Seattle-King County, Washington 

Community Case Study Report 

Security and Preparedness 

Practices: 

A Collaborative Approach to Water 

Sector Resiliency 
 

Office of Water (4608T) 

EPA No. 817-R-08-011 

October 2008 

www.epa.gov/safewater 
 

Prepared under 

Work Assignment No. 2-08 

Active and Effective Security Program Support 

EPA Contract No. EP-C-05-045 

Technical, Analytical, and Regulatory Mission Support for the Water 

Security Division 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

DISCLAIMER 

The information presented in the Seattle-King County, Washington Community Case Study provides an 

example of how one area of the country was successful at implementing practices that support 

preparedness and resiliency, with the expressed intent of using the effort to support water sector 

protective practices nationally. This document is not intended to serve as guidance. The mention of trade 

names or commercial products does not constitute endorsement or recommendation for use. 

Questions concerning this document or its application should be addressed to: 

Laura Flynn 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water 

Water Security Division 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Mail Code: 4608T 

Washington, DC 20460 

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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Seattle-King County, Washington Community Case 

Study Project Team wish to thank the following individuals and organizations for their participation in support of 

the project: 

Case Study Guidance Team 

Allen Alston, 

King County Wastewater Treatment Division 

Randy Holmes, 

City of Bellevue Utilities 

Mike Boykin, 

U.S. EPA Region 10 

Mike Jackman, 

City of Bellevue Utilities 

Ben Budka, 

King County Wastewater Treatment Division 

Mitzi Johanknecht, 

King County Sheriff’s Office 

Shad Burcham, 

King County Office of Emergency Management 

Fred Savaglio, 

Virginia Mason Medical Center 

Scott Decker, 

Washington State Department of Health 

Hal Schlomann, 

Washington Association of Sewer and Water 

Districts 

Robin Friedman, 

Seattle Public Utilities 

Ron Speer, 

Soos Creek Water and Sewer District 

Brandon Hardenbrook, 

Pacific Northwest Economic Region 

Ted Stencilin, 

King County Sheriff’s Office 

Jim Henriksen, 

Seattle-King County Department of Public Health 

Gene Taylor, 

U.S. EPA Region 10 

Area Workshop Participants 

Cedar River Water and Sewer District Ronald Sewer District 

Cingular Wireless City of Seattle 

Coal Creek Utility District Seattle City Light 

Highline Water District Seattle Fire Department 

King County Water District #111 Southwest Suburban Sewer District 

Lakehaven Utility District U.S. Department of Transportation 

Northwest Warning, Alert, and Response Network 

(NW-WARN) 

Washington State Association of Counties and 

Cities 

Puget Sound Energy Washington Military Department, Emergency 

Management Division 

Qwest Washington State Department of Transportation 

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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

A mission within the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Office of Water is to provide national 

leadership in developing and promoting protective programs that enhance the water sector’s ability to prevent, 

detect, respond to, and recover from all-hazards events that may cause harm to consumers and/or utility 

infrastructure. The term “water sector” is used to describe both drinking water and wastewater utilities. The 

information contained in this report is a reminder that a protective program is not simply guards and gates, but also 

an attitude and culture of security and preparedness that is created and maintained throughout the utility. 

EPA embarked on the Seattle-King County, Washington Community Case Study (Case Study) project as a strategy 

to increase awareness about the benefits of implementing an active and effective protective program. EPA turned to 

the Seattle-King County area because of their history of security and preparedness activity in the water sector. As an 

example for other communities across the country, the Case Study demonstrates how one area of the country is 

successful at implementing practices that support preparedness and resiliency. 

Drinking water and wastewater utilities across the country are important to EPA’s efforts for building relationships 

at the state and local levels. As such, the broad audience for this Case Study includes water sector utilities of all 

sizes, elected officials, local and state emergency management agencies, and leaders of critical infrastructure 

organizations across all sectors. The report should empower other communities and water sector utilities by 

demonstrating how implementing select practices supports creating an active and effective protective program. 

The primary goal of the Case Study was to identify and document select examples of protective practices being 

implemented within the Seattle-King County area that validate the key features of an active and effective protective 

program developed by the National Drinking Water Advisory Council’s (NDWAC or Council) peer-led working 

group; the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) Metrics Workgroup for Water would 

subsequently revise these key features. The features were developed as elements that, when applied individually or 

together, would help improve the water sector’s ability to protect its systems, respond effectively to all types of 

emergencies, and safeguard public health and safety. 

The Case Study report outlines the process EPA used to coordinate stakeholder participation, collect information, 

and select practices that would provide the water sector with detailed examples across a broad spectrum of 

possibilities. The practices center on activities that support all phases of security and preparedness. The purpose of 

this Case Study was to identify and describe security and preparedness practices water sector utilities are 

implementing in the Seattle-King County area, and provide a case study methodology that is easily replicated and 

can serve as a model for other communities and water sector utilities across the country. 

A project team comprising key staff from EPA Office of Water, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), 

CH2M HILL, and Ross & Associates, formed a guidance team from 16 agencies, comprising 11 utilities and 5 state 

and local agencies to advise them on the effort and to provide feedback on the practices. In addition, a workshop 

was held with representatives from participating utilities and agencies, to discuss specific security and preparedness 

needs and practices. (Refer to the Acknowledgements for a list of guidance team members and workshop 

participants.) 

The project team selected 23 practices from the many activities taking place in the Seattle-King County area to 

highlight the features of an active and effective protective program. To do this, the project team held a workshop 

with participants that included a cross-section of staff from water sector utilities, private sector, other infrastructures 

such as energy, and other response agencies such as law enforcement, fire, and emergency management. The result 

was a robust display of activities in the Seattle-King County area from which to match the features to demonstrate 

that all sizes of utilities could implement protective practices. 

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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

Case Study Findings: 

The following recommendations should be considered to ensure the water sector is successful in implementing 

active and effective protective programs: 

Partnership is Essential: Enhancing water sector security and preparedness requires collaborative partnerships with 

other interdependent sectors. 

Think Long Term: Create a protective mindset and commit to a long-term strategy of continual security and 

preparedness improvements. 

Secure Leadership Support: Engage municipal and county elected officials and encourage regional emergency 

operations staff to reach out to other interdependent sectors. 

Think Broadly: Collaborate with other utilities, other sectors, state primacy agencies, public health community, and 

law enforcement and other first responders to collect and share essential information. 

EPA’s support of this Case Study is to raise awareness and encourage adoption of effective practices that individual 

communities and utilities may determine appropriate. EPA’s involvement with documenting practices is not a 

promulgation of guidance or requirements. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

DISCLAIMER .............................................................................................................................................................. i
 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................................ ii
 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................... iii
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................................ v
 

LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................. vii
 

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 1
 

1.1 Background ................................................................................................................................................ 1
 

1.2 Case Study Goals and Objectives ...............................................................................................................2
 

1.3 Audience and Content ................................................................................................................................ 2
 

SECTION 2: SELECTING SEATTLE-KING COUNTY FOR THE CASE STUDY ..........................................3
 

2.1 Why Seattle-King County? ..........................................................................................................................3
 

2.2 Current Collaboration in Seattle-King County..............................................................................................3
 

SECTION 3: CASE STUDY APPROACH ............................................................................................................... 4
 

3.1 Case Study Guidance Team ........................................................................................................................4
 

3.2 Area Workshop ........................................................................................................................................... 4
 

3.3 Sample Practice Selection and Information Gathering.................................................................................5
 

3.4 Case Study Results Review ........................................................................................................................5
 

SECTION 4: RESULTS .............................................................................................................................................. 6
 

4.1 Benefits of Implementing Practices to Utilities ............................................................................................6
 

4.2 Benefits to Case Study Participants ............................................................................................................7
 

4.3 Challenges in Developing a Security and Preparedness Culture .................................................................7
 

4.4 Key Findings............................................................................................................................................... 7
 

SECTION 5: PRACTICES......................................................................................................................................... 9
 

1: Interdependencies Forum to Build Regional Preparedness ...................................................................... 12
 

2: Utilities Helping Utilities through Mutual Aid and Assistance Agreements...........................................14
 

3: Regional Contamination Response Network ............................................................................................... 16
 

4: Conducting Disaster Exercises for Regional Preparedness ........................................................................ 18
 

5: Educating Public Officials ............................................................................................................................. 21
 

6: Water Sector Collaboration with Law Enforcement to Enhance Local Emergency Response...............23
 

7: Drinking Water and Wastewater Agency Collaboration with Other Sectors in Regional Emergency 

Planning ............................................................................................................................................................... 25
 

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8: Supplying Emergency Water via Temporary Piping .................................................................................. 26
 

9: Enhancing Law Enforcement Response with Video Assessment..............................................................28
 

10: On-site Sodium Hypochlorite Generation for Wastewater Disinfection .................................................30
 

11: Securing Utility Information ....................................................................................................................... 32
 

12: Enhanced Security of the Distribution System through Bulk Water Metering Stations.......................34
 

13: EPA Assistance for Water Contamination Incidents ................................................................................ 36
 

14: Emergency Preparedness Survey of Critical Customers .......................................................................... 38
 

15: Funding Security Enhancements................................................................................................................ 40
 

16: Using a Clear Message for Risk Communications .................................................................................... 42
 

17: Security and Emergency Response Metrics ............................................................................................... 44
 

18: Radiological Contamination Event Procedure for a Combined Sewer System ......................................46
 

19: Utility Response to Changing Threat Levels ............................................................................................. 48
 

20: Procedure for Contractor and Vendor Access.......................................................................................... 50
 

21: Updating a Vulnerability Assessment ......................................................................................................... 52
 

22: Creating and Maintaining a Security Culture........................................................................................... 54
 

23: Training on Security and Emergency Response ........................................................................................ 56
 

SECTION 6: EXAMPLE OF SECURITY AT A SMALL UTILITY...................................................................58
 

APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY GUIDANCE TEAM MEMBERS .......................................................................60
 

APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL PRACTICES........................................................................................................ 61
 

APPENDIX C: KEY FEATURES OF AN ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTIVE PROGRAM...........65
 

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LIST OF ACRONYMS 

AWWA – American Water Works Association 

CID – Criminal Investigation Division 

CIPAC – Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 

CIPP – Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan 

CSC – Computer Sciences Corporation 

DEP – Department of Environmental Protection 

DEQ – Department of Environmental Quality 

DHS – U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

DOE – U.S. Department of Energy 

EMS – Emergency Medical Services 

EOC – Emergency Operations Center 

EPA – U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

ERP – Emergency Response Plan 

FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GETS – Government Emergency Telephone Service 

HAZMAT – Hazardous Materials 

HSIN – Homeland Security Information Network 

HSPD – Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

IC – Incident Commander 

ICS – Incident Command System 

IT – Information Technology 

MOU – Memorandum of Understanding 

NDWAC – National Drinking Water Advisory Council 

NIMS – National Incident Management System 

NIPP – National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

NW-WARN – Northwest Warning, Alert, and Response Network 

OEM – Office of Emergency Management 

PIO – Public Information Officer 

PNWER – Pacific Northwest Economic Region 

POTW – Publicly Owned Treatment Works 

RAM-D – Risk Assessment Methodology for Dams 

RAM-W – Risk Assessment Methodology for Water 

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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

RCAP – Rural Community Assistance Partnership 

RPTB – Response Protocol Toolbox 

SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 

SSP – Sector-Specific Plan 

TEWG – Terrorism Early Warning Groups 

TSP – Telecommunication Service Priority 

UASI – Urban Area Security Initiative 

VA – Vulnerability Assessment 

VSAT – Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool 

WaterISAC – Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

WEF – Water Environment Federation 

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction 

WPS – Wireless Priority Service 

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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 

1.1 Background 

The Seattle-King County, Washington Community Case Study (Case Study) was initiated to increase awareness of 

the benefits of implementing an active and effective protective program. Seattle-King County was invited to 

participate because of the area’s reputation in providing active leadership in water sector security and preparedness 

efforts. The Case Study is a model for other communities across the country. It demonstrates how one area was 

successful at implementing practices that support preparedness and resiliency. The intent of using this effort is to 

support drinking water and wastewater (water sector) protective practices nationally. 

Following the events of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 

Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act), requiring drinking water utilities across the nation to 

conduct vulnerability assessments of their systems and to update or create emergency response plans. EPA was 

tasked with overseeing security and preparedness efforts in the water sector pursuant to Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), “Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.” Under this 

directive, EPA has the authority to improve security and preparedness that protects critical infrastructure and key 

resources within the water sector. Although wastewater utilities were not required to conduct a vulnerability 

assessment under the Bioterrorism Act, EPA included both drinking water and wastewater utilities in their efforts to 

promote security and preparedness activities. 

In addition, the President issued HSPD-8, “National Preparedness.” The purpose of HSPD-8 is to “establish 

policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic 

terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness 

goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local 

governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities.” 

Moreover, EPA has additional responsibilities under HSPD-5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” HSPD-9, 

“Defense of United States Agriculture and Food,” and HSPD-10, “Biodefense for the 21st Century.” 

HSPD-8 ushered in a new way of thinking about the role of utility staff in an emergency. Utility personnel are now 

considered first responders under HSPD-8, and this changes their interactions with traditional first responders such 

as police and fire agencies. Recent natural disasters and terrorist incidents underscore the critical nature of 

protecting water sector infrastructure and the need for coordinated response efforts. 

In the fall of 2003, the National Drinking Water Advisory Council (NDWAC or Council) convened a peer-led 

working group within the water sector to consider and make recommendations on water protection issues. The 

work group included stakeholders from many disciplines and used a consensus-based collaborative problem-solving 

approach to develop its findings. The group presented its findings to the NDWAC, which unanimously adopted the 

findings as Council recommendations1. 

The NDWAC identified key features of active and effective protective programs that are important to increasing 

security and preparedness, and are relevant across the broad range of utility circumstances and operating conditions. 

While identifying common features of active and effective protective programs, the NDWAC emphasized that “one 

size does not fit all” and that there will be variability in protective approaches and tactics among utilities, based on 

utility-specific circumstances and conditions. The key features are based on an integrated approach that incorporates 

a combination of public involvement and awareness, partnerships, and physical, chemical, operational, and design 

controls to increase overall program performance. In addition, they address utility security and preparedness in four 

functional categories: organizational, operational, infrastructure, and collaborative. 

1 The NDWAC Report is available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/ndwac/pdfs/wswg/wswg_report_final_july2005.pdf. 

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As part of the charge provided to the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) Metrics 

Workgroup for Water, the NDWAC’s key features were revised for alignment with the Water Sector-Specific Plan 

for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Water SSP). The key features will align closely with the SSP goals and 

objectives, making them consistent with the document that acts as the baseline or standard for all-hazards, risk 

management efforts. 

1.2 Case Study Goals and Objectives 

Water sector security and preparedness are the foundation for mitigating consequences to people and property. 

Implementing key features of an active and effective protective program, should better position water sector utilities 

to protect their facilities and the people they serve. Highlighting the features demonstrates the importance of 

collaboration and relationship building at the local and state level. The “one size does not fit all” approach towards 

protecting the water sector is evidence of the flexibility the practices provide all water sector utilities. 

The following goals and objectives guided the work of the project team and provided the guidance team with a 

framework for supporting the Case Study effort. 

Goals: 

•	 Document and demonstrate how water sector utility practices that implement one or more of the key features of 

an active and effective protective program can achieve benefits, protection, and better resiliency. 

•	 Develop a case study methodology that is easily replicated and can serve as a model for other communities and 

water sector utilities across the country. 

Objectives: 

Collaboration: Improve understanding among participants of the relationship between implementing key features of 

an active and effective protective program and how other agencies in the community are linked through these 

practices. 

Multiple Benefits: Document how implementing key features of an active and effective protective program provides 

benefits to the utility and the community. 

Barriers and Mitigation: Identify barriers to implementing protective programs and document how barriers were 

mitigated. 

Performance Measures: Identify and document success measures from implementing practices. 

Next Steps for Seattle-King County: Present the Case Study findings to elected officials to raise awareness of the 

importance of making policy decisions that encourage and enable implementing active and effective protective 

programs in the water sector. 

Next Steps for the Nation: Promote the Case Study model in other areas of the country to raise awareness about 

successful practices in Seattle-King County, explore existing practices being implemented in those areas, and 

encourage water sector utilities in those areas to implement key features of an active and effective protective 

program. 

1.3 Audience and Content 

The audience for this Case Study is broad and includes water sector utilities of all sizes, elected officials, local and 

state emergency management agencies, and leaders of critical infrastructure organizations across all sectors. The 

report provides a valuable message to the entire spectrum of stakeholders about the importance and feasibility of 

implementing security and preparedness practices that make our water sector infrastructure and communities safe 

and resilient. In addition, these practices may assist the water sector in building upon or modifying programs 

already in place. 

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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

SECTION 2: SELECTING SEATTLE-KING COUNTY 

FOR THE CASE STUDY 

2.1 Why Seattle-King County? 

Officials in Seattle-King County have a track record of developing protective features, practices, staffing networks, 

and relationships between multiple agencies. In addition, proactive planning by officials has resulted in successes in 

securing grants, and industry-wide recognition of the region’s status as a leader in addressing water sector security 

and preparedness. This responsibility to preparedness has prospered in Seattle-King County, even as disaster 

planning has lost momentum in other regions of the United States. 

Another key to inviting Seattle-King County to participate in the Case Study is the high level of support shown by 

local elected officials, including the Mayor of Seattle, Greg Nickels. Mayor Nickels challenged the city and region 

to be among the best in the nation in addressing water sector security and preparedness. 

The region also has been able to tap into a network of resources across the state, and even in other states, by working 

with organizations such as the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER). PNWER is a public/private 

partnership promoting sustainable economic development and environmental stewardship in five U.S. states, two 

Canadian provinces, and one Canadian territory. For example, Seattle-King County was involved in the Blue 

Cascades preparedness exercise series organized by PNWER and supported by the U.S.’s Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, among others. 

2.2 Current Collaboration in Seattle-King County 

The Regional Disaster Plan in Seattle-King County promotes community involvement and collaboration and 

incident managers can escalate an emergency to the County level, as needed. This process has fostered mutual aid 

planning within the County and altered the culture of agencies by promoting cross-disciplinary teamwork. 

Teamwork also helps to integrate critical infrastructures, such as drinking water and wastewater utilities, into the 

bigger picture of regional disaster planning. 

In support of HSPD-8, the Seattle-King County water sector has taken steps to build relationships with fire, police, 

and public health agencies. Several utility representatives joined regional security and preparedness committees 

and, with the HSPD-8 designation, the water sector became eligible for federal Urban Area Security Initiative 

(UASI) funds to support ongoing security and preparedness programs. Tabletop exercises and monthly regional 

committee meetings also foster important relationships between the water sector and other agencies, many of whom 

received UASI funding. 

In addition, Seattle-King County agencies have agreed on the need for more security and preparedness training and 

drills to identify gaps and establish effective communications and relationships among agencies. By standardizing 

data flows and communication methods, utilities and collaborative partners hope to better communicate with each 

other during emergency events, and also hope to share response capabilities that each can supply during an 

emergency. 

