessment of nutrient requirements should evaluate the feasibility of considering the varied requirements

of different segments of the population based on age, sex. present state of health,

and environmental situation.

Any assessment of nutrient requirements should also examine the RDA-what

it is, what information it utilizes and provides, and how effective it is. Particular

attention should be given to the RAD and its users, since this is used extensively

in measuring adequacy of nutrient intakes. recommending diets. evaluating

nutritional needs, etc. Further, other suggestions for establishing nutrient requirements should be considered and analyzed with attention to ease of obtaining

information, cost, timeliness of obtaining results, and the validity of applying

the information to the target population.

What we must bear in mind in considering each of these components is that

this assessment will deal with information options rather than with policy

alternatives. By enumerating the nutritional components and evaluating the

available information in terms of quantity. quality, what information is needed

find how, or if, it can be obtained, we will have completed the first step towards

helping Congress to formulate a nutrition policy. If this is to be achieved. it is

only with quality information in sufficient quantity that responsible decisions

can be made.

OTA’s Board has approved a request by Congressman Tom Foley, chairman,

House Committee on Agriculture: Senator Herman Talmadge, chairman, Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry : Senator George McGovern, chairman, Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs; and Senator

Humphrey to develop and evaluate alternatives in U.S, food policy. This request
344

will initiate a number of OTA studies to be undertaken in the next year. Initially,

the staff and advisory panels will assess available nutrition information, nutrition gaps, and research priorities. This overall assessment will provide us with

an opportunity to evaluate numerous aspects of nutrition in America and develop

alternatives to issues which will be useful to Congress when considering nutrition policy alternatives.

This assessment is expected to be conducted simultaneously with the nutrition

information project, with which we are presently involved. By the year’s end

we believe we will have made a significant contribution to the nutrition information needs of Congress, whether it be for individual legislation or comprehensive

nutrition policy formation.

Mr. BROWN. We want to express our appreciation. I know the Board

will pay close attention to the full report, particularly Senator Humphrey who has played the leading role in encouraging the work of

your committee, and it will be included.

Would any of the other members of the Food Advisory Committee

like to add any comments of their own with regard to the report,

or their activities with regard to the committee?

Mrs. PETERSON. I would like to submit a statement for the record.

Mr. BROWN. Without objection it will be made a part of the record

at this point.

STATEMENT OF ESTHER PETERSON, VICE-PRESIDENT, CONSUMER PROGRAMS,

GIANT FOOD, INC., LANDOVER, MD.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Technology Assessment Board, I appreciate the

opportunity to present my views on the activities of the Food Advisory Committee of the Office of Technology Assessment from the consumer viewpoint.

I have served on many advisory committees, and I hope to continue to do so.

Few, however, have been more challenging or more elusive than the Food

Advisory Committee.

My perspective has developed through daily contacts with consumers in the

supermarket.

I work every day with customers who ask me for help about how to make wise

choices among the foods in our stores. (10,000-12,000 items) A growing number

want to know how to make their food purchases more meaningful to their diet

and health. Consumers want expert advice, and I have been trying to find

experts to provide that advice.

I can find experts who disagree with other experts;

I can find experts who tell me that consumers are expecting more than science

can deliver;

I can find experts who tell me that we need a lot more research and

information;

But it’s hard to find experts who can help consumers by providing reliable

standards to deal with a food system where man’s technology may have more

influence on nutrition than Mother Nature.

I face many problems as a consumer advocate as I testified before the Committee on Science and Technology last September.

For Example:

1. We are told that on the average Americans eat twice as much protein as

they need. In our diet, protein sources are the largest single cost item. If we

need less protein, how do consumers adjust their food planning to this condition?

There is no official acknowledgement of this overconsumption rind, therefore, no

public resources are available to supply educational information and materials.

Instead, the Congress passed a bill from the Agriculture Committee which would

have Congress endorse a public policy to eat more meat. It is back in committee

now, I’m told, but not because the public is to be informed of the facts or told

of the dietary options they should consider. No, it’s only because the two Houses

cannot quite agree on the wording of the same fundamental policy to eat more

meat.

2. There are problems which arise because technology has gotten way ahead

of our understanding of nourishment. For thousands of years, nature has put

trace elements in our food. We have adapted to them. In less than 50 years,

however, man has put “trace elements” in our food supply as “additives”.
345

Now some of our children seem to be telling us that technology’s trace elements, these additives, are having strange and harmful effects on their health. Dr.

Benjamin Feingold, a physician who has studied the effect of technology’s trace

elements in children, has evidence that seems to show that diet control can

reverse hyperkineses, or hyperactivity.

Some food technologists and some in the nutrition field argue that food additives are necessary and essential to sustain our food system. But a sharply rising cancer rate makes consumers question how much longer we can tolerate continuing changes in our environment which includes the foods we eat.

Scientists say we must conduct research and evaluate the data from these

conflicting viewpoints. But in the meantime, what is the consumer supposed to

do? Life is not a process of waiting for experts to agree on research topics.

3. What about nutrient changes in pre-plated and fully processed meals, including those served in and outside of our homes and in some school lunch programs? A large part of our population eats at least one meal outside the home

every day. Here we find ourselves confronted with more technological innovations in preservation and preparation, the effects of which are fundamentally

unknown. We are way beyond cooking and freezing as the consumer understands

it; using the stove and refrigerator freezer is as far as most o?’ us have progressed. Once again, we just don’t know what’s happening to the food we hope

is nourishing us. We don’t know the answer to the question, “Is it nourishing?”

To say nothing about taste!

4, Technology has made possible the growing and processing of fresh fruits

and vegetables for quantity production. Let us not forget that ultimately these

products must be eaten. Fresh fruits and vegetables are technologically ripened,

colored and processed to preserve freshness and to extend their handling time.

In some cases, these products carry pesticide residues, and they may be sprayed

with a waxy substance to seal them from the atmosphere; Experts set residue

limits and they tell us the coating substances are safe, but the Food and Drug Administration proposed banning PVC (polyvinyl-chloride) coatings on citrus

fruits as a health hazard. Who should the consumer believe? What can I tell

consumers? I wish policy could be bent more toward the position of “when in

doubt, leave it out”.

5. Food grading illustrates where consumers’ buying needs are beyond agriculture’s thinking. We all are aware that the food grading systems follow no

uniform standard, and they are very confusing to consumers. I applaud the proposed rationalization of these grades by the USDA, but still the basic intent is

not to serve the consumer’s need for nutritional information. Food grading is

cosmetic. It is a description of appearance.

Most of us have eyes. We may not judge appearance like the experts, but really

we can make an approximation suitable for our needs. What consumers don’t

know is nutritional value. What’s not talked about to the public is that grades,

as done now, are not signs of nutritional quality. In fact, I’m told that the nutritional content of all the grades is quite similar. Where does this leave the consumer? When we buy for quality we are paying more than necessary for

nourishment.

Consumers want and need this very basic information and yet we do not appear

to have the data to develop a nutritional grading system. Of course, it may be

that we will not need a nutritional grading system for some processed foods if

we develop such programs as percentage of ingredient labeling in conjunction

with nutritional labeling. The aim must be basic nutrition information for the

consumer.

6. Processing may reduce or eliminate nutrients from food. It also can restore nutrients and add others which were never an important part of the basic

food.

In a few instances, such as Vitamin “D” in milk, or iodized salt, the added

nutrient was placed there largely as a public health measure.

However, in typical fashion, some food processors have assumed that if some

is good, then more is even better. Now we find ourselves with highly fortified

cereals and snack foods, and the prospect of much more.

We are in the position of wanting a food supply that is nourishing, but we do

not know for certain what is happening to our health because of the nutrients

being lost, or why they are disappearing, and we are not prepared to say what

will happen to the nutrients we are adding to food products. We do not know if

there is a cumulative effect, nor do we know whether the loss of one nutrient will

cause harmful effects because it was necessary to the function of another nutrient, or if the adding of one will unleash harmful properties in still another.
346

These are the implied questions in the consumer query: “What’s a good cereal

for my child?” It isn’t a simple question, and there is no easy answer.

It is from these day to day problems of consumers that I derive my perspective

on the Food Advisory Committee.

We were charged with advising Congress on the impact of technology on the

food system.

As I recall, we had some difficulty at the outset in defining the purpose of our

activity, and in identifying the particular goals we would hope to achieve. The

decision was to assess the agriculture information systems and to improve their

capability for agricultural policy planning. This was at a time when the very

structure of policy development in agriculture seemed to be disintegrating, when

the cost of food was rising very fast and its availability to U.S. consumers did not

appear to be a national priority.

I felt and tried to indicate, that we were starting at the wrong place. I tried

to say so, and thought no one was listening. It seemed to me that we had to

define the policy framework within which an information system would function. Otherwise, it seemed we were saying, in effect, that the breakdown in the

food and agriculture policy could be corrected by simply improving some of the

internal data mechanism and evaluation procedures. We were chasing mosquitos

and ignoring the swamp.

I expressed these thoughts in three letters of dissent to the Food Advisory

Committee Report, one to Clif Wharton and one to Mim Daddario on June 10th.

1975, and a later letter of clarification to Clif Wharton on July 30th. I would

appreciate these letters being made part of the record. I ask this to illustrate

the difficulty that a lay person encounters while trying to bring policy matters

into focus for the benefit of the end user.

I am thankful, Senator Humphrey, to note that you held a hearing in December where three papers on the shape of a food-farm policy for the future was

presented. Two of those papers dealt with the substance of food-farm policy,

including one co-authored by my fellow committee member. Lauren Seth. The

third paper analyzed the administrative structure which has evolved within

the executive branch to deal with food policy issues. a structure which reflects

the absence of a food policy and the inability of Secretary Butz to recognize

the problem. I wish I could have heard the discussion at the time those papers

were presented, and I wish they had received greater public attention. But I

am pleased that OTA has now begun to set down a frame of reference in which

to consider food and farm policy issues.

I would like in this testimony to add a consumer dimension to the policy

structure which has been proposed, primarily to ensure that policy considerations include both food and farm issues. The two are but one sphere, although

too often the food problems are treated as the dark side of the moon, never

visible.

For clarification purposes, I want to define food policy as a framework for

issues of concern to users of food, or consumers. Farm policy relates to issues

of concern to producers, and is production oriented.

Farm policy and food policy obviously have many common features; there

are more similarities than differences and the differences are often matters of

emphasis. Food policy, because it deals with many areas of concern that production issues do not touch, is broader.

The following outline of a national food policy will give you specific examples

of these general concepts. I think you will recognize many of the elements in

the nine-point consumer food policy. They are, in fact, the same as those in

the Cochrane and Soth paper presented at the December 10 hearings. We began

formulating our consumer policy papers with an earlier draft of a farm policy

statement prepared by Dr. Cochrane.

The first element of a food policy is a National Food Budget. It contains

four components:

1. Domestic commercial and food assistance requirements.

2. Commercial exports.

3. Foreign aid commitments.

4. Supplies required to maintain food reserves, once a domestic and world

reserve program is developed.

We would measure domestic requirements in terms of RDA’s, the Recommended

Dietary Allowances which state individual food needs in nutritional terms. This

not only will convey to the individual citizen that national food policy is committed to nutritional adequacy for each person, but also enable planners to
347

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include the needs of those at nutritional risk, such as the poor, the elderly,

pregnant women and infants. National policy should not only reflect production

goals, but also health and social goals.

At some point, domestic requirements would be converted into units of

bushels, pounds and acres, terms which have meaning to producers and which

are necessary to production planning by farmers. Domestic production needs

would be added to commercial and foreign aid expert goals and these production

{objectives would be expanded to include whatever reserve supplies are needed

for the year.

The second element is a food reserve.

The third is a production incentive program—price supports, incentive payments, loans-to enable farmers to meet the needs set forth in the national food

budget.

The fourth element is an export policy which would specify that the domestic

requirements in the national food budget are guaranteed. It also should include

a commitment to long-term foreign aid commitments.

The fifth component of a food policy would be a commitment to producers

that farm prices would be guaranteed at a level no lower than an average of

a specific period, such as the previous three years.

The sixth element is a research program in the technologies of producing,

processing and distributing food with two general goals: insuring adequate

nutrition and securing a food supply at a lower real cost.

The seventh objective of a national food policy should be to promote and

strengthen competition in the food growing processing and distribution sector.

The National Food Marketing Commission warned 10 years ago of the advancing

threat of economic concentration in some areas of the food industry. Our food

industry is a creature of technology, and, in the absence of any other force. the

cost of new technology could cause the food industry to become more concentrated with the passage of time.

The eighth component of a national food policy is a commitment to domestic

and foreign aid programs to prevent hunger and malnutrition at home and

abroad. We would suggest that nations which seek food assistance be expected

to make the same commitment to improving the nutritional status of their

citizens as is spelled out in a U.S. food policy.

The ninth element of a national food policy is an educational program based

on expanded research in human nutrition. Thus we will increase our knowledge

of the relationship of diet and health, improve the capacity of our health programs

to employ diet as a preventive measure to control disease and illness, and through

education translate such knowledge into lay practice.

The three major killers of the American people-heart disease, cancer and

diabetes-are related to the food we eat. Yet we know very little about the relationship of diet and health. We do not as yet have a research program specifically for that purpose, and we do not apply what little knowledge we do have

to any great extent.

I feel that any national food policy proposal must be able to demonstrate that

it will promote the consumers’ welfare and assure adequate nutrition, that it

will improve food productivity and maintain a stable food system, and that it

has the capacity to alleviate famine and malnutrition abroad while maintaining our international economic position.

I believe that the consumer food policy proposal will help attain all these

goals. Let me emphasize, however, that there is much more left unsaid than

stated, and that much work remains to be done in specifying the structure and

process which will be necessary if the policy is to be implemented.

However, the first step is to describe the problem and outline an approach.

I am glad to see the Food Advisory Committee is now directing its attention

toward the areas of food policy and nutrition where I had originally hoped to

find it. I feel now that the direction is set, I hope I have made the contribution

I wanted to make.

With the recommendations for farm and food policy that have been presented

at these hearings, I feel that the committee has all that it requires to get on with

the task of helping develop a total food policy for this country.

Consumers will be watching closely. In a year’s time I trust we will be able

to review substantial progress toward our goal. By then I hope a blueprint will

be ready for the achievement of a comprehensive food policy for the United

States, one with broad enough scope to fulfill domestic and world needs, making

use of the many benefits that properly directed technology can provide.
348

[The following information was referred to on page 346 of Mrs.

Peterson’s testimony:]

JUNE 10, 1975.

Mr. EMILIO Q. DADDABIO,

Director, Office of Technology Assessment,

Congress of the United States,

Washington, D.C.

Dear MIM: I cannot endorse this report.

To me it looks like the committee lost focus of our original charge of helping

to develop an improved information system in the food area. In so doing, I am

afraid that the issues have been dealt with in a narrow and superficial manner

and in some instances the report draws inaccurate conclusions. It would seem

from this report that the committee has totally missed the point that the purpose

of agricultural production is good nutrition.

While there are sections with which I agree, and while I generally find the

material a useful summary of the information infra-structure in agriculture,

the section on nutrition is an absurdity. Accepting this report would not be “

fair to my colleagues who have worked with me these past eight years. I cannot

ask them to accept this report and my view of our joint effort. Nor could I

expect the members of the Congress to adopt the distorted view this report

gives of the advances in food and nutrition which occurred largely because of

Congressional initiative.

In addition, I find it difficult to accept the kind of logic which purports to

show that the Food and Agriculture Organization cannot justify its estimates

that 400 million persons in the world in 1970 were malnourished. The report

makes the same error which has characterized our food and nutrition policy

since the end of World War II by suggesting that the problem doesn’t exist since

we can’t count, test, or measure every individual case of malnutrition.

There is much that is simple carelessness in the report on nutrition. While

the food consumption surveys of 1945 and 1955 are used to justify a conclusion

that the nutritional status of Americans had improved in those years, there

is no mention of the 1965 survey which was the first hard evidence that the

nutritional status had begun to decline. This conclusion was reinforced by

the ten-State survey carried out by H.E.W. in the late 1900’s and by the HANES

survey completed only recently by H.E.W. Is a reader to assume that the

committee does not believe the food consumption surveys are valid, and cannot

be used to justify a finding of growing malnutrition?

The concept that nutrition planning must begin with blood tests of! each

individual is a preposterous strawman. The basic data required for adequate

nutrition policy planning can be provided through refinement.s in the presently

available Recommended Dietary Allowances, and the reliability of a planning

system based on these data can be improved through such monitoring techniques

as a statistically valid sampling of individual blood tests.

The recommendation that hearings be held to question the directors of

U.S.D.A.’S and H.E.W.’s surveys on nutritional status begs the real question.

The Administration has delayed the U. S.D.A.’s 1975 food consumption survey

for two years, and still will only permit tests of proposed survey techniques.

Ask the Office of Management and Budget how it can justify delaying the

gathering of vital information.

The basic reason why I must decline to sign this report is that the treatment

of nutritional policy needs betrays a total inability of the Committee to accept

any conceptual basis for food and agricultural policy other than its economic

role. Nutrition and health are closely related, and health data is difficult to

obtain and even more difficult to apply in planning. Food, however, is more a

social than a health issue. I find the emphasis on blood tests—which are

objectionable to most people-is only a very polite way of telling the committee

members that politically the Congress can deal with food only as a production,

or economic issue.

As committee members, we were expected to provide new ideas and new

concepts. We are, however, recommending that the solution to Congress’ inability to cope with the changes which technology imposes on laws and legislative policy is to do just a little bit more of the same. I do not believe this, and

have tried to express by concern with little apparent success.
349

I request that my name be withheld as a signator to this report and that

this letter setting forth my reasons be affixed to the report.

sincerely,

ESTHER PETERSON.

June 10, 1975.

Dr. CLIFTON R. WHARTON, Jr.,

President, Michigan State University,

East Lansing, Mich.

DEAR CLIFF: I tried to reach you on the phone and find you are away till

Friday. On Friday I hope to be sitting on a mountaintop in Vermont, far away

from telephones, so excuse, please, having to receive a letter when a telephone

call would be far more pleasant.

First, I regret neglecting to answer your letter of May 23. It literally "fell

between the cracks”. I will respond to your request for suggestions of people

for future O.T.A. work in the food nutrition area. I will also give some time

to your request to identify a small set of key documents addressing the question

of food nutrition achievement.

The major purpose of this letter and what I had hoped to talk to you about

over the phone is to inform you that I cannot sign the Wilcox report. I am

sending you a copy of the letter that I am sending to Mim with the report,

which carries some marginal comments. I am sorry to have to do this, but I

do feel, in all good conscience, that I must.

I will leave for further discussion the question as to whether or not I should

resign. I do not want to do this without consulting with you, Therefore, I will

hold that decision a bit longer.

You know I have enjoyed working with you and I appreciate you leadership

through a very difficult, confusing and frustrating situation.

Sincerely,

ESTHER PETERSON.

JULY 30, 1975.

Dr. CLIFTON R. WHARTON, Jr.,

President, Michigan State University,

East Lansing, Mich.

DEAR CLIFF: I take no pleasure in withholding my signature from the Food

Advisory Committee report. I write this with deep and heavy regret. I accepted

the invitation to serve on the Committee with a sense of hope that many of the

problems and weaknesses of food information systems which previously have

been overlooked would be addressed in this technology assessment. I cannot help

but feel that I have failed my colleagues on the Committee, by failing to express

my concerns early enough or strongly enough to elicit an adequate response.

The draft report as presently revised is much improved in its rhetorical analysis of the present situation, but the recommendations on an improved information system which led to my initial letter of concern on June 10 remain

unacceptable.

In my judgment the report remains narrow and superficial. It stops short of

any attempt to make an in-depth evaluation of the impact of modern technology

techniques on information systems or to consider how information systems might

be used for policy-making decisions in the Congress. Anyone reading this report

could conclude that somehow the difficult times of this decade could have been

avoided by doing a little bit more of what we have been doing for two generations and that the subject is just too cumbersome to consider in the first place. I

doubt that any legislator would be motivated to use this report as a basis for an

approach to future policy-making decisions.

The report still leaves the impression that there is only one goal as it relates

to “agriculture”-namely, production. The concept of nutrition being an integral

part of the food system seems to be anathema to the Committee. I once again will

reiterate my strong feelings that agricultural production should be considered in

the context of meeting the food needs of consumers. It seems to me that an intrinsic part of a technology assessment in any field is the realization that value

as well as volume must be the goal of the utilization of technology. Any analysis

of an information system should have taken this into account.

6S-877-76-2 3
350’

My own feeling is that the portion of the report which summarizes the government information infra-structure in-agriculture should be appended to a more

substantive report which would meet the full charge of the Committee. My colleague, Martin Abel, has pointed out that the private sector is responsible for a

good portion of the research done in agriculture today. The Committee has not

begun to take into account the impact of this change in control and orientation

of food research.

I am pleased with the decision to move ahead in the nutrition information area,

and I am hopeful that the recommendations that flow from this effort will meet

the purpose set forth by the Congress in establishing the O.T.A.

The basic function of O.T.A. “is to help legislative policy makers anticipate and’

plan for the consequences of technological changes and to examine the many ways, .

expected and unexpected, in which technology affects people’s lives. O.T.A. provides Congress independent and timely information about the potential effects

and side effects-both beneficial and harmful-of technological application.”

I do not feel that I can comply with this purpose and sign the draft report.

Sincerely,

ESTHER PETERSON.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you very much for your contribution.

Are there comments from any of the other members of the

committee ?

If not, I want to express my appreciation too to Dr. Abel for making

his report, and as I say, it will be considered in much greater detail by

both the staff and members of the Technology Assessment Board, and

I suspect we will want to follow up on that. 

Now, if I could get back for a moment to the panel. I think there

may be a few questions which we might raise here.

One of the questions which I would like to pose, because the point

was mentioned several times, was the degree of probability that we will

be able to continue with this remote sensing program. Apparently the

Landsat D is not committed. There are uncertainties about it.

I wonder, Mr. Matthews, if you could give us any indication of the

extent to which NASA's planning has made it possible to predict

whether we will go ahead with this program.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. chairman, there is no basis to say that the program will continue at the present time because although we have a

satellite planned for launch in 1977, there are no specific requests in the

budget for anything to follow up on that activity.

I do want to point out, however, that we have under development

this new sensing instrument that I spoke of earlier which does imply

that a system will in fact be in existence in the future and hopefully

in the near future.

The third Landsat which will be launched in September of 1977,

might last 2 or 3 or 4 years if we are very, very lucky, In that case,

I would think we would have a Treasonable chance of continuity particularly if it lasted 3 or 4 years.

Mr. BROWN. You don’t know if ‘budgetary commitments would give

any assurance beyond that period of time ?

Mr. MAT TEWS. That’s correct.

Mr. BROWN. Would this matter be affected by the degree to which

user programs were developed on a more significant basis among the

various departments, and is there something here that needs to be

given attention? Can you speak to that point ?

I was interested in a comment made by one of the gentlemen about

the user committee that has been set up and the degree to which the

development and the identifying of high priorities for some of these
351

uses might be an input into the budgetary process that would allow

us to make some commitments.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I really feel, Mr. Chairman, that the using communities both at the Federal level and at the State level, as well as

the international using community, are very much behind this program and have moved their activity level as rapidly as the technology

that is available to them has allowed. Indeed I think many of these

activities have very practical connotations right now.

. Perhaps you recall that in testimony before the House Committee

on Science and Technology, people in the geological area were talking

about actually finding minerals and peroleum. There are many more

examples like this.

So I think the using community is very much involved with the

program and is using it.

I do think that there is the concern in the using community relative

to the future and this is natural when a system is providing a valuable

capability.

Mr. BROWN. Well, I know that many of us on the House side are

concerned about a longer range of planning. I know Senator

Humphrey is very much intere.steel in this matter of long-range planning. And I am just trying to explore the degree to which we are able

to make plans in advance or usable pro rams and make commitments f i t

to them which will enhance their acceptability by a wide community of

people.

Mr. De Simone had a question also.

Mr. I)E SIMONE. Several times you spoke of new technologies. There

are several agencies in Government that are involved in this and you

represent the principal agencies.

Who is responsible for planning the research and development for

bringing these new technologies in? How is this planning -undertaken?

Dr. White referred in his testimony to an interagency committee of

the Federal Council for Science and Technology. Is this undertaken

them or at some other level?

Dr. WHITE. The methods of planning for various programs differs

as a function of the program. But as an example, in the case of

meteorological satellites, the planning is done by a joint board between

NASA and NOAA called the Meteorological Satellite Program Re-.

view Board. It plans the research and development effort that would

be required to support the operational applications of the meteorological satellite. Other agencies have requirements for such data work

with NOAA and we feed their requirements into this planning process.

In the Landsat case there is a different mechanism for doing it

which is a broader interagency mechanism.

I also mentioned ocean data buoys as a technology which is emerging and there is much research and development. In that case it is

done under the aegis of the Interagency Committee for Marine Science

and Engineering and there does exist a plan for a data buoy system

which involves the research and technology that would be required

as well as ‘the deployment of buoys to meet requirements of’ all the

agencies.

So I think it depends upon the particular kind of technology you

are dealing with. The mechanisms within the executive branch are

variable. But in most cases they do exist.
352

While I have the microphone, I would like to comment upon Congressman Brown's question with respect to continuity in the satellite

program.

1 would like to comment in the meteorological satellite program,

we do have continuity in the sense that it is planned through the

early 1980's as an evolving system. We know exactly how many satellites will be procured and how

many will be required based upon estimated lifetimes of the satellites. So in that particular satellite situation, there is a planned

continuity.

Mr. BROWN. If any of the rest of you would like to comment on

any of these questions, feel free to do so.

Mr. COR DA R O. Senator Humphrey asked me to follow up on some -

of these questions.

Some of these have to do with some excerpts we have made from

Dr. Park’s testimony. I would like members of the panel to comment on these.

The first one is a statement in Dr. Park’s paper that says:

Even in the U.S. Department of Agriculture there has been a minimal interest

in the program and a minimum investment on the part of the Department in

this technology.

Dr. Hill, would you like to comment on this?

Dr. HI L L. I think you have to look at that judgment in perspective.

The Department is making a substantial effort now in the LACIE

program and I take it that is what the reference is about. And it

has, through the remote sensing task force, given considerable attention to future needs.

My point is that careful planning is being done and that investments might flow from these.

Mr. CORDARO. Dr. Hill, there is a followup question to that.

You mentioned the SIX agencies that had cooperated within the

Department on this particular program. Speculating that the LACIE

experiment is successful, one could recommend that the program continue on a permanent basis. Which agencies, do you think, would

have the most use for this type of information and what specific

improvements would this make in those programs?

Dr. HILL. The principal agencies in the Department that we =

identify now as user agencies are the Foreign Agriculture Service,

the Economic Research Service, the Statistical Reporting Service,

and the Agricultural Stabllization and Conservation Services. Also

the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation has indicated an interest

in participating m LACIE. So that would make another user agency.

The Agricultural Research. Service and the Soil Conservation Service

are participating in a scientific capacity.

I beg the question about where LACIE might best be done. but

tile kinds of uses that it best serves are in line with some of the mission

responsibilities of all of those agencies.

Mr. CORDARO. Let’s take the Foreign Agricultural Service. I wonder

whether under the LACIE experiment, USDA is verifying satellite

information with some of the attache reports. Would that be one

possibe use?

Dr. HILL. Actually I don’t view that as one of the direct activities

It might work out indirectly. But I would expect a LACIE-type
353

.

system to produce crop estimates which would be assessed, possibly

including assessment by attaches in a country as well by commodity

experts in the United States.

Mr. CORDARO. I would like to ask Dr. White a question.

I know Senator Humphrey has a great deal of interest in climate

and weather. At the first OTA ‘hearings, we had a paper prepared by

Dr. Epstein in which he mentioned the national weather program.

You also mentioned this briefly. There is some question about whether

the national weather program should be expanded and extended.

Could you elaborate on what the implications of such a program would

be and also give us some idea of what the obstacles would be in expanding that program.

Dr. White. As a bit of background, the Domestic Council requested

about a year and a half ago that a study be conducted on whether it

would be possible to improve our ability to anticipate climate changes

and asked the question: What kind of program would you have to

institute to do that? A study was conducted. A report was prepared

and has been delivered to the Council and it has been released to

Members of the Congress.

That report concludes: That our best scientific estimates are that

we can improve our ability to anticipate climate changes. It would

not be an easy job and we do not know the extent to which improvement could be brought about. And that report recommends specific

things that could be done.

You asked the question, why such a program is not in motion, or

what are the obstacles to putting it in motion. They are financial.

Given the present stringency of the Federal budget, and given

judgments that have to be made with regard to programs that can

and cannot be supported, that program came down on the other side

of the priority line along with many other vital and important

programs.

That would be the principal obstacle.

Mr. CORDARO. I would like to ask one more question.

Dr. Pairk, you seem to be much more optimistic about the usability

of this technology today as opposed to waiting for more results.

Does that reflect your bias—the fact that you’re in the business of

selling the hardware--or does it perhaps reflect some of the biases or

● obstacles that need to be overcome in the bureaucracy, such as whether

the individual agencies represented here have made recommendations

to the office of Management and Budget for operationalizing the

program ?

