JPRS 71527

24 July 1978

TRANSLATIONS ON PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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JPRS 71527

24 July 1978

TRANSLATIONS ON PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

No. 445

CONTENTS PAGE

MILITARY

Communist, Nationalist Naval Strength Assessed

(Ti Tsung-heng; MING PAO, Feb, Mar, Apr 77) 1

-a - [III - CC - 80 S & T]
MILITARY

COMMUNIST, NATIONALIST NAVAL STRENGTH ASSESSED

Hong Kong MING PAO in Chinese Vol 12, Nos 2-4, Feb, Mar, Apr 77

[Article by Ti Tsung-heng [3695 4912 2897]: "Who Will Control the Taiwan

Straits in the Future?"]

[Feb 77, pp 20-27]

[Text] Part I A Review of the Chinese Nationalist and Communist Naval

Strength In Case of War Over the Taiwan Straits

For the past two decades, the Taiwan Straits which is 220 nautical miles

long and averages 100 nautical miles in width, has separated China into two

completely different worlds. The Nationalist withdrawal from Tachen Islands, the Gun Battle over Chinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu Islands, and a dozen

or so other major air and sea battles during these two decades have all

left their decisive marks on the continuing struggle between the Nationalists and the Communists. Penghu, Matsu, Tungyin, Wuchiu, Chinmen and

Liaolo Bay have imprinted their names in the pages of modern Chinese history as familiar battlegrounds. The names of these islands in the Taiwan

Straits might become household words if hostilities between the Nationalists and the Communists should flare up again in the future.

So far, command of the sea over the Taiwan Straits has rested in the hands

of the Chinese Nationalists. However, the last group of American military

advisers left Chinmen and Matsu on 15 June 1976. Their evacuation marked

the near end of the American presence in Taiwan. Now with the Americans

out of the mutual defense picture, can the Nationalists maintain its firm

control over the Taiwan Straits like before? This is a question which can

not be answered with any certainty even by the top military brass, be they

Nationalists or Communists. The departure of the Yankees left the Nationalists out on a limb. On the other hand, it also created a delicate balance

over the Taiwan Straits.

As far as Taiwan, an island that is extremely poor in natural resources and

overly dependent on foreign trade for its economic well-being, is concerned,

command of the sea over the Taiwan Straits is vital to its survival. As
for the Chinese Communists, who have insisted that "Taiwan must be liberated," the seizure of command of the sea is a pre-requisite to such

liberation, regardless of whether it is to be achieved through "peaceful

means" or by force. Therefore, both the Chinese Nationalists and the

Communists can be expected to exert their utmost to seize command of the

sea in the foreseeable future in order to achieve their strategic objectives. Such a tinderbox situation will make the rekindling of battles in

the Taiwan Straits inevitable.

Whoever Controls the Taiwan Straits Will Control Taiwan's Fate

Historical Background

The navy is instrumental to the command of the sea and the protection of

territorial waters. Both the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists have

done their best in the past in developing their naval forces. They are

expected to continue to do so at present and in the future. To help us

predict with more accuracy what will happen in the future, the writer considers it necessary to recount major naval conflicts between the Nationalists and the Communists in the past 30 years and to chronicle the growth

or losses of their respective navies.

Formative Years—The Chinese Navy grew up almost overnight after the V-J

day. From 1945 to 1948, the Nationalists received 271 ships (the preponderance of them are patrol boats and amphibious boats) from the Americans,

33 patrol boats from the Japanese, and 15 battleships from the British and

Canadians. At the time, the Nationalist Navy experienced grave difficulties in training, equipment maintenance and recruitment. At the same time,

the civil war raged on, leaving the Nationalist Navy no breathing spell to

beef up its capabilities. The role that the navy played during those years

was one of "giving artillery support to Nationalist troops on the shore

and "assisting in the evacuation of Nationalist troops." Thus the Nationalist naval forces retreated from Manchuria to northern China, then to central China, then to Choushan Islands, then to Hainan Island, and finally to

Taiwan. In the course of such a hasty retreat, the Nationalist navy (with

the help of military air transport units and the merchant fleet of the

China Merchants Steam Navigation Company) managed to evacuate 600,000

troops and 2 million civilians to Taiwan. In the early 1950's, the Nationalists lost two-thirds of their naval ships to either defection or

disrepair. Morale was low, supplies were short, ships were in disrepair,

and the tide of the civil war was entirely against the Nationalists. It

can be said that at this junction in history the Nationalist navy was in

the worst shape ever.

The Chinese Communists also founded their navy right after the V-J day

when the Soviets handed over to them 30 river gunboats captured from the

Japanese. The Communist navy, however, did not grow much in strength until 1949. In that year, the Communists set up two navy academies, one in

Antung city and the other in Nanking city, to train lower-level officers
to man the 160 ships of various types brought over by Nationalist defectors

and the 50 Russian ships given to them in Russian military aid. The next

year, the General Headquarters of the PIA Navy was formally inaugurated in

Peking. A large number of officers plucked from the Third Field Army commanded by Chen I were sent to North Korean naval bases for amphibious training under Russian advisors. At the same time, 300,000 men of the Third

Field Army who had undergone amphibious training, 15,000 paratroopers, and

6,000 motorized junks and sampans were amassed along the Fukien sea coast, ^

ready to cross the Taiwan Straits in June 1950 to "give Taiwan a bloodbath.

In June 1950, the Korean War broke out. Subsequently the U.S. Seventh

Fleet was stationed in the Taiwan Straits. This turn of events thwarted

the Communists' attempt to take Taiwan by force and enabled the Nationalists

to firmly establish themselves on Taiwan. In May 1951, 700 American advisors formed the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MMG) in Taiwan.

They provided the Nationalist navy with ammunition, fuel and supplies and

helped it to set up comprehensive personnel, intelligence, operation, training and logistical systems. Thus the Nationalist navy embarked on its path

to becoming a "regular and modernized force." From 1950 to 1954, the Nationalist navy, with the help of the Americans, performed the following

duties:

1. Mining Pohai Sea, mouth of the Yangtze River, and eastern and southern

Chinese coastal waters so as to close off the Chinese Communists' maritime

outlets;

2. Searching all foreign merchant ships sailing toward mainland China,

seizing three Russian ships carrying jet fuel and one Polish oil tanker;

3. Supplying offshore islands such as Tachen, Nanchishan, Matsu, Tangyin,

Wuchiu, Chinmen, Penghu, Tungsha and Paracel Islands, and patrolling the

Taiwan Straits;

4. Supporting assaults of the Nationalist troops on the sea.

The mining operation was called off as the Korean War ended. The searching of foreign ships was suspended as international criticism rose. The

patrolling and supplying missions were kept up, resulting in frequent

skirmishes with the Communist navy and air force. In those early years,

the superior performance of the American-made naval ships gave the Nationalists a definite edge over the Communists' infant navy and air force and

made them winners in most sea battles with the Communists. However, the

Nationalist air force's propeller fighter planes were no match for the

Communist jet fighters. Therefore, whenever the Nationalist fighters got

in trouble with MiG jets, they would dive to within the firing range of

the Nationalist naval ships for protection. In those years, the MiGs

also made frequent bombing and strafing runs over the Nationalist vessels

but inflicted little damage. On the contrary, they were often shot down

in flame by the latter's accurate anti-aircraft artillery.
With naval support, the Nationalist version of "green berets" made frequent

assaults and penetrations along the Chekiang, Fukien and Kwangtung coast.

Two major battles stood out in those days:

1. Assault on Nanji Island (facing Wuchiu Island): On 10 October 1952,

two amphibious detachments formed from two battalions of Nationalist naval

and special forces attempted a surprise attack on Nanji Island. Foul

weather delayed the landing again and again and took away the surprise

element. As a result, the assault turned into a fight to the bitter end.

On the morning of 11 October, two Nationalist amphibious ships landed more

reinforcements amid enemy fire and despite blockage of Communist torpedo

boats. At sundown, the Nationalist invaders declared their occupation of

the island. The Nationalist navy also repelled several counterattacks from

Communist speedboats. Three days later, the Nationalist assault troops

withdrew from the island under naval and air cover. In that battle, both

sides lost over 1,000 men. The Communists also lost several torpedo boats.

The Nationalists lost no ships and suffered little damages.

2. Assault on Tungshan Island (at the Fukien-Kwangtung border): The Nationalists were not entirely happy with the assault on Nanji Island. On

16 July 1953, they mounted another assault of similar troop strength. In

addition, they threw in paratroopers. Unfortunately, they were in for a

greater disappointment. First of all, bad weather forced most paratroopers

(about the size of a battalion) to turn back (three of the airplanes reached

the vicinity of Hong Kong without finding a place to land). Heavy sniping

fire from the Communist gunboats and inaccurate tide movement information

caused a delay in the beaching of Nationalist marines. As a result, the

few advance paratroopers who had been dropped on the island and had taken

up position waiting for reinforcements were annihilated. A bloody battle

then took place. In 3 days, the county seat of Tungshan County changed

hands several times in the seesaw between the Nationalists and the Communists. On the afternoon of 18 July, the Nationalists, after suffering

heavy casualties, beat a retreat. During this engagement, the Nationalist

navy fared well—itself suffered no casualties but sank three Communist

gunboats and five motorized junks.

The Battle of Tachen Islands—The battle over Tachen Islands afforded the

first opportunity for a true match between the Nationalist and Communist

navies. The outcome was that the Nationalists did not do as well as they

had expected while the Communists showed that their navy was now something

to be reckoned with.

Tachen Islands lie 15 nautical miles off the coast from Wen Mountains in

Chekiang Province and are within firing range of the Chinese Communist

coastal guns. They are also not far from a Communist air base of fighter

planes yet are more than 200 nautical miles away from Taiwan. Their geological location made it obvious that the Nationalists would have a hard

time defending them. Nevertheless, the Nationalists still had one infantry

division (the 46th Division) stationed on five major islands. The arduous

task of supply these islands and guarding the waters around them fell on

the Nationalist navy.
On 18 September 1954, a Nationalist propeller plane shot down a Communist

MiG fighter in a dog fight over Tachen Islands, thus raising the curtain on

the Battle of Tachen Islands2. First, the Communists started shelling

Chinmen and Matsu to divert the Nationalists' attention, disguising their

real intention of wanting to take the Tachen Islands. In the weeks that

followed, the Nationalist and Communist navies had some encounters in the

waters near Chinmen and Matsu. The Nationalists still had the upper hand,

sinking six Communist speedboats, one oil tanker, and 30 armed motor junks.

Then came the incident of the Taiping destroyer in November. This was when

the Communist navy dealt the Nationalist navy a resounding blow for the ^

first time. In the early morning of 14 November, the destroyer "Taiping

was patrolling the waters near Tachen Islands by itself. The ship's radar

screen showed a cluster of mainland Chinese fishing boats working in the

area. Then, all of a sudden, out of the cluster came several Communist

torpedo speedboats heading straight toward the destroyer, shooting torpedoes. Two torpedoes hit the "Taiping." Even though she managed to get

away, she sank not far from the Tachen Islands 17 hours after she was hit.

In firepower and tonnage, she ranked seventh in the Nationalist navy's

fleet. Her sinking was naturally a great loss for the Nationalists. While

the civilians in Taiwan took part in the popular movement of "buying a new

ship, avenging the lost one," the Nationalist military brass reviewed their

anti-speedboat tactics and reassessed Communist naval capabilities. One

week after the incident of the Taiping destroyer, the Nationalists and ^

Americans signed in Washington the "Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty.

This may be regarded as a coincidence.

On 10 January 1955, more than a hundred Chinese Communist bombers and

fighters bombed and strafed Tachen Islands. Two bombers were shot down by

anti-aircraft guns of Nationalist naval vessels. That night, Nationalist

and Communist naval ships fought tooth and nail in a fierce meeting engagement, in which the Nationalists lost a patrol boat and the Communists

lost two torpedo speedboats. As the week wore on, the Communists assembled

two Marine divisions, 154 ships and motor junks of various types, and 230

fighter planes along the coast facing Tachen Islands, girding themselves

for an attack on Tachen Islands. The "Engagement of Ichiangshan Island"

was to be the opening round.

In the early morning of 18 January, a Communist flotilla composed of two

destroyers and four patrol boats set up a blockade to isolate Ichiangshan

from other islands in the Tachen group. It also kept Nationalist rein-^

forcements from both the air and the sea miles away by a blanket of artillery fire. At noon, 60 Communist IL-28 bombers, with an escort of MiG

fighters, made saturation bombing of Ichiangshan Island which is only 1.3

square kilometers in area. At 2:00 in the afternoon, a regiment of Communist Marines boarded some 100 armed motor junks at Tungmen Island and

sailed the 5 nautical miles to Ichiangshan. Under cover of coastal and

naval artillery fire and fighter planes, they landed on the island. The

700 Nationalist guerrillas stationed there were obviously no match for the

Communist invaders. After 3 hours of heavy fighting, the island fell into

the Communist hands, even though the Nationalist defenders were to contxnue
their organized resistance for 3 more days. At midnight of 20 January, the

Nationalists sent several battleships to the island to attempt an evacuation of survivors but could not get past the sniping fire of Communist

patrol boats. As the night wore on, the Nationalists sank two Communist

patrol boats but also lost a battleship themselves. The Battle of Tachen

Islands was thus reaching its height.

As soon as the Chinese Communists took Ichiangshan, they turned their eyes

to Shangtachen and Hsiatachen Islands defended by Nationalist main forces.

