DEFENSE 

MANAGEMENT

More Reliable Cost 

Estimates and Further 

Planning Needed to 

Inform the Marine 

Corps Realignment 

Initiatives in the 

Pacific

Report to Congressional Committees

June 2013

GAO-13-360

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-360, a report to 

congressional committees 

June 2013 

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 

More Reliable Cost Estimates and Further Planning 

Needed to Inform the Marine Corps Realignment 

Initiatives in the Pacific

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has stated that it intends to 

rebalance its defense posture toward 

the Asia-Pacific region. Japan hosts 

the largest U.S. forward-operating 

presence in this region; the majority of 

the U.S. forces in Japan are located in 

Okinawa. The United States and Japan 

planned to reduce the U.S. military 

presence on Okinawa by relocating

approximately 9,000 Marines. DOD 

had originally planned to move the 

Marines only to Guam, but revised its 

plans in 2012 to include other locations 

in the Pacific. Congressional 

committees have directed GAO to 

examine DOD’s initiatives in the 

Pacific, focusing on planning and 

costs. This report discusses the extent 

to which DOD has (1) developed a 

comprehensive cost estimate for the 

realignment of Marines, (2) planned for 

and synchronized other movements to 

coincide with the realignment, and (3) 

identified plans to sustain the force 

until all initiatives are implemented. To 

address these objectives, GAO 

reviewed relevant policies and 

procedures, reviewed and analyzed 

cost documents related to the 

realignment initiatives, interviewed 

DOD officials, and conducted site visits 

at U.S. military installations in the 

Pacific.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD develop 

more reliable cost estimates and an 

integrated master plan for the 

realignment of Marines, develop a 

mechanism to share annual updates 

on the status of each, and identify 

sustainment requirements for affected 

facilities until realignment initiatives are 

complete. DOD generally agreed with 

GAO’s recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) preliminary cost estimate for its current 

realignment plan is not reliable, because it is missing costs and is based on 

limited data. According to DOD officials, DOD has not yet been able to put 

together a more reliable cost estimate because it will not have specific detailed 

information on the plan’s requirements until the completion of environmental 

analyses and host nation negotiations. Currently, DOD estimates that it would 

cost approximately $12.1 billion to implement its realignment plan—not including 

the Australia segment of the realignment. Still, GAO found that DOD did not 

include some up-front practices that could have provided a more reliable 

estimate that are not dependent on the completion of the environmental analyses 

and host nation negotiations. Specifically, DOD omitted any costs associated 

with mobility support, a critical component of the implementation, from its cost

estimate. Furthermore, although DOD based its cost estimate on several 

assumptions, there was no evidence DOD conducted analysis needed to 

determine the reliability of those assumptions. Without a reliable estimate, DOD 

will not be able to provide Congress and other stakeholders with the information 

Congress needs to make informed decisions regarding the realignment.

DOD has not developed an integrated master plan for its current realignment 

plan, and it has not developed a strategy to support the development and 

oversight of the Japanese construction projects associated with other 

realignment initiatives. DOD has taken initial steps to develop an integrated 

scheduling document based on currently known data, but indicated that specific 

requirements, schedules, and costs cannot be formalized in an integrated master 

plan until several studies and host nation negotiations are completed, which will 

take several years. Developing a master plan could enhance the management of 

the realignment by creating a systematic approach to planning, scheduling, and 

execution. In addition, DOD has not developed a strategy that identifies the

resources needed to support the development of and oversight for these 

projects. According to best practices, a strategy identifies goals and resources 

and supports the implementation of a program. Without the information contained 

in an integrated master plan and a construction support strategy, Congress will 

be unable to make informed decisions about the order in which it needs to 

provide funding to support the realignment. 

DOD has taken some steps to plan for the sustainment of U.S. forces on 

Okinawa and Guam, but it has yet to fully identify sustainment needs and costs 

for both locations during this period. At several installations on Okinawa, some 

of the infrastructure has severely deteriorated. DOD facilities planning guidance 

calls for updated facility master plans that capture requirements and propose 

solutions. On Guam, DOD has been maintaining an inventory of unoccupied 

family housing that could potentially be used for Marines relocating to Guam. 

However, DOD has not determined all the costs and benefits of maintaining this 

housing or the Marines’ potential housing requirements—information needed to

perform an economic analysis. Without an estimate of the sustainment 

requirements for Okinawa, the costs for maintaining housing, and the potential 

Marine requirements for housing on Guam, DOD will be unable to make informed 

decisions on whether continued investment in sustaining these facilities is 

warranted.

View GAO-13-360. For more information, 

contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Letter 1 

Background 4

DOD’s Initial Estimate for the Current Marine Corps Realignment 

Plan Is Not Reliable 20

DOD Has Not Yet Completed an Integrated Master Plan to 

Synchronize Realignment Initiatives in the Pacific or a Strategy 

to Support Japanese Construction 42

DOD Has Taken Initial Steps but Has Not Fully Identified 

Sustainment Needs and Costs on Okinawa and Guam 53

Conclusions 65

Recommendations for Executive Action 67

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 68

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 74

Appendix II April 2012 Joint Statement of the United States-Japan 

Security Consultative Committee 77

Appendix III Restrictions on Use of Funds For Marine Corps Realignment in 

National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 and 2012 82

Appendix IV Print-Friendly Version of Figure I 86

Appendix V Funded Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI)-Related 

Military Construction Projects on Guam Supporting Marine 

Realignment 89

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Defense 90

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 94

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Related GAO Products 95

Tables

Table 1: History of DOD’s Plans and Estimates for the Realignment 

of Marines 22

Table 2: Breakdown of Costs and Marine Corps Distribution for 

Current Realignment Plan 24

Table 3: Four Characteristics of a Reliable Cost Estimate 26

Table 4: Summary Assessment of DOD’s Current Realignment Cost 

Estimate Compared to Best Practices for Comprehensive 

Cost Estimates 27

Table 5: Okinawa Housing Redevelopment Plan as of February 

2013 58

Figures

Figure 1: U.S. Defense Posture in Asia 6

Figure 2: Planned Location of Replacement Runway at Camp 

Schwab 10

Figure 3: Okinawa Consolidation Plan 15

Figure 4: Japanese-Constructed Runway at Marine Corps Air 

Station Iwakuni 17

Figure 5: Government of Japan Host Nation Support and 

Realignment Funding (in Billions of Yen) from Japan 

Fiscal Years 1979 to 2010 18

Figure 6: Apra Harbor Wharf Improvements 20

Figure 7: Unoccupied Military Housing on Guam 33

Figure 8: Proposed Locations for Amphibious Landing Training on 

Tinian 36

Figure 9: Ongoing Japanese Construction at Marine Corps Air 

Station Iwakuni 49

Figure 10: Construction Errors on Defense Policy Review Initiative 

(DPRI) Projects in Okinawa as Identified by the Army 

Corps of Engineers 50

Figure 11: Examples of Deteriorated Conditions of Facilities in 

Okinawa 54

Figure 12: Japan Facilities Improvement Program Funding for All 

U.S. Installations in Japan and for Marine Corps 
Page iii GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Installations on Okinawa from 2002 to 2010 (in Billions of 

Yen) 56

Figure 13: Examples of Unoccupied Housing Units on Guam 62

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

DPRI Defense Policy Review Initiative

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Page 1 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

June 11, 2013

Congressional Committees

U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to 

developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East 

Asia into the Indian Ocean and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving 

challenges and opportunities. The Department of Defense (DOD) has 

stated that it would tailor its global presence and posture by rebalancing 

toward the Asia-Pacific region, emphasizing existing alliances and 

expanding networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the 

region to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common 

interests. One of the United States’ most important allies in the AsiaPacific region is Japan, which serves as the United States’ most 

significant forward-operating location in the region, accommodating 

approximately 39,000 U.S. military personnel, 43,000 dependents, and 

5,000 DOD civilian employees. The majority of this presence resides in 

Okinawa, an island prefecture south of the Japanese mainland that 

represents less than 1 percent of Japan’s entire land mass. Although it is 

small, Okinawa currently hosts over 25 percent of the U.S. bases in 

Japan, and Okinawa’s bases house approximately 8,000 Air Force 

personnel and up to 19,000 Marine Corps personnel on any given day. To 

balance the importance of this forward presence to both the United States 

and Japan with the stated need to reduce the burden on the Okinawa 

community, attempts to realign, consolidate, and increase the 

sustainability of this presence have been ongoing for nearly two decades.

Most recently, after 6 years of unsuccessful attempts to implement a 

realignment plan to move approximately 8,000 Marines and 9,000 

dependents from Okinawa to Guam, representatives from the U.S. and 

Japanese governments announced in a joint statement issued in April 

2012, that they would adjust the plan.1

 

1

See United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Joint Statement of the 

Security Consultative Committee (Apr. 26, 2012). Hereinafter referred to as the “April 2012 

Statement”, the entire statement is reprinted in app. II of this report.

The Marine Corps’ current 

realignment plan would relocate over 9,000 Marines from Okinawa and 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

realign Marine forces throughout the Pacific: 4,800 to Guam, 2,700 to 

Hawaii, and 2,500 to Australia.2

Conducting large-scale posture transformations during an era of 

increasing budgetary pressures and competition for scarce resources has 

proven to be a challenge for DOD. In May 2011, we reported that while 

DOD had originally estimated that the cost to the United States to execute 

the original plan to relocate 8,600 Marines and their dependents from 

Okinawa to Guam would be $4.2 billion, the Marine Corps estimated that 

it would actually likely cost the United States in excess of $13 billion to 

fully execute.3 Congressional committees have discussed the uncertainty 

surrounding the cost and schedule information regarding the 

realignment.4 Congress, in section 2207 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, and section 2832 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, restricted the use of 

certain DOD funds to implement the realignment of Marines until DOD 

provided to the congressional defense committees specified information 

related to its plans to move units to Guam and its overall posture in the 

Pacific.5

 

2

According to Marine Corps officials, these are approximate numbers and do not include 

any numbers specific to the continental United States; however, some units from the 

9,000 relocating from Okinawa are expected to relocate to the continental United States.

In Senate Report 112-29, we were directed to conduct a detailed 

3

Although the document developed by representatives from the two governments

concerning the original Guam realignment referred to approximately 8,000 personnel, the 

Record of Decision for the Guam and Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands Military 

Relocation referred to approximately 8,600 Marines. See Department of the Army and 

Department of the Navy, Record of Decision for the Guam and Commonwealth of the 

Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation (September 2010).

4

See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112-705, at 867-68, 969-70 (2012) (Conference Report, 

accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013); S. Rep. No. 

112-173, at 257, 258-59 (2012) (Senate Armed Services Committee report, accompanying 

a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013); S. Rep. No. 112-29, 

at 8-11 (2011) (Senate Appropriations Committee report, accompanying the Military 

Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 2012).

5

See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 2832 (2013) and Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 2207 (2011). Section 

2832(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 superseded and 

repealed section 2207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. In 

addition to the information to be provided by DOD, both provisions also required the 

submission to the congressional defense committees of a plan coordinated by all pertinent 

federal agencies, see § 2832(a)(4) and § 2207(a)(4), and contained certain exceptions to 

the restriction. See § 2832(c) and § 2207(c). Please see app. III of this report for full text of 

the respective sections in the Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Acts related to restrictions on the use of funding for Marine Corps realignment initiatives in 

the Pacific.
 

Page 3 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

assessment of posture initiatives in Japan, Okinawa, and Guam, focused 

on planning, costs, long-term financial commitments, and other topics.6

We were also directed, in Senate Report 112-173, to assess and identify 

the costs associated with the new plan to realign Marine Corps units to 

Guam, Australia, and Hawaii.7

For each of our objectives, we reviewed relevant policies and procedures, 

and collected information by interviewing and communicating with officials 

from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Air Force; the Army; 

the Navy; the Marine Corps; the Joint Staff; United States Pacific 

Command; and the State Department. We conducted site visits at Pacific 

Command and its service components in Hawaii; U.S. Forces—Japan 

and its service components; and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan; the 

U.S. Consulate on Okinawa; and military installations on Guam. To 

determine the extent to which DOD has developed comprehensive cost 

estimates for the realignment of the Marines, we reviewed DOD’s cost 

estimating methodology and planning assumptions and compared them 

to the cost estimating guidance in GAO’s Cost Estimating Guide.

Furthermore, we interviewed relevant officials from the Marine Corps, 

Pacific Command, U.S. Forces–Japan, Joint Guam Program Office, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Office of Economic Adjustment to 

determine the validity of the data. To determine the extent to which DOD 

has planned for and synchronized other U.S. defense posture movements 

in Okinawa and Japan to coincide with the Marine Corps realignment, we 

collected relevant planning documentation and interviewed Marine Corps 

officials in Washington, Honolulu, and Okinawa. Furthermore, we 

compared the data we received from each component within the Marine 

This report examines DOD’s plans and the 

costs associated with the most significant of these posture initiatives, the 

realignment of Marines off Okinawa, and the effects of this initiative on 

the current and future landscapes of Okinawa and Guam. Specifically, we 

report on the extent to which DOD has (1) developed comprehensive cost 

estimates for the realignment of Marines off Okinawa; (2) planned for and 

synchronized other U.S. defense posture movements on Okinawa and 

Japan to coincide with the relocation of Marines off Okinawa; and (3) 

identified plans to sustain the force until the Marine Corps realignment 

and other initiatives are completed.

 

6

See S. Rep. No. 112-29, at 11 (2011). 

7

See S. Rep. No. 112-173, at 257 (2012). 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Corps to one another, and the data we collected from the Pacific 

Command, U.S. Forces–Japan, Joint Guam Program Office, and the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine the status of planning 

consistencies and synchronization. Finally, to determine the extent to 

which DOD has identified a strategy to sustain its current forces on 

Okinawa and Guam, we reviewed sustainment planning documentation, 

base master plans, and historical host nation support and U.S. 

sustainment data for Okinawa. We also interviewed relevant Marine 

Corps and Air Force officials in Okinawa to determine sustainment 

planning needs and the status of future sustainment funding requests. For 

Guam, we interviewed Navy officials to determine the extent to which they 

have planned for the sustainment of family housing on Guam, and we 

reviewed planning documentation and analyzed current DOD cost data 

collection methodologies used by the service.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to March 

2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a more 

detailed description of our scope and methodology.

This report is one of a series of GAO reports on DOD’s global defense 

posture initiatives. Since 2006, we have reported on issues related to 

DOD’s overall global posture strategy and management practices, the 

military buildup on Guam, the transformation of United States Army and 

Navy posture in Europe, the transformation and consolidation of U.S. 

defense posture in South Korea and Japan, and the establishment of the 

United States Africa Command. Those reports make a number of 

recommendations to improve DOD’s management of these efforts and 

the information about them that DOD makes available within the 

executive branch and to congressional committees. Most recently, in May 

2011, we reported on U.S. defense posture in Asia, highlighting the need 

for additional cost information and methods for evaluating posture in that 

region. See the list of related GAO products at the end of this report.

The senior U.S. military authority in the Pacific Area of Responsibility is 

the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command. Pacific Command is one of six 

U.S. geographic combatant commands. Pacific Command’s area of 

responsibility spans roughly half the earth’s surface and encompasses 36 

Background
 

Page 5 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

countries, including Australia, China, India, Japan, the Philippines, and 

South Korea.8 The Pacific Command is supported by four service 

component commands: U.S. Army Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. 

Marine Forces, Pacific; and the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Each component 

command is generally responsible for its service’s actions and missions 

within the Pacific Command area of responsibility and is supported by 

subordinate commands, which help support the service’s presence in the 

region. For example, U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific, is supported by the III 

Marine Expeditionary Force, a large Marine Corps unit forward deployed 

to Japan and other parts of Asia, which stands ready to conduct 

operations.9 Also supporting Marines in the Pacific is U.S. Marine Corps 

Installations, Pacific, which is responsible for the command and control of 

all Marine Corps installations in the region. In Japan, U.S. Forces–

Japan—a subunified command under the Pacific Command—supports 

U.S. forward presence and ensures bilateral defense cooperation with the 

government of Japan. According to U.S. Forces–Japan, it focuses on war 

planning, the conduct of joint/bilateral exercises and studies, 

administering the Status of Forces Agreement, improving combat 

readiness, and enhancing the quality of life of military and DOD civilian 

personnel and their dependents. See figure 1 for information on major 

U.S. forces and installations in Japan, Okinawa, and Guam; approximate 

distances between Guam and other strategic locations in the Pacific; and 

U.S. strategic allies in the Pacific.

 

8

The Unified Command Plan establishes combatant commanders’ missions and 

geographic responsibilities. Combatant commanders link operational military forces to the 

Secretary of Defense and the President. The Secretary of Defense deploys troops and 

exercises military power through the combatant commands. 

9

The III Marine Expeditionary Force is a formation of multiple Marine units forwarddeployed in Japan and Asia to support the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 

between the United States and Japan, and other alliance relationships of the United 

States. It is able to deploy rapidly and conduct operations across the spectrum from 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to amphibious assault and high-intensity 

combat.
Page 6 GAO-13-360 Defense Management

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and other federal agency data.

U.S. Pacific Command

U.S. European 

Command

U.S. Northern 

Command

Figure 1: U.S. Defense Posture in Asia

U.S.

Forces

Travel

distances

U.S.

allies

Interactivity instructions: Roll over a button below to view more information. See appendix X for the non-interactive, printer-friendly version. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

The U.S.-Japan alliance dates back to the U.S. occupation of Japan after 

its defeat in World War II. The alliance is supported by the 1960 Treaty of 

Mutual Cooperation and Security10 and a related Status of Forces 

Agreement11

One issue that remains at the forefront of the alliance is the realignment 

of U.S. forces in Japan. Efforts to realign U.S. forces in Japan date back 

to 1995. Discontent among the people of Okinawa regarding the U.S. 

military presence led to the establishment of the Special Action 

Committee on Okinawa in November 1995 by the Security Consultative 

Committee, a bilateral group of high-ranking U.S. and Japanese officials 

involved with overall bilateral policy regarding the security relationship 

between the two countries.

which today covers about 51,200 U.S. servicemembers, 

5,400 DOD civilian employees, and 42,200 dependents in Japan, as of 

January 2013. As a result of the treaty, the Status of Forces Agreement, 

and related agreements, U.S. forces have the use of nearly 90 

installations throughout both mainland Japan and Okinawa, for the 

purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of 

international peace and security in the region. Under the treaty and Status 

of Forces Agreement, the United States is granted the use of facilities and 

areas in Japan, with specific facilities and areas to be determined by the 

two governments. Generally, according to U.S. Forces–Japan officials, 

Japan constructs the facilities, while the United States bears the costs of 

maintenance—with each facility typically having a 50-year service life.

