SATELLITE 

CONTROL

Long-Term Planning 

and Adoption of 

Commercial Practices 

Could Improve DOD’s 

Operations

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2013

GAO-13-315

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-315, a report to 

congressional committees 

April 2013 

SATELLITE CONTROL 

Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial 

Practices Could Improve DOD’s Operations

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD manages the nation’s defense 

satellites, which are worth at least 

$13.7 billion, via ground stations 

located around the world. These 

ground stations and supporting 

infrastructure perform three primary 

functions: monitoring the health of the 

satellite; ensuring it stays in its proper 

orbit; (activities collectively known as 

satellite control operations), and 

planning, monitoring, and controlling 

the execution of the overall mission of 

the satellite. Based on the House 

Armed Services Committee Report and 

discussions with defense committee 

staff, GAO (1) reviewed the Air Force’s

satellite control operations to assess 

the potential for fragmentation or

duplication, (2) assessed the status of 

modernization efforts, (3) identified any 

commercial practices that could 

improve the Air Force’s satellite control 

operations, and (4) identified any

barriers to implementing them. GAO 

reviewed modernization funding 

documents, related studies and

interviewed DOD and 7 commercial 

satellite companies, from a 

nongeneralizable sample selected in 

part because of their companies’ 

satellite capabilities. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary 

of Defense direct future DOD satellite 

acquisition programs to determine a 

business case for proceeding with 

either a dedicated or shared network 

for that program’s satellite control 

operations and develop a departmentwide long-term plan for modernizing its 

AFSCN and any future shared 

networks and implementing 

commercial practices to improve DOD 

satellite control networks. DOD 

concurred with our recommendations. 

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) satellite control networks are fragmented and 

potentially duplicative. Over the past decade, DOD has increasingly deployed 

standalone satellite control operations networks, which are designed to operate a 

single satellite system, as opposed to shared systems that can operate multiple 

kinds of satellites. Dedicated networks can offer many benefits to programs, 

including possible lower risks and customization for a particular program’s needs. 

However, they can also be more costly and have led to a fragmented, and 

potentially duplicative, approach which requires more infrastructure and 

personnel than shared operations. For example, one Air Force base has 10 

satellite programs operated by 8 separate control centers. According to Air 

Force officials, DOD continues to acquire standalone networks and has not 

worked to move its current standalone operations towards a shared satellite 

control network, which could better leverage DOD investments. 

The Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN), DOD’s primary shared satellite 

control network, is undergoing modernization efforts, but these will not increase 

the network’s capabilities. The Air Force budgeted about $400 million over the 

next 5 years for these efforts. However, these efforts primarily focus on 

sustaining the network at its current level of capability and do not apply a decade 

of research recommending more significant improvements to the AFSCN that 

would increase its capabilities. 

Commercial practices have the potential to increase the efficiency and decrease 

costs of DOD satellite control operations. These practices include: interoperability 

between satellite control operations networks; automation of routine satellite 

control operations functions; use of commercial off-the-shelf products instead of 

custom ones; and a “hybrid” network approach which allows a satellite operator

to augment its network through another operator’s complementary network. Both 

the Air Force and commercial officials GAO spoke to agree that there are 

opportunities for the Air Force to increase efficiencies and lower costs through 

these practices. Numerous studies by DOD and other government groups have 

recommended implementing or considering these practices, the Air Force has 

generally not incorporated them into Air Force satellite control operations 

networks. 

DOD faces four barriers that complicate its ability to make improvements to its 

satellite control networks and adopt commercial practices. First, DOD has no 

long-term plan for satellite control operations. Second, the agency lacks reliable 

data on the costs of its current control networks and is unable to isolate satellite 

control costs from other expenses. Third, there is no requirement for satellite 

programs to establish a business case for their chosen satellite control 

operations approach. And fourth, even if program managers wanted to make 

satellite control operations improvements, they do not have the autonomy to 

implement changes at the program level. Until DOD begins addressing these 

barriers by implementing a long-term plan for future satellite control network 

investments that can capture estimates of satellite control costs as well as 

authorities that can be given to program managers and incorporates commercial 

practices, the department’s ability to achieve significant improvements in satellite 

control operations capabilities will be hindered.

View GAO-13-315. For more information, 

contact Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4841, 

chaplainc@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

Letter 1 

Background 3

DOD’s Satellite Control Networks are Fragmented Resulting in 

Inefficiencies Across Satellite Programs 9

Air Force’s Modernization Efforts May do Little to Improve the Air 

Force Satellite Control Network 15

Commercial Practices Have the Potential to Increase DOD’s 

Satellite Control Operations Efficiencies 18

DOD Faces Barriers to Making Improvements to its Satellite 

Control Networks and Adopting Commercial Practices 23

Conclusions 27

Recommendations for Executive Action 28

Agency Comments 28

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 34

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 37

Table

Table 1: Pros and Cons of Using Dedicated Versus Shared Satellite 

Control Networks 14

Figures

Figure 1: Air Force Satellite Control Network 6

Figure 2: Numbers of Selected Shared and Dedicated Antennas at 

Locations Around the World 8

Figure 3: Proportion of DOD Satellite Programs Using Shared or 

Dedicated Infrastructure by Decade Since 1960 10

Figure 4: Numbers of Co-located Antennas at Selected Sites 11

Figure 5: Satellite Program Organizational Structure at Schriever 

Air Force Base 12

Figure 6: Past Government and Industry Studies on Opportunities 

to Improve Satellite Control Operations 22

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

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Page 1 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

April 18, 2013

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) uses ground stations located around 

the world to manage the nation’s defense satellites—satellites worth at 

least $13.7 billion. These ground stations and supporting infrastructure 

perform three primary functions: (1) monitoring the health of a satellite; (2)

ensuring the satellite stays in its proper orbit; (activities collectively known 

as satellite control), and (3) planning, monitoring, and controlling the 

execution of the overall mission of a satellite. Some of DOD’s ground 

stations are linked together to form networks. The Air Force operates the 

largest of these networks, the Air Force Satellite Control Network 

(AFSCN), which is also the primary network for supporting the placement 

of satellites into their proper orbit. Established in 1959, the AFSCN is also 

the nation’s primary network for the emergency recovery of tumbling or 

lost satellites.

Over the past two decades, the Air Force has replaced various outdated 

computer and communications equipment to sustain the AFSCN.

1

 

1 Sustainment involves design and planning for replacement, or continuous supply, of 

parts needed to prolong a system’s ability to perform its mission. 

Today, 

efforts continue to update the AFSCN satellite operations centers and 

remote tracking stations by replacing outdated software and equipment 

that, in some cases, have been in place over 40 years. According to the 

Air Force, the AFSCN, as it currently stands, without planned upgrades 

and modernizations, is not sustainable beyond 2020. At some point in the 

near future, the Air Force will be confronted with making investment 

decisions regarding the AFSCN to determine whether to continue to 

support it or to pursue other options for satellite control operations. With 

increasingly tighter budgets, these decisions will require accurate 

information on all aspects of the Air Force’s satellite control operations to 

make the best decisions for DOD. In the House Armed Services 

Committee Report accompanying the fiscal year 2012 National Defense 

Authorization Act, the committee raised questions as to whether satellite 

control operations centers require more resources than their commercial 

system counterparts. The committee also raised questions as to whether 

the Air Force was fully leveraging commercial practices to achieve greater 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

efficiencies, though it recognized that some DOD-unique requirements 

may preclude the adoption of certain commercial practices.