After 20 January, the nearby waters became the bloody battleground for the

two opposing navies. The Nationalists succeeded in sinking four Communist

ships and 17 motor junks and could not prevent the Communists from putting

together an amphibious assault force. The newly built runway for fighter

planes on Shangtachen Island lay useless under constant bombardment from

Communist coastal battery only 6 nautical miles away. Lacking local air

superiority and unable to establish total control of the sea, the Nationalists faced grave danger on and around Tachen Islands. Fortunately, the

"Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty" came into effect on 10 February.^ The

U.S. Seventh Fleet stepped in to contain the worsening situation. A SinoAmerican joint task force composed of 159 vessels of various types (including 27 National naval ships) managed to evacuate 25,000 soldiers and civilians from Tachen Islands to Taiwan in 5 days.

Once the Tachen Islands were lost to the Communists, the Nanchishan Islands

75 nautical miles to the south became indefensible. On 18 February, the

Nationalists took on the evacuation mission all by themselves. The evacuation was to be marred by sea battles around Taishan Islands. Nanchishan

Islands, totaling 15 square kilometers in area, were surrounded by Taishan

Islands which were in Communist hands. Naturally the 8-day evacuation had

to be carried out amid hourly bitter engagements between the Nationalist

and Communist navies. On 25 February, the Nationalists completed the evacuation of 5,000 troops and 2,000 civilians. The Nationalists came out of

the sea battles with the sinking of one Communist patrol boat, four gunboats, and five armed motor junks to their credit. With the conclusion

of the Battles of Tachen Islands, the Nationalists gave up their last

stronghold off Chekiang province's shores.

When the Chinese Communist navy was taking shape in the early 1950's, its

fleet consisted of American-made, Russian-made, Japanese-made, Britishmade, Canadian-made and German-made ships. Such wide variety created problems in maintenance and getting supplies. As Russian aid started pouring

in, the Chinese Communist navy achieved standardization gradually. First,

the Soviets gave the Chinese Communists large numbers of naval ships to

make up for losses suffered during various sea engagements with^the Nationalists. In 1955 alone, for instance, the Russian "buddies," having

bled Manchuria white and finally having decided to remove their Far Eastern

fleets from Lushun (Port Arthur), turned over to the Chinese Communists all

the naval facilities in Lushun and 44 ships of various types (including

two escort destroyers and five submarines). Second, the Soviets began to
provide submarine training facilities to help Chinese Communists develop

submarine forces. Third, the Soviets made all-out efforts to help the

Communists with mine sweeping, thus quickly reopening mainland Chinese

ports for international traffic. Lastly and most importantly, the Soviets

helped the Communists set up five naval shipyards in Talien, Shanghai and

Huangpu (Whampao) to build naval ships of Russian designs.

During the same period, the Nationalist navy also received some new ships

through American aid, offsetting the Communist advantage achieved through

Russian aid. The balance of naval forces between the Nationalists and the

Communists is shown in Table II.

The loss of Tachen Islands was actually a blessing for the Nationalists.

It was like the discard of a dead weight. Now the Nationalists could concentrate on defending Taiwan, Penghu (Pescadores), Chinmen and Matsu. The

72nd Patrol Detachment of the U.S. Seventh Fleet cruised the Taiwan Strait

all year round. The Nationalist air force, now an all-jet force upgraded

by American aid, provided air cover for naval patrols. As a result, the

Nationalist navy was patrolling a long stretch of waters extending along

Kwangtung, Fukien and Chekiang provinces' sea coasts. From 1955 to 1957,

the Nationalist and Communist navies ran into each other time and again

and battled each other fiercely, with the Nationalist navy coming out of

each engagement always a victor. The Nationalist navy was to reach its

heyday during the Gun Battle Over Chinmen and Matsu, to win worldwide recognition.

Though the Communists were thwarted in 1950 in their attempt to cross

Taiwan Strait and to give "Taiwan a bloodbath" at the height of their

sweeping victory on the mainland, they refused to abandon their established policy of "liberating Taiwan by force of arms." In 1958, both the

international and the domestic situation seemed to favor a second try.

Preparations got underway to assemble along the Fukien coast 13 infantry

divisions, three artillery divisions, two anti-artillery divisions, 298

fighter planes of various types, and 262 naval ships and armed motor junks

of various kinds. The plan was to take Chinmen and Matsu by storm first,

and then to liberate Penghu and Taiwan the following spring-3. In this

coming battle, the Communists were to throw in all their naval vessels.

A little prior to the battle, the Communist navy had several encounters

with the Nationalists along the Fukien coast and lost 18 ships of various

types and 45 motor junks while trying to get away from the Nationalist

hot pursuits.

The Gun Battle Over Chinmen and Matsu—At 6:00 in the afternoon of 23 August, the 342 Chinese Communist guns emplaced along the coast began carpetbombing of nearby Chinmen Island, thus raising the curtain on the "23 August Gun Battle" which was to shock the world. During the first 2 hours,

these guns hurled a total of 57,500 rounds of shells across the waters onto

Chinmen. The shelling failed to make enough of a dent on the steely fortifications on the island (defended by more than 100,000 Nationalist troops)

to encourage an attempt to land assault troops on the island. Therefore,
the next move which the Communists decided on was to try to choke Chinmen

off from its maritime and aerial sources of reinforcements and supplies,

hoping to attempt the landing as soon as the island defenders ran out of

their ammunition and provisions. The next day, the Communist navy and air

force entered the Liaolo Bay for bombing and strafing runs, but were repelled by island defenders.

The dawn of 25 August saw a Nationalist convoy of five landing craft and

some merchant ships sailing into Liaolo Bay to drop off provisions, ammunition and supplies on the beach. They immediately attracted scores of Communist torpedo speedboats, covered by coastal gun fire, into the area,

launching one torpedo after another in their direction. In the melee that

followed, Communist torpedoes hit one Nationalist landing craft loaded with

tanks and an unarmed merchant ship of the China Merchants Steam Navigation

Company. The impact set off the ammunition carried in the two ships into a

series of loud explosions. The two ships sank quickly (see Table 1). The

flames from the ships lit up the whole Liaolo Bay. The toll for the Communists was two torpedo speedboats sunk when they tried to get away from the

scene of the battle.

After 25 August, the Nationalist navy made several attempts to enter Liaolo

Bay under cover of night with supplies, but was stopped by Communist naval

ships and coastal guns. On 2 September, a Nationalist supply convoy consisting of two patrol boats, one mine sweeper, and three landing craft put

out to sea at Makung port of Penghu and sailed into Liaolo Bay with the

objective of dropping supplies on the beach of the besieged Chinmen at midnight. Meanwhile, more than 20 Communist torpedo speedboats and gunboats

were waiting at Amoy port to intercept this convoy. At 11:00 that night,

the two adversaries met in Liaolo Bay 6 nautical miles southeast of Chinmen.

The ensuing 4-hour battle would go down in history as the "2 September Sea

Battle in Liaolo Bay." During the engagement, the Communist speedboats

were helpless in trying to stop the Nationalist landing craft from unloading

their cargo and were powerless against the screening fire of the Nationalist patrol boats. The battle ended with a score of 12 to nothing in favor

of the Nationalists. The Nationalists won hands down! The highlight of

the combat was that the Nationalist patrol boat named "Tochiang" (PC-104)

charged single-handedly into the Communist formation of torpedo speedboats

and sank a total of nine one after another. As the combat progressed, the

"2 September Sea Battle in Liaolo Bay" brought more than 30 ships from

each adversary navy into the fray. It was a sea battle of the largest

scale in years between the Nationalists and the Communists. The toll was

also the highest. It was to change the course of the Gun Battle over

Chinmen and Matsu. The Chinese Communists, having suffered irreparable

losses in this conflict, were no longer able to block the Nationalist supply routes.

To supply provisions and ammunition to the 150,000 military and civilian

population on Chinmen Island (consumption at 700 tons per day), the Nationalists sent an amphibious convoy with mixed Chinese and American escort

ships every day after 3 September into Liaolo Bay to drop supplies. The
Nationalist air force would cover the Nationalist convoys from the air.

On 18 September, the Nationalists formed a transport flotilla out of scores

of ships of various types to ship scores of 155-centimeter and 203-centimeter cannons (with a firing range of 15 miles) to Chinmen. As the flotilla entered Liaolo Bay, hordes of Communist torpedo speedboats, relying

on a "tactic of numerical superiority," came out in a swarm to block the

way, but to no avail. During the sea battle in broad daylight, the Communists suffered casualties of three boats sunk and four damaged while the

Nationalists were unscathed. Six days later, the same Nationalist flotilla

returned with full loads, again heading into a fight. This time the fight

took place in the air, not at sea. As 32 Nationalist Sabre jet fighters

escorted the flotilla into Liaolo Bay, more than 100 Communist MiG fighters

closed in on them from the south, the north and the west. A 4-hour bitter

aerial battle took place. The Nationalist and Communist fighters chased

one another in fierce dog fights in an air space 100 miles long and 50 miles

wide above the Fukien coast. The final score: 10 to nothing. The Nationalist air force won a smashing victory!

On 15 October, the Communists, after expending 475,000 rounds of artillery

ammunition on Chinmen, realized the futility of their effort in spite of

their immense losses. They decided to call it quits. Thereupon the Gun

Battle Over Chinmen and Matsu petered out with the Communist declaration

of "firing on odd days and ceasefire on even days." According to Nationalist statistics, the Nationalists had two ships sunk and three damaged

in the 18 sea battles in the course of the Gun Battle over Chinmen and

Matsu. The Communist casualties, on the other hand, ran to 22 ships and

86 motor junks destroyed. The score for the 10 major air battles was 32

to 3 in favor of the Nationalists. For this period, victory clearly belonged to the Nationalists.

After the incident of the Taiping destroyer, the Nationalists attached

great importance to developing and improving on their anti-speedboat tactics. Their work proved its value during the Gun Battle over Chinmen and

Matsu. As for the Communists, they began to see the great disadvantage

of pitting their "numerical superiority" against the accuracy of the

automated battery of the Nationalist naval ships. Therefore, for both

the Nationalists and the Communists, the Gun Battle over Chinmen and Matsu

marked an important milestone in their respective naval development. The

Nationalist navy was to continue to improve on its firepower and tactical

maneuvers while the Communist navy was to turn its attention to building

larger naval ships and submarine units and to phase out its obsolete torpedo-boat tactics.

With massive Russian aid, the Chinese Communists began copying various

types of Russian ships in 1956. Their large-scale shipbuilding program

was suspended for a while in 1960 when Russian aid stopped. Then they

picked up again. Relying on rich natural resources and their teamwork,

they overcame one obstacle after another, embarked on research and development on their own, made innovations, and built a navy from their own

resources. In the early 1960's, the Chinese Communists not only continued
to churn out large numbers of speedboats (mainly Shanghai class superspeed

gunboats and Shantou class torpedo speedboats) which "offer small targets,

possess strong firepower, and move at high speed," but also designed large

ships. In those years, the Chiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai built a 1,800-

ton Chiangnan class escort destroyer; Wusung Shipyard in Shanghai built a

500-ton Wusung class minesweeper; and Hutung Shipyard in Shanghai built a

300-ton submarine chaser, all following Russian blueprints. These large

ships were new blood for the Chinese Communist navy. At the same time,

Talien Shipyard put together 21 W-type submarines from equipment left behind by Russians. Huangpu Shipyard also got busy building 500-ton Hainan

class patrol boats to be used against the Nationalist navy.

In the years following the "23 August Gun Battle," the Nationalist navy

had the command of the sea firmly in its hands. With American aid, they

modernized their ships' gunnery. They also set up naval repair yards at

Keelung, Makung, Tsoyin and Kaohsiung to increase their maintenance

capabilities. From 1959 to 1964, the Nationalist and Communist navies

had a number of skirmishes in the Taiwan Straits. The Nationalists still

had the upper hand (see Table 4). However, the three major sea engagements in 1965 were to cause the morale of the Nationalist navy to sink to

its lowest ebb. Perhaps the old Chinese proverb "armies drunk with victory will eventually lose; armies in humiliation will eventually win" is

still true for today's naval warfare.^

The Battles in Minhai Sea—On 1 May 1965, a patrol boat named "Tungchiang"

of the Nationalist navy went on night patrol duties around Tungyin and

Matsu Islands. Due to the negligence of the officers on night watch, the

ship blundered into Shansha Bay—a Chinese Communist naval port. A still

worse blunder was that when the radar operator saw on his radar screen a

large unidentified object charging toward his ship he did not notify the

officers on night watch. The ship did not sound its alert siren until the

first enemy shell fell on its pilot house. For the Nationalists, this sea

battle was joined in error and concluded in confusion. Because all the

men on the ship's deck were killed, there was no telling how many enemy

ships and what types took part in the combat. When "Tungchiang" was hit

scores of times by enemy barrage, she managed to get away and headed toward

Penghu. She finally ran out of steam and had to be towed to Tsoyin Naval

Base by other ships. Afterwards the Nationalists released the news that

"Tungchiang" sank four Shanghai class enemy gunboats and two other gunboats

during the engagement. It was an exaggeration which people find hard to

believe.

In the early morning of 6 August, a Nationalist patrol boat named "Changchiang," under the convoy of "Chienmen," the flagship of the Nationalist

No 2 Cruising Fleet, sailed toward the Fukien coast with the purpose of

landing special forces for penetration into the Liangshan area in Fukien

Province. As the mission was very important, the commander of the No 2

Cruising Fleet, who had the rank of rear admiral, was riding on the flagship to supervise the operation. The Nationalists made one big military

blunder—failing to keep the mission a secret. More than 10 Communist

10
destroyers, gunboats and torpedo speedboats were waiting in Shaoan Bay to

knock them out. At dawn, "Changchiang" and "Chienmen" sailed into Shaoan

Bay, 3,000 yards apart from each other. As they approached land, their

radar lost its effectiveness due to reflections from surrounding land features. At that very moment, flashes of white light exploded on the deck

of "Changchiang." She was being hit by a barrage of fire from Communist

ships' fast and accurate gunnery and the next moment she was sunk. "Chienmen" also found herself under a rain of artillery fire and immediately

tried to get away. At the same time she also radioed for help from Nationalist air force fighters. Badly wounded, "Chienmen" also went down

10 minutes later near Tungshan Island before air support could arrive at

the scene, carrying with her a Nationalist rear admiral to the bottom of

the sea. Shortly after the two ships sank, a dozen or so destroyers of

the Nationalist navy and the Taiwan Strait patrol detachment of the U.S.

