Victory Starts Here

A 35-year History of the 

US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Cover photo is a US Army photo of military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) 

at Fort Benning, Georgia.
Victory Starts Here

A 35-year History of the 

US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command

by

Benjamin King

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Foreword by

General Martin E. Dempsey

iii

Foreword

US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is one of the 

most unique organizations in the Army. For 35 years, it has functioned as 

originally intended and over that time has carried out its original mission. 

However, TRADOC has never stood still. It has adapted to changes in 

the strategic environment, technology, and the pressures of war, all while 

continuing to train Soldiers and leaders and develop doctrine. The history 

of TRADOC is worth the study, and I am pleased to introduce this survey of 

what the command has accomplished in those three and a half decades.

General William E. DePuy, TRADOC’s first commander, envisioned 

an organization dedicated to providing training excellence, guidance on 

how to fight the country’s wars, and insights into the organization and 

materiel necessary to support the Soldier and execute doctrine. From the 

beginning, General Depuy made sure that the Soldier was the centerpiece 

of TRADOC’s efforts. Technology and doctrine existed to assist, not 

replace, the Soldier. This policy has carried through to the present day and 

has been a prime reason for America’s success on the battlefields of the 

late 20th and early 21st centuries.

At the 35-year mark, TRADOC continues to train the individual 

Soldier, develop the Army’s leaders, support training, evolve doctrine, 

establish standards, and build the future Army. It is, therefore, important 

to take into account the lessons of the past 35 years in order to best 

accomplish our current work of establishing the standards and requirements 

for training and developments for the Army, and of developing competent 

and adaptive leaders while ensuring that our doctrine keeps pace with a 

changing world.

Throughout its history, TRADOC has remained an adaptable, 

innovative organization. We are part of a joint team that helps define the 

contribution of land forces to the joint and coalition battle and serves as the 

Army’s component for joint developments in training, doctrine, concept 

formulation, and experimentation.

Thirty-five years ago, TRADOC began developing the future Army. 

That future Army proved itself in the Gulf War of 1990–91, but nothing 

remains the same. That victorious Army had to become lighter and more 

deployable. That next future Army is being developed now, and then 

TRADOC will develop yet another “future Army.”

I would like to thank the Soldiers and civilians, together the bedrock 

of our Army and TRADOC, that have served with intelligence, creativity, 
iv

initiative, insight, and loyalty. I’m honored to stand at the forefront of 

not only the dedicated men and women serving in 2008 but also all of 

those that have contributed for the past 35 years. May future Soldiers and 

civilians of TRADOC learn from the challenges and successes chronicled 

in these pages.

Martin E. Dempsey

General, US Army

Commanding
v

Preface

Victory Starts Here is the history of the US Army Training and Doctrine 

Command’s (TRADOC’s) 35 years as the architect of the Army’s future. 

During the first years of the 21st century, “Transformation” became a new 

buzzword for the Army changing from the Cold War era to a new continental United States (CONUS) based rapidly deployable Army. TRADOC, 

however, has been transforming the Army and itself since its establishment 

in July 1973. Created to solve the cumbersome command and control problems of the Continental Army Command (CONARC), TRADOC’s mission charter was to oversee Army schools, training, doctrine, and combat 

developments. Through time those missions evolved and TRADOC also 

became responsible for preparing the Army for war and being the Army’s 

“architect of the future.” TRADOC’s first commander, General William E. 

DePuy, understood that the Army required sound training, coherent organization, modern weapons systems, and relevant doctrine. His successors 

built on that foundation and addressed the need for future planning. 

This brief history provides an overview of the first 35 years of 

TRADOC’s service to the Army and to the nation. Victory Starts Here

continues with the condensed format of the 30-year history. Nevertheless, 

we owe a considerable debt to the 1993, 1998, and 2003 editions that 

commemorated the command’s 20th, 25th, and 30th anniversaries. Mr. 

John L. Romjue, Dr. Susan Canedy, Dr. Anne W. Chapman, Dr. James T. 

Stensvaag, and others who contributed to those editions deserve continuing thanks. The TRADOC Military History Office accepts all responsibility for errors and will gratefully accept corrections.

Readers will discover that TRADOC’s story is generally one of success. Army operations since 1973 provide the historical evidence on which 

this conclusion is based. As noted in the preface to Prepare the Army for 

War, TRADOC’s 20-year history, the Army’s hierarchical nature focuses 

any study on its leaders, and this overview is no different. All of the elements that have constituted TRADOC through the years have reflected the 

intent of its commanding generals. This fact notwithstanding, it remains 

for the soldiers and civilians making up the command to shape and execute 

the commander’s intent. Therefore, the first dedication of this overview 

rightly belongs to General DePuy. His command produced the single most 

far-reaching transformation of the Army until the efforts at the beginning 

of the 21st century. But, because neither he nor his successors who have 
vi

served up until the time of this writing could accomplish their intent alone, 

we have also dedicated Victory Starts Here to the multitude of anonymous 

laborers who have made the vision work.

J. Britt McCarley, Ph.D.

Chief Historian

US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia 

2008
vii

Contents

Page

Foreword ................................................................................................ iii

Preface.......................................................................................................v

Chapter I. TRADOC: A Historical Summary ..........................................1

Chapter II. TRADOC Leadership ............................................................5

General William E. DePuy ................................................................5

General Donn A. Starry .....................................................................6

General Glenn K. Otis .......................................................................7

General William R. Richardson .........................................................8

General Carl E. Vuono ......................................................................9

General Maxwell R. Thurman .........................................................10

General John W. Foss ......................................................................11

General Frederick M. Franks Jr. ......................................................12

General William W. Hartzog ...........................................................13

General John N. Abrams .................................................................14

General Keven P. Byrnes .................................................................15

General William S. Wallace .............................................................16

Chapter III. Force Design and Weapons Development ..........................19

Army of Excellence .........................................................................19

Force XXI ........................................................................................20

Transformation ................................................................................21

Weapons and Equipment .................................................................22

The Global War on Terrorism ..........................................................29

Chapter IV. Doctrine ..............................................................................31

Chapter V. Training and Leader Development .......................................37

Chapter VI. TRADOC in the Joint Service Arena .................................49

Chapter VII. Organizational Structure ...................................................57

Initial Subordinate Organization .....................................................57

Headquarters Organization and Reorganizations ............................59

Installations and Changes, 1973–2003 ............................................61

Intermediate Level Changes, 1973–2003 ........................................62

Schools ............................................................................................63

Training Organizations ....................................................................65

Test Organizations ...........................................................................66

TRADOC Organization in 2008 ......................................................67
viii

Page

Chapter VIII. International Activities ....................................................71

Standardization and Interoperability ...............................................72

Bilateral Staff Talks .........................................................................73

Glossary .................................................................................................75

Suggestions for Additional Reading ......................................................79

Index ......................................................................................................83

About the Author ....................................................................................89


Chapter I

TRADOC: A Historical Summary

Established in 1955, the Continental Army Command (CONARC) 

was responsible for all the active units and armies in the continental 

United States (CONUS) as well as training centers, schools, and doctrine 

development. The only activity for which it was not responsible was 

combat developments—the purview of the Combat Developments 

Command (CDC), which was established in 1962. By the early 1970s, 

it was evident that the span of control for CONARC was too large for a 

single headquarters. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton W. 

Abrams Jr., initiated Operation STEADFAST, which was carried out by his 

FM 100-5, Operations, 1976. TRADOC’s Premier 

Doctrinal Manual.
Victory Starts Here

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General William E. DePuy. As 

a result of Operation STEADFAST, CONARC was inactivated, and on 

1 July 1973, two new organizations were activated in its place: the United 

States (US) Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) assumed control of the 

Active Duty armies and units in CONUS and the US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) assumed control of training centers, Army 

schools, and doctrine development. In addition, CDC was inactivated 

and TRADOC also assumed the mission of combat developments. Each 

command maintained its own installations until the US Army Installation 

Management Agency (later US Army Installation Management Command) 

assumed responsibility for all Army installations in 2002. The establishment 

of TRADOC was something revolutionary in the US Army. For the first 

time in its history, basic and advanced individual training, Army branch 

schools and Army colleges, Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), 

analysis, doctrine development, and combat developments were all the 

responsibility of a single headquarters. That TRADOC was a major 

command (MACOM) under the leadership of a full general indicated its 

importance in the new scheme of things.

TRADOC put combat developments back into the schools and 

focused the development of the Army’s tactical organizations, weapons 

and equipment, doctrine, and the training of soldiers in that doctrine. It 

also needed to reorient the Army’s thinking toward the Soviet Union’s 

dangerous and growing strategic threat to the North Atlantic alliance. The 

situation was exacerbated by what military observers in the United States 

and Europe described as a lost decade of weapons development by the 

US Army, stemming from a 10-year concentration on fighting and equipping for the Vietnam conflict. TRADOC came into existence during the 

American defense policy reorientation from Vietnam to North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) Europe and the challenge of the Warsaw Pact 

buildup. Those efforts fundamentally transformed the Army into a modernized, trained, and ready force—a significant component of the successful political-military challenge against which Communist power shattered 

and the Cold War ended in 1989–91. It was the highly trained, professional 

Army of Excellence (AOE) whose combat units helped restore democratic 

government to Panama in Operation JUST CAUSE in 1989–90 and later 

expelled the armies of Iraq from Kuwait in Operation DESERT STORM 

in 1991. This same Army increasingly provided peace operations and 

humanitarian relief in places such as Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, 

and Rwanda; and aided victims following natural disasters and the terrorist 

attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in September 2001.
TRADOC: A Historical Summary

Early in the 1970s, the United States found itself in a strategic situation in which a shift of power in favor of the political dynamic of revolutionary socialism was advancing worldwide. The United States’ strategic 

reversal in Southeast Asia seemed to question the continued validity of its 

long and hard-contested policy of Communist containment, with the bitter 

past and recent sacrifices of that historic effort. The gains of the worldwide 

Communist revolution in the 1970s, funded and supplied by the Soviet 

Union, and, to a lesser degree, by China, were dramatic and alarming. 

Revolutionary power seizures and military coups in Africa, South and 

Southwest Asia, and Latin America went forward largely uncontested by 

American policy makers of the middle and late decade.

The stunning reversal and sudden termination of that revolutionary 

impulse in the world-changing events from 1989 to 1991 created a new 

strategic world. By the early 1990s, the collapse of communism and the 

disintegration of the Soviet Union had ushered in a new world of power. 

The United States remained as the single superpower in an international 

order in which it could act with greater freedom to support national independence and democratic and free-market institutions. The imperatives of 

Artillery training at Fort Sill.

US Army Photo


Victory Starts Here

that situation seemed to dictate a smaller Army, one whose readiness was 

assured by the transit of new technological thresholds. In the mid-1990s, 

TRADOC institutionalized these new directions as the mid-future Army 

XXI, which included Force XXI, the TRADOC-led effort to determine 

future force structure based on digitally equipped forces.

Beginning in late 1999, a number of major Department of the Army 

initiatives—collectively termed “Transformation”—looked to the weapons, force structure, training, and doctrine of the Army well into the 21st 

century. TRADOC was in the vanguard of that effort. The advances in 

technology indicated an evolution to a battlefield on which time, distance, 

movement, and firepower existed in relationships arising from the evidence of the extended reach and pinpoint accuracy of weapons brought 

to effect by near-real-time intelligence, detection, target acquisition, and 

communications technology. This advent of a new strategic world and the 

emergence of a higher level of technological warfare took place in the 

context of a US military establishment sharply drawing down in the wake 

of the retrenchment of Soviet power. Against this background of radically 

altered strategic assumptions came the attack on the United States on 

11 September 2001 and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Once again, TRADOC was challenged to develop doctrine and train 

soldiers for a type of warfare very different from that of the Cold War or 

the first Gulf War of 1990–91. TRADOC’s 35th anniversary was observed 

by further challenges to deal with ongoing asymmetric warfare and the 

continued development of future conventional weapons and doctrine in 

an uncertain strategic environment. What follows is a concise historical 

overview of TRADOC’s role and contribution to a significant era in US 

Army institutional and developmental history.


Chapter II

TRADOC Leadership

During its 35-year history, TRADOC has had 12 commanders and 

each made a unique contribution.

General William E. DePuy

General William E. DePuy

served as TRADOC’s first 

commander from 1973 to 1977. 

He initially addressed TRADOC’s 

mission to get the Army ready to 

fight the next war, and his primary 

concerns were improvements in 

individual training, better support 

for training in units, new training 

doctrine, and a new emphasis and 

direction for combat developments 

activities. To correct the training 

difficulties that resulted from the 

Vietnam War, DePuy adopted a 

“back to basics” approach. Officer 

training courses were to prepare 

officers for their next assignment, the physical aspects of basic combat 

training (BCT) were toughened, and advanced individual training (AIT) 

was made more performance oriented. Another of DePuy’s major projects 

was the production of “how to fight” manuals and films that set forth Army 

doctrine in simple language. In addition, the Army Training and Evaluation 

Program (ARTEP) brought standardization to Army training.

DePuy and the TRADOC staff also made combat developments a 

prime concern. The process had to be harnessed to the present and near 

future. Heavily influenced by the 1973 Yom Kippur War with its increased 

lethality, especially in armored warfare, DePuy adjusted his emphasis from 

training the Army to win battles to specifically winning the first battle 

of the next war. This was because the initial battle of the Yom Kippur 

War was so critical. Due to the small size of the headquarters staff, the 

functional centers and schools undertook a major portion of the combat 

developments mission and the systems acquisition process.

DePuy instituted the installation contract system as a major innovation 

for improving management of the TRADOC structure and its installations. 

That document provided a medium for agreement between each installation 


Victory Starts Here

commander and the TRADOC commander, specifying the tasks to be 

performed and the resources provided. Believing that doctrine should 

emanate from the highest levels of leadership, DePuy created a Tactical 

Doctrine Office separate from both combat developments and training 

functions that reported directly to him. During his tenure, the capstone 

document, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, was significantly revised 

to provide the basis for the aforementioned “how to fight” series and came 

to play a more central role in defining Army doctrine.

General Donn A. Starry

General Donn A. Starry assumed 

command of TRADOC from General DePuy in July 1977. The key 

concept for internal affairs during 

his tenure was “decentralization.” 

Accordingly, he began a pronounced 

decentralization of major projects to 

the integrating centers and schools. 

Also in line with that approach was 

his decision to move the three-star 

TRADOC deputy commander position from TRADOC headquarters to 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

With regard to doctrine, Starry 

sought to answer what had come to 

be a substantial discussion and controversy over the Active Defense concept of the 1976 version of FM 100-5. He brought to TRADOC the idea 

of an integrated and extended battlefield—the Central Battle—to engage 

the enemy not only at the point of attack but also in depth. Another revision of FM 100-5 began almost immediately. The concept required extension of the combat developments period out 8 to 10 years, departing from 

DePuy’s focus on near-term problems. Following this approach, Starry 

hoped to harness the combat power of the oncoming generation of weapons and other modernization efforts.

Starry inherited from DePuy a process already underway to restructure 

divisions. Accordingly, he redefined division restructuring within a 

larger context that resulted in the first Battle Development Plan in 1978. 

Conceptualization of what came to be termed “Division 86” and subsequent 

studies of corps and echelons above corps defined “Army 86,” which was 

the framework for force development that replaced the DePuy division 
TRADOC Leadership

restructuring. The doctrinal premises grounding the studies became known 

as AirLand Battle. 

In addition, Starry assumed and expanded DePuy’s initiatives on training in a program dubbed Army 1990. Of special concern was TRADOC’s 

promotion of the need for a Combined Arms and Services Staff School 

(CAS3) for captains. Subsequently, the findings of a panel known as the 

Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) revolutionized 

both organization and execution in TRADOC schools.

General Glenn K. Otis

General Glenn K. Otis followed 

General Starry as TRADOC commander in August 1981. Internal 

to the command were his “3Ms”—

management goals of mobilization 

planning, maintaining the force, 

and modernization of the force. In 

all three areas, training stood first 

in his list of priorities. Mobilization 

planning involved development of 

programs of instruction, training 

base expansion capacity, and equipment requirements. Maintenance of 

the force concentrated on training 

and maintaining the momentum of 

the previous command. The challenges of force modernization included 

managing the phase-in of interim and new organizations and the development of support packages for training (spare parts, maintenance, and 

field manuals). Given the recommendations of the RETO Study, on­going 

changes in enlisted training, and the implications of AirLand Battle doctrine, Otis tended to look ahead for approximately 10 years. At his last 

TRADOC Commanders Conference in the fall of 1982, Otis added a 

“fourth M”—military history.

Over the course of 1982, TRADOC headquarters, at General Otis’ 

behest, developed a set of command goals in line with the recently promulgated seven Army goals. The purpose was to identify clearly each of 

the roles TRADOC would play in support of the Army goals. The seven 

Army goals addressed the areas of readiness, the human element, leadership, materiel, future development, strategic deployment, and management. With TRADOC’s declared purpose to prepare the Army for war, its 
Victory Starts Here

attendant missions as stated were to develop doctrine, to conduct and guide 

Army combat developments, to develop and maintain the Army training 

system, and to command installations and organizations. The development 

of a specific set of goals for TRADOC prioritized activities and served 

as a tool for the application of resources, a touchstone for defining future 

roles of the command, a resource for the development of a formal document that would come out during his successor’s tenure, and a measure for 

progress. The new version of FM 100-5 codifying AirLand Battle, begun 

under Starry, was published 1982.

Many substantial initiatives came to the fore during Otis’ 18-month 

term as commander of TRADOC. Late in 1981, Otis determined that the 

time had come to step back and evaluate what had been accomplished in 

the area of training and to plan for what would take place in the following 

decade. That initiative developed into the Army Training 1990 concept. In 

addition, a much greater use of simulators and simulations quickly developed. Significant also was the establishment of the School of Advanced 

Military Studies (SAMS), a postgraduate extension of the Command and 

General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, focusing on 

the operational level of war. In the force design arena, “light versus heavy” 

debates intensified as the Army established a High Technology Test Bed 

(HTTB) at Fort Lewis, Washington, to experiment with lightening the 

infantry Division 86.

General William R. Richardson

General William R. Richardson 

followed General Otis as TRADOC 

commander in March 1983. In 

accordance with Secretary of the 

Army John O. Marsh Jr.’s “Year of 

Excellence,” Richardson introduced 

the watchword for his tenure, 

“Excellence Starts Here.” Early in his 

command, he spelled out his priorities: 

better training, implementation of 

new doctrine, force modernization 

and integration, and mobilization of 

the Reserve Component. With regard 

to training, he expected to spend much 

time tying up the loose ends of Army 

1990 and overseeing a new initiative 
TRADOC Leadership

termed “School Model 86.” The former focused on performance-oriented 

training while the latter was an effort to give back to the director of training 

and the academic departments of the TRADOC schools the importance to 

resident instruction and doctrine writing he believed had been usurped 

over time.

Richardson was commander at a time when much of the work of his 

predecessors was coming to fruition across the Army. FM 100-5 had been 

written and promulgated, and the derivative manuals were being written 

in the schools; the training program was solidly emplaced; the development of the organizational design of the Army of Excellence (AOE) was 

undertaken; and weapons systems were coming on line. One of the biggest challenges Richardson noted for TRADOC was the recruitment and 

retention of good people within the command. Perhaps his first priority 

was to change the attitudes of officers and soldiers who considered assignment to TRADOC a dead end. Richardson was responsible for the establishment of several new agencies and departments at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas. Believing the heart of the Army was TRADOC, and the heart of 

TRADOC was Fort Leavenworth, he continued development of SAMS, 

created the School for Professional Development, the Center for Army 

Leadership, the Combined Arms Training Activity, the Center for Army 

Lessons Learned, and the Combined Arms Operational Research Activity. 