Based on the House Armed Services Committee Report’s requirement for 

our review and discussions with defense committee staff, GAO (1) 

reviewed the Air Force’s satellite control operations to assess the 

potential for fragmentation or duplication, (2) assessed the status of 

modernization efforts, (3) identified any commercial industry satellite 

control practices that could improve the Air Force’s satellite control 

operations, and (4) identified any barriers to implementing improvements 

to satellite control operations.2

To address these objectives, we reviewed various satellite control 

upgrades, sustainment efforts, and modernization efforts by the Air Force, 

Navy, and Army. To identify the potential for fragmentation or duplication, 

we assessed satellite control plans, requirements, programs, budgets, 

and studies associated with current and future capabilities. For the 

purposes of our analysis, we considered “duplication” to occur when two 

or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or 

provide the same services to the same beneficiaries. We used the term 

“fragmentation” to refer to those circumstances in which more than one 

federal agency (or more than one organization within an agency) is 

involved in the same broad area of national need, and opportunities may 

exist to improve how the government delivers these services. We 

analyzed documentation such as reports and studies on satellite control 

operations by government and industry groups, and interviewed officials 

from various offices of the Secretary of Defense, Air Force, Navy, and 

Army, and the National Reconnaissance Office. We also determined the 

extent to which various aspects of the modernization efforts were 

duplicative by reviewing DOD planning documents and discussing these 

topics with DOD officials. Our review focused on the ground systems 

used at command and control centers to perform satellite control 

operations. To determine the costs associated with current and planned 

upgrades, sustainment, and modernization efforts for the AFSCN and 

 

2 House of Representatives Armed Services Committee Report No. 112-78, at 117 (2011), 

accompanying H.R. 1540, the bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2012 (Pub. L. No. 112-81 (2011)) directed GAO to assess DOD satellite operations 

modernization efforts and identify potential best practices and efficiencies. To fulfill this 

mandate, we delivered an oral briefing to the House and Senate Armed Services 

committees on February 6, 2012. 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

other military services’ satellite control efforts, we reviewed the DOD’s 

satellite operations funding documents for fiscal years 2011 through 

2017. To determine which commercial practices could benefit the Air 

Force’s satellite control operations, we asked 13 companies to provide 

information on how they develop, conduct, and manage their satellite 

control activities. From this nongeneralizable sample, seven companies 

met with us and provided information. We conducted internet searches 

and attended conferences on the related subject matter to identify 

potential companies, and selected participants based on their companies’ 

satellites’ constellation size, orbit, and capabilities. We interviewed key 

personnel and reviewed company data to identify potential practices that 

could potentially be employed by the Air Force to improve its satellite 

operations. To identify any potential barriers to DOD of implementing 

these commercial practices, we analyzed documentation such as DOD 

and other government studies on the organization of satellite control 

operations, and interviewed DOD officials. We used the information to 

assess any barriers impacting the funding, cost, schedule, and 

performance of satellite control operations.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to April 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our scope 

and methodology are provided in appendix I.

Every satellite has a bus and payload. The bus is the body of the satellite. 

It carries the payload and is composed of a number of subsystems, like 

the power supply, antennas, telemetry and tracking command, and 

mechanical and thermal control subsystems. The bus also provides 

electrical power, stability, and propulsion for the entire satellite. The 

payload—carried by the bus—includes all the devices a satellite needs to

perform its mission, which differs for every type of satellite. For example, 

the payload for a weather satellite could include cameras to take pictures 

of cloud formations, while the payload for a communications satellite may 

include transponders to relay data such as television or telephone 

signals. Monitoring and commanding of the satellite payload is done to 

collect data or provide a capability to the warfighter. Satellite control 

operations are used to manage the bus and are the focus of this report.

Background
 

Page 4 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

Satellite control operations essentially consist of (1) tracking—

determining the satellite’s location based on position and range 

measurements to receive commands from the ground, (2) telemetry—

collecting health and status reports which are transmitted from the 

satellite to the ground, and (3) commanding—transmitting signals from 

the ground to the satellite to control satellite subsystems. Tracking, 

telemetry, and commanding (TT&C) are accomplished by a network of 

ground stations, ground antennas, and communication links between the 

centers, antennas, and satellites, strategically located around the world.

TT&C is essentially the same for any given satellite, based on its orbit, 

regardless of its mission. Payload control involves operation and control 

of the payload on the satellite, or managing the operations of a satellite’s 

mission equipment.

The ground segment of satellite control is made up of various ground 

control centers, ground stations, and user elements. There are two kinds 

of satellite ground stations: control stations and tracking stations. Satellite 

control ground stations perform the TT&C functions to ensure that 

satellites remain in the proper orbit and are performing as designed, and 

are the stations that manage the bus. The tracking stations enable 

contact with the satellites through communication uplinks and downlinks.

Ground stations can be tied together and can form two types of networks 

—shared and dedicated. A shared network can support several satellite 

systems, and is able to share its antennas and software among many 

different kinds of satellites. While not considering the payload, a shared 

network is primarily used for bus control and for controlling satellites that 

are only contacted intermittently using relatively low data rates. However, 

a shared network can also support functions such as launch and early 

orbit tracking of satellites, and telemetry and commanding of satellites 

that are experiencing anomalies.3

 

3 Satellite anomalies are malfunctions on the satellite. In most cases, these malfunctions 

do not affect operations or services, but occasionally can have serious consequences 

leading to interruptions in services, component failure, or in extreme events, total loss of 

the satellite. 

Examples of DOD satellite systems that 

are controlled by a shared network include the Defense Satellite 

Communications System and Ultra High Frequency Follow-On system, 

also a communications satellite.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

The AFSCN is DOD’s largest shared network. It supports national 

security (defense and intelligence) satellites during launch and early orbit 

periods, and is used to analyze anomalies affecting orbiting satellites. It 

also acts as a backup control system for national security satellites, even 

for satellites that are not routinely controlled by the AFSCN. AFSCN is 

comprised of three interrelated segments: (1) operational control centers 

that provide satellite TT&C support from launch preparation through onorbit operations, (2) remote tracking stations that provide the spaceground link between satellites on-orbit and the AFSCN, and (3) an 

interconnected network of space and ground assets with communication 

links that provides interfaces for external users to access network data.

The AFSCN has two operational control centers: a primary center located 

at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado; and a secondary control node 

(backup center) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The AFSCN 

also has antennas and tracking stations dispersed throughout the world. 

Figure 1 outlines the AFSCN and related centers, stations, and antennas.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

Figure 1: Air Force Satellite Control Network

The Navy and Army also operate smaller shared satellite control networks 

with satellite control operations centers, antennas, and tracking stations 

that support several satellite programs, including:

• The Naval Satellite Control Network, which operates, manages, and 

maintains five missions through one operational control center and 

four remote sites.
 

