www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 278 1 

As America ends its military commitment to Iraq and continues 

its drawdown in Afghanistan, a lively discussion has emerged on 

what future challenges the Nation faces. High on every list is the 

requirement to deal with a rising China. In his remarks to the Australian 

Parliament on November 17, 2011, President Barack Obama stated, “As we 

end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our 

presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.”1 As part of this rebalancing to Asia, the administration has stated that it seeks “to identify and 

expand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust, 

and to encourage China’s active efforts in global problem-solving.”2 Clearly, 

the United States seeks prudent and coordinated political, economic, and 

military actions to further integrate China into the international system.

The Pentagon’s new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 

Priorities for 21st Century Defense, reinforces this approach and states that the 

United States and China “have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia 

and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship.”3 At the same 

time, the document acknowledges both China’s military buildup and the U.S. 

commitment to maintaining regional access.

As expected, this strategic guidance has accelerated the ongoing discussion 

of how America will allocate resources among the military Services. An integral 

part of this discussion is the idea that the United States has focused on the Army 

and Marine Corps for the last decade of conflict and that now it is time to shift 

spending to the Navy and Air Force. Proponents of this approach note the rising power of China and the fact that the Pacific theater is primarily a naval and 

air theater. Reinforcing this perspective is the Air-Sea Battle concept recently 

revealed at the Pentagon. According to Chief of Staff of the Air Force General 

Offshore Control: 

A Proposed Strategy for 

an Unlikely Conflict

by T.X. Hammes

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. T.X. Hammes is a Senior Research 

Fellow in the Center for Strategic 

Research, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University.

Key Points

◆ China’s antiaccess/area-denial capabilities resulted in the Pentagon 

writing an Air-Sea Battle concept as 

part of its Joint Operational Access 

Concept. Missing is a discussion 

of an appropriate strategy if the 

entirely undesirable Sino-American 

conflict occurs. 

◆ Effective strategies include a coherent ends-ways-means formulation. 

Current budget issues place definite limits on U.S. means. China’s 

nuclear arsenal restricts the choice 

of ways. Thus, to be achievable, 

the ends must be modest. 

◆ This paper proposes Offshore Control as a military strategy. It recognizes that any conflict with China 

will be measured in years, not 

weeks or months. Offshore Control 

aligns U.S. strategic requirements 

with the resources available; takes 

advantage of Pacific geography to 

provide strategic, operational, and 

tactical advantages for U.S. forces; 

and provides a way for the conflict 

to end that is consistent with previous Communist Chinese behavior. 

◆ By reducing reliance on space and 

cyber domains, Offshore Control is 

designed to slow a crisis down and 

reduce escalatory pressure in a crisis and potential ensuing conflict.

June 2012

Center for Strate

gic R

eSEARCH
2 SF No. 278 www.ndu.edu/inss

Norton Schwartz and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Air-Sea Battle will help their 

Services organize, train, and equip to maintain operational access in sophisticated antiaccess/area-denial environments.4

 Other proponents note that this concept 

will be of particular importance in the western Pacific 

Ocean, where China is building its own antiaccess/areadenial capabilities in an effort to deny the U.S. entry in 

its near-seas.5

While intentionally vague, the Pentagon’s statements about Air-Sea Battle lead analysts to conclude 

that the concept contemplates attacks that penetrate 

Chinese airspace to eliminate key elements of the Chinese antiaccess/area-denial networks. Unfortunately, 

rather than exploring potential strategies in the event 

of conflict with China, the discussion has focused on 

the operational aspects of Air-Sea Battle outside any 

strategic context. What strategy might work in a war 

with China, however unlikely, is not being publicly discussed. Many media reports have confused the issue 

by suggesting that Air-Sea Battle is the strategy. Fortunately, the Pentagon’s own Joint Operational Access 

Concept states that “It is important to note that AirSea Battle is a limited operational concept that focuses 

on the development of integrated air and naval forces in 

the context of antiaccess/area-denial threats.”6

In fact, Air-Sea Battle is the antithesis of strategy. 

It focuses on the tactical employment of weapons systems with no theory of victory or concept linking the 

Air-Sea approach to favorable conflict resolution. To be 

fair, the absence of a stated strategy made it impossible 

for the drafters of the Air-Sea Battle concept to express 

Because it is a nation that relies on maritime trade to sustain its economic growth, China is at a disadvantage because the 

geography of the “first island chain” restricts its access to the region.
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 278 3 

how they could support such a strategy. In the absence 

of such a strategy, it is impossible to determine if investment in Air-Sea Battle logically advances or retards 

America’s strategic goals—or whether alternative approaches might be both more effective and more suitable.

While a major conflict is unlikely, and, of course, 

undesirable, the Nation requires a military strategy 

for a conflict with China for two reasons. First, an essential element of military planning is to consider all 

possible options—even ones with remote possibilities 

of occurring. Second, strategy should drive the force 

structure and supporting procurement plan that support the particular conflict. If we are going to structure 

a significant segment of the Armed Forces for a possible conflict with China, we need to develop a corresponding military strategy first.

Outline for a Strategy

There are a number of useful models to guide 

strategists. Professor Eliot Cohen stated that a strategy should include critical assumptions, ends-waysmeans coherence, priorities, sequencing, and a theory 

of victory. Without listing, examining, and challenging 

assumptions, it is not possible to understand a strategy.7

 With assumptions identified, coherence in endsways-means becomes possible. These elements should 

not be treated separately. If goals are selected that exceed available means, we do not have a strategy. Priorities are required because a nation will not have the 

resources to do everything at once. Sequencing flows 

from priorities. Finally, a strategy must have a theory 

of victory—an answer to the question “how does this 

end?” It must express how the strategy achieves war 

termination on favorable terms.