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SECTION 3: CASE STUDY APPROACH 

EPA established a project team that included staff from the Office of Water, contractor CSC, and subcontractors 

CH2M HILL and Ross & Associates. The project team was responsible for Case Study design, identifying the Case 

Study area, facilitating workshops and meetings, and documenting the Case Study findings and practice 

descriptions. 

3.1 Case Study Guidance Team 

A Case Study guidance team, recruited from 16 organizations, comprising 11 utilities and 5 state and local agencies 

to advise on the effort and to provide feedback on the practices, was chartered to assist the project team in 

identifying tangible benefits to the water sector and local community (see Appendix A for a list of guidance team 

members). Guidance team members shared roles and responsibilities, and had equal standing to participate and 

provide guidance to the project team. The guidance team promoted active participation in the Case Study, identified 

mutual benefits to the community, and provided the project team with strategic direction and feedback throughout 

the Case Study project. This assistance was essential to the success in identifying and validating the practices used 

in the community, adding credibility to the project findings. 

3.2 Area Workshop 

A key element of the Case Study was conducting a workshop to explore and expand on previously gathered 

information about practices being implemented in the Seattle-King County area. The Area Workshop brought 

together stakeholders from a broad spectrum of disciplines and members of the guidance team (see 

Acknowledgments for participant list). The workshop’s objectives were to: 

•	 Explore collaborative practices and interdependencies among the water sector and other sectors in effectively 

preventing, detecting, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from an all-hazard event. 

•	 Discuss a list of Seattle-King County practices captured earlier in the study and explore how agencies were 

using them. 

•	 Provide an opportunity for participants to learn more about how to help each other in security and preparedness. 

The workshop built upon a list of practices and interdependencies in the region already identified through 

discussions with water sector utilities and focused on the collaborative practices employed in the region. Workshop 

participants reviewed the practices and identified interdependencies, barriers, incentives, and multiple benefits. 

Attendees participated in five collaborative practice workgroups in the morning and five collaborative agency 

workgroups in the afternoon. Morning workgroup participants discussed detailed information on specific 

collaborative practices; afternoon workgroup participants discussed inter-agency needs and connections or linkages. 

Workshop session leaders also invited attendees to participate in a discussion to generate recommendations for 

future case study workshops. 

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3.3 Sample Practice Selection and Information Gathering 

Following the Area Workshop, the guidance team reviewed key findings from the workshop, determined which 

practice discussions should occur, and provided feedback on the format and content of a sample practice description. 

The guidance team used the following criteria to select practices: 

9 Active 9 Effective 

9 Sustainable 9 Current 

9 Exemplary 9 Performance tested 

9 Information available 9 Relevant to the features 

Not all practices met every criterion listed above, but 23 practices with the most information were developed into 

detailed practice descriptions. The practice descriptions are included in Section 5 as examples for stakeholders to 

use in developing their own customized approaches to security and preparedness. Workshop participants mentioned 

many additional practices, but specific details were not available within the time frame of the Case Study. These 

practices were still found to be relevant and worth exploring further in future case studies and are captured as a list of 

additional practices in Appendix B. In all, the project team conducted in-depth discussions with 16 participating 

water sector utilities during the summer of 2006, which resulted in the 23 practice descriptions highlighted in this 

report. 

3.4 Case Study Results Review 

The guidance team met to review the draft Case Study report, evaluate the effectiveness of the Case Study, discuss 

plans for presenting results to local public officials, and suggest next steps for the Seattle-King County area. The 

guidance team also provided recommendations to EPA on a plan to disseminate the Case Study results and conduct 

future case study projects in other locations around the country. 

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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

SECTION 4: RESULTS 

The Case Study is the first comprehensive effort to document the practices water sector utilities are implementing to 

improve the security and preparedness of their systems and protect the people and community they serve. The Case 

Study produced results that were both anticipated and surprising, and begins to answer questions other utilities have 

about the types of practices that are being implemented to make water sector facilities more secure and protect the 

public. The Case Study team anticipated answering utility questions about protective practices. What surprised the 

project team is the number of elected officials and leaders from other sectors and business that are interested in the 

practices because of the interdependent relationship between other sector facilities, such as hospitals and food 

production, which rely on a secure and resilient water sector. 

Although the 23 documented sample practices are from a single region, the lessons learned can be adapted to other 

communities across the country to increase local and regional awareness, and give utilities examples of practices 

currently being used by their peers. The Case Study provides a methodology that can be replicated in other parts of 

the country and a framework for documenting additional practices by other utilities that supports expanding active 

and effective protective programs. 

4.1 Benefits of Implementing Practices to Utilities 

Utilities that implement practices built around an active and effective protective program are able to achieve benefits 

that result in reduced risk to their system and the communities they serve. For example, enhanced protection of bulk 

water metering stations at one utility led to increased protection of the distribution system and substantial cuts in 

operating costs that, by themselves, were enough to justify the practice (refer to Practice Description #12). This 

particular practice also improved the monitoring of bulk water usage, which resulted in a significant drop in water 

quality complaints caused by hydrant abuse that affected water quality. More reliable systems, cost savings from 

mitigating effects of an event, and increased customer confidence and satisfaction are just a few of the potential 

benefits. 

Utilities that implement protective practices and make their customers aware of their efforts typically increase 

customer satisfaction. This satisfaction comes from the awareness of the important role that protective practices 

play in keeping facilities secure, and more often the satisfaction comes from a feeling that the utility is committed to 

keeping its customers safe. 

For drinking water utilities, a survey of critical customers such as those on dialysis machines can improve the 

utilities’ ability to respond to special needs customers in the event of an emergency while also educating customers 

on the need to assess personal vulnerabilities and prepare accordingly. The more community awareness there is 

about potential risks, the greater the opportunity for utilities to work in partnership with local officials and the 

community at large to encourage and improve practices that support a safe and reliable water sector. 

Many practices illustrate the benefits of collaboration between agencies. For example, water sector collaboration 

with law enforcement and public safety agencies enhances local emergency response and improves the effectiveness 

of regional disaster preparedness exercises (refer to Practice Description #6). These collaborative practices can also 

create a sense of ownership and responsibility between agencies and lead to faster response times, foster trust among 

local emergency responders, and create a more efficient working environment during an emergency. Active 

participation by the water sector in collaborative practices enables traditional first responders to recognize water 

utilities as an essential team member in emergency preparedness planning and a partner in first response, as defined 

in HSPD-8. 

Another benefit of promoting active and effective protective programs is that employees well-trained in disaster 

response are able to analyze their systems and recognize opportunities to improve operations on a daily basis (refer 

OCTOBER 2008 6 
 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

to Practice Description #23). Preparedness training for employees also benefits the broader community because the 

better people understand their role in an emergency; the better able they are to handle the response. Additionally, 

worker safety often improves when utilities update their policies to conform to new security and preparedness 

practices. 

4.2 Benefits to Case Study Participants 

In addition to benefiting from the information contained in the practice descriptions, utilities and agencies who 

actively participated in the Case Study also benefited from the personal interactions during Case Study meetings and 

the area workshop. The interactive format of the meetings and workshop encouraged participants to work 

collaboratively in groups to complete meeting objectives and fostered further collaboration after the Case Study. 

Additional benefits to Case Study participants include: 

•	 Greater awareness of resources available for planning and for assistance 

•	 New found understanding of practices used by other agencies to improve response coordination during 

emergencies 

•	 Increased understanding and familiarity of practices and terminology between agencies and staff 

•	 Cross-sector cohesiveness, networking, and collaborative practices generated by gathering a diverse group of 

participants from the water sector, fire, police, telecommunications, power, and other agencies 

•	 Potential to collaborate 

•	 Exposure of participants to existing resources or services, such as the Wireless Priority Service (WPS), 

Government Emergency Telephone Service (GETS), and Telecommunication Service Priority (TSP), that allow 

a utility’s calls to receive top priority when telephone networks are stressed during an emergency or disaster 

4.3 Challenges in Developing a Security and Preparedness Culture 

The Case Study revealed a persistent theme about the water sector’s view of its role in an emergency and the views 

outside agencies have of the water sector’s role in an emergency. The water sector and other sections within public 

works traditionally are considered a low priority for security and preparedness funding by the traditional first 

responder groups that receive federal money, which further limits the opportunity to focus on security planning and 

preparedness. In addition, within the sector, opportunities to plan and prepare for a future crisis are often deferred to 

meet the demands of daily operations. 

Many utilities acknowledged that preparedness practices are expensive to implement and/or maintain, and that 

training can be costly and time-consuming. Overall within the region’s water sector, there has been a general lack of 

support for security and preparedness initiatives and this lack of resources remains a significant barrier. Despite 

these difficulties, the water sector in the Seattle-King County area was able to implement the 23 described active and 

effective protective practices, and receive funding assistance by coordinating with traditional first responders. 

4.4 Key Findings 

The Case Study findings listed below are fundamental to ensure the success of local communities and the water 

sector in implementing security and preparedness programs. 

Partnership is Essential: Enhancing water sector security and preparedness requires 

partnerships with other interdependent sectors. 

Seattle-King County’s experiences and practices point clearly to the need for water sector utilities to build 

partnerships with community emergency management, public health, hospitals, law enforcement, transportation, 

telecommunications, and other agencies/sectors to ensure a comprehensive approach to security and preparedness. 

OCTOBER 2008 7 
 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

A first step in building these partnerships is to generate understanding about the critical aspects of drinking water 

and wastewater provision within a community, and the first responder role that water sector utility staff will play 

during an emergency. 

Think Long Term: Developing an active and effective protective program is a long-term 

process—iterative and at times frustrating. 

Water sector utilities and their community partners should feel comfortable adopting practices incrementally and 

anticipate the need to adapt practices as experience reveals opportunities for continual improvement. Communities 

should also promote a more collaborative emergency management culture so that sectors now operating in isolated 

“stovepipes” can work to break down barriers, improve communication, and readily share expertise and resources. 

A critical lesson learned in the Seattle-King County area was the need for a fundamental shift in thinking about 

culture and long-term commitment. Implementing practices that support an active and effective protective program 

is part of a long-term strategy for continual improvement. 

Secure Support from Leadership: Initiating and sustaining an active and effective protective 

program requires strong support from elected officials and emergency operations 

leaders. 

Seattle-King County partners identified two factors critical to the region’s success: (1) strong support from 

municipal and county elected officials; and (2) efforts by regional emergency operations staff to reach out to other 

interdependent sectors. These factors point to the importance for leaders in government, utilities, and emergency 

management to set the tone for implementing active and effective protective programs, and to work collaboratively 

on continuous improvement. 

Think Broadly: Pursuing a collaborative and community-oriented active and effective 

protective program produces multiple benefits. 

Collaboration leads to faster response times and a more effective and efficient working environment during an 

emergency. Other practices produce direct and operational cost savings, improved protection, and decreased 

operating costs. In addition, improved protective practices boost customer satisfaction and customer awareness of 

security and preparedness. 

OCTOBER 2008 8 
 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

SECTION 5: PRACTICES 

Strong security and preparedness is not an end state, but a process. For Seattle-King County agencies, as for any 

utility or community, improvements are gradual and continuous. By building from earthquake and storm events, 

local agencies like the King County Office of Emergency Management were able to reach out to each other and 

galvanize collaboration among utilities and other agencies within the region. The water sector in any community 

can benefit from the efforts in Seattle-King County by reviewing their region’s practices and enacting/enhancing 

their own program to reduce risk with an all-hazards approach to preparedness. 

There are hundreds of highly effective practices in use today by the water sector and other sector infrastructures. 

Many are in collaboration with community partners, while others are implemented solely by a utility. This Case 

Study report is considered a beginning; by describing 23 of them, EPA hopes to capture and share many more 

practices identified in future efforts across the country. 

This EPA report, and others that may follow, represent the consensus judgment of EPA, water sector, and public 

sector organizations that have participated in a community case study project. This and succeeding reports and 

practice descriptions are neither official EPA guidance nor requirements. 

Sample Practices 

For the purposes of the Case Study, a practice is defined as an action area that includes specific tools, behaviors, 

activities, systems, policies, and/or procedures that promote a protective posture and enhances the process for 

planning, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from all-hazards events. 

The project team identified practices under one or more of the key features of an active and effective protective 

program (Appendix C) recommended by the NDWAC. At least one practice was identified as meeting each of the 

key features. 

Practices were evaluated to determine if they fell into one or more of the following categories: 

Organizational practices relate to the agency’s overall structure and administration. 

Operational practices relate to activities, often daily routines, required to meet the agency’s mission. 

Infrastructure practices relate to the physical system. 

Collaborative practices involve interaction with one or more outside agencies. 

Although many practices identified during the Case Study straddled categories, the project team selected one 

category for each practice to streamline organization of the report. For example, enhancing law enforcement 

response with video assessment involves the “infrastructure” activity of installing a video surveillance system, but is 

also “collaborative” due to the coordination with a law enforcement agency. For the purposes of this report, the 

sample practice was categorized as “infrastructure” because the video assessment was the primary focus of the 

practice (see Table 5-1). The amount of information provided is related to the amount of information made 

available to the project team. All summaries provide the reader with enough information to understand the 

meaning, context, and applicability to the reader’s organization. 

Table 5-1 lists the 23 practices from Seattle-King County described in the report and identifies which of the key 

features (Appendix C) corresponds to each. In several examples, the practice includes more than one feature 

category for that practice. The complete practice descriptions (approximately two pages each) are included 

immediately following Table 5-1. The practice descriptions are a sampling and do not represent the full range of 

water sector security and preparedness practices taking place in Seattle-King County. 

OCTOBER 2008 9 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

TABLE 5-1: Twenty-three Practices from Seattle-King County 

ID 

Number Sample Practice

 Collaborative Infrastructure Organizational  Operational 

Corresponding Feature and 

Number (see Appendix C) 

1 Interdependencies forum to build regional 

preparedness 

9 9 Business Continuity Planning; and 

Partnerships 

(7 & 8) 

2 Utilities helping utilities through mutual aid 

and assistance agreements 

9 9 Business Continuity Planning; and 

Partnerships 

(7 & 8) 

3 Regional contamination response network 9 9 Contamination Detection; and 

Partnerships 

(3 & 8) 

4 Conducting disaster exercises for regional 

preparedness 

9 9 Business Continuity Planning; and 

Partnerships 

(7 & 8) 

5 Educating public officials 9 Communications; and 

Partnerships 

(9 & 8) 

6 Water sector collaboration with law 

enforcement to enhance local emergency 

response 

9 Communications; and 

Partnerships 

(9 & 8) 

7 Drinking water and wastewater agency 

collaboration with other sectors on 

regional emergency planning 

9 9 Business Continuity Planning; and 

Partnerships 

(7 & 8) 

8 Supplying emergency water via temporary 

piping 

9 Infrastructure Resiliency 

(6) 

9 Enhancing law enforcement response with 

video assessment 

9 9 Access Control; and Partnerships 

(5 & 8) 

10 On-site sodium hypochlorite generation 

for wastewater disinfection 

9 Infrastructure Resiliency 

(6) 

11 Securing utility information 9 Access Control 

(5) 

12 Enhanced security of distribution system 

through bulk water metering stations 

9 Access Control; and 

Infrastructure Resiliency 

(5 & 6) 

13 EPA assistance for water contamination 

events 

9 9 Contamination Detection; and 

Partnerships 

(3 & 8) 

14 Emergency preparedness survey of 

critical customers 

9 9 Partnerships 

(8) 

OCTOBER 2008 10 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

ID 

Number Sample Practice

 Collaborative Infrastructure Organizational  Operational 

Corresponding Feature and 

Number (see Appendix C) 

15 Funding security enhancements 9 Business Continuity Planning; 

Security Resources/Measures; 

and Access Control 

(7, 2, & 5) 

16 Using a clear message for risk 

communications 

9 9 Communications 

(9) 

17 Security and emergency response metrics 9 Security Resources/Measures; 

and Vulnerability Assessment 

(2 & 4) 

18 Radiological contamination event 

procedure for a combined sewer system 

9 Security Resources/Measures; 

and Partnerships 

(2 & 8) 

19 Utility response to changing threat levels 9 Threat-Level Based Protocols 

(10) 

20 Procedures for contractor and vendor 

access 

9 9 Access Control 

(6) 

21 Updating a vulnerability assessment 9 Vulnerability Assessment 

(4) 

22 Creating and maintaining a security 

culture 

9 Explicit Commitment/Promote 

Awareness; and Defined Roles 

(1 & 7) 

23 Training on security and emergency 

response 

9 9 Explicit Commitment/Promote 

Awareness; and Defined Roles 

(1 & 7) 

OCTOBER 2008 11 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

1 : Interdependencies 

Forum to Build Regional 

Preparedness 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Tested and 

Updated; and Partnerships 

Category Type: 

Collaborative; Operational 

General Description: Officials in King County, 

Washington, hosted their first Interdependencies 

Forum (Forum) in November 2005. King County is 

the most populous county in the state and is 

designated as Washington State Homeland Security 

Region 6, one of nine Homeland Security Regions in 

the state. The one-day Forum brought together 

representatives from the 17 federally recognized 

critical infrastructures and was driven by 

requirements contained in the Washington State 

Homeland Security Region 6 Critical Infrastructure 

Protection Plan (CIPP), a decision-making tool for 

prioritizing infrastructures and allocating funding 

resources. 

The Forum helps infrastructure representatives to: 

•	 Connect with other owners and operators in their 

sector to share best practices and identify the 

most critical assets within their sector. 

•	 Provide information on initiatives and tools that 

may assist with assessing vulnerabilities. 

•	 Understand their dependencies related to other 

infrastructure sectors. 

•	 Connect with other sectors to identify and protect 

the cross-sector assets that are considered most 

vital to the health and safety of the communities, 

the economy, and the environment. 

Resources Required: The Forum hosts were able 

to keep the costs manageable by using existing 

County personnel to organize, conduct, and report on 

the Forum activities. Additional funding to support 

the Forum was secured through U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) grants and from the 

private sector. Members of the Forum planning team 

invested approximately 4–8 hours per month in 

meetings and document preparation. A consultant 

initially assisted with facilitation of the Forum; 

however, future plans call for members of the 

region’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Workgroup 

to assist with planning and facilitating future forums. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The Critical 

Infrastructure Protection Workgroup comprises 

representatives from the following six sectors 

considered most critical to maintain in an emergency 

and tasked with planning the annual forum: 

1.	 Energy 

2.	 Water 

3.	 Information Technology (IT) 

4.	 Telecommunication 

5.	 Transportation 

6. Healthcare Systems 

The workgroup’s mission is to “determine regional 

critical infrastructure, establish priorities, evaluate 

requests, and provide appropriate resources to protect 

critical infrastructure in King County from terrorist 

attacks and all-hazard emergency events.” 

Workgroup members attend monthly meetings, 

review plans, represent their sectors in identification 

of interdependencies, and recommend priorities for 

funding to support preparedness efforts in organizing 

the Forum. 

The King County Office of Emergency Management 

(OEM) provided a staff person to lead the workgroup 

and organize the workgroup’s efforts. The OEM 

representative also coordinated with a larger regional 

interdependencies group and the Pacific Northwest 

Economic Region (PNWER), a bi-national, publicprivate partnership representing three Canadian 

provinces and five U.S. states. 