Page 7 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

• The Naval Research Laboratory satellite control network, which 

supports multiple classified and scientific satellite missions through 

one operational control center.

• The Army conducts payload control, transmission control, and backup 

platform control for two missions through five operations centers 

located throughout the world. 

In addition to the shared network, the Air Force operates a number of 

dedicated satellite control networks. A dedicated network operates a 

single satellite system, and its assets are generally not shared with other 

satellite systems. Dedicated networks are usually customized or tailored 

to their associated satellite and therefore unsupportable on the shared 

networks. In addition, unlike a shared network, a dedicated network often 

performs both bus and payload control through the same antenna. 

Examples of Air Force satellite systems controlled by a dedicated network 

include the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a missile warning 

satellite system, and the Global Positioning System (GPS), a constellation 

of satellites that provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to users 

worldwide. These dedicated networks have 23 antennas at 10 locations 

around the world. Figure 2 shows the number of antennas at various sites 

around the world for the AFSCN, a shared network, and for several 

dedicated networks, such as those used by SBIRS and GPS.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

Figure 2: Numbers of Selected Shared and Dedicated Antennas at Locations Around the World 

Although some satellites using dedicated networks require continuous 

contact with their ground antennas, thereby precluding those antennas 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

from being shared with other satellite systems, other satellites need only 

be in contact with their ground antennas on an intermittent basis, thus 

being potentially compatible with a shared network.

Over the past 50 years, and especially in the last decade, DOD has 

increasingly deployed dedicated satellite control networks in lieu of 

integrating them into a larger shared satellite control network. DOD is 

currently operating at least a dozen dedicated satellite control networks, 

which typically do not share assets or personnel with other dedicated or 

shared networks, resulting in fragmented and potentially duplicative 

operations and inefficiencies across its satellite control operations. While 

dedicated networks offer a handful of advantages to the specific satellite 

systems they serve, shared networks offer potential advantages DODwide in leveraging hardware, software, and personnel. As of February

2013, Air Force officials stated that the Air Force had not worked to move 

its current dedicated operations to a shared satellite control network, 

which could better leverage investments.

Since 1992, DOD has described its largest shared network, the AFSCN, 

as among other things, fragmented and lacking standardization and 

interoperability. In addition, Air Force Space Command officials also 

stated that consolidation of functions and capabilities, reduction of 

potential duplication and improvement in interoperability at all levels, is 

needed. DOD’s share of satellite programs using dedicated networks has 

increased since 1960, as shown in figure 3.

DOD’s Satellite 

Control Networks are 

Fragmented, 

Resulting in 

Inefficiencies Across 

Satellite Programs
 

Page 10 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

Figure 3: Proportion of DOD Satellite Programs Using Shared or Dedicated 

Infrastructure by Decade Since 1960

Long-standing systems, such as the Defense Support Program and 

Defense Satellite Communication System, were developed with their own 

control centers and antenna sites because existing shared networks 

could not accommodate them, or because the programs were determined 

to be better served by combining payload and satellite control operations 

into a single, dedicated network. As a result of these types of decisions, 

DOD now uses multiple dedicated networks built specifically for individual 

satellite programs. Some of these networks include:

• GPS, which is comprised of two control centers and four antenna sites

• SBIRS, which is comprised of three control centers and four sites 

which each have up to five antennas.

In recent years, the Air Force has acquired and launched the Space 

Based Space Surveillance satellite that has its own dedicated system. In 

addition, plans for other future satellite acquisitions indicate likely 

additional dedicated networks. While these networks enable satellite 

control operations, they were not designed to be interoperable. As a 

result, they require dedicated and unshared control centers and 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

antennas, even when sites are co-located. Figure 4 below illustrates the 

co-location of several antennas in the Indian and Pacific Oceans operated 

by the Air Force and Navy (a smaller network), but are not interoperable.

Figure 4: Numbers of Co-located Antennas at Selected Sites

Even when control centers are co-located, the configuration of the various 

networks as well as the organizational structure of the Air Force centers is 

often fragmented. For example, at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado, 

10 satellite programs are operated by eight separate satellite operations 

centers under the command of six separate space squadrons, or units, as 

shown in figure 5.
 

Page 12 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

Figure 5: Satellite Program Organizational Structure at Schriever Air Force Base

Note: The numbers in the figure are designations given to the space squadrons, operations and 

control centers, or satellite programs. 3SOPS and 4 SOPS are connected by an integrated operations 

environment, which better enables information sharing between the two squadrons. 

DOD’s reliance on dedicated satellite control operations networks is 

continuing with its newest satellite system acquisitions, as well as with 

updates for established systems. Despite being required to conduct a 

cost analysis and other analyses, DOD officials managing acquisitions of 

new satellite systems are not required to develop a business case when 

deciding whether to acquire a dedicated network or to use an existing 

shared network. Air Force officials stated that in some cases, satellite 

programs are required to make their dedicated networks compatible with 
 

Page 13 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

a potential future standard, but many programs receive waivers from that 

requirement. Furthermore, because dedicated networks effectively meet 

mission needs, the status quo is upheld without regard for cost or 

department-wide strategic planning for satellite control operations. New 

satellites in the early stages of development are already being designed 

to operate on dedicated networks rather than being designed with the 

interoperability needed for shared networks. For example, the Precision 

Tracking Space System, which will be part of the Missile Defense 

Agency’s Ballistic Missile Defense System, has been designed with a 

dedicated satellite control operations network. In addition, updates of 

existing systems, such as the third generation of GPS satellites, are also 

continuing with the dedicated network approach.

Although dedicated networks support the unique needs of some satellite 

programs, not all satellite control networks need to be dedicated.

According to Air Force officials, the increase in dedicated networks 

reflects more of a preference by satellite program managers than a need.

Officials stated that program managers would rather have the large, 

individual budget for completing its mission, to include a satellite control 

operations network, and have other programs become compatible with 

their satellite control operations network, if necessary. By customizing 

satellite control operations for each satellite, program managers do not 

have to modify their plans to fit within a larger organizational structure, or 

negotiate with any other programs over the satellite control operations 

system, which they may need to do if they used a shared network.

