alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
 (2)
    
    The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of Marlin Business Services Corp.
 Date: August 10, 2009
 /s/ Daniel P. Dyer

Daniel P. Dyer
Chief Executive Officer/s/ Lynne C. Wilson

Lynne C. WilsonChief Financial
Officer & Senior Vice President(Principal Financial Officer)
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FE BRUARY 20, 2014

NO. 03

- 13

- 00683

- CV

S. N. G., Appellant

v.

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 53RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNT Y
BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, GO ODWIN, AND FIELD

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the tr i a l court on October 1, 201 3 . Having

reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error

in the trial court’s judgment. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment. Because

appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, n o adjudication of costs is made.
#### John Robertson v. William L. P. Little and others.

Wlien a case made after judgment in the Circuit Court is settled and filed with the clerk of that court, either party desiring action upon it may cause it to he certified to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court cannot dismiss a case made after judgment which has never been transmitted to and filed in that Court.

*Heard and decided July 14th.*

*W. L. Webber*moved to dismiss a case made after judgment.

It appeared from the affidavits On which the motion was based, that defendants had judgment in the Court below July 5th, 1860; that a case was subsequently made, and settled by the Circuit Judge for review in.this Court, which was filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court February 11th, 1861, but the same has never been transmitted to this Court, and no action has been had thereon since the filing.

*J. G.*Sutherland, contra,

objected that the Supreme Court could not dismiss a case which was not yet in that Court.

By the Court.

When a case made after judgment has been settled and filed, in the Circuit Court, either party has the right to cause if to be certified to this Court for our action; and it must be brought here before any motion can be made in this Court upon it. We cannot dismiss a case from the Court which was never in it.

*Motion denied.*
#### FRANK H. FOSGATE, JR., PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT-CROSS-PETITIONER, v. JUNE STRELECKI, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER-CROSS-RESPONDENT.

*Mr. Arthur J. Sills, Mr. Mias Abelson*and *Mr. Thomas J. Savage*for the petitioner-cross-respondent.

*Mr. Charles J. Farley, Jr.*for the respondent-cross-petitioner.

May 14, 1968.

Granted.
No. 54100.

#### The House of Burgundy *v.*United States,

protest 152004-K (New York).

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protest.
Case No. 13,814.

#### SPARROW v. MUTUAL BEN. LIFE INS. CO.

Circuit Court, D. Massachusetts.

April, 1873.

Insurance — Life —Interrogatories—Truth of Answers — Misrepresentations—Acts of Agent — Estoppel.

Before

SHEPLEY, Circuit Judge.

This was an action upon a life insurance policy. The validity of the policy was made dependent upon the truth of the answers to the inquiries contained in the application. The insured was inquired of in the same interrogatory as to prior insurance, other insurance, and also if he had insurance upon his life in other companies, in what companies, and to what amount. The answer was, “Yes; 5000, under policy 17,990.” It appeared in evidence that the insurers, a New Jersey corporation, had a general agent in Boston for Massachusetts, who had supervision over the other agencies within the state, and appointed subagents, whose duty it was to submit to applicants for insurance certain questions, and to see that they were answered. This subagent solicited the insured, at the place of business of the latter, to make application for insurance, and took down from the dictation of the insured all of the answers, except the number of the policy, which was inserted by the clerk of the subagent at the latter’s direction; the information having been obtained from the records in the office, and all having been done after the signature of the insured was made to the application. The answer was untrue as to the amount of other insurance,, and incomplete as to the offices in which it was placed. It was held to be a question of fact for the jury, as-to each particular act in the negotiation, whether the agent, who might be acting now for the company, and now for the insured, was in fact acting for the one or the other; and the responsibility of each particular act or declaration would rest with that party for whom the agent acted in the matter, and under whose direction and control, as to that particular matter, he might be.

In the same case, where the answer, in the making of which the agent of the company intervened, was untrue and incomplete, the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that if the insured accepted the policy with the knowledge that the answers to the several questions were as they appeared at the trial, he was bound by them, whatever knowledge the agent of the company might have had from him, or from any other person, relating to the subject-matter inquired about But the court declined to so instruct, without qualification, but did instruct that, if the insured accepted the policy with the knowledge that the answers were in the words as they appeared at the trial, those words could not be altered or changed, or their meaning altered or changed, by the introduction of parol evidence, and that, although the agent of the company was aware from other sources that the answers were untrue, yet, if they were knowingly made by the insured, and adopted by him, and their truth made the test of the validity of the policy, he was bound by them.

