Curriculum Evolution

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

1920-1988

by

Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner

United States Marine Corps Reserve

Occasional Paper

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1988
The device reproduced on the front cover is

the oldest military insignia in continuous use

in the United States. It first appeared, as

shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five

points this device has continued on Marine

Corps buttons to the present day.
Curriculum Evolution

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

1920-1988

by

Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner

United States Marine Corps Reserve

Occasional Paper

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1988

PCN 19000316900
Other Publications in the Occasional Papers Series

Vietnam Histories Workshop: Plenary Session. Jack Shulimson, editor. 9 May

Vietnam Revisited: Conversation with William D. Broyles, Jr. Colonel John

G. Miller, USMC, editor. 11 December 1984. 48 pp.

Bibliography on Khe Sanh USMC Participation. Commander Ray W.

Strubbe, CHC, USNR (Ret), compiler. April 1985. 54 pp.

Alligators, Buffaloes, and Bushmasters: The History of the Development

of the LVT Through World War II . Major Alfred Dunlop Bailey, USMC (Ret).

1986. 272 pp. Reproduction of a master-of-arts thesis in history at the University of Utah, presented in March 1976, by a former LVT company commander

in Vietnam.

Leadership Lessons and Remembrances from Vietnam. Lieutenant General

Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret). 1988. 93 pp. Reproduction of a series

of articles which appeared in Sea Tiger, the weekly newspaper distributed

in the III Marine Amphibious Force area of northern South Vietnam, while

General Nickerson was force commander (June 1969-March 1970).

The Problems of US. Marine Corps Prisoners of War in Korea. James Angus

MacDonald, Jr. 1988. 295 pp. A thesis prepared for a graduate-level degree

in 1961 at the University of Maryland, this study has had a remarkable influence on official policies regarding prisoners of war since it was written.

It is published for the use of the serious student of the POW experience.

John Archer Lejeune, 1869-1942, Register of His Personal Papers. Lieutenant

Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett, USMC (Ret). 1988. 123 pp. Covers some of the

more than 6,600 documents of the Lejeune Papers in the Library of Congress,

photocopied for the Marine Corps Historical Center, and a small collection of

related items donated to the Center. Correspondence of the Thirteenth Commandant is explored with particular reference to the nine years of his commandancy, which "remain the least known and appreciated of his

accomplishments." Includes biographical sketch.

To Wake Island and Beyond: Reminiscences. Brigadier General Woodrow

M. Kessler, USMC (Ret). 1988. 145 pp. Vivid and highly readable memoir

detailing General Kessler's Marine service and, in particular, his efforts in

helping to set up the meager defenses of Wake Island in World War 11, his

involvement in the subsequent battle, and his experiences as a Japanese

prisoner of war. Published exactly as it was written in the author's legible

handwriting.
Foreword

The History and Museums Division has undertaken the publication for limited distribution

of various studies, theses, compilations, bibliographies, and monographs, as well as proceedings

at selected workshops, seminars, symposia, and similar colloquia, which it considers to be of significant value to audiences interested in Marine Corps history. These "Occasional Papers," which

are chosen for their intrinsic worth, must reflect structured research, present a contribution to

historical knowledge not readily available in published sources, and represent original content

on the part of the author, compiler, or editor. It is the intent of the division that these occasional

papers be distributed to selected institutions, such as service schools, official Department of Defense

historical agencies, and directly concerned Marine Corps organizations, so the information contained therein will be available for study and exploitation.

Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner was tasked to write this study in 1988 i n partial answer

to the inquiries of a Congressional subcommittee investigating the historical content of the senior

service schools' curricula. His position as military historian on the staff of Quantico's Command

and Staff College for the past 13 years has given him insight regarding the courses taught recentl y, but his research and clear presentation of the situation in previous decades is equally valuable.

The college is the Marine Corps' top professional school for officers and its annual student bodies

composed for the most part of majors with considerable career promise, encompass many of the

men and women who will lead the Corps in future years.

Lieutenant Colonel Bittner was a regular officer, serving on active duty from 1963-1968, before transferring to the Marine Corps Reserve and attending graduate school at the University

of Missouri. In 1974, he received his doctoral degree in history from Missouri, and the following

year he returned to active duty as a Reserve officer on special assignment to the faculty of the

Command and Staff College. He has been an teacher and curriculum innovator at Quantico and

active as well in professional historical organizations. A lifelong interest in modern British history

i s reflected in the publication in 1983 of his book, The Lion and the White Falcon: Britain and

Iceland in the World War II Era (Archon Books), and the 1984 monograph, The Royal Marine

Officer Corps of 1914 and A Ghost ofa General, a compilation of his essays issued by the Royal

Marine Historical Society. He is continuing his studies of Royal Marine officers with the aim of

writing a social and professional history of these men in the 1815-1914 century.

We are printing Lieutenant Colonel Bittner's study just as it was submitted, without altering

i n any way its content. We consider it to be of significant value in recounting the academic history of the Corps' "Senior School," as it used to be called. The opinions and facts represented in

t his publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Marine Corps

or the Department of the Navy. In the pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the History and Museums Division welcomes comments on this publication from interested individuals and activities.

EDWIN H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

III

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CURRICULUM EVOLUTION:

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE,

1920-1988

The U.S. Marine Corps has a three tiered professional

military education system for its career officers. The system

was built in three stages: The Basic School* in 1891, the

Command and Staff College* in 1920, and the Amphibious Warfare

School* in 1921. Since then, this concept has remained until

1988, except for a brief period between 1941-1943 when the

Command and Staff College and Amphibious Warfare School were

temporarily suspended due to the need for career officers

elsewhere because of the urgent wartime situation. In 1946 the

system was reestablished and has functioned since then, without

any closure, despite the heavy demands for officers in the

operational forces in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

In 1920, the Command and Staff College opened its doors to

its first students. It was envisioned as a one-year school for

field grade officers to prepare them for command and staff

duties at their current and possible future grades, in

organizations at levels commensurate with their ranks. This

-------------------------------------------- --------------------

* - The names are as of 1988. In 1891, the school for newly

commissioned second lieutenants was called "The School of

Application," in 1920 that for field grade officers was titled

"The Field Officers' Course," and in 1921 that for company grade

officers was named "The Company Officers' Course." Since then,

each school has had a variety of names, but the missions and

grades of their respective students have remained essentially as

originally conceived.
general mission has essentially remained since 1920, although

the primary focus of the Marine Corps has changed considerably

in the ensuing six decades. The curriculum was modeled after

the two institutions most available for such a school, and on

operations and doctrine most familiar to its instructors and

students: that of the U.S. Army schools at Fort Benning and Fort

Leavenworth, both with an infantry orientation.

In the 1920s, despite this initial Army focus, a naval

orientation gradually appeared in the curriculum. By the

1930-31 Academic Year, 216 hours of instruction in "landing

operations" had appeared in the curriculum of the College. By

then, a struggle occurred for the "heart and soul" of the Marine

Corps. Much of this was waged at Quantico and within the

professional educational system of the Marine Corps, most

specifically within the Field Officers' Course. This focused on

the development of an offensive amphibious mission for the

Marine Corps, leading to the seizure and not just defense of

advanced naval bases as part of a naval campaign. The schools

devoted themselves during the 1932-33 Academic Year to

developing the tentative doctrine for such a mission, and the

instructional materials needed to teach it within the schools,

using Marine Corps equipment, Marine Corps organizations, and

Marine Corps problems set within a maritime operational

scenario. This led to the writing of the "Tentative Manual for

Landing operations" and a complete shift of the focus and

content of the curriculum of the College towards amphibious

operations and away from the former predominately Army

vi
orientation. Until 1941, this remained the thrust of the

College as it educated its officers for the forthcoming war.

However, as World War II approached in 1941, the Marine

Corps was forced to prioritize several competing needs. As it

expanded in size to one and then two operational divisions (and

eventually six), a need arose to screen officer candidates and

train second lieutenants; despite the importance of educating

and training field grade officers, the need to train the company

grade officers assumed a higher priority. Hence, in January

1941, the College closed its doors and its staff and students

assumed other duties associated with this new priority. But by

1943, the Marine Corps recognized the increased need for school

trained officers with command and staff skills needed in the

Pacific in the operations involving Marine Corps regiments,

divisions, and corps. Hence, in 1943, an operationally oriented

"Command and Staff Course," soon renamed "Command and Staff

School," opened at Quantico. Its three month courses taught its

students the command and staff skills deemed immediately

necessary in the Pacific Theater of Operations.

After V-J Day, the Marine Corps confronted both demobilization and new responsibilities in the post-war world. Hence,

in 1946, it re-established the former three tiered professional

military education system .which had served it so well between

1920 and 1941. The initial full year academic course for the

College, now named "Senior Course" and later the "Senior

School," commenced in September 1946. The curriculum remained

focused on the amphibious mission developed prior to World War

II, with the instruction now rooted in both theory and the

vii
lessons learned from actual combat operations. However, in the

post-war years, the curriculum reflected the changed

technological era as the implications of both the atomic age and

helicopters were incorporated into the course of study.

Into the 1960s, the amphibious role of the Marine Corps

remained central to the curriculum. However, the College, in

1964 officially named the "Command and Staff College," had to

take cognizance of other events in an ever changing world.

Counterinsurgency and computer instruction thus became part of

the curriculum. Also, the instructional method shifted away

from lectures to the seminar mode of learning.

As the College proceeded through the 1970s and towards the

end of the 1980s, the amphibious operation has remained the

central focus of its curriculum, as indeed it should since by

law this is the primary mission of the Marine Corps. But in

these two decades, three major curriculum reforms have occurred,

one in 1972, the next in 1982, and the third in 1988. These

have gradually expanded the scope of what has been taught at the

College. The operational instruction remains the heart of the

curriculum, but other areas of instruction have been added or

expanded; this has included the return of military history

(non-tactical) to the core curriculum, and the inclusion of

strategic studies, oral and written communication, various

aspects of leadership studies, orientation to the mass media,

and adjunct faculty seminars taught by reserve field grade

officers, all with PH.D.s, in their fields of expertise which

also support the mission of the College. With the largest

viii
percentage of its curriculum ever devoted to such "enrichment"'

or mental broadening studies, the College has dedicated itself

to producing an-educated "whole man," an officer well-grounded

in the operational skills so necessary in a professional

military officer, but also one who can place any military

operation to which he might be committed within a knowledgeable

strategic and diplomatic context.

In the 68 years of its history, the Marine Corps Command and

Staff College curriculum has gradually evolved from one of

mirroring that of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College to one that is rooted in the Marine Corps mission of

amphibious operations linked to the needs of the nation and its

maritime services. It educates its officers in both the

professional skills needed to function on the contemporary

battlefield, and in the knowledge necessary to place such

operations in a larger context and to lead the highly skilled

and capable men and women who serve in the armed forces of the

United States. The goal has thus become to produce a

professional, educated, and sophisticated "whole man" officer.

In achieving this goal, its curriculum has unfolded along

evolutionary, not revolutionary, paths, retaining from the past

what has been and is of value, but adding from the contemporary

eras what has been necessary to accomplish its mission.

ix

CURRICULUM EVOLUTION

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

1920-1988

DR. DONALD F. BITTNER

LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE

MILITARY HISTORIAN

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

EDUCATION CENTER

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5050

APRIL 1988

xi

IT HAS BEEN MY BELIEF FOR YEARS

THAT THE SCHOOLS SHAPE THE CORPS...

THE SCHOOLS ARE THE CAUSE AND THE FLEET MARINE FORCES

...ARE THE EFFECT.

Brigadier General James C. Breckinridge, USMC

1 January 1940 (1)

xiii

xv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT PAGE

Introduction ..................................................V

Note on Spelling. Punctuation, and Capitalization............viii

Text

The Marine Corps Professional Military Education: 

The Founding Concept ....................................1 

The 1920s: The Field Officers' Course - The Influence 

of the Army.............................................. 8 

The Fight for the Soul of the Corps: 

Amphibious Warfare ..................................... 15 

World War II: Closure to Command and Staff Course ........ 30 

The Initial Post World War II Period: 

The Senior School.......................................37 

1964 and Beyond: The Command and Staff College .................49 

The Command and Staff College in 1988 .....................67 

List of Tables:

I Attendance/Graduation Figures: Field 

Officers' Course, 1920-21 - 1924-25 ................ 10 

II Instructional Hours, Second Year Class, 

1934-35 Academic Year ............................. 26 

III Curriculum: Command and Staff School, 1945 ........... 35 

IV Senior School, 1954-55 Academic Year: 

Curriculum Hours .................................. 41 

V Senior School Curriculum, 1955-56 Academic Year...........45 

VI Command and Staff College Curriculum, 

1966-67 Academic Year ............................. 53 

VII Command and Staff College Curriculum, 

1971-72 Academic Year .............................. 58 
xvi

List of Tables (Continued) Page

X Battle Studies [Military History] and Strategy 

Division Program, 1988-89 Academic Year 

(Proposed) ...........................................69 

XI Command Division Program, 1988-89 Academic Year 

(Proposed) ...........................................69 

XII Landing Force Operations Division Program, 

1988-89 Academic Year (Proposed) ....................70 

XIII Landing Force Operations Division: Exercise 

Emphasis, 1988-89 Academic Year (Proposed) ..........71 

Endnotes ...................................................... 74 

Appendices

A. Historical Lineage (Unofficial). Marine Corps 

Command and Staff College ........................... A-1 

B. Overview: Marine Corps Command and 

Staff College, 1988 ................................. B-1 

C. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. 

Student Body Size, Selected Years, 1920-1988 ........ C-1 

D. Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Academic Hour Load, Selected Years, 
INTRODUCTION

This history of the curriculum of the Marine Corps Command

and Staff College spans the 68 years from the institution's

founding in 1920 to the present year. A complicating factor has:

been the basic fact no real history of the professional military

education system of the Marine Corps has been written. For the

there are no histories similar to those of the U. S. Army

Command and General Staff College (Dr. Timmothy Nenninger, The

Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education,

Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States

Army. 1881-1918 [1978], and Dr. Boyd L. Dastrup, U. S. Army

Command and General Staff College [1982]), or the Naval War

College (Dr. Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War

College and the Development of the Naval Profession [1977],

Dr. John B. Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial

History of the United States Naval War College [1984], and

S. M. Barnes, "The United States Naval War College: A Staff

Study of Its Historical Background, Mission, Educational

Philosophy, and Principles..." [1954]), or the British Army

Staff College at Camberley (Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and

the Staff College, 1854-1914 [1972]).

The closest such history was that of First Lieutenant

Anthony Frances, USMCR, "History of the Marine Corps Schools,"

written in 1945. This is valuable for background information

for the period before and during World War II, based upon his

access to records no longer in existence; however, it is a brief

xvii
overview history. In 1978, the Marine Corps Historical Center

published a history of Quantico titled Quantico: Crossroads of

the Corps; but this is a chronological history of the base, of

which the Education Center is only a part. Hence, this volume

could provide only general background information; it is not a

detailed history of the College and its development.

Thus, it has been necessary to include in this examination

of the curriculum not only the progressive stages through which

it has evolved in almost seven decades, but also some history of

the founding of the Marine Corps educational system, the shift

in the mission of this service in the 1930s, and other

information about the students of the College. A curriculum

does not exist in a vacuum; it has to relate to a greater

whole. Hence, the simultaneous development of both the

curriculum and the institution, coupled with that of the Marine

Corps and the professional military education system of which it

is a part.

A brief note on sources would also be appropriate. Any work

of history is only as good as its sources. With respect to the

Command and Staff College, many documents pertaining to both its

early and recent history have not survived. Those that have are

scattered in various locations, obviously having been separated

from their original files. Recent records that do exist are

those of the author, retained by him as a faculty member since

joining the Command and Staff College as the military historian

xviii
in 1975. Hence, there are some materials for the 1920s, 1930s,

1970s, and 1980s, while gaps exist for the other decades and

years in between. The "best sources" available within the time

frame for preparing this paper have been used; often, these were

the base newspaper, the Quantico Sentry, and the professional

journal of the Marine Corps officer, the Marine Corps Gazette ,

both of which provide a general account of developments at the

senior educational institution of the Marine Corps. As

appropriate, the memory of the author has also been utilized.

