www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 267 1 

The Islamic Revolution surprised senior U.S. policymakers as 

well as the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. On the eve 

of revolution, Iran—a key U.S. ally—seemed relatively stable 

despite bouts of urban terrorism in the early and mid-1970s. At the first 

signs of escalating unrest in early 1978, neither Iranian nor U.S. officials 

considered the possibility that Iran’s armed forces, the largest and most 

modern in the region (next to those of Israel), would prove unable to deal 

with whatever trouble lay ahead. The fall of the Shah a year later, therefore, 

raised searching questions regarding the role of the armed forces during 

the crisis and its failure to quash the revolution. The recent emergence of 

popular protest movements that have overthrown authoritarian regimes 

in Tunisia and Egypt—and that are challenging similar regimes in Libya, 

Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria—has revived memories of the Shah and his fall. 

These developments have again raised questions regarding the role of armed 

forces during revolutions and whether Iran’s experience during the Islamic 

Revolution and after holds relevant lessons for current developments in the 

Middle East.

The Shah and Armed Forces

Both the Shah and his father, Reza Shah, owed their positions and survival to the armed forces.1

 Reza Shah came to power in a 1921 coup that 

eventually toppled the Qajar dynasty that had ruled Iran for more than a 

century. In 1941, British and Soviet armies occupied Iran and forced Reza 

Shah to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza. The new Shah also 

owed his political survival to a 1953 coup engineered by the United States 

Iran’s Islamic Revolution: 

Lessons for the Arab Spring 

of 2011?

by Michael Eisenstadt

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

Cen

ter 

for S

t

rategi

c

ReS

E

A

RCH

About the Author

Michael Eisenstadt is a Senior 

Fellow and Director of the Military 

and Security Studies Program at 

The Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy.

Key Points

◆ Iran’s experience in 1978–1979 

and after highlights key factors 

that could shape the outcome 

of the political struggles defining the Arab spring of 2011: the 

quality of regime leadership; the 

nature of civil-military relations; 

the training, equipment, employment, and cohesion of regime 

security forces; and the extent of 

foreign support.

◆ The Shah’s military was the main 

pillar of his rule but failed to 

quash the Islamic Revolution in 

1978–1979. Reasons include the 

Shah’s weak leadership, a military 

incapable of acting coherently to 

counter opposition demonstrations and propaganda, and the 

Shah’s belief that the United 

States no longer supported him.

◆ The leadership of the Islamic 

Republic has avoided repeating 

the many mistakes of the Shah. 

It has acted resolutely, created 

specialized security forces and 

employed them effectively, calibrated the use of force to prevent 

escalating violence, and cowed 

much of the opposition through a 

campaign of intimidation.

April 2011
2 SF No. 267 www.ndu.edu/inss

and Britain, which deposed the radical, populist prime 

minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq.2

From the beginning of his reign, the armed forces 

were the main pillar of Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule. 

Accordingly, the Shah was careful to cultivate the loyalty 

of the officer corps, providing generous salaries and a variety of benefits (subsidized housing, free education for 

their children, subsidized commissaries and exchanges, 

comfortable pensions, and, in some cases, plum jobs as 

provincial governors, in government ministries, or with 

state enterprises). The Shah personally approved all promotions above major, which generally were based more 

on loyalty than competence. He required all his service 

chiefs to report directly to him, prohibited them from 

meeting to plan and coordinate, and fostered rivalries to 

prevent them from plotting against him. The Shah also 

periodically reshuffled and cashiered officers to prevent 

power blocs from emerging within the military.

The security services, which included SAVAK 

(National Intelligence and Security Organization), 

military intelligence, and Special Intelligence Bureau, 

closely monitored anyone with decisionmaking authority. Also, the Shah had to approve all troop movements and military flights, thereby stifling initiative 

among his commanders. While this system of control 

served the Shah well in normal times, it proved fatal 

during the revolution.

The Shah aspired to transform Iran into the dominant regional power in the Gulf. To accomplish this goal, 

he oversaw the dramatic expansion of the military. By 

1978, Iran’s armed forces were the largest in the region 

and, after those of Israel, the most sophisticated (the acquisition of the latest military equipment also reinforced 

the military’s loyalty). Iran fielded 413,000 men (285,000 

the roots of the Islamic Revolution 

can be traced to developments that 

long predated it

soldiers, 100,000 airmen, and 28,000 sailors). The army 

consisted of three armored divisions, three infantry divisions, and four independent brigades. Major equipment 

items included 1,870 tanks, 459 combat aircraft (including 200 F–4 Phantoms, and 60 F–14 Tomcats), 3 destroyers, and 3 frigates.