Requirements for a Strategy

While military strategy is often seen only as 

creating cohesion between ends, ways, and means in 

a military conflict, its role as a deterrent and alliancebuilder prior to the conflict is also important. It is even 

more important against an enemy with thermonuclear 

capability. Any U.S. military strategy for Asia must 

achieve five objectives:

◆ access for U.S. forces and allied commercial interests

◆ assurance to Asian nations that the United States 

is both willing and able to remain engaged in Asia

◆ deterrence of China from military action to resolve 

disputes

◆ victory with minimal risk of nuclear escalation in 

the event of conflict

◆ credibility in peacetime.

Looming budget cuts require that the United States 

also consider a strategy for the Asia-Pacific that significantly reduces the cost of maintaining U.S. influence in 

the region. The challenge is to achieve peacetime savings 

while leaving the United States well-postured in the region, and to defend its interests in the event of war.

It is essential also to understand that there is no 

“good” strategy for a conflict between the United States 

and China. As has been the case when the United States 

confronted other nuclear powers, the strategist is forced 

to look for a “least bad” strategy.

A Proposed Strategy

The strategy of Offshore Control works with willing 

Asia-Pacific nations to ensure that the United States can 

interdict China’s energy and raw material imports and 

industrial exports, while protecting our partners.

Five Key Assumptions. The statement of clear assumptions is fundamental to good strategy planning. Offshore Control is predicated upon five explicit assumptions.

China starts the conflict. While it is possible to envision scenarios where the United States would initiate a 

major conflict with China, such scenarios lie at the extreme range of credibility. By initiating conflict, China 

seizes the initiative, maximizing political and military 

difficulties for the United States.

There is a high probability that a conflict with China 

would be a long war. For the last 200 years, wars between 
4 SF No. 278 www.ndu.edu/inss

major powers have generally run for years rather than 

months. Obviously, the big difference is that previous 

wars have not seen nuclear powers face each other except 

through proxies. Having no experience with large-scale 

armed conflict between nuclear powers, we cannot say 

whether this factor will shorten the war (as the case of 

the minor conflict between the Soviet Union and China) 

or lengthen the war because neither side can seek a 

decisive outcome with conventional forces. The United 

States would find a protracted conflict most challenging. 

Too often in the past, military planners have begun 

prosecuting a war assuming that it would be short. The 

obvious examples are the U.S. Civil War, World War 

I, World War II, the Korean War, the Soviet and U.S. 

invasions of Afghanistan, and U.S. operations into Iraq.

Any major conflict between the United States and China 

would result in massive damage to the global economy. The 

United States would cut Chinese trade simply because 

the American population would not accept continued 

trade with China while U.S. forces are suffering significant casualties. China would respond with military, fiscal, 

and economic actions.

The United States does not understand China’s nuclear 

decision process. Therefore, it is critically important that the 

U.S. strategic approach minimize escalation. If escalation 

is required, deliberate and transparent escalation is better than a sudden surprise that could be misinterpreted. 

This approach certainly violates the generally accepted 

precept that escalation in war must be violent and sudden to achieve maximum effect. However, that maxim was 

developed before the advent of offsetting nuclear arsenals.

In space or cyber domains, a first strike provides major 

advantages.8

 Thus, any operational approach that requires 

the robust use of space and cyber capabilities is inherently destabilizing in a crisis. Each side knows that if it fails 

to strike first, it would be at a disadvantage in the war. 

Of even more importance, the United States should not 

initiate major actions in space or cyber domains because 

the Chinese might consider such actions to be attacks 

on strategic systems and thus escalatory. If the United 

States does not strike first, it must assume both space 

and cyber assets might be severely degraded in an initial 

Chinese strike. 

Ends, Ways, and Means Coherence. The combination of decreasing defense budgets and rapid increases 

in procurement costs for new weapons suggests that a 

strategy for conflict with China should assume limited 

means, at least to start. In addition to limited means, 

the United States must accept that China’s nuclear arsenal imposes restrictions on the way American forces 

might attack Chinese assets. The United States must 

select ways that minimize the probability of escalation 

to nuclear conflict simply because no one can win a 

major nuclear exchange. With limited means and restricted ways, the ends selected therefore also should 

be modest. They must attain U.S. strategic goals but not 

risk a major nuclear exchange.

This logic leads to the concept of Offshore Control. 

Operationally, Offshore Control uses currently available but limited means and restricted ways to enforce 

a distant blockade on China. It establishes a set of concentric rings that denies China the use of the sea inside 

the first island chain, defends the sea and air space of the 

first island chain, and dominates the air and maritime 

space outside the island chain. No operations would 

penetrate Chinese airspace. Prohibiting penetration is 

intended to reduce the possibility of nuclear escalation 

and to make war termination easier.

Denial as an element of the campaign plays to U.S. 

strengths by employing primarily attack submarines, 

mines, and a limited number of air assets inside the first 

island chain. This area would be declared a maritime exclusion zone with the warning that ships in the zone could 

be sunk. While the United States could not initially stop 

the United States must accept that 

China’s nuclear arsenal imposes 

restrictions on the way American 

forces might attack Chinese assets
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 278 5 

all sea traffic in this zone, it could prevent the passage of 

large cargo ships and tankers. In doing so, it would cripple 

China’s export trade, which is essential to China’s economy.

The defensive component would bring the full 

range of U.S. assets to defend allied soil and encourage 

allies to contribute to that defense. It would take advantage of geography to force China to fight at longer 

ranges while allowing U.S. and allied forces to fight as 

part of an integrated air-sea defense over their own territories. Numerous small islands from Japan to Taiwan 

and on to Luzon would provide dispersed land-basing 

options for air and sea defense of the gaps in the first 

island chain. Since Offshore Control relies heavily on 

land-based air defense and short-range sea defense to 

include mine and countermine capability, we can encourage potential partners to invest in these capabilities 

and exercise together regularly in peacetime. In keeping with the concept that the strategy must be feasible 

in peacetime, the United States would not request of 

any nations the use of their bases to attack China. The 

strategy would only ask nations to allow the presence 

of U.S. defensive systems to defend that nation’s land, 

sea, and air space. The U.S. commitment would include 

assisting with convoy operations to maintain the flow 

of essential imports and exports in the face of Chinese 

interdiction attempts.