12 In December 1996, this committee approved 

the final report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, which 

included recommendations on how to consolidate, realign, and reduce 

U.S. facilities and areas and adjust the operational procedures of U.S. 

forces in Okinawa in order to reduce the burden on local communities.13

 

10See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 

1632.

11See Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security: 

Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-Japan, 

Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1652.

12The Security Consultative Committee is made up of the U.S. Secretaries of State and 

Defense and Japan’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense. 

13GAO has performed a review of U.S. realignment efforts under this agreement. See

GAO, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military 

Presence on Okinawa, GAO/NSIAD 98-66 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 1998). 

Realignment of U.S. Forces 

in the Pacific
 

Page 8 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Realignment efforts did not gain much traction until the end of 2002, when 

the United States and Japan launched an ambitious series of realignment 

initiatives called The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI).14 Under 

DPRI, both countries were seeking to reduce the U.S. footprint in 

Okinawa, enhance interoperability and communication, and better 

position U.S. forces to respond to a changing security environment. The 

major realignment initiatives under DPRI are outlined in the United 

States—Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (2006 

Roadmap) which was issued in May 2006 by the Security Consultative 

Committee,15 reaffirmed and implemented in part in a 2009 bilateral 

agreement,16

1. Futenma Replacement Facility,

and recently adjusted in the April 2012 statement. There are 

four initiatives under DPRI that are specific to the Marine Corps and its 

current plans to realign its forces in the Pacific:

2. Realignment of Marine Corps units,

3. Okinawa Consolidation, and

4. Carrier Air Wing Move from Atsugi to Iwakuni.

As envisioned by the 2006 Roadmap, the U.S. government would return 

to Japan the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa once the 

government of Japan constructed a fully operational replacement facility 

(Futenma Replacement Facility), including a runway, in a northern, less 

populated area of the island.17

 

14GAO has done work on posture issues related to Japan. See GAO, Defense 

Management: Comprehensive Cost Information and Analysis of Alternatives Needed to 

Assess Military Posture in Asia, 

This facility was originally projected to be 

complete by 2014. According to Marine Corps officials, some facilities 

have been constructed at the planned site of the realignment—Camp 

GAO-11-316 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2011). 

15United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document, U.S.-Japan Roadmap 

for Realignment Implementation (May 1, 2006). This document provided implementation 

details for realignment initiatives described in United States-Japan Security Consultative 

Committee Document, U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the 

Future (Oct. 29, 2005). 

16See Agreement Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine 

Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, U.S.-

Japan, Feb. 17, 2009, Temp. State Dep’t No. 09-89.

17The plan to return Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to the Government of Japan dates 

back to 1997. See Special Action Committee on Okinawa Final Report (Aug. 5, 1997).

Futenma Replacement Facility 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Schwab; however, the construction of the replacement runway has 

stalled.18 Those same officials stated that before construction of the 

runway can proceed, the government of Japan has to issue an 

environmental impact statement for the construction of the runway, and 

the Okinawa government has to approve a landfill permit. According to 

DOD officials, in December 2012, Japan’s Ministry of Defense submitted 

the environmental impact statement to the Governor of Okinawa.

Subsequently, in March 2013, DOD officials informed us that the 

government of Japan submitted the application for the landfill permit to 

the Governor of Okinawa.19

 

18According to Marine Corps documentation, the construction of 10 projects at Camp 

Schwab has been completed.

Figure 2 shows the planned location of the 

runway at Camp Schwab. The Marine Corps estimates that its Operation 

and Maintenance and Procurement costs for the Futenma Replacement 

Facility will be approximately $178 million over the next 5 years; however, 

this estimate does not constitute the total cost to the United States and, 

according to Marine Corps officials, has not been approved.

19Subsequent to the completion of the audit work on this engagement, in April 2013, DOD 

announced the completion and public release of the bilateral Okinawa Consolidation Plan 

that, according to DOD officials, stated that the best-case scenario for the completion of 

the runway is in 2022 or later.
 

Page 10 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Figure 2: Planned Location of Replacement Runway at Camp Schwab

Because of the uncertainties surrounding the construction of the runway 

at Camp Schwab and following direction from the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, DOD has examined the feasibility of relocating air assets 

from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Kadena Air Base, as an 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

alternative to constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp 

Schwab.20 However, DOD concluded that it was not a viable solution. In 

the April 2012 statement, the representatives from the United States and 

Japan reconfirmed their view that the Futenma Replacement Facility 

remains the only viable solution that has been identified to date.21

After several years of planning to move approximately 8,000 Marines off 

Okinawa to Guam, DOD revised its plan in April 2012 to relocate some 

units from Okinawa to Guam, Hawaii, and the Continental United States.

Additionally, the plan includes establishing a rotational Marine Corps 

presence in Australia, a move that, according to DOD officials, stems 

from a November 2011 agreement between the United States and 

Australia. To date, the Marine Corps has established a small presence on 

Guam to prepare for the Marine realignment, but it has not yet relocated 

any units from Okinawa to Guam, nor has it been able to reduce its 

presence on Okinawa as anticipated under the April 2012 statement.

In 

addition, the April 2012 statement noted that both governments 

expressed their commitment to contribute to refurbishment projects at 

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to sustain safe mission capability until 

the Futenma Replacement Facility is fully operational and to protect the 

environment. According to Marine Corps officials, as of February 2013, a 

list of refurbishment projects to be funded by the U.S. government and 

the government of Japan has been identified, and planning for these 

projects is expected to be completed by April 2013. Though time frames 

may vary, Marine Corps officials expect work on these projects could start 

sometime in 2014.

22

 

20Kadena Air Base is a United States Air Force base in the towns of Kadena and Chatan 

and the city of Okinawa, in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan. Kadena Air Base is the hub of 

U.S. airpower in the Pacific, and home to the United States Air Force’s 18th Wing and a 

variety of associate units. In 2011, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed the 

Secretary of Defense to study the feasibility of relocating Air Force assets at Kadena Air 

Base and moving Marine Corps aviation assets from Futenma to Kadena, in lieu of 

building a replacement facility at Camp Schwab. See S. Rep. No. 112-26, at 242 (2011).

According to Marine Corps officials, Marines cannot be relocated until 

21See United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Joint Statement of the 

Security Consultative Committee (Apr. 26, 2012). 

22The Security Consultative Committee statement noted that relocation of Marine Corps 

units from Okinawa was to occur when appropriate facilities were available to receive 

them, to be completed as soon as possible while ensuring operational capability 

throughout the process. See id.

Realignment of Marine Units
 

Page 12 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

suitable replacement facilities are constructed and made operationally 

capable on Guam and in other locations.

The Marine Corps’ current plan is to build facilities on Guam and live-fire 

training ranges on Guam, Tinian, and Pagan—members of the Mariana 

Islands—to support the realignment of approximately 5,000 personnel 

(mostly rotational) and any dependents to Guam.23 Before any Marines 

can relocate to Guam, DOD must examine the environmental effects of its 

proposed actions, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 

1969.24 To address this requirement in the past, DOD performed an 

environmental review of certain proposed actions under the original 2006 

realignment plan and released the Guam and Commonwealth of the 

Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation Final Environmental Impact 

Statement in July 2010.25 In September 2010, the Department of the 

Navy announced in the record of Decision for the Guam and 

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation that it 

will proceed with the Marine Corps realignment, but deferred the selection 

of a specific site for a live-fire training range complex on Guam pending 

further study.26 In February 2012, the Department of the Navy gave notice 

that it intended to prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact 

Statement to evaluate locations for a live-fire training range complex on 

Guam.27

 

23Rotational refers to Marine Corps units that are deployed for periods of approximately 6 

months to any given location. 

In October 2012, as a result of the current realignment plan, the 

Department of the Navy gave notice that it was planning to expand the 

24Pub. L. No. 91-190 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347). Under the 

act, federal agencies must assess the effects of major federal actions—those they 

propose to carry out or to permit—that significantly affect the environment. The act has 

two principal purposes: (1) to ensure that an agency carefully considers detailed 

information concerning significant environmental impacts and (2) to ensure that this 

information will be made available to the public. 

25Department of the Navy, Final Environmental Impact Statement: Guam and CNMI 

Military Relocation: Relocating Marines from Okinawa, Visiting Aircraft Carrier Berthing, 

and Army Air and Missile Defense Task Force (July 2010). 

26The Departments of the Navy and Army released a Record of Decision in September 

2010, which announced their decision to proceed with the Guam and the Commonwealth 

of the Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation. See Departments of the Navy and 

Army, Record of Decision for Guam and CNMI Military Relocation (Sept. 2010); 75 Fed. 

Reg. 60,438 (Sept. 30, 2010). 

27See 77 Fed. Reg. 6,787 (Feb. 9, 2012).
 

Page 13 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

scope of the ongoing Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement 

evaluating locations for the live-fire training range complex, to determine 

the potential environmental consequences from construction and 

operation of a main cantonment area, including family housing, and 

associated infrastructure on Guam to support the recently revised 

realignment plan.28 According to Marine Corps officials, the Supplemental 

Environmental Impact Statement is expected to be completed by 2014, 

and it is anticipated that a final decision on all matters being evaluated will 

be released by 2015.29

DOD, using costing data derived from previous cost estimates for Guam, 

estimates that the total cost to relocate Marines to Guam as part of the 

realignment plan will be $8.6 billion in fiscal year 2012 dollars. According 

to DOD officials, the government of Japan is expected to provide 

approximately $3.1 billion for this realignment.

The Joint Guam Program Office, which was 

established by the Navy in August 2006, leads this effort.

30

 

28See 77 Fed. Reg. 61,746 (Oct. 11, 2012).

As of June 2012, the 

United States had received $833.90 million from the Government of 

Japan for this initiative; however, provisions in the National Defense 

Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013 restricted the use of 

funds provided by the government of Japan to implement the realignment 

from Okinawa to Guam until DOD provided certain information to the 

29A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 prohibited 

DOD from establishing a live-fire training range complex in Guam (including any 

construction or lease of lands related to such establishment) in coordination with the 

realignment of forces in the Pacific until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the 

congressional defense committees that there is a military training and readiness 

requirement for the complex. See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 2831. Section 2831 is reprinted 

in app. III of this report.

30Under a 2009 agreement implementing the 2006 Roadmap, the government of Japan 

had agreed to provide up to $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2008 dollars in direct cash 

contributions to support the Guam relocation, subject to certain U.S. funding. See

Agreement Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary 

Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, U.S.-Japan, art. I, ¶ 1, 

Feb. 17, 2009, Temp. State Dep’t No. 09-89. In its April 2012 statement, the Security 

Consultative Committee reaffirmed that Japan’s financial commitment would be these 

direct cash contributions. According to DOD officials, the contributions would amount to 

roughly $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2012 dollars.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

congressional defense committees.31 Although the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 restricts the use of funds, it 

contains exceptions allowing DOD to use funds to complete additional 

environmental analysis for proposed actions on Guam or Hawaii, initiate 

planning and design of construction projects at Andersen Air Force Base 

and on Andersen South, and to carry out certain military construction 

projects as specified in the act.32

As part of the current realignment plan, DOD plans to move some Marine 

Corps units to Hawaii and the continental United States. As of March 

2013, the Marine Corps has not moved any units from Okinawa to either 

Hawaii or the continental United States. Additionally, DOD plans to 

establish a rotational presence of up to a 2,500 person Marine Air Ground 

Task Force in an undetermined location in Australia. As an initial step 

toward establishing a Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Australia, the 

Marine Corps rotated approximately 200 Marines from Fox Company, 2nd 

Battalion, 3rd Marine Division from their home station at Marine Corps 

Base Hawaii, Kaneohe Bay, to Darwin, Australia for a 6-month rotation 

from April to September 2012.

The April 2012 statement noted that the United States is committed to 

returning lands on Okinawa to Japan as designated Marine Corps forces 

are relocated and as facilities become available for units and other tenant 

activities relocating to other locations on Okinawa.33

 

31See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 2832 and Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 2207. The provisions 

similarly restrained the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the respective 

National Defense Authorization Acts and contained certain exceptions. See id. See app. II 

for the text of these provisions.

Figure 3 depicts all 

U.S. installations on Okinawa and identifies which installations have been 

designated to be partially or fully returned to Japan according to the April 

2012 statement. According to the statement, the two governments will 

jointly develop a consolidation plan, including sequencing of realignment 

steps, for facilities and locations remaining in Okinawa by the end of 

32See § 2832(c).

33The facilities that would be fully returned to Japan are Marine Corps Air Station 

Futenma, Camp Kinser, Naha Port, Kuwae Tank Farm, and Camp Lester. Camp Foster 

would be partially returned.

Okinawa Consolidation
 

Page 15 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

2012.34

Figure 3: Okinawa Consolidation Plan

DOD officials said that they have not been able to estimate U.S. 

costs for the consolidation, because consolidation plans remain under 

development.

 

34Subsequent to the completion of the audit work on this engagement, in April 2013, DOD 

announced the completion and public release of the bilateral Okinawa Consolidation Plan 

for forces remaining on Okinawa.
 

Page 16 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Carrier Air Wing 5, a Navy unit paired with the aircraft carrier USS George 

Washington, is currently located at Naval Air Station Atsugi (about 35 

miles southwest of Tokyo, Japan). On the basis of the 2006 Roadmap, 

Carrier Air Wing 5 would move its headquarters and fixed-wing flight 

operations from Atsugi to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, which is 

approximately 500 miles away. As a result, Marine Corps officials expect 

that when this initiative is complete, the air station will have increased in 

size from approximately 8,000 to 14,000 personnel. The air station’s 

acreage is also expected to increase, from 1,633 to 2,900 acres.

According to Marine Corps officials, this initiative calls for 1,306 new 

structures, at an estimated cost of $3.0 billion to the government of 

Japan. The Marine Corps estimates that the cost to the U.S. government 

for this initiative in fiscal years 2013 through 2018 will be $389 million for 

operation and maintenance, procurement, and family housing operation 

costs. However, this estimate may not constitute the total cost to the 

United States because it does not include such things as U.S. Navy 

collateral equipment costs associated with Carrier Air Wing 5 facilities.

The government of Japan recently constructed a new 8,000-foot runway 

at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, which is similar to the runway 

planned for the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab (see fig. 

4). The new runway was constructed using landfill material from a nearby 

mountain and took nearly 13 years to complete. According to Marine 

Corps officials, the government of Japan contributed $2.53 billion to the 

project, while the Marine Corps contributed $9.7 million. Furthermore, 

according to Marine Corps officials, an important lesson learned from this 

runway project is that it is important to identify sufficient landfill and 

concrete sources to complete a project. Failure to do so could further 

delay construction of the runway at Camp Schwab.

Carrier Air Wing Move from 

Atsugi to Iwakuni
 

Page 17 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Figure 4: Japanese-Constructed Runway at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni

In support of the security alliance, the government of Japan provides host 

nation support to defray some of the costs of stationing U.S. forces within 

its territory and contributes to the efforts to realign U.S. forces in Japan.

Support provided through a series of Special Measures Agreements 

helps offset labor, utility, and some training costs for U.S. forces in Japan.

As part of host nation support, to defray U.S. military construction costs 

the government of Japan also constructs facilities—such as family 

housing—for U.S. forces through the Japan Facilities Improvement 

Program. According to DOD officials, this program is on a voluntary basis 

and from 1979 to April 2010 has provided over $22 billion worth of 

construction for U.S. military facilities in mainland Japan and Okinawa.

In addition to host nation support, the government of Japan provides 

funding to support the realignment of U.S. forces within and from Japan. 

The government of Japan began funding projects to implement the 

Special Action Committee on Okinawa program in 1996 and the DPRI in 

2006. These projects include land purchases and the construction of 

replacement facilities to support realignment and consolidation efforts.

Although Special Action Committee on Okinawa and DPRI realignment 

funding directly supports U.S. posture, according to U.S. Forces Japan 

officials, it is accounted for in separate government of Japan budget 

categories from host nation support.

As noted, the government of Japan has historically been a major financial 

contributor in the form of host nation support funding; however, as 

reflected in figure 5, after peaking in 1999 (at ¥276 billion), host nation 

Government of Japan Host 

Nation Support
 

Page 18 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

support funding from Japan has steadily declined. In 2010, the 

Government of Japan provided ¥187 billion, or approximately $2 billion, in 

host nation support—the lowest total since 1992.35

Figure 5: Government of Japan Host Nation Support and Realignment Funding (in Billions of Yen) from Japan Fiscal Years 

1979 to 2010

The most significant 

decline in host nation support has come from the Japan Facilities 

Improvement Program, which has declined nearly 80 percent since 1993.

According to DOD officials, much of the decline in host nation support can 

be attributed to the increase in funding for the Special Action Committee 

on Okinawa and DPRI realignment initiatives, as reflected in figure 5.

 

35¥187 billion equals about $2 billion, based on a 89.96 foreign exchange rate
 

Page 19 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Over the past several years, DOD has been conducting both U.S.- and 

Japanese-funded military construction projects on Guam to support the 

realignment.36 For example, DOD is working to improve military wharves 

at Apra Harbor to support future Marine Corps embarkation and 

disembarkation operations (see fig. 6). As of January 2013, DOD had 

expended approximately $129.8 million for military construction and 

design projects and estimated that it would need to expend an additional 

$220.8 million to complete those projects (see app. V for a list of ongoing 

projects).37

 

36 According to agency officials, the projects currently being constructed on Guam were 

being built with fiscal year 2010 and 2011 funding, and were being constructed before any 

restrictions were placed in the law.

DOD also had expended approximately $47.1 million for 

military construction and design projects using funds provided by the 

government of Japan, and had estimated that it would need to expend 

$157.6 million more to complete those projects. According to DOD 

officials, these active projects are in support of elements of the planned 

Marine Corps realignment to Guam, covered by the 2010 Record of 

Decision, and based on previously certified cost analyses, and remain 

necessary under the current realignment plan.

37For a more detailed list of projects associated with the military construction on Guam, 

see Interagency Coordination Group of Inspectors General for Guam Realignment Annual 

Report (Feb. 1, 2013).