Origins

The roots of the Islamic Revolution can be traced 

to developments that long predated it. In 1963, the 

Shah initiated his “White Revolution,” a series of farreaching reforms intended to modernize and Westernize Iran. While these reforms produced rapid economic growth, they also led to social dislocation, rapid 

urbanization, and the adoption by the ruling elite of 

Western habits and customs that alienated traditional 

and religious elements in Iranian society. The reforms 

also threatened to undermine the economic base and 

influence of Iran’s clerical establishment, alienating 

the clergy from the regime.

The Shah’s modernization plans required a large foreign presence, including 9,000 U.S. military technicians 

and advisors and 60,000 foreign workers and businessmen (most of them American). The pervasive presence of 

these foreign workers—who often were paid much more 

than their Iranian counterparts—fostered resentment 

and offended the nationalist and religious sensibilities of 

some Iranians.3

Political modernization did not match rapid economic growth. Large parts of the population, particularly the educated middle class, chafed at not having 

a political voice. And an economic downturn in the 

mid-1970s, leading to inflation, a tighter job market, reduced government spending, and falling real 

income, contributed to widespread dissatisfaction at 

a time of rising expectations, setting the stage for 

the revolution.4

A Year of Turmoil

The spark that set off the revolution was the 

publication, on January 7, 1978, of an editorial in 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 267 3 

a government newspaper that defamed the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who since 1963 had led 

the religious opposition to the Shah (for most of 

this time, from exile in Iraq).5 Two days later, police shot seminary students demonstrating in Qom 

against the editorial, killing six and wounding 

many more.

Few if any Iranians or Americans grasped the importance of these events when they occurred; after all, Iran had 

weathered violent unrest in the past. Indeed, the regime’s 

success in dealing with the previous major episode of unrest in 1962–1963, in which the Ayatollah Khomeini also 

figured prominently, contributed to a sense of confidence.6

At a mass demonstration in Tabriz on February 

18–20, 1978, to mark the end of the 40-day mourning 

period for the fallen Qom seminarians, however, a large 

crowd quickly overwhelmed the police. The government 

called in the army to quell the protests (the first time the 

army had been called on to deal with domestic unrest 

since 1963). Lacking proper training and equipment to 

deal with demonstrators, the army used excessive force, 

killing 6 demonstrators and wounding more than 100.

These events established a pattern that was to repeat 

itself in the year leading up to the Islamic Revolution: large 

demonstrations prompted the military to overreact, leading to fatalities and another round of demonstrations and 

bloodshed at the end of the mourning period, starting yet 

another cycle of violence.7

 Meanwhile, the regime vacillated 

between attempts at conciliation—seen by the opposition 

as a sign of weakness—and hardline actions, which often 

led to fatalities and further violence. These contradictory 

policies helped drive events toward revolution.8

The progressive deterioration in the security and 

economic situation due to increasingly frequent demonstrations, and increasingly effective strikes by state 

employees and oil industry workers, eventually caused 

the Shah to declare martial law on September 7, 1978. 

The next day, the army massacred hundreds of demonstrators in Tehran. The media, parliament, and even the 

Shah harshly criticized the armed forces for their heavyhanded response, striking a blow at flagging military 

the progressive deterioration in the 

security and economic situation 

due to increasingly frequent 

demonstrations eventually caused 

the Shah to declare martial law

morale.9 This event, which became known as “Black Friday,” further radicalized the opposition and drove events 

in a more violent direction.

In response to the escalating violence, the Shah appointed a military government on November 5, 1978, 

but continued to pursue a conciliatory approach to the 

opposition, including attempts at political liberalization. 

(For instance, the Majles was permitted to debate and 

reject military decrees.)10

The crisis came to a head in December 1978 during 

the holy month of Moharram. While millions of people participated in mass demonstrations in Tehran and 

around the country, the military experienced its first major act of rebellion: an attack on December 11, 1978, in 

Tehran’s Lavisan Barracks by army conscripts who killed 

more than a dozen officers and wounded many more. 

This incident inspired mutinies and acts of rebellion elsewhere, leading the armed forces to confine many units to 

their barracks. Amid the growing chaos and in a final bid 

to placate the opposition, the Shah asked longtime opposition politician Shahpour Bakhtiar to form a government. Bakhtiar agreed to do so if the Shah would leave 

the country, disband SAVAK, put on trial military and 

police personnel who shot protestors, and allow Iran’s 

foreign affairs to be run by civilians.

Disheartened by this development, the army commander and martial law administrator for Tehran, General Gholam Ali Oveissi, resigned on January 4, 1979. 

Oveissi was a hardliner who opposed the Shah’s abdication. His resignation further undermined military 

morale and reduced the prospects that the armed forces 
4 SF No. 267 www.ndu.edu/inss

might play an active political role after the Shah’s departure. After naming a “regency council” to act in his 

absence, the Shah left Iran for Egypt on January 16. (He 

subsequently moved on to Morocco, Mexico, the Bahamas, the United States—for medical treatment—and 

Panama, where he died in July 1980.)

