Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass

Destruction

December 1993

OTA-BP-ISC-115

NTIS order #PB94-126984

GPO stock #052-003-01361-4
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying

Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, December 1993).
Foreword

c

ontrolling the spread of weapons of mass destruction depends on how

hard it is to manufacture them and on how easy such weapon programs

are to detect. This background paper, a companion volume to OTA’s

report Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the

Risks,l reviews the technical requirements for countries to develop and build

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, along with the systems most capable

of delivering these weapons to distant or defended targets: ballistic missiles,

combat aircraft, and cruise missiles. It identities evidence that might indicate the

production of weapons of mass destruction, and technical hurdles that might

provide opportunities to control their spread.

Of the weapons considered here, nuclear weapons are the most difficult and

expensive to develop-primarily due to the difficulty of producing the required

nuclear materials. These materials, and the equipment needed to produce them,

have quite limited civilian applications and are tightly controlled. States have

produced nuclear weapon materials indigenously by evading international

controls, but at great cost and with substantial opportunity for detection. For

chemical and biological weapon materials, in contrast, most of the equipment

needed also has civilian applications and has become widely available, making the

capability to produce such weapons much more difficult to monitor and control.

The level of technology required to produce weapons of mass destruction is

relatively modest: ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons date back to World War

II, and basic chemical and biological weapons predate even that. Since export

controls ultimately cannot block the spread of general technological capability, an

effective nonproliferation regime must supplement them with other

nonproliferation policy measures. Nevertheless, export controls can prevent states

from pursuing the easiest or most direct routes to weapons of mass destruction, and

they will remain an important component of nonproliferation policy.

‘ U.S. Congess, Office of ‘lkchnology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruch’on.” Assessing

the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993).

Roger C. Herdman, Director

. . .

III
Advisory Panel

James E. Goodbyl

Chairman through 3/22/93

Distinguished Service Professor

Carnegie-Mellon University

James F. Leonard2

Chairman since 6/1/93

Executive Director

Washington Council on

Non-Proliferation

George Anzelon

Associate Division Leader

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory

Will D. Carpenter

Chemical Industry Consultant

Lewis A. Dunn

Assistant Vice President

Science Applications

International Corp.

Randall Forsberg

Executive Director

Institute for Defense and

Disarmament Studies

Thomas R. Fox

Director

Office of National Security

Technology

Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Alan R. Goldhammer

Director of Technical Affairs

Industrial Biotechnology

Association

John M. Googin Gary Milhollin

Senior Staff Consultant Director

Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. Wisconsin Project on Nuclear

Robert G. Gough

Senior Member, Technical Staff

Sandia National Laboratories

Elisa D. Harris3

Senior Research Analyst

The Brookings Institution

Geoffrey Kemp

Senior Associate

Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

Joshua Lederberg4

Rockefeller University

John W. Lewis

Center for International

Security and Arms Control

Stanford University

Lee W. Mercer

Corporate Export Manager

Digital Equipment Corp.

Matthew S. Meselson

Department of Biochemistry

and Molecular Biology

Harvard University

Stephen M. Meyer

Center for International Studies

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

Arms Control

Marvin M. Miller

Senior Research Scientist

Department of Nuclear Engineering

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Janne E. Nolan

Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy

The Brookings Institution

William C. Potter

Director

Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies

Monterey Institute of International

Studies

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg

Division of Natural Sciences

State University of

New York at Purchase

Lawrence Scheinmans

Associate Director

Peace Studies program

Cornell University

Leonard S. Spector

Senior Associate

Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace

Sergio C. Trindade

President

SE2T International, Ltd.

1 Resimexi to become Chief U.S. Ne~otiator for Safe and Secure Dismantlement of Nuclear Weawns 2 Panei member until June 1, 1993; I%nel chair atler June 1, 1993.

.

3 Resigned Jan. 29, 1993 to join National Seeurity Council staff.

4 Ex-officio; Member of ‘kchnology Assessment klviso~ Council.

5 Resigned Aug. 13, 1993 to become Counselor for Nonproliferation in the U.S. Department of Energy.

NOTE: O’E4 appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The panel

does nof however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the amuacy

of its contents,

iv
Peter Blair Gerald L. Epstein

Assistant Director Project Director

Industry, Commerce, and International

Security Division Thomas H. Karas

Alan Shaw Jonathan B. Tucker

Program Manager

International Security and

Commerce Program CONTRACTORS

Dan Fenstermacher

Preject Staff

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Jacqueline Robinson Boykin

Office Administrator

Louise Staley

Administrative Secretary

CONTRIBUTORS

Kenneth E. Freeman

Eugene Gholz

Jacques Hyman

William W. Keller

Todd M. La Porte
Additional Reviewers

Kenneth E. Apt

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Los Alamos, NM

Gordon M. Burck

EAI COrp.

Alexandria, VA

Zachary S. Davis

Congressional Research Service

Library of Congress

Washington, DC

William C. Dee

Chemical-Biological Defense Command

Us. Army

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD

James de Montmollin

Albuquerque, NM

Alexander DeVolpi

Arms Control and

Nonproliferation Program

Argonne National Laboratory

Argonne, IL

C. Robert Dietz

Sunnyvale, CA

Warren H. Donnelly

Congressional Research Service

Library of Congress

Washington, DC

David W. Dorn

United Nations Special Commission

for Iraq

New York, NY

Michael S. Elleman

Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.

Palo Alto, CA

Harold A. Feiveson

Center for Energy and

Environmental Studies

Princeton University

Princeton, NJ

Thomas W. Graham

International Security Program

The Rockefeller Foundation

New York, NY

John R. Harvey

Center for International Security

and Arms Control

Stanford University

Stanford, CA

David L. Huxsoll

School of Veterinary Medicine

Louisiana State University

Baton Rouge, LA

Kenneth W. Jewett

Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force

Grand Forks Air Force Base

Grand Forks, ND

Gregory W. Jordan

Northrop Corp.

Los Angeles, CA

David A. Kay

Science Applications International

Corp.

McLean, VA

Robert E. Kelley

Action Team

International Atomic Energy

Agency

Vienna, Austria

Ronald A. Kerst

Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory

Livermore, CA

George Lo

Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.

Palo Alto, CA

Benoit F. Morel

Department of Engineering and

Public Policy

Carnegie-Mellon University

Pittsburgh, PA

Thomas Morgan

Alexandria, VA

Stephen S. Morse

The Rockefeller University

New York, NY

Thomas S. O’Beirne

Science Applications International

Corp.

McLean, VA

Kyle B. Olson

Chemical and Biological Arms

Control Institute

Alexandria, VA

William C. Patrick Ill

Biological Warfare Consultant

Frederick, MD

Michael Rosenthal

U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency

Washington, DC

Oswald F. Schuette

Department of Physics and Astronomy

University of South Carolina

Columbia, SC

Nelson F. Sievering, Jr.

Atlantic Council of the United States

Washington DC

Jessica Stern

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Livermore, CA

George Sutton

Danville, CA

Leo Zeftel

Chemical Industry Consultant

Wilmington, DE

Alan P. Zelicoff

Sandia National Laboratory

Albuquerque, NM

Raymond A. Zilinskas

University of Maryland

Biotechnology Institute

Catonsville, MD

Peter D. Zimmerman

Center for Strategic and

International Studies

Washington, DC

NOTE: OT4 appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the reviewers. The reviewers do not.

however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full resp6-hsib@ for the-report and the accuracy of its contents:

vi
——.—— .

contents

1 Introduction and Summary 1

Nuclear Weapons 3

Chemical Weapons, 6

Biological Weapons 8

Delivery Systems 11

2 Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon

Proliferation 15

Summary 1 6

Acquiring a CW Capability 18

Agents and Production Processes 21

Indicators of CW Proliferation Activities 36

Alternative Proliferation Pathways 53

Append ix 2-A: Techniques for the Detection

and Analysis of Chemical Signatures 59

3 Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon

Proliferation 71

summary 73

Biological and Toxin Agents 76

Acquiring a BTW Capability 82

Indicators of BTW Agent Production 99

Military Implications of Genetic Engineering 113

vii
4 Technical Aspects of Nuclear

Proliferation 119

Overview and Findings 120

Acquiring Nuclear Weapon Capability 127

Sources of Nuclear Materials 129

From Nuclear Materials to Nuclear Weapons 149

Signatures of Nuclear Proliferation Activities 161

Appendix 4-A: Components, Design,

and Effects of Nuclear Weapons 173

Appendix 4-B: Enrichment Technologies 176

Appendix 4-C: Safeguards and the Civilian

Nuclear Fuel Cycle 181

Appendix 4-D: Dual-Use Export Controls 191

5 The Proliferation of Delivery Systems

summary 198

Effectiveness of Delivery Systems 201

Ballistic Missiles 207

Combat Aircraft 235

Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Index 257

197

244

. . . Vlll
T

I

Introduction

and

Summary 1

his background paper explores the technical pathways by

which states might acquire nuclear, chemical, and

biological weapons and the systems to deliver them. It

also assesses the level of effort, commitment, and

resources required to mount such developments. The paper is a

companion to the OTA report Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction: Assessing the Risks, which describes what nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons can do and how they might be

used.1 That report also analyzes the consequences of the spread

of such weapons for the United States and the world, surveys the

array of policy tools that can be used to combat proliferation, and

identifies tradeoffs and choices that confront policymakers. A

forthcoming report will analyze specific sets of nonproliferation

policy options in detail.

The technical hurdles that must be surmounted to develop

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are s ummarized in

table 1-1, which also appeared in OTA’s earlier report.2 Those

steps that are particularly time-consuming or difficult for

proliferants to master without outside assistance can be exploited

to control proliferation. Conversely, steps that are relatively easy,

or that make use of widely available know-how and equipment,

make poor candidates for control efforts. Understanding the

extent to which ‘‘dual-use’ technologies or products—those

also having legitimate applications-are involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction is important, since both

the feasibility of controlling dual-use items and the implications

of doing so depend on the extent of their other applications.

1 U.S. Congress, OffIce of ‘lkchnology Axxx5mex$ Proliferation of Weapons of

Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993).

2 Ibid., pp. 1011.

11
2 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table l-l—Technical Hurdles for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapon Programs

Nuclear Biological Chemical

Nuclear materials or lethal

agents production

Feed materials

Scientific and technical

personnel

Design and engineering

knowledge

Equipment

Uranium ore, oxide widely

available; plutonium and

partly enriched uranium dispersed through nuclear power

programs, mostly under international safeguards.

Requires wide variety of expertise and skillful systems

integration.

Varies with process, but specific designs for producing

either of the two bomb-grade

nuclear materials can be difficult to develop:

■ Separation of uranium

isotopes to produce

highly enriched uranium;

. Reactor production

and chemical processing to produce

plutonium,

Varies with different processes

but difficulties can include fabrication, power consumption,

large size, and operational

complexity:

Electromagnetic

separation equipment

can be constructed

from available, multiple-use parts;

Equipment for other

processes is more

specialized and difficult to buy or build.

Potential biological warfare agents are readily available locally or internationally from natural sources or commercial suppliers.

sophisticated research and development unnecessary to produce commonly known agents.

industrial microbiological personnel widely available.

Widely published; basic techniques to produce known agents

not difficult.

Widely available for commercial uses.

Special containment and wastetreatment equipment may be

more difficult to assemble, but

are not essential to production.

Many basic chemicals available for commercial purposes;

only some nerve gas precursors available for purchase,

but ability to manufacture them

is spreading.

Organic chemists and chemical engineers widely available.

Widely published.

Some processes tricky (Iraq

had difficulty with tabun cyanation, succeeded at sarin alkylation; however, sarin quality was

poor).

Most has legitimate industrial

applications.

Alkylation process is somewhat

difficult and is unusual in civilian applications.

Special containment and waste

treatment equipment may be

more difficult to assemble, but

are not essential to production.

Monitoring the proliferation of weapons of This paper also identifies signatures that, if

mass destruction, or conversely monitoring compli- detected, might reveal the existence of or progress

ance with nonproliferation agreements, depends in programs to develop weapons of mass destrucon detecting and identifying various indicators or tion and their delivery systems.

signatures associated with the development, pro- OTA’s earlier report summarized the material

duction, deployment, or use of such weapons. included in chapters 2 through 5 of this report.3

j Ibid., pp. 33-43.
Chapter I–Introduction and Summary 13

Table 1-1-(Continued)

Nuclear Biological Chemical

Overall cost

Plant construction and Costly and challenging.

operation Research reactors or electric power reactors might be

converted to plutonium production.

Cheapest overt production

route for one bomb per year,

with no international controls, is about $200 million;

larger scale clandestine

program could cost 10 to 50

times more, and even then

not be assured of success

or of remaining hidden.

Black-market purchase of

ready-to-use fissile materials or of complete weapons

could be many times cheaper.

Weaponization

Design and engineering Heavier, less efficient, lower

yield designs easier, but all

pose significant technical

challenges.

Production equipment Much (e.g., machine tools)

dual-use and widely available,

Some overlap with conventional munitions production

equipment.

With advent of biotechnology,

small-scale faclities now capable of large-scale production.

Enough for large arsenal may

cost less than $10 million.

Principal challenge is maintaining the agent’s potency

through weapon storage, delivery, and dissemination.

Broad-area dissemination not

difficult; design of weapons that

effectively aerosolize agents for

precision delivery challenging

(but developed by U.S. by’60s).

Must be tightly contained to

prevent spread of infection, but

the necessary equipment i snot

hard to build.

Dedicated plant not difficult.

Conversion of existing commercial chemical plants feasible but not trivial.

Arsenal for substantial military

capability (hundreds of tons of

agent) likely to cost tens of

millions of dollars.

Advanced weapons somewhat

difficult, but workable munition

designs (e.g., bursting smoke

device) widely published.

Relatively simple, closely related to standard munitions production equipment.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

For those readers who do not have a copy of that

publication, the summary is repeated below.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

 Material Production

In terms of costs, resources required, and

possibility of discovery, the difficulty of obtaining nuclear weapon materials—plutonium

or highly enriched uranium—today remains

the greatest single obstacle most countries

would face in pursuing nuclear weapons. Even

straightforward methods of producing such material indigenously (such as building a small

reactor and a primitive reprocessing facility to

produce plutonium and recover it from irradiated

reactor fuel) would require at least a modest

technological infrastructure and hundreds of millions of dollars to carry out. Moreover, once such

a facility became known, it could generate

considerable pressure from regional rivals or the

international community. The costs of a full-scale
4 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

indigenous nuclear weapon program-especially

if clandestine-can be substantially higher than

for a program largely aimed at producing just one

or two bombs and carried out in the open. Iraq

spent 10 to 20 times the cost of such a minimal

program-many billions of dollars-to pursue

multiple uranium enrichment technologies, to

build complex and sometimes redundant facilities, to keep its efforts secret, and to seek a fairly

substantial nuclear capability. Few countries of

proliferation concern can match the resources that

Iraq devoted to its nuclear weapon program. (Iran,

however, probably could.)

Since production of nuclear materials is

generally the most difficult and expensive part

of producing a nuclear weapon, the leakage of

significant amounts of weapon-grade material

from the former Soviet Union would provide a

great advantage to potential proliferants. Indeed, the possibility of black-market sales of

weapon-usable materials may represent one of the

greatest proliferation dangers now being faced.

Even the covert acquisition of low-enriched

uranium, which can fuel nuclear reactors but is

not directly usable for nuclear weapons, could be

advantageous to a proliferant by enhancing the

capacity of its isotope separation plants.

This ominous prospect notwithstanding, nuclear materials suitable for weapon purposes

have to date been extremely difficult to obtain

from countries that already possess them.

There is no reliable evidence that any militarily

significant quantities of nuclear weapon material

have been smuggled out of the former Soviet

Union. The vast majority of nuclear material in

nonnuclear weapon states is safeguarded by a

comprehensive system of material accountancy

and control administered by the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These safeguards are not perfect, but they provide high

levels of confidence that significant quantities of

nuclear material have not been diverted from

safeguarded nuclear reactors. Diversion would be

more difficult to detect from facilities such as fuel

fabrication plants, uranium enrichment plants,

and plutonium reprocessing facilities that process

large quantities of nuclear material in bulk form,

as opposed to handling it only in discrete units

such as fuel rods or reactor cores. At present,

however, there are no large facilities of this type

under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in countries of particular proliferation concern.4 At least

in the short run, the diversion of safeguarded

materials poses less of a threat to the nonproliferation regime than the black-market purchase or covert indigenous production of nuclear materials.

Under current European and Japanese plans

for reprocessing and limited reuse of plutonium

from commercial reactor fuel, the current worldwide surplus of some 70 tonnes of safeguarded,

separated reactor-grade plutonium-the type produced by commercial nuclear reactors in normal

operation-will likely continue to grow through

the 1990s by more than 10 tonnes per year.

Reactor-grade plutonium is more radioactive and

more difficult to handle than weapon-grade

plutonium, which is produced specifically for use

in nuclear weapons, but it can still be used to

make a crude nuclear weapon of significant

(though probably less predictable) yield. Nevertheless, the states that have sought nuclear

weapons have gone to great lengths to produce

weapon-grade materials-either highly enriched

uranium or weapon-grade plutonium-rather than

reactor-grade plutonium. (Note that some types of

nuclear power reactors, including ones in India,

South Korea, and North Korea, can produce either

reactor-grade or weapon-grade plutonium, depending on how they are operated.)

4 B@~a m~iurn-s~ed fuel fa~cation facility under IAEA safeguards, and south AfiiC~ erllkkllmt fmihtieS ~~~da

safeguards with South Mrica’s announced destruction of its nuclear weapons and its accession to the NIT Neither state is considered an active

proliferation threat at present.
— .

Chapter I–Introduction and Summary | 5

 Other Technical Barriers

Unlike chemical and biological weapons, whose

lethality is roughly proportional to the amount of

agent dispersed, nuclear weapons will not produce any yield at all unless certain conditions are

met: a minimum “critical mass” of nuclear

materials must be present, and that material must

be brought together with sufficient speed and

precision for a nuclear chain reaction to take

place. A proliferant must master a series of

technical hurdles in order to produce even a single

working weapon.

Nuclear weapons are so destructive that they

place few requirements on the accuracy of delivery systems for any but the most protected targets.

Most proliferants would likely be able to design

frost-generation nuclear weapons that were small

and light enough to be carried by Scud-class

missiles or small aircraft. Given additional technical refinement, they might be able to reduce

warhead weights to the point where the 500 kg

(1,100 pound) delivery threshold originally established by the Missile Technology Control Regime

no longer provides a reliable barrier to nuclearcapable ballistic or cruise missiles.5

Although nuclear weapons were first developed 50 years ago and the basic mechanisms are

widely known, much of the detailed design

information, and particularly the knowledge

gleaned by the nuclear weapons states from

decades of design and testing, remains classified.

Much of this information can be reconstructed by

a dedicated proliferant, but it will take time and

money. Moreover, ‘‘weaponizing” a nuclear

warhead for reliable missile delivery or long

shelf-life creates additional hurdles that could

significantly increase the required development

effort. Therefore, having access to key individualssuch as those from the former Soviet nuclear

weapon program---could significantly accelerate

a nuclear program, primarily by steering it away

from unworkable designs. Specific individuals

could fill critical gaps in a given country’s

knowledge or experience, adding greatly to the

likelihood that a program would succeed.

High-performance computers (so-called “supercomputers “ in the 1980s) are not required to

design first-generation fission weapons. Thus,

placing strict Limits on their exports would be of

minimal importance compared with limiting technologies for nuclear materials production.

 Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation

Production of nuclear materials provides many

signatures and the greatest opportunity for detecting a clandestine nuclear weapon program. Even

so, a large part of the Iraqi program was missed.

Since members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty (other than the acknowledged nuclear

weapon states) are not permitted to operate

unsafeguarded facilities handling nuclear materi-

,.

. .

Iraqi electromagnetic isotope separation (EMS)

equipment, uncovered after having been buried in the

desert to hide it from United Nations inspectors. Iraq’s

EMIS program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons

had not been detected by Western intelligence agencies

prior to the GuJf War.

5 13roadening its focus, be Missile TwlmoIogy Control Regime now covers missiles capable of delivefig chemical and biological wapo~

as well as those that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. Consequently, missiles with payloads below 500 kg are included as well.
6 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

als, the existence of any such facilities would

probably indicate an illegal weapon program.6

Nuclear tests at kiloton yields or above would

probably be detectable by various means, especially if multiple tests were conducted. However,

such tests are not necessary to field a workable

weapon with reasonably assured yield. Similarly, the deployment of a very small number of

nuclear weapons might not be easily detected.

 Implications of Old and New Technologies

Low- and medium-level gas centrifuge technology for enriching uranium may become increasingly attractive to potential proliferants for a

variety of reasons, including availability of information about early designs, difficulty of detection, ease of producing highly enriched uranium,

and potential availability of equipment from the

former Soviet Union. Modern, state-of-the-art

centrifuges could lead to even smaller, more

efficient, and relatively inexpensive facilities that

would be diffificult to detect remotely.

In the longer run, laser isotope separation

techniques and aerodynamic separation may

have serious proliferation potential as means of

producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear

weapons. Openly pursued by more than a dozen

non-nuclear-weapon states, laser enrichment technologies use precisely tuned laser beams to

selectively energize the uranium-235 isotope

most useful for nuclear weapons and separate it

from the more common uranium-238 isotope.

Laser facilities would be small in size and could

enrich uranium to high levels in only a few stages.

They could therefore prove to be difficult to

detect and control if successfully developed as

part of a clandestine program. Nevertheless,

considerable development work remains to be

done before this method can be made viable or

can compete with existing enrichment technologies. Even for the advanced industrialized countries, constructing operational facilities will remain very difficult Some aerodynamic techniques—

which use carefully designed gas flows to separate the lighter uranium-235 from the heavier

uranium-238-require fairly sophisticated technology to manufacture large numbers of precision

small-scale components, but they do not otherwise pose technical challenges beyond those of

other enrichment approaches.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The technology used to produce chemical

weapons is much harder to identify unambiguously

as weapons-related than is that for nuclear materials production technology, and relevant knowhow is much more widely available. Although

production techniques for major chemical weapon

agents involve some specialized process steps,

detailed examples can be found in the open

literature and follow from standard chemical

engineering principles. Unlike nuclear proliferation, where the mere existence of an unsafeguarded nuclear facility in an NPT member state

could be sufficient evidence of intent to produce

weapons, many legitimate chemical facilities

could have the ability to produce chemical agent.

Intent cannot be inferred directly from capability.

 Agent and Weapon Production

Certain chemical agents such as mustard gas

are very simple to produce. Synthesis of nerve

agents, however, includes some difficult process

steps involving highly corrosive or reactive materials. A sophisticated production facility to

make militarily significant quantities of one class

of nerve agents might cost between $30 and $50

6 The exception to this statement would be unsafeguarded facilities dedicated to military purposes unrelated to nuclear weapons, such as

naval nuclear propulsion. Such uses are not prohibited by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. They fall outside IAEA jurisdiction however,

since IAEA safeguards pertain only to peaceful-e. g., nonmilitary-applications of nuclear power, See Ben Sanders and John SimpsoW

Nuclear Subman”nes and Non-Prol#eration: Cause for Concern, PPNN Occasional Paper Two (Southarnpto4 England: Centre for

International Policy Studies, University of Soutbarnpto% for the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation 1988).
million, although dispensing with modem wastehandling facilities might cut the cost in half. Some

of the equipment needed may have distinctive

features, such as corrosion-resistant reactors and

pipes and special ventilation and waste-handling

equipment, but these can be dispensed with by

relaxing worker safety and environmental standards and by replacing hardware as it corrodes.

Moreover, production is easier if a proliferant

country is willing to cut corners on shelf-life,

seeking only to produce low-quality agent for

immediate use.

Chemical-warfare agents can be produced

through a wide variety of alternative routes, but

relatively few routes are well-suited for largescale production. Just because the United States

used a particular production pathway in the past,

however, does not mean that proliferant countries

would necessarily choose the same process.

In general, commercial pesticide plants lack

the precursor chemicals (materials from which

chemical agents are synthesized), equipment,

facilities, and safety procedures required for

nerve-agent production. Nevertheless, multipurpose chemical plants capable of manufacturing

organo-phosphorus pesticides or flame retardants

could be converted in a matter of weeks or months

to the production of nerve agents. The choice

between converting a commercial plant in this

manner and building a clandestine production

facility would depend on the urgency of a

country’s military requirement for a chemical

weapon stockpile, its desire to keep the program

secret, its level of concern over worker safety and

environmental protection, and the existence of

embargoes on precursor materials and production

equipment.

Agent production, however, is several steps

removed from an operational chemical weapon

capability. The latter requires design and development of effective munitions, filling the munitions before use, and mating them with a suitable

delivery system.

.—.

Chapter I–Introduction and Summary | 7

Portable gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GCl

MS) developed to support onsite analysis for the

Chemical Weapons Convention. This equipment can

detect and identify minute quantities of organic

chemicals controlled by the CWC.

I Monitoring Chemical Weapon

Proliferation

Direct detection of chemical warfare agents in

samples taken from a production facility would be

a clear indicator of weapon activity, since these

agents have almost no civil applications.7 However, considerable access to production facilities

is required to ensure that appropriate samples

have been collected. Moreover, some of the

substances produced when chemical agents break

down in the environment are also produced when

legitimate commercial chemicals break down, so

detection of fina1 degradation products does not

necessarily indicate agent production. Nevertheless, the suite of degradation products associated

with a given chemical agent production process

would provide a clear signature.

Other than the agent itself, or an ensemble of

degradation products, chemical agent production

has few unequivocal signatures. Moreover, highly

reliable technologies to detect chemical agent

production from outside the site are not currently

7 Nitrogen mustards have some use in cancer chemotherapy, and phosgene and hydrogen cyanide have industrial applications.
8 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

available. Unlike nuclear weapon facilities, which

generally exhibit fairly clear signatures, civilian

chemical plants have multiple uses, are hundreds

of times more numerous than nuclear facilities,

and are configured in different ways depending

on the process involved. Moreover, many of the

same chemicals used to make chemical agents are

also used to make pharmaceuticals, pesticides,

and other commercial products. Since many

different types of equipment are suitable for

chemical agent production, plant equipment per

se does not provide a reliable means of distinguishing between legitimate and illicit activities.

Nevertheless, some potential signatures of chemical weapon development and production exist,

and a set of multiple indicators taken from many

sources may be highly suggestive of a production

capability.

Indicators at suspect locations that may contribute to such an overall assessment include:

visual signatures such as testing munitions and

delivery systems; distinctive aspects of plant

design and layout, including the use of corrosionresistant materials and air-purification systems;

presence of chemical agents, precursors, or degradation products in the facility’s production line or

waste stream; and biochemical evidence of chemical agent exposure (including that due to accidental leaks) in plant workers or in plants and

animals living in the vicinity of a suspect facility.

Nevertheless, the utility of specific signatures

depends on how a given weapon program operates, including the choice of production process

and the extent of investment in emission-control

technologies. Detection capabilities that are decisive under laboratory conditions may be rather

inconclusive in the field—particularly if the

proliferant has been producing related legitimate

chemicals (e.g., organophosphorus pesticides) in

the same facility and is willing to expend time,

effort, and resources to mask, obscure, or otherwise explain away chemical agent production

activities. Testing of chemical agents and training

troops in their use might be masked by experiments with or training for the use of smoke

screens. A robust inspection regime must therefore comprise an interlocking web of inspections,

declarations, notifications, and data fusion and

analysis, all of which a cheater must defeat in

order to conceal his violations. Focusing monitoring efforts at a single point-even one thought to

be a crucial chokepoint-would allow the cheater

to focus his efforts on defeating them.

Keeping a production program covert forces

other tradeoffs. Some of the simplest production

pathways might have to be avoided since they use

known precursors or involve known production

processes. Purchasing equipment from multiple

suppliers to avoid detection, or jury-rigging

facilities from used equipment, might increase

hazards to the workforce and nearby populations.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Biological-warfare agents are easier to produce

than either nuclear materials or chemical-warfare

agents because they require a much smaller and

cheaper industrial infrastructure and because the

necessary technology and know-how is widely

available. Moreover, it would not be difficult to

spread biological agents indiscrimin ately to produce large numbers of casualties, although it is

much more difficult to develop munitions that

have a predictable or controllable military effect.

 Agent and Weapon Production

The global biotechnology industry is informationintensive rather than capital-intensive. Much of

the data relevant to producing biological agents is

widely available in the published literature and

virtually impossible for industrialized states to

withhold from potential proliferants. A widespread support infrastructure of equipment manufacturers has also arisen to serve the industry.

Therefore, producing biological agents would

be relatively easy and inexpensive for any

nation that has a modestly sophisticated pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, nearly all the

equipment needed for large-scale production of
——

United Nations inspectors assessing the biological

weapon potential of Iraqi fermenters and other

bioprocess equipment.

pathogens and toxins is dual-use and widely

available on the international market.

One technical hurdle to the production of

biological weapons is ensuring adequate containment and worker safety during agent production

and weapons handling, although the difficulty of

doing so depends on the level of safety and

environmental standards. A government that

placed little value on the safety of plant workers

or the civilian population might well take minimal precautions, so that a biological-weapons

production facility would not necessarily be

equipped with sophisticated high-containment

measures, Another challenge is ‘‘weaponizing’

the agents for successful delivery. Since microbial pathogens and toxins are susceptible to

environmental stresses such as heat, oxidation,

and dessication, to be effective they must maintain their potency during weapon storage, delivery, and dissemination.

Chapter I–Introduction and Summary 9

A supply of standard biological agents for

covert sabotage or attacks against broad-area

targets would be relatively easy to produce and

disseminate using commercially available equipment, such as agricultural sprayers. In contrast,

the integration of biological agents into precise,

reliable, and effective delivery systems such as

missile warheads and cluster bombs poses complex engineering problems. Nevertheless, the

United States had overcome these problems by

the 1960s and had stockpiled biological warfare

agents.

 Monitoring Biological Weapon Production

Detection and monitoring of biological and

toxin agent production is a particularly challenging task. Even use of biological weapons

could in some cases be difficult to verify unambiguously, since outbreaks of disease also take

place naturally. Thanks to advances in biotechnology, including improved fermentation equipment as well as genetic engineering techniques,

biological and toxin agents could be made in

facilities that are much smaller and less conspicuous than in the past. Moreover, the extreme

potency of such agents means that as little as a few

kilograms can be militarily significant. Since

large amounts of agent can be grown from a

freeze-dried seed culture in a period of days to

weeks, large stockpiles of agent are not required,

although some stocks of the munitions to be filled

with these agents would be.

There are no signatures that distinguish clearly

between the development of offensive biological

agents and work on defensive vaccines, since

both activities require the same basic know-how

and laboratory techniques at the R&D stage.

Moreover, almost all the equipment involved in

biological and toxin weapon development and

production is dual-use and hence will not typically indicate weapons activity. Indeed, the

capacity to engage in illegal military activities

is inherent in certain nominally civilian facilities. Some legitimate biological facilities can also
10 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

convert rapidly to the production of biological

warfare agents, depending on the degree of

sophistication of the plant and on the required

scale of production, level of worker safety, and

environmental containment. At the same time,

however, legitimate applications of biological or

toxin agents (e.g., vaccine production and the

clinical use of toxins) are relatively few at

present. With the exception of a few vaccine

production plants, such activities are largely

confined to sophisticated biomedical facilities not

normally found in developing countries, and

these facilities generally do not engage in production except on a small scale. Moreover, given that

the global biotechnology industry is still in its

infancy, the number of” legitimate activitiesfrom which the illegitimate ones would have to be

distinguished-is still relatively small.

Sensitive analytical techniques such as polymerase chain reaction {PCR) analysis or use of

monoclinal antibodies can identify trace quantities of biological agents and might be able to do

so even after the termination of illicit activities.

However, the existence of such sensitive laboratory techniques does not necessarily translate into

a negotiated verification regime that might be

instituted to monitor compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, the international treaty

that bans biological weapons. Other factors that

must be assessed in establishing such a regime

include the likelihood of detecting clandestine

production sites, the ability to distinguish prohibited offensive activities from permitted defensive

efforts, and the risk of divulging sensitive national security or proprietary information during

inspections of U.S. facilities.8

Because of the difficulty of detecting clandestine biological and toxin weapon development

and production, effective tracking of such programs will require integrating data from many

sources, with a particular emphasis on human

intelligence (agents, defectors, and whistleblowers). Some weaponization signatures (storage of bulk agents, preparation of aerosol dispensers, field testing, etc.) would probably be easier to

detect than production signatures, but many such

signatures could be concealed or masked by

legitimate activities such as biopesticide R&D or

use. Production and storage of components for

BW munitions might also be masked by activities

associated with conventional weapons, such as

production of high explosives, bomb casings, or

artillery shells. Since excessive secrecy might

itself be indicative of offensive intent, greater

transparency would tend to build confidence in a

country’s lack of offensive intentions.

 Implications of New Technology

Genetic engineering is unlikely to result in

‘‘ supergerms’ significantly more lethal than the

wide variety of potentially effective biological

agents that already exist, nor is it likely to

eliminate the fundamental uncertainties associated with the use of microbial pathogens in

warfare. However, gene-splicing techniques might

facilitate weaponization by rendering microorganisms more stable during dissemination (e.g.,

resistant to high temperatures and ultraviolet

radiation). Biological agents might also be genetically modified to make them more difficult to

detect by immunological means and insusceptible

to standard vaccines or antibiotics. At the same

time, genetic engineering techniques could be

used to develop and produce protective vaccines

more safely and rapidly.

Cloning toxin genes in bacteria makes it

possible to produce formerly rare toxins in

kilogram quantities. Moreover, molecular engineering techniques could lead to the development

of more stable toxins. Even so, for the foreseeable

s The United States has already determined that inspection procedures under the Chemical Weapons Conventio% which allow the inspected

party to negotiate the level of access to be provided to international inspectors, are sufficient to protect national security information and trade

secrets, However, it is not necessary the case that the same inspection procedures would be suitable for the Biological Weapons Convention

should a formal veritlcation regime be instituted.
Chapter I-Introduction and Summary | 11

future, toxin-warfare agents are unlikely to provide dramatic military advantages over existing

chemical weapons. It is possible that bioregulators and other natural body chemicals (or synthetic analogues thereof) might be developed into

powerful incapacitants, but means of delivering

such agents in a militarily effective manner would

first have to be devised. Moreover, if warning of

their use were provided, chemical weapon protective gear would blunt their impact.

DELlVERY SYSTEMS

Although military delivery systems such as

ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and combat

aircraft are not essential to deliver weapons of

mass destruction, they can do so more rapidly,

more controllably, and more reliably than rudimentary means such as suitcases, car bombs, or

civilian ships or planes. Controlling the spread of

advanced delivery systems by no means would

eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass

destruction, particularly in terrorist applications.

However, limiting the availability of these delivery systems would make it harder for states to use

weapons of mass destruction for military purposes, particularly against well-defended, forewarned adversaries.

Unlike nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons themselves, which are not traded openly due

to treaty constraints or international norms, delivery systems such as aircraft and short-range

antiship cruise missiles are widely available on

international arms markets. Since the late 1980s,

the United States and other Western industrialized countries have had some success at delegitimizing the sale of longer range ballistic and

cruise missiles by creating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the participants in

which refrain from selling ballistic or cruise

missiles with ranges over 300 kilometers, or with

any range if the seller has reason to believe that

they may be used to carry weapons of mass

destruction. However, missiles with ranges up to

300 km-and to a lesser extent, up to 600-1,000

c

z

-n

United Nations inspector measuring an Iraqi AlHusayn (modified Scud) missile in Baghdad.

km-are already deployed in many Third-World

countries. Combat aircraft are possessed by almost all countries of proliferation concern. Cruise

missiles or other unmanned aerial vehicles with

ranges much over 100 km are not yet widespread

outside the acknowledged nuclear weapon states,

but large numbers of cruise missiles, including

antiship missiles, are available at lesser ranges.