A final significant reorganization was the transformation of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) into the 

ROTC Cadet Command as a major subordinate command of TRADOC.

General Carl E. Vuono

General Carl E. Vuono succeeded 

General Richardson in June 1986. 

He announced that his mission focus 

would have two aspects. Taking a 

somewhat more restricted view of the 

concept of preparing the Army for war 

than had Richardson, Vuono stressed 

that TRADOC had to not only prepare 

the Army for war in the present, but it 

must look farther ahead in time as the 

architect of the future. He stressed that 

TRADOC must consider the whole 

spectrum of war, and while addressing current challenges, not neglect the 
10

Victory Starts Here

design of the force 10 to 15 years out. He reoriented the 10 TRADOC 

goals into 6 major imperatives: doctrine, organization, training, leader 

development, materiel, and soldiers (DOTLMS). TRADOC’s responsibility was to ensure understanding of what the Army must be to win on the 

future battlefield. That understanding would provide vision and direction 

for the Army.

Vuono instituted guidelines for doctrinal development and derived 

the concept of the advanced collective training facilities, which led 

to the opening of the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee, 

Arkansas, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, 

Germany, and the initiation of the Battle Command Training Program at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Efforts in force modernization concentrated 

on improved application of the Concept Based Requirements System 

and a new emphasis on a system of systems approach to equipment 

modernization. Leader development was concentrated in the development 

of small group instruction and the invigoration of the Noncommissioned 

Officer Education System (NCOES). His program of “leading and caring” 

stressed excellence both in individuals and in installations of which they 

were a vital part. The TRADOC Long-Range Plan, published in May 

1987, was perhaps Vuono’s most ambitious effort. Designed to support 

TRADOC’s mission as the architect of the future, the plan constructed a 

vision of the command 10 years out based on Army long-term planning, 

the program objective memorandum (POM), and TRADOC goals.

General Maxwell R. Thurman

General Maxwell R. Thurman 

replaced General Vuono as TRADOC 

commander in June 1987 and 

stressed the command’s role as the 

key player in shaping the “azimuth 

for the Army of the future.” As set 

forth in a program known as “Vision 

91,” Thurman’s stated objective was 

to serve the Army in the field. That 

would be accomplished by writing 

the doctrine by which it would fight, 

testing that doctrine for soundness, 

designing well-balanced and capable 

forces, articulating the equipment 

requirements of the commanders in 
11

TRADOC Leadership

the field, providing combat-ready soldiers to units around the world, and 

developing future leaders.

Vision 91 examined the central question of how the command should 

position itself to meet the challenges of 1991 and beyond. That period 

would be a time of substantial manpower and funding constraints. Vision 

91 sought to address the evolution of doctrine, especially in the joint arena; 

a more focused force design; a system-of-systems approach to materiel 

development; full-service leader development; tough, realistic training; 

and well-developed mission support capability.

While Vision 91 addressed the immediate period, Thurman developed 

a 30-year TRADOC Long-Range Planning Vision, which solicited the 

thoughts of the subordinate commanders toward the further development 

of a new long-range plan.

General John W. Foss

General John W. Foss assumed 

the leadership of TRADOC in August 

1989, as the Army began a period 

of downsizing and strategic reorientation. A variety of factors—international, national, political, and 

economic—had combined to compel 

the Army to change into a more flexible, smaller force. The concept of the 

three TRADOC integrating centers, 

which had traditionally been part of 

the organization, gave way in 1990 to 

two major subordinate commands: the 

Combined Arms Command (CAC) 

and the Combined Arms Support 

Command (CASCOM). Also in 

October 1990, TRADOC eliminated 

the installation contract by which the TRADOC commander had managed 

the outlays of the installations since the mid-1970s.

As the effects of geopolitical change were felt during the 1990s, the 

primary focus of the Army began to shift to the projection of land combat 

power from CONUS, as well as from forward-deployed forces where possible. That had implications across the force, from warfighting doctrine to 

organizational structure to equipment to training.
12

Victory Starts Here

Foss addressed doctrinal challenges and changes through AirLand 

Battle-Future studies, doctrinal discussions, and map exercises, focusing 

on the nonlinear battlefield and the doctrine, organization, and logistics it 

would require. AirLand Battle-Future, later termed AirLand Operations, 

became the driving concept for TRADOC. Further, Foss directed the 

beginning of a revision of FM 100-5 to expand the doctrine into the strategic realm, although Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM 

in 1990–91 interrupted the effort.

General Frederick M. Franks Jr.

General Frederick M. Franks 

Jr. became the eighth TRADOC 

commander in August 1991. Franks 

set down his ideas regarding 

TRADOC’s future in five points: lead 

the Army through intellectual change, 

sustain excellence and relevance in 

training and leader development, 

propose modernization alternatives 

to maintain the technological edge 

for soldiers on future battlefields, 

foster organizational excellence, and 

focus on soldiers. The new TRADOC 

commander began anew the doctrinal 

revision of FM 100‐5. Convinced that 

doctrine was the basis of change and 

had to be a centerpiece of TRADOC 

activity, revision of FM 100-5 became a top priority to lead the Army 

through the intellectual readjustment from the Cold War to the post-Cold 

War Army. In addition, Franks instituted battle laboratories as a means to 

develop the capabilities for a force projection Army. The battle laboratories 

focused on the areas where the battle appeared to be changing and 

encouraged experimentation using simulations, prototypes, real soldiers, 

and real units to make the best use of technology and new requirements.

In his long-range planning guide for TRADOC, Franks interpreted 

TRADOC’s missions specifically. They were to set training standards and 

run the Army schoolhouse, provide modernization alternatives while representing the user to allow the Army to retain the battlefield edge, help the Army 

look to the future in warfighting, and foster organizational excellence. 
13

TRADOC Leadership

General William W. Hartzog

General William W. Hartzog 

became the ninth commanding general 

of TRADOC in October 1994. Like 

Franks, Hartzog’s efforts to meet the 

challenges of being the TRADOC 

commander took place against a 

background of a new global reality 

in which the primary concern was 

no longer a classic European air and 

ground war, but rather the possibility 

of many small operations. Further, 

the dramatic downsizing of forces to 

levels not seen since the pre-World 

War II era also shaped Hartzog’s and 

the command’s thinking and policy. 

Another factor that he had to consider 

in shaping the force of the future was 

the Army’s increasing involvement in 

peace operations, nation-building, and humanitarian relief.

Hartzog’s thinking about the 21st century Army was set down in the 

Force XXI Operational Concept. The key to the developmental work on 

Force XXI was a digitized Experimental Force (EXFOR) that stood up 

at Fort Hood, Texas, in 1994. Central to the shape of future forces was 

a series of advanced warfighting experiments (AWE) beginning in April 

1994, prior to Hartzog’s arrival at TRADOC, and continuing through 

March 1998. Looking even further into the future was an Army After Next 

project that sought to establish criteria for the Army by 2020.

Hartzog’s tenure saw the publication of two versions of TRADOC 

Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, based on the Force XXI concept 

and leading to the publication of a new FM 100-5, Operations. The concept also guided the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TTP) to be employed by the EXFOR in executing the various AWE. In 

turn, TTP supported further doctrine development for the execution of 

operations across the seven battlefield operating systems and at each echelon of operations.
14

Victory Starts Here

General John N. Abrams

General John N. Abrams began 

his 4-year command of TRADOC in 

September 1998. His vision for the 

command was to prepare the Army for 

decisive victory in the full range of 

required joint and combined operations. 

This focus meant providing soldiers and 

leaders with disciplined training based 

on fully developed doctrine, leader 

development, organizations, and materiel. It also meant providing a readiness 

infrastructure for training and projecting 

Army forces. Coupling that determination with the requirement to transform 

the Army’s education and training, 

Abrams led the Army’s effort to rethink 

the entire leader development process, 

including resident training, advanced distance learning, and individual 

study.

During Abrams’ command, two forces of change were propelling 

the Army in new directions: the ongoing efforts to make the Army more 

deployable and the revolution in computer and communications technology that had the potential of increasing battlefield awareness at all levels. 

In an address on 12 October 1999, Chief of Staff of the Army General 

Eric K. Shinseki made the case for transformation of the Army, specifying the need for both doctrinal and materiel change. A large portion of the 

challenges posed fell on TRADOC as the Army’s architect of the future. 

Responsibility of a brigade coordination cell for designing two Interim 

Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) at Fort Lewis, Washington, also fell to 

TRADOC.

To further the understanding of possible future warfare, Abrams 

instituted a series of Seminar War Games (SWG) beginning in July 2001. 

The SWG simulated the long-range deployment of an interim force and 

looked to define the objective force of the future and the Future Combat 

System (FCS). Transformation also called for a revision of the Army’s 

capstone doctrine, FM 100-5, Operations. A new version, renamed and 

carrying the joint Services number of FM 3-0, was published in the summer 

of 2001. The new doctrine was clearly cognizant of the changes in the 

nation’s geostrategic position and addressed the problems of deployment, 
15

TRADOC Leadership

asymmetric warfare, and the need for joint operations from major theaters 

of war to humanitarian relief.

Effective 15 February 2002, the US Army Accessions Command was 

established as a subordinate command of TRADOC. The new command 

included the US Army Cadet Command, the US Army Recruiting 

Command, and the US Army Training Center, Fort Jackson, South Carolina. 

The purpose of establishing the command was to combine accessions and 

initial entry training (IET) under a single headquarters.

General Kevin P. Byrnes

General Kevin P. Byrnes assumed 

command of TRADOC in November 

2002 and was the first TRADOC commander whose entire tenure occurred 

during wartime. Reassessing the 

command’s missions, he strongly 

reaffirmed that training and leader 

development would be TRADOC’s 

number one priority, especially at 

the IET and NCOES levels. Quality 

instructors and exported training, to 

reach soldiers wherever they served, 

would also be important. In addition, Byrnes stressed innovation, 

jointness, accession and recruiting, 

development of the future force, and 

people. As part of the development 

of the future force, Byrnes emphasized a sense of urgency in helping the 

Army accelerate the transformation process and in enhancing the credibility of current Transformation initiatives, especially by soliciting ideas and 

proposals from industry. Perhaps even more important was the necessity 

to demonstrate the links between Army transformation and Department 

of Defense joint initiatives, to include joint exercises. Byrnes planned 

for TRADOC to become a futures command that would serve the Army 

well on the fielding of the Objective Force and be a link to Joint Forces 

Command and the other Services.

In line with Byrnes’ goals, TRADOC headquarters was reorganized, 

and a Futures Center was established in October 2003. The center realigned 

functions and resources from the TRADOC staff and the objective force 

task force to develop and integrate into a joint warfighting environment, 
16

Victory Starts Here

all aspects of the future force from concepts to capability. It was tasked to 

develop and integrate joint and Army concepts, architectures, and doctrine, 

organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities.

General William S. Wallace

General William S. Wallace 

assumed command of TRADOC in 

October 2005. Like his predecessor, he was a wartime commander. 

Wallace’s view was that TRADOC 

was the architect of the Army to 

shape both today’s Army and the 

future combat force. The mission 

of TRADOC was to recruit, train, 

and educate the Army’s soldiers; 

develop its leaders; support training in units; develop doctrine; 

establish standards; and build the 

future Army. General Wallace also 

believed that TRADOC thought for 

the Army. As such, it had to meet 

the demands of a nation at war 

while simultaneously anticipating solutions to the challenges of tomorrow. To do this required changes in the way TRADOC viewed its mission. 

All activities were directed to provide input that reflected and assisted with 

the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE). Basic and advanced 

training were conducted to reflect the wartime challenges faced by soldiers in the field. Because much of the military operations occurred in 

cities in Iraq, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) became part of 

training as did training in dealing with different cultures. Stability operations became the key to success, and doctrine needed to reflect this. When 

General Wallace assumed command, the existing edition of FM 3-0 was 

already 4 years old and had been published prior to the attacks on the 

World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The 2008 

version of FM 3-0 was evolutionary but had four revolutionary aspects. It 

stressed the importance of stability operations with a “whole government 

approach,” it acknowledged the critical nature and influence of information operations, it forged an operational concept that drove initiative and 

embraced risk to create opportunities, and it emphasized the central role 
17

TRADOC Leadership

of the commander in full spectrum operations. To accomplish TRADOC’s 

missions, Wallace set the command’s priorities as safety; supporting our 

nation at war; recruiting and training quality warriors; developing adaptive, innovative leaders; and designing the Army’s modular force. He also 

coined the motto “Victory Starts Here.”

There were three significant reorganizations of TRADOC during 

General Wallace’s tenure as commander. Under Wallace, TRADOC continued to design the current Army modular force and the future combat force. 

The Futures Center established under General Byrnes grew and became 

the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) in 2006. In 2007, the 

TRADOC staff was reorganized to more closely align the command’s 

responsibilities with those of the Army Staff. The numerous changes made 

TRADOC more responsive to Army missions. The third change occurred 

near the end of Wallace’s tenure when the US Army Accessions Command 

became directly subordinate to the Department of the Army in October 

2008.

19

Chapter III

Force Design and Weapons Development

TRADOC designed the “TOE Army,” which meant more than 1,200-

odd tables of organization and equipment (TOE) for “type” units from 

platoon through corps and above. This was a continuous process because 

organizations changed with new weapons, equipment, and doctrine. Since 

TRADOC’s establishment in 1973, the command designed and implemented the major division reorganization known as the Army of Excellence 

(AOE) and began to define the nature of the force 20 or more years into the 

21st century. This “objective force” and a weapons and equipment “system of systems” known as the Future Combat System (FCS) were major 

components of a larger set of Department of the Army (DA) initiatives 

called Transformation. By the early 21st century, TRADOC was attempting to design rapidly deployable modular forces capable of deployment 

anywhere in the world on short notice.

Army of Excellence

The TRADOC-designed Army of Excellence (AOE), implemented 

by the Department of the Army (DA) from 1984 to 1986, was the first 

major reorganization of the tactical army since the Reorganization 

Objective, Army Divisions (ROAD) of the early 1960s. The TOE of the 

AOE supported AirLand Battle doctrine and the generation of weapons 

introduced in the 1970s and 1980s. The AOE owed much to the Division 

Restructuring Study (DRS) of 1976 as well as the Division 86 project and 

the Army 86 studies that followed. Both studies were influenced by the 

lessons of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and focused on heavy armor and 

mechanized infantry divisions. DA approved neither, and General Donn A. 

Starry began anew, because the heavy division was critical to operations 

in Europe during the Cold War. Studies of Division 86 (nonmechanized), 

Corps 86, and Echelons Above Corps 86 were completed in 1980. After 

crises in Afghanistan and Iran in the same period, Army 86 planners began 

studies of rapidly deployable units, because US Army forces also had to be 

prepared to meet contingencies in the non-NATO world.

In 1980, the Chief of Staff of the Army established a High Technology 

Test Bed (HTTB) in the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, 

to test concepts toward development of a lighter “high technology light 

division.” TRADOC and the Army Materiel Command (AMC) cooperated with the division’s parent commands, I Corps and the Army Forces 

Command, in this effort. Although valuable ideas emerged from the test 
20

Victory Starts Here

bed, no high-technology light division was fielded because of a lack of 

funding. This was a major dilemma. Heavy divisions were needed to meet 

the mechanized threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, and the Army had a 

fixed end strength of 780,000 personnel. The problem ended in June 1983 

when Chief of Staff of the Army General John A. Wickham Jr. directed the 

TRADOC commander, General William R. Richardson, to design a new, 

strategically deployable light infantry division with a strength of approximately 10,000 personnel that was globally deployable in approximately 

500 airlift sorties. To achieve this end, Wickham gave Richardson the 

authority to review and redesign the entire TOE Army. Undertaken by the 

Combined Arms Center (CAC) with support from the TRADOC branch 

schools, the AOE effort developed and put in place the force designs of 

the 1980’s Army. All elements of the tactical Army were reexamined. The 

AOE organizations modified but did not replace Army 86 designs. The 

notable exception was the new light infantry division, which was a threebrigade organization with a strength of 10,800 men. It was designed to 

operate in cities, forests, and mountain areas where heavy forces were at a 

disadvantage, and to buy time for heavy forces that deployed more slowly. 

The design was certified by the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, 

California, and supported by the TRADOC test organizations from 1984 

to 1986.

In AOE, TRADOC force designers reduced the heavy divisions to 

approximately 17,000 personnel. Significant transfers from division to 

corps in field artillery, air defense artillery, and combat aviation left the 

divisions smaller and with less organic combat power. The redesigned 

corps thus provided a more powerful fighting organization at the operational level of war. The AOE design of heavy divisions and corps moved 

Army tactical organizations more fully into consonance with doctrine at 

the most significant level of organization. There was criticism that AOE 

had overemphasized combat power at the expense of support units, was 

too light, and lacked tactical mobility, but it met the challenge of deterring 

the Soviet threat in the Cold War. It also began the development of lighter, 

more rapidly deployable forces.

Force XXI

The search for a successor to AOE began on 8 March 1994 when 

Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan directed the start of a 

major campaign effort to lead to the future Army in the early years of 

the next century. The Force XXI redesign was supposed to be the last 

of the major operational Army reorganizations of the 20th century. That 
21

Force Design and Weapons Development

initiative, however, would give way to the Transformation effort directed 

by Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki beginning in late 1999.

The Force XXI project was a significant departure from previous 

efforts. It was the first force redesign effort in which newly emergent, 

computer-driven, constructive, and virtual simulation methods, equipment, and software were joined to live field simulations to test and analyze 

military unit designs. In addition, the multiyear Force XXI design effort 

was the first to invent and embody in those heavy fighting units a linked, 

instantaneous, and common situational awareness of the battlefield and 

the three dimensions affecting it. “Digitization” was the rubric given this 

revolutionary emerging capability. In support of Force XXI, TRADOC 

began several major projects. First, the capstone “how to fight” doctrine 

was brought up to date in 1993 in FM 100-5, Operations. A year later, the 

command published TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, a 

concept for the Army of the 21st century. Also in 1994, TRADOC accepted 

a project known as “Joint Venture,” and proceeded to redesign the operational Army on a new information-or-knowledge basis. Concurrently, a 

modern Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) task force, begun in 1992, developed scenarios for the Army of the future.

From 1993 to 1995, TRADOC developed the concept for a key 

development vehicle for Force XXI, a division-sized Experimental Force 

(EXFOR). Late in 1994, the Army established the 4th Infantry Division, 

Mechanized, at Fort Hood, Texas, as a test bed for Force XXI. Beginning 

in 1994 and continuing into 1998, TRADOC fielded several advanced 

warfighting experiments (AWE) to carry through a sequence of experiments 

and simulations to examine the emerging digitization concept. Bearing 

names such as Desert Hammer VI, Roving Sands, Prairie Warrior, Mobile 

Strike Force, Focused Dispatch, and Warrior Focus, these exercises and 

experiments from platoon to theater levels were variously directed by 

TRADOC’s battle laboratories and CAC’s National Simulation Center.

