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WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY FROM 

THE OIL RIG TO THE SHORELINE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

EDUCATION AND LABOR 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JUNE 23, 2010 

Serial No. 111–68 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and Labor 

( 

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/education/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR 

GEORGE MILLER, California, Chairman 

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan, Vice Chairman 

Donald M. Payne, New Jersey 

Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey 

Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, Virginia 

Lynn C. Woolsey, California 

Rube ́n Hinojosa, Texas 

Carolyn McCarthy, New York 

John F. Tierney, Massachusetts 

Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio 

David Wu, Oregon 

Rush D. Holt, New Jersey 

Susan A. Davis, California 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, Arizona 

Timothy H. Bishop, New York 

Joe Sestak, Pennsylvania 

David Loebsack, Iowa 

Mazie Hirono, Hawaii 

Jason Altmire, Pennsylvania 

Phil Hare, Illinois 

Yvette D. Clarke, New York 

Joe Courtney, Connecticut 

Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire 

Marcia L. Fudge, Ohio 

Jared Polis, Colorado 

Paul Tonko, New York 

Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico 

Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, 

Northern Mariana Islands 

Dina Titus, Nevada 

Judy Chu, California 

John Kline, Minnesota, 

Senior Republican Member 

Thomas E. Petri, Wisconsin 

Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon, California 

Peter Hoekstra, Michigan 

Michael N. Castle, Delaware 

Vernon J. Ehlers, Michigan 

Judy Biggert, Illinois 

Todd Russell Platts, Pennsylvania 

Joe Wilson, South Carolina 

Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington 

Tom Price, Georgia 

Rob Bishop, Utah 

Brett Guthrie, Kentucky 

Bill Cassidy, Louisiana 

Tom McClintock, California 

Duncan Hunter, California 

David P. Roe, Tennessee 

Glenn Thompson, Pennsylvania 

[Vacant] 

Mark Zuckerman, Staff Director 

Barrett Karr, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on June 23, 2010 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Members: 

Kline, Hon. John, Senior Republican Member, Committee on Education 

and Labor ...................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 6 

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Ohio, questions for the record .................................................................. 60 

Miller, Hon. George, Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor ......... 1 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3 

Additional submissions: 

Letter, dated Oct. 1, 2010, from the Department of the Interior ... 57 

Letter, dated June 25, 2010, to the Secretaries of Labor and 

Interior, from Messrs. Miller and Rahall ..................................... 58 

OMB ‘‘Statement of Administration Policy,’’ dated July 29, 2010 . 59 

Questions submitted for the record .................................................. 59 

Payne, Hon. Donald M., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New Jersey, prepared statement of ......................................................... 56 

Titus, Hon. Dina, a Representative in Congress from the State of Nevada, 

questions for the record ................................................................................ 61 

Statement of Witnesses: 

Cook, Rear Admiral Kevin, Director of Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast 

Guard ............................................................................................................. 8 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 10 

Responses to questions submitted ........................................................... 63 

Howard, Hon. John, M.D., Director, National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services .............................................. 20 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 22 

Responses to questions submitted ........................................................... 69 

Michaels, Hon. David, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary, Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor ................ 16 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 17 

Responses to questions submitted ........................................................... 71 

Slitor, Doug, Acting Chief, Office of Offshore Regulatory Programs, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement ......... 11 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 13 

Responses to questions submitted ........................................................... 76 

(1) 

WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY FROM THE 

OIL RIG TO THE SHORELINE 

Wednesday, June 23, 2010 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Education and Labor 

Washington, DC 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. George Miller [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Miller, Kildee, Payne, Andrews, Woolsey, Hinojosa, Tierney, Holt, Davis, Bishop of New York, Loebsack, 

Hirono, Altmire, Hare, Clarke, Courtney, Shea-Porter, Polis, Tonko, 

Sablan, Titus, Chu, Kline, Petri, Castle, Biggert, Guthrie, Cassidy, 

and Thompson. 

Staff present: Aaron Albright, Press Secretary; Andra Belknap, 

Press Assistant; Jody Calemine, General Counsel; Lynn Dondis, 

Labor Counsel, Subcommittee on Workforce Protections; Jose 

Garza, Deputy General Counsel; David Hartzler, Systems Administrator; Gordon Lafer, Senior Labor Policy Advisor; Livia Lam, Senior Labor Policy Advisor; Sadie Marshall, Chief Clerk; Jerrica 

Mathis, Legislative Fellow, Ed & Labor; Bryce McKibbon, Staff Assistant; Richard Miller, Senior Labor Policy Advisor; Revae Moran, 

Detailee, Labor; Alex Nock, Deputy Staff Director; Robert Presutti, 

Staff Assistant, Labor; Meredith Regine, Junior Legislative Associate, Labor; James Schroll, Junior Legislative Associate, Labor; 

Mark Zuckerman, Staff Director; Kirk Boyle, General Counsel; Ed 

Gilroy, Director of Workforce Policy; Angela Jones, Executive Assistant; Barrett Karr, Staff Director; Brian Newell, Press Secretary; 

Jim Paretti, Workforce Policy Counsel; Molly McLaughlin Salmi, 

Deputy Director of Workforce Policy; Ken Serafin, Professional 

Staff Member; Linda Stevens, Chief Clerk/Assistant to the General 

Counsel; and Loren Sweatt, Professional Staff Member. 

Chairman MILLER [presiding]. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order to hold a hearing on worker health and 

safety from the—pertaining to the British Petroleum oil spill. We 

are trying to cover the area from the area around the rig to the 

shoreline, for those who are interested in what we are doing today. 

Today the Education and Labor Committee meets to examine 

critical issues surrounding the health and safety of workers on the 

oil rig to the shoreline. Sixty-five days ago, during the final stages 

of drilling an exploratory well 52 miles off the coast of Louisiana, 
2 

a blowout and subsequent fire on the Deepwater Horizon rig killed 

11 workers and injured 15 others. 

This devastating event set in motion the worst environmental 

disaster in our nation’s history. Even more striking, it seems there 

is no—currently there is no end in sight. We are told that it will 

take months—even years—to fully calculate the human, economic, 

and environmental damage. 

As cleanup and response activities continue, we must not forget 

the men who lost their lives and were injured in the Deepwater. 

We must take every step available to protect against something 

like this happening again. For the 25,000 workers participating in 

the cleanup work in the Gulf, we must ensure that everything possible is done to protect the health and safety of the workers cleaning up this mess. 

At the core of the tragedy is a multinational corporation with a 

dismal safety record in this country. This same company cuts corners that resulted in 15 deaths at the Texas City refinery. This 

same company ignored warnings about corroded pipelines that resulted in 200,000 gallons of crude oil spilled on the Alaska North 

Slope. 

It appears that Deepwater is simply another example of British 

Petroleum prioritizing profits over the health and safety of workers. British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon tragedy didn’t happen 

by chance nor was it the result of a ‘‘perfect storm’’ of events. It 

was predictable and could happen again. 

This is why the work of our nation’s health and safety agencies 

is so important. They are tasked by Congress to protect workers 

when a company carelessly puts its workers in harm’s way. 

The 130-member crew operation of the Deepwater Horizon was 

a complex one with a 20 story-high oil derrick at its center spanning the size of a city block. The oversight and regulation of the 

Deepwater and similar operations is a—appears to be a jurisdictional mishmash between three federal agencies and international 

shipping laws. 

The Occupational Health and Safety Act is our nation’s premier 

law governing workplace health and safety. Since the agency’s creation 40 years ago, workplace injuries and fatalities have dropped 

as workers have had access to on-the-job protections. 

However, OSHA does not have any authority for enforcing safety 

rules beyond three miles of the coastline. Outside of the three miles 

the United States Coast Guard has the authority, by virtue of the 

law of this country, to issue worker safety regulations. 

The Mineral Management Service also gets into this by covering 

the safety for drilling equipment and industrial systems. Additionally, the Coast Guard has ceded responsibility for enforcing Coast 

Guard regulations to Mineral Management Service on fixed oil 

platforms. And the Deepwater Horizon is a sea-going vessel flagged 

under the Marshall Islands, not subject to rigorous U.S. licensing 

requirements. 

In light of the current tragedy in the Gulf, I hope we can answer 

whether or not there is a better way to oversee and protect the 

health and safety of oil rig workers. The Deepwater disaster clearly 

demonstrates that the status quo is not good enough and that we 

must do better. 
3 

When something does go wrong it is just as important that there 

is clear guidance and swift and coordinated response. There are 

thousands of square miles of the Gulf of Mexico and hundreds of 

miles of shoreline currently impacted by this spill. 

The scale of the cleanup operation is massive and will likely continue to involve thousands of workers over a considerable period of 

time. It is vital that everything be done to prevent adding to the 

human toll of this disaster. 

The cleanup activity from the shoreline to the source of the spill 

presents many risks to workers, such as exposure to dangerous 

conditions and substances that have both short-and long-term 

health implications. That is why all agencies must coordinate effectively and provide the necessary equipment and expertise to protect 

cleanup—to protect the cleanup workers. 

We will hear testimony today on how cleanup operations are proceeding and whether the cleanup workers are being adequately 

protected. Starting today, our nation must assess whether or not 

there are sufficient safety protections on these operations to prevent companies from putting profits ahead of safety. 

Our task, beginning today, is to look more deeply into whether 

or not the current regulatory framework for worker safety is appropriate and effective. Has the responsibility for worker safety been 

diffused among various agencies with no minimum standard for ensuring worker safety protection? 

If agencies other than OSHA regulate safety, should their rules 

be at least as effective as OSHA’s where they overlap? Does the 

OCS worker covered by MMS and the Coast Guard regulations 

have adequate whistleblower protections? 

Is there need for independent safety regulators so that an agency 

that is responsible for leasing and revenue collection is not responsible for worker safety and environmental protection? Is there a 

better structure to ensure worker safety protections from process 

safety hazards? Are the agencies in charge of the spill response sufficiently coordinating their efforts? 

Our witnesses today will provide valuable insights into these 

questions. I thank the witnesses for joining us and look forward to 

their testimony. 

And with that, I would like now to recognize Congressman Kline, 

the Senior Republican of the Committee. 

[The statement of Mr. Miller follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Hon. George Miller, Chairman, 

Committee on Education and Labor 

Good morning. 

Today, the Education and Labor Committee meets to examine critical issues surrounding the health and safety of workers on the oil rig to the shoreline. 

Sixty-five days ago, during the final stages of drilling an exploratory well 52 miles 

off the coast of Louisiana, a blowout and subsequent fire on the Deepwater Horizon 

killed eleven workers and injured fifteen others. 

This devastating event set into motion the worst environmental disaster in our 

nation’s history. Even more striking, there seems to be no end in sight. 

We’re told it will take months or even years to fully calculate the human, economic and environmental damage. 

As clean-up and response activities continue, we must not forget the men who lost 

their lives and were injured at Deepwater. We must take every step available to 

protect against something like this happening again. 
4 

For the 25,000 workers participating in clean-up work in the Gulf, we must ensure that everything possible is done to protect the health and safety of the workers 

cleaning up BP’s mess. 

At the core of this tragedy is a multinational corporation with a dismal safety 

record in this country. 

This same company cut corners that resulted in 15 deaths at its Texas City refinery. 

This same company ignored warnings about corroded pipes that resulted in 

200,000 gallons of crude spilled in Alaska’s North Slope. 

BP’s Deepwater Horizon tragedy didn’t happen by chance, nor was it the result 

of a ‘‘perfect storm’’ of events. It was predictable and could happen again. 

This is why the work of our nation’s health and safety agencies is so important. 

They are tasked by Congress to protect workers when a company carelessly puts its 

employees in harm’s way. 

The 130 crew operation of the Deepwater Horizon was a complex one, with a 

twenty story-high oil derrick at her center, spanning the size of a city block. 

The oversight and regulation of Deepwater and similar operations is a jurisdictional mishmash between three federal agencies and international shipping laws. 

The Occupational Safety and Health Act is our nation’s premiere law governing 

workplace health and safety. Since the agency’s creation 40 year ago, workplace injuries and fatalities have dropped as workers’ have had access to on-the-job protections. 

However, OSHA does not have any authority for enforcing safety rules beyond 

three miles of the coastline. Outside of three miles, the United States Coast Guard 

has the authority to issue worker safety regulations. 

The Minerals Management Service also gets into the game by covering safety for 

drilling equipment and industrial systems. Additionally, the Coast Guard has ceded 

responsibility for enforcing Coast Guard regulations to MMS for fixed oil platforms. 

And, the Deepwater Horizon is a sea-going vessel flagged under the Marshall Islands and not subject to more rigorous U.S. licensing requirements. 

In light of the current tragedy in Gulf, I hope we can answer whether there is 

a better way to oversee and protect the health and safety of oil rig workers. The 

Deepwater disaster clearly demonstrates that the status quo is not good enough. 

We must do better. 

When something does go wrong, it is just as important that there is clear guidance and a swift and coordinated response. 

There are thousands of square miles of Gulf of Mexico and hundreds of miles of 

shoreline currently impacted by the spill. 

The scale of the cleanup operation is massive and will likely continue to involve 

thousands of workers over several years. It is vital that everything is done to prevent adding to the human toll of this disaster. 

The cleanup activity from the shoreline to the source of the spill presents many 

risks to workers—such as exposure to dangerous conditions and substances that 

have both short and long-term health implications. 

That is why all agencies must coordinate effectively and provide the necessary 

equipment and expertise to protect cleanup workers. 

We will hear testimony today on how cleanup operations are proceeding and 

whether cleanup workers are being adequately protected. 

Starting today, our nation must assess whether there are sufficient safety protections on these operations that prevent companies from putting profits ahead of safety. 

Our task beginning today is to look more deeply into whether the current regulatory framework for worker safety is appropriate and effective. 

Has responsibility for worker safety been diffused amongst various agencies, with 

no minimum standard for ensuring worker safety protection? If agencies other than 

OSHA regulate worker safety, should their rules be at least as effective as OSHA’s 

where they overlap? 

Do OCS workers covered by MMS and Coast Guard regulations have adequate 

whistleblower protections? Is there a need for independent safety regulators, so that 

an agency that is responsible for leasing and revenue collection is not also responsible for worker safety and environmental protection? 

Is there a better structure to ensure worker safety protections from process safety 

hazards? Are the agencies in charge of the spill response sufficiently coordinating 

their efforts? Our witnesses today will provide valuable insight into these questions. 

I thank our witnesses for joining us today and the committee looks forward to their 

testimony. 
5 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, to our witnesses. I want to thank all of our witnesses for your service to our country, and particularly to the men 

and women—the people—of the Gulf Coast during this horrific 

time. 

It has been 2 months since an explosion onboard the Deepwater 

Horizon oil rig claimed the lives of 11 workers and injured 17 more. 

Sadly, this catastrophic event 50 miles from the shoreline continues to devastate the businesses, communities, and families residing along the Gulf Coast. Our thoughts are with the victims’ 

families and the people of the Gulf Coast as they fight to preserve 

their way of life. 

BP bears total responsibility, including full financial liability of 

this tragedy, and they must be held accountable for the loss of life, 

the damage inflicted on the local economy, and the devastation of 

the area’s vast natural resources. I am pleased that an escrow fund 

managed by an independent third party has been created to mitigate the terrible ongoing impact being felt by the Gulf states and 

an untold number of American citizens. 

While not squarely within this committee’s jurisdiction, every 

member of Congress has an obligation to ensure BP provides every 

individual who has a legitimate claim with the just and timely 

compensation they and their families deserve. This committee does, 

however, have oversight responsibilities concerning workplace safety. 

Today we are here to discuss the safety of oil rig workers as well 

as the workers sent to the scene to clean up this environmental 

disaster. As of June 14th there was estimated between 40 million 

and 115 million gallons of oil have spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. 

And unlike some other oil in the Gulf, the oil that continues 

gushing 5,000 feet below sea level is heavy, crude, and easily 

emulsified, giving the cleanup crews a monumental task. As Ed 

Overton, an environmental scientist with the the Louisiana State 

University, has stated, ‘‘If I had to pick a bad oil I would put this 

right up there.’’ 

As we learned from recent events, including the aftermath of 

Hurricane Katrina, too often the hazards to worker safety are not 

fully understood at the time of the crisis. We must take every precaution and nothing for granted in the BP oil spill, recognizing that 

in an unprecedented disaster such as this one we are learning as 

we go. 

Response workers must have every resource necessary to move 

quickly and in a manner that does not compromise the workers’ 

own health and safety. Numerous federal agencies, each operating 

with their own mission and array of officials’ rules and regulations 

have descended on the Gulf to assist in the cleanup and investigate 

the cause of this disaster. 

Yet, we know from experience that poorly organized federal bureaucracies can be clumsy, delay response time, and even impede 

efforts underway at the state and local levels. There are a number 

of federal agencies sharing regulatory responsibility, involving the 

both safety of crews working on the rigs and the teams cleaning up 

the beaches. 
6 

State officials and individual citizens have expressed frustration 

as they attempt to navigate the federal response process. It is my 

hope today’s hearing will help sort this all out and provide a clear 

picture of how industry, states, and the federal government are ensuring workplace safety on oil rigs and in the event of an oil spill. 

We will also look for answers to a number of important questions, such as whether federal regulators are properly balancing 

worker safety and the need for a fast response effort and whether 

or not BP is doing everything in its power to ensure the safety of 

workers struggling around the clock to rescue the Gulf Coast from 

this unimaginable disaster. 

Mr. Chairman, as a nation we mourn the loss of life and livelihood in the Gulf region. Now is the time to ask tough questions so 

we can move forward in a manner that protects all workers and restores to the people of the Gulf Coast their cherished way of life. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And I yield 

back. 

[The statement of Mr. Kline follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Hon. John Kline, Senior Republican Member, 

Committee on Education and Labor 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Welcome to our witnesses and thank you all for your 

service to the country and the people of the Gulf Coast during this difficult time. 

It has been two months since an explosion onboard the Deepwater Horizon oil rig 

claimed the lives of 11 workers and injured 17 more. Sadly, this catastrophic event 

50 miles from the shoreline continues to devastate the businesses, communities, and 

families residing along the Gulf Coast. Our thoughts are with the victims’ families 

and the people of the Gulf Coast as they fight to preserve their way of life. 

BP bears total responsibility, including full financial liability, for this tragedy and 

they must be held accountable for the loss of life, the damage inflicted on the local 

economy, and the devastation of the area’s vast natural resources. I am pleased an 

escrow fund, managed by an independent third party, has been created to mitigate 

the terrible and growing impact being felt by the Gulf states and an untold number 

of American citizens. 

While not squarely within this committee’s jurisdiction, every member of Congress 

has an obligation to ensure BP provides every individual who has a legitimate claim 

with the just and timely compensation they and their families deserve. 

This committee does, however, have oversight responsibilities concerning workplace safety. Today, we are here to discuss the safety of oil rig workers, as well as 

the workers sent to the scene to clean up this environmental disaster. As of June 

14, it was estimated between 40 million and 115 million gallons of oil have spilled 

into the Gulf of Mexico. And unlike some other oil in the Gulf, the oil that continues 

gushing 5,000 feet below sea level is a heavy crude and easily emulsified, giving the 

cleanup crews a monumental task. As Ed Overton, an environmental scientist with 

Louisiana State University has stated, ‘‘If I had to pick a bad oil, I’d put this right 

up there.’’ 

As we learned from recent events, including the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 

too often the hazards to workers’ safety are not fully understood at the time of the 

crisis. We must take every precaution and nothing for granted in the BP oil spill, 

recognizing that in an unprecedented disaster such as this one, we are learning as 

we go. Response workers must have every resource necessary to move quickly and 

in a manner that does not compromise the workers’ own health and safety. 

Numerous federal agencies, each operating with their own mission and array of 

officials, rules, and regulations, have descended on the Gulf to assist in the cleanup 

and investigate the causes of this disaster. Yet we know from experience that poorly 

organized federal bureaucracies can be clumsy, delay response time, and even impede efforts underway at the state and local levels. There are a number of federal 

agencies sharing regulatory responsibility, involving both the safety of crews working on the rigs and the teams cleaning up the beaches. State officials and individual 

citizens have expressed frustration as they attempt to navigate the federal response 

process. 

It is my hope today’s hearing will help sort this all out and provide a clearer picture of how industry, states, and the federal government are ensuring workplace 
7 

safety on oil rigs and in the event of an oil spill. We will also look for answers to 

a number of important questions, such as whether federal regulators are properly 

balancing worker safety and the need for a fast response effort, and whether or not 

BP is doing everything in its power to ensure the safety of workers struggling 

around the clock to rescue the Gulf Coast from this unimaginable disaster. 

Mr. Chairman, as a nation we mourn the loss of life and livelihood in the Gulf 

region. Now is the time to ask tough questions so we can move forward in a manner 

that protects all workers and restores to the people of the Gulf Coast their cherished 

way of life. 

Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank you to the 

witnesses for being with us this morning. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much. 

Pursuant to committee rule 7(c) all members may submit an 

opening statement in writing which will be made part of the permanent record of this hearing. And I would like now to introduce 

our panel of witnesses. 

First will be Rear Admiral Kevin Cook, who is the director of 

prevention policy for Marine safety, security, and stewardship for 

the U.S. Coast Guard. In his current role Rear Admiral Cook develops and maintains policy standards and program alignment for the 

prevention activities of the Coast Guard, including navigation safety, Marine casualty investigation, and vessel inspection. At the 

time of his selection he was serving as chief of staff to the 13th 

Coast Guard district in Seattle, Washington. 

Next will be Mr. Doug Slitor, who is currently acting chief of Office of the Offshore Regulatory Programs for the Bureau of Ocean 

Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, formerly Mineral Management Services. Mr. Slitor has been with the Department of the Interior since 1981. He has served as chief of the OCS 

information program, worked in the inspection and enforcement 

program, and has also served as the national civil penalties coordinator branch chief of safety and enforcement. 

Dr. David Michaels is the assistant secretary of labor for occupational safety and health in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Prior to joining OSHA, Dr. Michaels was a professor 

of environmental and occupational health at George Washington 

University School of Public Health and Health Services, where he 

directed the department’s project on scientific knowledge and public policy. From 1998 to 2001 Dr. Michaels served as assistant secretary for energy—of energy for Environment Safety and Health. 

Dr. John Howard is the director of the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, which is part of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. He served in this capacity from July 

2002 to July 2008 and was reappointed in September 2009. 

Dr. Howard is board-certified in internal medicine, legal medicine, and occupational medicine. He has also been admitted to the 

practice of medicine and the law in the state of California and the 

District of Columbia and he is a member of the U.S. Supreme 

Court Bar. 

Before we begin, some of you are familiar with the congressional 

system, but when you begin your testimony, which will go 5 minutes, a green light will go on. When there is a minute remaining 

an orange light will go on; we would ask you to start thinking 

about summarizing your testimony. And then a red light, at which 

your time has run out, but we want you to make sure that you fin-
8 

ish in what you believe is a coherent fashion for you in getting your 

thoughts across. 

Rear Admiral Cook, we will begin with you. Welcome to the committee. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL KEVIN COOK, DIRECTOR, PREVENTION POLICY FOR MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND 

STEWARDSHIP, U.S. COAST GUARD 

RADM COOK. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished 

members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear 

before you to discuss the issues related to mariner safety in the oil 

industry. In my role as the Coast Guard director of prevention policy I oversee vessel, offshore facility, and mobile offshore drilling 

unit compliance with applicable U.S. and international laws, regulations, and treaties. 

I prepared a written statement to support today’s testimony and 

would ask to have the included in the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. Without objection. 

RADM COOK. On the evening of April 20th the mobile offshore 

drilling unit, Deepwater Horizon, reported an explosion. The Coast 

Guard’s response began as a search and rescue mission. 

Within a few hours 115 of the 126 crew members were safely rescued. Search and rescue continued over the next 3 days, but sadly, 

the remaining 11 crew members were never found. 

Before continuing, I want to express my heartfelt condolences to 

the families and friends of the 11 men who so tragically lost their 

lives. 

The safety of mariners operating in the U.S. waters, including 

the outer continental shelf, or OCS, is paramount importance to 

the Coast Guard. To help ensure mariner safety the Coast Guard 

coordinates with various federal agencies, including the Minerals 

Management Service and the Occupational Health and Safety Administration. With mariner safety as a primary driver directly after 

the Deepwater Horizon incident the Coast Guard, in partnership 

with MMS, issued a safety alert requiring operators on the OCS to 

carry out an immediate and extensive review of critical safety 

equipment and emergency procedures. 

There are four types of units which operate on the outer continental shelf. They can be either U.S. or foreign flagged. These units 

are fixed and floating facilities, mobile offshore drilling units—also 

known as MODUs and rigs—and support vessels. Regardless of the 

flag of registry for the type of offshore unit, the Coast Guard assumes an appropriate enforcement role. 

In 2004 a memorandum of understanding between the Coast 

Guard and MMS delegated responsibility to MMS for ensuring 

worker safety on fixed outer continental shelf facilities. In accordance with Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations in Subchapter N, prior to turning over the annual examination of these 

facilities to MMS the Coast Guard carries out an initial inspection 

to ensure the facility is in compliance with applicable safety regulations. 

Additionally, in accordance with Title 30 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations, the two agencies work closely together to review the 

current regulations and propose revisions as necessary to maintain 
9 

appropriate levels of safety and keep pace with evolving offshore 

technology. 

The Coast Guard carries out safety inspections on U.S.-flagged 

floating facilities, MODUs, and vessels operating on the outer continental shelf in order to verify safety and issue the necessary flag 

state statutory certificates. 

For foreign flag MODUs, the flag state or a recognized organization working on behalf of the flag state carries out the inspections 

required to issue those statutory certificates. The Coast Guard then 

conducts port state control examinations on these MODUs in order 

to verify that they meet equivalent domestic and international safety requirements prior to them being permitted to commence drilling operations in U.S. waters. 

The U.S. Coast Guard’s port state control program exceeds current international guidelines, and every annual port state control 

examination we perform on foreign units incorporates verification 

of worker safety requirements. In accordance with domestic and 

international law, all vessels—including self-propelled MODUs over 

500 gross tons, the category which the Deepwater Horizon fits 

into—are required to have the safety management system fully implemented. This management system provides for safe practices 

and ship operation and a safe working environment for crew members. The Coast Guard verifies satisfactory implementation of this 

safety management system upon each examination. 