Seventh Fleet steamed into the area to search for survivors. In 7 days,

they could only pick up five survivors—all deep-water demolition experts

of the navy and good swimmers. In this battle, the Communists handed a

resounding defeat to the Nationalists.

Late on the night of 13 November, a Nationalist patrol boat named "Yungtai"

(see Table 5) and a minesweeper named "Yungchang" were on guard in the

waters southwest to Wuchiu Island, covering some Nationalist amphibious

boats which were unloading supplies to the defenders on Wuchiu. As soon

as midnight struck, three Communist escort destroyers of the "Chiangnan"

class and five gunboats of the "Shanghai" class swooped out of Chuanchou

port toward Wuchiu for a massacre. The Nationalist "Yungtai" and "Yungchang" bore the brunt of the initial encounter. A bloody battle took place.

As the two Nationalist guard boats were outgunned, outmaneuvered and outnumbered, "Yungchang" soon lapsed into radio silence, its fate unknown.

"Yungtai" carried on a desperate fight with the Communists, hoping to buy

time for the beached Nationalist landing craft to get away and somehow to

attempt a rescue of her sister ship "Yungchang." The battle raged on for

the better part of an hour. "Yungtai," after sinking four Communist gunboats and herself being covered with holes from Communist artillery fire,

managed to pull out of the fight under cover of night-flying Nationalist

fighters. Fifteen crew members survived the ill-fated "Yungchang." They

later confirmed that their ship was sunk by Communist escort destroyers

at the very outset of the battle. Even "Yungtai" had to be scrapped later

because of excessive damage.

The battles in the Minhai Sea caused nearly equal casualties for the two

adversary navies. Yet for the Communists, who had endured defeat after

defeat for more than 10 years up to that point in history, these battles

marked the beginning of an era in which the Communists could fight the

Nationalists as tactical equals. These three major sea engagements brought

home to the Communists the message that it would be futile to use the

speedboats and gunboats against the better—equipped Nationalist ships

with superior firepower and that the only way to offset the Nationalist

advantage was to use large ships and speedboats at the same time.

11
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12
On the Nationalist side, the sinking of three ships and the wounding of two

caused the commanders-in-general of the Nationalist Navy and Air Force to

lose their jobs and all the Nationalist naval ships to display the slogan:

"Let us never forget the lesson of the three sea battles." The use of

large ships of over 1,000 tons in weight by the Communists in the three

sea engagements convinced the Nationalists that their navy of medium-sized

patrol boats and minesweepers was vulnerable. This may be the reason why

the Americans began granting large escort destroyers to the Nationalists

to replace their obsolete patrol boats after the Minhai battles.

At the end of 1965, Nationalist troops spotted at night a Communist W-type

submarine near Hsinchu coast of Taiwan and quickly reported their discovery

to the navy. In no time more than 10 destroyers and escort destroyers

equipped with anti-submarine weapons sailed out from both Makung and Keelung

ports toward the scene of sighting. Thus began the first anti-submarine

battle in the Taiwan Strait. The Communist submarine became the target of

more than 100 depth charges. Though badly wounded, the submarine still

managed to sneak back to Chekiang coast to safety. This was quite a blow

to the Nationalist navy equipped with such anti-submarine weapons as sonar

and depth charges. This embarrassing battle brought to an end the disastrous year of 1965 for the Nationalists.

As the Communists never announce their naval losses to the world and the

Nationalists sometimes tend to exaggerate battle results, it is very

difficult to correctly tabulate the Communist losses for each sea battle.

It is generally assumed that in the 100 or so sea battles, both large and

small, the Communists lost 50 to 70 ships of various types (more than a

half were torpedo speedboats and gunboats) and 100 to 150 motor junks to

artillery fire of Nationalist ships. The Nationalist losses6can be seen

from Table 1: Six ships were sunk in sea combat, two others wounded and

then scrapped; two others wounded but later returned to service after repair; and two others destroyed by ground and air fire. If the losses of

the Communists during sea battles (combat between adversary ships) are

compared with those of the Nationalists, the score on ships sunk or

destroyed by the enemy should be 60 to 8 in favor of the Nationalists.

Obviously the Communists were no match for the Nationalists. However,

it does not mean that the score will repeat itself in future battles. In

the recent decade, the quality of naval troops and naval ships of both

the Communists and the Nationalists has greatly improved. It will be

possible to predict what will happen in future sea battles between the

two adversaries. The only valid prediction will be that the Communists

and the Nationalists will employ different tactics, use more ships, and

conduct the battles differently in the future.

Ceasefire Period—After 1965, the Nationalists stopped their assault and

infiltration operations against the Communists, thus reducing the chances

for direct confrontation between the two navies. As the political tension

between the Nationalists and the Communists eased, their ships began to

avoid each other on purpose. As a result, the recent decade has not witnessed any major sea battle.

13
After the battles in the Minhai Sea, the Nationalist navy took the following five steps to beef up its capabilities:

1. Gradually retire old battleships, replace them with escort destroyers

obtained through American aid;

2. purchase a number of destroyers from the United States in order to

upgrade its firepower and speed;

3. purchase new anti-submarine equipment and precision weapons from the

United States and Japan;

4. purchase one squadron of anti-submarine airplanes to make its antisubmarine capabilities three-dimensional;

5. completely recondition over-age amphibious boats to keep up its ability

to supply offshore islands under Nationalist occupation.

Table 2. Decade-by-Decade Comparison of Nationalist and Communist Maritime

Forces*

Decade

Total tonnage of merchant ships

(1,000)*'*

Total number of merchant ships

Average tonnage of merchant ships

Number of naval troops (1,000)

Average tonnage of naval ships

Total tonnage of naval ships (1,000)

Total number of naval ships

End of 1956 End of 1966 End of 1976

unknown

unknown

unknown

:661

:324

:2040

669:

231:

2900:

770

166

4600

1871

360

5200

25

850

205

241

:31

:1190

:125

:105

92:

680:

293:

429:

35

1620

278

172

114

475

515

1086

:1450

:428

:3390

:35

:2050

:289

:141

Type

Submarines

Destroyers

Convoy ships

Missile speedboats

Speedboats and Gunboats

Other battleships

Amphibious boats

Auxiliary ships

8:

2:

2:

0:

50:

84:

70:

25:

0

3

5

0

0

47

32

18

33:

4:

6:

8:

192:

91:

60:

35:

0

5

16

0

6

37

86

22

64:

8:

10:

120:

675:

79:

58:

72:

5

18

10

0

20

19

51

18

figures on the right

boats under 25 tons in

*Communist figures are on the left, Nationalist

**Figures do not include privately owned boats or

weight

The respective strength of the Nationalist and Communist navies as it stands

at the end of 1966 can be seen from Table 2. In the recent decade, the

Communists have concentrated on designing and building large naval ships:

1. The first "Han" class nuclear-powered submarine carrying traditional

torpedoes was put on the drawing board at Talian Shipyard in 1965. The

submarine was launched in 1972;

14
2. the first submarine carrying G-class missiles (or no missiles) was

launched at Talien Port in 1967;

3. the first "Ming" class attack submarine was completed and launched

at Talien Port in 1967;

4. the first "Luta" class missile destroyer was built by Talien Shipyard

and was launched in 1972;

5. the first "Chiangtung" class-missile escort destroyer was built by

Shanghai Shipyard and launched in 1973.

In addition, Communist shipbuilding yards have churned out more and more

"Chiangnan" class escort destroyers, faster "Huchuan" class hydrofoil

torpedo speedboats, and more powerful "New Shanghai" class superspeed gunboats. At the same time, the Communists have retired the motley of naval

ships captured earlier from the Nationalists. As a result, the Communist

weaponry and ammunition have become standardized, making it simpler for

logistic support, repair and maintenance.

In 1971, the Americans dropped the 72nd Taiwan Strait Patrol Detachment.

In other words, the U.S. Seventh Fleet discontinued its patrol duties in

the Taiwan Straits. Thereupon, the responsibility for the security in the

Taiwan Straits fell entirely on the shoulders of the Nationalists. To

fill the defense vacuum left by American pullout, the Americans have gone

to great lengths to help the Nationalists put together a modernized destroyer fleet. The objective is to insure that the Nationalists will continue to hold the command of the sea. This destroyer fleet equipped with

computers and nuclear missiles can entirely offset the local superiority

of the Communist submarine fleet, which the Communists boast of being able

to "dive deep, travel far, and stay underwater long." The rapid growth

of the Nationalist destroyer fleet in the recent decade can be seen from

Table 2.

In January 1965, the Chinese Communists obtained as "Osa" class missile

speedboat from the Russians in an exchange. Soon they became keenly interested in the superior sea-to-sea missiles carried by that ship. After

several years of research and development, the Communists began to produce

sea-to-sea missiles in large quantities in 1972. Apart from copying Russian "Osa" and "Koma" classes missile speedboats, the Communists have also

installed the missile systems on "Luta" class destroyers and "Chiangtung"

class convoy ships, thus bringing their maritime firepower into a new era.

In addition, they have put a number of small tactical nuclear warheads on

their missile ships. The Communists' rapid expansion of their naval forces

can be seen from Table 2. Such expansion is accentuated by phenomenal

growth of their submarine and speedboat units.

Though the command of the sea still belongs to the Nationalists today, the

Taiwan Straits is seething with tension and explosiveness from the confrontation between the Nationalists and the Communists. As the Communists

15
have stationed their missile fleets along the Fukien coast, the Nationalist

ships go on "Battle Readiness One" as soon as they get within 30 nautical

miles from the coast, with the assumption that a missile attack can come at

any time. On the other hand, the Communists, fearing the powerful Nationalist anti-submarine capabilities, have tried to steer their submarines clear

of the Taiwan Straits. A superficial calm has settled on the Straits, but

the danger of naval conflicts is stalking the waters. Heavy fighting can

flare up at any time.

[Mar 77, pp 76-84]

[Text] Part II The Chinese Nationalist and Communist Naval Strength and

Their Ships' Characteristics

If one is to assess the Chinese Nationalist and Communist Naval strength

at present and to predict trends for the future, one must have a complete

understanding of the capabilities of the ships and their weapon systems of

the two navies. He will be greatly mistaken if he makes a judgement purely

on the basis of the number and tonnage of the ships alone.

It goes without saying that different ships in the Nationalist and Communist navies will have different equipment. Even ships in the same category

will have different weapon systems, depending on which side they are on.

To make it easier to understand a very complicated matter, the writer^

wishes to go into the weapon systems of the respective navies in detail

first. After that, he will attempt an analysis of the characteristics of

the ships on either side.

Weapon Systems

The weapons of the Chinese Nationalist and Communist naval ships fall into

four main categories: anti-submarine weapons; sea-to-sea and sea-to-air

missiles; ship battery; and sea mines and torpedoes. Let us deal with them

one at a time:

1. Anti-Submarine Weapons:

The most effective instrument to detect the presence of a diving submarine

is sonar. This piece of special equipment sensitive to supersonic vibrations can pick up the sounds of submarine propellers, thus determining the

presence of submarines. It can also pick up reverberations from sound

vibrations, thereby determining the distance, location and speed of subs.

By the same token, it can also establish the direction and speed of attacking torpedoes. Both the Nationalist and Communist anti-submarine ships are

equipped with sonar with an effective range of 3 nautical miles. In the

last 2 or 3 years, the Americans furnished the Nationalist navy with an

improved sonar (VDS-type sonar), extending its submarine detection range

to 14 nautical miles. Another submarine detection method used by the Nationalists is by dropping sonar buoys from anti-submarine airplanes into

intended waters. These submerged sonar buoys coupled with frequent antisubmarine patrols provide the Nationalists with an accurate picture of

16
what is going on under the water in the Taiwan Straits. For instance, it

takes only six sonar buoys placed at equal distance to cover the "sea

corridor" from Chinmen to Taiwan. It takes another two anti-submarine

ships to patrol the same stretch of waters. This will be a sufficient

deterrent to any enemy submarine for that area.

The most primitive and the best known anti-submarine weapon is the depth

charge. Depth charges carried by naval ships are launched at the proper

time based on the information provided by sonar. Unfortunately, while

sonar can determine the location and distance of an enemy submarine, it

cannot pinpoint its depth. Therefore, timing the detonation of a depth

charge is a difficult job (depth charge does not explode on impact).

Timing the detonation for too soon or too late will make a depth charge

harmless even if it should roll over the body of an enemy submarine.

Furthermore, when an enemy sub comes close to within 200 yards, the repeated reverberations of the same sound vibration will confuse a sonar

to render it ineffective. In other words, at the most crucial moment,

the question of when to drop a depth charge becomes a matter of guessing

and luck. Because of this fault, a new breed of anti-submarine weapons

found its way onboard both the Nationalist and Communist naval ships in

the later 1960's, namely, the hedgehogs (ASW Ahead-Thrown Weapons) for

the Nationalists and the anti-submarine rockets for the Communists.^ They

work on the same principle. Before the sonar is to lose its effectiveness

(when an enemy submarine is still more than 200 yards away), a number of

these weapons (24 hedgehogs or 12 anti-submarine rockets in every single

shot) are discharged in the direction of the enemy submarine for the right

distance. They are spaced evenly so that if any one of them in their

sinking comes into contact with the enemy submarine, it will detonate all

the others released in the same shot to blow the sub to pieces. For the

Communists, the depth charges and anti-submarine rockets are the only

weapons currently in their possession. But for the Nationalists, two more

lethal weapons—acoustic torpedoes and anti-submarine missiles—have been

introduced into their anti-submarine arsenal since 1970.