In terms of payloads that can be carried to

specfied ranges, the combat aircraft of virtually

all countries of proliferation concern far surpass

their missile capabilities. However, aircraft and

missiles have different relative strengths—

particularly in their ability to penetrate defenses—

and the two systems are not fully interchangeable.

Piloted aircraft have significant advantages over

other delivery systems in terms of range, payload,

accuracy, damage-assessment capability, and dispersal of chemical or biological agents. They can

be used many times, usually even in the presence

of significant air defenses. Missiles, however, are

harder to defend against, and they offer distinct

advantages for a country wishing to deliver a

single nuclear weapon to a heavily defended area.

Since missiles are not restricted to operating from

airfields, they are also easier to hide from

opposing forces. The wide range of motivations

for acquiring ballistic missiles-prestige, diversifying one’s forces, their psychological value as
12 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

terror weapons, lack of trained pilots, and technology transfer and export opportunities-will

continue to make missile technology very attractive for several countries of proliferation concern.

I Barriers to Missile and Aircraft

Proliferation

The spread of ballistic missiles around the

world was greatly facilitated by the export in the

1970s and 1980s of Scud-B missiles from the

former Soviet Union. With an increasing number

of countries abiding by the MTCR, the number of

potential missile suppliers has declined dramatically. Of the principal missile exporters, only

North Korea has not agreed to comply. However,

Ukraine poses future export concerns, since it

contains much of the former Soviet missile

production infrastructure, yet has not agreed to

comply with the MTCR. Moreover, additional

countries have learned to copy, modify, extend

the range of, and produce their own missiles, and

a small number have developed long-range systems—

often in conjunction with space-launch programs

and foreign technical assistance. Even so, MTCR

constraints can slow the acquisition by developing countries of technologies associated with

more advanced missiles--those having ranges in

excess of 1,000 km or guidance errors of less than

roughly 0.3 percent of their range.

Given the complex set of technologies and

expertise used in advanced aircraft, especially

high-performance jet engines, it remains virtually

impossible for developing countries to acquire

these systems without assistance. However, no

internationally binding restrictions limit trade in

combat aircraft, and such arms transfers continue

to be used as an instrument of foreign policy.

Moreover, overcapacity in Western defense industries, and the economic difficulties facing

newly independent Soviet republics and Eastern

European states, provide great incentive to develop arms export markets. Therefore, states can

and probably will continue to acquire highperformance aircraft easily, without having to

build them. Moreover, other options short of

buying aircraft or building them from scratch are

available to states wishing to acquire or mod@

combat aircraft, such as engaging in licensed

production. 9

If they have sufficient payload and range-and

if they can be procured despite export controls—

commercially available unmanned aerial vehicles

can be adapted to deliver weapons of mass

destruction without much difficulty. Developing

cruise missiles requires greater technical capability. Even so, technologies for guidance, propulsion, and airframes are becoming increasingly

accessible, particularly with the spread of licensed aircraft production arrangements to many

parts of the world. The most difficult technical

challenges to developing cruise missiles—

propulsion and guidance-do not pose much of a

hurdle today. The highest performance engines

are not required for simple cruise missiles, and

many sources are available for suitable engines.

Guidance requirements can be met by satellite

navigation services such as the U.S. Global

Positioning System (GPS), possibly the Russian

Glonass system, or commercial equivalents. Inexpensive, commercially available GPS receivers

are becoming available to provide unprecedented

navigational accuracy anywhere in the world.

Although GPS receivers would have only limited

utility to emerging missile powers for ballistic

missile guidance, they could be used to reduce

uncertainty in the launch location of mobile

missiles.

| Monitoring Delivery Vehicles

Although individual missiles can be very

difficult to detect, a program to develop ballistic

missiles is much more visible. Test firing and

g ne routes various s~tes around the world have taken to develop defense industries, including aircraft i.ldUShie$ we diSCUSSed k U.S.

Congress, OffIce of “lkdmology Assessment, Gfobuf Arms Trude, OTA-ISC-460 (Washingto% DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June

1991).
Chapter l-Introduction and Summary | 13

launching ballistic missiles can be readily seen.

Development of intermediate and long-range

ballistic missiles requires extensive flight testing,

making it particularly noticeable. Although states

pursuing both military and civil space technology

may wish to hide their military programs, civilian

space-launch programs are usually considered a

source of national prestige and proudly advertised.

Even a purely civilian space-launch program

provides technology and know-how useful for

ballistic missiles. The most important aspects of

a missile capability for weapons of mass destructionrange and payload-can usually be inferred from

a civil program. (A civil space-launch booster

does not need to have high accuracy, but neither

does a missile carrying weapons of mass destruction for use against populations.) On the other

hand, certain attributes desired for military applications, such as reliable reentry vehicles, mobility, and ease of operation in the field, suggest

distinct technical approaches for military and

civil applications. Although solid-fueled boosters

are in some ways more difficult to develop and

build than liquid-fueled boosters, they are easier

to use in mobile and time-urgent applications.

Liquid-fueled boosters were the first used in

military applications and are still more common.

(The seemingly ubiquitous Scud missile and its

modifications, such as were launched by Iraq

against targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia, are

liquid-fueled.)

Since combat aircraft are widely accepted as

integral to the military forces even of developing

countries, there is no reason to hide their existence. Individual planes, however, can be hidden.

Moreover, modifications made to aircraft to carry

weapons of mass destruction, or training given to

pilots for their delivery, might be difficult to

detect without intrusive inspections.

Of the three delivery systems, cruise missile

development and testing will be the hardest to

detect. Several types of unmanned aerial vehicles

are being developed and marketed for civil

purposes, and without inspection rights it will be

difficult to discern whether such vehicles have

been converted to military purposes. Therefore,

monitoring of delivery systems capable of

carrying weapons of mass destruction will

continue to be an uncertain exercise, having

most success with missiles and highly capable

aircraft. Nevertheless, the risk posed by

other delivery systems cannot be dismissed.

The full range of delivery technology must be

taken into account when evaluating a country’s overall proliferation capabilities and

behavior.
———

Technical

Aspects

of Chemical

Weapon

Proliferation 2

0

f the three categories of weapons of mass destruction,

chemical weapons are the most likely to be used in

warfare, and they remain a serious threat in regional

conflicts despite the end of the Cold War. Although

well-equipped troops can defend themselves against existing

chemical agents with detectors, decontamination equipment, gas

masks, and protective garments (albeit at a some cost in military

effectiveness), chemical weapons can still have devastating

effects when employed against defenseless civilians or poorly

equipped (or unprepared) armies or guerrilla fighters. This fact

was starkly demonstrated during the 1980s by Iraq’s use of

chemical weapons against Iran and its own Kurdish population.

The prospects for halting the proliferation of chemical

weapons are mixed. On the one hand, several states are currently

believed to possessor to be actively pursuing a chemical-warfare

(CW) capability. On the other hand, the international community

recently achieved a major step forward by concluding the

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) after more than two

decades of arduous negotiations. This treaty, which is expected

to enter into force in January 1995, enacts a comprehensive

global ban on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer

to other countries, and use of CW agents and delivery systems.

The CWC also provides for a highly intrusive verification regime

that will provide a legal framework for enforcement. However,

a number of key countries of concern have not yet signed the

treaty.

This chapter describes the chief technical hurdles associated

with the process of acquiring a militarily significant CW

capability and discusses detectable signatures’ associated with

each of these steps that might be used for monitoring or

verification purposes. A separate report explains the tactical and

strategic uses of chemical weapons, and the extent and

I 15
16 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

consequences of their spread.1 The analysis here

focuses on mustard and nerve agents because they

are militarily the most effective and have been

weaponized and stockpiled by several countries.

SUMMARY

CW capabilities can vary greatly in sophistication. Although hundreds of tons of chemical agent

would be required for large-scale use in a major

conflict, smaller quantities could be effective for

tactical engagements in regional wars or to

terrorize population centers. An advanced CW

capability would entail production of several

agents with differing toxicities and physical

characteristics, mated to different types of munitions, but a crude CW arsenal might contain only

one or two agents and a simple delivery system

such as an agricultural sprayer. The Iran-Iraq War

of the 1980s saw the first protracted use of

chemical weapons since World War I and the first

use of nerve agents. According to Iranian sources,

Iraqi chemical weapons accounted for some

50,000 Iranian casualties, including about 5,000

deaths. 2

The growing availability of chemical knowhow and production equipment, combined with

the globalization of chemical trade, have given

more than 100 countries the capability-if not

necessarily the intent-to) produce simple chemical weapons such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide,

and sulfur mustard. A smaller number have the

capability to produce nerve agents such as GA

(tabun), GB (sarin), GD (soman), and VX. The

reason is that whereas mustard-gas production is

very simple-particularly if thiodiglycol is available as a starting material—making nerve agents

involves more complex and difficult reaction

steps. Technical hurdles associated with the

production process include the cyanation reaction

for tabun and the alkylation reaction for the other

nerve agents. Alkylation requires high temperatures or highly corrosive reagents.

Chemical plants capable of manufacturing

organic phosphorus pesticides or flame retardants

could be converted over a period of weeks to the

production of CW agents, although this would not

be a simple process. Multipurpose plants would

be easier to convert than single-purpose plants.

The hurdles to acquiring a CW production capability are lower if a proliferant country seeks only

to produce low-quality agent for immediate use

and is willing to cut comers on agent shelf-life,

safety, and environmental protection. Even so,

CW agent production is still several steps removed from an operational CW capability, which

also requires the design and

effective munitions, the filling

before use, and mating with a

system.

development of

of the munitions

suitable delivery

| Indicators of CW Proliferation Activities

Many different types of precursor chemicals

and equipment, many of them dual-use, are

suitable for CW agent production. As a result,

plant equipment or precursor chemicals per se do

not provide a reliable means of distinguishing

between legitimate and illicit production. Since

most chemical facilities are relatively simple and

multiuse, nonproliferation policies will need to

focus on judgments of intent as well as capability.

Detection of CW proliferation-either within

or outside the framework of an international

treaty regime requires the correlation of multiple indicators and intelligence sources, ranging

from satellites to human defectors. The probability of detecting a clandestine CW capability must

therefore be evaluated in the context of the on-site

inspection regime established by the Chemical

Weapons Convention, as well as unilateral intelli1 U.S. Congress, Office of ‘IkcImology Assessment Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, O’E4-ISC-559

(Washingto4 DC: U.S. Government printing Office, August 1993).

2 Mike Eisenstadt, The Sword of the Arabs: Iraq’s Strategic Weapons, Washington Institute Policy Papers No. 21 (Washington DC:

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1990), p, 6.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation I 17

gence-gathering capabilities outside the treaty

regime,

Specific indicators, or “signatures,” of CW

acquisition activities may be detected through

remote or on-site inspection of a suspect facility.

Potential signatures include aspects of plant

design and layout, testing of chemical munitions

and delivery systems, presence of agents, precursors, or degradation products in samples from the

production line or waste stream; and presence of

“biomarkers” indicative of CW agent exposure

in plant workers or in wild plants and animals

living in the vicinity of a suspect facility. The

utility of any given signature depends on the

precise pathway taken by a given proliferant,

including the choice of production process, the

investment in emission-control technologies, and

the amount of effort taken to mask or otherwise

obscure the signature.

The production of both mustard and nerve

agents results in long-lived chemical residues that

can persist for weeks-in some cases years—

after production has ceased. Such telltale chemicals can be detected in concentrations of a few

parts per trillion with sensitive analytical techniques such as combined gas chromatography/

mass spectrometry. For this reason, the ability to

conceal illicit CW agent production in a known

facility is probably limited, although a number of

possible circumvention scenarios have been suggested. Existing analytical capabilities can be

fully exploited, however, only if the inspectors

are given intrusive access to a suspect site.

Confidence in a country’s compliance may,

therefore, diminish if such access is not forthcoming, or if the number of sites to be inspected is

impractically large. Furthermore, because chemical analysis has the potential to yield “false

positive’ results when in fact no violation has

occurred, chemical detection should not be seen

as unequivocal evidence of CW production but

rather as a key element in a broader array of

indicators suggesting a violation.

While detection of CW production with nearsite monitoring techniques (such as laser spectroscopy) appears promising, current technology

cannot provide a high probability of detection—

particularly for plants equipped with sophisticated emission-control systems. Nevertheless,

rapid improvements in the sensitivity and specificity of analytical devices, combined with the

rapid evolution of computer processing and

data-storage technologies, promise to improve

the utility of near-site monitoring in the not-toodistant future.

Finally, detection capabilities that are very

impressive in certain circumstances maybe rather

inconclusive in others-particularly if the proliferant is willing to expend time, effort, and

resources to mask, obscure, or explain away his

CW production activities. Thus, good detectability in principle does not necessarily mean highconfidence detection in practice. A robust inspection regime must comprise an interlocking web of

inspections, all of which a cheater must pass in

order to conceal his violations. Focusing inspections at a single point-even one believed to be a

crucial chokepoint-would allow the cheater to

focus his efforts on defeating the inspections.

| Alternative Proliferation Pathways

Chemical-warfare agents can be produced

through a wide variety of alternative routes. Just

because the United States used a particular

production pathway in the past does not mean that

a proliferant country would not chose another

route, although only relatively few are suited to

large-scale production. For example, the United

States and Iraq used different processes for the

production of G-category nerve agents.

A proliferant country would either build a

dedicated clandestine production facility or convert a commercial (single-purpose or multipurpose) chemical plant to CW agent production. In

general, commercial pesticide plants lack the

precursor materials, equipment, facilities, handling operations, and safety procedures required

for nerve-agent production, and would therefore

require weeks to months to convert. Binary
18 I Technologies Underlaying Weapons of Mass Destruction

agents-consisting of two relatively nontoxic

chemical components that when mixed together

react to form a lethal agent-might be attractive

to a proliferant because they are easier and safer

to produce and handle, although they may be

more complex to use in combat.

Each of the possible proliferation pathways

involves tradeoffs among simplicity, speed, agent

shelf-life, and visibility. The choice of pathway

would therefore be affected by the urgency of a

country’s military requirement for a CW stockpile, its desire to keep the program secret, its level

of concern over worker safety and environmental

protection, and the existence of embargoes on

precursor materials and production equipment.

ACQUIRING A CW CAPABILITY

Although hundreds of thousands of toxic chemicals have been examined over the years for their

military potential, only about 60 have been used

in warfare or stockpiled in quantity as chemical

weapons.

3 Physical properties required of CW

agents include high toxicity, volatility or persistence (depending on the military mission), and

stability during storage and dissemination. Lethal

agents that have been produced and stockpiled in

the past include vesicants such as sulfur mustard

and lewisite, which bum and blister the skin, eyes,

respiratory tract, and lungs; choking agents such

as phosgene and chlorine, which irritate the eyes

and respiratory tract; blood agents such as hydrogen cyanide, which starve the tissues of oxygen;

and nerve agents such as sarin and VX, which

interfere with the transmission of nerve impulses,

causing convulsions and death by respiratory

paralysis.

Unlike nuclear weapons, which require a

large, specialized, and costly scientificindustrial base, CW agents can be made with

commercial equipment generally available to

. .

Part of the U.S. Army’s Phosphate Development

Works, located on the grounds of Tennessee Valley

Authority’s National Fertilizer Development Center in

Muscle Shoals, Alabama. Between 1953 and 1957, this

facility met the Army’s need for dichlor, a precursor

needed to produce the nerve agent sarin.

any country. Indeed, few military technologies

have evolved as little as chemical weapons over

the past half-century.4 Current-generation mustard and nerve agents are based on scientific

discoveries made during and between the two

World Wars, and there have been few major

innovations since then in either basic chemicals

or manufacturing methods. The vast majority of

the U.S. stockpile (in terms of tonnage) was

produced during the 1950s and 1960s, when the

United States managed to produce high-quality

CW agents with what is now 30- to 40-year-old

technology. Moreover, production techniques for

the major CW agents have been published in the

open patent or chemical literature, including data

on reaction kinetics, catalysts, and operating

parameters. According to one analyst, “The

routes of production are generally known, and

they can be pursued with relatively primitive

3 World Health Organization@ Health Aspects of Chem”cal and Biological Weapons: Report of a WHO Group of Consultants (Genevz

WHO, 1970), p, 23,

4 In this respec~ there is a significant difference between manmade chemical agents and biological toxins, whose production has been

transformed by advances in biotechnology. See ch. 3.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation | 19

equipment, especially by those who are not overly

concerned with worker health and safety or

environmental impacts.

As the commercial chemical industry has

spread around the world in response to the urgent

needs of developing countries for chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and pharmaceuticals, the availability of chemicals and equipment required to

produce CW agents has increased. At the same

time, thousands of applied organic chemists and

chemical engineers from developing countries

have been trained in related production technologies at universities in the United States, Europe,

and the former Soviet Union.6 According to Rear

Adm. Thomas A. Brooks, former Director of

Naval Intelligence:

The substantial pool of Western or Westerntrained scientists, engineers and technicians has

successfully been tapped for years by Third

World states eager to acquire their expertise for

missile development, nuclear, chemical and other

weapon projects.7

The dual-use nature of many chemical technologies has made CW proliferation ‘‘an unfortunate

side effect of a process that is otherwise beneficial

and anyway impossible to stop: the diffusion of

competence in chemistry and chemical technology from the rich to the poor parts of the world.

Nevertheless, CW agent production is only one

step on the path to acquiring a full capability to

wage chemical warfare. A supertoxic agent,

despite its lethality, does not become a usable

weapon of war until it has been integrated with

some form of munition or delivery system and

made an integral component of a nation’s military

planning and doctrine.

| Acquisition Steps

The following steps are required for a proliferant country seeking to acquire a fully integrated

CW capability (see figure 2-l):

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

acquire equipment and materials needed for

CW agent production and the relevant

expertise;

produce agents in small quantities at a pilot

facility to work out technical details of the

synthetic process, and then scale up to a

production plant;

purchase suitable munitions and delivery

systems (or design, prototype, test, and

produce them indigenously);

fill the munitions with agent;

establish bunkers (or other storage facilities) and logistical support networks for the

stockpiling, transport, handling, and use of

bulk agents and munitions;

deliver chemical munitions to the military

logistics system for storage and transport to

the battle zone;

acquire individual and collective chemical

defenses and decontamination equipment,

and train troops how to fight in a chemical

environment; and

develop strategic and tactical battle plans

for CW use, and practice them in operational tests and field exercises.

To save time or money, a state seeking a more

rudimentary CW capability might cut corners on

some of these steps, for example, by omitting

rigorous safety and waste-treatment measures

during the production process. Proliferant states

might also settle for a less robust logistical

infrastructure than that developed by the United

5 Kyle OISOQ “Disarmament and the Chemical Industry, ” Brad Roberts, cd., Chem”cal Disarmament and U.S. Secun’ty (Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1992), p. 100.

G In 1990, for example, foreigners accounted for a large fraction of full-time graduate students at U.S. universities studying chemistry (32

percent) and chemical engineering (42 percent). Commission on Professionals in Science and ‘Ikchnology, “Foreign Graduate Students”

(table), Scientific-Engineering-Technical Manpower Comments, vol. 29, No. 6, September 1992, p. 13.

7 Michael R. Gordon, ‘‘The Middle East’s Awful Arms Race: Greater Threats from Lesser Powers, ’ The New York Times, Apr. 8, 1990,

sec. 4, p. 3.

g Julian Pen-y Robinso~ “Chemical Weapons Proliferation: The Problem in Perspective, ” Trevor Findlay, cd., Chenu”cal Weapons and

Missile Proliferation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riemer, 1991), p. 26.
20 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

R & D

Select standard or

develop novel

agents

Obtain precursor

chemicals

EzzEt

EiEl

Figure 2-1-Chemicai M4apon Acquisition

-r 1

Clevelop and

>

pilot-test

F

Iproduction 7

L

process

J

Synthesize agent Mass-produce

Unitary agent Use dedicated military .— plant

— OR OR

w Binary componentsFY

Use commercial plant —

1 I 1 ,

J_7Store

agent

Design, test, and build munitions

r Areadeliverv:

cluster bomb or warhead

1--- ‘

----

Stockpile

(unitary or binary) “ – > filled

L I

k

+

Acquire delivery system

lAdai’i5H-—E‘-’-

L I 1

Acquire operational capability

‘UPW”4 ~

Establish logistical

E

Train troops to use CW

munitions and to fight

in CW environment

=%J ‘B

1 >--nOperational

capability

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation 121

States and other nations with a broad, integrated

military establishment. Finally, proliferants might

forego protection and decontamination capabilities if the opponent lacks a CW capability and the

losses resulting from “friendly free” are considered an acceptable cost of war.9

AGENTS AND PRODUCTION PROCESSES

I Sulfur Mustard

Sulfur mustard (H), the main blistering agent

used in warfare, is an oily liquid at room

temperature that smells of garlic and ranges in

color from clear to dark brown depending on

purity. 10 It is readily absorbed by the skin and

most clothing. Sulfur mustard is fairly persistent

in the environment, presenting a hazard for days

or even weeks depending on the weather. Compared with the more toxic nerve agents, sulfur

mustard is relatively easy to produce and load into

munitions, and it can be stockpiled for decades—

especially when distilled-either as bulk agent or

in weaponized form. The primary drawbacks of

sulfur mustard as a CW agent are that:

■

■

■

it must be used in relatively high concentrations to produce significant casualties;

it freezes at a relatively high temperature—

about 14 degrees Celsius (57 degrees Fahrenheit) for distilled mustard; and

if not distilled to high purity, mustard tends

to polymerize when stored for long periods,

forming solids that precipitate out of solution

and reduce the efficiency of dissemination.

Sulfur mustard has diffuse toxic effects on the

body that may take as long as 3 hours or more to

manifest themselves. The primary effect of an

attack with sulfur mustard is to produce painful

skin blistering and eye and lung irritation, resulting in a large number of wounded casualties who

place an enormous burden on medical services.

Heavy exposure to an aerosol of mustard or

mustard vapor causes the lungs to fill with fluid,

“drowning” the victim from within.11 Nevertheless, only 2 to 3 percent of hospitalized American

and British mustard casualties in World War I

died, and a similar low death rate was reported for

Iranian mustard casualties during the Iran-Iraq

War. 12 Seven to 10 days after exposure, sulfur

mustard can also cause a delayed impairment of

immune function that increases vulnerability to

bacterial infection and may lead to serious

medical complications.

PRODUCTION OF SULFUR MUSTARD

Nine production processes for sulfur mustard

have been documented in the published chemical

literature. During World War I, thousands of tons

of mustard gas were produced from alcohol,

bleaching powder, and sodium sulfite. During

World War II, the two largest producers of

mustard gas, the United States and the Soviet

Union, used two common industrial chemicalssulfur monochloride and ethylene----as starting

materials. 13 A mustard-gas plant based on this

method could be located at an oil refinery, which

is an excellent source of ethylene and could also

extract the necessary sulfur from petroleum or

natural gas.14

g U.S. Congress, OffIce of ‘lkchnology Assessment Who Goes There: Friend or Foe?, OTA-ISC-537 (Washington DC: U.S. Gov ernment

Printing Offke, June 1993).

10 StiW mus~d may be produced in either crude form (H) or washed and vacuum-distilled @).

I I Most of tie w~fatiities cased by Irqi use of sulfur mustard during the Iran-Iraq War were caused by l@d on clothing ~%? tied

over a long period in the hot desert sun. William C. Dee, U.S. Army Chemical-Biological Defense Comman d, personal communication 1993.

12 Seti Schonwdd, “Mustard Gas,” The PSR Quarterly, vol. 2, No. 2, June 1992, p. 93.

13 Gordon Burck et al., Chenu”cal Weapons Process Parameters, Vol. I: Main Report (Alexandria VA: WCOT., Repofi No.

DNA-TR-91-217-V1, November 1992).

14 Gordon M. Buck and ~les C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chem”cal Weapons prOlifeWiO?I (New yOr& NY: m~nwod

Press, 1991), p. 50.
22 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Today, the precursor of choice for any large- f

scale production of mustard gas is thiodiglycol, a c

z

sulfur-containing organic solvent that has com0

p

mercial applications in the production of ball- %

point pen inks, lubricant additives, plastics, and z

c

photographic developing solutions, and as a

m

carrier for dyes in the textile industry. Thiodigly -

CO1 is just one step away from production of sulfur

mustard, requiring only a reaction with a chlorinating agent like hydrochloric acid (HC1), a widely

available industrial chemical.15 (See figure 2-2.)

Known as the Victor Meyer-Clarke Process, the

chlorination of thiodiglycol was developed by

Germany during World War I and adopted in the

1980s by Iraq. It does not require a particularly

sophisticated chemical industry and could, indeed, be performed in a basement laboratory with

the necessary safety precautions.

Sulfur mustard can be produced on an industrial scale on either a batch or continuous basis. Plant that produces the “dual-use” chemical

Given the extreme corrosiveness of hot hydro- thiodiglycol, which is both a key ingredient of

ballpoint pen ink and an immediate precursor of

chloric acid, it is advisable-but not essential-to

. .

mustard agent.

Figure 2-2—Production of Sulfur Mustard

CH2=CH2

(ethylene)

+ /

CH2CH2

-OH

/

CH2CH2CI

2 C H2

- C H2 + H 2S ~ S +2 HCI - S +2 H2O

\ o

/

\, \

CH2CH2

-OH CH2CH2CI

Ethylene Hydrogen Thiodiglycol Sulfur mustard (H)

oxide sulfide

SOURCE: Stephen Black, “Vesicant Production Chemistry,” In Black, Benoit Morel, and Peter Zapf, Tdnka/Aspects

of Verifimtion of the Chernid Weapons Convention, Internal Technical Reprt, Carnegie-Mellon Program on

International Peace and Security, 1991, p. 56.

15 See Ronald G. Sutherland, “’I’hiodiglycol, “ in S. J. Lundh cd,, Verification of Dual-Use Chemicals Under the Chendcal Weapons

Convention; The Case of Thiodiglycol, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Series No. 13 (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press,

1991), pp. 24-30,
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation | 23

use corrosion-resistant reactors and pipes. This

requirement might be reduced by substituting a

less corrosive chlorinating agent for HC1 or by

replacing the production equipment as often as

necessary. In order to improve the purity and

stability of sulfur mustard in storage, corrosive

byproducts can be removed by distillation or

solvent extraction.

There are five U.S. producers of thiodiglycol

and about eight foreign producers in five countries.l6 Most of these companies do not sell the

chemical but use it internally in the manufacture

of other products. In addition, about 100 firms

worldwide purchase thiodiglycol for the synthesis

of specialty chemicals and other industrial uses.17

When Iraq began mustard-gas production in the

early 1980s, it was unable to make thiodiglycol

indigenously and ordered more than 1,000 tons

from foreign sources. 18 In response to the threatened embargo on exports of thiodiglycol from

Western countries, however, Iraq developed an

indigenous production capability based on reacting ethylene oxide with hydrogen sulfide. Both of

these ingredients are widely available. Hydrogen

sulfide can be extracted from natural gas or crude

oil, where it is often present as an impurity, or

derived from elemental sulfur. Ethylene oxide is

readily produced from ethylene, a major product

of petroleum refining.

In sum, the production of mustard gas is

relatively easy from a technical standpoint and

could probably be concealed. While export

controls on thiodiglycol might initially create a

major hurdle for new proliferants, the effectiveness of controls will diminish as these countries

acquire an indigenous capability to produce it.

Furthermore, just because synthesis from thiodiglycol is the ‘‘best’ process does not mean that it

will be used by a proliferant. Any of the other

synthetic pathways could work just as well for a

developing country and might be used to circumvent export controls.

| Nerve Agents

Nerve agents are supertoxic compounds that

produce convulsions and rapid death by inactivating an enzyme (acetylcholinesterase) that is

essential for the normal transmission of nerve

impulses. The nerve agents belong to the class of

organophosphorus chemicals, which contain a

phosphorus atom surrounded by four chemical

groups, one of which is a double-bonded oxygen.

Although many organophosphorus compounds

are highly toxic, only a few have physical

properties that give them military utility as nerve

agents. 19 The difference in toxicity between

pesticides and nerve agents derives from the

nature of the chemical groups surrounding the

phosphorus atom. In general, nerve agents are 100

to 1,000 times more poisonous than organophosphorus pesticides.20

Two classes of nerve agents, designated G and

V agents, were produced in large quantities in the

1950s and ’60s by the United States and the

former Soviet Union. (See figure 2-3.)

The G-series nerve agents are known both by

informal names and military code-names: tabun

(GA), sarin (GB), GC, soman (GD), GE, and GF.

This class of compounds was discovered in 1936

by Gerhard Schrader of the German firm IG

16 h.~f(el, personal cornmunkatioq 1992; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of ExpOfl~‘ “stratiom Office of Foreign

Availability, Foreign Availability Review: 50 CW Precursor Chemicals (II) (Washingto& DC: Department of Commerce, Nov. 8, 1991), p.

54.

17 Giovanni A. Snidle, ‘ ‘United States Efforts in Curbfi]g Chemical Weapons Proliferation, ’ World Military Expenditures and Arm

IYamfers 1989 (Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Dis armament Agency, October 1990), p. 23.

18 W. Seth G-w,,The Gem’e Unleashed: Iraq’s Chemical and BioZogicai Weapons Program, policy papers No. 14 (wmtigtOn, ~: The

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989), p. 13.

1$’ Benj~in Wltten, The ,$earch for Chemica/ Agents (Aberdee~ MD: Edgewood Arsenal Special Tectical Repom 1969).

20 Alan R. Pittaway, “The Difficulty of Converting Pesticide Plants to CW Nerve Agent Manufacture, ” Task IV, Technical Report No. 7

(Kansas City, MC): Midwest Research Institute, Feb. 20, 1970), p. 1.
24 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 2-3-Nerve Agents

Tabun (GA)

CH3 o

\ ) –c

~: N

/

N I

CH3 OCH2CH3

Sarin (GB)

o CH3

II

CH.— P — o —’ b —- H

I

F CH3

Soman (GD)

CH3

I o C H3—– C — CH3

II o – ~

C H3 — P — — —- H

I

F CH3

VX

H

o

II

CH3—-C -----C H3

C H3 — — — CH2C H2—- N

7s

OCH2CH3 C H3—- C — CH3

H

SOURCE: JAYCOR, Noncompliamx Scenarios: Means By WhkA

Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention Might Cheat Technical

Report No. DNA-TR-91-193, January 1993, pp. B-2-B-5.

Farben during research on new pesticides. Although tabun is relatively easy to produce, it is not

as toxic as the other G agents. After World War

II, details of German research on the G agents

were published, and sarin and soman emerged as

preferred agents for military purposes.

All the various G agents act rapidly and

produce casualties by inhalation, although they

also penetrate the skin or eyes at high doses

(particularly when evaporation is minimized and

contact is prolonged by contamination of clothing). 21 Sarin evaporates faster than it penetrates

the skin, but soman and GF are less volatile and

pose more of a skin-contact hazard.

The V-series nerve agents include VE, VM,

and VX, although only VX was weaponized by

the United States. These agents were originally

discovered in 1948 by British scientists engaged

in research on new pesticides. Military development was then conducted by the United States and

the Soviet Union, both of which began large-scale

production of V agents in the 1960s.22 VX is an

oily liquid that may persist for weeks or longer in

the environment. Although not volatile enough to

pose a major inhalation hazard, it is readily

absorbed through the skin. The lethal dose of VX

on bare skin is about 10 milligrams for a 70

kilogram man.23

PRODUCTION OF NERVE AGENTS

From the standpoint of production processes,

the nerve agents can be clustered into three

groups: tabun; sarin/soman, and VX.

Tabun

The first militarized nerve agent and the

simplest to produce, tabun (GA), is made from

four precursor chemicals: phosphorus oxychloride (P0C13

), sodium cyanide, dimethylamine,

and ethyl alcohol. Most of these ingredients are

widely available. Ethanol and sodium cyanide are

commodity chemicals that are manufactured and

sold in vast quantities; dimethylamine and phosphorus oxychloride are produced by companies in

several countries for commercial applications in

the production of pharmaceuticals, pesticides,

missile fuels, and gasoline additives.

21 COI. M,ic~el A. ~arid Fr~~ck R. Sidell, “Progress in Medical Defense Against Nerve Agents, ” Journulof ihe American Medical

Association, vol. 262, No. 5, Aug. 4, 1989, p. 649.

22 Wuel sanches et al., Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Signatures Analysis (AdingtOIL VA: system pl- g Corp., Final

Tkdm.ical Report No. 1396, August 1991), p. 68.

23 Witten, op. cit., footnote 19, pp. 92, IW.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation 125

The basic production process for tabun was

developed by Germany during World War II and

was later employed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Tabun synthesis does not require the use of

corrosive starting materials and does not produce

highly reactive intermediates. The two-step process involves mixing the ingredients and a carrier

solvent in a reaction vessel equipped with a

sodium-hydroxide scrubbing system to neutralize

the gaseous hydrochloric acid (HC1) byproduct. A

relatively simple air-tight enclosure is also needed

to prevent the escape of toxic vapors. The

ingredients must be added in the correct order,

without heating, and the vessel cooled to keep the

reaction from building up too much heat. Little or

no distillation equipment is required, although the

purity of tabun can be increased to more than 80

percent by removing the carrier solvent and the

off-gasses by vacuum distillation.24 In sum, tabun

production is relatively easy because it does not

include the difficult alkylation reaction needed to

make the other nerve agents. The major technical hurdle in tabun synthesis is the cyanation

reaction (in which a cyanide group is added to

the central phosphorus), because of the difficulty of containing the toxic hydrogen cyanide

HCN gas used as the reagent.

During World War II, Germany manufactured

tabun in large quantities but never used it in

combat. In early 1940, the Germans began

construction of a huge tabun factory with the

capacity to produce 3,000 tons of agent a month.

Because of technical problems, however, it took

the Germans over 2 years, until April 1942, to get

the plant operational. 25 The Iraqis also had

difficulties with the manufacture of tabun, although they managed to produce a material with

about 40 percent purity that was used in the

Iran-Iraq War.26

Sarin/soman

Sarin (GB) and soman (GD) are both made in

a batch process with the same basic reaction steps,

but they contain different alcohol ingredients:

isopropyl alcohol for sarin and pinacolyl alcohol

for soman. (The choice of alcohol changes the

toxicity and volatility of the product but does not

affect the difficulty of production.) Phosphorus

trichloride (PCl3

) is the basic starting material for

the synthesis of both agents and, depending on

which of several alternative synthetic pathways is

chosen, two to five steps are required to make the

final product. The alternative syntheses all involve the same four reaction steps, which can be

carried out in several different sequences.27 During the 1950s, new production methods overcame

the technical difficulties that had prevented the

Germans from engaging in the large-scale production of sarin and soman during World War II.

The introduction of these new methods enabled

the U.S. sarin plant at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in

Colorado to produce 10 tons of agent per day.

The synthesis of G agents entails three major

technical hurdles. First, the production process

involves the use of hot hydrochloric acid (HC1)

and hydrogen fluoride (HF), both of which are

extremely corrosive. The use of these compounds

in reactors and pipes made of conventional steel

~ S. Bkck, B. lvfoRl, and P, Zapf, “Veri.tlcation of the Chemical Convention” Nature, vol., 351, June 13, 1991, p. 516.

2s ROM- and Jeremy PaxrnmL A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Germ and Gas Wa~are (1-ondon: Chatto & Windus,

1982), pp. 55-56.

26 DCC, op. cit., footnote 11.

27 For ~-plc, the u~t~ s~tti ~s~ tie s~~led “Di.Di” process to ~oducc sfi. ~ ~s proc~s, rnethylphosphonic dichlotidc ~),

or CH#OCt, is partially reacted with hydrogen fluoride (I-IF) gas to make a roughly 50:50 mixture of DC and methylphosphonic dilluoride

(D~. The DC-DF mixture is then reacted with isopropyl alcohol. This reaction displaces chlorine atoms preferentially, resulting in the

formation of sarin and hydrochloric acid @iCl) gas, which must be removed rapidly by distillation to avoid degradation of the nexve-agent

product. (Pure DF is not used because the reaction with isopropyl alcohol would liberate HF gas, which is soluble in G agent and virtually

impossible to degas, resulting in a highly corrosive mixture.)
26 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

results in corrosion measured in inches per year.28

During World War II, the Germans lined their

reactors with silver, which is resistant to HCl and

HF. Today, corrosion-resistant reaction vessels

and pipes are made of alloys containing 40

percent nickel, such as the commercial products

Monel and Hastalloy.29 Although it is possible to

manufacture sarin and soman without corrosionresistant reactors and pipes, the chance of major

leaks is significantly increased compared with

using corrosion-resistant equipment.