Donald F. Bittner

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Military Historian

Quantico, Virginia

April 1988

xix
NOTE ON SPELLING, PUNCTUATION, CAPITALIZATION

In this history of the evolution of the curriculum of

Marine Corps Command and Staff College, extensive use has been

made of both primary and secondary materials. These span

almost seven decades. When using direct quotations from these

sources, the author has retained the spelling, punctuation,

and capitalization as used in the quoted source. With respect

to the "Field Officers' Course," and the "Company Officers'

Course," useage in the Marine Corps varied as to the use of

the possessive case in the titles of each in the 1920s and

1930s. Unless a quoted source used the non-possessive case,

the author has used the possessive case in reference to both

courses since this seemed to be the form used by most Marines

in the inter-war years.
The Marine Corps Professional Military Education System:

The Founding Concept

The Marine Corps Command and Staff College, initially called

the Field Officers' Course, received its first students on

1 September 1920. Although there had been temporary schools

established for the training of Marine officers during World

War I, other than the School of Application (now called The

Basic School) established in 1891 for the training of newly

commissioned second lieutenants, this Field Officers' Course

marked an innovation in the education and training of career

Marine Corps officers. (2) As a 1945 history of the Marine

Corps Schools at Quantico succinctly noted, "This was the first

time that a course of formal study was organized specifically

for senior Marine officers." (3)

The new institution also had a clearly defined mission. By

1922, after the experience of two one-year classes, this was

articulated in the following manner: "to prepare the students to

function as field officers in infantry commands and to fill the

more important staff positions in the Marine Corps." (4)

This mission statement in concept has remained essentially

unchanged in the ensuing seven decades; although changed

conditions in the nation's international and strategic

positions, the nature of warfare, new technology, and an altered

service mission have occurred since 1920, the conceptual
underpinning of the institution remains the same, as is revealed

in the current mission statement for the 1987-88 Academic Year:

To provide intermediate level professional military

education for field grade officers of the Marine Corps,

other services, and foreign countries; to prepare them for

command and staff duties with Marine Air-Ground Task Forces

with emphasis on amphibious operations and for assignments

with departmental, joint, combined, and high level service

organizations. (5)

This concept, underlying so much of the 20th Century Marine

Corps, owed its genesis to major General John A. Lejeune, 13th

Commandant of the Marine Corps. His ideas on a military

educational system were developed prior to World War I, and his

experiences in that conflict only confirmed the need for such a

system. He eloquently articulated his concept before the House

of Representatives Committee on Naval Affairs on 26 February

1920, stressing the link between education and the American

soldier:

There used to be an old theory that the soldier ought to

be ignorant and illiterate and like dumb, driven cattle. I

think our experience in this war shows the more intelligent,

the more educated, and the more initiative a man has, the

better soldier he is.

In his ideas, however, Lejeune envisioned an educational system

for both the troops and officers. With respect to the latter,

he continued:

2
We have had to look out for the officers as well as the

men... A great many of us have had a desire for a long time

to see a school established where officers will learn their

duties as captains and field officers. Our officers have to

be self-educated. Few of us have had the opportunity of

going to Fort Leavenworth or the Army War College or the

Navy War College, and the average officers have had no

opportunity to learn anything in regard to their higher

duties except by studying themselves or what they have

learned from practical experience. It is our aim for all of

our officers to have as good opportunities to obtain a

military education as the officers of the Navy or Army.

Education is absolutely essential: an educated officer makes

for educated men and an ignorant officer makes for ignorant

men. (6)

The Commandant had already ordered the creation of the

nucleus of what would eventually become the Education Center of

the Marine Corps. Two new schools at Quantico for officers

other than new lieutenants were established, with both focused

primarily on infantry skills: in October 1919, the Marine

Officers' Training School and in January 1920, the Marine

Officers' Infantry School. However, two similar schools

operating concurrently was unsatisfactory; also, the subject of

Marine officer education was under review. Hence, in July 1920

both schools were merged into one organization, with separate

courses for field grade officers and company grade officers. A

staff was appointed to develop a curriculum, and the first

3
class ordered to assemble. By September, the need to have a

formal school structure, with various schools organized to suit

the needs of the diverse students had been recognized, thus the

Field Officers' Course opened its doors, to be followed a year

later by the Company Officers' Course. (7)

In his endeavors, Lejeune had the support of the Secretary

of the Navy. In a speech at Quantico on 5 March 1920, Josephus

Daniels told his audience that:

No Americanism has the right to call itself by that

proud name that does not seek to uplift, strengthen, and

make more efficient every man in America. With that spirit

in our marine service, our naval service, and our army, we

shall before a great while attract into the service the

flower of the country, and we will hold those of good

judgment and ambition by putting before them the opportunity

of the highest advancement. That day is past in America

when preferment is exclusively in the grasp only of those

who have been to Annapolis and West Point. We shall open

the doors of promotion to men from the ranks. We have seen

in historic wars that some of the greatest soldiers of

natural genius and ability have made themselves superior to

men of greater opportunities. We shall lift up always and

never pull down. We shall open no doors of advancement to

men who are not worthy and fit, who do not qualify

themselves by study to make themselves the equals of those

who enjoyed the best advantages. (8)

4
However, such ideas were not just the result of the World

War I experience or General Lejeune. As he had indicated in his

testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee, a minority

of farsighted officers had already been discussing this very

concept. The first year of the publication of the officers'

professional journal, The Marine Corps Gazette, in 1916 saw the

idea debated in its early issues. In reaction to future

commandant Ben Fuller's piece on the establishment of a Marine

Corps war college, numerous responses appeared. Another future

commandant, Fuller's successor, the then Lieutenant Colonel

John H. Russell, who himself would support the education system

in the 1930s, continued on a theme he had raised earlier that

year: the need for a Marine Corps mission, and one by

implication closely associated with the Navy. He commented in

December 1916 that the "Naval War College is the Marine Corps

War College. It is there that we obtain our conception of

war." In his view, that was where broad outline was obtained;

however, as Russell continued: "It then becomes the duty of the

Marine Corps to establish an educational system and such

educational institutions that will enable it to perfect the work

as outlined by the Naval War College." (9) In a series of

essays in response to Colonel Fuller's commentary, the

correspondents were not disputing the concept of a professional

educational system, but ultimately what form it would take. One

even submitted a tentative outline of a curriculum of such an

institution. (10)

The intellectual ferment and discussion reappeared in the

pages of the Gazette immediately after the war. In September

5
1919, Major E. W. Sturdevant stated the need for professional

military training for the officers of the Corps in a piece

titled "A System of Instruction for Officers of the Marine

Corps." In the introduction, he noted the obvious, well aware

of natural grouping of officers (newly commissioned officers

whose only experience was in France, older officers who had not

served there but remained "on foreign tropical service," and

training of future officers of the Corps) who would oppose such

a system:

The Marine Corps is now called on to furnish officers

equipped for a far wider range of duties than ever before.

The Military art in general has also expanded, new forms

have appeared, the old familiar branches we have studied for

many years have been greatly enlarged and they all need much

more thorough study to acquire proficiency."

Sturdevant addressed the even then old argument of "generalist

versus specialist," and concluded that "the Marine Corps system

of education should be like a university, which provides a

certain number of required courses and a certain number of

electives." And "higher education" in the profession was a

necessity: "That such education is necessary for the Marine

Corps goes without saying, as well as the fact that we cannot

rely upon the Army or Navy to give it to us, but must provide it

for ourselves." (11)

By June 1921, the Marine Corps Gazette, announced to its

readers that such a system was now in place and ready to

function. It also noted that the Field Officers' Course already

6
had a class in session, with a second to assemble in October of

that year. However, the goal of 25 field grade officers in each

had been impossible to achieve due to the needs of the service;

hence, although the number of students would remain at 25, the

student body would be composed of both field grade officers and

senior captains. (12)

However, despite the policies of the leaders of the Corps

and the vision of their future successors, opposition to this

new concept existed within the officer corps, with views ranging

from hostility of the very idea of such professional military

education, to various complaints about having to attend school.

after fighting in "The Great War," to objections of students

being taught by officers junior to them (despite the

instructors' qualifications), to views that "experience was the

best teacher." Marine Corps leaders in the field of

professional officer education throughout the 1920s periodically

took up the pen and authored pieces in the Gazette as they

attempted to refute such views and convince the officer corps of

the need for such education, as indicated by the periodic "soft

sell" articles which appeared in the inter-war years. Some

combatted the view of education or the study of the profession

as being "too high brow" and studious officers as being

"impractical." Throughout the period, a theme of "selling the

product" appeared in the pages of the Gazette , as well as

informing the officer corps of what was happening within the

educational system, especially at the Field Officers' Course.

(13)

7
Whatever the views of the officer corps, the fact remained

that the Marine Corps had established a professional military

education system for them; and the goal was clearly articulated

to it, although all the officers may not have been listening.

As Colonel Dunlap commented, "I foresee a time when all our

senior officers will have passed through the schools as they now

exist;" by this, he meant the now established The Basic School

for newly commissioned lieutenants, the Company Officers' Course

(now called Amphibious Warfare School), and the Field Officers'

Course (now called Command and Staff College), with appropriate

attendance at the Naval or Army War College. (14) But five

years after its establishment, what was the Field Officers'

Course?

The 1920s: The Field Officers' Course -

The Influence of the Army

As the Major General Commandant had stated in his annual

report for 1920, the decade of the 1920s revealed a common

approach and theme: the Field Officers' Course, as well as the

Company Officers' Course, were created in the image and taught

as adjuncts to the equivalent level schools of the U.S. Army.

After the 1924-25 Academic Year, the following summary remarks

were made by Colonel Robert Dunlap:

Course of instruction during this school year was

largely founded on the courses prescribed in Army. schools

and the text books in tactics were largely books, pamphlets,

8
and mimeographed sheets prepared by the Infantry School,

Fort Benning, and the Command/General Staff School,

Leavenworth. (15)

To accomplish its educational objectives with the projected,

annual student body of 25 students, the Field Officers' Course-.

was actually a part of the Marine Corps Schools, which was

headed by a Commanding officer with an appropriate staff. Both

the Field Officers' Course and the Company Officers' Course in:

turn had their own separate Directors. The course, now running

from September to June, was grouped into three areas of study:

the Department of Tactics, the Department of Topography, and the

Department of Law. (16)

From its initial class, the Field Officers' Course

confronted a problem common to all its succeeding ones: not all

students entered the school with the same background, even in

the area of basic military skills. Despite the ideal of

covering everything in greater depth, such could not always be

easily accomplished, then or now. As the end of course report.

for the 1924-25 Academic Year noted, "Topography was still

taught in a more or less elementary form to the members of both

classes, irrespective of their experience and training in that

subject." (17)

Each year, the end of academic year reports noted that

grades were given only in tactics, topography, and law.

Significantly, the report for the 1923-24 Academic Year noted,

"The greater part of the time was devoted to tactics." (18)

9
Another significant aspect of the Field Officers' Course

soon appeared: the students were expected to master the

instruction, pass examinations, and meet the overall standards

the school demanded of them. Stated another way, they were held

accountable. Thus, for the first five classes it became

apparent that attendance did not mean automatic graduation:

Table I

Attendance/Graduation Figures:

Field Officers' Course, 1920-21 to 1924-25

Comments

Honor: 2; Distinguished: 6.

"following somewhat the

system then in vogue in the

Command and Staff School,

Ft. Leavenworth."

"All members of the class

graduated, each given a

class standing as warranted

distinction."

"Remainder of class either

failed or received qualified

certificates."

Throughout this period, the Field Officers' Course remained

modeled on the U.S. Army course of instruction at Fort

Leavenworth. This was not surprising, since the major military

event of the century had been World War I where many of the

Marine leaders, including Major General Commandant Lejeune, had

served in France with the Army and Leavenworth trained

officers. Thus, the infant Field Officers' Course initially

1 0

2 received "no grades"

Academic

Year

Number of

Students Graduates

1920-21 24 24

1921-22 24 24

1922-23 22 15

1923-24 20 19

1924-25 22 20
patterned itself after its older sister service institution

Within a few years, this would soon be an issue of great

controversy at Quantico. But in the meantime, the Field

Officers' Course continued on its evolutionary path.

One element remained constant, then as now. That was and is

the ideal goal of producing a well educated, reflective,

professional officer. In words that could have been said in

1988, Colonel James C. Breckinridge addressed this subject in

1929. The Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps Schools

articulated the ideal in a Marine Corps Gazette article in

December of that year:

Military reasoning should be analytical and critical

above everything, because military problems are not

susceptible of academic proof; and that which has been

proven by force of arms in one place has been disproved in

another. There is no formula for waging war or fighting

battles; to apply a rule is to invite, or demand, disaster.

Breckinridge, above all, sought to teach his students how to

think, and not recite rules and formulae. As he continued:

These students are taught not to learn what is handed to

them, and to accept it because it is handed to them in a

college, and to mold their minds upon precedent and

chronology. They are taught to dissect, to analyze, and to

think. They are taught how to develop their inherent

intelligence and to use their minds for original

thinking ....We need officers who are trained to reason

briefly, clearly, decisively, and sanely. (19)

1 1
Breckinridge then addressed the ideal of the Field Officers'

Course within the Marine Corps Schools. He specifically noted

the following about the senior educational institution of the

Marine Corps:

And the Field Officers' Course finally removes the limits

and restrictions to originality, and teaches its students to

apply themselves and their innate abilities to every

situation that demands an analysis and a decision." (20)

Of course, this was an ideal; but was it the reality of the

1920s? Objective critiques, even in surviving records of any

institution, often only address the ideal or what the writers

desire to be known. However, Colonel Breckinridge's article

produced a response from a student, also published in the

Gazette. In a critique of the course, he addressed problems of

which Colonel Breckinridge surely was aware, and which plague

all military. schools, especially those at the command and staff

college and war college levels.

If the ideals of Colonel Breckinridge are relevant in 1988,

the critique from Lieutenant Commander H. S. Jeans could also

have been penned today. In it, he notes the perennial problems

of too many subjects to be studied in too little time; the

problems of tests, grades, and standings which interfere with

learning; and the real issue of trying to ascertain the "school

solution" to satisfy faculty and "the Marine Corps" which can

interfere with the ideal as articulated so precisely by Colonel

Breckinridge. (21) This essay gives a rare insight into what

1 2
was really occurring at the Field Officers' Course, a glimpse

behind the official records, statements, and few surviving

documents.

By the end of its first decade of existence, the Field

Officers' Course was firmly established within the Marine

Corps. Between 1920 and 1930, 198 Marine officers, six Naval

officers, and two Army officers had attended the Field Officers'

Course. (22) The leadership of the Corps firmly supported the

concept of professional military education throughout an

officer's career. Brigadier General George Richards, at the

opening exercises of the Marine Corps Schools in August 1931,

addressed past achievements, and compared previous and current

views, at least those supported by the Corps' leaders:

Prior to the war the various attempts to educate the

officers met a considerable amount of criticism. Too much

education was somewhat frowned upon. The supposedly

educated officer was looked at askance by the others. The

' high brow' was unhesitatingly rated as "impractical" by his

brother officers. It was-the "practical soldier" who ruled

the boat. Early in the war, our military forces awoke to

the need for trained officers, particularly specialists and

staff officers, for higher units who understood the tactical

use and limitations of various arms and could relieve

commanders of the detailed work required for the components.

of the various arms and services in the various combat

situations. As soon as possible after the war... our school

was broadened, bringing into existence... the Field

1 3
Officers, Company Officers, and Basic Schools... As soon as

student officers discovered how much this school could

teach, the spirit of opposition to schools in general ceased

to exist and instead officers began to seek assignment to

school duty. (23)

Of course, part of this was the ideal view. In addition to

persuading recalcitrant officers of the wisdom of studying their

profession, the real world intervened. Despite the support of

the senior leadership of the Corps, there were still only so

many officers in the Marine Corps and too many commitments.

Hence, because of the need to send expeditionary forces to

Nicaragua and China, the courses at the Marine Corps Schools

were interrupted and the officer students sent to these

unexpected duty stations. For the 1928-29 Academic Year, the

Company Officers' Course was suspended while the size of the

student body in the Field Officers' Course was reduced

considerably. By the 1929-30 Academic Year, some semblance of

order had returned and 17 students reported for the Field

Officers' Course that year.

But new issues were soon to arise. These concerned not the

idea of professional military education for officers, but what

the focus would be in the schools. Linked to this would also be

the future direction of the Marine Corps and its mission. In

retrospect, the indications of this fight for the "soul of the

Marine Corps" were evident. In 1930, under "Marine Corps

Schools," the pamphlet for Quantico already noted that, although

the Field Officers' Course was ten years old and had been

patterned after the course of study at Fort Leavenworth,

1 4
changes were occurring. By 1930, a new department had been

added: the Department of Overseas, whose instruction:

Takes up a large part of the students' time. This

instruction is most important for Marine Officers and has

gradually developed from a few hours until it now occupies

about one-fifth of the students' time." (24)

The Fight for the Soul of the Corps: Amphibious Warfare

The issue soon would. arise: "Where was the institution

heading?" A reactive piece to that. of Lieutenant Commander

Jeans' Gazette article appeared in that journal in 1931. Titled.

"A Plea for Revision of the Field Officers' Course," Major

John A. Gray addressed the real issue of the school and the

future of the Marine Corps, and provided a clue of what would be

coming:

The Field Officers' Course patterns itself closely to the

corresponding courses of the Army schools, which, admirable

as they are for the purposes of the Army, have neither the

flexibility nor the scope that a course of instruction for

Marine officers should have, and which in fact contains

material better eliminated and replaced by subjects of far

more value in a course designed for the education of Marine

officers. (25)

Major Gray had the right idea, but the incorrect direction. His

plea was one for a greater focus on "small wars" and the context

within which they occur. However, in the 1930s, another

15
direction would be chosen: west, into the Pacific, with an

orientation to the Navy and the amphibious mission of the Marine

Corps.