DPRI-Related Construction 

Under Way on Guam
 

Page 20 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Figure 6: Apra Harbor Wharf Improvements

Although DOD has developed a preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude 

cost estimate for its current plan to relocate Marines from Okinawa and 

realign them to Guam and other locations in the Pacific, it is not reliable, 

because it is missing costs and is based on limited data. According to 

DOD officials, DOD has not yet been able to put together a more reliable 

cost estimate for its current plan, because it will not have the information 

needed to do so until the completion of several key studies, including 

environmental analyses for Guam and Hawaii. In addition, host nation 

negotiations—specifically those with the government of Australia—have 

not been completed. As part of its preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude 

cost estimate, DOD currently estimates that it would cost approximately 

$12.1 billion to implement the current realignment plan—not including the 

Australia segment of the realignment. However, this estimate is not 

reliable because it omits potentially critical cost elements and risk 

parameters tied to the assumptions, and lacks detailed information on 

requirements for several key cost components that are needed to capture 

all costs related to the realignment. GAO’s cost estimation guide specifies 

four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate—the extent to which an 

DOD’s Initial Estimate 

for the Current 

Marine Corps 

Realignment Plan Is 

Not Reliable
 

Page 21 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

estimate is comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible. We 

found DOD’s estimate only partially meets best practices for being 

comprehensive, and according to best practices, when a cost estimate is 

not comprehensive, it cannot fully meet the other characteristics of a 

reliable cost estimate. As a result, we did not evaluate the other three 

characteristics. According to DOD officials, specific requirements and 

their associated costs cannot be developed for each cost component until 

the necessary analyses and host nation negotiations have been 

completed. Still, we found that DOD did not include some up-front 

practices that could have provided a more reliable estimate and could 

have been done despite the fact that the environmental analyses and 

host nation negotiations are not complete. For example, DOD officials 

identified mobility support as a critical component to the implementation 

of the realignment; however, no costs associated with mobility support 

were included in the estimate. Additionally, DOD based its estimate on 

several assumptions, but there was no evidence that DOD identified risk 

impacts or parameters for any of these assumptions. Overall, the cost 

components not fully addressed in the current estimate include the Guam 

physical layout and requirements; the housing requirements on Guam; 

the requirements to upgrade utilities and infrastructure on Guam; the Joint 

Training Range Complex in the Northern Marianas; the Marine Corps 

requirements for Australia; the Marine Corps requirements for Hawaii and 

other U.S. locations; and mobility support. In addition, DOD continues to 

seek funding for utilities and infrastructure projects on Guam that once 

supported the original Marine Corps realignment plan. DOD officials 

believe that some of these projects should not be affected by the current 

realignment plan. However, assessments to determine the extent to 

which these projects remain valid for the current realignment plan have 

not been completed. As a result, it is unknown to what extent these 

projects need adjusting, if at all, to support the new realignment plan.

Although DOD officials expect to develop a more reliable estimate as the 

necessary environmental analyses are completed and host nation 

negotiations have been finalized, they have not determined when this 

estimate will be available for Congress.

DOD has revised its plans and updated its cost estimates several times to 

relocate Marines from Okinawa and realign them to other locations in the 

Pacific. Table 1 lists the significant features, the number of Marines 

expected to leave Okinawa, and the estimated costs associated with its 

plans.

DOD’s Estimates for Prior 

Realignment Plans Were 

More Detailed than the 

Estimate for the Current 

Plan
 

Page 22 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Table 1: History of DOD’s Plans and Estimates for the Realignment of Marines

Plan Significant feature

Planned 

number of 

Marines 

leaving 

Okinawa

Anticipated 

United 

States share 

of cost 

(dollars in 

billions)

Anticipated 

Japan share 

of Guam 

cost (dollars 

in billions)

Total 

estimated 

cost (dollars 

in billions)

Original 

Realignment Plan 

(2006)a

• Establish large Marine Corps presence on 

Guam.

• Mostly Headquarter units relocate to Guam.

8,000 $4.2 $6.1 $10.3 

Original 

Realignment Plan 

Revised Cost 

Estimate (2010)b

 

• Establish large Marine Corps presence on 

Guam.

• Mostly headquarters units relocate to Guam.

• Estimate includes more cost elements not 

included in prior estimate.

8,600 c $12.7 $6.3 $19 

Current 

Realignment Plan 

(2012)b

 

• Establish Marine Air-Ground Task Forces on 

Guam and in Australia, and relocate some units 

to Hawaii and the continental United States.

• Smaller Marine Corps presence in Guam than 

in previous plans.

• Includes estimated costs for operation and 

maintenance and procurement for Defense 

Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) activities at 

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni and the 

Futenma Replacement Facility initiative on 

Okinawa.

9,500 $9 d $3.1 $12.1d

Source: DOD.

a

Estimates are in fiscal year 2008 dollars. 

b

Estimates are in fiscal year 2012 dollars. 

c

Although the 2006 Roadmap concerning the Guam realignment referred to approximately 8,000 

personnel, the Record of Decision for the Guam and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 

Military Relocation referred to approximately 8,600 Marines. See Department of Navy and 

Department of the Army, Record of Decision for Guam and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 

Islands Military Relocation (September 2010). 

d

The $9 billion and $12.1 billion figures do not include costs for Australia. 

As noted in table 1, under the original realignment plan developed in 

2006, the III Marine Expeditionary Force would have moved most of its 

headquarters elements from Okinawa to Guam, but not the other 

elements, such as ground forces and aviation units, that are needed to 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

create a full Marine Air-Ground Task Force capability.38 In 2010, DOD 

developed a revised cost estimate, referred to as the Original 

Realignment Plan Revised Cost Estimate (see table 1). This estimate is 

based on planning, studies, and defined facilities requirements and 

included additional cost elements, such as operation and maintenance, 

procurement, overseas housing allowance, and family housing and 

operations. 39

In April 2012, DOD briefed its current realignment plan to the 

congressional defense committees. The current realignment plan calls for 

the establishment of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces in Guam and 

Hawaii, and a rotational presence in Australia. In 2012, DOD officials 

developed a preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimate for the 

current realignment plan, which relocates fewer troops to Guam and 

realigns Marines to other locations in the Pacific. This preliminary roughorder-of-magnitude estimate for the current plan, which was briefed to 

congressional defense committees in the spring of 2012, is $12.1 billion; 

however, this estimate does not include any potential costs for the 

Australia segment of the realignment. Table 2 provides more locationspecific information on cost estimates and personnel breakdown for the 

current realignment plan.

On the basis of this more detailed analysis, DOD’s estimate 

for the original realignment plan increased from $10.3 billion in 2006 to 

$19 billion in 2010. Marine Corps officials told us they believed that not 

having a full Marine Air-Ground Task Force capability on Guam, a feature 

of the original realignment plan, would have hindered the Marines’ ability 

to properly train or deploy as a combined-arms force. Therefore, between 

2010 and 2012, DOD examined different options for realigning Marines in 

the Pacific. Although different options were considered, the costs 

remained significant to the United States and no option was officially 

adopted.

 

38Specifically designed for swift deployment of Marine forces by air, land, or sea, the 

Marine Air-Ground Task Force provides a broad spectrum of response options when the 

nation’s interests are threatened. Coordinating a balanced team of ground, air, and 

logistics assets under a central command, these self-sustained, combined-arms forces 

conduct the full range of operations. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces can be tailored in 

size and capability to meet the needs of each mission. 

39In GAO’s May 2011 report, GAO-11-316, DOD identified over $13 billion in potential 

costs to the United States associated with the realignment of Marines.
 

Page 24 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Table 2: Breakdown of Costs and Marine Corps Distribution for Current 

Realignment Plan

Guam Hawaii Australia

Continental 

United States Japan Total

Total estimated cost 

(dollars in billions)

$8.6 $2.5 n/a $0.4 $0.6 $12.1b

Planned number of 

Marines once 

realignment completed 

(approximate figures)

4,700 8,800 2,500 800 a 15,000 31,000

Source: DOD.

a

The 800 number reflects the total number of Marines moving to the continental United States due to 

the Realignment of Marines initiative. It does not reflect the total number of Marines in the continental 

United States, whereas the other figures represent an approximate total population. 

b

The $12.1 billion figure does not include costs for Australia. 

DOD officials informed us that the estimate for the current realignment 

plan is lower than estimates for prior plans because of several factors.

One factor is that more Marines, approximately 1,300, will remain in 

Okinawa than in previous plans, resulting in overall lower operation and 

maintenance costs. For example, on Guam and Hawaii, the United States 

will likely assume full responsibility for such things as labor and utilities 

costs, whereas the government of Japan provides significant host nation 

support for these two cost categories in Japan. Since more Marines will 

remain on Okinawa, operation and maintenance costs will not be as 

significant, causing the overall cost estimate to likely go down. Another 

factor is a reduction in expected military construction costs on Guam.

According to DOD officials, since approximately 5,000 fewer Marines are 

expected to relocate to Guam, and most of those who do will be deployed 

on a rotational basis, there will be a reduced demand for additional 

facilities and housing. Furthermore, DOD officials stated that the area 

cost factor for Guam had declined in 2011, helping to reduce the overall 

cost estimate.40

 

40The area cost factor is used by planners to adjust average historical facility costs to a 

specific project location, taking into consideration the costs of construction material, labor, 

and equipment, along with factors such as weather, climate, seismic conditions, 

mobilization, overhead and profit, labor availability, and labor productivity for each area.

DOD officials believe the cost estimate for the current 

realignment plan will be lower than the estimates for previous plans. 

However, DOD has not been able to apply the same rigor as was used in 

developing previous estimates because, unlike for previous estimates, 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

key studies, like environmental analyses, and host nation negotiations 

that will affect requirements have not yet been completed.

According to documentation attached to DOD’s fiscal year 2013 budget,

DOD cannot continue the practice of starting programs that prove to be 

unaffordable. Therefore, DOD plans to achieve program affordability by 

working to ensure that programs start with firm cost goals in place, 

appropriate priorities set, and necessary trade-offs made to keep them 

within affordable limits. Furthermore, this documentation states that 

understanding and controlling future costs from a program’s inception is 

critical to achieving the goal of affordability.41 According to GAO’s Cost 

Estimating and Assessment Guide, whether or not a program is 

affordable depends a great deal on the quality of its cost estimate.42 A 

reliable cost estimate is critical to the success of any government 

program, because it provides the basis for informed investment decision 

making, realistic budget formulation and program resourcing, and 

meaningful progress measurement. Office of Management and Budget 

guidance containing best practices indicates that programs should 

maintain current and well-documented estimates of program costs.43 In 

addition, our research has identified a number of best practices that 

provide a basis for effective program cost estimating and should result in 

reliable cost estimates that an organization can use to make informed 

decisions. These practices can be organized into the four characteristics 

of a reliable cost estimate. The cost estimate should be comprehensive, 

well-documented, accurate, and credible, as explained in table 3.

 

41Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Overview 

– FY 2013 Defense Budget (February 2012). 

42GAO, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

43See Office of Management and Budget, Capital Programming Guide: Supplement to 

OMB Circular A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition of Capital Assets, app. 8 (V 3.0, 

July 2012).

DOD’s Estimate for the 

Current Realignment Plan 

Is Not Reliable
 

Page 26 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Table 3: Four Characteristics of a Reliable Cost Estimate

Characteristic Explanation

Comprehensive The cost estimate should include both government and contractor costs of the program over its full life cycle, 

from inception of the program through design, development, deployment, and operation and maintenance, to 

retirement of the program. It should also completely define the program, reflect the current schedule, and be 

technically reasonable. Comprehensive cost estimates should be structured in sufficient detail (at least three 

levels of cost elements) to ensure that costs are neither omitted nor double counted.a Specifically, the cost 

estimate should be based on a product-oriented work breakdown structure that allows a program to track cost 

and schedule by defined deliverables, such as hardware or software components. Finally, where information 

is limited and judgments must be made, the cost estimate should document all cost-influencing ground rules 

and assumptions. 

Well-documented A good cost estimate—while taking the form of a single number—is supported by detailed documentation that 

describes how it was derived and how the expected funding will be spent in order to achieve a given 

objective. Therefore, the documentation should capture in writing such things as the source data used, the 

calculations performed and their results, and the estimating methodology used to derive each work 

breakdown structure element’s cost. Moreover, this information should be captured in such a way that the 

data used to derive the estimate can be traced back to and verified against their sources so that the estimate 

can be easily replicated and updated. The documentation should also discuss the technical baseline 

description and how the data were normalized. Finally, the final cost estimate should be reviewed and 

accepted by management on the basis of confidence in the estimating process and the estimate produced by 

the process. 

Accurate The cost estimate should provide for results that are unbiased, and it should not be overly conservative or 

optimistic. An estimate is accurate when it is based on an assessment of most likely costs, adjusted properly 

for inflation, and contains few, if any, minor mistakes. In addition, the estimate should be grounded in a 

historical record of cost estimating and actual experiences on other comparable programs. Finally, a cost 

estimate should be updated regularly to reflect material changes in the program, such as when schedules or 

other assumptions change, and actual costs, so that it is always reflecting current status.

Credible The cost estimates should discuss any limitations of the analysis because of uncertainty or biases 

surrounding data or assumptions. Major assumptions should be varied, and other outcomes recomputed to 

determine how sensitive they are to changes in the assumptions (i.e., sensitivity analysis). A risk and 

uncertainty analysis should be performed to determine the level of risk associated with the estimate. For 

management to make good decisions, the program estimate must reflect the degree of uncertainty, so that a 

level of confidence can be given about the estimate. Having a range of costs around a point estimate is more 

useful to decision makers because it conveys the level of confidence in achieving the most likely cost and 

also informs them on cost, schedule, and technical risks.b

 Further, the estimate’s results should be crosschecked, and an independent cost estimate conducted by a group outside the acquiring organization should 

be developed to determine whether other estimating methods produce similar results. 

Source: GAO.

a

The appropriate number of levels for a work breakdown structure varies from program to program 

and depends on a program’s complexity and risk. However, each work breakdown structure should, 

at the very least, include three levels. The first level represents the program as a whole and therefore 

contains only one element—the program’s name. The second level contains the major program 

segments, and level three contains the lower-level components or subsystems for each segment. 

b

A point estimate is the most likely value for the cost estimate, given the underlying data. The level of 

confidence for the point estimate is the probability that the point estimate will actually be met. For 

example, if the confidence level for a point estimate is 80 percent, there is an 80 percent chance that 

the final cost will be at or below the point estimate and a 20 percent chance that costs will exceed the 

point estimate. 

Our assessment of DOD’s preliminary estimate for the current 

realignment plan is that it is not reliable, because it is missing costs and 
 

Page 27 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

based on limited data. To arrive at this conclusion, we assessed DOD’s 

preliminary estimate against one of the four characteristics of a reliable 

cost estimate, comprehensiveness. As shown in table 4, we found that 

the preliminary estimate only minimally met best practices for being 

comprehensive.44

Table 4: Summary Assessment of DOD’s Current Realignment Cost Estimate Compared to Best Practices for Comprehensive 

Cost Estimates

According to best practices, when a cost estimate is not 

comprehensive, it cannot fully meet the other characteristics of a reliable 

cost estimate. For example, because the cost estimate is missing some 

cost elements, the documentation is incomplete, and since the 

requirements for the realignment are still being determined, the estimate 

cannot be considered accurate. Finally, the cost estimate is not credible 

because it does not include a full risk and uncertainty analysis, and the 

potential exists that some of the costs have been underestimated. Table 4 

provides a summary of our assessment of DOD’s preliminary cost 

estimate.

Detailed best practice Detailed assessment summary Assessment

Cost estimate includes all costs The estimate for the current realignment plan does not include all costs; instead, it 

includes some detailed cost elements from a previous cost estimate for Guam and 

relies on a high-level cost factor to estimate military construction, and operation 

and maintenance costs in other locations.

• The current estimate does not include detailed requirements for all aspects of 

the plan and is missing some cost elements because it was a preliminary 

rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimate. In addition, the current estimate 

omitted the cost of providing and supporting additional lift capabilities such as 

the procurement of the Joint High Speed Vessel (as well as other mobility 

costs to support the relocation).

• The cost estimates for realigning Marines to other geographic locations like 

Australia, Hawaii, and the continental United States were not determined 

using detailed requirements and facilities planning, but instead were 

developed using a high-level cost factor based on Guam cost data from a 

previous plan. This estimating approach did not provide the necessary details 

to determine if all military construction, and operation and maintenance costs 

were accounted for in the current realignment plan cost estimate.

Unless estimates account for all costs, they cannot enhance decision making by 

allowing for design trade-off studies to be evaluated on a total cost basis. Without 

Partially Met

 

44For this analysis, we focused only on the comprehensive characteristic. The cost 

estimate under review is a preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude estimate. Since the 

Marine Corps and DOD do not consider this a “budget-quality” estimate and had intended 

to use it for bilateral negotiations and assessment of alternatives instead of as the basis of 

budget requests, we determined that it was not necessary to perform a more in-depth 

review at this time.
 

Page 28 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Detailed best practice Detailed assessment summary Assessment

fully accounting for all costs, organizations will have difficulty successfully 

planning program resource requirements and making informed decisions.

Cost estimate completely 

defines the program, reflects the 

current schedule, and is 

technically reasonable

The current estimate does not include a document that contains a documented 

technical baseline description, but technical details are available in other sources. 

For example, one document outlines the number of Marines to be relocated from 

Okinawa, and realigned to Guam and other locations. However, these technical 

details are incomplete or remain unknown, because DOD has not been able to 

perform the necessary planning and assessments until certain environmental 

analyses and host nation negotiations have been completed. As a result, DOD 

cannot yet fully account for the requirements and costs associated with the 

following seven cost components:

1. Guam Physical Layout and Requirements;

2. Housing Requirements on Guam;

3. Requirements to Upgrade Utilities and Infrastructure on Guam;

4. Joint Training Range Complex in the Northern Marianas;

5. Marine Corps Requirements for Australia;

6. Marine Corps Requirements for Hawaii and Other U.S. Locations; and

7. Mobility Support.

Since specific technical details and any risks associated with them are not yet 

available, the cost estimate technical baseline is not sufficiently mature. Until this 

work is completed, and detailed master planning for all locations is completed, an 

accurate and refined cost estimate of budget quality cannot be prepared.

The key to developing a credible estimate is having an adequate understanding of 

the technical definition and characteristics associated with the program. Without 

these data, the cost estimator will not be able to identify the technical and 

program parameters that will bind the cost estimate and the quality of the cost 

estimate will be compromised.

Minimally Met

Cost estimate Work Breakdown 

Structure is product oriented,

traceable to the statement of

work, and at an appropriate

level of detail to ensure that cost 

elements are neither omitted 

nor double-counted

The current estimate breaks costs down into two main levels: military construction 

and non-military construction. Non-military construction costs include operation 

and maintenance, procurement requirements, and—for the Guam realignment—

utilities and infrastructure upgrades. A detailed breakdown of costs exists for the 

Guam realignment, but this breakdown was developed for a previous realignment

plan. Up-to-date and comprehensive cost breakdowns do not exist for Guam or 

the other locations under the current plan.

DOD officials said that a more detailed breakdown of costs for the current 

realignment plan would not be available until certain environmental analyses and 

host nation negotiations are completed.

Without a breakdown of costs at an appropriate level, we cannot determine if all 

cost elements have been included. In addition, the program lacks a framework to 

develop a schedule and cost plan that can easily track technical accomplishments 

in terms of resources spent in relation to the plan as well as completion of 

activities and tasks.