OCTOBER 2008 12 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

Collaboration with Other Partners: In addition to 

coordinating with regional members from the priority 

sectors, many forum participants also participate in 

multi-state/bi-national table-top exercises on critical 

infrastructure protection. The Blue Cascades series 

of exercises are in support of PNWER’s initiative 

called the Partnership for Regional Infrastructure 

Security, whose purpose is to develop a regional 

preparedness plan for dealing with large-scale 

emergencies in the region. 

Barriers: Forum participants face a number of 

barriers for achieving their present and future goals 

including: 

•	 Critical infrastructure sector representatives may 

not understand the value of the Forum to their 

agencies and not allocate the time to attend. 

•	 Critical infrastructures can have different 

geographic boundaries, which increases the 

difficulty of infrastructure protection planning. 

•	 Funding from DHS is limited, and new sources 

of funding will likely be needed in order to 

sustain efforts. 

Lessons Learned: Forum participants learned 

valuable lessons that will help improve future efforts 

and serve as a model for others that want to replicate 

the practice, including: 

•	 Developing relationships between 

interdependent sectors is critical to cooperating 

on joint activities. 

•	 “Champions” need to be identified in each sector 

and play a leadership role. 

•	 Interoperable communications mechanisms are 

essential to share threat and response/recovery 

information. 

•	 Command and control issues dealing with crossborder threats and hazards need to be addressed. 

The principles and concepts of the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS) and the 

Incident Command Structure (ICS) need to be 

used. 

•	 Understanding regional and cross-border 

interdependencies is important. 

Success Measures: The Forum was considered a 

success based on the following outcomes: 

•	 The Forum had a high participation rate; 

representatives from all 17 federally recognized 

critical infrastructures attended. 

•	 The Forum satisfied a key requirement in the 

Region 6 CIPP. 

•	 The action items identified in the Forum have 

been developed into a regional action plan, 

which will be reviewed and updated at the next 

Interdependencies Forum. 

Benefits and Incentives: The networking 

opportunity afforded at the Forum provided 

participants with potential continued benefits, 

including: 

•	 Having a voice in an organization that can 

represent them regionally and nationally 

•	 Collaborating and participating in emergency 

training exercises 

•	 Developing mutual aid agreements with 

interdependent or similar infrastructures 

•	 Creating a more clear and current understanding 

of regional preparedness, and how it affects their 

organization 

•	 Creating access to Homeland Security grant 

funding by participating in a regional emergency 

planning group 

•	 Developing key relationships with infrastructure 

representatives, which may help to increase 

routine cooperation and communications 

OCTOBER 2008 13 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

2 : Utilities Helping 

Utilities through Mutual 

Aid and Assistance 

Agreements 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Tested and 

Updated; and Partnerships 

Category Type: 

Collaborative; Operational 

General Description: The primary objective of a 

mutual aid and assistance agreement is to facilitate 

rapid, short-term deployment of emergency support 

to restore critical operations at an affected utility or 

group of utilities in an efficient and effective manner. 

Mutual aid and assistance agreements accomplish 

this by providing the framework through which 

private and public utilities share resources with one 

another, without the need for a declared state of 

emergency. They also include provisions to address 

issues such as liability, workers’ compensation, and 

reimbursement. 

While mutual aid has been practiced by fire and law 

enforcement officials for hundreds of years, it is 

relatively new to other emergency responders, such 

as those responsible for securing water and 

wastewater critical infrastructure. Thanks to the 

efforts of existing Water and Wastewater Agency 

Response Networks (WARN) and strong support 

from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) and water sector partners such as the 

American Water Works Association (AWWA), 

mutual aid and assistance agreements are now being 

developed between utilities across the country. 

A model mutual aid and assistance agreement and 

guidelines for developing a WARN, both outlined in 

the May 2006 “Utilities Helping Utilities” white 

paper authored by AWWA, can be found at 

www.NationalWARN.org. 

Resources Required: The resources associated 

with developing and maintaining a mutual aid and 

assistance network are minimal. In-kind services are 

typically used to draft an agreement and generate 

interest amongst other utilities. Once an agreement is 

finalized, utilities must determine the best way to 

facilitate activation of the agreement during a 

disaster. Some utilities invest in dynamic Web sites 

with sophisticated resource matching databases while 

others opt for an on-the-fly message board where 

human intervention is required to match resources 

with needs. Specifically, the resources required to 

develop and maintain a mutual aid and assistance 

agreement include: 

•	 In-kind contribution of time from members 

•	 Legal fees, or in-kind legal support, associated 

with drafting and finalizing an agreement 

•	 Marketing the agreement through participation in 

conferences and workshops 

•	 Development and maintenance costs associated 

with a Web site (if applicable) 

•	 Meeting space to hold regular meetings between 

members 

Roles and Responsibilities: Specific roles and 

responsibilities are typically defined within the 

mutual aid and assistance agreement, and can vary 

from one agreement to the next. Initially, a 

Leadership Team is tasked with identifying the 

utilities, associations, and agencies that should play a 

major role in the implementation of the mutual aid 

and assistance agreement. They facilitate meetings to 

promote interest in the agreement, and eventually 

recommend representatives for a Steering 

Committee. The Steering Committee is responsible 

for identifying a Chair or Leader, determining 

membership criteria, and outlining the governing 

principles of the agreement. The Chair is responsible 

for ensuring an agreement is then drafted, based on 

OCTOBER 2008 14 
 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

input from the group. The agreement then defines 

the roles and responsibilities of requesting and 

assisting member utilities in response to a disaster, as 

well as how other members help facilitate that 

process. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: 

Collaboration is vital to maintaining strong mutual 

aid and assistance networks. On February 15, 2006, 

eight major water sector associations, representing 

water and wastewater utilities and regulatory 

agencies, signed a joint policy statement promoting 

the development of mutual aid and assistance 

networks as a necessary step to securing our nation’s 

water and wastewater critical infrastructure. A strong 

partnership between these associations and utilities 

provides the framework for a better prepared and 

more resilient water sector. 

Coordination with the state and local emergency 

management agencies is also essential. 

Barriers: Mutual aid and assistance agreements 

provide many benefits to participating utilities. 

However, potential barriers exist and may include: 

•	 Integrating intrastate WARN response with state 

emergency management agencies requires 

ongoing collaboration and education to avoid 

apparent duplication with statewide mutual aid 

agreements for public assets. 

•	 Interstate WARN agreements are challenged by 

differences in state laws. 

•	 Currently, the ability for private sector resources 

to deploy under the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact (EMAC) is limited. 

Lessons Learned: Evaluating response to past 

events is the best way to prepare for the future. 

Events such as 9/11 and more recently, Hurricane 

Katrina, have identified a need for mutual aid and 

assistance agreements because: 

•	 Utilities require specialized resources to sustain 

operations. 

•	 Emergency response activities and other critical 

infrastructure rely on water supplies. 

•	 Utilities must provide their own support until 

state and federal resources are available. 

•	 Large events impact regional areas, making 

response from nearby utilities impractical. 

•	 Disasters impact utility employees and their 

families, creating a greater need for relief from 

outside sources. 

•	 Agreements must be established prior to an event 

for federal reimbursement considerations. 

Success Measures: One of the best ways to 

measure the effectiveness of an agreement is to 

evaluate how effectively, efficiently, and 

appropriately requests for assistance are met. This 

evaluation can take place in the form of an afteraction report, summarizing both the strengths and 

weaknesses of response actions. The report should 

examine at least: 

•	 How well requests were met and what 

percentage of those requests were addressed in a 

timely manner 

•	 Monetary and indirect value added due to 

decreased service downtime (i.e., cost-avoidance 

for businesses and restoration of hope within the 

community) 

•	 Ability of critical customers such as fire and 

health responders to continue their operations 

Benefits and Incentives: Numerous benefits exist 

for mutual aid and assistance agreement members 

including: 

•	 Expedited access to specialized resources 

•	 Improved planning and coordination 

•	 Consistency in response with National Incident 

Management System (NIMS) guidelines 

•	 Voluntary and cost-free participation 

•	 Articles addressing response issues such as 

member indemnification, workers’ 

compensation, and reimbursement 

•	 Ability to activate prior to an emergency 

declaration 

OCTOBER 2008 15 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

3 : Regional 

Contamination Response 

Network 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Contamination Detection; and Partnerships 

Category Type: 

Collaborative; Operational 

General Description: Through a grant from the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a 

utility in the region wanted to take the lead and 

develop a regional response network for responding 

to potential drinking water contamination events. 

The utility hired a consultant to identify and survey 

potential partners for collecting data, including 

information on agency decision-making authorities, 

and sampling and communications capabilities. 

Twenty-eight participants from a network of 16 

agencies attended a workshop that used a drinking 

water contamination event to determine the region’s 

response capabilities. During the workshop, 

participants drafted a statement of organizing 

principles, identified existing response groups, 

guidance documents, and systems with which the 

network should align. Participants developed a 

listing of single points of contact, agreed to 

implement a 24-hour phone number to activate their 

agency during an emergency, and developed action 

items for the network and region. A decision-making 

and communications flow exercise enabled 

participants to compare information about their 

agency’s communications needs during a water 

contamination emergency, and resulted in the 

creation of a draft communications model for use 

during an emergency. 

Following the workshop, participants formed a 

steering committee to further promote the network. 

Thirty agencies in the region participate in the 

response network. 

Resources Required: Approximately $100,000 

was spent to develop the materials, collect research 

information, plan and facilitate the workshop, and 

write up the results. 

Roles and Responsibilities: Each agency 

representative participated in pre- and post-workshop 

meetings, and coordinated with their respective 

coworkers to identify issues of concern and raise 

them during the workshop. Additionally, 

representatives had decision-making authority so that 

critical decisions could be made at the workshop. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: 

Collaboration between local agencies included 

utilities, police, fire, public health, hospitals, and 

emergency management. 

Barriers: Barriers included: 

•	 The existence of other local response networks 

dilutes the purpose of a network specific to water 

contamination 

•	 Lack of funding and commitment to lead the 

network inhibit development and growth 

Lessons Learned: An important lesson learned 

was that creating a contamination response network 

was critical for providing local response capability to 

a contamination event. EPA provides similar 

emergency capabilities in the Seattle-King County 

area that enhances a local contamination network’s 

ability to respond (see Practice Description #13). 

Success Measures: In the absence of an actual 

contamination event, the success of a response 

network can be measured by looking at specific 

instances of increased cooperation between network 

members. This can be evidenced by: 

•	 Instituting or increasing the number of joint 

contamination exercises between member 

agencies 

OCTOBER 2008 16 
 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

•	 Updating response plans, contact lists, and 

communication procedures based on joint 

exercises 

•	 Establishing mutual aid agreements between 

utility network members 

•	 Adding new members to the network 

Benefits and Incentives: Responding to an actual 

or suspected contamination event requires 

collaboration between the utility, the local health 

department, law enforcement, and emergency 

management. Each has a distinct responsibility to 

protect the health and safety of the public. Having a 

contamination response network provides a vehicle 

for engaging these partners as a group, which can 

lead to the pooling of resources and reduce costs. 

Additionally, federal security grants are increasingly 

being awarded with preferences towards regional and 

multi-agency approaches towards preparedness. 

OCTOBER 2008 17 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

4 : Conducting Disaster 

Exercises for Regional 

Preparedness 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Tested and 

Updated; and Partnerships 

Category Type: 

Collaborative; Operational 

General Description: To enhance preparedness, 

participants in this activity conducted three regional 

disaster preparedness drills, known as the Blue 

Cascades Series, which focused on public and private 

critical infrastructure interdependencies. The U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security has identified 

critical infrastructure exercises in the National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) as the model 

for addressing critical infrastructure security issues on 

a regional level. 

The number of attendees at each of the three Blue 

Cascade exercises ranged between 100 and 200 

representatives from regional public and private 

sector organizations. Participants included public and 

private infrastructure sector stakeholders from the 

United States and Canada, and federal, provincial, 

state, and local agencies. The activity also included 

exercise planning, as well as a workshop to follow up 

on the findings and recommendations of the afteraction report. 

Developing an exercise has been summarized into 

the following seven steps: 

Step 1. Create a regional cooperative initiative and 

partnership comprising key stakeholders, including 

the leadership of senior local, state, and private sector 

leaders. 

In this case, the core group of 30 to 45 organizations 

became the steering committee of the partnership and 

represents: major utilities; key local, state, regional, 

and federal government organizations; businesses; 

nonprofits; and community institutions such as 

hospitals and academics. Additionally, associations 

that represent broad organizational memberships 

were invited. 

Step 2. Develop and conduct an interactive, 

educational workshop(s) to provide necessary 

information to key stakeholders on regional 

infrastructure interdependencies, disaster 

preparedness, and security challenges. 

A primary goal of the workshop(s) was to develop an 

understanding of regional interdependencies and 

establish a framework for trust and collaboration to 

advance regional preparedness and response. 

Step 3. Develop and conduct a regional 

infrastructure interdependencies exercise based on 

scenarios designed by members of the core 

stakeholder group, and other interested organizations, 

which reflect their interests and concerns regarding a 

major disaster. 

The objectives of the exercise are not to test plans or 

procedures, but are designed to: 

•	 Provide participants with an awareness of 

baseline regional interdependencies and 

associated physical and cyber vulnerabilities. 

•	 Identify preparedness gaps. 

•	 Develop action items and next steps to solve 

issues exposed by the exercises. 

Step 4. Produce a report based on the lessons learned 

from the exercise with findings and 

recommendations that have been coordinated and 

validated by the key stakeholders. 

Step 5. Develop and conduct an Action Planning 

Workshop with the exercise participants. This 

workshop should focus on implementing the 

recommended activities from the exercise reports and 

identify specific projects to these ends. 

Step 6. In coordination with key stakeholders, 

prioritize the projects identified in Step 5 into an 

OCTOBER 2008 18 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

Action Plan. The Action Plan activities should be 

incorporated into regional and organizational 

preparedness strategies, plans, and funding requests. 

Step 7. Within the region, create working groups 

with lead government agencies and private sector 

organizations that will undertake development of a 

cross-sector approach to implementing the short-, 

medium-, and longer-term activities identified in the 

Action Plan. 

Resources Required: The total cost of planning 

and conducting the seminar, exercise and action 

planning workshop was $238,000; this amount does 

not include the volunteer efforts by the design team 

or participants. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The key roles and 

responsibilities for this practice are as follows: 

•	 The regional organization leading the preparation 

of the exercises should obtain funding, identify 

the scope of the exercise, and identify a scenario 

design team. It should then periodically meet 

with the design team to review and refine the 

scenario. 

•	 In parallel with overseeing the scenario design 

work, the organization should arrange all 

planning workshop and exercise logistics, 

including notifying and scheduling participants, 

securing the facilities to be used in the exercise, 

and developing materials for the exercise. 

•	 After the exercise, the regional organization 

collects all exercise feedback and materials and 

prepares an after-action report with 

recommendations. This report is then reviewed 

in a full-day meeting with the design team, the 

evaluation team, and in some cases the 

participants, to comment on the report and to 

prioritize the actions. The report is then finalized 

and a meeting is conducted to refine the resulting 

action plan. 

•	 The design team is responsible for designing the 

scenario within the scope dictated by the regional 

organization, participating in a pre-exercise 

walk-through, and helping with the review of 

materials for the after-action reports. 

•	 The evaluation team also participates in the preexercise walk-through; documents the successes, 

failures, and lessons learned from the exercise; 

presents their findings; and participates in 

drafting the after-action report. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: This entire 

practice is a collaborative process between sectors 

and public and private agencies. The focus is to 

identify interdependencies and further regional 

preparedness through collaboration. Additional 

collaboration can occur among regional organizations 

by sharing information on planning and 

implementing exercises as well as the after-action 

reports and other outcomes of the exercises. 

Barriers: The most significant barrier is balancing 

the need for comprehensive representation among 

participants with the inherent difficulties that emerge 

from trying to coordinate too large a group. This 

group has varied backgrounds, knowledge, 

experience, constraints, and capabilities that should 

be considered in the exercise design and conduct, as 

well as follow-up planning to prepare the region, but 

it is feared that the group cannot sustain many more 

members. 

Lessons Learned: The overall practice includes a 

process for identifying and applying lessons learned 

to constantly adapt and improve the practice. 

Lessons learned specific to this case include the 

following: 

•	 The core partnership is located in the Puget 

Sound region; however, several smaller 

metropolitan partnerships exist in Anchorage, 

Alaska; Vancouver, British Columbia; 

Edmonton/Calgary, Alberta; and Portland, 

Oregon. Engaging potential participants through 

smaller regional groups may allow the 

organizing agency to recruit a greater diversity of 

participants without significantly increasing 

effort. 

•	 The participants tend to be more from the core 

location of the organization than from outlying 

geographical areas. 

•	 The growth has occurred organically, based on 

word of mouth. Thus, providing successful 

exercises and good follow-up planning attracts 

new participants from the region and across 

sectors. 

OCTOBER 2008 19 
 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

Success Measures: For regional organizations 

seeking to undertake a similar activity, the success of 

the exercises themselves will be determined based on 

the specific objectives of the exercise and the afteraction report and evaluation. For evaluating the 

success of the process, the organizers can look at 

several factors, including: 

•	 Evaluation forms filled out by participants 

•	 Projected costs vs. actual costs, and the success 

in securing supplementary funding, like 

homeland security grants 

•	 Deadlines met for meetings and developing 

materials 

•	 Repeat and expanding participation (although, as 

mentioned, the size of the group should remain 

manageable) 

Benefits and Incentives: This activity presents 

many benefits and incentives to participating 

agencies, including: 

•	 Participants in the practice build relationships 

that can improve cooperation and response to 

many other types of events. 

•	 Interdependencies and gaps in a response are 

identified before an incident occurs, allowing 

participating agencies to develop plans and 

activities to deal with these. 

•	 Documentation of preparedness needs such as 

these can then support applications for homeland 

security grants. 

•	 In addition to homeland security grants, 

participating agencies can pool resources and 

funding, lowering the overall cost to individual 

agencies. 

OCTOBER 2008 20 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

5 : Educating Public 

Officials 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Promote Communication; and Establish Partnerships 

Category Type: 

Collaborative 

General Description: This utility established, and 

is maintaining, an ongoing relationship with local 

public officials to educate them on the importance of 

a safe and reliable water supply. The utility held oneon-one meetings with top public officials and water 

utility leaders to communicate the preparedness 

issues faced by the utility and how they impacted the 

community. Prior to the meetings, utility staff held 

discussions among themselves to decide the most 

critical information to provide the public officials, 

and provided this information to the public officials’ 

staffers in pre-meeting briefings. Discussion topics 

included utility security program features, funding 

issues, outcomes from emergency response exercises, 

and interactions with other city departments. 

This strategy allowed the utility to effectively 

communicate the true value of a safe water supply to 

the community, and enabled public officials to better 

understand that the water utility is a key component 

of the municipal infrastructure for promoting public 

safety and health. 

OCTOBER 2008 

These discussions have been extended to an annual 

basis and now include the entire group of elected 

public officials at the city and county level. 

Resources Required: The most significant 

investments involved activities related to the 

meetings utility staff attended. The main cost 

included staff time to develop briefing and 

presentation content, present that content to the public 

officials, and conduct follow-up activities as a result 

of the meetings. There were also additional minor 

expenditures for producing briefing materials. 