A submarine during its underwater navigation must make some noise. It may

stop its propeller. It may shut down its pumps. But it cannot turn off

the air-conditioning system giving air to its crew. That little noise it

makes is good enough for an acoustic torpedo. The acoustic torpedo is

itself a complicated computer. It has a warhead, a propeller, a sonar,

and electronic computer, an auto-pilot, and a target detector. It^needs

to be launched only in the general direction, determined by a ship's sonar,

of an enemy submarine, and it will take care of the rest. The Nationalist

navy is now in possession of "Mark-46" acoustic torpedoes. They can travel

for 13 minutes in the water at 30 knots.

Apart from acoustic torpedoes, the Nationalists have also received from

the Americans another deadly weapon—anti-submarine missiles. Now the

anti-submarine missiles, with interchangeable nuclear warheads, are

standard equipment on all Nationalist destroyers. They are just as effective against submarines as against enemy ships. They are similar to

17
acoustic torpedoes in structure except that they are moved by rocket

propellers. They are first guided by their parent ship's electronic

remote control system and sonar. When they get to within half a mile of

the enemy submarine, they will dive headlong into the water. They will

complete the rest of their mission on their own.

When faced with an attack from depth charges, or hedgehogs, or antisubmarine rockets (the three types of weapons have a range of less than

400 yards), a submarine still has time to counterattack with its torpedoes

or to escape. When faced with acoustic torpedoes, it becomes a sitting

duck. If faced with anti-submarine missiles, its fate is sealed. There

is no escape from the jaws of death. At the moment, even the most technically advanced countries have not yet come up with a device to fend off

anti-submarine missile attacks, not to mention the Chinese Nationalists

or Communists. Table 3 shows the capabilities of various anti-submarine

weapons.'

2. Sea-to-Sea and Sea-to-Air Missiles

Sea-to-sea missiles are the most important weapons for the Chinese Communist navy and are causing the greatest concern among the Nationalists.

The Communists have copied the Russian Styx (SS-N-2) sea-to-sea missiles

and have installed them on all their missile speedboats, missile destroyers,

and missile escort destroyers. Their ballistics work like this: The missile-carrier ship will "lock" in on the target enemy ship with its horizontal radar and then launch the missile according to the target's speed

and course. The "synchronized radar" in the missile will start itself

when the missile gets within 5 nautical miles from its target. This radar

system equipped with ultra-red heat-chaser, will guide the missile toward

its target.

However, Styx missiles cannot stand turbulence. Take speedboats for instance. When they sail in winds of gale force 4 or above, the sway of their

bodies will make the launching of such missiles totally inaccurate. In

spite of this drawback, these 800-pound missiles are deadly accurate if

the wind is still and the sea is calm. For example, during the 1967 ArabIsraeli war, an Egyptian missile speedboat fired Styx missiles from the

quiet sea within Port Said against an Israeli destroyer patrolling 15 nautical miles away. It took only three missiles to send a 2,500-ton destroyer

to the bottom of the sea. What destructive power!

The Nationalist navy also entered the missile era in 1975. The Nationalists

equipped all their destroyers with Israeli-made Gabriel-II sea-to-sea missiles to counter-balance the expanding capabilities of the Communist surface fleet. Gabriel-IIs are similar to Styx's in capabilities, as can be

seen from Table 4.

For both the Nationalists and the Communists, their sea-to-air missiles are

embryonic. The Chinese Communists installed the first generation of their

18
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19
"antelope" (SA-N-1) sea-to-air missiles on their "Chiangtung" class convoy

ships as early as 1971. No more has been heard about them since. Apparently the Communists are facing very serious design and construction problems. On the other hand, the Nationalists have bought Chaparral sea-to-air

missiles8from Israel and planned to put them on all their destroyers to

augment their anti-aircraft firepower. Besides, the Nationalists are bargaining with British, French and South African arms merchants for purchase

of more advanced sea-to-air missiles. It is very likely that in 2 or 3

years the sea-to-air missiles will be standard equipment for both the Nationalist and the Communist navies.

Up to now, neither the Nationalists nor the Communists have "electronic

anti-missile" system in their arsenals. For now, both the Nationalist

and Communist naval ships must rely on their ineffective artillery as

their only anti-missile weapons.

As the sea-to-sea missiles have the speed of only 530 nautical miles an

hour (comparable to the speed of the old MiG-15 fighters), they may be detected by radar gun control apparatus installed on both Nationalist and

Communist ships. The point is that even if it is spotted, it needs only

2 more minutes to fly into the firing range of the ship's battery. In

those 2 short minutes, it will be very difficult first to determine

whether it is an enemy missile and then to make firing preparations.

Once it is within the firing range of the ship's battery, there is only

30 seconds in which to shoot it down. Therefore, it may be said that

the anti-aircraft artillery, at its present speed and accuracy, of both

the Nationalist and Communist ships still offers no defense against the

sea-to-sea missiles.

3. Ship's Battery

The main battery of the Chinese Communist navy consists of the following:

a. Four 5.1-inch flat-fire guns emplaced on each destroyer. These

director-guided pieces have an effective range of 27,000 yards, b. Two

to six 3.9-inch guns emplaced on each escort destroyer and patrol boat.

Also director-guided, these guns have an effective range of about 20,000

yards, c. 57-mm and 37-mm semi-automatic anti-aircraft guns and antiaircraft machine guns of different caliber installed on various ships.

These weapons are all copies of Russian prototypes. It is also known that

the Communists have made little improvement on their gun directors. Hence,

the accuracy of the Communist ships' battery depends largely on weather

conditions and gunners' experience.

The Nationalist ships' battery includes 5-inch and 3-inch guns, with ranges

of. 18,000 and 14,000 yards respectively, installed on the destroyers (4 to

6 pieces each) and the escort destroyers (2 pieces each). Even though the

Nationalist main battery is inferior in caliber and range, it is superior

in accuracy to Communist guns. As soon as the director-radar is fixed on

a target enemy ship, a computer in charge of directing the guns begins

20
processing data such as the speed of both the enemy ship and its own ship,

wind velocity, the sway of its own ship, etc. and then adjusts the guns

for the right azimuth and angle of elevation. The Nationalist computerdirected guns attain an accuracy rate of 95 percent. Since 1969, such

radar control system has been installed on Nationalist ships one after

another to direct artillery fire. The 5-inch and 3-inch guns can also be

used against aircraft. However, the standard anti-aircraft weapon is the

semi-automatic 40-mm anti-aircraft gun. It fires "magnetic" shells, which

differ from ordinary shells. Magnetic shells have both contact detonator

and time fuse, while ordinary shells have either one or the other, but not

both. Therefore, even if the magnetic shell does not score a direct hit,

it will explode at a point nearest to the enemy airplane as a result of

magnetic reaction. With such magnetic shells, a radar-directed antiaircraft gun has a hitting average of 0.03 against supersonic aircraft.

This compares with the hitting average of 0.0005 (namely only 1 hit in

every 2,000 rounds fired) of conventional semi-automatic anti-aircraft

guns. Apart from the guns, the Nationalists also have smaller caliber

weapons such as 20-mm automatic anti-aircraft cannons and half-inch heavy

machine-guns on their naval ships. Table 5 shows the types and characteristics of the ships' battery of both the Nationalists and the Communists.

While the ships' guns are used mainly against enemy shipping and enemy

aircraft, they are often called into action during shelling of the coastal

areas, especially during saturation bombing of the beaches before amphibious troops are to land.

4. Mines and Torpedoes

The Taiwan Straits, for its depth and for the topography of its shores,

is an ideal place for both the Nationalists and the Communists to lay mines.

All that is needed to stop enemy naval ships and submarines is to put a

cluster of mines in all the harbors and bays and along all sea lanes and

shipping routes where the water is not more than 600 feet deep. Each mine

contains several hundred pounds of high explosive encased in a steel ball.

Any ship that strikes a mine will either sink or be severely damaged.

The mine of the longest standing is the "contact mine." It has many horns

on its surface. It is submerged in water at a depth of between 10 and 20

feet. Anything that touches one of its horn will detonate it. The

"Acoustic Mine" and the "Magnetic Mine" were introduced during World War II.

They are usually submerged at the depth of 30 feet. The "acoustic mine"

has a special "eardrum fuse." When a ship passes by above it, the noise

from the ship's propeller will affect the "eardrum fuse" and detonate it.

The "magnetic fuse" has a "magnetic fuse." A ship passing above will

trigger the magnetic mechanism to detonate it. After the war, "pressure

mines" and "combined influence mines" were developed to frustrate minesweeping efforts. The "pressure mine" has a pressure fuse which can only

be set off by substantial water pressure created by large naval ships of

21
Table 4. The Nationalist and Communist Naval Sea-to-sea and Sea-to-air

Missiles

ROC

PRC

Tv£e £t£

No of

Rounds Firing Firing Shell Shell Propellingper range Height length Weight control

±2Z2HZ ±mil?± H^^l. Ifggt) flbs) system

Gabriel-II 5 ships

S-to-S 25 pcs

Missile*

10

Chaparral

S-to-A

Missile*

45

Styx SS- 132 ships

N-2 S-to- 400 pcs

S Missile

Goa SA-N-1 1 ship

S-to-A 4 pcs

Missile

22 11.0 400

50,000 9.5

25 15.0

solid fuel,

radar-guided,

semi-automatic

chasing visually

25 solid fuel,

ultrared

heat chasing

800 solid fuel,

radar-guided,

semi-auto

ultrared chasing

17 40,000 19.3 45 Solid fuel,

radar-guided

semi-automatic

chasing

*Note: the Nationalists are putting

naval ships.

these two types of missiles on all

considerable tonnage passing over the mine. Its fuse will not react^to

small ships or minesweeping equipment. The "combined influence mine" has

all three types of fuses—"eardrum,

therefore the most reliable.

magnetic, and "pressure" and is

Any kind of mine, except the "contact mine," will pose a greater threat if

it is outfitted with a "timer." For instance, if the "timer" is set to 10,

the mine will blow up only when the 10th ship passes over it. It means

that any minesweeping equipment passing over it 9 times will still be unable to clear it away. Another lethal type is the "electronic mine' which

is detonated by remote control and cannot be swept away at all. In short,

mining operation is getting more and more complicated each day. For the

present, both the Nationalists and the Communists are in possession of all

six types of mines described above. As to the methods of mining, mines

can be dropped from airplanes or laid by ships, submarines, or even sampans.

A discussion of mine-laying naturally leads to a discussion of minesweeping.

Sonar, a device that can detect the presence of submarines, can also detect

the presence of mines. Sonar search may be coupled with aerial visual^

search of shallow waters. However, locating the mines is only the begin- ^

ning. The difficult task is to safely detonate the mines. Contact mines,

"acoustic mines" and "magnetic mines" are easy to get rid of. All it takes

is cut rope, noise makers and magnets to set them off respectively. But

22
"pressure mines," "combined influence mines" and "electronic mines" are

hard nuts to crack. At present, both the Nationalists and the Communists

own dozens of minesweepers, but their minesweeping abilities are very

limited. Such limitations are not confined to the Chinese Nationalists or

Communists. They are worldwide. If one opens any sea chart of small scales,

one will see markings such as "danger! Uncleared Mines" at scores of spots.

This is proof that mines are very hard to clear away.

Torpedoes remain a conventional but effective weapon after several decades

of use. An ordinary torpedo has a propeller, a fuel chamber, a control

system, and a warhead. It can be launched from an airplane, a ship, or a

submarine against an enemy surface or underwater target. The torpedoes

(except acoustic torpedoes) in the Nationalist and Communist arsenals are

the conventional type—battery-driven, 21 inches in diameter, with a speed

of 30 knots. Because of the limitations of their detonation devices (timer,

or contact fuse, or magnetic fuse), these torpedoes must be accurately aimed

at the target. At present, the torpedoes (weighing 2 and a half tons) deployed on both the Nationalist and Communist submarines have an effective

range of between 2,000 and 5,000 yards. Those deployed on Communist bombers

and torpedo speedboats (weighing 1 ton each) have an effective range of between 400 and 800 yards.

Types of Ships

Now that we have covered the naval weapon systems, we will get on with our

discussion of the various types of naval ships. Generally speaking, the

Chinese Nationalist and Communist naval ships fall into six main categories:

(1) submarines of various types, (2) destroyers of various types, (3) battle

ships of various types, (4) speedboats of various types, (5) amphibious

boats, and (6) auxiliary boats. The first four types are used in sea battles while the last two for logistic support. Let us deal with them one at

a time:

1. Submarines of Various Types

Since World War I, the submarines have emerged as the backbone of naval

forces competing for the dominance of the sea. They are effective strike

weapons against a numerically superior enemy surface force. The Chinese

Nationalist and Communist submarines are propelled by diesel combustion

engines when they are moving on the surface and by batteries when they are

diving. Due to technological breakthroughs, the Nationalist and Communist

submarines, fashioned after the German No 21 Submarine Prototype, can stay

submerged for a long time. They are no longer like the World War II models

which had to surface to recharge their batteries frequently. The present

deep-sea submarines (carrying approximately 20 torpedoes) weigh over 1,500

tons and have an operational radius of 15,000 nautical miles. Coastal submarines (carrying 6 torpedoes) weigh approximately 1,000 tons or less.

Their surface and diving speed averages between 15 and 20 knots. They can

dive to depths of around 400 feet. Their crew size runs up to 90 members.