[NOTE. The statement of the case above and the points decided is taken from 2 May, Ins. (3d. Ed.) § 500. The case is nowhere reported; opinion not now accessible.]
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JOHN JOSEPH HESLIP, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

See same case below: 99 *N. J. Super.*97.

*Mr. William B. Efolzapfel*for the petitioner.

*Mr. Leo Kaplowitz*and *Mr. Arthur J. Timins*for the respondent.

May 14, 1968.

Denied.
JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURAL RULES COMMITTEE

FINAL REPORT1

Amendment of Pa.R.J.C.P. 1128

On October 14, 2020, the Supreme Court amended Rule of Juvenile Court 

Procedure 1128 to clarify requirements for the presence of children at dependency 

proceedings.

Upon request, the Committee reviewed Pa.R.J.C.P. 1128 (Presence at 

Proceedings) to consider whether the rule invited a practice whereby children of a 

certain age were categorically excused from being present in court. While the rule did

not encourage excusing children, the Committee recommended the rule be refined to 

emphasize the importance of a child’s appearance and the need to consider a child’s 

individual circumstances when deciding whether to excuse the child from a proceeding.

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1128(A) generally requires all parties to be present at dependency 

proceedings. This paragraph is amended to specifically include children under the 

general requirement. Pa.R.J.C.P. 1120 (Definitions) defines a “party” as “a person or 

the county agency who has standing to participate in the proceedings but nothing in 

these Rules confers standing upon a person.” Under this definition, a child is a party 

because the child has standing to participate. See, e.g., Pa.R.J.C.P. 1151 (providing for 

appointment of guardian ad litem or counsel to represent a child). Specifically including 

the child in paragraph (A) reinforces the importance of the child’s presence and 

eliminates the need for readers to rely upon a definition to understand the scope of the 

requirement.

The Comment is also revised to emphasize that exceptions to a child’s presence

at dependency proceedings are to be based on individual circumstances. Moreover, 

the Comment references the requirement of Pa.R.J.C.P. 1129(A)(2) that the child be 

physically present in court at least every six months. Finally, the Comment indicates

that a child’s unease while attending should be mitigated by the court.

The amendment will become effective January 1, 2021.

 

1 The Committee’s Final Report should not be confused with the official Committee 

Comments to the rules. Also note that the Supreme Court does not adopt the 

Committee’s Comments or the contents of the Committee’s explanatory Final Reports.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Roberto Rodriguez, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 777]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bruce Allen, J.), rendered *233April 15, 1993, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fifth degrees and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to two concurrent terms of 4 1⁄2 to 9 years and a concurrent term of 2 to 4 years, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s argument that the People failed to prove his knowledge of the weight of the cocaine in his possession as required by *People v Ryan*(82 NY2d 497) is unpreserved for appellate review as a matter of law. Defendant did not raise this ground by objection or motion in the trial court *(People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10), and we decline to review the issue in the interest of justice.

Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges and, thus, it was not necessary for the prosecutor to offer a non-pretextual race-neutral reason for his challenges *(People v Jenkins,*75 NY2d 550, 556, citing *Batson v Kentucky,*476 US 79, 96-97).

The court properly discharged a sworn juror, over defense objection, when the juror willfully failed to appear and refused to continue serving. The juror was, therefore "grossly unqualified to serve” and had also "engaged in misconduct of a substantial nature” (GPL 270.35).

Finally, the People provided ample justification for the closure of the courtroom during the testimony of the undercover officer, who, *inter alia,*continued to work undercover in the same location as defendant’s arrest *(People v Martinez,*82 NY2d 436). Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Rubin, Kupferman, Asch and Mazzarelli, JJ.
(Reap. Dec. 10479)

#### Andrew Fisher Cycle Co., Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 793896-1/5.

(Decided April 8, 1963)

*Broolcs <& Brooks*for the plaintiff.

*John W. Douglas,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Oliver, Chief Judge:

Counsel for the parties have submitted the above-enumerated appeal for reappraisement for decision upon stipulation, on the basis of which I find that export value, as defined in section 402 (b), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Customs Simplification Act of 1956, is the proper basis for the determination of the value of the tires, imported from Holland, here involved.