Transformation

As TRADOC looked forward to the 21st century, the Force XXI operational concept was not a finished product. The developmental work to lead 

an Army capable of executing Force XXI concepts remained to be completed. Then, 12 days into fiscal year 2000, the new Army Chief of Staff 

led the Service in a radically different direction. As noted above, Army 

Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki announced on 12 October 1999 

his plans for “Transformation” or for an Army transformed into one that 

was more “responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and 
22

Victory Starts Here

sustainable.” Transformation was seen as a sweeping program to enhance 

the Army’s capabilities and change how it would fight in the post-Cold 

War world. Combat-ready brigades in the target Army would be deployable anywhere in the world in 96 hours.

The transformed Army would be comprised of three key elements: 

the legacy force, the interim force, and the objective force. The legacy 

force centered on the major weapons systems that the Army currently had 

in its inventory. The interim force would provide crossover capabilities 

between the legacy force and the objective force during the development 

of the latter. The objective force was envisioned as a totally revamped 

Army with regard to equipment, organization, and training. The backbone 

of the interim force would be six to eight Interim Brigade Combat Teams 

(IBCT), the first two of which were established at Fort Lewis, Washington, 

beginning in 2000. These experimental units operated under the direction 

of TRADOC’s Deputy Commanding General for Transformation and a 

brigade coordination cell at Fort Lewis.

The FCS would be the primary weapons and troop carrying platform 

for the objective force. The FCS was envisioned as a “system of systems” 

employing a common vehicle platform. For the IBCT in the interim period, 

the Army chose a wheeled light armored vehicle known as the LAV III, 

later renamed Stryker. In July 2001, to help design a force projection Army 

that was decisive across the full spectrum of conflict in the 21st century, 

TRADOC commander General John N. Abrams established Seminar War 

Games (SWG) at the headquarters. Those fora brought together senior 

leaders, representing all the Army’s functions and responsibilities, to play 

out scenarios. To operate in a nonstandard environment they created “units 

of action” and “units of employment” that were significantly different 

from the “companies,” “battalions,” and “brigades” with which many 

participants were familiar. This allowed the creation of new types of 

units without ties to organizations of the past. Transformation initiatives 

represented an all-encompassing effort to accomplish the Army’s vision 

and to change the way the Army thought, trained, and fought.

Weapons and Equipment

A major mission assigned to TRADOC on 1 July 1973 was combat 

developments—the systematic development of new and improved 

organization, equipment, weaponry, and doctrine. Combat developments 

had come to TRADOC from the former Combat Developments Command. 

The merger of combat developments with the training mission in one 

command guided the 1973 Army reorganization to reorient combat 
23

Force Design and Weapons Development

developments to the present and near future, and to apply new and 

improved materiel, organization, and doctrine to field units quickly. The 

reorganization decentralized the combat developments mission to the 

Army’s branch and service schools and placed the function with training.

Four basic elements constituted the TRADOC combat developments structure—the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments 

at the headquarters, the functional centers (renamed integrating centers 

in 1976), the schools, and the test and evaluation agencies. TRADOC 

directed its combat developments responsibilities through the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, which was established as 

the focal point for assigning projects and allocating and accounting for 

resources. Until 1990, the three functional centers directly subordinate and 

reporting to TRADOC headquarters—the Combined Arms Center at Fort 

Leavenworth, the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, and the Soldier Support 

Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison—directed, coordinated, and integrated 

the combat developments work of the Army schools with which each was 

functionally associated. At the next level were the branch and specialist 

schools where the commandants had responsibility for both combat developments and the training and education missions. The fourth aspect of the 

combat developments system within TRADOC was a series of agencies 

designed to provide data and reports from tests and experiments keyed 

to specific concepts and projects. Two of the most influential were the 

Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) at Fort Ord, 

California, and the Modern Army Selected Systems Test Evaluation and 

Review (MASSTER), an agency at Fort Hood, Texas.

The three major combat developments concerns were materiel, organization, and doctrine. Materiel development was a joint effort of TRADOC 

as the primary combat developer and AMC as the primary materiel developer. TRADOC played three essential parts in the effort. The first was to 

formulate and document requirements for specific materiel. The second 

was to monitor AMC development continuously, undertaking operational 

tests and analyses at critical points. The third role was to redraw organizations and refashion tactics as necessary to accommodate the new item. The 

combat developer determined a weapon’s need and operational specifications, monitored its development, and determined its ultimate issue to and 

use by the Army in the field.

The Middle East War of October 1973 was significant to the 

decision of where to place the combat developments function, and the 

Operation STEADFAST reorganization placed it in TRADOC. Members 

of TRADOC studied the war intensively, paying particular attention to 
24

Victory Starts Here

the tremendous attrition of materiel and unparalleled lethality of modern 

weaponry. Those lessons greatly shaped the vision of modern war. Crucial 

to reform of the tactical force was recognition that modern armies in the 

1970s were crossing a technological threshold. The lethality of fire, the 

tempo of battle, and the immense attrition of the Middle East War had 

demonstrated a quantum leap in weapons technology.

TRADOC took a total systems approach to weapons development, 

bringing trainers, logisticians, and personnel managers into the process early. The total systems methodology spawned the concept of the 

TRADOC System Managers (TSM), formally approved in March 1977. 

The TSM represented all major weapon and materiel systems in development and functioned with the power and authority comparable to the 

project managers of AMC. The TSM was charged with integrating and 

organizing the development process. Introduction of a new ConceptsBased Requirements System (CBRS) in 1980 provided a development 

schematic, the goal of which was to place fighting concepts at the beginning of all TRADOC’s products across the board—doctrine, materiel 

requirements, organizations, and training developments.

As management techniques and strategies were devised and emplaced, 

the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the launching of one of the most massive modernization programs in the history of the Army. The “Big Five” 

systems of greatly increased combat power included the M-1 Abrams 

M-1 Abrams Tank, One of the “Big Five.”

US Army Photo
25

Force Design and Weapons Development

main battle tank, the M-2 and M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, the Black 

Hawk and Apache helicopters, and the Patriot air defense missile. The 

Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) was also developed and fielded, 

as were individual equipment and electronic warfare protection devices. 

Anticipating a smaller force after the Vietnam drawdown, the ability to 

catch and keep the technological edge in weapons and equipment was 

imperative.

The modernization wave that began in the immediate post-Vietnam 

era crested in 1983. From that point, development was slower and more 

sporadic. By the late 1980s, modernization planning was less dramatic 

and aimed more at a coordinated effort, reduced budgets, and available 

resources. For instance, in 1986, the Department of the Army commissioned the Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force to examine the next 

phase of modernization. The emerging concept was that of an armored 

family of vehicles to be built around two common chassis. A total, phased 

replacement of the tracked and wheeled fleet would ensure compatibility, commonality, and survivability. Simultaneously, block improvements 

were projected for the Abrams main battle tank and the Bradley Fighting 

Vehicle. Upgrades were also planned for the AH-64 Apache.

The success of the total modernization effort was demonstrated in 

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM in 1990 and 1991. All of the “Big 

Five” systems were deployed and performed beyond expectations. The 

Apache attack helicopter, the Black Hawk transport and utility helicopter, 

the Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the Patriot 

missile system validated the combat developments process and products. 

The Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP) had resulted in the 

OH-58D armed Kiowa Warrior, which flew close reconnaissance and 

attack support for the Apache. Likewise deployed and successful were 

the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), the longest-range surfaceto-surface missile in the Army inventory, along with its companion the 

MLRS. Additionally, unmanned aerial vehicles, the Joint Surveillance and 

Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS), and the XM40 series protective mask were success stories of Operation DESERT STORM.

In TRADOC’s first two decades of combat developments, the command witnessed a massive modernization program for large end-items 

that was justified by a serious security threat. Adequate resourcing and 

enlightened leadership resulted in the Abrams M-1 Tank and the Bradley 

Fighting Vehicle, which were still in service nearly three decades later. 

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the need for weapons designed to 

fight a major heavily-armed adversary waned. The Army downsized and 
26

Victory Starts Here

evolved from a forward-based force to a force projection one. In the new 

strategic environment, where asymmetrical warfare was the predominant 

type of conflict and heavy weapons such as the Crusader 155-mm howitzer and the Comanche helicopter were canceled, weapons like the Stryker 

light armored vehicle developed. As costs rose and numbers of weapons 

declined, technology had to be harnessed to ensure the new generations of 

weapons were more accurate and lethal than their predecessors.

With decreased funding levels, equipment requirements shifted to 

focus on long-term development and acquisition. Weapons systems had 

to provide broad coverage in low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts as 

well as contingency and special operations. The Department of the Army 

proposed four principles to guide modernization decisions: key future 

modernization programs would be protected, some current major weapons 

systems would be terminated, investment in product improvements and 

systems modifications would be restricted, and new technologies would 

be advanced.

On the management side, the concept of battle laboratories located 

at key centers and schools evolved during late 1991 and early 1992 as 

TRADOC reassessed requirements for the post-Cold War Army. Without 

a clear external threat driving requirements, concepts of warfare and 

the associated equipment needed to be reevaluated. The battle laboratories were designed to be the institutional means to determine, develop, 

and experiment with equipment and technology, organizational design, 

and training. The trend in combat developments, with battle laboratories 

assisting, would be for fewer starts and dollars, higher technology, better 

integration, and more focus on joint efforts.

As TRADOC reached its 25th anniversary in 1998, the US Army’s 

modernization objectives were to project, sustain, and protect the force; 

win the information war; conduct precision strikes; and dominate the 

maneuver battle. Those objectives were formally set forth in the Army 

Modernization Plan update published in May 1994. The Modernization 

Plan and the Force XXI process were designed to move the Service to 

Army XXI, beginning with a conceptual base and continuing forward to 

post-fielding improvements. Declining defense resources and downsizing 

of the force made it necessary for the Army to analyze future warfighting 

capabilities with an eye to development and fielding of battlefield systems 

that best supported the Army envisioned in the next century. TRADOC, as 

the architect of the future Army, continued to fulfill that role. But as the 

command reached its 30th year, the road to the Army of the 21st century 
27

Force Design and Weapons Development

had taken some sharp turns as the Transformation initiatives looked to a 

lighter, more deployable force by 2020.

The Transformation effort did not displace all of the tenets of Force 

XXI. Indeed, it built on many of them. The importance of projection and 

sustainment of the force could not be overstated. The Army of the 21st 

century had to be a smaller, continental United States (CONUS)-based 

force that required the ability to project and sustain its power anywhere in 

the world. To realize that objective, Army systems had to be light, lethal, 

and modular, so more capability could be achieved with fewer resources. 

The Army also needed to have sufficient strategic and tactical lift assets 

to move its forces around the globe. The Army had to project forces efficiently by taking advantage of new technologies to move only what was 

absolutely necessary. Improved logistical information systems and a new 

emphasis on split-based operations were designed to allow the Army to 

sustain its forces while projecting fewer support elements. In addition, 

there were new missions to be taken into consideration such as humanitarian relief. Modernization for the Army of the 21st century included 

denying information to the enemy through secure communications and 

direct attack against enemy command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) assets. Joint efforts to expand their own C4I 

assets were designed to give US forces a complete picture of the battlefield 

that could be transmitted to all units. The Army Battle Command System 

with its many components would link commanders at all echelons. Global 

Positioning System (GPS) receivers provided precise targeting and navigation data. A new information architecture also included communications 

systems to securely and rapidly move data from point to point.

A number of weapons and equipment projects underway promised to 

support the transforming Army deep into the 21st century. Of special importance was a vehicle for the interim force and an FCS that would provide 

an integrated “system of systems” for the soldier of the future. On 15 April 

2002, the Army accepted early editions of its new interim armored vehicle 

for the IBCTs. Known as the LAV (light armored vehicle) III, it was earlier 

renamed “Stryker” in February 2002. The Stryker was a 19-ton eight-wheel 

armored vehicle that would provide the Army with 10 different variations 

from infantry carrier vehicles to reconnaissance and medical evacuation 

vehicles. The new vehicles had robust armor protection, could travel at 

speeds of about 60 mph, and possessed common parts and a self-recovery 

capability. The Stryker also was designed to be deployed by C-130 aircraft 

and to be combat-capable on arrival in any contingency area.
28

Victory Starts Here

The FCS program was a collaborative Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA)/US Army project to design and demonstrate 

combat systems that could be the centerpiece of the Army’s future objective force. TRADOC’s role as the Army’s combat developer placed the 

command at the forefront of defining what was needed and how systems 

should be integrated. Transformation planners envisioned FCS as a networked force consisting of separate robotic direct fire, indirect fire, and 

sensor platforms controlled by a manned command-and-control platform. 

The FCS was intended to involve both ground and air systems, connected 

through a sophisticated sensor and communications network.

Also under development for the objective force was the RAH-66 

Comanche helicopter. More than 20 years in development, the Comanche 

was expected to operate either as a stealthy reconnaissance system or as 

a highly lethal attack platform. Concurrently, the Army was testing a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV), known as “Shadow,” which was 

meant to accompany initial-entry ground forces to transmit pictures of a 

battlefield back to a ground station. Resembling a radio-controlled aircraft, the newest TUAV had a 13-foot wingspan and could stay aloft over 

a target for 5 to 6 hours. Also being tested were prototypes of a High 

Soldier prepares to launch UAV in Iraq.

US Army Photo
29

Force Design and Weapons Development

Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), the Army’s new light artillery system. Transportable in a C-130 aircraft, the early-entry artillery 

platform could launch the entire family of MLRS and ATACMS munitions 

to a range of 300 kilometers. HIMARS was designed to engage tube and 

rocket artillery, air defense concentrations, trucks, and light-armor personnel carriers.

The Global War on Terrorism

In addition to developing doctrine and materiel for the future, 

TRADOC was also concerned with developing the same for the Global 

War on Terrorism (GWOT), which began after the terrorist attacks on 

11 September 2001. The challenges ranged from the application of conventional doctrine during the initial stages of the invasion of Iraq to supporting asymmetrical operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Material 

developments included the development of systems very different from 

the tanks, fighting vehicles, and rocket launchers of the 1980s. Examples 

are the Enhanced Logistic Off-Road Vehicle (ELSORV), under test in 

Afghanistan, and the Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare 

(CREW), a device for jamming the signals that detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Giraffe Radar, which was primarily an air-defense 

radar, could be linked with a sensor system to aid the ground battle. The 

Battlefield Target Identification Device (BTID) is a combat identification 

system that increases combat effectiveness by minimizing false targeting errors, thereby reducing fratricide or friendly fire combat losses. The 

Tactical Ground Reporting System combines a database of information 

about the war along with maps, which allows junior officers to study the 

terrain in light of past incidents and share information about conditions on 

the ground. Troops were shown a prototype by DARPA in late 2006, and 

the current version was introduced in 2007. During this period, unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been under constant development and have 

been used for reconnaissance and attack. However, not all developments 

were new, as the need for convoy defense saw a renewed interest in the 

same type of gun trucks used for convoy escort during the Vietnam War.

31

Chapter IV

Doctrine

The year TRADOC came into existence saw the end of the US 

Army’s involvement in the Vietnam War and the end of the Arab–Israeli 

War. Vietnam focused the Army’s attention on counterinsurgency warfare against an elusive foe. Conversely, the Arab–Israeli War was a conflict unprecedented in tempo, lethality, and consumption of resources. 

Significant in themselves, these events occurred against a background of 

concerns over increasing Soviet power across the globe. It was obvious to 

General William E. DePuy, first Commanding General of TRADOC, that 

existing Army doctrine had to be revised. Thus, in 1974, DePuy began the 

process of change by sending letters to some of the TRADOC school commandants and by initiating a series of conferences to discuss the Middle 

East War and changes in Soviet doctrine. Not satisfied with the long process of developing new Army doctrine, TRADOC schools developed circulars on “how to fight.” Traditionally, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) 

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was the agency assigned to write “capstone” 

doctrine such as field manuals (FM), but after several conferences concerning the issue, the task of writing a new FM on operations was transferred from CAC to the Concepts Branch of Headquarters, TRADOC, in 

1975. The new FM 100-5, Operations, was published in June 1976.

The new FM 100-5 principally focused on potential conflict against 

the Soviets in Europe. It recognized the reality of the modern battlefield 

with its increased operational tempo and its increased lethality and that US 

forces needed to “fight outnumbered and win.” There was also emphasis 

on winning the first battle. The perception was that the United States had 

seldom won the first battle, because of the defeat at Kasserine Pass in 

World War II and Task Force Smith in Korea. The overall doctrine was 

called Active Defense. Despite its acknowledgment of a new strategic 

situation and the enhanced lethality of the modern battlefield, the 1976 

edition of FM 100-5 created considerable controversy. Broadly, the criticism centered on three issues. First, the doctrine was defensive in nature 

and perceived by some to be an all or nothing defense without a substantial reserve. Second, the preoccupation with the first battle seemed to 

be a commitment to fight that battle without consideration of subsequent 

operations. Third, and perhaps most significant, the Active Defense was 

seen as tied too specifically to one Soviet operational maneuver that called 

for a massive armored breakthrough that was typical of World War II. 
32

Victory Starts Here

Soviet doctrine, however, had also changed and called for multipronged 

attacks across the front seeking to exploit a weak point. As published, the 

1976 FM 100-5 was a tactical manual of limited focus. While it addressed 

the Soviet threat to NATO, it did not address US responsibilities in other 

parts of the world nor did it address joint operations or counterinsurgency 

warfare.

As early as 1976–77, there were efforts underway to redefine the battlefield of the near future. Lieutenant General Donn A. Starry spearheaded 

these efforts while he was V Corps commander in Europe. Earlier as Chief 

of Armor, he had contributed greatly to the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 and 

its Active Defense approach. As V Corps commander, however, Starry had 

gained a new appreciation of up-to-date Soviet doctrine and capabilities. 

In V Corps, the aspects of what Starry referred to as the Central Battle, 

such as the ranges and numbers involved, were fully analyzed. He realized that the commander’s view of the battlefield had to be wider and 

deeper than previously indicated by Active Defense. When Starry became 

TRADOC commander, these considerations became paramount in revising FM 100-5. During the same period, General Edward C. Meyer, Chief 

of Staff of the Army, recognized a need for the Service to be more responsive to global needs, hence more deployable. There was also the need to 

revise doctrine to reflect the more current Soviet threat. A major influence 

on Starry’s concept of the Central Battle was a study at the Field Artillery 

School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, begun at his request. The study suggested 

interdicting targets deep in the enemy rear to disrupt the Soviet second 

echelon during an assault. That study also projected cooperation with the 

US Air Force, which led to the need for an integrated battle across a wider, 

deeper battlefield. By 1980, the Central Battle idea became known as 

AirLand Battle and the draft of a new FM 100-5 had begun. In addition to 

the recognized principles and fundamentals of war, AirLand Battle called 

for depth, agility, and synchronization, as well as an insistence on initiative on the part of leaders at all levels. Published in August 1982, the new 

FM 100-5 became the cornerstone of US Army doctrine. It was revised 

in 1986, and AirLand Battle remained doctrine through the Gulf War of 

1990–91. The 1982 and 1986 editions of FM 100-5 were improvements 

over the 1976 edition in that they briefly addressed joint operations and 

contingency operations; however, they remained Eurocentric and did not 

address counterinsurgency warfare.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the strategic position of the 

United States changed drastically. Although in 1991 US and allied 

divisions smashed Iraqi military power using AirLand Battle doctrine, a 

philosophy that centered on fighting a major land power on the continent 
33

Doctrine

of Europe was no longer relevant. At the end of the Cold War, the United 

States emerged as a truly global power with the means to project its 

influence. Unfortunately, that did not mean peace. In the last decade of 

the 20th century, nearly half the countries in the world faced some sort 

of armed conflict, which included ethnic strife, political insurgencies, 

terrorism from political or transnational entities, or criminal elements that 

often masqueraded as political movements. The fall of the Soviet Union 

revealed challenges that were far more complex than were evident during 

the Cold War. The danger of facing a potential adversary in a land war 

that might turn nuclear was lessened, only to reveal multiple threats to the 

United States that did not originate in Moscow. This complex situation 

became known as asymmetric warfare, which included threats from diverse 

sources such as conventional forces, terrorists, and criminals. TRADOC 

commander General John W. Foss began the revision of Army doctrine in 

1989. The Gulf War, however, delayed further developments.

On taking command of TRADOC in August 1991, General Frederick 

M. Franks Jr. set as his primary goal the revision of FM 100-5 and its publication by early 1993. In addition, he envisioned Army doctrine moving 

in a different direction than had his predecessor. Thus, the writing team at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was changed and the new team worked to produce a manual that was less a tactical treatise than the two preceding versions and more a statement of the Army’s position in a world that required 

deployment from CONUS rather than a forward-based Army. It stressed 

the numerous missions the Army faced in the current strategic environment and took a realistic view of joint requirements in future operations. 