An indication of the future occurred during the 1926-27

Academic Year. That year, as Major General Commandant Lejeune

reported, "An overseas Expeditionary course has been added to

the curriculum of the Field Officers' Schools." Then Brigadier

General Dion Williams in 1933 addressed this in the Marine Corps

Gazette in yet another detailed presentation on the Marine Corps

officer education system:

This is interesting as showing the increasing tendency

in the Marine Corps to get away from the strictly Army

courses of study at the schools and then embark upon a

course of the subjects applicable to the primary mission of

the Corps as an integral part of the Naval Establishment,

namely 'to support the Fleet or any portion thereof in the

execution of its mission' by the organization and employment

of Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces for overseas Advanced

Base duties with the active Fleet. (26)

The course of study of the Field Officers' Course reflected

both the by now traditional course of study heavily influenced

by the Army and the shift to a maritime orientation, coupled

with subjects which revealed the state of war and technology at

the time. Thus, with regard to the letter, officers were

required-to take courses in animal management (9 hours),

equitation (30 hours), and pack transportation (8 hours); such

instruction reflected the state of technological development,

1 6
availability of mechanical transport, and the heritage of the

Marine Corps in small wars. But the focus on the latter was

declining, as only 10 hours were listed under "small wars,"

which included all aspects of this topic from introduction to

tactics.

Army influence was apparent in courses of study in map

maneuvers (30 hours, of which only four were in landing

operations), military organization (8 hours, which included

infantry battalion, regiment, brigade, and division

organization, plus cavalry units), solution of map problems

(20 hours, to include Army estimate of the situation and Army

forms), various elements of Army concepts in tactical principles

and decisions (96 hours), tactics and techniques of the various

arms - air service (23 hours, to include Air Corps organization,

bombardment aviation, The Air Division Operations against

Hostile Air Force, The Air Division in Defense of a Coast Line,

and Aviation in Support of an Army on the Defense), Tactics and

Techniques of the Various Arms - Cavalry (8 hours) and tanks

(4 hours). However, even though instruction based upon Army

organization and doctrine consumed much of the instruction of a

course numbering 1,016 hours, the future lay elsewhere.

The focus was already beginning to shift to operations

either unique to the Marine Corps or associated with the Navy.

Of course, the historical staff rides to the sites of the

battles of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and First and

Second Manassas consumed 24 hours of course time. But more

1 7
importantly, the students were studying Gallipoli (4.5 hours),

the British raid on Zeebrugge in 1917 (1.5 hours), and German

landings on the Russian islands in the Baltic in 1917 (1.5

hours), as well as maritime strategy in Central American waters,

the Pacific, and the Atlantic, Naval gunfire in support of

landing operations, and Marine Corps operations and war plans

(1.5 hours each). More significantly, even before the major

shift to the amphibious mission and attendant study and

development of doctrine thereto, the 1930-31 Academic Year

curriculum already contained 216 hours of instruction under the

title of "Landing Operations." (27)

The stage was now set for a battle for the "heart and soul"

of the Marine Corps, and this would partly be waged within the

professional military education system established at Quantico,

of which the Field Officers' Course would play a major role. In

1932-33, this would be decided, primarily through the efforts of

the Director of the Field Officers' Course (also referred to as

the Senior Course or the Second Year) and executive officer of

the Marine Corps Schools, Colonel E. B. Miller, with the support

of the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, the now Brigadier

General James C. Breckinridge, and the Commanding General,

Marine Barracks, Quantico, Brigadier General John H. Russell,

who by February 1933 would be the Assistant Major General

Commandant and by April 1934 would assume office as the Major

General Commandant. To Miller, the problem was simple:

although an educational system existed, it was in spirit and

content a defacto extension of that of the U.S. Army. On

15 August 1932, Miller presciently stated the issue:

18
(the] prolonged use of this Army material, now taken from

all of the Army schools, has so saturated the entire marine

Corps schools system that its foundation is still resting on

Army principles, Army organization, and Army thought." (28)

This simply was unsatisfactory, since Major General

Commandant Ben Fuller had already stated his concern that the

Marine Corps was not doing enough to prepare itself for its

unique mission: "Land operations in conjunction with the Navy

and the conduct of small wars." Equally significant, Major

General Fuller further noted that "the probability of the Corps

being again included in large Army operations is remote." (29)

With this as guidance, Miller then proceeded to propose the

direction that the Field Officers' Course in 1932-33 would

take. In this, he addressed the next and most obvious question:

why teach Marine officers Army doctrine, approach, and tactics?

Although Marine and Army organization, equipment, and operations

ashore had appeared similar, this was essentially superficial.

For Miller, the issue was simple and involved the whole

foundation upon which all training at Quantico rested:

instruction "must involve Marine organizations, marine

equipment, Marine problems, Marine operations, with a Naval, not

Army, background." As Miller noted, "The Marine Corps is not an

Army; the Army is not the Marine Corps." For Miller, the

orientation and foundation of the Marine Corps Schools was

misplaced. In the schools, when the students arrived, "Why

teach them Army? Why? Why? If fighting on land is a Marine's

job then why not teach Marine? ... Marine organizations, marine

19
equipment, Marine problems, Marine operations, with a Naval, not

Army, background?"

Miller then made his proposal: to shift the focus of the

Field Officers' Course to one of landing operations. But to do

this, the Marine Corps had to develop its own course of study

and textbooks, i.e., doctrine, independent of that of the Army,

for its own "'peculiar missions': Land[ing] Operations in

conjunction with the Navy and the conduct of Small Wars." He

thus made his recommendation for the coming year: "The prime

objective of the Marine Corps Schools for the year 1932-33 to be

to prepare a Field Officers' School course for 1933-34 based on

Marine Corps doctrine, organization, and equipment." In this

key major evolutionary but turning point year, Miller proposed

the following specific program:

By developing a Marine Corps doctrine.

By a study of Marine Corps organization.

By a study of Marine Corps-Naval Staff System.

By a study of Marine Corps-Naval Supply System.

By a study of Marine Corps equipment and armament

peculiar to our needs.

By a great expansion in our study of Landing Operations

in conjunction with and in support of the Navy.

By a great expansion in our study of expeditions in

situations not involving declared war.

By a greater development of the subject of Naval gunfire

support, Naval air support, amount of Naval support

needed for various types of operations under varying

conditions.

By a study of Naval-Marine communications peculiar to

our type of operations.

By a study of the joint and separate preparations to be

made by the Marine Corps and the Navy prior to embarking

on a Naval-Marine operation on expedition.

2 0
By writing our own tactics and technique for our own

units, and our own armament and equipment.

By preparing problems based on our own probable mission

and our own organization.

By writing, as far as we can go in the time, our own

text books for guidance of both instructors and

students.

By collecting available data, at Headquarters and

elsewhere, on past expeditions and past maneuvers, in

which Marines have taken a part. (30)

In this proposal, Colonel Miller received the full support

of General Breckinridge. As he noted, the coming year was a

"turntable," during which "we will re-orient ourselves, and pick

up the new track upon which we must travel for the future."

Breckinridge noted that the long list of what Miller proposed to

do "is more complicated in appearance than fact." As he

continued:

To accomplish the numerous items outlined is more a

mental adjustment than anything else. We are no longer

seeking precedents; we propose to establish our own because

they suit us, and because we want them. It will require a

natural wrench to part from the universal leadership of the

Army schools. But, we have been on our own. feet for twelve

years and we no longer need to be lead by anybody.

Hence, classes under the old curriculum would be suspended and

the students shifted to new studies. Breckinridge succinctly

outlined what would be and was done: "To meet the changes of the

year 1932-33, it will be necessary to create a new and entirely

different sort of Field Officers' class for that year, and for

that year only. To a large extent, the class and the staff will

2 1
be merged into one body for study and research." (31)

After a hesitant beginning, Colonel Miller's goal was soon

achieved. By the 1934-35 Academic Year, instruction and

problems were related to Naval campaigns and Marine operations

in support of them. As the Marine Corps Schools regulations for

the Field Officers' Course for that academic year noted:

The course for the second year class includes the entire

field of landing operations with special emphasis on the

Marine brigade, the Fleet Marine Force, both when acting

independently and when part of the fleet. Command and staff

functions in all types of operations and from small

independent units up to and including the mobilization,

organization, and operation of the largest probable Marine

force. The study of small wars forms an important part of

the course. (32)

To achieve this goal, the schools essentially closed their

doors, suspended the previous courses of study, and formed

themselves into committees to study landing operations and

prepare a tentative doctrinal manual on landing operations.

From this would come not only the future doctrine, but the

textbooks and curriculum for each course within the Marine Corps

Schools. In this the Field Officers' Course took the lead; its

staff and students, organized into study groups, did a detailed

study of the failed British amphibious operation at Gallipoli,

as well as using the "lesson learned" experiences the officers

had acquired in the various landing exercises in Hawaii and the

Caribbean. (33)

2 2
The net effect of this was seen immediately in the 1934-35

Academic Year. A mission had now been clearly defined in a

positive manner, an old concept rejected, and the curriculum of

the schools adjusted to this new reality. In response to a

request from the editor of the Marine Corps Gazette, the Marine

Corps Schools clearly presented the new direction (as well as a

new "sell" campaign to the officers of the Corps) in August of

1934. There could be no doubt of what was happening:

Probably no single or combination of factors has

contributed so much to crystallizing school opinion, and

forcing a change in our ideas as to the educational

requirements and needs of the Marine Corps as the

establishment of the Fleet Marine Force. This Force, as a

component part of the U.S. Fleet organization, is lending

color and purpose to every Marine Corps activity, and has

already served to amplify and clarify the mission of the

Marine Corps Schools.... Consequently, it would appear that,

our educational system should be predicated primarily on

fitting ourselves for service with the Fleet Marine Force inone capacity or another.... The creation of the Fleet MarineForce has had the salutary effect of removing the last

vestige of doubt as to the real objective of the Marine

Corps Schools,.which after all, is to increase our knowledge

of the art. and science of war as applicable to Marines, and

thereby train ourselves to execute more efficiently our

probable tasks in peace and war.

2 3
Clearly, the focus became, as the now General Breckinridge

advocated, the "infusion of naval thought into the courses in

order that we might better comprehend the Navy's method of

conducting war and our place in the scheme of national defense

as a part of the Navy." Conversely, the Corps had rejected the

previous Army oriented and based curriculum, concepts, teaching,

philosophies, and, most important, the assumption that in a

future war the Marines would serve with that service and hence

"train ourselves to serve with the Army." (34)

The net effect of this change was felt in all the schools,

but especially in the former Field Officers' Course, now called

the "Second Year Class." Because the system of professional

military education was based upon a building block approach,

with the officers passing through each phase at appropriate

points in their careers, the "Second Year Class" would be the

major culmination and capstone of the new program. After

graduation from this course, selected Marine officers would

receive their next and final professional military education at

either the Army or Naval War College, where the higher

perspective of war and strategy would be addressed.

With this change of focus on the mission of the Marine

Corps, the Marine Corps Schools, especially the "Second Year

Class," now concentrated on the techniques of learning and

implementing the new "landing operations" doctrine, later to be

called "amphibious operations." In previous years, Marines had

begun to study the defense of advanced naval bases. Now, they

stressed the seizure of such facilities; or, stated another way,

2 4
the Corps shifted from defensive to offensive operational

concepts now associated with the term "amphibious assault." (35)

However, the Marine Corps still had to prepare for both its

old and new missions. Hence, students at the Marine Corps

Schools continued to study "small wars" and some aspects of

defense of advanced naval bases in both the "First Year Class"

and "Second Year Class," while a new course was added to those

offered at Quantico: a year long "Base Defense Weapons Course."

Wake Island in December 1941 showed that such a mission

associated with "advanced base defense" was not illusionary.

(36)

But the future lay with the amphibious operation, still

titled "landing operations." And the study of this form of war,

in an offensive mode associated with the Navy, was the

cornerstone of the "Second Year Class" curriculum in 1934-35.

Because the Marine Corps was still developing doctrine and

techniques to implement what was still a new approach and

mission, the course focused on operational problems which were

designed to teach the students and, simultaneously,. assist in

developing amphibious operational doctrine.

Hence, for 1934-35, the "Second Year Class" consisted of

1056 hours of instruction. Of this, 239 remained "unassigned,"

to be used at the discretion of the faculty as they deemed

appropriate; in concept, they would be used to augment

instruction within the structure of the various problems. A

general analysis of the remaining 817 hours reveals where the

school was heading: offensive amphibious operations in support

of a naval campaign. (37)

2 5
TABLE II

Instructional Hours, Second Year Class, 1934-35 Academic Year

Primary Focus: Landing Force Operations

Illustrative Problem (landing attack): 97 hours

Project Problem (landing operations): 279 hours

Special Tactical Study (landing operations): 30 hours

Staff and Command Maneuvers (two sides map maneuvers

in landing operations): 75 hours

Naval War College Problem (landing operations): 75 hours

"Traditional Focus"

Illustrative problem (defense of a base): 89 hours

Project problem (small wars): 140 hours

Miscellaneous: Military government, plus "lecture course"

on military history, separate arms and

services, military and naval matters from

outside sources: 32 hours

Unassigned hours: 239 hours

Even in the "lecture course," the emphasis remained on the new

as well as the traditional: "A course in military history has

been included in this year's course for both classes... This

course will be devoted largely to a study of amphibious

operations and small wars." (38) Of course, this study of

military history also had another purpose, echoing that of

Colonel Breckinridge in 1929 who had urged that such study be

approached in the appropriate manner, i.e., to learn and not to

confirm:

Some may contend that a course in military history is

not worthwhile, in view of the fact that the development of

new weapons, and a constant change in the methods and means

2 6
of war are conclusive proofs that the commander of today has

no practical lessons to learn from situations and events

that occurred in the past. However, the human element is

always present in war, and the study of military history

stamps indelibly on our minds those facts and causes which

gave rise to success or failure. (39)

By the end of the 1935-36 Academic Year, yet another piece

appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette addressing the subject of

the Marine Corps Schools, professional military education for

career officers, and the new mission and orientation of the

Marine Corps. Clearly, this was part of a continual effort to

educate and convince the officer corps on all of these

functions. However, unlike the piece of two years earlier, this.

new essay was more general in nature. Of course, it addressed

many of the same issues, but often phrased differently. For

example, with respect to the World War I experience of the

Corps, Captain Arthur T. Mason wrote that:

It came to be realized that the experiences of the Corps'

in the World War were to be regarded as highly exceptional

rather than the normal; that such a situation might, and

probably would, never occur again; that the status of the

Marine corps was, as always, that of a naval force; that the

Navy and the Marine Corps were mutually interdependent, the

disparity in relative importance be what it may; that we

were soldiers of the sea not in name only but in actuality;

and that our whole future usefulness, and existence,

depended upon a practical application of these facts.

27
There appeared the now repeated theme of focus and mission: in a

future war, "it has long been realized that essential

operations... would be those required to obtain land areas

necessary for the support of the Fleet.. and... that the seizure

and defense of advanced bases is the primary mission of the

Marine Corps...."

With respect to the schools, they would conform to this

mission by concentrating on Marine Corps tasks: "in the main,

amphibious operations and small wars." This had to bring a

major revision of curriculum, since these subjects (primarily

the amphibious mission) "had hardly been touched upon before.

The seizure, occupation, and defense of advanced bases is new to

modern American naval thought which, heretofore, has been

occupied with the primary task of solving the problem of

defeating the enemy fleet afloat." Through their curriculum and

studies, the Marine Corps Schools proclaimed itself as unique,

for there could be found "no analogy in any other service school

at home or abroad."

The individual courses of instruction were then addressed in

general, with the repeated theme of a tiered professional

education system and planned sequence. In addressing the senior

course, Captain Mason noted that it was "specially designed for

older officers after a period of service and increase in rank

. has occurred." Of course, such students ideally would have

attended the previous schools. A mission statement then

appeared, repeating that for the 1934-35 Academic Year. Later,

he focused on the curriculum, stressing that 80% of the course

2 8
comprised operational problems in which the students "learned by

doing" through "the conduct of an operation from its inception

to its end." The problems involved both the seizure and defense

of advanced naval bases. Whereas the Gazette article two years

earlier had discussed the elements of the curriculum and the

number of hours devoted to each, Captain Mason did not go into

such detail for the concluding 1935-36 and forthcoming 1936-37

Academic Years; rather, he presented the curriculum in general

terms and told the readers what would be expected, i.e.,

philosophy of education and how this was implemented.

Mason concluded by stressing the association of the Schools

and the Fleet Marine Force. This obviously was an attempt to

bridge the two attitudinal groups associated with the value of

schooling versus that of practical experience, which Colonel

Dunlap had addressed in 1925 and General Richards in 1931.