Dr. PARK. I think it is a perfectly natural question concerning the

profit motive of any consultant in the business. I would be the first

to say however, that I don’t think there is anything basically dishonest

about the profit motive.

But I confess that my principal motivation is that hating participated in the development of the technology in the Government and

hopefully having contributed some small measure in spreading the

benefits of the program overseas in a private capacity, I am familiar

with the slings and arrows of the budget process and the defense of

that process.

And I think the answer lies in two parts. One of them deals with the

cost-benefit studies that have. been made and the requirement imposed
354

upon those studies to show benefits for the technology employed in the

United States and only for the United States as opposed to the world.

And the second part of that is an imposition, I believe by statute,

on the restrictions that the Department of Agriculture has relative

to spending money outside of the United States. That the budget put

forth by the Department includes only requests for money spent

domestically with possibly one exception and I believe that is the

screwworm program in Mexico.

The development of technology has been a difficult one to defend

as the cost-benefit guidelines have imposed rather severe restrictions

on those studies.

I think the proper question is: What is the cost to the Government

of not having the data rather than the relative costs of acquiring it.

Mr. CORDARO. Thank you. *

Mr. BROWN. I have just one or two more additional comments.

Dr. Park, I was impressed by the comprehensiveness of your presentation and I think it indicates a great deal of work. I haven't perused

it in sufficient detail to know whether or not you have included sufficient economicc data with regard to the cost of implementing the complete program that you have contemplated so that we could make a

judgment as to some of the budgetary aspects of it. I hope that we

can get further into it.

I think one Of the values of having someone in your position outside

of a particular agency environment examine these is that you can

pull together in a more comprehensive way a total program. And I

think your testimony is of particular value because of that.

I wanted to just get another bit of information and understanding

of the LACIE program. It is an experiment and it is moving into a

phase where it will involve activities outside the United States as I

understand it in the near future.

I am wondering about the foreign policy aspects of this. I note in

the testimony from Dr. Abel, he quoted, I think, Dr. Hill as saying

we are still not getting the cooperation from the Russians that we

needed in certain areas to develop the information we needed.

Is it possible that we may encounter resistance at the international

level from conducting programs which may have substantial possible

implications ? Could any of you comment on that ?

Mr. M AT T HE W S. Mr. Brown, I think there are two aspects of this

that are important. First, in all the experience with satellite programs

by and large the acceptance generally has been truly very, very positive. I think that is because their potential for doing good for everyone is so large.

Nevertheless there are occasions when this is not the case and they

relate to questions of sovereignty and so forth associated with satellite

observations or communications, either one.

Generally these questions have been discussed in the United Nations

in working groups, but they never have really reached a situation

where the have been raised to a higher level. I think this again

indicates that, in generalt as people discuss these things, the value of

them to the individual and to the individual nation is high enough

to prevent a serious concern,
’355

.

.-

Now, that doesn’t say that as time goes on that there won% be

further discussions. But if I were to guess, I certainly would say

 I think the value judgments would prevail over some of these concerns.

I think it will also be a great benefit in more or less helping in some

way, to shape and form the internationalization of these activities.

We have seen this in the meteorological program and maybe Dr.

White might want to comment on that.

Mr. BROWN. Well, the climatology and the meteorological areas are

those areas in which we have the most international involvement.

Let me put it this way, in a more specific context. Last year in the

House Agriculture Committee we had briefings with regard to the

wheat crop prospects in the U.S.S.R, One set from the Department of

Agriculture and another from the CIA.

The estimates from the CIA were considerably more accurate and

it led to the conclusion based upon open knowledge that they have

access to satellite observation data with considerable more resolution

than most people have access to; and perhaps they were using data

of that sort from other sources. It is possible that that might cause

some problems with relation to this?

Would any of you care to comment on whether the CIA% role in

making crop estimates has any sufficient bearing on the discussion we

have had here?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Brownj I won’t comment directly on that, but

I would say that the capabilities in place in the civil system described

by Dr. Park, and as the LACIE program now underway is indicating,

and particularly with the improvements in our new sensor, we should

have sufficient ability to produce the type of estimates that are needed.

Mr. BROWN . Well, I am not implying or suggesting even that the

CIA already has that capability. I have no way

[

of knowing. But

I was rather interested in the relative accuracy of the crop estimates

with regard to the U.S.S.R. and this is a matter of considerable

policy importance to the U.S.S.R.

I would like to merely make one additional point, that the House

Agriculture Committee is proposing hearings on the Department of

Agriculture’s research and development activities later on this month.

And I, personally, as a member of that committee, feel that much of

the contribution you have made here this afternoon has a great ideal

●

of pertinence to the object of those hearings.

And I would anticipate it would be very useful from that standpoint. And we might fOllOW up even further in connection with those

hearings these aspects we have discussed here.

I have no further questions.

I would just like to conclude by expressing my very sincere appreciation and I am sure I speak for Senator Humphrey in his appreciation to you. I know you are all very busy gentlemen and I am very

grateful that you have taken time to assist this Board in this matter.

Thank you very much.

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]

[The following paper was requested from Dr. Trelogan by OTA

and is referred to on p. 339.]
356

STATEMENT OF HARRY C. TRELOGAN, ARLINGTON, VA.

AN INTEGRATED AGRICULTURAL DATA SYSTEM

Two sets of developments have necessitated changes in methods of collecting

farm statistics. They are technogical advances in farming and simultaneous

progress in statistical technology.

Quality checks on the 1964 and 1969 Censuses of Agriculture indicated incompleteness of 8 and 17.6 percent respectively. Typically, years rather than months

elapsed between the time of the collection of the data and the publication of the

reports. Census data no longer meet users’ needs with respect to accuracy and

timeliness.

A program of sample surveys is proposed to integrate the collection of agricul- &

tural data now performed annually or more frequently by the Statistical Reporting Service of the Department of Agriculture and quinquennially by the Bureau of the Census in the Department of Commerce. The potential for gaining

efficiency of estimation, economies of scale, and improved employment conditions

are substantial through proper design of surveys to meet differing needs.

Methods for probability sampling to yield greater accuracy of estimates are

developed and in use for current crop and livestock estimates. They are funded

for expansion into the gathering of economic data heretofore made available

after serious delays by the Census of Agriculture.

A list sampling frame is being started in the SRS that will facilitate efficient

probability sampling for making all farm estimates. Since 1970, improved samples have been developed for hog and cattle estimates. With these developments

the stage is set for avoidance of considerable unnecessary duplication of work

through an integrated system of farm data collection.

The requests for additional timely and more accurate data relating to United

States food and fiber production are becoming more urgent, The burden on farmers to supply data is testing their endurance, as evidenced by resistance to answering recent census inquiries. Integration of the present systems offers opportunities for alleviating these problems with no more expenditures for data collection

than are now projected.

Requisites Of Farm Statistics

Advances in farming have led inexorably to larger and more specialized units.

While this has resulted in fewer and more conspicuous farming operations and

seemingly easier work to estimate aggregate production, actually the job of estimating has been made more difficult and expensive because long-established

earlier methods became obsolete. No longer can reliance be placed upon simply a

large sample of the farms to be representative of all farms in the country. In

contrast with 30 years ago, the size and specialization of farms has reached the

point where one Is unlikely to gain a valid impression of the agricultural production of a county by taking a random look at a few farms. A single farm may be

unique and also account for virtually all the production of particular crops or

livestock in a given area. It cannot be ignored in the estimating process. Consequently, the procedure for making estimates calls for a sampling procedure that

will give due weight to these large, specialized farms as well as the prevalent

types.

Growth of individual farming units has also engendered demand for more

accurate estimates and forecasts of farm production aggregated by counties,

states, regions, and nationally. The operational units have reached such dimensions that farm families can no longer finance the kinds of equipment or the volume of supplies and services needed without resort to commercial credit. Both the

farm management and creditors require reliable information on existing and prospective supplies of farm produce before making the investments or assuming the

risks of putting together a viable farming operation in today’s agriculture in

the United States.

Added to this demand for dependable statistics is that of manifold businesses

supplying or servicing farms that must keep tab on farm production to intelligently plan their operations. Assuming greater importance in recent years are the

needs of national and international planners and diplomats for protecting large

populations now dependent upon United States food supplies.
357

Higher quality statistics are now required. The quality features most needed

are: (1) accuracy and dependability; (2) timeliness in terms of frequency of

reports, short time intervals between surveys, and promptness in getting out

results of surveys; and (3) adequacy in terms of sufficient detail to meet

the purposes, The latter requirement usually refers to geographical detail, number

of items or species reported, and indications of quality of products. Almost invariably greater expense is incurred to obtain improvement in any of these quality

factors.

Steps Taken to Meet Requirement

Confronted with shortcomings in bases for sampling and more demanding

requirements for frequent, detailed, and especially accurate data, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has devised feasible means for getting the information. The first step is to collect authentic data from farms quickly and in a form

that can be readily transformed into estimates and forecasts useful to economic

analysts and business operators, including farmers.

Fortunately, the theory and practice of statistics has advanced along with

farming, so the problem is largely one of adapting new tools to the job. As with

farming, these new tools are far more expensive than the old tools. This is especially true of the current estimates of production made by the Statistical Reporting Service (SRS), where the notoriously inexpensive mail questionnaire system

had been perfected for over 100 years. [1] It performed well in this country,

where we had the advantages of a literate farmer population willing to give the

Government information, and so long as we had an inexpensive, reliable rural

mail service and a dependable five-year Census of Agriculture to periodically

true-up current estimates.

The inadequacy of the old tools came to public attention following a 10 percent

error in the cotton production estimate for 1952. Through research for new methods, instigated by this incident and directed by the House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee, a probability sample was designed to replace the previous

system. Over a period of 14 years, an area probability sample was put into operation in the 48 contiguous states.1

The probability sampling method was initially adopted in the form of an area

sample based upon a complete sampling frame for the 48 conterminous states. [2]

[3] It was designed to provide national estimates annually with a 2 percent

standard error and has replaced the role of the Census of Agriculture in providing benchmarks.

Implementation of area probability sampling for the entire country laid the

cornerstone for restructuring the entire agricultural data system. This new

foundation, replacing the Census of Agriculture as the underpinning for crop and

livestock estimates by providing annual benchmarks. occurred none too soon. It,

being the only complete sampling frame available for American agriculture, is

useful for backstopping other parts of an agricultural statistical program.

Census Difficulties

The rapidity of change in farming had rendered the Census of Agriculture obP solete. Typically, from three to seven years elapsed from the time an annual

estimate was made before a new benchmark was available for comparison. In

view of the fact that the number of farms raising dairy cattle, for instance,

dropped 40 percent between the 1954 and 1959 Censuses of Agriculture, the old

system would no longer suffice. Changes of similar magnitude have occurred

repeatedly, necessitating faster methods for getting such basic data as the number

of farms, land in cultivation, acreages of major crops, and livestock inventories.

These data furnish the undergirding for estimates and forecasts month by month

throughout the year.

As farms became larger, requiring huge investments, the structure of ownership changed to accumulate enough capital. Many farms integrated horizontally,

causing the farm operations to be done as separated tracts sometimes transcending

political boundaries. [12] They also integrated vertically, with marketing firms

supplying factors of production or processing or distributing the farm output. AS

these developments occurred, the concept of a Census of Agriculture as originally

1 Eight years of research and pilot operations preeeded the initiation of enumerative aurveys to collect these data in 11 southern and 4 Midwestern states iQ 1961. Thereafter, it was spread across the country as follows : 1982. 5 additional states; 1963, 4 states ; 1964, F! states; 1965, 4 states : 196t$ 5 states ; and 1967, 7 states. New appropriations for the 48 states totalled $4,137,000.
258

Conceived-i. e., a full count of independently owned family farms became an

anachronism.

Furthermore, the method of collection, using temporarily recruited canvassers

for a few weeks once every live years, became impractical. Qualified interviewers

became more difficult to find at the low rates paid, and the job become more difficult, involving more personal and intricate information about the ownership

relationships and sources of capital. To overcome some of these troubles, the

Bureau of Census began to collect the Census of Agriculture by mail.

Then they were confronted with two other major problems. One was to get a

satisfactory mailing list of the farms, This has never been adequately solved,

judging from the incompleteness of coverage that has evidently been growing in

successive censuses.

A quality check made by carefully and thoroughly recanvassing a subsample of

farms following the 1964 Census indicated 8 percent incompleteness. The quality

check for the 1969 Census made from data collected in the SRS enumerative surveys using the area sampling frame showed 17.6 percent incompleteness. [4] This a

check method, by the way, was far less expensive, much more effective, and added

no burden to farm correspondents.

With incompleteness of the magnitudes experienced, the Census took on the

characteristics of a large but uncontrolled sample. As such, its accuracy could

not be measured with statistical precision. The sampling method adopted for the

1969 Census of taking one half of the small farms, construed to be those producing

less than $2,500 of sales, also suffered from being an uncontrolled sample. These

circumstances dictated considerable adjustment before crop estimators could

use the data. The problem was particularly onerous in the case of livestock because the surveys are taken for different seasons of the year, and in the case of

cattle, for instance, the 1969 estimated incompleteness was 8.5 million head

located on 298,000 farms. [4]

These limitations pertain also to economic data obtained by the Census of Agriculture. For 1974 the census definition of a farm has been changed, so that results

will probably be reported with less coverage. [5] As we will see later, a shift tO

SRS for use of the probability sampling frames to acquire economic data is well

underway.

The circumstances suggest that to continue taking a Census of Agriculture on

the present pattern is a waste of time, effort, and money.

Quest for Greater Accuracy at Less Cost

Before the new area probability sampling became fully operative in the SRS,

it became evident that the goal of a 2 percent standard error would not be adequate. The results of the 1964 Census of Agriculture did not become available to

the Department of Agriculture for making revisions in its livestock estimates

until February 1967. Total cattle estimates had to be revised upward by 2 percent

to make the two series consistent. The revisions caused an uproar from cattlemen, who pointed out that they had been misled into raising more cattle during

the years since 1959 when the estimating error was accumulating. Price analysts

judging from current estimates of cattle inventories and market news slaughter

data had concluded that the cattle cycle had turned downward and advised -

farmers that the price prospects were very favorable. As a consequence of the

revision, the price outlook was reversed, causing financial disaster for some and

consternation among growers generally.

Two conclusions drawn from this experience were: (1) The area probability

sample was more efficient for estimating crops than for livestock; and (2) The

former goal of achieving a 2 percent standard error would no longer suffice. TO

meet these problems, it was further concluded that the area sample needed to be

bolstered by less costly methods than simply expanding the existing sample, the

usual method for gaining accuracy.

A new method was devised by SRS based on theoretical research by Professor

H. O. Hartley of Texas A&M University, which indicated how results from two

sampling frames could be embodied into a single probability estimate. This

opened a new way for SRS to take advantage of the less expensive mail survey

to acquire additional data to bolster the estimates.2 The major requirement to

achieve the attributes of a probability sample was that the samples canvassed

*To gain the advantage of an expanded probability sample without incnrrlng the verv

high costs of sending enumerators out to find the farms as In the area mmnkw, the SRR adopted a multi frame Bystem for different kinds of eutimates. It condstwl of the nr~a frame, 8 probability list frame, md old mailing lists. The latter were used primarily for

state estimates.
359

by mail be drawn from a list of all the farms growing the products being estimated

in the state or nation. Associated with the names and addresses, sufficient control information is needed to draw stratified samples. The farms in each stratum

have predetermined probabilities of being selected according to known characteristics such as approximate size. The control data, therefore, include, in addition to location, the farm enterprises and some indication of the size of each. [6]

Search for Lists

inquiring into the possibilities of developing a suitable list led the SRS to

seek cooperation with the Bureau of the Census because it was obvious that a

similar list would be needed by them if the Census of Agriculture were to be

taken by mail. Furthermore, it was apparent that the compilation and maintenance of such a list for the United States would be expensive-on the order of

$5 million a year. An early conclusion was that the public would not likely countenance two agencies of the Government incurring the expense and bothering the

farmers to maintain independent lists. The best starting point for this pioneering

effort, which was going to involve the combining of lists from many sources, was

to get the list of taxpayers reporting income from farming to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Inasmuch as the Bureau of the Census already had access to

this source, cooperation with the Bureau appeared promising, and SRS was encouraged by the Bureau that it might be worked out, although some hurdles had

to be overcome. One of these involved SRS getting approval to use IRS lists,

since the permission granted to the Census Bureau did not extend to the SRS.

The procedure was to get a Presidential order granting access to the lists. After

three years of negotiation, President Nixon issued such an order with the White

House determining the timing and the manner for publication of the order. When

the announcement was made, a furor ensued, resulting in congressional hearings

at which SRS was advised that $5 million was not to be regarded as too high

a cost to preserve the privacy of IRS records from another government agency for

statistical purposes. Other means had to be found for SRS to begin its compilation of suitable lists.

Presumably, the list compiled for the previous census might serve as a startingpoint. The Census Bureau ruled out this source for SRS, pointing out that under

law it was not allowed to reveal such information. Since SRS had the same

restrictions imposed by regulation and since both agencies would benefit from

combining their lists, it was believed that a single farm register could be contributed to and be used by both agencies. Several years of efforts were unsuccessful in getting the Bureau of Census to contribute to such an arrangement..

Meanwhile, the viability of the census lists was deteriorating, being at least five

years out of date.

During this hiatus the SRS was conducting research on how to compile lists

useful for the purpose. As appropriations were made available, SRS began in

1970 to introduce the use of these on a limited scale, notably in estimating hogs

(ultimately in 23 states) and cattle (in 38 states).’ The experience with livestock

clearly demonstrated the practicability of the method and that substantial improvement in accuracy could be achieved. Both the research and the experience

support the belief that the most effective approach will be to compile list frames

on a state-by-state basis because useful sources of names vary so much between

States. Depending upon provisions for state farm censuses, the incidence of different regulations such as brand registrations, the locations of markets with available records, and numerous other circumstance% the jobs are quite different from

state to state.

Conversely f no national source of names haS been identified that will yield a

list consistently by states that has the necessary attributes of being clean, current, and complete. To be clean, a name must appear once and only once as the

authentic source of information about a farm operation. To be current, the information on ownership should be authentic for the current year, and to be

complete, all farm enterprises should be included. Unfortunately, the largest

known lists compiled by the Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Service

are deficient in all of these qualities and are inconsistent by states.

a Hogs and pigs estimated from multiframe samples Were introduced in five states in 1970 : five additional stntes in ]971 : four states in 1973; and nine states in 1975. The 23 states cover 96 percent of the hog population. Coincidentally, the @ttle multiframe samples were introduced in 38 states covering 96 percent of the population. $2,646,900 is the present appropriation for these livestock estimates.
360

Consequently, the SRS asked Congress for appropriations to compile and maintain general purpose farm lists, as is done on a restricted scale for livestock estimating. In the budget for 1975, SRS was granted an appropriation of $1,225,000

to begin compiling the names for a general purpose list frame suitable for multiframe probability sampling. When this job is completed, the SRS will be in position to reduce the standard error for national estimates for major crop and

livestock species to 1 percent.

More importantly from the standpoint of this discussion, it will also be in

position to obtain through sampling methods almost any kind of data needed

from farms in the United States

Prospects for Additional Data Collection

A headstart has already been made toward the acquisition of economic statistics now needed by the Government and the economy on a more current basis.

Three years ago the SRS started a transition to the annual collection of data

on farm expenditures for updating the weights used to compare the indexes

of prices received and prices paid by farmers. Heretofore the data were collected in large national surveys intended to be taken about every ten years. [71

Owing to the large appropriations needed when they were scheduled, they were

actually taken less frequently, to the detriment of the indexes. It is anticipated

that the collection of these annual data may be coordinated with other economic

data collected especially if data are collected on a regularly scheduled basis. The

collection of such data is in prospect for the immediate future.

For many years SRS has collected economic information from farmers for the

Economic Research Service. Much of this has been done annually with little or

no compensation by adding questions to mail questionnaire surveys scheduled

in regular crop-reporting program Closer public scrutiny of economic analyses

and an accompanying demand for greater accuracy caused the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to rule that data collected for them be put on a more

acceptable statistical footing. Consequently, SRS has adapted probability

sampling methods and expanded the scope of data collected to accommodate

these requirements with ERS financing the added costs.

SRS likewise has been called u n to supply farm data for nine other agencies in the Department of Agriculture and seven federal agencies outside the

Department of Agriculture in the last five years.4 These special requests for

data usually involve economic data such as utilization of factors of production

and costs. In fiscal year 1975, for example, SRS received $&2 million for these

services for other agencies that needed current data, promptly reported. Twothirds of these data were obtained by utilizing the area probability sampling

frame.

In 1965 ERS was directed by Congress to analyze costs of production for

cotton. Collection of data for this and related studies was done by SRS. This

turned out to be the forerunner of similar studies in subsequent years. In 1974

and 1975 there has been a veritable eruption of needs for more current data on

farm costs and income. They have been instigated by several developments,

among them the imposition of price ceilings on farm products, revelation of -

defects in farm income estimates, and efforts to obtain better agricultural income

and expenditure statistics for use in the national economic accounts-a very

demanding system that has been developed in the Department of Commerce under

the guidance of the OMB and the Council of Economic Advisors.

To help meet the needs for additional and more accurate current economic

data, the ERS was given $1,330.000 to make an annual economic survey in addition to farm cost analyses. In 1975 ERS was (appropriated $670,000 for wheat,

feed grains, and dairy costs studies that were called for by the Agriculture and

Consumer Production Act of 1973. It is anticipated that about $1.9 million will

be transferred to SRS to collect the data for these studies beginning next year.

Multiframe probability sampling surveys will be employed for the purpose.

Thus, SRS will be coordinating data collection surveys for several different purposes that in years gone by might have been done with census data but that now

require up-to-date information from a fast-changing agricultural economy. The

ability and willingness of SRS to collect these data closely related to census data

is clearly demonstrated,

Respondent Fatigue

The proliferating demands for farm data causing repeated surveys of farmers

to supply them is taxing the patience and ability of farm respondents. Operas GAO, NASA, AID, Departments of Commerce, Interior, Labor, and HUD.
361

tors of sufficient size and scope to be included in every sample usually have

well-organized management records and professional accountants or bookkeepers to facilitate their response. Their burden can be weighed against the

public’s right to know of operations that significantly affect the food or fiber

supply of the state or nation. It can be regarded as one of the costs of being big

in our society. Less influential and specialized operators find the burden not

only onerous but more difficult to respond to, even though they may not be

included in every sample.

Respondent fatigue has been particularly noticeable in recent censuses as

resistance to reporting has grown. One can better understand this reaction

if he realizes that a small farmer is likely to receive a form containing about

200 questions to which he has to react in an intelligent manner, ascertaining

which questions apply in his case and giving the information. He is reminded

that the law requires his response. The large farmer is apt to receive in the

mail, with some 750 questions, a form designed for him to fill out and return

as required by law. [8]

Incompleteness of returns experienced in taking the Census of Agriculture

is partially attributable to deliberate refusals to reply and partially to inability

to contact the farm operators.

In the effort to reduce the latter problem, many more census forms were sent

out than there were people farming. For the 1974 census, 4.2 million questionnaire forms were mailed out. This compares with 2.7 million farms counted in the

previous census. Nevertheless, it appears probable that a substantial incompleteness will occur again. Inasmuch as efforts are still underway to get 1974-

census returns, it is premature to judge the amount of the shortfall.

A proposal to alleviate problems of lack of contact and reduce overkill in mailouts is to conduct a precensus canvass to locate farmers and to obtain preliminary information regarding their size and types of enterprises. This will

compound the fatigue problems, but it is hoped that the subsequent distribution

of the most appropriate questionnaire forms would be offsetting.

An important secondary benefit sought in sampling schemes adopted by SRS

was a reduction in the number of reports needed to get adequate data for estimating national and state totals. With judicious use of control information, the

number of farms that need to be contacted are reduced on the order of 75 percent compared with former methods for obtaining the same information. Offsetting this advantage in part is the fact that it is necessary to get data by telephone or personal visits when a respondent fails to reply to mail inquiries. The

most promising means to minimize respondent fatigue and still meet the rising demands for data is to coordinate all the farm data requirements into a single system of surveys, thereby reducing both contacts and duplication.

Other Deficiencies Needing Attention

A farm data collection system will need to be reasonably flexible to adjust

for the correction of some other arising problems. For about five years the American Farm Economic Association has called for a reconceptualization of the relationship of farms to the economic structure. The principal impetus is to obtain

better guidance on what data to collect in anticipation of how they are to be used

for analysis and decision making. As progress is made in updating the theoretical

framework, it is to be expected that changes will he needed in counting and

measuring farms and related phenomena.

One of the more important reasons for this will be to fulfill the needs of the national accounts system, which is preempting the economic statistical field. This

relatively recent development concentrated first on other parts of the economy,

adapting the agricultural data that were available to its needs. Now that the national accounts system is becoming more sophisticated and precise, it is calling for changes in the agricultural data inputs, necessitating more precise data

applying to shorter time periods. The agricultural statistics system will be ex–

pected to accommodate these needs. An integrated system able to collect data at

appropriate times is most likely to do so.

Similar needs for data at particular times to compare with data from other

censuses and other sources are also likely to occur. The Census of Agriculture

has always been taken quite independently of other censuses, except at 10-year

intervals when the time of data collection is near to that for the population

census. Otherwise, the concepts, timing, and administration of the farm census are

quite separate and apart.

A problem may arise from the fact that in the origination and 100-year growth

of the crop and livestock estimates, the main focus of attention has been on
362

facilitating decision making in the private sector. Crop and livestock estimating

is unique in that regard among public statistical services. The national accounts

have been tailored more to aid public policy makers and Government administrators. To meld data collection for these diversely motivated systems calls for

considerable reconciliation. [9] This problem was in the minds of the Agricultural

Economists' Committee, which had faith that new concepts could contribute

toward that end. They, more than the general economists and statisticians, are

conscious of the vital role federal agricultural statistical services have played in

guiding the myriads of independent business decisions affecting our food and

fiber supplies. The statistics have exercised the strongest cohesive force in the

agricultural economy because they provide a common fund of reliable information on which all segments of American agriculture depends. Society can ill

afford to reduce their effectiveness if a competitive economy is to be preserved.

The OMB, sensing some of, these problems, began calling for a study of the

entire agricultural statistical complex in 1968. Under an OMB directive, the

USDA requested in the SRS budget for that fiscal year $50,000 to finance the

inquiry. The request was denied by Congress, but the idea arises in one form

or another periodically, usually provoked when additional funds are requested

to institute new methods. It is being advocated again at the present time, but

plans as yet have not clearly indicated how it is to be financed and performed.

SRS has recognized a need for reconciliation of differing objectives in determining the content and timing of farm data collection. It awaits directions from

OMB or some responsible source for overall policy guidance. Meanwhile, it has

proposed piecemeal improvements and solicits users’ reactions. Acceptable proposals are adopted, Two events give evidence that OMB has institutional goals

uppermost in mind.

The proposed “Department Reorganization Plan” announced by President

Nixon in 1971 “called for concentrating the major statistical agencies of the

Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor in one principal subdivision

of the proposed Department of Economic Affairs.” [10] In essence, this centralized statistics agency would be divided into two main functional units—a unified

data and planning office, and a centralized, service-oriented data collection and

processing center. A reorganization plan was instituted in existing departments

by the OMB so that the work organizations would be prepared for ready transfer

to the Department of Economic Affairs when the Departmental Reorganization

Plan was approved by Congress, which did not occur.

USDA had very little adjustment to make internally to adhere to the OMB

guidelines because it had for many years maintained a segregation between SRS,

mainly in collection and processing activities, and ERS, engaged primarily in

economic analysis. Presumably, placing the work of these agencies into a single

agency, which also contained the Bureau of the Census, would circumvent the

legal and regulatory requirements preventing the agencies from sharing data. It

may be noted that placing the Census of Agriculture and SRS data collection

activities together into one agency oriented to concentrate on agricultural statistics is quite consistent with this idea, but it avoids complete centralization

of all federal statistical services. SRS has already amply demonstrated its posture of service for other agencies concerned with analytical and administrative

work, so the arrangement is not entirely novel.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of implementing a single agriculturallyoriented statistical unit, the OMB itself becomes a problem. The standard answer

is that they want a thorough inquiry into farm statistical services.

The second event, initiated by OMB in furtherance of their objectives, was

establishment of a unified statistical budget for tile Government. Departments

were directed to submit to the Office of Statistical Policy (OSP) of OMB their

proposed budget requests for statistical activities. This office then proceeded to

amend the amounts that could be requested, specifying increases or cuts by

agency and activity for the stated purpose of improving federal statistics. In

the first year of operation of the unified statistical budget, OSP claimed responsibility for a 16 percent increase in the statistical budget as a whole. The Department of Agriculture, however, was told to curtail its statistical budget request

by $1 million, later reduced to $750,000. Evidently, the authorizations taken

from the USDA’s requests were distributed to other agencies. Two years later

when the Administration and the public were concerned about what was going

to happen to food prices, the Council of Economic Advisors launched an inquiry

into the lack of ability of ERS to forecast these prices during the months and

, years ahead. The inquiry, by an outside scholar, cited the relationships between

budget allowances and the capabilities to do such work, pointing out the status

given earlier to agricultural statistical priorities. [11]
363

The desirability of a closer affinity between the farm census and the economic

censuses, especially in terms of the concept of business units, was advocated by

American Farm Economic Association’s Committee and called to the attention

of OSP. The response was the proposal that the Census of Agriculture be postponed and be taken at the same time as the Census of Manufacturers and other

economic censuses. This hardly dealt with the crux of the matter, but an integrated system would be more able to accomplish the timing of farm data collection to coincide with such needs than is the case at present. The Census

Bureau is asking for legislation to place them together in 1982 for the first time.

