UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O
. 03-2100
G EORGE T. R I C HAR DS ON , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. R

. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(De cided Ma

y 17, 2006 )

Kenneth M. Carpenter , o f T op e ka , K a ns a s, wa s o n th e br ie f f or the a pp e lla nt.
Tim S. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , As sis tant Ge ne ra l Co un se l; Brian B . Rippel , Deputy

Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Thomas E. Sullivan , al l o f W as h i n gt o n , D.C., were on the brief

for the a ppellee.
Be fore KASOL D, MOORMAN, a nd SCHOEL EN, Judges

. SCHOEL EN, Judge , f

il e d th e o p in io n o f

th e Co u rt. K

A SO L D, Ju d

ge , and MOORMAN, Judge , f ile d c on c ur

ri ngop ini on s. SCHOEL EN, Judge : T he a pp e lla nt, Ge or g e T. Ric ha

rd so n , th roug h c ouns e l, a pp e a ls a September 5, 2003 , Boa

rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (Boa

rd) decision denying his r equests for r evision

o f Au gu s t 1 944 and May 1946 VA re g ional office (RO) de cisions on the basis of cle ar a nd unmistakable er

ror ( CUE). Recor d (R.) at 1-18

. This appea l is ti mely , and the Court has jurisdiction

ov e r t he c a se purs ua

nt t o 3 8 U .S. C. § § 725 2( a ) a nd 72 66 . F or

the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e wi ll v a c a te the B oard' s determination that ther e wa s no CUE in the Aug ust 1944 RO decision and re mand that

ma tte r, and

we wi ll a ff

ir m th e B oa

rd ' s d e te rm inatio n th a t th e re was no CU E in the Ma y 19 46 RO decision.Carotid sinus sy ndrome is a "stimulation of a hy pera ctive ca

rotid sinus, causing a mar ked 1 fal l i n bl oo d p res su re du e to vas od il ati on , car di ac sl owi ng, o r bo th ." S TEDMAN ' S M ED I C AL D I CT I O N A RY 1749 (27th ed. 2000) [here inafter S TEDMAN ' S ]. The carotid s inus is located at the leve l of the C4 ver

tebra in the neck. See id. at 137. Neur ocirc ulatory

asthenia is "a ty

pe of anxiety

neurosis for

merly encounte red of

ten among 2 milit ary personne l dur ing times of w ar, in whic h car diorespiratory sy mptoms, such as palpitation, rapi d p ul se, andprec ord ial pai n, were p rom in ent ." S TEDMAN ' S 158.
M i graine, also known as a vascula r hea dache , is "[a] sy

mptom complex occur

ring 3 p er i o d i ca l l y

an d ch ar ac t er i z edb y

p ai n i n t h e h ea d

(u s u al l y u n i l at er al ), v er t i go , n au s ea an d v o m i t i n g, ph ot op ho bi a, an d s cin ti ll ati ng app earan ces o f l ight ." S TEDMAN ' S 1118. Maladjustment is "a

n inability to cope with the pr oblems and cha lleng es of e veryday living." 4 S TEDMAN ' S 1056. Psy choneuro s i s was for

merly used to descr ibe " a cla ssification of neur osis that included 5 hy st eri a, p sy chas th eni a, n eura st hen ia, andth e anx iet y andph ob ic d is ord ers ." S TEDMAN ' S 1477. 2 I. BACKG ROUND Mr. Richardson se rved on a ctive duty in the U.S. Army

from June to S eptember

1935 and from September

1942 to J uly

1944. R. at 220, 261. Service medical recor ds indicate treatment for

var i ous conditions. For e x ample, he w as see n by a doctor in J uly 1943 for we akness a

nd fainting attacks a nd was diagnose d with car otid sinus sy ndrome. R. at 57-59. Additional service medical

1

rec o rds indicate a

diag nosis of sinusit is and ca rotid sinus sy

ndrome. R. at 122. In J anuar y 1944,

a ft e r s pe nd ingfi ve we e ks in r e ha bil itatio n f

or his sy mpt oms , M r. Ric ha

rd so n w a s d ia g no se d w ith mild neurocirc ulatory

asthenia. R. at 96. A May 1944 hospital report notes that he h ad spent 11 2 of his 20 m o n t h s i n s er v i ce in the hospital. R. at 134. The final diag noses listed on the hospital

re po rt are c a ro tid

sin us sy nd ro me , s imp le mig ra ine a g g ra vate d by ps y c ho log ic a l fa c tor s, a nd sim ple 3

a du lt m a la dju stm e nt sy

nd ro me wi th p sy c ho so ma tic manif e station s. R. at 13 5. Th a t r e po rt a lso 4 notes that M r. R i chardson was see n by a neur opsy chiatrist who " concur red in the opinion that we

were n ot deal in g wit h a p sy cho neu ros is in th is in st ance. " Id. At dis c ha rg e , he wa s found to b e un fi t 5 for f urther military

service beca

use of moder ate r ight c arotid sinus s y ndrome, whic h had its onsetSy ncope is a "[l]os s of consc iousness and postural tone c aused by diminis hed ce rebr al blood 6 fl ow. " S TEDMAN ' S 1745. 3 in J uly 1943 and wa s manifested by "sy ncope, following pressure on the rig ht side, and a history of 6 dizz iness and fa inting." R. at 186. I n Aug ust 1944, Mr. Richardson, ac ting pr o se, filed a n application for VAbenef its (Form 526), in which, in the blank afte r "N ature of disease or injury on acc ount of which c laim is made and the date e a c h b e g a n, " he de sc ri be d h is i nju ri e s a s f oll ow s: Claimant had an attack of fe v er o n 7 -3-43. This was followed by 3 attacks of pneumonia. As a

result[,] hear

t was af fec ted and claimant has had migr aine heada ches since that time. Nerve s in throat controlling hear t have been injured a

nd claimant is unable to have any strenuous phy sical ac tivity . Claimant 's nervous sy stem has bee n aff

ecte d until he is unable to conce ntrate f or any period of time. R. at 220-21. I n Aug ust 1944, the RO gr anted se rvice connec tion for rig ht car otid sinus s y ndrome, rate d 30% disabling , and for migr aine, r ated 20% disabling, for a combined rating of 40%. R. at 226. A V A m e dic a l e xami natio n, date d F e br ua ry 19 46 , liste d only a dia g no sis of " hy pe rs e ns iti ve c a ro tid sinus with carotid sinus sy ndrome." R. at 243. A M arc h 1946 neuropsychiatric examination report noted that M r. R ichar dson suffer ed fr om an inability to conce ntrate, dizzi ness, chills, and fe ver. R. at 245. The examiner stated that these sy mptoms we re "se condar

y in most par

t to a car otid sinus sy ndrome," and diagnose d only car otid sinus s y

ndrome. Id. I n response to a reque st by the RO for

a " pr op e r ne ur op sy c hiatr ic dia g no sis in thi s ca se ," the VA e xami natio n re po rt s we re " re vie we d w ith

v ar i o u s e x a m i n e r s a n d [ t h e ] d i a g n o s i s o f m i g r a i n e [ w a s ] f o u n d t o b e i n e r

r o r
. " R

. a t2 4 8 , 2 5 2

. In May 19 46 , th e RO re c la ssi fi e d M r. Ric ha rd so n' s d isa

bi li ty as " hy

pe rs e ns iti ve c a ro tid

sin us wi th

car otid sinus sy

ndrome; associate d with he adac hes, for merly diag nosed as mig raine ," a nd incre ased his disabilit y

rating fo r ca ro t i d sinus sy ndrome to 50%. R. at 254. His rating f or mig raine was reduc ed to 0%. Id. I n April 1959, Mr. Richar dson was hospitalized fo r o b s ervation and examination for

ree valu at i o n p u rp o s es. R. at 264-65. In Aug ust 1959, the RO ag ain re classified his servicec o n n e c t e d

c o n d i t i o n t o b e " p s yc h o n e u r o s i s c o n v e r s i o n t yp e w i t h h e a d a c h e & v a s o m o t o r i n s t a b i l i t y, former ly diag nosed as mig raine & hy perse nsitive carotid s i n u s ," a nd his rating was re duced f rom4