General Franks was careful to ensure Army-wide consensus prior to publication and that the other US Services were privy to the elements of the 

new FM 100-5. In this way, it was a public document from its early stages 

and most of the criticism had been met prior to publication. FM 100-5, 

released in June 1993, scrapped the designation AirLand Battle. Because 

Franks did not want to focus attention solely on Army–Air Force cooperation, he did not select a single term to replace AirLand Battle. However, in 

the introduction to the 1993 FM 100-5, Franks insisted that AirLand Battle 

evolved into a variety of choices for a battlefield framework and a wider 

inter-Service arena that allowed for the increasing incidence of combined 

operations.

During his tenure as TRADOC commander, Franks worked closely 

with Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon R. Sullivan to change 

doctrine. In Exercise Desert Hammer, new versions of the M1 tank were 

tested at the National Training Center (NTC) in what would come to be 

considered the first advanced warfighting experiments (AWE). Franks also 
34

Victory Starts Here

looked for a way to test the concept of Army XXI. Another aspect of the 

change in doctrine was the effort of the battle laboratories to explore the 

various aspects of the future battlefield. Their focus included maneuver, 

maneuver support, fire support, combat service support, and the new 

electronics aspects that included computers as well as more traditional 

electronic equipment on the battlefield. All of these fell loosely under the 

auspices of General Sullivan’s concept referred to as the modern Louisiana 

Maneuvers (LAM), a reference to the Army’s famous training maneuvers 

in 1940 that led to significant reorganization. The modern LAM concept 

was a process that brainstormed new ideas. Although a Department of the 

Army initiative, the LAM task force was headquartered at Fort Monroe, 

Virginia, in part because of Sullivan’s heavy reliance on the TRADOC 

commander, General Franks.

For the next decade, the changing international situation demonstrated 

the need for another update of FM 100-5. The plan for a modified version 

of the manual tentatively scheduled for 1996, however, was put on hold. In 

1999, Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki made the case 

for both doctrinal and materiel changes in the Army, initiatives known 

collectively as Transformation. A large portion of the challenges posed 

fell on TRADOC as the Army’s architect of the future. At the same time, 

TRADOC was undergoing serious reductions in resources and personnel 

that affected both training and doctrinal development capabilities.

To further the understanding 

of possible future warfare, General 

John N. Abrams instituted a series 

of Seminar War Games (SWG) in 

July 2001 and revitalized a class of 

planning documents referred to as 

“O&O” for organization and operations. The SWG enabled the review 

process for O&O and simulated 

long-range planning for an interim 

and then an objective force. The initial purpose of the SWG was to help 

design a force projection army that 

was decisive across the full spectrum of conflict on the 21st century 

battlefield. The SWG particularly 

addressed the challenges raised 

by the revolution in computer and 

graphics technology. A TRADOC 
35

Doctrine

brigade cell at Fort Lewis, Washington, tracked and analyzed two Interim 

Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), which were also located there, and they 

tried new concepts for the future battlefield. Their idea resulted in a complete revision of the 1993 FM 100-5. To emphasize the break with the past, 

the joint numbering system of FM 3-0 was adopted for the new manual, 

which was cognizant of the changes in the nation’s geostrategic position. 

It clearly addressed the problems of deployment and asymmetric warfare 

and the need for joint operations in nearly every aspect of operations, 

from major theaters of war to humanitarian relief. The “Transformation” 

FM 3‐0 was published in June 2001.

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, TRADOC also had to 

support the war on terrorism. The command produced O&O for the Army 

on force protection and assessed the impact on the changed world situation 

on all other aspects of doctrine development. Especially critical was the 

development of joint doctrine that in the past had proceeded slowly and 

without the desired integration. As the Army became involved in Iraq and 

Afghanistan in both conventional and counterinsurgency situations, the 

need for an improved FM 3‐0 became evident. The new manual, published 

in February 2008, was a significant improvement over its predecessor. It 

addressed the current realities of an unstable world in which the threat was 

constantly changing. In addition to emphasizing information warfare in 

conjunction with conventional and counterinsurgency warfare, it gave full 

weight to stability or civil support operations as part of the full spectrum 

of warfare.

Another important doctrinal 

publication was the update of FM 3-

07, Stability Operations, in October 

2008, which represented a milestone 

in Army doctrine. Unlike previous 

editions, it was designed as a roadmap from conflict to peace. It institutionalized the hard-won lessons 

of the past while charting a path for 

the future. The manual focused on 

achieving unity of effort through a 

comprehensive approach to stability operations and remained consistent with a broader “whole of 

government” approach to those 

same operations.

37

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development

With the establishment of TRADOC, the Army’s training system 

began a major transformation. While many changes were evolutionary, 

they resulted in a revolutionary departure from the Vietnam era. The architects of this revolution were General William E. DePuy and his Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Training, Major General Paul F. Gorman. The latter was 

an advocate of performance-oriented training, which meant setting training objectives by carefully determining the tasks to be trained. After the 

objectives were set, the conditions under which the training was to take 

place were determined and the standards were established. Gorman and 

his “apostles and disciples” as DePuy later called them, also brought to 

training development an appreciation of rapidly advancing technology and 

an understanding of how it could be applied to training. In 1973, soldiers 

and officers were trained in accordance with the Army Training Program 

(ATP), which had been in use since World War I. The ATP prescribed the 

hours devoted to each subject and task. It was based on a conscript Army 

that had sufficient time to raise, equip, and train a combat force prior to 

its commitment to combat. With the beginning of the all-volunteer force 

in 1973, planners could no longer depend on an influx of draftees to meet 

their manpower needs. Other factors TRADOC had to consider in building a new training system were the post-Vietnam downsizing of the Army 

and the shrinking defense budgets of the 1970s. The Army needed better 

training that was more efficient and cost effective.

The lethality and ranges of the weapons used in the 1973 Arab–Israeli 

War brought home to DePuy and Gorman the tremendous importance of 

well-trained crews and tactical commanders. They agreed that the Army 

needed a “train-evaluate-train” program that required soldiers to perform 

to established standards. The program had to be progressive and sequential so that each level provided a foundation for the next higher one. They 

also believed that individual training in units was neglected and focused 

TRADOC’s effort there. Gorman’s idea was to reorient the TRADOC 

school system so it had a larger training intent than an educational one. 

Finally, both men believed a solid link had to be established between doctrine and training. Thus, the revision of FM 100-5, Operations, in 1976 

recognized the Service schools as the “Army’s source of combat developments and doctrine.”

Basic to the process of change was the adoption of a systems approach 

to training (SAT). The SAT consisted of five interrelated phases: analysis, 
38

Victory Starts Here

design, development, implementation, and evaluation. All issues involved 

in systems training, unit training, individual training, and training support 

were studied following the SAT model. In the face of decreasing budgets, 

it was obvious to TRADOC’s leaders that much individual training would 

have to be conducted in units. As a result, training developers began to 

create and field several programs to bring the training to the soldier. The 

Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) was a new performanceoriented program for collective training that placed responsibility for 

training directly on the unit. New skill qualification tests (SQTs) were 

designed to provide an indicator of a soldier’s proficiency in his military 

occupational specialty (MOS). The self-development test, a follow-on 

program to the SQT, was eliminated in 1995. An updated and revised 

training and doctrinal literature program included soldiers’ manuals that 

set forth what the Army expected a soldier to know and be able to perform 

at each skill level. The new program also included commanders’ manuals, 

field manuals, “how to fight” manuals, technical manuals, and training 

circulars. To meet increasing manpower shortages, DePuy and Gorman 

greatly expanded a training extension course program, begun under 

CONARC, designed to export training to the field.

DePuy and Gorman also initiated changes in the initial entry training (IET) program and the Noncommissioned Officer Education System 

(NCOES). In July 1974, a new basic combat training (BCT) program was 

Basic training.

US Army Photo
39

Training and Leader Development

implemented that stressed discipline, decentralization to the lowest possible level, and the teaching of basic combat skills. TRADOC also made 

a major change in the structure of BCT. A new one-station unit training 

(OSUT) plan integrated some BCT and advanced individual training 

(AIT) into cohesive programs. That action meant fewer soldiers undergoing IET would have to take the two phases at two different locations, 

which saved travel costs. TRADOC also established a progressive and 

sequential NCOES in line with the Officer Education System (OES). 

Generals DePuy and Gorman left TRADOC headquarters in June 1977, 

but their reforms provided the foundation for a continuing training revolution. Their programs were revised, increased, and in some cases deleted; 

nevertheless, the changes from 1977 to 2008 did not undo their work.

During TRADOC’s first 35 years, it employed a number of school 

models and long-range training plans to guide the command in fulfilling its mission to train the Army’s soldiers and officers. School Model 

76, TRADOC’s first, replaced the one operated by CONARC before 

Operation STEADFAST. It clearly demonstrated DePuy’s interest in 

training as opposed to education and Gorman’s interest in advanced technology. General DePuy directed his staff to develop new organizational 

concepts that would modernize and bring greater efficiency to the schools. 

School Model 76 was based on the premise that the commandants were 

responsible for the interface between combat developments and training 

developments. The combat developments function of the school created 

new weapons requirements, tactics, and tactical and support organizations, 

all based on approved doctrine. Training development personnel were 

responsible for resident training, extension training, simulation devices 

and simulators, and training literature to ensure the optimum employment of combat developers’ products. DePuy wanted the schools to be less 

instructor intensive and to take advantage of existing technologies.

Another initiative that affected the TRADOC schools was the 

establishment in 1982 of a military history education program, designed by 

the new Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. TRADOC 

Regulation 350-13, Military History Education Program (MHEP), first 

published in January 1982, formally established the effort and vested 

proponency for MHEP with the TRADOC chief of staff, and established 

command policy for the study of military history in the TRADOC 

Service schools and in senior ROTC detachments. The TRADOC MHEP 

was intended to foster a sense of historical mindedness in the Army 

community, resulting in sensitivity to the intellectual and functional values 

of military history as a necessary component of professional education and 

development.
40

Victory Starts Here

In 1983, proponency for MHEP management shifted to the Combined 

Arms Center (CAC) commander with executive agency given to the 

Director, Combat Studies Institute. Also that year, a revised TRADOC 

Regulation 350-13 placed the requirement for instruction in military history with uniformed officers outside the command history program and 

made no provision for utilizing civilian branch historians in MHEP. 

However, as the TRADOC history program grew in the field, commandants used the branch historians to coordinate MHEP in their commands 

and to serve as adjunct instructors. By 2003, a majority of branch historians served frequently as adjunct instructors of military history. In August 

1992, the proponency for TRADOC’s military history education program 

returned to TRADOC headquarters. At 35 years, TRADOC Regulation 

350-13 encompassed heritage instruction in BCT as well and was once 

again being revised to reflect visions of a transforming Army.

By the summer of 1982, problems inherent in School Model 76 were 

evident. The most notable problem barred instructors in the academic 

departments from participating in training developments and combat 

developments. Almost immediately after the model’s adoption, the 

schools requested exceptions to that policy. A working group established 

by TRADOC Commander General Glenn K. Otis recommended the 

adoption of a new school model that integrated the future direction of 

the Army with the school model. By abandoning a reactive approach, 

TRADOC would be in a posture to participate actively in designing 

the way it operated in the future. The new model combined combat 

developments and training developments in the same directorate, thereby 

bringing training developments and evaluation into the system acquisition 

process earlier. Thus, evaluation could serve to provide information on 

the potential successes or failures associated with total system fielding. In 

1983, TRADOC Commander General William R. Richardson approved 

School Model 83, giving back to the schools’ directors of training and the 

academic departments much of the responsibility for training developments 

they had lost in School Model 76.

In conjunction with a continuing assessment of TRADOC school 

organization, TRADOC Commander General Carl E. Vuono directed 

the development of a long-range plan to guide the command for 10 years 

into the future. TRADOC published its long-range plan in May 1987. 

Meanwhile, TRADOC training planners began writing “Army Training 

1997” in support of that plan. Army Training 1997 was based on an unsuccessful earlier effort known as Army Training 1990. Specific guidance 

included the integration of Reserve Component training throughout the 

document under a “Total Army” concept. Additional emphasis was given 
41

Training and Leader Development

to developing joint and combined operations and to the distributed training system. Army Training 1997 was published in September 1987. Major 

changes included in the final version dealt with leader development, future 

technology strategy, the connection between training developments and 

combat developments within the Concepts-Based Requirements System 

(CBRS), combat training centers, embedded training, and small group 

instruction. The long-range strategy provided for a new training system 

for warrant officers and a strong emphasis on civilian leadership training. The plan also included the results of an important study undertaken 

to draft a set of standards to improve training effectiveness and guide the 

evolution of IET.

In the fall of 1988, TRADOC Commander General Maxwell 

R. Thurman called for a reassessment of TRADOC’s status and the 

command’s short-term priorities. In a concept termed “Vision 91,” 

he outlined how the command should fulfill its mission through 1991 

with regard to doctrine, force design, equipment requirements, leader 

development, training, and mission support. Training had to be consistent 

with doctrine, embedded into the development of new equipment, and 

made an integral part of force modernization. Institutional, unit, and 

individual training had to focus on teaching warfighting skills in a tactical 

field environment to produce soldiers who understood the specific tasks 

of their jobs and could perform them to established standards. According 

to Vision 91, training plans had to make use of technological advances, 

especially computer-based teaching and testing and the simulation of 

force-on-force maneuvers.

Concurrently, an Army Training 21 (not to be confused with Army 

Training XXI) concept was being developed. That plan laid down the 

specifics for developing a long-range “umbrella” training strategy for 

the late 1990s and the first 20 years of the 21st century. It included such 

training strategies as distributed training, strategies based on the technical requirements of each MOS, civilian vocational and technical training 

for appropriate MOS, training in colleges and universities, recruiting by 

ability instead of aptitude, and reconfiguring the TRADOC school system 

to be more responsive to projected training requirements in the year 2020. 

For several years, suggested solutions to problems were tried, studied, and 

revised. In the end, the demands first of Army XXI and then of the various transformation efforts changed many of the parameters of the earlier 

initiatives.

As Thurman looked at how the command could best meet its responsibilities to 1991, TRADOC’s training managers were examining School 

Model 83 for needed changes. School Model 89 eliminated the “School 
42

Victory Starts Here

Secretary” organizations at TRADOC schools, aligned the threat support 

office under the assistant commandant, and limited the number of training 

departments to four. Because of the number of requests for exemptions, 

which had to be considered on a case-by-case basis, School Model 89 was 

not implemented until 1990.

Meanwhile, it was clear that the Army needed a new capstone training 

manual to keep pace with evolving training plans and doctrine. TRADOC’s 

new training philosophy was contained in FM 25-100, Training the Force, 

published in 1988 to take its place alongside FM 100-5, Operations, and 

FM 22-100, Military Leadership, as part of a trilogy of “train, fight, lead” 

manuals. FM 25-100, however, focused primarily on senior Active and 

Reserve commanders above battalion level. There was also a need for 

additional guidance to better apply the concepts of FM 25-100 at battalion 

and company level. Accordingly, FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training,

published in 1990, was developed to fill the void and serve as a “how 

to” manual for units in the field. In October 2002, the Army distributed 

FM 7-0, Training the Force, as an update to FM 25-100. This was in 

line with the adoption of the joint numbering system. Likewise in 2003, 

FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training, superseded the 1990 FM 25-101. The 

new manual was designed to bring training doctrine more in line with the 

emerging operational environment.

An important facet of the TRADOC training story was the command’s 

efforts to take advantage of ever more sophisticated technology that could 

be applied to training. This was increasingly evident in the transformation efforts of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. During the DePuy–

Gorman years, several tactical engagement simulation systems were in 

use to support unit training in the field. One of these was known as squad 

combat operations exercise, simulated (SCOPES). SCOPES was designed 

to eliminate the judgment of umpires that was highly subjective, and featured a 6-power telescope mounted on a rifle with numbers affixed to 

each individual soldier for the identification of casualties. A similar system for training tank crews called REALTRAIN had a 10-power scope. 

In the early-to-mid-1970s, TRADOC began developing a more sophisticated tactical engagement simulator for use in force-on-force field training 

exercises. That system, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System 

(MILES), revolutionized collective training in the Army. The upgraded 

MILES continued to be the Army’s most innovative and effective training 

device in 2008.

From its inception, TRADOC was responsible for the development 

of dozens of system and nonsystem training aids and devices. Most were 
43

Training and Leader Development

computer-based and designed to allow training when space, safety, cost, 

or environmental considerations might have prevented it. Simulators and 

simulations such as the Simulation Network (SIMNET), which joined 

more than 200 simulators, allowed units to participate in simulated battles 

without leaving home station. In the early years of the 21st century, 

SIMNET technology was applied to the development of a family of 

Combined Arms Tactical Trainers (CATT). A family of simulations 

(FAMSIM) allowed for training in command and control from platoon 

level to echelons above corps. DePuy’s and Gorman’s faith in the value of 

advanced technology applied to training, and the imagination and support 

of their successors placed the Army first among the Services in the field of 

training technology. It was rapidly advancing technology, too, that allowed 

for the establishment of the Army’s Combat Training Center (CTC) 

program. In 1976, Major General Gorman began developing a concept for 

a national training center where heavy armored and mechanized infantry 

units could train in force-on-force and live-fire exercises and where data 

could be collected to support doctrine development, combat development, 

and a lessons-learned system. The first force-on-force maneuvers were 

conducted at the US Army National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, 

California, in January 1982.

The NTC was a joint TRADOC–Forces Command (FORSCOM) 

project. The major features of the training center were the employment of 

MILES for casualty assessment and a sophisticated data collection system 

for exercise control, a TRADOC Operations Group, a superbly trained 

opposing force (OPFOR), expert exercise observer-controllers, after action 

reviews of unit performance, and take-home packages designed to aid 

units in correcting deficiencies while training at home station. The success 

of the NTC in training heavy mechanized forces led the Army to establish 

the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) for the training of light forces. 

