HOMELAND SECURITY

DHS and TSA Continue to 

Face Challenges Developing 

and Acquiring Screening 

Technologies

Statement of Stephen M. Lord, Director

Forensic Audits and Investigative Services

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on 

Transportation Security, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 1:30 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, May 8, 2013

GAO-13-469T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-469T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security, Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives 

May 8, 2013 

HOMELAND SECURITY

DHS and TSA Continue to Face Challenges 

Developing and Acquiring Screening Technologies 

Why GAO Did This Study

TSA acquisition programs represent 

billions of dollars in life cycle costs and 

support a range of aviation security 

programs, including technologies used 

to screen passengers and checked 

baggage. Within DHS, TSA is 

responsible for establishing 

requirements for testing and deploying 

transportation system technologies. 

Since 2010, GAO has reported that 

DHS and TSA faced challenges in 

managing acquisition efforts, including 

deploying technologies that did not 

meet requirements and were not 

appropriately tested and evaluated. 

As requested, this testimony discusses 

(1) the extent to which TSA addressed 

challenges relating to developing and 

meeting program requirements, testing 

new screening technologies, and 

delivering capabilities within cost and 

schedule estimates for selected 

programs, and (2) DHS efforts to 

strengthen oversight of component 

acquisition processes. This testimony

is based on GAO products issued from 

January 2010 through January 2013, 

including selected updates conducted 

in March 2013 on TSA’s efforts to 

implement GAO’s prior 

recommendations and preliminary 

observations from ongoing work. To 

conduct the updates and ongoing 

work, GAO analyzed documents, such 

as the AIT road map, and interviewed 

TSA officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made recommendations to 

DHS and TSA in prior reports to help 

strengthen its acquisition processes 

and oversight. DHS and TSA generally 

concurred and are taking actions to 

address them. 

What GAO Found

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken and is taking steps 

to address challenges related to developing, testing, and delivering screening 

technologies for selected aviation security programs, but challenges remain. For 

example, in January 2012, GAO reported that TSA faced challenges developing 

and meeting key performance requirements for the acquisition of advanced 

imaging technology (AIT)—i.e., full-body scanners. Specifically, GAO found that 

TSA did not fully follow Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acquisition 

policies when acquiring AIT, which resulted in DHS approving nationwide AIT 

deployment without full knowledge of TSA’s revised specifications. DHS required 

TSA to notify DHS’s Acquisition Review Board (ARB) if AIT could not meet any of 

TSA’s five key performance parameters or if TSA changed a key performance 

parameter during testing. However, GAO found that the ARB approved TSA for 

full-scale production without reviewing the changed parameter. DHS officials said

that the ARB should have formally reviewed this change to ensure that TSA did 

not change it arbitrarily. GAO recommended that TSA develop a road map that 

outlines vendors’ progress in meeting all key performance parameters. DHS 

agreed, and developed a road map to address the recommendation, but faces 

challenges implementing it—e.g., due to vendor delays. Additionally, in January 

2013, GAO reported that TSA faced challenges related to testing and deploying

passenger screening canine teams. Specifically, GAO concluded that TSA began 

deploying these canine teams to airport terminals in April 2011 prior to 

determining the canine teams’ operational effectiveness. In June 2012, DHS and 

TSA began conducting operational assessments to help demonstrate canine 

teams’ effectiveness. Also, TSA began deploying teams before it had completed 

an assessment to determine where within the airport the canine teams would be 

most effectively utilized. GAO recommended that on the basis of DHS 

assessment results, TSA expand and complete testing to assess the 

effectiveness of canine teams in areas of the airport deemed appropriate. DHS

agreed and officials said that as of April 2013, TSA had concluded testing in 

collaboration with DHS of canine teams in airport sterile areas—in general, areas 

of an airport for which access is controlled through screening of persons and 

property—and is testing teams on its own in airport sterile and public areas. 

DHS has some efforts under way to strengthen its oversight of component 

investment and acquisition processes, but additional actions are needed. In 

September 2012, GAO reported that while DHS had initiated efforts to address 

the department’s acquisition management challenges, most of DHS’s major 

acquisition programs continue to cost more than expected, take longer to deploy 

than planned, or deliver less capability than promised. GAO identified 42 DHS 

programs that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both, with 16 of the 

programs’ costs increasing from a total of $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 

2011—an aggregate increase of 166 percent. GAO concluded that DHS 

recognized the need to implement its acquisition policy more consistently, but 

that significant work remained. GAO recommended that DHS modify acquisition 

policy to better reflect key program and portfolio management practices and 

ensure acquisition programs fully comply with DHS acquisition policy. DHS 

agreed, and in September 2012 officials stated that it was in the process of 

revising its policy to more fully reflect key program management practices. 