The dominate phase of the campaign would be 

fought outside the range of most Chinese assets and 

use a combination of ground, naval, air, and rented 

commercial platforms to intercept and divert the supertankers and post-Panamax container ships essential to 

China’s economy.9

 Eighty percent of China’s imported 

oil transits the Strait of Malacca. If Malacca, Lombok, 

Sunda, and the routes north and south of Australia were 

controlled, these shipments could be cut off. The United 

States must recognize, however, that the dramatic reduction in China’s trade would significantly reduce its 

energy demands. Thus, energy interdiction would not 

be a winning strategy. Exports are of much greater importance to the Chinese economy. Those exports rely 

on large container ships for competitive cost advantage. 

These ships also are the easiest to track and divert. Naturally, China would respond by rerouting, but the only 

possibilities are the Panama Canal and the Strait of 

Magellan—or, if polar ice melt continues, the northern 

route. U.S. assets could control all these routes. While 

such a concentric campaign would require a layered effort from the straits to China’s coast, it would largely be 

fought at a great distance from China—effectively out 

of range of most of China’s military power. Furthermore, this phase can employ surface search radars and 

high frequency radio if U.S. space and cyber capabilities 

are severely degraded.

That leads us to modest ends. Offshore Control 

is predicated on the idea that the presence of nuclear 

weapons makes seeking the collapse of the Chinese 

Communist Party (or its surrender) too dangerous to 

contemplate. The United States does not understand 

the Communist Party decisionmaking process for 

the employment of nuclear weapons, but it does 

know the party is adamant that it must remain in 

control. Thus, rather than seeking a decisive victory 

against the Chinese, Offshore Control seeks to use a 

war of economic attrition to bring about a stalemate 

and cessation of conflict with a return to a modified 

version of the status quo.

Priorities and Sequencing. The priority in execution 

would go to establishing defenses for those nations that 

choose to ally themselves with the United States. Then 

the dominate phase of the campaign 

would be fought outside the 

range of most Chinese assets and 

use a combination of ground, 

naval, air, and rented commercial 

platforms to intercept and divert 

the supertankers and post-Panamax 

container ships essential to 

China’s economy
6 SF No. 278 www.ndu.edu/inss

U.S. forces would establish a distant blockade. Next, U.S. 

forces would establish the maritime exclusion zone inside 

the first island chain and finally dominate the area outside 

the first island chain to ensure the continued flow of trade 

to our allies while tightening the blockade against China.

Sequencing would follow priorities. However, it 

should be noted that due to the different forces required 

for each of the steps, further study might find that multiple steps could be initiated simultaneously.

Of particular importance is the peacetime preparation necessary for the strategy to succeed. Any strategy must be both feasible and credible in peacetime 

and in war. In peacetime, both enemies and potential allies must be able to see that the United States is 

providing sufficient training and forces to execute its 

strategy in time of war. A number of relatively inexpensive and highly visible steps could commence immediately that reinforce Offshore Control. Maritime 

prepositioning of defensive assets in theater adds both 

a rapid reinforcement capability and a reason to conduct exercises with friendly nations. The United States 

could also encourage Japan’s current reinforcement of 

its defensive capabilities in the Ryukyu Islands as well 

as assist the Philippines in establishing defenses in the 

islands between Luzon and Taiwan.

Theory of Victory. Offshore Control seeks termination of the conflict on U.S. terms through China’s 

economic exhaustion without damage to mainland 

China’s infrastructure or the rapid escalation of the 

conflict. It seeks to allow the Chinese Communist 

Party to end the conflict in the same way that China 

ended its conflicts with India, the United Nations in 

Korea, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. It allows China to declare that it “taught the enemy a lesson” and 

thus end the conflict. By forgoing strikes that destroy 

Chinese facilities or economic infrastructure on the 

mainland, Offshore Control reduces the probability of 

escalation and makes it easier for the Chinese to declare that they did not lose politically. Offshore Control does not seek decisive victory in the traditional 

military sense but secures U.S. objectives effectively. It 

recognizes the fact that the concept of decisive victory 

against a nation with a major nuclear arsenal is fraught 

with risks, if not entirely obsolete.

Inherently Offensive. While this strategy seems 

to focus on defense, it is inherently offensive. The real 

source of a nation’s strength—particularly in a long 

war—is its economy. This strategy strikes at that Chinese foundation by cutting off raw material imports 

and the wealth created by exports. The geography of 

the region lets Offshore Control capitalize on the advantages of an integrated defense versus the limited 

inventory of long-range Chinese strike assets. In periods where the defense gained a tactical advantage in 

warfare, successful commanders often sought to be on 

the strategic and operational offensive while fighting 

defensive tactical actions.

Potential Chinese Responses

In evaluating any strategy, we must consider a 

wide range of potential enemy responses. Every conflict brings surprises as each side seeks enemy weaknesses to exploit and makes its own mistakes. When 

comparing the effectiveness of two different strategies, 

we must consider not only the potential effectiveness 

of an enemy response but also the likelihood of such 

a response against the specific strategy. If alternative 

strategies are likely to provoke the same response, 

then the effectiveness comes down to a question of 

which strategy best prepares the United States to deal 

with that attack. To date, America has not proposed 

a military strategy for a conflict with China. Thus, we 

can only evaluate possible Chinese actions against 

Offshore Control seeks termination 

of the conflict on U.S. terms through 

China’s economic exhaustion 

without damage to mainland 

China’s infrastructure
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 278 7 

the proposed Offshore Control strategy. However, an 

analyst can also consider how Chinese actions might 

work against a strategy that uses Air-Sea Battle as its 

operational approach.

This paper divides Chinese reactions into conventional and unconventional responses. Chinese writings 

indicate that China will use a range of options simultaneously in any major conflict. Thus, planners should consider 

how China might use any combination of or all of the 

possibilities noted herein. Nor should planners assume 

that China could select only from this menu.

Conventional Responses. China could select from a 

number of conventional responses.