50% to 30%, effec tive October 3, 1959. R. at 264-66. No refer ence was made to his 0% rating for migr aine. Id. I n M a r c h 1 9 9 6 , M r
. Ri c h a r d s o n , thr o u g h c o u n s e l, f il e d a r e qu e s t f

o r r e v ision of the Au g us t 19 44 a nd

Au g us t 19 59 RO de c isi on s o n th e ba sis of CUE. R. a t 27 0- 71 . H e sp e c if ic a lly

asser ted that the RO should have c onsidered w hether he had psychoneur osis in it s Aug ust 1944 decision, base d on the 1944 application. R. at 271. In an Oc tober 1996 de cision, the RO deter mined that it did not have jurisdic t i o n t o co n s i d er the CUE issues. R. at 289-90. In a September 2001 decision, the B oard r eviewe d the two re quests for r evision on th e basis of CUE ar ising fr om the Aug ust 1944 and Aug ust 1959 RO decisions a nd rec og nized a third alleg ation of CUE in the May 1946 decision, base d on the re duction of Mr. Richardson' s rating for migr aine. R. at 358-60; 369-70. Pursuant to the holding in Br own v . W est , the B oard c oncluded t h at t h e RO did have orig inal jurisdiction to consider CUE issues and re manded the matter to the RO. 203 F.3d 1378 (F ed. Cir. 20 00 ) ( ho ldi ngthat an in te rv e nin g B oa rd de c isi on that do e s n ot d e c ide a n iss ue su bje c t to a re qu e st fo r r ev i s ion on the basis of CUE does not subsume prior RO decision so as to pr eclude R O's adjudication of the reque st for re vision on the basis of CUE); R. at 360, 369. I n J uly 2002, t h e R O determined that no revision wa s warr anted in the August 1944, May 1946, and August 1959 RO decisions. R. at 384-92. On September 5, 2003, the B oard issued the de c isi on

no w on a pp e a l, wh ic h fo un d no CU E in the Au g us t 19 44 a nd May 19 46 RO de c isi on s. R

. at 1 -1 8

. T h e B o ar d al s o s p e c i fi ca l l y

h el d t h at M r. R i ch ar d s o n d i d n o th av e a p en d i n g, unadjudicate d claim for psychoneur osis. R. at 11 ("Upon r eview of the claim, the c losest the veter an comes to see king se rvice connec tion f or psy choneur osis was to repor t that his 'ne rvous sy stem has be e n a ff e c te d unti l he is una

ble to c on c e ntr a te fo r a ny pe ri od of tim e .' Th a t st a te me nt d oe s n ot r ise to the l evel of a claim of entit lement t o service connec tion for psy choneur osis, particula rly in view of the May 1944 hospital summary that diag nosed simple adult maladjustment, and his attorney does not contend that it does." ). With reg ard to the Aug ust 1959 RO decision, the Board found that the decision wa s inadequate bec ause it did not list service c onnection for migr aine on the de cision, nor did it propose or indicate sever ance of ser vice c onnectio n fo r m i gra i ne. R. at 2. Thus, the B oard held that the August 1959 RO decision was not final a nd was not subject to CUE attac k. R. at 3. The B oard r efe rre d that matter to the RO and it is not prese ntly befor e the Court. Id.5 II. AN AL YSI S A prior final RO decision must be reve rsed or re vised wher e evide nce e stablishes clea r and unmistakable er

ror. See 38 U.S.C. § 5109A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a) (2005) . CUE is established whe n t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s a r e m e t : F i r s t , e i t h e r ( 1 ) t h e c o r

r e c tf a c t s c o n t a i n e d

i n , o r c o n str uc tiv e ly contained in, the r ecor d wer e not befor e the adjudicator, or ( 2) the statutory or re g ulatory

provisions extant at the time we re i n correctly applied. Se e Da mr e l v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 242, 245 ( 1994). Second, the a lleg ed er

ror must be "unde batable," not me rely "a disag ree ment as to how the fa cts wer e wei ghed o r eva lu ate d. " Russell v. Principi , 3 Vet.App. 310, 313- 14 (1992) ( en banc ). F inally , the

err or must have " manifes t l y ch an ged the outcome" of the prior decision. Id. a t 31 3- 14 , 3 20 ; see Bu sto s v. W

est , 179 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (F ed. Cir. 1999) (e x pressly adopting "ma

nifestly chang ed the outcome" lang uag e in Ru sse ll , su pra ). When the Court review s a dete rmination that there w as
n o C UE i na p ri o r f

i n al d ec i s i o n , t h e C o u rt 's re v i ew i s l i m i t edt o d et er m i n i n g wh et h er t h e B o ar d 's

c on c lus ion

in t hat r e g a rd

is " a rb itr a ry , c a

pr ic iou s, a n a

buse of di sc re tio n, or

oth e rw ise no t in

acc ordanc e with law," and whether it is supported by an adequate " statement of r easons or bases." 38 U. S.C. §§ 72 61 (a )( 3) (A ), 71 04 (d )( 1) ; se e Ed dy v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 52, 57 ( 1996). A. Clear a

nd Unmistakable Er

ror in the August 1944 Decision The B o a r d d e te r

mi n e d th a t th e a ll e g e d f a il u r e b y th e RO to a d

ju d ic a te a c la im f

or psy choneur osis could not be ra i s ed i n the context of a re quest for r evision on the basis of CUE be c a us e on ly fi na l de c isi on s a re su bje c t to re vis ion fo r CU E. R. at 10 -1 1; see 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a)

. The B oard state d that the failure t o rec og nize the ex istence of a pending claim is not a final decision

su bje c t to c oll a te ra l a tta c k in a re qu e st f or re vis ion on the ba sis of CU E, re lying on our hol din g in Nor ris v . W est , 1 2 Ve t.A

pp
. 41 3, 42 2 (1 99 9) (d e te rm ini ng that a c la im re a so na bly ra ise d to the RO was not adjudicated and holding that unadjudicate d matters we re not fina l fo r p u rp o s es of CUE attack) . R. at 10-11. Thus, t h e Bo ar d h el d that the 1944 RO' s failure to adjudicate a claim for psy choneur osis reasona

bly raised in 1944 cannot be CUE beca use there is no final decision on that claim subject to a CUE attack. Id. T h e B o a r d th e n p r o c e e d e d

to d e te r mi n e , o u ts id e o f

th e c o n te xt of CUE, that Mr. Richar dson had not rea sonably raised a claim for psy choneur osis in 1944. R. at 11.6

The Boar d stated t hat t he requirement under t he holdi ng of t he U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fe dera l Circuit (Fe dera l Circuit) in Roberson v. Princ ipi , 2 51 F .3 d 1 37 8 ( F e d. Cir . 2 00 1) fo r VAto