23
The Chinese Communists have one nuclear-powered submarine (carrying 17

torpedoes) which, of course, can dive deeper and longer and move faster.

A submarine's mission is related to the weapons it carries. It can fire

torpedoes against enemy shipping. If outfitted with special equipment,

it can lay mines. If equipped with anti-submarine sonar, it can hunt for

enemy subs. If equipped with sea-to-land missiles, it can strike at land

targets. Apart from being an offensive weapon against enemy ships, a

submarine can also carry special force troops to make coastal penetrations. Submarines have both advantages and disadvantages. First of all,

submarines are incapable of fulfilling a number of naval duties, such as

search and sentry duties, escorting convoys, shelling coastal targets,

or supporting amphibious operations. Furthermore, submarines have no defense against air strikes. They are sitting ducks when they run into

aerial attacks (especially from anti-submarine aircraft). Lastly, considering the present capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist and Communist

submarines, they are defenseless against latest sophisticated anti-submarine weapons and can hardly survive an enemy anti-submarine offensive.

Table 5. Capabilities of Nationalist and Communist Naval Guns*

Speed Firing Firing Shell

(round range height weight

Type Quantity per min) (yard) (feet) (lbs) Special features

5.1" guns 11 ships 10 27,250 — 59.5 Wasphead gun direc3g pcs tor, semi-auto, flat

fire

3.9" guns 15 ships 20 19,620 39,360 35.3 Sun-visor gun direcPRQ 43 pCS tor, semi-auto, dual

purpose

57-mm aaa 164 ships 120 9,810 16,000 6.2 Skinhead gun direc305 pcs tor, semi-auto, dual

purpose

37-mm aaa 572 ships 180 4,360 4,920 1.6 ditto

ROC

1888 pcs

5" guns 34 ships 22 18,000 37,400 55.1 MK-37 gun director,

129 pcs semi-auto, dual

purpose

3" guns 33 ships 50 14,170 29,520 13.3 MK-37 gun director,

66 pCS automatic, dual

purpose

40-mm aaa 79 ships 160 5,000 13,450 2.1 MK-37 gun director,

389 pcs semi-auto, dual

purpose

*not included are small guns with caliber less than 30 minimeters or nonnaval guns (like 75-mm howitzer)

24
2. Destroyers of Various Types

In today's navies, the destroyer has completely taken the place of capital

ship and cruiser to become an "all-round battleship." As destroyers are

seaworthy, durable, fast, and equipped with a complete range of weapons,

they can perform any sea duty under any weather condition. The Nationalist

and Communist destroyers weigh from 2,000 to 3,800 tons, have a maximum

speed of 36 knots, are manned by a crew of approximately 300 members, and

have an operational radius of 7,000 nautical miles. They are now the king

of the sea. They can attack enemy ships with guns, missiles or torpedoes;

enemy aircraft with antiaircraft guns; and enemy submarines with various _

types of anti-submarine weapons. They can shell coastal targets with their

main battery. With radar, they can search the sky and the sea and serve

as early warning systems. They can, with special equipment, seed the sea

with mines. Some Nationalist destroyers even carry with them helicopters

which extend their reach even further in performing any of the above described duties. Besides, destroyers can also perform deep-sea rescue and

towing missions. In short, they can do anything at sea.

For defensive purposes, a destroyer can repel attacks from the air, the sea

and from under the water with its three-dimensional fire. It can serve as

an escort and sentry ship for convoys. It can provide supporting fire for

amphibious operations with its main battery. Should the sea-to-sea missiles deployed on Communist destroyers and the anti-submarine missiles deployed on Nationalist destroyers be outfitted with small tactical warheads,

the respective destroyers could mount a nuclear strike and inflict greater

damage and loss of lives on the enemy.

In the past two decades, the Chinese Nationalists and Communists have made

little improvement on the structure and power unit of their respective

destroyers and yet have made amazing progress in upgrading their weapon

systems. The missiles, computers and nuclear power have increased the offensive capabilities of modern destroyers by 100 fold from 20 years ago.

Take the Nationalist "Hanyang" Missile Destroyer for example. It boasts

anti-submarine missiles, acoustic torpedoes, helicopters, and radar-guided

artillery. The entire ship is covered by closed-circuit air-conditioning

system. Its immunity to nuclear attacks makes it a unique ship in the

Chinese Nationalist and Communist navies. In fact, it is the only ship

in the world that can survive in a nuclear holocaust.9

3. Battleships of Various Types

These include escort destroyers, patrol boats, minesweepers and minelayers

(excluding submarines, naval vessels weighing less than 300 tons are called

boats; those weighing over 300 tons are called ships). In tonnage, firepower, speed and capabilities, these ships are inferior to destroyers.

Escort destroyers weigh between 1,500 and 2,300 tons, have a speed of

around 25 knots, and call for a 200-man crew. They can attack enemy aircraft, surface ships and submarines. They can serve as escort for ship

25
convoys and support amphibious operations. Chinese Communist escort

destroyers can also lay mines. A number of Nationalist escort destroyers

can hold four landing craft vehicle personnel (LCVP) and a 160-man amphibious reconnaissance company to conduct pre-landing reconnaissance. Chinese

Communist patrol boats can be grouped into at least five types. Their

tonnage ranges from 200 to 1,300. Their speed varies between 11 and 27

knots. Their crew numbers less than 100 men. Relying on their main guns

and antiaircraft guns, they are responsible for coastal patrol and coastal

defense. Nationalist patrol boats are armed with acoustic torpedoes, depth

charges and sonar. They are highly effective anti-submarine war vessels.

Mine sweeping and laying ships are, of course, responsible for sweeping or

laying mines. At present, Chinese Nationalist and Communist minesweepers

and minelayers weigh between 300 and 800 tons, move at under 18 knots, and

call for a crew size of about 50 men. Right now, these minesweepers are

helpless against "combined influence mines" and "pressure mines."

4. Speedboats of Various Types

These include various types of torpedo speedboats, superspeed gunboats and

missile speedboats. Their water displacements are—torpedo speedboats:

between 25 and 80 tons; superspeed gunboats: between 40 and 160 tons;

missile speedboats: between 100 and 200 tons. Their speed is usually

over 30 knots (hydrofoil gunboats and hydrofoil torpedo boats can speed

to 55 knots). Their crew runs up to 20 men. Being small in size, these

boats cannot take rough sea too well. Being fast in speed, they are real

gas guzzlers. Therefore they cannot fight too far away from their bases.

They are, however, very well suited to working in shallow waters and among

islands, like the waters along the rugged coasts of Chekiäng, Fukien and

Kwangtung Provinces.

Superspeed gunboats rely on high-angle fire artillery as their main weapons.

Torpedo speedboats each carry from two to four torpedoes. Besides, they

also carry a number of machine guns. What they do is that they will close

in on enemy ships at high speed, pour converging fire or launch torpedoes

against the targets, and then speed away from the fight. The trouble is

that they must attack at close range and, being thinly built, stand a good

chance of being destroyed themselves by enemy automatic fire during the

combat.

Missile speedboats are exclusive to the Chinese Communist navy. "Hola"

class missile speedboats each carry four sea-to-sea missiles. Those of

the "Hoku" class each carry two. As the missiles have a longer range and

a higher hit average, missile speedboats have become the star of the Chinese Communist surface fleet. The trouble with them is that they are also

thin in build and expose their radar and missiles in the open—an inviting

target for enemy fire. They are not very seaworthy or durable and therefore must stay close to home bases.

26
5. Amphibious Boats

To make an opposing landing, only amphibious boats can bring landing troops,

reinforcements and supplies to the enemy shore amid enemy fire. The majority of both Chinese Nationalist and Communist landing craft are American

made (The Communists took over the American made craft from the Nationalist

hands during the course of the civil war). They can be classified as follows:

Landing Ship Dock (LSD): The Nationalists own two of them. They displace

9,400 tons of water, have a speed of 16 knots, and are manned by a crew of

330. Each of them can carry 40 amphibious transport vehicles, or 32 landing

craft vehicle personnel, and 10 companies of landing troops. Besides, with

its helicopter deck, each of them can carry two attack helicopters. They

are the heaviest ships owned by the Nationalists.

Landing Ship Tank (LST): At present, both the Nationalists and the Communists

own several dozen of them. They make up the backbone of the respective

amphibious fleets. Each LST displaces 4,100 tons of water, has a speed of

11 knots, and requires a crew of 120 men. It can carry six landing craft

vehicle personnel. In addition, it can hold 17 amphibious transport vehicles (or tanks) and 6 companies of landing troops. Being large and slow,

it is nicknamed jokingly as a "Large Slow Target."10

Land Ship Medium (LSM) : Both the Nationalists and the Communists own a number of them. These vessels displace 1,100 tons of water, move at 12 knots,

and require a crew of 60 men. Each of them can hold eight amphibious transport vehicles and two companies of landing troops. Because of their low

drafts, they can land on shallow water beaches. At present, the Nationalists are using four LSMs to supply troops stationed on Tungsha and Nansha

Islands. The Communists, on the other hand, have converted some of their

LSMs into minelayers.

Infantry Landing Craft (LSIL): The Nationalists have dropped this type of

vessel while the Communists still keep a dozen or so of them in service.

When fully loaded, these crafts displace 285 tons of water, can achieve a

speed of 10 knots. They require a crew of 10. They can carry one infantry

company or three light tanks (or trucks). They are especially suited to

operating among island groups and .coastal areas. During amphibious assaults, these vessels will beach to unload landing forces and vehicles on

beachheads.

While on the subject of amphibious operations, tools for the "ship-to-shore

movement" merit mention here. It is obvious that if the above-mentioned

landing ships are to beach on their own amid enemy fire, it is like walking

right into the jaws of death. Therefore, the "ship-to-shore movement" must

be achieved with the help of the following tools:

Amphibious Tanks: Amphibious tanks can move both in the sea (being different from those tanks that can cross rivers) and on land. With their

27
cannons, heavy and light machineguns, they can neutralize enemy fire on

the beachheads. They are carried to the landing zone by any of the abovedescribed landing ships. Then they are lined up and move one abreast of the

other toward the beach, firing as they move to provide cover for landing

forces. They are indispensable in amphibious battles. At present, the

Nationalists own several dozen American-made LVTA-5 amphibious tanks (nicknamed duckie), each equipped with a 3-inch cannon. The Communists boast

several hundred Chinese-made T-60 amphibious tanks, each equipped with a

76-mm cannon.

Amphibious Transport Vehicles: When landing is attempted on a stretch of

hazardous coastline (rocks on shore and coral reefs in water), amphibious

transport vehicles are used to drop assault troops on the enemy shore.

These vehicles have thick armor to protect their passengers and are armed

with several light and heavy machineguns for suppression of enemy fire.

They can quickly bring the landing forces dozens of miles inland. At

present, the Communists do not yet have a single amphibious transport but

the Nationalists own hundreds of LVTP-5 amphibious transports. Each transport can carry one marine platoon and 2.5 tons of supplies.

Small Landing Craft: They include the 20-ton landing crafts machinery (LCM)

and the 9-ton landing crafts vehicle personnel. They can each land one

marine platoon on the beachhead. In addition, they can also carry tanks,

vehicles and supplies unloaded from transport ships to the beachhead.

Generally speaking, the second wave of assault forces to make an opposed

landing are either carried by amphibious transport vehicles or carried by

small landing craft. Both the Nationalists and the Communists can make

these craft themselves. At present, the Communists own 450 small landing

craft while the Nationalists, 200.

Any type of amphibious ships is armed with antiaircraft cannons and machineguns so that they can fend off air strikes. However, they cannot attack

submarines or large surface ships. Because of their vulnerability, they

are generally escorted by convoy ships.

6. Auxiliary Ships

Unlike battleships or amphibious ships, auxiliary ships do not engage in

combat. They fall into the following eight categories:

Repair Ships (AR): The entire ship is like a small repair yard. It is

often anchored in waters frequented by other naval ships in order to make

small repairs on the sea. Both the Nationalists and the Communists own

one repair ship, weighing over 4,000 tons.

Oiler (AO): They are similar in structure to oil tankers. They have midsea refueling facilities and their mission is to refuel naval ships at

sea, saving them a trip back to home bases. The oilers can also bring

gasoline and oil to territorial islands. At present, both the Nationalists

and the Communists own several oilers.

28
Supply Ships (AS): They are so constructed as to be able to carry ammunition, torpedoes, mines, and other supplies. They bring supplies to naval

ships on sea duties. At present, the Chinese Communists have six torpedo

speedboat supply ships and submarine supply ships, thus greatly expanding

the operational radius of their speedboats and submarines. The Nationalists have none.

Transport Ships (AK): Their mission is to transport military materiel and

personnel. The Nationalists own three transport ships at present. They

displace 3,000 tons of water and can attain a speed of 23 knots. They are

the cream of all auxiliary ships. The Communists own 20 transport ships

(including some ice-breakers).

Tugs (AT): Their duty is to tow stalled or damaged ships back to home

bases. They weigh between 500 and 2,000 tons and can operate far away from

home bases. Right now the Nationalists own six and the Communists 21.

Survey Ships (AGS): Their duty is to survey territorial waters and shipping routes regularly and to provide the latest data on sea currents, terrain at the sea bottom, and oceanographical characteristics to their navy.

At present, both the Nationalists and the Communists own several of these

survey ships.

Floating Drydock (ARD): They are supplements to repair yards at the home

bases. They may also be towed to the battle zone to provide maintenance

and repair facilities on the spot. Right now the Nationalists own five

floating drydocks capable of handling ships with 3,000 tons or less of

displacement not under load. The Communists launched a floating drydock

in 1974 that can service ships of up to 25,000 tons of displacement not

under load.