Minimally Met

Cost estimate documents all 

cost-influencing ground rules 

and assumptions

DOD provided us documentation of its planning assumptions for the current 

realignment plan. These assumptions include, but are not limited to:

• area cost factors for Guam, Hawaii, Australia and the continental United 

States;

• a non-military construction cost factor;

• utilities and infrastructure costs of $600 million for Guam civil military utilities;

Minimally Met
 

Page 29 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Detailed best practice Detailed assessment summary Assessment

• the number of months required to complete various environmental studies; 

and

• the number of personnel that would be realigned including which ones would 

be have a permanent change of station versus those who would be unitdeployed.

However, we found no historical data to support all of DOD’s assumptions, and no 

evidence that risk impacts resulting from assumptions changing were identified. In 

addition, none of the assumptions discussed included items such as additional lift 

capabilities needed to support the Marine Corps realignment.

Because assumptions are best guesses, the risks associated with any of these 

assumptions changing need to be identified and assessed. Unless ground rules 

and assumptions are clearly documented, the cost estimate will not have a basis 

for areas of potential risk to be resolved.

Overall Assessment Minimally Met

Source: GAO.

As discussed in table 4, we found that DOD’s preliminary rough-order-ofmagnitude estimate does not fully include requirements and associated 

costs for all segments of the realignment plan, because this information 

will not become available until several environmental analyses and 

specific host nation negotiations are completed. While the reason for the 

missing requirements and their associated costs is understandable, we 

also found that DOD omitted specific costs and risk data that could have 

resulted in a more reliable estimate and are not dependent on completion 

of the environmental analyses and host nation negotiations. Most notably, 

the estimate did not include any costs for mobility support, a component 

that DOD officials said was necessary for the implementation of the 

realignment. According to some DOD officials we spoke to, the potential 

cost for additional mobility support could be considerable. In addition, we 

found that the estimate was based on several assumptions, but there was 

no evidence that DOD identified risk impacts or parameters for any of 

these assumptions. For example, DOD assumed it would need $600 

million to cover utilities and infrastructure costs for Guam. There were no 

risk parameters put on this assumption indicating the estimate could be 

higher or lower. Considering that historical data from previous 

realignment plans estimated utilities and infrastructure costs for Guam at 

over $1 billion, risk parameters could have identified the potential for 

higher costs to DOD. Overall, we found that the preliminary estimate does 

not adequately reflect the program because it cannot yet fully account for 

the requirements and costs associated with the following seven cost 

components:

1. Guam Physical Layout and Requirements.
 

Page 30 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

2. Housing Requirements on Guam.

3. Requirements to Upgrade Utilities and Infrastructure on Guam.

4. Joint Training Range Complex in the Northern Marianas.

5. Marine Corps Requirements for Australia.

6. Marine Corps Requirements for Hawaii and Other U.S. Locations.

7. Mobility Support.

We discuss each of the seven cost areas in more detail below.

DOD does not yet know the full facilities requirements for Guam or 

potential environmental mitigations; therefore, it does not have sufficient 

information to determine the full costs of building the facilities and training 

ranges needed to support the Guam segment of the realignment. The 

cost estimate for the Guam segment of the current realignment plan—

including the cost of establishing training ranges in the Commonwealth of 

the Northern Mariana Islands and investing in local civilian 

infrastructure—is approximately $8.6 billion, of which a portion will be 

funded by the government of Japan.45

 

45Under a 2009 agreement implementing the 2006 Roadmap, the Government of Japan 

had agreed to provide up to $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2008 dollars in direct cash 

contributions to support the Guam relocation, subject to certain U.S. funding. See

Agreement Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary 

Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, U.S.-Japan, art. I, ¶ 1, 

Feb. 17, 2009, Temp. State Dep’t No. 09-89. In its April 2012 statement, the Security 

Consultative Committee reaffirmed that Japan’s financial commitment would be these 

direct cash contributions. According to DOD officials, the contributions would amount to 

roughly $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2012 dollars. 

However, this estimate does not 

fully capture the total costs of the Guam segment of the realignment, 

because DOD has not determined the physical layout of the Marine Corps 

presence on Guam, or fully identified specific infrastructure requirements 

yet. To estimate the costs for the Guam portion of the realignment, DOD 

officials assumed that the main Marine Corps installation, or cantonment, 

would be constructed at Finegayan (an area in the northern part of Guam 

just south of Andersen Air Force Base), and that the training range 

requirements would not have changed from those in prior plans.

However, since the current plan calls for fewer Marines to relocate to 

Guam, and the composition of the Marine units that will relocate has 

changed, different locations might be selected for the main Marine Corps 

cantonment and live-fire training ranges. Those locations under 

Guam Physical Layout and 

Requirements 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

consideration include military space at Andersen Air Force Base and 

Naval Base Guam. As of January 2013, DOD is assessing alternatives 

and the possible effects that the current plan might have on Guam’s 

infrastructure and on the environment in order to develop the 

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement. The results of DOD’s 

assessments could affect where DOD builds, what the facilities 

requirements will be, and what environmental mitigations DOD might 

take. DOD officials told us that they will wait until this environmental 

impact statement is completed before proceeding with any further 

planning and assessments that may be needed to identify specific 

requirements.

DOD does not know the minimum level of government-provided housing 

needed to accommodate the relocated Marines and to inform its housing 

investment strategies to ensure that the housing needs of 

servicemembers and their families are cost-effective on Guam. Of the 

$8.6 billion estimate for the Guam segment of the current realignment 

plan, DOD includes approximately $400 million to construct military 

housing for Marines on Guam; however, DOD has not performed the 

necessary housing analysis to validate this estimate yet, nor has it 

determined how Navy housing policies and Joint Region Marianas 

housing practices will affect Marine Corps housing requirements.

According to Joint Region Marianas officials, Joint Region Marianas is 

responsible for maintaining and sustaining housing on Guam. In 2010, 

DOD performed an analysis to determine the minimum level of 

government-provided military housing needed to serve both 

unaccompanied and accompanied servicemembers on Guam. However, 

this analysis was based on the original realignment plan and is no longer 

valid. The current realignment plan involves a smaller population and will 

consist primarily of rotational personnel. Navy officials told us that a 

realistic housing analysis indentifying construction requirements for the 

Guam segment of the realignment would not be able to be determined 

until closer to the time when Marine Corps families are expected to move 

to Guam, which is not expected for another 10 years. In the interim, 

Marine Corps officials have said that they will plan to build to 100 percent 

of the Marine Corps’ housing requirement on Guam, an assumption that 

will be used while completing necessary environmental reviews for the 

Guam segment of the realignment. According to Joint Region Marianas 

officials, their organization does not have the authority or responsibility to 

determine how much housing the Marine Corps should build on Guam.

Housing Requirements on 

Guam
 

Page 32 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Navy housing policy is to encourage and rely on private-sector housing 

whenever possible.46 Along these lines, the practice of Joint Region 

Marianas is to rely on the private sector for housing for servicemembers 

whenever possible.47

 

46See Commander Navy Installations Command, Navy Housing Eligibility, Assignment, 

and Termination Criteria, Instruction 5009.5, para. 4 (May 13, 2008).

A majority of the current Navy and Air Force 

servicemembers choose to live in private housing on Guam. Joint Region 

Marianas officials were uncertain what the effects would be if the Marine 

Corps proceeds with building 100 percent of the housing it needs for the 

relocated Marines, and whether the Marine Corps would attempt to 

prohibit Marines from living in private, off-base housing. Furthermore, 

according to DOD officials, if the decision is to house Marines on any 

existing installations on Guam, such as Andersen Air Force Base or 

Naval Base Guam, additional support infrastructure, such as dining 

facilities and gymnasiums, will likely be required. Joint Region Marianas 

also has a surplus of unoccupied military housing that could potentially be 

used to house Marines (see fig. 7 for photographs of select unoccupied 

military housing units on Guam). Unoccupied housing will be discussed in 

greater detail later in this report.

47However, Joint Region Marianas has made a determination that adequate housing in 

sufficient quantity to accommodate civilian employees is not available from the private 

sector on Guam. See Joint Region Marianas, Region Family Housing, Eligibility, 

Assignment and Governance, Instruction 11101.2, para. 7.b (Sept. 30, 2009).
 

Page 33 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Figure 7: Unoccupied Military Housing on Guam

DOD has not updated its list of utilities and infrastructure requirements 

that is tied to the current realignment plan; therefore DOD does not have 

an accurate estimate of how much it will cost to upgrade Guam’s utilities 

and infrastructure to support the planned Marine Corps presence on the 

island. These public infrastructure requirements include utilities and 

infrastructure improvements, as well as projects to augment public health 

and social services, and mitigate the social, economic, cultural, and 

environmental effects of the Marine Corps realignment to Guam. In June 

2009, we reported that DOD had determined that existing utilities and 

infrastructure on Guam were near or at their maximum capacities already, 

and would require significant enhancements to support the increase in the 

island’s population expected under the original realignment plan.48

 

48See GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Planning Challenges Could Increase Risks for DOD 

in Providing Utility Services When Needed to Support the Military Buildup on Guam, 

In 

addition, during the development of the 2010 Final Environmental Impact 

Statement, DOD, the Guam Waterworks Authority, and the U.S. 

GAO-09-653 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2009). 

Requirements to Upgrade 

Utilities and Infrastructure on 

Guam
 

Page 34 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Environmental Protection Agency developed a list of water and 

wastewater projects to address deficiencies in Guam’s water and 

wastewater infrastructure and respond to the increased population driven 

by the original realignment plan.49 This list of projects, estimated to cost 

approximately $1.3 billion, spanned the first 5 years of an overall 30-year 

$5.3 billion capital improvement plan. The government of Japan was 

expected to provide $600 million of the needed $1.3 billion, with the 

remainder to be provided by DOD. Funding outside this 5-year timeframe 

was expected to be covered by the government of Guam and non-DOD 

federal government agencies. According to DOD Office of Economic 

Adjustment officials, although other federal agencies, such as the 

Department of the Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs, could help fund these 

improvements on Guam, as of February 2013, there has been no 

financial assistance for these projects from non-DOD agencies.50

Although $1.3 billion in water and wastewater projects were connected to 

the original realignment plan, the Marine Corps, as part of the $8.6 billion 

estimate for the Guam segment of the current realignment plan, only 

identified $600 million for all utilities and infrastructure. According to 

Marine Corps officials, this $600 million was to only fund water and 

wastewater projects that the government of Japan was previously 

expected to finance, but is no longer obligated to pay for as a result of the 

adjustments to the 2006 Roadmap announced in April 2012. Marine 

Corps officials also said that the decision to include only $600 million was 

a planning decision and not based on any updated analysis of public 

infrastructure requirements for the current realignment plan. These same 

officials said that any updated analysis would not be available until the 

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Guam was completed.

According to Office of Economic Adjustment officials, no matter how 

many Marines relocate to Guam, significant improvements to the water 

and wastewater infrastructure will be necessary; many of these 

improvements are included in the $1.3 billion water and wastewater 

 

49See Departments of the Navy and Army, Record of Decision for Guam and 

Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation (September 2010). 

50The Office of Economic Adjustment is DOD’s primary source for assisting communities 

that are adversely affected by defense program changes, including base closures or 

realignments, base expansions, and contract or program cancellations. This office 

manages the Defense Economic Adjustment Program, and coordinates the involvement of 

other federal agencies to assist affected communities.
 

Page 35 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

infrastructure improvement estimate that was linked to the original 

realignment plan.

DOD plans and designs for a joint training range complex on Tinian and 

Pagan in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands have yet to 

be finalized, and the costs for this complex are not fully known. To 

support the original realignment plan, DOD developed plans and designs 

for live-fire training ranges on Tinian and Pagan, since not all training 

could be accommodated by the proposed live-fire training ranges on 

Guam. DOD also conducted several studies to identify training shortfalls 

in the region and determined the Marine Corps training requirements for 

units designated for realignment to Guam. According to Marine Corps 

officials, these plans and requirement studies have been under review 

since August 2012, and the studies have been updated to reflect the 

changes made under the current realignment plan. Marine Corps officials 

said that they intend to reexamine their plans and designs as they 

prepare an updated environmental impact statement for this complex; this 

environmental impact statement will be a separate effort from the Guam 

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, and, according to DOD 

officials, will be entitled the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas 

Joint Military Training Environmental Impact Statement. For the joint 

training range complex environmental impact statement, Marine Corps 

officials plan to examine alternatives and identify environmental 

mitigations needed to proceed with the development of the complex.

Marine Corps officials anticipate issuing a Record of Decision by early 

2016.

As part of the $8.6 billion estimate for the Guam segment of the current 

realignment plan, DOD identifies military construction costs for the 

complex to be approximately $800 million. However, this estimate does 

not include updated costs associated with environmental mitigations or 

operation and maintenance associated with the current realignment plan.

For example, Marine Corps officials said that developing an amphibious 

landing training area on Tinian could require coral realignment, which 

could cost approximately $10 million (see fig. 8 for photographs of select 

proposed amphibious landing training areas). According to these same 

officials, the Marine Corps will need to wait until environmental analyses 

are completed before fully determining the costs for environmental 

mitigations associated with the complex. Additionally, the Marine Corps 

estimated some operation and maintenance costs to maintain and sustain 

the complex under previous realignment plans, but has not updated these 

estimates based on the current plan. According to Marine Corps officials, 

there are currently no permanent DOD training facilities on Tinian, but the 

Joint Training Range Complex 

in the Northern Marianas
 

Page 36 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Marine Corps intends to build permanent facilities to store equipment and 

house civilians and servicemembers deployed to the island to train.

Furthermore, DOD has not developed a Concept of Operations for the 

complex, which could be used to determine other associated costs, such 

as transportation to and from the island.

Figure 8: Proposed Locations for Amphibious Landing Training on Tinian

DOD has developed some initial, rough-order-of-magnitude cost 

estimates to establish a rotational presence of approximately 2,500 

Marines in Australia; however, these cost estimates cannot be considered 

comprehensive, because they are not based on finalized plans or 

requirements. According to Marine Corps officials, facility requirements 

for the Marine Corps have been provided to the government of Australia; 

however, nothing has been finalized because there has yet to be a formal 

agreement on host nation support options for the provided 

requirements.51

 

51According to Marine Corps and State Department officials, as of March 2013, there is no 

time frame for the completion of negotiations between the United States and Australia.

In preparing to establish a rotational Marine Air-Ground 

Marine Corps Requirements for 

Australia
 

Page 37 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Task Force in Australia, the Marine Corps rotated approximately 200 

Marines to Darwin, Australia, for 6 months beginning in April 2012. DOD 

officials have also visited Australia to conduct site assessments and hold 

discussions with their Australian counterparts. According to DOD officials, 

DOD cannot finalize plans or fully determine facilities, housing, and 

training requirements until negotiations with the government of Australia 

have concluded. For example, Marine Corps officials said that the training 

requirements for Marines in Australia will not differ from those of Marines 

on Guam; therefore, officials did not know what additional infrastructure 

and support facilities in Australia, if any, would be needed to address 

these requirements. DOD officials acknowledged that the level of host 

nation support has not been determined, including Australian preferences 

for which Australian facilities will host the Marines, whether new facilities 

need to be built and by whom, and how to coordinate training ranges for 

exercises—all of which could significantly affect the costs of rotating a 

presence to Australia. Other details related to the Marine Corps presence 

will also need to be negotiated. For example, according to Marine Corps 

officials, the Marine Corps is considering prepositioning equipment in 

Australia, since it may be cost-prohibitive to transport equipment with 

each new deployment, given the costs associated with agricultural 

quarantine inspections and transportation; however, Marine Corps and 

Defense Logistics Agency officials we spoke with said it was too early to 

determine any details related to prepositioned stock because no 

requirements had been established yet.

DOD has developed some initial, rough-order-of-magnitude cost 

estimates to relocate Marines to Hawaii and the continental United 

States; however, these cost estimates cannot be considered 

comprehensive because they are not based on finalized plans or 

requirements. According to Marine Corps officials, information needed to 

help develop a comprehensive cost estimate will not be available until 

necessary environmental analyses have been completed. The Marine 

Corps and Navy have conducted initial assessments of possible locations 

to expand the Marine Corps presence in Hawaii, but facility, housing, and 

training requirements to support the realignment remain undefined.

According to Marine Corps officials, Naval Facilities Engineering 

Command Pacific is currently in the process of conducting three 

preliminary studies for the Marine Corps which will examine many 

potential options (among all DOD lands on Oahu) for basing additional 

Marine Corps Requirements for 

Hawaii and Other U.S. 

Locations
 

Page 38 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Marines in Hawaii.52

DOD did not include any estimates for mobility support in its preliminary 

estimate and could not provide sufficient information on how it intends to 

provide mobility support—which could be costly—to Marine Corps units 

once the current realignment plan has been implemented. According to 

Marine Corps officials, the current realignment plan was developed under 

the assumption that sufficient mobility capabilities would be available to 

support Marine Corps units stationed in the Pacific; however, as of 

August 2012, although DOD officials said studies looking at lift in the 

Pacific were underway, DOD had not completed any studies to determine 

the implications for mobility of distributing Marines to multiple locations in 

the Pacific. Marine Corps officials responsible for managing and 

implementing the current realignment plan could not provide us with 

information on how the Marines would travel to and from routine 

operations, such as training events, and contingency operations once the 

current realignment plan was implemented. As of August 2012, DOD 

officials said that the Department of the Navy was conducting a study of 

possible mobility solutions to support the current realignment. However, 

at the time of our review, the study remained in draft format and under 

review at DOD. Also, United States Transportation Command and its 

subordinate commands have not assessed the implications of the current 

realignment plan’s mobility requirements for its current operations and 

assets, because no request has been made to perform such a study.

According to United States Transportation Command Officials, they did 

not assess mobility requirements associated with distributing Marines to 

multiple locations in the Pacific in the command’s last Mobility Capability 

Requirements Study, and to their knowledge, mobility requirements 

supporting the current realignment plan were not assessed for the 

command’s current study, due to be published in summer 2013.

The Marine Corps has yet to identify possible 

locations for units relocating to the continental United States. According to 

Marine Corps officials, before the Marine Corps can relocate units to 

Hawaii and the continental United States, DOD will need to perform 

environmental analyses and develop plans.

The Marine Corps uses a variety of assets to transport personnel and 

equipment in the Pacific region. For example, the Marine Corps has in the 

 

52 Marine Corps officials told us that these preliminary studies will be complete in 

December 2013 and will inform future environmental analyses. 

Mobility Support
 

Page 39 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

past chartered the Westpac Express, a commercial shipping vessel, to 

transport personnel and equipment to various locations for training 

exercises or contingency operations. Marine Corps officials stated that 

they assumed that they would be able to use recently acquired Joint High 

Speed Vessels to transport troops and equipment. The Marine Corps can 

also use air and sea assets provided by U.S. Transportation Command.