The Shah’s departure effectively meant the end of 

his regime. Iran’s senior military leaders could not decide what to do: continue to support Prime Minister 

Bakhtiar’s government, throw their support behind the 

Islamic opposition, or launch a coup and impose military 

rule. Ayatollah Khomeini left his exile in France to return to Tehran on February 1, 1979, where he was greeted by more than 3 million people. The military made no 

attempt to block his return.

On February 5, Khomeini appointed a provisional 

government under the leadership of the veteran nationalist opposition politician Mehdi Bazargan. On February 

11, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declared its 

neutrality in the ongoing struggle between the Bakhtiar 

government and the provisional government appointed 

by Khomeini. Amid signs that the military was disintegrating and the opposition was looting government 

armories of their weapons, the council ordered all military personnel back to base. The declaration of neutrality 

by the military effectively yielded control of the country 

to Khomeini: the next day, Shahpour Bakhtiar resigned, 

formally marking the end of the Shah’s regime.

The revolutionary government spent much of 1979 

consolidating its rule, with clerical and nationalist elements vying for control over the levers of power. As part 

of this process, some revolutionaries wanted to abolish 

the military. But the new regime needed the military to 

consolidate its rule and deal with growing unrest in the 

provinces among various ethnic minorities (Kurds, Turkmen, Baluch, and Arabs) that were demanding autonomy. The regime therefore decided to purge the armed 

forces of former regime loyalists while taking steps to 

“Islamicize” them. At the same time, in May 1979, Khomeini ordered the formation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to counterbalance the regular 

military, which, despite the purges, was still distrusted 

by the revolutionaries because of its former association 

with the Shah and U.S. military. The mistrust was not 

unjustified: the government uncovered preparations for a 

coup in July 1980, leading to a much deeper purge of the 

armed forces (particularly the air force).11

On October 24, 1979, the provisional government 

approved a new Islamic constitution, formalizing Ayatollah Khomeini’s role as commander-in-chief of the armed 

forces. One month later, on November 4, radical student 

activists—suspecting that the provisional government 

sought to repair ties with the United States—seized the 

U.S. Embassy. Ayatollah Khomeini endorsed the seizure 

the next day, causing the United States to halt the sale 

of arms and spare parts to Iran. Finally, on November 6, 

the head of the provisional government, Prime Minister 

Mehdi Bazargan, resigned, resulting in the consolidation 

of power in the hands of Ayatollah Khomeini and his 

clerical allies.

The ratification of the new Islamic constitution in 

a nationwide referendum on December 2–3, 1979, and 

the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections 

in January and March 1980, respectively, marked the end 

of the initial period of consolidation of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). While the number of people killed 

during this period of revolution and consolidation is still 

unknown, estimates vary from a low of 700 to 900 killed 

to a high of as many as 10,000.12

Military Failure

A number of factors contributed to the failure of the 

Iranian armed forces to quash the Islamic Revolution. 

the revolutionary government spent 

much of 1979 consolidating its 

rule, with clerical and nationalist 

elements vying for control over the 

levers of power
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 267 5 

They include the Shah’s character, civil-military relations, 

social cleavages in the military, opposition propaganda, 

improper training, equipment, and employment of the 

armed forces, and perceived mixed signals from the 

United States.13

The Shah’s Character. There is a broad consensus 

among those who knew him that the Shah was weak, indecisive, and unwilling to take the steps necessary to stay 

in power. He reportedly suffered from dramatic mood 

swings. He was also allegedly demoralized by what he 

perceived as mixed signals from the United States—

particularly its criticism of Iranian human rights violations and insistence on political reform. Even though 

the United States continued to support him, the Shah 

was convinced that the Carter administration was conspiring with the opposition to get rid of him. Given his 

past dependence on foreign support against his domestic 

adversaries, this perceived abandonment may have had 

a significant impact on his decisionmaking. Finally, the 

Shah was suffering from a recurrence of cancer, which 

had been first diagnosed in 1973. While some sources 

assert that his illness had no palpable impact on his judgment, others claim that medication left him listless.

Dysfunctional Civil-Military Relations. The military was incapable of action without the Shah’s direction. 