The outer continental shelf Lands Act grants the Coast Guard 

certain workplace safety authority on the OCS. Regulations have 

been promulgated on many occupational safety issues within the 

realm of the Coast Guard’s maritime safety expertise—for example, 

lifesaving, firefighting, and personal protective equipment. The 

Coast Guard standards for workplace safety on the outer continental shelf are found in Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, 

Subchapter N. 

Under a 1979 memorandum of understanding between the Coast 

Guard and OSHA, the agencies set forth procedures intended to 

avoid duplication while still retaining each agency’s respective responsibilities. The memorandum of understanding emphasizes the 

Coast Guard’s role as the principal federal agency in matters of 

safety and occupational health on the OCS. 

In closing, let me emphasize that the Coast Guard places the 

highest priority on the safety and health of all mariners operating 

on the U.S. outer continental shelf. The Coast Guard and MMS are 

conducting a joint investigation of the Deepwater Horizon incident. 

The lessons learned from this investigation will be incorporated 

into revised guidelines to further enhance worker safety. 

The Coast Guard looks forward to continuing cooperation with 

MMS and OSHA to maximize safety and health protection of mariners working in the offshore oil industry and to avoid duplication 

of effort. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I will be 

pleased to answer any questions that you have. 

[The statement of Admiral Cook follows:] 
10 

Prepared Statement of RADM Kevin Cook, Director of Prevention Policy, 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss issues related to the health 

and safety of all individuals working on the outer continental shelf. In my role as 

Coast Guard Director of Prevention Policy, one of my primary responsibilities is to 

oversee the compliance of vessel, offshore facility, and mobile offshore drilling units 

with all applicable U.S. and international laws, regulations, and policies. 

On the evening of April 20, 2010, the Transocean-owned, BP-chartered, Marshall 

Islands-flagged Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit DEEPWATER HORIZON, located approximately 72 miles Southeast of Venice, Louisiana, reported an explosion and fire 

onboard. This began as a Search and Rescue mission—within the first few hours, 

115 of the 126 crewmembers were safely recovered; Search and Rescue activities 

continued through April 23, but the remaining 11 crewmembers were never found. 

Concurrent with the Search and Rescue mission, efforts to extinguish the fire and 

mitigate the impacts of the approximately 700,000 gallons of diesel fuel onboard 

began almost immediately. After two days of these efforts, on April 22, the Mobile 

Offshore Drilling Unit sank into approximately 5,000 feet of water. On April 23, remotely operated vehicles located the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit on the seafloor, 

and on April 24, BP found the first two leaks in the riser pipe and alerted the federal government. Within 24 hours of leaks being detected, the Coast Guard’s Federal on Scene Coordinator (FOSC) accessed the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund 

(OSLTF) to ensure funds were available to speed the federal response to the threat 

of an oil spill. Remotely operated vehicles continue to monitor the flow of oil. 

The Federal on-scene Coordinator established the Unified Area Command on 

April 23 in Robert, LA. The Unified Area Command utilized the Incident Command 

System as a proven organizational structure for incident management in accordance 

with the National Response Framework and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. The function of Incident Command System is 

to provide a common method for developing and implementing tactical plans to efficiently and effectively manage a multi-agency response to an emergency, such as an 

oil spill. The Incident Command System organization for this response includes Incident Command Posts and Unified Commands at the local level, and a Unified Area 

Command at the regional level. It is comprised of representatives from the Coast 

Guard (the FOSC), other federal, state and local agencies, as well as BP as a responsible party. 

From the very beginning of this crisis, the federal government has been in charge 

of the largest environmental cleanup effort in our nation’s history—an effort led by 

Admiral Thad Allen, who has almost forty years of experience responding to disasters. Thousands of ships and other vessels have been deployed to the Gulf. There 

are now nearly 33,000 personnel who are working across four states to contain and 

clean up the oil. These personnel are assisting in efforts to prevent more oil from 

coming ashore, clean beaches, train response workers, and help process claims. 

As a result of our efforts, millions of gallons of oil have already been removed 

from the water through burning, skimming, and other removal methods. Over fiveand-a-half million feet of boom has been laid to block and absorb the approaching 

oil. We have approved the construction of new barrier islands in Louisiana in an 

effort to stop the oil before it reaches the shore, and we are working with Alabama, 

Mississippi, and Florida to implement creative approaches to protect their unique 

coastlines. 

Inspection of oil platforms 

The Minerals Management Service (MMS) is responsible for inspecting oil platforms on behalf of the Coast Guard, using Coast Guard regulations. Because Mobile 

Offshore Drilling Units are considered vessels, however, they also fall under the 

purview of the Coast Guard’s inspection regime. Each Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit 

documented under the laws of a foreign nation must obtain a Letter of Compliance 

(now called a Certificate of Compliance) from the Coast Guard prior to engaging in 

outer continental shelf activities. When a foreign flagged Mobile Offshore Drilling 

Unit, such as DEEPWATER HORIZON, enters U.S. waters, the owner must contact 

the Coast Guard and request a Certificate of Compliance inspection. A Certificate 

of Compliance is valid for a two-year period in accordance with 33 CFR 143.210. 

In order to issue a Certificate of Compliance, one of three conditions must be met: 

• The Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit is constructed to meet design and equipment 

standards of the I.S. Coast Guard’s regulations at46 CFR part 108; 

• The Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit is constructed to meet the design and equipment standards of the documenting nation (flag state) if the standards provide a 
11 

level of safety generally equivalent to or greater than that provided under 46 CFR 

part 108; or 

• The Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit is constructed to meet the design and equipment standards for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units contained in the International 

Maritime Organization Code for the construction and equipment of Mobile Offshore 

Drilling Units. 

Certificate of compliance/certificate of inspection 

The Coast Guard is responsible for carrying out the inspections, tests and surveys 

required to issue the necessary statutory certificates on U.S. Mobile Offshore Drilling Units. For foreign vessels, the flag state—or authorized recognized organization 

(RO) working on behalf of the flag state—carries out the inspections, tests and surveys required to issue the statutory certificates. The Coast Guard performs port 

state-level examinations on foreign vessels to verify that the flag state has met its 

responsibilities and that the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit meets the appropriate 

international and domestic requirements. 

Responsibilities for worker safety 

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 USC 1331 et seq., enacted in 1953 and 

amended in 1978, grants the Coast Guard certain workplace safety authority on the 

outer continental shelf. The Act requires the Coast Guard to promulgate regulations 

or standards applying to ‘‘unregulated hazardous working conditions related to activities on outer continental shelf upon a determination that such regulations or 

standards are necessary’’ (43 USC 1347 (c)), and preserves the authority of other 

agencies with respect to outer continental shelf on matters related to their respective areas of expertise (43 USC 1347(d)). 

The Coast Guard has promulgated regulations on many occupational safety issues 

on the outer continental shelf within the realm of its maritime safety expertise (e.g. 

personal protective equipment, lifesaving and firefighting). The Coast Guard standards for workplace safety on the outer continental shelf may be found in 33 CFR 

Parts 140-147. 

Under a Memorandum of Understanding between the Coast Guard and OSHA 

dated Dec. 19, 1979, the agencies set forth procedures intended to avoid duplication 

regarding the issuance of citations for violations, while still retaining each agency’s 

respective responsibilities. The Memorandum of Understanding emphasizes the 

Coast Guard’s role as the ‘‘principal Federal agency in matters of occupational safety and health on the outer continental shelf,’’ and is directed toward ‘‘minimize[ing] 

the need for OSHA’s routine inspection authority.’’ 

MMS has also promulgated certain safety and health regulations, primarily pertaining to fire and explosion hazards, 30 CFR 250.106 et seq. 

Conclusion 

In closing, I would like to reiterate that the Coast Guard’s role as the principal 

Federal agency in matters of occupational safety and health on the outer continental 

shelf and it’s commitment to the safety and health of all individuals working on the 

outer continental shelf. The Coast Guard will continue to cooperate with OSHA and 

MMS to maximize the safety and health protection of mariners and streamline our 

efforts. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Slitor? 

I don’t think your—— 

STATEMENT OF DOUG SLITOR, ACTING CHIEF, OFFICE OF 

OFFSHORE REGULATORY PROGRAMS, OFFSHORE ENERGY 

AND MINERALS MANAGEMENT, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY 

MANAGEMENT, REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT (FORMERLY MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERICE), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Mr. SLITOR. Okay. 

Thank you, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Kline, and members of the committee, for the opportunity to be here today to dis-
12 

cuss the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Regulation and Enforcement’s regulatory program on the health and safety of workers 

on oil and gas facilities on the outer continental shelf. I will refer 

to our agency as BOE through the balance of my testimony. 

The BOE holds paramount the safety of all operations under its 

jurisdiction on the OCS. With over 35,000 people directly or indirectly involved in the exploration, development, and production of 

vital energy resources for our nation, every action taken by BOE 

is designed to ensure that risks to personnel are eliminated or mitigated to the greatest extent possible. 

Following the tragic and unprecedented explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, Secretary Salazar ordered immediate inspections of all deepwater oil and gas drilling operations in the 

Gulf of Mexico, and the department, along with the U.S. Coast 

Guard, issued a safety notice to all rig operators reminding them 

of their responsibilities to follow our regulations and to conduct full 

and thorough tests of their equipment. 

As directed by the OCS Lands Act, the Bureau of Ocean Energy 

Management shares jurisdictional authority on offshore oil and gas 

activities with the U.S. Coast Guard. While BOE has regulatory requirements that speak to worker health and safety in a very general sense, Coast Guard’s mandate is more specific to offshore personnel safety. 

BOE’s primary function is to ensure the operator complies with 

all regulations addressing drilling, production, and workover equipment, and process safety management. By regulating these activities BOE requirements create a safer work area for offshore workers. 

As mentioned, BOE does have general health and safety regulations that require the operator to conduct operations in a safe and 

workman-like manner and to provide for the safety of all personnel 

by taking all necessary precautions to correct and remove any hazardous oil and gas accumulation or other health, safety, or fire hazards. BOE also has requirements for the training of personnel regarding their competency level in conducting their jobs. 

OCSLA directed the U.S. Coast Guard to oversee personnel safety. Coast Guard’s requirements address personal protection equipment—safety belts and harnesses, personal flotation devices, respiratory protection, eyewash equipment, deck openings, means of 

escape, guards, rails, and fences, life-preservers, first aid kits, fire 

extinguishers, and emergency drills. 

Through a regulatory change in 2002 the Coast Guard authorized BOE to conduct safety inspections on their behalf. This was 

done in an effort to optimize the use of government resources and 

improve safety compliance through the application of the more frequent BOE inspection regime. Since 2003 the BOE has conducted 

almost 4,000 partial and complete fixed platform inspections annually on behalf of the Coast Guard. 

As both BOE and the Coast Guard have been given distinct regulatory authorities over OCS activities, these two agencies have had 

to work together closely where these jurisdictions intersect. In 2004 

a memorandum of understanding was signed by both agencies for 

the purpose of addressing individual areas of mutual jurisdiction 

through a series of topic-specific memoranda of agreements. 
13 

The overarching MOU provides the basis by which the two agencies clearly articulate lines of authority and address how we can 

work together most efficiently. The MOAs are more technical in nature, providing detailed guidance on topics such as civil penalties, 

incident investigations, and floating offshore facilities. 

The OCSLA also requires BOE and the Coast Guard to investigate and prepare a public report of each incident that includes fatalities, major fires, spills over 200 barrels, or serious injuries. On 

March 27th, 2009, BOE and the Coast Guard signed a MOA identifying the responsibilities of each organization. The MOA delineates 

these responsibilities by the type of facility and the type of system 

involved in the incident, which agency has investigative jurisdiction, and how the agencies should coordinate and conduct joint investigations when appropriate. 

If operators fail to comply with BOE regulations they are subject 

to incidence of noncompliance with enforcement actions ranging 

from a warning to the shut-in of an entire production facility. In 

cases where a violation has created high potential for or resulted 

in injury to personnel, the violation is referred for civil penalty review. 

If BOE determines that a violation contains an element of knowing and willful intent then BOE may refer the violation to the inspector general for their consideration as a criminal penalty. For 

those operators displaying chronic poor performance, BOE has regulations that allow for an operator to be placed on probation or disqualify them from operating on the OCS or acquiring any new 

leases or reassignments of existing leases. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

happy to respond to questions you or members of the committee 

have. 

[The statement of Mr. Doug Slitor follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Doug Slitor, Acting Chief, Office of Offshore Regulatory Programs, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and 

Enforcement 

Thank you, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Kline, and Members of the Committee for the opportunity to be here today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss 

the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement’s (BOE) 

regulatory program on health and safety issues of workers on oil and gas drilling 

rigs and production platforms on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). 

The tragedy and massive spill in the Gulf illustrates the need to improve safety 

on the OCS. To ensure the independence of the OCS inspections and enforcement 

mission, the Secretary announced the reorganization of the MMS, which will establish the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary for Land 

and Minerals Management; and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue under the 

supervision of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget. On June 

18th, 2010, Secretary Salazar issued Secretarial Order number 3302, and renamed 

the Minerals Management Service the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (‘‘Bureau of Ocean Energy’’ or ‘‘BOE’’) as it undergoes this 

reorganization and reform. 

Following the tragic and unprecedented explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, Secretary Salazar ordered immediate inspections of all deepwater oil and 

gas drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico, and directed the MMS to stop issuing 

all permits to drill new offshore oil and gas wells. The Department along with the 

U.S. Coast Guard also issued a joint safety alert to all rig operators reminding them 

of their responsibilities to follow our regulations and to conduct full and thorough 

tests of their equipment. 
14 

At the President’s direction, on May 27th, the Secretary presented to the President his recommendations for measures to improve offshore drilling safety as part 

of a 30-day safety review. The purpose of that Safety Report was to evaluate oil and 

gas safety measures that could be put in place on an interim basis before the ongoing investigations of the Deepwater Horizon accident and subsequent BP oil spill 

disaster have been completed. The report recommended a number of specific measures that can be taken on both a short and longer term basis to improve the safety 

of offshore oil and gas activities, including enhanced operating standards and requirements for offshore drilling activities. Key recommendations include: certification of all blowout preventers for new floating drilling operations; stronger well 

control practices, blowout prevention and intervention capabilities; more comprehensive inspections for drilling operations; and expanded safety and training programs 

for rig workers. 

The President ordered the Department to immediately implement a number of actions. Accordingly, the Secretary issued a 6-month moratorium on deepwater drilling (for this purpose, defined as water depths greater than 500 feet) and a suspension of the issuance of permits to drill new deepwater wells. The Department immediately took those actions, and laid the groundwork for additional measures in the 

future. On June 8, the Department issued a ‘‘Notice to Lessees’’ that provides an 

initial set of new safety requirements that all offshore operators must meet. 

The Department holds paramount the safety of all operations under its jurisdiction in the OCS. With over 35,000 people directly or indirectly involved in the exploration, development, and production of important energy resources for our Nation, 

BOE strives to ensure that risks to personnel are eliminated or mitigated to the 

greatest extent possible. This is accomplished through life cycle oversight that is 

driven by primarily prescriptive regulations. 

The BOE derives its authority from the OCS Lands Act that established Federal 

jurisdiction over submerged lands. Through the Secretary of the Interior, MMS (now 

the BOE) was designated as the administrative agency responsible for mineral leasing of submerged OCS lands and for supervision of offshore operations after lease 

issuance. The OCS Lands Act states that the Secretary ‘‘* * * shall require on all 

new drilling and production operations, and, wherever practicable, on existing operations, the use of the best and safest technologies which the Secretary determines 

to be economically feasible * * *’’ 

Regulations governing offshore operations under BOE jurisdiction are unambiguous when it comes to offshore safety. These regulations also require the use of Best 

and Safest Technology (BAST) and that operators conduct their business in such a 

way as to ‘‘prevent injury or loss of life’’. If operators fail to comply with BOE regulations, they are subject to Incidents of Non-Compliance (INCs), with enforcement 

actions ranging from a warning to the shut in of an entire production facility. In 

cases where a violation has created high potential for or resulted in injury to personnel, the responsible party is referred for civil and criminal penalty review. In the 

last five-year period, MMS issued 12,087 INCs for violations of MMS regulations. 

In the same time period MMS pursued and closed 154 civil penalty cases that resulted in fines of $8.5 million. For chronic poor performance, MMS regulations allow 

for BOE to place an operator on probation or disqualify them from operating on the 

OCS or acquiring new leases. 

The OCS Lands Act delegated certain responsibilities for safety on offshore facilities to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG is responsible for the inspection 

of personal protective equipment, such as safety belts and harnesses; life vests; respiratory protection; personal flotation devices; deck openings; slipping and tripping 

hazards; lights and fog horns; guards, rails, and fences; communications equipment; 

fire extinguishers; emergency drills; means of escape; and lifeboats and escape capsules. Through a regulatory change in 2002, the authority to conduct safety inspections on behalf of the USCG was delegated to MMS. This was done in an effort to 

optimize the use of government resources and improve safety compliance. Since 

2003, the MMS conducted almost 4,000 fixed-platform inspections on behalf of the 

USCG. 

As both MMS and the USCG have been given authority through the OCS Lands 

Act to ensure worker safety, these two agencies have necessarily had to work together closely where these jurisdictions overlap. In 2004, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by both agencies for the purpose of addressing individual areas of mutual jurisdiction through a series of topic-specific Memoranda of 

Agreements (MOAs). The MOU provides the basis by which the two agencies clearly 

articulate lines of authority and address how we can work together most efficiently. 

The MOAs are more technical in nature, providing detailed guidance on topics such 

as civil penalties, incident investigations, and floating offshore facilities. The MOAs 

provide guidance to regulators for consistent oversight and enforcement action, and 
15 

provide offshore operators and contractors with clear direction about what is expected of them as lease holders or operators. 

The regulations and inspections are designed to eliminate or minimize accidents, 

but as the Deepwater Horizon incident vividly illustrates, accidents do still occur. 

When they do, a series of reporting activities are triggered. Reporting requirements 

for BOE were updated with the publication of a new regulation in 2006. Fatalities, 

injuries that require the evacuation of the injured person, losses of well control, fires 

and explosions, and other similar significant events must be reported immediately 

via oral communication to the BOE District Manager. Beyond whatever immediate 

action may be necessary to respond to a significant event, a written follow-up report 

is required within 15 calendar days. Oral presentation of information for events required to be reported is limited to information that can be transferred quickly due 

to a potentially ongoing emergency. This information includes the date and time of 

occurrence, name and contact data, lease and block data, the name of the facility 

involved, and the type of incident and injury or fatality. Written reports, however, 

require submittal of data that has been verified after the response, and involve discussion of any corrective actions taken and data on monetary damage. 

During the five-year period prior to publication of the 2006 rule, MMS received 

an average of 210 incident reports per year. Following rule publication, incident reports increased by an average of 285 percent, providing the agency with improved 

reporting mechanisms on the types and severity of accidents that were occurring. 

The increase in the number of reports reflected an increase in reportable accidents 

due to changes in the reporting threshold. An analysis of the data indicated increasing trends related to crane and lifting incidents. This in turn has informed how staff 

conducts offshore inspections and regulatory development. Safety alerts are issued 

by BOE or jointly with USCG to alert operators of incidents that have occurred and 

provide recommendations to operators so they can immediately mitigate through improved work process management at their facilities. 

The OCS Lands Act requires BOE and USCG to investigate and prepare a public 

report of each incident that includes fatalities, major fires, spills over 200 barrels, 

or serious injuries. The BOE and the USCG conduct investigations for many other 

incidents as well. Since 2005 the MMS has completed 21 major-panel investigations 

and 378 district investigations. The two agencies coordinate incident investigations 

through an MOA signed on March 27, 2009. The MOA identifies the responsibilities 

of both BOE and USCG for incident investigations on the OCS. As detailed in the 

MOA, these responsibilities are delineated by the type of facility involved in the incident (fixed, floater, MODU) and type of system involved in the incident (i.e. drilling, production, unit stability, fire protection, etc). The MOA identifies which agency 

has investigative jurisdiction for various types of equipment, processes, and facility 

systems. It also provides processes for determining who will conduct the investigation and for the coordination and conduct of joint investigations when appropriate. 

The BOE conducts an initial onsite investigation for many of the incidents reported. Formal investigations are then conducted for the more serious or significant 

incidents as determined by the actual and potential outcome of the accidents as well 

as the complexity of the circumstances associated with the accident. The BOE District investigations are conducted by a team appointed by the District Manager of 

the office responsible for the area where the incident occurred. Teams are primarily 

composed of District office personnel, but may involve other BOE or non-BOE personnel. Occasionally, the District Manager may appoint an individual to conduct an 

investigation, rather than a team. 

For more serious accidents, Panel Investigations are conducted by a team appointed by the BOE Regional Director for the region where the incident occurred. 

A panel leader is designated to direct the work of the team. Teams are primarily 

composed of Regional and District personnel, but may involve other BOE or nonBOE personnel. Panel investigations are usually conducted when a more in-depth 

investigation is needed and may involve more comprehensive investigation techniques such as formal hearings. Such is the case with the on-going Deepwater Horizon investigation, in which the BOE and USCG are working together, bringing their 

respective expertise together in an effort to determine the root cause of the incident. 

I would like to reiterate that the BOE places a high priority on the safety and 

health of workers on the OCS. Again, the tragic and massive oil spill in the Gulf 

illustrates the need for improved safety in this area. We will continue to cooperate 

with OSHA and the U.S. Coast Guard to maximize the safety and health protection 

of oil rig personnel. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to questions you or Members of the Committee have. 
16 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Secretary Michaels? 

STATEMENT OF DAVID MICHAELS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

Mr. MICHAELS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Kline, members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss worker health and safety from oil rig to shoreline. This issue 

has been brought to our attention in the most tragic way possible, 

with the deaths of 11 workers and injuries to 17 others as a result 

of the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon. 

Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis’ vision for the Department of 

Labor is ‘‘good jobs for everyone.’’ Good jobs are safe jobs, and the 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration is working closely 

with other federal agencies to prevent additional worker injuries, 

illnesses, and deaths from the oil spill cleanup. 

As you are aware, OSHA has no regulatory or enforcement authority over oil drilling rigs or production platforms located on the 

outer continental shelf, where the Deepwater Horizon was located. 

Section (4)(b)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act preempts OSHA from enforcing its regulations if a working condition 

is regulated by another federal agency. I will therefore focus my remarks on OSHA’s efforts to keep workers safe during oil spill 

cleanup operations. 

Our involvement in the BP oil spill is part of a coordinated federal response which includes the Coast Guard, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the National Institute for 

Environmental Health Sciences, and other government agencies, as 

well as BP, to ensure that cleanup workers are protected. OSHA 

personnel were first deployed to the Gulf during the week of April 

26th and are now present at all 17 staging areas. 

Every day, OSHA has over 146 professionals protecting workers 

throughout the Gulf region, 25 of whom are assigned solely to the 

oil response cleanup. We have made more than 1,100 inspections 

and taken over 500 environmental samples. OSHA is on the beaches and on the boats to make sure BP and its contractors are protecting cleanup workers. 

Depending upon their assignments, these workers are at risk for 

injury and illness from heat, falls, drowning, fatigue, sharp objects, 

as well as bites from insects, snakes, and other native species. 

Many of these workers also face exposure to crude oil, oil byproducts, dispersants, cleaning products, and other chemicals used in 

the cleanup. 

When OSHA finds a safety problem or learns of one from workers we notify BP and expect the specific problem and similar concerns elsewhere are promptly addressed across the entire response 

area. We then follow up to determine if the problem has been corrected. 

OSHA is also ensuring that BP is providing workings free of 

charge the proper training and proper protective equipments. So 

far, OSHA has found this process to be effective and it has not had 

to issue citations or propose civil penalties to obtain compliance. 
17 

That option remains available, however, and we will not hesitate 

to use it should we determine that it is necessary. 

One of the most serious health hazards facing those involved in 

the cleanup effort is heat. Workers are often in the hot sun in the 

Gulf’s high humidity wearing chemical-resistant Tyvek coveralls, 

boots, and gloves for 12-hour shifts. There have already been over 

100 incidents of illnesses from heat among workers involved in the 

cleanup, some very serious. 

From the outset, OSHA has insisted that BP implement a robust 

program to protect workers from heat stress and heat stroke. All 

work sites now have a heat stress plan that includes a matrix setting out specific work-rest requirements based on the heat and relative humidity, and if workers are wearing protective clothing and 

equipment, which can exacerbate the hazards. 

To determine whether workers are exposed to dangerous levels 

of toxic chemicals, OSHA, along with NIOSH, is reviewing BP’s 

monitoring data and has brought in a team of industrial hygienists 

to conduct our own independent air monitoring both on the shore 

and on cleanup vessels. OSHA experts are observing and characterizing worker exposures in each job task to determine the appropriate level of protection from air contaminants. 

We are working closely with NIOSH to investigate reports of 

work-related illnesses and to establish a health surveillance program for workers involved in the event. We have also distributed 

to workers close to 50,000 copies of safety fact sheets, pocket cards, 

and pocket guides. Materials are printed in Spanish and Vietnamese, as well as English, in recognition of the diverse population 

inhabiting the Gulf Coast region. 

In order to get a firsthand understanding of our challenges I first 

traveled to Louisiana on May 2nd with a team of experienced 

health professionals. I returned with Secretary Solis earlier this 

month. 

OSHA’s top priority is to ensure that oil spill responsive cleanup 

operations are done as safely as possible and we are working hard 

to accomplish this. Last week the president assured the nation, 

‘‘We will fight this spill with everything we have got for as long as 

it takes.’’ OSHA will be there for that fight doing all we can to protect the safety and health of those fighters. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today. I am 

happy to answer your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Michaels follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Hon. David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department 

of Labor 

MR. CHAIRMAN, RANKING MEMBER KLINE AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: 

Thank you for inviting me to join you this morning to discuss worker health and 

safety from oil rig to the shoreline. This issue has been brought to our attention 

in the most tragic way possible—with the deaths of eleven workers, and injuries to 

17 others as the result of the April 20th explosion on the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil drilling platform. Now, two months into this disaster, which President 

Obama aptly called an ‘‘assault on our shores and our citizens,’’ thousands of employees and volunteers are working every day to clean up the mess. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is working closely with other Federal agencies to prevent additional worker injuries, illnesses and deaths from the 

oil spill cleanup. I am here today to discuss these ongoing efforts. 
18 

As you are aware, OSHA has no regulatory or enforcement authority over mobile 

oil drilling rigs or production platforms located on the Outer Continental Shelf 

(OCS) where the Deepwater Horizon was located. Section (4)(b)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act preempts OSHA from enforcing its regulations if a 

working condition is regulated by another agency of the Federal government. Thus, 

even though OSHA has some authority over OCS lands, because the Coast Guard 

has extensive regulations that apply to these facilities and coordinates its inspection 

program with the Minerals Management Service (MMS) to ensure that the USCG 

workplace safety requirements are carried out, OSHA has no regulatory or enforcement authority on oil drilling rigs or production platforms on the Outer Continental 

Shelf. I will therefore focus my remarks today on OSHA’s efforts to keep workers 

safe during oil spill cleanup activities. 