However, development of a dedicated network can also result in higher 

costs due to the unique development required, as well as for follow-on 

support, since the original contractor is typically the only one able to 

provide this proprietary or specialized support. At the same time, while 

shared networks offer efficiencies and lower costs, they can have other 

limitations, like not being able to support unique data rates and 

continuous contact needs. Some potential pros and cons of the two types 

of networks, based on our analysis, are outlined in table 1.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

Table 1: Pros and Cons of Using Dedicated Versus Shared Satellite Control Networks

Dedicated Network Shared Network

Pros Cons Pros Cons

Available to the satellite 

immediately and for any 

duration

Separate control centers and 

remote tracking hardware, which 

adds expense

Supports multiple satellite systems Network cannot be available to 

all satellites at all times 

Allows for special radio 

frequencies or high data 

rates

Unique software and hardware 

(proprietary) can be more costly

Hardware and software, to include 

ground antennas and core data 

processing capabilities, are 

shared among satellites

Potential delays in gaining 

access due to prioritization of 

satellites using shared network

Allows for added security

and resiliency

Costs to carry out similar 

functions, like TT&C, reoccur for 

every dedicated system

Costs for carrying out similar 

functions, like TT&C, are shared 

and consolidated for satellite 

systems 

Entire system must be 

modified, tested and 

implemented to every program 

for any change required by a 

single program

Each dedicated system requires 

personnel that must be trained on 

the specifics of that system

Less personnel is needed to carry 

out similar shared functions

Difficult to meet the needs of a 

large variety of systems within 

one network

Difficult to make interoperable and 

standardized

Greater flexibility to make 

interoperable and standardized

Less likely to use commercial offthe-shelf productsGreater opportunity to use 

commercial off-the-shelf products

Optimizes DOD’s investment by 

more fully/continuously using the 

hardware and staff

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents and interviews.

While each dedicated network optimizes its individual operations, our 

analysis indicates that multiple dedicated systems are inefficient, because 

they increase fragmentation and the potential for duplication across DOD 

satellite control operations, and they are ultimately more expensive for 

DOD to acquire and operate. This fragmented approach requires more 

infrastructure and personnel than shared networks, because the 

dedicated networks often require unique software, separate and possibly 

unique hardware, and specialized training. As such, dedicated networks 

that require global access to their satellites will each have to install at 

least one control center and several ground stations, whereas a shared 

network could accommodate multiple programs with one control center 

and a set of global ground sites. Dedicated networks typically require 

individualized training for their operators, and therefore personnel tend to 

be specialized to one system, leading to potentially higher overall costs.

Satellite operators learn how to use unique software that is not 

transferable across satellite programs, as well as unique protocols for the 

various dedicated networks, since they are built by several companies 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

with no common standards. The current practice is that satellite control 

operators specialize in functional areas for a specific satellite program.

The narrowly focused training associated with this specialization limits 

satellite and ground system technical knowledge, resulting in heavy 

reliance on “back room engineering” or experts to diagnose problems.

Training people on each of these programs requires time and personnel 

investment. Thus, a satellite operator who transfers from one satellite 

program to another will likely have to be retrained because even though 

the tasks are similar, satellite control operations are conducted differently. 

Networks established to operate under common standards, or with a 

common control interface, would likely not need special training.

The Air Force has budgeted about $400 million to modernize the AFSCN 

over the next five years, but the planned upgrades will do little to increase 

the network’s capability.4 These efforts are mainly focused on sustaining 

the network at its current level of capability, and ignore more than a 

decade of research recommending more significant improvements to the 

AFSCN.

The Air Force’s approximately $400 million investment in modernizing the 

AFSCN over the next five years is to extend its life by replacing 

unsupportable equipment. According to Air Force Space Command 

officials, these efforts will provide minor capability upgrades that will 

maintain the aging system, but will not provide material improvements in 

service.

Specifically, this modernization funding is being spent mainly on two 

efforts:

• The Electronic Schedule Disseminator (ESD) system, which 

schedules activities on the network, is to be upgraded from ESD 2.7 

to ESD version 3.0. Version 2.7 has been the operational baseline 

 

4 Modernization means the alteration or replacement of facilities solely to implement new 

or higher standards, to accommodate new functions, or to replace building components 

that typically last more than 50 years (such as the framework or foundation), as defined in 

DOD’s Financial Management Regulation, 7000.14R, Vol. 2B, Chap. 8, (Dec. 2010).

Air Force’s 

Modernization Efforts 

May do Little to 

Improve the Air Force 

Satellite Control 

Network

Air Force Spending to 

Modernize the Air Force 

Satellite Control Network 

will do Little to Increase 

the Network’s Capability
 

Page 16 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

since 1991 and operates on 1980s computer technology. The ESD 

upgrade will run on a Microsoft Windows operating system and 

commercial off the shelf (COTS) hardware. This upgrade is currently 

underway with a planned completion in mid-2015.

• The Remote Tracking Station Block Change effort is to upgrade 

existing electronics on the network’s ground control computers and 

antennas to more modern versions on a Microsoft Windows operating 

system. This upgrade is currently underway and the Air Force plans to 

have all of its stations upgraded by 2019. The AFSCN is currently 

using 1980s-era hardware based on the disk operating system.

While not fully funded, the Air Force plans to modify the AFSCN so that it 

is able to operate on an additional communication frequency, or band. 

This upgrade is to allow the network to perform data uplinks on both the 

L-Band and the S-Band, to add greater flexibility and avoid potential 

sources of interference.5

While these modernization efforts are intended to improve the aging 

system, according to Air Force officials, these measures sustain the 

system at the current level of performance and do not offer a material 

improvement in capability. For example, some of the equipment the Air 

Force is replacing was so outdated that program officials had to search 

on an online auction site for replacement parts, because they were no 

longer being sold by manufacturers. Air Force officials said that one 

reason the new upgrades were not undertaken to provide more capability 

is that the requirements for the network have not changed, and the Air 

Force does not want to pay for capabilities above and beyond the 

established requirements. For example, Air Force officials cited one case 

where the program acquired a new piece of hardware to replace an 

outdated piece. The new hardware provided additional capabilities 

beyond what was called for in the requirements document. However, the 

added capabilities are being turned off so that the Air Force does not 

have to pay to maintain them when they are not required. Though it is 

prudent for programs to only pay for capabilities called for by program 

requirements, the overall approach of making minor changes to keep the 

 

5 Bands are groups of radio frequencies that have similar characteristics, such as L-band 

and S-band. L-band operates at the approximate wavelength range of 30-15 cm 

(wavelength in centimeters) and approximate frequency of 1-2 GHz (gigahertz), while Sband operates at the approximate wavelength range of 15-7.5 cm and approximate 

frequency of 2-4 GHz. 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

system operating with its current capabilities may not be the best use of 

Air Force funds in the long-term.

The Air Force’s actions are somewhat contrary to more than 15 years of 

government and space industry reports that recommended that the Air 

Force incorporate newer and more efficient technologies into the AFSCN 

to improve its capability. As long ago as 1994, Air Force Space Command 

identified the need for improved satellite control operations capabilities. It 

cited, among other things, aging equipment and technological 

opportunities as reasons for needed network upgrades. In 1999, GAO 

reported6 that DOD had made minimal progress in integrating and 

improving its satellite control operations capabilities in accordance with 

the then 1996 national space policy.7 More recently, in 2008, the 

Commander of Air Force Space Command issued a memo describing the 

need for increased satellite control operations efficiencies, improved

interoperability, and consolidated functions. Despite these 

recommendations having been made over the course of almost two 

decades, no guidance currently exists directing the Air Force to increase 

the efficiency or capacity of the AFSCN. Thus, modernization efforts have 

continued to focus on sustaining systems at current levels of 

performance. A long-term plan for modernizing the network and any 

future shared satellite control operations networks could assist DOD in 

making more informed decisions about investments and whether and to 

what extent expand satellite control operations capabilities.