He had barred cooperation among his service chiefs and 

had fed petty personal and professional jealousies among 

his officers to preclude such cooperation. Moreover, even 

when some senior officers and civilian politicians argued 

for tough measures against the opposition, the Shah wavered—deploying troops to quell the unrest, but then imposing restrictive rules of engagement on them; agreeing 

to martial law, but then quickly offering compromises 

that undercut its efficacy; and installing Prime Minister 

Bakhtiar as a concession to the opposition, but failing to 

order his generals to back him. Vacillation emboldened 

the opposition and demoralized the military, which was 

forced to confront the demonstrators for nearly a year 

without proper training and equipment, without an effective strategy, and without permission to use the means 

they had at their disposal, except in extremis. And when 

they did use the means at hand, they were harshly criticized by the Iranian media and by the Shah.

Thus, when the Shah left Iran, the military was paralyzed by indecision and unable to act on its own either to 

preserve the regime or to promote its corporate interests. 

In the end, it tried to ride out the storm as best it could, 

in the hope of preserving the institution of the armed 

forces as well as its privileges.

Social Divisions in the Armed Forces. The military 

was deeply divided in their attitudes toward the regime. 

Senior officers were generally loyal to the Shah due to 

their privileged position in Iranian society. Midranking 

and junior officers, many drawn from the middle and 

lower middle classes, were split between upwardly mobile 

officers who identified with the armed forces and those 

who identified on some level with the general population 

or the opposition. The junior officers who attended university in Iran in the 1970s were exposed to the political 

currents present on campus and may have been influenced by some of them. This echelon of the officer corps 

was most susceptible to opposition propaganda.

The enlisted ranks were split: the professional noncommissioned officer corps was largely loyal to the Shah, 

but most of the military’s cadre of technical specialists (especially air force warrant officers—the homofaran) and its 

large conscript force sympathized with the opposition. In 

1977–1978, the contracts of many of the homofaran were 

involuntarily extended, preventing them from taking higher 

paying jobs in the civilian sector. This led to widespread dissatisfaction and mass defections to the opposition during 

the revolution. The conscript force consisted largely of the 

when the Shah left Iran, the military 

was paralyzed by indecision and 

unable to act on its own either to 

preserve the regime or to promote 

its corporate interests 
6 SF No. 267 www.ndu.edu/inss

sons of peasants and the urban poor, and often endured poor 

conditions of service. Young, lonely conscripts serving far 

from home were especially susceptible to the propaganda 

of local political activists and clerics during the revolution.

Opposition Propaganda. The revolution owed a good 

measure of its success to the opposition’s deft propaganda 

campaign, which sought to win over young conscripts and 

junior and midlevel officers. In so doing, the opposition 

exploited fissures in the military. Young conscripts were 

generally from the socially conservative lower and lower 

middle classes and thus tended to identify on some level 

with the demonstrators. They were particularly susceptible 

to opposition propaganda and religious appeals.

The opposition took both “soft” and “hard” approaches toward the armed forces. Demonstrators 

handed out flowers to soldiers, and young conscripts 

who wanted to desert were assisted with a change of 

civilian clothes and enough money for the fare to their 

home village or city. Soldiers were urged not to open 

fire on demonstrators and were promised a warm reception if they came over to the opposition. They were also 

constantly reminded of Khomeini’s religious decrees, 

which provided religious sanction for the opposition. 

On the other hand, the opposition promised that those 

with blood on their hands or who refused to break with 

the regime would eventually be punished, and warned 

the army against a coup, threatening an unending holy 

war by the people if it did so.

Improper Training, Equipment, and Employment.

From 1945 through 1963, the primary mission of 

the armed forces was internal security. After 1963, it 

was organized primarily for external defense. It was 

the Shah believed that the Carter 

administration’s criticism of Iran’s 

human rights policies was proof that 

the United States was conspiring with 

the opposition to depose him

therefore not organized, equipped, or trained for the 

internal security mission or for crowd control. As a 

result, the military response to large demonstrations 

was often inappropriate—even though the armed 

forces were instructed not to use lethal force, except 

in extremis. When force was used, it was often enough 

to further inflame and embolden the opposition and 

provoke additional violence, without either cowing or 

crushing the opposition.

“Mixed” U.S. Signals. Great Britain and the Soviet Union were responsible for putting the Shah on the 

throne in 1941, when they forced his father to abdicate, 

while Great Britain and the United States were behind the 

military coup that ensured that he remained on the throne 

in 1953. Accordingly, the Shah was sensitive to perceived 

shifts in the position of his great power patrons. The Shah 

apparently believed that the Carter administration’s criticism of Iran’s human rights policies, despite Washington’s 

repeated declarations of support, was proof that the United 

States was conspiring with the opposition to depose him. 