For years ending in “O” some state or national data wanted in conjunction with

the Census of Population could be added in an integrated program.

. Potential for Satellite Data

Before examining alternative means for acquiring farm data, we take a

moment to examine a source of data looming prominently on the horizon. Perhaps the most frequently mentioned contribution of the Landsat (formerly

* ERTS) satellite to civilian needs is information relating to food supplies, usually

involving crop acreages and yields. Although considerable money is being spent—

such as the Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE)—to demonstrate

the possibilities, they must still be regarded as potentially possible. Crude information about the earth’s resource inventories and kind uses is probably within

grasp, but many existing claims for detailed information are still to be classed

with unfinished research.

Evidently, the most practical use of the satellite for crop estimates with the

present state of the art is to make sampling more efficient. By relating information from the satellite to ground truth, a computer can be trained to stratify

land for the purpose of improving the efficiency of collecting agricultural statistical samples.

Up to now, efforts to gain information on crop acreages and yields directly

from satellite data, by-passing the use of ground truth, have been fruitless. The

possibility sounds dramatic and exciting and has captured the imagination, but

it has also diverted attention away from practical ways of combining the two

sources of data to yield better results, The great desire for gaining intelligence

on crops without dependence upon information from those who own, control,

and till the soil is so great in international affairs today that it has led scientists to exert strenuous efforts to find ways for the satellite to give the answers.

Hardware salesmen have fostered these efforts. But desire, no matter how intense, and money, no matter how much, do not in themselves create the means.

No practical way has yet been devised to measure crop acreages by species,

to estimate yields, or to count livestock in the absence of ground truth information to check satellite data. Without current data, estimates are likely to be

so far off as to be misleading for planning purposes.

Crop yields are of course affected by weather, but the measurement or prediction of yields from only weather data collected by satellite is hazardous, except

for gross changes leading to disasters such as major droughts, floods, or freezes.

The combinations of moisture and temperature during stages of plant growth

are so varied in intensity and duration that these data alone cannot be relied

upon to predict yields within reasonably useful ranges of precision. Actually,

the measurement or prediction of crop yields from weather data obtained on

the ground has never proved reliable in practice for crop estimating.

SRS research indicates means by which satellite data can be useful to improve

the efficiency of sampling to obtain more accurate crop estimates. This preliminary research has indicated that gains of up to 50 percent are possible. The

research suggests that the coefficient of variation or the standard error can

be reduced on the order of one half from their present size based on ground

survey data alone. Current satellite imagery, matched with samples of simultaneous ground truth such as is obtained regularly by SRS enumerative surveys,

gives correlations between crop identifications from the two sources that can

be applied to vastly larger areas supplied by satellite imagery. This method

for improving reliability of an estimate has yet to be proved in an operating

mode. If it works out, a smaller number of samples may suffice for probability

surveys.

Some Questions Posed and Answers Suggested

Any rationale for continuing the Census of Agriculture is that it will perform

different functions than other statistical services. Three functions that the

census has performed uniquely among statistical services are: (1) It has sup-
364

plied demographic data about the farm population, especially in those years

ending in “ “ when the population census was not taken; (2) It has supplied 5

economic data about farms not included in the current estimates programs; (3)

It has supplied county data that can be aggregated into relatively small areas;

i.e., areas smaller than states; (4) One variant of this, other than geographic,

is that it supplied data in much greater detail than surveys for current estimates. Each of these is discussed in turn below.

(1) At best, demographic data regarding the farm population obtained by

the Census of Agriculture was a by-product intended to fill a void. Its capacity

for doing this is now seriously circumscribed because of the radical changes

that have occurred in the farm structure which has largely separated farm

management and ownership from farm residence. [12]

The well-being of farm households could once be measured with data indicating

the prosperity of farm enterprises, but correspondence between them has diminished to the point where it is no longer practical to continue such statistical

concepts.[6] Farm income data derived from tax sources reveal the degree of

noncorrespondence when they show that only 7 percent of the families living

on farms in 1971 relied solely on farm self-employment income for family

living. Of those relying solely on farm self-employment income, 14 percent resided off the farm; and 31 percent of families residing on farms reported no farm

self-employment income. [13] [14] These circumstances suggest that the Census

of Population, possibly augmented by current population surveys and by tax

data, will be the source of farm demographic data in the future. [121

(2) Economic data, besides crop and livestock estimates, can be obtained from

probability samples, as the SRS has amply demonstrated through the extensive

use of the sampling frames for the purpose.

(3) The main difference in acquiring county farm data as contrasted with

state and national data is the size of the sample, which will also be influenced

by the degree of accuracy sought. In order to attain an accuracy level comparable with that obtained with the incomplete counts of the census, a well-designed

25 percent sample will probably do.

(4) The size of survey designed to acquire county data can be expanded in

terms of questions asked as well as in sample number sufficient to get the additional detail wanted. Some detail now included in the census would not be

necessary, since surveys taken at other times to give state and national estimates would not need to be repeated in county surveys.

An aspect of this fourth item is that the census provided much detail useful

for research. This is true especially for studies over time revealing trends, and

no doubt regular surveys of all types are a productive source of data for research.

But researchers emphasize that profile studies probing economic relationships in

depth for inquisition of knowledge require microdata with much more detail and

precision than is supplied for applications of knowledge through regular statistical services. [16] In fact, the characteristics of data needed for such research

calls for special surveys specifically designed for each research project, [16]

For agriculture most of these types of surveys are conducted by researchers in

land grant universities. Occasionally, data are collected specially for research

studies as an adjunct to a regular SRS survey.

These exceptions notwithstanding, census data have been particularly useful -

for research analysts who could relate the data to other economic phenomena and

could trace the data back through previous Censuses of Agriculture to identify

and measure long-term trend changes. This advantage is held in low regard by

the Department of Commerce, which proposed to arbitrarily break the series of

data by postponing scheduled censuses.

Purveyors, manufacturers, and producers of farm equipment, supplies, and

services also used the censuses to get detailed purchase, usage, and farm practice data indicative of the market for their products. The Censuses of Agriculture

had more requests for these kinds of data, useful to private industry—for example, sales managers devising sales schemes--than it could accommodate given the

limits imposed by respondent fatigue in filling out questionnaires. An integrated

system could furnish these same kinds of data, subject to the same limitations.

Cooperation with State 0ffices

One big advantage accruing to the SRS system for collecting farm data is

derived from the use of 44 permanent state offices to decentralize the work of
365

conducting inquiries and processing results for all states. In connection with the

operation of these offices for current data programs, cooperation with state

agencies is established in 48 states to obtain additional or more detailed farm

data needed for state programs. Through these voluntary arrangements, state and

federal agencies benefit (1) from cost savings by collecting the data for their

respective needs at the same time : (2) from reduced respondent burden by collecting their data together, thus avoiding repetitive inquiries; and (3) from

assurance of compatible results so that reports issued by the two sets of agencies

are consistent with each other.

Unified support received from federal and state officials in urging farmer

cooperation is also a boon. Data collected to satisfy state needs are often valuable as check data that would not otherwise be available. Working together

improves understanding of the statistical programs and promotes fuller use of

data for carrying out the respective public responsibilities as well as by private

industry.

But of much greater significance for operating sample surveys, where extreme

care must be exercised to make sure all counts and measurements are recorded

accrately, is the better opportunity to clear up inconsistencies uncovered by

editing of schedules. Located closer to enumerators or respondents who originate

the data, inevitable mistakes owing to misunderstanding of questions or other

errors can be corrected more easily and promptly.

Probability sampling requires more voluntary cooperation from respondents

than the older mail surveys, in the sense that the data has to be obtained from

the persons or places selected, whereas before, replies coming from only those

willing to reply quickly and regularly were used. Local enumerators plus state

and federal officials working together are better able to elicit the cooperation and

get the information straight.

This mutually beneficial state-federal system of data collection is already in

place and has demonstrated its superiority. It has the capacity for expansion

to also collect data for the clientele usually served by the census. The total job

could be done much more expeditiously if the inquiries were spread out over a

five-year period rather than all collected in one fell swoop every live years. This

is true for a number of reasons, of which several will be briefly cited.

Fitting Samples to Quality Requirement

All farm data does not have to be collected in the same detail or with the

same standards of quality. Some data are needed only on national bases, some

only for state estimates. and still others on localized or county bases. In general,

the greater the aggregation of data, the smaller the samples needed to achieve a

given accuracy standard. Exceeding the quality necessary is a waste of money.

Over a five-year period agricultural statistical surveys could be classified by

quality requirements and scheduled by years accordingly. Where national data

. will suffice, surveys may be scheduled in given years, for state data surveys.

other years will be used, and only once every five years will it be necessary to

increase the size of sample to produce county data. Exceptions could be made

for those states and for those items for which particular state or federal agencies

are willing to bear the extra costs. It is likely that the county data would be

collected for years ending in "2" and “7" to facilitate comparisons with economic

censuses for the same years.

Through this type of scheduling all needed farm data could be collected over

each five-year period with the accuracy, frequency, and detail of items and

geographical coverage fitted to needs. Drawing of samples to spread out the

reporting load among respondents or to minimize the chances of one respondent

being included in every survey may be arranged. The work of enumeration processing, and publishing could also he spread out among years and within years to

reduce the peaking of workloads. With prospects of steady work more experienced

employees may be attracted. for whom more training can be afforded.

Data collection for current surveys could be made to coincide with some

collection made for longer term needs. Probability samples would be designed

to yield standard errors adjusted to the needs of each survey, and data collected in one could be designed to supplement and reinforce the other. This

principal is now practiced in crop estimating: for example, planted acreages of’

crops are estimated only once for the year. When subsequent monthly surveys.

63–877—76—2 4
366

of crop yields are made, a small subsample of acreages is checked to see whether

adjustments are needed in acreage estimates.

Possible Cost Savings

Assuming an integrated system of the type described, opportunities for cost

savings include:

Reducing the number of times individual farms need to be contacted to

collect data ;

Reducing the size of questionnaires or length of interviews for farm data

collection by at least 25 percent—more for items needing only national or

state estimates;

Eliminating the need for two agencies to compile and maintain lists of

farmers in the United States identified by size groups, enterprises, and

locations;

Eliminating the printing and distribution of a million census forms that

are not used;

Eliminating the need for a precensus canvass in the effort to identify -

farms and verify control data;

Incorporating newly required data into an operating sampling scheme in

less time and at less cost;

Utilizing satellite data more quickly to improve the accuracy of sample

estimation. With success, this may be translated into smaller, less expensive

samples to get the same accuracy;

—Savings to the economy from greater accuracy. [17]

Savings involving appropriated funds will be offset in part by increased funds

needed to complete the compilation of a list sampling frame started in SRS. An

additional $3 million is required to make it operational for an integrated

program.

Estimated Cost

The main elements of the agricultural data system with which we are concerned are: $9.1 million for the Census of Agriculture and $28.5 million for the

crop and livestock estimates, or a total of $37.6 million annually.

The projected cost for an integrated program giving higher quality statistics

covering the same ground in a typical future year is $36 million.

These estimates make allowance for the cost increases and decreases discussed, except that they exclude statistics collected for state agencies and for

other federal agencies. They also exclude statistical research and clearance

activities presently assigned to SRS but not a part of the crop and livestock

estimates. None of these exclusions bear on the budget or appropriations for the

integrated services. None of these estimates make provisions for inflationary

Costs.

Administrative Alternatives .

Administration of an integrated system may be arranged in any of several

alternative ways, as the discussion has suggested. One would be through a general reorganization of government statistical services to accumulate most or

all of them in a single administrative unit. An expressed hope of the American

Statistical Association and also of blue ribbon committees with a statistical -

orientation has involved a change of this character, with the head of the statistical work reporting directly to the President. [18] A strong advantage would

be to get more balance and uniform quality in statistics throughout the Government. A disadvantage would be the separation of statistics from the programs

they support; or rather, conversely, the support of statistics from the program

administrators, usually Cabinet officers, and their budgets. This proposal, of

particular concern in the case of agriculture, was denied along with most of the

Governmental Reorganization Plan of 1971.

Another possibility akin to the first would give the Department of Commerce

responsibility for the collection of current agricultural statistics along with

the Census of Agriculture. A change in this direction would favor a continuation

of the Census of Agriculture in its present form, but with years for collection

altered to eventually coincide with the economic censuses.

A third possibility, a reversal of the second, would place the integrated system

in the Department of Agriculture. This arrangement would be appropos if the

objective to convert the census to a sampling approach is adopted.

Every one of these alternatives would require legislative changes and would

involve the transfer of legislative and budgetary responsibility among con-
367

.

gressional committees. Administrative responsibilities and appropriations would

accordingly be transferred between Cabinet officers pursuant to the legislation.

Agricultural statistics have fared well with legislative committees and administrative leadership interested in agricultural policy and have gained professional

respect for technical preeminence unequaled at any time or place.

Conclusion

Given the changes in agriculture and in methods of collection adopted by the

Census, it makes no sense to continue the Census of Agriculture. The Statistical

Reporting Service, facing the same problems of technological change, has taken

positive steps to solve them, thereby increasing the integrity of its public service

and reducing the need for the census by presenting a more viable alternative for

acquiring needed data. Thus the time has come to halt pandering with farm

statistics by assuring that only data released in time to be useful is collected

through an integrated system.

REFERENCES

1. “story of U.S. Agricultural Estimates.” U.S. Department of Agriculture,

Miscellaneous Publication No. 1088, 1969, pp. 40, 42-43, 5W58, 84-W.

2. “Scope and Methods of the Statistical Reporting Service,” U.S. Department

of Agriculture, Miscellaneous I’ublication No. 1308, 1975, pp. 6-16.

3. Houseman, Earl E., “Area Frame Sampling In Aj@mlture.” U.S. Department

of Agriculture, Statistical Reporting Service, SRS No. 20, November 1975.

4. ‘*1969 census of Agriculture, Part 16: Evaluation of coverage.” U.S. Department of Commerce, $pwial Reports, l“olurne 5, June 1974. All farms missed

were estimated at 476,670. ( Hee Appendix 1)

5. “Farm Definition Chanww,” U.S. I)epartxuent of Agriculture Press Release

2834-75, August 12, 1975.

6. “~ew Agricultural Data Smtem Yeeded.” ~merican Agribusiness Associates,

1$473.

7. “Government Price Statistics.” Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, 87th Congress of the L’nited Stntes, January 24, 1961, Part 1, pp. 5, 12,

31--W. Popularly known as the “Stigler Report.”

8. “Farn~ ~ensus Guide for the 1974 Census of A~iculture.” U.S. Department

of Commerce, Form 74A1O, December 1974, pp. 57-87.

9. Weeks, Eldon E., “Aggregate Xational Data—Status and Alternatives.” EccP

nomic Research Service, March 1971.

10. Statement of Julius Sbiskin, Chief Statistician of the Office of Management

and Budget, before the Joint Economic Committee on Reorganization of

Fwlmal Statistical Activities, October 27, 1971.

11. Fox, Karl, “An Appraisill of Deficiencies in Food Price Forecasting for 1973,

nnd Recommendations for Improvement.” Council of Economic Advisors,

November 29, 1973.

IX T:lenlwr, Conrad, “Future Structure of Census Data Relating to Agricultural

and Rural People.’* Paper given to the annual meeting of the American

.4gricu1tural Economics Association, 1971, and abstracted in the Journal of

Agricultural Economies,” Volume 53, No. 5, December 1971, p. gw,

a 13. Carlin, Thomas A., and Allen G. Smith, “New Approach to Accounting for

our Nation’s Farm Income,” Agricultural Finance Review, Volume 34,

July 1973, pp. 1-6.

14. Reinsel, Edward I., “l’arm Family Incomes and Farmers’ Incomes Improve

at Different Rates,” Agricultural Finance Review, Volume 35, October

1974, pp. 31-35.

15. Juster, F. Thomas, Wicrodata, Economic Research, and the Production of

Economic Knowledget” .4merican Economic Review, Volume LX, A’o. 2,

May 1970. m. 13%148.

16. Orcut~, Guy’ H-., “Data, Research and Government,” American Economic Review, Volume LX, No. 2, May 1970, pp. 132-137.

17. Hayami, l’ujiro, and Willis Peterson, “Social Return to Public Information

Services: Statistical Reporting of U.S. Farm Commodities,’7 Ameri~n

Economic Review, Volume LXII, No. 1, March 1972, op. 119--130.

18. Report of the Task Force on the Storage of find Access to Government Statistics, Committee report to the Bureau of the Budget, Octolwr 1966. Popularly known as the “Kaysen Report,” after Carl Kaysen, Chairman.
, 4

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Number of missed farm$----- 50,142 13,460 1,011 1,030 2, 2io 3,551

Land in farms -------------- 10, 544,;;;

5,658

7,492,221 1,62 0 2,159,761

36,682 5,546

1,632>604 1,266,641 795, 362 3,052, 042

25,193

489,13

5,943

1,072,042 1,490, 846

Average size of farm ----- 556

Corn For Grain:

2,096 738 356 42

------------------ 1,486 1,041 162 242 445

AM*----- .:----------- 44,023 341 6,; ; 3, 992

65 380 --------------

Sorghums for grain:

38,940 21,060 7,034 5,083 65 5,018 --------------

----------------- 242

Acres.-----------.---- - 20, 423 15,815 2, 760

357

Wheat:

3, 618 3,3 ; 4 , % 1, 710 4,608 3 , % 420 618

Farms----.------.-.-.- 2,986 2,125 297 443 528

7 , &

791

Acres ------------------ 172,877 158,488 55,707 20,992 42,824 31,425 14, 389

374

Soybeans:

3 , % 7,656 3 , %

 Farms

Acres-~~::::::j::::::::::j :j::::::::::::j:::::I:::::::::::j:::: :

---------- ‘--------------------------------- ‘--------------------------- ‘--------------------------------------

------ ---------- ---------- -------------- ---------- ---------- -------- ------------ ---------- ------------------ ---

Hay:

 -’-::;?---------------- - 16,666 5378 501

517,776

522 1,358

350,058

1,344

46,353

1,653 11,268

56,959

1,239 8,022 2,057

------------------

Cotton:

104,257 90,034 52,455 167,718 24,053 119,349 24,346

Farms ----------------- 537 318 108 219 --------------

Acres ------------------ 18,935

Tobacco:

17,612 6,860 4,551 4,266 1,731 204 1,323 -------------- 1,143 180

farms ---------------------------------- ------------------------------ ---------- . . . . . . . . . . ----------- --------- ------------ ------------ -------------- -----------------------------

Acres ------------------------------------- ------------------------------------ ------------------------------ ---------------------------- -----------------------------------------

Cattle and calves:

----------------- 33,403 8,626 621 578 1,502 2,259

Number -------------- 932,284 724,168 172,546

3,692 24,751

126,325 175,834

3,125

116,862

17,941

Hogs and pigs:

132,861 207,856 34,291 130,088 43,467

Farms.~-...----.-----. 5,977 1,779 --------------

Number.--.-------.---. 113,851 7,360

529 4,198

20, % 35,474

7,217 2,585

80,514 -------------- 16,934 33,337 5,150 25,811 2,376 Hens and pullets:

--------------- 8,541 2,115 123 224

Number ---------------- 1,938

744 6,426

532,012 383,111 1,845 47,306 323,856

4,168

17,416

1,218

Total value of products sold:

18,166 138,901 94394 30,091

--------------- 47,895 13,460 1,011 1,030 2,210 3,551 5658 34435 5,377 23,231 Dollars(l,000)l --------- 215,500 191,771 85,897 3&155 30,673 24,568 20,358 23,715 5,827 5,188 14,450 4,077

IDatsdoes not add due to rounding. Wote:lncludeaan estimated 314abnormal farms. Figuraa areeatimateabasedonaaample aartare

* Does not include data forAlaska and Hawaii. sutdectto sampfing errors.
370

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9

[The following paper was requested from the Bureau of the Census by OTA :]

STATEMENT OF BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

WASHINGTON , D.C.,

This paper presents the views of the Bureau of the Census relative to recommendation 4 of the OTA Food Advisory Committee (FAC) Report, Food, Agriculture and Nutrition information Systems: Assessment and Recommendations,

which proposes a study of the desirability and feasibility of integrating the

staff and activities of the agriculture census into the Statistical Reporting Service (SRS).

This paper also addresses the Issues raised in the FAG report concerning the

quality, timeliness, and cost of the agriculture census program. Finally the

paper describes improvements introduced into the 1974 agricultural census program and proposals for additional improvements in later agriculture census programs.

The Bureau’s views, presented in the more detailed sections of this paper, are

summarized below:

1. Transfer of Agriculture Census Responsbility to the Statistical Reporting

Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture

The Bureau’s view is that consolidation and integration of the agriculture

census, now conducted by the Bureau of the Census, into the Statistical Reporting Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture would not result in the gains

in quality, timeliness, and reduction in costs to the Government described in the

FAC report. It should be noted that the FAC report does not document anticipated gains.

It is exceedingly important that an independent agency, such as the Bureau

of the Census, continue collecting benchmark data and that these data be obtained from a complete census of agricultural enterprises. Thousands of individuals and organizations rely on the agricultural statistics published by the

Census Bureau as an independent source of data in using agricultural data from

other sources.

Apart from the distrust that will inevitably be aroused in the user community by a merger of the independent data collection function with the data analysis and policy making function-we feel that there will be a substantial rise

in cost (unless offset by serious cutbacks in the amount of data collected or

in the level of geographic detail published) coupled with a deterioration in quality and timeliness of the results if the merger is effected. We, therefore, strongly

recommend that responsibility for conducting the census of agriculture remain

with the Bureau of the Census.

2. Coverage and Coverage Improvement

The contention in the FAC report that “incompleteness in coverage of the agriculture census and technological advances by the Statistical Reporting Service

have resulted in the SRS providing the more dependable national estimates" is

an assertion not documented by fact. Nowhere in the report are the technological

advances by SRS described. The report says nothing about the reliability or coverage of SRS data at the subnational level. In contrast to the Bureau of the

Census, which has provided measures of undercoverage in its censuses since

1945. SRS does not publish information on the degree of undercoverage in its

surveys. This definitely misleads the user about the quality of SRS data.

While the Bureau continues to be concerned with the socioeconomic characteristics of farmers and farm families. this concern is not as closely related to a

census of agriculture as it was when the U.S. was an agrarian nation. To close

this major data gap in “statistics pertaining to rural people or households” cited

in the American Agribusiness Associates report, major household enumerative

surveys conducted by the Bureau of the Census can serve as a basis for a strengthened program of Information about people and households in rural areas. For

example, the Current Population Survey annually covers more than twice the

estimated number of households in rural areas covered by the enumerative surveys of the Statistical Reporting Service.
374

3. Timelines of Census Results ,,

The Food Advisory Committee (FAC) contention that a data series developed

by a non-using agency is given only second or third priority in its work schedule is

not true with regard to the Bureau of the Census. Collection and publication

of general-purpose data is the Bureau’s basic mission. The Bureau is not the

user of the Weekly Retail Sales report, the Housing Starts report, the Manufacturers’ Shipments, Inventories and Orders report or a host of other economic

indicators; yet these series are released by the Bureau on an extremely tight time

schedule. Moreover, the Bureau is constantly seeking to improve the timeliness

of its census benchmark reports.

It is important to note that USDA’s time schedule for its Proposed sample survey to be conducted in lieu of an agriculture census is inferior to that of any

recent agriculture census conducted by the Bureau. The plan proposed by USDA

requires 24-28 months from the reference period until the publication of results. 1

This proposal of USDA, coupled With the generally inferior utility of sample

estimates as compared with census results for small areas is a step backward. 

4. Mailout[Mailback

The problem of how to improve coverage in the agriculture census has concerned

the Bureau for some time. It was to correct this deficiency rather than (as claimed

in the FAC report) to reduce costs, that the Bureau changed in the 1969 census

from an enumerative field canvass to a mailout/mailback canvass. Thus, the principal reasons for the change were to improve coverage of the large significant

farms; to improve the overall quality of results; and to reduce respondent burden.

‘This change in technique will have important short and long term benefits to the

agriculture census program.

5. Transfer of Mailing List to USDA

The proposal of Agribusiness Associates also recommended that a directory of

farms be established within the USDA through transfer of the agriculture census

mailing list from the Bureau of the Census to USDA. The directory would be

maintained by USDA and would be used primarily as a sample frame for the

surveys discussed above. This is not a viable proposal for under the strict confidentiality proscriptions set forth in Title 13 of the U.S. Code, these records cannot be made available to the Department of Agriculture In view of the current

climate, with regard to the need to maintain the confidentiality of information

reported to the Census Bureau, it is unlikely that existing legal restrictions will

be relaxed in order to release confidential information. These restrictions were

reinforced by the Privacy Act which identified the Census Bureau as the sole

agency to which identifiable records may be transferred for statistical purposes

without consent of the individual.

6. Improvements to the Census of Agriculture Program

a. Timeliness of Publication.—Because of changes introduced into the processing of the agriculture census we are releasing the initial reports of the 1974 census

on a substantially better schedule than that achieved in 1969. Our publication

plans for the proposed 1978 Census of Agriculture (to be taken in 1979) call for a

further acceleration so that the publication of preliminary county reports would

start by October 1979 and be completed by March of 1980. These shifts in publication dates would provide results in a time period consistent with the dates cited

as desirable in the FAC report.

b. Processing Capacity.—The Bureau of the Census has already considerably

expanded its computer facilities for handling massive processing operations on

a concurrent basis. Additional expansions have been approved and will be installed over the next few years.

A shift in the reference year for the next two censuses of agriculture has been

proposed. By 1982 the agriculture and the economic censuses would have the same

reference period. This would lead not only to the development of better lists and

improved coverage but should also lead to better classification of agricultural

activities. It will also permit compiling data on agricultural activities related to

other economic enterprises.

c. Data Improvements.--In addition to the above the Bureau is proposing a

program to link agriculture data and economic census data. This program will

match and link suppliers and services for the agriculture sector with the actual

agriculture production and in turn, the production with the processing and

1 See Hearings Before the committee on Post Ofllce and Civil Service, U.S. Senate, SJ Re% 95, May 23, 1973.
375

marketing of agricultural commodities. These data are essential to a better understanding of how changing economic structures affect traditional agricultural

production patterns. Linkages are proposed to both the other economic censuses

and to the Bureau’s annual Company Organization Survey. Such important linkages to economic census information could not be undertaken if another agency

collected the agriculture census data, because of confidentiality provisions under

which the Census Bureau operates.

d. Evaluation of Results.--The agriculture census evaluation program-which

we have conducted for every agriculture census since 1945--will be expanded

to develop a better understanding of the coverage of marginal and nonresident

operators.

One should keep in mind that errors are inherent in all censuses and all surveys. Therefore, a combination of a census and a superimposed independent

sample survey can provide estimates based on more complete coverage than a

census itself. This paired approach has been used by the Bureau of the Census

to evaluate its censuses of agriculture. This has permitted us to inform users

of agriculture census data as to the quality and has provided us with information for improving future censuses.

A detailed presentation of the views of the Bureau of the Census is found on

the pages following.

DETAILED PRESENTATION OF BUREAU OF THE CENSUS VIEWS

Introductory

The Bureau of the Census, as the Government’s principal general-purpose

statistical agency, welcomes the efforts to improve agricultural statistics. Our

interest in agriculture activity dates back to 1840 when we undertook the first

U.S. census of agriculture. During the intervening 135 years, the Census Bureau

has conducted 19 nationwide enumerations of U.S. agriculture.

A1though our responsibility relates primarily to providing the periodic benchmark data derived from the censuses of agriculture, our interest and attention

far exceeds that basic function. Over the years we have become conversant with

both agriculture data users and ‘agriculture data providers. We have also maintained and benefited from a close liaison with the professional statisticians

in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). We have been gratified that the

improved techniques in the fields of sampling, collection, processing, etc., developed at the Bureau have been adopted by other agencies.

We are acutely aware of how U.S. agriculture has changed during the last

five decades, with the increasing application of technology and science to agriculture production. Although the number of farms has declined over the years,

there has been an accompanying substantial increase in the size and complexity

of agricultural enterprises.

The need for improved measures in the agriculture sector has never been

greater. We have directed our efforts to this end and fully endorse all serious

efforts to provide improved agriculture statistics whether they be interim measures of current activity or important periodic benchmarks of an agriculture

census.

Alternatives to the existing data system, however, should be developed without

sacrificing the important benefits deriving from the census of agriculture, which

include major benchmarking of agricultural activities every 5 years. This census

is the only source of agriculture data at the county level on a nationwide uniform

basis.