Roles and Responsibilities: Utility managers and 

supervisors from the major departments (such as 

customer service, operations, treatment, and 

distribution) needed to determine their respective 

issues, concerns, resources, and funding requirements 

for preparing and responding to a water emergency. 

The utility security lead acted as the utility’s 

representative to the public officials by presenting the 

utility department’s information and facilitating the 

subsequent discussion. The utility security lead 

required the support of a public official’s liaison to 

provide preliminary review of utility proposals and 

activities; and to coordinate with the public officials 

on the utility program and agenda items. The public 

officials liaison also needed to convey to the utility 

security lead the interests and needs of the public 

officials and their constituents to better prepare the 

utility security lead for the meetings and discussions. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: Key partners 

included law enforcement, fire, and information 

technology (IT) department officials. These partners 

often share budgets and should coordinate with each 

other regularly. A water emergency would directly 

affect a fire departments’ ability to provide adequate 

fire protection. Law enforcement may serve many 

roles, including site security and crowd control, or 

assist with door-to-door notification of water-use 

restrictions in the event of a water emergency. The 

IT department may need to be accessed to coordinate 

communication between these partners and the 

utility. Obtaining their support for utility security 

proposals and requests serves to bolster the utility’s 

case to the public officials. 

Barriers: The primary barriers encountered during 

this activity included gaining access to public 

officials and conveying that utility concerns are, in 

21 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

fact, public safety concerns and should be of concern 

to public officials. In addition: 

•	 Elected officials have a limited amount of time to 

allocate to the many, often competing, interests 

and constituents they serve. Utility proposals 

should be clear and supportable without 

overloading the officials with unnecessary 

information. 

•	 Many public officials have not viewed water 

utility security as a vital community security 

concern. Changing this mindset will take time 

and a regular flow of information to the officials. 

•	 Just as utility representatives should present their 

concerns in the best interest of the public and the 

public officials, they should also consider the 

impacts of their proposal from the perspective of 

the public officials. 

Lessons Learned: Among the lessons learned 

during this activity, a common theme involved 

cultivating professional relationships between agency 

representatives. In addition: 

•	 The credibility of the top utility officials among 

public officials and other first responder officials 

is invaluable in winning support for adequate 

budgets for security and preparedness. 

•	 The role of elected officials as policy advocates 

for utility security and emergency management 

activities is critical to winning requested funding. 

•	 An open and stable relationship between the 

utility and its elected officials, and first responder 

partner agencies, is essential to a successful 

utility preparedness program. 

Success Measures: The most evident success 

measure was increased and/or continued funding of 

the security and emergency management activities. 

This reflects recognition by public officials of the 

challenges faced by a utility in maintaining an active 

and effective protective program, as well as the 

success of utility representatives in presenting their 

concerns as overall community concerns. 

Benefits and Incentives: Maintaining regular 

meetings and communications with public officials 

can result in ongoing funding of the utility’s security 

and preparedness efforts. Additionally, in an 

emergency, public officials will serve as 

representatives both to, and of, the public. 

Cultivating a strong relationship with them will help 

maintain public confidence in the utility during times 

of crisis. 

OCTOBER 2008 22 
 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

6 : Water Sector 

Collaboration with Law 

Enforcement to Enhance 

Local Emergency 

Response 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Promote Communication; and Establish Partnerships 

Category Type: 

Collaborative 

General Description: This utility developed a 

working relationship with law enforcement to 

enhance their emergency response capabilities. The 

utility and law enforcement agencies employed a 

number of methods to open communication channels 

and improve cooperation, summarized below: 

•	 The utility and area law enforcement instituted 

regular monthly meetings to improve interagency familiarity and communication. 

•	 Daily electronic incident reports were sent to 

utility, law enforcement, and crime analysis staff 

to increase awareness of potential threats and 

vulnerabilities. 

•	 The utility became involved in the regional 

intelligence fusion center, allowing it to both 

contribute and receive threat information. 

•	 The utility and law enforcement collaborated to 

create a utility-specific video for law 

enforcement personnel to familiarize them with 

water security issues. 

•	 The utility included law enforcement personnel 

in reviewing and improving utility incident 

response procedures and facility security 

measures. 

•	 The utility and law enforcement agencies 

involved agree that the improved 

communication and cooperation realized through 

these actions has increased the security and 

safety of the community. 

Resources Required: The main resource 

associated with this activity was man-hours to 

perform the listed activities. These costs for staff 

time varied depending on the number of meetings the 

utility attended and the number of representatives 

they sent. The costs for staff attendance came out of 

the utility’s operations budget. Additionally, the 

utility had to procure software and training for staff 

on the electronic incident reporting tool. Law 

enforcement agencies incurred similar labor costs to 

attend monthly meetings, contribute to the 

development of the utility video for law enforcement, 

and review utility security procedures and measures. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The utility’s Director 

of Security and Emergency Management and other 

utility security specialists met regularly with local law 

enforcement agency representatives to discuss and 

maintain their partnership, to review patterns and 

trends in crime, and to develop plans to coordinate 

overall response. Additionally, utility security and 

watershed protection staff met regularly with the law 

enforcement officers assigned to their respective 

areas to discuss site-specific issues and response 

coordination. 

OCTOBER 2008 23 
 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

Collaboration with Other Partners: The utility 

collaborated with their local law enforcement 

partners at many levels, from highly placed officials 

to patrol personnel. Additionally, their participation 

in the regional fusion center allowed them to engage 

emergency response and law enforcement partners 

beyond the utility’s geographical coverage area and 

at the state and federal level. 

Barriers: Barriers encountered while building this 

practice include: 

•	 Changes in staff, which can set back 

communications while new relationships are 

built 

•	 Additional burdens on staff time, which limited 

their ability to promptly and carefully review the 

large amounts of intelligence and incident data 

that were received 

Lessons Learned: This practice revealed lessons 

learned that ranged from selecting appropriate 

technologies to better methods of fostering interagency relationships. Specifically: 

•	 A stronger relationship with law enforcement 

can be developed if both entities focus on 

common interests, like physical security and 

intelligence sharing. 

•	 The utility should be able to employ a number of 

different communication technologies. Text 

pagers and telephones may be best for relaying 

immediate security threat information, while 

emails may be the best vehicle for providing 

periodic reports. These should not replace faceto-face meetings and presentations, which 

reinforce existing relationships. 

•	 A main focus of inter-agency contacts should be 

to develop teamwork and trust between agencies 

in order to foster a positive working relationship 

over time. 

•	 Employing professionally trained patrol staff 

with law enforcement experience at the utility 

improves communication between agencies. 

Success Measures: The success of this practice 

can be measured by monitoring regular contacts 

between the utility and law enforcement. 

Specifically, evaluating the quality and consistency 

of: 

•	 Regular monthly meetings between utility and 

law enforcement managers and supervisors 

•	 Daily transmission of incident reports and 

summaries 

•	 Regular security reviews and patrols in 

conjunction with law enforcement personnel 

Benefits and Incentives: Partnering with law 

enforcement can help the utility win federal grants 

through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). 

UASI is the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security’s grant program, passed through to states to 

administer at the local level. UASI sets a strategic 

direction for the enhancement of regional response 

capability and capacity. UASI’s mission is to reduce 

area vulnerability and prevent terrorism and/or 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents by 

strengthening the cycle of response, and ensuring that 

potential targets are identified, assessed, and 

protected. 

The UASI funding board also includes law 

enforcement representatives. Developing strong 

relationships with local law enforcement agencies 

can improve the utility’s chance of securing UASI 

funding as those agencies can act as advocates for the 

utility. 

OCTOBER 2008 24 
 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

7 : Drinking Water and 

Wastewater Agency 

Collaboration with Other 

Sectors in Regional 

Emergency Planning 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Tested and 

Updated; and Partnerships 

Category Type: 

Collaborative; Operational 

General Description: Water sector agencies in the 

area recognized the need to be involved with regional 

security committees in order to have a voice in grant 

allocation and regional planning decisions. Several 

utility directors from across the county divided their 

efforts, so each of the regional homeland security 

committees would have a drinking water or 

wastewater utility representative. 

Water sector representatives attended regional 

meetings, promoted and received first responder 

recognition, and became accepted members of the 

regional emergency management groups. 

Representatives were able to participate in 

developing regional plans, including implementing 

requirements under the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security’s Strategic Plan. 

Resources Required: The resources for this 

activity include time and expenses for drinking water 

and wastewater utility representatives to travel and 

attend their respective regional security committee 

meetings and perform associated duties. Meetings 

are typically held annually. 

Roles and Responsibilities: It is the responsibility 

of each drinking water and wastewater utility 

representative to attend regional security committee 

meetings (or send an informed designee), to present 

the water sector’s concerns and issues, and to report 

back to other drinking water/wastewater security 

committee representatives on any regional 

developments and opportunities reported in 

committee meetings. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: This practice 

allows for regional collaboration of drinking water 

and wastewater utilities with fire and police 

departments, port authorities, local government, and 

citizen groups. 

Barriers: No significant barriers were encountered 

during this activity. 

Lessons Learned: Balancing the additional 

responsibilities of being a regional security 

committee representative with normal duties can 

prove challenging, as can securing funding for travel 

to the various meetings. 

Success Measures: Increasing drinking 

water/wastewater sector representation on regional 

security committees, which includes: 

•	 Increasing attendance at regional security 

committee meetings 

•	 Increasing representation of water sector in 

regional trainings and exercises 

•	 Increasing representation of water sector in more 

localized response committees and 

organizations, for example local fire and police 

chief associations 

Benefits and Incentives: In addition to giving 

utilities a voice in the security arena, utilities have 

been awarded grants that typically are provided to 

traditional first responders such as police and fire. 

OCTOBER 2008 25 
 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

8 : Supplying Emergency 

Water via Temporary 

Piping 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Design and Construction 

Category Type: 

Infrastructure 

General Description: This utility’s vulnerability 

assessment indicated that seismic activity or a 

malevolent act could result in significant 

consequences to critical customers—areas served by 

a sole water main or service areas isolated by bodies 

of water. The utility evaluated multiple scenarios and 

the impacts of a serious water service interruption 

following an emergency event or equipment 

malfunction, and identified those situations with the 

highest probability and consequence. 

As a result of the evaluation, this utility purchased 

flexible temporary transmission and distribution 

lines, along with multiple associated fittings to 

mitigate the risk of a service interruption. Lines in 

several diameters (up to 12 inches) are stored on reels 

and staged in three locations where they can be 

rapidly deployed. The water pipes are flexible plastic 

and can be installed on the ground or under water to 

provide temporary water service. 

Resources Required: The cost for 12-inch 

diameter flexible transmission and distribution lines 

OCTOBER 2008 

is around $150 per foot, including associated fittings. 

Additional resources include annual exercises for 

field staff to maintain familiarity in the deployment of 

the temporary water mains and pipes, and inspection 

time to ensure the lines and related supplies are wellmaintained and free of contamination. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The utility staff is 

trained by the supplier for effective use of the flexible 

transmission and distribution lines. Utility staff is 

responsible for installation, maintenance, 

disinfection, sampling, and testing of the piping and 

fittings according to approved procedures. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: The military 

and other utilities with experience using flexible 

transmission and distribution lines provided 

information on lessons learned and installation 

techniques for the pipes and fittings. Additionally, 

the utility incorporated the temporary transmission 

and distribution lines into their mutual aid agreements 

with other utilities, making them available in times of 

need. 

Barriers: The primary barrier encountered for 

implementing this activity was overcoming staff 

concerns that the temporary transmission and 

distribution lines might compromise disinfection and 

water quality. The utility previously employed rigid, 

less versatile piping to supply emergency water, 

which did not pose the same concerns. 

Lessons Learned: Multiple lessons learned from 

implementation and consultation included: 

•	 Positioning storage locations for the lines is 

important for ready deployment. Key 

considerations include storing equipment in 

multiple areas and focusing on sections of the 

water system that are only served by a single 

water main. 

•	 Proper maintenance, storage, cleaning, and 

disinfection are critical to effective deployment 

as a temporary potable water system. 

•	 Staff gains training and experience by 

implementing procedures and using the 

equipment during routine outages due to 

maintenance, water main breaks, or construction 

activity. 

•	 Assessing the correct sizes and amount of 

temporary lines needed is critical, and should be 

26 
SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

based on the utility size, geography, and single 

points of failure. 

Success Measures: Success measures for this 

activity include staff accepting use of the temporary 

lines as standard operating procedure, regular use 

during routine operations, and successful deployment 

of the lines during training and actual events. 

Benefits and Incentives: Implementing this 

practice provides multiple benefits for the utility and 

the community it serves, including: 

•	 The temporary lines can be used for both 

emergencies and routine operations. 

•	 The lines are sufficient for providing water for 

fire suppression, if necessary. 

•	 The equipment can be made available as a 

regional resource to other water utilities. 

•	 Customer confidence and satisfaction is 

increased by enhancing the utility’s ability to 

provide safe water to its customers during 

emergency events, routine system failures, and 

service interruptions due to construction 

activities. 

OCTOBER 2008 27 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

9 : Enhancing Law 

Enforcement Response 

with Video Assessment 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Physical and Procedural Controls on Facility Access; 

and Establish Local Partnerships 

Category Type: 

Infrastructure; Collaborative 

General Description: This utility’s vulnerability 

assessment identified priority facilities and critical 

assets vital to fulfilling the utility’s mission. They 

determined the loss of one or more of these critical 

assets were of high consequence. The utility installed 

a video assessment system to increase its ability to 

assess alarm events that occur at, or near, critical 

assets. This equipment uses a Digital Video 

Recording (DVR) system, along with a 

communications system to transmit the video to a 

central location for viewing and assessment. 

An actual security event occurred during the trial 

period, where the utility discovered evidence of a 

break-in and called local law enforcement. Law 

enforcement viewed the related video footage, and 

the individual was 

apprehended. 

After the incident, 

the utility and law 

enforcement 

determined that 

security could be 

further enhanced 

by the installation 

of alarms at locations where security cameras were 

OCTOBER 2008 

installed. The utility then installed detection and 

alarm monitoring equipment. The system now alerts 

utility staff of the immediate need to assess video 

surveillance images and to contact law enforcement 

for an investigation, instead of waiting until an 

intrusion is detected during routine patrols. 

Resources Required: Resources required for this 

practice are divided into three components: 

•	 Purchase and installation of cameras and DVR 

equipment 

•	 Building a wireless communications system to 

transfer images 

•	 Installing facility alarms 

Roles and Responsibilities: Roles and 

responsibilities include: 

•	 Utility control center staff receives alarms, 

monitors the video assessment equipment, 

assesses unusual activity, contacts law 

enforcement, and prepares incident reports. 

•	 Utility maintenance staff inspects and maintains 

equipment and the communications systems to 

assure reliable operation of the alarm and video 

system. 

•	 Law enforcement officers assess field conditions 

at the site and take appropriate action to prevent 

and/or mitigate consequences, including 

interactions, as necessary. 

•	 Utility management develops protocols for 

utility staff assessment and response, provides 

training, and provides supervision at critical 

events. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: 

Collaboration occurs between utility staff and law 

enforcement to maintain common understanding of 

the threats as well as the communication techniques 

employed during an event. 

Barriers: The barriers encountered were technical, 

which affect the operations of the equipment. For 

example, difficulty with using and adjusting the 

monitoring equipment resulted in poor video images 

due to improper camera focus, panning range, and 

changes in light and weather conditions. The quality 

of the images directly affected the assessment of 

those images, which impacted the utility’s ability to 

gauge the particular threat. 

28 
SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

Lessons Learned: The lessons learned involved 

both technological issues related to the new 

equipment implementation and inter-agency 

relationships to ensure an efficient response. 

Specifically: 

•	 Utilities need to include the use of video cameras 

in daily operations to keep employees trained 

and comfortable with the technology. This will 

also alert staff early to problems with the 

equipment from malfunctions and improper 

adjustments that impact the quality of the images 

recorded. 

•	 Detection is an important feature of the video 

assessment system to indicate an immediate 

need to monitor the event. Installing facility 

alarm systems in conjunction with video 

assessment systems greatly enhances facility 

security. 

•	 Creating relationships with local law 

enforcement before an incident is essential for 

coordinating response procedures. It is also 

important for law enforcement to know the 

reliability of information the utility is providing 

(a facility alarm with video of an intruder is more 

significant that just a facility alarm). 

Success Measures: The equipment has already 

proven successful at identifying an intruder. In 

addition, the equipment has the potential to decrease 

the number of false alarms in cases where an 

employee accidentally trips the alarm and fails to 

report it. 

Benefits and Incentives: This practice increases 

the utility’s ability to protect its customers’ drinking 

water supply and provide faster assessment and 

response to possible intrusion and malevolent acts. 

The enhanced relationship with law enforcement also 

helped to improve security and response to other 

facilities without equipment upgrades. This practice 

is an integral part of the utility’s comprehensive allhazards preparedness program. 

OCTOBER 2008 29 
 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

10: On-site Sodium 

Hypochlorite Generation 

for Wastewater 

Disinfection 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Incorporate Security Considerations into Design and 

Construction 

Category Type: 

Infrastructure 

General Description: Many utilities use chlorine 

for drinking water and wastewater treatment. The 

practice of using chlorine has included both gaseous 

and liquid forms based on factors of convenience, 

reliability, and safety. As concerns increased about 

risks associated with malevolent acts after 

September 11, 2001, utilities began finding new ways 

to reduce this risk. Concerns for personal and 

environmental safety resulted in adoption of risk 

management practices that caused many utilities to 

switch from using gaseous chlorine to liquid chlorine 

and other alternatives. Please note: EPA does not 

have an official position on chlorine use; the practice 

described here is utility specific. 

This practice was implemented at a small utility with 

less than 30 employees. The utility determined that 

using liquid sodium hypochlorite for one of its 

routine applications in wastewater treatment had been 

a preferred practice prior to September 11, 2001. The 

utility chose the process of on-site generation of 

sodium hypochlorite over deliveries of liquid 

chlorine. This process converts ordinary salt to a 

usable chlorine product via an electrolytic process. 

The utility continued to use gaseous chlorine for the 

remainder of its treatment processes, but changed this 

practice when the risk management processes 

required conducting emergency drills in the 

neighborhoods where the chlorine gas was used. 

This new requirement meant creating an ongoing 

program to prepare the local residences in the event 

of a release of chlorine gas. The utility chose the 

conversion process based on a cost-benefit analysis 

that considered security and public health concerns. 

The new practice at this utility is to use on-site 

chlorine generation for all wastewater treatment 

practices. 

Resources Required: The cost of this practice is 

approximately $6,000 every 2 to 3 years for 

maintaining the on-site equipment. Additional 

resources are needed to pay for power, labor, and salt 

costs related to producing sodium hypochlorite. The 

utility offset some of these costs by eliminating the 

expense and risk of transporting and storing one-ton 

gaseous chlorine cylinders. Instead, the utility stores 

a small amount of liquid sodium hypochlorite at a 

concentration that is at, or below, the concentration of 

household bleach. 

Roles and Responsibilities: There are no distinct 

roles and responsibilities for implementing this 

practice outside of the normal utility processes for 

operational safety. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: This practice 

does not involve collaboration with other partners. 