Hence, the piece which "presents the views of the Commandant and

Staff, Marine Corps Schools," concluded by linking education and

the operational forces:

The degree to which the Schools fulfill their function

may then be measured by the extent to which they prepare

officers for wartime service in the Fleet Marine Force and

in capacities contributing to the combat success of that

organization.... The relation between the Schools and the

Fleet Marine Force is very close in more than the mere

geographical sense.... The action and reaction of the

Schools and Fleet Marine Force, one on the other, is very

constant. We may characterize the Schools as the research

unit which seeks and develops the principles and data

2 9
relating to our task; the Fleet Marine Force as the

experimental laboratory which translates these principles

into action and tests their practicality. (40)

World War II: Closure to Command and Staff Course

As the Marine Corps entered World War II, it had a new

mission, developed a doctrine attendant to it, was working on

the means to implement it, and had inculcated both the new

mission and the doctrine into its professional education system

for its career officer students. However, problems loomed; the

number of students who attended these schools was small,

especially the Field Officers' Course (whatever it was called).

At an average of 25 students per course, by 1941 a maximum of

450 students could have attended (not graduated) from this

course. (18 courses times a maximum student body of 25 students

equals 450. However, note that the courses for 1927-28 and

1928-29 were either suspended or reduced in size; a student body

of 25 per course was a theoretical ideal not actually achieved

each year.) However, the total number of school trained

officers, either in the old "Army" or new "amphibious" system,

was also a misleading figure. Many of the graduates were old,

and had either died, or retired, or were physically unfit for

operational service; others had been rapidly promoted, and would

soon be major commanders in a rapidly expanding Marine Corps.

Herein lay the problem. The Marine Corps had correctly

identified its proper future mission and had tackled the problem

of how to conduct it. The Pacific would be the theater of its

3 0
operations, and the enemy an island empire, with outlying

defenses. Even if the Japanese fleet was defeated, its island

bastions would have to be assaulted and seized. Although an

embryo Fleet Marine Force existed to do this, hardly anyone

could have envisioned a World War II final strength of six

Marine Corps combat divisions, four marine Corps aircraft wings,

supporting troops initially under First Marine Amphibious Corps

and later FMFPAC, and all of this eventually organized into two

Marine amphibious corps. Equally important would be a major

support establishment existing to train, equip, and procure the

needed troops and equipment for the Pacific war.

All of this required manpower. By February 1941, the Marine

Corps had commenced its expansion with the activation of the 1st

and 2nd Marine Divisions. In an unprecedented expansion, the

base of the operational combat manpower officer pool had to be

filled before looking to the mid-level command and staff

billets. In reality, this meant screening officer candidates

and, after identifying those selected for commissions, training

the new second lieutenants. No matter how important command and

staff training was, the junior company grade officer now took

precedence. Hence, despite the advances made in professional

officer career level education and the new "heart and soul" of

the amphibious mission which had been infused into the Marine

Corps Schools, in January 1941 the Quantico Sentry announced the

inevitable: The "Senior Class" had graduated, and "no plans for

the further continuance of the schools, with the exception of

the Candidate and Reserve Officers Courses, have been

3 1
announced." (41) By 7 December 1941, the Marine Corps Schools

were reduced to five training courses: The Basic School, Base

Defense Weapons Course, Reserve Officers Course, Candidates

Course, and the Correspondence School. Except for the Base

Defense Weapons Course, a career officer equivalent to the

Company Officers' Course (or whatever name it carried) for

captains, the three resident courses were now devoted to

training candidates and lieutenants. (42) In the period just

prior to and in the early days of World War II, command and

staff level education would be sacrificed to other prioritized

needs which the rapidly expanding Marine Corps had to make, but

a price would have to be paid for this.

A finite number of officers were available for field duty as

operational units were built from the bottom up and new

personnel trained. In this process, both initial forces had to

be created and, as combat operations commenced in the Pacific,

replacements sent to them while simultaneously the Fleet Marine

Force continued to expand. However, this process extracted a

toll. Major General Charles F. B. Price, Commanding General,

Defense Force, Samoa area, addressed the issue in 1942:

Among the difficulties progressively developing as a

result of the rapid expansion of the Marine Corps, perhaps

the most perplexing to Senior Commanders in the field is the

growing shortage of officers with experience and other

requisite qualifications to perform efficiently the duties

of the four principal staff functions for Brigades and

higher units. The trial and error method of gaining such

3 2
(staff] experience is extremely wasteful in time, material

and human lives and some correction for the situation

confronting us is of vital importance to the Corps. (43)

This problem, of which the leadership of the Corps was

cognizant, was finally solved in 1943. In March of that year,.

the first class of a short and operationally oriented course

assembled at Quantico. Composed initially of captains and

majors with a few lieutenants and Army officers, and later

larger numbers of sister service and allied officers, this

Command and Staff Course, later titled "School," was not a

career course but one designed to give the needed skills

required for officers which immediate combat operations would

require. The Quantico Sentry announced the new 12-week course

and its objectives on 26 March 1943: "This course will be

devoted exclusively to the training of staff officers for Marine

divisions, regiments, and battalions, with particular emphasis:.

on amphibious warfare." Later, the scope would expand to

include corps operations, as the new school reacted to

increasing operational needs of the Pacific war. By 1945,

nearly 500 staff officers had graduated from this course,

including 44 naval officers, 25 army officers, and 37 allied

officers from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,.

New Zealand, The Netherlands, and France. (44) The size of the

classes had also increased, reaching 55 students per course by

February 1945 from an initial class size of 35 in March 1943.

As in the inter-war era, eventually the officers of the

Corps were informed about the new school through the Marine

Corps Gazette in February 1945; unlike the previous decades,

3 3
however, the purpose was clear and the officer corps needed

little convincing of the value of such instruction. In an

article titled "How Staff Officers Are Trained," the obvious was

stated: "because of its rapid expansion, the Marine Corps during

the early days of the war developed a shortage of qualified

staff officers." In February 1943, Headquarters, Marine Corps

issued the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools the

appropriate guidance for the new course: to prepare officers "to

perform efficiently the duties of the four executive staff

sections in the Marine battalions, regiments, and divisions."

Course content reflected what was occurring in the war, as the

instructors were "required to examine thoroughly all related

texts and reports, and incorporate in its instruction the latest

professional doctrines and trends." To do this, the experienced

staff not only "kept abreast of the latest developments in

modern warfare, coupled with a thorough study of plans, orders,

and special action reports from units in the field," but they

visited their sister institutions at Forts Benning and

Leavenworth, and at the Naval War College, and sent members of

the staff into the combat areas to see what was occurring,

balanced this against the curriculum, and submitted reports for

discussion back at the School. Such observers had been present

during the Saipan and Palau operations.

Thus, the focus of the course was operational, i.e., what

was needed for the immediate pursuit of the war effort. The

curriculum of the 12-week course reflected this. After an

initial review of basic military fundamentals, the Command and

Staff School structured its curriculum in the following manner

3 4
TABLE III

Curriculum:

Command and Staff School, 1945

Comment

Map problem, emphasis was on

battalion and regiment

operations and logistics (S-3

and S-4)

Terrain exercise, in which the

students had to select a MLR,

OPs, and CPs, site infantry

weapons, select artillery

positions, and identify

anti-mechanized barriers.

Students assumed staff positions

of battalion and regiment, and

functioned as such in a simulated attack.

Similar as in ground exercise,

except this was an amphibious

operation.

The major staff exercise of the

course. Students submitted G-2

estimate, commanders estimate,

corps operation plan, task

organization, and a landing team.

operation plan.

Map problem; focus - staff

duties in planning the defense

of an island base.

Regimental map problem; focus -

regimental staff duties.

Unique: no solution was

provided. Focus - division

staff. Students divided into

five groups and assumed various

positions, including division

commander. All five groups were

assigned the same mission and

intelligence, then prepared

plans, orders, and annexes "just

as though it was an actual

operation."

3 5

Problem Hours

Regiment in the Attack 15.5

Regiment in the Defense 10.0

CPX - Regiment 10.0

CPX - Regiment 45.0

Attack on an Enemy

Held Position

106.0

Defense of a Base 54.0

Jungle Warfare 11.5

Project Problem 40.0
In addition, there were various guest lecturers. This program

had one weakness: the students received all of the instruction

in the classroom except for one terrain exercise, two command

post exercises, and a few demonstrations. However, within the

operational focus of the school, the theme was obvious:

essentially offensive in nature, either amphibious assault or

subsequent operations ashore. Defense of a , island base,

although included in the curriculum and a final heritage of the

pre-1932 orientatio o f the Corps, was slowly r-ceding into the

background as the reality of war and the implications of that

conflict confronted the Marine Corps a d its educational system.

(45)

The Command and Staff School (nee Course) illustrated how

far the senior educational institution of the Marine Corps had

evolved. The war had accelerated developments which had already

commenced in the previous decade. In two and a half years, the

School had trained more Marine and sister service officers, with

a new infusion of foreign officers into its student body, than

had been educated and trained in the 21 years of its existence

prior to World War II. Its scope of tactical operations had

also expanded in response to the real world situation: correctly

envisioning amphibious operations in support of the Fleet as the

appropriate mission for the Marine Corps, the pre-war school

taught in terms of regiment and brigade. By V-J Day, it had to

plan, teach, and evaluate at the levels of the operational

division and corps, while a Marine (General Roy Geiger) had

commanded an operational army (10th Army) and others had served

on a staff at that level. It now remained to be seen what

3 6
would happen in the post-war world of professional military

education for the career field grade officers of the Marine

Corps. And the Corps anticipated this, for in February 1945 it

announced plans to lengthen the course from three to six and

eventually nine months, when the needs of the service would

permit it.

The Initial Post World War II Period: The Senior School

With the end of the war, a combination of demobilization

coupled with preparation for increased post-war responsibilities

confronted both the United States and the Marine Corps. At

Quantico, major reorganizations and loss of personnel both

occurred. Within the Marine Corps Schools, the post-war years

saw the reestablishment of the former three tiered professional

military education system for career officers. For career field

grade officers, their school now had another new name:

"Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course." The initial

post-war class convened in September 1946, commencing an eight

month course of instruction, with the second annual class

programmed for September 1947. By now, the mission of the

school was a confirmation of the decided shift in focus and

mission of the 1930s, coupled with the experience of war. The

new mission statement was brief and to the point:

To train field grade officers for command and staff

duties in appropriate echelons of command within the Fleet

Marine Force with primary emphasis on advanced instruction

in the doctrine and techniques of amphibious warfare.

3 7
A reading of the course description infers what would be

included in the curriculum, and what was now de-emphasized.

Within the framework of amphibious operations, World War II

experience had raised a new element hitherto not addressed in

such statements - aviation:

The (Senior] Course is primarily designed to cover the

conduct of amphibious operations employing battalions,

regiments, division, corps, and corresponding aviation

organizations contained within the Fleet Marine Force.

Instruction is designed to produce commanders on the

battalion and regimental level and executive staff officers

(and assistants) on all levels. (46)

Significantly, there was no mention of "small wars," and

officers who would be assigned to special staff duties were to

receive training for such assignments prior to attendance at the

"Senior Course." The course was programmed for 64 students,

one-third of whom were to be aviators.

Shortly after the war and as the Senior Course became

re-established, the old controversy about "experience and

practicality" versus too much theory arose again. Actually, a

blend of the two was ideal, but in letters to the Marine Corps

Gazette the issue appeared in its extremes. But in reading such

correspondence, the content of the Senior Course is clear: the

lessons of the amphibious assaults of World War II, taught by

the personnel who not only participated in them but performed

their duties successfully. The theory and techniques were those

of 1943 to 1945. (47)

3 8
The practical experience of the war continued to influence

the curriculum of the Senior Course. As the Commandant of the

Marine Corps Schools wrote in 1949, during the war:

Senior officer students reworked and enlarged on

problems involving the seizure of Pacific islands, problems

notably similar to those encountered by their predecessors

of the nineteen thirties and varying in solutions according

to the accelerated material developments of later days. As

always, the beaches were the laboratory of the Schools.

Since 1945, however, the practical experience of war was not

available. Hence, as part of the curriculum in the post-war

years, the students took to the field. As General Lemuel

Shepherd wrote, "in order that the instruction may not lose its

sense of reality, frequent resort is had to the medium of

command post exercises, demonstrations, field exercises,

historical rides, and terrain exercises." Most important, this

process culminated with staff and students joining Fleet Marine

Force units-for a two-week amphibious command post exercise,

which "gives the students an opportunity to apply and observe in

practice all of the various lessons learned in the increments

during the previous eight months." As always, the sister

services and foreign officers, coupled with outside guest

lecturers, were scheduled to give the students a "broader

picture of national and international problems and

development[s]." (48)

In 1950, just 15 days prior to the outbreak of the Korean

conflict, the Senior Course graduated its last class of 98

students before the Marine Corps found itself involved in

39
another war. (49) Unlike World War II, however, the school

remained open and continued its sequence of annual classes.

Meanwhile, in yet another internal reorganization of 1 September

1950, the school, now renamed "Senior School" became a component

part of the new Educational Center, whose Commanding General

reported to the Commanding General, Marine Corps Schools.

However, the mission statement remained as in 1946, except that

the term "amphibious operations" replaced "amphibious warfare,"

a change which occurred in 1948, (50) as did the disappearance

of Marine Barracks, Quantico, which now became Marine Corps

Schools, Quantico.

By 1954, the Marine Corps had returned to a peacetime mode.

Again, the officer corps was informed about the professional

education system through which they were expected to pass. At

the Senior School, however, a change had occurred. Now, by

policy, the students were lieutenant colonels and colonels, with

a mission of training them for command of regiments or groups,

and for all aspects of service on division, wing, or landing

force staffs. In the nine-month course, the emphasis was now on

both air and ground units, and training for all aspects of staff

duty. Instructional methods remained as before: a combination

of lectures, field problems, and demonstrations, culminating in

a one-month amphibious command post exercise, Operation Packard,

during which one week was spent at sea conducting an amphibious

landing at camp Lejeune. Reflective of the new era, the School

also devoted "considerable amount of time to atomic warfare."

As in the late 1940s, the Senior School claimed to make use,

4 0
through its library, not only of published books, but also

50,000 classified and 60,000 non-classified papers; these

included "operation reports for most of the major engagements of

the armed forces during World War II and Korea."

By 1954, the Senior School had assumed a definite

operational focus, with most of the curriculum devoted to what

would be considered the tactical or operational aspect of

military affairs. That academic year, the students culminated

their studies at Camp Lejeune in Operation Packard by planning

an amphibious operation involving two marine divisions and two

Marine aircraft wings. (51) Hours wise, the curriculum appeared

as follows:

TABLE IV

Senior School, 1954-55 Academic Year:

Curriculum Hours

Topic Hours

Command and Staff Subjects 550

Aviation 85

Naval Gunfire and Artillery 50

Mechanized Warfare 38

Engineer 25

Naval Subjects 27

Communications 13

Atomic Warfare 54

------------------------------------------

Total 842*

* - In the hour total, it is unclear if the four weeks

devoted to Operation Packard were included in this or if they

were counted separately.

4 1
Meanwhile, the size of the student body was growing. The

Senior School on 3 June 1955 graduated 119 students. Three

months later, on 6 September 1955, the 1955-56 class convened,

with 126 students in the school. In the opening address to the

students, the Director of the Educational Center, Brigadier

General H. P. Paige, challenged them to use their "imagination

and an unbiased viewpoint" when encountering "an almost

unlimited number of problems still to be solved." Paige

continued that "we must never be satisfied with the old and

imperfect way of doing things." (52)

In August 1956, another Senior School class convened in

Breckinridge Hall aboard Quantico base. A Quantico Sentry

article of 10 August 1956, in announcing that a new director had

assumed his duties at the Senior School, also noted that "at the

beginning of the school year 1955-56, Senior School adopted the

seminar method of instruction. This method proved greatly

superior over the lecture method previously used." The Sentry

then commented that this was one of the most "notable changes to

be affected at the Senior School in several years." (53)

However, this concealed a major upheaval in the institution

which occurred just prior to the 1956-57 Academic Year, one

which the new director of the Senior School would have to

implement. This occurred as a result of a study of professional

military officer education, which focused upon what should a

Marine officer know to competently command a Marine infantry

regiment, aircraft group, and/or to perform duty on a general

staff of a Marine division or aircraft wing. Then how much of

4 2
this should be taught by the Senior School, and finally how

should it be taught by the Senior School? Also, the

technological nature of warfare was changing, hence the Senior

School could not avoid being affected by these dual influences.

However, its mission remained essentially as before:

To provide professional education for Marine Corps

officers of the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel in

command and staff duties appropriate to the current and next

higher grades.

With a student body of lieutenant colonels and colonels,

however, the level for which the School trained and expected its

graduates to serve had increased. This was now, although in

concept similar to 1920, a much higher goal in the reality of

the changed circumstances of the 1950s.

This mission was amplified by a further statement, which in

turn reflected the changed technology of war and the increasing

demand placed upon the professional officers only 10 years after

the end of World War II.