On the eve of the Shah’s departure, Washington sent the 

deputy commander of U.S. European Command, General 

Robert Huyser, to Iran to signal continued support for the 

regime and to urge the military leadership to support the 

civilian government that the Shah had appointed, and to 

not undertake a coup. However, his mission “seemed to 

have been misperceived by all Iranians. The generals wanted 

Huyser to tell them what to do, the Shah came to believe 

that the American general was responsible for arranging a 

deal between the revolutionaries and the military to end the 

monarchy, and the revolutionaries were convinced Huyser 

was in Iran to promote a coup.”14

Consolidating the Revolution

The provisional government established by Ayatollah Khomeini after his return to Iran did not dismantle 

the armed forces, although there were elements in the 

new regime that wanted to do so. Instead, the new government attempted to co-opt the military and purge it 

of officers perceived as loyal to the former regime so that 

it could use the armed forces to consolidate control over 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 267 7 

the levers of power, ensure domestic order, and deter foreign threats.

Thus, in February 1979, amid signs that the military was disintegrating, the provisional government 

recalled military personnel to their duty stations and 

attempted to reconstitute the armed forces. It undertook limited purges of the upper ranks of the military—summarily executing many of the Shah’s senior 

generals—and embarked on a process of Islamicization 

to ensure that the armed forces were loyal to the new 

regime. To this end, the new government established its 

own system of oversight and control over the military. 

It assigned clerical commissars to the armed forces and 

created an Ideological-Political Directorate to indoctrinate the armed forces in the ideology of the revolution. 

It also created several security organs to keep an eye on 

the armed forces (elements of which were eventually 

integrated into military intelligence, the intelligence 

arm of the Revolutionary Guard, and the Ministry of 

Intelligence and Security).

The regime also created a series of revolutionary organizations to safeguard the Islamic Republic 

against domestic and foreign threats, maintain internal security, and counterbalance the military, which 

it distrusted.15 These revolutionary organizations included the IRGC, established in May 1979, and its 

popular militia and reserve force, the Basij, established 

in April 1980. The Basij was created after the failed 

U.S. hostage rescue attempt in order to create an “army 

of 20 million” to defend Iran against foreign intervention and invasion.

Lessons of the Shah

The Islamic Republic has created a number of new 

security and military forces to safeguard the Islamic 

Revolution and suppress periodic political unrest—and 

has devoted significant efforts to ensure their loyalty and 

reliability.16 In so doing, it has taken care to learn and 

implement the lessons of the Shah’s military and to draw 

its own lessons regarding the need for decisive leadership, proper training, equipment, and employment of the 

security and military forces, and intensive indoctrination 

to counter opposition propaganda.

According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic, the regular military is responsible for defending 

Iran’s borders and maintaining internal order, while the 

IRGC is responsible for safeguarding the revolution 

against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The IRGC 

also controls Iran’s strategic missile forces. IRGC garrisons are located near all major cities, in areas contested 

by various separatist groups, and in porous border regions. During the Iran-Iraq war, the IRGC’s ground, 

air, and naval units and the Basij fought alongside 

regular military units. The regular military and IRGC 

routinely hold joint military exercises, while the Basij, 

in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, has played a 

greater role in preparing to confront a foreign invasion, 

implement the regime’s new decentralized defensive 

concept (the so-called mosaic doctrine), and preserve 

the values of the revolution. The IRGC and Basij also 

routinely participate in exercises that hone their ability to deal with domestic unrest. The Law Enforcement 

Forces (LEF), which were created in 1991 by uniting 

the urban police, rural gendarmerie, and revolutionary 

committees (komitehs), partners with the Basij (and ultimately the IRGC) to maintain domestic order.

The intermittent unrest that has roiled Iran since the 

early 1990s has exposed latent tensions between the country’s political and military leadership as well as political differences between the senior echelons of the armed forces 

and the rank and file, forcing adjustments in the division of 

labor among the security forces. The first sign of trouble was 

the refusal of army and IRGC units garrisoned near Qazvin 

(a major town northwest of Tehran) to obey orders to quash 

riots there in August 1994. Members of these units apparently refused to turn their weapons on the Iranian people. 

The regime was forced to airlift in special IRGC and Basij

antiriot units from elsewhere to put down the violence.

The May 1997 election of reformist candidate Mohammad Khatami to the presidency put further stress 

on civil-military relations. Though senior IRGC officers had endorsed his conservative opponent, credible 
8 SF No. 267 www.ndu.edu/inss

postelection press reports indicated that IRGC personnel voted for Khatami in even greater proportions than 

did the general population (73 versus 69 percent).

This voting pattern indicates that the IRGC—a 

military organization long thought to have been a bastion of support for conservative hardliners—in fact reflected the divisions within Iranian society. These numbers should not have come as a surprise; for the past two 

decades, due to a drastic decline in volunteers, the IRGC 

has increasingly come to rely on conscripts to meet its 

manpower needs. The use of conscripts, however, raises 

questions about the reliability of the IRGC should it be 

needed to quell popular unrest.