China conducts a peacetime intimidation campaign.

Traditional Chinese wisdom recommends attacking an 

enemy’s strategy and alliances. If China believed that regional bases are essential to U.S. strategy, it would seek 

to defeat the U.S. strategy by intimidating regional states. 

Nations would be subjected to Chinese efforts to prevent any agreements that would allow U.S. basing. China 

would also pressure South Korea, Japan, and Australia 

to reduce their cooperation with U.S. forces and perhaps 

even ban the use of their bases in a conflict with China. 

China would gain little in separating these nations from 

the United States in the event it confronted a strategy 

of Offshore Control. Since Offshore Control does not 

require allied basing rights except in Australia, China 

would risk alienating regional nations without gaining 

much strategic benefit.

China conducts direct air and missile strikes against 

U.S. allies. In this case, Offshore Control presents 

China with a strategic dilemma. The only bases that 

the United States requires to sustain the operation are 

either on U.S. territory or in Australia. China nonetheless might seek to pressure the United States by 

striking at U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan as well 

as the port and fuel facilities that support them. Such 

attacks risk bringing those countries into the conflict. 

As a hedge, the United States could conduct peacetime combined, integrated defensive operations with 

South Korea and Japan specifically to address air, missile, submarine, and mine threats. Furthermore, the allies could participate without a commitment to fight 

on America’s side. Offshore Control uses U.S. forces 

in South Korea and Japan only to defend those nations from attack. While assisting in the defense of 

South Korea and Japan would require U.S. resources, 

the highly capable South Korean and Japanese forces 

would add great capability to the allied side. China 

would then have to decide whether adding the military, economic, and political power of South Korea and 

Japan to the U.S. side is worth the gains of attacking 

U.S. facilities in those nations. Peacetime combined, 

integrated defensive exercises should provide China 

with vivid demonstrations of the additional challenge 

they would face. This level of challenge, combined with 

the fact that U.S. forces stationed in these nations are 

not attacking China, could convince the Chinese that 

the benefits are not worth the complications of bringing South Korea and Japan into the war.

China imposes a blockade on allied states. If China 

were to do so, an obvious question is how the allies 

would sustain South Korea and Japan during a long 

conflict. While the maritime exclusion zone inside the 

first island chain means that all of South Korea and 

the west coast ports of Japan are in the exclusion zone, 

this fact does not mean they cannot be sustained. If 

China conducted an antishipping campaign, convoy 

operations would be required. Here again, geography 

favors the United States. Both South Korea and Japan have east coast ports that could be destinations for 

convoys. To attack convoys bound for Japan, Chinese 

air and missile attacks would have to fly over defended 

since Offshore Control does not 

require allied basing rights except 

in Australia, China would risk 

alienating regional nations without 

gaining much strategic benefit
8 SF No. 278 www.ndu.edu/inss

Japanese air space or take a long detour around it. 

For South Korea, convoys could enter the Sea of Japan (East Sea in South Korea) from the north and approach South Korea’s east coast ports. Air or missile 

attacks would have to fly over the Korean Peninsula. 

They would either fly into the range of allied air defenses or detour north to fly over North Korea. Fortunately, 

Korea’s major east coast ports are in the south—Pusan 

and Pohang. Geography also provides the allies an advantage in antisubmarine warfare. To reach the convoy 

routes, any Chinese submarines must transit relatively 

confined waters and operate outside the Chinese landbased antiaircraft umbrellas. Therefore, allied antisubmarine aircraft should be able to operate safely. The 

geographic advantage combined with superior allied 

antisubmarine assets should provide enough protection 

for convoys to reach South Korean and Japanese ports.

Unconventional Responses. China could also select 

from a number of unconventional responses.

Global sea-denial campaign. While China currently 

lacks the resources to conduct a sea-control campaign 

outside the range of shore-based air support, it could 

attempt a sea-denial campaign using a combination of 

submarines and surface raiders (armed merchant ships). 

Surface raiders have been used repeatedly in history and, 

while a nuisance, have never been particularly effective. 

In contrast, Chinese submarines would be a challenge. 

However, as noted, a number of factors favor allied forces 

in an antisubmarine campaign.

Mining U.S. and allied ports. Admiral Greenert 

has acknowledged the U.S. Navy’s deficiency in mineclearing.10 Thus, an obvious Chinese response to a U.S. 

blockade would be to use commercial shipping to mine 

South Korean, Japanese, and even U.S. ports. While 

this would cause a disruption of trade, it would be a 

manageable problem. It would also present a difficult 

challenge for China. Lacking sea superiority, China 

would have to risk laying most of the mines prior to the 

commencement of hostilities. Although sophisticated 

modern mines greatly reduce the probability of an unintentional, premature attack, it is always a possibility. 

Thus, China would risk tipping its hand for the dubious 

benefit of mining a foreign port. 

Drone attacks. The massive growth in drone capability, decrease in cost, use of additive/desktop manufacturing, and dramatic increase in drone autonomous 

capabilities presage the emergence of large numbers 

of cheap, autonomous drone aircraft.11 Using Global 

Positioning System–aided navigation and improved 

explosives, even small drones can damage key components in power and transportation systems. Besides 

attacking fixed infrastructure, small drones with limited intelligence can seek out the radars of combatants 

to degrade allied air defenses. The long-range, longendurance subsurface oceanographic research drones 

in use around the world could be modified for use in 

naval warfare.

Space and cyber attacks. Chinese strategists are 

aware of the advantage of the offense in each domain 

and the massive impact successful attacks could have 

on U.S. capabilities. However, a blockade could be conducted using surface search radar and high frequency 

radio communications. Since a blockade does not depend on space or cyber domains for operational success, Offshore Control reduces the Chinese incentive to 

conduct attacks in those domains.