The second hurdle in the production of G

agents is the alkylation reaction, in which a

methyl group (-CH3) or an ethyl group (-CH2CH3)

is added to the central phosphorus to form a P-C

bond. This step is rarely used in the production of

commercial pesticides and is technically difficult.

The third hurdle is that if high-purity agent

with a long shelf-life is required, the supertoxic

final product must be distilled-an extremely

hazardous operation. Distillation is not necessary

if a country plans to produce nerve agents for

immediate use rather than stockpiling them.

During the Iran-Iraq War, for example, Iraq gave

priority to speed, volume, and low cost of

production over agent quality and shelf-life. As a

result, the sarin in Iraqi chemical munitions was

only about 60 to 65 percent pure to begin with and

contained large quantities of hydrogen fluoride

(HF), both because of the synthesis process used

and the deliberate omission of the distillation

step. Although the Iraqis could have distilled their

sarin to remove the excess HF, they chose not to

do so because the batches of agent were intended

to be used within a few days. To retard the rate of

deterioration, sarin-filled shells were stored in

refrigerated igloos. Thus, whereas the distilled

sarin produced by the United States in the early

1960s has retained a purity of more than 90

percent for three decades, the agent content of

Iraqi sarin after 2 years of storage had generally

degraded to less than 10 percent and in some cases

below 1 percent.30

VX

The persistent nerve agent VX has a phosphorusmethyl (P-CH3

) bond and a phosphorus-sulfur

bond but contains no fluorine. There are at least

three practical routes to V-agents that might be

used by proliferant countries. As with G agents,

production of VX involves a difficult alkylation

step. 31 Because the VX manufacturing process

avoids the use of HF gas, however, it is less

corrosive than the production of sarin and soman.

Indeed, after the alkylation step has been completed, the rest of the synthesis is straightforward.

PRODUCTION HURDLES

In summary, the technologies required for the

production of mustard and nerve agents have been

known for more than 40 years and are within the

capabilities of any moderately advanced chemical

or pharmaceutical industry. The technical hurdles

associated with nerve-agent production are not

fundamentally different from those associated

with commercial products such as organophosphorus pesticides. The most technically challenging

aspects include:

■ the cyanation reaction for tabun, which

involves the containment of a highly toxic

gas;

28 Stephen Blx~ Benoit Mon:l, ~d peter Zapf, Technical Aspects of the Chemical Weapons Convena”on: rnte~”m Technical Report

(Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, Program on International Peace and Seeurity, 1991), p. 70.

29 AIfiou@ g~s-lined reactors and pipes resist HC1 corrosio~ H@ attacks glass and hence can only be used h meti remtors.

n United Nations Special commission, “Second Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission Established by the

Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991 ),” UN Security Council document No. S/23268,

Dec. 4, 1991, p. 5.

31 me U.S. p~duction rnetiod for VX, known as the Newport process, involved high-temperature rnet.hylatio~ in wtich phosphorus

trichlonde (PC13) is reacted with mlethane gas (CH~ at a high temperature (500 degrees C) to form au alkylated intermediate, with a yield of

only about 15 percent,
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation! 27

the alkylation step for sarin, soman, and VX,

which requires the use of high temperatures

and results in corrosive and dangerous byproducts such as hot hydrochloric acid;

careful temperature control, including cooling of the reactor vessel during heatproducing reactions, and heating to complete

reactions or to remove unwanted byproducts;

intermediates that react explosively with

water, requiring the use of heat-exchangers

based on fluids or oils rather than water; and

a distillation step if high-purity agent is

required.

While some steps in the production of nerve

agents are difficult and hazardous, they would

probably represent more of a nuisance than a true

obstacle to a determined proliferant. The final

distillation step can also be avoided if a proliferant country seeks to manufacture low-purity

agent for immediate use and is prepared to cut

corners on safety, environmental protection, and

the life-span of the production equipment. Indeed,

the United States produced nerve agents very

effectively with 1950s technology and without

the stringent safety and environmental standards

that would be required today. In an attempt to

conceal a CW production effort, a proliferant

country might also resort to less-well-known

production processes that had earlier been discarded because of their high cost, inefficiency,

hazards, or need for

lysts.

costs

A sulfur-mustard

unusual precursors or cataproduction plant with airhandling capabilities might cost between $5

million and $10 million to build, In contrast, a

more sophisticated G-agent production facility

would cost between $30 and $50 million. Since

waste-handling facilities would account for more

than 50 percent of the cost of a G-agent plant, a

‘‘no-frills’ production facility that did away with

waste handling might cost about $20 million.32

Construction of a large-scale plant and equipment

would be almost impossible for a developing

country without outside assistance, but cost alone

is unlikely to be the deciding factor for a

determined proliferant.

| Implications of New Technology

Given the well-understood production pathways of mustard and nerve agents and their record

of use in warfare, a developing country that

sought to acquire a CW capability would not need

to develop and weaponize new agents. The

development and production of novel CW agents

would probably be undertaken only by nations

with an advanced scientific-industrial base; even

then, a major investment of time and resources

would be required. During the 1930s, it took an

advanced industrial country like Germany 6 years

to put the first nerve agent, tabun, into production. 33

Even so, the development of entirely new

classes of CW agents remains a real possibility. In

late 1992, a Russian chemist alleged that a

military research institute in Moscow had developed a new binary nerve agent more potent than

VX; he was subsequently arrested by the Russian

Security Service for disclosing state secrets.34

Another cause for concern is that some laboratories working on chemical defenses are studying

the mode of action of nerve agents at the

molecular level. Although the purpose of this

research is to develop more effective antidotes, it

could also assist in the development of novel

32 I)&, op. Cl(,, fOO~O[e 11.

33 Gordon M. Bm&, “chemical weapons Production Ikchnology and the Conversion of Civil PHXhCtiOIL” Arm Confiol, VO1. 11, No.

2, September 1990, p. 145.

34 *~-yaov, Fedor~v De~l Russi~ CW ~odu~tio~’ No~oye Vremya (Moscow), No. 44, October 1992, pp. 4-9 (translated ill

FBIS-SOV-92-213, Nov. 3, 1992, pp. 2-7). See also, Will Englund, ‘‘Ex-Soviet Scientist Says Gorbachev’s Regime Created New Nerve Gas

in ‘91,” Baltimore Sun, Sept. 16, 1992, p. 3.
28 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of

compounds more deadly than existing

agents. 35 A more potent agent would not

Mass Destruction

nerve

necessarily translate into greater military effectiveness,

however, unless the dissemination system were

improved as well.

Some experts are also concerned that even

though the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

bans the development of any toxic chemical for

warfare purposes, some countries might seek to

circumvent the CWC verification regime by

modifying existing agents to avoid detection or

by weaponizing a “second string” of known but

less effective poisons. The carbamates, for example, are a class of toxic pesticides that resemble

organophosphorus nerve agents in that they

inactivate the enzyme acetylcholinesterase. To

date, the carbamates have not been developed as

CW agents because they have a number of

operational drawbacks: they are relatively unstable, are solids at room temperature (posing less of

an inhalation threat), and are relatively easy to

treat or pretreat with antidotes.36 Even so, such

chemicals might become more attractive as an

alternative to standard nerve agents. Also of

potential concern as novel CW agents are toxins

of biological origin, which might be produced in

militarily significant quantities with biotechnological techniques. Some toxins are thousands of

times more potent than nerve agents, although

they also have operational limitations. (See next

chapter.)

Another potential threat is the use of penetrant

chemicals to defeat chemical defenses, such as

“mask-breakers’ capable of saturating gas-mask

filters made of activated charcoal.37 Defensive

equipment has long been modified to deal with

certain small molecules of this type and is still

being improved.38 Although a variety of other

means for penetrating masks and protective

clothing have been examined over a period of

many years, all of them have operational shortcomings.39 Even so, penetrants remain a serious

potential threat. If a new concept for penetrating CW defenses emerged that lacked the

existing drawbacks, it could have a major

impact on the overall military significance of

chemical weapons. As one analyst has pointed

out, the long-term danger is that “some future

technological development might reverse the

present ascendancy of the defense (i.e., antichemical protection) over the offense, thereby destroying a major incentive for deproliferation. "40

Since such a technological breakthrough could

trigger renewed competition in chemical weapons, measures to constrain research and development would be of major value in halting CW

proliferation.

| Precursor Chemicals for CW Agents

Chemicals that serve as starting materials in the

synthesis of CW agents are known as ‘ ‘precursors. During the two world wars, the major

powers produced CW agents from indigenous

precursors. In World War I, for example, Germany manufactured chlorine and phosgene gas in

huge volumes with existing chemical facilities.

35 fite~Aff& ~d ~te~io~T~e cm@ vefilcationRc~ hUnic Ven~cation Methodr, Handling, andAssessment of Unusual

Events in Relation to Allegations of the Use ofNovel Chemical Warfare Agents (Ottaw% Canada: External Affairs, March 1990), p. 10.

~ ~em k, however, mother side to the coin. The reversibility of carbamate poisordng (e.g., Wih mophe treatment) would offer an

advantage to the attacker in the case of accidental leaks or spills. Similarly, the relative instability of carbamates wotid result in less persistence

in the environment facilitating occupation of attacked territory.

37 Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., chairman, et al,, Report of the Chemical Wa&areReview Commission (WaaMngtou DC: U.S. Government ~m

OfXce, June 1985), p, 32.

38 ‘Ikk@one interview with Tom Daahie~ conaultan~ U.S. Arms Control md Dk~ent Agency, Feb. 9, 1993.

39 J. PerryRob~m C& The C’he~”calIndus~ andthe Projected Chemical Weapons Convention, Vol. Z: Proceedings of a SIPRIIPugwash

Conference (New Yo~ NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 70.

a J~~ Peny Robtioq “The Supply-Side Control of the Spread of Chemical Weapons,” Jean-Francois Rio% cd., L“nu”ting the

Proliferation of Weapons: The Role of Supply-Side Strategies (Ottaw4 Canada: Carleton Univexxity Press, 1992), p. 70.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation! 29

Table 2-l—Dual-Use Chemicals

Dual-use chemical CW agent Commercial product

Thiodiglycol Sulfur mustard Plastics, dyes, inks

Thionyl chloride Sulfur mustard Pesticides

Sodium sulfide Sulfur mustard Paper

Phosphorus oxychloride Tabun Insecticides

Dimethylamine Tabun Detergents

Sodium cyanide Tabun Dyes, pigments,

gold recovery

Dimethyl methylphosphonate G Agents Fire retardants

Dimethyl hydrochloride G Agents Pharmaceuticals

Potassium bifluoride G Agents Ceramics

Diethyl phosphite G Agents Paint solvent

SOURCE: Giovanni A. Snidle, “United States Efforta in Curbing Chemical Weapons Proliferation,” U.S. Arms Control

and Disarmament Ageney, l%dcfkfilitary Expenditures andArms Transfers 7939 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, October 1990), p. 23.

Today, however, the globalization of the chemical industry has led to large international flows of

dual-use chemicals.

Many of the basic feedstock chemicals used in

the production of nerve agents (e.g., ammonia,

ethanol, isopropanol, sodium cyanide, yellow

phosphorus, sulfur monochloride, hydrogen fluoride, and sulfur) are commodity chemicals that are

used in commercial industry at the level of

millions of tons per year and hence are impossible

to control. Monitoring their sale would also be of

little intelligence value because the imprecision

of international-trade data would make it impractical to detect the diversion of militarily significant quantities. Hydrogen fluoride, for example,

is used at many oil refineries and can be purchased commercially in large quantities; it is also

easily derived from phosphate deposits, which

usually contain fluorides.

Most of the key precursors for nerve-agent

production also have legitimate industrial uses,

but the fact that they are manufactured in

much smaller volumes makes them somewhat

easier to control These chemicals include phosphorus trichloride (with 40 producers worldwide), trimethyl phosphite (21 producers), and—

for tabun only—phosphorus oxychloride (40

producers). 41 phosphorus oxychloride, for example, is used extensively in commercial products

such as hydraulic fluids, insecticides, flame

retardants, plastics, and silicon. Similarly, dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP), an intermediate in nerve-agent production, is produced as a

flame retardant by 11 companies in the United

States and 3 in Europe (Belgium, United Kingdom, and Switzerland) .42 (See table 2-l.)

Developing countries seeking a CW capability generally lack the ability to manufacture

key precursor chemicals and must purchase

them from foreign sources, typically at well

above normal market rates. Because of this

dependency, Western governments have attempted

to slow CW proliferation by establishing a

committee known as the Australia Group, which

coordinates national export-control regulations to

restrict the sale of key CW precursors to sus41 U.S. D~ment of Commerce, op. cit., footnote 16, pp. 39, 58, 36, resp=t.ively.

42 bid., pp. 22-23. Lists of souc~ of Cw precursors VW, since some lists include only those companies with an a.nnud prtiuction volume

greater than 4,500 kilograms or 5,000 pounds.
30 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

pected proliferants. 43 Nevertheless, the expor t

controls coordinated by the Australia Group

cannot prevent countries that are outside this

body from selling precursor chemicals. Indeed, as

Western countries have tightened CW-related

controls, exports from developing nations such as

India have increased. Of the 54 precursor chemicals whose exports are regulated by the Australia

Group countries, Indian companies export about

15, only 4 of which are subject to Indian

government export controls.44

Furthermore, to the extent that immediate

precursors for mustard and nerve agents are

controlled by the Australia Group, a proliferant

might seek to circumvent such export controls in

the following ways:

Substituting an uncontrolled precursor

chemical for one that is controlled. For

example, although thionyl chloride is subject

to export controls as a chlorinating agent for

producing nerve agents, a proliferant could

easily substitute some other chlorinating

agent (e.g., phosgene, sulphuryl chloride)

that is not on any export-control list. Thus,

the technical means may exist to bypass any

particular technology-transfer barrier.45

Purchasing relatively small amounts of

the same or different precursor chemicals from multiple sources, instead of

obtaining large quantities from a single

source. For example, a country might purchase several different types of chlorinating

agent for the conversion of thiodiglycol to

sulfur mustard. Such a purchasing strategy

would reduce the visibility of CW production, although it would also increase the

complexity of the production process.

Producing more obscure (but still effective) CW agents whose precursors are

still available. For example, production of

the nerve agent soman (GD) requires pinacolyl alcohol, which has no commercial uses

and whose export is restricted by the Australia Group. Because of this embargo, Iraqi

military chemists chose instead to produce a

60:40 mixture of sax-in and GF (a less

common nerve agent of intermediate persistence). 46 Sarin is made with isopropyl alcohol (ordinary rubbing alcohol), while GF is

made with cyclohexyl alcohol (an industrial

decreasing agent). Unlike pinacolyl alcohol,

both isopropyl alcohol and cyclohexyl alcohol are common industrial chemicals that are

not subject to export controls.

“Back-integrating,” or acquiring an indigenous capability to manufacture precursor chemicals from simpler compounds

whose export is not controlled or that are

available from domestic sources. For example, thiodiglycol, the immediate precursor of sulfur mustard, can be produced in a

batch process by reacting ethylene oxide

with hydrogen sulfide. Both of these ingredients can be derived from oil or natural gas.

Before the Persian Gulf War, Iraq built a

huge production line at its Basra petrochemicals complex that was capable of manufacturing 110,000 tons of ethylene per year.47

In the case of nerve agents, all of the key

precursors can be made from the most basic

starting materials; including phosphorus, chlorine, and fluorine. The production facilities

needed to make these precursors from raw materials are not particularly large and could be

43 Jfi~ Pq Robinsont “’I%e Australia Group: A Description and Assessmen~” Hans Guenter Brauch et al., eds., Controlling the

Development and Spread of Milita~ Technology (Amsterdam: W University Press, 1992), pp. 157-176.

44 ~c~el R. GordoU “U.S. Accuses India on Chemical Arms,” New York Times, Sept. 21, 1992, p. A7.

45 Rob~oq “me supply-side coxlml of the Spread of ~emktd WeaPOrlS, ” op. ci~, foo~oti ~, P. 68.

46 U.S. Dep-at of D~eme, The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washingto% ~: Depmtment of Wfense,

Ap~ 1992), p. 18.

47 Kenne~ R. T~rne~, Th,? Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq (Boston: Houghton-M.ifflh 1991), p. 35.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation I 31

embedded in an existing industrial complex,

although large amounts of energy would be

required. During the Iran-Iraq War, for example,

the Australia Group made a concerted effort to

prevent Iraq from obtaining supplies of phosphorus oxychloride (POCl3

), a key precursor of

tabun. In response, Baghdad built a plant to

manufacture phosphorus oxychloride indigenously,

using raw phosphate ore from its huge phosphate

mine at Akashat, so that it was no longer

vulnerable to supplier embargoes of this precursor.

48

Iraq also tried to apply back-integration to sarin

production. In 1988, the Iraqi government contracted two West German companies to build

three chemical plants at Al Fallujah, 60 miles

west of Baghdad, for the conversion of elemental

phosphorus and chlorine into phosphorus trichloride (PCl3

), a key sarin precursor.49 Baghdad also

planned to produce hydrogen fluoride (HF),

another essential ingredient in sarin production,

by extracting it from phosphate ore with sulfuric

acid. By the time of the August 1990 invasion of

Kuwait, Iraq was on its way to building an

indigenous capability to produce all of the major

precursors of tabun and sarin, although it ultimately did not achieve this objective.50

The Iraqi case suggests that a country with

large deposits of phosphate ore, a well-developed

petrochemical industry, plentiful energy supplies,

and access to the necessary technical know-how

can develop an indigenous capability to produce

all the major precursors of mustard and nerve

agents. This ‘ ‘back-integration’ strategy would

enable such a country to circumvent any foreign

export-control regime designed to deny it access

to CW agent precursors. Nevertheless, developing a back-integration capability is a large and

costly undertaking, and may therefore be

beyond the means of all but the richest and

most ambitious states of the developing world.

| Containment and Waste Treatment

Because of the toxicity of CW agents, containment measures may be taken to ensure the safety

of the plant workers and the nearby population.

Such measures include air-quality detectors and

alarms, special ventilation and air-scrubbing systems, protective suits and masks, and chemical

showers for rapid decontamination. The safety

and ventilation measures at the Iraq’s Al Muthanna

CW production plant included measures comparable to U.S. procedures in the 1960s, when most

of the U.S. chemical weapon stockpile was

produced. 5l

For this reason, one should not use current

U.S. safety and environmental standards as the

norm when judging the likely proliferation

paths of developing countries. If a ruthless

government is willing to tolerate large numbers of

injuries or deaths among production workers, CW

agents can be manufactured in a very rudimentary

facility with few, if any, systems in place to

protect worker safety or the environment. In the

former Soviet Union, for example, closed CWagent production facilities were only introduced

in the 1950s; before then the production process

was entirely open to the atmosphere. According

to a Russian scientist, production of blister agents

during World War II took place under horrifying

conditions:

In Chapayevsk we sent many thousands of

people “through the mill” during the war.

Soldiers who had been deemed unfit worked at

the plant. Production was completely open:

mustard gas and lewisite were poured into shells

from kettles and scoops! In the space of a few

months the ‘‘workers in the rear’ became invalids and died. New people were brought into

48 Ibid., p. 52.

49 CmS, op. cit., footnote 18, pp. 22-27.

50 I$News ~nolog: August through November 1991, “ Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 14, December 1991, p. 8,

51 D=, op. cit., footnote II.
32 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

production. Once during the war a train bringing

reinforcements was delayed for some reason, and

the plant stopped work. There was simply no one

there to work! In nearby villages and hamlets

there is probably no family which has not had a

relative die in chemical production.52

If a proliferant country is concerned about

protecting its environment or population (or

wishes to cover up telltale evidence of its CW

activities), the treatment and disposal of wastes

from CW agent production poses a technical

challenge. The waste stream contains hot acids

contaminated with lethal agents and a large

quantity of phosphates. Cleaning out the production line also requires large quantities of decontamination fluid, which becomes mixed with

chemical agent and must be chemically or thermally destroyed to dispose of it an environmentally sound manner. In the most modem plants,

many spent or unused chemicals (e.g., DMMP,

thionyl chloride) are recycled back into the

production process. With the effective use of

recycling, about one-half ton to 1 ton of waste is

generated for each ton of nerve agent produced;

without recycling, the ratio of waste to product is

much higher.53

| Weaponization of CW Agents

The weaponization of CW agents involves

three steps:

1. the use of chemical additives to stabilize or

augment the effects of a CW agent;

2. the design and production of munitions for

dispersal of agent; and

3. the filling, storage, and transport of munitions.

Each of these steps is discussed in detail below.

CHEMICAL ADDITIVES

The principal military requirements of a CW

agent are that it be sufficiently toxic to produce

large numbers of casualties, and thermally and

mechanically stable enough so that it can survive

explosive dissemination or passage through a

spray device. Several chemicals may be added to

CW agents to allow long-term storage or to

enhance their military effects against personnel:

Stabilizers (e.g., amines) prevent the degradation of CW agents exposed to hot temperatures or stored for long periods by absorbing

acids released by chemical decomposition.

Although CW agents filled into munitions do

not require a long shelf-life if they are used

immediately in combat, stockpiled munitions require stabilizers to prevent deterioration over a period of years.

Freezing-point depressants lower the freezing point of liquid CW agents primarily

mustard) to permit use under winter conditions.

Thickeners increase the viscosity and persistence of liquid agents.

Carriers increase the airborne concentration

of an agent like sulfur mustard, which is not

very volatile at normal temperatures. During

World War II, Germany did research on the

potential use of silica powder as a potential

carrier for mustard agents. A large quantity

of sulfur mustard can be absorbed onto the

powder and dispersed as a dust cloud.

Because it contains a higher concentration of

agent, ‘‘dusty mustard’ produces more serious and rapid casualties than droplets of

liquid agent.54

‘

2 “Mirzayanov, Fedorov Detail Russian CW production” op. cit., footnote 34, p. 4.

53 fia~ord & Russell, ~c,, Selection ati Demonstration of the A40st Suitable Processor the Production of Methylphosphom”c Dichloride

(Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Chemical Research Development and Engineering Center, Dec. No. CRDEC-CR-87086, June

1987).

S4 j. pev Robinson and wTmpp, ‘‘~uction and Chemistry of Mustard Gas, ” S, J. Lund@ cd., Verzficatz”on of Dual-use ch~”cals

under the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Case of T)u”odiglycol, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies No, 13 (New York Oxford

University Press, 1991), p. 8.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation | 33

■ Antiagglomerants, such as colloidal silica

prevent caking of powdered agent.

Although stabilizers are added routinely to CW

agents, thickeners and carriers are more difficult

to use. Thickeners, for example, do not readily go

into solution and may take several hours to

dissolve. Countries that do not require agents with

high effectiveness or a long shelf-life may simply

choose not to use additives, thereby simplifying

the production process.

FILLING OPERATIONS

In a CW agent production facility, the toxic

material may flow directly from the production

reactors to a munitions filling plant, where it is

loaded into artillery shells, rockets, bombs, or

spray tanks. Alternatively, the agent may be

stored in bulk so that military missions can be

considered when matching agents to munitions,

or in the expectation that new delivery systems

will be developed.

Because the filling operation is extremely

hazardous, it is typically performed inside a

sealed building with a controlled atmosphere; the

filling machines themselves are totally enclosed

and sealed from the external environment. The

primary technical challenge is to seal the supertoxic liquid inside the munition without leakage

and then to decontaminate the external surfaces.

Iraq filled its unitary CW munitions on an

enclosed, automated assembly line at the Al

Muthanna production complex near Samarra.

Such filling and sealing operations typically take

about 2 to 3 minutes per projectile.55

A proliferant country might also fill CW

munitions manually, although this operation would

be labor-intensive and extremely dangerous. (Recall the quote above describing the manual filling

of shells at a Soviet mustard plant during World

War II.) During manual filling, a plant worker

wearing a gas mask and protective clothing

transfers the agent through a hose from a storage

vessel to the munition, which must then be

plugged and sealed without any vapor loss or

spillage. In wartime, filled munitions would be

transported from stockpiles to positions on the

battlefield from which they wouId be used. Other

preparatory activities, such as inserting fuses and

bursters, would also be required.

MUNITIONS DESIGN

Chemical munitions are designed to convert a

bulk payload of liquid or powdered agent into an

aerosol of microscopic droplets or particles that

can be readily absorbed by the lungs, or a spray

of relatively large droplets that can be absorbed

by the skin.56 An aerosol consists of droplets

between 1 and 7 microns (thousandths of a

millimeter) in diameter, which remain suspended

in the air for several hours and are readily inhaled

deep into the lungs. In contrast, a spray capable of

wetting and penetrating the skin consists of

droplets at least 70 microns in diameter.57

A volatile agent like sarin is disseminated as a

fine aerosol to create a short-term respiratory

hazard. More persistent agents like sulfur mustard

and VX are dispersed either as an aerosol (for

respiratory attack) or as a coarse mist (for skin

attack or ground contamination). After dissemination, nonvolatile agents may remain in puddles

on the ground for weeks at a time, evaporating

very slowly. The quantity of agent required to

accomplish a particular military objective depends on the toxicity of the material involved and

the efficiency of dissemination.

Many of the design specifications for chemical munitions can be found in the open patent

literature, and suitable munitions production

plants exist in many parts of the world. An

aerosol or spray of CW agent may be disseminated by explosive, thermal, pneumatic, or mechanical means. The simplest device for deliverSS D&, op. cit., foomote 11.

S6 J. H. Ro~~ld, To~mo~’~ Weopom: che~”cal a~Biological (New Yc)*, w: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 66.

57 ~wwd M. Spires, Che~”ca[ WeaponV: A Continuing Challenge (New York NY: St. m’s~ss~ 19W~ P. 21.
34 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

ing CW agents is a liquid spray tank mounted on

an airplane or helicopter; such systems are

commercially available for the dissemination of

agricultural chemicals. To deliver an aerosol or

spray of agent close enough to the ground to

produce casualties, however, an aircraft must fly

at low altitude and is thus vulnerable to air

defenses, if they exist.

CW agents can also be delivered with a wide

variety of munitions. During the Iran-Iraq War,

for example, Iraq delivered mustard and tabun

with artillery shells, aerial bombs, missiles, rockets, grenades, and bursting smoke munitions.58 A

bursting-type munition is packed with chemical

agent and a high-explosive burster, a fuse, and a

detonator; the use of more explosive produces a

freer aerosol but may destroy much of the agent

in the process. The fuse may be designed either to

explode on impact with the ground or, using a

proximity fuze, at an altitude of about 15 feet to

enhance the formation of the aerosol cloud.59

Sarin does not burn, but VX does and is therefore

disseminated nonexplosively from a spray tank or

by simple injection into the air stream from an

aircraft or glide bomb.

Binary munitions

Chemical munitions can be either unitary or

binary in design. Unitary munitions are filled

with CW agent at a loading facility (often

colocated with the production plant) before being

stored and transported, so that only a fuse need be

added before use. Binary munitions, in contrast,

contain two separate canisters filled with relatively nontoxic precursor chemicals that must

react to produce a lethal agent. The two components are either mixed together manually immediately before firing or are brought together automatically while the binary bomb or shell is in

flight to the target. Contrary to general belief,

the chemicals produced in binary weapons are

not novel CW agents but rather well-known

ones, such as sarin, soman, and VX. (For

technical reasons, tabun cannot be produced

in a binary system).

The United States developed three binary

chemical munitions: a 155mm artillery shell to

deliver sarin against enemy troop concentrations

on the battlefield; the BIGEYE spray bomb to

deliver VX against fixed targets deep behind

enemy lines; and a warhead for the Multiple

Launch Rocket System (MLRS) containing a

mixture of intermediate-volatility agents.60 The

binary artillery shell is a liquid/liquid system: one

of the two precursor chemicals is isopropyl

alcohol (rubbing alcohol), while the other, methylphosphonic difluoride (DF), is less toxic than

tear gas.6l In contrast, the BIGEYE spray bomb is

a solid/liquid system: after the bomb is released,

a pyrotechnic gas cartridge mixes particulate

sulfur with a liquid precursor code-named QL to

form VX. After the reaction has occurred, the

bomb glides across the target, dispersing VX in its

wake as a spray. 62 The development Of advanced

binary munitions entails considerable engineering challenges, both to accommodate the two

components in a ballistically sound package and

to effect the necessary chemical reaction during

the flight of the shell or bomb.

58 Hmey J. ~George, t ‘~’ss-et Arsed, ’ Defense & Foreign A#airs, January/February 1991, p. 7; ~~orge, ‘‘The Grow@l

Trend ‘fbward Chemical and Biological Weapons Capability,” D@ense and Foreign Affairs, April 1991, p. 6.

59 Buck ~d ~owerree, op. cit., footnote 14, P. 5~507.

~ Dan Boyle, “AnEnd to Chemical Weapons: What Are the Chances?” Znternutionul Defense Review, vol. 21, September 1988, p. 1088.

Although the 155mm shell and the BIGEYE bomb were produced, the MLRS system was termina ted in the final stages of development.

61 ~ ~, DF ~~ LDw (le~ dose in 50 percent of a population) of 67,000 mg/min/m3, compared with 63,000 m_3 for CS (t~

gas). DF and isopropyl alcohol are loaded into the munition in separate canisters; when the round is fued, the forces of acmleration mpture

the wall between the canisters and allow the two reagents to mix. By the time the shell strikes the earth, the reaction is complete; the fuze

detonates a burster charge, which disseminates a cloud of aerosolized sarin. Dee, op. cit footnote 11.

62 D&, op. Cit., foo~ote 11.
—— —

Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation | 35

Nevertheless, binary CW weapons do not

necessarily require sophisticated munition designs, since the two precursor chemicals can be

premixed manually on the ground immediately prior to use. Iraq, for example, developed

crude binary nerve-agent bombs and missile

warheads because its DF precursor was very

impure, causing the sarin product to decompose

rapidly. As a result, the Iraqis planned to mix the

binary precursors at the last possible moment

before firing. At the Al Muthanna CW production

facility, Iraqi workers half-filled 250-kilogram

aerial bombs and Scud missile warheads with a

mixture of isopropyl and cyclohexyl alcohols,

and stored the DF component separately in plastic

jerry cans. The operational plan was that just

before the bombs and missiles were prepared for

launch, a soldier wearing a gas mask would open

a plug in the bomb casing or warhead and pour in

the contents of four jerry cans of DF; the ensuing

reaction would result in a 60-40 mixture of sarin

and GF (a more persistent nerve agent).63

Binary weapons offer advantages in terms of

ease and safety of production, storage, and

transport, and hence might be attractive to potential proliferants. Nevertheless, binary weapons

create operational drawbacks on the battlefield.

The two precursors must either be premixed by

hand-a dangerous operation----or separate canisters containing the two ingredients must be

placed inside each munition immediately before

firing.

Cluster bombs

One way to increase the area coverage of an

aerial bomb or missile warhead is by means of

cluster munitions, in which the chemical payload

is broken up into many small bomblets (submunitions) that are released at altitude and scatter over

a large “footprint’ on the ground. During World

War II, the United States developed chemical

cluster bombs that carried 100 bomblets, each

containing 5 kg of mustard, Such weapons were

United Nations inspector sampling DF, a nerve

agent precursor that had been dumped into a pit in

Iraq. The Iraqis stored DF separately from their

chemical munitions, intending to add it just before use

to form the nerve agents sarin and GF.

designed to release the bomblets in a random

pattern at an altitude of 1,000 feet; individual

parachutes slowed the descent of the bomblets so

they would not bury themselves in the ground.

MISSILE DELlVERY SYSTEMS

Ballistic missile systems such as the Sovietdesigned Scud-B (with a range of 300 km) and

FROG-7 (with a range of 67 km) can deliver

warheads bulk-filled with chemical agent. Iraq

developed bulk chemical warheads for its AlHussein modified Scud missiles (with an extended range of 500 to 600 km), although there is

63 Terry J. Gander, “Iraq--The Chemical Arsenal,” June’s Intelligence Review, vol. 4, No. 9, September 1992, p. 414.
36 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Iraqi worker preparing to open up for inspection a

chemical warhead developed for Iraq’s modified Scud

missile.

no evidence that they were actually tested.64

United Nations inspectors in Iraq were shown 30

CW missile warheads, of which 16 had unitary

sarin warheads. The other 14 were of the “binary” type and were partially filled with a

mixture of alcohols pending the addition of DF

stored in jerry cans nearby.

During the 1950s, the United States also

developed CW cluster warheads for a series of

rockets and missiles, including the Honest John,

Sergeant, Improved Honest John, and the developmental LANCE warhead. A cluster warhead,

however, cannot cover an area large enough to

ensure that a missile as inaccurate as a Scud will

deliver chemical agent to a particular target.

Moreover, the area covered by a cluster warhead

is somewhat unpredictable, since it depends to a

large extent on the terrain and weather in the

target zone.

Cruise missiles and remotely piloted vehicles

(RPVs) are also potential CW delivery systems.

During World War II, the Germans considered

filling the warhead of the V-1 flying bomb with

phosgene gas instead of the normal 800kilograms

of high explosive. They decided against this

proposal, however, after calculating that high

explosives would actually produce more casualties than gas.65 Nevertheless, a cruise missile or

long-range RPV fitted with a 500 kg spray tank

would be a cheap and effective delivery system

that could lay down a linear spray cloud of CW

agent.

In sum, systems suitable for delivering CW

agents are widely available, and even the development and production of crude (manually mixed)

binary weapons does not require a sophisticated

industrial base. These observations suggest that

the weaponization step does not pose a

technical bottleneck to the acquisition of

capability.

major

a CW

INDICATORS OF CW PROLIFERATION

ACTIVITIES

Verification of the international ban on chemical weapons will require the capability to detect

militarily significant production of CW agents in

a timely manner. Even a small production facility

could manufacture militarily significant quantities of CW agent if it is operated for several years.

Over a decade, a pilot-scale plant producing 10

tons of agent per year would accumulate 100

tons-a militarily significant quantity under certain contingencies.66 Such long-term accumulation would, however, require distilling the agent

to ensure a long shelf-life, thereby increasing

complexity and cost; otherwise the total quantity

of agent would be reduced by deterioration over

the lo-year period. Increasing the number or scale

of the production plants would reduce the length

of time needed to accumulate a militarily significant stockpile.

64 Dw~ McHug& ‘‘~w COnfeRII@,’ Trust and Venfi, No. 35, hnuary 1992, p. 2.

65 Harris and P~ op. cit., footnote 25, p. 59.

66 ~uel L, sm~he~ et ~., A~ly~i~ of sig~~~resAssociated with No~co@iunce sce~~os, Repofi No. DNA-TR-92-74 (&kgton, VA:

System PhMx@ Corp., January 19’93), p. 7.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation 137

Monitoring measures designed to detect illicit

CW production may be cooperative, within the

framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention

(CWC), or noncooperative, based on intelligence

agents, remote sensing, and covertly placed

monitoring devices that are not part of a negotiated regime. The cooperative monitoring regime

established by the CWC requires participating

countries to submit declarations, which will then

be checked through ‘‘routine’ onsite inspections;

discrepancies may suggest illicit activities. To

deter clandestine CW agent production, the treaty

also provides for “challenge” inspections at

government or private facilities, declared or

undeclared. The advantage of the cooperative

regime is that it permits direct access to production facilities, albeit in a tightly circumscribed

manner. In contrast, unilateral intelligencegathering efforts have the advantage that they are

not constrained by agreed restrictions on data

collection. The two approaches are not mutually

exclusive and can be employed in a complementary manner.