View GAO-13-469T. For more information, 

contact Steve Lord at (202) 512-4379 or 

lords@gao.gov. 
Page 1 GAO-13-469T 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and members of the 

committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work examining the 

Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to develop and 

acquire new technologies to address homeland security needs. Within the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), TSA is responsible for securing 

the nation’s transportation systems. TSA’s acquisition programs represent 

billions of dollars in life cycle costs and support a wide range of aviation 

security missions and investments, including technologies used to screen 

passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo, among others. For 

example, technologies used to screen passengers include advanced 

imaging technology (AIT), commonly referred to as full-body scanners, 

that screen passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats such as 

weapons, explosives, and other objects concealed under layers of 

clothing, and passenger screening canines trained to detect explosives 

being carried or worn by passengers.1 In addition, technologies used to 

screen checked baggage include explosives detection systems (EDS), 

which use X-rays with computer-aided imaging to automatically measure 

the physical characteristics of objects in baggage.2

Since 2010, we have reported that DHS and TSA have experienced 

challenges in managing their multibillion-dollar acquisition efforts, 

including implementing technologies that did not meet intended 

requirements and were not appropriately tested and evaluated, and not 

consistently completing analyses of costs and benefits before 

technologies were deployed for operational use. As requested, my 

testimony provides an update on that work, including (1) the extent to 

which TSA has addressed challenges relating to developing and meeting 

program requirements, testing new screening technologies, and 

Consistent with its 

responsibility, TSA establishes requirements for testing and deploying 

these technologies to, for example, screen airline passengers and their 

property.

 

1 Although canines are not considered a technology, they have been included in this 

testimony as one of the layers TSA relies on to screen passengers, baggage, and air 

cargo for explosives odor. 

2

An EDS automatically triggers an alarm when objects that exhibit the physical 

characteristics of explosives are detected.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-469T 

delivering capabilities within agreed-upon cost and schedule estimates for 

select programs, and (2) DHS efforts to strengthen its oversight of 

component investment and acquisition processes.

This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from 

January 2010 through January 2013, including selected updates 

conducted in March 2013 on TSA’s efforts to implement our prior 

recommendations.3

In addition, this statement includes preliminary observations based on 

ongoing work we conducted during the winter of 2013 at your request, 

assessing the effectiveness of AIT equipped with automated target 

recognition (ATR) software.

Specifically, to conduct these updates, we obtained 

information from TSA on the status of the current EDS acquisition and 

upgrades to existing systems, as well as on testing of passenger 

screening canine teams. Our previous reports incorporated information 

we obtained and analyzed from TSA and DHS officials on efforts to 

manage, test, acquire, deploy, and oversee various technology programs, 

including program schedules, planning documents, testing reports, and 

other acquisition documentation. Our previously published products 

contain additional details on the scope and methodology of our reports.

4 As part of this ongoing work, we analyzed 

documents and interviewed TSA officials on the status of AIT 

development and deployment efforts and milestones. All of our work was 

conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For new information that 

was based on work not previously reported, we obtained TSA’s views on 

our findings and incorporated technical comments where appropriate.

In 2003, we designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk 

because DHS had to transform 22 agencies—several with major 

 

3

See the related GAO products list at the end of this statement. 

4

We plan to issue a report with the results from this work in the fall of 2013. AIT systems 

equipped with ATR software display anomalies that could pose a threat using a generic 

figure for all passengers.

Background
 

Page 3 GAO-13-469T 

management challenges—into one department.5

As DHS continued to mature, and as we reported in our assessment of 

DHS’s progress and challenges 10 years after the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, we found that the department implemented key 

homeland security operations and achieved important goals in many 

areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential.

Further, failure to 

effectively address DHS’s management and mission risks could have 

serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security. Given the 

significant effort required to build and integrate a department as large and 

complex as DHS, our initial high-risk designation addressed the 

department’s initial transformation and subsequent implementation 

efforts, to include associated management and programmatic challenges. 

At that time, we reported that the creation of DHS was an enormous 

undertaking that would take time to achieve, and that the successful 

transformation of large organizations, even those undertaking less 

strenuous reorganizations, could take years to implement.