The student riots of July 1999 provided the backdrop 

for the next major test of the security forces. These riots 

were put down by the LEF, which were relieved by the 

Basij once the situation had stabilized. (The former were 

often aided by the thugs of the Ansar-e Hizballah, a shady 

vigilante group sponsored by hardline senior clerics.) Thus, 

by July 1999, a new division of labor had emerged: the 

LEF had become the regime’s first line of defense against 

domestic unrest, with the Basij providing backup. When 

necessary, they might be reinforced by IRGC “Special 

Units,” followed by IRGC ground forces. The regular military’s ground forces would be deployed only as a last resort.

At the height of the July 1999 unrest, 24 senior 

IRGC commanders published a letter to President 

Khatami threatening a coup should he not use his influence over his supporters to restore order quickly. Such a 

threat was unprecedented in the history of the Islamic 

Republic, though given the political divisions in the 

armed forces, it is unclear whether a coup would have 

succeeded. The result could well have been bloody street 

violence, perhaps even civil war. In the end, Iran’s security 

forces restored order, thereby averting a coup, though the 

threat of overt military intervention was an unsettling 

new development.

Hardline elements in the security services and 

armed forces had in fact already covertly intervened in 

the political arena when they participated in the murder of dissident and reformist intellectuals starting in the 

the election of Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad was a manifestation 

of the continued rise of security 

hardliners and a power elite 

composed largely of IRGC veterans

autumn of 1998 and continuing through the spring of 

2000. With these extrajudicial killings, the senior leadership of the security services and armed forces signaled 

their loyalty to the supreme leader and other conservative rivals of President Khatami, thus dooming the first 

incarnation of Iran’s reform movement.

The 2005 election of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, himself a former Basiji and Revolutionary 

Guard, was a manifestation of the continued rise of these 

security hardliners and the ascendency of a power elite 

composed largely of IRGC veterans, who form a significant bloc in the cabinet and parliament, and who have 

benefited from the expansion of the IRGC into nontraditional roles in business and industry.

The protests that followed in the wake of the 2009 

presidential elections constituted the most serious challenge 

to date to the legitimacy and stability of the Islamic Republic. They revealed new organizational arrangements for 

dealing with domestic unrest, with the Ansar-e Hizballah

and Basij this time in the lead in dealing with the unrest, and 

with the LEF playing a supporting role. This arrangement 

was consistent with the role assigned to the Basij in 2003 as 

the first line of defense against possible U.S. regime-change 

efforts. Although IRGC units were available if needed, they 

were not committed as part of the first line of defense. Senior IRGC officers did play, however, a key role in directing 

the suppression of the protests—formalizing IRGC status 

as first among equals in the internal security arena.

In 2009, the regime also disrupted opposition communications by shutting off or monitoring Internet and cell 

phone communications and jamming satellite television 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 267 9 

broadcasts. It sought to wear down the Green Movement 

by attrition, intimidation, and demoralization, rather than 

by escalating the conflict and using overwhelming force to 

crush it. This effort is consistent with a well-established pattern of behavior by the IRI whereby it deals with dangerous adversaries through strategies of patience, attrition, and, 

if need be, delay—the same strategy it adopted in dealing 

with the reformists and students in 1997–1999 and in nuclear negotiations with Europe and the United States since 

2003. This approach might be rooted, at least in part, in 

regime concerns that elements of the security forces could 

refuse to follow orders or defect to the opposition if massive 

force were used against the civilian population.

Lessons of the Islamic Republic

IRI leadership does not appear afflicted by selfdoubt and indecision, which paralyzed the Shah and 

his senior military leadership. Khamenei and his senior 

commanders have been resolute, and senior ranks of the 

security forces have acted with firmness, taking the fight 

to the opposition—perhaps due to the belief that any 

sign of weakness would further embolden them.

Basij and LEF antiriot units are now well equipped, 

with body armor, shields, and relatively low-tech weapons (wooden sticks, batons, chains, water cannon, and 

tear gas). By avoiding live fire and calibrating their response to keep fatalities down, they have precluded the 

mass funerals and demonstrations that energized the 

revolution against the Shah. Moreover, by ensuring that 

street clashes were bloody, close-quarter melees, they 

have frightened off the less stout-hearted among the opponents of the regime. Finally, their mistreatment, torture, and humiliation of detainees have demoralized and 

intimidated the populace and discouraged opposition to 

the regime.17

The IRI seems acutely aware of the vulnerabilities 

of the security forces, as demonstrated in past incidents, 

and has acted to rectify or to work around them. It has 

adjusted the division of labor among the security forces 

when this has proven necessary, creating special units 

in the Basij and LEF that are trained and equipped for 

crowd control, while keeping much of the LEF and the 

IRGC in reserve. Finally, it has devoted considerable 

attention to the ideological indoctrination of security 

forces to ensure their loyalty and to counter enemy psychological warfare—including putative U.S. efforts to foment a “soft revolution.”