Barriers: There are potential financial barriers to this 

practice. Individual utilities will need to weigh the 

expense of implementing an on-site sodium 

hypochlorite generation system with their current 

system. This analysis should include other 

considerations such as reduced security requirements 

from removing the likelihood of being a target. 

Lessons Learned: The primary lesson learned was 

improved safety for utility staff and the community. 

Success Measures: The main measure of success 

for this practice is that the utility found the practice 

sustainable for partial conversion to on-site 

generation before the heightened security concerns 

sparked by September 11, 2001, and found the 

changing security environment post-September 11, 

OCTOBER 2008 30 
SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

2001, justified conversion to complete on-site 

generation. 

Benefits and Incentives: The primary benefit of 

this practice is reduced risk to the community due to 

an accidental or purposeful release of gaseous 

chlorine. 

OCTOBER 2008 31 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

11: Securing Utility 

Information 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Security Sensitive Information Access Control 

Category Type: 

Infrastructure 

General Description: This utility developed a set 

of practices for identifying security sensitive 

information, determining the value of the information 

(based on the consequences from improper use, 

disclosure or loss), and developed practices and 

procedures to mitigate those risks, as follows: 

•	 Inventorying and controlling information to 

which employees need access (e.g., maps and 

records) by instituting employee access 

classifications, identifying procedures and 

facilities to protect restricted records, and 

assigning access based upon need and 

classification. 

•	 Using of a security consultant to assist the utility 

in controlling access to critical data in electronic 

format. 

•	 Restricting consultant/contractor access to data 

and preventing removal of data from a utility 

site. 

•	 Changing the traditional process of security 

consultant selection within the utility to reduce 

distribution of sensitive information. This 

included choosing a security consultant based on 

qualifications rather than bid. 

•	 Securing critical data from the public record by 

removing it from Web sites, and other public 

documents and records. Information provided to 

other government agencies may be subject to the 

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and state or 

local government requirements. However, 

FOIA, and many state and local ordinances, 

contain exemptions for sensitive and security 

related data. 

•	 Re-keying critical facilities on a scheduled basis 

to make sure access is restricted to authorized 

personnel. Assignment of keys to employees is 

done based on need. All assigned keys are 

tracked. 

•	 Securing vouchers and pay requests from 

contracts for physical security enhancements. 

When payment vouchers are routed through a 

primary government agency, purchase 

information becomes part of the public record, 

resulting in publicly accessible information about 

security enhancements. This knowledge can 

increase the risk of individuals or groups 

learning the nature, design, capabilities, and 

limitations of the utility security system. By 

allowing one category of vouchers to remain 

accessible only to the auditor, sensitive 

information regarding the nature of a utility’s 

security system is protected. This approach to 

designating one type of voucher or pay request 

can be justified based on being diligent when 

protecting the safety and security of the utility, 

the utility’s employees, and the public. 

Resources Required: The resources needed to 

protect and secure information vary widely 

depending on how much of the work is done 

internally and how much is contracted out to 

consultants. Accurate accounting for this practice 

was unavailable. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The utility 

designated an internal information security team, 

comprising members of all of the major departments. 

The team was responsible for identifying sensitive 

information and handling procedures, which include 

storage, handling when not in storage, and other 

considerations. Individual team members were 

responsible for identifying security sensitive 

information within their respective departments and 

OCTOBER 2008 32 
 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

for assessing the level of security needed for each 

piece of information. In addition, utility and local 

government councils were consulted to determine the 

legal issues associated with protecting information. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: This utility 

conducted their information security program 

internally, with the assistance of an outside security 

consultant. Utilities engaging in a similar practice 

may consider consulting other drinking water and 

wastewater utilities (and other utilities in general, 

such as electric or gas utilities), and local agencies to 

determine how they protect their information. 

Barriers: This utility did not face any significant 

barriers. However, some utilities may face barriers 

getting their employees to take a new, security 

minded attitude towards protecting information. 

Lessons Learned: Implementing a program to 

assess and protect sensitive information reduced the 

risk of malevolent acts. Additionally, it helped to 

educate staff about the types of information they 

handle on a daily basis and the importance of 

safeguarding that information. 

Success Measures: One measure of success is 

that the utility can demonstrate they have fully 

catalogued, and appropriately protected, sensitive 

security information. In addition, periodic audits of 

the program determine if employees have embraced 

it and ultimately determine the program’s success. 

Benefits and Incentives: Instituting an effective 

information security program has many benefits. 

Protecting sensitive information related to physical 

security measures improves the effectiveness of those 

measures by making them harder to identify and 

defeat. Measures for securing electronic information 

include general improvements to the utility’s 

information technology (IT) systems, which provide 

additional benefits in preventing electronic attacks on 

the utility (for instance, more secure firewalls for 

preventing access to sensitive data also helps prevent 

hacking of command and control systems). By 

identifying and eliminating information the utility 

does not truly need (or by implementing stronger 

security measures for protecting it), the utility 

increases customer confidence and decreases its legal 

liability in the event the data is stolen. 

OCTOBER 2008 33 
 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

12: Enhanced Security of 

the Distribution System 

through Bulk Water 

Metering Stations 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Intrusion Detection and Access Control; and 

Resiliency in Design and Construction 

Category Type: 

Infrastructure 

General Description: To reduce the risk of 

contamination from backflow or siphoning into the 

water distribution system, this utility installed water 

metering stations for its bulk water purchasers, such 

as builders and landscapers. All commercial bulk 

water purchasers should use the stations and are 

prohibited from using fire hydrants for bulk water 

filling. Additionally, the utility began a rewards 

program for citizens who report unauthorized use of 

fire hydrants. The use of the metering stations allows 

the utility to better track the number of gallons used. 

It also simplifies the monitoring of hydrants because 

unofficial vehicles should never use them. 

Resources Required: For this utility, a metering 

station cost approximately $25,000 to install, 

including appropriate backflow protection devices. 

Costs may vary depending on local conditions. No 

significant maintenance costs were incurred during 

the first 2 years of use. This utility also partnered 

with a neighboring utility, which decreased costs on 

design and construction. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The system requires 

minimal staff training and only routine equipment 

maintenance and billing administration. The utility 

provides orientation sessions to bulk water 

purchasers on the use of the metering stations. 

Citizens within the district take an active role in the 

program by reporting unauthorized vehicles and 

persons accessing the metering stations, which helps 

prevent theft and possible contamination. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: 

Implementation and design of the system involved 

collaboration with bulk water purchasers, fire 

department, law enforcement, and water utility 

customers. The utility shared its design with a 

neighboring water utility, and both utilities installed 

the water metering stations concurrently. 

Barriers: There was initial resistance from some of 

the bulk water purchasers who objected to the cost 

incurred for them to provide licensed vehicles and 

drivers to travel to the metering stations. This was 

resolved through a series of meetings with the utility 

manager who explained the importance of the 

stations to the security of the distribution system, and 

further explained that the utility incurred costs as 

well. 

Lessons Learned: Some lessons learned during 

this activity include: 

•	 A utility should site metering stations where 

access is visible to, and does not negatively 

impact, the existing community. This will 

increase the effectiveness of citizens as station 

monitors. 

•	 A utility should also site the metering stations 

where access is easy, and make metering system 

instructions as clear and simple as possible. This 

will help decrease resistance from bulk 

purchasers. 

Success Measures: This activity was highly 

successful for the utility in cost savings and 

community support. Some notable successes 

include: 

•	 The utility estimated that prior to the water 

metering stations, only one in ten water loads 

was reported. Revenue from the accurate 

accounting of the metering stations paid for the 

OCTOBER 2008 34 
 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

metering stations in 17 months and has provided 

a more accurate accounting of system efficiency 

and water loss figures. 

•	 Customer complaints of low pressure and cloudy 

water have decreased now that hydrants are not 

used for bulk water filling. 

Benefits and Incentives: This practice helps 

mitigate the risk of distribution system contamination 

identified in the vulnerability assessment. Although 

the implementation of the system was driven by a 

desire to decrease water contamination vulnerability, 

implementing water metering stations has provided 

other benefits, including: 

•	 Backflow protection. 

•	 Increased revenue through more accurate 

metering. 

•	 Decreased maintenance costs from hydrant 

abuse and damage to water mains caused by 

sudden surges (water hammers) within the 

distribution system. 

•	 Decreased customer water quality complaints. 

•	 Increased security awareness and personal 

responsibility of citizens to care for their water 

system. 

OCTOBER 2008 35 
 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

13: EPA Assistance for 

Water Contamination 

Incidents 

Corresponding Feature Descriptions: 

Contamination Detection; and Partnerships 

Category Type: 

Operational; Collaborative 

General Description: EPA’s Region 10 

Emergency Response Unit (Response Team) has 

developed a water sampling and analysis practice, 

and uses On-Scene Coordinators to support the water 

sector in responding to emergency contamination 

incidents. The practice was developed after several 

contamination events overwhelmed the local utilities’ 

response capabilities. EPA Region 10, which serves 

several Northwest states, including Seattle-King 

County, recognized the need for their role in this area 

and established this practice. 

The Response Team members, including On-Scene 

Coordinators, were trained to assist water systems 

with emergency preparedness, response, and 

recovery. The Response Team developed specific 

procedures for water related incidents including 

utilizing the practices contained in EPA’s Response 

Protocol Toolbox (RPTB). 

The Response Team’s capabilities include: 

•	 Readiness to respond 24 hours-a-day to a 

contamination incident 

•	 Response with technical resources required to 

address immediate dangers to the public and 

environment 

•	 Community relations skills that can be called 

upon to assist with informing the public about a 

contamination event, response activities, and the 

contaminant involved 

The four main practice areas where the Response 

Team provides emergency assistance are: 

1.	 Collecting multiple samples from different 

sampling points. 

2.	 Rapid analytical field testing, including 

deploying a portable gas chromatograph and 

mass spectrophotometer (GCMS). 

3.	 Coordinating analytical data, including access to 

the EPA National Homeland Security Research 

Center and certified commercial environmental 

labs. In addition, the Response Team 

coordinates directly with state labs, other federal 

agencies such as the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of 

Defense (DoD), depending on the complexity of 

the situation. 

4.	 Data management of samples, methods, and 

field and lab results. 

Members of the Response Team undergo more than 

one month of training and education annually, 

including: 

•	 Hazardous Worker Training 

•	 Advanced Emergency Response 

•	 Incident Command System (ICS) 

•	 Specialized training for sampling and analysis 

equipment and instrumentation 

Additional information on the Response Team is 

available at http://www.rrt10nwac.com/. 

Resources Required: There is no monetary cost to 

the utility to access the Response Team. The 

Response Team staff and equipment are maintained 

by the federal budget to support this practice. 

Roles and Responsibilities: On-Scene 

Coordinators lead the field sampling and response 

effort, and work as part of a Unified Command at an 

incident. EPA staff and their contractors are trained 

to respond as field support, part of the initial 

sampling team, and part of the analysis team. 

Administrative staff is provided by EPA to maintain 

accurate information on resources, contractors, and 

laboratories. The utility contributes to the response by 

OCTOBER 2008 36 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

providing staff who can supply utility-specific input 

and advice to EPA and contractor staff. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: This EPA 

practice supports public and private water sector 

agencies that request assistance from EPA. To 

support this effort, the Response Team uses the 

resources of other government and private agencies 

to provide a rapid and comprehensive response. The 

response capabilities include a variety of public and 

private labs, along with federal equipment and 

resources. 

Barriers: To avoid encountering barriers during a 

response, the following recommendations are for all 

utilities and drinking water and wastewater agencies 

and organizations: 

• Be familiar with the Response Team and its 

capabilities, as described above. 

•	 Utilities should be able to activate their own 

resources and personnel on short notice to 

provide support for an incident. 

•	 Understand that the Response Team’s first 

priority is to protect human health and assist in 

stabilization of an incident. 

Lessons Learned: EPA realized many lessons 

learned, including: 

•	 Outreach to local utilities through in-person 

networking has been a key to the ongoing 

success of the program. 

•	 Utilities need to know how to make a request for 

technical assistance if resources are needed. 

•	 The Response Team’s first concern is public 

health and the environment. 

Capabilities: The EPA Region 10 Emergency 

Response Unit has been successful in enhancing the 

resources and expertise that can quickly be brought to 

bear on a contamination incident. Some of these 

capabilities include: 

•	 Providing on-scene support in a water sector 

contamination incident 

•	 Ability to provide and utilize rapid response field 

testing kits for water contaminants 

•	 Ability to provide and utilize water 

contamination incident sampling kits 

•	 Successful implementation of emergency 

response drills and exercises with water utilities 

Benefits and Incentives: The EPA Response 

Team provides a number of benefits when activated 

to respond to an incident, including the following: 

•	 Resources for federal support to a contamination 

response can be activated without a disaster 

declaration. 

•	 Utilities gain access to experienced support staff 

that is well-trained in water sector emergency 

response and ICS. 

•	 Response Team can be a part of the Unified 

Command or work under the operations section 

of the ICS. 

•	 Response Team’s access to specialized 

equipment and analytical resources provides 

rapid and efficient results for samples taken for 

testing. 

Utilities that access the Response Team are accessing 

not only technical assistance, but also resources and 

coordination on preparedness, planning, response, 

and recovery activities. The Response Team will 

assist in incidents involving hazardous substances, 

biological agents, pollutants and contaminants, oil, 

and weapons of mass destruction in malevolent, 

natural, or accidental disasters or other incidents of 

national significance. 

OCTOBER 2008 37 
 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

14: Emergency 

Preparedness Survey of 

Critical Customers 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Partnerships 

Category Type: 

Operational; Collaborative 

General Description: This utility developed a 

survey to collect information on critical customers’ 

water needs in order to help prepare for an 

emergency that could result in a temporary or 

extended loss of service. Critical customers can 

include hospitals and other medical facilities, elderly 

populations, or other entities where water is a critical 

component to their operations, such as power 

generation and other industrial uses. Critical 

customers have special needs from water utilities, 

especially during emergencies. Periodically 

identifying and cataloguing the special needs for each 

critical customer provides for an understanding 

between the utility and the customer of what to 

expect if an emergency strikes. 

The utility’s annual survey is typically a two-page 

instrument with questions related to customer storage 

capacity, connectivity to the water system, and 

identification of the customer’s disaster plan. 

Customers respond with information on specific 

procedures for water needs (including backup water 

supply), an assessment of the customer’s level of 

independence (the length of time the customer can be 

self-sustaining), and emergency 24/7 contact 

information. These data are then provided to field 

crews responsible for routine and emergency shutoffs 

and outages, as well as emergency management staff 

responsible for event planning and response. 

Resources Required: The level of effort for 

developing the survey, administering it, and 

cataloguing responses represent a small increase in 

the annual operations budget. Implementing the 

system, developing surveys, and maintaining the data 

required staff time; however, actual hours were not 

tracked. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The utility Customer 

Service Key Account Representative (or equivalent) 

has responsibility to collect and maintain the data. 

The utility Field Operations and Control Center staffs 

maintain and review the data so they remain prepared 

for a loss of water in the portions of the system 

serving these customers. The lead for field response 

is the Water Quality Inspector, who assumes the role 

of Incident Commander and makes decisions on 

shutdowns, communications with critical customers, 

and providing temporary water. The utility should 

maintain access to each critical customer’s data and 

conduct regular, preferably joint training on action 

plans to maintain water service or provide adequate 

water in the case of a loss of service. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: Developing 

and maintaining critical customer data requires 

collaboration with local hospital associations, dialysis 

centers, nursing home associations, critical industries, 

and other service providers. Working with these 

groups enables improved communications and 

identification of additional critical customers, as well 

as identification of potential areas for improvement 

between the utility and customers. 

Barriers: Many of the barriers encountered relate to 

securing participation from critical customers, and 

include: 

•	 Difficulty obtaining responses from all or a high 

percentage of customers. Critical customers’ 

staffs may already be stretched thin answering 

other surveys. It is important to impress upon 

them the importance of the information to the 

utility and how it impacts their operations. 

•	 Challenges finding correct customer contacts 

within the surveyed entity (e.g., building 

OCTOBER 2008 38 
 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

engineer) who has the needed information and/or 

authority to provide it. 

•	 Hesitancy on the part of customers and utilities 

to make changes that incur costs if the survey 

indicates inadequate measures in place to deal 

with a loss of service to the customer. 

•	 Difficulty maintaining a regular schedule for 

updating the information. This is extremely 

important because outdated information can 

mask the severity of a situation and worsen an 

emergency. 

Lessons Learned: Lessons learned during this 

activity revealed gaps in the customers’ ability to 

continue operating during a loss of service from the 

utility. Some of the lessons learned include: 

•	 Critical customers need to ensure they have 

reliable backup supplies of water. Many 

customers mistakenly believed they did have 

supplies, but found through this effort they did 

not. 

•	 Utilities need to conduct surveys and work 

directly with critical customers to clarify specific 

customer vulnerabilities that would otherwise 

not be known until an emergency happens. 

•	 Once a vulnerability or inadequacy is identified, 

it is important to follow up with a contingency 

plan between the utility and the customer to 

address concerns. 

•	 Data and procedures related to water security 

apply to a multitude of events linking critical 

customers with the utility, including routine 

utility operation and maintenance. 

•	 After-action reports created following 

contamination events show that critical 

customers who cooperate with their utilities on 

their specific needs prior to an event are better 

prepared for a loss of service. 

Success Measures: Success measures for 

building a comprehensive critical customer database 

include: 

•	 Creating up-to-date information on critical 

customers, including having surveys available 

for collecting information 

•	 Increasing the number of customer or sectorspecific contingency plans and agreements (e.g., 

OCTOBER 2008 

with hospitals and medical facilities, fire 

departments, manufacturing facilities) 

Benefits and Incentives: Creating data on critical 

customers helps the utility meet their mission to 

provide safe and reliable water to their customers. 

The impact of a loss of service to a critical customer 

is likely to have greater consequences, and generate 

greater public attention, than a similar loss to the 

regular customer base. Avoiding a loss of services 

can help improve and maintain public confidence. 

39 
 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

15: Funding Security 

Enhancements 

Corresponding Features Description: 

Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Tested and 

Updated; Security Resources and Implementation 

Priorities; and Intrusion Detection and Access 

Control 

Category Type: 

Operational 

General Description: The U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) makes grants available 

that are administered through state committees for 

security enhancements. In this case, the utility 

applied for funding for security upgrades via the 

county emergency planning committee. The utility 

procured the equipment upgrades up front and then 

applied for reimbursement. The upgrades included: 

•	 Vault alarms installed around the wellheads 

•	 A metering station for bulk water sales 

•	 Chlorine residual and pH sensors to provide 

baseline contaminant protection 

All requests for funding should contain detailed cost 

information. For example, a utility applying for 

fencing should include the type of fence and cost per 

foot of installed fence. However, the application for 

DHS funding does not need to be elaborate; this 

successful application was three pages long. 

If a utility applies for grant funds prior to 

implementing the upgrades, the grant allows for a 10 

percent cost variance from the estimate on the 

application. Any expenditure beyond that requires 

pre-approval. 

The utility started the application process in 

September 2003 and received the grant 

approximately 18 months later. 

OCTOBER 2008 

Resources Required: In this case, total cost of the 

equipment installed was approximately $383,000. 