6

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) established TSA as 

the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the nation’s 

civil aviation system, which includes the screening of all passengers and 

property transported to, from, and within the United States by commercial 

As a 

result, we narrowed the scope of the high-risk area and changed the 

name from Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland 

Security to Strengthening the Department of Homeland Security 

Management Functions. Recognizing DHS’s progress in transformation 

and mission implementation, our 2011 high-risk update focused on the 

continued need to strengthen DHS’s management functions (acquisition, 

information technology, financial management, and human capital) and 

integrate those functions within and across the department, as well as the 

impact of these challenges on the department’s ability to effectively and 

efficiently carry out its missions.

 

5

GAO, High-Risk Series: Government-wide 2013 Update and Progress Made by the 

Department of Homeland Security, GAO-13-444T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 2013).

6

GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in 

Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11, GAO-11-881 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2011).
 

Page 4 GAO-13-469T 

passenger aircraft.7 In response to the December 25, 2009, attempted 

terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, TSA revised its 

procurement and deployment strategy for AIT, commonly referred to as 

full-body scanners, increasing the number of AIT units it planned to 

procure and deploy. TSA stated that AIT provides enhanced security 

benefits compared with walk-through metal detectors, such as enhanced 

detection capabilities for identifying nonmetallic threat objects and liquids. 

In July 2011, TSA began installing ATR software on deployed AIT 

systems designed to address privacy concerns by eliminating passengerspecific images. As of May 2013, TSA had deployed about 750 AIT 

systems to more than 200 airports, most of which were equipped with 

ATR software. In January 2012, we issued a classified report on TSA’s 

procurement and deployment of AIT that addressed the extent to which 

(1) TSA followed DHS acquisition guidance when procuring AIT and (2) 

deployed AIT units are effective at detecting threats. Pursuant to the FAA 

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, TSA was mandated to ensure 

that all AIT systems used to screen passengers are equipped with and 

employ ATR software by June 1, 2012.8 Consistent with provisions of the 

law, TSA subsequently extended this deadline to June 1, 2013.9

 

7

See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). For purposes of this testimony, 

“commercial passenger aircraft” refers to a U.S.- or foreign-flagged air carrier operating 

under TSA-approved security programs with regularly scheduled passenger operations to 

or from a U.S. airport. 

8

See Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 826, 126 Stat. 11, 132-33 (2012) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 

44901(l)). 

9

On March 26, 2013, TSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal 

Register soliciting public comment on the use of AIT as a primary means for screening 

passengers. See 78 Fed. Reg. 18,287 (Mar. 26, 2013).
 

Page 5 GAO-13-469T 

While TSA has taken some steps and is taking additional steps to 

address challenges related to developing, testing, and delivering 

screening technologies for selected aviation security programs, additional 

challenges remain.

As we have reported in the past few years, it is difficult to fully assess 

program performance without establishing valid baseline requirements in 

key foundation documents at the program start. According to best 

practices established in prior work on major acquisitions, without the 

development, review, and approval of key acquisition documents, such as 

the mission need statement and the operational requirements document, 

agencies are at risk of having poorly defined requirements that can 

negatively affect program performance and contribute to increased 

costs.10

AIT. In January 2012 we concluded that TSA did not fully follow DHS 

acquisition policies when acquiring AIT, which resulted in DHS approving 

full AIT deployment without full knowledge of TSA’s revised 

specifications.

Specifically, we have reported in the past few years that TSA has 

faced challenges in developing and meeting program requirements in 

some of its aviation security programs. For example:

11

 

10GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System 

Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes,

Specifically, DHS’s Acquisition Management Directive 

102-01 (AD 102) required TSA to notify DHS’s Acquisition Review Board 

GAO-07-388 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007). The mission need statement outlines the specific functional 

capabilities required to accomplish DHS’s mission and objectives, along with deficiencies 

and gaps in these capabilities. The operational requirements document includes key 

performance parameters and describes the mission, capabilities, and objectives to provide 

needed capabilities. 

11In January 2012, we issued a classified report on TSA’s procurement and deployment of 

AIT at airport checkpoints. 