Primary emphasis is placed on advanced instruction in

doctrines and techniques of amphibious warfare to include

the large scale all-helicopter assault and the employment of

atomic weapons. Instruction designed to broaden the

professional background of the students is included as well.

Clearly, in less than one decade, just re-teaching World War II

doctrine and techniques would no longer be appropriate or

satisfactory; the needs of the student and new technology now

placed increased demands on the designers of the curriculum.

4 3
Even in the brief amplifying statement, the old concept of the

waterborne ship-to-shore amphibious assault was beginning to be

superceded by "large scale all-helicopter assault," at least as

a theoretical teaching point even if the aviation assets were

then not actually available in great quantity. In concept, the

School, as in the mid and late 1930s, was teaching doctrine to

match the eventual capability to implement it.

Because of the aforementioned study, four major changes were

made to the curriculum of the Senior School. This included a

large increase in the time allocated to aviation instruction, to

include sending the ground officers for two weeks to the Marine

Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina. Also, the time

allocated to the study of nuclear weapons increased, with a goal

of ensuring that general staff officers and commanders would not

be completely dependent upon the specially-trained nuclear

weapons employment officer. Third, the course of instruction

was presented at a "graduate professional level, not unlike a

graduate school at a large university;" however, the Senior

School stressed the older operational oriented aspects of

previous years, stressing the solution of military problems,

preparation of staff papers, preparation of plans, orders, and

estimates. In addition, considerable time was also devoted to

improving written and oral communication skills, as well as

improving reading speed and retention.

The fourth major change occurred in curriculum organization,

time allocation, and accountability. As Colonel H. Nickerson

4 4
noted in the Gazette, "the title, time allocation, and content

of the phases of the 1955-56 courses are completely different

from the past, with the exception of the final phase,

(Operation) Packard." The course was now organized into eight

(8) phases, and the time in each was viewed in weeks and not

subjects and hours:

TABLE V

SENIOR SCHOOL CURRICULUM,

1955-56 ACADEMIC YEAR

Phase Weeks Title Focus

I 5 "Fundamentals of Basic background orientation

Combat and Basic to principles of war, combat

Tactical Doctrine" fundamentals, and FMF

organization. Ground

officers to Cherry Point for

aviation orientation. Phase

concluded with objective

examination.

Capabilities and limitations

of available and potential

weapons. Included

"conventional, atomic, and

super weapons and delivery

systems." Concluded with

two part test: objective and

problem.

Basic staff procedures,_

organization, and

relationships. Initial

orientation to foreign armed

forces. Concluded with

objective examination.

Instructional vehicle:

Advanced Base Problem XII.

Both offense and defense

included, with special

situations (climate,

terrain, political)

included. Concluded with a

subjective type and problem

solving examination.

4 5

II 3 Weapons

III 3 Staff Functioning

IV 11 Employment of

Marine Forces
TABLE V (Continued)

Phase Weeks Title Focus

V 7 Employment of Application. Advanced Base

Marine Forces Problem XIII. Amphibious

operations and control of

ground assets ashore, based

on a continuing situation.

Raids and defense of

advanced naval base were

included. No examination:

marked requirements were

completed throughout the

Phase.

VI 2.5 Concept of Future Evaluate current weapons,

Operations organizations, and tactical

concepts in light of new

developments and possible

improvements in case of

future war. Students

responded to staff concepts. Oral presentations

also given.

VII 1 Marine corps Designed to enable officer

Policies to "present and support the

best interests of the Marine

Corps at all times and in

all situations." Instruction

also included prisoner of

war psychology and survival

techniques.

VIII 3.5 Amphibious Command Senior and Junior School

Post Exercise joined together "to acquire

(Packard VII), practical experience in

planning and executing an

amphibious operation."

Included in the curriculum were guest speakers, averaging one

per week, from the government, military, and civilian

communities; these guest lecturers had the avowed goal to

"stimulate thought and broaden the professional background of

the students." (54) Despite this last statement, the focus of

the Senior course remained operational, concentrating upon the

Marine Corps and its amphibious mission. Interestingly, by 1955

4 6
no mention was made or instruction apparently given in "small

wars" and the complex issues such conflict would present in the

decades after World War II.

With this organization, the Senior School continued into the

1960s. The focus and emphasis remained the same; on reporting

the upcoming graduation of the 1962-63 class, the Quantico

Sentry noted the now standard, but re-phrased, points on 24 May

1963:

The course covers the organization, equipment, and

employment of amphibious forces up to and including corps

level. Use of the helicopter for movement of troops and

equipment is particularly emphasized.

The Sentry also noted other elements which were included to

broaden the students' professional background: in addition to

studying the general policies of the Department of Defense and

the individual services, they also examined military history,

political-military theory, American foreign policy, emergency

actions short of war, counterinsurgency , use of nuclear weapons,

and effective military writing and speaking. (55)

However, before the United States, the Marine Corps

included, became overwhelmed in Vietnam, the traditional

approach of the Senior School continued. By 1962, the 13th

evolution of Operation Packard, initially conducted in 1947, was

held. This final problem reflected the importance the Marine

Corps and its formal school system placed on training its future

senior leaders in the by now "traditional" concept of the

amphibious assault. Not only were the 300 students of the

4 7
Senior and Junior Schools sent into the field, but in so doing

Packard XIII, involved 1500 personnel of the Atlantic Fleet and

Quantico supporting units, 1000 communicators and support troops

from the 2nd Marine Division and Force Troops-Atlantic at Camp

Lejeune, and aviation assets from the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing.

The students also embarked aboard Navy amphibious ships at

Quantico, were transported by sea off Onslow Beach, Camp

Lejeune, North Carolina, and then conducted an amphibious

Command Post Exercise, to include executing their ship-to-shore

movement followed by subsequent operations ashore. The problem

focused on assisting "another country stricken by subversion and

outside aggression."

The objectives of this extensive and unique in-the-field

exercise were also quite clear:

To prepare these officers to plan concurrently with

Naval Commanders and to make plans, quick decisions and take

action during mock combat conditions in a simulated landing

assault involving widespread dispersion, these students must

also apply the techniques of executing, controlling and

protecting the ship-to-shore movement of their troops.

Packard, annually was updated and revised, to ensure realism and

to provide for the application of the principles taught through

the academic year. This was deemed most appropriate, for as the

Quantico Sentry reported on 18 May 1962, over half of the Senior

and Junior Schools' student officers would be reporting to

"Fleet Operating Forces" that summer; past experience with

4 8
Packard had indicated that "such actual field conditions are the

best way to prepare these officers for this future duty." (56)

However, if counterinsurgency was slowly intruding into the

curriculum of the Senior School and if the Packard XIII scenario

sounded like Vietnam, the objectives of the exercise and what

the students actually did on it were firmly rooted in World

War II and post-war traditions of the Senior School. Hence,

when the 1962-63 class assembled in August 1962, the reported

focus remained traditional, and in the general statement made

about subjects "aimed at supplementing the professional

background of the students," no general or specific mention was

made about the situation in Southeast Asia. (57)

1964 and Beyond: The Command and Staff College

In 1964, another reorganization occurred at Quantico. On 23

July 1964, Headquarters, Marine Corps announced that the names

of the Senior and Junior Schools would be changed to the

"Command and Staff College" and "Amphibious Warfare School"

respectively. As the Division of Information release noted,

"the new designations are intended to more accurately reflect

the level of training and functions of these schools." The

newly designated "Command and Staff College," however, had a

familiar mission statement:

To provide professional education for Marine officers of

the rank of major and lieutenant colonel. Its syllabus is

tailored to prepare them for command at the regimental and

aircraft group level, and for staff duty at the division,

4 9
aircraft wing and higher Fleet Marine Force levels. Also

included is preparation for duties appropriate to the grade

of lieutenant colonel and colonel with departmental,

combined, joint, and high-level service organizations. (58)

However, this was more than just a simple name change. The

foundation for the "modern" Command and Staff College of 1988

can be seen in the underlying substantive changes which would

occur in the College. Although possibly overlooked, the grade

of the officer student had changed again, moving down one level

from colonel and lieutenant colonel to lieutenant colonel and

major; this would commence a trend which by the 1980s would see

all the U.S. students in the class be of the grade of major or

captain (major selectee). By implication, this would eventually

begin to affect the curriculum of the school in future years.

But for 1964, major changes had occurred as a result of the

general officers conference of that year. In addressing the

professional military education program for officers, they

concentrated on the Senior course. Because of this meeting,

changes in substance as well as name occurred. In fact, some of

terminology of that year is still in use today. For example,

"the planners for the new high level course have envisioned a

sort of field grade workshop, where broader development of the

individual is sought." In 1982, the terms were "field grade

officers' workshop" and "the whole man concept."

In a major revision of the curriculum, "a good portion of

the student's time will go into individual research projects,

5 0
with corresponding free time for independent work written

directly into the course syllabus. Other new approaches

included required reading (with oral book reports), a reshaped

NBC warfare course, a study of unified and specified commands,

treaty obligations and mutual defense agreements, and the

capabilities and limitations of allied forces. The new course

of study also included area studies (by the 1970s titled

"strategic appraisals"), linked to contingency planning process.

(59)

Some of the course of instruction at the College in the late

1970s would still bear similar titles associated with this

reform; for example, the package in the Strategy Division in

1978-79 titled "Treaties and Alliances" was in reality the

"Treaty obligations and mutual defense agreements" of 1964. (60)

The College had now begun to address in its curriculum other

areas of study outside its previous narrow Marine Corps and

amphibious warfare focus (note the new emphasis on "unified" and

specified "commands," and potential service "with departmental,

combined, joint, and high-level Service organizations"). This

commenced an ever expanding process which has been necessary to

meet the necessity of preparation for service in the rapid,

complex, and ever changing world of the late 20th Century.

All of this was predicated upon the assumption that the

Command and Staff College curriculum should be based upon the

educational needs of the service and the experience background

of its officer students at this point in their careers; this

meant the students would have 12 or more years commissioned

5 1
service, consisting primarily of majors but with a few

lieutenant colonels also in each class. As a policy, this

continued in effect until the 1983-84 Academic Year, when the

first class of all Marine Corps majors assembled. (NOTE: in the

1982-83 Academic Year, only one lieutenant colonel received

orders to the College. The Commandant of the Marine Corps also

desired that the students be competitive; competitive not

against each other, but against the high standards expected of a

Marine officer. In 1988, this is phrased as "meeting the

expectations each officer demands of himself." The requirements

of the course were to "test the officer's powers of logic,

judgment, and ability to communicate. Formal examinations,

except in foreign language, were abolished; evaluations were

based upon student performance as problems were faced and

solved.

As the Director, Brigadier General F. J. Karch, wrote: "The

Command and Staff College has become a field grade officer's

workshop" in which the students confront problems and acquire

experience through solving them. To achieve these goals, the

curriculum was again reformed, organized into nine sub-courses:

5 2
TABLE VI

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE CURRICULUM,

1966-67 ACADEMIC YEAR

5 3

Comments

Review of military fundamentals. Designed to have

all students at a common

base.

Despite title, primary

focus was on effective

communication: writing,

speaking, reading, and

listening. Professional

reading program of six

books. Written communication the key: three papers

- Gazette type article,

staff study, and individual

research project.

Marine Corps Focus:

planning, programming,

budgeting, and management

of resources. Two computer

assisted management games

were used.

Focus: U.S. national

objectives, foreign policy,

and military strategy.

Goals included student

awareness of world, social,

economic, and political

factors. Foreign officer

presentations included.

Research and development

issues, with a focus on

contemporary and future

years.

Application exercises:

staff estimates, command

decisions, and preparation

of combat plans and orders.

SubCourse Title Hours

1

2

Doctrine,

Policies, and

Procedures

Executive

Leadership

49 4

101 9

3 Management 93 7

4

Techniques

and Procedures

Geopolitical 90 8

and Current

World

Situation

5 Organization 120 10

6

and Functioning

for National

Security

Air-Ground 160 14

Task Force

Operations

TABLE VI

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE CURRICULUM,

1966-67 ACADEMIC YEAR

5 3

Comments

Review of military fundamentals. Designed to have

all students at a common

base.

Despite title, primary

focus was on effective

communication: writing,

speaking, reading, and

listening. Professional

reading program of six

books. Written communication the key: three papers

- Gazette type article,

staff study, and individual

research project.

Marine Corps Focus:

planning, programming,

budgeting, and management

of resources. Two computer

assisted management games

were used.

Focus: U.S. national

objectives, foreign policy,

and military strategy.

Goals included student

awareness of world, social,

economic, and political

factors. Foreign officer

presentations included.

Research and development

issues, with a focus on

contemporary and future

years.

Application exercises:

staff estimates, command

decisions, and preparation

of combat plans and orders.

SubCourse Title Hours

1

2

Doctrine,

Policies, and

Procedures

Executive

Leadership

49 4

101 9

3 Management 93 7

4

Techniques

and Procedures

Geopolitical 90 8

and Current

World

Situation

5 Organization 120 10

6

and Functioning

for National

Security

Air-Ground 160 14

Task Force

Operations
7 Amphibious 392 33 Focus on doctrine and

Operations techniques. Sub-course and

academic year culminated in

Marine Expeditionary Force

level command post

exercise. Computers used,

including evaluation.

8 Counter- 64 5 Main focus: high level

insurgency analysis and planning,

despite claim that "the

student is prepared for

command and staff

assignments in planning and

conducting all phases of

counterinsurgency

programs."

9 Foreign 114 10 Three options: French,

Language Spanish, or Vietnamese.

Comprehension goal:

vocabulary sufficient to

conduct routine tasks,

movement, or business.

54
The guest speaker program of the College was also increasing.

In contrast to previous years when an average of one per week

addressed the students, now over 80 guest lecturers were

scheduled in the academic year. These came from government,

industry, labor, and education, as well as the military.

However, lectures and examinations constituted only 13% of the

instructional methodology of the College. The rest of the

curriculum was implemented by a variety of individual and group

applications.

Ultimately, the College expected its officers to be

proficient in the planning and conduct of "force in readiness"

operations, with a primary emphasis on amphibious operations; to

exercise judgement and decision making capabilities in

situations expected to be encountered in the future; as a

leader, to be able to communicate his knowledge and leadership

in writing and orally; to be qualified in the new management

techniques so important in the national military establishment;

and to think critically. (61)

In analyzing this reformed curriculum, several points should

be stressed. Despite the major war in Vietnam, the primary

focus of the College remained amphibious operations. Only 64

hours, or 5%, of the curriculum was devoted to counterinsurgency, although officers also had the option of studying

Vietnamese in the foreign language subcourse. Second,

management as a clearly identified skill desired in the field

grade officer was now stressed. Third, computers were entering

the instructional program, a trend which through the years has

5 5
become even more pronounced; this included the elimination of

the Packard amphibious command post in-the-field exercise, to be

replaced by a final exercise in which computers played a role.

Fourth, the guest speaker program designed to broaden the

students' background was increasing, as well as other elements

of the curriculum designed to achieve this same purpose; in

later years these would be grouped under the Strategy (later

renamed Battle Studies [Military History] and Strategy)

Division, and elements of the Command Division instructional

programs. Finally, a short lived foreign language program was

instituted, one which would not survive because of competition

for time from other subjects and, equally important, its goals

could not be achieved within the hours allocated and the

difficulties of adults acquiring foreign language skills.

If the reforms of 1964 laid the foundation for the "modern"

Command and Staff College; it assumed its recognizable form in

the early 1970s. That decade saw the College divide its course

of study and teaching faculty into three divisions: Command

( which later was renamed "Command and Management" and has since

returned to Command), Landing Force Operations, and Strategy

(now Battle Studies [i.e., Military History] and Strategy)

Division. By then, also, the use of computers and computer

instruction was increasing (in 1988 all student conference

groups have a computer and the students are tasked with becoming

familiar with this technology); the adjunct faculty of reserve

Marine officers from academe were not only assisting the

College, but also beginning to offer instruction; the emphasis

56
on the writing and research program was well established, with

the evolution of this program in the ensuing 16 years striving

for marked improvement in written communication skills; a guest

speaker program, which then was tapping outside sources has now

expanded beyond the scope of that of 1972; and the continued use

of various instructional methods designed to enhance student

individual and group effort, encourage peer learning from

officers who have key skills, and build teamwork, just as would

occur in the operational forces; and, finally, the increasing

number and expected contributions from the sister service and

international officers.

Writing in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1972, Brigadier

General Samuel Jaskilka, the Director of the College, reviewed

its status as of the summer of that year. He noted that the

College, in order to meet the needs of its students and the

Corps, had become a blend of the cerebral and physical, for the

two had to merge: for if the operations of the Corps were

physical, the management of its assets was mental. Hence, in

the Marine officer both aspects of his abilities had to be

developed.