Oil spill cleanup workers are on the front lines of the nation’s response to the 

Deepwater Horizon disaster. Currently it is estimated that there are more than 

33,000 people involved in the response, including over 13,000 cleanup workers employed by BP or its contractors, 1,600 National Guardsmen and women, workers on 

over 6,000 boats supporting the response operations, and more than 1,800 Federal 

employees directly involved in the cleanup operations in four states. And that number grows every day. Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis’ vision for the Department is 

‘‘Good Jobs for Everyone.’’ Good jobs are safe jobs and OSHA is extremely involved 

in making sure workers involved in the oil response and cleanup efforts go home 

safely when their work is done. 

OSHA’s involvement in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is part of a coordinated 

Federal response which includes the Coast Guard, HHS’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and National Institute of Environmental 

Health Sciences (NIEHS), and other government agencies, as well as BP, to ensure 

that workers are protected from hazards associated with cleanup work. OSHA is the 

lead agency responsible for the enforcement of worker safety and health standards 

for onshore cleanup and in the coastal waters (approximately 3 to 6 nautical miles 

from shore). 

The Department of Labor, through OSHA, is a member of the National Response 

Team and has been an active participant in the oil spill response by providing guidance, assistance, and support to the Coast Guard at the National Incident Command, the Unified Area Command and Area Commands. 

On June 10th, OSHA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 

Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) for the Deepwater Horizon response. The 

MOU solidified a close working relationship between the FOSC and OSHA, and established a specific mechanism for coordination. OSHA and the FOSC recognize the 

importance of close cooperation among all the agencies that have responsibilities 

during the oil cleanup efforts. The MOU furthers joint efforts to monitor compliance 

with safety and health standards and to protect workers. The FOSC and OSHA will 

share relevant information with each other to promote worksite safety in the Deepwater Horizon Response, including information provided by workers, local government officials or any other person. 

OSHA has the authority to conduct safety and health inspections of cleanup activities involving employees of BP and other private and Federal employers—and if 

necessary to issue citations—to determine if safe working conditions are being provided for employees. The MOU provides the means for OSHA to notify the FOSC 

when it intends to take enforcement action against BP, BP’s contractors, or any 

other employer engaged in response activities. 

OSHA personnel were first deployed to the Gulf during the week of April 26th 

and are now present in all 17 staging areas in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and 

Florida. OSHA’s Health Response Team, based in Salt Lake City, arrived in Louisiana on May 6th to provide technical support to OSHA response site personnel for 

worker exposure monitoring. 

Every day, OSHA has over 146 professionals protecting workers throughout the 

Gulf Region, 25 of whom are assigned solely to the Oil Response Cleanup. We are 

in the field and on boats to make sure BP and its contractors are protecting cleanup 

workers from health and safety hazards. OSHA inspectors ensure that the employer 

is complying with heat precautions, personal protective equipment and training requirements, and is properly addressing chemical and electrical hazards, decontamination of personnel and equipment, and many other hazards, such as being hit 

by the numerous vehicles dropping off supplies. As of June 11th, OSHA staff had 

made over 1000 site visits, both unannounced and coordinated with BP, covering all 

17 staging areas, and the active worksites on shore or at sea. 

Depending on their assignments, oil spill cleanup workers face hazards from heat, 

falls, drowning, fatigue, loud noises, sharp objects, as well as bites from insects, 

snakes and other wild species native to the Gulf Coast region. Many of these work-
19 

ers also face exposure to crude oil, oil byproducts, dispersants, cleaning products, 

and other chemicals being used in the cleanup process. OSHA is working to ensure 

that employers protect workers from this vast array of hazards. 

When OSHA finds a safety problem or learns of one from workers, we notify BP 

so that the specific problem and similar concerns are addressed across the entire 

response area. OSHA then ensures the problem is corrected. When necessary, OSHA 

raises concerns to the Unified Command. OSHA is also ensuring that BP is providing workers with both the proper training and proper protective equipment 

(boots, gloves and other necessary protective gear). At this point, OSHA has found 

this process to be effective, and it has not had to issue citations or propose civil penalties to obtain compliance. That option remains available, however, should we determine that it is necessary. 

All workers involved in the cleanup operation that have contact with contaminated material are required to receive training free of charge. Emphasis is placed 

on ensuring workers are trained in a language and vocabulary they understand. 

OSHA has been working with NIOSH, NIEHS and BP since the Deepwater Horizon 

sank to ensure that BP is providing the appropriate training, in the appropriate language to all workers involved in the clean up. OSHA, along with NIEHS, continues 

to monitor this program. In response to recently received information, OSHA is in 

the process of increasing the training requirement for crews on the vessels of opportunity engaged in offshore oil cleanup activities. Expanded training will cover chemical hazards and exposures, decontamination procedures, sampling results and 

workers’ rights. 

One of the most serious health hazards facing those involved in the Gulf Oil Spill 

Response is heat stress. There have already been over 100 incidents of illnesses 

from heat among workers involved in the cleanup, some very serious. From the outset, OSHA has insisted that BP implement a robust program to protect workers 

from heat stress and heat stroke, a potentially life threatening hazard for people 

working in cleanup operations. Many of these people work 12 hours a day, 7 days 

a week, wearing chemical resistant Tyvek coveralls, boots and gloves, in the hot and 

humid weather along the Gulf. BP has now implemented, at all work sites, a heat 

stress plan that includes a matrix setting out specific work/rest requirements based 

on the heat and relative humidity, and whether workers are wearing protective 

clothing and equipment—which can exacerbate the hazard. 

Other aspects of the heat stress plan ensure that: 

• Workers are trained in the hazards of heat and the precautions necessary to 

prevent heat stress. 

• Work begins early in the day to take advantage of cooler temperatures. 

• Shaded rest areas are provided at all work areas. 

• Workers drink liquids and take rest breaks throughout their work shifts. 

• Heat stress monitors are on site at all times to ensure the work/rest regimen 

is adhered to, that workers are drinking enough to stay fully hydrated and that any 

workers exhibiting symptoms of heat related illness are immediately given fluids, 

rest and other appropriate care. 

OSHA is also concerned about the potential health effects from inhaling chemicals 

in the crude oil, weathered oil, oil dispersants, cleaning agents, and other chemicals, 

which we continue to monitor, in order to assess and characterize the hazards the 

present. Aside from those workers on ships directly adjacent to the oil leak who are 

exposed to fresh oil, most of the cleanup workers are exposed to weathered or partially weathered oil, where all or most of the toxic volatile substances have evaporated. 

To determine whether workers are exposed to dangerous levels of toxic chemicals, 

OSHA, along with NIOSH, is reviewing BP’s monitoring data and has brought in 

a team of industrial hygienists to conduct its own independent air monitoring both 

on shore and on the cleanup vessels. OSHA is characterizing worker exposures in 

each job task to determine the appropriate level of protection from air contaminants. 

From the exposure characterizations already completed, we have developed, in collaboration with our colleagues at NIOSH, a personal protective equipment (PPE) 

matrix which outlines the equipment workers should be using for each job duty to 

protect them from the hazards and exposures associated with that job. For example, 

respirators are recommended at the source, whereas evidence does not support use 

of respirators in other locations and job duties. The matrix is posted on our website 

along with our sampling protocols and sampling results. The website includes clear 

information about where the samples were collected and what jobs the workers were 

doing when they were monitored. OSHA is also analyzing the ‘‘soup’’ of crude oil, 

oil by-products, dispersants, and any other material to determine what hazards the 

mixture might present workers as they respond to and cleanup the oil spill. We are 
20 

currently working with NIOSH to develop and issue a respirator and general worker 

health protection policy. 

Finally, OSHA is monitoring other chemical exposures, such as exposures to 

chemical solvents used to clean boats, to determine whether workers are being appropriately protected from these exposures. 

We have also distributed thousands of safety fact sheets and the OSHA-NIEHS 

pocket guides to workers involved with the oil spill cleanup along the Gulf Coast. 

The pocket guides and fact sheets are printed in Spanish and Vietnamese as well 

as English, in recognition of the diverse population inhabiting the Gulf Coast region. 

In addition, OSHA has a webpage titled, ‘‘Keeping Workers Safe During Oil Spill 

Response and Cleanup Operations.’’ This site has an abundance of helpful information for cleanup workers and the general public on the hazards that workers face, 

including crude oil, insects, snakes, poisonous plants, drowning, oil dispersants, 

ergonomic stresses, fatigue, and slips, trips and falls. It also has extensive safety 

information on subjects such as respiratory protection, boat and vessel safety, PPE 

and hazardous waste operations. The site references special oil spill training materials from other governmental agencies and provides useful contacts, as well as information on workers’ rights. It is excellent comprehensive information that I am 

proud to recommend. 

In order to get a first-hand view of health and safety activities in the Gulf, I first 

traveled to Louisiana on May 2nd with a team of experienced hazardous material 

professionals to lead efforts to ensure that cleanup operations were performed 

promptly, effectively and safely. At our initial meeting, I was joined by representatives of NIOSH, NIEHS and EPA, establishing a close working relationship between 

these public health agencies. I returned with Secretary Solis on June 9th and 10th 

to inspect efforts on behalf of the health, safety and well-being of cleanup workers 

affected by the spill. We met with beach cleanup workers in Port Fourchon to make 

sure that they received the required training and that they were provided the necessary equipment to be protected from job hazards. We also discussed worker safety 

efforts with community organizations representing fishermen and other cleanup 

workers. 

OSHA’s Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Jordan Barab participated in a multiagency delegation to the Gulf on June 1st—2nd where, after being briefed by the 

Unified Command leadership, he reviewed the safety and health protections in place 

to prevent worker injuries and illnesses. In Port Fourchon, he observed beach cleanup workers skimming the sand and collecting oil deposits. He also traveled to Venice, Louisiana, which is a major staging area for the Vessels of Opportunity Program, designed and implemented to provide local boat operators an opportunity to 

assist with response activities. DAS Barab spoke with workers about issues of concern to them which included exposure to chemicals, working in extreme heat, fatigue. He also verified that the workers had received the required protective health 

and safety training, in a language and at a level that they could understand. 

Conclusion 

OSHA’s top priority is to ensure that oil spill response and cleanup operations are 

done as safely, effectively and efficiently as possible. As the President said in his 

address to our nation, ‘‘We will fight this spill with everything we’ve got for as long 

it takes.’’ OSHA will be there for that fight, doing all that it can to protect the safety 

and health of those fighters. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer your questions. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Dr. Howard? 

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN HOWARD, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. 

DEARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Dr. HOWARD. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Kline, and members of the committee. 

Following the fire and explosion on the Deepwater Horizon on 

April 20th, CDC immediately activated its emergency response center to coordinate response activities across the agency. CDC’s Na-
21 

tional Center for Environmental Health leads the incident command and works closely with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to respond to potential health threats to 

the public, to workers, and volunteers from the disaster. 

As of today, CDC has 269 staff involved in the response, including 21 staff deployed to the Gulf Coast states. Throughout this response, CDC has been coordinating our efforts with other operating 

divisions of the Department of Health and Human Services, with 

the Coast Guard, with OSHA, with EPA, and state and local health 

departments in the Gulf states. 

As a part of the overall response, NIOSH has undertaken three 

activities: First, NIOSH is rostering workers involved in the response by means of a voluntary questionnaire. This roster will 

serve as an accurate record of individuals involved in the response, 

which will be vital for possible future studies to determine whether 

health conditions that may develop in the future are associated 

with occupational exposures during the cleanup. 

To date, NIOSH has rostered more than 14,000 workers and we 

continue to work hard to include as many of the responders as possible. We are rostering workers as they complete training and at 

the staging areas in order to reach workers already trained. 

In the last week NIOSH has also begun rostering some response 

workers online through a secure Web site. NIOSH has provided the 

secure link to multiple federal agencies, to BP, and to others, and 

has asked them to refer workers to the Web site to complete the 

roster electronically. NIOSH is also reaching out to state and local 

health partners to identify mechanisms to assist us in rostering all 

parish, local, state, and National Guard workers. 

Second, NIOSH is conducting health surveillance summates for 

worker symptoms, health complaints, injury and illness, or job 

stress, by collecting data from all sources and analyzing that data 

to detect trends in injury and illness reports so that we can recommend interventions to prevent injuries and illnesses. NIOSH is 

encouraging workers to report symptoms they feel are associated 

with the response work to both their employers, to medical personnel, and to state and local health departments. 

NIOSH is also drawing on the surveillance data being collected 

and analyzed by our colleagues in the Centers for Disease Control. 

CDC is collecting data from 60 poison control centers through the 

Gulf region. The majority of those calls thus far have been from response workers. 

CDC is also collecting data through the BioSense surveillance 

system, which we used during the H1N1 epidemic, from 86 health 

care facilities. Many of them are community clinics funded by the 

Health Resources and Services Administration of HHS, from clinical labs, from hospital systems, ambulatory care centers, and from 

V.A. medical treatment facilities, pharmacy chains, et cetera, to 

prevent any—to detect any increase in respiratory or other possible 

oil-related health effects. 

CDC is also analyzing surveillance data being collected by state 

health departments in the Gulf to monitor for potential health effects related to the oil spill. CDC has posted results of these collaborative surveillance activities on the CDC Web site and updates 

these regularly. 
22 

Third, NIOSH is conducting health hazard evaluations of reported illnesses among workers involved in onshore and offshore 

operations, as request by BP on May 28th, June 18th, and, most 

recently, at 8 a.m. this morning, a comprehensive request for workers involved in all activities on water and the land. We deployed 

several NIOSH staff members, including industrial hygienists and 

medical officers, to the Gulf to work on these evaluations. 

They are evaluating worker exposures to heat stress, volatile organic compounds, chemical oil dispersants, diesel exhaust from vessels, and other hazards as they are being identified. We are also 

administering health symptom surveys to workers involved in various onshore and offshore operations. 

Once the HHE is completed NIOSH will compile the findings and 

recommendations in a report that will be provided to the employer 

and employee representatives, and will be publicly available on the 

NIOSH-CDC Web site. As we learn more, CDC and NIOSH will update its recommendations regularly. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your continued support, and I am 

pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The statement of Dr. Howard follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Hon. John Howard, M.D., Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kline, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I am Dr. John 

Howard, Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH), which is part of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 

within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). I am here today 

to provide an update on NIOSH’s response to the recent Gulf of Mexico oil spill and 

our ongoing efforts to anticipate, monitor and respond to the potential health 

threats to workers. 

CDC’s Coordinated Response 

On April 20, 2010, after the fire and explosion on the Deepwater Horizon leading 

to the oil spill, CDC immediately began monitoring the situation. On April 22, CDC 

staff participated in the National Response Team’s activation meeting and then 

formed an oil spill task force to monitor and respond to any potential public health 

hazards associated with the oil spill. CDC quickly publicized information describing 

the potential health risks associated with the oil spill and steps individuals can take 

to protect their health and safety. On May 10, CDC’s Emergency Operations Center 

(EOC) officially activated and began coordinating CDC’s response, which includes 

staff from NIOSH and the National Center for Environmental Health, which is leading the EOC incident command and response activities. As of June 17, 204 CDC 

staff were involved in the agency’s response to the oil spill, and many of these staff 

are from NIOSH. 

Throughout the response to the oil spill, CDC has closely coordinated our efforts 

with other components of HHS—including the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness 

and Response, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Institutes of 

Health (NIH), and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration; other federal partners like the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Department of 

Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the Gulf coast states. 

NIOSH’s Response Activities 

As part of CDC’s overall response, NIOSH involvement in the oil spill response 

began very early. NIOSH was with OSHA and NIH’s National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) in the initial HHS response visit to the Gulf during the week of May 3. Since then, NIOSH has been providing information to BP, 

OSHA, the Coast Guard, and other federal and state partners about protecting response workers and volunteers from potential occupational safety and health hazards. I would now like to provide an update on the work that NIOSH has been doing 

to protect the response workers and volunteers, which includes: 
23 

Rostering responders; 

Collecting and evaluating health surveillance and injury and illness data; 

Conducting a health hazard evaluation of workers; 

Developing recommendations for response workers and volunteers; and 

Providing guidance on traumatic incident stress. 

Rostering Responders 

NIOSH is administering surveys to thousands of clean-up workers in an effort to 

compile a roster that will serve as an accurate record of many individuals involved 

in the response. The information collected in this roster would be vital for possible 

future studies to determine whether health conditions that may develop in the future are associated with occupational exposures during the cleanup. A roster is an 

important tool to capture site-specific information, such as a worker’s job task, time 

on task, available exposure information, use of personal protective equipment (PPE), 

and other related factors. Participation in the survey is voluntary, and once the information is collected, NIOSH will protect individuals’ personally identifiable information as confidential to the extent allowed by the law. 

We are rostering workers as they complete safety training required for all responders and at the staging areas in order to reach workers already trained. It has 

been challenging to enroll workers due to the different locations staging areas and 

training sites. To date we have visited many of the staging areas in Louisiana to 

roster workers. We are currently enrolling workers in Mississippi, Alabama, and 

Florida and returning to LA’s newly added staging areas. New staging areas are 

continuously being added in locations across the Gulf region. Through our rostering 

efforts, we have already captured information from more than 14,000 workers responding to this event. In an attempt to reach all cleanup workers, the survey is 

being administered in English, Spanish, and Vietnamese. This is an unprecedented 

effort, and NIOSH is working hard to ensure that our roster will include information for as many of the responders to this event as possible. 

In the last week, NIOSH also began rostering response workers online through 

a secure Website. NIOSH has provided the secure link to multiple federal agencies 

and BP, and has asked them to refer workers to the Website to complete the 

rostering form electronically. NIOSH is also reaching out to state and local partners 

to identify mechanisms to assist us in rostering all parish, local, state, and National 

Guard workers. NIOSH has created a database, which includes information from 

the paper surveys that is entered manually as well as information uploaded electronically from the Web-based surveys. Data from the electronic survey will be analyzed in the same manner as those completed on paper. A copy of the survey is included as Exhibit 1. 

Collecting and Evaluating Health Surveillance and Injury and Illness Data 

CDC is conducting surveillance across the Gulf States for health effects possibly 

related to the oil spill using national and state-based surveillance systems. NIOSH 

is analyzing injury and illness data collected at the BP medical sites. NIOSH is 

using all of this data to monitor reports of worker illness and injury and to work 

with the States, OSHA, and BP to identify trends and potential health effects. 

CDC’s National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH) contacted the American 

Association of Poison Control Centers to request that local poison control centers 

code any calls related to the oil spill so that CDC can track them. The majority of 

the calls we have received so far have been from response workers. NIOSH is also 

using CDC’s BioSense surveillance system—which analyzes diagnostic and pre-diagnostic health data from clinical laboratories, hospital systems, ambulatory care 

sites, health plans, U.S. Department of Defense and Veterans Administration medical treatment facilities, and pharmacy chains—to enhance surveillance for respiratory health effects in states along the Gulf of Mexico coast. CDC is receiving 

surveillance data collected by Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi and is 

working closely with the respective state epidemiologists to look for any health effects that may be related to the oil spill. CDC posted results from these collaborative 

surveillance activities on the CDC Website on June 10. NIOSH is also encouraging 

workers to report symptoms they feel are associated with response work to employers, medical personnel, or state and local health departments. 

Conducting Health Hazard Evaluation of Workers 

NIOSH has a unique opportunity to assess these occupational safety and health 

hazards that may arise as we conduct Health Hazard Evaluations (HHEs) of reported illnesses among workers involved in onshore and offshore cleanup operations. 

Several NIOSH staff members have been deployed to the Gulf coast to work on the 

HHEs, including industrial hygienists—who are assessing exposures through observation, industrial hygiene assessments, and evaluation of work practices and use of 
24 

PPE—and medical officers—who are evaluating illnesses and injuries among groups 

of onshore and offshore workers. Industrial hygienists are evaluating exposures to 

volatile organic compounds such as carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulfide, benzene, diesel exhaust, and propylene glycol (a component of the dispersant). The medical 

teams are administering health symptom surveys to workers involved in various onshore and offshore operations. The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals 

has agreed to provide medical reports of seven previously hospitalized fishermen for 

NIOSH physicians to review. Additional reports of the incident from the Coast 

Guard, OSHA, and BP are being reviewed as well. Once the HHE is completed, 

NIOSH will compile the findings and recommendations in a report that will be provided to employer and employee representatives, and it will be publicly available on 

the NIOSH Website. 

The additional HHE request received on June 18 will assist NIOSH in addressing 

activities associated with exposures that may occur during all types of operations 

related to this event. Since knowledge about potential inhalational exposures to the 

mixed exposure of crude oil, dispersant and combustion products associated with the 

Deepwater Horizon response work is incomplete and still evolving, NIOSH believes 

it is prudent to reduce the potential for adverse health effects by the responsible 

use of engineering controls, administrative controls and PPE, including respirators 

when appropriate. The following is a description of each of the categories of worker 

exposure. 

Source Control Activities: The source control vessels conduct activities closest to 

the area where crude oil appears on the surface, including drilling relief wells, conducting underwater operations at the source such as subsurface dispersant application, and providing support and supplies. 

Vessels involved in Burning Crude Oil: Vessels involved in crude oil burning are 

exposed to crude oil/dispersant that is less aged and may emit more VOCs than 

crude/dispersant closer to shore that may have undergone more weathering. 

Vessels not involved in Source Control or Burning: Some vessels operating offshore engage in deployment of containment and sorbent booms and skimming operations to remove oil from the water. These vessels are not involved in burning nor 

are they located in close proximity to in-situ burning. Generally, these vessels have 

contact with oil that has weathered, and, as such, does not emit significant amounts 

of VOCs 

Shoreline Activities: The types of activities associated with shoreline cleaning include manual removal of ‘‘tarballs’’ or ‘‘tarpatties,’’ shovel removal of oiled-contaminated sand, low pressure flushing, manual sorbent application, and manual cutting 

of vegetation. 

Decontamination Activities: Vessels, PPE and other equipment may become contaminated with weathered oil. Workers and volunteers may also be involved in 

cleaning and caring for birds, turtles and other wildlife 

Waste Stream Management Activities: Response and remediation workers are engaged in the disposal and recycling of hazardous solid and liquid wastes during collection, storage, transport and final disposal. 

Health Studies of Tanker Oil Spills 

It is important to note that in recent years several studies of previous oil spill 

response efforts have reported acute health effects in response workers. These studies may underestimate the health effects associated with oil response work since the 

magnitude and duration of the Deepwater Horizon response is unprecedented. At 

this time, there has been no comprehensive assessment of all response worksites in 

the Gulf, and as a result, we have an incomplete understanding of the human 

health toxicity associated with exposure to large amounts of dispersants and the 

toxicity associated with mixed exposure to large amounts of crude oil and 

dispersants together. This means that knowledge about potential human health effects to the mixed exposure of crude oil and dispersant associated with the Deepwater Horizon response work is still evolving. Therefore, NIOSH believes it is prudent to reduce the potential for such adverse health effects by the responsible use 

of administrative controls and PPE. 

Developing Recommendations for Response Workers and Volunteers 

To ensure a comprehensive approach to worker safety and health, NIOSH has 

been working closely with OSHA to develop Interim Guidance which focuses on 

issues specific to the Deepwater Horizon response. The recommendations in the Interim Guidance include: 

Conducting exposure assessment: Exposures to toxic chemical and physical agents 

should be comprehensively and routinely assessed during work activities under 

varying conditions. 
25 

Pre-Placement Evaluation: NIOSH currently is working with OSHA to develop 

recommendations for pre-placement evaluations for workers involved in the Deepwater Horizon response to ensure that each worker receives appropriate advice 

about his or her health status and the potential demands of the work before they 

begin. 

Medical Care and Symptom, Near-Miss, Injury and Illness Reporting and Recording: All health symptoms, illnesses, injuries or near-misses related to work activities 

should be reported by workers and volunteers, should be recorded by employers, 

contractors and volunteer organizations, and should be evaluated by safety and 

health or licensed health care professionals with action taken to protect workers 

Heat stress prevention: Excessive exposure to hot environments can cause a variety of heat-related problems, including heat stroke, heat exhaustion, heat cramps, 

and fainting. Heat can also increase the risk of injuries in workers from sweaty 

palms, fogged-up safety eyewear, and dizziness. Protective clothing and other PPE 

will increase the risk of heat-related problems. PPE should be selected to minimize 

heat stress on the wearer. 

Fatigue Prevention: Disaster response workers often work longer shifts and more 

consecutive shifts than the typical 40-hour work week. Working longer hours may 

increase the risk of work injuries and accidents and can contribute to poor health. 

Therefore, disaster response organizations should have management plans in place 

to minimize fatigue risks, recognize hazards, and provide regular opportunities for 

worker rest and recovery. 

Use of PPE: A variety of PPE will be needed by Deepwater Horizon response 

workers and volunteers. Administrative controls and engineering controls should be 

utilized first to minimize the need for PPE in any particular job. Where such controls will not effectively minimize the exposures, then PPE will be necessary. 

Guidance on Selection of Protective Clothing: Choosing the proper chemical and 

flame resistant protective garments is an exercise in the selection of fabric, seam 

and design. The selection must be based on expected exposure and verified by field 

audits and changed if the selected PPE does not perform adequately. The potential 

for contribution to heat stress must also be considered in the selection of protective 

clothing, in addition to the potential exposure to fire, water, oil and tar, and other 

chemicals. 

Reuse of Personal Protective Equipment: Consult the manufacturer’s instructions 

on whether personal protective equipment should be disposed of or cleaned after 

use. Many manufacturers of PPE, in particular manufacturers of gloves, will provide 

information on breakthrough times from various chemicals (time it takes for the 

chemical to pass through the protective material). Given the warm and humid conditions existing during the Deepwater Horizon Response, disposable filtering facepiece respirators will likely need to be discarded after several hours of use, in part 

because they will become moist with perspiration. 