TSA Has Taken Some 

Steps to Address 

Challenges Identified 

in Developing, 

Testing, and 

Delivering Select 

Screening 

Technologies

Developing and Meeting 

Key Performance 

Requirements for TSA 

Screening Technologies
 

Page 6 GAO-13-469T 

(ARB) if AIT could not meet any of TSA’s five key performance 

parameters or if TSA changed a key performance parameter during 

qualification testing.12 Senior TSA officials acknowledged that TSA did not 

comply with the directive’s requirements, but stated that TSA still reached 

a “good decision” in procuring AIT and that the ARB was fully informed of 

the program’s changes to its key performance parameters. Further, TSA 

officials stated that the program was not bound by AD 102 because it was 

a new acquisition process and they believed that the ARB was not fully 

functioning at the time.13

 

12AD 102 (effective November 7, 2008) and its associated instruction manual establish the 

department’s policies and processes for managing major acquisition programs. DHS 

generally defines major programs as those expected to cost at least $300 million over 

their respective life cycles, and many are expected to cost more than $1 billion. The ARB, 

now called the Investment Review Board, is the cross-component board within DHS that 

determines whether a proposed acquisition has met the requirements of key phases in the 

acquisition life cycle framework and is able to proceed to the next phase and eventual full 

production and deployment. Key performance parameters (KPP) are system 

characteristics that are considered critical or essential. Failure to meet a KPP could be the 

basis to reject a system solution. 

DHS officials stated that the ARB discussed the 

changed key performance parameter but did not see the documents 

related to the change and determined that TSA must update the 

program’s key acquisition document, the Acquisition Program Baseline, 

before TSA could deploy AIT systems. However, we concluded that, 

according to a February 2010 acquisition decision memorandum from 

DHS, the ARB gave approval to TSA for full-scale production without 

reviewing the changed key performance parameter. DHS officials stated 

that the ARB should have formally reviewed changes made to the key 

performance parameter to ensure that TSA did not change it arbitrarily. 

According to TSA, it should have submitted its revised requirements for 

approval, but it did not because there was confusion as to whether DHS 

should be informed of all changes. Acquisition best practices state that 

programs procuring new technologies with fluctuating requirements pose 

challenges to agencies ensuring that the acquisition fully meets program 

13DHS’s Undersecretary for Management issued a memorandum on November 7, 2008, 

requiring compliance with the directive at the program’s next formal decision point, but no 

later than 6 months from the date of the directive (by May 2009). DHS acquisition officials 

stated that enforcing compliance with the new policy took almost 1 year, but that it worked 

with TSA to make the directive’s requirements known. However, DHS’s previous 

directive—Management Directive 1400, which AD 102 superseded —also required 

component agencies to follow a similar process whereby programs were reviewed by 

DHS’s Investment Review Board. Accordingly, the Investment Review Board began 

reviewing TSA’s AIT program (at that time called the Whole Body Imager) as early as 

2008. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-469T 

needs.14

EDS. In July 2011, we found that TSA revised its EDS requirements to 

better address current threats, and had plans to implement these 

requirements in a phased approach.

DHS acquisition oversight officials agreed that changing key 

requirements is not a best practice for system acquisitions already under 

way. As a result, we found that TSA procured and deployed a technology 

that met evolving requirements, but not the initial requirements included in 

its key acquisition requirements document that the agency initially 

determined were necessary to enhance aviation security. We 

recommended that TSA develop a road map that specifies development 

milestones for AIT and have DHS acquisition officials approve the road 

map. DHS agreed with our recommendation and has taken actions to 

address it, which we discuss below.

15 However, we found that some 

number of EDS machines in TSA’s checked baggage screening fleet 

were configured to detect explosives at the levels established in 2005 and 

that the remaining EDS machines are configured to detect explosives at 

levels established in 1998.16

 

14GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better Outcomes, 

When TSA established the 2005 

requirements, it did not have a plan with the appropriate time frames 

needed to deploy EDS machines that meet the requirements. To help 

ensure that TSA’s checked baggage-screening machines are operating 

most effectively, we recommended that TSA develop a plan to deploy 

EDSs that meet the most recent explosive detection requirements 

established in 2010 and ensure that new machines, as well as machines 

already deployed in airports, will be operated at the levels established in 

those requirements. DHS concurred with our recommendation and has 

begun taking action to address it. Specifically, in April 2012, TSA reported 

that it had awarded contracts to vendors to implement detection upgrades 

across the currently deployed EDS fleet to meet the 2010 requirements. 

In March 2013, TSA reported that it plans to complete upgrading the 

currently deployed fleet by the end of fiscal year 2013. However, our 

GAO-10-374T 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 20, 2010). 

15GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection Requirements for 

Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions Are Needed, GAO-11-740 

(Washington, D.C.: Jul. 11, 2011). 

16Details on the number of EDS machines were omitted because TSA deemed them 

Sensitive Security Information, which must be protected from public disclosure pursuant to 

49 C.F.R. part 1520. 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-469T 

recommendation is intended to ensure that EDS machines in use at 

airports meet the most recent detection requirements—both previously 

deployed units as well as newly procured machines. Until TSA develops 

such a plan, it will be difficult for the agency to provide reasonable 

assurance that its upgrade approach is feasible or cost-effective.

As we have reported in the past few years, TSA has not always resolved 

problems discovered during testing, which has led to costly redesign and 

rework at a later date, as shown in the following examples. We concluded 

that addressing such problems before moving to the acquisition phase 

can help agencies better manage costs. Specifically:

Canines. In January 2013, we found that TSA began deploying 

passenger screening canine teams to airport terminals in April 2011 prior 

to determining the teams’ operational effectiveness.17 According to TSA 

officials, operational assessments did not need to be conducted prior to 

deployment because canines were being used to screen passengers by 

other entities, such as airports in the United Kingdom. In June 2012, the 

DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and TSA began 

conducting operational assessments to help demonstrate the 

effectiveness of passenger screening canine teams.18 We recommended 

that on the basis of the results of DHS’s assessments, TSA expand and 

complete operational assessments of passenger screening canine teams, 

including a comparison with conventional explosives detection canine 

teams before deploying passenger screening canine teams on a 

nationwide basis to determine whether they are an effective method of 

screening passengers in the U.S. airport environment, particularly since 

they cost the federal government more than TSA’s conventional canine 

teams.19

 

17GAO, TSA Explosives Detection Canine Program: Actions Needed to Analyze Data and 

Ensure Canine Teams Are Effectively Utilized, 

Additionally, we found that TSA began deploying passenger 

screening canine teams before it had completed an assessment to 

GAO-13-239 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 

2013). 

18The results were deemed sensitive security information by TSA. DHS S&T has 

responsibility for coordinating and conducting basic and applied research, development, 

demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities relevant to DHS components.

19TSA’s conventional explosives detection canines are trained to detect explosives in 

stationary objects (e.g., baggage and vehicles).

Testing New Screening 

Technologies
 

Page 9 GAO-13-469T 

determine where within the airport (i.e., the public, checkpoint, or sterile 

areas) the teams would be most effectively utilized.20

EDS. In July 2011, we found that TSA experienced challenges related to 

collecting explosives data needed by vendors to develop EDS detection 

software.

TSA leadership 

focused on initially deploying passenger screening canine teams to a 

single location within the airport—the sterile area—because it thought it 

would be the best way to foster stakeholders’ acceptance of the teams. 

However, aviation stakeholders we interviewed at the time raised 

concerns about this deployment strategy, stating that passenger 

screening canine teams would be more effectively utilized in nonsterile 

areas of the airport, such as curbside or in the lobby areas. DHS 

concurred with our recommendation to expand and complete testing to 

assess the effectiveness of the teams in areas of the airport deemed 

appropriate. As of April 2013, TSA concluded testing with DHS S&T of 

passenger screening canine teams in the sterile areas of airports, and 

TSA is still in the process of conducting its own testing of the teams in the 

sterile and public areas of the airports.

21

 

20The sterile area of an airport is the portion in an airport, defined in the airport’s security 

program, that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which the access 

generally is controlled through the screening of persons and property. See 49 C.F.R. § 

1540.5. 

These data are also needed by TSA for testing the machines 

to determine whether they meet established requirements prior to their 

procurement and deployment to airports. In the course of collecting data, 

TSA officials encountered problems associated with safely handling and 

consistently formulating some explosives, which contributed to delays in 

providing vendors with the data needed to develop the explosives 

detection software. These delays, in turn resulted in delays to TSA’s 

planned EDS acquisition schedule, which involved implementing the 2010 

requirements in phases. We recommended that TSA develop a plan to 

ensure that it has the explosives data needed for each of the planned 

phases of the 2010 EDS requirements before starting the procurement 

process for new EDSs or upgrades included in each applicable phase. 

DHS stated that TSA modified its strategy for the EDS’s competitive 

procurement in July 2010 in response to challenges working with the 

explosives by removing the data collection from the procurement process. 