Consultant services for developing the cost estimate 

were $2,000. Approximately $75,000 covered 

outside labor costs for installing the equipment, and 

approximately $50,000 paid for additional equipment 

to complete installation. 

The amount of time internal staff spent on preparing 

the grant was significant, but not closely tracked. A 

large part of this cost went to paying overtime to 

meet deadlines. These costs can be reduced through 

pre-planning, particularly if the utility has a dedicated 

grant-writer. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The utility staff 

performed most of the work required within the 

framework of the assistance agreement. This 

included managing the contractors performing the 

upgrades, or performing the upgrades themselves. 

The utility used a consultant to perform a detailed 

costs analysis for DHS. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: This activity 

did not involve collaboration with other partners 

beyond DHS. However, applying for grants in 

collaboration with, or with the support of, other local 

agencies (e.g., law enforcement and health) or 

utilities can help increase the chances of receiving a 

grant. 

Barriers: The barriers encountered relate to 

difficulties negotiating the process of applying for the 

grant, and included: 

•	 The committee in charge of funds had no formal 

system for allocating the money. 

•	 Some utility staff changed during the grant 

process and new staff had to be brought up to 

speed on the security enhancement program and 

grant application process, slowing the process. 

•	 Changes to the application required additional 

reviews by county, state, and sometimes federal 

government personnel. 

•	 Each step of the grant process required written 

approval of the state committee. 

•	 Communications between the county and state 

were cumbersome. 

Lessons Learned: The upgrades implemented for 

this activity were identified as necessary in the 

40 
 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

utility’s vulnerability assessment (VA). Relating 

funding requests to a VA, or similar risk assessment, 

demonstrates an ongoing commitment by the utility 

to improve the safety and security of its system, and 

lends additional legitimacy to funding requests. 

Success Measures: The new equipment and 

upgrades helped address gaps identified in the VA, 

allowing the utility to move on to other areas of 

concern. The utility’s success with obtaining grant 

funds has encouraged them to consider applying for 

additional grant funds to implement more securityrelated improvements. 

Benefits and Incentives: 

The wellhead protection upgrades and metering 

station for bulk water sales has lessened the risk that 

contaminants can be introduced to the system by 

limiting unauthorized access. As noted in Practice 

Description #12, metering stations also help the 

utility more accurately monitor bulk water sales, 

increasing revenue. 

The positive experience this utility had with obtaining 

grant funding has encouraged staff to complete a 

more comprehensive assessment of the water system 

beyond the VA, and look to grants for funding the 

assessment and any needed improvements. 

OCTOBER 2008 41 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

16: Using a Clear 

Message for Risk 

Communications 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Communications 

Category Type: 

Operational; Collaborative 

General Description: To prepare for critical 

communications with the public during an 

emergency incident, this utility developed prescripted communications materials, or “message 

maps” to deliver key messages to the public about 

specific emergency scenarios. Message mapping is a 

science-based communications methodology that 

enables people who are required to communicate 

with the public to quickly and concisely deliver the 

most important information about an emergency. 

Scientific studies regarding the way in which people 

absorb information during high-stress situations have 

been reviewed extensively. Guidelines have been 

developed for the most effective means for delivering 

critical information to the public in such a way as to 

increase their retention of important information and 

to ease public fears and stress. Guidelines include 

recommended length of messages and the order in 

which information is provided. 

Message mapping provides Public Information 

Officers (PIOs) and other public officials with key 

messages, graphics, maps, background information, a 

guidelines manual, and sample press releases (the 

message mapping “kit”) that can be quickly modified 

to the specifics of the event. Message mapping has 

been successfully employed during major crises such 

as the September 11, 2001 attacks, the London 

underground bombings, and the Severe Acute 

Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) scare, as well as 

during many less publicized events. In this utility, 

message maps were developed for four emergency 

scenarios: the bypass of radiological contaminated 

wastewater from a combined sewer system; 

radiological contamination of a wastewater treatment 

plant; toxic and flammable material in a combined 

sewer; and chlorine gas release from a treatment 

plant. 

Resources Required: The time it takes to develop 

message maps is dependent on the number of 

scenarios to be mapped and the number of people 

needing to be involved. In this case, an external 

consultant was employed to facilitate message 

mapping sessions and develop the initial message 

maps. Additionally, message maps should be 

reviewed and updated periodically and new staff 

should be familiarized not just with the maps, but 

with the concepts behind them. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The utility PIO 

should understand the contents of the message 

mapping kit and coordinate with utility staff and 

other PIOs to update and maintain the kits. Utility 

staff is responsible for providing specific data on an 

emergency event to the PIO. Types of data may 

include the nature of the incident, extent of the 

affected area, anticipated length of any service 

disruptions, water use and health advisories, etc. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: The message 

mapping kit was created in collaboration with 

personnel from the City of Seattle, U.S. Coast Guard, 

EPA Region 10, Washington State Department of 

Health, King County Public Health, King County 

Department of Natural Resources and Parks, and 

King County Office of Emergency Management. A 

key to the success of this practice is including all 

PIOs that would have involvement in the regional 

Joint Information Center. Another effective method 

is the practice of performing joint public briefings, 

with PIOs from different agencies addressing 

questions in their respective agencies’ area of 

expertise. For instance, law enforcement PIOs may 

address questions regarding criminal aspects of an 

OCTOBER 2008 42 
 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

event, while the utility PIO and health department 

PIO address questions regarding the safety of the 

water. 

Barriers: The concepts and techniques of using 

message maps were new to the participants 

developing the manual, which created some 

resistance to the process. Additionally, maintaining 

the kits is time consuming and can be neglected. 

Lessons Learned: Message mapping helps PIOs 

prepare for the expected and unexpected for 

communicating with the public. Following an 

emergency event, providing background information 

to PIOs can be time consuming and disruptive to the 

Incident Commander. Establishing a procedure 

before an event occurs that guides how and when a 

PIO should obtain information to plug into the 

message maps speeds and improves communications 

and reduces disruption. It is important that the PIOs 

of all responding agencies cooperate on developing 

the maps and related procedures prior to an event so 

the Incident Commander and his/her staff do not 

have to provide duplicate information to different 

PIOs. 

Success Measures: Success is measured by the 

presence of having readily available messages 

and reducing public stress and anxiety. 

Evidence of success includes: 

•	 Having readily available message maps that 

address a wide variety of crisis emergencies, as 

well as routine events that represent the input of 

multiple responding agencies 

•	 Increasing PIO usage of message maps in 

emergency training exercises, and the resultant 

after-action reports that allow emergency 

planners to gauge the effectiveness of the 

practice at the particular utility and locality 

Benefits and Incentives: This specific activity 

was initially developed for a radiological event, but 

participants learned that message maps are easily 

expanded to other types of events, including chemical 

releases. Additionally, a well developed message 

mapping kit should ease transition for new PIOs by 

organizing key utility messages (such as their mission 

statement) and presentation materials in advance, and 

familiarizing the PIO staff with the utility structure, 

assets, and systems. 

OCTOBER 2008 43 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

17: Security and 

Emergency Response 

Metrics 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Utility-Specific Measures 

Category Type: 

Operational 

General Description: The term “security metrics” 

is the application of quantifiable or statistical analysis 

to measure security functions and workload. If 

implemented effectively, it allows the agency to track 

staff level of effort, costs, and productivity. This 

practice is an ongoing activity to identify and revise 

metrics and communicate appropriate levels of detail, 

frequency, and format of the data with the intent of 

measuring processes, program activity, and 

achievements. 

A key objective for this practice is to identify those 

metrics by which real change can be measured. 

Metrics and data sources used in this practice include: 

•	 The number of assets patrolled and events 

detected or reported (e.g., graffiti, break-ins, 

vandalism or unlocked doors, alarms) 

•	 Type of background check for each category of 

critical personnel, different employees (vendors, 

contractors, etc.), and the percentage of those 

personnel who have received checks 

•	 Employee training (skills assessment/inventory 

and completion of scheduled trainings) 

•	 Time of response to incidents and resolution of 

events 

•	 Incident reporting tools (incident report forms, 

after-action reports, closure reports, executive 

reports, and daily operational reports) 

•	 Costs of security program (investments, 

resources, time spent) 

Resources Required: After an initial investment 

of staff time to identify relevant metrics and reporting 

format, an estimated 15 percent of security staff time 

is spent annually on reporting and analyzing the data. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The Director of 

Security and Emergency Management was the lead 

for identifying and reporting on metrics. However, 

staff from many different utility departments 

participated in collecting and submitting the data, and 

preparing reports. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: Law 

enforcement, other utilities, and other agencies (i.e., 

state drinking water primacy agency, EPA, state and 

local emergency management agencies, etc.) may 

provide useful advice in identifying metrics. 

Additionally, the utility may share specific incident or 

observation data with these partners to ensure the 

practice’s currency and relevance. 

Barriers: Potential barriers that were identified 

during this practice were: 

•	 Dedicating and maintaining sufficient staff time 

for identifying the metrics and subsequently 

implementing the data collection and analysis. 

•	 Identifying a high-level utility staff person to 

oversee the process and push for necessary 

changes identified by the practice. 

Additionally, this activity involved mainly risk-based 

measures that do not necessarily fit the traditional 

cost/benefit analysis process, and therefore may be 

difficult to communicate to decision makers. 

Lessons Learned: The lessons learned that were 

identified relate to developing and implementing the 

activity, including: 

OCTOBER 2008 44 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

•	 To ensure data is properly collected, 

management should ensure staff understands the 

reason for collecting the data. 

•	 The utility should periodically review the metrics 

and the data associated with them. Over time, 

the utility will likely eliminate or alter existing 

metrics and develop new metrics as users 

become more familiar with the program data and 

quality improves. 

•	 Measures can be borrowed from other sectors; 

however, terminology may not necessarily 

translate from one sector to another (particularly 

from private to public). One reference used by 

this utility was Security Metrics Management by 

Gerald L. Kovacich. 

•	 Planning for collection of data requires 

sophistication and multiple systems to report out 

the data with an understanding of the form and 

frequency needs of each person (e.g., pagers, 

displays on computers for various key staff, 

automated paper reports). Users may not know 

what they want to see and will need education 

and experience to refine information. 

•	 Metrics and measurable data can be used to build 

a business case for increasing and providing 

ongoing support of utility security programs. 

Success Measures: Some of the success 

measures that can be used to gauge the effectiveness 

of this activity include: 

•	 Data analysis outputs (like reports) are used in 

supporting the case for improving and 

maintaining the security program; their use was 

determined to be a factor in winning support. 

•	 Expanding the group of data users can support 

increased procurement of important equipment 

(for instance, data used by the department in 

charge of distribution may procure more secure 

or tamperproof hydrants). The data may also be 

used by entities outside the utility such as public 

funding agencies to support security 

enhancements. 

Benefits and Incentives: The output of this 

activity is a method for evaluating the effectiveness 

and efficiency of a utility’s security program in 

different ways. This information can be used to 

improve specific protocols and procedures to 

improve security practices, to better allocate 

resources to where they are needed most, and to 

demonstrate and justify a utility’s security needs to 

decision makers. 

OCTOBER 2008 45 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

18: Radiological 

Contamination Event 

Procedure for 

a Combined Sewer 

System 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

 Security Resources and Implementation Priorities; 

and Partnerships 

Category Type: 

Operational
 

General Description: This practice is based on a
 

risk assessment of the effects of a “dirty bomb”
 

explosion in an urban area serviced by a combined 

sewer system. The risk assessment was the first of its
 

kind to address the dangers to wastewater workers,
 

treatment plant and conveyance system, biological 

treatment processes, and the solid waste stream (e.g., 

biosolids, grit, screenings).
 

The tools and processes used in this practice 

included:
 

Detection and Notification: There were no detection 

instruments deployed in the system itself.
 

Emergency responders in the area notified 

emergency officials, who in turn notified the 

wastewater utility. 

Determining Extent of Contamination: To
 

determine the presence and extent of contamination
 

in the conveyance and treatment system, sampling 

points were identified upstream of the plant 

(including lift stations), in the influent barscreen
 

room, at grit collection points, and at biosolids 

collection and transport points. Personnel used 

electronic personnel dosimeters, portable survey
 

dosimeters, and other field laboratory
 

instrumentation. 

A Radiological Emergency Response Plan: The 

plan included procedures for protecting the workers 

and the plant itself in the event of radiological 

material entering the waste stream. The plan also 

included a decision process flow diagram (also 

known as a decision tree) presenting the decision 

points and subsequent actions to take. 

An Emergency Communications Guidance 

Manual: The manual included pre-scripted 

messages, also known as message maps, aimed at 

targeted audiences. The messages assisted the utility 

in answering common questions concerning the 

actions of the utility. This manual also included 

guidance on communication channels (for instance, 

using radio, television, print, and online resources), 

sample statements, and graphics to support the 

messaging. 

Cleanup, Decontamination and Contaminated 

Waste Disposal Considerations: It is acknowledged 

that an event of this type will likely tax local, state, 

and federal response experts and resources, so a 

private consultant well-versed in radiological 

contamination and terrorism has been contracted to 

assist the utility in post-“dirty bomb” operations. 

Training: Training is under development. The 

training will consider when and how to use the 

guidance as well as message mapping skills. 

Resources Required: This activity required 

conducting a risk assessment and procurement of 

detection equipment. Additionally, training on 

detection equipment and response procedures should 

be conducted. This utility obtained a Homeland 

Security grant to help fund this activity. In this case 

the risk assessment was designed and performed in 

such a way that its findings could be used by other 

wastewater utilities with similar combined systems to 

conduct a risk assessment if the parties agree to 

sharing the information and safeguarding the 

contents. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The overall lead for a 

radiological event is the municipal Emergency 

Operations Center (EOC). At the treatment plant, 

emergency actions were directed by the on-duty 

Operations Supervisor, who acted as the plant 

Incident Commander (IC). 

Staff was trained on sampling protocols and detection 

equipment calibration and maintenance for use 

immediately following an event; response protocols 

for the protection of workers, the public, and 

infrastructure; and cleanup and decontamination 

procedures. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: The utility 

collaborated with response agencies at the local, state, 

OCTOBER 2008 46 
 

 

 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

and federal level as part of this activity, and 

established notification protocols with local and 

regional emergency response agencies based on 

which agency first discovers the contamination. 

Barriers: Preparing for an event of this magnitude 

and impact can present many barriers; however, 

barriers can be greatly reduced through early and 

active cooperation between response partners. Some 

barriers include: 

•	 Inconsistent and improvised public 

communication protocols have the potential for 

causing mass panic. 

•	 Response personnel may be concerned for their 

personal safety while responding. Worker 

protection guidelines should be developed, 

communicated, and training conducted with 

personnel beforehand. 

•	 State and federal regulatory considerations 

regarding the collection, transport, and disposal 

of radiological contaminated waste may 

complicate efforts to restore normal utility 

service. 

Lessons Learned: Lessons learned from the 

assessment include: 

•	 The radiological risk assessment revealed that 

the plant and its workers are at risk. 

•	 The plant would immediately go from a 

permitted Publicly Owned Treatment Works 

(POTWs) under traditional regulations, to a lowlevel radiological facility, drastically changing 

requirements. 

•	 The 140–170 tons of biosolids produced at the 

plant every day would go from being marketable 

fertilizer to low-level radiological waste. 

In trying to address the consequences, the utility and 

its partners also determined the following: 

•	 Worker protection standards at the state and 

federal level would have to be changed to allow 

for the continued operation of the plant. 

•	 The wastewater utility would largely be on its 

own during the first days of a radiological event. 

•	 The utility and its partners identified the types of 

radiological monitoring equipment necessary to 

protect the workers and determine that the 

equipment should be stockpiled before an event 

to increase utility readiness and decrease 

response times. 

Success Measures: Success measures for this 

activity come from after-action reports following 

exercises and trainings. Additionally, the creation of 

the emergency response plan, the message maps and 

risk communication guidance, and regulationcompliant cleanup and disposal plans will be 

indicative of success. 

Benefits and Incentives: This activity provides 

many benefits to the utility. For example: 

•	 Risk assessments conducted as a precursor to 

this activity may reveal other, more probable, 

sources of potential radiological contamination 

than a dirty bomb scenario. 

•	 The concepts and principles for developing 

message maps to a radiological event can be 

applied to developing message maps for other 

scenarios. 

•	 The partners the utility engages for this practice 

will likely be partners for other types of 

responses; therefore this activity will set the stage 

for future cooperation on other, more probable 

scenarios. 

OCTOBER 2008 47 
SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

19: Utility Response to 

Changing Threat Levels 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Threat-level Based Protocols 

Category Type: 

Operational 

General Description: Utilities cannot operate 

efficiently in a constant state of high level alert; 

therefore, this utility developed a dynamic system of 

changing operational conditions, or alert levels, to 

correspond to the current level of threat to the utility. 

Threat levels can change due to national alerts, local 

events, or intelligence provided through a variety of 

resources. The practice that the utility developed 

uses a communication network with the water sector, 

and other agencies in the region, to share ongoing 

threat intelligence. This sharing of intelligence 

allows for quick adaptation to changes in threat levels 

by increasing surveillance at critical assets. 

This practice mandates that management monitor the 

threat level at the national, state, and local level to 

determine the appropriate alert level for the utility 

and decide whether an elevation or relaxation is 

necessary. Daily threat level monitoring and a 

credible communications network with local 

emergency managers, police, and federal agencies, 

helps assure that this information sharing process is 

timely and seamless. 

At times of elevated alert, operations staff increase 

site visits to critical facilities, and conduct more 

intensive inspections at each facility. On-call 

employees are also required to expand their weekend 

surveillance of utility facilities in response to 

increased alert levels. 

Resources Required: This practice requires an 

initial investment of staff time, mainly at the 

managerial level, to establish the communications 

network with regional partners, and to develop the 

protocols associated with different threat levels. The 

level of ongoing staff commitment will depend on 

the specific alert protocols and the frequency of alert 

level changes. For this utility, the practice did not cut 

into productive work hours or increase costs. 

Role and Responsibilities: Threats are monitored 

by utility managers through daily reports and email 

from Homeland Security Information Network 

(HSIN) and Water Information Sharing and Analysis 

Center (WaterISAC) at a national level. These same 

networks are also used to provide information on 

local incidents. The utility’s general manager is the 

contact for all communications between each 

network and the utility staff responsible to respond 

and prepare for changes in threats. 

Collaboration with other Partners: This practice 

involves collaboration with sector partners through 

the HSIN and WaterISAC. Additional partners for 

threat information sharing can include local 

Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEWG) (which 

usually include local law enforcement), and EPA 

Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and regional 

offices. Local partners can also contribute locally; for 

instance, local law enforcement may agree to assist in 

more frequent patrols. 

Barriers: There were no specific barriers identified 

for this practice; however, one barrier may include a 

utility not having electronic access to security 

information networks such as HSIN and WaterISAC. 

Water sector information sharing networks, such as 

HSIN and WaterISAC, are readily available to the 

water sector. Alert level protocols should not 

fundamentally involve new practices, and typically 

focus on more frequent and thorough patrols and 

inspections. Training on new protocols should be 

easily folded into existing security training programs. 

Lessons Learned: The main lesson learned during 

this practice is that implementing a system of threatbased security protocols is a low-cost and effective 

OCTOBER 2008 48 
SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

way to improve utility security, which can be applied 

to utilities of all types and sizes. 