Use of Respiratory Protection: A decision to use respiratory protection should be 

based on the best available qualitative information using the expert opinion method 

and on the best available comprehensive quantitative information about the type 

and level of exposure to toxic chemical and physical agents by the inhalational 

route. The use of effective engineering and administrative controls, and other personal protective [sic] 

Resources for Use of Respiratory Protection: Information about which respirators 

are approved by NIOSH, how to get them and how to use them, can be found at 

the NIOSH Respirator Trusted-Source Information Page at: http://www.cdc.gov/ 

niosh/npptl/topics/respirators/disp—part/RespSource.html#sect1. 

Voluntary Use of Respirators: Respiratory protection may be worn by employees 

voluntarily as permitted by the OSHA Respiratory Protection Standard (29 CFR 

Section 1910.134). An employer may provide respirators at employees’ requests or 

permit employees to use their own respirators if the employer determines that use, 

in itself, will not create a hazard (29 CFR Section 1910.134(c)(2)(i)). 

Recommendations contained in the Interim Guidance will be updated as more information about exposures is collected and assessed in relationship to the incidence 

and prevalence of symptoms, illnesses and injuries. 

Providing Guidance on Traumatic Incident Stress 

Deepwater Horizon response workers and volunteers are at risk of feeling uncomfortable levels of stress from what mental health professionals refer to as a traumatic incident. NIOSH is developing guidance that describes the range of ordinary 

reactions to stress—such as complaints of physical ailments, trouble thinking clearly, emotional concerns, and behavioral changes—which responders may experience 

during their work or in the weeks or months that follow. NIOSH guidance recommends that responders take care of themselves and monitor their own emotional 
26 

and physical health both during the response and after the event ends. Specifically, 

responders should: control the pace of their rescue and recovery efforts and be mindful of potential hazards; maintain adequate nutrition, hydration and rest; and monitor their own mental and emotional health. Additionally, the Substance Abuse and 

Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) supports Mental Health First 

Aid training and other psychological health programs for dealing with trauma and 

stress for first responders, behavioral health workers, and persons who are experiencing the aftermath of traumatic situations. NIOSH and SAMHSA are collaborating to assure that the guidance provided is aligned with the tools and services 

available to individuals to address their reaction to this traumatic incident. 

Conclusion 

CDC continues to work diligently to anticipate, monitor and respond to potential 

health threats to protect the health and safety of workers, volunteers and residents 

along the Gulf coast. This oil spill underscores the importance of CDC’s work and 
27 

the need for further health and safety research. It is important to protect response 

workers, volunteers and Gulf coast residents against potential health hazards now 

so that we can prevent future chronic health effects associated with this spill. As 

this event evolves and we learn more about potential health hazards, CDC will update our recommendations. I appreciate the opportunity to describe the steps 

NIOSH is taking to protect response workers and volunteers along the Gulf coast. 

Thank you for your continued support. I am pleased to answer any questions you 

may have. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Thank you to all of the witnesses for your testimony, and again, 

for your expertise. 

Dr. Howard, just quickly, I appreciate your remarks on the 

rostering. Obviously we learned a terrible lesson after 9/11 and 

after Katrina for people who volunteer or were hired to work in 

what turned out to be seriously toxic waste sites. And I know this 

was raised in the Energy and Commerce Committee last week also, 

but I really appreciate you getting very aggressive about getting 

these people rostered so that if we have something similar happen 

we know who and what their status was and the rest of that when 

they came here. So thank you very much for that. 

As I understand the situation, we have—back in 19-maybe-53, or 

1979, ocean responsibilities were delegated to the Coast Guard 

under the outer continental shelf legislation of that time, and that 

has continued forward with the rewrites—some of the rewrites that 

took place after Exxon Valdez. And then the Coast Guard has delegated the actual responsibility for onsite inspections to MMS. Is 

that a fair statement here of kind of the situation we are in? 

Dr. Howard. Yes. 

RADM COOK. Mr. Chairman, the part about—that you discussed 

initially with the Outer Continental Lands Act giving the Coast 

Guard the authority to go and regulate the safety health was true. 

The part about then Coast Guard transferring to MMS is just a 

subset of six platforms which are on the outer continental shelf for 

which the Coast Guard does the initial safety and health inspection 

and then MMS does the annual inspection, because many of them 

are unmanned—— 

Chairman MILLER. Right. 

RADM COOK [continuing]. Some of them are simply well heads. 

So the bigger units are mobile offshore drilling units still—— 

Chairman MILLER. And the authority for the worker safety inspections there is showed how on the mobiles? 

RADM COOK. Well, the Coast Guard has primacy and we have 

a detailed MOA which goes section by section of the mobile offshore 

drilling unit on which part the Coast Guard or MMS will look at 

in detail, but the Coast Guard has primacy. 

Chairman MILLER. But who is doing the onsite inspections? 

RADM COOK. The Coast Guard is. 

Chairman MILLER. The Coast Guard is? 

RADM COOK. And MMS also has inspection functions for which 

we have split out in an MOA—— 

Chairman MILLER. So you are both doing onsite inspections—— 

RADM COOK. Correct. 

Chairman MILLER [continuing]. According to that memorandum 

of understanding. 
28 

RADM COOK. That is correct. It is delineated, though; it is not 

both doing the same thing. 

Chairman MILLER. I hope not. Okay. 

Just for the information of the committee members, I should 

have said that under previous agreement the chair and the senior 

Republican will have 10 minutes each opening. 

And then that is—you review MMS’s work in their portion that 

you have delegated to them? Do you have an annual review? Do 

you have a 5-year review of how that is going? 

RADM COOK. We have quarterly meetings with MMS and review 

all the different aspects of our relationship, and that is at the, kind 

of the D.C. oversight regulatory level, and that has been out of our 

standards shop. And then on the coastline or, you know, primarily 

the Gulf area where we interact on an operational basis, we share 

in each other’s joint training activities. 

Chairman MILLER. So for this purpose on worker safety the 

Coast Guard’s the lead agency? 

RADM COOK. That is correct, sir. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Thank you. 

After this tragic accident and those people were being interviewed, and we have gone back and forth in a number of different 

areas, there has been substantial evidence that workers—whether 

they are online workers, whether they are supervisorial individuals, whether they were from a contractor, or subcontractor, or 

whatever their situation was on this rig—that there were serious 

concerns about the process that was—as it was going forward to 

close in this well. Where are workers’ whistleblowing rights protected in this act? 

RADM COOK. Sir, I am going to answer that in an operational 

way, because I am not—I don’t have the legal standard at hand. 

But all of our inspectors and investigators are trained from the variety of different types of vessels that we interact with, including 

the mobile offshore drilling units. Wherever we get a complaint we 

protect the anonymity of the person making the complaint and we 

follow up immediately. 

But as far as direct whistleblower statute, I will have to get back 

to you on the record for that. 

Chairman MILLER. So you don’t know whether you have whistleblower protection. 

Secretary Michaels, in OSHA there is specific whistleblower protection, is there not? Am I correct? 

Mr. MICHAELS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman MILLER. And in theory people cannot be retaliated 

against or punished for exercising that right? 

Mr. MICHAELS. That is the theory, correct. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Slitor, where do your people go for whistleblower protection, and how do they enforce this? 

Mr. SLITOR. I am not sure of the legislation how it speaks to 

whistleblower. I don’t believe that it is listed as part of the requirements. 

However, we have issued an NTL regarding whistleblower—— 

Chairman MILLER. What is that? What is an NTL? 
29 

Mr. SLITOR. I am sorry. A notice to lessee. And it has emanated 

from a GAO study conducted on MMS and production verification. 

So we wanted to ensure that there was an avenue for people to—— 

Chairman MILLER. That was related to whether or not people 

were keeping two sets of books or honestly reporting—— 

Mr. SLITOR. Correct. 

Chairman MILLER [continuing]. Production to the federal government. 

Mr. SLITOR. And it directed them to the inspector general’s office, 

and other than—— 

Chairman MILLER. But right now you can’t sit here either—and 

tell me that those individuals that might have wanted to not proceed further with this process because they felt it was unsafe, either in terms of the rig, or the personnel, or the environment— 

however—there is no place where their rights or posted on these 

rigs with respect the that. 

Mr. SLITOR. Not directly related to that type of activity—— 

Chairman MILLER. Some employers have told me and they have 

shown me posters that they have posted as a company policy, but 

again, in many instances they have a contractor running these rigs; 

the oil company itself is not doing that. Is that correct? 

Mr. SLITOR. I believe that can be the case. 

Chairman MILLER. Well, we will follow up with you, but this is 

obviously—you have an inherently dangerous workplace, and the 

question of whether or not a worker will have the ability and the 

protection to say, ‘‘Stop,’’ in the face of danger is a very serious 

problem if that doesn’t exist by right in the law. 

We have just went through a horrible mine accident in West Virginia, and it became very clear that even with whistleblower protections miners were seriously intimidated, miners were threatened 

because they wanted to—the owners wanted to produce coal. 

Here, we have had a great deal of attention to the cost of these 

rigs, to the cost of operating them, decisions that were apparently 

made because they didn’t want to delay any longer, any more 

hours, to getting this rig offsite so it could go off and be released 

to somebody else. This is an environment that is a disaster for 

workers to work if those concerns aren’t explicit in the law. So I 

will stop there on that point and maybe come back to it later. 

Dr. Michaels, let me ask you this—you are starting to look at the 

issue of process safety management—MMS and you. Is that correct? Regulations with respect to process safety management? 

Mr. MICHAELS. You are speaking to—— 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Slitor, Mr.—or, well, I don’t know which 

one of you takes responsibility because you are—— 

Mr. SLITOR. We have a rule that is under review in the department and they are moving forward on safety and environmental 

management systems, which speaks to safety organization and 

management—— 

Chairman MILLER. Where did you get the expertise to develop 

this rule? 

Mr. SLITOR. This rule is—we participated with American Petroleum Institute in developing—— 

Chairman MILLER. That is an organization of the oil companies? 
30 

Mr. SLITOR. Yes—developing a recommended practice. It has 

been in use for approximately 15 years. We have kind of monitored 

the—— 

Chairman MILLER. Been in use on the rigs for 15 years? 

Mr. SLITOR. It is a voluntary program since it is a recommended 

practice. We are moving forward at this time to make it a requirement. 

Chairman MILLER. Have you discussed this with OSHA? 

Mr. SLITOR. Yes, actually, we have. 

Chairman MILLER. When? 

Mr. SLITOR. It was after the Deepwater Horizon event. OSHA 

contacted us to gain a better understanding of our regulations 

and—with respect to worker safety, and that came up in the conversation. 

Chairman MILLER. Well, my time has run out, but I would be 

very concerned on how this is being developed. This safety process 

management rules are absolutely critical in these work environments. It is stunning that we don’t have one in place for this—for 

these rigs. 

We have obviously been through it as a committee in a number 

of chemical and refinery tragic accidents that have taken place. My 

district, I represent five or six refineries, and these rules are critical to the processes. And when you start to move through a refinery you are going to change processes, you are going to change operation, you are going to go to a shutdown, you are going to go to 

a restart. These are the things that really give you some of the best 

protection for workers. 

OSHA has been in this field for 35 years, and I just find that 

when you are taking advice from the oil industry you wouldn’t 

bounce that off against the very—that they regulate the oil industry where we have had these tragedies in refineries in Washington, 

in the Midwest, in Texas, in my district, where people have lost 

their lives, that we wouldn’t have some kind of discussion before 

this goes to final rule, that it wouldn’t just come out of the oil industry’s recommendations. We have been through that on this committee. I am not sure that is what the public is looking for at this 

moment, so I would hope that there would be a little timeout here 

to rethink whether this is really the system that will offer the protection. 

Mr. Kline? 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Listening, as I always do, 

Mr. Chairman, carefully to your questions, and clearly, as you were 

going through you can see that there is confusion—perhaps on your 

part, perhaps on their part, but I think on everybody’s part—about 

who is in charge. Who is in charge? 

And so we have wonderful public servants sitting down here representing government agencies and in listening to you, I understand that there are MOUs and MOAs and discussions, but it is 

not entirely clear to me that we know who is in charge here. So 

I am going to continue to explore that with you and I expect that 

many of my colleagues will as we go forward. 

Dr. Michaels, at a hearing last week a question was asked about 

the possibility of OSHA taking over rig worker safety and the response Deputy Assistant Secretary Jordan Barab stated, ‘‘Nobody 
31 

has offered it to us and we certainly haven’t asked.’’ Are you better 

able today to speak to the agency’s view? 

Mr. MICHAELS. The administration has no position on this issue. 

Right now we are working very closely to help each other and to 

learn from each other in terms of protecting the workers and on 

the shore, and I think this experience has driven these agencies to 

work much more closely together. 

Mr. KLINE. Well, that is a heck of a way to have to be driven 

to work more closely together. We have seen this before; we certainly saw it in the intelligence and defense communities after the 

terrible tragedy of 9/11 and the subsequent military reaction, they 

were driven together, but it is a heck of a way to do it. It would 

be so much better if we could work this out in advance. 

Just supposing—continuing with you, Dr. Michaels—that you 

allow for the possibility that OSHA actually takes over the responsibility, or maybe we take—following up on the chairman’s question 

about where this was designated—could you do it? Do you have the 

resources? Do you have the people? 

Mr. MICHAELS. We certainly don’t have the resources. I mean, 

the requirement of inspecting—there are two different issues, really. One is the resources of inspecting offshore rigs that require vessels to get to them and a great deal of additional staff. 

OSHA currently has a very limited staff to look at process safety 

management issues; I know this committee has looked at that before. And unfortunately, we have even taken people from the 

Texas-Louisiana area who are inspecting oil refineries now to help 

with the cleanup effort. 

The other issue, though, is really to think about the OSHA regulatory regime and the approach we take, and this is a good opportunity to relook at that. Because right now, you know, for example, 

in oil refineries they have a lot of the same risks as oil drilling operations. We have a system where we inspect on some regular 

basis, but certainly not frequently, and we would need a great deal 

more staff to be in the refineries at all times. 

And we find ourselves going to refineries that are very complex 

that take a huge amount of time to investigate, and the Contra 

Costa County, where the chairman is from, has a very extensive 

staff in their county to look at just the refineries in that region. We 

don’t have that level of—we don’t have that level of resources. 

But what we find is that when we go into an oil refinery the limited OSHA fines have not a big effect. I mean, the maximum fine 

for a serious penalty is $7,000. When we are talking about a company whose profits are in the billions of dollars a year the—I think 

they look at the costs of OSHA fines as just really part of the cost 

of doing business. 

So if we were to take on this issue we would have to rethink the 

way we do inspections and the way we issue fines—— 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. But you don’t have—you simply don’t have the 

people or the expertise right now, and it would take some time, I 

would presume, before you could get that. 

Following up—I am staying with you just a little bit longer here, 

and actually this is going to go over to Admiral Cook—on May 25th 

you issued a memorandum to Admiral Allen stating many things— 

it is a copy here—but part of it was, you are quoted as saying, 
32 

‘‘OSHA has witnessed numerous deficiencies at several work sites 

and staging areas through the Gulf Coast region.’’ 

Can you describe some of those? 

And then to you, Admiral Cook, what has been your response 

here as we are trying to coordinate the multiple agencies here and 

figure out who is in charge? 

Mr. MICHAELS. You know, OSHA went to all these staging areas 

as they were being put together and we saw a number of different 

problems at different levels. We saw site security issues just when 

those sites were opening up and hundreds of workers were being 

brought in. We thought the security and essentially logistics of the 

site weren’t adequate to protect worker safety. We were concerned 

about heat. 

But we had two sort of more pressing, more larger concerns. One 

was that it wasn’t clear what the line of authority was within BP. 

When we would raise this issue with the local or our contact within 

BP we didn’t see the problem getting abated immediately, and we 

insisted the problem was abated immediately. 

And we didn’t see the resources there to deal with these problems as BP and its contractors geared up for much larger operations. So we thought it was important to raise that issue immediately, which we did with BP and we did with Admiral Allen. And 

Admiral Allen responded very quickly, communicated to BP the importance of this, and their response since then has been very good. 

So we are very pleased with the response to that memo. 

Mr. KLINE. Admiral Cook, can you address the Coast Guard’s response to the memo? 

RADM COOK. Congressman, one of the things that—you know, 

not in a bureaucratic sense but in a way to formalize it, we went 

back and put in writing again, with, between—our relationship between OSHA and the Coast Guard at the federal on-scene coordinator level, the unified commander that was down there representing the Coast Guard in New Orleans—so the OSHA and 

Coast Guard responsibilities were clear and reinforced, and what 

we did is continue to build on OSHA presence in all the different 

staging areas, and OSHA has now expanded and sometimes rides 

the vessels that are—that BP has hired to do some of the booming 

strategies or some of the skimming strategies. 

So what we have done is integrated OSHA to the maximum extent possible so that we can leverage their expertise as part of the 

overall safety net. But clearly the federal on-scene coordinator has 

overall responsibility for site safety as regarding the response. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you. 

Let’s talk about overall on-scene responsibility. There have been 

news reports of late that there were a number of vessels—skimmers and boats—ready to go to work here in helping to clean up 

and mitigate the damage, and the reports we have seen were that 

they were stopped—they were prevented from doing this because of 

the lack of inspection by the Coast Guard, or perhaps there was an 

inspection by somebody and there weren’t enough life preservers, 

and so forth. 

And this goes to the point—couple of points here about who is 

in charge and the balance between cleaning up and mitigating the 

disaster and being responsive to the people who live on the Gulf 
33 

Coast and checking blocks. And I fully understand that checking 

blocks can be very important when safety is at stake, but I am 

wondering about the balance and the urgency—and I am looking 

at you, Admiral Cook, because I take your point that you are in 

charge, and the on-scene commander, and these are floating vessels, although Dr. Michaels said that OSHA was ‘‘on the beaches 

and on the boats,’’ so I am not sure what—again, what OSHA is 

doing on the boats. 

It is sort of that question about who is in charge, but I would 

like you to address that question of how you are balancing the response to the disaster on the coast and responding to the demands 

of the people living on the Gulf Coast and protecting the environment down there, and safety of the workers. And then maybe one 

or both of you can address that—who is doing what to whom on 

the boats? 

RADM COOK. Mr. Congressman, first off, I want to convey that 

there is a sense of urgency, so the balance is clearly we want to 

do the right thing for the environment; we certainly don’t want to 

put anybody in harm’s way in doing that. 

I would like to just characterize one example which recently got 

a lot of play in the media. There were some barges who had some 

vacuum sucking equipment installed on top of them that were 

being used in the Louisiana area, and they were going to be used 

in a variety of locations—coastal, but on out what we call the 

boundary line, or kind of the—if there was a clear opening to a 

river it would be where the river went into the sea, but in New Orleans—I mean, in Louisiana it is sometimes a little bit tough to 

tell. 

But some of the barges were going to be used beyond the boundary line, and there were stability issues that they wouldn’t have to 

take into account if they were used closer in, but the last thing we 

wanted to do was have those barges go out and flip over. Well, the 

work that went on was stability calculations, you know, back in our 

engineering center, so it wasn’t real visible within the media what 

was going on, and as soon as that work was complete those barges 

were allowed to go back into service. 

So I would say there are a number of cases where we are out 

there. Another one is—another situation we—I just want to describe that side of the balance where we have to look at more than 

check-the-box—vessels that are hired that weren’t intended for oil 

spill cleanup service. We want to make sure they have fire extinguishers, life preservers, the right navigational lights in case they 

are used at night. 

So we do those things and every once in a while one of those gets 

more public attention than the case rightly deserved—— 

Mr. KLINE. Let me let Mr. Michaels—my time is—it is turning 

red here. But I guess what I am getting at is that considering the 

magnitude of this tragedy and the need to respond quickly because 

the oil moves inexorably into these marshes, it seems to me that 

we would make sure that there is somebody in the organization— 

somebodies, many of them in the Coast Guard, or in OSHA, or in 

MMS, or OBE, or whatever we change the name to—that you 

would be working 24/7, and if it took—you needed more inspectors 

that you would be pulling people from Antarctica or someplace to 
34 

make sure that they were there and getting this done in a timely 

fashion. 

And I guess my time is up, but I am hoping at some point we 

will understand the relationship of what OSHA is doing on the 

boats along with the Coast Guard. 

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I see that my 10 minutes—— 

Chairman MILLER. If I might add to this question, we ran into 

this problem in the oil spill in San Francisco Bay a couple of years 

ago. I think what we really need along areas like the Gulf Coast 

or harbors—we need a precertification of private boats fishing because you lose a huge amount of time while you are trying to decide whether the fishermen can be helpful or not and whether they 

comply. And I think we need a program of annual certification of 

those people who would want to participate. 

In San Francisco we lost two tide cycles. Well, in two tide cycles 

a relatively small spill by any—was all of a sudden out the Golden 

Gate and into the ocean and onto the beaches. So we can’t do this 

after the oil is in the water; it all has to be done on a constant 

basis, I think, so that we know that those people one, they can be 

effective, two, they have the capacity to—they have the safety 

equipment and they are ready to go. Because we lose just too much 

time going through this after the accident. 

Congresswoman Woolsey? 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good leadin on the San Francisco Bay spill. 

From that very moment I have had this question, and Ranking 

Member Kline said it too: Who is in charge? It just really—and it 

was so much smaller for us but we thought it was devastating. 

It was so clear to me that we have so many elements to these 

spills: Who is in charge of prevention? Who is in charge of certification? Who is in charge of cleanup? Who is in charge of safety and 

health? Research and development has to be at the forefront so we 

can know better how to treat all of this and how to prevent it all. 

I am thinking we need an umbrella agency. I don’t know who 

that agency is. And I am also thinking that maybe over each of the 

major sections there will be a lead agency, such as, for today we 

are talking about safety and health, OSHA for safety and health. 

I am just throwing that out there as an idea. 

What I would like to know, Rear Admiral Cook and Mr. Slitor— 

tell me, before this incident in the Gulf how many times did each 

of your agencies inspect that particular site and did you come up 

with anything that was suspicious? And what did you do about it? 

Just tell me about your inspections, starting with you, Admiral. 

RADM COOK. Yes, Congresswoman. First off, the Coast Guard 

has been inspecting the Deepwater Horizon every year since 2001, 

when it came in—first came into U.S. service, and we do the—an 

inspection for which we take the information that is provided by 

the flag state, their certification with international standards, and 

then we validate it. 

Over the 9 years that we have been inspecting it they have only 

had two deficiencies, but really, we are looking at the navigation, 

lifesaving, and some of the firefighting aspects that go along with 

accommodations, almost as if it was a ship—because it is a, you 

know, it is a vessel until it is attached to the seabed. 
35 

So we are looking at all those type of activities that we would 

normally associate with a ship, and then MMS or BOE comes in 

and takes care of the—more of the production aspects that associate it with drilling. 

So the two discrepancies were just a placarding issue, and in one 

case a gauge that wasn’t calibrated correctly, which they fixed on 

scene. So they have had a good safety record with us. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. So, Mr. Slitor? 

Mr. SLITOR. Our experience has been, actually, similar. I don’t 

have the actual number of total inspections that we have conducted 

since 2001, but we—it is our policy to visit and inspect drilling facilities every 30 days, or as close to that as we possibly can. Weather plays a big factor, at times. 

Over the—I believe it is the last two or three inspections that we 

conducted on the Deepwater Horizon they did not have any incidents of noncompliance. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. So then, Dr. Michaels, you are OSHA and you are 

going in there to inspect, first of all, would you hope they had a 

safety committee of some sort that you would be hearing from, but 

would you tell us what you think you would be looking for? 

Mr. MICHAELS. You have raised a very interesting question— 

what OSHA would do and what I think should be done really are 

two different questions. OSHA has the same sort of approach that 

we go and we look for compliance with certain rules, and that is 

important. 

But the two traditional ways that OSHA and other agencies look 

at safety and health in these process safety and management situations are inadequate, in my view, because really these are what we 

call low probability, high consequence events that often occur because of a combination of conditions and decisions that are made— 

often decisions that are made to save money or to move quickly, 

and that is the history of the BP Texas City disaster, and likely 

the history of this, though the history has not yet been totally written. 

So when an employer tells us, for example, ‘‘This facility is safe 

because of very few injuries notices,’’ we say, ‘‘Well, that is not really relevant.’’ But we see that in press conferences all the time. You 

know, the night before the Deepwater—the night that the Deepwater Horizon exploded, BP executives were on the ship giving a— 

on the vessel giving a plaque to the workers for 7 years of no losttime injuries. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Oh, wow. 

Mr. MICHAELS. So one measure that we use, which is injury 

rates, is not useful. The other thing is when we look at compliance 

with certain rules, at any point in time they could be being complied with and we can’t be there all the time, so we have to look 

at how they make decisions, how they investigate near misses—the 

instance that could have predicted what goes on. And that is a very 

different regulatory approach. 

And frankly, OSHA doesn’t do well either. But that is the approach that I would have taken and would like to take not just on 

the Deepwater Horizon site, but across oil refineries and chemical 

plants as well. 
36 

Ms. WOOLSEY. So, Mr. Chairman, if I could just say 1 more 

minute—not a minute even. 

Had some of the employees—the workers—on the vessel been 

able to speak out they would have been able to point out areas of 

danger? 

Mr. MICHAELS. Absolutely. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Castle—Congressman Castle? 

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like everybody else 

here, you know, we are concerned about the health issues, the environmental issues that have arisen from this. But obviously the 

deaths of the people who were working there is a matter of great 

concern, and my questions in the limited time I have will be in the 

whole area of prevention and future prevention. 

And, you know, it is a little confusing as to exactly who is in 

charge or to what is going on here, but I have at least read or 

heard—and if I don’t state this correctly please straighten me out— 

that there was a shut-off device or a breaker system of some kind 

or another that apparently may have actually come up with—parts 

of it may have come up with the oil and gas that was being retrieved, so there was some knowledge that perhaps it was not 

working. Who had knowledge of that or whether that is an accurate statement I don’t know, but, Admiral Cook and Mr. Slitor, can 

you comment on that? 

Mr. SLITOR. I notice similar things from what I have read in the 

newspaper, but we need to wait until we get the results of the accident investigation before we can even comment on what is in the 

newspaper, so I really can’t speak to that directly. 