"' fully and sy mpathetically

develop the vetera

n' s claim,' and the conseque nces of VA' s failure to do

s o , i. e
. , r e ma

n d f o r a d ju d ic a ti o n o f

a n o ld ' im p li c it ' c la im , h a s b e e n li mi te d to th e f a c ts o f th a t c a s e [, ]" citing our decisions in Lane v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 78, 86- 87 (2002), a nd Simmons v. P rincipi , 17 Vet.App. 104, 110 ( 2003). R. at 10. I t found that the duty to fully and sy mpathetically

develop a cla im enunciated in Roberson only applies whe n a ser

vice -c o n n ec t i o n claim for a particula r disability is acc ompanied by

a contention that the disabilit y cause s unemploy ability . R. at 10. The Boa rd esse ntially

limit ed Roberson to i ts f a c ts b y ho ldi ngthat R o berson did no t a pp ly in c a se s in which the a lleg ed prior r easona bly raised c lai m wa s fo r service connec tion rather tha n for a total disability rating based on individual unemploy ability (TDI U)

. R. at 10. Thus, the Boa rd did not follow the holding in Roberson that "in or der to de velop a c laim 'to its optimum' as mandated by Hodge [ v . W

est , 155 F.3d 1356, 1362- 63], t he VA must deter mine all potential claims raise d by the

e vid e nc e , a

pp lyinga ll r e le va

nt l a ws a nd

re g ulatio ns , r e g a rd le ss of wh e the r t he c la im i s sp e c if

ic a lly lab ele d a cl aim for

TDI U." Roberson , 2 51 F .3 d at 13 84 ; see R. at 10. Subsequent to the Boa

rd dec ision on appeal, the F eder al Circuit resolved any confusion as to whether Roberson applies only in claims for TDI

U. See Sze mraj v. Principi , 357 F.3d 1370, 1373 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 4) (h old ing that " VA ha s a du ty to sy mpathe tic a lly re a d a ve te ra n' s a lle g a tio ns in a ll be ne fi t c la ims " ). Th e F e de ra l Cir c uit he ld t hat, up on re c e ipt

of a re qu e st f or re vis ion on the ba sis of CU E, " VA mus t gi ve a sy mpa the tic re a din g to the ve te ra n' s fili ng s in tha t earl ie r pr oc e e din g to det erm in e th e sco pe o f t he cl aim s. " Id. ; see also Moody v. Principi , 360 F.3d 1306, 1310 ( Fe d. Cir. 20 04 ). VAmus t r e a d a ll p ro se su bmi ssi on s sy

mpathe tic a lly , in c lud ingsu bmi ssi on s in

c la ims underlying a

reque st for re vision on the basis of CUE, to " ' deter mine all potential claims raise d by th e evi den ce, ap pl y in g all rel evan t l aws andregul ati on s. '" Bev erly v . Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 394, 4 0 5 (2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Roberson , 2 51 F .3 d at 13 73 ); see also Andrews v. Nicholson , 421 F.3d 1278, 12 82 (Fed. Ci r. 200 5) (st ati ng th at "' Roberson require s, with respec t to all pro se pleading s, that the VA gi v e as y

mp at h et i c r ea d i n g t o t h e v et er an 's fi l i n gs '" ( qu o t i n g Szemraj , 357 F.3d at 1373)). Mr . Ri c ha

rd so n a rgue s th a t, i n d e nying hi s r e qu e st f or re vis ion of the Au g us t 19 44 RO decision on the ba sis of CUE, the Boa rd misint erpr eted and misapplied the rule of law ar ticulated7

in Roberson , which has since be en fur ther e x plained in Szemraj

and Moody . Appellant' s Br ief (B r.) at 6 -1 0

. He a

rg ues that under Roberson , Szemraj , and Moody , V A h a s a d u ty to f ully and sy mpathetically

rea d the pleading s and evide nce subm itted in support of his prior claim bef ore adjudicating his r equest for revision on the basis of CUE. Id. at 9. He states that it is appare nt that the Board did not apply the principles articulated in Roberson befor e deny ing his re quest for r evision

on the basis of CUE. Id. a t 6- 7. He a sse rt s that th e ma tte r s ho uld be re mand e d to the B oa

rd to a pp ly Roberson and re ad his 1944 submissi ons sy mpathetically to inc lude a c laim for ser vice c onnection for psy choneur osis based on his orig inal 1944 application. Id. at 9-10. Th e Se c re tary arg ue s th a t th e B oa rd ' s d e te rm inatio n th a t th e re wa s n o CU E i n th e Au g us t 1944 RO decision shoul d be affirmed beca use i t was not arbitra

ry , capr icious, an abuse of discre tion, or otherw ise not in acc ordanc e with la w, and was acc ompanied by an ade quate state ment of re asons or base s. Secre tary ' s Br . at 9. The Sec reta ry also argues that the pe ndency of a c laim for psy choneur osis is not pr operly addre ssed in a reque st f or revision on the basis of CUE. Id. at 11-12. I n the alter

native, the Sec reta

ry asser ts that, if Mr. Richard s on' s challeng e is proper ly raised in a reque st for re vision on the basis of CUE, then the Court s hould find no CUE beca use Mr. Richar dson is merely disag ree ing w ith the Boa rd' s fac tfinding. Id. at 13. W e t u rn first to t he Secr etar y ' s argument that, under Nor ris , the matter of

a pending, unadjudicate d claim is not proper ly addre ssed in a reque st f or revision on the basis of CUE. Id. at 11-12. The Court a g ree s that revision of a prior decision on the basis of CUE can only be based on

a final decision by

the RO or the B oard. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a) (providing for the r evision of

" [p]r e vio us [RO] d e te rm inatio ns wh ic h a re fi na l and bi nd ing " on

the ba sis of

CU E) ; 38 C.F .R. § 20.14 0 0 (a ) (2005) (providing f or re view to deter

mine whether

CUE "e x ists in a final Boa rd de c isi on " ); see also May

v. Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 310, 314-19 (2005) (disc ussing the f inality of B oa rd de c isi on s f

or the purp os e of

c oll a te ra l a tta c k) ; Nor

ris , 12 Vet.App. at 422 (holding that where there is no final RO decision, there can be no CUE). The F eder al Circuit held recently in An dr e ws , su

pr a , that, wher e the B oard ha s ruled on a CUE motion in which the appellant alleg ed a rea sonably raised claim and our Court " proper ly had jurisdiction to review the B oard de cision," the Fe dera l Ci rc u i t had jurisdiction to reviewour decision. Id. , 421 F.3d at 1281. Nothing in the An dr e ws decision, howe ver, de monstrates an intent8

to alter the rule that revision on the basis of C UE m ust be based upon a final a dju dic a tio n. I n f

a c t, An dr e ws points t o t h e d ecisions in Roberson and Szemraj , which stated that "' apar t from the

re q u i re m en t that a pro se ve tera n' s pleading s be re ad sy

mpathetically , our discussion in Roberson did not chang e the well-e stablished leg al s tandar d for determining the ex istence of CUE in RO and [ Board ] deci si on s. '" An dr e ws , 4 2 1 F. 3 d at 1 2 8 3 (q u o t i n g Szemraj , 357 F.3d at 1373). I t is clear that An dr e ws does not alter f

undamentally

the indispensable pr ere quisite fo r revision on the basis of CUE – a fina l RO or Boa rd dec ision. See 38 C.F. R. § 3. 16 0( d) (2 00 5) (d e fi nin g a " fi na lly adjudicate d claim" as a cl ai m "w hich has be en allowe d or disallowed by the ag ency