In October 1987, the JRTC opened at its temporary home of Fort Chaffee, 

Arkansas. Like the NTC, it featured a TRADOC Operations Group and an 

OPFOR. Unlike the NTC, the JRTC was a TRADOC-only endeavor until 

it moved to a permanent home at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in 1993. At that 

time, the JRTC also became a TRADOC–FORSCOM effort. In 1988, the 

Army planned to establish a Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) 

at Hohenfels, Germany, to provide the same realistic combined arms training exercises for troops in Europe as those at the NTC. Meanwhile in early 

1987, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved the concept of the Battle 

Command Training Program (BCTP) to train Active and Reserve division 

and corps commanders, their staffs, and major subordinate commanders in 

warfighting skills.
44

Victory Starts Here

In May 1987, NTC, JRTC, CMTC, and BCTP were brought under 

a single training “umbrella” and became known as the Combat Training 

Center (CTC). Collectively, the CTC projects focused on integrating all 

elements of combat power and were designed to provide tough, realistic 

combined arms and services training in accordance with AirLand Battle 

doctrine for units from squad through corps. The CTC provided the Army 

the capability to train heavy, light, and special operations forces across the 

spectrum of conflict. In the summer of 2002, the NTC became the focus of 

the US Army’s participation in Millennium Challenge, the first major joint 

experiment ever conducted. The Army conducted exercises with the new 

Stryker interim armored vehicle to test its deployability, especially when 

airlifted by a C-130 aircraft. The TRADOC battle labs also conducted 

experiments in satellite communications, intelligence, command and control, and terrain mapping. Lessons learned from Millennium Challenge 

helped develop a new joint training transformation project known as Joint 

National Training Capability (JNTC) that focused on the upgrading and 

certification of training ranges for joint training.

One of General DePuy’s requirements in the design of an integrated 

training system for the Army was that training programs were to be progressive and sequential. He also required that standards of performance be 

set and met at each level. As TRADOC reached the 30-year mark, the OES 

and the NCOES met both those criteria. After completing the officer basic 

and advanced courses, captains were required to attend the Combined 

Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) that trained soldiers to function as 

staff officers with the Army in the field. Because its curriculum overlapped 

that of the advance course, kept soldiers away from their assignments, and 

increased travel costs, CAS3 was discontinued in 2004. After attending the 

Command and General Staff Officer Course, majors and lieutenant colonels could be selected to attend the School of Advanced Military Studies 

(SAMS). 

In the first decade of the 21st century, TRADOC considered transforming the OES to train the leaders who would command the objective force 

of the future. Many of the initiatives were the result of an Army Training 

and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) study, which had revealed a 

number of weaknesses in the precommissioning through majors’ training 

programs. Changes were also designed to address transformation issues, a 

doubling in the number of deployments, and a smaller Army. Under consideration was a more integrated, three-level Basic Officer Leader Course 

(BOLC) for lieutenants, a two-part course for captains that included both 

staff training and company command. Finally, an Intermediate Level 

Education (ILE) model prescribed both a core curriculum and electives. 
45

Training and Leader Development

All courses would be timed to officer assignments. BOLC was implemented in fiscal year 2006.

NCOES served as the cornerstone of the “train-the-trainer” emphasis 

that guided TRADOC’s approach to its overall training responsibilities. 

DePuy’s and Gorman’s efforts to establish a sequential and progressive 

educational program for noncommissioned officers had evolved slowly 

over the 35 years of TRADOC’s existence. NCOES featured four vertically integrated levels of training: primary, basic, advanced, and senior. 

Those levels had, over a period of years, been tied to promotions in accordance with TRADOC’s long-range goals. Similar to training for NCOs 

was that for warrant officers. A Warrant Officer Leader Development 

Action Plan of February 1992 established a six-level program beginning 

with the Warrant Officer Candidate Course. In 2002, the ATLDP released 

a study focused on training and leader development requirements for 

warrant officers as the Army transformed to what was then known as the 

objective force. The study was part of the largest self-assessment ever 

done by the Army and affected warrant officer training from the Warrant 

Officer Candidate Course to the advanced course and brought it more in 

line with commissioned officer training. In 2004, the commanding general of TRADOC approved development of a single, two-phased Active 

Component and Reserve Component Warrant Officer Candidate Course 

that recognized the education, training, and experience of the majority of 

warrant officer candidates.

The Army’s IET program included BCT; AIT, which trained soldiers 

in their MOSs; and OSUT, which combined BCT and AIT for some 

career fields, primarily combat arms. On 1 October 1998, Army BCT 

had been expanded from 8 weeks to 9 weeks so that new soldiers could 

be immersed in the Army’s heritage and its seven core values: loyalty, 

duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. The 

directive for the additional week of BCT had come from the Army Chief 

of Staff, in the wake of allegations of sexual harassment during IET at 

several Army installations. The revamped program also included human 

relations, rape prevention, and financial management. In addition, a 3-

day field training exercise reinforced training given during BCT. Valuesbased training—values, heritage, and tradition—would not end when 

soldiers graduated from BCT, but would continue into AIT to reinforce 

the instruction given in basic training and to keep those principles fresh. 

In 2003, Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker created 

Task Force Soldier. One of its tasks was to examine all Initial Military 

Training (IMT) to ensure it was preparing soldiers for combat. The results 

were 32 Warrior Tasks and 12 Battle Drills that made training more 
46

Victory Starts Here

relevant. The tasks fell into areas such as shooting, communicating, 

urban operations, moving, and fighting. The drills included reactions to 

combat situations and evacuation of casualties. The tasks and drills were 

implemented throughout IET in TRADOC in 2004 and a number of drills 

were included in AIT. In 2007, General William S. Wallace expanded BCT 

from 9 to 10 weeks without adding additional tasks. The purpose was to 

determine the effect on training of the additional time. The results are 

expected in 2009.

From the beginning of the all-volunteer force in 1973 and into the 

21st century there were important developments and much controversy 

concerning the training of men and women recruits together in BCT. In 

the absence of a pool of draftees, women enlistees were necessary to meet 

manpower requirements. As a result, the numbers and percentages of 

women in the enlisted ranks increased dramatically from the late 1970s 

through the beginning of the 21st century. That situation and the strong 

feminist movement, beginning in the late 1960s and strengthening until 

Technical training at the US Army Signal School.

US Army Photo
47

Training and Leader Development

the early 1980s, came together to indicate that the Army could no longer 

resist a program to integrate the sexes during BCT. From 1978 to late 

1981, men and women were trained together in BCT at company level 

(for example, a company of three all-male platoons and one all-female 

platoon). That experiment encountered numerous difficulties, especially 

with physical training, and was terminated in 1981.

From 1982 to 1994, men and women were trained at separate locations. The Persian Gulf War of 1990–91 changed that arrangement when 

41,000 women deployed, some serving on the front lines. As a result, 

the Secretary of Defense declared that women could fly combat aircraft 

and serve on combat ships. Faced with such competition in recruiting, 

the Army once again established a gender-integrated BCT program. This 

time the companies were totally integrated. The new program had fewer 

problems and it opened more specialties to women; however, criticism 

remained and increased in 1996, after allegations of sexual harassment and 

rape during training at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and at other 

sites. The program remained, but was the object of numerous studies and 

investigations by Congress and other agencies. As TRADOC observed its 

35th anniversary, gender integrated training remained Army policy.

Leader development has always been a concern of the Army. As a result, 

TRADOC brought that concern into sharper focus and institutionalized 

leader development programs on several levels. Since 1973, many studies 

have been conducted to investigate the status of leader development in the 

Army. In the fall of 1987, General Carl E. Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, 

tasked Major General Gordon R. Sullivan to conduct a formal study of 

leader development in the Army and to build an action plan to provide 

specific recommendations concerning changes needed in the Army leader 

development process. The action plan, submitted in April 1988, envisioned 

a program that rested on three doctrinal pillars—institutional training, 

operational assignments, and self-development.

Another major initiative of the 1990s was the Future Army Schools 

Twenty-One (FAST) effort. The mission of a FAST task force was to 

establish an effective and efficient Total Army School System (TASS) 

of fully accredited and integrated Active Component/National Guard/

Reserve Component schools that provided standard individual training 

and education for the Total Army. One of the task force’s recommendations was the establishment of TRADOC as the sole accrediting authority 

for the schools, effective in January 1993. The major thrust of FAST was 

the establishment of a regionally-based Reserve Component school system under the auspices of TRADOC headquarters.
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Victory Starts Here

Looking to the Army of the 21st century, TRADOC trainers considered their challenge to be maintaining the essence of the Army’s education 

and training system and the utilization of the best combinations of live, 

virtual, and constructive simulations and simulators. That strategy was 

designed to unite the many ongoing training efforts into a clear, coherent 

vision to produce trained and ready units into the next century. To achieve 

the Army’s objectives in Force XXI to transform from an Industrial Age 

Army into a knowledge and capabilities based power projection Army, 

TRADOC had to concurrently develop the means and methods to train 

and sustain the force. To support efforts to have Force XXI reach its maximum potential and to ensure that training was included in every phase 

of Force XXI development, the TRADOC training community developed 

Army Training XXI (AT XXI). TRADOC’s AT XXI concept incorporated 

strategic plans for unit training and an integrated plan for the training of 

battle staff and collective tasks.

In late 1999, the AT XXI concepts were absorbed into a body of initiatives known as Transformation. While the new effort built on many of 

the ongoing AT XXI concepts and projects, some Transformation training initiatives were new. TRADOC developed both Senior and Tactical 

Leadership Courses to address the transition from a Cold War focus to 

a full-spectrum focus for the new IBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington. The 

Senior Course, for key leaders, was built on an “adaptive thinking methodology” and included a constructive simulation exercise. The Senior 

Course was held at Fort Lee, Virginia; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Fort Knox, 

Kentucky; Fort Benning, Georgia; and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The 

Tactical Leaders Course, held at Fort Lewis, featured training executed 

relative to the IBCT organization and operational concept and was based 

on the unique differences of how the IBCT would fight.

At TRADOC’s 35th anniversary, the command’s training community 

remained dedicated to the development of competent soldiers, capable 

leaders, relevant products, and the shaping of future Army training in units 

and institutions utilizing information-based technology to support the 

objective force. It also demonstrated its flexibility by providing specialty 

training for soldiers deployed in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
49

Chapter VI

TRADOC in the Joint Service Arena

From its beginning, TRADOC has been a participant in the joint service arena. It has cooperated in wartime operations and peacetime planning 

among US ground, air, and sea services. As the successor to CONARC, 

TRADOC worked closely with the Air Force Tactical Air Command 

(TAC) at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. This was a continuation of 

efforts begun shortly after World War II. When TAC was disestablished in 

1992, TRADOC continued its joint work with Headquarters, Air Combat 

Command (also at Langley AFB), which was responsible for all Air Force 

combat forces, both tactical and strategic. During the 1970s, cooperation 

developed steadily so that the 1980s yielded important procedural and 

doctrinal results. The command’s cooperative work with the US Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command, begun in the early 1980s, found 

points of common interest and agreement. In the post-DESERT STORM 

period, cooperative ventures began with US Navy agencies.

General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., Chief of Staff of the Army, and 

General George S. Brown, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, promoted 

the inter-Service cooperation at the operational level that had developed 

during the Vietnam War. Post-Vietnam force reductions and the need to 

concentrate on warfighting in central Europe also played a role. General 

William E. DePuy, at Abrams’ request, worked to further Air Force–Army 

dialogue at his own level. A concurrent TAC initiative helped set up the 

first meeting of the “TAC–TRADOC dialogue” between DePuy and the 

TAC commander, General Robert J. Dixon, in October 1973.

Early discussions involved joint working groups centered on airspace 

management, reconnaissance and surveillance, and electronic warfare. 

The focus was on procedures to improve joint combat capabilities and to 

implement existing doctrine, rather than creating new doctrine. The 1973 

Middle East War encouraged greater cooperation, because of increased 

lethality in the air as well as on the ground. In July 1975, TRADOC and 

TAC established an Air-Land Forces Application Agency (ALFA) dedicated to managing the working groups and mutual projects. In November 

1976, a TAC–TRADOC working group produced a joint manual on airspace management, which provided guidance to develop appropriate air 

control procedures on battlefields that promised to be more lethal and 

complex in the future.

The NATO doctrine of battlefield air interdiction incorporated 

the ALFA work. TAC–TRADOC work resulted in a November 1984 
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Victory Starts Here

agreement on joint procedures for offensive air support. Joint suppression 

of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD), another significant project in cooperation 

with US Readiness Command, resulted in a joint concept published in 

April 1981 that outlined both Army and Air Force responsibilities. In 

December 1982, the three headquarters published the Joint Attack of the 

Second Echelon (J-SAK), which delineated attack procedures by level 

of command for the identification of and attack on the enemy follow-on 

echelons. The project lay at the heart of TAC contributions to the deep 

attack aspect of the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine published in August 

1982. TAC–TRADOC projects expanded in the late 1970s to joint tactical 

training projects, tests, and evaluations, and led to joint doctrine endeavors 

invaluable to the development of Army doctrine.

Although these joint agreements were useful, they were not doctrine. 

Close air support issues were complex and other Air Force missions 

competed with the Army for air resources. In addition, theater needs and 

concerns were paramount in any resource decision and took precedence 

over these agreements. The requirement for a better way to ensure 

cooperation was demonstrated in 1982 during Operation URGENT FURY 

when US forces prevented a Communist takeover of Grenada. The various 

branches observed different priorities and inter-Service communications 

were inadequate.

In April 1983, General Charles A. Gabriel, Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force, and General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, signed 

a memorandum of understanding in which both Services agreed to engage 

in joint training and exercises based on AirLand Battle doctrine and to 

continue other inter-Service efforts. This led to the inauguration of a 

major force development process by General Gabriel and General John 

A. Wickham Jr., Meyer’s successor. That program, “The 31 Initiatives,” 

was heralded as a means to design and field the best affordable AirLand 

combat force.

The 31 Initiatives program, which addressed seven basic areas of 

AirLand combat, included a number of joint projects already underway. 

Extending to 1988, the program furnished a high-level forum and focus for 

the solution of difficult bi-Service issues. An initiative on intratheater airlift 

led to the establishment in 1984 of the Airlift, Concepts, and Requirements 

Agency (ACRA) at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. In January 1986, the 

two Services established the Army–Air Force Center for Low Intensity 

Conflict (CLIC), at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

The numbered initiatives included a variety of issues, including 

air defense, rear area operations, and joint suppression of enemy air 
51

TRADOC in the Joint Service Arena

defenses. Several initiatives dealt with special operations forces and 

search and rescue, while others addressed joint munitions development, 

combat techniques, and procedures for the combined arms battlefield. Air 

interdiction, joint target assessment, close air support, and the link between 

air liaison officers and forward air controllers were also important issues. 

A final group of original initiatives focused on the acquisition of aircraft 

to meet joint targeting and reconnaissance needs. Among these, the Joint 

Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS) that figured 

significantly in the Gulf War. There was also an affirmation of Army 

primacy for rotary wing combat support and Air Force primacy for fixedwing support. An important program element was the uniformed Service 

chiefs’ agreement to a combined budgetary submission package for priority 

programs and establishment of a Joint Assessments and Initiatives Office 

to institutionalize the joint force development process. In June 1986, US 

Navy representation was added to that office. Ultimately numbering 38, 

the initiatives were substantially completed by 1987.

TRADOC’s work in joint doctrine proceeded along two tracks. The 

first was the multi-Service doctrinal literature published as field manuals 

together with one or more of the other Services. The second was publication 

of multi-Service doctrine. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization 

Act of 1986 assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

the responsibility to develop doctrine for joint employment of the Armed 

Forces. The newly established Operational Plans and Interoperability 

Directorate (J7) was responsible to the chairman of the JCS for the 

management of the joint doctrine development process. Along with the 

regional commanders and the Services, the J7 developed a Joint Doctrine 

Master Plan. TRADOC was a key player in the Army’s contribution to the 

whole JCS development effort.

In 1988, the JCS issued JCS Pub 1-01, Joint Publication System, Joint 

Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development 

Program. This master regulation specified publications in the major 

categories of reference; intelligence; operations; logistics; plans; and 

command, control, and communications (C3) systems. Each had a 

capstone manual that brought together all joint doctrine approved by the 

three Services.

TRADOC reviewed JP 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, for 

the Army, and it was published in November 1990 to aid ongoing operations in the Persian Gulf. This significant manual proceeded from the 

belief that warfare in the modern era was, in fact, joint warfare. The manual provided the basis for the future joint strategic view in discussions of 
52

Victory Starts Here

American military power. For the warfighting level, TRADOC completed 

JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, a capstone operational manual issued by the Joint Staff in 1990.

Cooperative work by TAC and TRADOC during 1989–90 produced a 

White Paper titled “Air Attack on the Modern Battlefield.” Approved by the 

two uniformed Service chiefs, the paper led to a five-part Air Attack Action 

Plan, which the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff signed to synchronize 

joint air attack combat planning and procedures. This led to a modernized 

Air Force tactical air control system–Army air-ground system (TACS–

AAGS), which was tested and validated in exercises during 1990.

In 1984, TRADOC undertook important joint work through the ACRA 

covering multi-Service employment of the C-17 aircraft and its related 

activities, which were subjects of cooperative doctrinal and procedural 

effort between TRADOC, the Military Airlift Command, and the Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command. By the late 1990s, doctrine was 

increasingly joint, and Army doctrine manuals reflected that reality. Force 

projection from CONUS, which constituted the prime deployment trend 

of the post-Cold War, was innately joint. Such operations were indeed the 

purview of the regional commanders of joint forces.

Low intensity conflict (LIC) was a category of engagement short of all 

out war and consisted of diverse and unconventional military operations. 

The 1993 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, characterized LIC as operations 

other than war (OOTW). For most of the 1970s and 1980s, LIC defined 

the whole realm of operations below high- and mid-intensity conflict. It 

received considerable attention by TRADOC doctrine developers from 

the early 1980s on because defense policy became increasingly concerned 

with that type of military operation. Throughout the decade, LIC emerged 

as a major concern. In July 1985, TRADOC joined the Air Force and other 

agencies in the major Joint Low Intensity Conflict Study that was released 

in 1986. It summarized previous efforts and became a springboard for 

subsequent Army and joint doctrinal formulation and further work. The 

study revealed that the definition of LIC was too broad to accurately 

quantify the problem.

Planners recognized the major categories of insurgencycounterinsurgency, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and 

peacetime contingency operations, as well as a host of subcategories, 

such as counterdrug efforts and disaster relief. The crucial question was 

when the use of force was appropriate and under what circumstances. 

In 1986, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated an official 
53

TRADOC in the Joint Service Arena

definition of LIC, recognizing its diversity in general terms. But, general 

definitions were only useful in a limited way for the formulation of such 

multifaceted doctrine. A bi-Service LIC manual, FM 100-20/AF Pam 3-20, 

Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, was published in December 

1990. The manual opened the way for effort on the JCS equivalent, JCS 

Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in LIC, which was retitled Military 

Operations Short of War.

Army oversight of the CLIC resided with Headquarters, TRADOC 

until 1990, when it was transferred to the Department of the Army Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. TRADOC, however, retained a 

close relationship with the CLIC for assistance in LIC concepts, doctrine, 

and training matters. In 1996, the CLIC was inactivated and its missions 

dispersed. Air Force and Army planners believed that LIC had been a 

predominant form of engagement for US forces since World War II and 

that the trend was likely to continue. The 1990 LIC doctrine spelled 

out critical differences between LIC and other conventional operations 

in activities such as foreign assistance and also provided an analysis of 

insurgencies. In the ambiguous environment of LIC, the contribution of 

military force to achieving the strategic aim was supportive and indirect. 