However, the mission of the College remained essentially the

same as it always had been: "to provide professional education

for Marine Corps field grade officers to prepare them for

command staff duties through the grade of colonel." He noted

that the heart of the curriculum remained amphibious operations,

now structured to include low, mid, and high level intensity

conflict. However, reflecting the year in which he wrote,

Jaskilka also stressed that "we have de-emphasized instruction

5 7
based on our Vietnam experience. In effect, we have taken our

heads out of the jungle. We are resharpening our skills in the

amphibious business and again firing up the great Navy-Marine

team." (62)

In 1972, the curriculum consisted of 1,135 hours of

instruction, plus 58 hours of administrative time. The course

of study for 1972-73 reflected the new internal organization of

the College and its evolving curriculum:

TABLE VII

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE CURRICULUM,

1971-72 ACADEMIC YEAR

Areas of Study Hours Comments

Increased in hours from 16 in

1956-57, to 83 in 1966-67, to

114 in 1971-72. Included

computer fundamentals (30

hours) and maintenance

management (37 hours), the

latter taught at Fort Knox.

Included the individual

research project or effective

(written) communication

courses for 60 hours; other

electives had values of 30,

60, or 90 hours, and spanned

the spectrum from approved

off-duty university courses,

to foreign language, to

history, to cross cultural

communications, to selected

advanced professional

courses.

58

COMMAND

Leadership. 107.5

Professional Skills

& Fundamentals

89.5

Staff Functioning 38.0

Management 114.0

Electives 150.0
Course year culminated in a

90 hour Marine Amphibious

Force amphibious planning

exercise, with student plans

executed in a CPX.

5 9

Adjunct Faculty 12.0 Commenced offering courses in

Seminars 1971-72 Academic Year,

meeting twice with their

seminars on four visits to

the College.

--------------------------------

[SUB-TOTAL 511.0]

LANDING FORCE

OPERATIONS

Amphibious 279.0

Operations

Operations Ashore 140.0

Special Subjects 19.0

--------------------------------

[SUB-TOTAL 438.0]

STRATEGY

Counterinsurgency 43.5

National Policy 1.5

Organization, 16.5

Function, &

Decision Making

Within Department

of Defense

Army, Navy, Air 37.5

Force Concepts

Strategic Surveys 56.0

Military Strategy 18.0

Domestic Forces 13.5

Factors

--------------------------------

[SUB-TOTAL 186.0)

ADMINISTRATION 58.0

--------------------------------

TOTAL HOURS 1,193.0
With this as a base, the Command and Staff College continued its

mission of educating its students through the 1970s and into the

1980s. The essential structure and approach as outlined by

Brigadier Generals Karch and Jaskilka evolved slowly and

gradually. All traces of counterinsurgency instruction

gradually disappeared from the curriculum, except for an

occasional guest lecture and academic problem associated with

foreign and internal defense planning or an overview analysis

from the strategic and diplomatic policy levels of what had

occurred in Vietnam; by 1978, the old "Centralia" exercise had

disappeared from the course of instruction. An amphibious

operation problem set in the South China Sea, called Hainan, was

changed in locality to Denmark in 1978, to reflect the renewed

interest of the Marine Corps in Europe, NATO, and the northern

flank of the alliance in Norway.

However, the College continued its program of broadening the

overall background of its students, while developing their

professional skills. This included an expanded electives

program, which at one time included university professors from

local institutions who taught graduate level courses (minus the

tests, papers, and grades) as well as the in-house offerings of

military history and strategy. The effective communication

program remained, with most of the students taking the written

communication course while only 10% enrolled in the graduate

level research seminar taught by the College's Military

Historian; at one time, this program included public speaking

and television communication options, but these were phased out

by 1978. Gradually, however, the academic electives

6 0
disappeared, partly due to financial reductions in the program's

funding and partly due to increasing competition for instruction

hours from other programs. Thus, by the 1981-82 Academic Year

there were only four in what was retitled the "Professional

Studies Program": military history, strategy, ground operations,

and air operations. The adjunct faculty program, however,

continued to thrive, as the Marine Reserve Officers continued to

offer subjects related to both their academic expertise and the

perceived needs of the students and the Marine Corps. (63)

However, what was appropriate for almost two decades could

not continue indefinitely. As the Marine Corps headed into the

1980s, it was confronted with new challenges, changing

equipment, and a post-Vietnam officer corps; hence the Command

and Staff College would undergo another curriculum reform. This

occurred in 1981-82, and was implemented in the 1982-83 Academic

Year. The impetus for this came from a new Director of the

Education Center, Major General David Twomey, and it was

developed and executed under Colonel John T. Garcia, Chief of

Academics at the College in 1981-82 and Director of the College

between 1982-84. Colonel Garcia's successors in turn have

continued to build upon the changes of 1982, as the institution

has continued to evolve towards the end of the 8th decade of the

20th Century.

The new curriculum reforms centered around three major

areas: the return of military history to the core curriculum of

the College; indepth education and training, in addition to core

curriculum instruction, for officers in what was titled SAGE

(Selected Air-Ground Education) in ground and aviation (a combat

6 1
service support option was included in 1983), with the

assignment to a SAGE track being dependent upon each officer's

MOS; and the goal of having a major computer or manual war game

execution phase for all the amphibious and land warfare

operation problems, which still remained the heart of the

curriculum of the College. Within this program, the development

of "the whole man" concept was articulated; this was defined to

mean an officer professionally qualified in command and staff

duties; educated in the areas of military history, strategy,

foreign relations, and similar areas so vital for an

understanding of the context within which military operations

occur; the continued development of written and oral

communication skills; and the further enhancement of leadership

skills and physical training so needed by leaders in the Marine

Corps of the 1980s.

All of this was done within the framework of a changing

student body. By policy, officers could not attend the College

who had over 15 years commissioned service; in fact, their

length of service has declined to where the average student in

1988 has between 12 and 13 years of commissioned service. The

student body, in contrast to previous years and decades, is not

only younger chronologically but also in grade; since 1983, of

the U.S. students, only majors, with a few lieutenant colonel

selectees or senior majors who will be considered by the

lieutenant colonel's selection board which would convene during

the academic year, have attended the College. As recently as

the late 1970s, former battalion and squadron commanders, and

officers who had served on major staffs at Fleet Marine Force,

6 2
joint, and specified commands, and at the departmental level,

were students at the College. These experienced student

officers, who at times became defacto assistant faculty, are now

part of the past. Equally important, a generation of non-combat

veterans compose the student body; through a combination of time

and changed policies, this is almost a unique situation in the

68-year history of the Command and Staff College. All of this,

coupled with the ever changing international situation,

potential threats, and increasing commitments of the Marine

Corps, and an assignment pattern whereby 70% of the students in

the future would be returning to the Fleet Marine Force,

required the changes which occurred in 1982.

The curriculum changes, however, were evolutionary and not

revolutionary. The study and final program consumed almost a

year of work by four officers on the staff, augmented as

appropriate by other instructors in their areas of expertise.

The net result was a new curriculum, but one built upon the

foundation of the old. It blended the continued broadening

mental perspective of the officer students, while remaining true

to Major General Twomey's charge to the students to "hone their

warfighting skills and merit the trust that the young Marines of

the Corps placed in them as commissioned officers and leaders."

(64)

The curriculum of 1982-83 was an inter-related one, planned

to support each area of instruction although. the College was

still divided into three separate areas for instructional

purposes: Landing Force Operations, Command, and Battle Studies

(Military History) and Strategy. In 1982-83, there were

6 3
1,240.25 academic hours of instruction; this included 97.5 hours

of student Academic Study and Preparation Time. The general

mission remained as previously, with the terms associated with

the MAGTF (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) now being used. And

the blend of enhancing operational skills combined with the

enrichment elements of the curriculum combined to present to the

students the most diverse and demanding course of study yet

produced by the College. (65)

TABLE VIII

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE CURRICULUM,

1982-83 ACADEMIC YEAR

Areas of Study Hours Comments,

LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS

--------------------------------

[SUB-TOTAL 592.00]

6 4

Included five operational

problems; final was a

computer war game during

which the students executed

their plans against a

reacting enemy. Since

initially conceived in 1975,

the location has shifted from

Israel to Lebanon to the

Persian Gulf. For combat

arms officers returning to

the Fleet Marine Force, they

participated in a one week

combined arms exercise at

Marine Corps Base, 29 Palms,

California.

Initially included only air

and ground. In 1983, Combat

Service Support added. For

1988, Joint Operations track

will be added for joint staff

service officer designees.

Amphibious

Operations

291.0

Operations Ashore 172.0

Special Subjects 24.50

Selected Air

Ground Education

104.50
TABLE VIII (Continued)

Areas of Study Hours Comments

--------------------------------

(SUB-TOTAL 407.75]

BATTLE STUDIES (MILITARY HISTORY] AND STRATEGY

Security Relationships

6 5

Included one week of military

justice. Effective writing

part of this program, but,

students in research seminar

came/come under history

hours.

Defacto operational problem

taught on command and staff

procedures.

Seminars originally conducted

during four visits, two

two-hour seminars each

meeting. Now, adjunct

faculty come three times a

year, meeting for three times

for three hours each during

each visit. Topics taught

are in the academic area of

expertise of the faculty.

COMMAND

Leadership 156.0

Professional Skills

& Fundamentals

150.0

Staff Functioning 3l.0

Management 48.75

Adjunct Faculty

Seminars

22.0

Fundamentals of 10.0

Military and

Maritime Strategy

Current National 21.0

Issues

International 6.0
Historical

Introductions

Historical

Perspectives

TABLE VIII (Continued)

Comments

By 1987, hours increased; now

part of Landing Force

Operations Division

Initially 12 campaign

analyses of 2.5 hours each.

Hours cut back, so as to

force prioritization of

analysis. Each conference

group did/does one,

presenting its findings to

the class. Campaigns are

those, generally, which have

occurred in the 20th

Century. They involve those

in which the Marine Corps,

the U.S. sister services,

American allies, former foes

and now friends, and former

friends and now potential

foes, have fought. The heart

of the core curriculum

history program.

6.0 Part of the initial core

curriculum in 1982, these

introduced Landing Force

Operations problems. Now

eliminated.

25.0 Includes military historian

presentations, two military

history professional readings

seminars, and history guest

lecture program, which

focuses on U.S. military

history, professional biographical presentations, and

the military traditions of

Britain, France, Germany,

Italy, Spain/Latin America,

and Russia.

6 6

Areas of Study Hours

. Other Services, 21.0

Roles, Missions,

Organization and

Operations

Counterinsurgency 8.0

Campaign Analysis 40.0
Areas of Study Hours Comments

War Since 1945 6.0 Symposium now renamed "War in

Symposium the Modern Era Symposium."

Focus: the Nature of Modern

War (presented by the

military historian), morning

seminars in which the

students in the War in the

Modern Era Seminar present

the results of their work,

and an afternoon rotating

sequence of two or three

guest speakers conducting

seminars on the topic of "War

in the Modern Era."

--------------------------------

[SUB-TOTAL 143.0]

ACADEMIC STUDY AND 97.50

PREPARATION TIME

--------------------------------

TOTAL 1,240.25

The Command and Staff College in 1988

This was the academic program of the Command and Staff

College in the 1982-83 Academic Year, and in essence has

continued into the 1987-88 Academic Year. Since then, it has

evolved as perceived needs or changes have necessitated

alterations. For the 1988-89 Academic Year, these are already

being planned. As the Command and Staff College heads into the

1988-89 Academic Year, these changes will have been made based

upon recent laws, especially in the area of joint staff

training, the general guidance given by the Commandant of the

Marine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray, and the perceptions of the

faculty. As of March 1988, the rough breakdown of curriculum

hours for the next academic year will be as follows:

TABLE VIII (Continued)

Number of hours will vary

each academic year. Time

linked to an identified area

of study.

67
The general focus of each division would be as noted below

for the last two decades. The Battle Studies (Military History]

and Strategy Division has the task of presenting the

"environment" instruction. This is the element of the

curriculum designed to broaden the perspective of the students

and educate them in areas other than military operations. Its

offerings will be grouped as follows:

68

TABLE IX

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE CURRICULUM BREAKDOWN.

1988-89 ACADEMIC YEAR (PROPOSED)

Division Hours

Command 311.5

Landing Force operations 541.0

Battle Studies [Military

History] and Strategy 137.0

General Officer Lectures 9.0

Sister Service Lectures 23.0

Lectures of Opportunity 18.0

Academic Study and

Preparation Time

------------------------------------

TOTAL 1,234.0

194.5
Military History

(Campaign Analyses)

(Military Historian

Presentations)

(Guest Speaker Program

War in the Modern Era

Symposium

U.S. Service History

Symposium

History and Strategy

Professional Readings

Seminars (Four)

The Command Division of the Command and Staff College has always

had a unique place in the development and presentation of

instruction. This division has been and is a bridge between the

Battle Studies (Military History] and Strategy and Landing Force

Operations Divisions, since it offers instruction in both

"enrichment" and operational areas. Its elements of the 1988-89

course of instruction will be:

TABLE XI

COMMAND DIVISION PROGRAM,

1988-89 ACADEMIC YEAR (PROPOSED)

Command/Staff Functions

and Plans

Effective Written

Communications

Naval Justice

Training Management

Military Fundamentals

Micro Computers:

TABLE X

BATTLE STUDIES (MILITARY HISTORY] AND STRATEGY DIVISION PROGRAM

1988-89 ACADEMIC YEAR (PROPOSED)

6 9

Strategy Symposium

Joint Operational Planning

and Strategic Mobility

Command and Staff College

Symposiums

International Officer

American Culture

Information Program

Leadership and Executive

Development

Effective Briefing &

Persuasive Speaking

Media Awareness

COJASMMM/SOLMC

Adjunct Faculty
7 0

Finally, the heart of the College's curriculum will remain,

as in the past, the operational element of the course of study.

It must be remembered that the Command and Staff College is an

intermediate level school and such an institution is thus a

blend of a war college and a career level school; it thus must

offer both traditional academic instruction and operationally

oriented training. Without these two blended elements, the

graduates would be ill-prepared to function in the military,

national, and global arenas of the contemporary era. The

program for Landing Force Operations Division in 1988-89 will

be:

TABLE XII

LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS DIVISION PROGRAM,

1988-89 ACADEMIC YEAR (PROPOSED)

Combat Concepts Review

Introduction to Amphibious Warfare

Landing Force Operations Planning

Amphibious Operations Field Trip

Marine Air-Ground Task Force in the Defense

Low Intensity Conflict Operations

Seizure and Defense of an Advanced Naval Base

Norway Air-landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Marine Air-Ground Task Force in offensive operations

Fire Support Coordination Application Course

Marine Expeditionary Force in Amphibious Operations

Selected Air-Ground Education
Since operations are the core of the Command and Staff College

curriculum, what is the primary focus which will be addressed in

them? The following table notes the general subjects with which

all Marine officers must be professionally competent:

TABLE XIII

LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS DIVISION: EXERCISE EMPHASIS,

1988-89 ACADEMIC YEAR (PROPOSED)

Amphibious Operations

Compositing

Joint and Combined Operations

Special Operations

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

Integrated Combined Arms

Integrated All-Source Intelligence

Command, Control, Communications.

Task organization

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Warfare

Flexible Combat Service Support

Air Defense/Air Command and Control

Tactical Deception

Rear Area security (66)

In achieving this, the Commandant of the Marine Corps,

General Alfred M. Gray, has given general and not detailed

guidance. Thus, at the meeting with the faculty of the College

in February 1988, he noted that with an officer corps composed

of non-combat veterans, they must realize certain things about

7 1
war, especially the ambiguity and uncertainty associated with

combat. In the development of operational skills , the College

has a key role for it must develop in the students "a framework

of thought so as to have the entire force going down the same

path together." He further alluded to one key aspect of what

must be conveyed to our officers: that "principles do not change

but our officers must do it in a hurry" under conditions on the

contemporary or future battlefield. General Gray emphasized

that he would not tell the College what to do in specifics, but

would state his goal:

A whole and bold new approach from an institutional

perspective - but one must be able to take this and

understand the larger direction in which we are going. (67)

In implementing the Commandant's desires, the Marine Corps

Command and Staff College will continue on an evolutionary

rather than revolutionary path. Even in the major reorientation

of mission and curriculum of 1932-33, the Field Officers' Course

actually built upon the slow evolution of the previous 12

academic years, plus other work occurring simultaneously at the

Marine Corps Schools of that era. Since then, continuity and

change have been inter-twined as the curriculum of the College

has evolved. Lieutenant Colonel Al Emerson addressed this in

1982 when he informed the readers of the Marine Corps Gazette

about the curriculum changes which would occur in the 1982-83

Academic Year:

7 2
The Command and Staff has always kept pace with the needs

of the Marine Corps and its students. This usually has

required only minor shifts in direction or emphasis. Hence,

the major focus of change is principally in the evolutionary

improvement and expansion of existing traditional programs.

Over the years, leaders within the Education Center have

wisely and carefully preserved time-tested programs,

resisting change for the sake of change. Yet, with equally

sound judgement, they have also had the foresight to

anticipate and plan for future needs. (68)

7 3
CURRICULUM EVOLUTION

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

1920-1988

ENDNOTES

1

As quoted in "The Education Center: The Path to

Professional Achievement" by Major Donald F. Bittner, USMCR,

Unpublished Manuscript, July 1979.