of orig inal jurisdiction, the action having become final by the expiration of 1 y ear afte r the date of notice of an

awa rd or dis a llo wa

nc e , o r b y

de nia l on

a pp e lla te re vie w, wh ic he ve r is th e e a rl ie r" ); 38 C.F .R. §§ 20.1100, 20.1103, 20.1104 (2005) (providing for the finality of B oard de cisions and under ly ing RO de c isi on s) ; see also May and Nor ris , both su

pra . I f any doubt e x isted as to w hether a final decision is a nec essar y prer equisite to a re quest for revision on the basis of CUE, the F eder al Circuit clar ified the matter further in Bingham v. Nicholson , 4 21 F.3 d 1 34 6 (Fed . C ir . 2 00 5), whe re i t r eje cte d t he ap pel lan t's a ss ert io n t hat "a purported failure to evaluate a service c onnection cla im under ' all applicable law' – e.g. , the var ious theories of

entitlement authorized by statute – is a lega l err or t hat precludes final adjudication of that

c la im ." Id. at 13 48 . T he F e de ra l Cir c uit he ld t hat " fi na lity

a tta c he s o nc e a

c la im f or be ne fi ts i s di sal lo wed , not whe n a part icu lar th eory is rej ect ed. " Id. at 1348-49. B eca use the Bingham Court fo u n d a fi n al d ec i s i o n o n t h e cl ai m , i f t h at d ec i s i o n wa s d ef ec t i v e, i t co u l d o n l y b e co rr ec t edt h ro u gh t h e s t a tu t o r

y e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e r

u l e o f f i n a l i t y ( e.g. , a re quest for r evision on the basis of CUE or a claim to reope n based on ne w and mate rial evide nce) . Reg arding An dr e ws , the Bingham Court stated that " VA' s failure [i n An dr e ws ] t o consider a ll aspects of a claim does not re nder its dec ision

no n-f in al but in st ead 'is prop erl y chal len ged th rou gh a C UE m ot io n. '" Bingham , 421 F.3d at 1349 (q u o t i n g An dr e ws , 421 F.3d at 1281). I n Moody , su

pra , the Fe dera l Circuit addre ssed an appeal f rom this Court's af

firmanc e of a Boa rd denia l of a re quest for r evision of a pr ior RO decision on the b as i s o f CUE in which the appellant soug ht an ea

rlier e ffe ctive date for a g rant of seconda ry service connec tion. The a ppellant

asser ted that the RO dec ision contained CUE becau s e his prior submissions rea sonably raised a nWhether or not CUE is the exclusive way to raise suc h a matter

is an issue we need not 7 a dd re ss i n o rd e r t o d e c ide the ma tte r b e fo re us
. A claim that has not be en fina lly ad judicated is nec essar ily

pending

. See 38 C.F .R. 8 § 3.160(c) (2005) ( defining "pe nding c laim" a s a cla im "which ha s not been fina lly adjudicate d")

. 9 inf or ma l c la im fo r se c on da

ry se rv ic e c on ne c tio n for a ps y c hiatr ic dis or de r t

hat, i f r e c og nize d, wo uld support an ea

rlier e ffe ctive date . 360 F.3d at 1309. The Moody Court vacated this Court's dec ision and rema nded the matter for the a

pplication of the holding in Roberson

. I n i n t er p re t i n g Roberson , the Moody

Court stated: T h e qu e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r

t h e [ B o a r d ] , a s r e qu i r e d

b y Roberson , sy

mpathetically

rea d Mr. M o ody ' s [prior filings], in determining whe ther Mr. Moody made a n informal claim for se condar

y service connec tion for his psy chiatric d i s order . The interpre tation of these pr ior filings is esse ntially a fa ctual inquiry , and it is beyond our jurisdiction to make that deter mination. Id. at 1 3 1 0 (c i t i n g Lennox v. Principi , 353 F.3d 941, 946 ( Fe d. Cir. 2003), and Cook v. Principi , 353 F.3d 937, 939 ( Fe d. Cir. 2003) (en ba nc))

. Thus, a cla imant may

asser t that VA fa iled to adjudicate a rea sonably ra i s ed cl ai m in the context of a reque st for re vision of a prior decision on the basis of C UE. See B ingham , An dr e ws , 7 Moody , and Roberson , a ll su pra . Wh e n p re se nte d w ithsu c h a re qu e st, VA mus t mak e tw o thre sh old fac tual deter

minations. First, VA must apply the holding in R o b e rson an d g ive a f ull and sy mpathe tic re a din g to t

he pr o s e c la ima

nt' s p ri or su bmi ssi on s to det erm in e wh e the r s uc h a c la im

was re asonably

raised. I f i t is determined that a claim was r easona

bly raised, V A must then deter mine whether

such a c laim is pending or whether it wa s adjudicate d as par t of a fina l decision. 8 I f s uc h a re a so na bly ra ise d cla im re ma ins pe nd ing , the n the re is no d e c isi on on that c la im t o r e vis e on the basis of CUE; how ever , the claim must be adjudicate d. See R oberson , 251 F.3d at 1384-85 (dete rmining that the appellant' s ear lier submissions raised a TDI U claim as a

matter of l aw a

nd

re mand ingthe ma tte r f

or a de te rm inatio n o f en tit le me nt t o T DI U) . I f V A d e te rm ine s th a t th e c la im

was a djudicated, then the claimant may collater ally attack the resulting decision on the ba sis of CUE. Howeve r, it is not for this Court to decide in the first instance whether such a claim ever exis ted or, if so, whether

such a c laim was eve r adjudicated. See M oody , 360 F.3d at 1310.The Boar d must determine, in light of Be rn ar d v . B ro wn , w h e t h e r i t c a n a p p l y Roberson in 9 the first instance , or whether it must rema nd the matter to the RO. Se e Be rn ar d , 4 Vet.App. 389, 394 (1993) ( holding that whe n the B oard a ddresse s questions not addressed by the R O, "it must consider whether the claimant ha s been g iven ade quate notice of the ne ed to submit evidenc e or ar g ument on that question and an opportunity to submit such evidence and argument and to addr ess that question at a he aring , and, if not, whe ther the c laimant has bee n prejudice d there by ")

. The matter would have to be rema nded to the RO (if not a lrea dy rema nded by the B oard) 10 for a n initial decision o n t h e cla im. Se e Go dfr e yv . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 398, 408 ( 1995) (holding 10 I n this case, a lthough the B oard de termined that ther e " is no pending claim for se rvice

c on ne c tio n f

or ps y c ho ne ur os is" ba se d o n M r. Ric ha rd so n' s st a te me nt i n h is 1 94 4 a pp lic a tio n in conjunction with the " May 1944 hospital summar

y that diag nosed simple adult maladjustment," the Bo ar d re ac h ed t h i s co n cl u s i o n wi t h o u t fi rs tap p l y i n g Roberson a nd g ivi nga " fu ll a nd sy mpathe tic read in g" to M r. Ric ha

rd so n' s 1 94 4 s ub mis sio ns . R. a t 10 -1 1; see Roberson , 251 F.3d at 1384 (q u o t i n g Hodge , 155 F.3d at 1362). After Szemraj , there is no quest i o n t h at the B oard' s holding (b a se d on our the n- e xtan t juri sp ru de nc e ) t hat Roberson a

pp lie s on ly

in T DI U c la ims wa s in c or

re c t. B e c a u s e t h e B o a r d

f a i l e d t o a p p l y Roberson pr ior

to a dd re ssi ngwh e the r M r. Ric ha rd so n r e a so na

bly raised a claim for psychoneur osis in 1944, thi s matter must be remande d to the Boa rd to make the requisite fac tual finding s. See 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( a ); Gutierrez v. Princ ipi , 19 Vet.App. 1, 10 ( 2004) (finding that rema