Another option is the Amphibious Ready Group, which consists of a group 

of Navy warships, including amphibious assault and dock landing ships, 

and a landing force used to perform amphibious operations.53 The Navy 

has one forward-deployed Amphibious Ready Group stationed in Sasebo, 

Japan, that supports the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit. Pacific 

Command officials said that a possible solution would be to deploy 

another Amphibious Ready Group to the command’s area of 

responsibility, but this could be costly if new ships and supporting 

infrastructure are required. According to the Congressional Budget Office, 

the average cost of constructing an Amphibious Assault Ship54 alone is 

$4.3 billion.55

DOD civilian, military, and State Department officials have all stressed the 

importance of ensuring that sufficient mobility capabilities are available to 

support the current realignment plan. State Department officials said that 

U.S. allies in the region may become concerned with DOD’s ability to 

address threats, given the distribution of Marine Corps units across the 

Pacific region, as proposed under the current realignment plan. Military 

officials also warn that a lack of mobility capabilities could affect the ability 

of the U.S. military to both adequately train and execute missions.

 

53An Amphibious Ready Group can consist of approximately 5,000 personnel and include 

Amphibious Assault Ships, Amphibious Transport Docks, Dock Landing Ships, AV-8B 

Harrier II jets, CH-53D/E Sea Stallion Helicopters, CH-46D/E Sea Knight helicopters and 

AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters. 

54Amphibious assault ships are the second largest ships in the fleet at 40,000 tons. They 

form the centerpiece of Amphibious Ready Groups and each can carry as many as 30 

helicopters and 6 fixed-wing Harrier jump jets. 

55Estimate for LHA-6 amphibious assault ship over the 2013-2042 period. See 

Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding 

Plan (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2012). 
 

Page 40 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

DOD has sought funding to upgrade utilities and infrastructure on Guam 

prior to updating its assessment of requirements needed to support the 

personnel and facilities changes in the current realignment plan.

According to Office of Economic Adjustment officials, $106.4 million in 

funding was sought for the first stages of the Guam water and wastewater 

improvements in fiscal year 2013. In addition to the water and wastewater 

improvements, DOD sought an additional $33 million of funding for the 

completion of mental health facilities, and the construction of a public 

health laboratory on Guam in fiscal year 2013. The $33 million is the 

second half of a $66 million island-wide socioeconomic improvement plan 

coordinated through the Economic Adjustment Committee based on the 

sudden population growth associated with the original realignment plan. 56

The other $33 million, for projects that included the construction of a 

cultural repository, the purchase of school buses (for emergency 

evacuations and military dependents), and improvements to the Guam 

Mental Health and Substance Abuse Facility, was sought in fiscal year 

2012. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 

authorized appropriations for the Office of Economic Adjustment,57 but did 

not include specific authorizations for the projects. 58

 

56The Economic Adjustment Committee is chaired by the Secretary of Defense or his or 

her designee, and is made up of representatives from 22 federal agencies. The committee 

is to develop procedures for ensuring, among other things, that communities that are 

substantially and seriously affected by certain DOD actions are notified of available federal 

economic adjustment programs. The committee is also to advise, assist, and support the 

Defense Economic Adjustment Program, which assures coordinated interagency and 

intergovernmental adjustment assistance concerning defense impact problems and serves 

as a clearinghouse to exchange information among federal, state, regional, metropolitan, 

and community officials involved in the resolution of community economic adjustment 

problems, among other functions. See Exec. Order No. 12,788, 57 Fed. Reg. 2213 (Jan. 

15, 1992), amended by Exec. Order No. 13, 286, § 33, 68 Fed. Reg. 10, 619, 10,625 

(Feb. 28, 2003) and Exec. Order No. 13,378, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,413 (May 12, 2005), 

reprinted as amended in 10 U.S.C. § 2391 note. 

According to DOD 

officials, funding for these projects has been put on hold until restrictions 

57See Pub. L. No. 112-239, §§ 301, 4301.

58The restriction on use of funds for realignment, noted previously, includes a restriction 

on DOD grants, cooperative agreements, transfer of funds to another federal agency, or 

supplement of funds available in fiscal year 2012 or 2013 under federal programs 

administered by agencies other than DOD. If the Secretary of Defense determines that 

one of these actions will result in the development of public infrastructure on Guam, he 

may not carry out the grant, transfer, cooperative agreement, or supplemental funding, 

unless it is specifically authorized by law. See § 2832(b). Office of Economic Adjustment 

officials stated that they need specific authorization to spend funds for the public 

infrastructure and socioeconomic projects on Guam.

DOD Sought Funding for 

Guam Utilities and 

Infrastructure Projects in 

Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013, 

but the Request Was Not 

Revalidated on the basis of 

the Current Realignment 

Plan
 

Page 41 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

imposed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 

have been addressed.

According to Office of Economic Adjustment officials, some of the 

socioeconomic and utilities projects, such as the cultural repository, and 

water and wastewater improvements, should not be affected by the 

changes in personnel and facilities associated with the current 

realignment plan; however, some projects, such as the improvements to a 

mental health and substance abuse facility, may not be necessary due to 

fewer Marines and dependents relocating to Guam. Office of Economic 

Adjustment officials said that they intend to perform assessments, in 

conjunction with the Joint Guam Program Office, to reexamine and 

validate all utilities and infrastructure projects during DOD’s development 

of the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Guam.

However, until these assessments are completed, DOD is seeking 

funding for utilities and infrastructure projects that have either not been 

fully estimated or may no longer be needed.

DOD officials told us that they intend to develop a more reliable cost 

estimate for the current realignment plan as environmental analyses and 

host nation negotiations are completed. According to DOD officials, the 

completed analyses and finalized host nation negotiations will provide the 

necessary information needed to complete a comprehensive cost 

estimate for the current realignment plan, but DOD officials have not 

determined when this estimate will be available. They informed us that a 

more detailed estimate for the Guam realignment would require the 

completion of an ongoing environmental impact statement on Guam, 

which is expected to be completed in 2014, and a separate environmental 

impact statement for the Joint Training Range Complex on Tinian and 

Pagan, which is expected to be completed in 2015. According to DOD 

officials, the Hawaii segment of the realignment would also require an 

environmental analysis before a more detailed cost estimate could be 

performed, but as of March 2013, they did not anticipate that this analysis 

will be completed until a date beyond 2018. Furthermore, DOD officials 

do not anticipate that a more detailed estimate for Australia will be 

available until host nation negotiations are complete, but no date has 

been determined for the conclusion of these negotiations. According to 

the Office of Management and Budget guidance containing best practices 

for cost estimating in the context of capital programming, early emphasis 

A Comprehensive Cost 

Estimate for the 

Realignment of Marines in 

the Pacific May Take Years
 

Page 42 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

on cost estimating during the planning phase is critical to successful life 

cycle management of a program or project.59 This guidance recognizes 

that insufficient data and undefined risks are some of the challenges in 

estimating costs. It also notes that the cost estimating process is 

continuously updated, on the basis of the latest information available, to 

keep the estimate current, accurate, and valid. According to DOD 

officials, updated cost estimates will be developed when additional data 

from ongoing analyses are available and negotiations have been 

completed. However, until estimates are developed that address the 

seven cost components described in this report, DOD will not be able to 

provide Congress and other stakeholders with a reliable cost estimate to 

make informed funding decisions regarding the realignment of Marines.

In April 2012, DOD announced that it would be revising its previous 

Marine Corps realignment plan; however, DOD has not yet completed two 

key planning mechanisms: an integrated master plan that synchronizes 

the various realignment initiatives with all geographic segments of the 

realignment and a construction support strategy. Although DOD has 

taken initial steps to begin the master planning effort for the realignment, 

DOD has not yet been able to fully develop an integrated master plan 

synchronizing the realignment with other DPRI initiatives and laying out 

the necessary facilities, progression of construction, unit movements, and 

costs to efficiently complete the realignment. Furthermore, DOD has not 

developed a strategy to support a potential surge of simultaneous 

Japanese construction projects associated with the other DPRI initiatives 

that may occur concurrently with the realignment of Marines.

DOD is moving forward with the current realignment plan; however, 

Marine Corps officials are still determining how the projects associated 

with the Futenma Replacement Facility and Okinawa Consolidation are 

either related to or dependent on each other, and what effects these 

projects might have on the realignment of Marines. According to Marine 

Corps officials, uncertainties surrounding these initiatives and the effects 

on the realignment of Marines will exist until the government of Japan can 

 

59 Office of Management and Budget, Capital Programming Guide: Supplement to OMB 

Circular A-11: Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition of Capital Assets, App. 8 (V 3.0, July 

2012). The information in the appendix on cost estimating is based in part on GAO 

guidance.

DOD Has Not Yet 

Completed an 

Integrated Master 

Plan to Synchronize 

Realignment 

Initiatives in the 

Pacific or a Strategy 

to Support Japanese 

Construction

Effects of Other Initiatives 

in the Pacific on the 

Sequencing of the Current 

Realignment Plan Remain 

Uncertain
 

Page 43 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

provide a timeline for construction of related facilities. The Futenma 

Replacement Facility is an initiative in which Japan is constructing 

facilities and a runway to replace Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on 

Okinawa. Okinawa Consolidation is an initiative that involves returning 

land to Japan that is currently occupied by U.S. military installations and 

consolidating the remaining U.S. forces in less populated areas of 

Okinawa once Japan has constructed necessary replacement facilities.

Under the 2006 Roadmap and the 2009 agreement, these initiatives, 

along with the realignment of Marines to Guam, were directly linked 

because progress on both Okinawa Consolidation and the realignment of 

Marines was contingent on Japan making a certain level of progress 

toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility and financial 

contributions to fund development on Guam.60

According to Marine Corps officials, since the three initiatives remain 

likely to be implemented concurrently, the proper sequencing of 

movements will influence whether the Marine Corps can maintain full 

operational capability and how smoothly the realignment can be 

accomplished. However, at the time of our review, it was too early to tell 

how each of the three initiatives will affect the progress or sequencing of 

the others. For example, Marine Corps officials said that many elements 

of Okinawa Consolidation will still be contingent on substantial progress—

and in some cases completion—of the Futenma Replacement Facility at 

Camp Schwab. In the April 2012 statement, the Security Consultative 

Committee agreed that some segments of Okinawa Consolidation could 

However, as part of the 

April 2012 statement, the Security Consultative Committee decided to 

delink these initiatives, effectively no longer requiring that progress on 

constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility be made before the other 

initiatives could commence. This change, in theory, allows all three 

initiatives to move forward independently of each other; however, in 

practical terms, the three initiatives still have elements that are linked, and 

each could ultimately affect the progress of the others.

 

60The 2009 Agreement provided that the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam 

would be dependent on “tangible progress” towards the completion of the Futenma 

Replacement Facility by Japan as stipulated in the Roadmap. See Agreement Concerning 

the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and 

Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, U.S.-Japan, art. 3, Feb. 17, 2009, Temp. State 

Dep’t No. 09-89; see also Roadmap, § 1(d). Furthermore, the Roadmap provided that 

approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force Marines and dependents needed to 

relocate to Guam prior to the commencement of Okinawa Consolidation. See Roadmap, § 

1(d).
 

Page 44 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

start immediately, but the sequencing and timing of the more significant 

segments, such as those related to Marine Corps Air Station Futenma 

and Camp Schwab, were going to have to be determined through bilateral 

planning at a later date. At the time of our review, the two countries had 

not finalized a bilateral plan for Okinawa Consolidation; therefore, Marine 

Corps officials on Okinawa could only make assumptions about the 

details of the initiative.61 Furthermore, Marine Corps officials on Okinawa 

believed that unless facilities related to the realignment of Marines are 

constructed on Guam and Hawaii, significant elements of the Okinawa 

Consolidation could not progress. For example, certain Marine Corps 

units that currently reside at Camp Schwab on Okinawa would have to be 

able to relocate to either Guam or Hawaii before other units could move 

to Camp Schwab.

Since the original realignment plan in 2006, congressional committees 

have been calling for DOD to submit a master plan or other information 

regarding the realignment, including costs and schedules for projects.

However, DOD has not developed and finalized a master plan in support 

of the realignment. Congressional committees have expressed concern 

about the sweeping transformation in the Pacific, including concern 

regarding the practicality and economic viability of the realignment. In 

some instances, committees have sought a master plan or other 

information regarding the realignment of Marines before they will support 

the authorization or appropriation of certain funds to be used towards the 

implementation of the initiative. Most recently, the National Defense 

Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013 imposed restrictions 

on the use of funds to implement the realignment until DOD submits 

certain information to the congressional defense committees, including 

master plans.62

 

61Subsequent to the completion of the audit work on this report, in April 2013, DOD 

announced the completion and public release of the bilateral Okinawa Consolidation Plan 

for forces remaining on Okinawa. DOD officials are in the process of updating planning 

documents to reflect this plan.

Previous GAO reports on the original realignment plan 

62See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 2832(a)(2) and Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 2207(a)(2). Section 

2832(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 superseded and 

repealed section 2207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. The 

master plans called for by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 

would be for the construction of facilities and infrastructure to execute the Marine Corps 

distributed lay-down on Guam and Hawaii, including a detailed description of costs and 

the schedule for such construction. See § 2832(a)(2). See app. III. 

DOD Has Not Yet Been 

Able to Complete an 

Integrated Master Plan for 

the Current Realignment 

Plan
 

Page 45 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

have stressed the importance of a master plan to provide Congress with a 

complete picture of facility requirements and associated costs so that it 

can make informed funding decisions.63

In the context of acquisition, the integrated master plan is a fundamental 

management tool that is critical to performing effective planning, 

scheduling, and execution of work efforts, according to a guide prepared 

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on Integrated Master Plan and 

Master Schedule Preparation and Use.

DOD was not able to provide a 

specific time frame including when it plans to complete an overarching 

master plan in support of the current realignment plan.

64 It consists of a hierarchy of 

program events, each event supported by specific accomplishments and 

each accomplishment associated with specific criteria that must be 

satisfied for its completion. In the context of DOD installation development 

and management, master planning is a continuous, analytical process 

that involves evaluation of factors affecting the present and future 

physical development and operation of an installation.65

 

63GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of Future Overseas 

Planning Reports and Factors Affecting the Master Planning Effort for the Military Build-Up 

on Guam, 

The evaluation 

forms the basis for determination of development objectives and planning 

proposals to solve current problems and meet future needs, with each 

step or element of the process building upon the preceding step, 

providing a logical framework for the planning effort. A successful 

installation master plan provides timely and correct planning information 

and real property support for installation missions, and supports informed 

decision-making. The integrated master plan for the current realignment 

would not be an acquisition integrated master plan and, unlike an 

installation master plan, would focus on a variety of installations and 

locations. However, if developed on the basis of similar concepts, the 

realignment integrated master plan could help planners determine the 

necessary progression of Marine Corps movements, and establish a 

logical sequencing of events. It could also include all projects associated 

with each event, with the expected costs and resource requirements for 

each. Additionally, an integrated master plan for the realignment could 

GAO-08-1005 (Sept. 17, 2008).

64Department of Defense, Integrated Master Plan and Integrated Master Schedule 

Preparation and Use Guide, ver. 0.9 (Oct. 21, 2005).

65See Department of Defense, Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01: Installation Master 

Planning (May 15, 2012).
 

Page 46 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

take planners through “what if” scenarios to determine whether certain 

aspects of the realignment are actually executable.

At the time of our review, Headquarters Marine Corps, which is 

conducting the master planning process for the realignment of Marines, 

had started to develop what officials called the first step of an integrated 

master plan. This first step, called the synchronization matrix, is described 

by Headquarters Marine Corps officials as an overarching scheduling tool 

that synchronizes the various realignment initiatives and graphically 

depicts how these realignments are interconnected and affected by both 

unit movements and facilities construction. Specifically, the 

synchronization matrix attempts to synchronize other DPRI initiatives—

the Carrier Air Wing Move from Atsugi to Iwakuni, Okinawa Consolidation, 

and the Futenma Replacement Facility—with time frames and unit 

movements associated with the realignment of Marines. During the 

course of our review we spoke with Marine Corps officials from the 

Pentagon, Honolulu, and Okinawa, and heard conflicting views on the 

logical order of unit movements, the potential effects of the other DPRI 

initiatives on the realignment, and the time frames associated with each 

move. For example, Headquarters Marine Corps officials said they 

believed that fighting forces should be the first to leave Okinawa and 

relocate to Guam; however, Marine Corps officials we spoke to in 

Okinawa did not agree, stating that headquarters units should move first, 

followed by the fighting forces. According to Headquarters Marine Corps 

officials, the synchronization matrix will serve as a tool to address any 

conflicting internal views, determine how each initiative relates, and 

establish the appropriate sequencing of events needed to complete all 

realignment initiatives.

Although the synchronization matrix is an important first step of the 

integrated master plan, it is still based on several assumptions regarding 

environmental analyses, facilities planning, funding availability, and, 

where applicable, host nation support, meaning that it’s always subject to 

change. As previously discussed, since environmental analyses and host 

nation negotiations still need to be completed, Marine Corps officials have 

not developed specific projects, facility and resource requirements, and 

costs for the realignment of Marines. According to Marine Corps officials, 

once the necessary analyses and negotiations are completed for each 

geographic segment—Guam, Hawaii, Australia, and the continental 

United States—of the realignment, DOD can begin to finalize master 

plans specific for each location. Each master plan, coupled with the 

synchronization matrix, will eventually formulate an integrated master 

plan for the realignment of Marines.
 

Page 47 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

According to Marine Corps officials, they recognize the importance of the 

master planning process for the realignment of Marines; however, they 

know master plans for some geographic segments of the realignment 

may take several years to produce. DOD officials stated that they can 

only estimate when an integrated master plan can be completed, but it 

will likely be beyond the 2018 time frame. Until then, Marine Corps 

officials stated that they will continue to update the synchronization matrix 

as geostrategic events change, and analyses and negotiations conclude.

Still, without an integrated master plan that reflects not only the 

synchronization of DPRI initiatives with the realignment of Marines, but 

the projects, facility and resource requirements, and costs for all 

geographic segments of the realignment, congressional committees will 

not have a complete picture of the requirements and costs in order to 

make informed funding decisions.