Intelligence Ships (AGM): They are equipped with special electronic and

radar guidance systems and can serve as a midway guiding station for

ballistic missiles. Today the Chinese Communists own four such ships,

with undetermined capabilities and efficiency.

The abovementioned auxiliary ships are armed with antiaircraft cannons

and machineguns. However, due to their heavy weight, thin armor, and slow

speed, they must be escorted by other battleships or they will be sitting

ducks in the face of underwater, surface and air attacks. Besides, both

the Nationalists and the Communists have hundreds of merchant ships. With

the addition of several naval signal officers to the crew and some restructuring of the ships, the merchant ships can quickly be converted into

military transport ships and oilers. (The only difference between a naval

ship and a merchant ship is armament.)

The submarines, destroyers, battleships, speedboats, amphibious ships and

auxiliary ships described above, plus a small number of gunboats for harbor

and river defense, make up the bulk of the Nationalist and Communist naval

forces. Besides, the Communists also have about 5,000 armed sampans and

29
motor junks that do not deserve any further classification. Their displacement is under 20 tons. They are not fit to take up combat duties on

the open sea far away from the coast and will not contribute much to the

contention for the command of the sea in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore,

they do not merit any further elaboration.

Worth mentioning in the last paragraph are the ship's planes. Presently

neither the Nationalists nor the Communists own any ship's planes. Nevertheless, the Nationalists own 18 large ships that can carry one or two

helicopters. Helicopters can perform such duties as long-distance transportation and rescue. ' Furthermore, they can be equipped with suspensiontype sonar and acoustic torpedoes and thus become long-range anti-submarine

weapons. During amphibious operations, these helicopters can serve as

aerial observation posts and communications centers to guide ships artillery. With their rockets and machineguns, they can also provide cover fire

for marines taking a beachhead. The introduction of helicopters into the

navy has taken modern naval warfare a giant step forward.

[Apr 77, pp 24-33]

[Text] Part III The Chinese Nationalist and Communist Naval Organization

and Capabilities

Military capabilities express themselves in both tangible and intangible

forms. The various types of naval ships and their weapons will definitely

contribute to tangible capabilities. Nevertheless, they must be backed^

up by "supply, repair and maintenance operations" and "combat training,

two other indispensable components of the tangibles. Then, how to bring

the tangible capabilities into the fullest play? That is where the intangible capabilities—morale and leadership—come into the picture.

The administrative and tactical organization will serve as a catalyst in

the fusing of the intangibles with the tangibles. In other words, naval

organization and naval capabilities are really two sides of a coin. They

are not independent of each other.

The Chinese Nationalist and Communist Naval Organization

The Chinese Communist navy has a total of 170,000 men, representing 5.2

percent of the strength of the People's Liberation Army. Of these men,

110,000 belong to naval forces, 20,000 belong to the naval air service,

and 38,000 belong to the marine corps. The Chinese Communist navy owns

1,100 ships and 650 airplanes. Its organization is shown in Table 6.

The Navy General Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army is at the

top of the chain of command. Its staff units are responsible for setting

up naval forces and then keeping them going. It has its seat in Peking.

Its first echelon operational units include the coastal artillery headquarters, the marine headquarters, naval aviation headquarters, and, most

importantly, the submarine headquarters and the three fleet headquarters.

30
The three fleet headquarters form the regional tactical command centers

of the Chinese Communist navy. They are: The North Sea Fleet Headquarters

(its jurisdiction extending from the mouth of the Yalu River to Lienyunkang), East Sea Fleet Headquarters (its jurisdiction extending from Lienyunkang to the southern tip of the Taiwan Strait), and South Sea Fleet

Headquarters (its jurisdiction extending from the border between Fukien

and KwangtungProvinces to Hsisha Islands). These three fleet headquarters

exercise operational controls over all the naval units as well as support

units of other arms of service in their respective jurisdictions. Of the

three, the East Sea Fleet Headquarters understandably controls nearly half

of the Chinese Communist battleships because its jurisdiction happens to

include the Taiwan Straits.

The main bases of these fleets are as follows:

North Sea Fleet—Lushun, Tsingtao, Taku, Yentai

East Sea Fleet—Shanghai, Choushan, Foochow, Amoy

South Sea Fleet—Huangpu, Chanchiang, Shantou, Yulin

In addition to these main bases, there are 17 lesser naval bases along the

China coast.

The 64 submarines and one submarine supply ship come under the Submarine^

Headquarters. They are grouped into five submarine detachments. The main

bases are Lushun, Tsingtao and Choushan, where training for underwater

combat in coastal shallow waters is conducted. When Americans started

pulling out of Vietnam in 1973, the Communists moved some of their submarines south to Yulin Harbor and began training for deep-sea diving and

combat in the South China Sea. Though the Submarine Headquarters is

responsible for training programs, logistics and administration, it does

not command the submarines. The submarines are under the command of the

three fleet headquarters in time of war.

The Marine Headquarters is in command of three marine divisions (each division has an artillery regiment, three infantry regiments, and other supporting units) and four armored amphibious regiments. The bulk of these

marine forces is deployed along the east and south China coast. Amphibious

exercises are frequently conducted.

The Coastal Artillery Headquarters commands 12 coastal artillery regiments

deployed along the coast and approximately 500 coastal guns.

The Naval Aviation Headquarters controls nearly 100 old-fashioned IL-28

torpedo bombers, 400 F-9, F-6 and F-4 fighter bombers, and a little more

than 100 auxiliary airplanes. These aircraft are organized into six mixed

Air Attack Divisions and an Auxiliary Aviation Regiment directly commanded

by Headquarters. They are stationed at air bases along the coast. Unlike

the aircraft in the air force, these naval airplanes are remodeled for sea

31
Table 6. Chinese Communist Naval Administrative System

State

council

Ministry

of

Defense

PLA

navy

hqr

CCPCC

military

comm.

Research

committee

Office

i-| Military aff.

confidential

Logistical div.

Sail & rope

Administration

Automotive mgr

Maintenance

Fuel

Transportation

Finance

Quartermaster

Political div.

Court martial

Propaganda

Security

Youth movt.

Culture

Organization

Cadre mgr.

i—Naval hospitals

Shipyards

— Navy academies

Navig. survey

School mgr.

Navig. guarantee

Repair & mfg.

Health

Engineering

Staff div.

Training

Communications

Intelligence

Operation

Planning

Submarine

hqr.

Submarine detachments

Naval Naval

aviation aviation

hqr. divisions

Fleet

hqr.

Naval

-aviation units

—t Garrison [

—| Base commands |

—| Fleet detachments!

Engineering j

Training

Coastal artillery regiments

Marine

j—\ Marine divisions

Armored regiments

32
combat duties. Some of them can strafe and bomb enemy ships with their^

machine guns and rockets. Some of them can attack enemy ships with their

torpedo bombs. Some can lay mines from the air. These naval planes are

subordinate to the three fleet headquarters and are under their command

in time of war.

The Chinese Communist naval militia units control 5,000 armed sampans and

motor junks and over 1 million regular and irregular militiamen. In time

of peace, the militiamen help the naval regulars with their coastal patrol,

transportation and sentry duties. In time of war, they are combat forces

to be reckoned with. In combat, they can count on the support from innumerable (at least more than 200,000) fishing boats and sampans which can

serve as mobile coastal machine-gun positions or coastal freighters.

Apart from the submarines, the Chinese Communist navy also owns eight

destroyers, 10 escort destroyers, 54 patrol boats, 22 minesweepers, 800

speedboats, 58 amphibious boats, and 72 auxiliary boats at present. These

boats are regimented into 60 detachments (each detachment has from 12 to

22 ships) according to their characteristics, commanded by the three fleet

headquarters (see Table 7). It must be stressed that more than 100 of

these ships can launch sea-to-sea missiles. They form the navy main force

on the first line.^

On the other side of the Taiwan Straits, the Nationalist navy has 67,100

men in uniform, representing 13.6 percent of the total strength of the

Nationalist armed forces. Of this number, 35,000 men work on the ships

and 9,000 are marines. The Nationalist navy owns 140 ships of over 25 tons

in weight and 30 helicopters and anti-submarine airplanes. Its administrative and organizational system is shown in Table 8

13

. Apart from staff

units, the Nationalist Navy General Headquarters commands two first-echelon

operational units, namely the fleet headquarters and the submarine headquarters .

The fleet headquarters is the operational nerve center of the Nationalist

navy. It has two arms, namely the amphibious units and the destroyerpatrol boats units. The former include two landing craft fleets, one

independent ship detachment, two small-craft brigades, one demolition

brigade, and one beach duty brigade. They are responsible for amphibious

operations and supplying the civilian and military populations on Matsu

Islands (19 islands), Chinmen Islands (14 islands), Tungyin and Wuchiu

(0.52 square kilometer), Penghu Islands (64 islands), Tungsha Island

(11 square kilometers) in the Tungsha islands, and Taiping Island (0.43

square kilometer) in the Nansha group of islands. The latter include two

destroyer fleets, two patrol boat fleets, one minesweeper and minelayer

fleet, one auxiliary fleet, one speedboat detachment, and one submarine

detachment. They are charged with patrol and sentry duties in waters

surrounding Taiwan. They are also responsible for rescue missions on

international beaches in the Far East. The Nationalist naval ships include five submarines, 18 destroyers, 10 escort destroyers, 16 minesweepers, 23 battleships, 51 amphibious boats, and 18 auxiliary boats. The

33
North Sea East Sea South Sea SubFleet Fleet

2

Fleet total

2 1 5

3 1 1 5

2 2 1 5

2 3 1 6

4 5 3 12

7 9 5 21

1 2 1 4

1 2 1 4

22 26 14 62

Table 7. Chinese Communist Naval Tactical Units

Type of Detachment

Escort and patrol detachments

Submarine detachments

Mine sweeping and laying

detachments

Missile speedboat detachments

Torpedo speedboat detachments

Gunboat detachments

Landing troop detachments

Logistical detachments

Total number of detachments

main naval bases are Tsoying, Makung and Keelung. The lesser bases are

Kaohsiung, Hualien and Tachung.

The marine headquarters commands two marine divisions, whose organizational

structure and method of training are patterned after those of the American

marines. The Nationalist marines also use heavy weapons and have high

mobility. Recently an aviation wing has been added to the marine command,

using Nationalist-made assault helicopters. The air marines add an extra

dimension to the marines' amphibious capabilities. The Nationalist marines

are based throughout southern Taiwan, plus Tungsha islands, Nansha islands,

and Wuchiu Island. They are so well equipped and trained that they are

rated by Western military experts as among the best in the world.

The "62 Task Force" is a tactical unit of the Nationalist armed forces for

the defense of the Taiwan Straits. Its commander is usually also the

commander of the fleet headquarters of the Nationalist Navy. The task

force controls North Patrol Detachment, South Patrol Detachment, Matsu

Transportation Detachment, Chinmen Transportation Detachment, and Nanwei

Detachment, each detachment consisting of a mixture of naval ships suited

to its mission. The task force also controls fighter planes and antisubmarine aircraft assigned to Straits defense duties by the Nationalist

air force.

The U.S. Taiwan Defense Command plays a different role. It is a tactical

coordination unit composed of 150 U.S. military officers and men. It can

call in American troops in the Far East to come to the Nationalist aid in

times of need according to the stipulations of the Sino-American Mutual

Defense Treaty. However, USTDC discontinued its patrol duties in the

Taiwan Strait as of November 1969 and disbanded its "72 Taiwan Strait

Patrol Detachment" as of February 1971. Thereupon, the Nationalist navy

has assumed responsibilities for the security in the Taiwan Strait singlehandedly. As the United States has tried to improve her relations with

Communist China in recent years, the Nationalists no longer place much

faith in USTDC.

34
An Appraisal of the Chinese Communist Naval Equipment

In merely 27 years, the Chinese Communist navy has developed from nothing

into an all-round force. This is no mean feat. It is true that during

the 1950's the Russians rendered considerable assistance and should take

some credit. However, after the Russian aid stopped coming, the Chinese

Communists have gone all out on their own to build their navy. Their hard

work has put them where they are today—a sea power in the Far East. They

make every piece of naval equipment themselves. They refine their own

fuel; make their own ammunition; build, repair and maintain their own

ships; develop and produce their own radar, communications systems, engines

and missiles1*. It is clear from Table 9 that the average age of the 1,086

ships in the Chinese Communist navy is only 14 years and that the majority

of their ships are made in China. Nevertheless, such impressive statistics

do not necessarily imply that the Chinese Communists have had an easy time

advancing their shipbuilding technology and their naval capabilities. The

Chinese Communists launched their one and only nuclear-powered "Han class

submarine, using the conventional torpedoes as its weapons, in 1972. Five

years has now elapsed but they have not yet put together a nuclear-powered

submarine fleet using strategic missiles as their weapons, with a range

that can reach every corner of the world. This is because they have been

beset with technical problems and are not expected to solve their problems

in the next 3 to 5 years. The technical problems are as follows:

1. The atomic reactor used on the nuclear-powered submarine is not sound

enough: the Chinese Communists built (more aptly a copying job) five atomic

reactors in the late 1960's. However, those reactors are firmly planted

on land. An atomic reactor used for nuclear-power submarines must be seaworthy when the submarines are cruising, pressure-proof when the submarines

are diving, and shock-proof when the submarines are engaged in combat.

Therefore, it is not the same as a land-based reactor. After its launching, the one and only nuclear powered submarine of the Chinese Communists

was good only in developing one malfunction after another and had to undergo

frequent repairs. It did not conduct its first diving test until as late

as 1974. Since then, it has been in and out of the repair yard all the

time.