Several potential indicators, or “signatures,”

of CW development, production, and weaponization are discussed below. Although each signature taken in isolation is probably inadequate to

prove the case, a “package” of signatures from

various sources may be highly suggestive of a

CW capability. Evaluating the effectiveness of

the verification regime for the Chemical Weapons

Convention must take into the account the specificity and sensitivity of these various signatures

and how much confidence one might have in

them. The following analysis does not attempt a

full assessment of the CWC verification regime

(e.g., detailed procedures for inspections) but

focuses more narrowly on the utility of the

various signatures that might be monitored.

A separate but related issue is the quality of the

evidence needed to ‘ ‘prove’ to the international

community that a country has violated its treaty

obligations, and the consequences of detecting a

violation. This issue of the standard of proof has

been a long-standing problem of verification.

Although there may be sufficient evidence to

convince some countries that a violation has

occurred-particularly if they are suspicious to

begin with-the case may not be unassailable in

the face of the accused party’s plausible denials.

At the same time, the accusing party may not wish

to release all of its supporting evidence to a larger

audience because of the risk of compromising

sensitive sources and methods of intelligence.

The standard-of-proof problem has no simple

solution and should be kept in mind during the

following discussions of ‘signatures” of chemical weapon acquisition.

| Research and Development Signatures

The frost stage in the acquisition of a CW

capability is laboratory research and development

of offensive agents, although this step is not

necessary if standard agents and known production processes are to be employed. The following

step is pilot-scale production to work out problems in the manufacturing process. Because of the

small scale of these operations, they can be very

difficult to detect.

SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS

One way of tracking a country’s research and

development activities relevant to CW is to read

its contributions to the chemical literature. The

fact that leading academic chemists suddenly stop

publishing may bean indicator of military censorship or the diversion of civil scientists into

defense work. Publication tracking can also

produce red herrings, however, since changes in

scientific productivity may result from many

factors. During World War II, for example, the

Germans read great significance into the fact that

references to new pesticides suddenly disappeared from U.S. scientific journals. German

intelligence analysts deduced correctly that military censorship was responsible for the cut-off,

but they wrongly assumed that the United States

had independently discovered nerve agents. The

Germans’ faulty intelligence assessment led them

to fear U.S. retaliation in kind if they initiated the
38 | Technologies Underlaying Weapons of Mass Destruction

use of nerve agents, and was one of several factors

that deterred them fiorn resorting to chemical

warfare. 67

While publication tracking might provide clues

to technologically advanced CW developments, it

would be much less useful in the case of a

developing country like Iraq that is simply

attempting to produce standard agents with known

production processes. Such a country would

employ mainly industrial. chemists and chemical

engineers, who publish very little in the open

literature. For this reason, publication tracking

is likely to be of only secondary value in

monitoring CW proliferation.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (AGENTS OR

DEFECTORS)

Human agents, defectors, or even leaks to the

press in more open societies can be of value in

revealing the existence of secret chemicalwarfare R&D activities. In October 1992, for

example, Vil Mirzayanov, a Russian military

chemist, gave interviews to the press in which he

stated that scientists at the State Union Scientific

Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and

Technology in Moscow had developed a new

binary nerve agent that, in terms of its combat

characteristics, was “five to eight times superior’ to the most toxic of the VX-type agents now

in existence. Mirzayanov also alleged that a batch

of between five and 10 metric tons of the new

agent had been produced.68 He was subsequently

arrested by the Russian Security Ministry (the

successor to the KGB) and charged with revealing

state secrets.69 Because human-intelligence reports--

particularly those based on hearsay or indirect

evidence—may be misleading, however, they

typically need to be confirmed with other, more

objective forms of evidence before being used to

support final conclusions.

| External Production Signatures

Since so much of CW agent production involves dual-use technologies, it is necessary to

distinguish clearly between illicit and legitimate

production. Unfortunately, there are few, if

any, specific, unambiguous external signatures of CW production. A number of potential

indicators are discussed below.

PATTERNS OF MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

IMPORTS

Developing countries seeking to acquire a CW

capability are nearly always dependent on outside

assistance, at least in the initial stages. During the

1980s, numerous companies from Western Europe and Japan sold chemical plants to proliferant

countries, which then converted them into CW

production facilities. Different suppliers provided

the laboratories and production plants, sold chemical precursors, and furnished maintenance equipment. Iraq, for example, was able to purchase 7

turnkey chemical plants and to order thousands of

catalogue parts on the international market, along

with all the necessary precursor chemicals for the

production of CW agents. Similarly, the Libyan

CW plant at Rabta was designed by the West

German firm Imhausen-Chemie and built by

companies from ‘‘nearly a dozen nations, East

and West, ’ according to Robert M. Gates, then

deputy director of the National Security Council. 70

Because of the initial reliance of proliferants on

outside assistance, suspicious exports and imports of production equipment and chemical

157 Harris and Paxmanj op. cit., footnote 25, p. 64. For a discussion of other factors that convinced the Germans not to use chemical weapons,

see Frederick J. Brow Chemical Wa@are: A Study in Restraints (Princeto~ NJ: Princeton University Press, 1%8); and John Ellis van

Courtland MOOQ “Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The World War II Experience,” International Secun”ty, vol. 8, No. 4, spring 1984, pp.

3-35.

68 ~~~zaymov, Fedorov Dew Russian CW pmductio~” Op. Cit., fOOrnOte 34, P. 2.

69 Serge Schrnernann, “K,G.B,’s Successor Charges Scientist,” New York Times, Nov. 1, 1992, p. 4.

70 William Thohy, ‘

{U.S. Pressing Allies on Libya Chemical Plan4° Los Angeles Times, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 10.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation 139

precursors may indicate the acquisition of a CW

production capability. For this reason, monitoring

exports of materials considered critical for CW

production, such as glass-lined pipes and corrosionresistant alloys, could prove useful.71 Since much

of this equipment is dual-use, however, its

acquisition is not necessarily proof of an intent to

produce CW agents. Moreover, tracking such

transactions is difficult because proliferants like

Iraq and Libya take care to set up elaborate

networks of ‘front’ companies, paper subsidiaries, and middlemen to hide their purchases.

Precursors of CW agents are also difficult to

track. Unlike weapon-grade fissionable materials

(e.g., highly enriched uranium and plutonium),

which are produced in relatively small quantities

and have quite restricted civil uses, most CW

precursors have legitimate commercial applications and are traded internationally in volumes

that make precise accounting impossible. A

useful case study is that of thiodiglycol, the

immediate precursor of sulfur mustard. Since a

limited number of companies and countries manufacture this chemical, it was initially believed

that calculating the agreement between its production and consumption, or material balance,

might provide a way to detect diversions from

legitimate commercial uses to illicit mustard

production.

In 1989-91, a working group of the internationa1 scientists’ organization Pugwash studied

the feasibility of such a monitoring effort. They

found that since thiodiglycol could be produced

secretly or diverted from legitimate uses with

relative ease, an effective control regime would

require: 1) continuous monitoring of all chemical

plants capable of producing it, and 2) establishing

a materials balance between starting materials

and products at all stages of its life-cycle. The

Pugwash team concluded that such a monitoring

system would be extremely difficult and costly to

implement. Moreover, standard inaccuracies in

data-gathering on feedstock chemicals could

mask the diversion of significant quantities of

thiodiglycol for the production of mustard agent,

rendering mass-balance calculations of questionable utility .72

Tracking phosphorus-based compounds used

to make nerve agents is even more difficult.

Billions of pounds of these chemicals are bought

and sold for commercial purposes, so that militarily significant quantities would be lost in the

‘‘noise’ of international trade. Because the production of many basic commodity chemicals is

shifting from the industrialized countries to the

developing world, some precursor chemicals are

produced at multiple locations in several countries, greatly complicating the difficulty of material accounting. Moreover, given the long interval between order and delivery, it is difficult to

account for materials in transit.

At the level of an individual plant, calculating

the material balance between the feedstocks

entering a plant and the products coming out is

only possible to an accuracy of 2 to 3 percent—a

margin of error too large to prevent a militarily

significant diversion of precursors to CW agent

production. Calculating a precise material balance would also require extensive access to a

company’s production records and might therefore jeopardize legitimate trade secrets. As a

result, materials-balance calculations cannot

provide a reliable indicator that precursor

chemicals are being diverted to CW agent

production.

Some analysts have suggested that the ratios of

starting materials and catalysts needed for CW

agent production might provide reliable signatures because they are distinctive from those used

in commercial production. For example, a plant

producing 10 tons of sarin per day would need

large quantities of precursors and catalysts in

71 Robert Gillette, “Verification of Gas Plant a Murky Task” ,QM Angeles Times, Jan. 5, 1989, p. 5.

72 Martin M. Kaplan et al., ‘‘Sumrnary and Conclusions, ’ Verification of Dual-Use Chem”cals Under the Chemical Weapons Convention:

The Case of ?’hiodigZycol, S. J. Lundti ed. (Oxford, England: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 124-136.
40 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

specific proportions. Nevertheless, many complex factors influence the quantities of precursor

chemicals consumed by a chemical plant, including the stoichiometry of the reactions used for

agent production, the number of production steps,

and the yield of each step.73 Some reactants might

be used in excess to boost yield or to increase

reaction rates, and feedstocks could be deliberately stockpiled to distort the calculated ratios.

For these reasons, ratios of starting materials

are unlikely to provide a reliable indicator of

CW agent production.

The presence of key additives (e.g., stabilizers,

thickeners, or freezing-point depressants) in association with precursor chemicals may be indicative of CW agent production. Because the use of

additives is generally optional, however, their

absence would not necessarily rule out illicit CW

agent production.

ECONOMIC DISLOCATIONS

The clandestine diversion of a large commercial chemical plant (and associated precursor

materials) to CW production might have a noticeable impact on the local economy in a small,

underdeveloped country with relatively little

economic activity. For example, temporarily

ceasing civilian production might create observable shortages of consumer goods normally produced by the plant, such as pesticides or drugs.

Whether such economic dislocations would be

observable, however, depends on the extent to

which the chemical plant was integrated into the

local economy. In more industrialized countries

such as India, South Korea, and Taiwan, such

relatively small economic effects would be obscured by the ‘‘noise” of fluctuating output

within the overall economy. Moreover, in some

developing countries, chemical production is

entirely for export, so that one would have to

monitor foreign sales rather than domestic markets. A proliferant country might also stockpile a

portion of its output for several months or years

and use it to make up for shortfalls in normal

production. As a result, economic dislocations

are unlikely to be a reliable signature.

VISUAL SIGNATURES

Unlike nuclear weapon facilities, which are

single-use, limited in number, and easy to identify, civilian chemical plants are two orders of

magnitude more numerous, have multiple uses,

and are configured in different ways depending

on the chemical process. Moreover, there are no

unique features or external markings that would

distinguish a facility capable of CW agent production from an ordinary chemical plant.74 A

clandestine military production facility might be

hidden underground or inside a mountain, or

embedded within a legitimate chemical complex,

making it essentially invisible from the air.

Chemical munitions are small, impossible to

distinguish visually from high-explosive shells,

and easy to conceal, as are bulk chemical agents.

Indeed, 100 tons of nerve agent—a militarily

significant quantity in many conflict scenarios—

would fit into a dozen trailer-trucks.75 A proliferant country might therefore hide chemical weapons or bulk agent on railcars, in underground

bunkers, or in inconspicuous buildings.

Despite these limitations, however, a pattern

of anomalous visual indicators at a chemical

facility might arouse suspicions that could be

verified by other means. Indicators of CW

production that might be visible in overhead

imagery obtained by reconnaissance aircraft or

satellites include:

73 ~k F. M~le~ Kenne~ E. Apg and William D. StanbrO, Criten”a for Monitoring a Chemical Arms fiea~: Implications for the

Verification Regime (Los Alamos, NM: IXM Alamos National Laboratory, Center for National Security Studies, Report No. 13, Deeemba

1991), p. 8.

74 Brief@g by Manuel L. Sanches, System PI arming Corp., Oet, 23, 1992.

75 NWeen C. Bailey, “Problems With a Chemical Weapon Ba” Orbis, vol. 36, No. 2, spring 1992, p. 244.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation | 41

the construction of a large chemical plant

that has not been reported in the chemical

trade press;76

siting of the plant in an extremely remote and

isolated location;

a high level of security surrounding the plant,

such as multiple or electrified fences, airdefense batteries, and guard units;

an extremely dispersed layout, with large

distances between buildings to complicate

attacks from the air;

the proximity of the chemical plant to a

metal-machining factory capable of fabricating munitions;

the presence of tanker trucks associated with

the transport of hazardous chemicals;

a lack of steel drums or other packaging

materials normally associated with the production of commercial chemicals;

traffic movement at night or under guard;

the death of vegetation, livestock, birds, or

wild animals in the vicinity of a plant;

a flurry of activity at a chemical facility

suggestive of a major accident, yet no

coverage of the event in the local media.

Box 2-A provides an example, taken from press

accounts, of how visual signatures contributed to

the identification of a CW production facility in

Libya. The utility of these signatures depends, of

course, on the individual proliferant’s approach.

Although the visual indicators cited above would

have worked well for Iraq, they would have been

unsuccessful in the case of a proliferant that

embedded its CW production facilities within

large commercial chemical complexes.

In addition to visual signatures, infrared reflections or emissions detected by specialized overhead sensors might, in principle, provide indications of CW production activity .77 For example,

multispectral cameras might detect stressed or

dying foliage around a production plant resulting

from emissions of toxic chemicals. A thermalinfrared camera might also assist in monitoring a

facility’s operational status by revealing the

intensity of heat emitted by various parts of the

production line and smokestacks. Cool and hot

buildings, pipelines, and tanks could be readily

identified by infrared imaging, indicating which

parts of the facility were active at any given

time-although such evidence could be misleading. 78 Synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) imagery,

which tends to highlight reflective surfaces,

might also reveal details not evident in an optical

photograph such as feed pipes, power lines, and

vehicles parked around a facility .79 SAR can also

generate images of near-photographic quality at

night and in bad weather.

Nevertheless, overhead reconnaissance has its

limitations. In addition to the difficulty of distinguishing a CW production facility from an

ordinary chemical plant in photographs, overhead

imagery may be susceptible to deliberate efforts

at camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D).

The Libyans, for example, reportedly engaged in

an effective deception campaign that initially

convinced Western intelligence agencies that the

Rabta CW production plant had been destroyed

76 ~ ~ma~ he ~~e pr~s r~om on the construction Of M =JOr lcgi~te ch~c~ p~ts.

77 For ~ddition~ ~omtion on ~efi~ce ~d remo~ ~~~g, see Us. co~ess, ~~ of ~hnology Assessmen~ Cooperative find

Sunei/lance in InfernafionalAgreemenrs, OTA-ISC-480 (Washingtortj DC: U.S. Government Printing OfIlce, July 1991) and U.S. Congress,

OfIice of Twhnology Assessment The Future of Remote Sen.n”ng From Space: Civilian Satellite Systems and Applications, OTA-ISC-558

(lVashingto% DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1993).

75 by Sfithson ~d ~ctiel wepo~ Strengthening the Chem”cal Weapons Convention Through Aen”al Inspections, OCC~iOnd papa

No. 4 (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 1991), p. 15.

79 SPthetic-a-e mdm (Sri) ~mtes a dewed terr~ -p by cqb the refl~tion Of timed microwave p~WX emitted by a IIIOviXlg

transmitter, whose motion creates a synthetic antenna with an apparent diameter much greater than that of the actual transmi tting antenna. This

large effective antenna size allows much greater resolution than a stationary radar could achieve, permitting the creation of photograph-like

images.
42 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Box 2-A-How Libya’s Secret CW Plant Was Detected

Press accounts provide an interesting illustration of how patient detective work by the U.S. intelligence

community, compiling data from a wide variety of sources, provided strong circumstantial evidence that Libya was

building a clandestine CW facility long before the plant started production.1 (In summarizing these stories here,

OTA is neither confirming nor challenging their accuracy.) The Rabta case therefore provides some useful lessons

in the detection of covert CW proliferation by intelligence means.

In the early 1930s, reconnaissance-satellite photos of Libya revealed that a major construction project was

under way in a hilly region about 35 miles southwest of the Libyan capital of Tripoli. Western intelligence reports

also indicated that Ihsan Barbouti, an Iraqi-born businessman whose Frankfurt-based engineering firm had been

linked to the construction of a CW plant in Iraq, was using front companies to ship chemical equipment, supplies,

construction plans, and personnel to Libya. Barbouti’s operation involved some 30 German companies, several

Austrian engineers, and Swiss banks.2

The prime contractor was lmhausen-Chemie, a West German chemical firm that became involved with the

Libyan project in 1985, at a time when it was in financial difficulties. Most of the equipment and supplies left

European ports under false export documents, and in order to circumvent existing export controls, Barbouti used

a complex commercial network involving front companies that transferred goods through ports in the Far East.3

Construction at Rabta was carried out under tight security conditions by 1,300 low-wage laborers imported from

Thailand.4

Meanwhile, satellites and high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft followed the progress of construction at the

Rabta site. By 1938, the imagery suggested that the facility, which sprawled over several acres, was nearing

completion. Libyan government officials adamantly insisted that the Rabta facility was a pharmaceutical plant,

designated Pharma-150. Yet the factory was unusually large by the standards of the pharmaceutical industry and

was ringed by high fences and 40-foot sand revetments-seemingly excessive security for an ordinary chemical

plant.5 Since the production facility was completely enclosed inside a warehouse-like structure, overhead

photography revealed nothing about the process equipment inside, but the plant’s oversized air-filtration system

suggested that it was intended for the production of toxic chemicals.

Once the overhead imagery had aroused suspicions, Western countries sought to develop new sources of

information among the foreign technicians and construction workers from more than a dozen European, Asian,

and Middle East countries employed at the Rabta facility. These sources described plant equipment layout, and

supplies, providing additional dues that the site might be intended for CW production. Intelligence analysts

concluded that the complex comprised a large chemical agent production plant, a chemical arms storage building,

and a metalworking plant built by Japan Steel Works.6The latter facility contained Japanese-made machine tools,

officially intended for the production of irrigation pumps but also suitable for the production of artillery shells and

gas cannisters.7 Delivery of special steels used in bomb casings suggested to U.S. and British intelligence that

1 %e nOnMS C. Wiegele, 7he Clandestine Bukfing of Ubya’s Chemkal Wapons Factory: A fiudy in

internatiom?i Co/iusion (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992).

2 wiiiiamC. Rempei and Robin Wrtgh~ “Libya Piant Found by Vfgiiance, Luck” 77?e Los An.geles ~m% Jan.

22, 1989, pp. 1,21.

3 ~mthy AW@i, “seg~ng smoking Guns,” 77?e Chdstian -rice hfOt?ikM Jan. 6 1*93 P. 10

4 WIiIi~ R. i)oerner, “On Seoond Thought” 77nw, vol. 133, No. 4, Jan. 23, 1969, p. al.

5 Biii Gerti, %ateliltesspt Poison-Bomb Piant In Uby%” 14&shington 77meq Mar. 5,1991, P. A3.

6 Biii Gertz, ‘12nd Chemicai Arms Plant Spied in UbWL” 77?0 Wfk?M@On Thn&% June 18, Iwo, p. A6.

7 RotNrt Gilette, ‘kVerification of Gas Plant A Murky Task” Los Angeies 77~s JWI. 5, 1989, P. 11.
————

Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation \ 43

Libya was actually manufacturing chemical munitions?

The West German government obtained construction blueprints of the Rabta plant from the engineering firm

Saltzgitter. These plans revealed some anomalous features suggestive of CW agent production. According to a

German government report,

The joint planning of chemical plants and the metal processing plant as well as security facilities not

usually found in a pharmaceutical facility (airtight windows and doors, gas-tight walls between the

production and the control unit, burn-off unit, corrosion-proof Iining on pipes, and escape routes) make

it possible to draw the conclusion that ‘Pharma 150’ is a chemical weapon Plant9

It was not until August 1988, however, that the CIA obtained more solid evidence that the Rabta plant was

engaged in CW agent production. Following a partial test run of the production process, an accidental spill occurred

as highly toxic wastes were being transferred for diaposal outside the plant. The resulting aloud of fumes killed

a pack of wild desert dogs in the vicinity of the plant. Their bodies, detected by satellite, indicated that the plant

was producing chemicals of warfare toxicity.l0

The “smoking gun,” however, reportedly came from communications intercepts. During the accident,

panicked Libyan officials called Imhausen-Chemie-the West German firm that had designed the plant-for

emergency advice. Since the Libyans placed the call over international phone lines, U.S. intelligence was able to

intercept the conversation.11 According to an account in Time magazine, “in a frantic effort to get advice on

cleaning up and repairing the plant, Libyan officials spoke at length with lmhausen-Chemie personnel. Those

conversations left no doubt that employees of the West German firm were just as aware as the Libyans that the

plant was being used to produce toxic gas.”12

On September 14,1988, the State Department went public with the fallowing statement: ‘The U.S. now believes

Libya has established a CW production capability and is on the verge of full-scale production of these weapons.”

CIA director William Webster provided further details in a speech on October 25, 1988 claiming that the Libyan

plant was the largest chemical weapon facility the agency had detected anywhere in the developing world.13 In

August 1990, the intelligence community deduced that large-scale production of chemical agents at Rabta had

begun after a photoreconnaissance satellite observed specialized trucks designed to transport CW agents picking

up barrels of suspected agent at the plant.14 In 1992, an intelligence official stated publicly that the Rabta facility

had produced and stockpiled more than 100 metric tons of the nerve gas sarin and other CW agents.15

Nevertheless, the public case against Rabta-as reported in the news media-is circumstantial and will

remain so until Libya signs and ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention and permits intrusive inspections of

the facility. According to a skeptical assessment, “Neither the charges that Libya is attempting to develop chemical

weapons nor the allegations that Libyan forces have used them can be independently substantiated from the public

8 J-S Adams, Engines of War: Merchants of Death and the New Arms Ra= (New York Ny: Atiantlc

Monthly Press, 1990), p. 243.

9 ‘lRe~rt Submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of G8rmany to the German Bundestag on

Feb. 15,1989, Concerning the Possible Involvement of Germans in the Establishment of aChemical Weapon Fadlity

in Libya,” reprinted in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, C/?emka/andBio/o@@/ 14&apons: The U@nt

NeedforRenwdies, 101st Congress, First Session, Jan. 24, Mar. 1, and May9, 1989 (Washington, DC: Government

Printing Office, 1989), p, 81.

10 Rempel and Wright, op. dt., footnote 2, p. 21.

~ 1 Ibid, pp. 1, 21.

12 Downer, op. dt., footnote 4, p. 31.

13 Da~d B. Ottaway, “Behind the New Battte With Libya” The Washington post, Jan. 8, 1989, p. w.

14 Gertz, op. cit., footnote 6, p. Al.

15 Gordon c. oehler, “Address to the Annual Soref Symwsium of the Washington Institute fOr Near ~

Policy,” Apr. 27, 1992, p. 4.
44 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Box 2-A-How Libya’s Secret CW Plant Was Detected-(Contfnued)

record, but there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to make Libya a strong suspect as a chemical weapons

proliferator:’ 16

Moreover, although the detection and monitoring of the Rabta site was an intelligenoe success-story, it

remains to some extent a special ease. Because Libya is a desert nation that relies heavily on foreign expertise

and labor, the presence of foreigners provided valuable sources of information. Densely populated and

industrialized countries suspected of having covert CW programs are harder to monitor because they can conceal

them in a large and diverse array of chemical plants involved in production of pharmaceuticals, pesticides, and

fertilizers. 17 Finally, even in the Rabta case, the inherent unreliabilityof circumstantial evidence underscores the

importance of rigorous onsite inspection in verifying the Chemical Weapons Convention.

16 Gordon M. Buck ami Charles C. flowerree, /nfernationa/Handookon Ch@/?Wd 14@@ons %lifemtfon

(New Yorlq NY: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 267.

17 Rernpel and Wright, op. dt., footnote 2, p. 21.

by fire on March 13, 1990.80 When the French

commercial Earth-resources satellite SPOT-1 photographed the Rabta facility on March 18, however, it looked fully intact.81 According to press

reports, only after several days did the U.S.

intelligence community realize that the Libyans

had created the illusion of a major fire at the plant

by painting scorch marks on the roofs of buildings, burning several truckloads of old tires to

produce black smoke, and. rushing ambulances to

the area to make it appear that the plant had

suffered severe damage.82

In sum, external visual signatures, such as

those that might be observed through overhead photography, can provide clues of CW

production activities but. are rarely conclusive

and must be supplemented with evidence from

onsite inspections. While it is possible to conclude from indirect or ambiguous signatures that

something suspicious is going on, making a

convincing case that a country has broken its

solemn treaty commitments requires a higher

standard of evidence.

| Internal Production Signatures

Under the CWC verification regime, external

signatures obtained noncooperatively through

overhead photography and remote-sensing will

be supplemented with internal signatures obtained by authorized onsite inspections. Examples of some internal signatures are discussed

below.

PRODUCTION PROCESS EQUIPMENT

As discussed above, the synthesis of nerve

agents requires a few reactions that are rare in the

production of pesticides: the cyanation reaction

for the synthesis of tabun; the alkylation reaction

for the synthesis of sarin, soman, and VX; and the

fluorination reaction for the synthesis of sarin and

soman.

83 Indeed, since alkylation is not required

for the production of most organophosphorus

pesticides, civil plants employ feedstocks conSo M,ic~e] R. Gordo~ “U.S. Says Fire at Libya Arms Plant May Be a HoaL” The New York Times, w. 31, 1990, p. 3.

$1 “S~l Fire, Much Sxnok,” The Econom”st, vol. 314, No. 648, MM. 31, 1990, p. 42.

sz Bifl ~~, “satellites Spot Poison-Bomb Plant in Liby%” The Washington ~“~S, ~. 5, 1991, p. 3.

$3 Bm~ op. cit., footnote 33, p. 155.

84 me Phosphom us~ in most pesticides is Pentavalent rather* triv~ent.
Chapter 2—Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation 145

taining a different chemical form of phosphorus

than is used to make nerve agents.84

Unfortunately, there is no “signature equipment for the manufacture of CW agents. Since

CW agents can be and have been produced by a

variety of standard organic-chemical processes, it

is almost impossible to identify an individual

piece of equipment that has been specifically

designed or modified for this purpose. This fact

makes it extremely difficult for all but the most

trained eye to spot a CW production facility. The

necessary equipment would tend to be standard

rather than unique, consisting of chemical reaction vessels and “back-end’ processing equipment. Distillation columns, for example, are not

necessarily a good indicator of illicit activity

because they are also found in many legitimate

chemical plants. They might also be omitted from

a CW production facility if the proliferant does

not require pure agent with a long shelf-life.

Still, a combination of subtle changes in

plant design and layout might be indicative of

illicit production, particularly if an analysis of

the design suggests that it does not make

engineering and economic sense for its declared commercial purpose. For example, unusual process steps such as alkylation might stand

out if they are inconsistent with the plant’s pastor

present mix of commercial products or are not

being carried out on an appropriate scale. A plant

designed to work with highly toxic materials

might also have specialized pumps and valves

with double seals and other safety measures. In

such cases, a more intrusive inspection would be

warranted to verify that the suspect facility is not

engaged in CW production activities.

Another feature of a nerve-agent production

plant that might help distinguish it from an

ordinary pesticide plant is the means of heating

and cooling the reaction vessels. Since chemical

processes for nerve agents produce highly unstable intermediates that react explosively with

water, steam-heating and water-cooling must be

replaced with special heat-exchange fluids and

heating oils that require the use of cooling towers

rather than steam vents. A nerve-agent production

plant would therefore lack the steam clouds that

are a common feature of chemical plants.85 Even

so, this signature would not necessarily be unique

to nerve-agent production, since many legitimate

chemical plants use organic solvents or mineral

oils as heating and cooling media rather than

steam or water. Moreover, a shrewd proliferant

seeking to avoid detection might deliberately

install misleading steam-cloud generators!

In general, analysis of plant design and layout

is most useful in the case of turnkey plants

developed and exported by foreign companies,

which tend to use distinctive design formats and

templates. Indigenously designed chemical plants

may have unique layouts that make it more

difficult to draw inferences about their functions.

CORROSION-RESISTANT MATERIALS

Since the reactions needed to produce mustard

and nerve agents are highly corrosive, along-term

CW production facility might use corrosionresistant pipes, valves, and reaction vessels made

of special alloys with a high nickel content, such

as Hastelloy. Unfortunately, there is currently no

practical method to identify corrosion-resistant

materials without taking physical samples or

looking inside, particularly if a reactor or pipe is

painted or wrapped in insulating material.86

Moreover, the use of corrosion-resistant reactors

and pipes is increasingly common in the civilian

chemical industry. Since commercial manufacturers may wish to avoid replacing vessels and

pipes on a regular basis, some advanced commercial plants build in an extra level of protection by

installing Hastelloy or glass-lined reaction vessels to protect equipment and maintain product

85 Stoctiolm hte~tion~ peace Resewch wti~te, The Problem of Chem”calandBiological Warfare, Vol. VI: TechnicalAspects of ~rly

Warning and Verification (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1975), p. 293.

86 Smches et al., op. Cit., fOO~Ote 66, P. 63”
46 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

purity. A proliferant country might also be able to

acquire used corrosion-resistant equipment that

still has a few years of life in it after the

guaranteed 5 to 10 years have expired.87

Conversely, a proliferant engaged in the covert

production of CW agents might choose deliberately not to use corrosion-resistant materials for

the following reasons:

such materials might not be available because of export controls;

the use of such materials might reveal the

intent to produce CW agents; or

the near-term capital cost to extend the life of

the equipment would not be justified, particularly if a country planned to produce only a

limited stockpile of chemical weapons.

Although a stainless-steel reactor will be severely corroded by HF gas, it can still function for

about a year. A proliferant might therefore be

willing to live with the inconvenience of replacing equipment at shorter intervals and use ordinary construction materials in an attempt to

conceal its activities. For this reason, the presence in a chemical plant of corrosion-resistant

material does not necessarily indicate that C W

agents are being produced, and its absence

from a suspect facility may merely reflect the

frequent replacement of standard equipment

or a lack of plans for long-term agent production.

SAFETY AND POLLUTION-CONTROL EQUIPMENT

The toxicity of nerve agents is roughly 1,000

times greater than that of most organophosphorus

pesticides. Nevertheless, only the last step in

agent production poses a serious toxic hazard; in

the case of both G and V agents, this is a very

small part of the process. To prevent the release

of deadly fumes into the environment, the final

process step in a CW production plant would

probably be carried out in a tightly sealed

enclosure, operated at a negative pressure so that

any leaks would result in air being drawn in rather

than toxic gases escaping. Reaction vessels involved in this step might also be operated by

remote control, requiring special piping and

computer systems, and pumps might be equipped

with double or triple seals to guard against

leaks. 88

A CW production plant might also have

ventilation and emission-control systems that

differ from those of a legitimate pesticide or

pharmaceutical plant. In pesticide plants, fresh air

often circulates continually through the plant and

vents directly into the atmosphere. Although

increasingly stringent environmental regulations

are strengthening emission controls in developed

countries, pesticide plants in developing countries are likely to be open to the environment.89

Similarly, pharmaceutical plants generally shield

products from contamination by maintaining the

production area at a higher air pressure than the

outside environment, so that all contaminants

flow away from the production process. In

contrast, in a CW agent plant the final production

steps would probably be maintained at a lower

pressure than the outside air so that the lethal

vapors do not leak into the surrounding environment.

The hazards associated with production of

nerve agents might also require the use of large

activated-carbon filtration systems and scrubbers

to remove all supertoxic chemicals from the

exhaust air. The German firm of Noske-Haeser,

for example, installed an expensive air-cleaning

plant for the Iraqi chemical laboratory at Salman

Pak Intelligence analysts concluded that the

dimensions of the air-cleaning system were too

large if the 10 laboratories were simply engaged

in commercial research and development, partic87 @rdon BUC~ W corporation ~rSOId CO-uniCdO~ 1992.

88 Bwc~ op. cit., footnote 13, p. 129.

69 peter M. ~pf, “Appen& A: The Chemis@y of Organophosphate Nerve Agen@, ” Benoit Morel and Kyle Olso~ eds., Shadows and

Substance: The Chem”cal Weapons Convention (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 297.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation 47

ularly given the fact that the Iraqis did not

normally care about environmental protection.9o

Thus, while plant emission controls would reduce

chemical signatures outside the plant, the presence of scrubbers and other air-cleaning systems

would provide a clue that toxic agents were being

produced.

Still, while special containment measures

may provide a telltale sign of CW agent

production, they are by no means a foolproof

signature. First, the pressurization of a facility

can be reversed by changing the direction of air

flow, perhaps in a deliberate attempt to deceive an

inspection team, although this capability must be

designed-in. Second, as the chemical industry has

adapted to increasingly stringent environmental

and occupational-safety laws, ordinary chemical

plants have increasingly adopted sophisticated

air-treatment systems and corrosion-resistant materials, blurring the distinction between CWcapable and commercial facilities. As a result,

equipment designed for commercial purposes

may provide adequate containment for CW-agent

production .91

Conversely, a lack of stringent safety measures is not a foolproof indicator that a country

is not producing CW agents, since a ruthless

government that does not care about the

welfare of workers might fail to take such basic

precautions. Although the German Government

argued that the chemical plant sold to Iraq by the

Karl Kolb firm was not suitable for CW production because it lacked adequate safety equipment,

the real reason for the lack of safety measures was

Saddam Hussein’s willingness to tolerate a high

incidence of injuries and deaths among the plant

staff. Iraqi officials later admitted to UN inspectors that there were about 100 accidents per year

involving chemical agents, 10 of them major.92

Finally, the advent of binary chemical weapons means that it is no longer necessary to

manufacture supertoxic agents to acquire a

CW capability. Instead, a production plant could

manufacture DF, the immediate precursor of the

G agents, which is no more toxic than many

commercial organophosphorus pesticides. Such a

plant would not require high levels of containment and hence could be more easily disguised.

WASTE TREATMENT AND DISPOSAL

Chemical weapon producers have been known

to dispose of their highly toxic wastes in an

environmentally reckless manner. After World

War II, the Soviet Union and other countries

dumped large quantities of nerve and mustard

agents at sea in metal barrels that have now

corroded, posing a serious threat to the marine

environment. The Soviets also dumped vast

quantities of toxic wastes from CW agent production directly into rivers. In the aftermath of the

Gulf War, Iraq destroyed large quantities of

chemical munitions it had failed to declare by

pouring the toxic agents into standing ponds or

holes dug in the ground, and by open-air burning.93

Nevertheless, countries with greater concern

about protecting the environment might equip a

CW agent production plant with more extensive

waste-treatment facilities than a typical commercial plant. Such facilities might include tanks for

the storage of toxic wastes and a treatment unit to

neutralize acid byproducts with alkaline chemicals and to detoxify and remove phosphorus

compounds. After treatment, the neutralized

wastes might be reduced by evaporation or

incineration, and then disposed of in ways that

might be observable. For example, waste lagoons

are quite conspicuous because of their size and

90 1‘Report on German ‘Ikcimology in ‘Diyala’ Gas Lab,” Stern, Feb. 7,1991, pp. 29-33; translated in FBIS-WEU-91-032-A, Feb. 15,1991,

p. 9.

91 Buck and Flowerree, op. Cit., footnote 14, p. 13.

92 Chemica[ Weapons Convention Bulletin, op. cit., fOOtnOte 50, p. 16.

93 Peter Grier, “UN Inspectors in Iraq Get Chemical Surprise, ” Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 1992, pp. 1,4.
48 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 2-4-Production Facility Observable

L————.—- J

-Onsite

-O ffsite

I

‘T-r-rT-- (

\

/ d u J

,

Onsite plant’s observables

-Equipment/rain runoff

-Spills

-Air emissions deposited on ground

SOURCE: System Planning Corp., Chsmiea/ 14@apons Convent/on (CWC) S~naturas Ana/ysis, Final Teehnieal

Report No. 1396, August 1991, p. 61.

because phosphates promote algal and bacterial

growth, which would be visible in overhead

photographs. (However, some legitimate chemical plants have lagoons situated near agricultural

land, where fertilizer runoff may cause similar

algal blooms during the summer months.) Another disposal method involves injection of toxic

wastes into deep underground wells. Since deep

wells are hard to dig and would have to be quite

large, they might be difficult to conceal.94 The

waste well at the U.S. Rocky Mountain Arsenal,

for example, was 12,000 feet below the surface.