Proposal to Transfer Agriculture Benchmark Statistics to the U.& Department

of Agriculture (USDA)

The contention of the American Agribusiness Associates cited in the Food

Advisory Committee (FAC) report that more timely and accurate benchmark

data could be provided by the USDA Statistical Reporting Service at the same

or lower cost than by the continuation of the 5-year agriculture censuses conducted by the Census Bureau is neither documented by facts nor supportable.

The FAC report also contends that “other users” of agriculture census data believe that both the reliability and timeliness of such data could be improved

at less cost if the responsibility for providing such data were transferred to

the Statistical Reporting Service. Unfortunately the FAC report does not identify

the users who hold these views nor does it describe the basis for their beliefs.

It is safe to say that contrary views are widely held.2

~ See footnote 1, Page 374,
376

The American Agribusiness Associates report reflects a failure to understand’

the decentralized Federal statistical system. Under the present Federal statistical syst.em the responsibility for periodic data collection has been maintained functionally separate from data analysis and policy formulation. The Bureau

of the Census is responsible for providing general-purpose data concerning the

American economy. Other agencies analyze the data for purposes of policy formulation. Transferring the agriculture census or benchmarking to USDA, which

is also responsible for agriculture programs and policy, would merge these

functions within a single organization.

To have the same agency collect by survey what would purport to be benchmark

statistics and also collect and publish annual estimates could lead to conflicts

of interest. A department responsible for crop estimates, other projections relating both to production, domestic use, and potential exports, and the admin-

.

istration of programs bearing directly on the final outcome of many of those

estimates would be subject to great pressures to publish statistics that would

reflect favorably on its handling of program responsibilities, or at least would

be perceived to be so subject. Such actions could deteriorate further the public’s

confidence in Federal statistic.

It is exceedingly important that an independent agency, such as the Bureau

of the Census, continue collecting benchmark data and that these data be obtained from a complete census of agricultural enterprises. The agriculture

census information also is the basis for many Federal, state and local programs.

Thousands of individuals and organizations rely on the agricultural statistics

published by the Census Bureau as an independent yardstick in using agricultural data from other sources.

According to the proposed plan of American Agribusiness Associates, the anticipated improvement in timing and reduction in cost of the program, if transferred to the Agriculture Department, would come about by discontinuance of

the agriculture census program currently conducted by the Bureau of the

Census and substituting a variety of rotating sample surveys. This proposal in

essence, would reduce the cost of the program by reducing the amount as well

as the quality of data produced.

Leaving aside the legalities involved in discontinuing the census, the census

of agriculture provides the only complete series of agricultural data available

at the county level.

In order to provide county data, now collected on a systematic standardized

basis throughout the U.S. only in the agriculture census program. It was proposed that a once-in-five years expansion of the sample be undertaken. It was

felt that the expanded sample would be adequate to provide the required county

data. The adequacy of the proposed sample derived data for the wide range of

local area data users, the size of the sample that would be need@ and its level

of reliability are not documented in the Agribusiness report.

The plan suggests that a moderate infusion (not quantified) of Federal funds

into the state agriculture programs would provide additional county data. if

needed. It is unlikely that the kind of data produced by the states would be

suitable for aggregation to national totals. States are interested primarily in

agricultural activities important to their economy and are much less likely to

collect information of general interest.

This means that measures of the total market activity would be difficult, if not

impossible, to develop. Even in instances where the measurement of a common

set of activities would be acceptable to each participant state, information from

organizations whose activities cross state lines would be difficult to come by let

alone to assess once obtained.

The level of statistical expertise varies widely among states and this may

impact seriously on the quality of the aggregated data. Another problem would be

timing. Will all the state produced data be available in time to meet publication

requirements? If not, the anticipated gains in timing would vanish. Finally. what

about the cost of the program? The cost to support the statistical staffs and

overheads of the 45 to 50 states participating in a data program is certain to be

much higher than the coat of supporting a single staff collecting the same data by

mail. This would result in a substantial increase over current costs rather than

a decrease.

The proposal of Agribusiness ASSOCiates also recommends that a directory of

farms be established within the USDA through transfer of the agriculture census

mailing list from the Bureau of the Census to USDA. The directory would be

maintained by USDA and would be used primarily as a sample frame for the

surveys discussed above. This is not a viable proposal for under the strict con-
377

fidentiality proscriptions set forth in Title 13 of the U.S. Code, these records

cannot be made available to the Department of Agriculture. In view of the current climate, with regard to the need to maintain the confidentiality of information reported to the Census Bureau, it is unlikely that existing legal restrictions will be relaxed in order to release confidential information.

Timeliness of Census Results

The FAC contention that a data series developed by a non-using agency is

given only second or third priority in its work schedule is not true with regard

to the Bureau of the Census. Collection and publication of general-purpose data

is the Bureau’s bade mission. The Bureau is not the user of the Weekly Retail

* Sales report, the Housing Starts report, the Manufacturers’ Shipments, Inventories and Orders report or a host of other economic indicators; yet these series

are released by the Bureau on an extremely tight time schedule. Moreover, the

Bureau is constantly seeking to improve the timeliness of its census benchmark

reports.

It is important to note that USDA’s time schedule for its proposed sample survey to be conducted, in lieu of an agriculture census is inferior to that realised

by any recent agriculture census conducted by the Bureau. The plan proposed

by USDA requires 24-28 months from the reference period until the publication

of results.3 This proposal of USDA, coupled with the generally inferior utility

of sample estimates as compared with census results for small areas, is a step

backward.

The Committee’s observation that recent agriculture censuses have not been

released as promptly as those of earlier years does not give proper recognition

to a number of factors that should be considered when comparing census release

dates over time. One must not compare apples and oranges. For example, in the

earlier censuses, the content of the preliminary reports was more restricted than

that of the reports issued in the later census years. The 1939 preliminary county

reports consisted of roughly 3,000 pages, whereas the 1969 county census reports

consisted of about 24,500 pages. In addition, the 1989 census reports incIuded basically final, rather than preliminary data.

Because of changes being introduced here at the Bureau, we are releasing the

initial reports of the 1874 Census of Agriculture on a substantially better schedule than achieved in 1989. The release of the flint preliminary report from the 1974 census bettered, by several months, the 1969 schedule. More Significant, however, is that the reports should be released on a schedule fully comparable to

that achieved in the earlier censuses which issued more abbreviated preliminary

reports.

Our publication plans for the proposed 1978 Census of Agriculture call for a

further acceleration so that the initial publication of county reports would start

by October 1979 and be completed by March 1980. These publication dates would

provide results in a time period consistent with dates cited as desirable in the

FAC report.

Coverage and Coverage Improvement

The contention by FAC that “incompleteness in coverage by the agriculture

census and technological advances by the Statistical Reporting Service have

resulted in the SRS providing the more dependable national estimates” is an

assertion not documented by facts. Nowhere in the report are the technological

advances described. The report says nothing about the reliability of (SRS data

at the subnational level. Furthermore the report does not describe the degree

of undercoverage in the SRS surveys. In contrast to the Bureau of the Census,

which has provided measures of undercoverage in its censuses since 1945, SRS

does not publish information on the degree of undercoverage in its surveys, nor

on the sampling errors of its estimates. This definitely misleads the user about the

quality of SRS data.

If the universe to be covered by a census or survey can simply be defined as a

list of “known” units, (whether the list resulted from field canvasses or from

administrative records ) the coverage of the census or survey can be made as

complete as respondent cooperation makes possible. This would be the case, for

example, if the universe of a census or sample survey of agriculture were defined

to be those units listed in a farm directory. This is not presently the case in

agriculture surveys nor censuses! Rather, the universe is defined in terms of

all units which meet a combination of criteria based on acreage and value of

3 See footnote 1, page 374.
378

sales. Coverage thus depends upon identifying all units potentially within the

scope of the census or survey and obtaining correctly for each unit the information,

needed” to determine whether or not the unit satisfies the definition of a farm.

Since all censuses and surveys are subject to error on the part of enumerators

and respondents, complete coverage of the intended universe cannot be attained

with this kind of definition even with full respondent cooperation.

Despite the error inherent in all censuses and surveys, a combination of a

census and a superimposed independent sample survey can provide estimates

based on more complete coverage than the census itself even if the coverage of

the sample survey is inferior to that of the census. The combination of a check

survey with the census makes it possible to provide estimates of coverage with

sampling errors small enough to detect undercoverage of just a few percentage .

points in the census. However, the evaluation must be based on matching and”

comparison of data from individual farms in the check survey and the census.

It cannot be carried out merely by comparing aggregate statistics from the two

sources.

As indicated earlier, since the 1945 Census of Agriculture of the Bureau of the

Census has used this technique to evaluate the completeness of coverage of its

agriculture censuses with regard to the number of farms and land in farms and—

since 1964-also the value of sales. These evaluations have been carried out so

that Census Bureau can inform users of its data as to their quality, and to

provide the Bureau with information for improving future censuses. In future

censuses the agricultural census evaluation program will be expanded to develop

a better understanding of the coverage of marginal and non-resident operators.

Coverage Experience in Prior Censuses of Agriculture

Estimates from the evaluation study of the 1969 census indicate that there was.

a substantial increase in the number of small marginal economically insignificant

farms mimed compared to earlier censuses. These farms, although they account

for more than one-third of the total number of farms, account for only about

two percent of the total value of farm products sold. In fact, because of the generally poor quality of their records only a limited amount of data are published

for the small farms. Moreover, such farms cannot be realistically classified by

principal agricultural activity. Although the results of the 1974 census are not

yet available, it is felt that with better coverage of the larger, economically significant farms the coverage of farm production has been improved.

Differences between alternative survey and/or census approaches are to be

found primarily in the treatment of smaller and marginal farms. The allocation

of resources which should optimally be devoted to the coverage of smaller farms.

should be justified and determined on the basis of the data objectives of the

survey or census. Such decisions would differ for data about agribusiness and for

data about people and households in rural areas. While efforts are being made

to improve coverage of the small farms it is felt that the Bureau’s agriculture

census resources would be more effectively utilized by directing them toward

improved coverage of economically significant enterprises. Substantial improvement in the coverage of smaller and marginal farms can only be obtained through

a household survey approach.

The problem of how to improve coverage in the agriculture census has concerned the Bureau for some time. It was to correct this deficiency, rather than

to reduce costs, as claimed in the FAC report that the Bureau changed in the

1969 census from an enumerative field canvass to a mailout/mailback canvass.

Thus, the principal reasons for the change were to improve coverage of the large

significant farms; to improve the overall quality of results; and to reduce respondent burden. This change in technique will have important short and long

term benefits to the agriculture census program,

Censuses of agriculture, up through the census of 1964 had been taken by a

field canvass using personal visits by census enumerators. Past experience indicated that this methodology had a number of shortcomings, of which an increasingly significant one was caused by the increasing number of farms operated by

persons who do not live on the farms. This made it difficult for enumerators to

find nonresident farm operators during door-to-door enumeration and resulted in

farms being omitted from the census.

Another major complication that was expected to become more troublesome

was the large and growing number of agricultural establishments that are comprised of non-contiguous tracts of land. In many instances, separate tracts lie in

two or more enumeration districts, counties or even states. This caused enumerator assignment problems, and created uncertainty as to the land and agricultural
379

v

operations that should have been included. The result was that some land areas

were counted twice while others were omitted during the field operations and

in the data tabulations.

In addition, experience showed that enumerators tended to miss part of the

farms in their assigned districts, usually by failure to identify all the separately

operated tracts or by failure to cover all back roads and trails.

Other problems were the increasing scarcity of qualified enumerators, the

disappearance of clearly recognizable differences between suburban and rural

farm areas, and the increasing mobility of farm people, making it more difficult

for the enumerator to find the farmer at home. In addition, the increased diversity and complexity of enterprises engaged in agriculture activities coupled with

a rise in “nonrecognizable” agricultural businesses, such as agricultural services,

posed potentially serious problems in coverage of large farms. In 1966, when

systematic planning for the 1969 Census of Agriculture started, it was clear that

a basic change in data collection procedures-from an enumerative to a mail

approach-deserved serious consideration.

Use of Mailout/Mailback Procedures in Other Censuses

For the censuses of manufactures and mineral industries, retail and wholesale

trade, and service industries, the change to a mail census had been made successfully over a decade earlier, in 1948 for the Census of Manufactures and in 1954

for the Census of Business. For these censuses, a mailing list of establishments

having employees was prepared from IRS records of firms subject to payments

of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes, and census reports were

then collected by mail. In the Census of Business, in addition, data for “nonemployers” or zero-employee establishments were obtained directly from data

extracted from tax returns.

This change in economic census procedures, in addition to reducing the costs of

data collection and the burden on small respondents, resulted in coverage as good

as that resulting from an enumerator canvass. Coverage was probably improved

for certain types of “nonrecognizable” businesses, i.e., those operated from homes

or on an itinerant basis, and for businesses not in operation at the time of

enumeration.

‘In subsequent economic censuses, costs and reporting burden were further reduced by using administrative records to furnish data for the smaller employers.

In a roughly parallel fashion, self-enumeration had been used with satisfactory

results for a substantial part of the country in the 1960 Census of Population and

Housing, and the Census Bureau was already committed, based on extensive

research and testing of procedures, to use a mailout/mailback procedure for more

than half of the population in the 1970 census. Research in the 1950 and 1960

censuses had demonstrated that, in addition to reducing collection costs, selfenumeration could be expected to improve the quality of census data for small

areas by minimizing the influence of enumerators on the results. In the 1964 Agriculture Census, advance distribution of questionnaires, to be filled out and held

for the Census enumerator, had demonstrated that at least a substantial proportion of farm operators were capable of completing the questionnaires themselves.

Information About Persons and Households in Rural Areas

While we shall continue to be concerned with the socioeconomic characteristics

of farmers and farm families, this concern is not as closely related to a census of

agriculture as it was when the U.S. was an agrarian nation. The American Agribusiness Associates report cites the lack of information about rural people or

households as “the biggest single gap in the existing statistical system.” To close

this gap, the major household enumerative surveys conducted by the Bureau of

the Census best serve as a basis for a strengthened program of information about

people and households in rural areas.

For example, the Current Population Survey annually covers more than twice

the estimated number of households in rural areas than is covered by the enumerative surveys of the Statistical Reporting Service. The Census Bureau conducts

other large scale national enumerative sample surveys which also provide information about people and housing in rural areas, and could be utilized to provide

additional information not now collected if it were of interest to do so. An example

is the 250,000 household Survey of Income and Education to be conducted in the

spring of 1976. We believe it would be in the public interest, and efficient to the

Federal Government, for the Department of Agriculture to utilize Bureau of the

Census capabilities for conducting household surveys to obtain information about

rural households needed by the Department.
380

Mailing Ltst Development

Although mail enumeration should be less expensive (and more appropriate in

view of the changed nature of the agricultural enterprises) than the personal

interview technique, the mail method requires extensive mailing list development

and maintenance work in order to achieve full coverage without duplication.

We expect to improve coverage and accuracy by ezpanding our efforts %~tain

better mailing lists; by construct% a more preise mailfng regtster tl.mough

using administrative sources more eff-vely; by Ilnproting Unduplleatlon techniques; by address Ilnkage with the other economiccensusea; and @using a short

~recanvass form to hientify the type of operation of each tirm, which in turn will

reduce the respondent burden tlmm@ the subsequent use of specialized data

collection forms which pertain directly to the respondent’s type of agriculture

production. .

Other Proposals to Improve Coverage and Data

A shift in the reference year for the census of agriculture has been proposed.

l’his should lead to better classification and coverage of agriculture operations 4

of agribusiness firms and the establishment of a base for compiling data on the

integration of agricultural operations tith other economic enterprises. Additional benefits would include improvements to me accumcy of the Cknnmerce

Department’s GNP estimates. Much of the data obtained in the ensus of agriculture is economic in nature and these data are used In eornpiling the national

accounts.

If the data for the agriculture census are collected for the sa!ne reference year

as that of the economic censuses, there will be a universe list, which will permit

the transfer from one census to another of enterprises changtng their princfpal

activity subsequent to the preparation of the mailing list.

The result will be a complete and unduplieated, coor~nated, simultaneous and

consistent treatment of all major economic sectors of the United States economy

and will permit the unified planning and execution of the various census programs.

To accomplish the change over in an orderly manner, Iegbdation has been prepared proposing that the next two censuses of agriculture ,be taken on a 4-year

cycle. The 1978 agriculture census year would be 1 year later than the economic

censuses scheduled for 1977. The economic and agriculture censuses would be

for the same reference year in 1982 and thereafter. Thus, certain priority conflicts with the decennial census that occurred during the processing of the M189

Agricultural Census will be avoided.

In the event the proposal is not approved, priority conflicts with the 1980

demographic census wlll still be minimized for the Bureau has considerably

expanded its computer facilities for handling massive processing operations on a

concurrent baats.

Pr0p08ed Data Mvpansion

The increase of the corporate type fa~ in today’~ agriculture sector has

become a significant influence upon our agricultural activities.

/@or the 1974 census the Bureau requested increased funds to provide statistics

that are more descriptive of the activities of these corporatiorw These would provide a measure of the agricultural activity in which such firms are engaged, without consideration of other economic activities of the corporations. The tabulatloqs --

and publications would be developed from limited data collected in the 1974 census

precanvass matched to the general census data. An expansion of this program is

planned for the proposed 1978 census which would provide composite statistics

about these corporation% including other economic activities in which they are

engaged. 4

In addition to the above, the Bureau is proposing a program to link agriculture

and econmnic census data. This program will match and link suppllers and serv-
.

381

ices for the agricultural sector with the actual agriculture production, and, in

turn, the production with the processing and marketing of agricultural commodities. These data are essential to a better understanding of how changing

economic structures affect traditional agricultural production patterns. Linkages are proposed to both the other economic censuses and to the Bureau’s annual

Company Organization Survey. Such important linkages to economic census information could not be undertaken if another agency collected the agriculture

census data, because of confidentiality provisions under which the Census Bureau

operates.

The Census Bureau's Program of Fertilizer Statistics

Although not directly related to the agriculture census program discussed

above, the report of the Food Advisory Committee criticized the timeliness of

fertilizer data and recommended that studies be conducted and hearings held “to

determine ways, means, and costs of improving fertilizer information systems. ”

Monthly estimates of United States production and stocks of nitric acid, sulfuric acid, and ammonia and phosphatic fertilizer materials are published by the

Bureau of the Census about 30 working days following the close of the reference

month, Benchmark data for these products were published in the 1972 Census

of Manufactures. Product class data are published annually in the Annual Survey of Manufactures.

We believe the quality of the monthly fertilizer production data to be good.

Comparisons of the value of shipments estimates developed from the current

survey with the 1972 census results show a difference ranging from one to three

percent.

The monthly survey is continually monitored for coverage. The annual data

published on number of production establishments by state, is reviewed by industry which notifies us of any potential short-fall in coverage, Industry also

provides the Bureau with lists of all known producers. The chemical industry

also participates in an advisory capacity in the development of data categories.

The Bureau of the Census participated in the Fertilizer Task Force meeting in

August 1975, which was organized by the Economic Policy Board. In the course

of this meeting, possible improvements of Census fertilizer data were discussed,

including expanding manufacturing data, upgrading import and export product

content to include products collected in the monthly survey, and the possibility

of a retail stock survey to be conducted in the spring and the fall of each year.

While the Bureau of the Census is only one of many organizations that provide fertilizer data, it is actively seeking ways to improve its program.

Conclusion

The evidence is that the consolidation and integration of the quinquennial

censuses of agriculture, now conducted by the Bureau of the Census, into the

Statistical Reporting Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture would not

result in the gains in quality, timeliness, and reduction in costs to Government as

stated in the report. To the contrary—apart from the distrust that will inevitably be aroused in the user community by a merger of the independent data colU lection function with the data analysis and policy making function—there will

be a substantial rise in cost (unless offset by serious cutbacks in the amount of

data collected or in the level of geographic detail published) coupled with a deterioration in quality and timeliness of the results. We, therefore, strongly recommend that responsibility for conducting the census of agriculture remain with

the Bureau of the Census.

We also urge that the Department of Agriculture utilize ongoing Census Bureau surveys, and the Bureau’s capabilities for conducting large-scale household

surveys, to obtain needed information about people and households in rural

areas.

68–877 O—7&------25
Mr. J. R. Cordaro

Food Program Manager

Office of Technology Assessment

Congress of the United States

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Cordaro:

This is in reply to your letter of November 19 regarding the census of

agriculture program.

1. Total expected cost of the 1974 Census of Agriculture

It is necessary to establish the background to the 1974 census in order

to relate costs. Although the 1974 census followed essentially the same

procedures as used for the 1969 census, it was much more limited in scope.

The usual pretesting of new procedures and methodologies that precede a

census were not conducted. The 1974 census appropriation was for a period

15 months shorter than normal, the associated censuses of irrigation and

drainage were not included since they were conducted in 1969 and are

conducted only every 10 years, and follow-on surveys on farm finances,

horticulture, etc., were omitted. This abridgement occurred because of

the delay in receipt of the census appropriation and the limitations

placed on total expenditures. Taking the foregoing into consideration,

the cost of the 1974 census is expected to approximate $23 million

(exclusive of the October 1975 Pay Act and the December 1975 postage

increase). There have been no significant differences between the appropriations for FY 1974 and 1975 and actual obligations.

2. Costs for the proposed 1978 and 1982 Censuses of Agriculture

The cost of the proposed 1978 census is expected to be higher than the

1974, since the 1974 census was significantly abridged in timing and

scope. Since neither authority nor funding has been approved for staff

to begin planning the 1978 census, detailed plans and cost estimates are

not available at this time. Preliminary estimates indicate that the 1978

census, with the censuses of irrigation and drainage and the follow-on

surveys as included in the 1969 census, should be comparable to the

updated costs of the 1969 census. The 1969 census costs updated to current

postage, salary, etc., would approximate $35 million.
2

This would include continued activity directed toward expanding the

analytical information provided in the census by relating statistics on

agricultural production to other economic activities. The two primary

objectives in this expansion are: 1) to provide a measure of agribusiness

through tracing the vertical flow from those supplying materials and

supplies to the agricultural sector through the processing and marketing

of the agriculture connodities ; and 2) to expand a report being developed

for the first time for the 1974 census which will provide statistics on

corporate activity in agricultural production. In addition, the Bureau

will be evaluating new methods for collecting and processing the census,

exploring improved uses of administrative records available from other

agencies in order to reduce the reporting burden on the public and

improve timeliness of the data, and expanding the evaluation and

coverage programs for the census for use in planning improved systems

for future censuses. It is too early to develop any cost estimates for

the 1982 Census of Agriculture.

3. Status of collecting the 1974 data and issuing reports

The Bureau’s schedule calls for releasing preliminary county data reports

for all 3,100 counties between December 1975 and April 1976. We are

pleased to announce that the first reports have been sent to the printer

and should be available within the next several weeks. The complete

State reports are scheduled to be released beginning in April 1976.

If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to call.

Director

Bureau of the Census

[The following paper was requested from the Statistical Reporting

Service. U.S. Department of Agriculture by OTA:]

The Statistical Reporting Service appreciates this opportunity to comment for

the record of the Technology Assessment Board. National and worldwide economic and agricultural developments since 1972 have probably generated more

attention to and interest in the estimates and forecasts of the Statistical Reporting Service than at any time inthe102-vear history of agricultural estimates by

the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Statistical Reporting Service is the

primary fact -collecting and fact-reporting organization of the U.S. Department

of Agriculture and is responsible for National and State crop and livestock estimates and related statistical data and the coordination and improvement of the

U..S. Department of Agriculture’s statistical program.

One of the principal purposesof SRS is to present a picture of the current and

near-future supplies of agricultural products. For crops, the annual cycle of reports begins with farmers’ intentions to plant, followed by forecasts of planted

acreages. acreages intended for harvest, probable yields, and forecasted production. Estimates of acreages harvested, actual yields, and production are made at

the end of the season. Subsequently, reports on utilization, disposition, and value

are issued.

Livestock inventory numbers are published annually or semiannually. Seasonal

details on hog production, cattle on feed, and production of eggs, milk, and meat

are issued during the year in monthly and quarterly reports. Reports on breed-
384

ing intentions, farrowing, hatching, chick

provide indications of prospective market

dairy products and cold storage holdings

published on a regular basis.

placements, and calf and lamb crops

supplies. Estimates of manufactured

of agricultural commodities are also

Numerous associated statistics series are also reported: fertilizer use, number

and size of farms, farm labor and wages, prices received and paid by farmers,

grain stocks, honey, mink, mushrooms, naval stores, and weekly weather ‘and

crop bulletins.

In addition, an activity that has received an unusual amount of attention during the past three seasons is the Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin, which

includes estimates of relative progress of crop planting, development and harvest.

These reports have provided weekly monitoring of unusual situations such as

the planting progress during the extremely wet late planting season of 1973 and

crop development during the short-term drought conditions of 1974 and 1975.

An important condition for virtually the entire statistical output of the Agency

is that all estimates are based on current sample surveys and are not projections

or estimates based simply on an evaluation of history, trends, or non-surveyed

current developments. A unique feature of the Statistical Reporting Service

among the primary Federal statistical agencies is that virtually its entire output

of crop, livestock, and agricultural price statistics is released on a firm time

schedule. Time and date of each release is published in “Crop Reporting Board

Reports—Issuance Dates and Contents” which is distributed each December

preceding the calendar year to which it refers. Moreover, its current estimates

and forecasts during the growing season are typically released within 10 to 15

days after the collection of survey data.

Most of the major estimates and forecasts of the Statistical Reporting Service

are subject at completion of the marketing year to comprehensive data on sales,

marketing, movement and commodity usage which make it possible to rather

precisely measure the estimating and forecasting performance of the Agency.

The world food and economic situation in 1973, with substantially increased

demands for U.S. grain, contributed to abnormal economic stresses on the U.S.

livestock industry, primarily related to increased feed prices. As a result, there

was substantial speculation among the public and the livestock industry relating

to reductions in sizes and numbers of cattle on feed. The higher feed costs resulted in shifting practices for the feeding of grains and concentrates so that

long-standing relationships of cattle and hog inventories with disappearance and

slaughter data would not hold. As a result, the inventory estimates of the Statistical Reporting Service on hogs, cattle on feed, and cattle were subject to unusually

great scrutiny and question due to the general speculation that economic conditions should be forcing reductions of inventories. Speculation continued as the

relatively large estimated inventories were not subsequently followed by usual

patterns of livestock slaughter and disappearance. The record on slaughter and

marketing now confirms the probability sample based estimates of the Statistical Reporting Service and would tend to confirm the estimates of heavier weights

for cattle on feed, increasing cattle inventories, and greater reliance on roughage

for gains, with the gains extended over a longer period of time. This series of

events and conditions provided an unusual test of the estimating system of this

Agency. Without the sampling surveys and techniques employed by the Statistical Reporting Service to estimate cattle on feed and cattle and hog inventories,

the information available from utilizing common analytical procedures would

have misled the public substantially regarding livestock inventories.

.

-

The Crops Estimates Program of the Statistical Reporting Service also has

been subject to greater and more critical public interest and scrutiny than at any

time in the past. The program starts each year with a December forecast of the

following year’s winter wheat crop acreage and production, then moves through .

farmers’ intentions to plant major crop acreages as of January 1 and March 1.

Estimates of acreage planted to major crops are made as of July 1, Forecasts of yield per acre and production for major field crops are prepared throughout the growing season, starting with the December forecast of winter wheat

production. The forecasting schedule is heaviest June through October but continues for the later field crops and ends with December forecasts for cotton and

burley tobacco. Forecasts for cotton, corn, soybeans and winter and spring wheat

utilize objective yield surveys. These are probability samples of very small plots

randomly chosen and systematically placed in fields. The plots are visited

throughout the growing season with counts of plants and fruits and other observations made for characteristics which possess usable relationships to mature

yield.
385

The Statistical Reporting Service also prepares estimates quarterly of grain

stocks stored on farm and off-farm. Stocks on farms are measured by mailed

sample surveys and stocks off farms are the result of mailed surveys combined

with enumeration of important storage facilities. The resulting sample coverage for off-farm stocks ranges from 80 to 90 percent of the total. Stocks estimates

have been prepared quarterly as of July 1, October 1, January 1, and April 1 for

wheat, barley, oats, rye, flaxseed, corn, and soybeans, except that a September

estimate is prepared for soybeans which then are not included in the estimates

for October 1.

A description of recent achievements of the Statistical Reporting Service must

be prefaced by a review of major developments and achievements over the past

15 years. During this period, the methods, facilities and staffing of the Statistical Reporting Service have undergone revolutionary change and modernization

as the Agency was successful in obtaining resources and direction to proceed with

modern sampling techniques. In the early 1900’s, the Agency completed construction of an area sampling frame, stratified by land use and has relied substantially

on sample surveys from this frame each June and December to provide the

principal inputs into estimates of major crop acreages and livestock inventories.