Political, economic, and psychological objectives shaped the way such 

operations were executed. What was important was understanding that 

military force had to be closely coordinated with other responses. One 

of the most perplexing issues was joint counterdrug operations. Doctrine, 

procedures, and training to assist the interdiction of the illegal drug flow 

into the United States were some of the many challenges and projects 

in which TRADOC, the joint agencies, and subordinate elements of the 

command were active.

The Mobility Concepts Agency (MCA), located at Fort Monroe, 

Virginia, since 1994, drew together doctrine and other developments for 

airlift and joint mobility for all the Services including a C-17 multi-Service 

employment concept, a study of early-entry deployability, and a study 

of joint theater airlift capabilities. Other studies of the period dealt with 

mobile offshore basing and the deployment sequence of joint reception, 

staging, onward movement, and integration.

The Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) Support Program, dating from 

August 1991, was a tool by which TRADOC-led teams annually visited 

the headquarters of the regional CINCs to determine their pressing 

developmental demands. The program responded comprehensively to the 

CINCs in all military development areas. In January 1996, the CINC, US 
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Victory Starts Here

Central Command, requested that TRADOC shift the program’s emphasis 

from specifically Army areas of interest to one more joint in nature. Other 

unified headquarters concurred. Consequently, TRADOC restructured the 

program, redesignating it the CINC Joint Warfighting Support Program. 

On 1 October 1996, the program was transferred to the Joint Warfighting 

Center at Fort Monroe, Virginia.

In October 1999, Atlantic Command, established in 1993 as a regional 

command with joint authority, was re-designated Joint Forces Command 

(JFCOM). In addition to its other responsibilities, JFCOM was given the 

mission of joint training and transformation as outlined in the Department 

of Defense’s Unified Command Plan. As the Army’s trainer, TRADOC 

coordinated closely with JFCOM. In 1999, JFCOM absorbed the Joint 

Unified Quest 2006, Exercise with Joint Forces Command.

US Army Photo
55

TRADOC in the Joint Service Arena

Warfighting Center into its Joint Training Center at Suffolk, Virginia. In 

2002, TRADOC participated in Millennium Challenge, the US military’s 

largest joint peacetime exercise to date, which JFCOM controlled. 

TRADOC had the Army lead for Millennium Challenge 02 and coordinated 

with JFCOM to provide management oversight for the overall experiment 

and to achieve both joint and Army objectives. TRADOC was also the lead 

for Army Transformation Experiment 02 in which the Stryker armored 

vehicle was tested at the National Training Center (NTC).

The emphasis on joint operations called for a substantial revision 

of US Army doctrine in the form of FM 100-5, Operations. In a clear 

break with the past, the Army manual numbering system was dropped 

and the joint numbering system was adopted in 2001 when the manual 

became FM 3­‐0. The new manual recognized the changes in the nation’s 

geostrategic position since the end of the Cold War. It clearly addressed 

the problems of deployment and asymmetric warfare as well as the need 

for joint cooperation in nearly every aspect of operations, from major 

theaters of war to humanitarian relief. FM 3-0 was further revised in 2008 

and placed even greater emphasis on joint interdependence.

In 2003, General Kevin P. Byrnes established a special relationship 

with the JFCOM because he believed the Army was built to support a joint 

Joint Forces Command Exercise.

US Air Force Photo
56

Victory Starts Here

forces commander. TRADOC, he believed, should operate as the Army’s 

component command with JFCOM. In addition, JFCOM would be a 

cosponsor of the annual transformation war game to be held at the Army 

War College in April 2003. That war game was followed by JFCOM’s 

war game Pinnacle Impact and by joint exercise Unified Quest. Byrnes 

emphasized that TRADOC had to increase the command’s insistence 

on joint exercises in the future and, in October 2003, established the 

TRADOC Futures Center, which became the core for development of 

joint doctrine in TRADOC. In 2006, the center evolved into the Army 

Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), which continued as the center 

of joint doctrine development. Five divisions in the Concept Development 

and Experiment Directorate were dedicated to joint issues.

Unlike previous decades when joint meant agreements with other 

Services on practices and procedures, the new joint environment focuses 

on multi-Service cooperation from inception. For example, Army FM 3-24, 

Counterinsurgency, published in 2006 was also Marine Corps Warfighting 

Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency. The joint publications to which 

TRADOC contributed in 2007 included topics as varied as joint terminology, joint intelligence, joint operations, join amphibious operations, 

and space operations and logistics. In the area of materiel development, 

TRADOC contributed to weapons developments, joint heavy lift, aerial 

sensors, and improvised explosive device (IED) detectors. In the 35 years 

of its existence, TRADOC has helped lead the Army from the era of joint 

memorandums of understanding to the era of joint development.
57

Chapter VII

Organizational Structure

In 1973, TRADOC consisted of a headquarters, 3 major subordinate 

commands, 16 branch schools, 8 military schools and colleges, 4 specialist schools, and a variety of special activities. Support agreements 

(intra-Army, inter-Service, and interagency), together with memorandums 

of understanding internal and external to TRADOC, helped smooth the 

complex administrative, logistical, and funding relationships. On its activation, TRADOC headquarters commanded, separately, its own installations, certain TRADOC tenants on those installations, and TRADOC 

tenants on non-TRADOC installations. Initially it directly commanded 

20 major installations through the commanders of the centers resident on 

18 of the installations and through the post commanders of Fort Monroe 

and Carlisle Barracks, which were not centers. In 2003, the Installation 

Management Agency (IMA) (later raised to a command) assumed direction of all Army installations.

Initial Subordinate Organization

Initially organized on Operation STEADFAST principles of centralized management and decentralized operations, TRADOC executed its 

individual training mission through its Army training centers; service 

schools; Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) regions and subordinate detachments; and US Army Reserve schools, training divisions, and 

brigades under its operational control. The STEADFAST reorganization 
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Victory Starts Here

had divided and assigned the parts of the Army field establishment in the 

United States not by geography but by function. In 1973, TRADOC also 

monitored individual training in Army-operated Department of Defense 

schools, the Army War College, logistics-related schools operated by the 

Army Materiel Command (AMC), and other non-TRADOC schools and 

training centers. The headquarters accomplished its combat developments 

mission in 1973 through three mid-level functional centers, later designated integrating centers, as well as through the Service schools and other 

combat developments activities.

The 18 installations with centers were actually of three different types. 

Three functional centers—the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, 

the Administration Center and Fort Benjamin Harrison, and the Logistics 

Center at Fort Lee—drew together the training and combat developments 

tasks in their respective functional areas of combat and combat support, 

personnel administration, and logistics or combat service support. Two 

of the three functional center headquarters oversaw separate school and 

combat developments activities. The Combined Arms Center commanded 

the Command and General Staff College, the Combined Arms Combat 

Developments Activity, and the installation garrison. The Administration 

Center commanded the Institute of Administration, the Personnel and 

Administration Combat Developments Activity, and the garrison. The third 

functional center, the Logistics Center, was initially a combat developmentsoriented organization, operating as a tenant on Fort Lee.

Ten more of the initial 18 center-type installations of TRADOC were 

Army branch or specialist school centers: the Engineer Center and Fort 

Belvoir, the Infantry Center and Fort Benning, the Air Defense Center and 

Fort Bliss, the Transportation Center and Fort Eustis, the Signal Center and 

Fort Gordon, the Armor Center and Fort Knox, the Quartermaster Center 

and Fort Lee, the Aviation Center and Fort Rucker, the Field Artillery 

Center and Fort Sill, and the Primary Helicopter Center and School and 

Fort Wolters.

The six remaining TRADOC center installations were training centers 

devoted primarily to basic combat and advanced individual training or, 

at Fort McClellan, to Women’s Army Corps basic training. These were 

the Training Center and Fort Dix; the Training Center and Fort Jackson; 

the Training Center and Fort Ord; the Training Center, Engineer and Fort 

Leonard Wood; the School/Training Center and Fort McClellan; and the 

Training Center, Infantry and Fort Polk. The commander of the Armor 

Center and Fort Knox also administered basic combat training.
59

Organizational Structure

Eight schools—the Air Defense, Armor, Engineer, Field Artillery, 

Infantry, Quartermaster, Southeast Signal, and Transportation Schools—

were components of their respective branch centers, at which they were 

located. Three other branch schools were situated on TRADOC installations. The Institute of Administration was subordinate to the Administration 

Center and Fort Benjamin Harrison and commanded the resident Army 

Finance School and Army Adjutant General School; the Women’s Army 

Corps Center and School was subordinate to the School/Training Center 

and Fort McClellan; and, the Military Police School was subordinate to 

the Signal Center and Fort Gordon. The five remaining TRADOC branch 

schools were tenants on non-TRADOC posts—the Chaplain Center and 

School at Fort Hamilton, New York; the Intelligence Center and School at 

Fort Huachuca, Arizonia; the Missile and Munitions Center and School at 

Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; the Ordnance Center and School at Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland; and the Signal School at Fort Monmouth, 

New Jersey.

In addition to the 16 branch schools, in 1973 TRADOC commanded 

four specialist schools: the Aviation School, part of the Aviation Center 

and Fort Rucker; the Primary Helicopter School and Fort Wolters; the US 

Army Element, School of Music, Norfolk, Virginia; and the US Army 

Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. TRADOC 

also commanded, through the installations involved, the Command and 

General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the US Army 

Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas. Department of Defense 

schools operated by TRADOC were the Defense Information School at 

Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, and the Defense Language Institute at 

the Presidio of Monterey, California. Initially, TRADOC administered the 

Army ROTC program through four ROTC regions established under the 

STEADFAST reorganization.

Headquarters Organization and Reorganizations

Command of TRADOC resided with the commanding general, 

assisted at his headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia, initially by a 

single deputy commander, a chief of staff, and general and special staffs. 

The general staff consisted of seven deputy chiefs of staff (DCSs) who 

managed the major elements of the headquarters and exercised staff 

responsibility for the commanding general to the installations, centers, 

schools, and other subordinate elements. The seven DCSs established 

in Headquarters, TRADOC in 1973 were responsible for Training 

and Schools, ROTC, Combat Developments, Resource Management, 
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Victory Starts Here

Personnel, Logistics, and Operations and Intelligence. In January 

1974, the last named general staff agency was restructured as DCS for 

Operations, Readiness, and Intelligence. In 1974, “schools” was dropped 

from the title, but not from the purview of the DCS for Training.

There have been four major reorganizations of TRADOC headquarters since 1973. These occurred in 1979, 1990, 2002–03 and 2007. The 

1979 reorganization, implemented provisionally in April and formally 

on 1 October of that year, was prompted by the decision of TRADOC 

Commanding General Donn A. Starry to shift resources to the main mission components—the Deputies for Training, Combat Developments, and 

ROTC. Another impelling cause was Starry’s decision to involve TRADOC 

more emphatically in doctrine development. The new structure retained 

the DCSs for Training, Combat Developments, ROTC, and Resource 

Management. It disestablished the DCSs for Personnel; Logistics; and 

Operations, Readiness, and Intelligence. The 1979 action established new 

DCSs for Doctrine, Personnel and Logistics, and Engineer.

In 1990, the headquarters downsized with the rest of the Army. 

The offices of the DCSs for Personnel, Administration, and Logistics; 

Contracting; and Engineer; together with Surgeon, Chaplain, and other 

selected staff offices were merged into the DCS for Base Operations 

Support. The DCSs for Doctrine, Intelligence, and Combat Developments 

were merged into the DCS for Concepts, Doctrine, and Developments, 

with transfer of some functions to Headquarters, Combined Arms Center, 

which became Combined Arms Command in October 1990. A third major 

change was the establishment of the TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC) 

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as DCS for Analysis on the headquarters 

staff, albeit with a local staff representative. This reorganization left the 

offices of the DCSs for Information Management, Resource Management, 

and Training substantially unchanged; the office of the DCS for Training 

was reorganized internally. The 1990 merger of the doctrine office with 

combat developments did not work well and on 1 October 1992 became 

the office of the DCS for Doctrine and the office of the DCS for Combat 

Developments.

The effort to transform TRADOC in line with changes to the entire 

Army began to bear fruit in 2002. Although the command did not expect 

all of the changes to be complete until 2006, after Congress initiated a new 

round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions, TRADOC leaders anticipated that the command would look significantly different by the 

end of 2003. 
61

Organizational Structure

Effective 20 July 2007, the TRADOC staff was reorganized to improve 

the alignment of TRADOC responsibilities with the operational Army, and 

staff titles were changed to reflect the new G-Staff organization.

Previous Title G–Staff Title

DCS, Personnel, Infrastructure & Logistics G1/4

DCS, Intelligence G2

DCS, Operations & Training G3/5/7

Chief Information Officer G6

DCS, Resource Management G8

Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center G9

Installations and Changes, 1973–2003

TRADOC commanded 20 major installations on the day it was established. Fort Wolters closed in 1974, and Forts Ord and Polk were transferred to Forces Command (FORSCOM) when their missions changed 

from training to unit stationing. In 1992, training at Fort Dix, New Jersey, 

was phased out and it, too, was transferred to FORSCOM. Thereafter, 

TRADOC operated 16 installations until 1 October 2003 when the Army’s 

Installation Management Agency (IMA) assumed control of all Army 

installations. However, TRADOC mission commanders remained in the 

rating chains of the installation commanders to provide input on how the 

installations were run. IMA became Installation Management Command 

(IMCOM) in October 2006.
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Intermediate Level Changes, 1973–2003

In September 1977, TRADOC’s intermediate-level structure was 

strengthened to give the three functional centers a stronger integrating role 

vis-à-vis their associated TRADOC schools. The three-star TRADOC deputy commanding general position moved from Fort Monroe, Virginia, to 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, making the commander of the Combined Arms 

Center (CAC) dual-hatted. Beyond his local duties as Commander, CAC, 

as Deputy Commander, TRADOC he was to execute specific TRADOC 

missions. He was to direct, coordinate, and integrate combined arms doctrine, organization, and combat and training development programs for 

the Army.

In 1980, TRADOC reorganized and redesignated the Fort Benjamin 

Harrison agency as the US Army Soldier Support Center with much stronger doctrinal and training responsibilities in the personnel, administration, 

finance, and automatic data processing areas. The action also included 

replacement of the center’s Institute of Administration by a newly renamed 

US Army Institute of Personnel and Resource Management. Two branch 

schools, the Finance and Adjutant General Schools, along with two new 

specialist-type schools, the Computer Science School and the Personnel 

Management School, were aligned under the new institute. The institute 

was subsequently redesignated the Soldier Support Institute in 1984.

In April 1983, the Logistics Center commander at Fort Lee was redesignated the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General for Logistics, and the 

position was upgraded to a three-star billet. The Logistics Center remained 

in tenant status on the installation, which was commanded by one of its 

subordinate organizations, the US Army Quartermaster Center and Fort 

Lee. That anomaly was rectified on 3 January 1989 when the TRADOC 

commander brought the Fort Lee structure in line with that existing at Fort 

Leavenworth and Fort Benjamin Harrison by establishing the US Army 

Logistics Center and Fort Lee, with the US Army Quartermaster Center 

and School becoming the tenant.

The integrating center structure remained in place until the end of the 

Cold War, which ushered in a period of Army drawdown and consolidation. 

On 1 October 1990 TRADOC replaced the integrating center structure 

with two major subordinate commands. The Combined Arms Command 

replaced the Combined Arms Center. Internal reductions and realignments 

recast the commanders of the Combined Arms Combat Developments 

Activity and the Combined Arms Training Activity as deputy CAC 

commanders for combat developments and for training. The second major 

action merged the Soldier Support Center with the Logistics Center creating 
63

Organizational Structure

the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) headquartered at Fort 

Lee, Virginia. At that time, the Soldier Support Center’s Soldier Support 

Institute was eliminated as an administrative organization layered between 

the center and the resident schools.

Because of budget reductions and a changed world situation, 

TRADOC launched a “reengineering” initiative in 1993. TRADOC headquarters assumed the integration function traditionally held by CAC and 

CASCOM. That action necessitated several organizational and functional 

changes in both CAC and CASCOM, most of which were completed 

by the end of 1994. In July of that year CAC once again became a center. The reorganization shifted some functions and personnel from Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, to other TRADOC installations. In addition, CAC’s 

combat development, doctrinal concepts, and integration functions moved 

to Headquarters, TRADOC. The CASCOM reorganization included the 

centralization of combat developments, training developments, proponency and evaluation, and standardization at Headquarters, CASCOM.

Schools

Under the STEADFAST reorganization, TRADOC commanded 16 

branch schools, 8 military schools and colleges, and 4 specialist schools. 

As previously noted, the Primary Helicopter School at Fort Wolters, Texas, 

was discontinued on 30 June 1974. TRADOC inherited two signal schools 

from CONARC, the Signal School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and the 

Southeastern Signal School at Fort Gordon, Georgia. On 1 July 1974, the 

Monmouth organization became the Communications-Electronics School, 

and the Gordon organization was redesignated the Signal School, a step in 

the consolidation of all signal training at the southern post. That occurred 

2 years later when the Communications-Electronics School was discontinued on 31 October 1976. The Chaplain School, located at Fort Hamilton, 

moved to larger facilities at Fort Wadsworth, New York, a subpost of 

Fort Dix, on 15 August 1974. It remained there until Fort Wadsworth was 

closed on 1 August 1979 and was relocated to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. 

The Military Police School moved from Fort Gordon to Fort McClellan, 

Alabama, on 1 July 1975, to make room for the consolidation of signal 

training.

The Organizational Effectiveness Training Center was established 

on 1 July 1975 at Fort Ord, California, to inculcate and teach organizational skills. It was redesignated the Organizational Effectiveness Center 

and School on 2 April 1979. After 10 years in operation, it was closed 

on 1 October 1985. On 1 October 1976, the US Army Security Agency 

Training Center and School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, was transferred 
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Victory Starts Here

into the TRADOC school system. The new TRADOC school was renamed 

the Intelligence School, Fort Devens, and was subordinate to the commandant of the Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Beginning in the 1970s, female soldiers were integrated into the main 

branches of the Army. As a result, the Women’s Army Corps Center and 

School at Fort McClellan was discontinued in 1978. The first post-Vietnam 

move in the direction of a larger chemical training program occurred with 

the redesignation on 30 November 1976 of the Ordnance Center and 

School at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, as the Ordnance and 

Chemical Center and School. As plans unfolded, the Chemical School was 

moved and established as a separate school at Fort McClellan, Alabama, 

on 14 September 1979.

Changes continued in the 1980s. The Aviation School, historically a specialist school, became a branch school following designation 

of Army aviation as a branch by the Secretary of the Army on 12 April 

1983. Simultaneous expansion of the aviation logistics mission prompted 

TRADOC to establish an Aviation Logistics School, colocated with 

the Transportation School, at Fort Eustis, Virginia, on 1 October 1983. 

Shortly thereafter, on 10 January 1984, those two schools were merged 

as the Transportation and Aviation Logistics Schools. That arrangement 

continued until 1988 when, on 1 October, TRADOC brought the Aviation 

Logistics School under the direct authority of the Commander, US Army 

Aviation Center, while leaving it at Fort Eustis. A similar realignment 

occurred with placement of the Missile and Munitions Center and School 

at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, under the commander of the Ordnance 

Center and School at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. On 3 August 

1984, the Redstone facility was realigned and retitled the Ordnance Missile 

and Munitions Center and School.