 

6 GAO, Satellite Control Systems: Opportunity for DOD to Implement Space Policy and 

Integrate Capabilities, GAO/NSIAD-99-81 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1999). 

7 National Space Policy, Presidential Decision Directive-National Security Council49/National Science and Technology Council-8 (Sept. 14, 1996). The current policy 

(National Space Policy of the United States of America (June 28, 2010)) does not 

specifically direct DOD to integrate and improve its satellite control operations. 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

Commercial satellite companies that we spoke with incorporate varying 

degrees of interoperability, automation, and other practices into their 

satellite control operations networks to decrease programs costs and 

increase efficiencies. According to Air Force officials, commercial 

practices could offer the Air Force similar benefits for routine functions.

Satellite control operations officials at commercial companies also agree 

that there is potential for improvement if the Air Force adopts some 

commercial practices. Furthermore, for over 10 years, government and 

space industry reports have asserted that commercial practices for 

satellite control operations may increase the efficiency and effectiveness 

of government satellite control operations. Although there is ample 

evidence that these leading commercial practices could generate cost 

savings and improve efficiency, the Air Force has generally not 

implemented these practices.

Officials from the seven commercial satellite companies that we spoke 

with leverage practices such as interoperability and automation to realize 

cost efficiencies and increase the accuracy of their satellite control 

operations. Because this industry is extremely competitive, these 

companies have been reluctant to publicize or share with us specific 

program costs, though they noted that since their companies are profitoriented, they would not undertake the various commercial practices if 

they did not reduce costs and increase efficiency. Specifically, officials 

from all seven of the commercial companies we spoke with have found 

some or all of the practices below to be beneficial:

• Interoperability: Interoperable satellite control operations networks 

allow a single operator to control multiple satellites from one terminal, 

with one software interface, regardless of the satellite’s age or 

manufacturer. For example, one company that we spoke with 

develops satellite control operations software for multiple companies. 

One of their software programs is being used to control four satellites, 

each of which was made by a different contractor, and all four are of 

different ages.

• Automation: All but one of the commercial companies we spoke with 

use automation of routine functions, such as downloading telemetry 

data, which allows these companies to reduce the number of 

operators they need, and can reduce the risk of human errors. One 

commercial company we spoke with wrote software that allows its 

customer to leverage automation to operate a fleet of communication 

satellites with nearly “lights out” operations—needing only one 

Commercial Practices 

Have the Potential to 

Increase DOD’s 

Satellite Control 

Operations 

Efficiencies

Commercial Satellite 

Companies have Taken 

Steps to Lower Costs and 

Increase Satellite Control 

Operations Efficiencies
 

Page 19 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

operator at a time to control 15 satellites.

• Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products: All but one of the 

commercial companies we spoke with agreed that COTS products are 

less expensive than custom ones and can be modified to meet each 

company’s needs. A number of companies we spoke with take 

advantage of COTS products, which are also easier to replace when 

needed. For example, one of the COTS satellite control operations 

software systems that is used by many commercial satellite operators 

allows a satellite to be controlled by any company that uses the same 

software. This can be beneficial when companies buy and sell 

satellites, or when a company leases out control of its satellite to 

another company.

• Hybrid network: A hybrid network arrangement allows a company to 

augment its ground network of antennas and control stations by 

leasing antenna time on another company’s network.8 One company 

we spoke with has found that using pre-existing physical assets from 

other providers can be less costly than building and maintaining all of 

the ground assets they use.

While commercial satellites and Air Force satellites can greatly differ in 

their missions, and to some extent may differ in their need for information 

security, basic satellite control operations functions of most of these 

satellites are generally the same, allowing trusted practices from the 

commercial sector to be applicable to many Air Force satellite programs.

Air Force satellite control officials have stated that there are opportunities 

for increasing efficiencies and reducing costs in Air Force satellite control 

operations by using these commercial practices. Officials at three of the 

commercial satellite operations companies we spoke with that have 

knowledge or experience with DOD satellite control networks, agreed with 

these statements. The practices mentioned above are trusted and proven 

in the commercial sector, and incorporating some or all of them may 

result in improved Air Force satellite control operations. For example:

• Interoperability: While implementing an interoperable infrastructure 

for software and hardware could have a dramatic impact on program 

costs, many Air Force satellites currently rely on separate interface 

 

8 At this point, the Universal Space Network (USN) is the only U.S. company that operates 

a satellite control network as a leased, pay-as-you-go arrangement to customers. 

Commercial Practices are 

Applicable to DOD 

Satellite Control 

Operations
 

Page 20 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

software and hardware to control each kind of satellite. For example,

when looking at basic control functions, the control interface for a 

communications satellite is significantly different from a positioning, 

navigation, and timing satellite, and even two positioning, navigation, 

and timing satellites may have different control interfaces, depending 

on when they were built and what company built them. Making future 

Air Force satellite programs’ satellite control operations interoperable 

would allow one operator to use a single terminal to control numerous 

satellites, similar to commercial practices. This could reduce costs 

associated with purchasing multiple types of software and training the 

operators on each system, as well as potentially reduce the number of 

staff required, since one person could operate multiple satellites more 

easily. One example put forward by an industry group study estimated 

that increasing interoperability and automation could allow one Air 

Force satellite control operations group to reduce its operations 

personnel by 45 percent9

• Automation: While commercial companies use computer programs 

to perform routine tasks, the Air Force typically uses human 

operators. Increasing automation for routine control functions could 

reduce Air Force personnel costs, and the potential for human errors. 

According to satellite control operations officials at Air Force Space 

Command, the use of automation in Air Force satellite control network 

is discouraged by the risk averse culture of the service.

. Retrofitting existing satellite programs to 

use common software would likely be cost-prohibitive, but it would be 

possible for programs under development to be designed and built 

utilizing standard satellite control operations software programs, 

allowing for greater flexibility in the future.

• COTS products: Basic satellite control operations software programs 

exist on the market that could be modified to meet the Air Force’s 

needs, but the Air Force continues to purchase custom software 

solutions. Specialized software systems are usually expensive and 

often take longer to develop than planned. Not only are customized 

systems expensive to acquire, they are also proprietary to the 

company that developed them, requiring the Air Force to use the 

original contractor for any follow-up modifications to the software.

 

9 National Defense Industrial Association, 2007 Summer Study – AFSPC Satellite 

Operations Enterprise Assessment. December 19, 2007.
 

Page 21 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

• Hybrid networks: Although the Air Force has selectively and 

sparingly used commercial networks for some satellite control 

operations, it has no future plans to regularly use any commercial 

antennas or control centers for its satellite control operations. The Air 

Force by necessity has very high standards for security and reliability, 

and Air Force officials have said that these security standards are 

higher than those of private sector space systems. However, officials 

from the commercial companies we spoke with that have used this 

practice told us that they have similarly high security standards to the 

Air Force, and have been able to effectively use hybrid networks. Both 

large defense contractors and space agencies in other countries use 

second party providers for some of their satellite control operations.