nd is the appropr iate re medy wher e B oard ha s failed to apply law cor rec tly). On re mand, the B oard ( or the RO ) first s h o u l d g ive a f ull and sy mpathetic re ading of the 9 appellant' s 1944 application to deter mine whether

there is a pending , u n adjudicate d claim for p s y ch o n eu ro s i s
. I f, af

t er ap p l y i n g Roberson , it

is de te rm ine d tha t Mr. Ric ha rd so n d id n ot r e a so na

bly raise a claim for psychoneur osis in his 1944 application, or that such a c laim was adjudicated, either

a s a se pa rate a nd dis tin c t c la im o r a s p a rt

of the Au g us t 19 44 RO de c is ion, t he n th e B oa

rd sh ou ld adjudicate the re quest for r evision on the b as i s o f C UE. I f the B oard de termines that the 1944 application re asonably

raises a claim for psychoneur osis and that such a c laim was not adjudicated, then t h e c la im r e ma in s p e n d in g a n d mu s t b e r e f e r r e d to th e RO f

o r a d e te r

mi n a ti o n of Mr. Richardson' s entitlement to service connec tion for psy choneur osis based on the 1944 a pplication beca use a c laim on which there has bee n n o fi n al d ec i s i o n cannot be addre ssed in a re quest for revision on the basis of CUE. See Nor ris , 12 Vet.App. at 42 2 (n o t i n g t he pende ncy of an 10" that th e B oa rd did no t e rr in re fe rr ing the ma tte r to the RO be c a us e the B oa

rd did no t ha ve a pp e llate jurisdiction to re view the veter an' s claim of entitlement to bene fits under sec tion 1110 . . . and lacke d jurisdiction to adjudicate the mer its of that claim")

. 11 unadjudicate d TDIU claim bef ore the RO beca

use the RO failed to adjudicate a claim for TD I U as pa rt of an inf

or ma l c la im fo r a n inc re a se d r a tin g ); see also Robe rson , 251 F.3d at 1385 (re manding the matter of elig ibilit y for TDIU afte r deter mining that a T DI

U claim wa s rea sonably

raised by the veter an' s submissi ons).

B. Clea r and U nmistakable Err or in the May 1946 Dec ision Mr. Richardson a lso ar gu es that there was CUE in the May 1946 RO decision, which

rec lassified his migr aine a s hy perse nsitive c arotid sinus with carotid sinus sy ndrome a nd incre ased his dis a bil ity ra tin g for caro ti d sinus sy nd ro me to 5 0% . R. a t 25 4. Th e RO a lso re du c e d h is disability rating for mig raine to 0%. Id. Mr. Richardson argues that this decision unlawfully merg ed two separ at e disabiliti es into one disability rating , and that the RO ha d no authority to do so. Appellant' s Br

. at 10-13. The Sec reta ry asser ts that the Boa

rd did have lawful a

uthority to merg e the separ ate r ating s. Secre tary ' s Br . at 16 (c iting 1945 Schedule for Rating Disabilities, ¶ 1). As a pre liminary matter, as noted above, a Boa rd dec ision addressing a re quest for r evision of a pri o r dec ision on the basis of CUE in a prior f inal decision is g ener ally revie wed unde r the "a rbitrar y , capr icious, an abuse of discre tion, o r o t h er wi s e not in acc ordanc e with law" standard. 3 8 U. S .C. § 7261(a) (3)( A). I f the appellant alleg es that there was no leg al authority for t h e R O's

a c tio ns , th e n th e Court is be ing a sk e d to a dd re ss a qu e sti on of law. Al l qu e sti on s of law, e ve n th os e raised in the c ontext of a request for revision on the basis of CUE, a re r eviewe d under the nondefe rential de novo standard of revie w. See Ke nt v. Principi , 389 F.3d 1380, 1384 ( Fe d. Cir. 2004); Joyc e v. Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 36, 43 (2005). There fore , the deter mination of whether

the RO had the a

uthority to adjust Mr. Richardson' s rating in 1946 is reviewe d de novo. The B oard found that the RO had the authority to modify

Mr. Richardson' s rating s based on Parag raphs 1 a

nd 13 o f t he 1945 Schedule for Rating Disabilities [ here inafter , Parag raph 1 a nd Para g ra ph 13 ], ba se d up on the F e br ua ry 19 46 VA e xami natio n that a ttr ibute d his he a da c he s to

car otid sinus s y

ndrome a nd a May 1946 medical opinion that he did not suffe r fr om m i gra i ne. R. at 14 ; see R. at 24 3, 25 2. Para g ra ph1 p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p a rt :12

A v e t e ra n' s d isa bil ity c la im m a y

re qu ir e re ratin g s in

a c c or da nc e wi th c ha

ng e s in laws , chang es in medica l knowledg e, and c hang es in phy sical or mental condition, ove r a period of ma

ny y ear s. I t is thus essential, both in t he examination and in the e v a l u a t i o n o f

d i s a b i l i t y, t h a te a c h d i s a

b i l i t y b e v i e w e d

i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s w h o l e h i s t o r y. Diffe rent e x aminers, at dif fe re nt times, will not describe the same disability in the same langua g e; features of the di sability which must have pe rsisted uncha ng ed may be over looked or a

chang e for

the better or

worse ma

y not be ac curately

appre ciated or desc ribed. 19 45 Sc he du le fo r R a tin g Di sa bil iti e s, ¶ 1 ; cf. 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4

. 2 (2 0 0 5 ) (c odified ver sion of Para g ra ph1) . Pa ra g ra ph13 pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p a rt : Whe n a ny c ha ng e in e va luatio n is to be ma de , the ra tin g a g e nc y

sh ou ld a ssu

re its e lf that there has bee n an ac tual chang e in the con d i t i o n s , for be tter or wor se, and not me re ly a dif fe re nc e in t

ho ro ug hn e ss o f t

he e xami natio n o r i n u se of de sc ri pti ve te rm s. Th is wi ll n o t, o f c o u r s e, p r e c lu d

e th e c o r r e c ti o n o

f e r r o n e o u s r a ti n gs , n or

wi ll i t p r e c l u d e g i v i n g t h e v e t e r a n t h e b e n e f i to f r e a s o n a b l e d o u b ta s t o i n c r e a s e i n s e v e r i t y. 19 45 Sc he du le fo r Ra tin g Di sa bil iti e s, ¶ 1 3 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; c f. 38 C.F.R. § 4.13 (2005) ( codified version of Par ag raph 13)

. The B oard he ld that Parag raphs 1 a nd 13 provided authority for the RO decision in Ma y 1946 to r e c la ssi fy

Mr . Ri c ha

rd so n' s mig ra ine a s h y

pe rs e ns iti ve c a ro tid

sin us wi th c a ro tid

sin us sy nd ro me and incr ease his rating to 50%. R. at 14. Specifica lly , the B oard f ound that the RO modified Mr. Richardson' s disability

rating s based on the new medical opi nion that his diag nosis of m igr aine wa s