Mr. CASTLE. Well, if there is a shut-off device and it is in place 

how would a worker or anyone else inspecting that rig know that 

it is either functioning or not functioning? 

Mr. SLITOR. We require the operator to conduct regular tests of 

the BOP—the blowout preventer—system, and they are pressure 

tests to see if they can hold the pressure—the formation pressure. 

Mr. CASTLE. Okay. Can you tell us now when that last test was 

performed in that particular blowout preventer system on this rig? 

Mr. SLITOR. When the last test—I don’t know the particular date 

of that, but I believe the requirement is that they test BOPs every 

14 days. 

Mr. CASTLE. And that is a self-test which they do themselves. Is 

that the idea? 

Mr. SLITOR. Correct. 

Mr. CASTLE. Okay. 

And you had no report—none of you had any report that it was 

not functioning correctly, or anything of that nature? 

Mr. SLITOR. No. When we do inspections we test all of the operator’s—or inspect all of the operator’s testing record to ensure that 

they have done all tests for the various devices onboard, whether 

drilling or production, and these have frequencies of, you know, 

weekly, biweekly, monthly, every 6 weeks, depending on what the 

particular device is. 

Mr. CASTLE. Based on what you know now with the history of 

the last couple months of all this, would you—either of you— 
37 

change the inspection frequency or systems that were in place then 

to prevent future problems with rigs such as this—frequency of inspections or anything else that perhaps could be done? 

Mr. SLITOR. In the 30-day report to the president Secretary Salazar has come out with a number of recommendations, some of 

which speak to our inspection frequency and augmenting the inspection workforce, and to witness tests—some of the testing that 

is done on critical devices such as the blowout preventers. That can 

happen at any time during a 24-hour period, so we are looking at 

ways to provide more oversight on those tests. 

Mr. CASTLE. Can you tell us whether there was any correspondence, in terms of communications, with BP or anyone else dealing 

with the Horizon drilling rig before this happened, in, say, the 30 

days before, with respect to either the blowout prevention system 

or anything else that might have been some sort of a lead that 

there was a possible potential problem that could explode as it did? 

Mr. SLITOR. No. I am not aware of any type of documentation or 

information transfer that would have indicated that there was any 

kind of problem, but I can get back to you on that and see if there 

is something, but I am not aware of any. 

Mr. CASTLE. Okay. I realize you are the acting chief in this case, 

Mr. Slitor, but are you satisfied that the people at MMS are sufficient, in terms of both numbers out there in the Gulf and numbers 

in terms of what you have to do at home in Washington or wherever it may be, to continue the kind of work that MMS should be 

doing with respect to prevention of something such as this? 

Mr. SLITOR. No, I don’t believe we do have sufficient resources. 

We have 56 inspectors in the Gulf of Mexico, and about a handful 

of those are more supervisory and administrative and have significant office functions, so it is actually less folks that actually get out 

there to do these inspections. And as you know, there are over 

3,500 facilities offshore, so it is a challenge to meet our statutory 

requirement of inspecting every facility annually. So to that end we 

have put in budget requests to augment the inspection workforce. 

Mr. CASTLE. I know my time is up, but my notes had indicated 

that you try to inspect every 30 days, I thought, and you just said 

annually. 

Mr. SLITOR. There are two types of facilities out there. There are 

drilling rigs that are mobile, and there are production platforms. 

We try to inspect drilling rigs every 30 days because they are mobile, they do move around from place—location to location, and frequently they are on a location for 3 months or so, but can be as 

much as a year, depending upon the target they are after and a 

number of other factors. So for drilling rigs we do go out every 30 

days or as close to that as we possibly can. 

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Kildee? 

Mr. KILDEE. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As a corollary to the governor’s question, a certain culture exists 

in various agencies. We have two agencies that have a key role 

here: the MMS and the Coast Guard. 

I would like to address this to the two physicians, Dr. Michaels 

and Dr. Howard: Was there a proper focus among those two agen-
38 

cies, or within those two agencies? Was there a proper understanding of their mission? 

Were both adequately performing based upon the need with the 

various factors out there in the Gulf? Was one doing a better job 

than the other? And what could one or the other be doing better 

to fulfill their mission? 

Mr. MICHAELS. Mr. Kildee, I am not sure I can comment on the 

particular work on offshore drilling regulations by these two agencies, but I can look very carefully at—we work very closely with the 

Coast Guard on a number of different activities and we are very 

pleased with their work and our relationship with them, and we 

have relatively little contact with MMS, or with BOE, so I can’t 

really comment on their particular work. 

Mr. KILDEE. Doctor? 

Dr. Howard. Yes, sir. Previous to this episode, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health or CDC has not had any 

knowledge of these offshore activities. 

Mr. KILDEE. There are four of you here representing. All of you 

are concerned about the safety of those people who are working in 

that area and about the environment, but all the factors. Would it 

not be helpful if you bring your area of concern and your area of 

expertise into the other two agencies to discuss some overlapping 

interests that one may not have thought of? 

Admiral, could you suggest how you could coordinate better between the various agencies that have at least a level of responsibility? 

RADM COOK. Yes, Congressman. You know, one thing I just, you 

know, want to point out is that OSHA has a maritime safety advisory committee—a federal advisory committee. The Coast Guard 

has a seat on there. I mean, that is just one area where we try and 

be part of the maritime fabric of what OSHA is concerned about. 

But I think the best way is to continue the meetings that we 

have with MMS and I said to our standards organization where we 

develop regulations—the advisory committee activity. And I think 

what we can do is add more of that type of activity where there 

is information-sharing. 

Currently, I would say it is more at the headquarters level with 

OSHA. In the field we have a lot of interaction with MMS because 

the activity is primarily in the Gulf of Mexico, although certainly 

not exclusively. Everyone knows that. 

So I think in the future what we have to do is aim to formalize 

some of that interaction and look to where we can build more, because I think one of the underlying pinnings of this program where 

we look at safety and health on the outer continental shelf is that 

the Coast Guard has vessels to get out there, we have a combined 

contract for aviation to get out there. So there are some logistical 

things that the agency who is going out there needs to be able to 

carry the ball effectively. 

Mr. KILDEE. Mr. Slitor? 

Mr. SLITOR. I would agree with Admiral Cook. We would embrace the idea of bringing OSHA in and coordinating among the 

three agencies to ensure that we all know the breadth of our regulations and how we oversee those regulations. So I think it is a 

positive suggestion. 
39 

Mr. KILDEE. Well, might that avoid some contradictory regulations or those that aren’t compatible? 

Mr. SLITOR. I am sorry; I did not hear. 

Mr. KILDEE. Might that avoid some contradicting regulations or 

regulations that might not be compatible? 

Mr. SLITOR. Yes, I do believe that would. That is a big part of 

our coordination with the Coast Guard, working on not only our 

quarterly meeting that we hold in Washington here, but we do fairly frequent training with our inspectors and Coast Guard personnel 

in the various regions to understand better concerns of their statutes and regulation, since we are out there as their eyes and ears. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Thompson? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. I would kind of like to continue a little bit with the sort of the 

questions that Mr. Kildee has raised regarding integration and coordination, which is obviously always important. 

After the World Trade Center and Hurricane Katrina national 

disasters RAND conducted research projects with respect to lessons 

learned related to public health and worker safety and health. The 

studies made several recommendations to prepare for future 

events, and the studies suggested specifically an integrated approach to safety management events. The studies suggested that, 

you know, for example, assessing the health hazards associated 

with cleanup was subject to debate, as it is in this incident. 

To these lessons that need to be internalized by the federal agencies to avoid the stakes being repeated, what are the specific actions that have been taken to implement an integrated approach to 

safety management? 

RADM COOK. Congressman, thank you for that question, because 

it gives me the opportunity also to mention, we have had this undercurrent of who is in charge, and now let me just talk—this is 

about the response. You know, under the National Contingency 

Plan the Coast Guard is the federal on-scene coordinator for coastal 

spills. EPA is the federal on-scene coordinator for inland spills. 

So with that goes a host of requirements, and it actually requires 

an incident command system to bring together the variety of agencies as well as the responsible party so that we end up with an integrated response. And I think that speaks to some who say, ‘‘Why 

was OSHA on the boats?’’ It wasn’t that OSHA was in charge of 

safety on the boats; OSHA was helping as part of the unified command to address safety issues in an integrated fashion. 

So that dates back really to the Exxon Valdez, and at that time 

they also envisioned what we have termed our national incident 

commander, which Admiral Allen fills that role now. This is the 

very first event where we have ever had a national incident commander under the National Contingency Plan. We have exercised 

it every 3 years in accordance with the regulations for spills of national significance—exercises where we draw in agencies and we 

get industry to step up and be responsible parties for those exercises so that we get a realistic approach to integrating. 

But I would say the scale of this response, you know, is beyond 

anything that we have ever exercised, for sure—the largest response—you know, I think Admiral Allen has characterized it as a 
40 

siege. We have some 35,000 people involved in the response right 

now, and in terms of vessels and being prepared and all that, there 

is 2,700 vessels of opportunity, so to speak—fishing vessels or other 

ones that are being used that weren’t really intended for that purpose. 

So I think it is integrated to the extent it can. This response, 

though, is of very large magnitude. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Any other panelists have any thoughts or comments on the integration? 

Mr. MICHAELS. Just to add that within the, you know, the structure it has been fill-up, it is very clear where expertise and responsibilities lie. So OSHA, for example, is on those boats because we 

are measuring exposure to chemicals, we are observing the work 

that is done, where the Coast Guard is concerned about the seaworthiness of the vessels and various sea-related activities. But in 

fact, the work that we are looking at is not particular to the boat, 

but it is worker exposure. 

So it actually works pretty well in terms of the—that safety and 

health are integrated very well between the four or five agencies 

that are actively involved in the cleanup operation. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Admiral, you talked about how this is, you know, 

beyond the scope and size of what you anticipated the first time to 

implement this incident command system. I am assuming that 

there are ongoing lessons being learned and being documented in 

terms of how to refine and improve this process for future application. 

RADM COOK. Yes, Congressman. I am not really prepared to 

enumerate those right now, but yes, we are thinking that, you 

know, possibly there will be some legislation, you know, which will 

help to point the way forward from beyond what was done with the 

Exxon Valdez from OPA 90. Because certainly the framework is 

there, but in order to scale up to a spill which we can’t really quantify the extent—in this case, something that keeps coming from the 

well—I think we need to rethink some of the aspects of coordination. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Andrews? 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you calling this hearing so we can focus, you know, beyond the obvious 

tragedy of the loss of the way of life for people in the Gulf and the 

tragedy to the environment is the tragedy of 11 people not coming 

home to their families anymore. And I think that is something we 

really ought to be focusing on in addition to the rest of the very 

sad news here. 

My understanding is that long before any of you got here Mr. Michaels’ agency, in 1979, signed an agreement with Admiral Cook’s 

agency that said that worker safety would be the responsibility of 

the Coast Guard. Then, in 2003 Admiral Cook’s agency signed—or 

delegated to Mr. Slitor’s agency the responsibility of actually doing 

the inspections that are incumbent in that duty. Am I right about 

that? 

RADM COOK. Congressman, the essence is correct. The part 

about the delegating—Coast Guard delegating to Minerals Manage-
41 

ment Service, or BOE, is not entirely correct. That is just for annual visits to fix facilities—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay. 

RADM COOK [continuing]. Which some of them are unmanned, 

and—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay. Thank you. 

And I have heard testimony this morning that, with respect to 

the rigs, that their practice is to inspect at least every 30 days. Is 

that right, Mr. Slitor? 

Mr. SLITOR. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. ANDREWS. How many people go on those inspection visits? 

Mr. SLITOR. It certainly depends on the size of the facility—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. How many went to this facility? 

Mr. SLITOR. I believe at the last inspection there was two inspectors that went to that—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. How long do they—how much time do they spend 

on the inspection? 

Mr. SLITOR. I would have to get back to you on the precise time, 

but it was probably on the order of a full day. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I thought I heard you testify, too, that there—are 

there 58 people that you have doing the business of these inspections—is that right? 

Mr. SLITOR. Sixty-two total, across all regions, 56 of which are 

in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And of those 56 people, how many actually go out 

to the rigs and do the inspections? 

Mr. SLITOR. The way that our inspection workforce is set up, that 

all inspectors have responsibility or are trained to do both drilling 

and production inspections, but—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. So these are field personnel, not desk personnel? 

Mr. SLITOR. Well, nearly. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay. 

Mr. SLITOR. About five are so supervisory inspectors that their 

duties keep them in—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. How many rigs are there that need to be inspected in that category of inspections? How many are there in the 

Gulf? 

Mr. SLITOR. Well, it fluctuates quite a bit, of course, depending 

upon the price of oil, but it can range anywhere from 40 to 100. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So let’s say the midrange of that would be 70. 

There would be 840 inspections a year, right—70 times 12? 

Mr. SLITOR. Yes. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So you have 56 people doing 840 inspections a 

year? 

Mr. SLITOR. Once a month, yes. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes. Once a month. So how many inspections does 

the typical inspector do per week? 

Mr. SLITOR. Again, that number is quite varied because of the 

nature of the facilities can be—as Rear Admiral Cook pointed out— 

can be literally a single well—that has very little equipment to extremely large production facilities. So to come up with an average 

number, I am not sure what that might be, because some—it can 

take a day to do many of the inspections, or it can take a few hours 

to do some of these very small things. 
42 

Mr. ANDREWS. But the Deepwater Horizon fell into the day-long 

type category because it was more complex and larger? 

Mr. SLITOR. More complex, and the distance to shore is a big concern, or a big factor in what you can accomplish. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I think your testimony indicated that in the last 

5 years you issued 12,087 incidents of noncompliance and proceeded and closed 154 civil penalty cases. Do you know how that 

stacks up with previous 5-year periods? Is it more? Was it less? 

Mr. SLITOR. No, I do not know. I will—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Could you get that for us for the record? 

Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, in closing, one concern that I 

have is that any time someone gets sort of too far away from their 

core business it raises some concerns. I mean no disrespect to any 

of the agencies here, but one of the things that struck me about 

the testimony this morning is that we have a federal agency whose 

core business is worker safety, which is OSHA. 

And in 1979 OSHA decided, in conjunction with the Coast Guard, 

that it would sort of get out of that business and the Coast Guard 

would get into it. And there there is some arrangement, although 

I didn’t quite precisely state it, where in 2003 the Coast Guard decided that it will at least share that responsibility with Mr. Slitor’s 

agency. 

One of the things we ought to take a look at is whether, you 

know, the core business of the two agencies doing these inspections 

is really close enough to the job they have been given to do. 

Chairman MILLER. Well, I think the gentleman—if the gentleman would yield just quickly—raises a very important point. In 

1979 this industry, for the most part, did not exist. We were still 

operating off technology from the 1950s and 1960s on the outer 

continental shelf very close in, for the most part. 

I have had oil company CEOs tell me that when you make this 

decision you are betting the company; you are betting the company 

to go into this deep water, whether you go in Brazil, or you go in 

Nigeria, or you go in the Gulf of Mexico. And there is a huge 

amount of pressure on the oil executives, on the workers, on the 

safety organizations, and others. 

But that primary mission, I think you are right, has to somehow—it has to be walled off because they have an obligation to 

workers who are put in very difficult situations. I have been in 

these worksites as a worker and as a member of Congress. This is 

a tough place to do work. These are remarkable people who can do 

it on a constant basis, and I think you raised some important 

issues. 

Mr. Cassidy? 

Mr. CASSIDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Michaels, the—I am looking here at a CRS report—Congressional Research Service—speaking about oil and gas industry safety statistics, and as I gather, as it turns out, the chairman characterized it as inherently dangerous, and I suppose any such industry 

is, but I will point out that the oil and gas extraction industry has 

an injury rate that is significantly lower than other industries, and 

yet you use the term, which I really like, concept of low incident 

but high impact. And I think you also put that in context that if 

it is low incidence, high impact, oftentimes that it is a confluence 
43 

of—did you say human error, mechanical error, or how did you put 

that? 

Mr. MICHAELS. Well, it is a combination of factors. There are existing conditions—physical conditions and then, you know, individual decisions that are made—that lead to these disasters. 

Mr. CASSIDY. So, I am a physician, so my mind kind of, of course, 

will come from whence it comes, and I have noticed that in health 

care no matter how many systems you have, if you have somebody 

that makes a series of bad decisions, that oftentimes a terrible incident will occur despite good systems, despite everybody else behaving with proper concern. And I gather that by analogy that is almost what happens in these low frequency, high impact sort of conditions, or can be part of it? 

Mr. MICHAELS. I don’t know if we can generalize across the 

board, but when we look back, for example, at BP Texas City, 

which was a disaster which has been well researched, we saw that 

there were a number of systems that were not put into place that 

would have—or a number of decisions that were made over the 

course of several years that, had they been made differently, would 

have avoided the death toll there. And then there was operator 

error that—and conditions, essentially, the malfunctioning of machinery that measured the operator error, so the operators didn’t 

know that they had made the mistake. 

So those combination of things led to this event. And so from a 

safety point of view—— 

Mr. CASSIDY. Let me interrupt you, just—of time. So one of the 

things that is very, kind of, weird here is that BP is on the rig to 

give a safety award. 

Mr. MICHAELS. Right. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Steven Newman, who is testifying in Energy and 

Commerce, has had a time-out rule, that anybody on trans-ocean 

rigs could call time-out if they thought there was a safety issue. 

And yet, our concern is that there was an absence of attention to 

safety. 

And is there a way to reconcile the two, where there is a rig with 

great safety records, and an operator with the time-out rule, and 

an industry standard which has fewer injuries relative to other industries, and yet, here—boom, this happens. Now, how would you 

interpret that? 

Mr. MICHAELS. It is obviously complex. First, it is important to 

separate out personal safety issue, which is the injury and illnesses, versus process safety. And that is now fairly well understood by safety experts, though people still often conflate the two. 

Within that, though, we know from looking at some of these 

events that you have to have multiple levels of safety, or multiple 

protections in place. And apparently in the Deepwater Horizon a 

number of the things that should have stopped the blowout from 

occurring didn’t work, and obviously we are still trying to figure 

out exactly what that was. 

But then, even if you have a situation where workers understand 

they can, you know, call a time-out or things like that—and I don’t 

know if that was true or not—but if they can do that, there are still 

decisions made—production decisions that are made—you know, 

how long should we let this cement harden, for example—— 
44 

Mr. CASSIDY. So both systems failures and personal failures. 

Mr. MICHAELS. Exactly. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Now, one of the concerns is that there is an absence 

of regulation, but I am struck, Mr. Slitor, that your agency, in 

2002, issued new rules and within the year of issuing the new rules 

you had a 285 percent increase in what, INCs, or something—2006 

incident reports per year. 

Mr. SLITOR. Right. 

Mr. CASSIDY. So it appears that both you have the regulations 

and that you were doing the job if you were suddenly reporting 

roughly 500 incidents per year. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. SLITOR. It needs to be qualified. That 285 percent increase 

was the result of redefining the reporting threshold. So it—— 

Mr. CASSIDY. So you lowered the threshold, therefore that which 

was previously acceptable now no longer was. 

Mr. SLITOR. Correct. We wanted to know more of what was going 

on out there and we—— 

Mr. CASSIDY. So, and this is under 2006. I think one of the concerns is that the previous administration relaxed rules, but in 

terms—it actually seems as if they actually lowered the threshold 

by which violation would take place. 

Mr. SLITOR. No, not by which violation would take place. We are 

talking about the requirement upon the operator to report incidents. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Okay. 

Now, and, Admiral, again, one of the concerns that I think my 

colleague raised a good point: Should we take your safety inspections and give it OSHA, which has kind of a dedicated responsibility for worker safety, and yet here are you all and I see that it 

is part 142 of Title 33 includes regulations relating to workplace 

safety and health on the OCS. 

Do you think you do a good job? I will just say, again, it looks 

like the industry is actually safer than other industries, which, if 

your end point is safety I would say you would, but I would just 

like your take on that. 

RADM COOK. Congressman, I would say we could always improve, but I think the Coast Guard is the right agency to be looking 

at safety of vessels. We understand the maritime context better 

than any other agency within the government, so that when we inspect a mobile offshore drilling unit inside a fire cell that is navigationally, structurally, firefighting, lifesaving—all that stuff is right 

and is safe, and then they move into the drilling or production 

phase, you know, that is a little bit of a different world. But as far 

as determining safety and health in a maritime context for ships 

of all types, including mobile offshore drilling units, I think the 

Coast Guard is the right agency. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the indulgence. I 

yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Hare? 

Mr. HARE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Howard, I have a question for you here. I have been a longstanding supporter of the work that NIOSH does to enhance worker safety across the board, and first of all, let me thank you for the 
45 

work that your organization does to ensure that workers on the 

ground are protected. 

I wonder if you could tell me in what way that your education 

resource centers have been called upon to assist in this disaster. 

For example, I know the students of the University of Illinois at 

Chicago have recently been trained in hazardous waste cleanup, 

which is directly applicable to current efforts in the Gulf, and is 

there more that can be done to leverage their expertise, research 

ability, and training capacity to perhaps increase their role for future disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon? 

Dr. Howard. Yes, sir. We have, as you know, 17—we fund 17 

education and research centers throughout the United States, and 

I think that the expertise within those centers should be tapped. 

In this situation we have tapped some of that expertise informally. 

One of the issues that the National Institutes of Health director 

announced on the 15th was money available to look at human 

health effects. I hope that that money is made available through 

requests for applications for these institutions that not only we 

fund but superior academic institutions in the Gulf region so that 

they are able to participate in the research that needs to be done 

following this incident on human health effects. 

Mr. HARE. As the chairman mentioned, I am glad that you are 

having this list because we have already seen reports of people 

going to the hospital who are complaining of all kinds of problems 

that they have had, and I am concerned with some of the 

dispersants that are being used in terms of how toxic are they, you 

know, people getting sick down the road from this. I mean, this is 

going to be a very, very long process of cleaning up and—you know, 

probably years. 

And I think the important thing, as the chairman mentioned, is 

being able to, you know, have a list of people so that if there is a 

problem—a health problem—we can address it. I mean, it would 

seem to me that if we didn’t do that that would just, you know— 

it is beyond belief to me. 

Mr. Slitor, it is my understanding and the committee’s understanding that the inspector that went on the Deepwater Horizon 

had only been on as an inspector for 4 months. Is that correct— 

he had 4 months experience? 

Mr. SLITOR. Are you speaking of the last inspection? 

Mr. HARE. Correct. 

Mr. SLITOR. That is not my understanding. 

Mr. HARE. Okay. 

Mr. SLITOR. My understanding is the inspector that was on there 

the last time has been a long-term employee of MMS. 

Mr. HARE. All right. If you could just double check that for me, 

I would be interested to see. 

Mr. SLITOR. Sure. 

Mr. HARE. The other thing—and I just want to make sure I 

heard you correctly—you said when you are putting together this 

inspection thing that the oil producers help develop the inspection 

process. Is there anybody else that you think ought to be brought 

into the mix besides the people on it? 

Because I guess the one thing that concerns me is we have 

heard, again, reports about inspection reports being done in pencil 
46 

and then being written over in ink. So if these folks are writing 

their own inspection reports and then somebody is tracing over 

them, you know, I don’t know whether that is factual or not, but 

I am just saying that is very disturbing to me and I think to a lot 

of people. 

So, you know, it is sort of these guys are helping to write their 

own inspection things for you guys to go in and inspect. You know, 

I mean—— 

Mr. SLITOR. Well, I would understand your concern and we 

would share that, certainly, if we found that to be the case. But we 

are talking about two different things going on here. 

The industry standards groups that write recommended practices—these are highly vetted and rigorous procedures for doing 

this. Their sole goal is to develop practices for all of industry that 

speak to safety of either devices, equipment, methods, and we review—we sit on a number of these, not as a—member, but they are 

interested in our contribution as a regulator. So we are involved 

and we tell them of our concerns along the way as these are developed. 

Mr. HARE. I just have one final question. I know I am running 

out of time. 

If you or Admiral—if you folks are inspecting any one of these 

and your inspectors see something that, in their professional opinion, could be very, very troublesome here—in other words, have 

some serious consequences—do you have the authority to shut that 

well down? 

Mr. SLITOR. Without a doubt, sir. Without a doubt. 

RADM COOK. Same for the Coast Guard, sir. 

Mr. HARE. Okay. Well, I am glad to hear that. Thank you so 

much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Guthrie? 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you. What Congressman Hare brought up is important. And I think that what the chairman and the ranking member 

said earlier about precertifying being ready—Congressman Hare 

brought up dispersants, and one of the frustrating things amongst 

several things that people I have talked to have with the response 

from the administration’s side of it is we put dispersants into the 

water, we are all hoping it is going to disperse the oil and be successful, and then we find out it is got human or other environmental impacts of its own. 

And I guess my question is, did we know those threats were 

there but it was viewed—a decision was made to use a dispersant 

knowing the environmental impact it would be better—the worse 

impact would be to not use the dispersant, or did we just use something and then figure out there is a problem later—we were just 

completely unprepared for this kind of oil spill we are using 

dispersants? 

RADM COOK. Congressman, I will go ahead and answer your 

question not on a true, technical, scientific basis, but the procedures in the National Contingency Plan require that the regional 

response team, which is Interior, EPA—Coast Guard and EPA co- 
47 

chair it—and each region of the—federal region of the country— 

they have to authorize the use of dispersants before they can even 

be applied. 

In this case, the Gulf Coast plans already had preapproved use 

of the dispersants and the actual dispersant that was used, the 

Corexit. And that was done with the full knowledge and basis of 

testing that had to support its approval done in advance, so it was 

thought at the advance approval time that the impact of the 

dispersants would be less than the hazards presented by the oil 

making its way to the surface and reaching the beaches. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. But in reality it has been different, or are we still 

studying that? 

RADM COOK. Well, the authorization, even though it was 

preapproved, comes with a lot of testing that has to be done, and 

EPA is overseeing the continuous work on testing. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Okay. 

I have a question for Mr. Slitor. In MMS the I.G.’s report was 

not flattering at all of the activities that MMS—that who has been 

regulating this industry—and so now I think you laid out in your 

testimony the process about MMS’s investigation. Is there a conflict, or do you see a conflict, or how do you avoid a conflict of your 

agency and doing this investigation, which will look at the way 

your agency regulated the industry which has been brought into 

question, your performance by the I.G. report? 