In April 2012, TSA reported that it had begun using a Qualified Products 

21GAO-11-740. 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-469T 

List for its acquisition of EDS, which would separate the need for 

explosives data from future procurements, and would require that EDS be 

certified to meet detection requirements prior to beginning acquisitions of 

EDS to meet those requirements.22

According to best practices established in prior work on major 

acquisitions, realistic program baselines with stable requirements for cost, 

schedule, and performance are important to delivering capabilities within 

schedule and cost estimates.23 Our prior work has found that program 

performance metrics for cost and schedule can provide useful indicators 

of program health and can be valuable tools for improving oversight of 

individual programs. According to DHS’s acquisition guidance, the 

program baseline is the contract between the program and departmental 

oversight officials and must be established at program start to document 

the program’s expected cost, deployment schedule, and technical 

performance. Best practices guidance states that reliable and realistic 

cost, schedule, and performance estimates help ensure that a program 

will deliver capabilities on time and within budget.24

AIT. In January 2012, we found that TSA did not have clear plans to 

require AIT vendors to meet milestones used during the AIT acquisition. 

On the basis of our findings, we recommended that TSA develop a road 

map that outlines vendors’ progress in meeting all key performance 

parameters because it is important that TSA convey vendors’ progress in 

meeting those requirements and full costs of the technology to decision 

makers when making deployment and funding decisions. While TSA 

reported that it hoped vendors would be able to gradually improve 

meeting key performance parameters for AIT over time, we concluded 

that TSA would have more assurance that limited taxpayer resources are 

used effectively by developing a road map that specifies development 

However, as we have 

reported in the past few years and on the basis of our preliminary 

observations from our ongoing work, TSA has not always developed 

accurate baselines for establishing cost, schedule, and performance 

estimates.

 

22Technologies that successfully pass independent and operational evaluation are added 

to a list of qualified products. 

23GAO-07-388. 

24GAO-07-388. 

Delivering Capabilities 

within Schedule and Cost 

Estimates
 

Page 11 GAO-13-469T 

milestones for the technology and having DHS acquisition officials 

approve this road map. DHS agreed with our recommendation and has 

taken actions to address it. For example, in February 2012, TSA 

developed a road map that specifies development and deployment 

milestones, including the addition of ATR to existing deployed systems, 

continued development of enhanced detection capabilities, and 

acquisition plans for the next generation of AIT systems (AIT-2).25 In July 

2012, DHS acquisition officials reviewed the AIT road map. However, on 

the basis of our preliminary observations from our ongoing work 

conducted in March 2013, we found that TSA has fallen behind schedule 

as outlined in the AIT road map to install ATR software upgrades to 

existing deployed AIT systems because of one of the vendors’ inability to 

develop this software in time for the installation of ATR software on all 

units by June 2013. TSA subsequently decided to terminate its contract 

with this vendor and remove all deployed units from airports. TSA has 

also fallen behind schedule as outlined in the AIT road map to acquire 

and test AIT-2 systems because of vendors’ inability to provide required 

documentation verifying that contractual requirements have been met and 

the units are ready to begin testing. Although TSA updated the AIT road 

map in October 2012, it subsequently missed some of the key deadlines 

specified in the updated version as well. We currently have ongoing work 

related to this area and we plan to report the results in the fall of 2013.26

EDS. In July 2011, we found that TSA had established a schedule for the 

acquisition of EDS machines but it did not fully comply with leading 

practices, and TSA had not developed a plan to upgrade its EDS fleet to 

meet the current explosives detection requirements.27

 

25In February 2012, TSA issued a request for vendors to provide a second generation of 

AIT system, referred to as AIT-2. In September 2012, TSA made contract awards to 

purchase and test AIT-2 systems from three vendors. All AIT-2 systems are required to be 

equipped with ATR, have a smaller footprint than previous systems, and be capable of 

meeting enhanced detection requirements, among other things.

These leading 

practices state that the success of a large-scale system acquisition, such 

as TSA’s EDS acquisition, depends in part on having a reliable schedule 

that identifies when the program’s set of work activities and milestone 

events will occur, amongst other things. However, we reported that the 

26In response to your request, we have initiated a review of AIT that will examine the 

effectiveness of AIT systems equipped with ATR.