On the basis of the said stipulation, I find export values of the merchandise to be as follows:

(1) As to the items identified on invoice No. 1 as 2,000 tires, 26 by 1.75 whitewall, and on invoice No. 2 as 4,000 tires, 26 by 1.75 whitewall, US $79 per 100 tires, net, packed.

(2) As to the items identified on invoice No. 1 as 1,500 tires, 26 by 1.75 black, US $64.82 per 100 tires, net, packed.

(3) As to the remainder of the merchandise specified on invoice No. 1, invoice No. 2, and the merchandise specified on invoice No. 3, invoiced unit prices, net, packed.

Judgment will issue accordingly.
Case No. 16,118.

#### UNITED STATES v. FIVE JUGS OF BRANDY.1

[11 Int. Rev. Rec. 5.]

District Court, N. D. Florida.

1869.

Violation or Customs Laws—Forfeiture and Seizure.

[The fact that foreign distilled spirits and wines are found in considerable quantity in an upper room of a private house, stored for safekeeping, as alleged by the house owner, and not his property, justifies a seizure thereof, and places the burden upon the claimant to show that they were legally imported, and that the original packages had been inspected, marked, and branded, as required by law.]

1

 [Not previously reported.]

Before

FRASER, District Judge.

This was an information filed by the attorney of the United States, setting forth that the said liquors or spirits were fraudulently imported, and praying that they be condemned as forfeited to the United States. Held, that a considerable quantity of foreign distilled spirits and wines being found in an upper room of a private house, stored for safe-keeping, as alleged by the proprietor, and not his property, would justify a seizure. That such fact appearing, the burden of proof was upon the claimant to show that they were legally imported, and that the original packages had been inspected, marked, and branded, as required by law. Two witnesses for claimant having testified that the casks out of which the spirits and wines were drawn had an inspector’s mark upon them, and one of said witnesses having stated that said inspector’s mark was a curious mark, which he should not have noticed had not his attention been particularly called to it, and no other description having been given of said mark by said witnesses, or either of them, and it being in evidence that the said original packages were purchased in New York, and shipped direct to Florida, after verdict for the United States, and upon motion for a new trial, held, that the jury, being the judges of the facts, and of the credibility of the witnesses, did not exceed their province if they came to the conclusion, from the evidence, that the said original packages had no inspector’s marks upon them, and that the said spirits and wines were fraudulently imported. Motion for a new trial was therefore denied.
(Reap. Dec. 9176)

#### Railway Express Agency, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. B-1446, etc.

(Decided June 25, 1958)

*Barnes, Richardson & Colburn*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Richardson, Judge:

The appeals for reappraisement listed in schedule *“A,”*attached hereto and made a part hereof, have been submitted for decision on the following stipulation of counsel for the parties hereto:

> IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED, subject to the approval of the court, that the merchandise and the issues in the reappraisement appeals enumerated in Schedule A, attached hereto and made a part hereof, are the same in all material respects as in *F. W. Myers & Co., Inc.*v. *United States,*38 Cust. Ct. 569, Reap. Dec. 8728, and that the record in said case may be incorporated herein.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that the prices at the time of exportation of the instant merchandise to the United States, at which such or similar merchandise was freely offered for sale for home consumption to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade, including the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature, and all other costs, charges and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States, were the entered values, and that there was no higher export value for such or similar merchandise.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that these cases may be submitted upon this stipulation.

On the agreed facts I find the foreign value, as that value is defined in 19 U. S. C. section 1402 (c) (§ 402 (c) of the Tariff Act of 1930), to be the proper basis for the determination of the value of the merchandise here involved, and that such value is the entered value.

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
**Exhibit      32.2**

**OFFICER’S      CERTIFICATION**

**PURSUANT      TO**

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

**(18      U.S.C. 1350)**

| 1.     | The                  Report is in full compliance with reporting requirements of Section                  13(a)                  of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and                   |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| 2.     | The                  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                  respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the                  Corporation. |

|                                     |                                                                                                                                   |
|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| */s/                William J. McGinnis* |
|                                     | William                J. McGinnis                                                                                                     |
|                                     | Acting                Chief Accounting  Officer, Corporate                Secretary  and                Controller |
|                                     | (Principal Accounting              Officer)                                                                                       |
Before the Third Division,

November 10, 1948

No. 52670.

protest 134885-K (Great Palls).