Mr. SLITOR. No, Congressman. I don’t believe there is a conflict 

in this regard. The I.G. report, I believe, has found unethical behavior, without a doubt, and that is not—does not characterize our 

inspection workforce nor the intent of the people that do work in 

MMS. 

The people that are conducting the accident investigation are 

truly dedicated to finding out what is going on; they are very familiar with the processes, the equipment, and it is just—I know those 

folks, and it is their nature to get after the truth and how things 

went wrong. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Good. I am glad you have confidence, because that 

is important that we do that. I appreciate that. 

And then one more for Dr. Howard: You did a—in your testimony—a speech—or your written testimony—in New Orleans 

based on registering and trying to—ensuring that we have a good 

documentation of workers who are exposed. And just, could you 

give a—I guess I have probably a couple of minutes left—just an 

overview of what you were talking about, and are we registering— 

are we doing this correctly? And is there anything preliminary that 

you have seen in your studies already? 

Dr. Howard. The rostering effort thus far has resulted in nearly 

15,000 workers being rostered. One question that we have, of 

course, is what is the real denominator? 

We have asked and been given BP’s list of badged individuals. 

We are going through that list now to figure out what is the true 

denominator so we can have some idea whether we are 50 percent 

successful, 25 percent successful, or nearly 100 percent successful. 

Some of the government agencies have asked for their individuals to be rostered. We are doing through electronic Web site for 

them. 
48 

As everyone has noted this morning, one of the lessons of 9/11 

is that we did not have such a roster. It made any immediate or 

long-term follow-up of human health extremely difficult. So this is 

a primary mission of ours to get everyone rostered. 

Mr. GUTHRIE. Well, I am glad that all of you are taking our 

workers’ safety very important as you move forward, and we appreciate that. That is very important we do so, and thanks. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Howard, why would this continue to be 

voluntary? Why would we allow a worker to go into the area without being rostered? 

Dr. Howard. Well, we don’t have the legal authority to involuntarily ask individuals to roster, but we certainly—— 

Chairman MILLER. Well, don’t hire the person, with all do respect. 

Dr. Howard. I am sorry? 

Chairman MILLER. Don’t hire the person. 

Dr. Howard. Well, the employer certainly has that ability. 

Chairman MILLER. I mean, if we have learned something from 9/ 

11 it was these gaps turned out to be very costly for victims, for 

the government, for mitigators. Okay. 

Mr. Courtney? 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I just wanted to say that for some people who have 

been critics of the government’s response, I think Admiral Cook’s 

opening remarks about the fact that 115 lives were saved because 

of the search and rescue response that the Coast Guard mounted 

immediately is something that shouldn’t be forgotten, and I want 

to just again publicly thank the Coast Guard for their efforts at 

that time. 

One of the chairman’s comments when he opened this hearing 

was the fact that in addition to sort of the cross-jurisdictional 

issues that we are trying to figure out here today within the U.S. 

government there are also international maritime issues that add 

another layer of complexity to try and just sort out the rules here. 

This is a rig which was built in South Korea, operated by a Swiss 

company, under contract to a British firm, BP, flagged by the Marshall Islands, who contracts out its inspections to a private company. 

And, Admiral Cook, in your opening remarks—or your written 

remarks—you indicated that when the Coast Guard is doing its 

statutory certification for foreign vessels the flag state or authorized recognized organization working on behalf of the flag state carries out the inspections, tests, and surveys required to issue the 

statutory certificates, which I assume were submitted to the Coast 

Guard in the form of reports. 

Again, just in terms of who is doing the inspections, the initial 

certificates with a foreign-flagged rig, how is that working? How is 

that different than if it was a U.S.-flagged rig? 

RADM COOK. Mr. Congressman, and first let me just say thank 

you for acknowledging the lives saved there, and I think that is 

somewhat of a statement of the fact that the types of requirements 

the Coast Guard has for lifesaving equipment, and our inspection 
49 

techniques, and things like that, validate that those were useful 

and helped save lives at the time. 

So I will try and drive down—and it is a little—it is a complex 

web, but in some terms it is called a safety net because we do have 

a flag state that has responsibilities, we have a recognized organization which, in this case, was the American Bureau of Shipping, 

which is an agency which specializes in maritime—almost like a 

maritime surveyor—and there are several of those throughout the 

world. 

There are very few of them, but they have a lot of expertise, and 

that is who has done the—they have been recognized by the Marshall Islands to carry out the certification inspections in their behalf. 

We, as the Coast Guard, represent the U.S. to the International 

Maritime Organization, where the foundational codes are developed, and we invest our best engineers and operational people to 

try and make those codes that are enforced throughout the world 

up to the standards of the U.S. So they have met the international 

mobile offshore drilling unit code, they were issued the right certificates, and then they presented themselves for inspection to the 

Coast Guard. 

We go on, we know what we need to look for to validate that the 

rig is up to standards, and if we have anything that we see out of 

the ordinary—you know, any kind of navigation thing, safety thing, 

firefighting, on and on—we are able to then dig further and we do 

what is called an expanded exam, and there is no limits to an expanded exam. You know, we could spend a week there if we needed 

to, but typically that is not necessary. So we make sure that they 

back up, proof is in the pudding, verify what has been presented 

to us. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, clearly the countries that a lot of these 

companies gravitate towards in terms of getting flagged, whether 

it is Liberia, Marshall Islands, Panama—I mean, they are going 

there sometimes for tax reasons, sometimes for other reasons, but 

flags of convenience, as they are referred to. I mean, there is certainly a concern that people have that the rules are not the same 

standards that the U.S. would apply. 

And one quick example, and maybe you can respond to it because 

it has been reported in the press, which is that the Marshall Islands permitted a dual command structure so that the sea captain 

on the rig was not the person solely in charge of decision at the 

time of the explosion, that there was a offshore installation manager who had, basically, concurrent authority with the sea captain. 

Again, press reports have suggested that that would never happen on a U.S.-flagged rig, and again, I just wonder if you could 

comment on that because, you know, that obviously would appear 

to be something that we have to accept under the rules of international maritime. 

RADM COOK. That split in responsibility between the vessel 

master and the offshore installation manager is allowable underneath the International Safety of Life at Sea Convention. So they 

did meet international standards. We at the U.S. signed up for that 

convention. 
50 

In our own regulations we have continued to require that the 

master and the officer—the offshore installation manager be the 

same person, so his license is a master with an OIM endorsement. 

And I think that is one of the areas that we do need to explore further and, you know, consider all the aspects of having that split. 

The split does not take place until the drilling connection to the 

bottom takes place, but still, we need to know clearly who is in 

charge. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Loebsack? 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

This has really been pretty enlightening, I have to say. A little 

stressing, obviously, the lack of coordination that does exist at the 

federal level. I know everyone is trying their best to do what they 

can now after the disaster. I just see this truly as a national disaster, not just a regional or a local disaster, for a variety of reasons, but I appreciate all the work that you folks are doing. 

I would just like to focus a little bit again on sort of the postdisaster response. NIOSH and OSHA are working together, you 

said, Dr. Howard—is that correct—to develop an interim guidance. 

Is that what it is called—an interim guidance? Can you talk about 

that a little bit? 

Dr. Howard. Yes, sir. Both OSHA and NIOSH have been looking 

at all of the hazard profile in all of the exposure groups of workers 

involved with the response and then have been developing a comprehensive interim guidance for protecting workers and volunteers 

in the Deepwater Horizon response. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Can you give us some specifics as to what that 

is, what that means, what are the different things that you are 

looking at? 

Dr. Howard. Well, there are a number of very important issues. 

Dr. Michaels mentioned the issue of heat stress. Fatigue, long 

hours is another important issue. 

The issue of personal protective clothing is an important issue. 

Clothing can exacerbate heat stress. The issue of respiratory protection is an important issue. 

So all of those issues we are trying to put together into a guidance that both agencies can stand behind, would be able to inform 

the Coast Guard, BP, all of the contractors, and others involved in 

the response. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. And what about psychological and mental stress? 

Dr. Howard. Clearly that would be in our guidance, too. First of 

all, long hours and fatigue add to stress, and the work itself can 

be very stressful—response work itself can be stressful. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. When might we have data—I assume you are collecting some kind of data at this point as far as the effects not only 

of the dispersants but the oil, and the fires, all the rest. When we 

will have data? 

Dr. Howard. We are not yet focused directly on the effects. Right 

now we are focusing on prevention, and so we have a tremendous 

amount of data about the exposures, and that is what we are focusing on. 

In addition, though, every report of a potential work-related illness is followed up on by the medical detectives at NIOSH. Yester-
51 

day the Institute of Medicine convened a large meeting in New Orleans that both Dr. Howard and I participated in to think about 

how to collect data on effects into the future, both physiologic and 

psychological effects, and that process is just beginning. 

To this point there aren’t too many effects other than mental 

health-related. We believe that the physical effects we know a 

great deal about what is going on right now, and fortunately they 

are still limited, but we need to follow up on that. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Do you know how many workers have reported 

illnesses that may have resulted from the cleanup work? Do we 

have specific numbers on that? 

Dr. Howard. Dr. Michaels mentioned several hundred workers 

had reported symptoms. I believe that was one of the issues. A lot 

of workers report symptoms of odors—hydrocarbon odors—a lot of 

workers report heat-related illnesses and have sought medical attention. The department has a mobile unit—medical unit—in Venice, Louisiana, and we have had over 178 visits to that both from 

workers as well as residents in the area. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. And I guess sort of going back to the whistleblower issue but something broader than that, and that is workers 

feeling free to report when they are injured or when they are suffering illnesses. How are we doing on that post-disaster, at this 

point? 

Dr. Howard. That is a very important issue. We have gotten one 

formal whistleblower complaint so far, which we are following up 

on. We have been very clear to the public, to workers, and to BP 

that workers should feel free to call us. 

BP has said workers are free to call, but I think this is a message that we have to repeat over and over because we aren’t everywhere all the time, and I think people already are feeling very 

stressed and very concerned about their future, their employment, 

their income, their families. And I think this is an issue we will 

have to deal with, you know, as long as the cleanup goes on, and 

we have to play a proactive role in encouraging people to call us. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. And making sure that they are free and that 

they—or they won’t be fired, or whatever the case may be. 

Dr. Howard. And if we find an example of that to make a public 

shaming of the company involved. And we have had examples so 

far where subcontractors have done things that are clearly against 

our regulations—for example, charging roofers for protective equipment which should be free. 

And together with BP we have made it very clear to that company that is wrong; those companies have publicly said, ‘‘We are 

wrong,’’ and reimbursed the workers, and done it in a way that 

they won’t do it again. And so we have to be on the case on this. 

This is a real concern. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you. 

Thank you all. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

We currently have votes on the floor. My intent is before we go 

to the vote to recognize Ms. Chu, Mr. Polis, and Ms. Hirono. So we 

are going to try to do that now, and I think that means we will 

not be coming back unless somebody lets the chair know. 
52 

Congresswoman Chu? 

Ms. CHU. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I wanted to ask questions about heat illness. I authored a heat 

illness bill for farm workers in California, and as far as I know it 

is the only state with worker protections against heat illness. In 

California it is mainly a dry heat, but I can imagine how much it 

is aggravated on the Gulf Coast and what it must be like now in 

June,. and what it will be like in the upcoming months of July and 

August. 

Now, I understand that the workers in the Gulf are working 20 

minutes and then resting 40 minutes. Is this true, and did OSHA 

set up this schedule? Or how was this schedule determined and 

how is OSHA enforcing this rest break, Dr. Michaels? 

Mr. MICHAELS. First, Congresswoman, I want to thank you for 

your work on heat in California. You led the nation and I hope we 

and other states will be able to follow you as well. 

Heat is a very important issue. Every year between 20 and 40 

workers lose their lives to heat in the country. Far more people are 

made ill, as well, and as we said before, that is a very significant 

issue on the coast. We have had well over 100 reports of heat illness with some people being sick at some medical facilities as well. 

There is a matrix that has been put together by BP and the 

Interstate Command which goes through the working conditions 

based on temperature, relative humidity, and the clothes that people are wearing. If people are wearing chemical-resistant clothes— 

you know, boots, gloves, and Tyvek outfits—it is—in hot weather— 

it is very difficult to work. 

And so in those requirements workers work 20 minutes on and 

then 40 minutes in the shade being rehydrated. If it is a lower temperature or they are not wearing certain equipment it can be 30- 

30 or it could be 40-20. And so it depends. 

We insist that—OSHA is enforcing that to our—not through 

issuing citations, but saying, ‘‘This is what we insist on,’’ and there 

is no disagreement across the entire operation that that is the way 

it must be, because we really are afraid of people being seriously 

made ill or killed by this, because it is a really hazard. I know 

some people don’t take it as seriously as we do. 

In addition, there are now medics at every one of the staging 

areas to take pulses, to look at workers, to tell them to get out of 

the sun when they think that there is a problem, to talk to people 

about symptoms, to ensure that they are protected. So this is actually the example of sort of the way we are working right now. We 

don’t have a heat standard, and it would be difficult for us to enforce a heat standard using citations. 

On the other hand, because of the nature of where we are working we say, ‘‘This is what must be done,’’ and everybody does it. So 

I think that is actually working pretty well. 

Ms. CHU. In my bill we also had requirements for water, access 

to shade, and training for employees to learn how to prevent heat 

illness. Do you have any of those elements in there? 

Mr. MICHAELS. All of those things about heat is in the training 

now, shade—in fact, when I was down there recently there were 

complaints that the shade areas were not closely enough—situated 

closely together and so that was then changed; they were put at 
53 

much more close intervals on the beach so workers could get to 

those more quickly. And lots of hydration is available and people 

are really regularly reminded they must drink a lot. 

Ms. CHU. Very good. 

Just to switch to a different topic, I have a concern about the Vietnamese-American fishermen that are down there. About onethird of the fishermen are Vietnamese, and many of them are linguistically isolated—that is, they speak primarily Vietnamese. 

We know that there are very difficult emotions they are feeling 

now—hopelessness, and depression, and even suicidal thoughts. So, 

Dr. Howard, what is the availability of Vietnamese-speaking mental health professionals and literature, and what is being done to 

address the mental health effects of the Vietnamese fishermen population and on their families, too? 

Dr. Howard. Certainly that issue is extremely important for all 

workers, and clearly what we are doing in terms of education is 

getting our materials in English, Spanish, and Vietnamese. The 

part of HHS that does behavioral health support, SAMHSA, is very 

much involved in the Gulf, and we are working with state and local 

health departments on that issue to make sure that none of the linguistically challenged folks are unaware of the issues related to 

stress as well as heat and other hazards. 

Ms. CHU. And is there any monitoring to determine whether 

there are enough mental health professionals that speak the language? 

Dr. Howard. We are doing that now actively with state health 

departments to make sure that there is enough personnel available. I don’t have an answer for you today, but I would say that 

we can follow up with you about that. 

Ms. CHU. I would appreciate that. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Polis? 

Mr. POLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to talk—some questions for Dr. Michaels and Rear Admiral Cook. First, you know, a little history: Valdez Crud was the 

nickname that was given to the sickness experienced by cleanup 

workers, which Exxon attributed to a cold or flu. I have to say that 

I found it incredibly troubling that during the Exxon Valdez spill 

Exxon argued that their cleanup workers simply had a nasty flu 

that was spreading throughout their camp accounting for symptoms that just happened to be more closely aligned with high chemical and crude oil exposure. 

Now, unfortunately, that so-called flu, for many Exxon Valdez 

cleanup workers, lasted over 20 years. That is a long flu. And I 

think it is time that we realized that cleanup crews are being exposed to unhealthy chemicals and toxins that can have debilitating 

long-term health effects. 

Now, here we are today, 20 years later, but most troubling of all, 

we are watching history repeat itself and we seem to be learning 

too little from the past disasters. Just weeks ago we saw BP taking 

the strategy page right out of Exxon’s book by saying they are the 

same common symptoms with the result of food poisoning. 

BP’s Tony Hayward said: I am sure they were genuinely ill, but 

whether it had anything to do with dispersants in oil, whether it 

was food poisoning or some other reason,’’ et cetera. Exxon said of 
54 

this disaster that the illnesses were a flu-like upper respiratory illness that spread because of crowded living conditions. 

I would like to ask why you think a company in Exxon or BP’s 

position would want to link common symptoms of crude oil and 

chemical exposure to a virus or food poisoning no matter how obvious the linkage to toxic exposure the symptoms could be. 

Mr. MICHAELS. You know, I can’t speak to BP’s motivation, but 

we see over and over again situations where workers—even where 

workers are injured, fairly the worker is blamed. I mean, at BP 

Texas City the initial response of BP was to fire the workers involved, and only after there was an investigation that was done it 

was shown they weren’t—you know, they did make mistakes, but 

they weren’t at fault at all because of the way the system works, 

and they were actually rehired again with apologies made. 

The issue, though, of figuring out what illnesses are associated 

with the exposure is a very tough one. You know, we have longterm OSHA rules on what is recordable, but what is going on in 

the Gulf now is any time a worker reports a condition that they 

believe to be work-related—either reports it to us, reports it to 

NIOSH, to BP, or through one of the health surveillance systems 

that Dr. Howard works on, that goes into the system and the medical detectives from NIOSH actually investigate it, because we have 

learned from Exxon Valdez. We need to run down every one of 

these cases. 

Mr. POLIS. Now, a follow-up question there: It is my understanding that there is a clause that specifically states that under 

OSHA cold and flu will not be considered work-related, so is there 

any concern that throwing into question these symptoms’ linkage 

to toxic exposure could limit your ability to investigate? 

Mr. MICHAELS. I don’t think so. I mean, officially it is not recordable because the way we—what is useful—you know, we take recordable conditions consist. But in this situation we are running 

down every report of an illness, and this may lead to changes in 

the way we record injuries, but certainly I think in this case we 

are not construing these as any less valid than any other reports. 

Mr. POLIS. Admiral Cook? 

RADM COOK. Just briefly, Congressman, you know, I am sitting 

here wearing the uniform trying to represent all aspects of the 

Coast Guard. We receive our medical support from the public 

health service, so we have an admiral on staff in the public health 

service who is our chief medical officer, and he has just spent the 

better part of the last week in the Gulf in the same meetings as 

our two doctors here, and—because we are so interested, too. So I 

think there has been some learning that has gone on over the years 

as far as getting in there and trying to assess the impact of workers quickly. 

Mr. POLIS. Well, I want to encourage you all to look at the lessons that we have learned in the last 20 years from the Exxon 

Valdez incidents. We really can’t let history repeat itself, and we 

need your agencies to be very vigilant in that cause. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Ms. Hirono? 

Ms. HIRONO. I would appreciate short answers because we are 

running out of time. 
55 

Dr. Michaels, in October Secretary Solis suggested imposing a 

fine of $87 million on BP. Has BP paid that fine? 

Mr. MICHAELS. No. We are still in settlement negotiations with 

them. 

Ms. HIRONO. But you intend to pursue that to the—— 

Mr. MICHAELS. We are pursuing it. 

Ms. HIRONO [continuing]. Ultimate degree? 

Mr. MICHAELS. But more importantly than the fine, we want the 

hazards abated, and that is—— 

Ms. HIRONO. Sure, they need to make the changes at—I take it 

at the Texas refinery? 

Okay. 

Mr. Slitor, you said in your testimony that after larger disasters, 

which this is, there is a panel investigation done. Was a panel investigation done after the Texas disaster where 15 people died and 

170 people were injured? 

Mr. SLITOR. None that we were involved in. That isn’t within our 

jurisdiction. We have from three miles out—you are speaking of the 

Texas refinery? 

Ms. HIRONO. Yes. 

Mr. SLITOR. No. We do not have jurisdiction—— 

Ms. HIRONO. So who does the investigation on that, and 

shouldn’t there be some lessons learned because they were talking 

about the same company? 

Mr. MICHAELS. OSHA investigated and the Chemical Safety 

Board did a very extensive investigation. We have—and the Baker 

Commission—we have lots of lessons learned; the problem is applying them. 

Ms. HIRONO. You said that could have been applicable—that applies? 

Mr. MICHAELS. I think there are several, yes. 

Ms. HIRONO. Apparently the MMS people didn’t get it, right? So 

this, again, speaks to the need for coordination, and I would think 

that after the Texas disaster that maybe that would have led to 

some cooperation and coordination, and if it didn’t—and I know 

that you are all sitting here saying that you are going to be collaborative and all that—how can we be assured, because after a huge 

disaster that happened with BP in their Texas refinery if this 

didn’t happen how can we be reassured that you are, in fact, going 

to coordinate response and do all the things that we would like you 

to do? 

Mr. Slitor, would you like to respond to that? 

Mr. SLITOR. I can respond to part of that. We have no authority 

over the refinery activity, but I would imagine that the lessons 

learned from that among our three bureaus will be shared on the 

applicable points to this particular disaster. 

Ms. HIRONO. Especially as I am seeing even with the same company that seems to have had a lengthy record of safety violations 

and all that, which leads me, Mr. Slitor, to my last question. I do 

have more, but we are out of time. You mentioned in your testimony there are over 12,000 INCs for violations of your requirements, regulations. How many of those involve BP? 

Mr. SLITOR. I would have to get back to you. I don’t know how 

many involve—— 
56 

Ms. HIRONO. So before this testimony, knowing that we were 

going to be focused on BP, you didn’t happen to look to see how 

many of these citations involve BP? 

Mr. SLITOR. No. 

Ms. HIRONO. You will get that to us? 

Mr. SLITOR. I can get that to you. 

Ms. HIRONO. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much. I would just say, I 

know this sounds like a lot of lack of coordination, what have you. 

As one who was present on-site at the Exxon Valdez for a considerable period of time, this is a different world. Workers there who 

would face down in the oil were told to get up and go to work or 

get fired, and this went on over, and over, and over, and over 

again, and with little discussion that is now taking place. 

You know, this accident happened in one of the most sensitive 

environments, complex environments in the entire—obviously in 

the entire United States, with the Gulf and the Delta regions of 

that area. We all understand the magnitude of this spill and the 

rest of that, but the fact of the matter is that we are now, in real 

time, talking to workers, and workers have a place to report, I 

think, it is really a testimony to how far we have come from 9/11, 

Katrina, Exxon Valdez, to today, and I want to appreciate that coordination. 

We are trying to figure out—it is not just a question of coordination, but we really have—we remove the barriers to the expertise 

being applied where it should, and that is not a process of second 

guessing. This is an opportunity to learn, as we have said. We are 

referring back to laws from 1953, 1979, 1983. 

It is a different world out there today in disaster response, in 

worker safety, in the complexity of these work sites. Today, here, 

what is the human safety problem can become an environmental 

problem rapidly because when something goes wrong on one of 

these rigs that ordinarily it would injure somebody, it would be 

confined—like in my hometown, the refineries, it can get out of 

hand rather rapidly. And so these crossovers here are difficult, jurisdictionally, to deal with. 

We never thought we would ever use this much dispersant at one 

time. That decision is far different than the initial one, while it 

may be helpful in the short run. 

Anyway, I really appreciate your cooperation with the committee. 

We are going to come back to you. I am very, very concerned about 

the process management rule being expedited. I know there is 

some pressure to get it done. I think we had better pause a moment here and see if this is really the rule that we want in place 

and that will work, given the magnitude of this tragedy. 

So with that, all members will have 14 days to submit additional 

materials and questions for the hearing record. And again, thanking the witnesses for your time and your expertise and your experience, the hearing will stand adjourned. 

[The statement of Mr. Payne follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Donald M. Payne, a Representative in 

Congress From the State of New Jersey 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
57 

The BP Deepwater Horizon tragedy has been labeled as one of the worst environmental disasters in the nation’s history. On April 20, 2010, the lives of 11 workers 

were lost and fifteen others were injured as a result of neglect from BP. 

The BP Deepwater Horizon has had a devastating impact on fisheries, wildlife, 

and tourism in the Gulf Coast, among other things. Included in the many concerns 

is the health and safety of workers employed to clean this disaster. 

There have been roughly 25,000 workers engaged in the Gulf Coast oil spill cleaning effort, which is expected to extend into the coming months and years. As the 

focus on ending and cleaning the spill continues, we must not neglect the health 

and safety of workers. 

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, long term exposure 

to dispersants can cause central nervous system problems, or do damage to blood, 

kidneys or livers. In the sixty-five days since the Deepwater incident, there have 

been reports of flu-like symptoms and respiratory problems from workers. Emergency room doctors and other physicians in the Gulf Coast continue to see a pattern 

of symptoms among patients who work closely with the cleaning efforts. This has 

led to the investigation of the long term impact of this spill on workers. 

BP is ultimately being held responsible for all things related to this disaster; however, our current catastrophe is a result of a breach in responsibility on BP’s part. 

Today, we will examine the responsibility of federal agencies to worker safety and 

health in this oil spill clean up. 

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), United States Coast 

Guard and the Minerals Management Service (MMS) all hold a portion of responsibility in ensuring worker safety. I look forward to examining how these agencies are 

currently fulfilling their responsibilities to health and safety for workers tasked 

with cleaning the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. Additionally, I hope we can explore how the assignment of personnel to the Gulf is affecting enforcement activities 

elsewhere. 

Thank you. 

[Additional submissions of Mr. Miller follow:] 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 

BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY, MANAGEMENT, REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT, 

Washington, DC, October 01, 2010. 

Hon. GEORGE MILLER, Chairman, 

Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, Washington, DC 

20515. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter dated June 25, 2010, to the Interior Secretary Salazar, cosigned by Chairman, Committee on Natural Resources, 

Nick J. Rahall, II, requesting that the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) work closely with the Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration (OSHA) in the development of new Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS) regulation. As Director of BOEMRE, I have 

been asked to respond on the Secretary’s behalf. A similar response is being sent 

to Chairman Rahall. 

I have meet with OSHA Assistant Secretary David Michaels on two separate occasions on issues of mutual interest, including rulemaking, and our staffs have engaged in a productive dialogue. We have developed the SEMS regulation and expect 

to publish it in the near future. During the process, we received valuable input from 

OSHA that we have considered in developing the rule. 

We anticipate the need for future rulemaking as the SEMS program evolves and 

will continue to work closely with OSHA. If you have further questions, please contact me at (202) 208-3500 or Ms. Lyn Herdt, Chief, BOEMRE, Office of Congressional Affairs, at (202) 208-3502. 