27GAO-11-740. 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-469T 

schedule for the EDS acquisition is not reliable because it does not reflect 

all planned program activities and does not include a timeline to deploy 

EDSs or plans to procure EDSs to meet subsequent phases of explosive 

detection requirements. On the basis of our findings, we concluded that 

developing a reliable schedule would help TSA better monitor and 

oversee the progress of the EDS acquisition. DHS concurred with our 

recommendation to develop and maintain a schedule for the entire 

Electronic Baggage Screening Program in accordance with the leading 

practices we identified for preparing a schedule.28

Electronic Baggage Screening Program. In April 2012, we found that 

TSA’s methods for developing life cycle cost estimates for the Electronic 

Baggage Screening Program did not fully adhere to best practices for 

developing these estimates.

In July 2011, DHS 

commented that TSA had already begun working with key stakeholders to 

develop and define requirements for a schedule and to ensure that the 

schedule aligns with the best practices we outlined. TSA reported in 

March 2013 that it plans to have an updated integrated master schedule 

by September 2013.

29 According to best practices, a high-quality, 

reliable cost estimation process provides a sound basis for making 

accurate and well-informed decisions about resource investments, 

budgets, assessments of progress, and accountability for results and thus 

is critical to the success of a program.30 We found that TSA’s estimates 

partially met three characteristics and minimally met one characteristic of 

a reliable cost estimate.31

 

28TSA’s Electronic Baggage Screening Program, one of the largest acquisition programs 

within DHS, certifies and acquires systems used to screen checked baggage at TSAregulated airports throughout the United States.

DHS concurred with our recommendation that 

TSA ensure that its life cycle cost estimates conform to cost-estimating 

best practices, and identified efforts under way to address it. DHS also 

acknowledged the importance of producing life cycle cost estimates that 

are comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible so that they 

29GAO, Checked Baggage Screening: TSA Has Deployed Optimal Systems at the 

Majority of TSA-Regulated Airports, but Could Strengthen Cost Estimates, GAO-12-266 

(Washington D.C.: Apr. 27, 2012).

30GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2 2009). 

31We reported that the estimate was partially comprehensive, partially documented, 

partially accurate, and minimally credible when compared against the criteria in our Cost 

Estimating and Assessment Guide.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-469T 

can be used to support DHS funding and budget decisions. In April 2013,

TSA reported it plans to have an updated integrated master schedule and 

revised life cycle cost estimate by September 2013, which, when 

completed, will allow it to update its cost estimate for the Electronic 

Baggage Screening Program.

In part because of the challenges we have highlighted in DHS’s 

acquisition process, strengthening DHS’s management functions remains 

on our high-risk list. However, DHS has efforts under way to strengthen 

its oversight of component acquisition processes.

We found in September 2012 that while DHS has initiated efforts to 

address the department’s acquisition management challenges, most of 

the department’s major acquisition programs continue to cost more than 

expected, take longer to deploy than planned, or deliver less capability 

than promised.32 We identified 42 programs that experienced cost growth, 

schedule slips, or both, with 16 of the programs’ costs increasing from a 

total of $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011—an aggregate 

increase of 166 percent. Moreover, we reported that DHS leadership has 

authorized and continued to invest in major acquisition programs even 

though the vast majority of those programs lack foundational documents 

demonstrating the knowledge needed to help manage risks and measure 

performance. For example, we found that DHS leadership—through the 

Investment Review Board or its predecessor body, the ARB—has 

formally reviewed 49 of the 71 major programs. We found that DHS 

permitted 43 of those programs to proceed with acquisition activities 

without verifying the programs had developed the knowledge in key 

acquisition documents as required by AD 102. 33

 

32GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment Management to 

Help Meet Mission Needs, 

DHS officials reported 

that DHS’s culture has emphasized the need to rapidly execute missions 

more than sound acquisition management practice and that DHS could 

not approve the documents in a timely manner. On the basis of our 

findings, we concluded that DHS recognized the need to implement its 

acquisition policy more consistently, but that significant work remains. We 

GAO-12-833, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2012). 

33We surveyed all of DHS’s 77 major acquisition programs from January to March 2012, 

and received a 92 percent response rate. DHS originally identified 82 major acquisition 

programs in the 2011 major acquisition oversight list, but 5 of those programs were 

subsequently canceled in 2011. Seventy-one program managers responded to the survey. 