With several hundred projects associated with the remaining DPRI 

initiatives in mainland Japan and on Okinawa, and the likelihood that 

these initiatives will be implemented concurrently, it remains unclear 

whether DOD would be able to support a surge of this magnitude in 

construction in Japan. Although the April 2012 Security Consultative 

Committee statement did not establish definitive time frames or identify 

start and completion dates for the Futenma Replacement Facility, 

Okinawa Consolidation, or the realignment of Marines, DOD officials have 

stated that it is likely all three of these initiatives will proceed concurrently 

with the ongoing DPRI initiative to relocate a carrier air wing from Naval 

Base Atsugi to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in mainland Japan. It is 

anticipated that the government of Japan will fund and construct the 

hundreds of projects associated with the remaining DPRI initiatives in 

mainland Japan and Okinawa; however, DOD will play a critical role in the 

design and construction oversight of these projects, assuring that each 

project is built to U.S. requirements and standards. Although DPRIrelated construction at Iwakuni commenced in the last year, and only 10 

projects in Okinawa have been completed to date, Marine Corps officials 

told us that DOD has encountered several challenges in supporting the 

design and construction of these projects; these challenges have led to 

delays in construction and, in some instances, generated additional costs 

to the United States. Several DOD officials we spoke with were 

concerned that if the other DPRI initiatives were to begin, DOD might not 

be in a position to support the surge in construction.

It Is Unclear Whether DOD 

Can Support a Surge in 

DPRI-Related Construction
 

Page 48 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

DPRI construction projects in mainland Japan and Okinawa fall under the 

purview of the United States Army Corps of Engineers.66 As the DOD 

construction agent, the Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for 

working with each service to provide design and construction criteria to 

the government of Japan, and then design and construction surveillance 

and inspection to make sure that every DPRI project is being completed 

in accordance with the appropriate requirements and standards.

However, according to Marine Corps officials, the Army Corps of 

Engineers has had a difficult time supporting the DPRI-initiatives at both 

at Iwakuni and at Okinawa. For example, Marine Corps officials at 

Iwakuni told us that the Army Corps of Engineers was both underfunded 

and understaffed to support initial Japanese design and construction 

efforts, and that, as a result, officials at Iwakuni circumvented the DPRI 

project development process in order to move project design and 

development along more quickly. According to these same officials, the 

government of Japan was prepared to provide as much funding as was 

necessary to complete construction of the facilities at Iwakuni as early as 

possible. Marine Corps officials also told us that in its fiscal year 2011 

budget, the government of Japan allocated $700 million for the design 

and construction of facilities at Iwakuni (see fig. 9 for a photograph of the 

ongoing Japanese construction at Marine Corps Station Iwakuni).

However, DOD and the Army Corps of Engineers were unprepared to 

support an effort of this magnitude.67

 

66According to its Japan Engineering District, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is 

responsible for the design, engineering, and construction oversight of all projects in Japan, 

including military construction projects built by the United States. In mainland Japan and 

Okinawa, about 80 percent of construction projects are funded and built by the 

government of Japan.

According to officials at Iwakuni, the 

Army Corps of Engineers did not have the resources to support an 

accelerated buildup of this magnitude by the government of Japan and 

questioned whether the Army Corps of Engineers could fully support the 

entire DPRI initiative at Iwakuni, which will eventually cost Japan nearly

$3 billion to complete through 2017.

67According to DOD officials, the Japanese fund construction projects on a year-by-year 

basis, and not the typical 5-year basis that DOD uses to fund its projects. 
 

Page 49 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Figure 9: Ongoing Japanese Construction at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni

The Marine Corps officials we spoke with in Okinawa agreed with the 

officials at Iwakuni, suggesting that the Army Corps of Engineers did not 

have the appropriate resources to oversee the design and construction of 

the DPRI-related projects in Okinawa. Although less than 20 DPRI-related 

projects have been designed and constructed to date, according to 

Marine Corps officials several of these projects had errors that led to 

unplanned budget expenditures by DOD. Marine Corps officials attributed 

most of the errors to a lack of communication of proper requirements to 

the government of Japan, and insufficient oversight during the 

construction process. For example, the government of Japan designed 

and constructed a bachelor enlisted quarters at Camp Schwab based on 

requirements provided by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Marine 

Corps. After construction was completed, the Marine Corps refused to

accept the building, because it discovered that the building’s heating, 

ventilation, and air conditioning systems did not meet Marine Corps 

standards. Army Corps of Engineers officials said that they had not 
 

Page 50 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

identified the discrepancy between the Marine Corps’ requirement and 

the government of Japan’s designs prior to construction, resulting in the 

error. After about a year, the Marine Corps corrected the problem by 

developing an ad hoc solution to the heating, ventilation, and air 

conditioning systems issue at its own expense in order to bring the 

building up to its standards. In another example, on the basis of 

requirements provided by the Marine Corps and Army Corps of 

Engineers, the government of Japan designed and constructed a new 

police station with a fenced-in area to house military working dogs at 

Camp Foster. After construction had been completed, it was discovered 

that the fenced-in area had not met DOD standards for housing military 

working dogs. As a result, the Marine Corps funded a corrective action.

See figure 10 for a list of additional DPRI-related construction errors in 

Okinawa, as described by the Army Corps of Engineers.

Figure 10: Construction Errors on Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) Projects in Okinawa as Identified by the Army

Corps of Engineers
 

Page 51 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Army Corps of Engineers officials said they are aware of the setbacks 

associated with the DPRI-projects in both Iwakuni and Okinawa; however, 

Army Corps of Engineers officials told us that external factors associated 

with its DOD counterparts (U.S. Forces–Japan and the military services) 

may have helped to contribute to these setbacks. For example, Army 

Corps of Engineers officials told us that both a lack of proper master 

planning and circumventing the DPRI project development process at 

Iwakuni led to an expedited process that caused heightened risk. The 

expedited process, according to Army Corps of Engineers officials, made 

it difficult to catch and correct errors in the design phase of DPRI projects.

Army Corps of Engineers officials expressed concern that if DPRI projects 

in Okinawa proceed in a similar, expedited manner as Iwakuni, similar 

problems will occur, including heightened risk and an inability to 

appropriately plan for resource requirements.

In response to the setbacks related to DPRI projects in both Iwakuni and 

Okinawa, the Army Corps of Engineers has requested funding to increase 

staff at Iwakuni by 75 percent in fiscal year 2013 and have designed tools 

intended to prevent such setbacks in the future. For example, Army Corps 

of Engineers officials developed case studies of the errors and 

disseminated the information throughout their organization to better 

prepare their staff. In March 2011, Army Corps of Engineers personnel 

and senior leadership held an internal meeting to review construction 

project errors and discuss ways of improving their services. In addition, to 

ensure that they have sufficient resources and staffing to support the 

Marine Corps and the other services, Army Corps of Engineers officials 

have told us that they have conducted analyses every 6 months since 

July 2011 to forecast their future workload. These forecasts, according to 

Army Corps of Engineers officials, will continue in the future and include 

planning for any ramp-up needed in the immediate future. 

Although the Army Corps of Engineers has recognized and attempted to 

address the problems associated with the DPRI-related projects at 

Iwakuni and Okinawa, at the time of our review it had not yet developed a 

strategy, in conjunction with its DOD counterparts, to support a surge in 

Japanese construction that would require Army Corps of Engineers to 

support multiple, concurrent DPRI initiatives. Army Corps of Engineers 

officials acknowledged that there is potential for a surge in Japanese 

construction, so it is important that both the Army Corps of Engineers and 

the services be prepared for such an event. Furthermore, Army Corps of 

Engineers officials stated that the way the government of Japan funds 

and plans for construction makes DOD planning difficult. Specifically, 

DOD Does Not Have a 

Strategy for Supporting a 

Surge in Japanese 

Construction
 

Page 52 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

according to DOD officials, the government of Japan funds projects on a 

year-by-year basis, giving DOD limited time to react in any given year.

According to Army Corps of Engineers officials, the lack of a bilateral 

integrated master schedule for all DPRI initiatives between the United 

States and Japan makes it very difficult to forecast its resource 

requirements more than 1 year at a time. However, Army Corps of 

Engineers officials agreed that they must still work to develop a strategy 

to deal with the possibility that additional resources will be needed to 

support any surges in Japanese construction up to 5 years in the future.

In previous work, we identified key elements that should be included in a 

support strategy:68

• Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures 

set clear desired results and priorities, specific milestones, and 

outcome-related performance measures while giving implementing 

parties flexibility to pursue and achieve those results within a 

reasonable time frame.

• Organizational roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for 

coordinating their efforts identify the relevant components. The 

strategy clarifies the components’ relationships in terms of leading, 

supporting, and partnering.

• Resources, investments, and risk management identify, among other 

things, the sources and types of resources and investments 

associated with the strategy and where those resources and 

investments should be targeted.

Without a strategy to address future construction surges, the Army Corps 

of Engineers and the services will not have a clear picture of how the 

design and construction process should be handled moving forward, or 

the resources needed to support the effort. Such a strategy would allow 

both the Army Corps of Engineers and service officials—mainly the 

Marine Corps—to establish a process that assigns specific 

responsibilities, with time frames, to participating parties and assist the 

Army Corps of Engineers in identifying funding needed to support 

construction projects being conducted by both the United States and 

Japan. Without a strategy, DOD may not be in a position to successfully 

support upcoming DPRI-related projects and may face further planning 

 

68GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C., Feb. 3, 2004).
 

Page 53 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

and construction errors that have in the past led to unplanned funding 

needs and delayed completion schedules. Delayed completion schedules 

may ultimately affect the implementation of the realignment of Marines or 

other DPRI initiatives.

DOD has taken some steps to plan for sustaining its forces on both 

Okinawa and Guam until the Marine Corps realignment is implemented 

and consolidation initiatives on Okinawa are complete, but it has not yet 

fully identified what will need to be done to sustain the facilities at these 

locations and what it will cost for the immediate future. Facility 

maintenance and replacement for installations on Okinawa that were 

identified to be returned to the government of Japan have been limited for 

many years. As a result, many facilities have reached the end of their 

useful life and are in a state of disrepair. Specifically, DOD has identified 

the sustainment needs on Okinawa for Marine Corps Air Station 

Futenma; however, it has not identified sustainment needs for other 

facilities on the island that are expected to be eventually returned to 

Japan or fully planned for the sustainment of its family housing units on 

Okinawa. In Guam, DOD has begun to develop initial sustainment plans 

for its family housing units; however, these plans have not been updated 

to reflect the Marine Corps’ current realignment plan.

According to Marine Corps officials on Okinawa, many of the facilities 

supporting U.S. forces there are old, and are in need of resources to 

sustain them. We observed multiple facilities in various states of disrepair 

during our site visit to the island. For example, we observed facilities at 

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma that had been shuttered because 

service officials deemed them too dangerous to occupy; in some cases, 

there was so much mold growth that an extensive removal process would 

be necessary before the facilities could be occupied again. In addition to 

mold removal, some of these facilities would require other improvements 

or complete renovation before they could be used again. Marine Corps 

officials said that in some of the Marine Corps installations south of 

Kadena Air Base several facilities either are nearing or have already 

exceeded their 50-year service life and will need to be either renovated or 

replaced. The most significant examples of aging and deterioration that 

we observed were at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, the installation 

that has been at the center of controversy on Okinawa for nearly two 

decades. At Futenma, at several facilities currently in use, we observed 

concrete ceilings, staircases, and walls that showed evidence of 

deterioration, ranging from superficial cracks on the exterior of the 

DOD Has Taken Initial 

Steps but Has Not 

Fully Identified 

Sustainment Needs 

and Costs on Okinawa 

and Guam

Many Okinawa Facilities 

Have Reached the End of 

Their Projected Service 

Life, and Maintenance and 

Replacement Has Been 

Limited
 

Page 54 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

structure to severe fracturing that rendered the facility unsafe for 

occupancy. Figure 11 shows some examples of deteriorated conditions at 

two locations on Okinawa.

Figure 11: Examples of Deteriorated Conditions of Facilities on Okinawa

On Okinawa, DOD conducts routine maintenance and repair to keep its 

facilities in good working order over a 50-year service life and has 
 

Page 55 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

historically relied on the government of Japan to fund the construction of 

new U.S. facilities to replace deteriorating, obsolete structures.69

In recent years, sustainment funding and facility replacement by the 

government of Japan has been limited because delays in the Marine 

Corps realignment, construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility, 

and Okinawa Consolidation have left unclear what facilities will need to be 

available and sustained—and for how long. Since 2006, in the face of the 

uncertainties surrounding these initiatives, both DOD and the government 

of Japan have questioned how they will proceed with maintaining some 

existing facilities on Okinawa. According to Marine Corps officials, 

because of the uncertainties surrounding the timing of the various 

realignment initiatives, the government of Japan has been hesitant to 

invest in constructing new facilities on Okinawa. Figure 12 shows a 

steady decline in funding since 2002 under the Japan Facilities 

Improvement Program. In 2002, Japan provided approximately ¥75 

billion, or approximately $834 million. Of that ¥75 billion, approximately ¥6 

billion, or $67 million, was for Marine Corps installations in Okinawa.

The 

government of Japan will demolish these structures and construct new 

ones through the Japan Facilities Improvement Program. The program 

allows DOD to identify necessary projects from across the services and 

installations in Japan, rank them by priority, and submit them to the 

government of Japan for funding consideration.

70

 

69According to Marine Corps officials, the service life of buildings before the government 

of Japan will replace them is dependent both on the type of building and the type of 

construction.

The figure shows a significant decline for funding in 2006, the year the 

2006 Roadmap was developed outlining the realignment initiatives.

70The U.S. dollar figures are based on the January 2013 foreign exchange rate of 89.86 to 

indicate an approximate value.
 

Page 56 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Figure 12: Japan Facilities Improvement Program Funding for All U.S. Installations 

in Japan and for Marine Corps Installations on Okinawa from 2002 to 2010 (in 

Billions of Yen)

DOD officials told us that, to date, the services have submitted over $1.2 

billion in backlogged construction replacement projects to the government 

of Japan under the Japan Facilities Improvement Program. However, 

according to DOD officials, the projects in this total for Okinawa are on 

hold until firm requirements can be determined for what will be needed to 

support the final Marine Corps end strength left in Okinawa to avoid the 

government of Japan constructing new facilities on lands that will 

subsequently be returned. DOD officials told us that a large portion of 

these backlogged projects are family housing projects.

The Air Force, which is the executive agent for military family housing on 

Okinawa, had 7,823 family housing units in its active inventory as of 

February 2013. In February 2013, approximately 75 percent of its housing 

units were occupied. According to DOD officials, similar to other DOD 

facilities on Okinawa, many of the family housing units are old and in 

need of renovation or replacement. At Kadena Air Force Base, we 

Family Housing
 

Page 57 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

observed several vacant housing units that had not been renovated and 

showed significant mold damage. We also observed several recently 

renovated units. According to Air Force officials, approximately 58 percent 

of the military family housing units on Okinawa have been assessed as 

inadequate.71

The Air Force developed a family housing master plan in November 2011 

to provide a corporate, requirements-based housing investment strategy 

that integrates traditional construction funding and private sector 

financing. This master plan covered the period of fiscal years 2012 

through 2017 and estimated that the total funding required to maintain 

adequate military family housing and bring all housing-related 

infrastructure on Okinawa up to modern DOD standards would be $690.7 

million; this figure includes $131.7 for military construction and $559.1 for 

operation and maintenance. On the basis of its analyses and master plan, 

the Air Force has been working to modernize or replace 6,988—89 

percent—of its family housing units on Okinawa through various 

initiatives. Under its Post-Acquisition Improvement Program, the Air Force 

intends to renovate 3,747 housing units; these renovations are 

considered to be more extensive than minor repair and maintenance work 

and are intended to ensure that the renovated unit remains habitable for 

their full service lives. The government of Japan planned to build 1,770 

new units under the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa report 

and another 1,471 under the Japan Facilities Improvement Program, but 

as of February 2013 it had built only 38 percent of the first group and 13 

percent of the second. (See table 5 for list of family housing projects and 

status as of February 2013.)

However, inadequate units are not necessarily 

uninhabitable. Air Force officials told us that one reason these units have

been assessed as inadequate is that they were built to Japanese 

standards, which can differ significantly from Air Force standards. For 

example, Japanese accommodations tend to be smaller than housing 

units constructed by the services, so that kitchen, bathroom, and 

bedroom space may be more limited than it is in family housing units at 

other DOD locations, although the units are still viewed as safe to occupy.

 

71These officials explained that they used the Condition Assessment Matrix to assess 

housing conditions in Okinawa. Housing units that score below 3.75 are deemed 

inadequate.
 

Page 58 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Table 5: Okinawa Housing Redevelopment Plan as of February 2013

Funding program

Funding 

source

Total 

estimated 

cost (dollars 

in millions)

Housing units 

planned 

for repair

Percent 

of units 

completed

Special Action 

Committee on Okinawa

Japan $1,032 1,770 38%

Japanese Facilities 

Improvement Program

Japan $882 1,471 13%

Post-Acquisition 

Improvement Plan

United States $650 3,747 69%

Source: DOD.

The Air Force’s current master plan and supporting analyses were based 

on the premise that approximately 8,600 Marines and 9,000 dependents 

would relocate to Guam by 2014—as anticipated under the original 

realignment plan. However, under the current realignment plan, DOD is 

planning to move only 4,700 Marines and their dependents to Guam. Air 

Force officials informed us that because many of the replacement 

projects funded by the government of Japan are on hold, they have 

developed a “bridging strategy” to fund minor renovations for a select 

number of units, in order to meet DOD’s housing needs on Okinawa until 

additional units are constructed or renovated. As a result of the 

deterioration of its facilities and replacement projects being on hold, 

Marine Corps officials have stated that a sustainment funding strategy is 

going to be critical to maintain some of its infrastructure that has 

deteriorated past its useful life for the immediate future.

Marine Corps officials have stated that the uncertainties regarding the 

timing of the realignment initiatives have made it difficult for them to 

determine what sustainment projects will be needed for facilities on

Okinawa, because they do not know when the realignment initiatives will 

be completed and therefore do not know how long the existing facilities 

will continue to be used. Marine Corps officials in Okinawa informed us 

that construction and sustainment projects described in the base master 

plans for each of the Marine Corps installations on Okinawa have not 

been updated to take into account delays in the realignment and 

consolidation plans, and that these base master plans remain in draft 

form. DOD has not developed any updated sustainment plans for these 

installations as part of their base master plans—with the recent exception 

of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

DOD Has Taken Some 

Steps but It Has Not Fully 

Identified Sustainment 

Needs for Facilities on 

Okinawa
 

Page 59 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Many of the facilities on Futenma are 30 to 50 years old and have 

degraded over time due to limited investment in sustainment and the 

harsh tropical and corrosive saltwater environment of Okinawa. In 

response to the April 2012 Security Consultative Committee statement, 

and the delay in the Japanese construction of a replacement facility at 

Camp Schwab, the United States began to identify sustainment needs for 

Futenma. In April 2012, in a preliminary estimate, the Marine Corps 

identified approximately $165 million in funding needed to sustain 

Futenma for the next 10 years. In October 2012, the Marine Corps 

developed a draft sustainment plan after performing an assessment of the 

facilities on Futenma to identify, validate, and prioritize its sustainment 

needs. This plan included a priority list of repair and maintenance 

projects, and new construction projects needed to ensure that Futenma 

could continue to meet operational and training demands until the 

Futenma Replacement Facility is constructed and fully operational. The 

plan prioritizes facility repair and renovation projects to address critical 

mission and quality-of-life requirements. U.S. Forces–Japan officials said 

that DOD and the government of Japan are negotiating a possible costsharing arrangement, and that as of February 2013, both sides had 

agreed to a list of projects that the government of Japan had submitted to 

its legislature for funding consideration.72

Although DOD has developed a sustainment master plan for Futenma in 

response to the uncertainties surrounding the construction of the 

replacement facility on Okinawa, no plans of this type have been 

developed for any of the other installations on Okinawa. DOD Instruction 

4165.70 requires that base master plans or comprehensive plans be 

developed for all installations and that these plans include a specific, 

annual listing of all construction and major repair and sustainment 

projects over the period covered by the plan.