The area sample frame provides an exhaustive record of all the land in the 48

States, classified by agricultural land use, and permits the selection of probability samples which totally assure that every acre of farm land and every

farm has a chance of selection in each sample. Its greatest value lies in the fact

that it is totally complete and that on the other hand, no elements in the population may be sampled more than once. This represents a substantial breakthrough

in the sample survey process which is not possible by the exclusive use of lists,

since it is impossible to evaluate lists to assure that no farm or operation is

included more than once. Additionally, it is well-known that no totally complete

list exists. Area samples have been most effective for producing precise estimates

for the major crop acreages. The system also produces estimates of livestock

numbers, but with sampling errors larger than for crop acreages. In 1970, the

Statistical Reporting Service was authorized to develop survey procedures which

would increase precision in its livestock inventory estimates. This project implemented what is known as multiple frame sampling. The procedure involves

enumeration of large samples drawn from lists of livestock operations, accompanied by enumerated samples from the area frame. Since no list is totally

complete, the area sample has been used to estimate for the incompleteness of

the list population sampled, thus assuring complete coverage for the survey

and an efficient information collection procedure. The coverage for multiple frame

livestock surveys done in June and December has gradually been increased over

the U.S. and in December 1975, the sample multiple frame estimates will cover

about 95 percent of the total U.S. inventories of cattle and hogs. Livestock inventory estimates for the residual States with inventories too small to warrant multiple frame surveys and representing about 5 percent of total inventories.

will utilize the December area sample survey. The mailed surveys long employed

for livestock estimates have been discontinued. This has permitted the Agency to

discontinue for livestock the old procedure of mailing inquires to large numbers

of livestock operators and utilizing response from those who voluntarily respond

in time to meet survey deadlines. The response to the enumerative surveys replacing these mailed surveys is much higher than for a mailed inquiry, and

approaches 100 percent.

A 1973 development of the Statistical Reporting Service was the establishment

* of a system for rapid review, and August 1 revision if necessary, of the July 1

estimates of acreages planted to major crops. The procedure is based on a

July update survey, a following subsample of the June Enumerative area sample

survey, This permits a letter indication of the outcome of plantings which were

reported for the June survey but may have still been intentions or not completed

at the time of the June survey. The update survey was especially important in

1973 for providing badly needed update information following the very wet plant.

ing season.

A significant development for the Statistical Reporting Service occurred in

1973, following enactment of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of

1973. The Act directed the Secretary to report weekly export sales outstanding

of major agricultural commodities and this responsibility was assigned to the

Statistical Reporting Service. The task was substantially one of logistics, requiring prompt reporting by exporters, rapid review of reported data, and a high

performance system for data processing, and rapid development and release of

weekly results. A highly automated review and processing system employing an

*

r

6S-877 O—7G26
386

interactive input-output system to a large computer was developed by the Agency

and employed operationally starting in October 1973. The Agency operated and

further improved this reporting system until it was recognized as a function of

the Foreign Agricultural Service and transferred to that Agency in December

1974.

Since 1970, an important continuing process of the Statistical Reporting Service

has been formal program evaluation in which the statistical output of the Agency

is examined for its relevance to current agricultural and economic needs and its

effectiveness in terms of quality of output. The Agency first examined its program

of crop estimates and as a result discontinued some crop estimates and forecasts

in some minor States and the frequency of forecasting for crops in States of

limited National importance. Subsequently, the Agency has reviewed the livestock estimates program and has made modifications similar to those for crops,

that is, the discontinuance of least needed programs of estimates and elimination

of estimates for some items in some States where the data possesses only minute

importance in the National picture. Since then, the Agency has also modified its 

program for fruit and vegetable estimates and is in the process of examining its

program of prices received and prices paid by farmers.

The final part of these comments will relate to discussions of some of the

Agency’s current needs.

One of the needs of the Statistical Reporting Service relates to greater protection of confidentiality for the data voluntarily supplied by the respondents

to its many mailed and enumerative surveys. The Agency has never in its history

of data collection committed a breach of confidence, and has been able to effectively guard these records with provisions of the regulations of the Department

of Agriculture. Nevertheless, new developments create the need for explicit

statutory protection of data from virtually all access except the use intended

by its collection. New legislation such as the Freedom of Information and Privacy

Acts and other laws which may be enacted in the future tend to focus public

attention on confidentiality. The promise of complete protection, including protection from subpoena by the courts not now provided by the Privacy Act, may

be necessary to achieve a high rate of voluntary response to surveys. In addition

such protection, which is already present in the law. Title 13, under which the

Bureau of the Census operates, would permit the Statistical Reporting Service the

potential of greater efficiency of operation by access to administrative records of

other Federal agencies. For example, the Statistical Reporting Service is barred

from even limited access to IRS records which would greatly enhance its efficiency

of sampling-yet the Census Bureau is granted such access for precisely the

same statistical purposes. The Statistical Reporting Service is currently proceeding within the Department of Agriculture to draft proposed legislation to seek

full statutory protection of survey data, and is hopeful that it will be quickly

introduced and enacted by Congress.

The Statistical Reporting Service, in its role as the primary Federal statistical

agency in the Department of Agriculture, provides reimbursable services to other

agencies in the Department of Agriculture for survey design and operation. These

activities are limited to what the Agency may undertake within its manpower

resources, There is general feeling that some of the statistical survey activities

by other Department of Agriculture agencies would be more effective if the

Statistical Reporting Service could perform the design and data collection for

them. The Agency’s current limitation on the amount of these survey activities

which it may accept is dictated primarily by manpower ceilings. To be more effective in providing agricultural survey services to other government agencies, the

Agency would require permanent provisions for adding and developing professional staff.

Finally, the rapid schedule of release for the agricultural statistics of the Statistical Reporting Service is not matched by a program of similar scope anywhere

else in the Government, but there nevertheless is tremendous pressure upon the

Agency to shorten the time periods from data collection to release of estimates.

It must be recognized that shortening the time periods for data collection and

several subsequent survey and estimating procedures would be too costly economically or would promote deterioration of a quality output. An area to which the

Agency attributes substantial potential for reducing time to release is in rapid

data transmission and an optimum system and facility for data processing.

Although the Agency has progressed substantially in equipping for and implementing these activities, it is in the process of seeking funds to proceed with a

nationwide adaptation to a common data processing system and network.
387

.

This completes the statement for the Statistical Reporting Service and we

again thank you for the opportunity to be included in the record of these hearings.

— .

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

Raleigh, N.C., December 5,1975.

Mr. EMILIO Q. DADDARIO,

Director, Office of Technology Assessment,

Congress of the United States, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. DADDARIO: I wish to report to you on the resolution passed by the

National Association of State Departments of Agriculture No. MT-15 on “Agricultural Data Systems” a copy of which, I understand, has been submitted to

your committee.

This resolution, which calls for the integration of agricultural statistics into a

single system, is of great importance to farmers because of the burden that is

being placed upon them to give reports to both the Department of Agriculture’s

Statistical Reporting Service and to the Bureau of Census. Evidence of this

showed up in our State these past months as a reaction against the U.S. Census

of Agriculture.

In addition and possibly of even greater importance is the fact that the U.S.

Census of Agriculture is now obsolete in view of the new methods of getting

farms and agricultural statistics through a sampling process which is employed

by the Statistical Reporting Service.

The size, specialization and ownership of farms has changed to the point where

it is no longer feasible to endeavor to make a canvass of all the farms in the

United States to get the information. Therefore, a new system such as that suggested by the American Agri-Business Association needs to be put into effect.

There are two other advantages that I would like to stress. First, the information will become available much more promptly when it is needed than has been

true with the Census for a long time. Second, when the data is collected in

cooperation with the State Departments of Agriculture, as is done by the Statistical Reporting Service, it is most advantageous and efficient from the standpoint of the time, work, and expense that is incurred.

I urge your committee to give favorable consideration and support to this resolution.

Cordially,

J AMES A. GRAHAM, Commissioner.

A GRICULTURAL D ATA S YSTE M

The complexities and rapid changes of modern agriculture have a great impact

on farmers, the agri-business industry, and consumers. Effective planning and

management of all phases of agriculture require statistical information with

great detail, timeliness and accuracy. State Departments of Agriculture in

cooperation with the Statistical Reporting Service have demonstrated that joint

use of resources and personnel can minimize duplication and maximize efficiency

of State and Federal agricultural statistics programs. Some overlap in the agricultural data programs of the Statistical Reporting Service and the Bureau of

Census is resulting in inefficiencies and duplication of statistical services that

adversely affect the quality of the total agricultural data system. A detailed

report entitled “New Agricultural Data System Needed” has been developed by

American Agri-business Association. The report reviews the total agricultural

statistics program including the agricultural census and makes specific recommendations for improving agricultural data at the local, state and national levels.

RESOLVED, that the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture in convention at Charleston, West Virginia, October 9, 1975, endorses and

pledges to work with the United States Department of Agriculture, Congress and

the Executive Branch of the United States Government to implement the recommendations of the American Agri-business Associates as a means of effectively

improving agricultural data through the implementation of a combined Federal

statistical system built upon the existing Federal-State cooperative programs,
388

T HE STATE OF FL OR IDA,

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

Tallahassee, Fla., January 2, 1976.

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY A SSESSMENT ,

Congress of the United States,

Washington, D.C. 90510,

(Attention Mr. J. B. Cordaro, Food Program Manager).

GENTLEMEN : I am writing to you on behalf of a resolution passed by the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA) at Its annual

convention in Charleston, West Virginia last fall relative to the agricultural

census system.

I have enclosed a copy of this resolution entitled Agricultural Data System ‘

(MT-15). You will note in the resolution that NASDA is very much interested in

developing an effective system of securing accurate agricultural statistical information based on existing Federal-State cooperative programing.

For many years complaints have been received from our farmers on the volume

of work that had to be done regarding agricultural census and the fact that such

census programs took so much time, that some of the statistics were useless, and

that it took so long to get the facts and figures the census was supposed to

acquire.

The NASDA office and its many allied state members have had a very successful relationship with the Statistical Reporting Service. Our past programs with

that office have indicated that we were able to get out more useful information

faster and much more accurately. The probability sampling approach has been

perfected and is far superior as it relates to accuracy and timeliness than any

other system of census taking used in the past.

We feel that the advantages of working with State Departments of Agriculture through our Washington office will enable the United States Government to

get the census of all agricultural activities in greater detail, in speedier time,

and on a more truthful level.

We endorse the concept proposed by the NASDA resolution and offer our complete support in pursuing and reaching the goals of the most effective agricultural data reporting system possible.

With warm personal regards, I am,

Sincerely.

DOYLE CONNER Commissioner.

A GRICULTURAL D ATA S YSTEM

The complexities and rapid changes of modern agriculture have a great

impact on farmers, the agri-business industry, and consumers. Effective planning and management of all phases of agriculture require statistical information with great detail, timeliness and accuracy. State Departments of Agriculture

in cooperation with the Statistical Reporting Service have demonstrated that

joint use of resources and personnel can minimize duplication and maximize

efficiency of State and Federal agricultural statistics programs. Some overlap .

in the agricultural data programs of the Statistical Reporting Service and

the Bureau of Census is resulting in inefficiencies and duplication of statistical

services that adversely affect the quality of the total agricultural data system.

A detailed report entitled “New Agricultural Data System Needed” has been

developed by American Agri-business Association. The report reviews the

total agricultural statistics program including the agricultural census and makes

specific recommendations for improving agricultural data at the local, state and

national levels.

RESOLVED, that the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture in convention at Charleston, West Virginia, October 9, 1975, endorses and

pledges to work with the United States Department of Agriculture, Congress

and the Executive Branch of the United States Government to implement the

recommendations of the American Agri-business Associates as a means of

effectively improving agricultural data through the implementation of a combined

Federal statistical system built upon the existing Federal-State cooperative

programs.
389

FEBRUARY 18, 1876.

Mr. DOYLE C ONNER ,

Commissioner, Department of Agriculture, The State of Florida,

Tallahassee, Fla.

DEAR C OMMISSIONER C ONNER : I appreciate very much your sending me a copy

of the resolution passed by the National Association of State Departments of

Agriculture at its annual convention in Charleston, West Virginia.

I know that you would be interested in some of the work we are doing on

our food information systems project. For this reason, I send you a copy of two

papers that we have had prepared for this assessment to help us in judging the

options that we will be presenting to the Congress on the issue related to

whether the Bureau of Census’ agriculture activities should be incorporated

into the Department of Agriculture. The papers were prepared by Dr. Harry

Trelogan and the Bureau of Census.

Again, my thanks and appreciation.

Sincerely,

J. B. CORDARO,

Food Program Manager.

[The following paper was requested from Mr. Frazier by OTA:]

STATEMENT OF F RANK F RAZIER PRESIDENT , AMERICAN AGR IBUSINESS ASSOCIATES ,

INC., McLEAN, VA.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS : FOOD, AGRICULTUBE, AND NUTRITION

The Office of Technology Assessment has rendered an invaluable service in

pointing the way toward improved information systems for food, agriculture,

and nutrition, by developing the twelve recommendations in the June 1975

report to their Food Advisory Committee.

This view is strengthened by comments on the report in papers presented by

Dr. Don Paarlberg, Director of Economics for the U.S. Department of Agriculture; Dr. Harry C. Trelogan, until recently the Administrator of USDA’s

Statistical Reporting Service; and by the Bureau of Census of the Department

of Commerce.

However, a review of the papers presented by Dr. Trelogan, and by the Bureau of Census, reveals a sharp difference of opinion as to the type of administrative structure needed for improving current information systems. Both agree

new statistical tools are now being used that upgrade the accuracy of agricultural data. The Bureau of Census uses some in current sampling techniques

to replace the enumerative field canvas used prior to 1$69.’ And the Statistical

Reporting Service uses recently developed multiple frame sampling techniques

to reduce the standard error for @rep and livestock estimates from two to one

percent.’

Congress has recognized the need to expand the utilization and implementation

of these new statistical ‘tools, and included $1,225,000 in USDA’s 1975 appropriation to be used in compiling a list of names essential for multi-frame probability

samplings

Significantly, the effect of the implementation of improved probability sampling methods, is crop and livestock statistics that surpass the quality of census

data.’ No longer, therefore, is census data needed to true up the accuracy of

USDA’s crop and livestock estimates. This gives rise to the charge that a continuation of the Census of Agriculture on the present pattern is a waste of

time, effort, and money:

Since new statistical tools have already made data systems of former years

archaic, information systems should now be updated to today’s data needs,

utilizing the economy and efficiency resulting from the improved statistical

techniques which have proven effective.

Such a system could result from combining into a single administrative unit,

a program of sample surveys that would integrate the present data being collected by SRS and the Bureau of Census.’ This approach should more ade1 Census, p. 12.

Trelogan, p. 11.

s Trelogan, p. 11.

f Paarlberg, p. 4.

5 Trelogan, p. 7.

6 Trelogan, p. 1.
390

quately meet the needs of public and private decision makers, and also save

$1,600,000 annually in federal funds.’ Logically, the new system should ‘be

located in the Statistical Reporting Service, to which Congress has appropriated

over 75 percent of current budget for agricultural data.8 This agency has been

out in front in developing and using improved statistical techniques. It competes for resources only with other agricultural services, rather than with all

other statistical programs of the entire federal government.

Even so, the Bureau of Census anticipates that the integration of agricultural

data systems, as proposed, would lead to a number of difficulties.

The Bureau claims to be an “independent agency,” and for this reason should

continue collecting “benchmark data.”9 The validity of such a claim is questionable. In USDA the collection of data in SRS is separated from the analysis of

data by ERS. And why have “benchmark data” from Census, if they are using

USDA surveys to help assure its accuracy?10

The Bureau claims failure to accept their views on the organization structure for data collection will lead to user “distrust,” a substantial rise in data

cost, and a deterioration of data quality and timeliness.11 While a full scale

feasibility study has not been made to either document or refute these charges,

certain realities should not be overlooked. No agency in government has achieved

a better reputation for safeguarding the confidentiality of data than SRS. Their

officials go through “lockup” procedures several times a year. In the absence

of the proof of any wrong doing, for any agency that releases agricultural

data only once in the years to imply SRS officials are not to be trusted is both

invalid and irresponsible.

The Bureau’s claim that an integrated data system would result in a substantial rise in data cost not only is not documented, but it seems to completely discount the extensive experience of SRS with budgets involving multiple frame sampling . . . the technique now used for hog estimates in 23 states

covering 96 percent of the population, and for cattle estimates in 38 states covering 96 percent of the population.12 SRS claims the integrated system will result

in a substantial saving , . .$36 million in contrast to $37.6 million annually

for USDA crop and livestock estimates and the Census of Agriculture.13

The Bureau claims timeliness would be adversely affected by an integrated

data collection system.” Such a claim can hardly be accepted at face value when

SRS announces a year in advance the date and the hour reports are to be

released giving data collected, only a few days previously, and then meets

the deadline. On the other hand, the Bureau of Census released reports on the

1969 agricultural census two to three years after the data was gathered. True,

after the 1873 hearings on S.J. Res, 95, before the Senate Post Office and Civil

Service Committee, the Bureau of Census promised to mend its ways.

The Bureau claims the FAC Report indicating SRS provides more dependable

national statistics are not documented.15 However, Dr. Trelogan cites the research

of Professor H. O. Hartley, Texas A & M University, as the basis for improved

statistical accuracy through the application of two sampling frames.16 Dr. Trelogan indicated SRS, by increasing to a 25 percent sample, could obtain county

data comparable in accuracy to that of the agricultural census.17

The Bureau claims Title 13 of the U.S. Code prohibits sharing the agricultural -

census mailing list with SRS.18 If it is proper to protect the confidentiality of

information in this way, then the law should be broadened to restrict access of

one federal agency to the classified information of another. However, in many

instances it may well be in the public interest for agencies to share such information and, therefore, perhaps Congress should modify the unique privilege restricted to the Bureau of Census.

The Bureau makes reference to a considerable expansion of computer facilities for handling massive processing operations on a concurrent basis.19 Since

many agencies now share computer facilities, there is no reason to believe adequate computer services could not be made available or transferred to SRS.

T Trelogan, p. 28,

8 Trelogan, p. 28. 0 CensuR. D. 1. 10 Paarlberg, ~. 4. 11 Census, P. 2.

~ Trelogan, p. 10.

la Trelogan, p. 28.

14 Census, p. 2.

15 Census, p. 2.

~ Trelogan, p. &

17 Treloean. p. 23.

~ Census, p. 3.

10 Census, p. 4.
391

*

The Bureau is to be commended for suggesting a proposed program for linking agriculture data with economic data, as well as with other censuses and

their Company Organizations Survey.20 But this undertaking should be approached with great care, because of the structural changes emphasized by both

SRS and the Bureau of Census. No longer is a system of food production located

in its entirety on a farm. For example, since the late nineteen forties, SRS has

obtained information from hatcheries (an off farm source) as to the number of

meat type chickens grown on farms. Nor are food production scheduling decisions

necessarily made by farmers. In the broiler industry, they are geared to the

financial resources of integrators, who contract with growers. Congress should

not permit legal technicalities, or out of date laws to prevent the coordination

among federal agencies that is essential to updating services to conform to the

changing needs of users of their services.

In summary, recommendation number four in the FAC Report, calling for

Congressional study of the transfer of the agricultural census into the Statistical

Reporting Service, merits prompt implementation to determine the legislation

needed to bring about such an integration of agricultural data systems. Paradoxically, SRS by utilizing new statistical tools has improved data quality to the

point that “benchmark data” from the agricultural census is no longer needed.

This progress should be applauded and enthusiastically supported. But instead,

it seems to be overshadowed by an unfortunate jurisdictional rivalry that may

thwart the adoption of the improved system recommended, which is so urgently

needed by both public and private data users.

Beyond the question of who is to administer agricultural data systems, is the

data needed to guide decisions, public and private, affecting food production

and consumption. The twelve recommendations in the FAC Report all merit the

careful and continued consideration by the Congress. Information system

failures, such as experienced in 1972–73 with feed grains and many other commodities, illustrate emphatically the political pressures that are triggered by

economic pressures growing out of decisions based on inadequate information.

In the future, to guard against compounding difficulties caused by the lack of

such information, the Office of Technology Assessment has a unique and challenging opportunity to give real leadership. Significantly, the Office of Technology Assessment is the only point in the nation’s government to which American

agriculture can turn, that transcends jurisdictional boundaries of both Congressional Committees and federal agencies.

[The following paper was requested from Dr. Epstein by OTA:]

STATEMENT OF D R E DWARD S. EPSTEI N, ASSOCIATE A DMINISTRATO R, ENVIRO NMENTAL M ONITORING AND P REDICTION , NATIONAL O CEANIC AND A TMOSPHERI C

A DMINISTRATION . U.S. DEPARTMENT OF C OMMERCE

WEATHER INFORMATION FOR ASSESSING CROP PROGRESS

v Agricultural productivity has always been sensitive to fluctuations in local

weather and regional climate. As global food reserves have decreased, and

demand rises, natural weather and climate variability plays an increasingly

important role in agricultural production and planning. Since 1972, the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has taken several steps to

improve its daily weather advisories to farmers, its weather-yield modeling research, and the content of its data publications. This report emphasizes summarization and publication of weather data that relate to crop progress during

the growing season. It also gives a brief introduction to N0AA’s new weatheryield modeling research.

The principal relevant NOAA periodical is the “Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin”, coedited and published by NOAA’s National Weather Service and the Department of Agriculture's Statistical Reporting Service.21 The NOAA office is

W Census. p. 4.

z publication of u-s, weather data rela~n to Crop progress can be traced back to 1872.

when a general 2-vage “Weekly Weather ~hronicle” was started by the Army Signal

Service. In 18$?7, the newly named Signal Corps began publishing a “Weather and CroP

Bulletin” weekly during the growing season and monthly during the rest of the year.

In 1924. the current title. “Weekly Weather and C!roD Bulletin”, was adopted by the

I)eDartment of Agriculture which included the Weather Bureau. Wlwn the Weather

Bureau was transferred to the Department of Commerce in 1940. the publication became a

cooperative effort jointly supported by funds appropriated to each Department.
392

located in Room 1137, South Agriculture Building. In addition to its editorial

duties, the NOAA office monitors cumulative weather developments, provides

monthly briefings for Department of Agriculture officials, and provides data and

consultation to Agriculture agencies for planning and operating national programs dealing with the production of food and fiber. As an example, in early 1973,

cumulative weather analysis showed that much soybean planting would be significantly delayed due to very wet fields. Accordingly, Agricultural officials increased

acreages allowed for soybeans and a record harvest was realized.

The Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin is released each Tuesday noon throughout the year. Each issue contains precipitation and temperature data and narrative weather and crop summaries for each state and the nation. Circulation has

nearly doubled since 1972 and is now about 5,300 copies. In response to the growing concern about the global food situation, NOAA began in February 1874 to

prepare world maps of precipitation and temperature. These maps are published

in the Bulletin—usually the third issue of each month. The maps show the distribution of the past month’s average monthly temperature and total precipitation and departure from normal for the major agricultural areas of the world.

Accompanying the maps is a narrative World Agricultural Weather Summary

written by a specialist in the Foreign Agricultural Service. A recent issue of the

Bulletin, including the world maps and summary, is appended to this report.

The Bulletin’s monthly summaries permit only a general and somewhat delayed

assessment of global crop situations. To achieve more timely information, NOAA

specialists recently have written and are now refining complex computer programs

that produce cumulative weekly statistics from conventional 6-hourly coded

weather observations. Previously these data, long exchanged internationally, were

discarded once used in preparing the next sequence of forecasts. This activity is

taking time because of variations in coding practices and limitations of telecommunications facilities in some parts of the world. However, with the cooperation

of the World Meteorological Organization, we are making progress in overcoming

the difficulties and are already producing preliminary computer printouts of

weekly global weather data for two to three thousand stations for use by Agriculture and NOAA specialists. If current progress is maintained, we may be able

to realize accurate data consistently enough to justify publication of weekly data

for selected foreign areas beginning during the spring of 1976.

We have also made progress in estimating accumulated precipitation from

daily NOAA satellite imagery. Such satellite interpretation has been used to help

analyze the extent of drought conditions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic

during the first half of 1975 for the Department of State (AID). Satellite imagery is also an important source for information NOAA has been furnishing

weekly this year to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) headquarters in

Rome on monsoon rains over the Asian subcontinent. This information is being

furnished at the request of FAO and is responsive to a resolution of last November’s World Food Conference which called for establishment of a Global Information and Early-Warning System on Food and Agriculture.

NOAA, along with NASA and the Department of Agriculture, is participating

in the Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment (LACIE). The Experiment uses

satellite data (LANDSAT and eventually NOAA environmental satellites) and

surface meteorological data in a coordinated manner to explore new ways of estimating wheat production. Initial systems development and test is on North American winter and spring wheat crops. A major part of the current NOAA-LACIE

effort is to develop weather-wheat yield models. Where the data are reliable, yield

estimates derived from these models are already comparable to official USDA

wheat yield estimates produced by conventional methods, when areas as large as

several states are considered. In October of this year, LACIE is scheduled to begin

tests to determine the capabilities to go global in scope. Wheat production (acreage and yield ) will be determined in sample areas in several wheat producing

countries. At each stage of the experiment, NOAA results are provided to Department of Agriculture and NASA for study and evaluation.

The yield modeling research is being led by NOAA’s new Center for Climatic

and Environmental Assessment, established in November 1974. The Center is

rapidly developing two important applied climatological capabilities: (1 ) assessing impact of weather events on major crop areas as a particular growing season

proceeds, and (2) interpreting long-term impacts of growing season weather in

terms of variability of future yields. Most of the Center’s applied research is

being carried on in Columbia, Missouri, while a room for providing briefings on

current crop-weather situations has been set up in a NOAA facility in the Georgetown section of Washington, D.C.
393

A

u S DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Nat!onal Ocean&c and Atmospheric Admm!strat,on

U S DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Statwt!cal Rep.xtlng Service

Volume 62, No. 33 Washington, D.C Aug. 19, 1975

NATIONAL WEATHER SUMMARY

For the Week of August 11.17
394

2 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin Aug. 19, 1975

DEPARTURE OF AVERAGE TEMPERATURE FROM NORMAL (“F)

through the Plains and upper Mississippi Valley California . Strongest act i\. i ty , however, focused

touched off storms , mostly in upper Michigan on the Northeast , Southeast , and centra 1 part s

through southern Wisconsin and northern Illinols of the Nation .

7
395

Aug. 19, 1975 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin 3

NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL SUMMARY

For the Week of August 11-17

Highlights : Beneficial rain was received ove r

much of the Corn Belt aiding row crop development, however moisture shortages are still causi ng stress 1n northern port i ins of tlle North Cen -

tral area . Corn and so} bean~ continue to progres s

ahead o f both 1974 and norma 1 I n mo~ t St ates

Sprlnc wheat harvest made excellent progress a~

combl n ing passed the one- th 1 rd mar k

SILALL GR~lliS : Harvest of small grains continue d

to make Kood progress, but behind last year’s

excellent pace in nearly all areas .

Winter ~heat combining edged closer to%ard

windup as favorable conditions prevailed in tbe

northern States , the only areas with acreage no t

yet harvested . AS o: August 17tb, 91? of th e

crop was harvested , much be bind last year’ s

excel lent progress . Rains interrupted combining

in Montana .

Spl. ing wheat harvest advanced rapidly in mos t

major States and by August 17th, 35? of the 197 5

crop was harvested , much behind 1974 leve 1 .

Combining was neari n~ cmnple tl on in South Dakota ,

4!37 done in Ni “nesota , 24% 1n NoI. th Dakota , an d

57 i n Montana .

Oat harvest cOnt 1nucd to move northward WI t b

807 of the Wisconsin crop harvested. 757 1n bot h

\!ich~ gan and ![1 nnesota , and 36? z n North Dakota .

Prcparat lon of f ie 1 ds for seeding th IS f a 11 ‘s

wheat was ahead 01 usual in I llino Is and fndiana ,

but behx nd schedule I n Ohio .

CDRN : Rains eased stress in many parts of the

Corn Belt during the week, but above norma l

tempera tures kept t op~oi 1 moisture 5U PP 1 les

Sbort i 01. 31UC h of ttlc a 1 ea .

1 n the North Centra 1 S La tes, corn de vc 1 opmcnt

cent i nued to progre a t a steady. pace ahead o f

1 ast year and normal i n near] y a 11 States . Corn

was i n most 1 ~. good to exce 1 lent condi tion I n

11 llnols , whl le growin K condi t ions 1n 1 o%a we re

onl y f a ir . In Illinois , 5 3

<

< of the crop *as I n

the dent stage versus only 5% in 1974 and 19?

avc rage . 1 a a corn was 307 in tbc dent 1ng stage ,

double the 1974 rate 3w, of Indiana crop I$as

a Isc) den ted or beyond , whl Ie 20C of Ohio corn

had reached t bls s Cage . Corn on 1 I gh t soi 1s

1 n hiscons in was s t 111 under severe stress anc!

dry weather 1n lllnncsota cent 1nucd t<> dimlni S5

prospect s .