The IRI has been careful about how it employs its 

security forces, at least in part due to fears that the security forces might refuse orders or fracture—with some 

personnel deserting or going over to the opposition—if 

it were to try to crush the opposition with massive force. 

It uses violence in a calibrated fashion—there have been 

no Tiananmen Square moments in Tehran. Instead, the 

regime has sought to prevail by prolonging the struggle 

to wear down its domestic opponents rather than by 

seeking a decisive outcome through escalation and massive use of force. The regime has also detained thousands 

of members of the opposition—many of whom have 

been mistreated and tortured; it has held show trials of 

prominent reformers, who have been forced to make 

televised “confessions;” and it has placed the leadership 

of the Green Movement under house arrest in order to 

intimidate and demoralize the opposition.

Finally, most of the units used for internal security 

tasks seem to be drawn from the poorer, more religiously conservative elements of Iranian society, whereas the 

leadership and much of the rank and file of the opposition tend to be drawn from the educated middle 

class, elements of which have a somewhat cosmopolitan 

complexion. Thus, unit cohesion in the security forces 

has been reinforced by class and urban/rural distinctions. The regime has seized on this point in its propaganda, ridiculing the opposition for being in thrall to 

foreign ideologies, for betraying the homeland and the 

ideology of the revolution, and for working on behalf 

of foreign powers (that is, the United States, United 

Kingdom, and Israel).

Lessons for the Region

The fall of the Shah raises the question: Could the 

outcome have been different had the Shah’s military 
10 SF No. 267 www.ndu.edu/inss

been employed more effectively to quash the incipient 

Islamic Revolution?

There are no correct answers to such counterfactual, 

“what if ” questions. History offers examples of the use of 

force to suppress political and nationalist uprisings—for 

example, Hungary in 1956 and China in 1989. Other 

examples involve a more subtle combination of targeted 

operations, population control measures, and carrots and 

sticks—for example, Israel during the first and second 

Palestinian intifadas.

Thus, to consider an extreme case, Syria used brute 

force to crush a low-grade insurgency by the armed wing 

of the Muslim Brotherhood that had roiled the country from 1979–1982, and that culminated in an abortive popular uprising in the city of Hama in February 

1982. Syrian security forces leveled parts of Hama in 

response, killing some 15,000 to 30,000 civilians over a 

3-week period. The Syrian army succeeded in quashing 

the uprising because it imposed a news blackout on and 

placed a cordon around the city, which prevented details 

of the uprising from getting out. This ensured that the 

uprising was limited to Hama and enabled the military 

to concentrate overwhelming force against the city. The 

regime also used special units comprised largely of personnel from the ruling Alawite minority, who were loyal 

to the regime and who shared its hatred for the Islamist 

opposition.18 None of these factors applied to the circumstances surrounding the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

The fall of the Shah and the success of the IRI in 

repressing its domestic opposition highlight the importance of a number of factors in confrontations between 

popular opposition movements and the military/security forces of the state—at least in cases where the latter 

are unwilling or unable to use massive violence against 

the populace. Some of these factors might be relevant 

to the ongoing confrontations between popular protest 

movements and regime military/security forces in several 

Arab states. These factors include:

◆ Leadership—strong and decisive civilian and 

military leadership is necessary, but it is not a 

sufficient condition for success in suppressing a 

popular uprising. Its absence, however, may doom 

a regime.

◆ Civil-military relations—the failure of civilian 

leaders to partner effectively with the leaders of the 

military/security forces and to provide clear, consistent guidance, adequate resources, and strong 

political support may significantly hinder an effective military response.

◆ Training, equipment, and employment—the 

military/security forces must be properly trained, 

equipped, led, and employed if they are not to take 

actions that inadvertently contribute to an escalation of violence, and if they are to retain the morale 

and cohesion needed for a prolonged struggle 

against popular opposition movements attempting 

to neutralize or co-opt them.

◆ Morale and cohesion—the morale and cohesion of 

the military/security forces will depend on a number 

of variables: the degree of political support provided 

by the civilian leadership; the social makeup of these 

forces, and the impact of tribal, regional, sectarian, and class solidarities and cleavages on relations 

among the ranks and between the forces and the 

populace; the relative effectiveness of regime indoctrination and opposition propaganda; and the ability 

to insulate vulnerable units from the stresses of internal security duties by creating special units for the 

most sensitive and demanding crowd control tasks.

◆ Ability to draw and implement lessons—the military/security forces must be able to learn from 

their own experiences (and those of others) and 

to refine their strategy, tactics, and concept of employment accordingly.