Financial actions. Another area of lively debate is 

the ability of China to use its fiscal reserves, in particular 

its ownership of U.S. debt, to attack the United States 

or even the global economy. From this author’s reading, there is no consensus among economists of whether 

China could use these tools without causing massive 

since a blockade does not depend 

on space or cyber domains for 

operational success, Offshore 

Control reduces the Chinese 

incentive to conduct attacks 

in those domains
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 278 9 

damage to its own economy. In any case, the decision to 

do so is unlikely to be driven by what strategy the United 

States chooses.

“Three warfares.” China has suggested that it 

would use legal, media, and psychological warfare in 

conjunction to defeat opponents. To these efforts we 

should add diplomatic. China could engage in both 

legal and diplomatic maneuvering in any conflict with 

the United States. If the United States employs Offshore Control, a key question would be the legality of 

the blockade and in particular the legality of placing 

U.S. troops aboard merchant ships to ensure that they 

do not trade with China. We can assume China would 

also attempt a diplomatic offensive to bring European 

nations to pressure the United States to cease interfering with trade and separate Asian allies from the 

United States. Media and psychological efforts would 

augment China’s efforts to neutralize U.S. military 

power. However, if China engaged in military attacks 

on other Asian nations, it would complicate those efforts. Conversely, if the United States conducted repeated strikes on the Chinese mainland, it would simplify China’s efforts in this area.

Advantages of Offshore Control

No strategy for fighting China can promise a 

good outcome. We are simply seeking to achieve our 

strategic goals while minimizing the damage incurred 

in such a conflict.

Increases Deterrence and Assurance Due to Feasibility and Transparency of the Concept. In peacetime, it is easier to convince another nation we have 

a viable strategy if we regularly exercise the necessary 

forces and operational techniques. To date, the only 

U.S. approach being discussed openly for a potential 

U.S.-China conflict seems to be based on Air-Sea 

Battle. Unfortunately, the idea that a conventional 

strike campaign can defeat a continental-size power 

in a short war is dubious at best and certainly ahistorical. Furthermore, many of the necessary Air-Sea 

Battle technologies are classified. They can neither be 

openly discussed nor exercised. If critical capabilities 

lie within Special Access Programs, the United States 

will not even be able to suggest it has that capability. 

This fact creates a dilemma since both deterrence and 

assurance are rooted in a confidence that the stated 

strategy can be executed.

In contrast to Air-Sea Battle, the United States can 

demonstrate Offshore Control’s feasibility in peacetime 

exercises. Partner states will only be asked to participate 

in the protection of their own sea and air space. Any nation is free to declare neutrality. Offshore Control focuses resources on air and sea defense of allies rather 

than investing heavily in defeating China’s increasingly 

capable antiaccess/area-denial network.

Such an approach has two benefits. First, it is politically more acceptable to most nations if they train to 

defend only their own territory. Second, by making it 

clear that their participation is not a requirement for a 

successful U.S. strategy, it takes away the Chinese option 

of “attacking the enemy’s strategy” by pressuring regional 

states to refuse U.S. basing rights.

Lowers Probability of Rapid Escalation. Current 

strategic discussions in the United States highlight 

two possible ways to deter China. The first way is to 

convince China that the United States can overcome 

China’s antiaccess/area-denial capabilities to place 

China at risk. Unfortunately, this operational approach 

depends heavily on U.S. space and cyber capabilities. 

This creates the unintended consequence of raising 

the value of a first strike. To reduce the perceived 

value of a first strike, the United States must create 

redundant systems that can immediately restore lost 

systems. This redundancy is expensive and, since much 

the idea that a conventional strike 

campaign can defeat a continentalsize power in a short war is dubious 

at best and certainly ahistorical
10 SF No. 278 www.ndu.edu/inss

of the U.S. command network depends on commercial 

cyber and space assets, may not even be possible. Thus, 

U.S. space and cyber systems remain a vulnerable and 

high-payoff target.

Offshore Control does not require extensive use 

of space or cyber systems. While these systems are 

useful, the United States and its allies can develop 

relatively inexpensive backup systems to create tactical networks using a mix of older technologies and 

air-breathing platforms. With limited investments in 

alternative systems and a training program, Offshore 

Control could be executed even if China conducted a 

highly successful first strike in the space and/or cyber domains. Because of its transparency, this capability could be demonstrated in peacetime exercises. 

By devaluing the first strike, such an approach could 

increase the deterrence value through reducing the incentive to start a war. This is particularly important in 

a crisis. The premium attached to a strategic first strike 

creates a great deal of escalatory tension. Each side’s 

military leaders would be obligated to inform their civilian leaders that failure to strike first would place 

them at a significant military disadvantage.12

Expands Decision Space and Timelines. While a distant blockade is an escalation, its execution and impact 

would take hold only over a period of weeks. This would 

give diplomats time to seek a solution free from the demand for sudden escalation in space or cyber. The idea of 

slowing escalation and making it transparent seems to 

defy military wisdom and the history of conflict. But if 

we examine those confrontations where nuclear powers 

faced each other—for example, the Cuban Missile Crisis, 

the China–Soviet Union Zhenbao Island incident, and 

India-Pakistan Kargil crisis—in each case escalation was 

done slowly and openly. Each crisis ended without triggering a wider conflict.

In contrast, space and particularly cyber escalation 

take place in seconds and thus would drive decisionmakers in unpredictable ways.13 Offshore Control is inherently de-escalating since the strategy cannot be defeated 

by a first strike on space and cyber assets. Furthermore, the 

allies would only need to rebuild cyber and surveillance 

assets over and outside the first island chain. Geography 

would make establishing and defending such a network 

much easier, further reducing the value of a first strike.

Lowers Peacetime Cost to Maintain U.S. Capabilities to Fight Such a Campaign, thus Increasing Its Deterrent Effect. Credibility and feasibility require that a 

strategy be economically sustainable in the current and 

projected peacetime U.S. political environment. Due to 

lack of transparency, it is impossible to say for certain, 

but it seems the Air-Sea Battle concept requires major 

new procurement programs. In contrast, Offshore Control could be executed based on current capabilities while 

guiding future investments away from large numbers of 

expensive penetrating platforms. For instance, instead of 

another aircraft carrier, the United States may choose to 

purchase six more Virginia-class submarines for roughly 

the same investment. Rather than building a system that 

could provide rapid replacement of surveillance and connectivity over China, the United States would only have 

to build systems that provide coverage and networks over 

friendly territory.