Sincerely, 

MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, 

Director 
58 

[VIA FACSIMILE], 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 

Washington, DC, June 25, 2010. 

Hon. HILDA SOLIS, Secretary, 

U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20210. 

Hon. KEN SALAZAR, Secretary, 

U.S. Department of the Interior, 1849 C Street, NW, Washington, DC 20240. 

DEAR SECRETARY SALAZAR AND SECRETARY SOLIS: During our respective tenures 

as Chairman of the Natural Resources Committee, we have long advocated more rigorous oversight of the Minerals Management Service (MMS) (now renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOE)). This interest as only increased as a consequence of the Deepwater Horizon incident. 

Building on the series of hearings the Committee on Natural Resources has held 

this spring, the Committee on Education and Labor held a hearing on June 23, 

2010, entitled ‘‘Worker Health and Safety from the Oil Rig to the Shoreline’’ that 

examined the frame work for worker health and safety oversight following the explosion and fire on the Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico which killed 11 

worker and injured 17. At this hearing, witnesses indicated that there had been 

only limited interaction between the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA) and MMS/BOE in the reviewing and proposed ‘‘Safety and Environmental 

Management Systems’’ regulation, which covers worker safety on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). This rule is absolutely critical because it sets forth a systems 

approach to managing explosive and flammable materials throughout every function 

and decision involved in offshore oil and gas drilling and production processes. 

We are writing to urge the Department of the Interior to actively engage OSHA 

to seek that agency’s expertise and experience on process safety management prior 

to issuing any final ‘‘Safety and Environmental Management Systems’’ regulation. 

In parallel, we urge OSHA to review proposed MMS regulation in light of its own 

experience in enforcing a similar safety management regulation, and to incorporate 

lessons learned from major oil rig disasters such as Piper Alpha rig explosion off 

the coast of the United Kingdom. OSHA’s process safety management rule, which 

it finalized in 1992, served as the basis for an $87 million proposed fine against BP 

at its Texas City refinery. The MMS proposed regulation and OSHA’s rule share a 

common feature: both are focused on management systems to ensure hydrocarbons 

stay inside pipes in complex industrial processes such as oil rigs and refineries. 

While the purpose of the proposed MMS rule is laudable—to improve environmental and worker health and safety on the Outer Continental Shelf—we have 

some concerns that the rule is not comprehensive enough. It is based on the American Petroleum Institute’s Recommended Practice 75 (API RP 75), yet only includes 

4 of the 12 provisions of that RP. However, following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, it is unclear whether the API’s approach is sufficiently robust for developing 

the Interior Department’s proposed rule, and it is imperative to assess whether the 

API Recommended Practice is sufficient. Furthermore, the proposed rule appears to 

exclude a number of the mandatory elements contained in OSHA’s process safety 

management regulations, such as assessing hazards during startup and shutdown, 

incidents investigations, training for process safety management, and assessing the 

consequences of deviation from operating procedures. Notably, the proposed rule excludes any formal role for employee participation, whereas OSHA has expressed requirements for participation in process hazard analysis and access to information. 

While the proposed rule does not foreclose operators from adopting a more comprehensive approach on a voluntary basis, we want to be sure that there are no 

gaps in the regulatory safety net. 

We urge both of your agencies to complete this review and assessment as quickly 

as possible so as not to delay issuance of this regulation, which is already overdue. 

We also respectfully request that both agencies brief us once the BOE-OSHA review 

has been completed. 

Moving forward, the health and safety of OCS workers depends on maximizing 

interagency cooperation and expertise. Thanks you for your immediate attention to 

this critical matter. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE MILLER, Chairman, 

Committee on Education and Labor, 

NICK RAHALL, Chairman, 

Committee on Natural Resources. 
59 

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 

Washington, DC, July 29, 2010. 

(HOUSE RULES) 

Statement of Administration Policy 

H.R. 5851—Offshore Oil and Gas Worker Whistleblower Protection Act of 2010 

(Rep. Miller, D–California and Rep. Markey, D–Massachusetts) 

The Administration strongly supports House passage of H.R. 5851, the ‘‘Offshore 

Oil and Gas Worker Whistleblower Protection Act of 2010,’’ because it would provide 

important whistleblower protections to workers on the Outer Continental Shelf. 

All workers should be able to protect their health and safety by reporting violations of the law or workplace hazards without fear of retaliation from their employers. These protections are particularly important for workers whose lives depend on 

their employers’ assurances of their safety. Congressional hearings have revealed 

that workers on the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil drilling platform had significant 

safety concerns, but feared they would lose their jobs if they spoke out. Whistleblower protections must be meaningful so that workers feel secure enough to speak 

up when they see hazards going unaddressed. 

There is currently no Federal law adequately protecting offshore workers who 

blow the whistle on worker health and safety hazards. While there are some protections for workers who blow the whistle on environmental or pipeline safety violations, these are not uniform. H.R. 5851 would extend strong whistleblower protections to workers on the Outer Continental Shelf, including workers who are part of 

a drilling or spill clean-up operation. The bill would accomplish this by prohibiting 

retaliation against workers who, among other things, report violations relating to 

the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act or refuse to perform their duties based on 

the good faith belief that the work could result in injury or illness, or could cause 

public harm, such as an oil spill. H.R. 5851 also would provide that any covered 

worker who is a victim of retaliation be made whole by reinstatement, back pay, 

and compensatory and punitive damages. 

For these reasons, the Administration strongly supports H.R. 5851, and urges its 

swift passage. 

[Questions submitted for the record follow:] 

[VIA E-MAIL], 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

Washington, DC, June 25, 2010. 

RADM KEVIN COOK, Director, 

Prevention Policy for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, U.S. Coast Guard, 

2100 Second Street, SW, Washington, DC 20593. 

DEAR REAR ADMIRAL COOK: Thank you for testifying at the Wednesday, June 23, 

2010, Committee on Education and Labor hearing on ‘‘Worker Health and Safety 

from the Oil Rig to the Shoreline’’ in Washington, DC. 

I have additional questions for which I would like written responses from you for 

the hearing record: 

1. What specific whistleblower protections are provided to private sector workers 

who are employed between the in-shore areas where OSHA has jurisdiction (shoreline to 3 miles out) and the Outer Continental Shelf, and are working on vessels, 

platforms, drilling rigs, MODUs, and support equipment that is covered under 

USCG worker safety and health regulations? 

2. What employees are covered, if any? 

3. Which employees are excluded, if any? 

4. Please name the specific statute or statutes and regulations that cover such 

employees for protected activity. 

5. What activity or actions are protected under such whistleblower statutes, and 

which is excluded? 

6. What agency adjudicates those claims? 

7. Is there an expressed right to refuse unsafe work and if so, where is that provided and to the extent that it is, what happens is there is retaliation? 

Please send your written response to Meredith Regine of the Committee on Education and Labor staff at meredith.regine@mail.house.gov by COB on Wednesday, 

July 5, 2010—the date on which the hearing record will close. If you have any ques-
60 

tions, please contact Ms. Regine at 202-225-3725. Again, we greatly appreciate your 

testimony at this hearing. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE MILLER, 

Chairman. 

[VIA E-MAIL], 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

Washington, DC, June 25, 2010. 

Mr. DOUG SLITOR, Acting Chief, 

Office of Offshore Regulatory Programs, Offshore Energy and Minerals Management, 

Bureau of Ocean Energy, Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, 1849 C 

Street, NW, Washington, DC 20240. 

DEAR MR. SLITOR: Thank you for testifying at the Wednesday, June 23, 2010, 

Committee on Education and Labor hearing on ‘‘Worker Health and Safety from the 

Oil Rig to the Shoreline’’ in Washington, DC. 

I have additional questions for which I would like written responses from you for 

the hearing record: 

1. What whistleblower protections are provided to private sector workers employed on the Outer Continental Shelf drilling rigs, platforms or related equipment 

who are covered under BOE safety and health regulations? 

2. What employees are covered, if any? 

3. Which employees are excluded, if any? 

4. Please name the specific statute or statutes and regulations that cover such 

employees for protected activity. 

5. What activity or actions are protected under such whistleblower statutes, and 

which is excluded? 

6. What agency adjudicates those claims? 

7. Is there an expressed right to refuse unsafe work and if so, where is that provided and to the extent that it is, what happens is there is retaliation? 

Please send your written response to Meredith Regine of the Committee on Education and Labor staff at meredith.regine@mail.house.gov by COB on Wednesday, 

July 5, 2010—the date on which the hearing record will close. If you have any questions, please contact Ms. Regine at 202-225-3725. Again, we greatly appreciate your 

testimony at this hearing. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE MILLER, 

Chairman. 

[VIA E-MAIL], 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

Washington, DC, June 25, 2010. 

Dr. DAVID MICHAELS, Assistant Secretary, 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 

Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20210. 

DEAR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MICHAELS: Thank you for testifying at the Wednesday, June 23, 2010, Committee on Education and Labor hearing on ‘‘Worker Health 

and Safety from the Oil Rig to the Shoreline.’’ 

One of the Committee Members had an additional question for which he would 

like a written response from you for the hearing record. 

Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH) asks the following question: 

I am gravely concerned about the immediate and long-term health effects of the 

spill and the clean-up operations on workers. The cleanup workers of the 1989 

Exxon Valdez spill continue to suffer from their exposure to the crude oil and the 

dispersants used during the cleanup. The same is true of the 2002 Prestige spill in 

Spain. And we are all too familiar with the plight of the 9-11 workers 

I’d like to think that we have learned our lesson from these disasters and that 

the workers will not suffer from chronic diseases for the rest of their lives. Unfortunately, early indications are not promising. We are hearing reports of little or no 

personal protective equipment availability, exposure to volatile organic compounds, 

many of which are carcinogenic, exposure to dispersants—the composition of which 

we still don’t know, and exposure to acidic gases and acutely toxic gases like hydrogen sulfide. 
61 

Workers are considered to be the canary in the coal mine because what happens 

to them may also happen to other exposed to the same hazards. Dr. Michaels, you 

have an admirable history of advocacy for the public’s health so I’d like to ask you 

this question; 

If we can’t fully protect the workers, despite your efforts, how can we possibly protect all the potentially affected communities? I have in mind the coastal communities that will be exposed to airborne compounds at levels that are toxic but aren’t 

detectable by normal smell; the oil droplets that get aerosolized into particles so 

small they go deep into the lungs where they can do major damage; the massive 

infusion of metals like lead and cadmium and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons into 

the marine ecosystem and therefore into the national food chain through bioaccumulation. 

Please send your written response to Meredith Regine of the Committee on Education and Labor staff at meredith.regine@mail.house.gov by COB on Wednesday, 

July 5, 2010—the date on which the hearing record will close. If you have any questions, please contact Ms. Regine at 202-225-3725. Again, we greatly appreciate your 

testimony at this hearing. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE MILLER, 

Chairman. 

[VIA E-MAIL], 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

Washington, DC, June 25, 2010. 

Mr. DOUG SLITOR, Acting Chief, 

Office of Offshore Regulatory Programs, Offshore Energy and Minerals Management, 

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, 1849 C 

Street, NW, Washington, DC 20240. 

DEAR MR. SLITOR: Thank you for testifying at the Wednesday, June 23, 2010, 

Committee on Education and Labor hearing on ‘‘Worker Health and Safety from the 

Oil Rig to the Shoreline.’’ 

One of the Committee Members had additional questions for which she would like 

written responses from you for the hearing record. 

Congresswoman Dina Titus (D-NV) asks the following questions: 

Thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. While deep sea drilling is 

not a big issue in my state of Nevada, worker safety certainly is an important issue, 

and workers in Nevada have paid the price for lax safety oversight. It is important 

we keep workers safe during the oil spill clean-up, but I also want to focus on how 

we can prevent a situation like this from occurring to begin with and keep the workers on oil rigs safe at all times. 

1. You said earlier at this hearing that the number of MMS inspectors—especially 

those without ‘‘substantial office responsibilities’’—is not adequate to conduct all of 

the inspections MMS is responsible for. 

a. With this in mind, could you please give us a little history of your agency since 

the Memorandum of Agreement with the Coast Guard was signed? 

b. Specifically, has your agency grown appropriately to meet expanding need, has 

the budget increased correspondingly, and have personnel and resources been enhanced as requested by the agency? 

c. If not, why not? 

2. It seems that several government agencies have been coordinating and working 

well together on worker safety issues in the response to the oil spill. 

a. What has the role been of other entities, such as the Department of Homeland 

Security and state and local governments, in ensuring the safety of clean-up workers and the general public? 

b. What plans or efforts are being put in place now for the future role these 

groups will assume as more and more of the oil hits our shores? 

Please send your written response to Meredith Regine of the Committee on Education and Labor staff at meredith.regine@mail.house.gov by COB on Wednesday, 

July 5, 2010—the date on which the hearing record will close. If you have any questions, please contact Ms. Regine at 202-225-3725. Again, we greatly appreciate your 

testimony at this hearing. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE MILLER, 

Chairman. 
62 

[VIA E-MAIL], 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

Washington, DC, June 25, 2010. 

Mr. JOHN HOWARD, M.D., M.P.H., J.D., LL.M., Director, 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Center for Disease Control 

and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Suite 9200, 

395 E Street, SW, Washington, DC 20201. 

DEAR DIRECTOR HOWARD: Thank you for testifying at the Wednesday, June 23, 

2010, Committee on Education and Labor hearing on ‘‘Worker Health and Safety 

from the Oil Rig to the Shoreline.’’ 

One of the Committee Members had additional questions for which she would like 

written responses from you for the hearing record. 

Congresswoman Dina Titus (D-NV) asks the following questions: 

Thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. While deep sea drilling is 

not a big issue in my state of Nevada, worker safety certainly is an important issue, 

and workers in Nevada have paid the price for lax safety oversight. It is important 

we keep workers safe during the oil spill clean-up, but I also want to focus on how 

we can prevent a situation like this from occurring to begin with and keep the workers on oil rigs safe at all times. 

1. It seems that several government agencies have been coordinating and working 

well together on worker safety issues in the response to the oil spill. 

a. What has the role been of other entities, such as the Department of Homeland 

Security and state and local governments, in ensuring the safety of clean-up workers and the general public? 

b. What plans or efforts are being put in place now for the future role these 

groups will assume as more and more of the oil hits our shores? 

Please send your written response to Meredith Regine of the Committee on Education and Labor staff at meredith.regine@mail.house.gov by COB on Wednesday, 

July 5, 2010—the date on which the hearing record will close. If you have any questions, please contact Ms. Regine at 202-225-3725. Again, we greatly appreciate your 

testimony at this hearing. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE MILLER, 

Chairman. 

[VIA E-MAIL], 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

Washington, DC, June 25, 2010. 

Dr. DAVID MICHAELS, Assistant Secretary, 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 

Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20210. 

DEAR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MICHAELS: Thank you for testifying at the Wednesday, June 23, 2010, Committee on Education and Labor hearing on ‘‘Worker Health 

and Safety from the Oil Rig to the Shoreline.’’ 

One of the Committee Members had additional questions for which she would like 

written responses from you for the hearing record. 

Congresswoman Dina Titus (D-NV) asks the following questions: 

Thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. While deep sea drilling is 

not a big issue in my state of Nevada, worker safety certainly is an important issue, 

and workers in Nevada have paid the price for lax safety oversight. It is important 

we keep workers safe during the oil spill clean-up, but I also want to focus on how 

we can prevent a situation like this from occurring to begin with and keep the workers on oil rigs safe at all times. 

1. You spoke of how the Deepwater Horizon incident was a ‘‘low frequency, high 

consequence’’ event. We have been dealing for decades with events that fit that description, including Three Mile Island. You also have pointed out that our current 

ways of measuring or predicting these events are inadequate. Is OSHA working on 

models of safety to prevent, and/or deal with such events? 

2. It seems that several government agencies have been coordinating and working 

well together on worker safety issues in the response to the oil spill. 

a. What has the role been of other entities, such as the Department of Homeland 

Security and state and local governments, in ensuring the safety of clean-up workers and the general public? 

b. What plans or efforts are being put in place now for the future role these 

groups will assume as more and more of the oil hits our shores? 
63 

Please send your written response to Meredith Regine of the Committee on Education and Labor staff at meredith.regine@mail.house.gov by COB on Wednesday, 

July 5, 2010—the date on which the hearing record will close. If you have any questions, please contact Ms. Regine at 202-225-3725. Again, we greatly appreciate your 

testimony at this hearing. 

[VIA E-MAIL], 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

Washington, DC, June 25, 2010. 

RADM KEVIN COOK, Director, 

Prevention Policy for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, U.S. Coast Guard, 

2100 Second Street, SW, Washington, DC 20593. 

DEAR REAR ADMIRAL COOK: Thank you for testifying at the Wednesday, June 23, 

2010, Committee on Education and Labor hearing on ‘‘Worker Health and Safety 

from the Oil Rig to the Shoreline.’’ 

One of the Committee Members had additional questions for which she would like 

written responses from you for the hearing record. 

Congresswoman Dina Titus (D-NV) asks the following questions: 

Thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. While deep sea drilling is 

not a big issue in my state of Nevada, worker safety certainly is an important issue, 

and workers in Nevada have paid the price for lax safety oversight. It is important 

we keep workers safe during the oil spill clean-up, but I also want to focus on how 

we can prevent a situation like this from occurring to begin with and keep the workers on oil rigs safe at all times. 

1. It seems that several government agencies have been coordinating and working 

well together on worker safety issues in the response to the oil spill. 

a. What has the role been of other entities, such as the Department of Homeland 

Security and state and local governments, in ensuring the safety of clean-up workers and the general public? 

b. What plans or efforts are being put in place now for the future role these 

groups will assume as more and more of the oil hits our shores? 

Please send your written response to Meredith Regine of the Committee on Education and Labor staff at meredith.regine@mail.house.gov by COB on Wednesday, 

July 5, 2010—the date on which the hearing record will close. If you have any questions, please contact Ms. Regine at 202-225-3725. Again, we greatly appreciate your 

testimony at this hearing. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE MILLER, 

Chairman. 

[Responses to questions submitted follow:] 

RADM Cook’s Responses to Questions Submitted for the Record 

Question: What specific whistleblower protections are provided to private sector 

workers who are employed between the in-shore areas where OSHA has jurisdiction 

(shore to 3 miles out) and the Outer Continental Shelf, and are working on vessels, 

platforms, drilling rigs, MODUs, and support equipment that is covered under 

USCG worker safety and health regulations? 

What employees are covered, if any? 

Which employees are excluded, if any? 

Please name the specific statute or statutes and regulations that cover such employees for protection activity. 

Response: Coast Guard Workplace Safety and Health Regulations for Outer Continental Shelf Activities establish protections for any person making a report of an 

alleged violation of the OCS regulations, at 33 CFR 142.7(c). This regulation makes 

clear, in relevant part, that as a safeguard the identity of any person making a report of violation of the Workplace Safety and Health regulations will not be made 

available to persons other than those tasked with investigating the report, unless 

the person making the report consents to being identified. 

Another general whistleblower protection for seamen is found at 46 USC 

2114(a)(1)(A). The statute states that ‘‘[a] person may not discharge or in any manner discriminate against a seamen because—the seamen in good faith has reported 

or is about to report to the Coast Guard or other appropriate Federal agency * * * 

that the seamen believes that a violation of maritime safety law or regulation * * * 
64 

has occurred. Enforcement of this provision is available in federal court. In addition, 

46 USC 3115(a) prohibits any official of the Coast Guard from disclosing the identity 

of any individual that provides information on vessel defects, imperfections, and 

overall safety of an inspected vessel on which he or she is serving. This includes 

information on watch keeping and work hours. 

In addition, other general whistleblower protection clauses that may apply to private sector workers employed where OSHA has jurisdiction (shore to 3 miles out) 

and on the Outer Continental Shelf are found within federal environmental protection laws: the Clean Air Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Lastly, the Pipeline Safety 

Improvement Act may also apply to such employees. The Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 

USC 7622, provides protections for employees who report potential violations regarding air emissions from area, stationary and mobile sources into the air. The 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 

(CERCLA), 42 USC 9610 provides protections for employees who report potential 

violations regarding clean-up or uncontrolled or abandoned hazardous waste sites 

as well as accidents, spills, and other emergency releases of pollutants and contaminants into the environment. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 

USC 1367, provides protections for employees who report potential violations regarding discharges of pollutants into the navigable waters of the United States or 

in connection with activities under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 USC 

1331 et seq. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 USC 2622, provides protections for employees who report potential violations regarding the testing and use 

of certain chemical substances and the mixture of chemical substances over which 

the Environmental Protection Act has authority. The Solid Waste Disposal Act 

(SWDA), 42 USC 6971, provides protections for employees who report potential violations regarding the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of 

all solid wastes, including those wastes determined to be hazardous wastes. (The 

materials used in the clean-up of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill are being treated 

as solid waste.) The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act (PSIA), 49 USC 60129, provides protections for employees who report potential violations regarding pipeline 

safety. Based on the definitions in the PSIA, it appears that rigs, such as the Deepwater Horizon, are pipeline facilities and, therefore, are subject to the PSIA. The 

implementing regulations for the whistleblower provisions in these environmental 

protection statutes are found at 29 CFR Part 24. The implementing regulations for 

the PSIA are found at 29 CFR Part 1981. 

If an employer is covered under one of the environmental protection statutes, it 

may not discharge or in any way retaliate against any employee because he or she 

reported potential violations of environmental laws and regulations or the PSIA and 

its regulations to either the employer or the government. 

Question: What activity or actions are protected under such whistleblower statutes, 

and which is excluded? 

What agency adjudicates those claims? 

Response: 33 CFR 142.7 covers reports of unsafe working conditions relating to 

outer continental shelf activities. It is based on general authorities contained in the 

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 33 CFR 142.7 provides as a safeguard that, except as authorized by the reporting individual, his identity is protected from everyone other than officers within the Department of Homeland Security who have a 

need to know in the performance of their official duties. The report is made to the 

Coast Guard Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection or his representative. 

There are two other statutes that are not specific to outer continental shelf activities that apply only to seafarers. The first, 46 U.S.C. § 3315, requires licensed mariners to affirmatively point out defects during inspections of vessels by Coast Guard 

marine inspectors. This statute only applies to licensed individuals on vessels. The 

official who receives this report may not disclose the identity of the individual to 

anyone except a person authorized by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

The second, 46 U.S.C. § 2114, provides protection for seaman from discrimination 

if he reports a violation of a marine safety law or regulation. This statute is limited 

to individuals who are seamen. The seaman can also refuse to perform duties ordered by his employer when he has a reasonable apprehension of serious injury to 

himself, other seamen or the public, but he must have asked the employer to correct 

the unsafe condition. When a seaman reports a condition to the Coast Guard or 

other federal agency and he is discharged or discriminated against as a result of 

the report he can seek judicial relief in Federal district court. 
65 

The environmental whistleblower provisions (CAA, CERCLA, FWPCA, TSCA, and 

SWDA) protect employees who provide information, file complaints, and/or participate in a proceeding or other action related to the administration or enforcement 

of the statutes. The Secretary of Labor and the courts have consistently taken a 

broad view of what is considered protected under the environmental statutes, including internal complaints to management, raising concerns to the media, and refusals to perform work. 

Under the PSIA, the whistleblower protection provision protects employees who, 

inter alia, provide information, file complaints, or participate in proceedings related 

to violations of any federal law relating to pipeline safety, and employees who refuse 

to engage in any practice made unlawful by any federal law relating to pipeline 

safety. 

The basic elements of a whistleblower claim are the complainant’s protected activity under a whistleblower statute, the employer’s knowledge of the protected activity, an adverse action taken against the complainant, and a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. A causal connection may be inferred when an adverse action occurs shortly after protected activity. Causal connections may also be inferred from one or more indicators such as animus (exhibited 

ill will) toward the protected activity, disparate treatment of the complainant in 

comparison to other similarly situated employees, a pretextual explanation for the 

adverse action, false testimony or manufactured evidence. If, after investigating and 

reviewing the evidence, OSHA is unable to determine, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, the existence of a prima facie case, then the case must be dismissed. 

Under the environmental statutes, complainants have 30 days from the day they 

learned of the adverse action to file a retaliation complaint. Under the PSIA, complainants have 180 days. However, equitable tolling might operate to extend the filing deadline in certain situations. 

The Department of Labor adjudicates claims under the environmental statutes 

and the PSIA. Complainants who file whistleblower complaints with OSHA under 

these statutes may object to the Secretary’s investigative findings (and order) and 

request a de novo hearing before a Department of Labor administrative law judge. 

Further right of administrative appeal is provided to the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board, which issues final decisions of the Secretary. The ARB’s 

decisions may be appealed to federal courts of appeal. 

Question: Is there an expressed right to refuse unsafe work and if so, where is that 

provided and to the extent that it is, what happens if there is retaliation? 

Response—Oil Rig and Oil Spill Workers: 33 CFR Part 142 is applicable to lessees, permittees, persons responsible for actual operations, and persons working in 

OCS activities. These regulations address recognized hazards, reporting unsafe 

working conditions, and also specify protective equipment and safe working conditions on OCS facilities. 

In making reports of unsafe conditions, the identity of any person making the report is not made available, without the permission of the reporting person, to anyone other than those officers and employees of the Department that would investigate such reports and would have a need for the record in the performance of their 

official duties. 

The 33 CFR Part 142 regulations do not apply to oil spill workers. 

Right to refuse work: Under the environmental protection statutes with whistleblower protection clauses, there are no express provisions for employees who refuse 

to work because of alleged environmental violations by an employer. Irrespective of 

this factor, the Secretary of Labor—where complaints are made and adjudicated— 

interprets the environmental protection statutes to protect refusals to work when 

an employee has a reasonable belief that his or her working conditions are unsafe 

or unhealthful, and he or she does not receive an adequate explanation from a responsible official that the conditions are safe. The PSIA, however, expressly protects 

refusals to engage in any practice made unlawful by a federal law relating to pipeline safety, if the employee has identified the alleged illegality to the employer. 

Under all of these statutes, any employee who, acting without direction from his or 

her employer (or the employer’s agent), deliberately causes a violation of any requirement of any of the statutes, is not protected. 

Question: It seems that several government agencies have been coordinating and 

working well together on worker safety issues in the response to the oil spill. 

What has the role been of other entities, such as the Department of Homeland Security and state and local governments, in ensuring the safety of clean-up workers 

and the general public? 