Corn ttcvel OP . nt I n 1.( ntuc) v I <,,1a 1 197,! and

was S1 I #ht 1 y ahead of average , while in Tennesse e

de \,e 1 opmcnt has ahead of 1974 and behind a ve rage .

cOTTON : Cot ton cent 1 nuc~ to make favorable

progress I n NO? t ma I or States , howcve r insect s

a rc hea vy i n many a 1 ea~ and arc causing damage.

Cot ton in the Texas Black lands and South Cen -

t ral was rapidly reaching naturi t y . Harves t

was de layed in the Coasta 1 Bvnd and Love I. RIO

Grande Val Iey, but lw~u?ed by the weekend . 1 n

Miss Issi ppi , cotton wa~ LI> f a 1 r cond I t Ion an d

93? of t hr C1. Op bad SC t bol 1s . I[cavy 11 u I t 1nx

c’on t I nued i n trkansas , bu t I?ost f 1<1 ti5 uc w

pa5 t peak . TIIc Oklafio, m crop ua~ 5J!<, sc t t IIIK

bol 1 s , S8,, I n Tc”,,c, +<<,<, 9 !’, In 1 laha(ta and 95<;

111 L<>u 1s L nna .

Cot ton uas in f al r conti I t 10!) III hcu W A I LU anb

,)111 \, n S-lal 1 p{, l. L,rllta JL, uf t,l{ h[,l 1s were, ope nIIIK . C., 1 I 101 nla ‘s la tc crop uas bl oomlnq an d

5( tt 1,, < 1><> 115 .

~LlrTS ,iND NuTS : Peach ha rvcs t I ng ua+ art I v e

I n sc VQ t a 1 NO I the rn States and neari nc complv -

t 10n in most sou them areas . EaI.1 y a pplcs were

s i zing we 11 and harvest ga I ned mumen tun . Cl trus

trees i n Texas benef i tted f ro!n recent ra infa 11

and groves *erc z n excc 1 lent condlt i on in F1 orida .

Pecans were i n fair to good condl tl on i n Gcorgla

but ye 1 low apb Ids and we bwornls %e re caus I ng

problems I n Rol llng Pla ins , Texas. Almond ha rvest wa s underuas. in Ca 1 I fern la . 1 n Oregon,

the walnut and filbert crops look gond .

VEGETABLES : Sweet corn and snap bean harvest s

cent 1nue in Ncw York . Torlat o harvest uas heav y

in Maryland , Pcnnsyl vanla , \’ I rgi nla and \llchigan.

I n \$ashington , broccoli , bush bean, caul i f 1 ouer ,

cucumbe r , mel on , suee t corn and tona t o harvest s

continued . Canta loup harvest was i n ful 1 ?wing

in Cal 1 fern ia , but harvest of broccol I , caul i -

f lower , carrots , and le t tuce was S1 owe r . Car -

rots , cucumbers , canta 10UPS , onions , peas , an d

wa te rme ions were bc I ng harvested i n Texas .

Land prcparatl on uas act I ve i n F1 ori da for Septcmbe r plant ings .

PASTURES AND LIVESTOCK . Pastu r<s and ranges

cent inued to de t<, r I ornte t broughout much of the

Xa t 1on except tlle South Cc nt ra 1 wht r<> abov e

no) ma 1 prec I PI tat Ion Cent I nues t u a 1 d IIC>U K1o N th .

Stock wa tcr IS yet t I ng short I n se vc i a 1 areas oi

Ar 170na , Ca 1 if o] nla , and Utah, u hi 1< I I rr dangc:

IS lnc r6as1 ng ln sc vera 1 of t he Westc rn Sta tes .

Cat t le cent lnue I n most 1 y good condl t lon through -

out most of the Nat lon and supple mcnta 1 fecdi nfz

was nlnlmal .

SOYBEi NS : Prospects for thls year ‘s soybea ”

crop are more enc Ouraglng as ra~ n tel 1 os cr

much of the ma.1 or Krov lng area during the pas t

ueek . DCVC lopment of the crop cent lnucs atlead

of 1974 and nor,nal i n most Sta tes .

I n tbc Norti) Ccntra 1 States , soi 1 nolsture i s

s t 111 rated short ln , (any a reas , hot$evc r , rece ”t

ra lns wi 11 ald ln pod i 111 lng . Pod se ttlng ln

both 111 i nols and I oma reached 922 ; 1 W. of the

crop had leaves turnl ng ye 11 ow ln 111 i nols an d

87 I n Iowa ; a 11 stages were Tuch ahead of bot h

1974 and average . E lscwhc re I n tile Region , pod

set tlng ranged from 60? I n !IISSOUI. I t C> 95’. in

\llnncsota .

Soybeans ir,lpl, oved I n Kentucky and were ~ood

to C,(CC 11 c nt 1 n Tcnncsscc . 111 Wissl S>l ppl , <5’<

of the crop was p ,ddl n~ and i n Arkansas early

beans were blooming and sc t t Inc pods , wh I lC

late kans r,ere bloomln K

OTHIR CROPS: Sorgbum :Iarvcs t in Texas at 4P%

cent inued ahead of hotll 1974 and avc, raE .

Deve 1 opment 01 t hj ~ year ‘s crop %a5 ahead o f

normal and 1974 i n mos t ma,]or St a ! c? .

FI ur-cured t obacco wa, 951 ha, vcs tcc, ,n

Ge 01, RIa , 8S’. 1 n South Ca I ,,1 I “a . 54<, I 3> ho, t:>

La 101 I na and 2 i’, I n t’1 i,gi ma . Ra, na a Idcd

t h{, c rop in KC n tucky, u ,e rt, 33’ uf t,:< BU 1 lc,},

<t op lab becnt t oppco . Tobacco hill, V< ‘ t \ t., I tcti

I n TC nncssce , but Ullcb, rll :1 “v t 1 w 111 5 1“ u

pl. of!ll >9.

P<)t.1 t ,)<, S ill A ,005 t ook C,,unt y , \la in< al,c gl ou1]1: S1OW1 Y and sub~t ant la 1 i aII15 WI 1 1 b<,

11< cd< d <1) a 1 d > 1 ( 1 d+ l)< f <>, < [hit 1 vest . III Idaho ,

20’, of t Ihe 1 IC, 1 ds Wc,le turnln K col 01. , much

bchl nd la% t vear ‘s 40’, .

,,\hi tc m{,l d I+ { a“s~”g crm{ or!, t [1 p< 31111 t

crower? 111 --v \<, ,.a 1 Sta t~+ . Thv crop con t znuc,~

I n most 1 ) g,,od condi t I on ln nest art, as .
396

—4 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin Aug. 19, 1975

#

Temmrature attd Frsx itation Data for the Week End& Mid ght, ld.tw Aug. 17, 1975

Temperature “F

re. ipimti

Inches

Temperature ‘F

precipitation

Inchws

Precipltati<

Inches

I

:

s

:

8

+ ,3

-1 0

7

--- -

- - -

.2

,7

--- -

- ,6

- ,1

.3

.6

.1

,1

+2 2

1

0

.3

0

0

+ .2

0

0

0

● 1.4

,2

+1, 3

.5

.6

0

-1 4

-1 2

, ,:

.5

+ 3.5

+ 4

.9

- 1$

-1,0

, . 8

,4

i

,6

,4

.1

,2

.1

0

.1

.1

2,2

.4

0

1.7

2

,2

1.6

1,2

,6

.7

2.1

3

,7

,6

1,7

,5

2

,:

,5

,9

g

:

:

0

1

0

2

+ 5

+ 3

4

3

. -

3

2

2

0

* 1

1

3

1

2

2

1

0

0

2

+ 1

, 1

0

, 2

, 3

0

7

:

L 4

z

a

:

;

- ,5

,7

-.

-;

-, 6

- . 4

+ ,3

,7

--- -

- .6

- .3

.6

- ,4

- 2

- .:

. s

.5

8

- ,4

- .6

.6

+1::

.8

*1.4

.3

+1 o

.3

1

3

.2

0

6

,1

+ 3

.1

1

+ :3

* .1

,2

1

:4

.1

,1

,1

.1

,6

+ .3

.3

.4

+ ,3

.5

.9

+

::

.4

.7

+ .2

0

.2

+ 1.1

+ 1.0

, 1.5

- . 3

2

:

1.

Tz

.5

2, 1

,;

.4

T

.3

.5

1,2

.6

.7

1,2

2 3

.2

T

;

.1

6

.5

.3

1,6

::

4

4

1.2

2.s

o

.!

0

T

3

,1

1,5

.1

.s

1.4

.1

T

T

.:

.1

T

2::

.2

1.0

1,5

- - -

:;

,2

.1

0

.1

2.5

3 5

3.3

2.0

1.3

T

.5

.3

.1

.3

.1

,2

55

:<

IA .Sato. Rouse. . 82

Lake Chmrle8 . 83

New Orleans . . . 82

Shreveport. . . . 82

SA1N2 .Caribou . . . 68

Portland . . . . 70

KD. aaltinore. . . 79

MASS .So8ton . . . 75

Chatham . . . . . 70

MICH .Alp8na . . . . 68

~troit . . . . . 73

Flint . . . . . 71

0,.”4 Rapids . . . 71

ISourbton Lake . . 67

Lansing . . . . . 89

Marquette . . . 69

Huakegon. . . . . 71

S. ste. Marie . . 66

. . .

. . .

+1.5

-, 1

+1.5

- ,2

0

● .3

1

+ ,1

+4

+ ,2

- ,1

0

+ .3

)1.6

- .5

- .9

.1..s

-1.3

- .8

b ,1

0

., 1

+1.0

.3

,4

. .4

.3

, .8

,2.1

.5

.1.3

. 4

.7

. 2

0

. 4

. 5

.9

1

1 0

2

5

- .7

.4

,4

.3

.2

1:;

.1,2

,2

.5

- - -

,:

0

0

.1

0

:,:

2.5

1.2

.7

.7

1

:3

0

.1

0

1.:

ALA:~;;~~nCham .

. . . .

Mmtconery.

ALASKA, Anchorage.

Sar!’ou. . .

Fair b.nks .

JUne.u . . .

Kodiak. , .

Nrne , . . . . .

AISIZ .Flagstaff .

Phoentx . . . .

Tucson. . . .

Wi”slm . .

80

83

83

. - -

- -

60

: 55

. - -

, 54

63

: 90

84

. 74

91

80

81

: 85

54

76

: 71

. 77

69

: 61

73

. 68

. 74

. 74

. 76

. 74

. B1

. 62

81

W34

0

+1

+ 2

- - -

- - -

+ 4

0

- - -

. 4

- 1

+1

0

- 2

- 2

- 2

0

+3

- 3

- 2

- 3

- 3

3

2

2

4

2

1

+ 3

3

+

;

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

-1

+1

1

0

+ 1

0

- 1

- 1

0

+3

- 1

0

+ 2

+ 1

+ 1

2

+ 3

1

1

+ 3

2

1

+ 9

- i

1

;

2

:

4

1.3

,5

T

- - -

Youngstown. .

OKLA.dkla . City

Tul=a . .

OREG. Astorl* . .

Sums . . . .

Medford . . .

Peudletam . .

Portland. . .

Salem . , . .

PA .Allentown. .

Erie. . . . .

Ifarriab. rg. .

Ph11ade19hia .

Pittsburgh .

Scranton. . .

R. [ . Providence

S.C. Charleston

Colurnbla. .

Greenville .

S.D. Aberdeen .

Huron . . . .

---

.3

4

---

.2

,5

T

0

T

.5

.2

,1

T

3

0

2,6

,5

0

.4

0

0

2

0

77

. 74

. 72

. 74

. 81

. 81

. 80

. 69

. 70

. 66

. 70

. 78

. 79

. 63

. 80

. 82

. 75

. 84

. 8S

. 83

. 64

+2

+3

+1

+3

+1

0

+2

- 3

- 3

- 7

- 3

0

+1

+2

+1

- 2

- 3

- 1

0

- 1

- 1

Y“-. . . . .

Ass ,Fort B9ith . Li ttle Rock . .

CALIF .IUkersf ield

E“reka. . . .

Fres”o. .

Los AnEeles . .

.3

.6

.2

.:

1

4

.;

l:;

.7

1.1

.5

.6

Red Bliff . . .

San Diego . .

San Franc imco .

Stockton . .

COLO. Denver . .

Grand Junction.

Miniwapolis

Rc.cbester .

St . Cl Gad .

MI SS.Jack80”.

Ueridlan. .

MO. Colombia .

Kansns City

St . Louis .

Springfield

NDWT. BilliWm

GlamEow . .

Rapid Cit Y . . .

S 1OUX F.lls . .

T2sw.Chattanooga.

SnOxvil Xe . . .

Memphi. . . . .

Nashville . .

TSX .Abilene . . .

A.artllo. . .

Austin. . .

T . . .17

. . . 2

. , . 2

. . . 7

. . . 0

. . . 1

. . . 7 8

.,.

. . . :

. . . 4

. . 5

0

1.7

.1

Pueblo. . . . .

CONY .Bridgeport .

Hartford . . .

D. C. Washington. .

~.Apalachicola.

Devt. na Seach

1,s

,4

.1

1.1

4

3

9

2,0

.4

5,1

1.9

6

.9

,8

,5

9

3

1

T

.2

.8

B8mu90nt . . . .

13rownmville . .

Ft”, M“.,, corpus Chrlsti .

Jacksmvil le.

Key West . . . ,

Lakeland. .

Miami .

Orlando . . . .

Tallahassee .

Tampa . . . . ,

W. Palm Seach .

GA .Atlanta . . .

A“t?usta . . . .

Macon .

Sav. n”ah . . .

SAhAI1 .Hilo . .

Hc. nolul ”. . .

Kahului . .

Lih”e . . . .

lDAHO. Boiee .

Le. ist’xl . . .

Pc.catellrJ . .

lLL. Cai FO . . . .

Chicago . . . .

!401 ine . , . . .

Peoria . . . .

Rock ford. . . .

sPrl IU3field .

lND.Evansville. .

Ft Wayne . .

Indianapolis. .

South Send,

10wA .B”rl inst,

D+. Motnes.

Oubuque .

Sioux city’. .

KANS .Co”cor’di8.

Dodge

G’

ToDeka . . .

. bo

. B5

62

S3

. S2

: ::

. 81

79

. 81

81

. 82

. 76

. 80

Helena. . . . .

Kllimpcll . . .

Miles city. . .

!41S*OU1S . . . .

WSBR. Grand Inland

Lincoln . . . .

Norfolk . . . .

N. Platte. . .

-ahm . . . .

Vslentine . . .

Wsv .Sly . . . .

Las Vegas . .

Reno. . . . . .

Winnemucca . . .

N. H. Concord . . .

P .J .Atlmntic City

. 2

. 6

. 66

66

. 71

. 77

73

71

. 78

7D

. 65

. 87

. 68

. 73

. 70

. 75

. 76

. 75

. 77

. 71

. 66

. 72

. 76

. 69

70

. 74

.60

5

, 3

8

2

6

0

2

3

+ 3

4

1

1

1

5

2

, :

2

:

o

3

, 1

1

0

+ 1

h 2

ml Rio . . . . . 84 - 3

El Paso . . . . . 80 - 1

Fort Worth. . . . 2s +1

Galveston . . . . 85 + 2

Rouston . . . . . 82 - 2

Lubbock . . . . . 79 0

Midland . . . . 80 - 2

San AnSelo. . . . 81 - 4

San Antonio . . . S3 - 2

Victoria. . . , . 85 0

Waco. . . , , , . Sg

Wichita ialls . . S3 -:

UTAH.8Land1nE . . . 68 -3

Salt Lake City. . 7!3 +1

VT. brlington . . . 71 + 3

VA .Lynchburg. . . 77 +2

Uc.rfolk . . . . . 82 +5

Richmond. . . . . al +4

Roanoke . . . , . 77 +2

WASS .C01V1119 . . - - - - -

Gmmk . . . . . . . 7(J +1

Qlilllyute . . . . 59 0

Seattle-Tacoma. . 67 + 3

Spokane . . . , . 6s -1

W,lla Walla . , . 75 +1

Yakima. . . . , . 71 +2

1.Va .Eeckley . . , , 72 + 3

Charleston. . . . 74

Huntington. . . . 80 ,;

pnrkersburg . . 77 +3

HIS .Gree ” B.y . . . 69 +1

La CT OE=S* . . , . 71 - 1

tsadiwon . . . . . 71 +1

Milwaukee . . . . 72 + 2

STO. C**per. . . . . 66 -5

Cheyenne . . . . . 63 -5

Lander. . . . , . 64 -6

Sheridan. . . . . 64 -6

P. R. San Ju. n. . . Fj2 ,1

.2

,6

.1

.5

.0

,7

.:

.2

T

o

T

T

T

.5

,7

.7

T

.6

.2

1.0

1.5

T

:;

T

T

3,0

.3

.7

2,3

[

7 6

. 73

.75

.9

.0

. 76

.75

7 5

.74

.76

.78

.73

.7

. 4

. 4

. 7

.72

.3

.79

. 0

.2

.0

.0

.9

. 0

Trenton . . . i

N .SSX .Albuquerque

Romvall . . .

N. T. Al b8ny, . . .

Bingilam

Suft

New York. . . .

,7

.1

.7

.6

,6

.:

,3

.9

,8

.tal. . ,

fnlo . . . .

Rochester . . .

Syracume. . . .

N .C. Asheville . .

Charlotte . . .

.6

4

2.3

1.S

L,4

[.s

1.9

.5

2

1.3

1.4

1

:3

.0

,2

3

!,‘6 1

Greensboro. . . . I

IIntterss. . . . . I

Raleigh . . . . . 0

Wilminstcm . . . .

N .DAK .Blamarck. . . 4

Fargo . . . . . . 7

Willlston . . . . 1

OHIO. Akron-Cnnton 4

Cincinnati . . . 8

C1evelsnd . . . 3

Columbus . . . 7

Otyton. . . . . . 5

Toledo. . . . . 2

I

4

3

3

-;

3

1-

9

3

3

2

4

1

1

on .

.4

.1

,:

.2 ,5

l-l

T ,4

8 .2

1 1 .5

.9

1.2 ::

1,5 9

.8 .1

, cl t>.. .

oodland. .

hi; hita .

KY. Lexington. .

Louisville .

Based on 1941-70 Nor~als

TM,* .s9 s. error i“ thw July monthly table for MS Noines , lo-a It ● hould h8v. resd T for pr.cipitntim,

departure ‘3 3 This e..or appe.red i. the Aug”st 12. volume 62 No 32 . . precl pit. t ion 4, depnrt. re ‘2.9 -.

! ?-

The Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin prepared by Dr. Richard E. Felch,

I Ser~ice, NoAA, and statistical lteport -

1s ubl i shed by the Na ti ona 1 Weathe r agricultural climatologist , Lyle M .

I

Dsnny , Orus W . Byrd, meteorologists ,

i ng .%rvice , USDA .

I -l

DsLon Brown , agricultural statistician ,

Standard copy for the Bulletin i s and Susan E . Atkins, edl tor.

—

., .

. .
397

*

.

w

Aug. 19, 1975 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin 9

STATE SUMMARIES OF WEATHER AND AGRICULTURE

These summaries provide brie ! descrl pt i ons of crop and wea ther condi t ions important on z

national scale . \lore detailed data are ava i lahlc I n Wea the r and C] up Bu 1 le t Ins publ i she d

each Mmtda y by SPS Sta te o { f ices i n coopera t I on wi th the ?ia t i ona 1 Weather Service , NOAA .

ALA BA!!A Sca t tc red shoners and thunders howc rs

t hrou ghfm t R I t h mos t nume rous amount % concen t ra tea

over nu, t h GI ea tes t 2 l-hour I a ln fa 11 tota l

2.35 I n a t Lou I svk 1 IQ . Tempe la tu res wa lmc r t #lan

pas t sc vc ra 1 weeks with weekly ave rage 1° above

nol mal

Sll Ower act i VI t y decreased , making u orki ng cond I t Ions f a vora ble i n most areas . Sol 1 Iois tu re~

adequat e Corn condi t lon gOOd t o exce 1 lent

757 de !tted , same as 1974 . Cot ton condi t ion f a i r

t o good 94q set t I ng bol 1s , 100’7 1974 . Insec t

contl 01 uncle rway Soybean cmtd I t i on good w I t h

841 bl oominz and 517 set t I ng pod s Peanut condl.

t Ion st i 11 good, !Ju t diseases a re s t i 11 presc, nt .

Ra J, ha rves t i ng I n i u 11 sw I nK as wea tbc r perm its

Pa~ ture c ond i t ion re. na i ns good

ALASKA : Taua na Va 1 le y ses t ha 1 i wa I m and re lat 1 VQ 1 \ d: y , e a~ t ha 1 i uc t w i th nc. al 1101 :Ia 1 tem -

pc ra tul *S Kc na 1 Pe n I n~ula n< a I nol na 1 tcvpe I atu rcs c oab t< , a ho .W nol ma 1 i n land . Kod I ak Ra ln -

fa 11 was tw Ice the sea~ona 1 noma 1, t< Ipe I a turc ~

were be 1 cm nnrnal .

Hay ha Ives t continued a t a S1 OM pace w i th the

fr equent ra ln shOMe rs Hay qua 1 I t y i ron Ianv

f ie 1 ds bave been ~ c duccd Gra Ln f ie Ids are most 1 y

in the dtmqh stage oi de vc 1 upme n t w I th seve I a 1

turn i ng c 01 or . Harvest of gra I n IS e xpectect t o

beKl n short 1 y I n the Fa L I banks a rra bu t la tc, r I n

re,na 1 ncte I ot Ra I lbe 1 t . Ground mols turc supply

cent lnued adcqua te .

AR I ZC:iA Tempe r~ t ure~ near nnt’ma 1 most re~ ,on~ ,

abOLt ~’ be: c A n ,rrr~ ! Grand Can!<>n area spot t \

t hundc, r~ho!$f? t’s *-.. I r 1 ! week L’ I rr UJ 11 } nc, r.i I n

a ft. r 13t L

Cot 1 on m< ● t 1 \ Fa ) r tc Kood c[)nd I t 1(, n Cra ln

><, rA. hum F 1 .ir, t I n~ c ( m~, lete. Ear 1 \ p 1 an t I ng+ read!

for ha ri e. t S:1 f f 1 os<t.r ha r\ est cc I-P 1 ete cock; ! 5P

Count 1 % f J 11 beet. g,, od cnnd> t Ion .! 1 f ci ! f a hay

se<t~(>nal pr - gre~. Land preparat : (n. fa 11 p 1 ant -

In,:. C* nl ra: <c ,2[ h,, e >t south ea~t F’t 1 I cant a-

:(>Ups +Jt 1 5 ! :i’t 01. } !’u!r, d Sh ipmer. t s ,,fh I te Kr,ipe -

frul t ‘tar I cclpa Count I FI Ult ?171ng uel 1 snuth -

Ne<t Fe% mI res , ore i$l cd burn un dr}. t rees

Range+ ! a 1 r t o Urod cond lt Inn hl gh reg ] ons , fair

10M er e 1 ex a t 10n5 Ra: n needed soon so Ltheas t

Cat t 1 e ros t l\ fd I r , stock mater gett ing short

ARK4x S\S Tempe ra tui e~ near norma 1 De pa r tu I es

ran?ed f : on) .3 to .2” Extreme v : 101” a t

Gi 1 be I t t o 61” a t GI 1 be I t . P1. e C1 PI tat lon ua=

w idesp~ cad u I t h b i ghc$ t over north hal f . G:.ea tes t am Ounts were 3.75 I n . a t Faye t te VI 1 lC an d

3.74 in. at Evening Sbade . Over 1.00 I n a t , !OS t

s ta ti ons .

bca t tered s,lo!ht! I act i VI t y improved _OI 1 r ,ois -

ture SUPP1 v sol 1 ,Ioi s t uri’ ,0s tl y zlti<. qlla te Al 1

c,,ops : n -., ,,d , o,,{, I t , o“ Fit 1 d% <)1 k 5 1 dzl\.+

SU 1 ta bl<, Cut t c]n ! I u I t I nl: hex v I 1 y , mo< t f 1< 1 dpa ‘, t P< ak i 6 M (>p’ ,, !)(>1 1s H I c F [ rCJp la tu i I n<

rap lit 1 (, tla 1 b. . t 5 ta 1 t’ d <>1> < a , 1 y b a ,, t t ,,,,

Fn ,.1 \ +ovb{, n I,< t,] <).,v I I]K , L<, t t ] n< p<)d< 12 t c 11{ ,111.

1)1 ,,$, ~ n~ , n<. < <1 (11 5 tut L i [)1 1 !1< 1< a-c u v., gc, to t 1 Vc

K1 UN t c1 . COI n . I laKC De I n,; hat ve5 te< . C[ll 11 f 01

k , J 1 !1 Ilefl 1 ,il tul 1 t y . La I 1 y XI a III S[,IK31U , bc I I)K

ha > \ < s, te(, . Pas t urcs *UPP1 Y1 nK acx qua t{ 101 a I,<, ,

I>e< b 1 .11 !1 I a 11 i (,1 1<, gl on t ,1 .

c.AL I FORh IA 1$ 1[, t 1 y s{ a t 1 c 1 <,< t lIUI1lA( 15 blow< 1< 1 I t 1

un not t h and cc ot i a 1 , ot-hc r.+ 1 s<, I a I ) S1 lg lt

c u[)l ] J]i. [’u] I ]]: U( { k . !11 : 1< 1 n 1 !1 t 1.11 ) 11 r , ,,,rc ,

1 00” be?i nni n< week . COa Sta ] highs 50 ‘S nort ;1

t O 70 ‘ S SOU th . Averages S1 I ght 1 y be low nor,na 1

coast a 1 , s 1 i Kht 1 v above nortbeas t and nea r norma 1

Othel. areas

Sma 11 gI a in harvest nearly complc ted . Rice flood

progress, headl ng out . Cot t on b] oomi ng, ● e t t i ng

bol 1s , late . Sugarbec t digql nq cent i nue< . Dry

bean maturing ra pi dl y, thrashing be~ttn . 41fa l~a

cu t t i nK -ont inues . Sorle ar-~,wot I da ,aye . i 1 i a 11 a

seed harvc>st Kai nlng , I,IC ld c, ow n Sa ff 1 owe r IZ3 I -

ve~ t ga 1n LIIg . Pea r , Gravens te ln apple hal vest s

undc rwa}, nor th coa~ t Ca I 01 vn, JUI>FC rman pt. ache=

be 1 nK Iha rves ted . Prune , almunu lal VC5 t> c tal t( d

!+ o“dl a !1<$ , othe r a I cas t II 1s Meek . La t< f 1P sh ta ] -

ke t ncc tarines , Pluns be I ng har{ es ted . sot 1. n 1 t<, ,

husk 11 y pl. oblcm$ u a 1 llU ts . Thompson , Ca rdl na 1,

Exot lC , Queen \,ir r IL t v KI a P Cs be I ng PLC kc d , qua 1 I t y

Cood k 1 nc grapes L ena In week be:1 i nd , Vzt lencl it

,na ] vt, ct c c)nt lnues c1 C,W , qual I t v decl I ni n% . Nave 1

CI op val IV< bv arcd , 5ca lC Y),OW I nl; u p . cool

ut at h{ , l)uld~,, g l)ac k Ic, mon c (,l,]r PVU1 a Vo<adc)

SC, t Santa Ba, baI it B] O< CO1 I and < aul I 11 ()%c, 1 ,

cal rots and le t tuc. c 1 lKht Sa 1 I nas . Can tal oups

f u 11 -WI ng Mes ts Idc . Cc le I.Y mode rate cent ra 1

coast , !ton~ ydeu ‘s cent I nue San Joaqu i n Va 1 lC y .

On I ons and p[, ta toe5 g od <vow t h , ear 1 y potato Iha rVQS t be g I n next week Shas ta \’a 1 le y . CanninK tOma -

toc Y proK1. ess i ng San J oaqu I n, beglnnl ng Sacramen t<> .

ha terme 1 on con t i nut s cent ra 1 San Joaqu In . LI t<e -

s t ock rema ins good , Yupplc ~c, ntal f ecdln~: 5 tart in, :

Water suppl Les < n ~ ltl,a~ ,

CUU3R.AD3 Temperatures s 1 ight 1 Y be 10M I1OI la 1.

H ig,l S 80 ‘ s t o 90 ‘ s . Cold f rOnt 12 t !I and 13t h

1 out?red te npela ture< 1‘) to 25” . High tem~raturc

was 1 00° a t La JUI1 ta . Showc rs and thunders , or~s

‘,ounta ins and ln east . Heaviest totals 2.05 ln .

.It Ft . Co]] lnS. P] c ci pi tat 1 on avera KC d over 1.00

111. east .

Col. n ake ra ge he L ght 75 1 n . , tasse led 957, 961

avermgc, , 987 19i 1, s I lke Q o4c* , 93[. 1974. Dry bean s

1 i owe red , V< , ?33’. 19; .: . Sol E,IU~I .]@adCd 502, .! i<

197 i . buKa rh~e ts late w 1 t h cood KI.0* t,) , Stm,le ,Iai 1

dama xecl . A 11 row CI ops good conul t Lon . Second

cu t t I ng a 1 fa 1 i a S7;< couple te . Ranges and pas tures

1‘:prove d , but rela III c’I.> sout ‘least , Ios t 1S quo<:

elseu lere . LI ves tock good cr>nc I t Ion .