CHEMICAL SIGNATURES

The goal in collecting and analyzing samples

during on-site inspections of chemical plants and

suspect facilities is to detect signatures of illicit

CW production; at the same time, it is important

to minimize the potential for false alarms and to

limit the disruptive effects of sampling on the

commercial chemical industry. Phosphorusmethyl (P-CH3

) bonds are characteristic of nerve

agents, are rare in most organophosphorus pesticides, and are extremely resistant to degradation

and hence persist for long periods in the environment. The phosphorus-fluorine bond found in

sarin and soman is also unusual, and its detection

in a commercial pesticide plant would warrant

further investigation.

Chemical signatures may be detected from a

variety of sources. (See figure 2-4.) Inspectors

given on-site access to chemical facilities under

the terms of the chemical Weapons Convention

will be allowed to take wipe samples from the

surfaces of process and pollution-control equipment, as well as liquid samples from the production process and the waste stream. Even if the

reactors and pipes are flushed clean prior to an

inspection, the production of CW agents would

leave behind traces of agents, precursors, and

byproducts that are absorbed into rubber seals and

gaskets, which are too costly to replace frequently. The concrete floor of a plant also

provides an absorbent matrix for leaked chemicals and is a potential reservoir of CW agent

residues. Analyzing such samples with sensitive

M st~wo~ ~te~tion~ Peiim Research Institute, op. cit., footnote 85, p. 293
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation | 49

analytical techniques such as combined gas

chromatography/mass spectrometry should therefore reveal the presence of telltale chemicals. (See

app. 2-A.) Nevertheless, such sampling and

analysis may be constrained by the amount of

access provided during an onsite inspection.

| Detecting Clandestine Production

Detection of clandestine CW agent production

in a nondeclared facility would require noncooperative data collection by human agents or by

covertly emplaced or remote sensors, which

might then be used to cue a challenge inspection.

While detection of a clandestine production

facility would be difficult, some possible signatures are discussed below.

EFFLUENT ANALYSIS

A number of approaches rely on the monitoring

of plant effluents to detect clandestine CW agent

production at a distance. One such approach is to

use computer atmospheric models to predict

where gaseous plant emissions are most likely to

be deposited on the ground, and to take soil

samples from such locations for analysis. Because the atmospheric models are imperfect,

however, the effluent sample may be too dilute to

be identified.

Near-site monitoring techniques, such as laser

spectroscopy, are also under development for

detecting telltale chemicals in the exhaust plumes

rising from chemical plant stacks without the

need to obtain access to a plant site. Such

technologies include both passive spectroscopic

systems that detect and analyze radiant emissions

at multiple wavelengths, and active systems that

transmit laser radiation at selected wavelengths

and then analyze the backscattered or emitted

radiation. (See app. 2-A.) At present, near-site

monitoring technology is not yet sufficiently

sensitive or reliable for verification purposes.

Part of the problem is that the quantity of

gaseous emissions from a chemical production

facility is very site-dependent and is a function

of the plant’s emission-control systems and the

quality of its maintenance.

A third approach to detecting clandestine CW

agent production is the analysis of liquid effluents. Since no chemical reaction is 100 percent

complete, there are always some residual materials left over that may not be emitted as a gas and

will emerge in the waste stream. All methods of

CW production produce significant quantities of

wastes, although the exact amounts depend on the

choice of production process, the extent of

recycling, and how rapidly the waste stream is

sent to a treatment facility. Flushing out the

production line with a decontaminating solvent or

water also creates a liquid effluent that must be

disposed of. Analyzing such chemical traces

may therefore provide a means of detecting

CW agent production without gaining access

to the interior of a site. Nevertheless, effluent

analysis has a number of limitations:

■

■

■

A proliferant may simply store production

wastes onsite or inject them into a deep well

rather than releasing them into the environment. A proliferant might also create a

phoney waste stream to mislead monitors,

who would not be able to detect the real fate

of the production wastes without access to

the interior of the plant.

Once the waste stream has passed through a

treatment facility, its characteristic chemical

components may be destroyed.

Since a handful of commercial products

(pesticides and fire retardants) break down to

methylphosphonate, the same final degradation product as nerve agents, merely identifying this compound in the waste stream

would not in itself provide conclusive evidence of a violation.

If the plant effluent were discharged into a

river, one would have to obtain water samples

close to the source before the chemical signatures were diluted to undetectable levels.

For a detailed discussion of effluent analysis,

see appendix 2-A.
50 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

BIOMARKERS IN PLANT WORKERS AND

WILDLIFE

Yet another approach to monitoring makes use

of the natural ecosystem around a chemical plant

as a long-term collection mechanism. In recent

years, occupational health specialists have identified a number of “biomarkers” associated with

exposure to toxic chemicals such as pesticides.

Living plants and organisms (including humans)

tend to concentrate various trace chemicals in

their tissues, so that measurable quantities can be

detected in the higher members of the food chain

living in the vicinity of a suspect facility. Entire

small organisms (e.g., insects), samples of animal

fur, urine, blood, or feces, or plant leaves, flowers,

fruit, or roots, could be analyzed to identify

chemical compounds not normally present in the

local environment.95 Such an approach might

provide more comprehensive coverage than point

detectors.

A related approach is to collect samples of

tie, blood, skin, or hair from chemical plant

workers and analyze them for telltale biomarkers

of covert CW production. One might look either

for metabolizes of sulfur mustard and nerve agents

in body fluids such as blood and urine, or for

‘‘adducts’ of mustard or nerve agents bound to

cellular DNA. (See app. 2-A.) In the United

States, however, such monitoring might be considered a violation of Fourth Amendment protections against intrusive personal searches if it were

conducted without a warrant, and other countries

might simply refuse to allow it.

| Storage of Agents and Munitions

Although CW munitions are indistinguishable

at a distance from conventional munitions, they

may be stored in bunkers that have distinctive

characteristics. In Iraq, CW storage bunkers were

located inside ammunition-storage depots but

were secured separately with fencing or barbed

wire, set off in remote locations, and spaced far

apart. Before the start of the Coalition bombing

campaign during Operation Desert Storm, however, the Iraqis moved many of their chemical

munitions out of the storage bunkers and buried

them in the desert to protect them from attack.

The Iraqis also constructed decoy bunkers intended to mislead enemy bombers. Thus, storage

bunkers may not be a reliable signature of

either the presence or the absence of a CW

capability.

Of course, the discovery of stockpiled chemical

munitions would provide a clear indication of a

CW capability. Artillery shells and rockets containing CW agents, high explosives, or smoke

rounds are identical in shape, however, and differ

only by an external color code that could be easily

painted over. Since chemical munitions are impossible to distinguish by visual inspection alone,

a proliferant country might attempt to violate the

Chemical Weapons Convention by painting chemical munitions to look like high-explosive shells

and storing them in the same depot.

In order to characterize the contents of

sealed munitions while avoiding the hazards of

direct sampling, several nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods are under development.

One such method, known as Portable Isotope

Neutron Spectroscopy (PINS), was developed by

the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. This

technique involves irradiating a shell with neutrons, which interact with the chemical contents

of the munition to produce g aroma rays that are

unique for each chemical element. Nerve agents

are rich in phosphorus and mustard agents in

chlorine, while high explosives contain large

quantities of nitrogen but no phosphorus, chlorine, or arsenic. As a result, the gamma emission

spectra for CW agents and high explosives are

easily distinguishable. Although the PINS technique has shown a 95 percent accuracy rate in

tests on known chemical shells, its reliability

under uncontrolled field conditions has not yet

93 sylv~ ‘IMmage and Barbam Waho~ ‘‘SXI@ Mammals as Environmental Monitors,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory Review, vol. 25,

No. 1 (1992), pp. 55-57.
—

Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation | 51

been demonstrated conclusively.96 Several other

NDE systems are also under development and

have differing strengths and weaknesses.97 For

example, acoustic resonance spectroscopy uses

sound waves to assay the contents of a shell. It has

the advantage of being able to complete an assay

in 10 seconds, but the disadvantage of requiring

the acoustic signatures of known reference shells

of the same type.

| Weaponization and Testing Signatures

Weaponization and testing of CW munitions

may also provide signatures, although these, too,

may be ambiguous.

VISUAL SIGNATURES

Test ranges for operational testing of chemical

munitions and dual-use delivery systems such as

artillery and missiles cannot be hidden underground or inside closed buildings, and hence may

show up in overhead images. Such a test range

generally consists of a support area containing

administration and logistics and an experimental

area containing a test grid and a large downwind

sampling zone with an array of sampling poles .98

Nevertheless, an illegal test facility might well be

camouflaged and the tests conducted at night or

when reconnaissance satellites are out of range.

Observing a test might require considerable luck.

Ground or aerial observations of military

exercises involving chemical weapons might

provide some clues to a country’s intentions, but

they are probably not a reliable signature. One

problem is that it is very difficult to understand

the purpose of a military exercise without knowing the scenario that the planners are ruining.

Exercises that involve the firing of munitions to

generate an aerosol might imply preparations for

Ultrasonic pulse echo apparatus to distinguish

chemical munitions from conventional rounds. No

echo is observed if the shell is empty; echoes will

return at characteristic times lf the shell contains a

solid, liquid, or powder.

offensive CW use, but they could also pertain to

the generation of smoke screens. Alternatively, a

proliferant might conduct misleading field exercises for purposes of deception. Defensive and

decontamination exercises might also be part of a

broader offensive strategy. And although field

testing is desirable, it is not an essential prerequisite for acquiring a CW capability.

DIFFICULTIES OF DETECTION

The various signatures associated with the

acquisition of a CW capability, along with

potential detection methods and countermeasures, are summarized in table 2-2. Overall, the

challenge of detecting and monitoring clandestine production of CW agents is a formidable

one. None of the production signatures is a

reliable indicator by itself, and even combinations of signatures may depend on making

96 personal mmmticatio~ A. J. Caffrey, senior scientist, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Aug. 23, 1993.

97 ~ addition t. p~s, ~~er N~rl.Des~ctive Evaluation (NDE) me~ods c~enfly ~der investigation include x-ray, aCOUStiC reSOIUUllX

spectroscopy, ultrasonic pulse echo, laser acoustic spectroscopy, and ion-tube neutron spectroscopy. For a review of current NDE research and

development, see the special issue of Verification Technologies devoted to this topic (LJ.S. Department of Energy, OffIce of Arms Control and

Nonproliferation, Verification Technologies, First/Second Quarters 1992).

98 Sanches et al., op. cit., footnote 66, pp. S3-$$.
52 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 2-2—Chemical Weapon Program Signatures and Concealment

Program stage Signature Detection methods Concealment methods comment

Design and Scientific and technical Literature survey and

engineering publications (presence analysis

or absence)

Acquisition of raw Patterns of feed material Monitoring of open-source

materials acquisition trade data; espionage

Clandestine produc- Security Measures

tion plant

Effluents

Converted or multipur- Security Measures

pose production plant

Effluents

Overhead imaging or human

intelligence (humint)

Sampling of air, water, or

soil near suspect plant--

various forms of chemical

analysis

Overhead imaging or

humint

Sampling of air, water, or

soil near suspect plantsvarious forms of chemical

analysis; laser remote sensing of emission plumes

1. Manage publication activities

2. Use widely available technical

information rather than design

new agents or techniques

1. Shuffle, divert acquisitions; mix

with legitimate uses

2. Develop clandestine networks

3. Produce known precursor chemicals indigenously

4. With chemical industry development, raw materials acquisitions

increasingly lose their utility as a

signature

Conceal measures, or place

plant within other secure facilities

1. Chemically alter effluents with

decontaminating solvents or 

them with additives

2. Hide wastes or remove for offsite disposal

Conceal measures

1. Chemically alter or mask

effluents

2. Remove wastes for offsite

disposal

observations in the right place and at the right

time. Major hurdles to detection include:

the possibility of intermittent production in

a small, pilot-scale facility;

the low volatility of most of the compounds

of interest (resulting in low atmospheric

concentrations even insignificant leaks occur);

masking and interference from legitimate

chemicals produced at a typical multiple-use

facility;

the political and economic costs of challenge

inspections, which will severely constrain

the number of facilities that can be inspected;

the difficulty of detecting production of

binary agents, which are made from dual-use

chemicals and widely available industrial

alcohols.

Despite the difficulties of detecting clandestine CW production, however, the cooperative

verification regime will be supplemented with

national intelligence-gathering efforts that may

provide indications of CW-related activities

somewhere along the acquisition spectrum

ranging from research through testing and the

development of military doctrine. (As an illustration of the contribution of national intelligence

efforts, Box 2-A recounts press reports describing

how the United States tracked the Libyan CW

production facility at Rabta.) These additional

sources of information should increase the chances

of detecting a clandestine CW program, and could
i .

Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation | 53

Program stage Signature Detection methods Concealment met hods comment

Special safety and containment measures

Rare chemical processes

(e.g., alkylation or cyanation)

Corrosion-resistant reactors

and other fittings

Tell-tale residues within plant

Biomarkers in plant

workers

Weapon assembly Uniquely configured arsenals (e.g., distribution of storage bunkers)

Weapon testing Uniquely configured test

facilities

Onsite inspection of suspect

plants

Onsite inspection of suspect

plants

Onsite inspection of suspect

plants; tracking of imports

of such parts

On-site chemical analysis of

absorbent parts (or removal for

off-site analysis)

Analysis of urine and blood

samples

Overhead imaging

Overhead imaging

1. Sacrifice worker safety

2. Modern chemical plants

increasingly have these features

Alternate weapons agent production with commercial production

requiring same processes

1. Replace corrodible equipment

as needed

2. Trend is toward use of such

parts in legitimate commercial

processes

1. Use decontaminating solvents

2. Practice quick replacement of

such parts as rubber flanges

and seals that might absorb

residues

Prevent collection of samples unIess specifically permitted by challenge inspection regime

Pattern facilities after conventional

arsenals

1. Make special features

temporary

2. Test on overcast days, at night,

or in absence of imaging devices

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

be used to trigger challenge inspections under the

treaty regime.

ALTERNATIVE PROLIFERATION

PATHWAYS

There are two basic approaches to acquiring an

indigenous CW production capability:

■ build a dedicated CW agent production plant

(open or clandestine);

■ convert existing chemical facilities (singlepurpose or multipurpose) to CW agent

production on a temporary or permanent

basis. 99

In the past, proliferant countries seeking a CW

production capability have purchased turnkey

plants from foreign suppliers. For example, both

Libya and Iraq purchased entire chemical plants

from German firms that were then converted to

CW agent production. Increasingly, however,

proliferants purchase parts and engineering knowhow from a variety of sources and integrate them

on their own. This new approach to acquisition

makes it more difficult to halt CW proliferation

through export controls.

Proliferant countries-particularly those that

sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention-

~ A Prolifermt might al.so purchase bulk or weaponized CW agents from a state that already possesses them. This appmch is ~ely to be

at most temporary, however, since the purchasing state would remain dangerously dependent on the supplier.
54 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

are most likely to produce CW agents in a

clandestine manner to avoid provoking international political and economic sanctions. Nevertheless, a country that has been threatened or

attacked by a more powerful neighbor may seek

to acquire a CW capability as quickly as possible.

This scenario would be compatible with the

manufacture of cheap, low-stability agents for

near-term military use and might involve acquiring the capacity for rapid but not necessarily

secret production in wartime. Such a‘ ‘breakout’

capability might either be built deliberately in

peacetime or improved in response to a military

crisis.

| Building a Dedicated Plant

The advantage of building a clandestine CW

plant on a new site is that it can be built in an

isolated location, far from commercial chemical

plants that might be subject to routine inspections

under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 100 The

number of plant personnel could be kept to a

minimum for security reasons, and specialized

construction and camouflage procedures could be

used. On the other hand, siting a dedicated CW

production facility in the midst of a large commercial industrial complex would have the advantage that the surrounding ‘‘noise” would drown

out any telltale CW-related signatures. Moreover,

the construction of a clandestine plant at an

isolated site, if detected, would tend to draw

attention to the facility.

Another strategy for a proliferant country

would be to acquire one or more pilot-scale

chemical plants and use them to accumulate, over

a period of years, enough CW agent to be a potent

strategic asset in certain regional conflicts.l0l

Because of their small size, pilot-scale facilities

would be easier to conceal. Nevertheless, stocks

of agent produced over a long period of time

would have to be of greater purity to ensure an

adequate shelf-life. This requirement would in

turn demand distillation and the use of stabilizers,

complicating the production process.

| Converting an Existing Plant

An alternative pathway to acquiring a CW

capability would be to convert all or part of a

declared commercial facility to CW agent production. Experts disagree over the speed with

which a commercial plant could be converted.

Former CIA director William Webster alleged

that the Libyan Pharm-150 plant at Rabta was

capable of CW agent production but that ‘‘within

fewer than 24 hours, it would be relatively easy

for the Libyans to make the site appear to be a

pharmaceutical facility .’’102 Reportedly, this potential for deception was one reason that the

United States turned down an offer by Libyan

leader Muhamar Khadafy to do a one-time onsite

inspection of the plant.103

Some analysts challenge the assumption that it

would be easy to convert a commercial chemical

plant to the production of CW agents by simply

changing valves or piping.

104 First, only a few

types of chemical plants are suitable for conversion to production of nerve agents. Fertilizer

plants use a different kind of phosphorus (phoslm Most comm~i~ chemical plants in the developing world are located in populated areas. Even if a commercial plant is initially built in

a remote locatiow the resulting employment opportunities and economic activity tend to attract large numbers of migrants to the immediate

vicinity.

101 Ro~fi C. GOU~ Smdia National Laboratory, ~rSOnd Communication 1992.

102 ~s~ony by w7ill~ H. Webster, D~ctor of Central ~tellig~~, h U.S. Semte, Committee on Governmental Al%@, G/obd $Vead

of Chenu”cal and Biologica/ Weapons, IOlst Congress, Ist Session, Feb. 9, 1989 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing CMt3ce, 1990),

p. 13.

los ~ohy, op. cit., foomote 7C! P. 10.

104 Much of he follotig ~ysisis based on research conducted by Alan R. Pittaway and the Midwest Research Institute in the late 1960s

and early 1970s. See Midwest Research Institute, The Dlficulty of Converting Pesticide Plants to CWNerve Agent Manufacture, Rchnical

Report No. 7 (Kausas City, MO: Midwest Research Institute, Feb. 20, 1970).
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation | 55

phate) chemistry, do not contain most of the

necessary equipment for the chemical synthesis

of nerve agents, and lack stringent safety and

containment measures. Pharmaceutical plants share

many precursors with CW agents, but the scale of

drug production is generally much smaller than

that of other specialty chemicals. Organophosphorus pesticide plants are most suitable for conversion to nerve-agent production, since the phosphorus chemistry is similar and much of the

process equipment is of the type and capacity

suitable for large-scale production of nerve agents.

In 1987, for example, the United States produced at least 5,000 pounds of each of 204

pesticides, of which 33 were organophosphorus

compounds. Of the 33, six were alkylated, making

them structurally similar to nerve agents and

hence of greatest concern. Those six alkylated

pesticides were produced at 24 plants owned by

17 companies.

105 In recent years, however, the

trend in pesticide development—at least by

countries not seeking to produce nerve agents—

has been to move away from alkylated compounds to those with reduced mammalian toxicity. As a result, ever fewer pesticide plants

today are equipped with processes that can be

readily converted to nerve-agent production,

although a proliferant could opt deliberately

for an old production method.

In addition to pesticides, a handful of commercial organophosphorus compounds are structurally related to nerve agents, including flame

retardants, plastics, and fuel additives. Volume of

production for the most significant of these

compounds, the fire retardant dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP), is on the order of 2,200

metric tons annually among four producers worldwide. l06 Thus, the manufacture of DMMP and

related compounds could still be used as a

cover for nerve-agent production.

The technical hurdles involved in converting a

commercial plant to CW agent production are

different depending on whether the commercial

facility is single-purpose or multipurpose. Both

pathways are discussed below.

SINGLE-PURPOSE PLANT

Single-purpose chemical plants are generally

custom-designed and optimized for production of

one product in vast quantities. As a result,

converting such a plant to some other form of

production can take months. The German pharmaceutical firm Bayer, for example, spent 2 years

rebuilding a single-purpose facility so that it

could produce two different but related chemicals. After this initial investment, the plant could

alternate between the two products with a changeover time of 3 to 4 weeks.107

The differences in the chemical synthesis of

commercial organophosphorus compounds and

nerve agents mean that some of the processes

and equipment are not easily convertible, but

others are. For example, pesticide plants do not

normally contain equipment for performing the

cyanation reaction needed for tabun; the alkylation reaction needed for sarin, soman, and VX; or

the fluorination reaction needed for sarin and

soman. Thus, the presence of any of these process

steps in a pesticide plant would warrant further

investigation. Pesticide plants normally have

distillation equipment that consists mainly of

stripping columns, which are not adequate for

distilling nerve agents like sarin or soman.108

(Distillation is only needed, however, if a long

105 me ~~ ~c~ticide~ ~i~ a p.~1 bond tit were produced ~ he past ~ he u~ted states were: 2-chloroethy]phosphonic acid, Fonophos,

Fosrnine ammonium, Glyphosate and its isopropyhirnine salt, and Trichlorfon. lbday, Fonophos is the only allqdated pesticide still produced

in signitlcant quantities. See Stanford Research Institute International, Directory of Chem”cul Producers USA (Menlo Padq CA: SRI

International, 1988).

ILM ~pf, op. cit., footnote 89, P. 280.

lm Buck op. cit., footnote 33, p. 151.

1m Ibid., p. 148.
56 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

shelf-life is required.) Moreover, pesticide plants

do not normally use hydrogen fluoride-a key

ingredient of sarin and soman-and generally use

phosphorus oxychloride (POCl3

) or phosphorus

pentasulfide (P2S5) as a starting material rather

than phosphorus trichloride (PCl3

). Since phosphorus pentasulfide is not suitable for use in

alkylation reactions, it cannot be utilized as a

starting material for nerve-agent production.l09

For these reasons, converting a pesticide

plant to nerve-gas production would mean

modifying the production process and stretching the operating conditions to obtain reasonable yields while still maintaining secrecy. According to one assessment, for example, ‘‘the

conversion of a parathion plant to the production

of G-agents would be extremely difficult, requiring substantial material changes and plant retooling. ‘’110 The modifications would involve rerouting pipes, valves, and mechanical seals to meet

minimal operating requirements. For example, a

proliferant might design a plant to produce an

organophosphorus pesticide that lacks a phosphoruscarbon bond and then change the feed materials

and process equipment to add a final alkylation

step-either in a clandestine section of the main

plant or at a separate location. It would also be

possible to design a plant that could make nerve

agents and then add on “bypass piping to permit

the commercial production of pesticides and

pharmaceuticals. Thus, in time of need, it would

be easy to convert the plant back to nerve-agent

production.

Conversion to nerve-agent production might

also require upgrading safety, containment, and

waste-disposal procedures, although as has been

stated earlier, such signatures can be ambiguous.

Converting a single-purpose pesticide plant to

nerve-agent production would require at least

several weeks and would involve the following

steps: design of the modified production line,

acquisition of the needed equipment, and

construction, checkout, and pilot operation.

The actual time requirements would depend on

the experience of the plant personnel, the priority

given the project, and willingness to cut corners

on worker safety and environmental protection.

Conversion time might be reduced by cannibalizing equipment from other plants or by employing used equipment, but the lack of integrated

safety systems would probably result in serious

accidents and deplete the skilled workforce needed

to run the plant. According to one analyst,

‘‘Unless the plant had been designed for convertibility in the first place, the first victims of the

conversion would be the production workers.’111

It would also be difficult or impossible to clean

out the pipes, pumps, and reactors well enough

after CW-agent production to deceive an onsite

inspection. For all of these reasons, it would

probably be simpler to build a dedicated CW

agent production facility than to convert an

existing single-purpose plant.112

MULTIPURPOSE PLANT

A multipurpose plant would be easier to

convert to production of nerve agents than a

single-purpose plant. Multipurpose plants are

common in the specialty chemical industry, and

they are also operated by subcontractors known as

“toilers” or custom producers who make small

batches of chemicals for larger companies that do

not want to invest in special equipment for this

purpose. For this reason, multipurpose plants are

designed for maximum flexibility. Process units,

heat exchangers, and storage facilities are connected by extra pipes that can be linked in various

configurations to manufacture several different

KM pit~way, op. cit., fOOtnOte ’20.

110 ~pf, Op, Cit,, foomote 89, P. 2~0

111 Rob~om CCChernicSJ weapons Proliferatiotq” op. cit., footnote 8, p. 26.

112 Alan R. Pittaway, “An Approach to the Problem of Impeding for Organophosphorus Chemical Munition Production, Transportation

and Storage” (Booz-Allen Applied Research, Inc., August 1%8), p. 14.
Chapter 2–Technical Aspects of Chemical Weapon Proliferation | 57

chemicals over the course of a year. 113 T h e

equipment is generally designed to handle highly

corrosive chemicals. Some process equipment

may be kept on pallets to minimize conversion

time, and quick-cleaning features and sophisticated electronic controls permit rapid rearrangement of components. Because of the complexity

of a multipurpose plant, its operation requires

highly skilled engineers and other experienced

personnel.

Today, modem multipurpose facilities capable

of short-term, small-batch production are not the

norm in developing countries, where the great

majority of companies produce large volumes of

a few commodity chemicals. As a result, there are

few multipurpose plants in the developing world

that could be reconfigured. Nevertheless, the

trend in the worldwide chemical industry is to

build more multipurpose plants as a means of

adjusting to rapid changes in production technology. Such a plant might therefore have the

equipment needed for nerve-agent manufacture

distributed among its various production processes.

If a multipurpose plant were designed for

rapid conversion from one chemical process to

another, it might be possible to switch over in

a few days with little chance of being detected.

Even so, a plant specifically designed for rapid

conversion from commercial to CW-agent production would be costly to build (on the order of

$150 million), and would require a high level of

technological know-how in plant design, engineering, and operation, and a skilled construction

workforce. Design and construction would take

about 4 years in most parts of the developing

world.

A dual-use plant designed for rapid conversion

would also require stringent cleaning measures

for the final steps in the production process to

prevent the contamination of commercial productsparticularly pharmaceuticals-with deadly CW

agents. Since seals on pumps and other materialhandling equipment absorb chemicals from the

production process, switching from production of

one chemical to another requires removing the

pumps and cleaning them off-line, a timeconsuming process. In a rapidly convertible plant,

however, the production line might be configured

with modular pumps that could be removed

quickly for cleaning and then replaced. Alternatively, two sets of pumps might be installed in

parallel so that different chemicals could be

produced on the same line without contaminating

each other.114 Nevertheless, a plant that has

been specifically designed to facilitate rapid

decontamination would probably be uneconomical for commercial production, and would

therefore arouse suspicions on those grounds.

| Binary Agent Production

Some analysts have argued that binary weapons might accelerate CW proliferation by making

chemical weapons inherently easier and safer to

manufacture, store, transport, and use.115 Indeed,

the relative lack of toxicity of the two precursors

means that production plants require less stringent containment measures. In the 1950s, for

example, the United States produced the binary

precursors DF and QL in plants open to the

outside air and with relatively few safety precautions. Illicit production of binaries is also more

difficult to detect because the two chemical

components have some legitimate commercial

113 ‘CCMA}S O1sonUmve~~~Mcies of Ver@inga (2knica.1 Arms Treaty,” Chemical and Engineering News, vol. 67, No. 17, Apr. 24,

1989, p. 8.

114 ~t~im with Kyle OISO~ EAI COW., 1992.

11S Br~ Ro~, ~~~fic~ ~p~~ents t. ~oliferation ~dB-~oductioq” Bi~q Weapon$; Implications of the U.S. Chen”cul

Stockpile Modernization for Chemical Weapons Proliferation, Report by the Congressional Research Service prepared for the Subcommittee

on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Apr. 24, 1984 (Washington

DC: Government Printing OffIce, 1984), p. 14.
58 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

uses. A binary sarin weapon, for example, would

consist of two ingredients, DF and isopropanol,

which react spontaneously to form the nerve

agent. Yet dichlor-the immediate precursor of

DF—has legitimate commercial uses in fire

retardants, insecticides, and plastics, and isopropanol (rubbing alcohol) is a common industrial chemical. Manufacture of these compounds

for legitimate uses could thus be used as a cover

for the illicit production of nerve agents. Finally,

binary weapons make it possible to use standard

logistics channels and less rigorous security

measures during production and transport, and

they have a relatively long shelf-life.

I Trade-Offs

For a country seeking to develop a CW

production capability, there are several major

tradeoffs in the choice of proliferation pathway:

SIMPLICITY V. VISIBILITY

A proliferant faces a tradeoff between the use

of a proven and relatively simple production

process for CW agents (e.g., conversion of

thiodiglycol to sulfur mustard) and the need to

conceal its activities by using less well known

precursors or procedures, thereby complicating

the production process. Thus, a proliferant must

balance the need for secrecy against the efficiency

and cost of production.

SPEED V. VISIBILITY

If an aspiring proliferant faces a long-term

adversary and seeks to acquire a strategic CW

stockpile, it may seek to minimize visibility by

investing the money and time needed to build a

dedicated clandestine plant. If the threat is more

immediate, however, it may choose to convert an

existing commercial facility to CW agent production.

SAFETY V. VISIBILITY

A proliferant may seek to minimize the visibility of a CW production facility by jury-rigging it

from used equipment or items purchased from

multiple suppliers. The lack of an integrated plant

design would result in more hazardous operation,

however, increasing the occupational risks to the

workforce and the contamination of the environment near the plant. A reckless government might

even deliberately accept a greater risk to its

workforce or population in order to acquire a CW

capability more quickly or covertly, particularly

if it were a party to the Chemical Weapons

Convention.

SIMPLICITY V. SHELF-LIFE

The sophistication of the production technology required to manufacture agents depends on

the urgency of a country’s military requirements.

If a country has no immediate need to use CW

agents and plans to stockpile them for several

years, the agents will require along shelf-life and

must therefore be produced with high purity. If a

country is producing nerve agents for immediate

use in battle, however, it can afford to make a less

pure product by eliminating the distillation step or

the use of stabilizing additives.

AUTONOMY V. EFFICIENCY

Using an immediate precursor of a CW agent is

obviously more efficient than using a starting

material that is several steps removed from the

final product. Thus, while back-integration of

precursor chemicals reduces a proliferant’s dependence on outside suppliers, it also results in

greater overall complexity and cost, requires

more workers to operate the plant, and results in

a larger production complex to conceal and to

decontaminate.
— —.

Appendix 2-A

T

he Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

permits the collection and analysis of samples

during onsite inspections. Although the details of the sampling process remain to be

determined by a Preparatory Commission that is

meeting in The Hague to negotiate the details of treaty

implementation, several analytical techniques may be

used to detect and monitor chemical signatures associated with the illicit production of CW agents. Such

methods could be employed either during onsite

inspections of declared chemical plants authorized by

the CWC or for near-site monitoring from the perimeter of a facility or from an overflying aircraft.

Clandestine CW production facilities would first have

to be identified by intelligence assets and then

subjected to a challenge inspection before chemical

sampling could take place.

The future international inspectorate to be established under the CWC will require the establishment of

accredited analytical laboratories that use certified

testing procedures for identifying CW agents, precursors, and degradation products. During onsite visits,

inspection teams will use specified instrumentation for

performing in situ chemical analyses. To facilitate the

Techniques for

the Detection

and Analysis of

Chemical Signatures

development of such agreed instrumentation and

procedures, the Government of Finland has sponsored

since 1973 the development of suitable analytical

techniques. In recent years, this program has included

a series of international ‘‘round-robin” experiments

involving the analysis by laboratories in 15 countries

of unknown samples spiked with nerve and mustard

agents, precursors, and degradation products.l The

participating countries have agreed that the presence of

controlled compounds will be confirmed with at least

two different instrumental methods of analysis, and

that the analytical laboratories will implement stringent quality-control measures.

The difficulty of detecting CW agent signatures

is site-dependent and is a function of the sophistication of a plant’s emission-control and decontamination systems and the quality of its maintenance.

According to one analysis, the verification challenge

ranges in difficulty from the relatively simple task of

detecting the production of treaty-controlled chemicals

in a large, single-purpose, stand-alone facility with a

rudimentary emission-control system to the much

harder problem of detecting telltale signatures at a

facility equipped with an advanced environmental

1 The participating countries in the Third Round-Robin ‘I&t were Australia, Canad~C- the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic,

Finland, France, Germany, Indi~ the Netherlands, Norway, the Russian Federation (two labs), SwedeG Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and

the United States (two labs). See Marjatta Rautio, cd., International Interlaboratory Compan”son (Round-Robin) Test for the Verification of

Chemical Disarmament. F.3. Testing of Procedures on Simulated Military Facility Samples (Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland,

1992).

I 59
60 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

control system and embedded in a large multipurpose

chemical complex.2

Since the analytical techniques described below can

reveal a considerable amount of information regarding

the operation of a chemical facility, verifying the CWC

must balance the intrusiveness needed to detect treaty

violations against the risk of compromising confidential business information unrelated to the treaty.3 In

order to minimize this risk chemical analyses for

CWC verification will not involve an exhaustive

characterization of samples but will focus instead on

the search for a specific set of known chemicals

associated with CW production. Screening for a set of

known target compounds poses less of a threat to

proprietary information than would a complete chemical analysis of the sample. If one or more suspect

chemicals were detected in the waste stream, however,

a more in-depth analysis might be warranted.

ONSITE INSPECTION TECHNIQUES

During the production of a CW agent, traces of

various chemicals are released in vapor form from the

plant’s smokestacks and ventilation systems and are

also absorbed by the seals and gaskets on pumps and

other fittings, the agitator in the reaction vessel, and

various rubber components and grease seals. Thus,

during onsite inspections; of a chemical facility,

inspectors might disassemble pumps and other pieces

of equipment close to the production vessel, or take

swipe samples from inside the machinery, which is not

likely to be flushed clean by conventional decontamination methods.4 In order to ensure that the samples do

not degrade before being analyzed, inspectors must use

proper sampling techniques (e.g., dry v. wet swipes).

They must also determine whether actions have been

taken to preclude access to) possible samples, such as

painting over a stain on the floor.

CW agents and precursors break down in the

environment through the action of ultraviolet radiation

(photolysis), water (hydrolysis), and air (oxidation),

resulting in a series of degradation byproducts. Environmental factors such as sunlight, weather, temperature, and soil type can influence the rate of degradation.

Dilution is another key factor affecting detectability:

chemicals in effluents discharged into a river, for

example, may be diluted to undetectable levels a few

hundred meters or so downstream from the outflow

pipe. 5

Determining g the presence or absence of known

chemicals is generally performed with some variant of

a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS), an

instrument that combines two analytical methods in

tandem. First, the gas chromatography vaporizes the

sample and passes it through a packed column or a

hollow glass capillary tube lined with a fine polymer

material. Various substances in the sample take

different amounts of time to emerge from the tube,

depending on their molecular weight and their attraction to the polymer lining. As they emerge from the

chromatography, constituents of the sample are then

introduced into a mass spectrometer, which breaks

them up into a compound-specific set of molecular

fragments and then measures their masses very precisely.

Sorting molecules first by their retention time in the

chromatography and then by the masses of their

constituent parts, GC/MS analysis can reliably identify

each of several compounds in a sample. Such identification is usually performed automatically by a patternrecognition algorithm, which tries to match the mass

spectrum of each component against a computer

database containing tens of thousands of reference

spectra of known chemical compounds and comes up

with one or more candidates with specified probabilities. For purposes of CWC verification, considerable

effort has gone into compiling ‘‘libraries” of GC/MS

spectra for CW agents, precursors, and degradation

products.

If the GC/MS instrument is calibrated correctly,

it can confirm very reliably whether a given

2 Jwes D. Bardem et al., Remote Sensing Technology and CW Am Control (Alexanti% VA: K~ Sciences Corp., Report No.

P650-1254G-1, Feb. 2, 1993), p. ‘7.