2

The Field Officers' Course open in 1920 and the Company

Officers course in 1921. The main reason for this was

controversy over which company grade officers would be retained

in the Marine Corps after the post World War I reductions, what

rank they would hold, and where they would be placed on the

appropriate grade lineal list. Two boards were held, the

Russell Board in 1920 and the Neville Board in 1921, the latter

which overturned the results of the former. This was a highly

internal politicized issue, which had an influence on the

officer corps structure, sense of professionalism, and direction

of the post-war Corps, the ramifications of which continued into

the 1930s. For a brief discussion of the issue, see Brigadier

General Robert H. Williams, USMC (Ret.), "Those controversial

Boards," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1982, pp. 91-99. How

the results of the Neville Board had an impact into the 1930s,

influenced a new promotion reform bill, and a discussion of

differing perceptions on past service, promotion, and the

future, see Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner, USMCR,

"Conflict Under the Dome: Senator Hugo Black, Major General

Smedley Butler, and the Challenged Promotion of Major General

John H. Russell, United States Marine Corps," Unpublished paper

presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical

Association, December, 1984.

3 First Lieutenant Anthony Frances, USMCR. "History of the

Marine Corps Schools," Unpublished Manuscript, December, 1945,

p. 28.

4

Major Jesse F. Dyer, USMC, "The Military Schools in the

Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, March, 1922, p. 23. Major

Dyer is listed as the 12th Commandant of the Marine Corps

Schools, having served between March 1919 and July 1920, but the

first at Quantico, as the previous eleven were Commanding

Officers of the School of Application; see Frances, "History of

the Marine Corps Schools," 'Commandants: Marine Corps Schools',

p. 109. For the first report of the Field Officers Course, see

the Annual Report of the Major General Commandant of the Marine

Corps for 1920; in this, General Lejeune wrote that, although

based upon the Army School of the Line (now called the Command

and General Staff College) at Fort Leavenworth, "this course is

not as extensive nor as advanced as that at Fort Leavenworth,

but it is exceedingly well adapted to meet the needs of the

7 4
field officers of the Marine Corps, and for the purpose for

which this school was organized." (p. 21).

5United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College,

Program of Instruction, 1987-88 Academic Year, dated 4 February

1988. By 1929, the initial sister service officers had

graduated from the Field Officers' Course; by 1929, there were

five navy and 2 army graduates from the new institution. The

first foreign officers attended the reopened World War II three

month courses in 1943, and the first foreign officer (from

Britain) to graduate from the year course was in the 1947-48

class. Since then every class has at sister service officers

from all three U.S. armed forces, plus foreign officer

attendance that has ranged from one student to 25 international

officers. (See Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner, USMCR,

"Historical Overview, Command and Staff College. Foreign Military

Officer/International Officer Program, 1943 to Present," dated

1 July 1981.)

The wording of the mission statement of the College has

changed through the years, even within the last 12 years.

However, the concept remains and the same and recent word shifts

reflect either new definitions within the armed forces or slight

shifts of emphasis. Compare the- mission statement in the text

with that for the 1975-76 Academic Year:

To provide high level professional education with

emphasis on Marine Air-Ground Task Forces in amphibious

operations for field grade officers of the Marine Corps,

other services, and foreign countries; to prepare them

for command and staff duties at regiment/aircraft group

and division/wing levels and assignments with

departmental, joint, combined and high level service

organizations. And to conduct appropriate courses for

selected reserve field grade officers with.emphasis on

amphibious operations in order to prepare them for

command and staff duty at the regimental/group and

division/wing levels. (Program of Instruction, Marine.

Corps Command and Staff, 1975-76 Academic Year, dated

9 September 1975.)

7 5
6

House of Representatives Naval Affairs Committee, Major

General John A. Lejeune, USMC, testimony of 26 February 1920.

7

Frances, "History of the Marine Corps Schools," pp. 27-28.

8

Marine Corps Historical Center, Geographical Reference

File: Quantico, Virginia. Secretary of the Navy Josephus

Daniels spoke at the Marine Barracks, Quantico, on 5 March 1920.

9

LtCol John R. Russell, USMC, Marine Corps Gazette,

December 1916, p. 363. Russell had been an instructor and

served on the staff of the Naval War College between 1908-1910.

10

Discussions on a Marine Corps War College," Marine Corps

Gazette, December 1916, pp. 361-373. LtCol George C. Thorpe,

USMC, proposed the curriculum; see pp. 367-368.

11

Major E. W. Sturdevant, USMC, "A System of Instruction for

Officers of the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, September

1919, pp. 232-238.

12

"Military Education in the Marine Corps," Marine Corps

Gazette, June 1921, p. 230.

13

See especially Colonel Robert Dunlap, USMC, "Education in

the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1925, pp.

149-156. On page 149, he discusses the anti-education view in

general, with a vivid and succinct example of an older and

prevailing attitude.

14

Dunlap, Marine Corps Gazette, December 1925, p. 153.

15

Marine Corps Historical Center, Geographical Reference

File: Quantico. "Remarks on Course of Instruction,

1924-1925." Typed summary comments on card inserted into the

file. Handwritten comment noted "Colonel Dunlap in charge," but

gives no date. See further comment in endnote 17.

16

For comparison, in 1988 the Command and Staff College is

divided into three "divisions": Landing Force Operations (the

equivalent of the old Department of Tactics), Leadership (the

old Department of Law had been subsumed into this division, with

more areas in the leadership area now covered by that all

inclusive term), and Battle Studies (i.e., Military History) and

Strategy. The latter is the major conceptual change in the.

organization of the, current Command and Staff College from its

ancestor of the 1920s: the old Department of Topography would

now be viewed as being part of Landing Force Operations

Division, with the study of history and strategy, although

acknowledged in the 1920s as important, now raised to a separate

division, a status reflecting the importance ascribed to this

area of study.

7 6
17

Marine Corps Historical Center: Geographical Reference

File: Quantico. "Remarks on Course of Instruction, 1924-25."

The organization of the Field Officers' Course and its

curriculum, along with that of the Company Officers' Course,

appears in articles in the Marine Corps Gazette, remarks on

instruction at the end of various courses, and in the reports of

the Major General Commandant. Colonel Dunlap discusses this in

some detail in his Marine Corps Gazette article of December

1925, p. 155. With respect to topography, he noted the unequal

backgrounds of the students in this area, that not all the

students had the advantage of graduation from the Company

Officers' Course or other training, or duty where expertise in

this subject could be acquired; hence."it has been found

necessary to increase the number of periods in Topography, for

should they not be particularly good in that subject it reacts

later when they come to map maneuvers, terrain exercises, or

tactical walks." (p. 155).

18Marine Corps Historical Center, Geographical Reference

File: Quantico. "M. C. Schools, Field Officers' Course,

1920-21"; "M. C. Schools, Field Officers' Course, 1921-22";

"M.C. Schools, Field Officers' Course, 1922-23"; M. C. Schools,

Field Officers' Course 1923-24"; "Marine Corps Schools,

1923-24"; "M.C. Schools, Field Officers' Course, 1924-25";

Marine Corps Schools, 1924-25"; and "Remarks on Course of

Instruction, 1924-25." On these comment cards, there are no

indications of compiler, writer or dates of preparation.

19Colonel J. C. Breckinridge, USMC, "Some Thoughts on

Service Schools," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1929, pp. 231,

232, and 237. Colonel Breckinridge, however, was aware of the

problem of schools and potential student reaction to what was

occurring in them. As he also wrote, "military schools conform

too closely to the ritual of techniques and events" (p. 236).

Breckinridge served as Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Schools,

a subordinate agency responsible to the Commanding General,

Marine Barracks, Quantico; he later served as Commanding

General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.

20

Breckinridge, Marine Corps Gazette, December 1929, p. 237.

21

Lieutenant Commander H. S. Jeans, USN, "Field Officers'

Course at Marine Corps School(s)," Marine Corps Gazette,

November 1930, pp. 49-50 and 105-106. It should be stressed

that LCdr Jeans was a "friendly critic," and he made this clear

in his comments. His comparison with the Naval War College at

Newport, of which he was also a graduate, is in contrast

probably an idealized one. LCdr Jeans also addresses the

problems, still existing, of limited facilities, lectures, and

too large classes. In many ways, similar comments have been

7 7
uttered to the author in his 13 years as the historian at the

Marine Corps Command and Staff College, especially the critique

by Major Dick Jaehne, USMC, during the 1982-83 Academic Year.

In some ways, this reveals that the ideals and practical

problems associated with this type of education are universal,

transcending time and place. However, everything is relative;

Colonel Dunlap wrote in December 1925 that "this course is

difficult but not so difficult that the average officer can't

complete it satisfactorily. The morale is high, and conditions

of living not too bad (for the student in the Field Officers'

Class they are good). If the student will relax when the period

for relaxation comes, if he will take regular exercise, he

leaves at the end of the course a wiser man, and one who feels

happier because he is more confident of his professional

ability." (Dunlap, Marine Corps Gazette, December 1925, p.

156). The latter statement, despite his friendly critique,

would be one with which LCdr Jeans would have concurred.

22

"The Marine Corps Schools," in United States Marine Corps,

Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, 1930, p. 33.

23

Marine Corps Historical Center, Geographical Reference

File: Quantico. Brigadier General George Richards, USMC,

Opening Exercises, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia,

dated 28 August 1931. General Richards was the Paymaster of the

Marine Corps in 1931. Of course, this is also an ideal which

the general officers of the Marine Corps tried to establish in

the officer corps. The professionally aware and motivated

officer, and those just executing orders, came to the Schools.

A balanced and demythologizing view of the inter-war Marine

Corps and a portrayal of the entire spectrum of its officers can

be found in Brigadier General John Letcher, USMC (Ret.), One

Marine's Story, McClure Press, Verona, Virginia, 1970.

24

"Marine Corps Schools," United States Marine Corps, Marine

Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, 1930, p. 32. In 1931 this part of

the pamphlet was published: see Brigadier General Randolph C.

Berkeley, USMC. "The Marine Corps Schools," Marine Corps

Gazette, May 1931, pp. 14-15.

25

Major John A. Gray, USMC, "A Plea for Revision of the

Field Officers' Course," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1931,

p. 64.

26

Brigadier General Dion Williams, USMC, "The Education of a

Marine Officer. II. The Marine Corps Schools." Marine Corps,

Gazette, August 1933, p. 19. Unlike the previous "sell" and

informative articles published in this journal in the previous

13 years, General Williams penned a series of four lengthy

articles on this subject. This issue also contained a detailed

breakdown of the Field Officers' and Company Officers' Courses,

to include subjects taught and hours devoted to each one. In

1933, the Secretary of the Navy approved the creation of the

7 8
Fleet Marine Force as an integral part of the U.S. Fleet, under

the operational control of the fleet commander. This officially

ended the organizational entities and commitments of the old

expeditionary forces, generally envisioned for expeditionary

duty in small wars. The missions of the Fleet Marine Force in

conception and eventual development would be the amphibious

mission. For a brief discussion of this, see Allan R. Millett,

Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps

(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.), Chapters 10 and 12;

and Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, USMCR, Progress and

Purpose: A Development History of the United States Marine

Corps, 1900-1970, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and

Museums Division, 1973), Chapters II and III.

27

Williams, "The Education of a Marine Officer II," Marine

Corps Gazette., August 1933, pp. 23-28. General Williams gives

the entire course of study, and hours devoted to each, of not

only the Field Officers' Course for 1930-31, but also the

Company Officers' Course and the Basic Course.

28

As quoted in Bittner, "The Education Center," p. 6.

Original in Marine Corps Historical Center, Geographical

Reference File - Quantico.

29Amphibious Warfare Research Facility, Breckinridge

Library, Education Center, Marine Corps Combat Development

Command, Quantico, Virginia. (Hereafter referred to as

Breckinridge Library). Historical Amphibious File. General

Fuller quoted in Colonel E. B. Miller to Commandant, Marine

Corps Schools', letter dated 15 August 1932. Subject: "Field

Officers'. Schools, Marine Corps, 1932/33."

30

Breckinridge Library, Historical Amphibious File. Miller

to Breckinridge letter dated 5 August 1932. Objectives listed

in the text are as phrased and quoted from Miller's letter. By

implication in Colonel Miller's letter, other areas needed

reform. As he noted, the average age of the students in the

forthcoming Field Officers' Course for the 1932-33 course was

49! Their total years were 978! The youngest officer was 38,

while the oldest was 58; ten of the students were in their 50s,

nine in their 40s, and only one below 40. This problem of an

overaged officer corps would be rectified in 1934, when John

Russell become Commandant, and achieved a major promotion

reform : advancement based on merit by selection by promotion

board instead of vacancy and seniority. See Bittner, "Conflict

under the Dome."

31

Breckinridge Library, Historical Amphibious File.

Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, to Major General Commandant

endorsement on Colonel E. B. Miller's letter of 15 August 1932,

dated 18 August 1932. For a discussion on how this was partly

done, see Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 45, and the

detailed student studies retained by Breckinridge Library in the

Historical Amphibious File.

7 9
32

Frances, "History of the Marine Corps Schools," p. 46.

This was published in "Marine Corps Schools, 1934-35," Marine

Corps Gazette, August 1934, p. 58. The report for the "Field

and Company Officers' Schools, 1934-35, read as follows: "New

objective of the school to prepare officers for staff and

command in the Fleet Marine Force. Schools to have a closer

coordination with that part of the Marine Corps. Tactics and

techniques of that Force to be especially emphasized." (Marine

Corps Historical Center: Geographical Reference File:

Quantico). The Fleet Marine Force had been established in 1934

as an integral operational element of the U.S. Fleet under the

command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. See Major

General John H. Russell, USMC, "The Fleet Marine Force," United

States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1936, pp. 1408-1412.

33

For a discussion of this, see Millett, Semper Fidelis,

Chapters 10 and 12; Frances, "History of the Marine Corps

Schools," pp. 48-50, and Clifford, Progress and Purpose,

Chapters II and III. Many of the studies which contributed to

the "Tentative Manual for Landing Operations" are retained in

the Amphibious Warfare Research Facility, otherwise known as

Breckinridge Library, Education Center, Marine Corps Combat

Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. See the "HAT File,"

i.e., Historical Amphibious File.

34

"Marine Corps Schools, 1934-35," Marine Corps Gazette,

August 1934. p. 57.

35

For early 20th Century studies on the defense of advanced

naval bases, see the studies conducted at the Naval War College

by Majors John H. Russell, Robert Dunlap, and Dion Williams, and

Captain Earl Ellis, in that order between 1908 and 1913, the

originals of which are retained in the Naval War College

Archives (Record Group 8, Box 79, Files XBAA). It is no

accident that, as previous citations and text have noted,

Russell, Dunlap, and Williams were influential in guiding the

change in direction of the Marine Corps as they rose in power;

Ellis foresaw a Pacific War against Japan where this new

direction would be necessary, but had died in the Pacific while

on a mission in Japanese held islands.

36

Brigadier General Robert Devereux, USMC (Ret.) oral

interview with LtCol D. F. Bittner, USMCR, at Ruxton, Maryland,

dated 17 November 1983. General Devereux, then a major,

commanded the Marine garrison on Wake Island against the

Japanese attack against that island in December 1941. Devereux

was a graduate of the Base Defense Weapons Course.

37The distinction between amphibious operations in support

of naval as opposed to a continental (i.e., Army) campaign may

seem esoteric, but was obviously a distinction made by Marines

of that era. General Holland M. Smith, USMC, a protege of

8 0
General John H. Russell, the main trainer of troops in

amphibious operations on the east and west coasts in the early

days of World War II (who had served with the Army, graduated

from some Army schools, and trained and commanded Army troops

during World War II) drew this distinction in a series of

articles in the Marine Corp Gazette after World War II. See

especially LtGen H. M. Smith, USMC, "The Development of

Amphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy, Part I," Marine Corps

Gazette, June 1946, pp. 12-18.

38

"Marine Corps Schools, 1934-35, Marine Corps Gazette,

August 1934, p. 59. The division of the curriculum as contained

in Table II is that of the author. The total of 32 hours under

the grouping of miscellaneous was ascertained by subtracting all

the listed hours for the other areas from the total of 1056

instruction hours.

39 "Marine Corps Schools, 1934-1935," Marine Corps Gazette,

August 1934, pp. 59-60.

40

Captain Arthur T. Mason, USMC, "The. Role of the Marine

Corps Schools," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1936, pp. 7-9 and

61-64. In 1936, both the Marine Corps Schools and the Fleet

Marine Force were located at the Marine Barracks, Quantico,

Virginia.

41Quantico Sentry, 31 January 1941. This unofficial base

newspaper had been founded in 1935. It also noted that the

"Junior Class" and "Base Defense Weapons Course" had graduated

on 20 December 1940.

42

Frances, "History of the Marine Corps Schools," p. 69.

43

As quoted in Frances, "History of the Marine Corps

Schools," p. 88.