◆ Foreign support—foreign criticism of or support for the regime or for the popular opposition 

can have an important impact on the course of 

the struggle, although the law of unintended 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 267 11 

consequences makes the implications of foreign 

involvement difficult to predict.

Finally, popular opposition movements in various 

Arab countries seem to be drawing strength and inspiration 

from the successes (thus far) of the opposition movements 

in Tunisia and Egypt. It is not clear how such a demonstration effect (for example, how events in Libya, where Muammar Qadhafi’s determination to stay the course has resulted 

in civil war) will influence the staying power of opposition 

movements in other Arab states, or the morale and cohesion of the security forces of other embattled regimes.

Notes

1 This section draws on Ahmed Hashim, “Civil-Military 

Relations in Iran: A Case Study,” unpublished manuscript, January 

1999, 140–168; Mark Roberts, Khomeini’s Incorporation of the Iranian 

Military, McNair Paper 48 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1996); 

5–28; Steven R. Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its 

Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 

208–210; Nader Entessar, “The Military and Politics in the Islamic 

Republic of Iran,” in Post-Revolutionary Iran, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 

57–61; Nikola B. Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic 

Republic, R-3473-USDP (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1987), 12–34; 

Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War (London: 

Routledge, 1988), 1–135; and Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and 

Development (New York: Pelican Books, 1979), 64–102.

2 For more on the 1953 coup, see Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 

1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 3 (August 1987), 261–286.

3 Patrick Clawson and Michael Rubin, Eternal Iran: Continuity 

and Chaos (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 82–83.

4 Ibid., 69–85.

5 Inauspicious events seem to spark popular uprisings or revolutions. 

Thus, the spark for the first Palestinian intifada (1987–1993) was an automobile accident in Gaza involving an Israeli military truck that caused the 

death of several Palestinians, while the 2010–2011 revolutions in Tunisia 

and Egypt started by the self-immolation of a street vendor in Tunisia.

6 Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran (New York: Viking-Penguin, 1980), 109–111.

7 Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran

(New York: Random House, 1985), 34–35.

8 Ward, 213. Tape recordings of sermons by the Ayatollah Khomeini and Friday sermons by mosque preachers played a major role in 

mobilizing demonstrators during the Islamic Revolution in much the 

same way that social media such as Facebook and Twitter have helped 

demonstrators to organize recent protests in Iran and the Arab world.

9 One key indicator of growing demoralization in the military is 

the fact that whereas absentee rates in the armed forces averaged 100 

to 200 per day at start of 1978, these rates reportedly reached more 

than 1,000 per day by the end of the year. See Ward, 217.

10 Hashim, 148–149.

11 Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The Nuzhih Plot and Iranian Politics,” 

International Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 4 (September 

2002), 645–666.

12 The low estimate is from Clawson and Rubin, 91; the high 

estimate is from Ward, 225.

13 This section draws on Hashim, 140–168; as well as Roberts, 

5–28; Ward, 208–210; Entessar, 57–61; Schahgaldian, 12–34; and 

Zabih, 1–135.

14 Ward, 221.

15 This perception was reinforced by the failed July 1980 air force 

coup, which prompted a new round of much deeper purges of the armed 

forces. In all, as many as 12,000 servicemembers are believed to have been 

purged from the armed forces during the first 18 months of the revolution. See Roberts, 45. For more on the coup, see Gasiorowski, 645–666.

16 This section draws on Michael Eisenstadt, “The Armed Force of 

the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment,” MERIA Journal 5, no. 1 

(March 2001); Michael Eisenstadt, The Security Forces of the Islamic Republic and the Fate of the Opposition, PolicyWatch No. 1538 (Washington, DC: 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 19, 2009), as well as 

Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Ali Alfoneh, What Do Structural Changes 

in the Revolutionary Guards Mean? AEI Middle Eastern Outlook No. 7 

(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, September 2008); Ali 

Alfoneh, The Basij Resistance Force: A Weak Link in the Iranian Regime? 

Policy Watch No. 1627 (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute 

for Near East Policy, February 5, 2010); and Ali Alfoneh, Changing of the 

Guards: Iran’s Supreme Leader Struggles to Control Military, AEI Middle 

Eastern Outlook No. 1 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 

April 2010). Ironically, IRI armed forces have had to grapple with some of 

the same challenges that confronted the Shah’s military.

17 Ali Ahmadi Motlagh, “Political Prisoners and the Security 

Apparatus in Post-Election Iran,” Muftah, August 2, 2010, available at 

<http://muftah.org/?p=215>.

18 Michael Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Defense Companies: Portrait of a 

Praetorian Unit,” unpublished paper, 1989.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

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briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

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The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

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Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

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INSS
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