FLORIDA ‘r\, r I c a 1 -umtnert lme bieather near nci-r$a 1

temperature. H 1 gh\ in low 90 S Scattered a fte rnooc tkunder~houers ent I re St ate, amoan ts a3.er -

aglng 1 .00 to 3.00 Ln

So I 1 mo 1s t ure adequate to surplu s FIood i ng

cent I nues Panhandle CrOP cond 1 [ ion? x,ar I ab le ,

con~ I de rabl e danage I n Panhandl e rt her a rea s

mc st 1 I guod F I e 1 d cc,rn har- e~ t cc, nt i nue? Pean(. t ● hard h I t hi. whi t P no 1 d. FI ue- cured t nbaccc,

ha t-t est comp 1 et v 11,, \ I n~ lnt<. rrupt ed h~ ~1..oucr<

s,, > b(>a”. uamagvd P,tnh and 1 ? good . nd I t I i,n e 1 +e -

Mhcr? . . ug.arcaae L.or, d ( find I t I t!n Px5 t u t-e+ r.x,~ r 1 v

X,,, a .. . nd I: i r C I t t 1 +. and cn 1 ! e~ g(md r(>nd i t Ion ,

1 I t rLs K r,)x e , ,nd I t I c n PXCP I 1 f.nl r,en PI a 1 t-o i n~

c nt I nu( +, mv ,* rea,. VXCC.5. 11 c> mo: \ t u re Abund.tnce

, ! r>~.v ! r, 1 I ik, r nt+. (r, !, f ru ] 1 I1rC k-ress I rig . c 1 1

L < * I d I r *SII.I r.lt I, n JC t I L.- 1 (,r S[.]t embf. r p 1 ant i ng.

11 .n III IJ( in+ I- Jl)l :, K,, +ueet c.< t- n < ucurnber.

.r{u, !\P. P 1:* nt I nK cc er\, (,KRS 1 ant pepper tnnl21-

t $,CS und, r,% it ~ :, r) ~, ~ ! ,,nt I nK pt-<>grv~+ I ng UC, 1 1

<)” J : 1 , 1.[ , .

GEORGIA a , (,,, < 1 ), \$t a the 1 “V<, 1 1>01 t 1 c116c1A I lduc, ck

anu <)11 1 y I 501 a t< d a [ te i 110011 t hunc, c rsil owe i 5 ‘t 11

t le 1 c a 1 t< 1.. !+{ < t c t n t I a 1, ca ~ t <en t ! a 1 , and L <m t >-
398

6 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin Aug. 19, 1975

eas t a~e rnueci ove r 1 .00 I n. , northern t hir d

ave ra~e d near O .75 1n . cen tl. al uas the dry spo t

w i Ch onl y O .25 in. or less . Isolated thunder -

showers over ueekend .

S O I 1 mu is ture mostly adequate to surplus . Fielduork vorv act 1ve , 4 days SUI table . Corn most 1 y

good t u cxce 1 lent . S1 lage harvest active . Peanut s

rlos t 1 y good , M lhI te lnnl d a maJ or conce rn . Cotton

f a I r t o !nos t 1 y good, high insect popula t ions ,

i ns<-c t tc Ittc appl ica t i ons cent I nued act ive . soj.-

beans MOS t 1 y good to cxce 1 lent , Insects becomin g

a problem . Tobacco 95Z harvested , average 96$,

1974 94s . Watermelons 977 harvested Pastures ,

cat tle , hogs good . Haying ve r:.’ act ive . Pecans

fair tu good , spra vi n~ act i ve .

BAW*I I : S3ene f I cia 1 I* ins fe 11 1n sections o f

Ha\*a i I and Kaua i . Kc> re 11ef in t >e dry Hamakua

Coast of Hau a i i .

Grow i ng con<] i t ion- 1 a vorable t c,r crop growth .

SpIa \.i nC f rcquo nt t c, curb lnscc t i nfc,. ta t i on .

b’cf?<% t abl c 5U pp~ it-i ndcqun tc, . uc 1 on productio n

1 i Kht . fhnanm SUPP1 iv> I v ma in Iodera tc t o ‘,]eav~ .

P.I paya ha I VC< t I n~ 1 uc tua t ing . PI nra pplc la tc c ) u p

111 1111 1 Ilarvcst Sug:l 1, hn 1 v{ ‘+ t 1 llK steady .

I 0!110 TV 1P( 1 a tul ()+ IIC:l I ,,(>1 ,,, a 1 C3 , 1 y ucck . bc 1 ou

II(]1 )n 1 cnd <)1 uc, ck . Scn t tc red S:IOWC 1.s la t te I Da I t

01 u<, ck .

lln I best I n;: OPC I* t Ions hiKhl lulltcd meek act I\, I -

t 1, . . lt i ntcr wlleit t 25’: harves tcd , 60’: 19? 4.

P[>ta t[> Cll)p 2G’, f ic lds “. ,] i IIK CO1 UI , ‘ OZ 19, 4,

,.1 t ,1 1 j~, vines dying . Spl, I IIC w(lea t 1)21, vc5 t

+t.a) tln h,, 3W< ha rvcs ted 197 1. Barlc y 23’, l)m.-

\f{ s tu(; , 3s’{ 1974 . RanKc ana 11 ~cstock Kood cond 1 t Ion

ILLINOIS : T( IIIPC 1 n tu 1 c’i 1“ k 1 cm nor!,t. tl west , 1 to

.“’” nil ”,,, 11,,, .,,.11 e I ~c,,,h( , <~ . Precl pl tat l,, n O .33 to

0 7.5 111 1101, t 11, Sllouc 1+ up t c) 3.00 in . SC>lI t h .

<,>> t> >(>st 1 y Go[><i t o <~Ycc. 1 lent c in\di t ion d[>uyh S8”, ,

;’5: 197’4 , 51’ a vrla !:t’ : dell t 530, , 57 I 974, ~“~,.a <~

.,nybenn< ,nost 1 v ;OOCI to cxcc 1 len t SC t t 1 I>K

pod+ 92’/ , 4(V 1974, Nvcl age 62’. 1 O? turninq vc11 CYA ,

O’ 197 I n i< , ,1,:,, 1’ . \ 1 I al t n ha ~, must 1 b t n I r to

,r,, [,(j 3<1 c 1, )p 28’ < u t , 22, 1971, ave,.ag~ 1 ‘3” .

N I n t< ! ,! Ilcfi t pl C>W 4 ,1): c ,,nplc tc 46, 1974, a ve I-axe

!4, . Pa? tu i ( 11,,>- L 1 v 141 i , to ~t)oti . Soi 1 ,1101 s tu Ie

“2’ *IIU I t , XL’ .Itfeq N:I tr , .j’ s“ L plus . FIC 1 du c)rk :

:, <,rl ,,s .11 1 1.,1>1< .

I\rII \\\ ]!tl,,l 1<1 !,:11 1 )$([ku i t ,1 nLl,,lC , <>11S S!l[)WC1,S .

pa ~1,1 ~] 1 m,,,,,,,,<, (1 t r(,m 1 .10 I M sou t hcast t o 1 30

111 . 11[), ::IU< ,. t rc IIIIW , J t u i ~,Y I a I)<CO I I OIN 54 tc> 9J” .

\ 1,.,11 s ,,, a , ,, ?11,, ;1U4 t 1 [, . ‘Ill lll,,lU ) t<, ]pc 1 a tull- s and

11: 1 J <’ 1 1 { . 1,%1 I I .111 ,5, ( IIIJ, ml

F ] (, 1, ~ [,] k a\ ( .1 .( (, .’, d.ty> . Tc>p>oI 1 and !s11 bS1ll 1

1(,15 til, , ,,, s L I } m’,<,qllatc . Cui r) 93’, +1 lk< d , 19“/ 1

~, , L(, I 1> 0 J’ 111 <,c)u~t,$,, 1X y<,,,< , 3(Y, C:C ,1 t’ ( all<.

.-,’ ,1.1 t 11 ) ( . ., ,1! ‘1[ .111+ so”< .< t t 1 11< poc,. , 1 9: ~ !3 .

1 1$ .11 1 .111’1 20’ pl il!$~ , . i 9, ! 23’, , !’. ‘Ive lZI,; C .

\ PPl t > 2(Y PI c kc <; . P, .!< I>c,% 50’< ])l<k< d . \ 11 a 1 i a

\l.1 , 90’ < 11( .< , t>,, d ( , !’ . Pn\ t 1,, l,Y pc)<)l. t o ,,(,. t 1 )

1.1, 1 .

Io\\ \ T( 1,>,,, , .1 ((!) ( 7“ al), >v<, )1,,, l,, ! , 1 x{ < pt 11, .1,

11!)1 ,1 1 ~ ,,1, ( 1! .1 , ( . 1“ .,,, I,,Y. ,,,,, ,0 1 ,1,,, t,,,,, ., ( .

I L , > t ,1 )C>t ( 1,, ) cl 1 .I , l) , ,1 11 \ III< ,, JtI,, , 1 11 ,1 11.111<,

, i ,> , 11,, , t ,!$, L L t,) .,<>u 1 ), :1~ 1 .1< 1 ,,5s S [ ,1 t<, . \Ial, \f

.1,,, ,)1111 t , cI\ ( ‘ 1 . ()(] 111. 14 ‘$ ;1 1)1111< ~ .00 111. \$, L t ,-

!,, , t . -.(,u L ,( .,. ( , (), 1 c , . ( <)nt 1 IILI< ( < L I< 1< 111 .

>< .I t L, I << i .I , I,.- L,), ZLI,., I(>U t ‘i< < h lx ])< 1 IL I a 1 tu

.<>,C)< .11, + .Il, d 1 .\ t, < ,), 1, . s, VL, L< 1$1 ,1 tl,~> , ,c,*(I 1 t< u

1 1! !1.1 1 I .111[1 w 1 11(. (4.17.1.1%<, . SIJ1 1< 101 II c1 I c 11 [ IIl)ppe[l ,

,11 t I (1, . 1 1 .1 -,( . c,), ,, ()’ 111 <I[alxll ● ta:< , 34’ 197 ,

(:2’ n !,< , .1<< , .:0’ 111 [1,,!, L \ la,:< , 1 .-)’ 1 q, } , 20’

.l\( , .1 :< ‘: I 11!’ 1 !11: 1. [)11[, 1 t 1 ()!1 ,11!). t 1 \ 1.1 , 1 K.1 111s w 111

a 1,1 1 1 I I L ,1,. (!1 +,),, I)C n,, ,> !){,< 92,, +,, t t 1 ,,~, ,x,,,+ , ;:,,.

1974 , 812 average, 82 leaves turnl ng, we 11 ahead

of 1974 and average , gron ing condx t ion f a i r to good .

Thll.d cut a 1 fal fa 11% harvested and considere d

Sbol. t . Second cut red clover bay 70< harvested .

Pas tures poor, but expected to green u p % I th ra ins.

Topsoi 1 moisture 857 short, 157 adequate . Subsoi 1

mois ture 867 short , 147 adequate . Fieldwork average d

5.6 da ys su i table .

KANSAS : Tempera tures a$,e raged near normal . Bene -

i IC Ia 1 to subs tant iitl rains occurred over most o f

the dry areas of the nortb and east on 13th .

Scat tered showers and thunderstorms many areas last

ita 1 f of week . Southwest and sou tb cent ral st ill

dl \ w i tb general 1 y less than 0.50 1n . rain .

Good rains northwest , north centra 1 and caste rn

third improved soybean and sorghum prospects .

Corn ;5’, in doug,~ stage , same as 1974 70? average :

30’, in dent , 357 1974 and average . sorghum 557

headed , sane as average , 457 1974 . Soybeans set -

t i ng ports GOZ, 5W. 1974, 557 avc rage . All alfa

th I I d cut t lng, 557, same as 1974, 6ffc ave laKe .

KENTUCKY : Warm and humid wea thel’ M I t h da i 1 Y SCa tte ICC I ttlundershowers prevailed t tlrougbout . Tem-

~ I J tulws averaged slightly abuve no]mal . Raintall avc iaged O .75 ln. w I th isolated amounts around

2 .~~ ,:, .

Fa 1.mc, 1 + husy c1 I PPI ng pas tul@s , baying, spra Yi ng

a IId t c)pp L n<; tobacco ~nd ‘:c t t I ng reach incry read},

i 01 ha 1. VL’S t . Over 5 da KS f xvorable i icldm o] k

(l< ● pl t<, sho\$c 1,s . Soi 1 muis tltl,e ?!OS t 1 y adequate ,

sorm SIIOI taf:cs central cOuntles . Corn %“, dough

01 dent , same as 1974 nnd S1 ight 1 y aheitci of avel. agc .

.5uvhc ans XFIPI, OVIIIZ, 36”, pocfdl ng , 45”; 19i 4, 46’.

avc! age Tobacco grcclllng and Krom ing aga in .

Bu ),lcv 33’ t opped, compa red 53’, 1974, GIY, average .

Ikt lk t ).pc s ha 1 t topped . Bu i lC Y cut t ing t!x pec t i nK

t[> ● tai t I]<,x t week . ThI rtl CL! t t LIII! a 1 i a 11 a 58,,

1 I n lshed . Pas LU1 C* Improved .

LOUIS IAN1 : Te lpC 1 a turcs 2“ be 1 ow nolvna 1 north ,

Ileil 1 nol,ma 1 Sou th . Scat tclcd t ‘bundc rshowc rs

TOllt hca5 t , !mcasurable rn i n 2 t,) 5 days . lsola t{ d tbuntlc Ishowe r+ c lscwhe I t , rempera tul c

[,x t 1,cmc7 98” Alexandr la 12tb through 15tn , j ;“

\. 110 lltl 11 t ,1. Greatest l-da j 1 it i nf al 1 2.05 in. ,

])<2QLI i 11(JY 1 ; th .

>011IIC)15 tlil c SU1 plUS 5“u tbeas t , adc. q”a tc e 1 Sen,). , c, . ~’ lc ld~ 01 k pOSS 1 bl(, 1.1 dayS . \la in act I-

~ 1 t Lc, s c-ul t 1 va t lng late> soybeans , I Ic.c, and swec, tpo tn to ha I be< t , I nsect con t],,l , and ha yin[; . soyk J115 f a i r t u good: insect IL ldc a!id 1 UIIg IC I uc

a PP1 I ca 11011 I neITascd ; ea> 1 y bca ns SC, t t I“X pods ;

I&CL 1>< a115 I]lct)lll[lq . cot toll lilt , , 95”. se tt 111,:

1,,,115 1 1)s’ c 1 < 0,,1, $1 1,,. , , .I$WCI . \><, ’.v i 1s a “d

t OI1:IC co Ibudw 01.,$1 ,[11[, llU ,c~ ,“115 . RICC : \ost 1 Y

.0[)(! , 3,!’, :1.11 vc.s ted , 5.!”, 1974 , 2,!’, aV{,l.ti~L, ,

k lC lds sood : la t<, r> cc ;lt. adl nK . Corn good , 1 I ght

,1.1 1 kc, , t . bvl,gbum ,,tc)s tl y 1 ai I : 1 nsect i cIctcv a ppl I -

[ a 1 I 011 in’,,,cnscd . .SUgilt can<, ,Aoo[i , :1 m, I n:; iapidly,

“1[)1 1 1 1111< Sta t 1,,11 ,[><, C,l .1 f < t <> I)c, a L \ . Fa 11 OU pl ON -

1 11A >$ IIC 1 L poh+ 1 111( . *WCC t pota 10(, + 1 a 11 t <, g“o’. ,

l:, .lal UC, % tc<’ . [1.ly ,}arv~ s t In !U 11 +W III};. Pas -

t u I c xve rade . Cat t lC rto$) t 1 y good .

,,! fr/\ I ]., [) f.,1) [Ii. ] ,\h,\p[ 7 c.mper:i r urc~ :1 I <.ralt,c>d nulm<i 1 1: i Lb , 111 ,I~i,rMI5 anLI Ioa> uppt, r GO +. Pre-

, , I) ] t J t I < ,n I 11 ! < ,rm C, I [ hun<l,,t..,l]<,)$<~r. orcurrt. d

n Lct[ tar I<,lt

(’, , rn r 1 . t~d k <), ,[1 t o c,xce 1 I t,n t I,(IY 1 n d<, ugh .t J <?

, Ild )1 1 n doll 1 .t. .LKe , 6.5’ 2($” 1974 \<,, 1,<.’ 1”,

(,:, ’ 1, 1!$( )“,. (I 31 IW ,dded , 7 Y 27’ 197 ! 1< IIlacc<>

11., I.\ t . + 1 5’ < $ ,n,l) i f’t F 5( mm 116.1 d., I a Le and pI,or

<[ (2.1 I , ! \ 11. > rd < UT t 1 nK .( I f J 1 fu O :{’; <.< )mplet e.

s,~, e D* , b 1 1 1 n, ) <,! et. ,tnd , 1 C,L F, I r I xt ure5 b57 c(Ir, -

1 1,1, ( I n t :1 1 C,\II s %)’ bJ I.1 1,. f (d ,,:, t*rmelo ”5 ?5~ ,

1,, } I ~ I . Q,{]’ ( >1 CWII t c ,ma t{ 1.,, r, , ..t <,[,mp lete , r[>d

r-
399

Aug. 19, 1975 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin 7

\
400

8 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin Aug. 19, 1975

Grasshopper damage to crops and ranges mostl}

light to moderate , some heavy damage south cent ral

Stock water and range feed SUPPI I e~ genera 11 y ade.

quat e Ranges norma 1 tc, ab<,~ ? norma 1

NEBRAsKA FI rst day o f per 1od t emperat ure~ abu\, e

normal , otherwl se , cool t emperat ure., pre\ al 1 ed

Topso 11 mo Lsture supfrl ies 5tl~ short , 421 ade -

qudtc, Sub+() i 1 moisture suppl 1es 741 short , 262

.tdequat e, A year ago topso i 1 64% sbort , subso I 1

837 ~hilrt I rr igatetf corn condlt ion most 1 Y good

r u excel 1 ent Dry 1 and c(~rn cond 1 t 1on fa) r to goo d

Corn 70% i n the dough st age . Sorghum cond I t I oc

f a I r to gu<)d over 90? headed, 757 197 4 Soybean

eond 1 t 1on mos t 1 }. good , ober 80~ podded , 70; 1974

A 1 f:i 1 fa ha} most ly 1 a I r , over 402 [ h I rd cut t , n~

h.ir\, e>ted Sugarbeets and dr} beans con t I nue to

look good Pasture and range feed SUPPI le~ G?r

\hort and 335 ,adequa te

NE L’ADA Tempera tures near norma 1. Lightning

f rum thundvr5t(>rms north started numerous brush

f I re+ South remained hot and dusty Ext reme>

1 0 7

[

’ Logand:i 1 e , .JJo fjat ~ , ~ ~ount ~ ~ “

Smal 1 gra I n bar\est wel 1 a long north G<I rl 1 c

harx<est near lnc complet 1t)n Second cut t ittg e 1-

! a 1 f a *e 1 I a long Xorthern Va 11 e), s L1\estock

mo~t 1 y go[ld cond 1 t lon

NL\i ENGLAND R. in fal 1 1 i ght . scattered thunde’r–

showers . !+’arm wear her al 1 week .

Har\,est early apples , peaches , p lures underway

1n h’eu England . A roost ouk, Me. Pot a to crop

grou 1ng s 1<)* 1 \ FI nal > 1el d~ depend subst ant 1 al

ra I n before har\.est S 11 age corn better than nnr -

mal Secc, nd and th I rd cut t 1 ng ha}, act 1 ve

NEW JERSLY Tempera t ures averaged 2° abo\,e n, rmal Cxt reme< 5 2

[) a t Canoe Brook on 12th an d

92’) at Rrl dgcton on 14t h Week 1 y ra 1 n f al 1 averaged O 45 in. north , 1.24 In central and 1 3F,

In, south , llea\ lest 24-hour tot a 1 was 3.02 I n .

at Gl ass boro <>n 15th to 16t b Eat Imated sol 1

mo IS t ure, I P percent of f Iel d capac I t> a>, eraged

631 north , 697 cent ra 1 and 67? south

So i 1 mols t ure adequate MI th a feu areas 1 n nee d

<)f rain Smal 1 gru I n harve~ t VI rt ual 1 y complet e

Ha\ mak 1 n~ progressed wel 1. \’eget ab 1 e and I r I sh

[,<, t dto har~eyt I n fu 11 su , “g H,lr\ est o f summer

\ ar I et) app 1 e~ near I ntz c(>mp 1 *,* 1<>n Peacb har\est

Ab<>ut 50’, comp 1 et e Efl uvbe rr\ h.+ r\ v. t \ I rtu,i 11 !,

comp Iete.

vi w MEXICO Thundershower+ some%here a 1 mos t da 11 }

. I t h greatest rain ta 1 1 tota ls northern mount it Ins.

Tempera tures a\; era\:ed near t (, ab[!ut 3° C(XI 1 er

t han norma 1

!!o 1st ure short , ranges fa I r , 1 i k,estock good .

rot t <In fa 1 r , bol 1s sett lng, sma 11 percentage opening [MO fieek~ lat e A 1 fa 1 fa fa I r to good ~t art

3d cut north , nel 1 atl\ ztnced 4th cut sout h Grain

?orgtlum most 1 v go(>d , we 1 1 ad\ anc(~d heed I !tC, Inl -

t I a 1 grecnbug con r i-o : 5 I ne f f ec t 1 \ e I n 3 count I ec(~rn good , ne~ r c(,ml, 1 et I t)n t .Ls3~> 1 I ng , wme :% re<t~

I n dough ~ tage Land p reparcit ~<,n for w I nt c> r

tihea t

NF W YORfi Temperttt ures 1 t(> 3° ahr, \e norma 1 ex -

crpt St 1 an rence k’a 1 : e\ at 70 ab(>! e Spot t v ral nfa 11 a\ eraged ab(, ut O 50 ] n be 1 C>U nnrma 1 mo+t

areils but Ru f {a 10 and fll nghatnton had 1.00 I n

above

Second cut t 1 ng a 1 fa 1 fa 73T comp 1 et e , 3d cut t I nr

10’: Oats neo r 1 ), 50r ha r~ (,s te d Wheat harve~ c

nea r 1 \ comj, 1 ( te Corn Co, )d t (, exce 11 ~nt c<, nd I t Ion

~,,mt> in drr) t .st axe Pa. turv~ fa I r c<)nd I t ,,)n

hrau t t, ‘tkb.ipv h,{ IX Y. t uncle r,,,1 \ 5W ml c c rn ,IKII

~n.ii) b<8J n h,t r! t \ L c,, n t I nu(., I a r I \ Vc 1 n t r,+h 11.I rvest underwa), Grapes i“ good condi t ion , ahea d

o f normal matur I t y

NORTI{ CAROLINA Near normal temperature s f o r

ueek , but belov norma 1 prec I p i tat ion . Temperat ures brgan be 1 vw normal but by m 1 dueek were we 11

abc,~ e norr. a 1 and c(, nt lnued I nto ueekend. Prec I I,-

I tat Inn uas 1 1 ght but scattered thunder sh<)wers

late (,n 17th brought needed ra 1 ns t<> much of

State

Da} \ SUI table f Ie ldwork 5.0. S O I Is became (’r ler ,

16C f erj short , !97 short , and 357 adequate . Gen -

eral ra I n~ need t.t atew I d e O!era 11 cond i t Ion o f

crop5 unchange d ! 1 ue-cured and burley tobacc o

fal r to good F 1 U C- cured hartest 547 complete ,

1974 55<, ave’ralxe ‘t 87 C<)t to” improved, most 1}.

good (’ortt, hav tnd I r I -h potatoes s 1 ight ly

down, fa I r t (, m<)~t 1 ) g,x)d Peanuts , so}beans ,

sueet potatoes , and aPP 1 eS !70s t 1 I good Limite d

sueetpot atu dl R$ ~ng Pastures need ra 1n , most IY

fa I r to good

NORTH [) AKf)TA Temperat ure~ near norma 1 Ext remes

~~11 a t “at ford C , t}, . 490 a t pemb] na Precl PI ta -

t 1on belou norma 1 . Wo~t prec i PI ta t Ion for %eek

0.76 In. at f30wntan Weekend “ear norma I da\, t I me

tempera t ures and cool ni !?hts wj t h scat tered shower s

Ilar\ e<r 1ng ~mal 1 Era 1 ns progressed Mel 1 u I th

24:’ hard sprl n~ wheat harve+ted, 31? 1!37 I 2i<

norma l burur, ,wB’+ 1 ~’. comb 1 tted , equa 11 ). 1974 and

norma l flats .f >’, anl, .3’, bar 1 e! comb I ne d R} t,

and u inter wbetit near I ng complet Ion. Scat tvrv>d

● houf?rs ga \,r 1 I t t 1 e re 1 I e f to row crops and sna 1 I

gra In< L I \ e> t<>ck Kene ra 11> Rood cond I t ion u 1 t h

pas ture~ n<. ed I ng r,i I n

ON1O Above norma 1 t emperat ure~ earl\. ueek the n

cool 1 ng I n nc>rt hem a reas 15th and 16t h Temper-

.+t ure ext remes 95 and 59” . Shouers and thunder-

, t o rms t h ruuuhout tieek Great est ra I n fa 11 =x, ut heast 3.62 I n

IIa r~ es t comp let ed Pot a toes 257 , 25’ 1974 and

nc)rma 1 , a 1 f a 1 f a ha!. 3d cut t I nr 20r , 10$ 1974 and

“<, rmal , c lo\ er - t 1moth\ 2d cut t I ng , 85; , 80? 197 4

.ind 7(M norma 1 C<jrn 80”, I n clouch stage, Wr

1974 and 55: norma 1, 207 dented, but not hard ,

1 2“ 1971 and n<>rma 1 Soybeans 50” pod< set , 257

1974 and 40’ norma l Fa 11 p 1 ow I ng 1 <)r uheat 255,

20% 1974 ana .10? n<)rmal Tohacc(l 25r topped :)5c

1974 and norma 1 \fo I sturc. suppl I es 19C, short ,

7(Ir adequa t e 1 IT surp 1 us . Oker 4 dztj. s fa\,[)rab le

‘<, r f Ielduof-k

OKLAHOtM,l 7 ernperat ures al e raged f ror 2U belom

n($rma 1 t<, 2[) abo$. e norma l Prec I p I tat Ion a t eraged

from () 1 i I n south cent ra, 1 to 2.16 I n northeas t

l\p~kend \er$ uarm N 11 b ra I n mo~t area %

F I v Id crop cottd I t Ions most 1 y K<>od to fa I r

Ra I n f al 1 needed 1 or uheat seedbed preparat I on , 225

com~) 1 ete Surf ace so 11 ma i sture 43% short , 49<

adc’q uate 8% surpl u s Subsoi 1 mo >s tu re 32? sbort ,

6bg adequat e COrn 707 dented, 101 mat u r-e, 46’7

1!174 20” d \,erJge. S(, r~hum~ 86? headed , 53[”

dough st age 7’7 mature fir 1974 . Cot ton acr~ace

100’” <qua red , 547 set t lng bol 1s, 777 1974 , Peanut~ good , 63r spI ked, 70? 1974 . Soybeans k.1 rt ua 1–

1 \ C<ITP 1 et ed f lns~r I ng T t:ige 395 podding , 345

197.~ A 1 fa 1 fa 3d cut t I ng 775 cump 1 et e , seed pro-

~pect ~ must 1 v fa 1 r due to heav> ra I ns . Range and

PA>l ure condl t 1<>n~ most 1 ). K(,od , cent I nued to de-

.1 > ne +t a t es ]de

OREGON : Temperatures near normal . t.lax imums

80 and 90 interior , 60s and low i’O along

coas t . MI n LI Iums In 40 and 50 . PIeci PI tat ion

N< s t 0.01 1 II . u, ICS’. . xn pl Cc 1 pl lat1011 east .

Fa 11 K1 .1111 lla I v<<> t 7.5<. c O1llplC tc , yll, 1 ds gu[)d .

SC>< ond and t II I I d < u t t 1nK bay co!] t I nu Inx . !11 ,, t
401

Aug. 19, 1975 Weekly Weather and Crop Bullehn 9

Il”ps good . GIa~s sc cd 1)x1 btih 1 I)< al 1 k i I III shed .

rftl L t 1P t t p< al hill Vest ilbou t t<l bc gill , good Clop .

Chc 1 L y harvest almos 1 complc ted . Pc aches bc Ing

plckccf . Nal 1lU ts , t 11 be 1 ts Good . Lvc 1 grcc n

bl ac. kbcl 1i<,S bc I I:G picked . C8U1 1 i 1 Ouel , Sweet

<.01.11 , b].oc <,<)1 ; , bcc ts , KI cc u beans , cucu IbC r+

1>1, lng ha 1$,<,5 t<’ d . !105 t p(, ta t oc. KC,od c xce pt 1 n

K 1 xna t h Coun t y whc J c sc a t t< I <d f rec~c dxma Kc

(,c cU1 rcd , a , 1 ic , . LOMC 1 , mlcf< lc. vat 1 <Ill 1 nngcs

<11 \, . 1{1 KIIC. I c l<,Vilt10115 1 n Gllclc! .011111 t 1 on .

c ii t t 1< and i a I VC, \ in good sha p< . F{ < d , Iallcc,

ua tc, 1 adcqllri t<, . FI ) c danxt I Inc. I,( a% 1 !lK .