2. The most advanced "silent submarines" are still out of their reach:

Due to the superiority of today's anti-submarine weapons, only the most

advanced "silent submarines"—submarines that keep their noises to themselves and thus can elude enemy acoustic weapons—can survive the cruel

test of an anti-submarine offensive. Naturally the Chinese Communists

are not so foolish as to build noisy nuclear-powered missile submarines

at the cost of millions of dollars each to make them easy prey of the

enemy.

3. The submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) are still far from

becoming a reality: SLBMs with a range of over 1,000 miles cannot be

propelled by liquid fuel now commonly used by Chinese Communist strategic

35
Table 8. Chinese Nationalist Naval Administrative System

Research

& devel

opment

office

Executive

yuan

Minis-

— try of

defense

Navy

gen.

hqr.

Liaison

office

U.S.

Taiwan

defense

command

Navy

hospitals

Maritime

survey

bureau

Staff

college

Planning

dept.

Logistic

dept.

Operational

dept.

Intelligence

dept.

Personnel

dept.

Ship administration

dept.

Public

works

dept.

Medical

dept.

Communications

dept.

Comptroller dept.

Supervisory dept.

Navy gen.

political

warfare

dept

Judge advocate dept.

Supervisory office

Supply

command

Shipyards^

Air force

operational hqr.

Supply

dept.

Antisubmarine

wlnE

Ships

landing

dept,

Destroyer

patrolboat

command

Amphibious force

command

I

. _ _i

Battle

ships

TrainlHSLanding

crafts

Training

Marine

hqr.

Amphibious

reconnaissance

Amphibious

transportation

Marine divisions

Marine air

service

Marine

academy

Naval

districts

Navy

garrison

dept.

command channel

coordination channel

36
missile units. The Chinese Communists are not expected to develop solid

fuel for such, missiles and reliable delivery systems in a short time.

According to a prediction in the 1976 issue of the Jane's Yearbook, the

Chinese Communists will not launch their first strategic nuclear-powered

missile submarine having capabilities equal to those of the superpowers

until the early 1980's. Even if such a submarine comes into being, it may

not be much of a help in establishing the command of the sea in the Taiwan

Straits.

Apart from the 22 obsolete submarines made jointly by Russians and^Chinese,

the Chinese Communist submarine fleet is made up of 36 "liberation class

attack submarines (copies of Russian R-class submarines). These extremely

noisy submarines, each carrying eight conventional torpedoes, seem rather

vulnerable to modern anti-submarine operations. This notwithstanding, the

Chinese Communists are still churning them out at the rate of six each ^

year. As a step forward toward building the advanced "silent submarines,

the Chinese Communists began trial production of "Ming" class attack submarines (with a tonnage and fire power similar to "Liberation" class submarines) in 1967 and have been beset with one technical problem^after

another. Even today they still own two experimental models of "Ming class

submarines.

They appear to be facing similar technical problems in building up their

ocean-going surface fleet—ships that can engage in combat thousands of

miles away from home and support remote amphibious operations. Telltale

signs can be detected from their progress in building large naval ships.

Their shipbuilding program got off to a roaring start in 1962, slowed

down after 1972, and ground to a complete stop after 1973. The reasons

are as follows:

1. Technological problems in shipbuilding are looming large: To build

small speedboats and merchant ships is one thing. To build large and fast

battle ships is another matter. From 1965 to 1973, the Chinese Communists

built 10 (escort) destroyers in the 1,000-ton class. Afterwards, the shipbuilding program came to a standstill due to faulty designs and manufacture

(today four battleships are still sitting unfinished on shipyards' assembly

lines. To make up for the slowdown in production, they renovated and remodeled 21 overaged large ships to beef up the strength of their oceangoing fleet.

2. Ship-launched missiles are not working well on large naval ships: The

Chinese Communists have put missiles on half of the 10 large ships they

built and on eight of the 21 overage ships they remodeled. Why didn t they

put missiles on all their ships? In a previous installment of this article

it was pointed out that the sway of the ship's body would affect the performance of ship's missiles. Therefore, how could the missiles work

properly on ocean-going ships of faulty design that must sail in rough

sea?

37
In order to counter-balance the ever growing Nationalist fleet of missile

destroyers and to extend their coastal defense periphery by at least a

thousand miles, the Chinese Communists have turned their attention away ^

from the problem-laden large ocean-going ships to the 500-ton "Chiangnan

class patrol ships that are easier to make (they are naturally inferior

to the large naval ships in speed, firepower and effective combat radius).

At present, the Chinese Communists are turning out this type of ships at

the rate of four a year.

Small gunboats, torpedo boats and missile speedboats make up Chinese Communist Coastal defense units. Their total number at present makes it

possible to put one of them at every 5-mile interval all along the China

coastline. These small craft suitable for coast guerrilla warfare form

the Chinese Communists' last line of defense against possible enemy invaders from the sea. That is why the Chinese Communists are doing their

best to increase the number of these craft. The production rate is as

follows:

"Hola" class missile speedboats: 10 are built each year

"Hoku" class missile speedboats: 10 are built each year

"Shanghai-4" superspeed gunboats: 20 are built each year

"Huchuan" class hydrofoil speedboats: 10 are built each year

In addition, the Chinese Communists still keep a number of old gunboats

and torpedo boats, the majority of which were made before 1960 by the

Communists themselves. At the present rate of production, they will have

over 1,000 speedboats of various descriptions in the 1980's.

Table 10 shows the number of naval ships the Chinese Communists handed

out in foreign military aid in the past 10 years. The ships involved in

the aid were, for the most part, small craft for coastal defense. The aid

takes two forms: 1) an outright grant—involving mostly old and wornout ^

craft which the Chinese Communists want to get rid of (like the 50 Shantou

class superspeed gunboats which they handed over to the North Vietnamese

and which were, without exception, sunk later by American bombers) and

2) sale at high price—involving more advanced speedboats (like those

"Huchuan" class hydrofoil speedboats sold to Romania.) These small craft

may seem all right in calm waters but will malfunction as soon as winds

become strong and waves become high. Sri Lanka complained long ago that

the five "Shanghai-4" type superspeed gunboats it received from Communist

China in military aid were practically useless in the turbulent waters of

the Indian Ocean—another proof of the defective design of Chinese-made

ships. In other words, the boats covered in Table 10 are sub-standard

ships or ships that in the eye of the Chinese Communists are losing their

tactical value.

The number of Chinese Communist auxiliary ships has tripled in the past

20 years (see Table 2 in the 134th issue of the MING PAO Monthly). The

Communists also produce their own fuel, ammunition, machinery and equxpment themselves. These supplies are quickly transferred from assembly

lines to the naval ships through efficient logistical units.

38
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39
The amphibious boats have always been and remain today the weakest links

in the Chinese Communist navy. They were all captured from the hands of

the Nationalists during the civil war period. Without replacement parts,

these American-made boats are hard to keep in good repair. Furthermore,

they are all overaged—any ship that has been in service for 30 years without being overhauled is regarded as being "overaged." In the past 2 or 3

years, the Chinese Communists have found it necessary to break down ships

in a poorer condition in order to yield replacement parts for ships in

better condition. Such a method of scrapping one ship in order to keep

another ship afloat is temporarily relieving the shortage of parts and

keeping some of their overaged ships from deteriorating still further.

Old ships never die, they just "move more slowly and need repairs more

often."

Now the shocker! The Chinese Communists began secretly building "Yulin"

class landing ships medium in 1971. The news threw the Nationalists into

consternation and even caused deep concern in Washington and Moscow. These

new LSMs in the 1,500-ton class can carry three companies of fully equipped

landing troops. Their presence is an indication of the Chinese Communists'

intention to expand their amphibious fleets. As the entire Far East falls

within the cruising radius of these ships, they pose a direct threat to

the Chinese Nationalists and put the Asian balance of power in jeopardy.

At this very moment, the Chinese Communists are building four of these

LSMs a year. However, the overaged American-made amphibious ships are expected to remain the backbone of the Chinese Communist naval amphibious

units in the next 3 to 5 years.

For more than 20 years, the Chinese Communist marine corps maintained its

strength at the level of 28,000 men. Suddenly in the recent 2 years, they

have boosted its strength by 35 percent. In addition, they have been buying large numbers of amphibious transports (not the armored transport

vehicles that can move on land and in the water) which they cannot make

themselves. These are indications that they are going all out to expand

their amphibious forces. Besides, half of the Chinese Communist naval

reserves are marines. Once they are mobilized, the Chinese Communist

marines will play a decisive role in any conflict.

During air strikes against enemy ships, the aircraft's bomb-carrying

ability and maneuverability are more important than anything else. That

is why the supersonic fighters are not effective for naval services. The

old fashioned IL-28, F-6 and F-4 fighters that belong to the Chinese Communist naval air service are better suited to air-to-sea combat duties.^

Now, the intriguing question is why did the Chinese Communists take their

F-9 fighters (supposedly their fastest fighters at twice the speed of

sound) out of the Air Force and put them in Naval Air Service? According

to the Nationalist intelligence information, the engines of the F-9's were

of faulty design. As a result, the fighters would lose half its designed

speed after a while. The Communists stopped making F-9's 2 years ago.

40
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41
Then they began to purchase high-speed engines from overseas. Now they

have relegated the F-9's to naval duties. All these developments support

the Nationalist intelligence reports. The fact that the Chinese Communists

are unable to make good ships and aircraft on their own is ample proof that

in this age of rapid scientific and technical advances it is not necessarily

a convenient and economical shortcut to shut oneself up and to do everything

oneself.

An Appraisal of the Chinese Nationalist Naval Equipment

Two things that are immediately noticed about the Nationalist navy is that

the Nationalists rarely build naval ships of their own and that they are

overly dependent on U.S. aid.

The only commendable achievement of the Nationalist navy is its ability

to maintain its ships. Ever since their evacuation to Taiwan, the Nationalists have looked upon their amphibious forces (including marines)^

as the ace of their assault troops and have given top priorities to equipping them and keeping them in good shape. Moreover, the need to supply

the troops stationed on 109 islands outside of Taiwan also makes it necessary for the Nationalists to keep their amphibious fleets and amphibious

forces strong. Unfortunately, all the U.S.-made amphibious ships in the

Nationalist naval service are of World War II vintage. They are overaged,

worn out, and no longer efficient. There is no way the Nationalists can

get modern landing ships from overseas, build their own, or even receive

replacement parts from the United States (the United States stopped making

them after the war). Caught in such a dilemma, the Nationalists embarked

on the "Modernizing Chung" and "Modernizing Mei" Programs in 1967. Under

such programs, the 24 LSTs in the "Chung" series and the dozen or so LSMs

in the "Mei" series were sent to the Naval Shipyard in Kaohsiung by turn,

each ship to stay at the shipyard for a year, during which it was overhauled from top to bottom, with new motors, new weapons, new communications equipment, new facilities, and new ship's hull put in. Thus "rejuvenated," the relaunched landing ship was to achieve greater speed,

greater fuel economy, greater firepower, and greater efficiency. In

short, they are as good as new. The "Modernizing Chung" Program gave the

Nationalists 24 completely renewed landing ships tank and the "Modernizing

Mei" Program made available another four rebuilt landing ships medium.

The star of the 8-year renewal program was the "Synchrco Lift Dock," the

largest of its kind in the world, of the Kaohsiung Naval Shipyard. It can

lift simultaneously several ships of 4,000 tons or less not under load

out of the water and into the shipyard. Because of this lift dock, the

Nationalist navy is believed to have the largest and best ship maintenance

and ship repair facilities in east Asia15.

Besides, what can be regarded as Nationalist-made are the scores of 30-ton

superspeed patrol boats. Most of them are assigned to garrison and coastal

defense duties. The few that remain with the Nationalist navy are used

only in training for anti-speedboat combat. All the other ships in the

42
Nationalist navy have either been obtained through U.S. aid or been purchased from overseas. Their average age and their countries of origin are

shown in Table 11.

The 18 "Yang" class destroyers which the Nationalists bought from the

United States were American destroyers launched between 1943 and 1947.

Under the U.S. "Fleet Rearmament and Modernization" Program of the mid1960' s, each of these destroyers underwent an 8-month overhaul, during

which it received 8 million dollars worth of new weapon and communications

systems, new engines, and a new keel. In the years from 1969 and 1974,

these destroyers were sold, one after another, to the Nationalists. Of

these ships, Destroyer "Tanyang" and seven of her sister ships have special platforms for helicopters to take off and land as well as hangars.

They will come in handy if the Nationalists decide to add one more dimension to their navy by increasing their ship-based airplanes at some point

in the future. Destroyer "Liaoyang" and three other sister ships are armed

with anti-submarine missiles. Destroyer "Hsiangyang" and four others are

armed with sea-to-sea missiles. As to sea-to-air missiles, plans are afoot

to install them on all the 18 Nationalist destroyers. The coming months

will see these destroyers completely equipped with sea-to-air, sea-to-sea,

and anti-submarine missiles through direct or indirect U.S. aid. These

ships form the main force of the Nationalist surface fleets.

The Nationalists also own 16 minesweepers made in the United States during the early years of the Vietnam War. These minesweepers, naturally,

will be central figures in any minesweeping operation. The Nationalists

also own nine Japanese-made and American-made superspeed torpedo boats.

They are now patrolling the waters around Penghu islands. Besides, there

are some "senile" naval ships, including 10 escort destroyers and three

patrol boats. They are candidates for the mothballs unless they are to

be rebuilt and armed with missiles in the near future.

The Chinese Nationalist submarine fleet consists of two ocean-going attack submarines and three spy submarines. The former were purchased from

the United States in 1973 for use in anti-submarine combat training for

the naval aviators. The latter, "mini-submarines" that require only an

8-man crew and displace 70 tons, were purchased from Italy in 1969 for

special combat assignments. The small submarines will not play any decisive role in the contention for command of the sea.