Marine Corps officials said that, 

without sustainment investment, the installation’s ability to support 

operations would be put at risk.

73

 

72Marine Corps officials stated that planned U.S. government sustainment funding for 

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma for fiscal years 2013-2015 is $36 million, while the 

planned government of Japan sustainment funding during the same time frame is $28 

million. However, funding requirements for fiscal year 2016 and beyond have yet to be 

determined.

According to the Unified 

Facilities Criteria, installation planning and programming staff must 

73See Department of Defense Instruction 4165.70, Real Property Management, para. 6.1 

(Apr. 6, 2005).
 

Page 60 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

capture facility requirements and propose solutions to meet those 

requirements from the options available.74 The Unified Facilities Criteria 

also indicates that a facility’s master plan will be revised and updated to 

maintain its relevance as a useful planning and management tool.75

Furthermore, guidance on DOD housing management indicates that DOD 

housing—both family and unaccompanied—is to be operated and 

maintained to a standard that protects the facilities from deterioration and 

provides safe and comfortable living places for servicemembers and their 

dependents.76 DOD policy is to rely on the private sector as the primary 

source for family housing for personnel stationed at locations within the 

United States. DOD guidance indicates that in overseas locations where 

servicemembers are given an overseas housing allowance to reimburse 

them for the cost of housing, the policy of relying on off-base housing first 

is not mandatory, but should be encouraged where appropriate.77

The Air Force’s current housing requirements and market analysis for 

Okinawa do not reflect current plans. While the Marine Corps has 

provided the Air Force with the number of Marines that will remain on 

Okinawa following the full implementation of all realignment initiatives, the 

Air Force office responsible for family housing on Okinawa has not been 

DOD 

guidance also indicates that for installations on U.S. soil, to determine the 

need for military housing at the installation, the military services must 

perform a housing requirements and market analysis to determine 

whether the adjacent community can accommodate the housing needs of 

the military and must identify the minimum housing requirement—the 

minimum level of housing needed on base to allow the installation to 

effectively accomplish base missions. If the base is located overseas, the 

military service may determine the need and applicability of the housing 

requirements, and market analysis is not mandatory. DOD policy also 

states that master plans for housing should address, among other things, 

military housing requirements.

 

74See Department of Defense Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, Installation Master 

Planning, para. 2-11.1.

75See id., para. 3-2.4.

76See Department of Defense Manual 4165.63-M, DOD Housing Management, encl. 3, 

para. 2.a (Oct. 28, 2010).

77See id., paras. 1.a, 1.f.
 

Page 61 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

able to update its housing requirements and market analysis, and housing 

master plan, because the Marine Corps has yet to provide the Air Force 

with the incremental schedule and unit movements associated with the 

realignment initiatives on Okinawa. According to Marine Corps officials, 

the Marine Corps cannot provide incremental data until bilateral 

negotiations on the Okinawa Consolidation initiative and the subsequent 

master plan are finalized. Air Force officials told us that while they plan to 

update their housing requirements and market analysis in the summer of 

2013, this will only cover the next 5 years. Considering that the 

realignment initiatives in Okinawa have no definitive timelines and may 

potentially take decades to complete, the Air Force office responsible for 

family housing on Okinawa told us that it needs a better understanding of 

when facilities will be constructed and units moved over the next 10-15 

years. This incremental data will help Air Force officials conduct housing 

analyses and develop housing plans based on more short-term and 

intermediate housing requirement needs on Okinawa.

Until the Air Force knows what the incremental Marine Corps housing 

requirements will be for all phases of the realignment initiatives in 

Okinawa, it will not have sufficient information to project housing demand 

and assess the housing sustainment cost for the current realignment 

plan. As a result, the Air Force will not be able to determine how to 

sustain its housing inventory on Okinawa in a cost-effective manner, 

which could lead to overinvesting in certain housing areas and 

underinvesting in others. Without identifying sustainment needs for all its 

infrastructure that will be used until the realignment and consolidation 

actions are implemented, DOD risks not having the information necessary 

to make informed decisions about maintaining its infrastructure at an 

acceptable level to carry out its mission.

DOD is in the process of developing plans to meet the housing needs for 

U.S. forces on Guam, but these plans will not take into account the 

housing requirements associated with the current realignment. According 

to Joint Region Marianas officials, Joint Region Marianas is responsible 

for overseeing all military housing on Guam, but Naval Base Guam and 

Naval Support Activity, Andersen, are each responsible for implementing 

their own housing operations. Joint Region Marianas and its installations 

face many of the challenges associated with sustaining aging housing 

units that we reported are being experienced by the Air Force on 

Okinawa. A June 2012 assessment of housing on Naval Base Guam 

found housing deficiencies such as mold, broken windows, and 

inoperative fans and ventilation systems. While in Guam, we observed 

DOD Has Not Accounted 

for the Marine 

Realignment in Its Housing 

Plans on Guam, and 

Housing Cost Data Are 

Limited
 

Page 62 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

several unoccupied housing units that showed significant pest infestation 

and mold growth in their interiors and heavy vegetation and mold growth 

on their exteriors. Figure 13 shows pictures of some of the housing units 

we observed.

Figure 13: Examples of Unoccupied Housing Units on Guam

There is currently a surplus of military family housing on Guam. As of 

January 2013, approximately 67 percent of available military housing on 
 

Page 63 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Guam—1,577 housing units—are occupied, and 785 units remain 

vacant.78

Joint Region Marianas officials informed us that, because of the 

uncertainty regarding when Marines will begin relocating to Guam, they 

had decided to proceed with developing housing plans independently of 

the Marine Corps realignment initiative. They explained that delaying 

action on meeting their housing needs could adversely affect their ability 

In addition, there are 311 additional housing units that have 

been classified as inactive, which according to Joint Region Marianas 

officials, means that those units are viewed as uninhabitable and are no 

longer considered part of the active housing inventory. Joint Region 

Marianas officials said that the low occupancy rate in their housing units 

can be attributed to several factors. First, since many servicemembers 

are eligible to live off base, many choose to do so to enjoy the benefits of 

living in the local community. Many servicemembers also choose to 

reside in private housing to take advantage of the high overseas housing 

allowance and utilities stipend. According to the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service, in 2011 approximately 3,800 personnel from the Air 

Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps who were stationed on Guam 

received a combined total of $96.1 million in overseas housing allowance.

Under the auspices of Joint Region Marianas, both Naval Base Guam 

and Andersen Air Force Base have developed housing plans that seek to 

address the low occupancy rate in their on-base housing and make more 

effective and efficient use of their housing inventories. To increase the 

occupancy rate, Joint Region Marianas officials are assessing several 

alternatives, including revising their housing policy to make more DODcivilians eligible to reside in military housing, requiring more 

servicemembers to reside in military housing, and reducing the number of 

housing units in the inventory. However, Joint Region Marianas officials 

informed us that, until the Marine Corps completes its requirements 

determination, arrival dates, and housing policy, none of their alternatives 

or plans will consider housing requirements associated with the current 

Marine Corps realignment plan that will eventually send nearly 5,000 

Marines to Guam. Moreover, they said that they do not have plans to set 

aside and sustain existing facilities to support the realignment of Marines.

 

78The data presented here are not reflected, as of January 2013, in the enterprise Military

Housing Database used by Joint Region Marianas officials to manage their housing 

operations. These officials are in the process of updating this database. According to the 

database, there are 1,227 total units recorded on Guam; 739 are occupied, 270 vacant, 

and 218 inactive, as of January 2013. 
 

Page 64 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

to provide housing to servicemembers currently stationed on Guam. 

Initially, Joint Region Marianas was making preparations to support the 

Marine realignment. The Department of the Navy had conducted a 

housing requirements and market analysis to identify the demand for 

military housing on Guam based on the Marine Corps requirements 

associated with the previous realignment plan. Joint Region Marianas had 

identified surplus housing units that could have been used to provide 

transitional housing for Marines relocating to Guam. However because of 

the delay of the realignment and reduced number of troops relocating, the 

Marine Corps data that the Navy used when it conducted its housing 

requirements and market analysis were no longer valid. Because no firm 

requirements or a time frame for the realignment are available, Joint 

Region Marianas officials are currently only addressing the housing 

issues directly relevant to its immediate needs.

DOD data on the cost of maintaining vacant and inactive housing on 

Guam are limited.79

 

79Joint Region Marianas identified vacant units as those that are suitable for occupancy 

but not occupied and inactive units as those that are not suitable for occupancy and will 

not be used for habitation.

Joint Region Marianas officials said that they have 

yet to determine the average cost of maintaining a vacant or inactive 

housing unit on Guam. Officials from Andersen Air Force Base estimated 

that the average annual cost of maintaining an inactive unit on the Air 

Force Base, including the cost of providing electrical power and ground 

maintenance, is approximately $4,500 per house. However, Joint Region 

Marianas officials said that similar data have not been calculated for Navy 

housing on Guam. Joint Region Marianas officials told us that Navy 

housing units on Guam can be found both on the military installations and 

embedded in the local community and that, because different types of 

costs are involved for the two types of housing units, it becomes difficult 

to determine an average cost for maintaining inactive housing units. For 

example, officials stated that certain services, like fire protection and 

security, for Navy housing units located on military installations would be 

incorporated into the base operating support expenses for that 

installation; however, for certain Navy housing units embedded in the 

local community, officials stated that Joint Region Marianas would pay for 

these services from accounts other than base operating support, and it 

may be difficult to isolate and merge this data.
 

Page 65 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

DOD guidance on economic analysis for decision making states that the 

purpose of such an analysis is to give decision makers insight into 

economic factors bearing on accomplishing a project’s objectives and that 

alternatives must be fully investigated and a determination made on 

whether an alternative satisfies the functional requirements for the 

project.80 This guidance also indicates that, as part of assessing the costs 

and benefits of alternatives, an economic analysis should include all 

measurable costs and benefits to the federal government that are incident 

to achieving the stated objectives of the project. However, without the 

Marine Corps housing requirements being considered and the total costs 

of maintaining vacant and inactive housing units known, Joint Region 

Marianas’ planned assessment of alternatives will not fully measure the 

costs and benefits to the federal government of its housing plans. As a 

result, decision makers will not have sufficient information to identify an 

investment strategy that addresses both Joint Region Marianas’ current 

housing needs and the Marine Corps’ housing requirements once the 

realignment is completed.

DOD believes that rebalancing and strengthening its posture in the AsiaPacific region offers many advantages, including reassuring allies and 

partners in the region of the United States’ commitment and shaping the 

security environment, while also providing forward capabilities to deter 

and defeat aggression. However, in an era of significant budgetary 

pressures and competition for resources, it is important to conduct 

detailed planning, supported by comprehensive cost information, to 

ensure that DOD is making the most efficient use of its resources.

Although DOD has revised its plan to relocate Marines off Okinawa, it has 

yet to identify the total costs, requirements, or sustainability of a move 

that will realign Marine Corps forces throughout the Pacific. In our 

assessment of DOD’s preliminary estimate for the realignment, we found 

that DOD’s estimate is not reliable because it omits potentially critical cost 

elements such as mobility support and risk parameters tied to the 

assumptions, and lacks detailed information on requirements for several 

key cost components that are needed to capture all costs related to the 

realignment. According to DOD officials, specific requirements and their 

associated costs cannot be developed for each cost component until the 

 

80 See Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis for Decisionmaking, 

encl. 3, para. E3.3, E3.3.2 (Nov. 7, 1995).

Conclusions
 

Page 66 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

necessary environmental analyses and host nation negotiations have 

been completed. Still, we found that DOD did not include some up-front 

practices that could have provided a more reliable estimate and could 

have been done despite the fact that the environmental analyses and 

host nation negotiations are not complete. Office of Management and 

Budget guidance indicates that it is a best practice to continuously update 

the cost estimating process to keep estimates current, accurate, and 

valid; and DOD’s overview of its fiscal year 2013 budget states that DOD 

cannot continue the practice of starting programs that prove to be 

unaffordable and that it will work to achieve program affordability by 

working to ensure programs start with firm cost goals in place, 

appropriate priorities set, and necessary trade-offs made to keep 

programs within affordable limits. Without comprehensive cost estimates 

developed for the realignment plan, DOD will be hampered in achieving 

its affordability goal of not starting a program without firm costs goals in 

place. DOD acknowledges that it will be 2018 or later before an integrated 

master plan can be completed to provide Congress with the necessary 

information it needs on all of the specific projects, requirements, 

schedules, and costs to aid it in its decision making regarding the 

realignment of Marines in the Pacific. However, DOD has made a first 

step in capturing some of its planning information including integrated 

schedules of its planned actions in its synchronization matrix. While we 

acknowledge that this type of information will periodically change as 

environmental analyses and negotiations are completed, and plans start 

to be implemented, this type of information would provide Congress with 

current plans in the interim until such time that the integrated master plan 

can be completed.

Furthermore, it is unknown what the government of Japan’s long-term 

construction schedule will be for building the infrastructure to complete its 

plans for Iwakuni and Okinawa. DOD currently has not developed a 

strategy to identify the resources it needs to assist with the development 

and oversight of these projects that may involve a surge in concurrent 

construction. Without a strategy, DOD will not have the safeguards in 

place to help ensure facilities are being built to standard and that 

problems that already existed on a smaller scale are not magnified.

Finally, uncertainties surrounding this realignment have disrupted 

planning for current facilities and family housing on Okinawa, and family 

housing on Guam, leaving the potential for hundreds of millions of dollars 

in unplanned sustainment projects in the future. Without developing 

comprehensive cost estimates and further planning to support the 

realignment, DOD risks requesting realignment funds without fully 

determining requirements, and Congress may be asked to fund 
 

Page 67 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

requirements without knowing the full cost. Furthermore, without 

developing updated sustainment plans on both Okinawa and Guam, DOD 

lacks reasonable assurance that it will have adequate facilities to support 

operations and the lives, health, and safety of servicemembers and their 

families.

To provide DOD and Congress with more reliable information to inform 

investment decisions associated with the realignment of Marines and U.S. 

military posture in the Pacific, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense update the current cost estimate to include additional estimates 

for mobility support, and additional analysis that would quantify the risk 

impacts and parameters to account for its various assumptions changing.

Furthermore, as appropriate environmental analyses and host nation 

negotiations are completed, update the estimate with comprehensive cost 

estimates (as identifiable) that factor in and include the following seven 

cost components associated with the current realignment plan:

• Guam Physical Layout and Requirements;

• Housing Requirements on Guam;

• Requirements to Upgrade Utilities and Infrastructure on Guam;

• Joint Training Range Complex Requirements including associated 

environmental mitigation in the Northern Marianas;

• Marine Corps Requirements for Australia;

• Marine Corps Requirements for Hawaii and Other U.S. Locations;

• Mobility requirements to support the current realignment plan to 

conduct routine operations, training, and any contingency situations.

To provide DOD and Congress with sufficient information to make 

informed decisions about the sequencing of projects supporting the 

realignment of Marines and the interdependent projects on Okinawa and 

about the timing for the funding needed to simultaneously support these 

projects and those already planned on mainland Japan, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:

• As the master planning process continues over the next several 

years, require the Secretary of the Navy to develop annual updates on 

the status of planning efforts for appropriate congressional 

committees until such time as master plans are completed for each 

geographic segment of the realignment. These updates should 

include, but not be limited to, providing congressional committees with 

up-to-date information on the status of initiatives, identified 

requirements and time frames, and any updated cost information 

linked to specific facilities or projects.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 68 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

• Direct the Secretary of the Army to require the Army Corps of 

Engineers to coordinate with appropriate military service officials 

involved in the planning and management of DPRI projects in Japan, 

including U.S. Forces–Japan, Marine Corps Installations Pacific, and 

Marine Corps Headquarters, to develop a strategy to identify how the 

design and construction process of DPRI projects should be handled 

moving forward and the necessary resources needed to support any 

surge in construction associated with posture-related initiatives in both 

Iwakuni and Okinawa.

To aid DOD and Congress in obtaining sufficient information to make

prudent investment decisions for the sustainment of U.S. forces on 

Okinawa and Guam while implementing the planned movements 

associated with the realignment of Marines and the consolidation efforts 

on Okinawa, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the 

following three actions:

• Direct the appropriate service officials to update Okinawa installation 

master plans to include sustainment requirements and the costs to 

sustain the U.S. presence on Okinawa until the Marine realignment 

and Okinawa consolidation efforts are completed. At a minimum, 

these plans should identify both short-term needs and long-term 

needs to account for the uncertainty regarding the time needed to 

implement the realignment and consolidation initiatives on Okinawa.

• Direct appropriate service officials to provide, as they become 

available, annual master schedule and unit movement updates 

associated with the realignment initiatives on Okinawa to the 

appropriate Air Force officials. These updates should include any 

updated housing requirements such as the demographics of Marine 

families required to be housed on Okinawa during the future phases 

of the realignment initiatives on Okinawa, thus allowing the 

appropriate Air Force officials to perform up-to-date assessments and 

develop housing investment strategies reflecting the updated 

schedule and housing requirements.

• Direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct an economic analysis to 

include assessing the costs of maintaining vacant housing on Guam 

to arrive at an informed decision weighing the cost of maintaining or 

renovating this housing versus the construction of new facilities to 

support the requirements for the Marine Corps realignment to Guam.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred with 

five of our recommendations, partially concurred with two 

recommendations, and stated it would work with DOD components to 

implement the recommendations. While DOD agreed with the content of 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 69 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

the report and the recommendations, the department expressed concern 

with the report’s title. DOD believes the title suggests the department 

currently has the ability to produce comprehensive cost estimates and 

complete planning for the realignment initiatives but has not done so. Our 

report title Defense Management: More Reliable Cost Estimates and 

Further Planning Needed to Inform the Marine Corps Realignment 

Initiatives in the Pacific conveys that more reliable estimates and 

comprehensive planning will be needed to inform decision makers. We 

acknowledged in our report that DOD will not be in a position to provide 

comprehensive cost estimates and complete planning documentation for 

the realignment to Congress until the environmental studies and host 

nation negotiations have been completed. However, it is important to 

ensure that Congress is aware that current cost estimates provided to 

them to date are not reliable because they are incomplete for the reasons 

stated above and in our report. As a result, we did not change the title of 

the report. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to update its current 

cost estimate for the realignment to include additional estimates for 

mobility support, and additional analysis that would quantify the risk 

impacts and parameters to account for its various assumptions changing.