On 1 October 1983, the Institute for Military Assistance at Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina, was redesignated the JFK Special Warfare Center, 

because of a special operations forces (SOF) realignment that year. The 

JFK Special Warfare Center was in essence a branch school but was categorized as a TRADOC special activity. Further SOF realignments transferred the TRADOC school to the US Army Special Operations Command 

at Fort Bragg on 20 June 1990. TRADOC gained the US Army School of 

the Americas (SOA) when provisions of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 

necessitated the transfer of that US Army Security Assistance Agency 

component, located at Fort Gulick, Panama, to CONUS. The school was 

relocated to Fort Benning and transferred provisionally to TRADOC on 
65

Organizational Structure

16 December 1985 and formally on 16 April 1986. On 17 January 2001, 

the SOA was inactivated and became the Western Hemisphere Institute for 

Security Cooperation(WHINSEC), aligned directly under the Secretary of 

Defense with TRADOC as its executive agent. In 1988, following earlier 

designation of the Signal Center as proponent for the information mission 

area, the Computer Science School, a component of the Soldier Support 

Institute at Fort Benjamin Harrison, was transferred to Fort Gordon.

When the Department of the Army decided to develop advanced training for Army civilians in the form of the Army Management Staff College 

(AMSC), TRADOC assumed proponency for it in August 1987. AMSC 

initially opened in Baltimore, Maryland, in July 1986, and in August 

1987, Fort Belvoir was selected as the new site for the school. Following 

assignment of a full-time commandant, classes were convened at the Fort 

Belvoir location in 1990. On 1 October 1991, TRADOC acquired the 

Army Logistics Management College (ALMC) at Fort Lee from AMC. 

In July 2002, the two schools subordinate to the Ordnance Center and 

Schools, one at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, and the other at Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland, were renamed, respectively, the Ordnance 

Munitions and Electronics Maintenance School (COMEMS) and the 

Ordnance Mechanical Maintenance School (OMMS).

Training Organizations

Throughout TRADOC’s history, training organizations continued to 

evolve. A large portion of basic combat and advanced individual training was conducted by the Army Training Centers (ATC) at Forts Dix, 

Jackson, and Leonard Wood, which were devoted specifically to that mission. Initial entry training was also conducted at the ATCs at Forts Knox, 

Benning, Gordon, Sill, and Bliss. Women’s Army Corps (WAC) training 

was conducted at Fort McClellan. TRADOC commanded seven ATCs 

in 1973. The number rose to 11 in 1976 when one-station unit training 

(OSUT) was phased in at several posts. OSUT enabled trainees to pass 

directly from basic to branch-related advanced individual training, saving 

both time and travel. The number of ATCs dropped to 8 in the early 1980s 

and was maintained at that level until the closeout of training at Fort Dix 

in 1992. TRADOC also commanded noncommissioned officer academies 

and drill sergeant schools through several of its installations, as well as an 

Active Component Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning.

The two specialized training agencies under TRADOC jurisdiction in 

1973, the Combat Arms Training Board at Fort Benning and the Training 

Aids Management Agency at Fort Eustis, were joined on 1 August 1974 by 
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Victory Starts Here

a new Training Devices Requirements Office at Fort Benning, responsible 

for Army-wide training device requirements. The Fort Eustis agency was 

redesignated the Army Training Support Activity on 1 July 1975. The 

training support program at Fort Eustis was expanded and consolidated in 

a retitled Army Training Support Center on 1 July 1976.

The Training Management Institute, established at Fort Eustis on 

16 July 1975 to further training improvements through workshops and 

special projects, was redesignated the Training Developments Institute 

on 2 May 1977. A further change was the combination of the Logistics 

Training Board at Fort Lee and the Combat Arms Training Board at Fort 

Benning into a redesignated Army Training Board on 1 October 1977. 

This was also located at Fort Eustis. Both the Training Developments 

Institute, which was renamed the Training Technology Agency, and the 

Army Training Board eventually moved to Fort Monroe. The former was 

inactivated in 1988 and the latter in 1989.

Test Organizations

There were important early additions to TRADOC’s experiment and 

test capability that served the command in pursuit of its combat developments mission into the late 1980s. In August 1974, the major test facility at 

Fort Hood known as the Modern Army Selected Systems Test Evaluation 

and Review (MASSTER) was transferred to TRADOC from FORSCOM. 

Also transferred to TRADOC were five test boards of AMC’s subordinate 

Test and Evaluation Command. The test boards gave TRADOC, as the 

user representative, control over the means for early-stage conceptual and 

experimental work in the fields of airborne, communications, electronics, field artillery, infantry, armor, engineer, and air defense. These boards 

were subsequently joined by an aviation board and an intelligence and 

security board. As the testing mission grew, TRADOC established a headquarters, DCS for Test and Evaluation, in December 1980. That position 

was eliminated in March 1985 and the function returned to the DCS for 

Combat Developments.

Late in 2002, the position of Deputy Commanding General (DCG), 

Initial Entry Training (IET), created in 1997, became dual-hatted with the 

Army’s new Accessions Command (AAC). The mission for the DCG-IET 

was to ensure that initial entry training remained challenging, safe, relevant, realistic, and executed to Army standards. Originally, DCG-IET had 

oversight for IET policies and programs encompassing the entire process 

of bringing soldiers into the force from recruitment to the completion of 

AIT. With the establishment of the Accessions Command, the recruitment 
67

Organizational Structure

function became the responsibility of the new command. Another major 

change was the establishment of a TRADOC DCG, Transformation at Fort 

Lewis to command the brigade coordination cell of the Interim Brigade 

Combat Teams (IBCTs) that were established as a test bed for transformation initiatives.

The DCG, Combined Arms, physically located at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, and the DCG, Combat Service Support, located at Fort Lee, 

Virginia, had oversight for near-term and mid-term training in their respective realms. The DCGs for the Army National Guard and for the Army 

Reserve, both headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia, were responsible 

for integrating doctrine, training, and combat development throughout the 

Reserve Components.

Also in 2002, the DCSs for Doctrine, Combat Developments, Training, 

and Intelligence received new titles. The DCS for Doctrine became the 

DCS for Doctrine, Concepts, and Strategy. Training now fell under the 

DCS for Operations and Training. The DCS for Combat Developments 

became the DCS for Developments to bring the title more in line with 

transformation efforts. The Directorate of Information Management came 

under the purview of the DCS for Command, Control, Communications, 

and Computers (DCSC4).

TRADOC Organization in 2008

TRADOC continued as a major command (MACOM) until the 

Army was reorganized in September 2006. At that time, it became one 

of three Army Commands (ACOM) along with FORSCOM and AMC. 

Headquarters, TRADOC consisted of a command group; the commanding general’s personal and special staffs; five DCGs—Initial Military 

Training (IMT), Combined Arms (CA), Army Capabilities Integration 

Center (ARCIC), Army National Guard (ARNG), and US Army Reserve 

(USAR); and the G-Staff consisting of the G1/4, G2, G3/5/7, G6, G8, and 

G9. ARCIC and G9 were one in the same function.

TRADOC Major Subordinate Commands

US Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

The Commander, CAC is also DCG, Combined Arms.

US Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), Fort Lee, 

Virginia.

US Army Accessions Command (AAC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, was 

originally organized to encompass both ROTC and Recruiting Commands 
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Victory Starts Here

as well as the training center at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Its commander 

was also DCG, IMT. In a move to bring all Army accession functions 

directly under Department of the Army (DA), Accessions Command 

became a DA subordinate on 1 October 2008. The training center at Fort 

Jackson reverted to the staff supervision of DCS for G3/5/7. 

TRADOC Schools, Centers, and Activities

Adjutant General School, Fort Jackson, South Carolina

Airborne School, Fort Benning, Georgia

Air Defense Artillery Center and School, Fort Bliss, Texas

Armor Center and School, Fort Knox, Kentucky

Army Logistics Management College, Fort Lee, Virginia

Army Management Staff College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

Aviation Center and School, Fort Rucker, Alabama

Aviation Logistics School, Fort Eustis, Virginia

Chaplain School, Fort Jackson, South Carolina

Chemical School, Maneuver Support Center, Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Drill Sergeant Schools, Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Jackson, South 

Carolina; and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

Engineer School, Maneuver Support Center, Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri

Field Artillery Center and School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Financial Management School, Fort Jackson, South Carolina

Infantry Center and School, Fort Benning, Georgia

Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Military Police School, Maneuver Support Center, Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri

Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Georgia

Ordnance Mechanical Maintenance School, Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, Maryland

Ordnance Munitions and Electronics Maintenance School, Redstone 

Arsenal, Alabama

Physical Fitness School, Fort Benning, Georgia

Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, Virginia

Ranger School, Fort Benning, Georgia

School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

School of Information Technology, Signal Center, Fort Gordon, 

Georgia
69

Organizational Structure

School of Military Packaging Technology, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland

Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas

Signal Center and School, Fort Gordon, Georgia

Transportation Center and School, Fort Eustis, Virginia

Warrant Officer Career College, Fort Rucker, Alabama

71

Chapter VIII

International Activities

Since its establishment in 1973, TRADOC has managed an expanding 

program of bilateral staff talks and exchanges with allied armies. Included 

in the command’s responsibilities were the coordination of a quadripartite, 

or America, Britain, Canada, and Australia (ABCA) forum, and NATO 

standardization and interoperability programs.

Beginning in 1975 with the German Army, TRADOC began a series 

of bilateral army-to-army staff talks with other countries. By 2008, there 

were staff talks with 11 nations on a regular basis. In addition, TRADOC 

represented the US Army in more informal discussions with the Israeli 

Defense Force. International activities, including work with selected armies 

of Latin American nations, increased greatly. As part of the TRADOC liaison network, TRADOC officers served abroad in Germany, the United 

Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Israel, Korea, Japan, and Canada. 

At the same time, 15 nations sent liaison officers to TRADOC headquarters. Of long-standing were the liaison arrangements with Australia, Brazil, 

Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, 

Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Additions that are more recent 

were representatives from the Czech Republic and Greece. By 2008, the 

number had grown to 17 with the addition of Singapore and Norway.

International Reception, Fort Monroe, 2007.

US Army Photo
72

Victory Starts Here

The International Army Programs Directorate (IAPD), Army 

Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), was responsible for the administration and logistical support of Foreign Liaison Officers assigned to 

Headquarters, TRADOC; the administrative support to TRADOC liaison 

officers assigned overseas; the implementation and day-to-day management of the TRADOC International Engagement Activities; and TRADOC 

support to Army-level bilateral staff talks. The Joint and Allied Doctrine 

Division (JADD) of ARCIC provided staff management for the integration of Army doctrine into joint, multinational, and multi-Service doctrinal 

publications. JADD wrote selected joint and multinational doctrine and 

coordinated and reviewed selected joint Army doctrine. It focused primarily on strategic and operational level doctrine.

Standardization and Interoperability

On its establishment, TRADOC continued CONARC’s coordination of the Service schools’ participation in international standardization 

programs held under the auspices of NATO and ABCA. NATO meetings 

included separate panel and working party conferences relating to a wide 

variety of military topics including weapons; inter-Service tactical air 

operations; mobility; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense; 

and intelligence. ABCA meetings—more doctrinally oriented than the 

NATO meetings—related, among other things, to standardization in the 

fields of command and control, aviation, air defense, communications, and 

quality assurance.

In 1976, TRADOC assumed Department of the Army (DA) planning 

and coordination responsibilities for four NATO and four ABCA working 

parties. The new ABCA responsibilities included the air defense, armor, 

infantry, and surface-to-surface working groups. The NATO responsibilities were for the movements and transport, and rail movement and transport 

working parties; the land-based air defense weapons panel; and the NATO 

helicopter inter-Service working party. TRADOC provided delegates and 

data to the subgroups of both those forums. Actions in TRADOC’s purview that were agreed to by the national parties and cleared by the review 

bodies were implemented by TRADOC on DA approval.

During fiscal year 1977, a new Defense Department emphasis on 

developing standardized equipment with NATO allies began to be felt at 

TRADOC. Prompted as part of that defense policy was the related notion 

of seeking “interoperability” between like weapons or pieces of equipment that were being developed separately by the United States and an 

allied nation. The issue of a two-way street in weapons development was 

sensitive, and usually meant that the United States would have to adopt 
73

International Activities

more allied-built weapons into its own arsenal if the principles of standardization and interoperability were to have any meaning. The NunnCulver Amendment to the 1977 Department of Defense Appropriation 

Act formally committed the United States to standardization, or at least 

interoperability, with its allies.

During the 1980s, it became evident that doctrine to guide US Army 

operations with allied forces was needed. Though the writing of up-to-date 

Army and joint doctrine were priority efforts by necessity, it was also true 

that future wars of any large dimension would likely be allied enterprises. 

Some alliance-specific doctrine existed, such as Allied Tactical Publication 

(ATP)-35A, Land Force Tactical Doctrine, which was the NATO manual 

published by the Military Agency for Standardization in 1995. ATP-35A 

was contemporary with the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, which had several 

chapters devoted to combined arms operations. Also already published 

in a test version was JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. But 

there was no formal and general combined operations field manual in the 

US Army inventory. Beginning in early 1989, TRADOC undertook the 

development of FM 100-8, Combined Army Operations. Doctrine writers 

completed the preliminary draft of FM 100-8 in September 1992 and sent 

it to the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine for approval. After 

some revision, it was resubmitted in December. Over the next 5 years, the 

draft manual underwent significant revision, and its name was changed 

to The Army in Multinational Operations. FM 100-8 was published on 

24 November 1997.

Bilateral Staff Talks

By virtue of its Army-wide doctrinal, combat developments, and training missions, TRADOC acted as the US Army’s executive agent for bilateral staff talks and exercised multilateral contacts with allied and friendly 

armies around the world. Those significant activities were carried out from 

the headquarters at Fort Monroe. Beginning in 1975 with the first formal 

staff talks with the army of the Federal Republic of Germany, the level 

of activity in bilateral army-to-army dialogue increased to include staff 

talks with armies of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Canada, 

Brazil, Korea, Australia, Israel, and Japan. The primary objective for talks 

among formally allied armies was the enhancement of the ability to operate together with common understanding of the battlefield and interoperable equipment with which to fight. Further, in discussions with friendly 

countries, TRADOC aimed to develop instructive exchange on broader 

areas of interest. In addition, over its 35-year history, TRADOC increasingly carried out cooperative activities with the armies of several Latin 
74

Victory Starts Here

American countries. In the absence of formal talks, informal bilateral 

exchanges were common, as were visits by senior officers of allied and 

some non-allied armies to TRADOC headquarters, centers, and schools, 

and numerous visits by senior TRADOC officials to other armies.

With the end of the Cold War, bilateral talks continued as routine without the urgency of a looming Soviet threat. New dialogues opened with 

former East Bloc countries and with China. However, with the beginning 

of the Global War on Terrorism in 2001, bilateral talks as well as issues 

of interoperability assumed a new urgency. Operations in Iraq included 

several allied nations, as did operations in Afghanistan. Once the conventional aspects of the war ended, counterinsurgency warfare dominated 

operations. Allies with experience in the counterinsurgency environment 

were asked for their views. During this period, TRADOC coordinated the 

reviewing, editing, and staffing of Allied Joint publications (AJP), which 

included the subjects of allied military police operations, joint airspace 

control, personnel recovery, targeting, information operations, and foreign humanitarian assistance. Like joint operations with other Services, 

the Army and TRADOC have become directly involved with allies in 

developing doctrine and procedures from inception rather than adjusting 

to already established procedures.

Chinese officers visit ROTC command.

US Army Photo
75

Glossary

AAC Army Accessions Command

ABCA America, Britain, Canada, and Australia

ACOM Army Command

ACRA Airlift, Concepts, and Requirements Agency

AHIP Army Helicopter Improvement Program

AIT advanced individual training

AJP Allied Joint Publication

ALFA Air-Land Forces Application Agency

ALMC Army Logistics Management College

AMC Army Materiel Command

AMSC Army Management Staff College

AOE Army of Excellence

ARCIC Army Capabilities Integration Center

ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program

AT XXI Army Training XXI

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

ATC Army Training Center

ATLDP Army Training and Leader Development Panel

ATP Army Training Program

ATP Allied Tactical Publication

AWE advanced warfighting experiments

BCT basic combat training

BCTP Battle Command Training Program

BOLC Basic Officer Leader Course

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

BTID Battlefield Target Identification Device

C3 command, control, and communications

C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

CAC Combined Arms Center/Combined Arms Command

CAS3 Combined Arms and Services Staff School

CASCOM Combined Arms Support Command

CATT Combined Arms Tactical Trainer

CBRS Concepts-Based Requirements System

CDC Combat Developments Command

CDEC Combat Developments Experimentation Command

CGSC Command and General Staff College

CINC commander in chief

CLIC Center for Low Intensity Conflict

CMTC Combat Maneuver Training Center

COE Contemporary Operating Environment

CONARC Continental Army Command

CONUS continental United States

CREW Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare
76

Glossary

CTC Combat Training Center

DA Department of the Army

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DCG Deputy Commanding General

DCS Deputy Chief of Staff

DCSC4 Deputy Chief of Staff for Command, Control, Communications, 

and Computers

DCSTE Deputy Chief of Staff for Test and Evaluation

DOTLMS doctrine, organization, training, leader development, materiel, 

and soldiers

DOTMLPF doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities

DRS Division Restructuring Study

ELSORV Enhanced Logistic Off-Road Vehicle

EXFOR Experimental Force

FAMSIM family of simulations

FAST Future Army Schools Twenty-One

FCS Future Combat System

FM field manual

FORSCOM Forces Command

G1/4 (Personnel and Logistics)

G2 (Intelligence)

G3/5/7 (Operations, Plans, and Training)

G6 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computers)

G8 (Resource Management)

G9 (Concept Development, Experimentation, and Requirements 

Determination)

GPS Global Positioning System

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HDTE historical decision training exercise

HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

HTTB High Technology Test Bed

IAPD International Army Programs Directorate

IBCT Interim Brigade Combat Team

IED improvised explosive device

IET initial entry training

ILE Intermediate Level Education

IMA Installation Management Agency

IMCOM Installation Management Command

IMT Initial Military Training

JAAD Joint and Allied Doctrine Division

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFCOM Joint Forces Command

JNTC Joint National Training Capability

JP joint publication
77

Glossary

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

J-SAK Joint Attack of the Second Echelon

J-SEAD joint suppression of enemy air defense

JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System

LAM Louisiana Maneuvers

LAV light armored vehicle

LIC low intensity conflict

MACOM major command

MASSTER Modern Army Selected Systems Test Evaluation and Review

MCA Mobility Concepts Agency

MHEP Military History Education Program

MILES Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System

MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System

MOS military occupational specialty

MOUT military operations in urban terrain

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NCOES Noncommissioned Officer Education System

NTC National Training Center

O&O organization and operations

OES Officer Education System

OMEMS Ordnance Munitions and Electronics Maintenance School

OMMS Ordnance Mechanical Maintenance School

OOTW operations other than war

OPFOR opposing force

OSUT one-station unit training

POM program objective memorandum

RETO Review of Education and Training for Officers

ROAD Reorganization Objective, Army Divisions

ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

SAMS School of Advanced Military Studies

SAT Systems Approach to Training

SCOPES squad combat operations exercise, simulated

SIMNET Simulation Network

SOA School of the Americas

SOF special operations forces

SQT skill qualification test

SWG Seminar War Games

TAC Tactical Air Command

TACS-AAGS tactical air control system–Army air-ground system

TASS Total Army School System

TOE table of organization and equipment

TRAC TRADOCAnalysis Command

TRADOC US Army Training and Doctrine Command

TSM TRADOC System Managers
78

Glossary

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

TUAV tactical unmanned aerial vehicle

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

US United States

WAC Women’s Army Corps

WHINSEC Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
79

Suggestions for Additional Reading

Bronfeld, Saul. “Did TRADOC Outmanoeuvre the Manoeuvrists? A Comment.” 