DHS Has Efforts 

Under Way to 

Strengthen Oversight 

of Component 

Acquisitions
 

Page 14 GAO-13-469T 

recommended that DHS modify acquisition policy to better reflect key 

program and portfolio management practices and ensure acquisition 

programs fully comply with DHS acquisition policy. DHS concurred with 

our recommendations and reported taking actions to address some of 

them. For example, in September 2012, DHS stated that it was in the 

process of revising its policy to more fully reflect key program 

management practices to enable DHS to more rapidly respond to 

programs’ needs by facilitating the development, approval, and delivery of 

more specific guidance for programs.

In March 2012, we found that to enhance the department’s ability to 

oversee major acquisition programs, DHS realigned the acquisition 

management functions previously performed by two divisions within the 

Office of Chief Procurement Officer to establish the Office of Program 

Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) in October 2011. PARM, 

which is responsible for program governance and acquisition policy, 

serves as the Management Directorate’s executive office for program 

execution and works with DHS leadership to assess the health of major 

acquisitions and investments. To help with this effort, PARM is developing 

a database, known as the Decision Support Tool, intended to improve the 

flow of information from component program offices to the Management 

Directorate to support its oversight and management efforts. However, we 

reported in March 2012 that DHS executives were not confident enough 

in the data to use the Decision Support Tool to help make acquisition 

decisions.34

In February 2013, we reported that DHS updated its Integrated Strategy 

for High Risk Management in June 2012, which includes management 

initiatives and corrective actions to address acquisition management 

challenges, among other management areas.

On the basis of our findings, we concluded that DHS had 

limited plans to improve the quality of the data because PARM planned to 

check the data quality only in preparation for key milestone meetings in 

the acquisition process. We reported that this could significantly diminish 

the Decision Support Tool’s value because users cannot confidently 

identify and take action to address problems meeting cost or schedule 

goals prior to program review meetings.

35

 

34GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Continued Progress Made Improving and 

Integrating Management Areas, but More Work Remains, 

In the June 2012 update, 

GAO-12-365T (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 1, 2012). 

35GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-13-283 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2013).
 

Page 15 GAO-13-469T 

DHS included, for the first time, performance measures and progress 

ratings for all of the management initiatives. The June 2012 update also 

identified the resources needed to implement most of its corrective 

actions, although we found that DHS needs to further identify its resource 

needs and communicate and mitigate critical gaps. On the basis of our 

findings, we concluded that the strategy, if implemented and sustained, 

will provide a path for DHS to be removed from our high risk list. Going 

forward, DHS needs to continue implementing its Integrated Strategy for 

High Risk Management and show measurable, sustainable progress in 

implementing its key management initiatives and corrective actions and 

achieving outcomes including those related to acquisition management. 

We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts to determine if the actions and 

outcomes are achieved.

Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and members of the 

committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to 

responding to any questions that you may have.

For questions about this statement, please contact Steve Lord at (202) 

512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

include Dave Bruno, Assistant Director; Carissa Bryant; Susan Czachor; 

Emily Gunn; and Tom Lombardi. Key contributors for the previous work 

that this testimony is based on are listed within each individual product.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 16 GAO-13-469T 

High-Risk Series: Government-wide 2013 Update and Progress Made by 

the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-13-444T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 21, 2013.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-13-283. Washington, D.C.: February 

14, 2013.

TSA Explosives Detection Canine Program: Actions Needed to Analyze 

Data and Ensure Canine Teams Are Effectively Utilized. GAO-13-239. 

Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2013.

Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment 

Management to Help Meet Mission Needs. GAO-12-833. Washington, 

D.C.: September 18, 2012.

Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Face Challenges Overseeing 

Acquisition of Screening Technologies. GAO-12-644T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 9, 2012.

Checked Baggage Screening: TSA Has Deployed Optimal Systems at the 

Majority of TSA-Regulated Airports, but Could Strengthen Cost 

Estimates. GAO-12-266. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2012.

Transportation Security Administration: Progress and Challenges Faced 

in Strengthening Three Key Security Programs. GAO-12-541T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2012

Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress, but Additional Efforts Are 

Needed to Improve Security. GAO-11-938T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 16, 2011.

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining 

in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11. 

GAO-11-881. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2011.

Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and 

Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 2011.

Aviation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Improve Security, but 

Additional Efforts Remain. GAO-11-807T. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 

2011.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 17 GAO-13-469T 

Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection 

Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions 

Are Needed. GAO-11-740. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February 

16, 2011.

Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex 

Acquisitions. GAO-10-588SP. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better Outcomes. 

GAO-10-374T. Washington, D.C.: January 20, 2010.

(441144)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.