" fo un d to be in e rr or ." R. at 25 2; see R. at 14. I n addition, the Boa rd dete rmined that the RO had the leg al authority

to rec lassify

his disabilit ies based on Par ag raphs 1 a nd 13. R. at 14. Mr. Richardson' s assertion that " [t ]h er e wa s no change in t he de sc ri pti on

of [his ] ca ro tid sinus sy ndrome disability

or his migr aine he ad ac h es d isability " ( Reply Br . at 7) is contra

ry to the

e vid e nc e of

re c or d ( R. at 24 3, 24 5, 25 2) , w hic h in dic a te s th a t th e re wa s, in fact , a cha ng e in h is dia g no sis . T his a sse rt ion ill us tr a te s th a t Mr . Ri c ha rd so n is me re ly

dis a g re e ingwi th the mann e r i n which the RO weig hed the fac ts in rende ring its May 1946 decision. Mere disag ree ment with the way that the RO evaluated the fac ts c annot be a basis for a finding of CUE. Se e Ru sse ll , 3 Vet.App.

a t 31 3- 14 ; c

f. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(d)( 1) (2005) (a new medic al diag nosis that "cor rec ts" a n ear lier diagno s i s cannot be the basis for a finding of CUE in a B oard de cision). Even a ssuming that Mr. Richardson' s assertion that his condition did not chan g e is corr ect ( beca use mig raine was ne ver causinghis heada ches) , the RO had law ful authority to modify his r ating under Par ag raph 13, w hich13

allows for " the cor

rec tion of err oneous ratings." Thus, the B oard' s conclusion that the RO had la wful

a uth or ity to a dju st M r. Ric ha

rd so n' s d isa

bil ity ratin g s, ba se d o n Pa

ra g ra ph s 1 a nd 13 , is c or re c t. I n addition, Mr. Richardson as s er t s t h at the B oard violate d 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) by failing to consider a ll applicable provisions of law. Specifica lly , he ar g ues that the matter of CUE in the May 19 46 de c isi on

sh ou ld b e re mand e d b e c a us e the B oa

rd fa ile d to dis c us s Es te ba n v . B ro wn , 6 Vet. Ap p
. 2 5 9 (1994), a nd Fa nn ing

v . B ro wn , 4 Vet.App. 225 ( 1993), which he argues ar e "'p o t en t i al l y

ap p l i cab l e'" p ro v i s i o n s o f l aw
. Ap p el l an t ' s B r
. at 1 4 (c i t i n g Schafrath v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 589, 593 ( 1991)). Our holdings in E

s te ban and Fanning

both stand for the g ener al proposition that all disabiliti es m ust be rated sepa rate ly

. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.25(b) ( 2005) (" Ex cept as otherw ise provided in [the rating ] schedule, the disabilities arising from a single disease entity

. . . are to be rated sepa

rate ly as are all other disabling c onditions, i f any .") . Mr. Richardson is cor rec t that the Boa

rd is r equire d by 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) to consider all applicable provisions of law. See Sc ha fra th , 1 Vet.App. at 592-93. Howeve r, his argument fails bec ause the holdings in Esteban and Fanning wer e not laws

e xtan t a t th e tim e of

the May 19 46 de c isi on . T he re fo re , it wa s n ot n e c e ssa

ry fo r t he B oa rd to a dd re ss the applica

bility of those ca ses to Mr. Richardson' s reque st for re vision on the basis of C UE

. See Damrel , 6 Ve t.A

pp . at 24 5- 46 ; Ru sse ll , 3 Vet.App. at 313-14. Moreove r, the RO specif ically soug ht a medica l opinion clar ify ing whether Mr. Richardson' s car otid sinus s y ndrome a nd migr aine we re separ ate diseases (R. at 248), which stated that the diag nosis of migr aine wa s err oneous (R. at 252). Thus, the R O reduced his rating for migra ine t o 0%, apparently deter mining that he did not suffe r from mig raine – a dete rmination that was consistent with the most rec ent medica l opinions at the tim e . R. a t 25 4; see R. at 252. Mr

. R i c h a r d s o n a l s o a s s e rt s t h a t t h e B o a r d ' s s t a t e m e n t o f r e a s o n s o r b a s e s r e g a r d i n g its finding that there was no CUE in the May 1946 RO decision is inadequate. Appellant' s Br . at 15-19;

see 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1). This a rg ument is without merit. He does not alleg e that the B oard f ailed to a dd re ss f ull y a ny of his a rgume nts re g a rd ingCU E i n th e Ma y 19 46 RO de c isi on . U nd e r t he g uis e of re asons or ba ses, he mer ely rea sserts the same arguments that he makes reg arding the m erits of his request for

revision on the basis of C UE. Moreove r, t o the extent that he argues that the B oard should have a ddresse d any RO decisions based on new medical diag noses re ndere d afte r May 1946,14

we note that these subseque nt decisions are based on e vidence n o t of rec ord in May 1946, and do not establish CUE in the M ay 1946 RO decision. Se e Ru sse ll , 3 Vet.App. at 314 (stating that a new

me dic a l dia g no sis that " c or re c ts" a n e a rl ie r e rr or

is no t C UE) ; cf. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(d)( 1). There fore , the B oard' s finding that there w as no CUE in the May 1946 decision will be af

firmed.

III . C ON CL USI ON After considerati o n o f Mr. Richardson' s and the Sec reta ry ' s pleading s, and a r eview of the

re c or d, the B oa

rd ' s Sept emb er 5, 2003 , d e c isi on tha t th e re wa s n o CU E i n th e Au g us t 19 44 RO de c isi on is V AC AT ED a nd that matt e r is RE MA ND ED fo r f

ur the r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s decision. The B oard' s decision that there was no CUE in the May 1946 RO decision is AFF I RMED.

KASOL D, Judge , concur

ring : Iconcur

in the Court's holding that Mr. Richardson' s assertion that the 1944 RO decision failed to c onstrue his ple ading s to raise a claim was pr operly

broug ht as

a re quest to revise that decision based on CUE a nd that this matter must be remande d in light of An drew s and for application of Roberson

. I d is a g r e e w it h th e ma jo r it y ' s d is c u s s io n a s to how the B oa rd or RO sh ou ld p ro c e e d o n r e mand . I be lie ve a fi nd ing on re mand that the 19 44 RO fa ile d to construe M r
. A n dr e w s ' p le a d in g s to r a is e a c la im w o u ld c o n s ti tute CU E in

th a t d e c is io n , w it

h the manifestly chang ed outcome be ing the proce ssing of the claim. See A ndrews v. Nicholson , 421 F.3d 12 78 , 1 28 4 ( F e d. Cir . 2 00 5) (" [W]he n th e VAvio la te s Roberson b y fa i l i n g t o co n s t ru e t h e v et er an 's plea d i n gs to raise a

claim, such c laim is not considered una djudicated but the e rror is instead pr op e rl y c or re c te d th ro ug h a CU E m oti on [.]" ); see also Bingham v . Nicholson , 421 F.3d 1346, 1349 (F ed. Cir. 2005) (f

inding that the 1950 Boa

rd' s disallowance of cla im was a fina l decision and that the Se c r e ta

r y ' s " f a il u r e to c o n s id e r a ll a s p e c ts o f a c la im d o e s n o t r e n d e r a d e c is io n n on-final but i n s t ea d 'i s p ro p er l y

ch al l en gedt h ro u gh a C UE m o t i o n
. '") (c i t i n g An dr ews , su pra ); Roberson v. Principi , 251 F.3d 1378, 1384 (F ed. Cir. 2001) (f inding in the c ontext of a r equest for revision on t h e b a s i s o f