Reverses the Cost Imposition Formula. To penetrate Chinese airspace the United States must spend 

a great deal on advanced platforms. By shifting the 

onus of penetrating integrated air defenses to the Chinese, Offshore Control reverses the cost imposition. It 

would cost the Chinese much more to create sufficient 

long-range assets to achieve sea control than it would 

cost the United States to achieve sea denial inside the 

first island chain. As part of his confirmation process, 

Admiral Samuel Locklear III, commander of U.S. 

Offshore Control matches the 

capabilities required for its 

execution to reduced U.S. defense 

resources while increasing the cost 

to China to respond effectively
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 278 11 

Pacific Command, spoke before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee in February 2012 and assessed 

China’s goals as “building the capability to fight and 

win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its 

periphery.”14 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made 

the same statement in his confirmation hearing.15 A 

U.S. approach that envisions an extended conflict at 

a distance from China could neutralize much of the 

Chinese investment in this capability. In short, Offshore Control matches the capabilities required for its 

execution to reduced U.S. defense resources while increasing the cost to China to respond effectively.

Reverses the Geographic Advantage. Rather than 

engaging the Chinese over their home territory where 

almost all Chinese assets can participate and concentrate 

their effects, Offshore Control forces the Chinese to 

send their limited number of long-range assets into U.S. 

and allied integrated land, sea, and air defenses.

Allows Higher Probability for China to Declare Victory (Saving Face) and End the Conflict in much the 

same way it ended its intervention in Korea, invasion of 

Vietnam, and border conflicts with Russia and India. If 

the United States has conducted numerous strikes into 

mainland China, it would be much more difficult for 

Chinese leadership to decide to end the conflict. Historically, passion often became the driving forces once 

the war started, and direct attack on a homeland has been 

most likely to stir that passion. 

Plays to U.S. Strengths. Offshore Control does not 

focus on the few systems necessary to destroy China’s 

antiaccess/area-denial systems and achieve sea control 

inside the first island chain. Instead, it is built on U.S. superiority in submarines and, with proper investment, sea 

mines to achieve sea denial inside the first island chain. It 

then adds highly capable U.S. ground- and sea-based air/

missile defense to the battle for air superiority over key 

battlespaces above allied nations. It also moves the allied 

antisubmarine campaign to the restricted gaps in the first 

island chain and outside the first island chain, where U.S. 

air assets could participate in the antisubmarine warfare 

effort. Finally, it allows U.S. ground forces to contribute 

to the fight by intercepting and controlling major commercial ships. By mid-decade, roughly 869 new ships will 

make up over one-third of the global merchant fleet capacity when delivery is complete.16 While the total cargo 

capacity is growing steadily, the total number of ships 

is decreasing as older container ships that hold 5,000 

TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) or less are being 

replaced by ships holding up to 18,000 TEU.17 Clearly, 

the U.S. Navy has insufficient ships to control the almost 

1,500 very large commercial ships projected to be in use 

by 2015. However, these numbers can be controlled by 

U.S. amphibious shipping projecting Army and Marine 

boarding parties that will travel with the ships to ensure 

they do not enter the maritime exclusion zone. Commercial shipping and helicopters could be contracted to 

support the distant efforts, thus reducing the stress on 

the amphibious fleet.

Minimizes Economic Losses. As noted in the assumptions, any war between the United States and 

China would devastate the global economy. Thus, a key 

consideration for any strategy must be how to shorten 

the war and minimize economic damage. Given the 

continental size and wealth of both the United States 

and China, the only path to a short war is for one side 

to terminate the conflict by deciding it is not worth the 

potential gain. This author believes a distant blockade 

that does not strike the Chinese mainland offers China’s 

leaders the best opportunity to choose to terminate the 

conflict. Furthermore, the maritime geography would 

allow the rest of the world to rebuild trading networks 

without China. Thus, China would be faced with a deteriorating economic situation and accumulating erosion of trade relations. The longer the war, the longer it 

would take China to rebuild the trust essential to trading networks. Furthermore, avoiding passion-inducing 

any war between the United States 

and China would devastate 

the global economy
12 SF No. 278 www.ndu.edu/inss

direct attacks on China, while presenting Chinese leaders with an ever worsening economic outlook, might 

provide a path to a shorter war.

Allows for the Rebuilding of the World Trade System 

During the Conflict. Sustainability in a long war would 

largely be based on rebuilding trade networks during the 

conflict. The U.S. geographic position and maritime nature of global trade means the rest of the world economy 

could rebuild around the perimeter. In contrast, China 

has little prospect of rebuilding via a new Silk Road. The 

U.S. control of the sea lanes clearly favors the United 

States in an extended conflict.

Previous Conflicts Between 

Nuclear Powers

An essential part of developing a strategy is to 

think through how the conflict might develop. Historical precedence would not provide a formula for 

success but would illuminate issues to consider. Fortunately, to date there have only been two conflicts 

between nuclear-armed states. The 1969 Sino-Soviet 

border conflict and 1999 Kargil conflict between Pakistan and India each saw nuclear-armed states actually fighting. Rather than escalating, the leadership on 

each side responded to the original crisis cautiously. 

Military moves were announced and essentially transparent. While two examples represent an extremely 

limited field, they are the only examples of military 

action overshadowed by nuclear arsenals.

In addition to these two active conflicts, we 

have decades of history showing how the United 

States, Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and India have 

dealt with crises between and among themselves. 

The Cuban Missile Crisis highlights the pattern of 

cautious and relatively transparent actions taken 

when nuclear-armed powers found themselves in a 

growing crisis. Leaders on each sides avoided sudden 

escalatory moves or offensive actions that could have 

been misinterpreted as a major attack.