DOD stated that it is in the process of responding to requirements 

contained in Section 2832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2013, which also requires an assessment of the necessary 

strategic and logistical resources. However, the provision does not 

specifically require DOD to include risk impacts and parameters.

Furthermore, DOD stated that estimates for mobility support will not be 

available until the department completes the required environmental 

planning documents. As our report states, we acknowledge that 

comprehensive estimates for most costs tied to the realignment cannot be 

completed until appropriate environmental analyses and host nation 

negotiations are complete. However, we believe DOD should update its 

current estimate to include risk parameters to produce a more reliable 

cost estimate by accounting for potential cost fluctuations (if its 

assumptions change) and include an initial estimate for mobility support, 

a cost that DOD officials told us could be considerable.

DOD concurred with our recommendation to update the cost estimate for 

the realignment with comprehensive estimates as environmental analysis 

and host nation negotiations are completed and consequently more 

specific data becomes available on seven specific cost components 

including Guam physical layout and requirements; housing and utilities 

infrastructure on Guam; joint or Marine Corps training and other 
 

Page 70 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

requirements in the Northern Marianas, Australia, and Hawaii; and 

mobility requirements. DOD stated that it plans to identify and incorporate 

comprehensive cost estimates as they become available upon completion 

of necessary environmental planning documents.

DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to provide annual updates on 

the status of master planning efforts to the appropriate congressional 

committees, until such time as master plans are completed for each 

geographic segment of the realignment.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the Army 

Corps of Engineers to coordinate with appropriate military service officials 

to develop a strategy to identify how the design and construction process 

of Defense Policy Review Initiative projects should be handled moving 

forward, and the necessary resources needed to support any surge in 

construction in both Iwakuni and Okinawa. DOD noted that it would take 

these steps, but stated that the effort necessarily relies upon a detailed 

master plan that has been coordinated among several organizations 

within DOD in order to identify the necessary resources to support a 

surge in construction. We agree that developing a master plan is the first 

step, and coordination with the various DOD organizations will be 

required to complete this task.

DOD concurred with our recommendation to update Okinawa installation 

master plans to include sustainment requirements and the costs to 

sustain the U.S. presence on Okinawa until the Marine realignment and 

Okinawa consolidation efforts are completed. DOD stated that the 

completion of the bilateral Okinawa Consolidation Plan in April 2013 

removed much uncertainty and will allow the development of more 

detailed master plans for each camp.

DOD concurred with our recommendation to provide, as they become 

available, annual master schedule and unit movement updates 

associated with the realignment initiatives on Okinawa to the appropriate 

Air Force officials including updated housing requirements and 

demographics of Marine Corps families required to be housed on 

Okinawa. DOD stated it will direct U.S. Pacific Command and the Marine 

Corps to provide current fiscal and unit movement data to the Air Force, 

and update as plans are reviewed and revised.

DOD concurred with our recommendation to conduct an economic 

analysis to include assessing the costs of maintaining vacant housing on 
 

Page 71 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Guam. DOD stated that the Navy is conducting a housing market analysis 

to establish a baseline for long-term military family housing requirements 

on Guam and that, once the baseline requirements are established, the 

Navy will conduct a cost/benefit analysis for addressing new requirements 

related to the Marine Corps realignment.

We also provided the Department of State with a draft of this report for 

official comment, but it declined to comment since the report contains no 

recommendations for the Department of State. DOD and State provided 

technical comments separately that were incorporated into the report as 

appropriate. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix VI. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 

and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Secretary of 

State; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and appropriate 

organizations. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on our 

website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Affairs and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of 

this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix VII.

Brian J. Lepore, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
 

Page 72 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Tim Johnson

Chairman

The Honorable Mark Kirk

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans’ Affairs, and Related

 Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Honorable John Culberson

Chairman
 

Page 73 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

The Honorable Sanford Bishop

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans’ Affairs, and Related

 Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 74 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

To evaluate defense posture initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, we 

interviewed and collected information from various Department of 

Defense (DOD) officials including:

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy);

• Department of the Army;

• Department of the Air Force;

• Department of the Navy;

• U.S. Pacific Command and its Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 

Force component commands;

• U.S. Forces–Japan and its Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force 

component commands;

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and its Japan Engineering District;

• Joint Region Marianas; and

• Joint Guam Program Office.

We conducted site visits to

• Yokota Air Base and Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in mainland 

Japan;

• Kadena Air Base, Camps Schwab and Kinser, and Marine Corps Air 

Station Futenma on Okinawa;

• Andersen Air Force Base and several Naval installations on Guam; 

and

• the proposed training locations on Tinian.

Specifically, to determine the extent to which DOD has developed 

comprehensive plans and cost estimates for the realignment of Marines, 

we interviewed appropriate DOD and State Department officials, collected 

plans and cost estimates related to this initiative, and applied the best 

practices included in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide to 

our assessment of the available data. In addition to the agencies listed 

above, we interviewed and collected data from officials in the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Director, Cost Assessment 

and Program Evaluation; the Joint Staff; the Office of Economic 

Adjustment; U.S. Transportation Command; the Defense Logistics 

Agency; the Naval Center for Cost Analysis; and U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, 

Japan, and U.S. Consulate in Naha, Okinawa. For this review, we 

collected DOD plans and cost estimates associated with the original and 

current Marine realignment plans, DOD budget data on U.S. projects 

related to the Defense Posture Review Initiative (DPRI) and the Marine 

realignment, budget data on DPRI and Host Nation Support expenditures 

provided to DOD by the government of Japan, military base master plans 

and housing requirements analyses, and other relevant documentation.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 75 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

To assess the comprehensiveness of DOD’s realignment cost estimate, 

we analyzed DOD’s plans, cost analyses, and cost estimating process 

and compared them with the best practices included in the GAO Cost 

Estimating and Assessment Guide. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for and synchronized 

other U.S. defense posture movements in Okinawa and Japan to coincide 

with the Marine Corps realignment, we reviewed planning documentation 

associated with these posture movements for completeness and 

coordination. We interviewed and collected relevant planning 

documentation from officials in the DOD offices listed above. We 

compared the data we received from each component within the Marine 

Corps to one another, and compared the data we collected from U.S. 

Pacific Command, U.S. Forces–Japan, the Joint Guam Program Office, 

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine the status of 

planning consistencies and synchronization. We evaluated these plans 

with criteria established in relevant DOD guidance and Key Elements for 

Developing a Strategy.

To determine the extent to which DOD has identified a plan to sustain its 

current forces on Okinawa and Guam, we interviewed the DOD officials 

listed above and conducted site visits where we observed the conditions 

of facilities and housing, collected appropriate planning documentation 

and cost data, and assessed the data against GAO cost estimating 

guidance and DOD planning guidance. We interviewed officials to identify 

DOD requirements and plans for sustaining U.S. forces on Okinawa until 

realignment efforts are completed. We collected sustainment planning 

documentation, base master plans, and historical host nation support and 

U.S. sustainment cost data for Okinawa and compared them to GAO cost 

estimating guidance and DOD guidance on installation master planning to 

determine the extent to which DOD has planned for the sustainment of 

U.S. forces on Okinawa until realignment efforts are completed. We 

interviewed officials to determine the extent to which they have planned 

for the sustainment of family housing on Guam, reviewing planning 

documentation and analyzing current cost data collection methodologies 

used by the Air Force and the Navy. We compared sustainment plans to 

criteria established by relevant DOD guidance on economic analysis for 

decision making and installation master planning.

To determine the reliability of the numerical data provided to us by DOD 

organizations, we collected information on how the data was collected, 

managed, and used through interviews and a survey provided to relevant 

DOD officials. By assessing this information against GAO data quality 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 76 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

standards, we determined that the data presented in our findings were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to March 

2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: April 2012 Joint Statement of the 

United States-Japan Security Consultative 

Committee

Page 77 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Appendix II: April 2012 Joint Statement of the 

United States-Japan Security Consultative 

Committee 
Appendix II: April 2012 Joint Statement of the 

United States-Japan Security Consultative 

Committee

Page 78 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 
Appendix II: April 2012 Joint Statement of the 

United States-Japan Security Consultative 

Committee

Page 79 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 
Appendix II: April 2012 Joint Statement of the 

United States-Japan Security Consultative 

Committee

Page 80 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 
Appendix II: April 2012 Joint Statement of the 

United States-Japan Security Consultative 

Committee

Page 81 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 
Appendix III: Restrictions on Use of Funds For 

Marine Corps Realignment in National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2013 and 

2012 

Page 82 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20131

SEC. 2831. CERTIFICATION OF MILITARY READINESS NEED FOR A 

LIVE FIRE TRAINING RANGE COMPLEX ON GUAM AS CONDITION 

ON ESTABLISHMENT OF RANGE COMPLEX.

A Live Fire Training Range Complex on Guam may not be established 

(including any construction or lease of lands related to such 

establishment) in coordination with the realignment of United States 

Armed Forces in the Pacific until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the 

congressional defense committees that there is a military training and 

readiness requirement for the Live Fire Training Range Complex.

SEC. 2832. REALIGNMENT OF MARINE CORPS FORCES IN ASIAPACIFIC REGION.

(a) RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR REALIGNMENT.—

Except as provided in subsection (c), none of the funds authorized to 

be appropriated under this Act, and none of the amounts provided by 

the Government of Japan for construction activities on land under the 

jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, may be obligated to 

implement the realignment of Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to 

Guam or Hawaii until each of the following occurs:

(1) The Commander of the United States Pacific Command 

provides to the congressional defense committees an assessment 

of the strategic and logistical resources needed to ensure the 

distributed lay-down of members of the Marine Corps in the United 

States Pacific Command Area of Responsibility meets the 

contingency operations plans.

(2) The Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional 

defense committees master plans for the construction of facilities 

and infrastructure to execute the Marine Corps distributed laydown on Guam and Hawaii, including a detailed description of 

costs and the schedule for such construction.

(3) The Secretary of the Navy submits a plan to the congressional 

defense committees detailing the proposed investments and 

 

1 Pub. L. No. 112-239 (2013).

Appendix III: Restrictions on Use of Funds For

Marine Corps Realignment in National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2013 and 2012
Appendix III: Restrictions on Use of Funds For 

Marine Corps Realignment in National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2013 and 

2012 

Page 83 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

schedules required to restore facilities and infrastructure at Marine 

Corps Air Station Futenma.

(4) A plan coordinated by all pertinent Federal agencies is 

provided to the congressional defense committees detailing 

descriptions of work, costs, and a schedule for completion of 

construction, improvements, and repairs to the non-military

utilities, facilities, and infrastructure, if any, on Guam affected by 

the realignment of forces.

(b) RESTRICTION ON DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC 

INFRASTRUCTURE.— 

If the Secretary of Defense determines that any grant, cooperative 

agreement, transfer of funds to another Federal agency, or 

supplement of funds available in fiscal year 2012 or 2013 under 

Federal programs administered by agencies other than the 

Department of Defense will result in the development (including 

repair, replacement, renovation, conversion, improvement, expansion, 

acquisition, or construction) of public infrastructure on Guam, the 

Secretary of Defense may not carry out such grant, transfer, 

cooperative agreement, or supplemental funding unless such grant, 

transfer, cooperative agreement, or supplemental funding is 

specifically authorized by law.

(c) EXCEPTIONS TO FUNDING RESTRICTION.—The Secretary of 

Defense may use funds described in subsection (a)— 

(1) to complete additional analysis or studies required under the 

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et 

seq.) for proposed actions on Guam or Hawaii;

(2) to initiate planning and design of construction projects at 

Andersen Air Force Base and Andersen South; and

(3) to carry out any military construction project for which an 

authorization of appropriations is provided in section 2204, as 

specified in the funding table in section 4601.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) DISTRIBUTED LAY-DOWN.—The term ‘‘distributed laydown’’

refers to the planned distribution of members of the Marine Corps 

in Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, Australia, and possibly elsewhere that 

is contemplated in support of the joint statement of the United 

States–Japan Security Consultative Committee issued April 26, 

2012, in the District of Columbia (April 27, 2012, in Tokyo).
Appendix III: Restrictions on Use of Funds For 

Marine Corps Realignment in National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2013 and 

2012 

Page 84 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

(2) PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term ‘‘public 

infrastructure’’ means any utility, method of transportation, item of 

equipment, or facility under the control of a public entity or State or

local government that is used by, or constructed for the benefit of, 

the general public.

(e) REPEAL OF SUPERSEDED LAW.—Section 2207 of the Military 

Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (division B of 

Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1668) is repealed.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20122

SEC. 2207. GUAM REALIGNMENT.

(a) RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS.—Except as provided in 

subsection (c), notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the 

funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act, and none of the 

amounts provided by the Government of Japan for military 

construction activities on land under the jurisdiction of the Department 

of Defense, may be obligated to implement the realignment of United 

States Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam as envisioned in 

the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation 

issued May 1, 2006, until— 

(1) the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the 

Commander of the United States Pacific Command, provides the

congressional defense committees the Commandant’s preferred 

force lay-down for the United States Pacific Command Area of 

Responsibility;

(2) the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense 

committees a master plan for the construction of facilities and 

infrastructure to execute the Commandant’s preferred force laydown on Guam, including a detailed description of costs and a 

schedule for such construction;

(3) the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense 

committees that tangible progress has been made regarding the 

relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma;

 

2 Pub. L. No. 112-81 (2011). Section 2832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2013 repealed section 2207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012. See Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 2832(e) (2013).
Appendix III: Restrictions on Use of Funds For 

Marine Corps Realignment in National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2013 and 

2012 

Page 85 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

(4) a plan coordinated by all pertinent Federal agencies is 

provided to the congressional defense committees detailing 

descriptions of work, costs, and a schedule for completion of 

construction, improvements, and repairs to the non-military 

utilities, facilities, and infrastructure on Guam affected by the 

realignment of forces; and

(5) the Secretary of Defense— 

(A) submits to the congressional defense committees the 

report on the assessment of the United States force posture in 

East Asia and the Pacific region required under section 346 of 

this Act; or

(B) certifies to the congressional defense committees that the 

deadline established under such section for the submission of 

such report has not been met.

(b) DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE.— 

(1) AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED.—Notwithstanding any other 

provision of law, if the Secretary of Defense determines that any 

grant, cooperative agreement, transfer of funds to another Federal 

agency, or supplement of funds available in fiscal year 2012 under 

Federal programs administered by agencies other than the 

Department of Defense will result in the development (including 

repair, replacement, renovation, conversion, improvement,

expansion, acquisition, or construction) of public infrastructure on 

Guam, such grant, transfer cooperative agreement, or 

supplemental funding shall be specifically authorized by law.

(2) PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE DEFINED.—In this section, the 

term ‘‘public infrastructure’’ means any utility, method of 

transportation, item of equipment, or facility under the control of a 

public entity or State or local government that is used by, or 

constructed for the benefit of, the general public.

(c) EXCEPTION TO RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The 

Secretary of Defense may use funds described in subsection (a) to 

carry out additional analysis under the National Environmental Policy 

Act of 1969 to include the following actions:

(1) A re-evaluation of live-fire training range complex alternatives, 

based upon the application of probabilistic modeling; and

(2) The ongoing analysis on the impacts of the realignment and 

build-up on Guam as described in subsection (a) on coral reefs in 

Apra Harbor, Guam.
Appendix IV: Print-Friendly Version of Figure 

I 

Page 86 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

 

Appendix IV: Print-Friendly Version of 

Figure I
Appendix IV: Print-Friendly Version of Figure 

I 

Page 87 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

 
Appendix IV: Print-Friendly Version of Figure 

I 

Page 88 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

 
Appendix V: Funded Defense Policy Review 

Initiative (DPRI)-Related Military Construction 

Projects on Guam Supporting Marine 

Realignment 

Page 89 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Project

Funding 

category Start date

Estimated 

budget (dollars 

in millions)

Cost incurred 

from inception 

to December 

31, 2012 

(dollars in 

millions)

Estimated 

remaining cost 

to complete 

(dollars in 

millions)

Government of Japan–funded

Guam Utilities and Site Improvements – 

Phase 1 

Design 14-Feb-09 $8.544 $8.544 $0.000

Construction 11-Aug-11 196.100 38.547 157.553

Project total $204.644 $47.091 $157.553

U.S. government–funded

Apra Harbor Wharf Improvements I Design (I and II)a 14-Feb-09 6.396 6.396 0.000

Construction 30-Sep-10 127.033 68.857 58.176

Project total $133.429 $75.253 $58.176

Apra Harbor Wharf Improvements II Construction 27-Nov-12 39.105 0.000 39.105

Working Dog Facility Relocation Design 25-Oct-08 1.539 1.539 0.000

Construction 29-Sep-10 14.000 3.529 10.471

Project total $15.539 $5.068 $10.471

Andersen Air Force Base North Ramp 

Utilities I

Design 3-Dec-09 1.222 1.222 0.000

Construction 6-Apr-11 21.500 6.136 15.364

Project total $22.722 $7.358 $15.364

Andersen Air Force Base North Ramp 

Parking I

Design 3-Dec-09 2.197 2.189 0.007

Construction 6-Apr-11 88.797 39.692 49.105

Project total $90.994 $41.881 $49.112

Defense Access Roads Constructionb 13-Jul-11 48.860 0.268 48.592

U.S. government–funded totalc $350.648 $129.829 $220.819

Source: DOD.

a

Design includes Apra Harbor Wharf Improvements I and II projects. 

b

Project executed by Federal Highway Administration. Construction funds used to develop design. 

c

Figures in table may not sum correctly due to rounding error. 

Appendix V: Funded Defense Policy Review 

Initiative (DPRI)-Related Military 

Construction Projects on Guam Supporting 

Marine Realignment
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 90 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Appendix VI: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 91 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 92 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 93 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 94 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

Brian Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant 

Director; Jeff Hubbard; Gilbert Kim; Joanne Landesman; Ying Long; 

Charles Perdue; Carol Petersen; Karen Richey; Michael Shaughnessy; 

Amie Steele; and Lindsay Taylor made key contributions to this report.

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgements
Related GAO Products

Page 95 GAO-13-360 Defense Management 

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Military Buildup on Guam: Costs and Challenges in Meeting Construction 

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(351659)
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