C U E t h a ta

f i n a l R O d e c i s i o n f

a i l e d t o c o n s tr

u e c l a i m a n t ' s p l e a d i n g s t o i n c l u d e a T D IU

c la im a nd re ve rs ing ); Nelson v. Principi , 18 Ve t.A pp . 4 07 , 4 09 (2 00 4) (n oti ngtha t F e de ra l Cir c uit in Norton v. Principi , 376 F.3d 1336, 1338- 39 (2004), r ejec ted ar g uments that proce dural violations in prior final de cisi o n could re nder that decision nonfinal, or that RO decision rema ined15

unadjudicate d beca

use the RO fa iled to sy

mpathetically

rea d his claim, and noting Mr. Nelson ha d not arg ued CUE). Moreove r, on rema

nd, beca use Mr. Richardson' s reque st is one for revision base d on CUE, the 19 44 RO de c isi on

tha t is be inga tta c ke d s ho uld

be re vie we d in

the c on te xt of

the law, re g ulatio ns , and sta nd ards g e ne ra lly

a pp lie d in re qu e sts fo r r e vis ion

ba se d o n CU E a

nd fi le d und e r 3 8 U .S. C. § 5109A. See , e.g. , Pierce v. Principi , 240 F.3d 1348, 1355 ( 2001) (noting that final RO dec isions

are e nti tle d to a

pr e su mpt ion

of va lid ity ); Ha ine s v . W est , 154 F.3d 1298 ( Fe d. Cir.1998), c e rt. denied , 526 U.S. 1016 (1999) (noting that CUE is the ty pe of e rror

"a bout which re asonable minds

c ou ld n ot d if

fe r" ); Ed dy v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 52, 57 (1996) ( finding that CUE must be based on the

rec ord and the law that existed at the time of the prior de cision). Ia lso wr ite to c on tr a st An dr e ws with two situations not prese nt he re, and to which the CUE analy sis in An dr e ws is not applicable. F irst, the CUE aspec t of An dr e ws is i na pp lic a ble to c a se s in wh ic h a n RO de c isi on or c e rt a in sub se qu e nt pr oc e dura l rig hts we re ne ve r pr ov ide d with re g a rd to a cla im for VA be nefits or the ple ading s of a c laimant for VAbenef its. I n such ca ses, the entire claim for be nefits and a ll a spects of that claim rema in ope n – in an unadjudicated status – and the claim ca n be pursue d in a non-CUE contex t. Se e Tab laz on v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 359, 361 ( 1995) (a llo wi ngc la ima

nt purs uin g c la im to re op e n to a sse rt that his or ig ina l c la im w a s n e ve r f ina l be c a us e
no Sta te me nt of the Ca se (S OC ) h a d b e e n p ro vid e d) ; Ha uc k v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1994) (a llo wi ngc la ima

nt p ur su ing a n inc re a se d ra tin g c la im to ass e rt that his c la im w a s n e ve r f ina l be c a us e the Se c re tary

fa ile d to ma il him a co py of the B oa rd de c isi on purs ua

nt to 3 8 U .S. C. § 71 04 (e )) ; Kuo v. De rwinski , 2 Ve t.A

pp . 662 , 6 66 (1 99 2) (a llo wi ngc la ima nt p ur su inga n in c re a se d r a tin g c la im t o
a sse rt that he wa s ent itl e d to an ea rl ie r ef fe c tiv e date be c a

us e no SOC ha d b e e n p ro vid e d) ; Ashley v. De rwinski , 2 Vet.App. 307, 311 (1992) (finding claim in non-final status when the Secre tary failed to m a il a c la ima

nt a c op y of the B oa

rd de c isi on

purs ua nt t o 3 8 U .S. C. § 71 04 (e )( 3) ); see also Cook v. Principi , 3 1 8 F

. 3 d

1 3 3 4 , 1 3 4 0 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ( c i t i n g f a v o r a b l y Tablazon , Hauck, Kuo , and Ashley , a ll supra, and finding a non-f inal claim occ urs when "the time for appealing either an RO or a Boar d decision did not r

un wher e the [S ecr etar

y ] fa iled to pr ovide the veter an with inf ormation or mater ial

c ri tic a l to the a

pp e llate pr oc e ss" ); W

oznick v . Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 198, 201-02 (2005) ( direc ting the Secr etar

y to issue an SOC as to the appellant' s claim).16

Second, the CUE aspec t of An dr e ws is not applicable to a failure of the RO to adjudicate an informal claim for a

n incre ased disability

rating and assoc iated bene fits, including TD I U, that ar ises from VA medical ex ams or hospitalization reports. See 38 C.F .R. § 3 .1 57 (b )( 1) (2 00 5) ; Norris v. W est , 1 2 V e t.A

pp . 4 13 , 4 22 (1 99 9) (d e te rm ini ng that an inf or ma l cla im f

or a TD I U r a tin g re a so na

bly raised to the RO via

VA medica l rec ords was not a djudicated a nd thus the claim was not fina l for purp os e s o f C UE a tta c k) ; see also Robe rson (explicitl y distinguishing the holding in Nor ris that an informal cla im for TDIU bene fits a rising from VA medica l rec ords had ne ver be en adjudicated and there fore had not become final, with the circ umstances in Roberson , which involved a claim for a TDIU rating pr esente d by the veter an in his or igina l c laim f or benef its that had not been pr ocesse d beca use the plea dings w ere not sy mpathetically

rea d). One notable distinction between the f ormal claim or plea dings of the claimant a

nd an inf or ma l c la im b a se d o n me dic a l r e c or ds is t hat in the fo rm e r the c la ima

nt make s a

sp e c if ic re qu e st for be nefits, is presumably knowledg eable about what be nefits he is see king a nd the base s theref

or,
and is p re su ma

bly c a pa ble of a pp e a lin g a

de c isi on that do e s n ot p ro vid e a ll of the be ne fi ts s ou g ht. See , e.g. , Roberson , 251 F.3d at 1383 (stating that Roberson' s orig inal medical disability claim was de c ide d b y

the RO a nd wa s the sp e c if ic re qu e st fo r be ne fi ts fo r wh ic h Robe rs on so ug ht t he hig he st rating possible). I n the latter situation, howeve r, the e ntire cla im and the bene fits arising from that

c la im a re g e ne rate d b y

me dic a l r e po rt s and

are in it iat ed pu rs ua

nt t o r e g ulatio n, wi tho ut a sp e c if ic claim being filed by

claimant. Se e Al lin v . B ro wn , 10 Vet.App. 55, 58 ( 1997) (hospital re port may constitute an informal claim for incre ased benef its a nd assig nment of an e arlier eff ective da te that

c or re sp on ds to d a te of ho sp ita l r e po rt ); Serve llo v. Derwinski , 3 Vet.App. 196, 199 ( 1992) (stating that § 3 .1 57 (b ) doe s not re qu ir e the ve te ra n to ide nti fy the re po rt

a s a c la im o r t o id e nti fy

the be ne fi ts soug ht). I n the instant case , the R O re n d ered a de cision with reg ard to Mr. Richa rdson' s claim for disability compensation. That dec i s i o n b ec ame f inal and, pursua

nt to An dr e ws , M r. R i ch ar d s o n 's claim that the RO err ed "by failing to construe [his] pleading s to raise a claim, [ ] is not considered

un adj ud ica ted bu t t he error is in st ead pro perl y corr ect ed thr ou gh a CU E mot io n[ .] " An dr e ws , su pr a .17

MOORM AN, Judge , concur ring : Iwrite sepa

rate ly to further

discuss the state of the law fo l l o wi n g Andrews v. Nicholson , 4 2 1 F. 3 d 1278 (F ed. Cir. 2005), a nd specific ally