Also, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has 

embraced a hybrid system for its Near Earth Network, and although it 

owns and operates some control stations, NASA has seen benefits 

from contracting out its service in other locations. According to NASA 

officials, there were cost avoidances associated with not building 

satellite tracking stations in geographical areas where mission 

requirements were minimal. In this case, a commercial network was 

able to provide the necessary capabilities to augment NASA’s network 

with a lower cost alternative. According to NASA officials, obtaining 

geographically diverse support from commercial providers enables 

NASA to avoid some infrastructure costs. Although NASA was unable 

to quantify the exact cost savings from using hybrid networks, one 

commercial company who provides services to NASA estimated the 

use of commercial networks reduced NASA’s operations and 

maintenance cost by about 30 percent with very low mission risk.

According to Air Force Space Command satellite control operations 

officials, the Air Force has not yet explored this possibility. Air Force 

officials acknowledged that they may be missing out on an 

inexpensive way to improve their satellite control operations at a low 

cost, though said that security issues, such as handling of classified 

data, would have to be addressed to the Air Force’s satisfaction to 

make this a possibility. 

Government and space industry reports for over 10 years have reported 

that commercial practices for satellite interoperability may increase the 

efficiency and effectiveness of government satellite control operations, 

and many of these studies have recommended that DOD adopt these 

practices. Since 1996, a number of reports by government and industry 

groups have described opportunities for Air Force satellite control 

operations to improve their efficiency through methods such as 

interoperability between satellite control networks and the adoption of 

Over a Decade of 

Government and Industry 

Research Supports 

Applying Commercial 

Practices to DOD’s 

Satellite Control 

Operations
 

Page 22 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

commercial practices. These reports generally concluded that there are 

numerous opportunities for improvement in Air Force satellite control 

operations in the near- and long-term as indicated in figure 6.

Figure 6: Past Government and Industry Studies on Opportunities to Improve 

Satellite Control Operations

Though Air Force officials, management at commercial companies, and a 

decade of government research agree that there are opportunities to use 

commercial practices in Air Force satellite control operations, the Air 

Force has generally not implemented these practices. Efforts to 

implement commercial practices have been discussed, and in some 

cases initial steps to initiate changes have been taken, but the Air Force 

has not followed through with their implementation. For example, the Air 

Force participates in the annual Ground Systems Architecture Workshop, 

where experts in the field gather to discuss ground system issues and 

DOD has Generally Not 

Implemented Commercial 

Practices
 

Page 23 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

collaborate on solutions, but according to Air Force officials, few if any of 

the solutions discussed have been implemented. In addition, DOD 

initiated the SATOPS (satellite operations) Enterprise Transformation 

effort in 2011 to reduce duplication, improve interoperability, enable 

consolidation, and move to more efficient satellite control operations. 

However, one of the new technologies that was planned as part of this 

effort, a new type of antenna, has not been proven to be cost effective, 

and progress appears to be stalled overall on the proposed 

improvements, resulting in no change to the way the Air Force conducts 

its satellite control operations.

While opportunities exist to improve DOD satellite control operations, 

there are also barriers that hinder DOD’s ability to make these 

improvements. These barriers exist at both at the program level and at 

higher management levels within DOD, and include: the lack of a longterm plan for satellite control; limited insight into satellite control 

operations spending; no existing requirement to establish a business 

case for a program’s satellite control operations approach; and lack of 

autonomy at the program level to implement satellite control operations 

improvements. In particular:

• DOD does not have a long-term plan for satellite control 

operations. Several DOD officials we spoke with stated that although 

they believe there are efficiencies to be gained from alternative ways 

of performing satellite control, there is nothing prompting them do 

things differently. Furthermore, they stated that there is no DOD-wide 

guidance or long-term plan that directs or supports the implementation 

of alternative methods for performing satellite control operations. In 

addition, DOD does not have plans to transition its dedicated 

networks to shared networks. Instead, the agency plans to continue 

deploying dedicated networks, in part because it is not required to 

justify whether a shared or dedicated network best meets overall 

requirements. However, we found that there have been some plans to 

evolve future satellite operations centers to be more integrated and 

interoperable. For example, in an Air Force briefing from June 2007, 

plans were depicted to evolve stove-piped centers—where each 

satellite program procures its own TT&C system—to centers where 

compatible systems share TT&C services. In addition, in December 

2008, the Air Force Space Command Commander issued a 

memorandum on its intent for an Air Force Satellite Operations 

Enterprise Architecture Transformation. The Commander cited fiscal 

realities, operational efficiencies and emerging threats as reasons for 

DOD Faces Barriers 

to Making 

Improvements to its 

Satellite Control 

Networks and 

Adopting Commercial 

Practices
 

Page 24 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

reevaluating how satellite operations, to include satellite control, are 

conducted for on-orbit systems. However, Air Force officials told us 

that other than the current, limited AFSCN modernization efforts, there 

are no other current plans in place to update or modernize the 

capabilities of the network, and at this time, according to Air Force 

documents, there is no end-of-life or follow-on projected for the 

network, either.

• DOD is unable to quantify all spending on satellite ground 

control operations across DOD programs. DOD is unable to 

identify all funding for satellite control operations across all DOD 

satellite programs. Programs have not needed to keep track of 

budgets by dividing satellite control operations funding out from other 

satellite mission funding since the focus has been on dedicated 

ground control networks. However, without knowing how much it 

spends on basic satellite control operations for all of its satellites, 

DOD cannot calculate the potential savings or perform a cost/benefit 

analysis of any future changes to satellite control operations. Each of 

the individual satellite programs with a dedicated ground system 

manages and reports that program’s satellite control operations 

budget separately from AFSCN funding. These budget reports do not 

separate the satellite control operations funding from other program 

funds, such as those expended on mission data. Furthermore, the 

way that programs are budgeted and organized makes it onerous for 

them to determine how much of their budget is spent on satellite 

control operations. It can be particularly challenging when programs 

use the same communication paths and staff for satellite control 

operations and mission data transfers, or when a satellite ground 

control center controls multiple systems, because program costs are 

accounted for as a whole for these functions. For example, the Navy’s 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) program office officials said 

that MUOS uses the same communications paths for both the satellite 

control operations and the mission data commands. As a result, 

determining how much of the communication time is spent on satellite 

control operations versus mission data would be hard to do 

accurately. In addition, three satellite constellations are controlled 

from the same Navy satellite operations center using the same people 

and same equipment. To determine how much time spent on each 

piece of equipment by each person in order to divide the funding 

between the three systems would be difficult to do with any degree of

reliability. Similarly, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

sends communications for both satellite control operations and 

mission data simultaneously over the same routes. The program 

utilizes commercial circuits for this, and pays for these connections 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

under the same invoice, with no way to determine how much would be 

allocated to satellite control operations and to mission data. However, 

it may be possible to track costs associated with satellite control 

operations through the program’s individual work breakdown structure 

which is the cornerstone of every program because it defines in detail 

the work necessary to accomplish a program’s objectives. 