Pi h“SSYI.\’4h’I \ : i.a,w, and ,,( ,,y I,[I,V, ICI ,,,, )st of wc ck .

h< c kl } tc.1 LPC la tuiw~ abc iagc,d 2 t u 1“ above norma 1

.C)ut h and Mcst , ,,(, al Il[)lnlal ( 15<, \\hc 1x, . Ex t 1 c m<>s :

91 and .t!l” . Sh(n$t! 1.s and t !11111[1[ rshu~c 1,s t :11 OU~h -

out u[, ( k pl. UdU( ( d 1 ] [) 0.50 111 . ritinfal 1 north

t o mol ( than 2.50 Iv. pa 1 ts sol! thwcst and -,Ilu th

, < 11 trill . L lSVU :]c I [8 !Io_ tl y O .75 L<] 1.25 I n .

c1 up PI c1 > WC t 5 lvlpi Lived l)\ lx 111 \la )01 ac t 1 -

i I t lcs combl n I ng oats and bal lttg s t raw , hnrvc+t i nK

<,al,l v potot [X,5 , ~PPlv5 > pcac,ll<, s , pc, nl. s , plums

t Imla to(, 5, -M,(?C t Col.1: , t[, bacc, ) and f al 1 pl o!! i!IK .

P! ( pa ra t 1 <,n,. f 01 % 110 i 111 I nK undc Iway . oat7 ,-)’ < (>lllhltl<, d , t[>bil[. <.o Y [u t , I><)t~ t OC- 20”, dug .

( <II n t 01 KI a I n 16’ ~ 11 kc d . .42’, dough , 3<: d<nte>d.

I 11511a W ( [>1.11 1 1’ !la 1.Vi, % tcd . ,11 f al t a tlay 2[1 [lit

>; “ Collplc t,, , 3(1 Lu t 21’ , cl ()-’ ”1111 2[1 Cut 5 1’:

1 a 11 PI OWL nc 12<. cm )Pl c tc, . Pas turc, s PI OVI ctin~

a \ C, rage to be 1 ow av( raI:i, i ( cd . Grap<> crop 1 ook -

ll)g Gclod . Appl(. = s I / I nK wc 11 , Ihn I V( st of < aI 1 y

\,Zl 1. le t 1( s Und( Pway , P( a c h llxl. v< St 1 n fu 11 9U ing .

Cabba g< hal,\fCS t undr 1 wa Y i n R ill!: to$$ n \,a 1 IC y

alca . tjua 1 L tl nl]d quan t I t } ,i 5WC c t corn and

t <>n,a toes f o, f rcsh ma rk(, t g [K)(I .

1’[ 1 R’ro R Ico Is . and J I r raxc ra I n fa 1 1 2 29 I n

H 1 ghe<t Neek 1 ! t at a 1 6, 17 I n a: P I co Oe 1 kst P1 Uqu 111 [+ H I Nhesc 2 l–hour t )t a 1 3 7( I I n. a t BII.-

: n Iu?n a 1 i-p, r t Tt.m,>erd t ur’f>. J , c raced U I on

*5 t . ,ind 75C) I ntpr l,>r I ht I cmc., 93 and 58”

! ,~, I it 1 t ,S t .*1 1,,. I I r d, , I 1,1111 5 t ~ ! .,u K., rcanf>

I 8 t n. k,~( II , -. ul II . d. L I 1 d rf I. ,it I r< . r I

I , I rl. II( i Ji L! i * rI IS 1 - I I , I , Y I nc . 1 . ! t -< v

I 1 en, I n<,. ( I ,.L I , r , . 1 .’ ,,. n ,.. , ! : , ,,, [k -

\, .s , - ?,11, ‘ 1,, ,,!1 h (. III] I , ‘.,3 i. r, . , III r t I n-

.!1 ,,4 , 1, , 4 k, \ r L 1, I ~1 L I n . 1 , : d I I ) n 1 11-

r It i< . l\ It i ,, 1 :>’ 1 1, t .,, :,,. t I t )1 I,CI1 ,C 1 1

1,1 I . r u r< $., - .i[!< I,U , [ * I r , r, , .1 r t t 1 :, I .’ t.dl><, d .

P, . 1, i I i 1 I n f ; ‘+ . 1 1,, , . r, 1 , d , t , J. ,! ‘, ,’. I 1 Inl

It , :4 L 1 .$ 1 n.n $< t r. I 1 L r I . I r + I c <.. n. f ,I\ I.–

.,~ $ 1, I , n. n, I , rl I , ., I IL III(I , d I 1 1 I ,* t I III nI<L I n

‘i . ~, ) r 1 ( .

5 0 LITII ( \Rol I \ i ( [)(>1 I 1 t Ilall !1111 118A I c a 1 1 y 1151 11!:

t [1 a I][lk 1 !1[11 !,1.1 1 1.3 t< M< ( h !+I)[ I> <(>, )< [, 1 t <1( l<lttc St

w, a 11,, , ,,1 .Uvln, c 1 c,< , L1 , , < <! . Ra 1 n f a 11 mo- t 1 v

b< I <)M [101 ,,,.11 Shln!c 1. < a 1 1 Y , $+ Id<, 1 y Scat tr 1 [ d

511,)%, 1 ~ , , 1 .1 1111!1 1 1> ! U< < k . N< a u 1 c 5 t t Ilulldc , -

.I, ”u< , . HI’>5 L 1 y 1!1 boulll

G) ,N lng c reps a ) c. I !> nc $ (! <>1 I a ID 1 a 11 , t JI tu I <

c , ups ale in K< od .l,l. tfl t 11)11 . Tohacc, > Stl(, !Ia , -

ves ted , 90’, 1974, 8, a I c I a 6:< . Cc>t t[lll t a 11 t 1)

,:oud Condl t 1 0!1 1 !>1 c.5 ta t I on (,f hul lU VI ,1s an~

ncc, vl 15 .Icau), , 95, .,< L t 1 ,,g 1>, )1 15 6’< Upt !1 1)1,1 15 .

Sob i,< .1115 xu(, d c C,,, L 1 t 1 $1!1 , , ‘ 1>1 ()<,, ,1 llK , 39’< ‘,< t11 Ilg ,1[)<1. . C(,II: c und I t I [),, KC, <,d , 55’ m.t tu I ( \ 1 Acc

w

P( a< 111 . 9(7 Ila , ,,{ . t{ d 97’ 1 P7 1, 93’ avc, raKc

SDUTII L14t(OT\ : Tc, npt x n tu I c \ a \ c I ab,c d 1 t o i“

t)< 1 ( )), 111)1.,la 1 . I At 11 III< 5 9 7 ” G: c K(, ] Y and ,. h I t{

1 a h( 11 t 11, 3:+” Ra 1 p , 13 t , . PI << 1 pl t ‘i t 1,)11 13 llKC d

i , 1)1 0. n I 1 xl w< ‘, t Lu 1 .1 s 1 !1 . c ’35 c P) [ < 1 pl tat 1,)1) (1( I)x, tll 1< 1> <VI , 11<) l.,l, a 1 i I )1 t h< z) I),A 1111, 5< asi)ll

1 .111 ,C . 1 1 c, 1 ‘1 b -~ 1 1, . h I 11, 1.1 )1 .11 111)1 t ,>< a . t t cl

:; , ‘ 111 , Jl]c)k( )1111 1.11 .

1 I .1\ ) 1 lx !“(, h.1 I b c . t < c< , 1 V“ 1 ‘C, , l)ol r la 1

66-8770-76---2 7
402

10 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin Aug. 19, 1975

and oats 14% harvested . Second crop alfalfa hay

65% harvested, meadow hay 80%. Late spring plant -

ed crops good condition, but need a late frost to

mature . Livestock in good condition. Range feed

plentiful but dry. Fire warnings posted.

VIRGINIA: Hot, humid ehnwere, thundermtorme

with rain averaging 0.60 in. Temperature

averaged normal.Extremes: 95 and 52°.

Fieldwork: 5.2 days euitable.Topsoil moisture: 58% adequate, 40% short, 2% surplue,

Corn silage harveet increasing. Field crops in

good to excellent condition. Soybean ineect

scouting programs organized, snme spraying necessary. Tobacco harvest progrees: Flue-cured

27%, 1S74 24Z.Fire-cured 6%, 1S74 S%. Burley,

sun-cured less than 3% harvested. Peanuts

received chemicals for diseaae, ineect, weed

controls. Hay quality good. pasture, hay condition still gnod to excellent. Grazing supplemented with hay etill needed in southwest.

Cabbage harveet ❑ tarted. Potato, tmmato harvest continuee.

WASHINGTON: West: Temperatures near normal.

Wlow normal ~ipitation.

Nsepberry picking almost complete.Blueberry, blackberry harvest continued. Cucumber,

broccoli, bumh beanand vegetable harveet progressing. cauliflower harvest under way. Haying continued. East:Temperatures near normal.

No precipitationPeach harvest continued.Third cutting alfalfa

hay begun. Potato, mweet cOrn, t~ato and melon

harveets continuing.Wheat harvest continued

full swing. Lentil, dry psa harveet progressing.

Grass seed harvest cemplete, yialds belnw normal.

WEST VIRGINIA: Temperatures above normal. Pre -

cipitation above normal with mnst in northwest

and north central.

Favorable workdays 3,8. Soil molature 31$ short,

55% adequate and 14% surplus.Main activities:

Haying, clipping pasturee and cutting weeds and

brush. Second cutting of hay 44% cnmplete. Oats

85% and wheat 95% harveeted.Corn in fair to

good condition with 18% pre-silked, 44% silked

and 3S% dough stage.Much needed rain helped pastures and hay. Liveetock generally in good condition.

WYOMING: Another very dry, cool week. Temperatures all areas below seasonal normals, Precipitation very spotty, mostly below normal.

Small grain harvest continued. Percent harvested: Winter wheat 88%, barley 41%, epring wheat

34%, oats 21%. Second cutting alfalfa 42% cut,

other hay 70%. Row crop prospecte nmstly good .

Corn 81% taseeled, 57% silked.Dry beans 9W in

bloom, 66% setting pods, cutting expected to begin about September lst.Potatoes 93% in bloom,

Soil moisture supplies short several areas. Major activities:Combining, haying, irrigating,

care of livestock.

WISCONSIN: Warm tempcraturee prevailed on llth

and 12th, also partly cloudy skies. Snme ehowers

and thunderstorms on llth, more widespread across

north on 12th. Cmoler on 13th through l?th.

Highs 70’s and low 60’s.Scattered rain 15th

and 16th generally light.

Oat harveat made rapid progress, SO% combined,

1974 50S, normal 65% . Many farmers finished

combining, now baling straw. Corn crop 35%

dnugh stage, 1974 20%, normal 25%. Still under

mevere moisture stresm on light soils. Early

corn on heavier soils ❑ uch ahead of 1S74. Weather

favorable for development of European corn borer

and rootworms. Second crop hay 70S harveated,

1974 65%, normal 60%. Soybeans need rain for

pod set. Paetures have little feed value left.

Sweetcorn yields lewered by lack of rain. Ear

size and shape deteriorating. Snap beans improved

by showers. Commercial cherry harvest near completion. Tobacco being top~d. Late plsnted

tobacco needs rain.Soil ❑ oisture 93% short,

7% adequate,
403

Aug. 19, 1975 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin 11

WORLD AGRICULTURE WEATHER SUMMARY

HIGHLIGHTS : Drought and 1ecord h i gh tempc ra turcs v, 1 t 11OU t Scvc 1 c 1 Osses .

in Ju 1 y and ca I IY August spread thl. oughou t mos t

On the other hand , this

unusua 1 wca thel reduced production prospects fo r

of wes tern Europe and crops dc te rlo].a ted . fkll - corn and late seeded snal 1 gra ins . In the USS R

e rous ra Ins boosted crop pi ospec ts I n much o f good I a Ins s knee late July uest oi the Volg a

European USSR , but a large part of the New Lands we 1,c too 1 ate t o sa\.e some corn and smal 1 grains

recc 1 ved 11 t tle rain and crops cent I nucd to decl 1nc . 11) tbe sou the as te I-n Ukrai ne and \“ol Ca IX?CI ons .

I n northern parts of European USSR and west

Siberia cool uca the r and sune 1 ros t 1n AUKUS t

thrca telled crops and dc layc d gro~ t h . Increase d

shove r ac ti L I t v I n mld-A1lgust tended to eas e

drought 1n both East and l%es t Europe and I r tbc

USSR .

Summer monsoons i n Asia arc, pc rio] ming we 11

but causl nK some 11 oudl ng . La tc July and cal 1 Y

August ra I ns br i ghtcned the product I on out look I n

Canada ‘ T Ma I I t Imc and Pra i rIc PI OVI ncxs .

\VEATHER : Record tlca t accompanied by drough t

tornw ntcd crops 1n wcs te ,n ELI, ope , M he 1 c , cxcc p t

fol brief perz ods 01 nol !Ia 1 condl t 1 ons , thi s

summe r ‘s uea the r has bee n mol e 11ke that 1n tbc

!Icdl tc rranean reg Lon than 1n the No, th Sca ‘and

Bal t IC areas. Sucdcn c t,c n 1 e PO> tc d tempc I a tures

In the 100. Tempera tul es mode 1 a ted In mldAugust , Ilowe ve 1 , and ral nf a 11 I ncl,casc d.

Eastern Eu, . PC cxpe rlenced Imorc moderat e

wea the r--a f avorable turn f rom cal 1 ie r f I ood s

in the Danube Bas 1 II and drought in parts of t ,Ic

USSR . Drought PC I SIs tcd, I!ovr%c I , 1 n the USS R

dry southel n UYa 1s and Tul. ga\ Plateau of Kazak -

hstan . Some crops 1 n the southern and eastern

Ukraine aren ‘ t expected to mature for gra 1n o r

oi 1 see ds and a rc be I ng grazed or cut for s I lagc .

I n North Am. r Ica 1,ains i n late July and ea I 1 y

August re 11eved hot , clry condl t Ions f or crops i n

Canada !Iari t ime and PI a I I Ie PI evinces . Nexico

pi eked up valuable 1ains, es p+?clal 1 y I n tllc

previously dry. nol. theast . Scat tc I eu I a ins a 1s0

eased the prol ong;ed drought 1n the Caribbean an d

Cell t ra 1 Amez i ca , a 1 t hough dry spots I er]a 1 n,

espec Ial 1 y 1n Nondul as , NI cal, ahwa , and Gua temala .

Ra I n vas M idespre ad I n Japan the 1 I I s t week 01

August al te r sc \c ra 1 uccks o! dl y NC at Ivc I , an d

Typhoon PhYll i s added s t 111 f!ol c at [ ! 1d[ )011 t ,1.

North and corthca 5 t China and Inner \longol i a gut

heavy rains in late July and c> arl y /Au&!us t a t the

expense of f 1 c odi ng . Some ! 1 oodl ng also occurred

in Sou t,l ChI na . ‘,lonsoon rai ns cent inut?d to a Id

summer crops in Paki Stan, India , Bangladesh, and

most southeast Asian coun tr 1es .

Af r xca “summe r we t “ count rles l.e cc I ved ade -

quate rain for the most pa: t , especial 1 y ‘Aes t

Af 1.lca . Nouakcbot t in \laul. I ta n la had Its f I I st

subs tant la 1 rai n i n 5 ),ea I s .

July u as Ye lat I ve 1 y dry In Argent I na and B1, azl 1

except f or torrential ra in+’ i n northeast Braz I 1,

nhe re f loods damaged crops . subs tant Ia 1 rains

fe 11 i n mi d-August in sou the rn Braz 11 , ?lrug, d Y ,

and nor tbern Argentina . Central and southe 1-n

Chl le also received beneficial rains . Preclpi -

tat ion was good in coasta 1 areas of AUS tra 1 ia

but sparce in much of the inland whaat-producing

areas o! the southeast .

Earl y seeded-early maturing grains in

Europe’ ueat he I cd the dl y, bot sunmer

But 1.alns he 1 pcd sp; i ng wheat in no;. the I ~ and

caste rn Kazakhs tan and ues t Siberia . Elsenhc re

In I astern Lu1 ope midsummc 1 weatbel was gene L all y

favurable .

Ralnf a 11 imp: oved I n much of Central America

but dry spots rcma 1n and corn and pastul es arc

e rl,at IC In Nondul,as , Guatemala , and Nical. ag”a .

1 n Canada , the PIaI I IC PI ovlnccs cent inued t o

I ecc 1 ve mulstu rc at t be right t 1mcs and sma 1 1

gra I n PI osprc ts t here are good . llolstul c condl -

t 1 ons a) c a 1s0 good 101 cot n and 1 i cc III Asia

with some monsoon i 1 oodlng as usua 1 . From June 1

tbruUKh AU&USt 6, areas t Iha t produce 84 pc rcent

of I ndla ‘s summel cereal gl.alns rece I vecl nol.ma 1

or above norma 1 prcc I PI ta t 1on compared t o 43 pe rcent 1 n 1974. Flooding in Chl na, howe vcr, COU1 d

be nore =,eve re .

N i ntc i. whca t IS doing we 11 I n western and part s

of caste rn Austra 1 ia , but inf 1equcnt i,altts caumd

problems f 01 sou them pa] ts of the caste 1n be 1 t .

Excc pt for some f ree.zc losses Pa ,and u 1lltc I whea t

In Braz I 1 bas bad most 1 y favorable wcathel .

Good !Jea t he 1 a Iso favored u 1l~tc r wheat I n LIx. ”-

guay and Argc nt i na , but 1 n t bese aI eas mol c whca t

is do] man t than usuit 1. B1, azl 1 1 ost some corn

and rice in the northeast , .+ he re up to 20 inche s

of 1.aln f e 11 In a ! e% dajs 1n early July .

Condi t ions are genera 11;’ favorable for seeding

w inter gra ins in the USSR ,

OILSEEDS : Ju 1 y-Augus t rains gave sunf I owe s a

blg boost in the USSR , but some acreage was st111

10s t , DrOU Kh t hurt 01 l~ced crops I n v“c., > 01

Ues te L n Eul opc . In Niger la extensive ,x?plant ing

of pc’anu ts f 01 lowed IIISCC t damage , ~ai nf a 11 was

generous but good yields !$ 111 de penal on I a IIIS

cent i 1lu I IIK we 11 into Oct obc r and that would be

ullusual . 01 lseeds arc Kc?nc ral 1 }. doing nlccl y I n

Nortn Al)cllca and India but COLI1 d have been hur t

by scx]e f loo(fing in China .

OTHER : In Braz I 1 the July 17-19 freeze damage d

sugarcane , pas tures , vege tables , bananas , and

cof f ee in tbe sou tll , uhI IC f loods damaged tobacco ,

manl Oc , l.lce , corn , beans, and cotton in th e

nortbeast . Heavy summer ra ins increased incidence

of coffee berry disease 1 n Kenya . Prolonge d

drought in much of western Lurope caused ,lL lk

product 1on, pastures , sugarbce ts , f rul ts ancf

vegetables to de terlol. n te , ho%ever, rainf all

picked up in mfd-August . Potato and onion yield s

are expected to decline . Summer ral ns in Cuba

improved eugarcane and other crop prospects .

A USSR weather and crop report indicated goo d

cotton growing condl tlons in central Asia .

Thunderstorms 1n Spain Leon P:, evince on

August 3 caused severe crop damage that coul d

include the 1 oss of mole than bal f of Spai n

hop C1. Op .
404

12 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin
405

.

Aug. 19, 1975 Weekly Weether and Crop Bulletin 13

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406

14 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin Aug. 19, 1975

TOTAL PRECIPITATION (mm)

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July 1975

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407

Aug. 19, 1975 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin 16

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408

16 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin Aug. 19, 1975

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Aug. 19, 1975 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin 17

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AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (“C)

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410

18 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin Aug. 19, 1975

AVERAGE MONTHLY WEATHER OUTLOOK

AGRICULTURAL IMPLICATIONSContinued above nor- soil moisture is al ready short .I n areas where

mal precipitation and be low normal temperature s soil moisture is ample and corn and beans are

in the Southeast come at a time when cot ton need s ahead o f normal , crops will likely survive a dry

lots 0 f warm, sunny weather to produce a goo d period better , especially with the predicted norquality crop. Insect control is more difficul t ma 1 temperatures.

in wet weather . 1 n New England above normal precipitation and

In corn and soybean areas, below normal precip - temperatures will he 1 P Maine pot a toes

Itation will deter formation of dry matter in Pastures In the Great Plains will deteriorat e

crops and result in lighter weights i n areas where further with the predicted below normal rainfall .

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

I NOAA - NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE

I U S DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE I

L—. .. — .— ——.—— -

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9

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.

.

411

Aug. 19, 1975 Weekly Weather and Crop Bulletin 19

#

The map above give6 & Ceneral pfcture of ho. Wet o r

8re8s dried last .eek. The centers of wet or dry srbaa

y <ho nat ton was last .eek The lines shcw the .crop- ● re marked. W for Wet, D for dry. imt. re $1 tuatlon according to . .index computed fr.m Ume the legend to

interpret. IIJ.X of temperature and precipitation by ● reas . Previous Local variations caused by iac.lated rain or bl soil

ekly contp. tatio ”s of soil moisture account for the affect difference!+ are not shorn. Any interpretation must

prior weather.

Shaded ....s are those where precipitation %“creased consider the type of Agriculture .nd the ~tsge of crop

development .

e index last Week or wIIere soils did “ot dry. Unshad &

rSIIADED AREAS . INDEX DECREASED SlL4CED ARSA: INDEX INCREASED OR DID IWr C31ASCB

law 3,0 sOuE DRYING Bm STILL Excessively XET AROVE

!.0 to 3.0 UORE DRT NZATHER NEEDED, WORK DELAYED

3,0 EXCESSIVELY SST RD= ?3ELDS TWOCNZCI

1.0 to

2.0 to 3 ,D TOO NET, SDl~ STAWDING WATSR

2.0 FAVORABLE , E%CE$T STILL ‘tW3 WET IN SPDT9 1.0 %0 2.0 PNDSPECTS ABoVE NoRKAL, SOMS HELOS TV3 W

0 to I.0 F4C,0RABLE mR NOBNAL GRDW-TH AND F3ELDWONX 0 to

0 t. ‘1 .0 TOPSOIL WI STURE SHORT, GERUINATION SUJW

1,0 KIISTURE ADEQuATE P3R PSSSENT SSSM

1.0 ta

0 to

-2.0 ,4 Bh0RU4LLY DRY, PROSPECTS DfXER1ORATIffi

‘1.0 PRDSPECTS I~ROVED BUT SAIN STILL fUIDSD

!.0 to

-1.0 to

‘3.0 IQ(3 DRY, Yl&LD PROSPECTS R2DUCED

-2.0 302z IlfPROV?JkZNT sUT STILL 3t70 OSY

-2.0 to -3.0 D~UGIfT EASED BUT STILL SIRIOOS

1.0 to ‘4.0 PDTEYTIAL YIELD3 SEVERELY C(JT BY D14CXJ2RT -3.0 to -4.0 DRDUGNT CONTIW~S RAIII UW3SFTLY NUDSD

mow ‘4.0 EXTREXIZLY DRY , lk13.T CBOPE RuINSD rlsww ‘4. o POT SNOffiH SAIN ST13J sXTU=LY DS T

/’
412

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PERCENT OF POSSIBLE SUNSHINE

w -

\
413

[The following paper was requested from AID by OTA:]

AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION SYSTEM OF AID

The Agency for International Development (AID) does not operate an

Agricultural Information System in the context which concerns the Office of

Technology Assessment (OTA) and the Congress. As we understand this latter

interest, it relates primarily to information systems which provide data and

assessments to the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government and to the Congress

on prospective and actual harvest yields and food supply availabilities in foreign

countries, particularly for those in which the food production level can have a

significant impact on the worldwide demand for or the supply of a particular

crop or crops.

Food and nutrition problems in AID-assisted developing countries have the

highest priority in AID program policy, reflecting both our judgment of developmental priorities and the predominant emphasis accorded this program area

in the Foreign Assistance Act. AID accordingly gives major attention to the

status of agriculture and to general food and nutrition matters in the countries

* in which it has programs, making available to its own field personnel and to

host country authorities and institutions a broad array of advice and guidance

on food production, storage and distribution, AID could be said to operate

agricultural information systems of two kinds. We study and analyze the food

and nutrition status in cooperating countries, in the process of making programming decisions on the amount and nature of assistance that is desirable and

possible for the agricultural sector. This involves the preparation of sector

assessments and analyses which, along with comparable studies by the I.B.R.D.,

probably constitute the most exhaustive and reliable sources of information on

agriculture in developing countries. Secondly, we develop and compile relevant

technological data for use by ourselves and our contractors/grantees in providing

advice and assistance for agricultural improvement in LDC’s.

However, AID does not make any independent effort to accumulate information on anticipated or actual crop yields in cooperating countries. We use data

made available by host country governments, international organizations, and

the U.S. Department of Agriculture as the basis for our judgments as to the

relative importance of assistance to individual LDC’s or to the developing countries generally on the production, storage and marketing of a specific crop or of

food products generally. We are concerned with production information as it

affects planning for assistance in the agricultural sector. This requires that in

individual countries we have some judgment as to the adequacy of national food

production data and that we concern ourselves with the availability to host

government of timely and accurate food production and other statistics as they

may be required for policy formulation and program management.

In this regard, we have been engaged in extensive technical cooperation with

the Ministry of Agriculture in almost every country with which we have had a

bilateral assistance program. AID agriculture program planners and project

designers in the natural course of their interaction with host country agricultural

authorities have identified crop reporting, agriculture census methods, and other

improved agricultural statistics as areas for technical assistance activity when

they seemed important to achievement of overall agricultural program goals and

f: objectives. A substantial but undeterminable number of LDC personnel have b

come to the U.S. during the last twenty years from many of the cooperating

countries for orientation on the crop reporting function or for training in the

/ techniques used in operating a crop reporting system or an agricultural census.1

Further, the training in agricultural sciences provided to thousands of LDC

personnel who have attended U.S. universities under AID agricultural projects

has in many cases included some coverage of crop reporting systems and techniques.

AID has not given special policy emphasis to technical assistance for the

establishment or strengthening of crop reporting systems. The judgment as to

the priority of this specific aspect of agricultural development has been left to

the assessment of those engaged in the analysis of agriculture sector situations

and the design of programs and projects. The significance of adequate crop

reporting systems in other countries for policy development and program formu1 In fiscal year 1975, approximately 130 AID-tlnanced trainees from LDCS were assigned

for varying periods to the Department of Agriculture% StatlsticaI Reporting Service for

study of crop reporting systems.
414

lation by the U.S. Government, the governments of other food exporting countries,

and international organizations, as discussed in the OTA documents, has not to

date influenced AID’s policy or programming. While the latter must be responsive to domestic considerations in many ways, the fundamental determinant of

program content has been and remains the host country situation and its development objectives and requirements. We could increase the policy priority of

crop reporting in our technical assistance programs, but the actual planning and

implementation of training and technical advice for the improvement of LDC

crop reporting systems would depend in each country upon the interest of the

local government.

AID personnel have been involved peripherally in and have made contributions to the international crop reporting system of the Department of Agriculture, which depends upon reports received from Agricultural Attaches in

U.S. Embassies abroad. Agricultural Attaches often have used their contacts

with AID direct-hire and contract agricultural technicians, frequently dis- “

persed over the host country, to supplement and reinforce their own observations

as to progress with planting, the effect of rainfall and other climatic conditions

on germination and growth of crops+ and estimates of probable yields as harvest

approaches. This has not been a systematically organized cooperation but has

been found both natural and convenient for Agricultural Attaches in many instances, depending upon the desire of the particular individual to make use in

this way of personnel in the country under the AID program.

AID further has contributed in recent years to the possible improvement of

international crop reporting quality and timeliness by its technical assistance

to cooperating countries in the utilization of data made available by U.S. remote

sensing satellites. Many LDC’s have requested ERTS data for agriculture-related

purposes. These in some cases have significance for more accurate and more

timely crop reporting, providing, for example, improved knowledge of acreage

planted in the aggregate and to specific crops, early knowledge of disease outbreaks, and indications of crop maturation and yield. AID has assisted developing countries to prepare for exploitation of ERTS data, providing technical

training and consulting advice to help integrate the information from this source

into the countries’ own systems for assembling information to support agricultural planning and program management.

In summary, AID: (a) has made many technical assistance efforts over the

years to improve LDC crop reporting information systems; (b) stands ready

to continue such assistance; and (c) could increase the attention given to this

aspect of agricultural development assistance where warranted by country

analysis of priorities necessary to raise agricultural production. AID does

assemble substantial amounts of information on LDC agricultural situations and

conducts an extensive system to collect and disseminate technological information for assistance to cooperating countries.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to

call of the Chair.]

o