Success Measures: The success of this practice 

can be measured by the establishment of threat-based 

protocols for increasing utility security (particularly if 

law enforcement, security, and/or utility experts 

review and agree with the protocols), as well as by 

maintaining daily interaction with the different threat 

intelligence networks and law enforcement. 

Benefits and Incentives: This practice is part of a 

broad strategy applied in many practices; establishing 

and maintaining a network of people in the region 

who have invested in building relationships with each 

other to prepare for and respond to emergencies. 

Many of the contacts and communications networks 

employed in this practice, particularly at the local 

level, will be applicable to other emergency 

situations. 

OCTOBER 2008 49 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

20: Procedure for 

Contractor and Vendor 

Access 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Access Control 

Category Type: 

Operational; Infrastructure 

General Description: This utility’s vulnerability 

assessment recognized that vendors and contractors 

have both knowledge of, and access to, critical utility 

assets. In response, the utility developed protocols 

and procedures for contractor and vendor access to 

sensitive utility information and facilities. This 

represents a major change in the historical practices 

used in the water sector. Utilities often have had a 

long-standing relationship with their vendors and 

contractors and have relied on them to safeguard the 

most important assets with little oversight. 

The process began with the identification of each 

vendor and contractor and their need for specific 

knowledge of, and access to, critical assets. If access 

was justified, procedures were developed to restrict 

or provide oversight for each access event. The 

following are examples of this utility’s procedures: 

Contractor companies verify personnel employment 

and assignment to the utility. When work is to be 

performed, each contractor staff person registers on 

site as they enter facilities and when they leave, and 

are escorted to sites by utility employees. 

Identification badges are issued to contractors while 

they work at utility facilities. Contractor equipment 

or materials cannot be left on site without approval of 

the utility. 

Vendors are usually chemical supply companies but 

can include other types of vendors. Chemical 

delivery agents are prescreened for entry to the 

facility by having their driver’s license verification 

issued by facsimile from the chemical supply 

company. Chemicals are then tested on site with 

portable test equipment. Drivers are accompanied on 

site and utility employees observe the unloading to 

the utility storage areas. Finally, field water-quality 

monitors are observed for unusual changes that may 

relate to the delivery and use of new chemicals. In 

some cases, chemicals are picked up by employees 

directly from the supply company. For other 

vendors, drop-off points are provided outside critical 

areas. 

Cell phone company installations are located on this 

utility’s property. Cell phone company personnel 

who maintain these sites should be accompanied by 

utility staff. Utilities are compensated for the use of 

facilities, such as water storage tanks, and terms are 

agreed to in the contract for the lease of the utility 

property. 

Utility services, specifically the electric power utility 

staff, no longer enter utility sites to read meters. 

Instead, the electric utility uses remote meter-reading 

technology. 

Resources Required: This practice does not 

require any resources beyond staff time to review and 

revise contractor and vendor access protocols. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The specific roles 

and responsibilities for this practice may differ by 

utility, depending on their existing internal processes 

for contracting and procuring supplies and services. 

The utility security officer should lead the effort to 

revise access protocols, and should coordinate with 

different departmental managers to ensure that the 

revised protocols are not overly burdensome. Utility 

departmental managers are responsible for 

identifying vendor and contractor functions that 

require access to sensitive sites, for providing 

recommendations to the security officers, for 

instructing their personnel on the new access 

protocols, and for relaying the new protocols to 

vendor and contractor staff. 

OCTOBER 2008 50 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

Collaboration with Other Partners: This practice 

does involve collaboration with affected contractors, 

vendors, and other entities. 

Barriers: This utility did not encounter any barriers 

in implementing this practice. However, staff and 

contractor/vendor acceptance of, and adherence to, a 

change in the status quo could prove difficult for 

other utilities. 

Lessons Learned: The primary lesson learned was 

to have active outreach to vendors and contractors to 

ensure compliance with defined protocols and 

procedures. 

Success Measures: The success of this practice 

can be measured by the existence of defined 

processes and protocols. Another success measure is 

mitigating or reducing risks identified in the 

vulnerability assessment. 

Benefits and Incentives: The main benefit to this 

practice is that it is a low cost, low effort way to 

improve security, in both implementation and 

maintenance. Developing new protocols means 

better controls of who has access to the utility. 

Another benefit is the opportunity to gather feedback 

through surveys and other means from both their 

own staff and contractor and vendor staff on the new 

procedures. Additionally, utility security records 

concerning unauthorized access by non-utility staff 

may also be a data source for determining whether 

the program is being accepted by the staff responsible 

for implementing it. 

OCTOBER 2008 51 
 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

21: Updating a 

Vulnerability Assessment 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Vulnerability Assessment Up to Date 

Category Type:

 Operational 

General Description: This utility established a 

vulnerability assessment (VA) cycle for each 

function of their operation, including drinking water 

and wastewater. The initial VA was completed 

before the deadline set by the Bioterrorism Act of 

2002 for water utilities, and was performed with the 

Risk Assessment Methodology for Water 

(RAM-WTM) and the Risk Assessment Methodology 

for Dams (RAM-DSM). The utility has planned for 

the VA update by establishing a VA committee 

composed of eight members, which meets monthly. 

Timing for an update of the utility’s VA is driven by 

the cycle for implementation of improvements. This 

utility defined that cycle to be every 5 years, and it is 

composed of the following: 

•	 Conduct the VA, which takes approximately 

three months and covers about 150 assets. 

•	 Develop security improvement proposals based 

on the results of the VA. 

•	 Present proposals to elected officials to secure 

funding. 

•	 Implement the improvements in a phased 

approach. 

• Review progress and initiate the cycle again. 

Resources Required: Updating the VA cost the 

utility approximately $85,000, which does not 

account for costs associated with staff time for 

maintaining a VA committee to review and discuss 

findings. Developing proposals for utility 

improvements and implementing them are already 

accounted for in the utility’s budget and staff 

responsibilities. 

Roles and Responsibilities: Utility operations 

and security staff compile hazard trend information 

for review by the VA committee. The VA 

committee comprises seven members representing 

OCTOBER 2008 

critical assets (including Information Technology 

[IT] and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 

[SCADA] system components), and the eighth is a 

security specialist. In addition to the responsibilities 

of hazard trend review, the committee also advises on 

budget expenditures and presents budget proposals 

for security improvements to elected officials. They 

also oversee improvement implementation and 

progress. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: This practice 

did not involve collaboration with other partners 

outside the utility. 

Barriers: The main barrier encountered for this 

practice was dedicating staff time to gather the data 

necessary to perform the VA update, in addition to 

their regular duties. 

Lesson Learned: The utility learned two main 

lessons through updating its VA. First, the utility has 

switched to the Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool 

(VSATTM) to replace the RAM method for the 

update. Utility staff found that VSAT’s ease of use 

(specifically the data displays with color codes) 

makes for simple revisions for future VA updates, 

and only one primary data collector needed VSAT 

training. VSAT also allows for documentation of 

specific risk reduction measures and also measures 

how much they helped reduce risk. Second, the 

committee found that Design Basis Threat (DBT) 

conditions documented during the first VA had not 

changed; therefore, the rigorous assessment of all 

assets done for the initial VA was not necessary for 

the update. 

Success Measures: The success of this practice 

can be measured every cycle by comparing previous 

52 
SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

VAs and noting the reduction and/or elimination of 

vulnerabilities. Additional measures include funding 

secured for improvements based on the 

recommendations of the VA, and implementation of 

those improvements. 

Benefits and Incentives: The results of the 

updated VA provide documented security needs for 

the utility, which can serve as a basis for the utility’s 

funding requests to budgeting officials, and for 

changes in utility security protocols and programs. 

OCTOBER 2008 53 
 

 

 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

22: Creating and 

Maintaining a Security 

Culture 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Explicit Commitment to Security; Promote Security 

Awareness; and Defined Security Roles and 

Employee Expectations 

Category Type: 

Organizational 

General Description: This utility adopted a plan to 

foster a security culture using a variety of methods to 

increase awareness of security and preparedness 

among its employees. The process began with the 

formation of an executive committee representing all 

branches of the utility. The committee defined a 

single plan and message to create the security culture. 

This message provided a framework for the other 

components of the plan, which were: 

•	 Linking safety and security by incorporating a 

security message into every safety training 

session 

•	 Developing a security and emergency 

management Web site that provides employee 

access to security information, policies, and 

procedures 

•	 Providing preparedness training for all 

employees 

•	 Monthly newsletter articles 

Resources Required: This practice potentially 

requires significant staff time, particularly in the 

development stages. Additionally, resources such as 

a Web site, newsletter, and poster publishing, need to 

be developed to spread the messages created by the 

committee throughout the utility. 

Roles and Responsibilities: Creating a security 

culture requires the cooperation and participation of 

staff from all levels of the utility, but should start at 

the highest levels. In particular, the Security and 

Emergency Management Director and staff are 

responsible for developing a plan to implement the 

culture within the utility. Senior management and 

supervisors are responsible for presenting a consistent 

message to the employees that security is important, 

and to reinforce that message by example. All levels 

of staff are responsible for participating in training 

and events pertaining to security, and utilizing this 

knowledge during daily operations. 

Staff providing employee training should maintain 

knowledge of current threats to the utility as well as 

current security practices as this information is 

provided to policy and decision makers during 

discussions that shape the security culture training 

program. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: The utility 

worked closely with other departments, including 

human resources, citizen groups, and the Mayor’s 

office to develop and present a cohesive message. 

The utility also sought to improve communication 

and interaction at all levels with responders like 

police, fire, public health, and labs to further reinforce 

the security culture. 

Barriers: When creating a security culture, the utility 

encountered employees who were resistant to the 

idea that the utility would ever be subject to any sort 

of illegal activity or disaster, which hindered efforts 

to implement this practice. Additionally, the 

deployment of monitoring equipment, such as 

cameras, caused privacy concerns for both 

employees and the general public. 

Lessons Learned: This utility learned a number of 

lessons that may help others better implement a 

security culture at their utilities. First, the utility 

found that creating a team early on to implement the 

program helped to maintain a consistent message. 

OCTOBER 2008 54 
 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

However, adoption and acceptance of the security 

culture by employees takes persistent effort. To ease 

this, communication to employees should occur often 

and in a variety of settings and forms. Also, in some 

instances, messages should be tailored to specific 

audiences inside and outside the utility. Because of 

increased awareness and reporting of security 

incidents, additional security staff was added. 

Success Measures: In this case, after 

implementing the program the utility noted an 

increase in the reporting of security incidents each 

year. The increase in reported incidents demonstrates 

that staff are more aware of and reacting to possible 

problems that would otherwise result in more severe 

measures needed such as public notifications. 

Benefits and Incentives: Fostering a security 

culture has shown external as well as internal benefits 

to the utility. Utility security concerns have increased 

credibility in the eyes of law enforcement and the 

local Federal Bureau of Investigation office. This has 

improved the utility’s ability to win funding for 

further security and preparedness upgrades by 

acquiring external partners who will support the 

utility’s security concerns to decision makers. This in 

turn results in staff that are well trained in disaster 

response and recovery, which can be applied to many 

more common events, such as weather related 

disasters or civil unrest, that threaten utility assets. 

OCTOBER 2008 55 
 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

23: Training on Security 

and Emergency Response 

Corresponding Feature Description: 

Promote Security Awareness; and Defined Security 

Roles and Employee Expectations 

Category Type: 

Organizational; Operational 

General Description: This utility developed a 

National Incident Management System (NIMS)-

compliant Emergency Response Plan (ERP). The 

utility then created an internal training program based 

on its ERP. 

The training program is exercised at all staff levels to 

improve the utility’s capability to respond to allhazard events. It consists of an annual tabletop 

exercise based on a different emergency scenario 

each year. The utility has also conducted a full-scale 

exercise that involved an earthquake scenario. As 

part of the exercise, the staff trained on performing 

visual inspections of sites and reporting the 

assessments to the Emergency Operations Center 

(EOC). 

Additionally, the utility maintains a library that has 

copies of the ERP that can be easily accessed during 

an emergency, or if staff feel the need to review the 

plan between exercises and training. Another copy 

of the ERP is kept at a remote site in case the library 

is destroyed or inaccessible. Also, the utility has 

placed placards in key locations where response 

resources are located. 

Resources Required: This practice requires an 

initial investment of staff time to revise the ERP for 

NIMS compliance, to conduct staff training on NIMS 

concepts and processes, and then to train staff on the 

new ERP. However, after this initial investment, this 

practice should not represent a significant increase in 

the normal emergency response training budget of 

the utility. Additionally, there are many local, state, 

and federal grants available for emergency 

preparedness and training, particularly to bring 

response entities into NIMS compliance. 

Roles and Responsibilities: The utility formed a 

Safety and Emergency Management Committee that 

meets once a month. Departmental staff members 

are periodically rotated through the team to provide 

the utility with a broad emergency response 

knowledge base. The district engineer and a few 

other key personnel are the only permanent members 

of the team. This committee advises management 

regarding how to use the training funds and other 

available resources. The group also decides who will 

be sent to external training events, like regional 

exercises. 

The average staff member participates in 

approximately 16 hours of training each year, as well 

as biweekly safety and security meetings. Senior 

staff and members of the Safety and Emergency 

Management Committee have additional training 

requirements. 

Collaboration with Other Partners: In this case, 

the utility collaborated with the state Office of 

Domestic Preparedness Programs, state Department 

of Health, the County government, and an outside 

consultant to develop its training program. However, 

NIMS trainings and exercises can be designed to 

incorporate a wide range of partners, ranging from 

the local to federal level. 

Barriers: In revising its ERP and NIMS structure, 

this utility encountered difficulty in defining the roles 

and responsibilities of certain staff if an emergency 

occurs after normal business hours. 

Lessons Learned: The utility was not awarded 

preparedness grant money in 2006. This underscored 

the need for dedicating regular annual funds for 

security and preparedness, so that the utility is not 

caught short if supplemental funding sources do not 

come through. 

OCTOBER 2008 56 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

Success Measures: Success is measured by the 

existence of an ERP that has been reviewed and 

accepted by the local, county, or state NIMS 

compliance officer. In addition, having personnel 

that have received the appropriate NIMS training is a 

requirement for receiving Homeland Security grant 

funding, and many states and tribes have more 

stringent requirements. The current federal NIMS 

training requirements can be found at 

http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/nims_training 

.shtm. 

Additional success can be measured by reviewing the 

results of training after-action reports. In this case, 

successive trainings and exercises have shown staff 

and management are better prepared and more 

capable to respond to an emergency than prior to the 

implementation of the practice. This was 

demonstrated by improved communications across 

groups both internal and external to the utility and in 

awareness of interdependencies among different 

agencies when various scenarios were applied. 

Benefits and Incentives: NIMS compliance is a 

requirement for receiving federal preparedness 

funding, and individual states and tribes have more 

stringent requirements. This practice is a necessary 

step towards opening future supplemental funding 

pathways for utilities. Additionally, NIMS is a 

proven emergency response framework; federal 

program administrators have developed specific 

NIMS trainings targeted at public works departments. 

Finally, the response partners with which a utility will 

team during a response will likely be well versed in 

NIMS; being NIMS compliant is therefore necessary 

to ensure that the utility is capable of a coordinated, 

effective response effort. 

OCTOBER 2008 57 
 

 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

SECTION 6: EXAMPLE OF SECURITY AT A SMALL 

UTILITY 

Even small utilities can use the practices described in this report to develop an active and effective protective 

program. The description below shows how one small utility in the Seattle-King County area implemented such a 

program. The program provides them with benefits through collaboration with other utilities and agencies, reduces 

costs for the utility and its customers, improves its infrastructure, and enhances its protective posture. For security 

reasons, the utility is not identified. 

Utility Background 

The utility profiled here is a small combined drinking water and wastewater system serving approximately 10,000. 

Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the utility made security and preparedness a high priority. After 

September 11, 2001, the utility increased its efforts in response to federal mandates and management’s 

awareness that more could be done—especially to address terror-related threats. Historically, the focus was on 

natural disasters and vandalism. 

Operational Practices 

The utility added or changed several practices to increase security and preparedness of its facilities and its control 

and communication systems. One step it took after September 11, 2001, was increasing system component 

inspection from once weekly to twice weekly. 

Remote access to computer and SCADA systems is proven to be valuable to operations, yet the potential for 

hacking is a credible threat. The utility addressed the risk by switching connections to “dial-up,” which provides 

protection by having the ability to monitor who is connecting to the system. In addition, any user will be locked out 

after three failed attempts to connect. This feature diminishes the likelihood that code-breaking programs can 

access the system. 

The utility took simple effective steps to protect communications equipment. The utility keeps a variety of 

equipment available such as non-electronic phones capable of maintaining dial tone during power outages, 800 

MHz radios, two-way walkie-talkies in vehicles for general maintenance work, and access to a ham radio. The 

utility also has access to daily threat information through Northwest Warning, Alert, and Response Network 

(NW-WARN). The utility also communicates security information to customers through a newsletter that advises 

them to dial 911 if they see suspicious activity, such as persons attempting to connect to a fire hydrant. 

The utility secured public access to information by removing pump station location information from its Web site. 

The utility also requires those who request information to identify themselves and the purpose of their information 

request. Both drinking water and wastewater systems are secured at the same level because the utility included 

the entire system in its security and preparedness program. 

Organizational Practices 

Before September 11, 2001, the utility had policies and procedures in place to prevent and mitigate acts of 

vandalism. Each of the utility’s staff also had his/her own written emergency response procedures for disasters. 

The staff used these emergency procedures during an earthquake in 1989, when a quick visual assessment of 

the entire system was necessary. The staff’s familiarity with procedures enabled them to confidently assess the 

system and report information back to administrators. Because of the procedures, staff was able to complete the 

assessment within 40 minutes. 

Utility managers provide staff with security and emergency training to foster a culture of safety and security. Staff 

members are trained continuously with basic protective practices during weekly staff meetings and participate in 

regional emergency exercises. 

Continued on next page 

OCTOBER 2008 58 
SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

Infrastructure Practices 

The utility implemented several practices to better protect its infrastructure. First, the utility installed water 

metering stations at secure points in the distribution system for contractors to safely withdraw bulk water for their 

trucks. This protects against contamination and eliminates wear and tear on hydrants, which used to occur when 

contractors hooked their hoses directly to a hydrant. Now the hydrants have a non-standard lock to prevent 

unauthorized hook-ups. Second, after an incident in which a hatch was left ajar and the utility incurred a $3,000 

charge to isolate a tank and sample water, staff modified the hatch so it cannot be left open or ajar; now it can 

only be totally removed. Third, all entrances and exits at the utility’s headquarters have been secured using a 

combination of locks, alarms, and cameras. The details of the protective components at the remote sites are kept 

secret from all outside entities. 

Collaborative Practices 

Historically, utility personnel were not considered first responders. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 

(HSPD-8) redefined public works department staff, including those within the water sector, as first responders. 

Utility managers encouraged staff to participate on regional security and emergency management committees in 

response to the shifting culture. 

The utility manager provided local police with a list of critical sites and contact information of system operators 

and managers to help familiarize local responders with the utility system. A much stronger local network has 

emerged in which utility operators are fully integrated into the local emergency response community. In addition, 

a better understanding exists among local emergency responders about one another’s needs, and utility 

vulnerabilities. 