Establishing a work breakdown structure to track weapon system 

acquisition costs is a best practice because it allows a program to 

track cost and schedule by defined deliverables.10

• Satellite programs are not required to present a business case 

when choosing to develop a dedicated network. Air Force satellite 

program officials are currently free to choose the satellite control 

network type that best suits their program without needing to justify 

that choice. Without the requirement to weight potential compromises 

in performance with potential reductions in cost, most new programs 

are choosing to build a dedicated network. For some satellite 

programs, having a dedicated satellite control operations network 

might still be the most efficient choice, due to unique mission 

requirements. However, programs are not required to conduct an 

analysis to determine a business case for proceeding with a dedicated 

or shared network, or to validate their network’s requirements11

 

10 GAO, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs (Supersedes 

. 

Currently, the lack of cost data means that DOD cannot perform a 

cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the potential benefits of 

individual programs using dedicated networks outweighs the potential 

drawbacks of continued and even increased systemic fragmentation 

and inefficiency. Without a cost-benefit analysis, DOD has a less 

compelling business case for its current approach for acquiring 

satellite control networks and cannot strategically determine if its 

GAO-07-1134SP), GAO-09-3SP 

(Washington D.C.: Mar 2, 2009).

11 While business case analyses are required for milestone B certification of major 

defense acquisition programs, which is approval to enter system development, there is not 

a specific requirement or policy to analyze whether or not to use a shared satellite control 

operations network. 10 U.S.C. §2366b (a); DOD Instruction 5000.02, Encl. 2, §6 (c) (5) 

(Dec. 8, 2008). DOD Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027, “Implementation of 

Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009,” (Dec. 4, 2009, incorporating Change 4, 

Jan. 11, 2013). Major defense acquisition programs are those estimated by DOD to 

require an eventual total expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of 

more than $365 million, or for procurement of more than $2.19 billion, including all 

planned increments or spirals, in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

current options of shared and dedicated networks are the best option 

or whether other options, such as hybrid networks, might be better 

suited to meet its satellite control operational needs.

GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a business 

case analysis or a cost-benefit analysis seeks to find the best value 

solution by linking each alternative to how it satisfies a strategic 

objective. This linkage is achieved by developing business cases that 

present facts and supporting details among competing alternatives, 

including the life cycle costs and quantifiable and non-quantifiable 

benefits. Specifically, each alternative should identify: (1) relative life 

cycle costs and benefits; (2) methods and rationale for quantifying the 

life cycle costs and benefits; (3) effect and value of cost, schedule, 

and performance trade-offs; (4) sensitivity to changes in assumptions; 

and (5) risk factors.12 DOD guidance regarding economic analysis 

similarly encourages the use of sensitivity analysis, a tool that can be 

used to determine the extent to which costs and benefits change or 

are sensitive to changes in key factors; this analysis can produce a 

range of costs and benefits that may provide a better guide or 

indicator than a single estimate.13

• Satellite programs do not have the autonomy to implement 

improvements to satellite control operations. It is difficult to 

implement improvements to satellite control operations practices, 

because changes must be initiated at a level higher than at the 

individual program-level. According to Air Force officials, even if an 

While historical trends show a move 

away from shared networks to dedicated networks, AFSCN, the 

largest shared network, is currently undergoing expensive efforts to 

sustain the networks capabilities. This is happening at the same time 

that DOD is planning on building new dedicated networks for 

upcoming satellite programs. These are large investments for DOD, 

and approaching them without a thorough analysis of the options for 

satellite control operations may lead to wasted money and missed 

opportunities to reduce fragmentation and increase satellite control 

operations efficiencies.

 

12 GAO, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs (Supersedes GAO-07-1134SP), GAO-09-3SP 

(Washington D.C.: Mar 2, 2009).

13 See Department of Defense Instruction No. 7041.3, Economic Analysis for 

Decisionmaking, E3.A1, (Nov. 7, 1995).
 

Page 27 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

individual satellite program’s managers wanted to begin to incorporate 

commercial practices, they have limited flexibility to do so. We 

reported above that DOD allows programs to begin without 

establishing a business case resulting in program managers not being 

well-positioned to successfully execute a weapon acquisition.

Program officials are required to adhere to established program 

requirements, and many such requirements do not allow for these 

improvements. For example, Air Force officials cited one case where 

the program acquired a new piece of hardware to replace an outdated 

piece. The new hardware provided additional capabilities beyond what 

was called for in the requirements document. However, the added 

capabilities are being turned off so that the Air Force does not have to 

pay to maintain them when they are not required. In addition, 

according to Air Force Space Command officials, some DOD satellite 

program managers prefer to have satellite control networks that are 

optimized for their specific mission needs and are wary of introducing 

alternative ways of doing business, such as automation and 

interoperability into satellite systems. Officials explained that concerns 

about information security, automation errors, and a lack of desire to 

change the status quo, keep programs from implementing changes 

that they feel might threaten their missions. Information security in 

particular is of concern for the Air Force. According to Air Force 

officials, satellite control operations are highly dependent on accurate 

and precise information, and security threats such as introduction of 

malicious code to the system or interception of sensitive data could 

pose significant risks to the satellite’s mission. The perception that a 

large upfront investment would be needed to implement new satellite 

operation practices likely make the status quo of dedicated networks 

the preferred acquisition approach going forward. In addition, the time 

that would be needed to develop a shared system with increased 

automation, for example, also likely makes the status quo more 

appealing.

DOD’s current array of satellite control networks favor dedicated systems 

that have been largely shaped by past practices. Dedicated networks are 

the default option because they offer custom solutions for each satellite 

system. For this reason, there have been and will continue to be good 

reasons for having dedicated networks. However, opting for dedicated 

systems does not form a clear approach for acquiring satellite control 

networks that are a result of analysis, not a presumption. Given the 

prevalence of dedicated networks, DOD has had long-standing difficulty 

in effectively implementing improvements across its varied satellite 

control operations which has hindered its ability to achieve significant 

Conclusions 
 

Page 28 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

results in this area. At the moment, DOD lacks the incentive to change its 

current practices, in part, because it does not know the total cost 

associated with its satellite control operations, though it is currently 

spending millions on modernization efforts. Numerous studies, 

commercial practices, and fiscal constraints all offer compelling reasons 

for DOD to take a fresh look in how it designs and invests in control 

networks. But several barriers have maintained the status quo, to include 

the lack of a long-term plan, an aversion to risk, and no cost visibility.

Thus, by developing a plan for modernizing its shared satellite control 

operations networks, DOD could be better positioned to address barriers, 

reduce fragmentation, and increase efficiencies.

To better facilitate the conduct of satellite control operations and 

accountability for the estimated millions of dollars in satellite control 

investments, and to reduce fragmentation, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:

1. Conduct an analysis at the beginning of a new satellite acquisition 

to determine a business case for proceeding with either a shared 

or dedicated satellite control system, to include its associated 

ground antenna network. The analysis should include a 

comparison of total dedicated network costs to the incremental 

cost of integrating onto a shared network to determine applicable 

cost savings and efficiencies.