44Quantico Sentry, "New Staff School Organized," 26 March

1943; and Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools, pp. 88-89,

108, and 110. On 1 April 1944, the "Command and Staff Course"

became the "Command and Staff School" (Quantico Sentry, "New

Schools Designations," 7 April 1944). Frances lists 37 allied

officer graduates, while current Quantico records cite only 33

names. For the numbers of allied officers, see Lieutenant

Colonel Donald F. Bittner, USMCR, "Historical Overview, Command

and Staff College Foreign Military Officer/International Officer

Program, 1943 to Present," dated 1 July 1981, with the following

breakdown: United Kingdom (8), Canada (3), Australia (4), New

Zealand (1), The Netherlands (12), and France (5). All the

names and figures for the allied officer attendees generally

have been confirmed by separate correspondence with each

respective country; however, one Australian was "unknown" and

one name of 12 in the Quantico records for The Netherlands was

unknown to Dutch authorities, but was so similar to another that

they postulated that one officer had been counted twice.

8 1
45

„How Staff Officers are Trained," Marine Corps Gazette,

February 1945, pp. 61-63. In April 1944, the Command and Staff

School, in addition to a new name, also received a separate

director: Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans, USMC, a World War I,

Caribbean Wars, and World War II veteran. He was experienced in

the focus of the school; he commanded 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines

on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, was Quartermaster of I Marine

Amphibious Corps, and commanded the 17th Marine Engineer

Battalion on Cape Gloucester. Colonel Rosecrans was awarded the

silver star for gallantry on Tulagi, plus had purple hearts from

France in 1918 and Tulagi. (Quantico Sentry, "Col Harold E.

Rosecrans New Director of C & S School," 14 April 1944).

46

Marine Corps Historical Center. Geographical Reference

File: Quantico. Unsigned/undated document, "AO-3-myc,

Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course." The document also

contains details for all the other schools within the Marine

Corps Schools (Amphibious War School, Junior Course, The Basic

School, Communication Offices' School, and Field Artillery

School; by internal analysis, this was obviously prepared prior

to July 1946. See also Commandant of the Marine Corps to

Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, letter dated 15

July 1946.

47

See especially Colonel Donald Spicer, USMC, "Marine Corps

Schools - Up to Date," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1946, pp.

58-59. At this time, and for the next 30 years, the Marine

Corps was and has been fortunate in having experienced officers

who blended combat experience and theoretical knowledge as the

instructors assigned to the senior educational institutional of

the Marine Corps.

48 Quantico Sentry, "Article by Major General (Lemuel)

Shepherd Explains Marine Corps Schools," 13 January 1949. In

1949, General Shepherd was both Commanding General, Marine Corps

Barracks, and Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, in accordance

with the major post-war reorganization of Quantico which

occurred in 1946.

49 Quantico Sentry, 8 June 1950, at the graduation, Senator

Paul Douglas of Illinois addressed the class and presented the

diplomas; one of the graduating students was the former

battalion commander of the Senator, LtCol William Piper, who

commanded 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, when Senator Douglas was a

company commander during the new Britain campaign. This

provides a contrast to the Command and Staff College of 1988,

when by policy only majors attend; ideally, none of the students

would be in the zone for promotion to lieutenant colonel,

although only once has this occurred since this new policy was

implemented. Generally, since 1975, the number of students in

the zone for lieutenant colonel when that board has met during

the school year has spanned the spectrum from 4 to 42.

8 2
50

Marine Corps Historical Center. Geographical Reference

File: Quantico. Marine Corps Schools General Order Number 76,

"Reorganization of Marine Corps Schools," dated 1 September

1950. For the mission statement, see Senior School in "Marine

Corps Educational Center," The Marine Corps Schools. Quantico ,

Virginia (1952).

51

"The Development of MCS." Marine Corps Gazette, September

1954. Senior School is discussed on pages 40-43. For a

discussion of Operation Packard, see Quantice Sentry, "Senior

Students Plans Amphibious Five Day Problem," 17 March 1955.

52

Quantico Sentry, 2 June 1955 and 8 September 1955. The

article of 2 June also stated the mission of the Senior School.

53 Quantico Sentry, "Col W. Buchanan is Now the Director of

Senior School," 10 August 1956. In all fairness, almost all

published articles in the Marine Corps Gazette over the previous

three decades stressed that the instructional philosophy and

technique used in the senior educational instruction of the

Marine Corps utilized the seminar or conference method of

instruction. Was the reliance upon the lecture method a result

of the World War II need to train as many officers as quickly as

possible, coupled with the rapid increase in the student body

since 1946?

54 Colonel H. Nickerson, Jr., USMC, "Senior School . . .New

Look," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1956, pp. 13-15.

55Quantico Sentry, "Grads to Hear SecNav Speak," 24 May

1963. Author's emphasis. The Sentry article reporting the

graduation of Senior and Junior Schools one week later returned

to the more familiar wording of the mission (Quantico Sentry, 31

May 1963).

56

Packard XIII received considerable publicity in the

Quantico Sentry., in May 1962. See Quantico Sentry,

"Junior-Senior Schools Participate in Packard," 4 May 1962;

"Packard Underway for Norfolk Sunday", 10 May 1962; and "Packard

Ends Today; Graduation Friday," 25 May 1962.

57Quantico Sentry, "CMC Will Address Students Attending Ed

Ctr Monday," 24 August 1962.

58

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Division of Information

Release No. GD-211-64 dated 22 July 1964.

59 "Formal School Training Sooner, Changes Due at MCS,"

Marine Corps Gazette,, May 1964, p. 1.

60

Program of Instruction, U.S. Marine Corps Command and

Staff College, 1978-79 Academic Year, dated 30 June 1978.

83
61

Brigadier General F. J. Karch, USMC, "Marine Corps Command

and Staff College," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1967. General

Karch states that the stimulus for the reforms came from the

July 1963 General Officers Symposium, and that the Commandant,

General David M. Shoup, was the force behind them.

62

Brigadier General Samuel Jaskilka, USMC, Director, C&S

College, "Command and Staff College Today," Marine Corps

Gazette. , June 1972, pp. 25-30.

63

There is no brief overview record of these evolutions.

This account is based on the experiences of the military

historian, Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner, USMCR, of the

Command and Staff College, who joined the faculty in 1975, and

his records, documents, and recollections of service on the

staff.

64

This was a theme in every address Major General David

Twomey gave to every class which commenced at the College during

his tour as Director of the Education Center or commanding

General, Marine Corps Development and Education Command.

Opening exercises, 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85, and

1985-86 Academic Years. For a report of such an opening

exercise, see Quantico Sentry, "160 officers convene at CSC,"

21 August 1981.

65

Lieutenant Colonel Russell A. Emerson, USMC, "It's

Academic! CSC: Prospectus for the 1980s," Marine Corps,

Gazette, August 1982, pp. 62-67. In addition to Lieutenant

Colonel Emerson, Colonel John T. Garcia, USMC, Lieutenant

Colonel Roy DeForest, USMC, Lieutenant Colonel Vic Russillo,

USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Bittner, USMCR, assisted

in the preparation of this piece. For the specifics of the

curriculum of each academic year, see the Programs of

Instruction, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College,

1982-83 Academic Year, dated 27 September 1982; 1983-84 Academic

Year, dated 15 July 1983; 1984-85 Academic Year, dated 14

November 1984; 1985-86 Academic year, dated 15 July 1985;

1986-1987 Academic year, dated 25 September 1986; and 1987-88

Academic Year, dated the 4 February 1988. The initial effort to

mutually support in a conscious way the instruction of other

divisions occurred in the 1979-80 Academic Year, when Lieutenant

Colonel Roger Knapper, USMC, Head of the Strategy Division,

ensured that all of this division's instruction supported or

dovetailed, as much as possible, with that of either the Command

or Landing Force Operations Division.

66

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Holden, USMC, "Marine Corps

Command and Staff College: Meeting the Needs of the Corps,"

draft article for Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988.

8 4
67 General Alfred M. Gray, USMC, Commandant of the Marine

Corps meeting with Command and Staff College Faculty, Heywood

Hall, The Basic. School, 22 February 1988.

68

Lieutenant Colonel R. A. Emerson,"C&SC: Prospectus for

the 1980's," Marine Corps Gazette, p. 62.

8 5
86

APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL LINEAGE (UNOFFICIAL)

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE*

19 May 1918 - 10 March 1919: Tactical Department, Overseas

Depot, Quantico, Virginia**

11 March 1919 - 2 January 1920: Transition and Reorganization,

Field Depot, Quantico,

Virginia**

3 January 1920 - 31 August 1920: Marine Officers Infantry

School**

1 September 1920 - 31 January 1941: Field Officers' Course,

Marine Corps Schools

Detachment, Marine Barracks

Quantico, Virginia***

1 February 1941 - 31 January 1943: Suspended 

1 February 1943 - 31 July 1946: Command and Staff School** ***

1 September 1946 - 30 August 1950: Senior Course, Amphibious

Warfare School******

1 September 1950 - 31 July 1964: Senior School, Educational

Center

1 September 1964 - Present: Command and Staff College,

Education Center

* - At various times in its history, the Command and Staff

College (under its current and former names) has been

part of the following parent organizations: Marine

Corps Schools Detachment, Marine Barracks, Quantico,

Virginia; Educational Center, Marine Corps Schools,

Quantico, Virginia; Education Center, Marine Corps

Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia;

and Education Center, Marine Corps Combat Development

Command, Quantico, Virginia.

** - The names of the organizations responsible for all

tactical training, based at Quantico, prior to the

establishment of a formal professional military

education system for Marine Corps officers which would

encompass an entire career in 1920. This three tiered

system was finally functioning with three schools in

1921.

*** - In the mid-1930s, the Field Officers' Course had several

names, including Senior Class, Second Class, and Senior
  -

** *** -

******-

Course. These were all within the organizational

structure of the Marine Corps Schools Detachment, Marine

Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.

Suspended due to need for experienced officers

elsewhere, especially in screening officer candidates

and training second lieutenants. Reopened in 1943, with

three month "command and staff courses," primarily

composed of reserve officers, with a curriculum devoted

to the needed operational and staff skills deemed

immediately necessary in pursuit of wartime needs.

Initially Command and Staff Course; from 1 April 1944,

Command and Staff School within the Marine Corps Schools

Detachment, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.

Since 1946, the senior educational institution of the

Marine Corps has taught one course per academic year.

These courses have commenced in either August or

September, and graduated in May or June. In addition, a

reserve course now exists, consisting of pre-course

instruction and two, two week phases taught in July of

each year.

87
APPENDIX B

OVERVIEW: MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, 1988

The Command and Staff College possesses an historical

lineage which can be traced back to the American participation

in World War I, although the College was not officially

established until 1920. Although its curriculum, based upon

doctrine, tactics, and evolving emphases, has changed through

the years, the goal of this educational institution, whatever

its name and internal organization, has always remained the

same: to train and educate field grade officers to perform

command and staff duties commensurate with their rank.

Today, the College is an educational institution devoted to

educating and training not only Marine Corps officers, but also

those of the three U.S. sister services and selected foreign

nations. Every class is divided into 12 permanent conference

groups, with each having at least two foreign and two sister

service officers in it. The 1987-88 Academic Year class has the

following officer composition.

The academic year at the Command and Staff College is 43

weeks in length. Although professional operational topics are

the "core" of the curriculum, the College maintains that a

professional officer must be an educated and well-rounded

individual in addition to being tactically and operationally

proficient. Hence, the core curriculum also contains such key

subjects as military history, strategic studies, leadership,

electives taught by reserve officers with university

affiliations, and written communications, whose purpose is to

broaden the officer's overall background and add depth to

certain subject areas deemed of special importance by the

school. In addition, invited guest lecturers from the armed

forces, government, academe, and business provide the students

and staff with personal views and differing insights into a

variety of subjects of professional, national, and international

interest.

 8888

Service LtCol/Cdr

Total

U.S. Marine Corps 123 123

U.S. Army 12 12

U.S. Navy 9 9

U.S. Air Force 2 2

Foreign Officers

TOTAL

----------------------------------------------------------------

9

9

15

161

24

170
The Command and Staff College curriculum is thus a blend of

professional military subjects, augmented by appropriate outside

professional and civilian instruction, which provides its

students with offerings in military subjects as diverse as

amphibious operations, fundamentals of offensive and defensive

combat, joint operations, command and staff functioning,

logistics, Marine aviation, military law, and perspectives on

the sister services and foreign nations. All of this is, as

from the very beginning, constructed around appropriate.

operational exercises. In 1988, through the use of current

technology, the students war game on computers their various

operation plans in realistic global scenarios.

Finally, because of the vital importance of. the Marine Corps

Reserve in our total force structure, the Command and Staff

College offers a four week reserve course, divided into precourse instruction and two two. week phases which.the reserve

officer attends in consecutive sequential years. The reserve

course contains the operational heart of the regular 43 week

course, providing the attendees with a fundamental background in

command and staff planning in amphibious operations. Thus, in

the event of mobilization, the reserve officer will be able to

function in whatever billet to which he might be assigned.

89
APPENDIX-C

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

* - Totals compiled from various sources. From 1975 to 1988,

based upon documents compiled at the beginning of each

academic year; totals include only those officer students

attending the school on permanent change of duty station

orders, and not equivalency students.

90

STUDENT BODY SIZE. SELECTED YEARS, 1920-1988*

Academic

Year

Number

of

Students

Academic

Year

Number

of

Students

1920-21 24 1962-63 126

1921-22 24 1975-76 139

1922-23 . 22 1976-77 143

1923-24 20 1977-78 144

1924-25 22 1978-79 148

1927-28, Closed 1979-80 146

1928-29 Semi-closed 1980-81 148

1929-30 17 1981-82 156

1932-33 20 1982-83 160

Mar 1943 35 1983-84 162

Feb 1945 55 1984-85 168

1946-47 55 1985-86 171

1949-50 98 1986-87 168

1954-55 119 1987-88 170

1955-56 126 1988-89 180

1961-62 124

(Projected)
APPENDIX D

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

ACADEMIC HOUR LOAD. SELECTED YEARS

1930-31 TO 1988-89 (PROPOSED)

Academic 

Year 

Mis 

cellanneous 

 Landing Force 

Command Operations 

Division+ Division+

History/ 

Strategy 

Division+ 

Total 

Instruc

tional 

Hours

1930-31 64.0* 222.5* 678.0* 51.5* 1,016.0*

1934-35 239.0 ** 785.0 32.0 1,056.0 

Feb 1945 *** *** 292.0 *** *** 

1966-67 234.0. 357.0 616.0 210.0 1,183.0*

1971-72 58.0. . 511.0 438.0 186.0 1,135.0

1975-76 

0.0... 594.5 351.5 144.0 1,090.0

1976-77 

0.0... 581.5 383.5 135.5 1,100.5

1977-78 

0.0... 492.0 414.5 140.5 1,047.0

1978-79 0.0... 480.0 435.5 128.5 1,044.0

1979-80 0.0... 495.5 480.5 132.5 1,108.5

1980-81 0.0... 509.5 447.5 126.0 1,083.0

1981-82 0.0... 530.0 445.0 144.5 1,119.5

1982-83 0.0... 405.0 592.0 143.0 1,140.0

1983-84 0.0... 378.5 583.5 145.5 1,097.5

1984-85 0.0... 379.5 572.0 153.5 1,105.0

1985-86 0.0... 350.5 586.5 159.0 1,095.0

1986-87 0.0... 353.5 564.5 191.5 1,109.5

1987-88 0.0... 311.5 543.0 130.0 984.5

1988-89 

(Planned) 

 50.0ˆ 311.5ˆ 541.0ˆ 137.0ˆ 1,039.5ˆ

+ - The names of these divisions are somewhat "generic", and 

partly conform to those in use at the College between 

1975-1988. 

* - For the 1930-31 and 1965-66 Academic Years, the sources did 

91 
**

***

not "group" the hours and subjects by division. These

groupings are thus arbitrary, as the subjects might

have been assigned in 1987-88.

- For the 1934-35 Academic Year, almost all of the

course was "operational". The 32 hours of

"miscellaneous" topics have been listed under

"history/strategy" due to the nature of the subjects

listed.

- Total number of hours not available; only the hours

for the operational problems were listed.

.

 - In the 1965-66 Academic Year, these hours under

"Additional Time Allocations" were Reserved for

Director (17), Physical Conditioning (77),

Administrative Time (21), and Holidays (119).

.. - 58 hours of Administration Time. This total is NOT

included in hours of instruction.

... - Although listed as "zero", from 1975 to 1988 there

were real hours in the category; in addition to

holidays and physical training, from 1982 to 1988

"Academic Study and Preparation Time" has been

included in the curriculum, specific hours set aside

for student study.



 - Hours as given are those planned for the 1988-89

Academic Year, as of spring 1988. Included in the

figure of 50 instructional hours are the following:

General Officer Lectures (9.0), Sister Service

Lectures (23.0), and Lectures of Opportunity (18.0).

In addition, student Academic Study and Preparation

Time will account for 194.5 hours.

92 * U.S. GPO: 1989-227-557