Given this historical record, strategists should be 

cautious about building a concept that requires political decisionmakers to move quickly or make more than 

minor surreptitious deployments. The timeline required 

to execute Offshore Control allows decisionmakers to be 

deliberate and transparent.

Taiwan-China Conflict?

The most discussed, researched, and wargamed 

conflict between the United States and China is a 

Chinese attack on Taiwan. While highly unlikely, it is 

militarily feasible and requires continued research. An 

obvious question is “How does Offshore Control work 

in that case?” More pointedly, one might ask, “If the 

United States adopted Offshore Control, could China 

present a fait accompli by a sudden invasion of Taiwan?” Moreover, “Would the United States be willing 

to employ such a long war strategy to drive Chinese 

forces out of Taiwan?”

China has the capability to conduct a short-notice, 

overwhelming missile campaign against Taiwan. Since 

U.S. forces are not allowed either to exercise with Taiwanese forces or be stationed in Taiwan, there is little the 

United States can do to stop or even mitigate a sudden 

offensive. Even if U.S. airpower is present in the region, 

the historical experience of air forces trying to detect and 

attack mobile launchers is not encouraging. Simply put, 

Taiwan must be prepared to absorb the thousands of missiles that China has placed within range of the island as 

well as a simultaneous sustained Chinese air campaign. 

The good news is that despite Douhet’s predictions, it is 

difficult to bomb a nation into submission.

Thus, if Taiwan, with the assistance of the United 

States, could prevent a Chinese amphibious landing, it 

could retain its independence. To achieve this, Taiwan 

strategists should be cautious about 

building a concept that requires 

political decisionmakers to move 

quickly or make more than minor 

surreptitious deployments
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 278 13 

would need to invest in hardening its own society as well 

as developing its own antiaccess/area-denial capability 

focused on defeating an amphibious operation. Mines, 

mobile antiship missiles, submarines, and air defense 

systems could create the same barriers for China that 

China’s antiaccess/area-denial creates for the United 

States. These systems could deny China the possibility of a quick victory as long as Taiwan’s government 

refuses to capitulate. This defense combined with efforts to keep supplies flowing to allied nations provides 

Taiwan’s most feasible course of action for maintaining 

its sovereignty.

The alternative is for the United States to make the 

large investments necessary to develop Air-Sea Battle to 

the point that it could defend Taiwan on short notice. 

This approach requires major forces continuously deployed well forward in theater. It is difficult to see Congress approving large expenditures to provide a limited 

capability to respond to this low probability contingency. 

It also requires a change of policy to allow U.S. forces 

both to train with the Taiwanese and to be based in Taiwan. And, of course, it would require going down the 

escalatory path of Air-Sea Battle.

Critical Continuing Research

The fiscal situation resulting from a Sino-American conflict and its longer term economic impact need 

much deeper research. Both areas lie well outside the 

expertise of this author and scope of this paper. However, in examining the viability of any strategy in a 

China conflict, the Pentagon must examine the range 

of possible fiscal outcomes with particular emphasis 

on the impact of a long conflict on the global fiscal 

situation as well as the ability of each nation to sustain 

the conflict fiscally.

The integration of the global economy means 

that economic issues must be closely examined when 

developing a viable strategy for conflict with China. 

Obviously, any serious study must examine global supply chain interdependencies. The wide-ranging impact 

of the recent Japanese tsunami is pointed evidence 

that such a conflict would trigger surprises. In particular, we must examine the impact on critical commodities such as medicines, food, and energy. The initial 

economic focus would be on U.S. and Chinese abilities 

to sustain a long conflict, but it must also examine the 

potential responses of other nations whose economies 

are affected. Of particular importance for the Offshore 

Control concept is the speed with which the global 

economy could reestablish itself around the blockade 

in the absence of Chinese financing and production.

An important issue is the impact of Offshore 

Control on other nations in the region. China is currently the single largest trading partner for Australia, 

Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam.18 Any 

conflict would cause major damage to these economies. The key question for them becomes what strategic approach is likely to cause the least direct damage 

and bring the most rapid conclusion of the conflict 

and resumption of trade.

Summary

This paper is just the start of what should be a deep, 

wide-ranging discussion of potential strategies for a conflict with China. The debate should examine the credibility of the proposed strategies both in peace and in 

war. While conflict with China is highly unlikely, it is 

in fact driving many of the Pentagon’s investment decisions today. This paper seeks to test whether or not those 

decisions are consistent with U.S. strategic interests in a 

period of austerity and to examine if they are tied to a 

coherent strategy.

One of the central criteria of any strategy for a potential conflict with China is the presence of China’s 

Offshore Control is designed to 

slow a crisis down to allow weeks, 

not seconds, for decisions 

concerning escalation
14 SF No. 278 www.ndu.edu/inss

nuclear arsenal. It cannot be ignored or idly wished 

away. Concepts and strategies should not compress the 

decision timeline. In particular, any approach must examine the degree to which the strategy fuels escalation 

in a prewar crisis or in a war. Furthermore, the strategy 

must be affordable in peacetime and executable in wartime—even if China should strike first. It should shape 

the operational/tactical fight to provide geographic and 

temporal advantages to U.S. forces. And it must provide 

a theory of victory.

By reducing reliance on space and cyber and maintaining transparency in peace, crisis, and war, Offshore 

Control reduces the escalatory pressure on decisionmakers while meeting the other criteria. It is designed to 

slow a crisis down to allow weeks, not seconds, for decisions concerning escalation. Moreover, Offshore Control 

is designed to better align strategic requirements with 

available resources as well as place U.S. and allied forces 

in favorable tactical positions if it comes to a fight. Finally, it provides for conflict resolution that does not require 

an unobtainable “decisive” victory.

Notes 1 “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” 

Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011, available 

at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>. 

2 Department of Defense (DOD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: DOD, January 5, 2012), 2, available at <www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf>. 

3 Ibid., 3. 

4 Norton A. Schwartz and Jonathan W. Greenert, “Air-Sea 

Battle: Promoting Stability in a Period of Uncertainty,” The American 

Interest, February 20, 2012, available at <www.the-american-interest.

com/article.cfm?piece=1212>. 