2. Develop a department-wide long-term plan for modernizing its Air 

Force Satellite Control Network and any future shared satellite 

control services and capabilities. This plan should identify 

methods that can capture or estimate satellite control costs as well 

as authorities that can be given to the program managers to give 

them the flexibility needed to ensure ground systems are built to a 

common network when the business case analysis shows it to be 

beneficial. This plan should also identify which commercial 

practices, if any, can improve DOD satellite control operations in 

the near- and long-term, and as appropriate, develop a plan of 

action for implementing them.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written 

comments, DOD concurred with our two recommendations. The 

comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical 

comments which were incorporated as appropriate.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments
 

Page 29 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

In concurring with our recommendations, DOD agreed that efficiencies 

can be gained from investing in shared satellite control operations 

networks, with a goal of reducing duplication and improving 

interoperability among networks. DOD also agreed that developing a 

long-term, department-wide plan for modernizing satellite control 

operations is needed. DOD noted that both of GAO’s recommendations 

are similar to concepts endorsed by the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and 

DOD plans to initiate a comprehensive Satellite Operations Enterprise 

Architectural Analysis to serve as a foundation to define requirements for 

planning new satellite program acquisitions.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, 

Navy, and Army; and other interested parties. In addition, the report is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix III.

Cristina Chaplain

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management
 

Page 30 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

Our review focused on the ground networks used to perform satellite 

control operations. As such, we reviewed relevant satellite control 

upgrades, and sustainment and modernization efforts for the Air Force, 

Navy and Army to determine the potential for fragmentation or 

duplication. We reviewed satellite control plans, requirements, budgets, 

and studies associated with current and future capabilities. We developed 

an inventory of key satellite programs to enable a comparison of satellite 

control operations types, attributes, and funding. To identify any potential 

for fragmentation and duplication, we assessed military service 

investments in satellite control operations, acquisitions, and capabilities, 

and reviewed prior GAO work for relevant criteria.1

To assess the status of modernization efforts and the costs associated 

with current and planned upgrades and sustainment efforts for the Air 

Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) and other services’ satellite 

control efforts, we reviewed the military services’ satellite operations 

budget documents for fiscal years 2011 through 2017. Specifically, we 

obtained budget documentation from the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller) for all 7 years. Based on our review of budget 

information we collected from agencies that we contacted as well as from 

We also used the 

information associated with various aspects of the modernization efforts, 

and actual or planned satellite control operations capabilities, to assess 

whether any of the efforts were potentially duplicative. We analyzed 

documentation and interviewed officials from various offices of the 

Secretary of Defense, to include the Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command and Control and 

Cyber, Air Force, Navy, Army, and National Reconnaissance Office 

(NRO). We did not, however, review NRO systems, budgets, or 

requirements, but did obtain perspectives on satellite operations from the 

NRO, which could not be incorporated due to their classification. We also 

determined the extent to which various aspects of the modernization 

efforts were duplicative by reviewing briefings on satellite control 

operations and obtaining status updates from Air Force, Navy, and Army 

officials.

 

1 For the purposes of our analysis, we considered “duplication” to occur when two or more 

agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or provide the same services to 

the same beneficiaries. We considered “fragmentation” to occur when more than one 

federal agency (or more than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same 

broad area of national need and there may be opportunities to improve how the 

government delivers these services.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 32 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

presidential budget estimates, we determined that the AFSCN was the 

largest satellite control operations network within DOD and that the Air 

Force was responsible for most satellite control programs. We 

interviewed AFSCN officials and asked for an explanation and description 

of each planned upgrade, sustainment and modernization effort. We 

reviewed documentation and interviewed officials on the status, 

technology, and actual or planned operational characteristics. We 

reviewed and analyzed the budget documents and program 

documentation to determine how the Air Force defined and was 

proceeding with its modernization efforts for the AFSCN and interviewed 

DOD officials. We also reviewed our prior reports on satellite control 

operations to gain a better understanding of the progress DOD has made 

on its satellite control operations.2

To determine which commercial practices could benefit the Air Force’s 

satellite control operations, we conducted internet searches and attended 

conferences on the related subject matter to identify potential companies 

to participate. We then selected a nongeneralizable sample of 13 

commercial companies that are known in the space community to operate 

satellites and have knowledge of satellite control operations and based on 

their satellite constellation size, orbit and capabilities. We asked the 13 

companies to provide information on how they perform or build their 

satellite control operations and capabilities. Of the 13 companies we 

contacted, we received detailed information from 7. We interviewed 

officials from these commercial companies and reviewed documentation 

on their practices associated with satellite control operations and 

compared and contrasted them with Air Force practices. We interviewed 

key personnel and reviewed company data to compile a list of potential 

practices that could be employed by the Air Force to improve its satellite 

operations. Based on interviews and reviews of commercial 

documentation and DOD reports on satellite control operations, we 

determined that specific commercial practices—such as automation and 

commercial off- the-shelf products—may be beneficial to DOD satellite 

programs. It should be noted that the commercial practices used by the 

companies that we included in our review align with practices that other 

satellite industry companies, as well as DOD, have cited as beneficial for 

 

2 GAO, Satellite Control Systems: Opportunity for DOD to Implement Space Policy and 

Integrate Capabilities, GAO/NSIAD-99-81 (Washington D.C.: May 17, 1999). GAO, 

Satellite Control Capabilities: National Policy Could Help Consolidation and Cost Savings, 

GAO/NSIAD-96-77 (Washington D.C.: May 2, 1996). 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

improving the effectiveness of satellite control operations. Our 

assessment of the applicability of satellite control operations practices 

adopted by commercial companies is focused primarily on unclassified 

DOD satellite programs and may not be applicable to classified NRO 

systems. 

To identify any potential barriers to the implementation of commercial 

practices, we reviewed reports and documentation, such as the National 

Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) 2007 Summer Study –AFSPC 

Satellite Operations Enterprise Assessment and briefings from the 

Ground Systems Architectures Workshop and interviewed officials from 

the organizations mentioned above. We interviewed commercial company 

officials with prior military service and Air Force officials, given that the Air 

Force Satellite Control Network is DOD’s largest satellite control network. 

We reviewed our prior reports to compare and contrast previous DOD 

efforts to improve satellite control operations.3

 

3 GAO, Satellite Control Systems: Opportunity for DOD to Implement Space Policy and 

Integrate Capabilities, 

In doing so, we were able 

to identify if DOD had improved its operations, or if barriers persisted. We 

used the information to assess whether barriers had affected the funding, 

cost, schedule, and performance of satellite control operations.

GAO/NSIAD-99-81 (Washington D.C.: May 17, 1999). GAO, 

Satellite Control Capabilities: National Policy Could Help Consolidation and Cost Savings, 

GAO/NSIAD-96-77 (Washington D.C.: May 2, 1996). 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 34 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 35 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 36 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 37 GAO-13-315 Satellite Control Operations

Cristina T. Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Arthur Gallegos, Assistant 

Director; Marie P. Ahearn; Maricela Cherveny; Danielle Greene; Laura 

Hook; Ioan Ifrim; Angela Pleasants; and Roxanna T. Sun made key 

contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgements

(121074)
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