Iconclude that filing a motion for revision of a

prior fina l RO or B oard de cision on the basis of CUE is not the on ly way in which to raise the issue of an una djudicated pe nding c laim. I conclude that the Fe dera l Circuit in An dr e ws stated a r elatively narr ow conc lusion that was based on the particular fa ct patter n and proc edura l posture of that c ase. In An dr e ws , VA ra ised for the first time on appea l, as an argument to defe at t he United States Court of Appeals for the F eder al Cir c uit ' s (F e de ra l Cir c uit ) e xer c ise of jur isd ic tio n, the po ssi bil ity that a c la im f or TD I U w a s st ill pending and unadjudicated. 421 F.3d at 1281. Howeve r, in An dr e ws , the final de cision by VA had be e n r e nd e re d a ft e r t

he fa c ts that g a ve ri se to t

he po ssi bil ity

of a TD I U r a tin g we re kn ow n a nd sh ou ld have be en conside red by

VA in deter

mining that aspec t of the orig inal claim, the assig nment of the disability rating

. Id. a t 12 79 -8 0; se e Col lar o v . W e st , 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (F ed. Cir. 1998) (noting the fi ve e le me nts of

a c la im f or se rv ic e c on ne c tio n) ; Fe nd e rso n v . W

est , 1 2 Ve t.App. 119, 125 (1 99 9) . T he Court

op ine d th a t, u

nd e r t he se c ir c ums tanc e s, " when the VAvio la te s Roberson [ v. Principi , 251 F.3d 1378 ( Fe d. Cir. 2001)], by failing to construe the ve t er an 's p l ea d ings to ra ise a claim, such a

claim is not considere d unadjudicate d but the er ror is instead pr operly

corr ecte d th rou gh a C UE m ot io n[ .] " An dr e ws , 421 F.3d at 1284. The pre sence of an underly ing final dec ision is key to this conclusion. I t is clear that there must be a finding that there is a final d ec i s i o n as to a c laim before a revision base d on CUE will lie. S e e M a yv
. Ni c h o ls on , 1 9 Ve t

. Ap p . 310, 314-19 (2005) ; Link v. W est , 1 2 V e t.A

pp . 3 9, 45 (1 99 8) ; Be

st v . B ro wn , 10 Vet.App. 322, 325 (1997). And, if there is such

a fi na l de c isi on

a s to the c la im in iss ue , on ly a mot ion fo r re vis ion on the ba sis of

CU E o r a

c la im to reope n for ne w and material evide nce w ill li e. Cook v. Principi , 318 F.3d 1334, 1339 ( Fe d. Cir. 20 02 ) ( no tin g the tw o s ta tut or y e xce pti on s to the ru le of

fi na lity ). I n d isc us sin g TD I U, thi s p re se nts a troubling p r o b le m. F o r y e a r s , V A a n d th is Co u rt' s ju r is p r u d e n c e h a v e d is c u s s e d a " c la im for TDIU." The implication is that TDI U is a sepa rate claim. B ut, the Fe dera l Circuit in Roberson and ag ain in An dr e ws clea

rly found that TDIU, re ason ab l y ra i s ed before a final dec ision on the underlying disa

bility claim, is incorporated as an element of t hat claim and is finally decide d when the underlying disability claim is r ated. See R oberson , 2 5 1 F

. 3 d a t1 3 8 4 ( n o t i n g e v i d e n c e o f T D IU18

submitt ed at the time the application for VA disability compensation wa s filed and holding that the subsequent CUE motion addr essing the RO' s failure to c onsider TDIU in the final RO dec ision was

a p p r o p r i a t e b e c a

u s e " R o b e r s o n ' s c l a i m h a s b e e n f i n a l l y d e c i d e d b y t he RO " ); see als o An dr e ws , 421 F.3d at 1281. On the other hand, there are circ umstances wher e TDI U clea rly can c onstitut e a separ ate c laim. One such c ircumstance is ill ustrated in Nor ris v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 413 (1999), wher e this Court found that there wer e pending , unadjudicate d claims for TDIU based on the fact tha t n o f in a l d e c is io n h a d b e e n ma d e c o n c e r n in g th e in f

o r ma l c la im s f

o r a n in c r e a sed ra ting (implicating TDIU) that we re r aised y ear s after the initial RO decision on the appellant's c laim for service connec tion. Th e F eder al Circuit, in An dr e ws , su pra , s a w n o n e c e ssi ty

to d isc us s Nor

ris , su pr a , beca use, i n my view, it perc eived no conflict with Nor ris , su pra . There fore , Iconclude that a final decision concerning a cla im remains the indispensable a ntece dent for a

finding of CUE and provides the ex p l an ation for the dif fer ent treatment of TDIU issues in An dr e ws and Nor ris , b oth

su pr a . The F eder al Circuit further reinfor ced this conc lusion in B in g h a m v
. Ni c h o lson , 4 21 F.3d 1346, 1349 (F ed. C ir. 2005), i n finding that a VA failure to consider a ll possibl e theor ies, including presumptive theor ies, for service connec tion does not prec lude a de cision on the claim for service

connec tion from being final; rathe r, such err or results in a n incomplete, y et final, a djudication of the claim that can be subject to a CUE attack. The Court c oncluded that, as to the appellant' s assertion that failure to consider one theory of ser vice c onnection constituted a leg al er ror that pr eclude d finality , "the sole vehicle in which to proper ly pursue that c halleng e is a CUE claim." 421 F.3d at 1349. The Fede ral Ci rcuit t hen also noted the holding in An dr e ws that " VA ' s f a ilure to c on sid e r a ll

as p ec t s o f a cl ai m d o es n o t re n d er i t s d ec i s i o n n o n -f i n al b u t i n s t ea d 'i s p ro p er l y ch al l en gedt h ro u gh a C UE m ot io n. '" Id. N o t h i n g i n t h e s e d e c i s i o n s , h o w e v e r , l e a d s m e t o c o n c l u d e t h a te v e r y d i s a b i l i t y l i s t e d

b y a
ve te ra n in a sin g le a pp lic a tio n f

or VAdis a bil ity c omp e ns a tio n is ne c e ss ari ly encompa sse d w ith in

a fi na l de c isi on

by the RO or

B oa rd that e xpre ssl y

a dju dic a te s o nly

on e of the c la ime d d isa

bil iti e s. One possible re ading of An dr e ws is that a de c isi on a s to on e of

se ve ra l di sa

bil ity c la ims simult aneously

filed, as pa

rt of the same application for benefits, would constitute a final de cision as to all. That re ading would lead to the c onclusion that, following a final decision as to one of the19

claimed disabilities, the veteran' s subsequent request t hat VA pr ocess the othe r cla ims that were pa rt

o f t h e s am e ap p l i ca t i o n co u l d b e as s er t ed o n l y i n C UE m o t i o n s , n o t as re qu es t s t o p ro ce s s p en d i n g, unadjudicate d clai m s
. I d o n o t agre e with such a rea ding. A s the Court indicated in Bev erly v

. Nicholson , 1 9 V e t.A

pp . 3 94 , 4 04 -0 5 ( 20 05 ), it " wo uld be ill og ic a l a nd un fa ir

. . . to the a

pp e lla nt t o [m ake him or he r] wait until t he B oard de cision is final and th en fa ce t he hig h burden of proving CU E w he n a

ny oth e r e rr or c a n be a dd

re sse d imm e diate ly a nd

mor e fa vo ra bly wh e n r a ise d in

a tim e ly

manner ."