#### E. C. Moran *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Cline, J.

When the case was called for trial there was no appearance on the part of the plaintiff and the case was ordered submitted on the official records. The report of the collector states that duty was assessed on the seed content of the merchandise on the basis of *United States*v. *Amendola*(5 Ct. Cust. Appls. 516, T. D. 35156), wherein it was held that the nuts there involved were dutiable under the *eo nomine*provision for nuts in paragraph 283, Tariff Act of 1909, and that the cones were free of duty as crude vegetable substances. The official papers herein indicate that the merchandise consisted of spruce cones with seeds attached. It was held that duty was therefore properly assessed by the collector and the protest was accordingly overruled.
#### Milissa J. Martin, Appellant, v Virginia Rice et al., Respondents.

[635 NYS2d 497]

—In an action, *inter alia,*for a judgment declaring the rights of the parties to a certain thoroughbred horse named "Mikey”, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Lama, J.), dated August 12, 1993, which, after a hearing, denied the plaintiffs motion for the provisional seizure of the horse pursuant to CPLR article 71 and for a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of the horse.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The record supports the Supreme Court’s determination that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof with respect to the provisional seizure of the horse pursuant to CPLR 7101 and 7102 and a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of the horse *(see, East Side Car Wash v K.R.K. Capitol,*102 AD2d 157, 161; *Aetna Ins. Co. v Capasso,*75 NY2d 860, 862).

The plaintiff’s argument concerning a bailment for the mutual benefit of the parties is raised for the first time on appeal and is, therefore, unpreserved for appellate review *(see, Synder v Newcomb Oil Co.,*194 AD2d 53, 61). Mangano, P. J., Balletta, Copertino and Hart, JJ., concur.
#### IN THE MATTER OF ALPHONSE M. CANTABENE, ATTORNEY AT LAW.

Argued March 5, 1968—

Decided April 1, 1968.

See also 48 *N. J. 571, 227 A. 2d*131.

*Mr. Robert J. McCurrie*for the order.

*Mr. Alphonse M. Cantab ene, pro se.*

The opinion of the court was delivered

Per Curiam.

A presentment was filed against respondent charging him with unauthorized use of a client’s trust funds. *382He is presently under suspension from practice for an earlier violation of the code of ethics of the same kind. Both violations were committed prior to the existing suspension. The present offense is conceded. In fact respondent admits that he used some of the funds involved here to make up the shortage in the earlier case.

In view of respondent’s statements during the oral presentation of the matter, we shall continue the existing suspension from practice until the present claim against him is paid. When payment is completed, the matter of further discipline to be imposed will be given consideration.
Before the Third Division,

May 12, 1948

No. 52321.

petition 6532-R (St. Albans).

#### G. R. Kirk Co. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Cline, J.

The petition was dismissed.
Exhibit 13.1

Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,  as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Kappa Holding B.V. (the "Company") on form 20-F for the period ending December 31, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, G.P.F. Beurskens, President/Managing Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, that:



Date:
August 19, 2004

| |  | By:    | /s/G.P.F. BEURSKENS        
| |  | ------ | ---------------------------
| |  | Name:  | G.P.F. Beurskens           
| |  | Title: | President/Managing Director

---



QuickLinks
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 28, 2020

No. 04-19-00875-CR

Justin Henry SOWERS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CR7493

Honorable Lori I. Valenzuela, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The reporter’s record was due to be filed with this court on February 14, 2020. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 35.1. After the due date, court reporter Geneva Garcia filed a notification of late 

record. She requested a thirty-five-day extension of time to file the record.

The reporter’s request for an extension of time to file the reporter’s record is GRANTED 

IN PART. See id. R. 35.3(c) (limiting an extension in a regular appeal to thirty days). The 

reporter’s record is due on March 16, 2020. See id.

If the reporter’s record is not filed with this court by March 16, 2020, any further requests 

for additional time to file the record must be accompanied by a signed, written status report. The 

report must describe the transcript by day with the date, description, page counts, and remarks 

for each day. The page counts must include the total number of pages, the number of pages 

edited, proofread, and formatted into the required electronic form (including bookmarks). The 

report may describe any unusual aspects of the record. The report must describe any problems 

the court reporter reasonably believes may delay the completion of the record beyond the 

extended date. A preferred form for the status report, with an accompanying example, is 

attached. 

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 28th day of February, 2020.

___________________________________

Michael A. Cruz,

Clerk of Court
No. 56017.

protest 969933-G (Los Angeles).

#### Three G Distillery Corp. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protest.