The utility worked to expand relations with other drinking water and wastewater utilities in the county. According 

to the utility manager, although there was a mutual aid response program for water and sewer districts for many 

years, after September 11, 2001, agencies and municipalities began to work even more closely together through 

the county’s regional disaster planning group. 

Conclusion 

The practices at this utility demonstrate that even a small utility can make meaningful gains in security and 

preparedness. Part of this utility’s success is due to its commitment towards making security and preparedness a 

high priority. As a result, it has been able to make significant progress despite a limited budget. Implementing 

security and preparedness priorities through the use of in-house staff, rather than hired consultants, is one way 

that it keeps costs low. This is critical, because the utility found obtaining federal, state or county funding is 

difficult. 

While the utility is unable to define cost savings resulting from its safety and protective programs, management is 

confident that in the event of an emergency, they “will be able to respond quickly so that [their] customers are 

protected.” Moreover, the utility’s security and preparedness programs help to educate utility staff and the 

community about the importance of security and preparedness issues. “This opened people’s eyes to some of 

the potential problems that can arise,” said the utility’s general manager. “It has been a good education.” 

OCTOBER 2008 59 
 

SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
 

APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY GUIDANCE TEAM 

MEMBERS 

Person Affiliation 

Allen Alston King County Wastewater Treatment Division 

Ben Budka King County Wastewater Treatment Division 

Gene Taylor Water Security Lead: U.S. EPA Region 10 

Mike Boykin On-Scene Coordinator: U.S. EPA Region 10 

Shad Burcham King County Office of Emergency Management; King County Critical 

Infrastructure Protection Group 

Scott Decker Washington State Department of Health 

Robin Friedman Seattle Public Utilities Director for Security and Emergency Management 

Brandon Hardenbrook Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER) 

Jim Henriksen Seattle-King County Department of Public Health 

Randy Holmes City of Bellevue Utilities 

Mike Jackman City of Bellevue Utilities 

Mitzi Johanknecht King County Sheriff’s Office 

Bob Lomax Seattle Fire Department 

Fred Savaglio Region 6 Hospital Emergency Preparation Committee 

Hal Schlomann Washington State Association of Sewer and Water Districts; King County 

Critical Infrastructure Protection Group 

Ron Speer Soos Creek Water and Sewer District 

Ted Stencilin King County Sheriff’s Office 

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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL PRACTICES 

The Area Workshop and individual discussions provided opportunities to gather information on practices that are in 

use or are needed by the Seattle-King County community. Although the Case Study effort could not document all 

of these practices in detail, the following additional practices were captured for future consideration. 

Organizational Practices 

Conduct management training and briefings about the water sector and interdependent services. 

Conduct training and tabletop exercises for water sector management and staff on security, emergency
 

preparedness, and response. 

Provide technical assistance and capacity development for small systems on planning, response and recovery, and 

Rural Community Assistance Partnership (RCAP). 

Conduct regular tabletop exercises to practice response plans and facilitate collaboration and networking between 

water sector utilities.
 

Dedicate funding resources for security and preparedness activities. 

Identify specific staff with security and preparedness as a primary job function. 

Train staff on Incident Command System (ICS) and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) functions.
 

Participate in EOC training and planning. 

Identify and document who has primacy over utilities in each jurisdiction (e.g., local health department, state health 

department, Department of Environmental Quality [DEQ], Department of Environmental Protection [DEP], and 

U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]). 

Develop response and recovery plans with the idea that all response activities begin at the local level. 

Use water sector needs assessments conducted by local and state agencies to develop response and recovery plans. 

Learn to use home rule/jurisdictional agreements (e.g., Memoranda of Understanding [MOUs] to facilitate mutual 

aid, collaboration, and resource sharing). 

Conduct cross-training with Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) units. 

Operational Practices 

Establish an ability to connect with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and other Information 

Technology (IT) systems remotely. 

Ensure a method for continued communications of customer service/communications during an emergency event.
 

Conduct cyber security and preparedness training. 

Provide technical assistance and capacity development for small systems.
 

Establish cross-sector liaisons within interdependent agencies (e.g., electric customer service representative 

dedicated to water sector). 

Update local and regional Emergency Medical Services (EMS) contact information. 

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Identify organizations and residences exempt from service shutoff for all utilities and share information between 

sectors.
 

Update emergency response plans regularly. 

Identify and prioritize equipment needs that facilitate continuity of service.
 

Plan and develop system redundancies for continuity of service (e.g., personnel, equipment, and fuel). 

Use established tools, such as the EPA Response Protocol Toolbox to validate potential contamination events. 

Ensure occupational safety and security is integrated.
 

Establish the ability to track field staff.
 

Identify essential personnel and cross-train staff to ensure coverage during an emergency; put emergency roles and
 

expectations into job descriptions. 

Create a response plan for radiological contamination events.
 

Work collaboratively to create specific agreements with hospitals (who are large drinking water and wastewater
 

users). 

Conduct IT/data systems cross-training within the water sector and with other sectors, to support continuity of 

business and service outside the disaster area. 

Develop water sector response and recovery teams. 

Develop lists of laboratories (e.g., public health, environmental, or both), and create agreements on capabilities 

during an emergency.
 

Provide continuing education opportunities on security and emergency response. 

Establish rules for disclosing information to the public. 

Develop a manual of operations that addresses cross-sector issues. 

Prioritize restoration of service for water sector utilities and other critical infrastructures.
 

Establish emergency permitting protocols and a tiered permit approval process to respond to increasing levels of
 

urgency.
 

Conduct assessment of information needs and develop communication plans. 

Train field personnel within all sectors to recognize and report issues of concern. 

Train operator and field staff on contaminant detection and other security surveillance. 

Establish protocols for distributing emergency drinking water. 

Routinely re-key assets so that people with old keys cannot open locks. 

Use a testing procedure to verify chemical delivery truck contents.
 

Infrastructure Practices 

Develop an ability to isolate portions of the system in a contamination event (e.g., diversion valves). 

Develop intra-/inter-agency communications systems (e.g., radios, phones). 

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Create off-site data centers.
 

Develop maps and overlay water, electric, and transportation pipes and conduits. 

Catalog equipment within mutual aid areas, including with other critical infrastructures. 

Develop plans for accessing resources such as fuel, energy, staging, etc.
 

Install water hydrant access control.
 

Install raw water intake protection.
 

Designate wells as emergency water supply.
 

Develop multiple source water intake locations.
 

Secure wellheads for protection. 

Install intrusion alarms on assets such as reservoir hatches and remote site doors. 

Collaborative Practices 

Conduct joint emergency response planning among neighboring water sector utilities. 

Conduct joint emergency response planning among critical infrastructures (e.g., energy, dams, and hospitals). 

Create cross-sector advisory committees. 

Use Northwest Warning, Alert, Response Network (NW-WARN) for information sharing.
 

Conduct regular meetings in water sector and across sectors to facilitate networking and relationship building. 

Conduct outreach and education with public officials. 

Submit multi-sector and cross-jurisdictional applications for U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grants 

and other funding. 

Conduct water sector-specific and cross-sector tabletop exercises. 

Establish contact with other sectors for collaboration and networking (e.g., invite to tabletop exercises).
 

Advocate for water sector inclusion as a first responder in activities. 

Identify interdependencies and impacts between water sector and other critical infrastructures.
 

Conduct and participate in multi-sector conferences, trainings, and workshops. 

Develop and coordinate Public Information Officer (PIO) functions, especially for organizations without PIO 

capacity.
 

Identify audiences and target messages for communication (e.g., who do we need to reach, what do they want to 

know, when do they need to know it, what is the best way to communicate each message to each targeted audience). 

Share surveillance data, customer calls, and water quality data with public health departments.
 

Share information through established security channels (e.g., Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

[WaterISAC]).
 

Learn surveillance methods and capacities of state and local health departments, and integrate syndromic 

surveillance when possible.
 

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Engage the public on security and preparedness issues.
 

Establish better relations between the local EOC and water sector utilities. 

Establish a policy that allows water sector utility leaders to use the county EOC if their own EOC is not available.
 

Improve collaboration between public organizations and private entities.
 

Establish protocols for communication channels between local, state, and federal agencies.
 

Establish multi-sector planning for prioritizing equipment sharing and restoration of service. 

Create and implement a risk communication strategy for the water sector. 

Develop cross-sector information sharing through Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). 

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APPENDIX C: KEY FEATURES OF AN ACTIVE AND 

EFFECTIVE PROTECTIVE PROGRAM 

The water sector has developed the Features of an Active and Effective Protective Program to assist 

owners and operators of drinking water and wastewater utilities (water sector) in preventing, detecting, 

responding to, and recovering from all-hazards, including terrorist attacks or natural disasters. The 

features are based on the National Drinking Water Advisory Council’s recommendation: 14 Features of 

an Active and Effective Security Program. The features contained in this version update the original 14 

to: 

•	 Capture the water sector’s post Hurricane Katrina emphasis on “all hazards” preparedness; and 

•	 Establish explicit alignment with the Water Sector-Specific Plan for Critical Infrastructure 

Protection (Water Sector SSP) prepared under the framework of the National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan (NIPP). 

The features describe the basic elements for establishing a “protective program” for owners/operators of 

utilities to consider as they develop utility-specific approaches. 

Note: Throughout this document, the terms “protective program,” “protection,” or “protective” are used 

to describe activities that enhance resiliency and promote continuity of service regardless of the hazard a 

utility might experience. These activities address the physical, cyber, and human elements of prevention, 

detection, response, and recovery. 

Features of an Active and Effective Protective Program 

1. Encourage awareness and integration of a comprehensive protective posture into daily business 

operations to foster a protective culture throughout the organization and ensure continuity of 

utility services. (Most strongly aligned with SSP Goal 1, Objective 1.) 

•	 Senior leadership makes an explicit, easily communicated commitment to a program that 

incorporates the full spectrum of protection activities. 

•	 Incorporate protection concepts into organizational culture. 

•	 Foster attentiveness to protection among front line workers and encourage them to bring potential 

issues and concerns to the attention of others; establish a process for employees to make 

suggestions for protection improvements. 

•	 Identify employees responsible for implementation of protection priorities and establish 

expectations in job descriptions and annual performance reviews.
 

•	 Designate a single manager (even if it is not a full time duty) responsible for protective programs. 

Establish this responsibility at a level to ensure protection is given management attention and 

made a priority for line supervisors and staff. 

•	 Keep current on improvements and good protective practices adopted by other utilities. 

•	 Monitor incidents and available threat-level information; escalate procedures in response to 

relevant threats and incidents. 

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2. Annually identify protective program priorities and resources needed; support priorities with 

utility-specific measures and self-assess using these measures to understand and document 

program progress. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 1, Objective 1.) 

•	 Annually identify and dedicate resources to protective programs in capital, operations, and 

maintenance budgets; and/or staff resource plans. 

•	 Tailor protective approaches and tactics to utility-specific circumstances and operating 

conditions; balance resource allocations and other organizational priorities. 

•	 Annually review protection commitments and improvement priorities with top executives. 

•	 Develop measures appropriate to utility-specific circumstances and operating conditions. 

•	 Self-assess against the measures developed to understand and document program progress. 

3.	 Employ protocols for detection of contamination while recognizing limitations in current 

contaminant detection, monitoring, and public health surveillance methods. (Most strongly 

aligned with Goal 1, Objectives 2 and 3.) 

•	 Recognize that water quality monitoring, consumer complaint surveillance, sampling and 

analysis, enhanced security monitoring, and public health syndromic surveillance are different, 

but related, elements of an overall contamination warning system. The effectiveness of these 

components may vary from system to system. 

•	 Establish sampling and testing protocols for events (and suspected events) and understand 

availability of, and be prepared to access, specialized laboratory capabilities that can handle both 

typical and atypical contaminants. 

•	 Track, characterize, and consider customer complaints to identify potential contamination events. 

•	 Use security monitoring methods (e.g., intrusion detection devices such as alarms or closed 

circuit television) to aid in determining whether a suspected contamination event is the result of 

an intentional act. (Also see feature 5) 

•	 Establish working relationship with local, state, and public health communities to detect public 

health anomalies and evaluate them for contamination implications. 

4. Assess risks and periodically review (and update) vulnerability assessments to reflect changes in 

potential threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 2, 

Objectives 1 – 3, although is a critical contributor to Goal 1, Objective 1.) 

•	 Maintain current understanding and assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. 

•	 Utilities will need to adjust continually to respond to changes in threats, vulnerabilities, and 

consequences. 

•	 Establish and implement a schedule for review of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences and 

their impact on the vulnerability assessment at least every three to five years to account for 

factors such as, but not limited to, facility expansion/upgrades, community growth, etc. 

•	 Reassess threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences after incidents and incorporate lessons into 

protective practices. 

•	 Individuals who are knowledgeable about utility operations should conduct the reviews. Include 

an executive in the review process to provide an ongoing conduit of information to/from 

management. 

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•	 Use a methodology that best suits utility-specific circumstances and operating conditions; 

however, ensure the selected method supports the criteria outlined in the National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan (NIPP). 

5. Establish physical and procedural controls to restrict access only to authorized individuals and to 

detect unauthorized physical and cyber intrusions. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 2, All 

Objectives.) 

•	 Identify critical facilities, operations, components, and cyber systems (such as SCADA). 

•	 Develop and implement physical and cyber intrusion detection and access control tactics that 

enable timely and effective detection and response. 

•	 Utilize both physical and procedural means to restrict access to sensitive facilities, operations, 

and components; including treatment facilities and supply/distribution/collection networks. 

•	 Define, identify, and restrict access to security-sensitive information (both electronic and hard 

copy) on utility operations and technical details. 

•	 Establish means to readily identify all employees (e.g. ID badges). 

•	 Verify identity of all employees, contractors and temporary workers, with access to facilities, 

through background checks as appropriate per local/state law and/or labor contract and other 

agreements. 

•	 Test physical and procedural access controls to ensure performance. 

6. Incorporate protective program considerations into procurement, repair, maintenance, and 

replacement of physical infrastructure decisions. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 2, All 

Objectives) 

•	 Bring forward protective program considerations early in the design, planning, and budgeting 

processes to mitigate vulnerability and/or potential consequences and improve resiliency over 

time. 

•	 Design and construction specifications should address both physical hardening of sensitive 

infrastructure; and adoption of inherently lower risk technologies and approaches where feasible. 

•	 Design choices should consider ability to rapidly recover and continue services following an 

incident. 

7. Prepare emergency response, recovery, and business continuity plan(s); test and review plan(s) 

regularly, update plan(s) as necessary to ensure NIMS compliance and to reflect changes in 

potential threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, physical infrastructure, utility operations, 

critical interdependencies, and response protocols in partner organizations. (Most strongly 

aligned with Goal 3, Objectives 1 and 3.) 

•	 Understand the National Incident Management System (NIMS) guidelines established by DHS 

(as well as community and state response plans and FEMA Public Assistance procedures); and 

incident command systems (ICS). At a minimum, utility response and recovery planning should 

be NIMS compliant. 

•	 Coordinate emergency plan(s) with community emergency management partners: 

o	 Establish interoperable communications systems where feasible to maintain contact with 

police, fire, and other first responder entities. 

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o	 Establish internal protocols to maintain communications with employees to ensure safety and 

to coordinate response activities. 

•	 Implement backup plans and strategies for critical operations, including water supply and 

treatment (to mitigate the potential public health, environmental, and economic consequences of 

events), power, and other key components. 

•	 Maintain plan(s) that are exercised at least annually, identify circumstances that prompt 

implementation, and identify individuals responsible for implementation.
 

o	 Provide employees with appropriate security and preparedness training and education 

opportunities. 

o	 At least annually review plan(s) and conduct exercises that address the full range of threats 

relevant to the utility. 

o	 Update plan(s), as necessary, to incorporate lessons from training, exercises, and incident 

responses. 

•	 Ensure plan(s) identify critical and time sensitive applications, vital records, processes, and 

functions that need to be maintained; and the personnel and procedures necessary to do so until 

utility has recovered. At a minimum, plan(s) should include a business impact analysis and 

address need for power, communication (internal and external), logistics support, facilities, 

information technology, and finance and administration-related functions; including necessary 

redundancy and/or timely access to backup systems and cash reserves. 

8. Forge reliable and collaborative partnerships with first responders, managers of critical 

interdependent infrastructure, other utilities, and response organizations to maintain a resilient 

infrastructure. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 3, Objectives 2 and 4.) 

•	 Partnerships should be forged in advance of an emergency, ensuring utilities and key partners are 

better prepared to work together if an emergency should occur. 

•	 Partnerships with other local utilities, peers, and associations should emphasize formation of, and 

participation in, mutual aid and assistance agreements such as a Water and Wastewater Agency 

Response Network (WARNs). 

•	 Maintain awareness of industry best practices and available protective program-related tools and 

training. 

•	 Establish relationship with critical customers (hospitals, manufacturing, etc.) to identify
 

interdependency issues that may impact business continuity. 

•	 Participate in joint exercises with identified partners as appropriate. 

9. Develop and implement strategies for regular, ongoing communication about protective 

programs with employees, customers, and the general public to increase overall awareness and 

preparedness for response to an incident. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 4, Objective 1, 

although is critically supportive of Goal 1, Objectives 1 and 2.) 

•	 Establish public communications protocol, including pre-prepared public announcement 

templates, to share critical information; and implement mechanisms for receiving community 

feedback. 

•	 Public communication strategies should: 

o Identify means to reach customers and the general public with incident information; 

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o	 Provide a mechanism for customers and the public to communicate with appropriate 

personnel about unusual or suspicious events; 

o	 Inform customers about appropriate actions to enhance their preparedness for potential 

incidents that may impact services; and 

•	 Internal communication strategies should: 

o	 Increase and/or maintain employee awareness of protective program; 

o	 Motivate staff to support protective program strategies and goals; 

o	 Provide ways for staff to notify appropriate personnel about unusual or suspicious activities; 

o	 Ensure employees understand nature of, and restrictions on, access to security sensitive 

information and/or facilities; and 

o	 Ensure employee safety during an event or incident and enable effective employee 

participation during response and recovery efforts. 

•	 Evaluate effectiveness of communication mechanisms over time. 

10. Monitor incidents and available threat-level information; escalate procedures in response to 

relevant threats and incidents. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 4, Objective 2, although a 

critical contributor to Goal 1, Objective 1 and Goal 3, Objective 3.) 

•	 Develop standard operating procedures to identify and report incidents in a timely way and 

establish incident reporting expectations. 

o	 In the specific context of intentional threats and acts, ensure staff can distinguish between 

normal and unusual activity (both on/off site) and know how to notify management of 

suspicious activity. 

•	 Develop systems to access threat information, identify threat levels, and determine the specific 

responses to take. 

o	 Investigate available information sources locally, and at the state or regional level (e.g., FBI 

Infraguard and Water ISAC). 

o	 Where barriers to accessing information exist, make attempts to align with those who can, 

and will, provide effective information to the utility. 

•	 Make monitoring threat information a regular part of the protective program designee’s job and 

share utility-, facility- and region-specific threat levels and information with key staff and those 

responsible for protection. 

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