3 For ~ in-dep~ dis~ssionof this issue, see U.S. congress, OffIce of ‘Ikchnology Assessment The ChemicaZ Weapons Convention: ~flects

on the U.S. Chemical Zndustry, O’TA-BP-ISC-1O6 (Washington, DC: U.S. Governrn ent Printing OffIce, August 1993),

4

“CMA’s Olson Unravels Intricacies of Verify@ a Chemical Arms Treaty,” Chenu”calund Engineenng News, vol. 67, No. 17, Apr. 24,

1989, p. 9.

5 Albert Venveij et al., “Chemical Warfare Agents: VerMcation of Compounds Containing the Phosphorus-Methyl Linkage in Waste

Water,” Science, vol. 204, May 11, 1979, p. 617.
Appendix 2-A–Techniques for the Detection and Analysis of Chemical Signatures | 61

chemical is present in a sample at remarkably low

concentrations, even in complex mixtures. The

device can detect substances in the parts per trillion

range, although the more complicated the mixture is,

the harder it is to reach such high sensitivities. If the

sample is being tested for the presence of a known

chemical, the detection limit will be much lower than

for an unknown chemical. GC/MS is sensitive enough

to detect nerve-agent degradation products in waste

water even after extensive purification efforts. Empirical results also indicate that detectable traces of CW

agents may persist for long periods after production. In

one trial inspection, traces of a carbamate pesticide

were found 2 months after production ended by

analyzing wipe samples from equipment and waste

samples, as well as air samples from warehouses and

packaging lines.6

Nevertheless, the extremely low detection thresholds achieved in the laboratory may not be possible

in the field. GC/MS may not be able to identify trace

quantities of agent with a high probability in the

complex environment of a multipurpose chemical

plant, since other compounds unrelated to CW agent

production may interfere with the analysis. In such

cases, visual inspection of the plant could help pare

down the list of possible candidate compounds to those

it would be technically feasible to manufacture in that

facility.

During an onsite inspection, special samplepreparation methods may be necessary. For example,

a water-soluble chemical may have to be converted

into a derivative that is volatile enough to pass through

a gas chromatography. It may also be necessary to try to

extract the target compounds from a more complex

mixture or from an absorbent material such as concrete, although such custom extractions tend to be

difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. Some nerveagent precursors, for example, absorb tightly to

concrete and are only released by strong acid treatment.

In addition to GC/MS, a gas chromatography can be

combined with other types of detectors to perform

specific analytic tasks. For example, a flame photometric detector can identify the presence of sulfur or

phosphorus in a sample with high sensitivity, while an

electron-capture detector can identify fluorine and

phosphorus-containing compounds. GC/MS can be

complemented with other methods of chemical analysis. For example, high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) is useful for separating polar, nonvolatile compounds, Bioassays such as the acetylcholinesterase-inhibition test can detect nerve agents at

very low concentrations through their ability to

inactivate the enzyme acetylcholinesterase involved in

neuromuscular transmission. Antibody-based techniques, such as the enzyme-linked immunosorbent

assay (ELISA), rely on the ability of monoclinal

antibodies to detect trace quantities of target compounds with high sensitivity, although their specificity

may be relatively poor. Monoclinal antibodies have

been produced for most of the major CW agents.7

Finally, research and development is under way on

biosensors, in which binding of the target compound

to specific antibodies or cellular receptor molecules

triggers an optical, physical, or electrochemical change

that can be converted into an electrical signal.

In the hypothetical case of a whole new class of CW

agents whose spectra are not already stored in a

computer database, one would have to use an analytical method that provides detailed structural information from which the identity of the molecule can be

deduced. GC/MS can provide useful information about

unknown compounds, such as their molecular weight

and elemental composition. In addition, nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy is often used in

conjunction with other techniques such as infrared and

Raman spectroscopy to derive a molecular structure

for unknowns. Nevertheless, structure determination

with NMR requires a fairly pure sample in the

milligram range, many orders of magnitude greater

than the minimum concentration at which a known

compound can be detected with GC/MS.8

c Gordon M. Burck+ “Chemical Weapons Production Technology and the Conversion of Civil pmductiom” Arms Control, vol. 11, No. 2,

September 1990, p. 141.

7 C. N. Lieske et rd., “Development of an Antibody that Binds Sulfur Mustard,” Proceedings of the 1991 Me&”cal Defense Bioscience

Review (Fort Detrick MD: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Aug. 7-8, 1991), pp. 131-134.

8 Manuel Sanches et al., Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Signatures Analysis (ArlingtoxL VA: System Planning Corp., Final

Twhnical Report No. 1396, August 1991), p. 23.
62 Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

 Chemical Signatures

Sulfur mustard breaks down in the environment into

thiodiglycol and two impurities, thioxane and dithiane,

which can be identified as signatures of mustard

production. 9 Most nerve agents (e.g., sarin, soman, and

VX, but not tabun) contain a phosphorus-methyl

(P-CH3) bond that is difficult to break it remains intact

after chemical treatment and can only be destroyed by

aggressive treatments such as high-temperature incineration.l0 These nerve agents break down in the waste

stream into methylphosphonate (which contains the

phosphorus-methyl bond), whereas most organophosphorus pesticides are degraded to phosphoric acid. (See

figure 2A-l.)

The durability of the phosphorus-methyl bond

also means that it can be identified for long periods

after being discharged into the environment. For

this reason, the phosphorus-methyl linkage is thus

a good signature of illicit nerve-agent production.

For example, soil samples taken in late 1992 from

bomb craters near a Kurdish village in northern Iraq by

a team of forensic scientists and later analyzed with

GC/MS were found to contain degradation products of

sarin and mustard gas more than 4 years after the

village was bombed by the Iraqi army in 1988. This

finding suggests that traces of CW agents or their

degradation products can be detected after persisting in

the environment for long periods, provided that the

samples are taken from a point of high initial

contamination such as the center of a bomb crater.ll

Chemical signatures associated with the production

of CW agents could also be obtained from sampling

the waste effluent stream of a production plant,

although the samples would have to be collected

before significant dilution occurred. At the same time,

little additional data would probably be derived from

visiting the plant’s control room (where the relevant

information could be hidden), sampling from the

production line (which might interfere with production), or examining the plant’s books (which could be

forged) .12 In order to ensure that the waste stream was

actually connected to the production line, however, the

inspectors would have to be given unlimited access to

the plant’s waste-processing system.

I Problem of False Positives

Since GC/MS analysis is so sensitive, it is unlikely

to yield “false negatives,” that is, to conclude

mistakenly that a sample contains no evidence of illicit

production. However, the problem of ‘false positives”—

unfounded suspicions of noncompliance-is more

troublesome, particularly with respect to early precursors and final degradation products. In the case of

nerve agents, false-positives can arise if the plant is

manufacturing or using a legitimate compound

that contains a phosphorus-methyl bond and thus

breaks down into the same degradation product as

a nerve agent. Fortunately, only a handfull of commercial products contain a phosphorus-methyl bond,

including the pesticide Mecarphon and the organophosphorus flame retardant dimethyl methylphosphonate

(DMMP), which is also used as a plasticizer for vinyl

plastic and an intermediate in the production of

herbicides.

Worldwide production of DW is spread among

14 companies, 11 in the United States and 3 in Western

Europe. 13 According to one assessment, “A challenged facility may claim it is producing a chemical

closely related to a scheduled agent [CW agent or

precursor] which would result in emissions overlapping those of the scheduled agent. As a result, some

identified chemicals may not be sufficiently unique for

g Sanches et al., Analysis of Signatures Associated with Noncompliance Scenarios, Report No. DNA-TR-92-74 (Arlingto~ VA: Systems

Planning Corp., January 1993), p. 59.

10s= U.S. Congess, of fIce of WholoH Assessmen~ Disposal of Chenu”cal Weapons: Alternative Technol@v--Bm&Ound paPer~

OTA-BP-O-95 (Washington, DC: U.S. Governm ent Printing Hlce, June 1992).

11 Human Rights Watch “Scientific First: Soil Samples Thken From Bomb Craters in Northern Iraq Reveal Nerve Gas-Even Four Years

Later, ” press release, Apr. 29, 1993; Lois Ember, “Chemical Weapons Residues Verify Iraqi Use on Kurds,” Chemical& Engineering News,

vol. 71, No. 18, Mlly 3, 1993, pp. 8-9.

12 Stephen Black, Benoit Morel, and Peter M. ~Pf, “E laminating the Shadows: On-site Inspections and the Chemical Weapons

Convention” Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson, eds., Shadows and Substance: The Chem”cal Weapons Convention (Boulder, CO: Westview,

1993), p. 193

13 U.S. @artrnent of Commerce, Bureau of EXPOrt~“ “ tratiom OffIce of Foreign Availability, Foreign Availability Review: 50 CW

Precursor Chemicals (//) (Washington DC: Department of Commerce, Nov. 8, 1991), p. 23.
Appendix 2-A—Techniques for the Detection and Analysis of Chemical Signatures | 63

this particular plant. The same situation applies to

illicit facilities embedded within larger related

plants. ’’14

Because methylphosphonate is resistant to further

degradation, it tends to accumulate in the environment,

Background levels have therefore been increasing

gradually in the rivers, lakes, and streams of industrialized countries. For example, Albert Verweij and

colleagues in the Netherlands detected significant

levels of the compound in the waters of the Rhine and

Meuse Rivers because of the upstream manufacture of

DMMP.15 Such environmental background levels may

either generate false-positives (unless they had been

previously measured) or, conversely, mask the actual

effluents from nerve-agent production. For this reason,

the detection of trace levels of methylphosphonate in

the air, soil, or water near a chemical plant might not

provide unequivocal evidence of nerve-agent production.

To solve the problem of false positives, it would

be essential to screen liquid and gaseous chemicalplant emissions for a specific set of target compounds. In addition to the CW agents themselves and

their degradation products, this list would include

agent precursors and intermediate byproducts generated at various steps in the manufacturing process, and

their respective degradation products. The major

weaponized CW agents each have up to six different

synthetic routes, requiring different sets of equipment

and precursor chemicals. Thus, a suite of target

compounds could provide evidence for each of these

alternate production pathways. Identifying such suites

of chemical compounds in the waste stream would

reduce the likelihood of false-negatives and falsepositives.

Detecting traces of nerve agents themselves clearly

provides the best evidence of illicit production. If the

actual agents cannot be found, the next best evidence

is provided by primary degradation products and, if

possible, both parts of the original agent molecule

(e.g., the acid and amine components of VX). The

detection of a secondary degradation product such

as methylphosphonate would not in itself constitute

Figure 2-A-l-Chemical Warfare Agents and

Degradation Products

/

CH2CH2OH

CHCI-ICI ‘

s <CHcHo H

/

2 2

22

s’

\

Thiodiglycol

\

CH2CH2CI

A

/

CH2CH2

\

s s

Sulfur mustard

\

(dichlorodiethylsulfide) \ CH2CH, /

\

1, 4-Dithiane

J4

/

CH2CH2

\

s o

\ CH2CH2

/

1, 4-Dithioxane

CH3

/

CH3

/

O—CH O—CH

/- ‘\ HP / \cH

H3C–P —F C H3 —> H3C–P–O H

8

II

3

0

Sarin (GB) lsopropylmethylphosphonic

acid

I H2O

v’ OH

/

H 3C–P–OH

1!

Methylphosphonic acid

(Methylphosphonate)

SOURCE: Chemical and Engineering News, vol. 71, No. 18, May 3,

1993, f). 8.

14 s~ches et al., op. cit., footnote 9, p. 65.

IS VeWeij et a]., op. cit., footnote 5, P. 617.
64 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

strong evidence of illicit production because it could

also result from certain legitimate chemicals.16

Nevertheless, if methylphosphonate is detected in the

waste stream and plant officials seek to explain it away

by claiming pesticide or DMMP production, the

inspectors could ask for supporting evidence in the

form of samples and written records.

| Circumvention Scenarios

In addition to the problem of false-positives, there is

the possibility of deliberate deception on the part of a

determined proliferant. For example, a country engaged in clandestine CW-agent production might

take special measures to mask or otherwise conceal

the presence of telltale chemical signatures in the

waste stream.17 Indeed, a problem associated with

sensors designed to detect trace quantities of chemicals

is that they can easily be swamped by related signals.

Examples of some possible deception strategies include:

Pumping chemical wastes from the plant into

underground storage tanks or wells, or into tanker

trucks for disposal off-site.

Setting up a phoney waste stream for sampling

that is unconnected to the actual production line.

Continually recycling the waste stream to reduce

the quantities of byproducts released.

Using a decontaminating solution that reacts with

traces of illicit chemicals to form a product that

may not be in the standard library of a GC/MS.

This strategy has been termed “designer deconlamination.”18 For example, the methyl phosphonate in the waste stream could be reacted with

thionyl chloride and an alcohol to obtain a diester,

which would not look anything like the original

compound in a GC/MS analysis. Nevertheless,

the use of an unusual decontaminating solution

would be suspicious if’ nothing about the facility

justified its presence; in addition, the sample

could be hydrolyzed during the analysis to

regenerate the methylphosphonate.

Diluting the release of a telltale byproduct such as

methylphosphonate in the waste stream so that it

can no longer be detected. In practice, the

effectiveness of this strategy would depend on the

detection limits of the analytical instrument,

which for GC/MS can reach parts per trillion.

Thus, achieving the necessarily dilution to evade

detection would require impractically large volumes of decontamination fluid.

Flushing the production line with a decontaminating solution followed by a legitimate but

closely related commercial product to mask any

residues of agent. This scheme would only be

possible if the plant were simultaneously producing a commercial compound containing a phosphorus-methyl bond, such as an alkylated pesticide (e.g., methyl-parathion) or DMMP. A sophisticated cheater, however, would almost certainly couple the two operations.

Passing production wastes through an ionexchange resin to remove methylphosphonate;

such resins are expensive but reusable.

Developing a novel agent that is not in the

GC/MS database. Russian scientists, for example, have reportedly developed a new type of

binary nerve agent.19 Such a scenario is unlikely

in most developing countries, however, since the

development of an entirely new class of CW

agents would require a costly investment in

research, development, and testing. Modifications of existing CW agents might be detected by

programming the instrument’s computer to recognize a family of related agents.

Some of these circumvention strategies might reduce the probability of detection. If, however, they

were performed after notification of a challenge

inspection, they might be carried out hastily and

carelessly, resulting in spills or other accidents that

would leave behind telltale traces of agent. The use of

unusual decontamination strategies might also raise

suspicions of a violation. Thus, such waste effluent

lb ~a~~utio, ed,, Internafi’onal Inter-L.aboratory Compan”son (Round-Robi”n) Testfor the Verification of ChemicalDisarmame nt. F.l.

Testing of Existing Procedures @Iclsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finlan& 1990), p. 93.

N S= Kathleen C. Bailey, “Problems With a Chemical Weapons BUS’ Orbis, vol. 36, No. 2, spring 1992, pp. 239-251.

18 Ibid., p. 241.

19 ‘*-y~ov,F~orov ~~/Russ~~~oductioU’ ‘Novoye Vremya, No. 44, October 1992, pp.4-9(~kcdti FBIs-sov-92-213,

Nov. 3, 1992, pp. 2-7),
Appendix 2-A–Techniques for the Detection and Analysis of Chemical Signatures 165

sampling techniques would be most effective when

used in conjunction with other forms of onsite

inspection.

Searching for a suite of compounds (agents, precursors, and degradation products) on a target list would

also help defeat circumvention efforts, since the

pattern of chemical signatures emitted by a plant could

not be masked as easily as a single chemical. Indeed,

the likelihood of masking all of the target compounds

associated with a given production process would be

very low. Conversely, whereas a secondary degradation product like methylphosphonate may give rise

to false-positives, the probability of an error declines rapidly when the suspect chemical is found in

conjunction with a suite of other target compounds

in the same manufacturing process.

In sum, it remains an open question whether a

carefully planned and executed deception aimed at

illicit production of CW agents would be detected.

Nevertheless, cheaters would probably not be sure they

could get away with the deception, and hence might be

deterred from trying. While one might theoretically

conceive of a plant design that could circumvent

detection, such a facility would probably differ

significantly from existing commercial plants and

might therefore arouse suspicion on those grounds.

According to one analysis:

In a multipurpose plant. . . industry would

invest significantly so that the interior of the

actual production line could be easily cleaned in

order to enable quick product change; this would

not be the case for waste water channels, reactor

ventilation systems, off-specification lines and so

on, which would be connected either to purification stations or to equipment used to recycle

certain chemicals. It is there inspections would

look for traces of illicit production; if they were

designed in such a way that they could easily and

thoroughly be decontaminated, this would be an

economically unfeasible and suspect effort by

civil industry .20

NEAR-SITE AND REMOTE MONITORING

TECHNIQUES

Near-site and remote monitoring of chemical signatures will probably be carried out openly within the

negotiated terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention and covertly as an intelligence operation. Covert

sensors, by definition, could not be openly discussed

they would have to be made sufficiently reliable and

rugged to permit long periods of unattended operation

in a potentially hostile environment and cleverly

disguised to prevent detection and tampering.21

Near-site monitoring can be either real-time, meaning that the concentration of a particular substance is

monitored continuously, or integrative, meaning that

only the average or the cumulative amount over a

period of time is recorded. Integrative monitoring can

be further subdivided into active and passive methodologies. Active-integrative systems pump air or water

through a filter over a period of days or weeks to

concentrate trace molecules for later analysis. In

contrast, passive-integrative systems simply absorb

and retain trace chemicals from the environment over

a period of time, much like a sponge.

I Air-Sampling Systems

Active air-sampling could be conducted either with

a system on the ground in the vicinity of a chemical

plant, or based on an overflying aircraft.22 There are

two types of gaseous emissions from a CW production plant: controlled smokestack emissions and

“fugitive” emissions. Stack emissions are planned

releases from the production process that have been

filtered by the plant’s pollution-control system. Fugitive emissions are uncontrolled releases that have not

passed through the pollution-control system, such as

slow leaks from storage tanks, gaskets, and reactor

pressure-release valves, or an accidental productionm J. pm Robinson and RaLf Trapp, “Production and Chemistry Of MusWd GM,” S. J. Lund@ cd., Verification o~lluai-use Chem”cak

under the Chem”cal Weapons Convention: The Case of Thiodiglycol, SIPRI Chemical& Biological Warfare Studies No. 13 (Oxford, England:

Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 15.

21 Franklin E. Walker, Technical Means of Vetifiing Chemical Weapons Arms-Control Agreements (WashingtorL DC: Foreign Policy

Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced Lutemational Studies, May 1987), p. 15.

~ m~for FO@n ~fis Of F-d, Air ~Onitoring us a Meun,s for Veriflcafion of ch~ical Disarmmnt, VOIS. I-III (Heklki:

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1985-1987).
66 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

line rupture. Since the chemicals involved in CW

production are not particularly volatile, fugitive emissions would tend to stay closer to the ground, and

might be detected through real-time sampling at

locations near the production equipment. Moreover,

fugitive emissions (e.g., from storage tanks or the

waste-treatment system) may persist even after a plant

has been temporarily shut down.

Air sampling involves collecting samples of air

downwind from a chemical facility and analyzing them

for CW agents, precursors, or byproducts; it can be

either real-time or integrative. In one approach,

atmospheric contaminants could be pumped through a

tube packed with an absorbing substance (e.g., resin

beads), concentrated for a period of time, and later

driven off by flash heating in an inert-gas atmosphere

and identified with GC/MS or high-performance liquid

chromatography. Air-borne chemicals may also adhere

to dust particles or and maybe transported in droplets

of water vapor, raindrops,, or snowflakes.23 In an

experiment conducted in Finland, 4 kilograms of a

nerve-agent simulant containing phosphorus were

released into the atmosphere and subsequently identified in air samples collected 200 kilometers from the

release site.24 The U.S. Army is also developing

atmospheric monitoring systems to protect the public

from accidental leaks during the destruction of CW

agent stockpiles.

In the treaty-verification context, detection sensitivities for air sampling are demanding for the

following reasons:

■ Given the lethality of CW agents, production

plants usually incorporate high-containment features that minimize emissions. The more modern

the plant design, the lower the level of fugitive

emissions and the more difficult detection becomes. Developing countries tend to impose less

stringent safety practices, but the extent of

fugitive emissions varies greatly from plant to

plant. The trace amounts released into the atmosphere might not be concentrated enough to create

an identifiable signal.

The majority of materials involved in CW agent

production that yield detectable signatures are not

very volatile even if a leak occurs, compounding

the sensitivity problem.

When air samples are taken over longer ranges,

weather patterns can complicate efforts to identify the source of detected emissions, since wind

may shift the direction of the emission plume.

Remote air sampling cannot pinpoint the source

of a clandestine facility for challenge inspection

unless the sampling is conducted for extensive

periods or happens to coincide with the release of

detectable emissions, and unless an atmospheric-transport model can trace the contaminants back to the facility of origin.

Deliberate countermeasures might foil airsampling efforts. A clever plant operator might

be able to mask such releases, particularly if he

had prior knowledge of the monitoring technologies. Alternatively, a cheater who was aware he

was being monitored might control emissions or

discontinue production while samples were being

collected, or refuse permission for aerial overflights. Although fugitive emissions (e.g., from

storage tanks) might continue in the absence of

production, they might not be concentrated

enough to be detectable.

Because of these factors, even in those instances

where detection has been accomplished by air

sampling, the detection was made through extensive sampling grids during rather massive releases.

This source is easy to extinguish simply by stopping

production. 25

| Optical Detection Systems

Another approach to the real-time detection and

analysis of chemicals released deliberately or accidentally from a CW production facility is to use a remote

spectroscopic system based on light scattering, absorption, or induced fluorescence. A combination of two or

more of these techniques may be needed to produce

n ~ySfitin ~d ~c~el ~e~~ Smengthening the Chemical Weapons Convention Through Aen”alInspections, Occasioml Paper No.

4 (Washingto~ DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 1991), p. 13.

w WQ for ForelP ~~of Fti~~ The Finnish Research Project on the Verification of Chemical Disarmament (Heh~: -V

for Foreign Affairs, 1989), p, 13.

2S RaPond R. Mc~e, Tr~ty Vefilcation pro~, Lawrence Liverrnore National bbOratOIy, W~Olltd cO-ticatiO% 1~.
Appendix 2-A—Techniques for the Detection and Analysis of Chemical Signatures I 67

reliable results.26 Remote spectroscopy can either be

“passive,’ which analyzes electromagnetic radiation

emitted by the sample or by background sources, or

‘‘active, ’ which irradiates the sample with a laser

beam. For example, fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) has been used to detect telltale

chemical signatures in stack plumes or fugitive emissions at ground level or at higher altitudes. Broadband

infrared has the potential to identify a wide variety of

compounds simultaneously.

A closely related active laser sensing technique is

known as lidar, for “light detection and ranging, ”

Whereas spectroscopes are generally broad-band

techniques, lidar is laser-based and thus consists of a

single or a few distinct wavelengths. (As lasers become

tunable, however, this distinction may disappear). An

advantage of laser-based systems is that the power is

focused at a single wavelength rather than being spread

among many, Differential absorption lidar (DIAL)

uses two different wavelengths, one of which is

absorbed by the target molecule and one that is not.

The difference between the absorbed and unabsorbed

signals is used to determine the target molecule’s

concentration. Another lidar technique, known as

Raman spectroscopy, involves exciting a chemical

with a monochromatic laser and measuring shifts in

frequency that provide structural information. Water is

not a strong Raman absorber and thus causes little

interference.

Remote sensing of chemical-plant emissions maybe

performed on stack plumes or fugitive emissions at

ground level or at higher altitudes. In principle, the

illuminating laser can be located on the ground or

mounted on an aircraft, a remotely piloted vehicle, or

even a satellite. To characterize the chemical emissions

from a smokestack, the laser would be pointed either

directly at the gaseous exhaust emitted from the stack

or downwind along the effluent plume, and the

returned light picked up by a detector. Fluorescence or

absorption of light by the chemical compounds in the

exhaust give rise to characteristic spectral bands.

“Closed-end” optical detection systems employ a

mirror or separate detector to analyze the illuminating

laser beam after it passes through the chemical plume.

They are more sensitive than “open-ended” systems,

which collect only light scattered back to a detector

near the laser source. The FTIR detector, under

development for the Environmental Protection

Agency, is an example of a closed-end system. It

emits a beam of infrared light across the plume, and a

large mirror then reflects the beam back to the

emitter/detector system, doubling the path length and

thereby increasing the sensitivity. After being processed the resulting data yield the characteristic infrared absorption spectra for the chemical species of

interest.27

The success of optical remote-sensing techniques

depends on a number of variables, however, including:

■

■

■

the concentration of the target compound(s) in the

plant emissions, which may be a function of

emission controls;

the chemicals present in the background and their

concentrations;

the detection limits of the remote-sensing equipment.

Current-generation systems are not sufficiently

sensitive to detect trace quantities of agent. For

example, lidar technologies are capable of detecting

CW agent in air at concentrations of 1 to 10 milligrams

per cubic meter. In other words, they are several orders

of magnitude less sensitive than existing analytical

instruments used for onsite sampling, which have a

detection limit of 1 to 10 micrograms per cubic

meter. 28 Experience has shown that the probability of

remotely detecting activities occurring within a manufacturing facility is nearly zero if samples are collected

more than a few meters from the building. Waste

effluent streams are an exception to this rule, but even

here samples must be collected before significant

~ Kenne~ E. Apg LOS Alarnos National hboratory, “Near-Site Monitoring for Compliance Assessment of the Chemical Weapons

Convention” IACP-90-289, June 15, 1990.

27 Ro~fl ~ntz et ~$, Chemical weapons (CW) TreaV Venflcafion Technology Research and Development: program Interim su??v)Mry

(Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: Chemical Research Development & Engineering Center, Report No. CRDEC-CR-124, September 1991),

p. 24.

28 Mmuel L, s~~hes, et ~.,A*/y~i~ of sig~ture$A~~ociared With Noncompliance sce~rios, Rq)ort No. DNA-~-92-T4 (Arlington, VA:

System Pkmning Corp., January 1993), p. 96.
68 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

dilution occurs.29 Moreover, chemical plants in developing countries do not now employ sophisticated

environmental protection devices, but as such equipment becomes more widely available, plant emissions

could be reduced significantly.

Potential countermeasures also exist to remotesensing technologies. For example, a determined

cheater might reduce emissions below the detection

threshold, or release masking compounds that absorb

infrared radiation at the same frequencies as do the

target chemical species.

| Sorbent Materials

One approach to passive-integrative monitoring

involves the use of absorbent materials called “sorbents, ’ which have a very large internal surface area.

Airborne chemicals simply diffuse into the material

and are irreversibly bound to it, although they can later

be extracted for chemical analysis. Examples of

sorbent materials include diatoms (porous, silicabased structures that are the microscopic skeletons of

plankton), zeolites (long-chain polymers of silicon,

oxygen, and aluminum), and silica gels that have been

chemically modified to absorb organic chemicals but

not water.

Conceivably, artificial rocks or gravel made of a

sorbent material could be dispersed in the vicinity of

a suspect facility. These sorbents would accumulate

volatile chemicals from the air over an extended period

of time, providing concentrated samples for laboratory

analysis.30 The drawbacks of passive-integrative systems are the lack of temporal information about the

timing of effluent releases, plus the fact that chemical

agents may degrade in the natural environment or

within the absorbent material.

BIOMARKERS FOR CW AGENTS

Wartime or occupational exposure to CW agents can

leave behind long-lasting traces in humans or other

living organisms. These biochemical signatures, known

as “biomarkers,” might conceivably be monitored as

a means of detecting illicit CW production or use.

During the Iran-Iraq War, for example, chemical

analysis of urine samples from Iranian soldiers attacked with sulfur mustard revealed elevated levels of

the metabolize thiodiglycol in most of the victims. In

some cases, however, the technique could not distinguish between control urines and samples of allegedly

exposed soldiers. To solve this problem, scientists at

the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical

Defense developed a more sensitive assay that involved chemically derivatizing thiodiglycol before

conducting the analysis. 31 Using this method, levels Of

urinary thiodiglycol in individuals moderately exposed to mustard gas were found to be greater than 10

nanograms per milliliter (10 parts per billion) for at

least a week32 Similar techniques have been developed for detecting the major metabolizes of nerve

agents (methylphosphonate esters) in biological fluids

by converting them into derivatives suitable for

gas-chromatographic analysis.33 The advantage of

urinary metabolizes is that measuring them is much

less invasive than taking blood samples; the drawback

is that most organophosphorus compounds are cleared

from the body within 48 hours of exposure.

Another biomarker technique involves measuring

the activity of the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, which

is specifically inhibited by nerve agents. While this

enzyme is located primarily in nervous tissue, it is also

present in the blood-both plasma and red blood

m Rapond R. IVMhim, Op. Cit., footnote 25.

~ W, l%rl, Los Alamos Natiomd Laboratory, “Speciabd Sorbents,” presentation at the Chemical Weapons Convention Verifkation

‘Rchnology Research and Development Conference, Herndoq VA, Mar. 3, 1993.

31 E. M. Jakubowski et al., ‘QwuXMcation of ThiOdiglycol in Urine by Electron Ionization Gas Clmxnatography-Mass Spectmmetry,”

Journal of Chromatography, Biomedical Applications, vol. 528, 1990, pp. 184-190.

32 E. M. Jakubowski et al., “Case Studies of Accidental Human Mustard Gas Exposure: Verifkation and Quantification By Monitoring

ThiOdyglycol Levels, ” Proceedings of the 1991 Med”caIDefenseBioscience Review (Fort DetriclG MD: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute

of Chemical Defense, Aug. 7-8, 1991), pp. 75-80.

33 M. L. Shih et al., “Detection of Metabolizes of l’bxic A@hnethylphosphona&S in Biological Samples, ” Biological Mass spectrome~,

VO1. 20, 1991, pp. 717-723.
Appendix 2-A–Techniques for the Detection and Analysis of Chemical Signatures | 69

cells—although its function there is unknown. It is

possible to measure the activity of blood acetylcholinesterase compared with known normal values (preferably with earlier values from the same person or a set

of normal values from several individuals); the effects

of nerve-agent exposure on the activity of the enzyme

are detectable for up to 3 weeks .34 Measurements can

be made on small blood samples drawn from the

fingertip. This technique has been used for routine

health control of workers involved in production or

spraying of organophosphorus pesticides, and it might

also reveal the clandestine production of nerve agents

at a suspect production or storage facility. Nevertheless, the assay would not be able to distinguish

between the illicit production of nerve agents and the

legitimate production of organophosphorus pesticides

or fire retardants in the same plant. It would also be

essential to know the background (pre-exposure)

levels of acetylcholinesterase activity.

Yet another means of detecting exposure to CW

agents involves the detection of “adducts” resulting from the binding of toxic chemicals directly to

molecules of DNA or protein in the body. Sulfur

mustard, for example, forms covalent bonds with

nucleotide bases along the DNA strand that may

persist for several days or weeks. The major DNA

adduct produced by sulfur mustard is an alkyl group

bound to the nucleotide guanine, which accounts for

over 60 percent of the DNA damage caused by sulfur

mustard. 35 The DNA molecules can be extracted from

skin cells or peripheral white blood cells and analyzed.

A group of Dutch scientists has also developed

monoclinal antibodies to alkylated guanine, making it

possible to use an immunoassay (ELISA) technique to

detect adducts in DNA extracted from white blood

cells. This method is sensitive enough to detect one

DNA adduct among 108 unmodified nucleotides-a

level of damage resulting from exposure to a small

dose of sulfur mustard.36

Analysis of DNA adducts can reveal an individual’s

prior exposure to toxic chemicals, and has already been

used to monitor occupational exposure to pesticides

through both the air and the skin. This technique might

also be used to detect clandestine production of CW

agents by plant workers at suspect facilities, although

there may be constitutional barriers to mandatory

blood testing in some countries. Monitoring of DNA

adducts also has some technical drawbacks. Only

small quantities of adducts can be extracted from

accessible tissue such as white blood cells, and DNA

adducts tend to be removed by chemical and enzymatic

processes and hence do not persist for long in the body,

having a half-life of a few weeks.

Because of the transience of DNA adducts,

several investigators have turned instead to protein

adducts, such as the alkylation of hemoglobin by

sulfur mustard. Experiments have shown that about

1,000 times more sulfur mustard binds to proteins than

to DNA.37 Moreover, hemoglobin has a relatively long

lifespan (120 days), permitting the determination of

cumulative exposure to toxic chemicals over a period

of months.38 Analysis of blood samples for hemoglobin adducts might therefore be the best way of

detecting long-term exposure to CW agents in chemicalplant workers. Nevertheless, the concentrations of

hemoglobin adducts are usually found at extremely

low levels (femtomoles or picomoles per gram),

requiring measures that are extremely sensitive and

selective.39 Such testing therefore entails complex

tradeoffs among sensitivity, specificity, and cost.

34 s. J. L~@ ‘ ‘me ~bition of chol~est~~e Activity by ~~ophosphorus compounds as a M- kl m h.lSpCCtiOIl hCK%dUR,” in

Stockhom International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Wi@are, Vol. V: Technical Aspects of Early

Warning and Verification (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1975), pp. 180-181.

M David B. Ludl~ paula A. ~tc~e, ~d ~tig Hagopi~ “Systemic Toxicity of suh Mus~d: A predictive ~st B* on ~

Measurement of DNA Adduct Formation in Peripheral Blood, ” Proceedings of the 1991 Medical Defense Bioscience Review (Fort Dehick

MD: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Aug. 7-8, 1991), pp. 97-100.

36 H. P. Benschop et d., ‘‘Immunochemical Diagnosis and Dosirnetry of Exposure to Sulfur Mustard,” Proceedz”ngs of the 1991 Medical

Defense Biosa”ence Review (Fort Detrick MD: U.S. Army Medicat Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Aug. 7-8, 1991), pp. 67-74.

37 Ibid., p. 72.

38 C@ T. WUglW and T. Mark Florence, “Biomonitoring of DNA-Damaging Toxina, ” Dianne Watters et al., eds., Toxins and Targets:

Effects of Natural and Synthetic Poisons on Living Cells and Fragile Ecosystems (Philadelphia PA: Hanvood Academic Publishers, 1992),

p. 172.

39 Ibid., p. 172.
Technical

Aspects of

Biological

Weapon

Proliferation 3

B

iological and toxin warfare (BTW) has been termed

“public health in reverse” because it involves the

deliberate use of disease and natural poisons to incapacitate or kill people. Potential BTW agents include Living

microorganisms such as bacteria, rickettsiae, fungi, and viruses

that cause infection resulting in incapacitation or death; and

toxins, nonliving chemicals manufactured by bacteria, fungi,

plants, and animals. Microbial pathogens require an incubation

period of 24 hours to 6 weeks between infection and the

appearance of symptoms. Toxins, in contrast, do not reproduce

within the host; they act relatively quickly, causing incapacitation or death within several minutes or hours.

The devastation that could be brought about by the military use

of biological agents is suggested by the fact that throughout

history, the inadvertent spread of infectious disease during

wartime has caused far more casualties than actual combat.1 Such

agents might also be targeted against domestic animals and staple

or cash crops to deprive an enemy of food or to cause economic

hardship. Even though biological warfare arouses general

repugnance, has never been conducted on a large scale, and is

banned by an international treaty, BTW agents were stockpiled

during both world wars and continue to be developed as strategic

weapons—“the poor man’s atomic bomb’’—by a small but

growing number of countries.2

1 John P. Heggers, “Microbial Lnvasion-The Major Ally of War (Natural

Biological Warfare),” Military Medicine, vol. 143, No. 6, June 1978, pp. 390-394.

2 This study does not address the potential use of BTW agents by terrorist groups.

For a discussion of this topic, see U.S. Congress, Oftlce of lkchnology Assessment,

Technology Against Terrorism: The Federa/ Ej@rt, O’IX-ISC-481 (Washingto~ DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991), pp. 21-22. See also Jessica Eve Stem,

“Will lkrronsts Tbrn to Poison?” Orbis, vol. 37, No. 3, summer 1993.