5 J. Randy Forbes, “America’s Pacific Air-Sea Battle Vision,” 

The Diplomat, March 8, 2012, available at <http://the-diplomat.

com/2012/03/08/americas-pacific-air-sea-battle-vision>.

6 DOD, Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 1.0, January 17, 

2012, 4, available at <www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%20

2012_Signed.pdf>. 

7 For a discussion on why assumptions are critical, see T.X. 

Hammes, “Assumptions: A Fatal Oversight,” Infinity 1, no. 1, available 

at <www.infinityjournal.com/article/1/Assumptions__A_Fatal_Oversight>. 

8 David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, Sino-American 

Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability, INSS Strategic Forum 

273 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, January 2012), 3.

9 Post-Panamax is the designation for ships that were too large 

to transit the Panama Canal before it was expanded.

10 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Iran Mine Threat Scares Navy: CNO 

Scrambles to Fix Decades of Neglect,” AOL Defense, May 4, 2012, 

available at <http://defense.aol.com/2012/05/04/iran-mine-threatscares-navy-cno-scrambles-to-fix-decades-of-ne/>. 

11 Additive manufacturing uses three-dimensional printing from 

digital files to produce parts of entire systems.

12 For a deeper discussion of Chinese thinking on escalation, see 

Forrest E. Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation 

in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), available at 

<www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG614.pdf>. 

13 For a thorough discussion of the implications of cyber and 

space capabilities on the Sino-American relationship, see David C. 

Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: SinoAmerican Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, 2011), available at <www.ndu.edu/press/paradox-ofpower.html>. 

14 Richard Halloran, “The Rising East: U.S. Admiral Identifies 

China’s Capabilities and Objectives,” Honolulu Civil Beat, February 

13, 2012, available at <www.civilbeat.com/articles/2012/02/13/14874-

the-rising-east-us-admiral-identifies-chinas-objectives>. 

15 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Hearing to consider the nomination of: Honorable Leon E. Panetta to be Secretary 

of Defense,” June 9, 2011, available at <http://hongkong.usconsulate.

gov/uscn_dod_2011060901.html>. 

16 “Global Merchant Shipping Fleet Continues to Grow,” 

Shippingplatform.com, August 3, 2011, available at <www.shippingplatform.com/News_Details.aspx?id=1269&head=Global%20merchant%20shipping%20fleet%20continues%20to%20grow>.

17 One TEU represents the cargo capacity of a standard intermodal container: 20 feet (6.1 meters) long and 8 feet (2.44 meters) wide.

18 The Economist, Pocket World in Figures 2012, comp. Burgess, 

Andrea et al. (London: Profile Books Ltd, 2011), 115, 171, 217, 241.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Francis G. Hoffman

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 278 15 

New & Forthcoming from 

NDU Press For online access to NDU Press 

publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force:

Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities 

(forthcoming)

Edited by Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force has undergone a rapid transformation since the 1990s 

into a formidable, modern air force that could present major challenges to Taiwanese and U.S. 

forces in a potential conflict. To examine the present state and future prospects of China’s air force, 

a distinguished group of scholars and experts on Chinese airpower and military affairs gathered in 

Taipei, Taiwan, in October 2010. This volume is a compilation of the edited papers presented at 

the conference, rooted in Chinese sources and reflecting comments and additions stimulated by the 

dialogue and discussions among the participants. Contributing authors include Kenneth W. Allen, 

Roger Cliff, David Frelinger, His-hua Cheng, Richard P. Hallion, Jessica Hart, Kevin Lanzit, Forrest 

E. Morgan, Kevin Pollpeter, Shen Pin-Luen, Phillip C. Saunders, David Shlapak, Mark A. Stokes, 

Murray Scot Tanner, Joshua K. Wiseman, Xiaoming Zhang, and You Ji.

The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic 

Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

By David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders

The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon 

the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, 

despite each country’s power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. A clearer understanding of the 

characteristics of these three domains—nuclear, space, and cyber—can provide the underpinnings 

of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. David Gompert 

and Phillip Saunders assess the prospect of U.S.-Chinese competition in these domains and recommend that the United States should propose a comprehensive approach based on mutual restraint 

whereby it and China can mitigate their growing strategic vulnerabilities. This mutual restraint 

regime may not take the form of binding treaties, but patterns of understanding and restraint may 

be enough to maintain stability.
16 SF No. 278 www.ndu.edu/inss

Grand Strategy and 

International Law

Nicholas Rostow

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 277, 

April 2012)

Cross-currents in French Defense 

and U.S. Interests

Leo G. Michel

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Perspectives 

No. 10, April 2012)

Russia and the Iranian 

Nuclear Program: Replay 

or Breakthrough?

John W. Parker

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Perspectives 

No. 9, March 2012)

Post-Asad Syria—Opportunity 

or Quagmire?

Patrick Clawson

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 276, 

February 2012)

Space and the Joint Fight

Robert L. Butterworth

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 275, 

February 2012) 

Raising Our Sights: RussianAmerican Strategic Restraint in 

an Age of Vulnerability 

David C. Gompert and Michael Kofman 

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 274, 

January 2012)

Sino-American Strategic Restraint 

in an Age of Vulnerability 

David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders 

(Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Strategic 

Forum 273, January 2012) 

Deterrence and Escalation in 

Cross-domain Operations: Where 

Do Space and Cyberspace Fit? 

Vincent Manzo 

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Forum 272, 

December 2011)

The Emergence of China in the 

Middle East 

James Chen 

(Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, 

Strategic Forum 271, December 2011)

A Review of the 2001 Bonn 

Conference and Application to 

the Road Ahead in Afghanistan 

Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed 

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Perspectives 

No. 8, November 2011)

Korean Futures: Challenges to 

U.S. Diplomacy of North Korean 

Regime Collapse 

Ferial Ara Saeed and James J. Przystup 

(Center for Strategic Research, Strategic Perspectives 

No. 7, September 2011)

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