What plans or efforts are being put in place now for the future role these groups 

will assume as more and more of the oil hits our shores? 
66 

Response: The role of all Federal, state and local entities in ensuring the safety 

of clean-up workers responding to the Deepwater Horizon incident and the general 

public has been and continues to be a top priority. Strict to all applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations and National Institute 

of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) recommendations are in place. Temporary suspension of any applicable regulation or standard is reviewed on a case 

by case basis. For further information see http://www.osha.gov/oilspills/oilspill-activity-update.html and http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/oilspillresponse/ 

Adherence to these regulations and safety standards are embedded with the enduring Incident Action Plans as well as the Deepwater Horizon Severe Weather 

Contingency Plan which guides response actions leading to, during, and after a hurricane or tropical storm. 

Below is the response to your question regarding a HOTLINE that workers can 

call to report health and safety problems on a rig. There is one attachment, which 

includes OSHA’s worker safety fact sheet (contains BP hotline info). 

QUESTION: Is there a HOTLINE workers can call to report health and safety 

problems on a rig? Who investigates complaints? 

ANSWER: According to a representative from The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) who participates in the NIC’s 

Interagency Solutions Group: 

‘‘The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement 

(BOEMRE) has not required the rig operator to post a Hot Line number to report 

unsafe working conditions. BOEMRE requires a Hot Line number to report violations to the Inspector General related to production, such as theft, tampering, and 

falsifying records. Rig workers have contacted BOEMRE District offices to report 

concerns and issues. Although the district offices do not advertise their number at 

a Hot Line, due to the constant communication between the rigs/platforms and the 

district offices, the number is readily available. Should BOEMRE receive a call or 

other communication from an offshore worker, the BOEMRE District Manager dispatches an inspector to conduct an inspection on the platform in question to determine if the complaint has merit.’’ 

OSHA’s worker safety Fact Sheet, which contains BP hotline information, is attached. 
67 
68 

Below are two more responses to staff questions relating to the 21 June hearing. 

Please let me know if you have any questions! 

QUESTION: Deepwater Horizon workers had complaints about safety, especially 

concerns related to drilling. Should CG have followed up with these complaints? 

ANSWER: There is no record of complaints regarding safety aboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON received by the Coast Guard prior to the DEEPWATER HORIZON casualty. 
69 

For complaints the Coast Guard receives related to marine safety, security and 

environmental protection, if the Coast Guard has jurisdiction over the complaint, it 

would be documented in the Coast Guard’s Marine Information for Safety and Law 

Enforcement (MISLE) database and appropriate measures taken to investigate and 

resolve the complaint. 

If a complaint involves a safety program administered by another federal agency 

(for example, concerns relating to drilling safety are administered by the Minerals 

Management Service), the complaint is referred directly to the cognizant agency. 

For complaints not involving safety, the Coast Guard directs the complainant to 

contact the appropriate agency. 

QUESTION: What is the CG’s relationship with OSHA? Does CG receive OSHA 

guidance regarding potential workplace occupational safety problems? Does CG look 

at OSHA standards? What does CG do to protect worker safety? 

ANSWER: The February 2010 OSHA Directive CPL 02-01-047 provides current 

policy, information and guidance with respect to OSHA authority over persons working on vessels and facilities on or adjacent to U.S. navigable waters and the Outer 

Continental Shelf (OCS). [see http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive—pdf/CPL— 

02-01-047.pdf Appendix E for details]. 

The Coast Guard has a very good working relationship with OSHA and has been 

a longstanding member of OSHA’s Federal Advisory Committee on Maritime Occupational Safety and Health (MACOSH). MACOSH was established on February 8, 

1995 to advise the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health on issues 

relating to the delivery of occupational safety and health programs, policies, and 

standards in the maritime industries of the United States. The committee provides 

a collective expertise not otherwise available to the Secretary to address the complex 

and sensitive issues involved. The committee consists of 15 members who represent 

different interests within the maritime industry. The 15 members are divided into 

3 equal groups representing: 1) government, 2) employers, and 3) employees. 

The 1978 amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act greatly increased 

the U.S. Coast Guard’s authority to promulgate and enforce safety and health regulations on the OCS. The CG has promulgated regulations on many occupational 

safety and health issues on the OCS (such as personal protective equipment, housekeeping, guarding of deck openings, means of escape, lifesaving appliances, firefighting equipment, emergency equipment, work vests, alarm systems, emergency 

evacuation plans, and safety zones (33 CFR 140.1 et seq.)), as well as commercial 

diving, 46 CFR Part 197, Subpart B et seq. (the CG diving regulations also cover 

diving in other locations). 

The 1979 ‘‘Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Coast Guard and 

OSHA Concerning Occupational Safety and Health on the Outer Continental Shelf 

(OCS)’’ established procedures to increase consultation and coordination between the 

agencies, including: development, promulgation and enforcement of standards; investigation of accidents; investigation of allegations; and joint training programs. 

Director Howard’s Responses to Questions Submitted for the Record 

1. It seems that several government agencies have been coordinating and working 

well together on worker safety issues in the response to the oil spill. 

a. What has the role been of other entities, such as the Department of Homeland 

Security and state and local governments, in ensuring the safety of clean-up workers 

and the general public? 

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), defers to our colleagues 

at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as to the full extent of their role 

in ensuring the safety of clean-up workers and the general public. The U.S. Coast 

Guard (USCG) is the lead agency in the Deepwater Horizon Response and is in the 

best position to provide information regarding Coast Guard and/or DHS activities. 

Additionally, the DHS Office of Health Affairs also works with the designated Senior Health Official, Admiral Galloway, and his team to provide subject matter expertise and to coordinate reporting on public health, worker safety, and food safety 

issues. 

From the time of the announcement of the explosion and fire, the HHS Assistant 

Secretary for Preparedness and Response’s Regional Emergency Coordinators in Region VI (includes Louisiana and Texas) and Region IV (includes Mississippi, Alabama and Florida) were in close communication with the States’ Emergency Coordinators, the State Departments of Health, and the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials. On May 31 HHS, in coordination with the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, set up a mobile medical unit in Venice, Louisiana 
70 

to provide triage and basic care for responders concerned about health effects of the 

oil spill. 

HHS has a Memorandum of Understanding with the USCG and ASPR liaisons 

serve as Medical Unit Leaders at the Command Centers in Houma, LA, and Mobile 

AL, and has deployed ADM James Galloway of the U.S. Public Health Service and 

his staff to the National Incident Command Center in DC. The HHS Assistant Secretary for Health has been addressing recovery issues. 

The HHS Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in coordination with 

state and local health departments, is conducting surveillance across the Gulf States 

for health effects related to the oil spill. Early on, CDC worked with states to help 

define what to watch for in their own surveillance systems and what enhancements 

to make to their surveillance systems to have more effective vigilance of health effects related to the oil spill. States now share the results with CDC (and with each 

other) and some of the most useful data are coming from the states’ own surveillance systems. CDC is also using established national surveillance systems: The National Poison Data System (NPDS) and BioSense. This health surveillance will capture health issues that may arise in the general public. A summary of state findings 

are posted on the CDC website. See http://www.bt.cdc.gov/gulfoilspill2010/ 

2010gulfoilspill/health—surveillance.asp. 

CDC’s Environmental Health Team continues to review EPA environmental data 

with the purpose of determining whether exposure to oil, oil constituents, or 

dispersants might cause short term or long term health effects. Data include sampling results for air, water, soil/sediment, and material actually reaching the beach 

or marsh. 

CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is working 

to protect workers and volunteers from potential safety and health hazards related 

to the spill and clean up efforts. NIOSH is conducting Health Hazard Evaluations 

to evaluate potential exposures and health effects among response workers. An interim report of the finding is available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/pdfs/interim—report—1.pdf. NIOSH is also helping the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and National Institute of Health’s 

National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) with technical assistance for training response workers. NIOSH together with OSHA have recently released an Interim Guidance for Protecting Deepwater Horizon Response Workers 

and Volunteers to ensure a comprehensive approach to occupational safety and 

health available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/oilspillresponse/protecting/. 

CDC is also sharing its health information with industry, OSHA, the Department 

of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Coast Guard, and other federal and state agencies. 

Additionally, CDC has participated in public availability sessions and press conferences for residents of the Gulf Coast. In order to maintain open lines of communication, CDC has liaison officers in Florida, Louisiana and Texas and at the Public 

Health Unit in the Unified Command Post in Mobile. 

NIEHS administers the Worker Education and Training Program (WETP), which 

for 24 years has provided safety training to emergency responders and the hazardous materials workforce. Through this program, NIEHS provided nearly immediate assistance to the oil spill response to protect the health of oil spill workers 

and continues working with Coast Guard and BP officials as well as local and state 

officials, academic institutions, and other federal agencies to provide worker safety 

training. NIEHS continues to help NIOSH improve worker participation in the Gulf 

Coast worker roster by recommending the incorporation of participation in the roster and surveillance forms into training curricula being delivered to workers who 

may perform cleanup work. 

In partnership with OSHA and the Unified Command, more than 8,000 pocketsized booklets from NIEHS entitled ‘‘Safety and Health Awareness for Oil Spill 

Cleanup Workers’’ have been distributed to instructors, safety officials, front-line responders participating in the BP Vessels of Opportunity Program, and beach workers in the Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Team. The booklets also have been printed 

in English, Spanish and Vietnamese. The training is being paid for and administered by BP, and is being provided in English, Spanish and Vietnamese. All of the 

NIEHS worker training resources and materials are available online, 

www.niehs.nih.gov/oilspill. 

b. What plans or efforts are being put in place now for the future role these groups 

will assume as more and more of the oil hits our shores? 

The long-term human health effects from the oils spill are unknown. As a result, 

HHS has begun planning for future activities that will provide opportunities to 

learn about potential health hazards. HHS’ current efforts include continued health 
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communications; continued and enhanced public health surveillance; continued 

analysis of environmental sampling data from oil contaminated areas (oil, soil, 

water, and sediment); and identifying data gaps to address and evaluate potential 

long-term and short-term health effects. These efforts are being planned and carried 

out in coordination with state, local and federal partners. 

Communications 

HHS will continue to provide timely, accurate and actionable information to the 

public, Gulf Coast residents, clinicians and clean-up workers/volunteers to understand and protect themselves from potential and evolving health risks associated 

with the oil spill. HHS has posted to its website factsheets for various audiences 

on what to expect from the oil spill and how to protect health: http://www.hhs.gov/ 

gulfoilspill/index.html. HHS also has over one million Twitter followers and uses 

this social media outlet to send health related messages. 

Environmental Health Monitoring 

CDC will continue to analyze environmental sampling data and conduct toxicological evaluations. 

Surveillance 

CDC will continue to coordinate surveillance activities with Gulf State health departments for health effects in the general population and response workers possibly 

related to the oil spill, including providing technical assistance to enable states to 

generate mental health surveillance data. To do this, CDC will continue to use both 

state-based and national surveillance systems, National Poison Data System and 

BioSense. CDC will continue to analyze 2009 and 2010 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) data from affected states and will continue to identify 

changes and trends in mental and behavioral health indicators based on questions 

in BRFSS. CDC is also collaborating with HHS’ Food and Drug Administration (the 

lead federal agency for food safety) to monitor the safety of the seafood supply. 

Research 

HHS is collaborating with a number of internal and external partners to create 

an agenda of oil related research issues, especially those that would address possible 

long-term health effects and outcomes. In order to better inform the research efforts 

needed to determine health impacts from the oil spill and dispersants, the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response convened a workshop 

by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) at the end of June in New Orleans and will continue to work with the IOM to get advice on proposed research studies and to have 

them monitor research efforts on an ongoing basis. CDC is also conducting a pilot 

study to identify gaps in scientific knowledge about the specific dermal and respiratory effects of oil and dispersant mixtures and oil burning combustion products 

associated with this discharge. 

NIH will devote $10 million to support research on the potential human health 

effects of the oil spill. NIEHS will recruit clean-up workers and Gulf residents and 

will collect biological samples, health histories, as well as information about cleanup work they performed and the nature of their exposures. In the near term, NIH 

will establish a baseline of such information and then monitor the oil spill workers 

for respiratory, immunological and neurobehavioral effects. NIEHS will work with 

other HHS agencies, federal partners, as well as local communities and universities 

to both assess and implement its research plan. 

Assistant Secretary Michaels’ Responses to Questions 

Submitted for the Record 

Representative George Miller (CA–7th) 

Question 1: What whistleblower protections are provided to private sector workers 

employed on the Outer Continental Shelf drilling rigs, platforms or related equipment who are covered under OSHA safety and health regulations? 

Response: The familiar gaps and inconsistencies in whistleblower protections for 

workers are exacerbated on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) by the preemption 

of OSHA’s jurisdiction by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy, 

Management, Regulation and Enforcement, creating a vacuum in the most basic of 

whistleblower protections—protection to blow the whistle on matters relating to 

worker safety and health under Section 11(c) of the OSH Act, 29 USC §660(c); 29 

CFR Part 1977. For this reason, OSHA and the Administration strongly support enactment of the Offshore Oil and Gas Worker Whistleblower Protection Act, H.R. 
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5851, which would provide clear and certain remedies for offshore oil and gas industry workers who engage in safety activity. 

Because the Coast Guard has the statutory authority to prescribe and enforce 

standards or regulations affecting the occupational safety and health of seamen 

aboard inspected vessels, OSHA may not enforce the OSH Act with respect to those 

conditions. Although OSHA and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) agreed in a 1983 

memorandum of understanding that OSHA would retain its whistleblower authority 

under the OSH Act, even where the USCG had jurisdiction of occupational safety 

and health, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (which covers Louisiana, 

Texas, and Mississippi), held that the whistleblower provision of the OSH Act does 

not apply to workers whose working conditions are comprehensively regulated by 

another agency (in that case, the Coast Guard). The Fifth Circuit, whose jurisdiction 

includes a vast portion of the Nation’s offshore oil and gas activity, refused to give 

effect to the OSHA/Coast Guard interagency agreement. The intricacies of this jurisdictional issue are more fully described in the response to Question 2 below, but the 

reality for workers is virtually no protection for blowing the whistle relating to occupational safety or health. 

There are other whistleblower protections that apply on the OCS, but they are 

not related to worker safety and health. The whistleblower protection provisions of 

the Clean Air Act; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; the Toxic Substances 

Control Act; the Solid Waste Disposal Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, 

which are administered by OSHA, may also apply, if the protected activity alleged 

to have resulted in or contributed to retaliation is related to environmental or pipeline safety. Unfortunately, workplace safety and health issues on OCS drilling rigs, 

platforms or related equipment are not related to environmental or pipeline safety, 

and therefore not covered by these laws. 

Question 2: What employees are covered, if any? 

Question 3: Which employees are excluded, if any? 

Response: Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 

Like other provisions of the OSH Act, geographical coverage under section 11(c) 

is defined by section 4(a), which provides in pertinent part: ‘‘This Act shall apply 

with respect to employment performed in a workplace in a State * * * [and] Outer 

Continental Shelf Lands [OCS] defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 

* * *’’ For purposes of 11(c), the protected activity and the unsafe or unhealthful 

conditions that are the subject of the protected activity must be in the geographic 

areas specified in section 4(a). 

According to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the OCS includes all subsoil 

and seabed lying seaward and outside the lands beneath the navigable waters within the jurisdiction of a state under the Submerged Lands Act (which is typically 

three miles from shore, but approximately nine miles in the Gulf of Mexico) and 

‘‘* * * all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to 

the seabed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom, or any such installation or other device 

(other than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting such resources * * *’’ 

43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1). OCS facilities include platforms permanently attached to the 

seabed or subsoil of the OCS, buoyant OCS facilities securely and substantially 

moored so that they cannot be moved without special efforts, and mobile offshore 

drilling units (MODUs) when in contact with the seabed of the OCS for the exploration of subsea resources. 33 C.F.R. 140.3, 140.10. Thus, while a structure attached 

to the OCS, such as a drilling rig, is potentially within OSHA’s geographical coverage, vessels on the OCS except MODUs when in contact with the seabed, are not. 

Once it is determined that the protected activity and the underlying conditions 

were in areas defined by section 4(a), it must then be determined whether OSHA’s 

enforcement authority under section 11(c) is pre-empted by another federal agency. 

Section 4(b)(1) provides in pertinent part: ‘‘Nothing in this Act shall apply to working conditions of employees with respect to which other Federal agencies * * * exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety and health.’’ The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which 

covers Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi, has held that, because of section 4(b)(1) 

of the Act, section 11(c) does not apply to a seaman aboard a vessel whose working 

conditions are comprehensively regulated by the Coast Guard. The court reasoned 

that when the Congress said that ‘‘[n]othing’’ in the OSH Act shall apply to conditions regulated by other federal agencies it meant that no provision of the Act, including section 11(c), would apply to such conditions Donovan v. Texaco, Inc., 720 

F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1983). While the Texaco case specifically involved Coast Guard 

requirements, the court’s ruling would be equally applicable in cases involving regu-
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lations issued by other agencies such as the Bureau of Ocean Energy, Management, 

Regulation and Enforcement. At this time it is binding on the U.S. District Courts 

within that Circuit. 

Because of the limitations imposed by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texaco, 

OSHA’ s authority to use Section 11(c) to protect whistleblowers on oil or gas drilling platforms or on MODUs on the OCS within the range of the Fifth Circuit may 

be seriously questioned. Working conditions on OCS facilities, such as fixed oil and 

gas drilling platforms and mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs), are subject to extensive regulations of both the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy, Management, Regulation and Enforcement (formerly the Minerals Management Service), 

including regulations dealing with fire and explosion hazards and a wide variety of 

other working conditions. 

For example, 33 CFR Part 142, which is enforced by the Coast Guard, is ‘‘intended to promote workplace safety and health by establishing requirements relating to personnel, workplace activities and conditions, and equipment on the Outer 

Continental Shelf’’ (§ 142.1). It provides at § 142.4(a) that ‘‘[e]ach holder of a lease 

or permit under the Act shall ensure that all places of employment within the lease 

area or within the area covered by the permit on the OCS are maintained in compliance with workplace safety and health regulations of this part and, in addition, free 

from recognized hazards.’’ It further provides, in § 142.7(a), that ‘‘[a]ny person may 

report a possible violation of any regulation in this subchapter or any other hazardous or unsafe working condition on any unit engaged in OCS activities to an Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection.’’ Although § 142.7(c) provides that the identity 

of any such person shall not be disclosed without that person’s permission, there is 

no whistleblower protection for reporting possible violations or hazardous conditions. 

Question 4: Please name the specific statute or statutes and regulations that cover 

such employees for protected activity. 

Response: As mentioned in the response to Question 1, the reality for workers on 

the OCS is that there is virtually no protection for blowing the whistle on worker 

health and safety hazards. That is the reason why OSHA and the Administration 

strongly support H.R. 5851, and why its enactment is so critical. 

Question 5: What activity or actions are protected under such whistleblower statutes, and which is excluded? 

Response: As mentioned in the response to Question 1, the reality for workers on 

the OCS is that there is virtually no protection for blowing the whistle on worker 

health and safety hazards. Once again, that is the reason why OSHA and the Administration strongly support H.R. 5851, and why its enactment is so critical. 

Question 6: What agency adjudicates those claims? 

Response: As mentioned in the response to Question 1, the reality for workers on 

the OCS is that there is virtually no protection for blowing the whistle on worker 

health and safety hazards. Once again, that is the reason why OSHA and the Administration strongly support H.R. 5851, and why its enactment is so critical. 

Question 7: Is there an expressed right to refuse unsafe work and if so, where is 

that provided and to the extent that it is, what happens is there is retaliation? 

Response: As mentioned in the response to Question 1, the reality for workers on 

the OCS is that there is virtually no protection for blowing the whistle on worker 

health and safety hazards. Once again, that is the reason why OSHA and the Administration strongly support H.R. 5851, and why its enactment is so critical. 

Representative Dina Titus (NV–3rd) 

Question 1: You spoke of how the Deepwater Horizon incident was a ‘‘low frequency, high consequence’’ event. We have been dealing for decades with events that 

fit that description, including Three Mile Island. You also have pointed out that our 

current ways of measuring or predicting these events are inadequate. Is OSHA working on models of safety to prevent, and/or deal with such events? 

Response: In 1996, OSHA promulgated its Process Safety Management (PSM) 

standard with the purpose of preventing or minimizing the consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive chemicals. Such consequences can include toxic, fire or explosion hazards. While the PSM standard covers many hazardous operations, such as oil refineries, the standard does not apply 

to operations that preempt OSHA jurisdiction. Such operations can include oil and 

natural gas drilling and nuclear power plants. 

To ensure strong PSM systems, we need to do a better job of identifying useful 

leading indicators. We all know the warning that ‘‘past performance is no guarantee 

of future success.’’ This is particularly true of the low-frequency, high-impact events 

that process safety programs guard against. The oil and gas industry must continue 
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to develop and track leading indicators to measure the performance and continuously improve process safety management systems. Recent work by the Center for 

Chemical Process Safety and American Petroleum Institute (API) is a good start. 

Additionally, it comes down to organizational culture—a set of practices that define the organization and influence the individuals who make up the organization: 

organizational safety culture must come from the top. 

OSHA is also working to improve its own targeting system. Until recently, OSHA 

has based its refinery targeting system on Days Away, Restricted, or Transferred 

(DART) rates. Specifically, only those refineries with elevated rates of injuries and 

illnesses were selected for programmed inspections. Clearly we need to change this. 

While injury and illness numbers are important, they are not the only indicator of 

establishments with major problems. We need to find a better way to target problem 

refineries or other production sites so that we can better spend our resources at facilities where potential disaster exists. 

And to the extent we continue to factor DART rates into our targeting mechanism, we need to make sure that they are accurate. That is why we are paying special attention to safety incentive and discipline programs that have been shown to 

discourage workers from reporting injuries and illnesses. 

We are also starting to take the safety of the entire refinery workforce into account—no matter who the employer is or the industry code they fall under—to ensure we do not miss any important indicators. Previously, our targeting system was 

based only on the injury and illness rates of employers, not contractors who may 

make up a large part of the workforce and employ workers who do some of the most 

dangerous work in the refineries. 

OSHA is continuing a concerted effort to enlist the cooperation of industry, labor, 

and other stakeholders in developing models and systems of safety to prevent and 

address high-catastrophic events. This cooperation is crucial to maximizing our impact because OSHA cannot inspect every refinery every year. 

You can also expect to see OSHA collaborating more with the National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Environmental Protection Agency, 

and other agencies to address the worker health and safety problems in the refinery 

and petrochemical industry—and in other industries as well. Together, we can develop a more effective system for targeting problem hazards and problem worksites, 

and addressing the problems that we have identified. And, in connection with hazards to which workers outside our jurisdiction are exposed, OSHA is actively collaborating with other agencies to assist in promoting worker safety. 

Question 2: It seems that several government agencies have been coordinating and 

working well together on workers safety issues in the response to the oil spill. 

a. What has the role been of other entities, such as the Department of Homeland 

Security and state and local governments, in ensuring the safety of clean-up workers 

and the general public? 

b. What plans or efforts are being put in place now for the future role these groups 

will assume as more and more of the oil hits our shores? 

Response: OSHA has joined with agencies in the Department of Homeland Security, including the U.S. Coast Guard; the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), including the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH) and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS); 

and other federal agencies, in ensuring the safety and health of workers involved 

in the Gulf oil spill response and cleanup operations. Examples of collaborative efforts with other Federal agencies include the coordination of injury/illness monitoring with NIOSH; the coordination of safety and health training with NIEHS; and 

the coordination of exposure sampling with NIOSH, the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA), the U.S. Coast Guard, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA). 

In addition, OSHA attends daily conference calls with local and State governments to address and resolve safety and health issues. These coordination efforts 

among Federal agencies and State and local governments will continue throughout 

the response and cleanup efforts. 

Representative Dennis Kucinich (OH–10th) 

Question: Workers are considered to be the canary in the coal mine because what 

happens to them may also happen to others exposed to the same hazards. Dr. Michaels, you have an admirable history of advocacy for the public’s health so I’d like 

to ask you this question: 

If we can’t fully protect the workers, despite your efforts, how can we possibly protect all the potentially affected communities? I have in mind the coastal communities 

that will be exposed to airborne compounds at levels that are toxic but aren’t detectable by normal smell; the oil droplets that get aerosolized into particles so small they 
75 

go deep into the lungs where they can do major damage; the massive infusion of metals like lead and cadmium and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons into the marine 

ecosystem and therefore into the national food chain through bioaccumulation. 

Response: OSHA’s jurisdiction with respect to the Gulf oil spill extends only to 

workers involved in response and cleanup operations. OSHA’s role is to provide advice and consultation to the federal on-scene coordinator (in this case the U.S. Coast 

Guard) regarding hazards to persons engaged in response activities. OSHA does not 

have jurisdiction over health risk assessments or exposure monitoring of the general 

public or the surrounding communities. The federal on-scene coordinator is responsible for coordinating federal resources for the overall response, including public 

safety. However, OSHA is monitoring and responding to potential occupational 

health concerns. 

We have stationed safety and health professionals throughout the Gulf Region 

who visit worksites every day to protect oil response cleanup workers from health 

and safety hazards. OSHA staff is evaluating the safety at worksites around the 

Gulf, covering the vessels of opportunity, beach cleanup, staging areas, decontamination, distribution and deployment sites. When OSHA finds problems or 

learns about them from workers, we immediately bring them to the attention of BP 

and ensure that they are corrected. OSHA also raises its concerns through the Unified Command so they are addressed across the entire response area. OSHA is also 

ensuring that employers provide, free of charge, appropriate personal protective 

equipment such as boots, gloves and other protective equipment. 

To determine whether workers are exposed to dangerous levels of toxic chemicals, 

OSHA is conducting its own independent air monitoring both on shore and on the 

cleanup vessels for crude oil, weathered oil, dispersants, and cleaning agents to 

characterize exposures and determine if any chemicals are present at dangerous levels. OSHA is also reviewing data from BP, the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). OSHA 

is working with NIOSH to characterize worker exposures in each job category so 

that workers can receive necessary protections from air contaminants. This information is available to the public on OSHA’s oil spill response website at: http:// 

www.osha.gov/oilspills/index.html. At this time, OSHA has identified no exposures 

that exceed any of the most up-to-date standards for hazardous chemicals. 
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[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

Æ