I 71
72 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, signed and ratified by some 130

countries, bans the development, production,

stockpiling, and transfer of BTW agents for

warfare purposes. This treaty was weakened from

the start, however, by the impossibility of banning research on BTW (agents, the fact that the

development, production, and storage of BTW

agents are permitted for defensive or peaceful

purposes, and the absence of formal mechanisms

for verification or enforcement.3 It has also been

alleged that key signatory states such as the

former Soviet Union have systematically violated

the treaty. According to a recent White House

report, ‘‘the Russian offensive biological warfare

program, inherited from the Soviet Union, violated the Biological Weapons Convention

through at least March 1992. The Soviet offensive

BW program was massive, and included production, weaponization, and stockpiling. ’

The biological disarmament regime has also

come under growing pressure from the global

spread of biotechnologies suitable for both civil

and military applications, and from the revolution

in genetic engineering, which has made it possible to manipulate the genetic characteristics

encoded in the chemical structure of the DNA

molecule. Soon after the publication in 1973 of

techniques for cutting and splicing DNA molecules across species lines, a few concerned

scientists worried that these powerful methods

might be applied to develop new and more

dangerous biological-warfare agents. Today, some

defense planners believe that genetic engineering

and other biotechnologies may eventually remove

some of the military liabilities of BTW agents,

increasing the attractiveness of these weapons to

states of proliferation concern. It is not clear,

however, that such techniques would significantly alter the military utility of BW agents

compared with the numerous already known

agents.

Given the perceived need to strengthen the

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the

fact that the Chemical Weapons Convention

(CWC) includes formal verification measures

such as onsite inspections, a number of countries

have proposed establishing a similar verification

regime for the BWC. (See box 3-A, pp. 74-75.

See also ch. 2 for discussion of procedures and

technologies that might be used to detect the

production of chemical weapons.) Nevertheless,

verifying the nonproduction of biological weapons is inherently more difficult than for chemical

weapons, for three reasons.

First, since BW agents are living microorganisms that reproduce inside the host, they are much

more potent per unit weight. Thus, whereas CW

agents must be stockpiled in the hundreds or

thousands of tons to be militarily significant, a

few kilograms of a BW agent such as anthrax

bacteria could cause comparable levels of casualties. Such a small quantity of agent would be

relatively easy to hide.

Second, whereas the production of CW agents

requires certain distinctive precursor materials,

reactions, and process equipment and leaves

behind telltale chemical signatures, the production of BW agents involves materials and equipment that are almost entirely dual-use. As a result,

it can be extremely difficult to distinguish illicit

BW agent production from legitimate activities

permitted under the BWC, such as the production

of vaccines.

Third, because of the potency of BW agents

and the exponential rate of microbial growth, a

militarily significant quantity of BW agent could

be produced in a matter of days in a small, easily

3 Some analysts worry that the Chemical Weapons Convention which was recently opened for signature and includes stringent verification

measures, may create incentives for some prolifemnt countries to acquire biological rather than chemical arms-both because BTW agents can

be produced in smaller, more concealable facilities, and because the Biological Weapons Convention cumently lacks effective verifkation

mechanisms.

4 George Bus& “The President’s Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, ” Jan. 14, 1993, p. 14.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation | 73

concealed clandestine facility. All of these factors

make the verification of compliance with the

BWC a particularly challenging task.

This chapter provides technical background on

the difficulty and detectability of BTW production and weaponization. The discussion covers

the major technical hurdles involved in the

acquisition of biological weapons and the associated ‘‘signatures’ that might be monitored to

track their spread.

SUMMARY

Although biological and toxin weapons are

often grouped together with chemical weapons,

they differ in important ways. The most obvious

difference is that whereas CW agents are manmade, nonliving poisons, biological agents are

infectious microorganisms that reproduce within

the host to cause an incapacitating or fatal illness.

Toxins, being poisonous chemicals manufactured

by living organisms, have characteristics of both

chemical and biological agents.

Because of the ability of pathogenic microorganisms to multiply rapidly within the host, small

quantities of a biological agent—if widely disseminated through the air-could inflict casualties over a very large area. Weight-for-weight,

BTW agents are hundreds to thousands of times

more potent than the most lethal chemicalwarfare agents, making them true weapons of

mass destruction with a potential for lethal

mayhem that can exceed that of nuclear weapons.

The lengthy incubation period of microbial pathogens places a major limitation on their battlefield

utility, except in situations of attrition warfare,

sabotage attacks against command and communications facilities deep behind enemy lines, or

strikes against massed troops prior to their

commitment to battle. Moreover, the delayed

effects of biological weapons would not prevent

their covert use against crops, livestock, or people

as a means of crippling the economy and psychological morale of a targeted country.

Biological and toxin weapons potentially pose

greater dangers than either chemical or nuclear

weapons because BTW agents are so lethal on a

pound-for-pound basis, their production requires

a much smaller and cheaper industrial infrastructure, and the necessary technology and know-how

are almost entirely dual-use and thus widely

available. Despite the drawbacks of biological

agents for tactical military use (e.g., delayed

action, the dependence on meteorological conditions for their effectiveness, and the difficulty of

precise targeting), they might be attractive as a

strategic weapon-particularly for small, nonnuclear nations embroiled in regional conflicts or

threatened by a nuclear-weapon state.

One technical hurdle to acquiring a militarily

significant BTW capability is to ensure adequate

containment and worker safety during production

and weapon handling. It is also technically

difficult to deliver biological agents to a target

area so as to cause infection in a reliable and

predictable manner. Although a supply of standard BTW agents for strategic attacks against

wide-area civilian targets (e.g., cities) would be

relatively easy to disseminate using crude delivery systems such as an agricultural sprayer, this

means of delivery would be largely uncontrollable and subject to shifting atmospheric conditions. A more predictable-and hence more

tactically useful-means of delivery against point

targets on the battlefield would require extensive

research, development, and testing. In particular,

the integration of BTW agents into long-range

delivery systems such as cluster bombs poses

complex engineering hurdles-although these

problems appear to have been solved for a few

agents by the United States and the Soviet Union

during the 1950s and 1960s.

There are no specific indicators, or “signatures,” that can differentiate unambiguously between the development of offensive BTW agents

and work on defensive measures such as vaccines,

since both activities require the same basic

know-how and laboratory techniques at the R&D

stage. Moreover, certain types of civilian facili-
74 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Box 3-A—The Debate Over BWC Verification

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 bans agents and delivery systems of types

and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes," yet the treaty

does not define permitted activities more precisely and lacks any formal mechanisms for verifying compliance. At

the time the BWC was negotiated it was considered politically impossible to obtain international support for onsite

inspections and other intrusive verification measures. Since 1972, however, the emergence of genetic engineering

and other novel biotechnologies has led to renewed concern over the seriousness of the biological and toxin

warfare threat. Given the dual-use nature of the agents and equipment the feasibility of effective verification has

been widely debated.

At the Second Review Conference of the BWC in 1986, the participating countries sought to build confidence

in the treaty regime through an annual exchange of information on permitted activities and facilities that could be

potentially associated with biological and toxin warfare. Additional confidence-building measures were adopted

at the Third Review Conference in 1991. None of these measures are legally binding, however, and less than half

of the parties to the treaty have participated to any extent in the data exchanges. At the Third Review Conference,

several countries supported the drafting of a legally binding verification protocol to supplement the BWC that, inter

alia, would require each Party to declare all treaty-relevant biological research and production facilities. The

declarations would be confirmed by routine onsite inspections, supplemented by challenge inspections of

undeclared facilities.

Proponents of a verification protocol argued that while a BWC verification regime could not provide absolute

confidence in a country’s compliance, it would serve to deter the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons by:

● imposing a risk of discovery and increasing the cost and difficulty of a clandestine program;

■ providing opportunities for parties to demonstrate compliance, and enhancing confidence in the compliance of

others;

■ decreasing the number of sites of proliferation concern;

 providing an opportunity to act on national intelligence information without public disclosure of sensitive sources

and methods;

 creating a legal framework for the conduct of challenge inspections; and

■ reinforcing the international legal norm against the acquisition and use of BTW agents.1

The Bush administration, however, opposed the negotiation of a formal verification protocol on three grounds:

 the BWC could not be verified effectively because biological production facilities are dud-useand Iack distinctive

“signatures”;

● a negotiated regime could not be sufficiently intrusive to detect clandestine facilities, generating false confidence

that a country was in compliance with the treaty when in fact it was not; and

 highly intrusive inspections by multinational teams could expose both government and commercial facilities to

foreign espionage. In particular, the loss of valuable trade secrets could weaken the competitive edge of the U.S.

biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries?

1 FederationofA~d~nS~e~i~s, MMkingGrwponBioiogical andToxinMbapons Verification, “pKWrOSS

in Identifying Effective and Acceptable Measures fora compliance Protocol tithe Bio@icai Mkapons convention,”

working paper, May 1993.

2 Statemnt by Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman, 11, Head of United States Delegation, Biological and Totin

Weapons ConventIon Third Review Conference, Sept 10, 1991. Note that In signing the (Xemioai Weapons

Convention (CWC), the U.S. Government has determined that the highly intrusive inspections mandated in that

treaty do not pose an unacceptable risk to proprietary information or national security. However, the Inspections

spedfied in the CWC to verify that chemical weapons are not being prochced or stored wwid not necessarily be

sufflcientforthe purposes of verifying the Bioiogicai Mbapons Convention. Therefore, the factthat CWC Inspections

have been judged worthwhile despite their potentiaiforespionage does notautomatioaliy mean that proposed BWC

inspections wwid be also be seen as acceptable. For a discussion of measures by which industry can protect itself

from the ioss of proprietary information due to Chemical Weapons Convention declarations and inspections, see

U.S. Congress, Office of T~noiogy Assessment lhe Chemka/ i4@apons ConWnfkw: Effecfs on the U.S.

Chem/ca/ /ndusfry, OTA-BP-ISC-1O6 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993).
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation | 75

While the controversy over BWC verification has focused largely on technical issues, it is fundamentally a

political debate over whether the burden of uncertainty associated with BWC verification would hamper more

severely the verifier or the violator. Proponents of BWC verification argue that even imperfect monitoring measures

would create a finite probability of detection that would have a significant deterrent effect on potential proliferants.

Furthermore, a verification regime based on mandatory declarations of treaty-related sites and activities would

deter the use of known facilities for BTW production, driving any violations into Clandestine facilities and thus

making them more difficult and costly. Verification opponents counter, however, that an ineffective verification

regime would create false confidence and hence would be worse than none at all.

There is also a semantic difference over the meaning of the term “verification.” The U.S. Government uses

this word in a narrow technical sense to mean the ability to detect violations within a specified regime with a high

degree of confidence. In contrast, proponents of verification see it as the cumulative result of many sources of

information, only some of which would be explicitly contained in a negotiated regime. Indeed, verification

proponents admit that no negotiated inspection regime could detect clandestine facilities with a high degree of

confidence. Instead, they argue, a formal verification regime would provide a Iegal instrument to permit inspections

of suspicious facilities that have been detected by covert intelligence means. While many countries could be

deterred from violating the treaty by a low probability of detection, some determined proliferants would require more

intrusive measures.

Despite the Bush administration’s opposition to a formal verification protocol for the BWC, it did agree to the

establishment of an Ad Hoc Group of Government Experts to identify and evaluate various monitoring approaches

from a scientific and technical standpoint. This verification experts (VEREX) group met twice in Geneva during

1992, from March 30 to April 10 and from November 23 to December 4. The focus of its activities was to prepare

a list of 21 potential BTW verification technologies, divided into onsite and offsite categories. The onsite measures

were exchange visits, inspections, and continuous monitoring; the offsite measures were information monitoring

declarations, remote sensing, and inspections. Each of these verification measures was evaluated in terms of 6

criteria:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

To

technical strengths and weaknesses, including the amount and quality of information provided;

ability to distinguish between prohibited and nonprohibited activities;

ability to resolve ambiguities about activities;

technology, material, manpower, and equipment requirements;

financial, legal, safety, and organizational implications; and

impact on scientific research, cooperation, industrial development, and other permitted activities, and

implications for the protection of commercial proprietary information.3

determine whether combining some measures would result in synergistic effects, a methodology was

developed for assessing measures in combination. The results indicate that the interaction of two or more

measures may yield synergistic capabilities or limitations that are not present when the measures are evaluated

in isolation.

Between the first and second VEREX meetings, the U.S. position on BWC verification softened noticeably,

and the new Clinton administration initiated a thorough review of its BTW nonproliferation policy. The VEREX group

met again on May 24- June 4, 1993 to evaluate the proposed verification measures. The group met a final time

on September 13-24,1993 to prepare and adopt by consensus a final report to be forwarded to the States Parties

to the BWC. This final report will provide the basis for a decision by a majority of the participating countries on

whether to proceed with the negotiation of a legally binding verification protocol for the BWC. If such a decision

is made in the affirmative, a Preparatory Conference could take place in late 1994 followed by a Special

Conference in early 1995.

3 Conferenm on Disarmament, Flna/ Deckvatkw of the Third Rev/ew Conference of the BWC, part 11,

document no. BWC/CONF.111/23, p. 17.
76 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

ties will inevitably have the capacity to engage in

illegal military production activities. Since excessive secrecy might be indicative of offensive

intent, however, greater opemmess and transparency would tend to build confidence in a country’s defensive intentions.

Advances in biotechnology have made it possible to produce militarily significant quantities of

pathogens and toxins rapidly and in small, easily

concealable facilities, greatly complicating the

task of detecting BTW programs with national

technical means of surveillance. To monitor

clandestine programs, it is necessary to integrate

data from many sources, with a particular emphasis on human intelligence: (agents and defectors).

Even though much of the equipment used to

produce BTW agents is dual-use, this is not

necessarily true of the agents themselves. Most

microbial agents produced for peaceful purposes

have no military utility, while those that do are

made in very few places and in small quantities.

Legitimate applications of dangerous pathogens

and toxins (e.g., vaccine production and the use of

toxins to treat neurological disorders and for

experimental anticancer therapy) are relatively

few at present, and are largely confinied to sophisticated biomedical facilities not normally found

in developing countries (with the exception of a

few vaccine production plants). Moreover, given

the fact that the biotechnology industry is still in

its infancy around the globe, the background of

legitimate activities is still relatively small.

The weaponization of BTW agents entails field

testing of biological aerosols, munitions, and

delivery systems, as well as troop exercises,

which might be detectable by satellite or other

technical means of verification. Nevertheless,

testing of microbial aerosols might be conceded

or carried out at night or under the cover of

legitimate dual-use activities, such as the application of biopesticides.

Despite growing concern over the military

implications of genetic engineering, this technology is unlikely to result in ‘supergerms” significantly more lethal or controllable than existing

BW agents or capable of eliminating many of the

uncertainties associated with the use of microbial

pathogens in warfare. At the same time, however,

gene-splicing techniques might facilitate the weaponization of microorganisms and toxins and

enhance their operational effectiveness by rendering them more stable during dissemination (e.g.,

more resistant to heat, ultraviolet radiation, and

shear forces) and insusceptible to standard vaccines and antibiotics. Moreover, genetic engineering techniques could be used to develop and

produce more effective protective vaccines for the

attacking forces.

In the past, most plant and animal toxins had to

be extracted from biological materials in a costly

and labor-intensive operation, but the ability to

‘‘clone’ protein toxin genes in bacteria has made

it possible to produce formerly rare toxins in

kilogram quantities. For the forseeable future,

however, toxin-warfare agents are unlikely to

provide dramatic military advantages over existing chemical weapons, although their greater

potency makes it easier to transport and deliver

militarily significant quantities. While it is possible that bioregulators and other natural body

chemicals (or synthetic analogues thereof) might

be developed into powerful incapacitants, the

nontrivial problem of delivering such agents in a

militarily effective manner would first have to be

solved.

BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN AGENTS

Just because a microorganism causes a serious

disease does not make it a potential warfare agent.

Of the several hundred pathogenic microbes that

directly or indirectly afflict humans, only about

30 have been considered as likely warfare agents.5

s Department of the Army, U.S. Army Medical Researeh and Development Command, Final Programma tic Enw”ronmental Impact

Statement: Biological D#ense Research Program, RCS DD-M (AR) 1327 (Fort Detric~ MD: USAMRDC, 1989), p. A7-2.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation! 77

Desirable characteristics of a biological agent

developed for military use include:

the ability to infect reliably in small doses;

high virulence, or capacity to cause acute

illness resulting in incapacitation or death,

without experiencing an undue loss of potency during production, storage, and transport;

a short incubation period between infection

and the onset of symptoms;

minimal contagiousness of the disease from

one individual to another, to avoid triggering

an uncontrolled epidemic that could boomerang against the attacker’s population;6

no widespread immunity-either natural or

acquired-to the disease in the population to

be attacked;

insusceptibility to common medical treatments, such as generally available antibiotics;

suitability for economic production in militarily significant quantities from available

raw materials;

ease of transport, and stability under wartime field conditions of storage and delivery;

ease of dissemination (e.g., as an aerosol

cloud transmitted through the air);

ability to survive environmental stresses

during dissemination (e.g., heat, light, desiccation, and shear forces) long enough to

infect; and

availability of protection against the agent

for the attacking troops, such as a vaccine,

antibiotics, and/or protective clothing and

respirators. 7

Figure 3-1—Toxicity of CBW Agents

Estimated lethal dose

(mg/person) a

[

- 103

I

$

102

CW agents

10

L 10-2 Toxin agents

ii’ \

,0-3

104

~- 10-5

i }

BW agents

104

t

, (--7 I

al paper clip weighs about 500 mg

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993,

BTW agents differ widely in infectiousness,

length of incubation period, and lethality (see

figure 3-l). A variety of them, including bacteria,

rickettsiae, viruses, and toxins, were weaponized

during the U.S. offensive BTW program, which

was terminated in 1969. Brief descriptions of

some typical BTW agents follow.

| Bacteria

Bacteria are single-cell organisms that are the

causative agents of anthrax, brucellosis, tularemia, plague, and numerous other diseases. They

vary considerably in infectivity and lethality. The

bacterium that causes tularemia, for example, is

highly infectious. Inhalation of as few as 10

organisms causes disease after an incubation

period of 3 to 5 days; if not treated, tularemia

results in deep-seated pneumonia from which 30

s Some analysrs have suggested that a coun~ might deliberately develop contagious BW agents, which might be rendered insusceptible

to any drugs that could be used to combat them. Japan, for example, developed plague-a highly contagious dis~ a BW agent during

World War II. Wbile contagious agents are commonly dismissed as too dangerous to use, they might convey a dedsive military advantage on

the attacker if (1) he could give an antidote or vaccine to his own population, (2) the agent was designed to attack crops or livestock specific

to the target country, or (3) the agent could be delivered to a distant target by a long-range delivery system such as a ballistic missile. Although

mass vaccination of the attacker’s own population appears unlikely for logistical reasons, a ruthless aggressor-state might be willing to put its

own population at risk.

7 The effectiveness of defenses cannot be guaranteed, however. No vaccine is 100 percent effective, since even a strong immunity can be

overwhelmed by inhaling a heavy dose of agent.
78 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Box 3-B-Anthrax as a Biological-Warfare Agent

Anthrax, a severe illness caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, is considered the prototypioal

biological-warfare agent. In nature, anthrax is primarily a disease of cattle and sheep but can also infect humans.

it can survive for long periods in soil in a dormant (spore) phase; after infection, it reverts to an active phase in

which it mulitipiies rapidly in the body and secretes fatal toxins. Natural human infection can result either from skin

contact with infected animals, ingestion of contaminated meat or inhalation of anthrax spores, usually from

contaminated hides. Cases of pulmonary-and in some outbreaks gastrointestinal--anthrax are almost invariably

fatal if not treated immediately with antibiotics. Inhalation of aerosolized spores would be the primary route of

infection if the bacteria were used deliberately as a biological-warfare agent. As extrapolated from animal studies,

inhalation of about 1,000 spores or less can produce fatal pulmonary anthrax in some members of an exposed

population, while inhalation of about 8,000 spores-weighing about 0.08 microgram-is fatal within less than a

week to a large proportion of those exposed.l

After inhalation into the lungs, anthrax spores travel to the lymph nodes of the chest, where they become

active, multiplying and releasing three proteins-edema factor, lethal factor, and protective antigen. in specific

combinations, these proteins function as potent toxins, enabling the bacteria to resist host defenses and to invade

and damage host tissues via the bloodstream, resulting in uncontrollable hemorrhaging. in this manner, anthrax

bacteria travel to the intestines and other areas, where they cause severe tissue damage. Initial signs of pulmonary

anthrax infection include a high fever, labored breathing, choking cough, and vomiting; it is usually fatal within 4

days.2 Although infections may respond to immediate antibiotic therapy, it is relatively easy to develop

antibiotic-resistant anthrax strains.

in addition to its lethality, anthrax has other characteristics that make it an effective BW agent. First the

disease is not contagious from one individual to another. As a result, anthrax would not spread far beyond the

intended target or boomerang against the attacker’s troops or civilian Population, assuming they do not enter a

contaminated area Second, anthrax is easy to produce. The organism and its spores can be readily produced

1 Te~jmonY by Barry J. Erii~ Bioio@ai VWapons Analyst, Department of the Amy, in U.S. *nate,

Committee on Governmental Affairs, Global @read of Chernkxdati B/o/o@caJ Mapons: Assessing Challenges

tmdl?esponsesj IOlst Congress, First Session, Feb. 9, 1989 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offioe,

1990), p. 32.

z Phiiip J. Hiits, “U.S. and Russian Researchers Tie Anthrax Deaths to %viets,” N8w Yom ~mes Mar. 15,

1993, p. A6.

to 60 percent of victims die within 30 days.8 Under certain environmental conditions, anthrax

Brucellosis, another bacterial disease, has a low

mortality rate-about 2 percent-but an enormous

capacity to inflict casualties. Infection gives rise

to fever and chills, headache, loss of appetite,

mental depression, extreme fatigue, aching joints,

and sweating.9 The bacterial agent that has

received the most attention is anthrax, whose

pulmonary form is highly lethal. (See box 3-B,)

bacteria will transform themselves into rugged

spores that are stable under a wide range of

conditions of temperature, pressure, and moisture. One gram of dried anthrax spores contains

more than 1011 particles; since the lethal dose by

inhalation in monkeys is between l@ and l@

spores, a gram of anthrax theoretically contains

some 10 million lethal doses.

s TXimony byBany J, ErlicQ Biological Weapons Auilyst, Department of the Army, in U.S. Senate, Comrnitt~ on Oovernrnental Affairs,

Global Spread of Chem”cal and Biological Weapons: Assessing Challenges and ReWonses, IOlst Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 9, 1989 (Washington

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 32,

9 J. H. Rothschild, Tomorrows Weapons: Chemical and Biological (New York NY: McGraw-Hill, 19W), P. 212.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation 179

in the laboratory in almost unlimited quantities, and antibiotic-resistant strains have been developed with standard

selection techniques. 3

Third, when anthrax bacteria are incubated under particular conditions, they transform themselves into the

rugged spore form, which has along shelf-life. Although most spores can be killed by boiling for 10 minutes, they

can survive for up to 20 years or longer in soil and animal hides.4 This spore-forming ability makes anthrax

particularity well suited for delivery by missiles or bombs. The spores are stable when suspended in air, can survive

explosive dissemination from a bomb or shell, and-unlike most pathogens-will live for several days if direct

sunlight is avoided. Indeed, fieldtest data have shown that anthrax spores decay at a rate of Iess than 0.1 percent

per minute, which is very slow for a microorganism.5

Nevertheless, anthrax has certain liabilities as a tactical weapon. First, at lower doses there is a wide spread

in incubation times, ranging from a few days to several weeks, suggesting that the spore germinations that result

in infection can be delayed for considerable periods.6 This variability greatly reduces the predictability and hence

the military utility of the agent. Second, anthrax spores are so persistent that they can contaminate an area for

long periods, denying it both to defender and attacker. During World War II, for example, Britain detonated

experimental anthrax bombs on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland, releasing spores that remained in the

top 6 to 8 inches of soil for more than 40 years.7 By infecting livestock, anthrax bacteria might also create new

reservoirs of disease that could result in occasional outbreaks, making it impossible to use the affected area

productively for long periods.8 That might be the desired intent, however, were anthrax to be used as a strategic

weapon.

3 wo~d Health Organi=tion, /+ea/th @e~fs ~fchem~~/ and Bjo/ogj@/IMgapons (Geneva: WHO, 1970),

p. 74.

4 Donald Kaye and Ro~rt G. petersdorf, “Anthrax,” Eugene Br~nwalci et at., eds., HaffiSOn’S ~fil?C@/8S Of

/nferna/ Medicine, 1 Ith ed. (New Yo~ NY: McGraw Hill, 1987), p. 557.

5 Wotld Health Organization, op. dt., fOOtnOtO 3, p. 94.

6 presentation ~ Matthew Meselson, Harvard University, at Smlnar on BioIo@cd VWapons in the 1990S,

sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, Nov. 4, 1992.

7 ~ese explosive anthr~ bombs were crude and ineffi~ent in creating an aerosol cloud COmpOSOd d Small

particles. Instead, the bombs compacted the spores into the ground. Effective BW munitions would not do this.

William C. Patrick Ill, former program analysis officer, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases,

Fort Detric~ MD, personal communication, 1992.

B Wofld Health Organization, op. cit., fOOtllOM 3, p. 75.

| Rickettsiae

Rickettsiae are microorganisms that resemble

bacteria in form and structure but differ in that

they are intracellular parasites that can only

reproduce inside animal cells. Examples of rickettsial diseases that might be used for biological

warfare include typhus, Rocky Mountain spotted

fever, Tsutsugamuchi disease, and Q fever. Rickettsiae have a wide variety of natural hosts,

including mammals and arthropods such as ticks,

fleas, and lice. If used as BW agents, however,

they would probably be disseminated directly

through the air.

| Viruses

Viruses are intracellular parasites that are about

100 times smaller than bacteria. They can infect

humans, crops, or domestic animals. Viruses

consist of a strand of genetic material (DNA or

RNA) surrounded by a protective coat that

facilitates transmission from one cell to another.

The Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus

causes a highly infectious disease that incapacitates but rarely kills. In contrast, some hemorrhagic fever viruses, such as Lassa or Ebola fever,

are exceedingly virulent, killing 70 out of every

100 victims. The AIDS virus, despite its lethality,

would not be an effective warfare agent because
80 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

its mean incubation period of 10 years is too slow

to give it any tactical or strategic value in warfare,

and because it cannot be transmitted through the

air.

 Fungi

Fungi do not generally cause disease in healthy

humans, although the fungus Aspergillus, which

infects by inhalation, can cause serious opportunistic infections in people with a weakened immune system. A few other fungi, such as Coccidioides immitis and Histoplasma capsulatum, also

infect naturally by inhalation and can cause

severe pulmonary infections in susceptible individuals, but they have never been considered as

potential BW agents. Fungal diseases are, however, devastating to plants and might be used to

destroy staple crops and cause widespread hunger

and economic hardship. Examples of plant fungal

pathogens include rice blast, cereal rust, and

potato blight, which can cause crop losses of 70

to 80 percent.

| Toxins

A toxin is a poisonous substance made by a

living system, or a synthetic analogue of a

naturally occurring poison. An enormous variety

of toxins are manufactured by bacteria, fungi,

marine organisms, plants, insects, spiders, and

animals, and more than 400 have been characterized to date. Such toxins can exert their effects by

three different routes of exposure-injection,

ingestion, and inhalation-and their potency

derives from their high specificity for cellular

targets. For example, many toxins bind to specific

sites in nerve membranes, disrupting the transmission of nerve impulses and causing fatal

respiratory paralysis. Other toxins selectively

block cellular protein synthesis or other vital

physiological functions.

From a chemical standpoint, there are two

categories of toxins: protein toxins, which consist

of long folded chains of amino acids; and

nonprotein toxins, which tend to be small but

complex molecules.

PROTEIN TOXINS

Most bacterial toxins, including those associated with cholera, tetanus, diphtheria, and botulism, are large proteins. For example, various

strains of Staphylococcus aureus, a major bacterial pathogen, secrete protein toxins that cause

severe nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea lasting

from 1 to 2 days. The United States developed one

of these toxins, Staphylococcus enterotoxin B

(SEB), as a warfare agent in the 1960s. Spraydried SEB, when disseminated through the air in

aerosol form, causes a chemical pneumonia that

is more debilitating than the toxin’s gastrointestinal effects when ingested; it can incapacitate

exposed troops within hours, with recovery in 4 to

6 days.l0 Botulinal toxin, secreted by the soil

bacterium Clostridium botulinum, is the most

poisonous substance known. The fatal dose of

botulinal toxin by injection or inhalation is about

1 nanogram (billionth of a gram) per kilogram, or

about 70 nanograms for an adult male.11 The toxin

is also relatively fast-acting, producing death

between 1 and 3 days in 80 percent of victims.

The U.N. inspections of Iraq after the Gulf War

confirmed that the microbiological research facility at Salman Pak had done development work on

botulinum toxin as a potential warfare agent.

Nevertheless, attempts to weaponize botulinal

toxin have in the past failed to prevent extensive

loss of toxicity that accompanies dispersion.

Ricin, a plant toxin derived from castor beans,

irreversibly blocks cellular protein synthesis and

is lethal when inhaled in a dose of about 10

micrograms (millionths of a gram) .12 Castor

10 WiU~ C. ntrick III, fo~e:rpm~ analysis officer, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, Fort ~tridc+ MD,

personal communicatio~ 1993.

11 D. M. Gill, “Bacteri~ ‘1’bxins: A ‘Ihble of Lethal Amounts,” Microbiological Reviews, March 1982, pp. 86-94.

12 G. A. B~@ “wc~ me Toxic Protein of Castor Oil Seeds,” Tom”cology, VO1. 2, 1974, p. 80.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation 181

beans are widely cultivated as a source of castor

oil, which has numerous legitimate industrial

applications. The paste remaining after the oil has

been pressed out contains about 5 percent ricin,

which can be purified by biochemical means.

During World War II, several countries studied

ricin as a potential chemical-warfare agent, and

the British developed and tested an experimental

ricin weapon known as the ‘‘W bomb, ” although

it was not ultimately deployed.13 In September

1978, the Bulgarian secret police (with technical

assistance from the Soviet KGB) assassinated

Georgi Markov, an exiled Bulgarian dissident

living in London, by firing a tiny metal ball filled

with ricin into his thigh from a pellet-gun

concealed inside an umbrella; Markov died two

days later.14 According to published reports, Iran

has acquired 120 tons of castor beans and is

allegedly purifying ricin in pharmaceutical

plants. l5

NONPROTEIN TOXINS

Nonprotein toxins are small organic molecules

that often have a complex chemical structure.

They include tetrodotoxin @educed by a puffer

fish), saxitoxin (made by marine algae known as

dinoflagellates, which are taken up and concentrated by clams and mussels), ciguatoxin and

microcystin (synthesized by microscopic algae),

palytoxin (made by a soft red Hawaiian coral),

and batrachotoxin (secreted by poisonous frogs

indigenous to western Colombia). Typical characteristics of nonprotein toxins are high toxicity,

the absence of antidotes, heat stability (unlike

most protein toxins), resistance to other environmental factors, and speed of action. Saxitoxin, for

example, produces initial symptoms within 30

seconds after ingestion and can cause labored

breathing and paralysis in as little as 12 minutes.

There is no known prophylaxis or therapy, and the

lethal dose in 50 percent of those exposed maybe

as low as 50 micrograms, a potency 1,000 times

greater than the chemical nerve agent VX.l6

Trichothecene mycotoxins are a family of

about 100 poisonous compounds manufactured

by certain strains of the mold Fusarium that grow

on wheat, millet, and barley. When ingested by

people or livestock, these toxins kill rapidly

dividing cells such as those of the bone marrow,

skin, and the lining of the gastrointestinal tract;

they also block certain clotting factors in the

blood, causing severe bleeding after injury. In

aerosol form, about 35 milligrams of the trichothecene mycotoxin T-2 can kill a 75-kilogram man;

unlike most other toxins, it is also absorbed

through the skin. Although mycotoxins are significantly less potent than chemical-warfare agents

such as VX, they are relatively easy to produce

and are highly stable.

In 1982, the Reagan administration alleged that

the Soviet Union and its allies were using a

toxin-warfare agent in Southeast Asia known as

“yellow rain” whose active ingredients were

trichothecene mycotoxins.17 The Soviets denied

the allegations, and the United States was unable

to provide convincing public evidence to back up

its charges in the face of criticism on the part of

13 Stwkholm htemtio~ pe~e Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Vol. I: The Rise of CB Weapons

(Stockholm: Almqvist & WikseU 1971), p. 123.

14 Rob@ Harris and Jeremy PaxmmL A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Gas and Germ Waglare (1-mdon: Chatto & Windus,

1982), pp. 197-198; David Wise, ‘‘Was Oswald a Spy, and Other Cold War Mysteries,” New York Times Magazine, Dec. 6, 1992, p, 44.

15 Douglas Wailer, “Sneaking in the Scuds, ” Newsweek, June 22, 1992, p. 42.

16 Erlic~ op. cit., footnote 8, p. 32, See also B.J. Benton and F.C.T. Chang, ‘‘Reversal of Saxitoxin-Induced Ctiio-Resptitov F~~e by

Burro XgG Antibody and Oxygen Therapy,’ Proceedings of the 1991 Medical De$ense Bioscience Review (Fort lletric~ MD: U.S. Army

Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Aug. 7-8, 1991), p. 176.

17 U.S. Department of State, Chem”cal Wag2are in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, Special Report No. 98, w. 22, 1982, P. 30.
82 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

many in the U.S. scientific community.18 Following early reports of the presence of trichothecenes

in samples from alleged attacks, the U.S. Army

and the U.K. Ministry of Defense initiated large

analytical studies but were unable to confirm the

early findings.19 Nonetheless, U.S. intelligence

officials, based on all the: information available to

the U.S. intelligence community, remain confident in the yellow rain allegations and have not

retracted them.

Compared to microbial pathogens, toxins offer

the following tactical advantages:

The most toxic toxins (e.g., botulinal toxin)

are exceedingly potent, so that small, easily

transportable quantities would be militarily

significant for certain missions.

Toxins tend to deteriorate rapidly once

released into the environment, whereas anthrax spores and persistent chemical agents

can centaminate soil for months or years. For

this reason, territory attacked with toxin

agents could be occupied more rapidly by

attacking forces.

Toxins are well suited to covert warfare.

Whereas chemical agents leave telltale degradation byproducts that persist for long

periods in the environment, some toxin

agents break down completely over a period

of weeks or months, leaving no traces.

Moreover, even fresh samples of toxin might

not provide conclusive evidence of military

use if the agent occurred naturally in the

region where it was employed.

Despite these operational advantages, however, toxins have drawbacks for battlefield use:

Protein toxins such as botulinal toxin decompose rapidly on exposure to sunlight, air, and

heat, and thus would have to be used at night.

Protein toxins may be inactivated by the

mechanical shear forces caused by passage

through an aerosol sprayer.20 While lowmolecular-weight toxins such as saxitoxin

and trichothecene mycotoxins are more stable than protein toxins, they are less stable

than chemical-warfare agents.

Most toxins (with the exception of trichothecene mycotoxin T-2) do not penetrate the

skin, nor would toxin lying on the ground

create a vapor hazard.21 Weaponization therefore requires the creation of a small-particle

aerosol cloud, in which the toxin must

remain airborne to be effective.

The inhalation threat posed by protein toxins

such as botulinal toxin can be countered

effectively with modern gas masks (although

a surprise or covert attack might expose

personnel to lethal concentrations before

they could don their masks).

For conventional battlefield use, toxins offer

few military advantages over chemical nerve

agents. Toxins would, however, probably be

superior for small-scale clandestine operations.