In the past 10 years, the Chinese Nationalists have pressed on with their

program of retiring old ships and acquiring new ships in order to keep

their fleets in top shape. Table 12 shows the ships' turnover. Generally

speaking, the Nationalists retire nine ships and acquire the same number

of new ships each year. The figure represents 10 percent of the total

number of ships in the Nationalist navy. It is a big turnover. Under

such a vigorous renewal program, the "Yung" class and the "Chiang" class

patrol boats, once the pride of the Nationalist navy, are all gone by

now.

43
Table 11. Average Age and Countries of Origin of Nationalist Naval Ships

QuanAverage

Age

Types of Ships tity (years) Countries of Origin

Missile destroyers 9 12* U.S.A.

Ordinary destroyers 9 12* U.S.A.

Escort destroyers 10 33 U.S.A.

Combat Patrol ships 3 33 U.S.A.

Units Minesweepers 16 19 U.S.A.

Torpedo boats 9 14 U.S.A., Japan

Speedboats 11 3 Nationalists

Submarines 5 13 U.S.A., Italy

Landing ships dock 2 32 U.S.A. -

Landing ships tank 23 8* U.S.A., Nationalists

Auxiliary Landing ships medium 4 6* U.S.A., Nationalists

Units Landing ships general 22 30 U.S.A., Japan

Auxiliary ships 18 28 U.S.A., Japan

Total 141 ships, at average age of 18.5 years

*Note: They have been remodeled

In addition to the ships now in active service, there are a number of ships

in the Navy reserve. In case of total mobilization, they can be quickly

refitted for naval duties. They include:

one destroyer

three escort destroyers

five patrol ships

20 speedboats

one repair ship

one tug

one oiler

two transport ships

At present, these 30 or so ships are either on loan to other arms of the

armed forces or being mothballed for use in time of total mobilization.

They should be counted as part of the Nationalist navy in case of war over

the Taiwan Straits.

Judging by the pace of development of shipbuilding and related heavy

industries in Taiwan, the Nationalists should have no difficulty churning

out naval ships in large numbers. Why have they not done so yet? The

problem is not with shipbuilding technology. It is with how to make

sophisticated weapon and communications systems. At present, the Nationalists still cannot mass-produce an integrated system composed of search

radar, data-processing computer, and fully automated ship's battery and

missiles. Therefore, even if the Nationalists could build the bodies

for a hundred destroyers a year, they would be of no use if there were

no sophisticated weapons and communications equipment to go with them.

Nevertheless, the Nationalists are sparing no effort in developing their

ability to make naval ships on their own.

44
The Second and Third Institutes of the Dr Sun Yat-sen Academy of Sciences

are successfully working on ship-launched missiles. The Nationalist navy

is designing and building its first superspeed battleship. The first

Nationalist-built modern battleship is expected to make its debut in the

1980's. The Nationalist navy is already making most of its fuel, ammunition, ship's spare parts, and instruments. It also keeps a large inventory

of the few items which it cannot make for the eventuality of war. The

computer-controlled naval logistical apparatus is sending supplies directly

to all destinations and is indirectly contributing to the usage rate of the

naval ships. The Nationalists' close concern for naval logistics is evident from the fact that the "Logistical Headquarters" is equal to the allimportant "fleet headquarters" in status as units of the first echelon

right under the Navy General Headquarters (see Table 8).

The Nationalist marines, who boast of "being ready for combat every minute

of the hour," are well known for their gallantry. Counting the marine

reserves, the Nationalists have a total of 60,000 (four marine divisions)

marines under arms. In the last 2 years, the marines have been modernizing their equipment and have acquired several hundred LVTA-5 amphibious

tanks and LVTP-5 amphibious transport vehicles, the best of their kinds.

In addition, they also have in their service a large number of Nationalistmade UH-1H helicopters. Predictably, the Nationalist amphibious operations

in the future will be more like "three-dimensional" operations.

The usage of a naval ship is about the same for both the Chinese Communists

and Nationalists. Let us use the Nationalist navy for an example. The

ships are on a rotation of duties. During the first third of the rotational cycle, a ship returns to the naval shipyard for periodic maintenance

and repairs. During the second third of the cycle, the ship goes on training and exercises, while at the same time is on standby for combat duties.

During the last third, the ship goes on patrol duties. After that, the

cycle begins again. It is easy to see from this example that in time of

peace the usage rate is 67 percent (or two-thirds) for any ship. In time

of war, such usage rate may be boosted to 85 percent for newer ships. At

present, the Communists have a large number of ships in active service

but none in reserve. For the Nationalists, it is the other way around.

Nevertheless, both sides are hoping to increase the usage rate of their

naval ships.

Morale and Leadership

Morale and leadership are two main pillars of the intangible capabilities

of any military force. The various systems adopted by the Chinese Communist and Nationalist navies are the best mirror of their morale and leadership qualities.

There is a jungle of systems within the Chinese Communist navy. Only the

personnel system and the political commissar system have a direct bearing

on morale and deserve a closer look here. Before 1955, the Chinese Communist navy was too young to have much of any system. On 11 February 1955,

45
Table 12. Turnover of Nationalxst Naval snips

Retired

Battle ships

ships

Auxiliary ships

Newly acquired ships

Year Battle ships Auxiliary ships

1966 2 0 7 1

1967 0 1 3 0

1968 3 0 5 0

1969 6 3 13 2

1970 8 4 2 2

3

4

1971 1 8 5

1972 20 8 4

1973 13 7 9 1

1974 0 3 6 3

0

1975 4 2 2

1976 1 6 3 1

Total 58 42 59 17

Note: Retired ships include all those taken off active duties, scrapped,

sold, mothballed, or handed over to the Customs offices and research

institutes.

Newly acquired ships include all those made by the Nationalists

themselves, purchased from overseas (Japan, Italy, United States),

and received in U.S. Aid.

the State Council made public the regulations governing military servi

ce'

The regulations followed the Soviet system of military ranks and divided

the naval rank and file into five classes and 18 grades, from admirals

through captains, lieutenants, petty officers down to seamen. Thereafter,

a complete system regarding ranks, uniforms, conditions of service, promotion and discharge, discipline, and pension gradually took shape. On

30 July 1955, the Statute on Military Service was promulgated, requiring

all men 18 years or older to serve. In time of peace, the length of service is 4 years with land-based naval units and 5 years onboard naval

ships. In time of war, the length of service will be prolonged. Naval

reserves are to report for combat duties immediately if war breaks out.

Coinciding with the promulgation of the new statute on military service

was the change from a system paying the serviceman in kind to a system

of paying him a salary. In January 1965, the Communists further extended

the length of military service by 1 year. On 1 June 1965, the Chinese

Communist Party Central Committee adopted a resolution of the Ninth Na

tional People's Congress to abolish all military ranks and titles and to

do away with all insignia and emblems as a means of boosting morale and

promoting unity. This system has remained unchanged to this day because

of favorable response.

The system of political commissars is most important for the Chinese Communist navy. It is through such a system that the Chinese Communist Party

exercises its absolute control over the armed forces. The Chinese Communist navy, understandably, is also a product of the philosophy that the

46
party must control the armed forces and political objectives override

military objectives." Generally speaking, the Chinese Communist naval

officers and men are at a low educational level but have a high political

awareness. Their training is low on military skills but high on political

indoctrination. The hallmarks of the political commissar system in the

Chinese Communist navy are "large organization, rigid control, separation

of political authority from military authority, and involvement of every

officer and man in political activity."

The Chinese Nationalist naval officers and men, on an average, are of a

higher caliber than their Communist counterparts. The career officers

are all well trained in naval sciences and technology. Reserve officers

who serve for 2 years are all college graduates. The seamen, who serve

3 years, are all high school graduates. There are also political departments in the Nationalist navy. However, the rank and file have far less

political awareness than their Communist counterparts.

Generally speaking, morale is high in both the Communist and Nationalist

navies. The performance of their men in the various sea engagements is

good proof of such high morale. Defections are rare. Since 1950, only

one incident involving "defection" has occurred for each side:

1. At 3 a.m. on 9 January 1966, a landing craft machine (LCM-119) of the

Chinese Communist navy sailed from Communist China toward Nankan Island

in the Matsu group under the Nationalist control. Seven seamen of Fukien

Province with defection on their minds put up a fight with three Communist

cadres on the craft. Only three seamen survived the fight and steered

their craft to Nankan Island. Later on, when the three defectors were

flying to Taipei aboard a hydroplane, they ran into an ambush of Chinese

Communist MIG fighters and were killed. It was a tragic ending.

2. In the early morning of 20 March 1974, a Nationalist naval officer

left his station on Wuchiu Island for Communist-controlled Nanjih Island

in a rubber speedboat. His name was Wu Miao-huo, a lieutenant and platoon

leader of an amphibious reconnaissance battalion of the Second Marine

Division, also a graduate of the Nationalist Navy Academy.16He defected

because he could not get along with his superior officers.

These two incidents are merely freakish occurrences and do not reflect

any internal problems that may exist within the Communist or Nationalist

navies. If these incidents are irrelevant, the background of the top

commanding officers of the two navies may offer some clues to their character and potential problems:

Hsiao Chin-kuang—presently the commander of the Chinese Communist navy.

Born in 1904, a native of Changsha city in Hunan Province, graduated from

Dr Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1924, graduated from Soviet Red

Army University and University of Political Science in 1930. He has

served as commander and chief of staff at various levels, and has headed

a number of special districts and military districts. He saw action in

47
the Northward Expedition, Long March to Yenan, War of Resistance Against

Japan, and the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists.

He was the first commander of the Chinese Communist navy when it was

founded in 1950 and has held that position ever since. He became an admiral in 1955. He retained his position when military titles were

abolished in 1965. His wife is Russian.17

Chou Chien—presently commander-in-chief of the Chinese Nationalist navy.

Born in 1921, a native of Chienou County in Fukien Province. Graduated

from the Chinese Nationalist Navy Academy in 1940. Graduated from the

senior class of the British Royal Navy School. He saw action in the civil

war and in various battles in the Taiwan Straits. He has commanded a

number of ships. He has served as navy attache to Washington, commandant

of the Navy Technical School, commander of the destroyer fleet, commander

of the patrolboat fleet, commander of fleet headquarters, commander of the

62 Detachment, and deputy commander-in-chief of the navy. In July 1976,

he was promoted to admiral and appointed the commander-in-chief of the

navy, the eighth commander-in-chief since V-J day.10

Conclusion on the Chinese Communist and Nationalist Naval Capabilities

In terms of manpower, number of submarines and number of naval aircraft,

the Chinese Communist navy ranks the third in the world. In terms of

capabilities, it is probably a match for some advanced countries (such

as Japan's navy for self-defense and Italy's navy) but is no rival for

such sea powers as the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain,

and France. For example, it would take only one American attack fleet

headed by an aircraft carrier—with its nuclear-powered engines, heavy

armor, high speed, ship-carried supersonic fighters, electronic-controlled

missiles, including sea-to-sea, sea-to-land, sea-to-air, and anti-submarine

missiles—to annihilate the entire fleet of the Chinese Communist navy.

The Chinese Communists still have a long way to go to become a superpower

of the sea. Nevertheless, there is no question that the Chinese Communists

are now a stronger sea power than the Nationalists.

The following factors, nonetheless, are evening the scores for the Chinese

Communist and Nationalist navies:

1. The Communists have a long coastline and face quite a number of potential enemies. They are spread thin.

2. The Nationalists have no quarrels with other nations and can concentrate on defending the Taiwan Straits.

3. As far as ship's weapon system is concerned, the Communists hold

numerical superiority while the Nationalists hold qualitative superiority.

4. The Communists lead in shipbuilding capacities while the Nationalists

lead in ship maintenance and repairing capacities.

48
5. All the Communist ships are in active service while the Nationalists

have some ships in reserves.

A subsequent installment of this article to be published in the next issue

of the same magazine will deal with the question of just how evenly matched

the two adversary navies are.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. Gittings, "The Role of the Chinese Army," Oxford University Press,

N.Y., 1967.

2. "Time" Magazine, from July 1954 to April 1955.

3. P. Y. Hu, "A Brief History of the Chinese National Revolutionary

Forces," Chung Wu Publishing Co, Taiwan, 1971.

4. U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, "Action Reports on Chinese Navy," USTDC,

Taiwan, 1965.

5. Chinese Information, "China Yearbook," Annual Issues from 1950 to

1975, China Publishing Co, Taiwan.

6. R. Blackman, "Jane's Fighting Ships," Jane's Yearbooks Co, 1966.

7. Weyers, "FLOTTEN-TASCHEN-BUCH, 1976-1977," Lehmanns Verlag, Germany,

1977.

8. News from "The Christian Science Monitor" on 6 January 1977.

9. R. Blackman, "Jane's Fighting Ships 1976-1977," Jane's Yearbooks Co,

1976.

10. S. E. Morrison, "History of USN Operations," Atlantic Monthly Press

Book, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1959.

11. E. Luttwak, "A Dictionary of Modern War," Harper and Row Publishers,

N.Y. 1971.

12. J. R. Dewenter, "THE EAST CHINA AND YELLOW SEA" in U.S.N. Institute

Proceeding, March 1975.

13. W. H. Powers, "UNDERWAY WITH CHIANG'S NAVY" in U.S.N. Institute

Proceeding, January 1975.

14. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "MILITARY BALANCE,

1975-1976," IISS, London, 1975.

49
15. Director of FAS, "AEEA HANDBOOK FOR THE R.O.C." U.S. Government

Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1969.

16. China News on 30 March 1974, China News Agency, P.O. Box 64, Peking.

17. Union Research Institute, "WHO'S WHO IN COMMUNIST CHINA," H.K. 1969.

18. Chinese Information, "CHINA YEARBOOK," China Publishing Co, 1976.

9055

CSO: 8111/1454 mD

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