War and Society 27 (October 2008): 111–125.

———. “Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. 

Army.” The Journal of Military History 71 (April 2007): 465–498.

Brownlee, Colonel Romie L., and Brigadier General William J. Mullen III, 

interviewers. Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E. 

DePuy, USA Retired. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Military History Institute, 

and Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1988.

Cameron, Robert S. Mobility, Shock, and Firepower: The Emergence of the 

U.S. Army’s Armor Branch, 1917–1945. US Army Historical Series. 

Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2008.

Canedy, Susan, James T. Stensvaag, Anne W. Chapman, John L. Romjue, and 

Charles H. Cureton. TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm: A Preliminary Study. TRADOC Historical Study Series. 

Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, US Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, 1992.

Chapman, Anne W. The Army’s Training Revolution, 1973–1990: An Overview. 

TRADOC Historical Study Series. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the 

Command Historian, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, and 

Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1994.

———. The National Training Center Matures, 1985–1993. TRADOC Historical 

Monograph Series. Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, 1997.

———. The Origins and Development of the National Training Center, 1976–

1984. TRADOC Historical Monograph Series. Fort Monroe, VA: Office 

of the Command Historian, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 

1992.

Chapman, Anne W., Carol J. Lilly, and Benjamin King. Transforming the Army: 

TRADOC’s First Thirty Years, 1973–2003. TRADOC Historical Study 

Series. Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command, 2003.

Chapman, Anne W., Carol J. Lilly, John L. Romjue, and Susan Canedy. Prepare 

the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and 

Doctrine Command, 1973–1998. TRADOC Historical Study Series. Fort 

Monroe, VA: Military History Office, US Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, 1998.

Dastrup, Boyd L. Eyes and Ears: A History of Field Artillery Target Acquisition. 

US Army Fires Center of Excellence Historical Monograph Series. Fort 

Sill, OK: Office of the Field Artillery Branch Historian, US Army Fires 

Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, 2008.

———. Field Artillery: A History and Sourcebook. Westport, CT: Greenwood 

Press, 1995.
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———. King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery. 

TRADOC Branch History Series. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the 

Command Historian, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, and 

Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1993.

———. Modernizing the King of Battle, 1973–1991. US Army Field Artillery 

Center and School Historical Monograph Series. Fort Sill, OK: Office 

of the Command Historian, US Army Field Artillery Center and School, 

and Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2003.

———. Operation Desert Storm and Beyond: Modernizing the Field Artillery 

in the 1990s. US Army Field Artillery Center and School Historical 

Monograph Series. Fort Sill, OK: Command Historian’s Office, US 

Army Field Artillery Center and School, 2005.

Doughty, Major Robert A. The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–

76. Leavenworth Papers Number 1. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat 

Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1979.

Gole, Henry G. General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War. 

Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2008.

Griffith, Robert K. Jr. The U.S. Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 

1968–1974. Army Historical Series. Washington, DC: US Army Center 

of Military History, 1997.

Herbert, Major Paul H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. 

DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Leavenworth 

Papers Number 16. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US 

Army Command and General Staff College, 1988.

King, Benjamin, Richard C. Biggs, and Eric R. Criner. Spearhead of Logistics: 

A History of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps. Fort Eustis, VA: US 

Army Transportation Center, and Washington, DC: US Army Center of 

Military History, 2001.

Linn, Brian M. The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War. Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 2007.

Lock-Pullan, Richard. “‘An Inward Looking Time’: The United States Army, 

1973–1976.” The Journal of Military History 67 (April 2003): 483–

512.

Raines, Edgar F. Jr. Eyes of the Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army 

Aviation in World War II. Army Historical Series. Washington, DC: US 

Army Center of Military History, 2000.

Raines, Rebecca R. Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. 

Army Signal Corps. Army Historical Series. Washington, DC: US Army 

Center of Military History, 1996.

Romjue, John L. A History of Army 86, Volume I: Division 86: The Development 

of the Heavy Division, September 1978–October 1979. TRADOC 

Historical Monograph Series. Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, US 

Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982.
81

Suggested Reading

———. A History of Army 86, Volume II: The Development of the Light Division, 

the Corps, and Echelons Above Corps, November 1979–December 1980. 

TRADOC Historical Monograph Series. Fort Monroe, VA: Historical 

Office, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982.

———. American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War. TRADOC Historical 

Monograph Series. Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, 1996.

———. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army 

Doctrine, 1973–1982. TRADOC Historical Monograph Series. Fort 

Monroe, VA: Historical Office, US Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, 1984.

———. The Army of Excellence, The Development of the 1980s Army. TRADOC 

Historical Monograph Series. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command 

Historian, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, and Washington, 

DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1997.

———. “The Evolution of American Army Doctrine,” in The Origins of 

Contemporary Doctrine, edited by John Gooch. Strategic and Combat 

Studies Institute Occasional Paper Number 30. Camberley, UK: Strategic 

and Combat Studies Institute, 1997.

Romjue, John L., Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman. Prepare the Army 

for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, 1973–1993. TRADOC Historical Study Series. Fort Monroe, 

VA: Office of the Command Historian, US Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, 1993.

Swain, Colonel Richard M., comp. Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy: 

First Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1 July 

1973. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army 

Command and General Staff College, 1993.

Trauschweizer, Ingo W. “Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and the 

Bundeswehr in the Cold War.” The Journal of Military History 72 (April 

2008): 477–508.

Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. Enlarged edition. 

Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984.

Weinert, Richard P. Jr. A History of Army Aviation, 1950–1962. TRADOC 

Historical Monograph Series. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command 

Historian, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991.

Williams, James W. A History of Army Aviation: From Its Beginnings to the War 

on Terror. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2005.

Yarrison, James L. The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers. Washington, DC: US 

Army Center of Military History, 1999.

83

Index

31 Initiatives, 50

ABCA, 71–72

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 47, 59, 64–65, 68–69

Abrams, General Creighton W., 1, 49

Abrams, General John N., 14, 22, 34

Active Defense, 6, 31–32

Adjutant General School, Fort Jackson, SC, 59, 62, 68 

advanced individual training (AIT), 2, 5, 39, 45–46, 58, 65–66

Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE), 13, 21, 33

Air Defense Artillery Center and School, Fort Bliss, TX, 68

Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 50

Airborne School, Fort Benning, GA, 68

AirLand Battle, 7–8, 12, 19, 32–33, 44, 50, 89

Air-Land Forces Application Agency (ALFA), 49

Apache helicopter, 25

Armor Center and School, Fort Knox, KY, 58, 68

Army 86, 6, 19–20

Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), 17, 56, 61, 67, 72

Army Logistics Management College (ALMC), Fort Lee, VA, 65, 68

Army Management Staff College (AMSC), Fort Belvoir, VA, 65, 68

Army Materiel Command (AMC), 19, 23–24, 58, 65–67 

Army Modernization Plan update, 26

Army of Excellence (AOE), 2, 9, 19–20

Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), 25, 29

Army Training 1997, 40–41

Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), 5, 38

Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), 44–45

Army Training Program (ATP), 37

Army Training XXI (AT XXI), 41, 48

Army Transformation Experiment 02, 55

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 56, 58, 68

Army XXI, 4, 26, 34, 41

Atlantic Command, 54

Aviation Center and School, Fort Rucker, AL, 58–59, 64, 68

Aviation Logistics Center, Fort Eustis, VA, 62

basic combat training (BCT), 5, 38–40, 45–47, 58

Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC), 44–45

Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), 10, 43–44

Battle Development Plan, 6

Battle Drills, 45

battle laboratories, 12, 21, 26, 34

Battlefield Target Identification Device (BTID), 29

Big Five systems, 24–25
84

Index

bilateral staff talks, 71–73

Black Hawk helicopter, 25

Brown, General George S., Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 49

Byrnes, General Kevin P., 15, 17, 55–56

Carlisle Barracks, PA, 57, 68

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), 9

Central Battle, 6, 32

Chaplain School, Fort Jackson, SC, 63, 68

Chemical School, Maneuver Support Center, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, 64, 68

China, 3, 74

Cold War, 2, 4, 12, 19–20, 22, 26, 33, 48, 52, 55, 62, 74

Comanche helicopter, 26, 28

Combat Developments Command (CDC), 1–2, 22–23

Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC), 23

Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), 10, 43–44

Combat Training Center (CTC), 41, 43–44

Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), 7, 44

Combined Arms Center/Command (CAC), 11, 20–21, 23, 31, 40, 58, 60, 62–63, 

67

Combined Arms Operational Research Activity, 9

Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), 11, 63, 67

Combined Arms Tactical Trainers (CATT), 43

Combined Arms Training Activity (CATA), 9, 62

Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, KS, 8, 58–59, 

68

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I), 27

Communist, 2–3, 50

Concepts-Based Requirements System (CBRS), 24, 41

Continental Army Command (CONARC), 1–2, 38–39, 49, 63, 72

Corps 86, 19

Crusader 155-mm howitzer, 26

Contemporary Operating Environment (COE), 16

DePuy, General William E., 2, 5–7, 31, 37–39, 42–45, 49

Desert Hammer, 21, 33

digitization, 21

Division 86, 6, 8, 19

Division Restructuring Study (DRS), 19

Dixon, General Robert J., TAC commander, 49

doctrine, 1–2, 4–14, 16, 19–24, 29, 31–35, 37, 39, 41–44, 49–53, 55–56, 60, 62, 

67, 72–73

doctrine, organization, training, leader development, materiel, and soldiers 

(DOTLMS), 10

doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, 

and facilities (DOTMLPF), 16
85

Index

Drill Sergeant Schools, Fort Benning, GA; Fort Jackson, SC; Fort Leonard Wood, 

MO, 68

Engineer School, Maneuver Support Center, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, 68

Enhanced Logistic Off-Road Vehicle (ELSORV), 29

Experimental Force (EXFOR), 13, 21

family of simulations (FAMSIM), 43

Field Artillery Center and School, Fort Sill, OK, 58, 68

Financial Management School, Fort Jackson, SC, 68

FM 3-0, Operations, 14, 16, 35, 55

FM 3-07, Stability Operations, 35

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 56

FM 7-0, Training the Force, 42

FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training, 42

FM 22-100, Military Leadership, 42

FM 25-100, Training the Force, 42

FM 100-5, Operations, 6, 9, 12–14, 34, 42, 55

FM 100-5, Operations, 1976, 1, 6, 31–32, 37

FM 100-5, Operations, 1982, 8, 32

FM 100-5, Operations, 1986, 32

FM 100-5, Operations, 1993, 21, 33, 35, 52, 73

Focused Dispatch, 21

Force XXI, 4, 13, 20–21, 26–27, 48

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN, 23, 58–59, 62, 65

Fort Benning, GA, 48, 58, 64–66, 68

Fort Bragg, NC, 59, 64

Fort Chaffee, AR, 10, 43

Fort Dix, NJ, 58, 61, 63, 65

Fort Eustis, VA, 58, 64–66, 68–69

Fort Gordon, GA, 58–59, 63, 65, 68–69

Fort Hamilton, NY, 59, 63

Fort Huachuca, AZ, 48, 59, 64, 68

Fort Jackson, SC, 15, 58, 65, 68

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6, 8–10, 23, 31, 33, 39, 48, 58–60, 62–63, 67–68

Fort Lee, VA, 23, 48, 58, 62–63, 65–68

Fort Leonard Wood, MO, 58, 65, 68

Fort McClellan, AL, 58–59, 63–65

Fort Monmouth, NJ, 59, 63

Fort Ord, CA, 20, 23, 58, 61, 63

Fort Polk, LA, 43, 58, 61

Fort Rucker, AL, 58–59, 68–69

Fort Sill, OK, 3, 32, 58, 65, 68

Fort Wolters, TX, 58–59, 61, 63

Foss, General John W., 11–12, 33

Franks, General Frederick M. Jr., 12–13, 33–34
86

Index

Future Army Schools Twenty-One (FAST), 47

Future Combat System (FCS), 14, 19, 22, 27–28

gender integrated training (GIT), 47

Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 4, 29, 48, 74

Grenada, 50

G-Staff, 61, 67

Gulf War, 4, 32–33, 47, 51

Haiti, 2

Hartzog, General William W., 13

Headquarters, Air Combat Command (ACC), 49

Headquarters, Tactical Air Command (TAC), 49

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), 28–29

High Technology Test Bed (HTTB), 8, 19

improvised explosive device (IED), 29, 56

Infantry Center and School, Fort Benning, GA, 58, 68

initial entry training (IET), 15, 38–39, 41, 45–46, 65–66

Installation Management Agency (IMA), 2, 57, 61

Installation Management Command (IMCOM), 2, 61

integrating center, 6, 11, 23, 58, 62

Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, AZ, 59, 64, 68

Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 14, 22, 27, 35, 48, 67

International Activities, 71

Iraq, 2, 16, 28–29, 32, 35, 74

JCS Pub 1-01, Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures Development Program, 51

JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, 52, 73

JCS Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in LIC, 53

Joint Assessments and Initiatives Office, 51

Joint Doctrine Master Plan, 51

Joint Publication System, 51

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), 10, 43–44

joint suppression of enemy air defense (J-SEAD), 50–51

Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (JSTARS), 25, 51

Joint Venture, 21

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, 51

Kuwait, 2

LAV (light armored vehicle) III, 22, 27

liaison officers, 51, 71–72

low intensity conflict (LIC), 50, 52–53

M-1 Tank, 24–25

M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 25

M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 25

major command (MACOM), 2, 67

Military Airlift Command (MAC), 52

Military History Education Program (MHEP), 39–40
87

Index

military occupational specialty (MOS), 38, 41, 45

military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), 16

Military Police School, Maneuver Support Center, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, 68

Millennium Challenge, 41, 55

Mobile Strike Force, 21

Mobility Concepts Agency (MCA), 53

Modern Army Selected Systems Test Evaluation and Review (MASSTER), 23, 

66

Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), 42

Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), 25

National Simulation Center (NSC), 21

Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), 10, 38

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2, 19, 32, 49, 71–73

Objective Force, 14–15, 19, 22, 28, 34, 44–45, 48

Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, GA, 65, 68

Officer Education System (OES), 39, 44

one-station unit training (OSUT), 39, 45, 65

Operation DESERT SHIELD, 12, 25

Operation DESERT STORM, 2, 12, 25, 49

Operation JUST CAUSE, 2

Operation STEADFAST, 1–2, 23, 39, 57, 59, 63

Operation URGENT FURY, 50

operations other than war (OOTW), 52

Ordnance Mechanical Maintenance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 65, 

68

Ordnance Munitions and Electronics Maintenance School, Redstone Arsenal, AL, 

65, 68 

Otis, General Glenn K., 7–8, 40

Panama, 2, 64

Physical Fitness School, Fort Benning, GA, 68

Prairie Warrior, 21

Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, VA, 58–59, 62, 68

Ranger School, Fort Benning, GA, 68

Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO), 7

Richardson, General William R., 8–9, 20, 40

Reorganization Objective, Army Division (ROAD), 19

Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), 2, 9, 39, 57, 59–60, 67, 74

Roving Sands, 21

School Model 76, 39–40

School Model 83, 40–41

School Model 89, 41–42

School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, KS, 8–9, 44, 

68

School of Information Technology, Signal Center, Fort Gordon, GA, 68

School of Military Packaging Technology, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 69
88

Index

Seminar War Games (SWG), 14, 22, 34

Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, TX, 59, 69

sexual harassment, 45, 47

Shinseki, General Eric K., 14, 21, 34

Signal Center and School, Fort Gordon, GA, 58–59, 65, 68–69

Simulation Network (SIMNET), 43

skill qualification test (SQT), 38

Somalia, 2

Soviet Union, 2–3, 25, 32–33

squad combat operations exercise, simulated (SCOPES), 42

Standardization and Interoperability, 71–73

Starry, General Donn A., 6–8, 19, 32, 60

Stryker, 22, 26–27, 44, 55

Sullivan, General Gordon R., 20, 33–34, 47

Tactical Ground Reporting System, 29

tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV), 25, 28

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), 13

Thurman, General Maxwell R., 10–11, 41

Total Army concept, 40, 47

TRADOC Long-Range Plan, 10–11

TRADOC Organizational Structure, 57

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 13, 21

TRADOC System Manager (TSM), 24

Transformation, 4, 9, 14–15, 19, 21–22, 27–28, 34–35, 37, 41–42, 44, 48, 54–56, 

67

Transportation Center and School, Fort Eustis, VA, 58–59, 64, 69

US Army Accessions Command (AAC), 15, 17, 66–68

US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), 2, 19, 43, 61, 66–67

US Army National Training Center (NTC), 33, 43–44, 55

US Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 49, 52

unit of action (UA), 22

unit of employment (UE), 22

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), 15, 54–56

Victory Starts Here, 17

Vietnam, 2, 5, 25, 29, 31, 37, 49, 64, 89

Vision 91, 10–11, 41

Vuono, General Carl E., 9, 10, 40, 47

Wallace, General William S., 16–17, 46

Warrant Officer Career College, Fort Rucker, AL, 69
89

About the Author

Benjamin King was born in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1944. He 

graduated from the University of Connecticut with a degree in Liberal 

Arts (History) in 1965. From the time of his graduation until 1977, he was 

on Active Duty with the Army serving in Germany and Vietnam where 

he was awarded the Bronze Star with “V,” the Air Medal, and the Purple 

Heart. After his release from Active Duty, he served as a contract historian 

to the Casemate Museum from 1978 to 1979. In 1984 he was selected 

Chief of Simulations at the US Army Transportation School. During 

his tenure he designed the simulations TRASWAR III, Transportation 

Movement Control in the Theater of Operations, and TRANSWAR IV, Truck 

Company Operations in the AirLand Battle. In 1992, Mr. King became the 

Command Historian of the US Army Transportation Corps. From 1992 to 

1994 he headed the team that wrote Spearhead of Logistics, A History of 

the US Army Transportation Corps, the second branch history completed 

in the Army. He also appeared in the Discovery Channel production of 

Machines that Won the War. In 2000, King accepted his current position 

as Research Historian in the TRADOC Military History Office. Since 

arriving, he completed five multiyear command histories bringing the 

headquarters up-to-date. His research on US Army doctrine and the history 

of TRADOC and its organization has been widely used, and parts of his 

monographs on soldiers and warriors were used in the Warrior Code. In 

addition, he designed 15 historical decision-training exercises (HDTE) 

that were used by the Army. Mr. King is also the co-author of Impact, 

the History of Germany’s V-weapons, the definitive history of German 

surface-to-surface guided missiles published in 1998. He contributed to 

Coalition Air Warfare in the Korean War published by the US Air Force 

History and Museums Program and has articles published in Field Artillery 

Journal, Transportation Professional Bulletin, and Vietnam magazine. His 

book-length works of fiction include A Bullet for Stonewall, 1990; A Bullet 

for Lincoln, 1993; and The Loki Project, 2000. He lives in Isle of Wight, 

Virginia, with his wife, Loretta, and Bismark the cat.