ACQUIRING A BTW CAPABILITY

The acquisition of a militarily significant BTW

capability would probably involve the following

steps (see figure 3-2):

la Jfi~RobinsoG Je~e Guille~ and Matthew Meselso~ “Yellow Rain in Southeast Asia: ‘he StOry COlkipSeS,” SUS~ wrigh~ cd.,

Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 220-238. See also U.S. Senate, Cornrnittee on Foreign Relations,

Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment, 98th Cong., 1st sess., YelZ~w Rain: The Arms Conrrol

Implications, Feb. 24, 1983 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Off@ 1983).

19 Robinson et al., op. cit., footnote 18, pp. **8-**9.

20A fw prote~ tox~ we quite s~ble: SEB ~ ~~ for e~ple, is not &s~oy~ ~t~ boiling for 30 minutes. III additio~ the stibility

of protein toxins can be increased through a technique known as microeneapsulation (see production section below), David S. Huxsoll, former

director, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, personal comrnunicatiom 1992.

21 Shirley Freeman, ‘‘Disease as a Weapon of War, ” Pacific Research, vol. 3, February 1990, p. 5.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation | 83

R&D

v’

or novel agent

– —v— – - -

Figure 3-2—Biological Weapon Acquisition

Produce agent

, ;;;>~~~;~>E-->F ->?

, Test suitability

A >’ for weapon

I

~ Mampulate genehc ~

characteristics I

I

I

(optional)

Design, test, and build munitions

E

Micro-

> encapsulate

agent

I Area delwery: I v

I

L.––—.:–-–L—

sprayer system - )

I I ~~‘-~

~—.--.—

i

Field- ‘ MaSS- ‘ >

Fill

test produce munitions < -

I

Point dellvery: ‘

cluster bomb or warhead ,

~——- . -–. J

Acquire delivery system

r?=fl

r%%=”!

E!!Z2EE!I

L J

Develop strategic and

tactical BW battle plans

Eiiiiaa

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

delivery system

Acquire operational capability I

1. Establishment of one or more facilities and 3.

associated personnel with organizational

and physical provisions for the conduct of

work in secret; 4.

2. Research on microbial pathogens and toxins, including the isolation or procurement

of virulent or drug-resistant strains;

>

~

Integrate

weapon systems

into military ,

force sd

@ockpile

>1 fille d

Lm!!!’ti!!s

mOperational

> capability

Pilot production of small quantities of agent

in flasks or small fermenter systems;

Characterization and military assessment of

the agent, including its stability, infectivity,

course of infection, dosage, and the feasibility of aerosol dissemination;
84 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

5.

6.

7.

8.

Research, design, development, and testing

of munitions and/or other dissemination

equipment;

Scaled-up production of agent (possibly in

several stages) and freeze-drying;

Stabilization of agent (e.g., through microencapsulation) and loading into spray tanks,

munitions, or other delivery systems; and

Stockpiling of filled or unfilled munitions

and delivery vehicles, possibly accompanied by troop training, exercises, and doctrinal development. (In some but not all

cases, a country planning the offensive use

of BTW agents would take measures to

protect its own troops, such as immunization, the acquisition of respirators, and

training in self-protective measures.)

The key steps in this acquisition sequence are

examined below in terms of their technical

difficulty.

| Research, Development, and

Weaponization

Countries seeking a BTW capability are likely

to start with the development of standard agents

that have been weaponized in the past, such as

anthrax, tularemia, and botulinum toxin. Nearly

all proliferant states lack the sophisticated scientific and technological infrastructure needed to

develop novel agents such as exotic viruses,

whose military characteristics are poorly understood.

BTW agents are widely accessible. Pathogenic

microorganisms are indigenous to many countries

and can be cultured from infected wild animals

(e.g., plague in rodents), living domestic animals

or infected remains (e.g., Q fever in sheep,

anthrax in cattle), soil in endemic areas (which

may contain trace amounts of anthrax bacteria

and other pathogens), and spoiled food. Certain

biological supply houses also ship strains of

microbial pathogens to scientists throughout the

world. For example, American Type Culture

Collection (ATCC), a nonprofit company in

Rockville, MD, acts as a clearinghouse for

research institutions around the world, shipping

each year approximately 130,000 cultures of

weakened (’‘attenuated”) pathogens to 60 nations. 22 While such attenuated strains are not

virulent and hence could not be converted directly

into biological weapons, they would be useful for

BTW research and development and for preparing

self-protective vaccines. Methods for culturing

organisms and for inducing spore formation are

also described in the open scientific literature, and

standard microbiological procedures can be used

to produce more virulent or antibiotic-resistant

strains of microbial pathogens.

Once a proliferant had acquired BTW agents,

they might be modified genetically through

simple selection techniques to increase their

virulence or effectiveness. For example, incubating microbial pathogens in the presence of

standard antibiotics can induce the emergence of

drug-resistant strains, which can then be subculture and mass-produced. Agent development

would also involve “weaponization," or a thorough assessment of the agent military potential,

including its stability, infectivity, course of infection, and effective dosage. This step would

include the testing of candidate agents to determine their effectiveness, including the feasibility

and reliability of aerosol dissemination. Such

tests might be carried out either in a sealed aerosol

chamber or in field studies of simulant microorganisms at a remote testing range.

THE DUAL-USE DILEMMA

A fundamental problem in countering the

proliferation of biological and toxin weapons is

the fact that much of the necessary know-how and

technology is dual-use, with legitimate applications in the commercial fermentation and biotechnology industries. Many developing countries

n Wc N~Im dRoM WiIIdreW, “&adly Contagio~” The New Republic, vol. 204, No. 5, Feb. 4, 1991, p. 18.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation | 85

have acquired industrial microbiology plants for

the production of fermented beverages, vaccines,

antibiotics, ethanol (from corn or sugar cane),

enzymes, yeast, vitamins, food colors and flavorings, amino acids, and single-cell protein as a

supplement for animal feeds.23 This global expansion of the civilian biotechnology industry, combined with the growing number of molecular

biotechnologists trained in the West, has created

much broader access to the expertise and equipment needed for the development of BTW agents.

Sophisticated laboratories that might be used for

the design of novel BW agents are inexpensive

compared with nuclear weapon plants. Moreover,

biotechnology is information-intensive rather

than capital-intensive, and much of the relevant data are available in the published scientific literature. For these reasons, it is virtually

impossible for industrialized states to prevent

the diffusion of weapon-relevant information

to states of proliferation concern.

It has been estimated that more than 100

countries have the capability-if not necessarily

the intent-to develop at least crude biological

weapons based on standard microbial and toxin

agents. 24 In addition to the United States, Russia,

Western Europe, and Japan, countries with an

advanced commercial biotechnology infrastructure include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, India,

Israel, the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan,

and Thailand. Cuba, in particular, has an advanced biotechnology industry that exports vaccines and reagents to other Latin American

countries .25 While Iraq lags somewhat behind this

group of countries, Baghdad established a national Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology in the late 1980s, initially staffed with

only four scientists.26 As an increasing number of

developing countries become involved in commercial biotechnology, they may be tempted to

explore its military potential.

In addition, the legitimate use of toxins for

medical therapy and biomedical research is increasingly widespread. Botulinal toxin, for example, is used to treat abnormal muscle spasms

known as dystonias by selectively paralyzing the

spastic muscles; it has also been applied cosmetically to smooth wrinkles.27 Toxins such as ricin,

when linked to antibodies that selectively target

cancer cells, have shown promise in clinical trials

as an anticancer therapy.28 Furthermore, saxitoxin

and other exotic toxins that bind specifically to

channels or receptors in nerve-cell membranes are

valuable research tools in neuroscience. The

inherently dual-use nature of many pathogens and

toxins makes the prevention of BTW-relevant

research extremely difficult. Consumption of

toxins for medical therapy and research has

already expanded to the current level of hundreds

of grams per year, and the anticipated further

growth of such therapies will eventually blur the

23 For an overview, see U.S. Congr=s, OffIce of ‘lkchnology Assessment, Biotechnology in a Global Economy, OTA-BA-494 (w~mto~

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1991).

u ~s~ony of moms Welcb D~~ty Assistant Smre- of Defense (~emic~ Matters), reported in D#ense Week, May 9, 1988.

2S ~wond A. Zilinska% “Biological Warfare and the Third World” Politics and the L~e Sciences, vol. 9, No. 1, August 1990, p. 61.

26 presentation by Raymond Zilinskas, Washington Sh’ategy s~, Washington, DC, July 14, 1992.

27 Tom Waters, ‘me F~e M of M.alcing Poisou” Discover, vol. 13, No. 8, August 1992, p. 32; and Anna Evangeli, ‘ ‘Botulism Gives Fac~

New base of Life, ” New Scien~ist, vol. 137, No. 1859, Feb. 6, 1993, p. 18. See also Fritz P. Gluckstein and Mark Hallet, Clinical Use of

Botulinum Toxin: January 1987 through September 1990, 318 Citations (Washington DC: National Library of Medicine/U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1990).

28 David Fitzgerald and Isa Pastaq ‘‘Targeted Toxin Therapy for the Treatment Of Cancer, ” Journal of the National Cancer Institute, vol.

81, No. 19, October 1989, pp. 1455-1463; Andrew A. Hertler and Arthur E. Frankel, “Imrnunotoxins: A Clinical Review of Their Use in the

Treatment of Malignancies,” Journal of Clinical Oncology, vol. 7, No. 12, December 1989, pp. 1932-1942; Lee H. Pai and Ira PastarL

‘‘Immunotoxin Therapy for Cancer,’ Journal of the Amen’can Medical Association, vol. 269, No. 1, Jan. 6, 1993, pp. 78-81.
86 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

distinction between medically useful and militarily significant quantities of toxins. 29 The legitimate applications of toxins will therefore have to

remain relatively open to preclude their use for

illicit purposes.

Finally, the development of defenses against

BTW attack-an activity explicitly permitted by

the Biological Weapons Convention-draws on

much of the same knowledge base needed to

develop offensive BTW agents. Indeed, “threat

assessment, an important aspect of some biological-defense programs, includes the evaluation

of defenses under simulated warfare conditions

and may be indistinguishable from the development of offensive BTW agents .30 Furthermore,

certain defensive activities may have offensive

applications. According to one assessment, ‘‘the

virulence of micro-organisms is studied both for

its relevance to the field of natural infections and

in order to produce living, attenuated vaccines.

Such knowledge can obviously be used more or

less directly to make a BW agent more virulent.” 31 For these reasons, biological-defense

activities such as the development of vaccines

may arouse concerns about offensive intentions

unless they are conducted openly and in an

unclassified environment..

In sum, research on potential BTW agents does

not necessarily imply an offensive weapon program because much of the relevant knowledge is

multiuse. This inherent ambiguity means that at

the R&D stage, the only difference between

offensive and defensive activities is one of intent.

The policy dilemma is that progress in controlling

infectious diseases requires the free and open

flow of information, so that researchers can build

on and validate the work of others; imposing

controls on the publication of results with potential military implications would seriously impede

legitimate scientific research worldwide. Nevertheless, openness may impose some limits on the

misuse of biomedical research for malicious

purposes.

| Large-Scale Production

BTW agents would be relatively easy and

inexpensive to produce for any nation that has a

modestly sophisticated pharmaceutical or fermentation industry. Indeed, mass-production

methods for growing pure cultures are widely

used in the commercial production of yogurt,

yeast, beer, antibiotics, and vaccines. Nearly all

the equipment needed for the production of

pathogens and toxins is dual-use and widely

available on the international market, increasing

the potential for concealing illicit activities under

the cover of legitimate production. Whereas a

typical vaccine production facility costs a minimum of $50 million, a much less elaborate

industrial fermentation plant suitable for conversion to BTW agent production could be built for

about $10 million.32 In such a‘ ‘no-frills’ facility,

bacteria could be grown in standard dairy tanks,

brewery fermenters, or even in the fiberglass

tanks used by gas stations.

In contrast to chemical-warfare (CW) agents,

no specialized starting materials are required for

the production of biological and toxin agents

except for a small seed stock of a diseaseproducing organism. Nutrients such as fermentation medium, glucose, phosphates, peptone, and

a protein source (e.g., casein, electrodialyzed

whey, or beef bouillon) are widely available and

are routinely imported by developing countries

that have commercial fermentation industries. A

state seeking a CW capability, in contrast, re29& p. ~licoff, Senior Me~~, ‘lMmical Staff, Sandia National Laboratories, personal COmlll@catiolL 1992.

30 s= su~m Wn@t ~d SW: Kc@@ ‘‘~ probl~ of ~terpre@ tie U.S. BiOIOgic~ D~e~ llese~ch program,’ SUSan Wrigh~

cd., Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 167-196.

31 stw~o~ htemtio~ Pea:e Re~~h lnsti~te (SIPIU), The Problem of Chemical and Biological Wa~are, Vol. VI: Technical Aspects

of Early Warning and Verification (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1975), p. 24.

32 ~temiew tit.b Dr. Ron l“hibeauto~ Wyeth-Ayerst vaccine production pkm~ Marietta, pA, &t. 22, 1992.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation | 87

Figure 3-3-Production of Biological Agents by Fermentation

,~’y /’

~

Freeze-dried

seed culture fl

T

Propagation vessels ~LY@l.

Production-scale

fermenter

c--—

C2

.

‘\

“3.

‘7.—. .

/’”

Final processing — >

SOURCE: U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Global Spread of Chemical and Biological k$bapons,

IOlst Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 9, 1989 (S. Hrg. 101-794), p. 241.

quires hundreds or thousands of tons of unusual

precursor chemicals that may be difficult to

obtain.

PRODUCTION OF BACTERIAL AGENTS

A biological-warfare plant would contain fermenters and the means to sterilize and dispose of

hazardous biological wastes on a large scale. A

small vial of freeze-dried seed culture, grown in

a fermenter in a nutrient medium kept at constant

temperature, can result in kilograms of product

(e.g., anthrax bacteria) in as little as 96 hours.33

(See figure 3-3.) Microbial pathogens such as

plague bacteria can also be cultivated in living

animals, ranging from rats to horses.

Fermentation can be carried out on a batch

basis or in a continuous culture from which

organisms are constantly removed and an equal

volume of new culture medium is added. An

advantage of continuous culture is shorter turna33 Er~c~ op. cit., foomote 8, P. 32.
88 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

round time, increasing the productivity of each

fermenter. Indeed, if nutrients are supplied continuously and natural growth-inhibitors are removed as soon as they are formed, the bacterial

culture can be maintained indefinitely in a phase

in which it multiples exponentially. A continuous

culture can therefore yield nearly 10 times as

much product per volume of culture medium as

the batch approach.34 Nevertheless, batch culture

has generally been used to cultivate BW agents in

the past because continuous culture is technically

more complex and sometimes results in a loss of

potency. High levels of purity are not required for

BW agents; 60 to 70 percent purity will suffice

and is easy to obtain. The main technical hurdles

in bacterial production are:

the danger of infecting production workers;

genetic mutations that may lead to a loss of

agent potency; and

the contamination of bacterial cultures with

other microbes (e.g., bacterial viruses) that

may kill them or interfere with their effects.

Although biological agents can be grown in

ordinary laboratory flasks, an efficient production

capability would require the use of specialized

fermenters. Until fairly recently, large-scale production of bacteria for commercial or military

purposes required tank-type bioreactors containing thousands of liters of culture, with mechanical

stirring or a flow of air to oxygenate the culture

medium. During World War II, for example, the

Japanese Army ran a top-secret BTW facility in

occupied Manchuria at which more than 3,000

workers grew kilogram quantities of pathogenic

bacteria (including the agents of anthrax, brucellosis, plague, and typhus) in giant vats.35

Also during World War II, the United States

and Britain planned to produce anthrax bacteria in

large quantities for use in a strategic bombing

campaign against Germany. In 1943, a pilot

anthrax production plant became operational at

Camp Detrick, MD, staffed with about 500

bacteriologists, lab assistants, chemical engineers, and skilled technicians.36 Based on this

experience, the decision was made to build a

fill-scale plant at Vigo, Indiana, at a cost of $8

million, where 1,000 workers would manufacture

more than 500,000 anthrax bombs a month (or,

alternatively, 250,000 bombs filled with botulinal

toxin). Since both agents store well, they could be

stockpiled in large quantities. The Vigo plant was

completed in early 1945 but never actually went

into production. 37 Although it is far from certain

the anthrax bombs would have worked as designed, it is possible that large areas of Germany

could have been rendered uninhabitable for decades.

In 1950, the U.S. Congress voted $90 million

to build another BTW plant called X-201 at a

renovated arsenal near Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The

new production facility had 10 stories, 3 of them

underground, and was equipped with 10 fermenters for the mass-production of bacterial pathogens on short notice.38 To give some idea of the

scale involved, the Pine Bluff facility and its

associated munitions-falling plant required a water

supply of 2 million gallons per day, an electrical

power supply of 5 megawatts, and an initial

workforce of 858 people.39 Production of BW

~ SIPM, VO1. VI, op. cit., footnote 31, p. 43.

N me Jap~~B~fmfi~ WaS c~e.~~ Unit 731. John W. Powe~ “A Hidden Chapter in History,” Bulletin ojtheAro?nic ~denti$t$,

vol. 37, No. 8, October 1981, pp. 44-52. For a more detailed deseriptio~ see Petes Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan’s Secret

Biological Warjare in World War II (New Yorlq NY: Free Press, 1989).

36= ~d p~, op. cit., footnote 14, pp. 1(X L101.

37 Ibid,, p. 103.

SE Ibid., p. 160.

39 ~~ew Me~lsO~ hlartin M. Kapl~ and Mark A. Mokukk-y, ‘ ‘Vcrifkat.ionof BiologieaJ and ‘Rm.in WMpOrM Di saxmarnen4° Science

& Global Security, vol. 2, Nos. 2-3, 1991, p. 237.
Chapter 3–Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation | 89

agents on such a vast scale is far in excess of what

a country would need to wreak enormous destruction on an adversary.

Over the past decade, technological advances associated with the commercial biotechnology industry have made it possible to

produce large quantities of microorganisms in

much smaller facilities. The introduction of

computer-controlled, continuous-flow fermenters

and compact ultrafiltration methods has vastly

increased productivity, making it possible to

reduce the size of a fermenter to about 1,000-fold

less than conventional batch fermenters that give

equivalent production.40 Real-time sensors and

feedback loops under microprocessor control

have also optimized culture conditions, resulting

in much higher yields and better quality products

than in the past. The resulting increase in productivity has made it possible to reduce the amount

of trained manpower needed to operate largescale fermenters and to use smaller, more concealable production equipment. Of course, a

developing country could produce many smallscale batches of BTW agents in laboratory

glassware without the need for high-technology

fermenters.

PRODUCTION OF VIRAL AND RICKETTSIAL

AGENTS

Pathogenic viruses and rickettsiae are intracellular parasites that can only reproduce inside

living cells. There are two approaches to cultivating these agents: in intact living tissue (e.g., chick

embryos or mouse brains) or in isolated cells

growing in tissue culture. The latter approach is

technically simpler because it requires only flasks

and nutrient medium, but certain viruses (e.g.,

influenza) do not grow well in tissue culture and

must be cultivated in fertilized eggs. In 1962, Fort

Detrick used more than 800,000 eggs for the

cultivation of pathogenic viruses.41

Growing viruses and rickettsiae in cultured

mammalian cells offers greater control but involves certain technical hurdles. The cells must

adhere to a surface to grow and also require a

complex culture medium based on blood serum

obtained from horses and cows. Until recently,

cultured mammalian cells were grown on the

inner surface of rotating glass bottles, which

limited the volume of production. Over the past

decade, however, new methods for cultivating

mammalian cells have been developed that permit

higher concentrations of cells and greater recovery of product. For example, allowing the cells to

grow on surface of beads suspended in culture

medium has permitted the scaling-up of production. Yield has been improved further by replacing the beads with microcarriers, which have a

porous internal structure into which animal cells

can grow.

42

Hollow-fiber technology offers an even more

efficient method of growing anchoragedependent mammalian cells in high concentrations for the cultivation of viruses or rickettsiae.

The cells are grown on the outer surface of thin

fibers that are immersed in the growth medium;

air is pumped through the fibers and diffuses

through the fiber wall to reach the cells.43 Since

a single hollow-fiber bioreactor is equivalent to

several thousand one-liter roller bottles, it occu-

~ Gove~ent of Aus~~ia, ‘Impact of Recent Advances in Science and ‘Ikdmology on the Biological Weapons Convention’ Background

Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production

and Stockpiling ofBacten’ological (Biological) and Tom’n Weapons and on Their Destruction, Third Review Conference of the BWC (Genev%

Switzerland), Document No. BWC/CONF.111/4, Aug. 26, 1991, p. 3.

41 SePOW M. Her~~ Chemical ~nd Biological Wa$are: Am~ca’~ Hidden Arsenal @I&uMpofis, IN: Bobbs-M@l, 1%8), p. 78.

42 S.B. Wose, Molecular Biotechnology, 2d ed. (Oxford, England: Blackwell Scientitlc Publications, 1991), P. 116.

43 Government of the U.S.S.R, “Selected Scientilc and Technological Developments of Relevance to the BW Conventio~” Background

Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production

and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Tom”n Weapons and on Their Destruction, Third Review Conference of the BWC, Genev~

Switzerland, Document No. BWC/CONF.111/4/Add.1, Sept. 10, 1991, p. Al 1.
90 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

pies less than one-twentieth the volume of the

previous technology.

44 Advantages include economy and the high concentration and purity of the

end-product, which reaches 98 percent on leaving

the reactor. In sum, the new cell-culture techniques greatly simplify the production of viruses and rickettsiae and allow large-scale

yields from very small facilities.

PRODUCTION OF TOXINS

The most efficient way to produce bacterial

toxins is through fermentation. Botulinal toxin,

for example, is derived from a culture of Clostridium botulinum bacteria, which multiply rapidly

under the right conditions of temperature, acidity,

and the absence of oxygen. It takes only about 3

days to grow up a dense culture of the bacterial

cells, which extrude botulinal toxin into the

surrounding culture medium. (Purification of the

toxin is neither necessary nor desirable, since it

tends to reduce stability.) During World War II,

Japan’s Unit 731 produced kilogram quantities of

botulinal toxin in a fermenter approximately 10

feet high and 5 feet wide.45 A crude preparation of

toxin can be freeze-dried down to a solid cake,

which is then milled into a fine powder suitable

for dissemination through the air. The milling

operation is exceedingly hazardous, however, and

must be carried out under high-containment

conditions. Plant toxins such as ricin, whose raw

material is widely available, could easily be

produced in the hundreds of kilograms.

With recombinant-DNA techniques, rare

animal toxins—formerly available only in milligram amounts-can be prepared in significant quantities in microorganisms. Although

these techniques are still largely restricted to the

advanced industrial countries, they are spreading

rapidly around the world. One method, known as

the “cloning” of toxin genes, involves identifying DNA sequences in plants and animals that

govern the production of protein toxins, transferring these genes to a suitable microbial host, and

mass-producing the toxin in a fermenter. In this

way, ordinary bacterial cells can be transformed

into miniature toxin factories.% Production of

animal toxins in bacteria involves certain technical hurdles, however. Bacteria typically produce

and secrete toxins only under special conditions,

which may not be met in an artificial environment; and bacteria may be unable to perform

certain biochemical “processing” steps needed

to convert a protein toxin to its active form.47 For

these reasons, it maybe necessary to clone plant

and animal toxins in yeast or mammalian cells, a

technically more challenging task.

Nonprotein toxins are considerably harder

than protein toxins to produce in militarily

significant quantities. Until recently, even small

amounts of nonprotein toxins such as saxitoxin

had to be extracted from large quantities of

biological material with costly and laborintensive purification methods. For example, 270

kilograms of toxin-containing clam siphons yielded

less than 5 grams of saxitoxin. 48 Although some

nonprotein toxins such as saxitoxin and tetrodotoxin can be synthesized in the test tube with

multistep procedures, the overall yield is only

44 @vement of the United States, “lkchnological Developments of Relevance to the Biological and ‘Ibxin Weapons Convention”

BackgroundDocument on New Sciennj?c and Techno[ogica[Developments Relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Third Review Conference of the

BWC (Genev& Switzerland), Document No, BWC/COITF.111/4, Aug. 26, 1991, p. 30.

45 Wflh ~d JVmce, op. cit., fmtnote 35, p. 124.

46 Akm Wiseman, “The Organization of Production of Genetically-Engineered Proteins in Yeast,” Endeavor (new series), vol. 16, No. 4,

1992, pp. 190-193,

4T Mc~d Novick ~d Seth S,h- “New FOMM of Biological Warfare?’ Susan Wrigh4 cd., Preventing A Biological Arms Race

(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), p. 115.

48 Edwmd J. SChantZ et al., ‘‘Paralytic Shellfish Poison. IV. A Procedure for the Isolation and PurMcation of Poison from Toxic Clam and

Mussel Tissues,” Journal of the American Chemical Society, vol. 79, Oct. 5, 1957, pp. 5230-5235,
..— ———

Chapter 3–Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation I 91

Table 3-l—Key Production Techniques for BTW Agents

Type of agent Low-tech production High-tech production

Bacteria Batch fermentation, production in Genetically engineered strains, conanimals tinuous-flow fermentation

Rickettsiae and viruses Cultivation in eggs, mouse brains, Culture in mammalian cells grown

or tissue culture (roller bottles) on beads, microcarriers, or hollow

fibers

Protein toxins Batch fermentation and purification Cloning of toxin gene in microbial

of a bacterial toxin, or extraction of host, extraction

toxin from a plant or animal source

Nonprotein toxins Extraction from plant or animal Cloning of a series of genes, each

source governing production of one of the

enzymes needed to complete a

step In the biosynthetic pathway

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

about 0.1 percent, making it unlikely that militarily significant quantities of toxin could be produced by chemical synthesis.49 Biotechnological

approaches are possible but technically challenging, involving the synthesis not of a single protein

but of an entire series of enzymes, each necessary

to catalyze one step in a complex series of

reactions .50

Production techniques for the various types of

BTW agents are summarized in table 3-1. With

advanced fermentation techniques available

today, a militarily significant supply of BTW

agents could be produced over a period of

several days, obviating the need for the longterm stockpiling of agents. As a result, a BTW

production facility might remain largely quiescent in peacetime. After completing R&D,

weaponization, and pilot-production tests on

BTW agents, a proliferant could build production

and storage facilities and either keep them mothballed or in use for legitimate commercial purposes. Clandestine production facilities might be

kept in reserve, ready to be diverted to the rapid

manufacture of BTW agents in the event a major

conflict breaks out. Alternatively, a commercial

production facility could be kept in operation and

converted to BTW production in wartime. The

advantage of the latter option is that it would be

easier to retain the necessary trained staff and

up-to-date equipment, albeit at some cost in

secrecy.

CONTAINMENT MEASURES

Since working with pathogenic microorganisms is extremely hazardous, specialized physicalcontainment or ‘‘barrier’ measures are needed to

protect plant workers and the surrounding population from infection. Great care must be taken to

prevent BTW agents from escaping from a

production facility and causing a devastating

plague in the country producing the weapons.

In advanced industrial countries, work on

highly infectious microbial agents is carried out

in high-centainment (Biosafety Level 3 or 4)

facilities. In a BL3 facility, all personnel have

been immunized against the infectious agents

they work with. Since no vaccine is 100 percent

effective, however, they also wear protective

@ Muel L. Sanches et al., Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Signatures Analysis (Ml figto% VA: System plmg Corp, Final

Technical Report No. 1396, August 1991), p. 89.

so ~05e, op. cit., footnote 42, p. 84.
92 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

clothing, goggles, and face masks. Microorganisms are manipulated in special biohazard safety

cabinets maintained under “negative’ pressure

(lower than the outside atmosphere), so that air

flows into the work area. In addition to these

primary barriers, secondary barriers to the spread

of infectious materials include the use of highefficiency particulate air filters and the incineration of exhaust.51 Because viral particles are

about a hundredth the size of bacteria, they are

more difficult to contain with filters and other

means. Moreover, spore-forming bacteria (e.g.,

the agents of anthrax and tetanus) foul the

air-handling system with long-lived spores, which

can easily contaminate other products. As a result,

these bacteria are normally produced in separate

facilities. 52

A BL4 facility, the highest level of containment, is designed to isolate the human operator

from the infectious agents. Since research on

dangerous microbial pathogens requires handling

much lesser quantities of” hazardous material than

does production, it is generally performed in

small BL4 enclosures inside a less stringent BL3

facility .53 Such enclosures generally consist of

sealed boxes with rubber-glove ports that provide

absolute containment, and ‘hoodlines’ that make

it possible to move hazardous cultures directly

from a glove-box to an autoclave, which destroys

the infectious microorganisms with superheated

steam. In a larger BL4 research or production

facility, the human workers are isolated from the

microbes, rather than vice-versa. Each operator

wears a self-contained “space suit” and is

completely isolated from the surrounding room,

which is contaminated with infectious agents. He

or she enters the laboratory through an air-lock

and hooks up to a supply of compressed air. The

suit is kept under positive pressure so that if there

is any loss of physical integrity, the leaking air

will blow outwards, reducing the risk of infection.

A developing country seeking to develop

biological weapons would probably use much

less elaborate containment measures. During

World War II, for example, the Japanese Army’s

Unit 731 produced vast quantities of highly

infectious agents, yet the workers were protected

only by wearing rubberized suits, masks, surgical

gloves, and rubber boots, and by receiving

vaccinations against the agents they were working with. The United Nations inspections of Iraq

after the 1991 Gulf War revealed that BTW

researchers in that country’s BTW program used

surprisingly rudimentary containment measures,

at the level of a BL2 facility. Laboratory technicians were vaccinated against the infectious

agents they worked with and used simple laboratory hoods, but they did not wear masks or

protective clothing.

Commercially available containment systems

used for vaccine production might be suitable for

cultivating highly pathogenic organisms. To comply with environmental and occupational-health

standards and to ensure the purity of products for

human use, many pharmaceutical plants carry out

the microbial production of antibiotics and other

drugs in a “clean room” that is comparable to a

formally designated BL4 facility. Clean rooms for

drug production are normally kept Under positive

pressure to keep contaminants out, whereas areas

of a vaccine plant used for the culture of in

fectious microorganisms are kept under negative

pressure to prevent the dangerous microbes from

escaping. In principle, the direction of air flow

could be reversed, albeit with some difficulty.

Methods for sterilizing equipment after use

with hazardous microorganisms include physical

measures such as dry heat or pressurized, superheated steam; ionizing radiation such as x-rays

‘1 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Medical Resetirch and Development Coremand, op. cit., footnote 5, p. 7-15.

52 G- E&fi vice pr~ident for operations, Connaught Laboratories (Svfifhvater, IA), pUSO@ Commticatio% 1~.

53 Ha&fl M~covi@ “verification of High-Containment Facil.itiea,” S.J. Lund@ cd., Views on Possible Verification Measures for the

Biological Weapons Convention (Oxford, England: SIPRI/Oxford University Preas, 1991), p. 55.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation | 93

and high-energy ultraviolet radiation; and chemical treatment with formaldehyde or bleach.54

Sophisticated biotechnology plants often have

self-sterilizing fermenters and process equipment,

whether or not they are handling hazardous microorganisms. Such plants would therefore have an

inherent capability to work with BTW agents.

| Stabilization of BTW Agents

Once BTW agents have been produced, it is

necessary to process them into a form that

enhances their stability in storage and after

dissemination, so that they remain viable long

enough to infect. Since microbial pathogens are

living organisms, they will eventually deteriorate

and die unless their metabolism is slowed down

or stopped. Such a process of suspended animation occurs naturally in the case of spore-forming

microorganisms such as anthrax, which can

survive for decades in the dormant spore form.

Nonspore-forming microbes and most toxins,

however, tend to break down rapidly in the

environment if not protected. For this reason,

BTW agents are generally most effective if

disseminated within a few days after production.

If rapid use is not feasible, the live agents must be

converted into a more stable form so that they can

survive the stresses of storage, transport, and

dissemination.

FREEZE-DRYING

One method for enhancing the stability of

BTW agents is rapid freezing and subsequent

dehydration under a high vacuum, a process

known as freeze-drying or lyophilization. In a few

hours, a lyophilizer, a device mainly used in the

pharmaceutical industry, reduces a solution of

bacteria and a sugar stabilizer to a small cake of

dried material that can then be milled into any

desired state of freeness. Lyophilization avoids

the need to maintain microorganisms in inconvenient and dangerous liquid suspensions during

storage and transportation. It also makes possible

a significant increase in agent potency by direct

inhalation of particles of dried agent into the

lungs. 55 This technique is also applicable to

toxins; a fine dust of dried toxin, if inhaled, can be

deadly in extremely small quantities.

If kept in cold storage, the desiccated organisms will remain viable for long periods, although they still deteriorate. For example, freezedried brucellosis bacteria can be stored for several

months, and Q-fever rickettsiae for up to 8

years. 56 Lyophilization alSO extends the shelf-life

of protein toxins: freeze-dried Staphylococcus

enterotoxin B (SEB) can be stored for up to a year.

Even so, the virulence and viability of lyophilized

BTW agents decays over time: there is a loss of

potency of a factor of 10 to 100 over a period of

1 to 5 years, so that much larger quantities of older

agent are required to produce the same military

effect. 57

CHEMICAL ADDITIVES

The stability of a microbial aerosol can be

increased by adding a variety of compounds to the

spray material.58 Moreover, antiagglomerants such

as colloidal silica help prevent the clumping of

freeze-dried microbial agents and toxins that have

been milled into a fine powder. Agricultural

research on biological pesticides, such as the

insect-killing bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis,

has provided much information on methods for

stabilizing bacterial agents in the field. For

example, new formulations of B. thuringiensis

have been developed that extend the life of the

~ DW~ent of my, U.S, AI-My MedicaJ Research and Development Co remand, op. cit., footnote 5, pp. A-132, A-13-3.

55 WIiH~ ad Wfice, op. cit., footnote 35, p. 72.

SC Rotichild, op. cit., foo~ote 9, pp. 206-219.

57 SPRI, VO1. VI, op. cit., foomote 31, p. 50.

58 Row J. Goodlo~ ~d F~~c A. ~~, “Viability and I.nfcctivity of Microorganisms in Experimental Airborne InfectiorL”

Bacteriological Reviews, vol. 25, 1%1, p. 185.
94 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

disseminated bacteria by means of ultraviolet

protestants and other additives that ensure compatibility with existing agricultural sprayers.59

MICROENCAPSULATION

Another approach to stabilization, known as

microencapsulation, emulates natural spore formation by coating droplets of pathogens or

particles of toxin with a thin coat of gelatin,

sodium alginate, cellulose, or some other protective material. (An industrial example of microencapsulation is the production of carbonless carbon

paper, in which ink droplets are coated in this

manner.) Microencapsulation can be performed

with physical or chemical methods.60

Micromcapsulation production methods can

be set up to generate particles of a selected size

range (e.g., 5 to 10 microns).6l The polymer

coating protects the infectious agent against

environmental stresses such as desiccation, sunlight, freezing, and the mechanical stresses of

dissemination, and permits cold-storage of microbial pathogens for several months. Microcapsules

can be charged electrostatically to reduce particle

clumping during dissemination, or ultravioletlight blocking pigments can be added to the

microcapsule to protect microorganisms against

degradation by sunlight. Once in the target

environment, such as the interior of the lung, the

polymer coating dissolves, releasing the agent.

Microencapsulation can also be applied to toxins,

making them more stable, predictable, and safer

to handle.

| Integration With Delivery Systems

A biological or toxin agent is of little military

utility if it does not produce consistent and

reliable effects and cannot be delivered to a target.

BTW agents are all nonvolatile solids that would

be disseminated either as a liquid slurry or a dry

powder of freeze-dried organisms or toxin.62

Possible delivery systems range in complexity

and effectiveness from an agricultural sprayer

mounted on a truck to a specialized cluster

warhead carried on a ballistic missile. T h e

difficulty of delivery-system development depends on the proliferant’s military objectives.

It is not hard to spread BTW agents in an

indiscriminate way for the purpose of producing large numbers of casualties over a wide

area. It is much more difficult, however, to

develop BTW munitions that have predictable

or controllable military effects against point

targets, such as troop concentrations on the

battlefield.

Many pathogens infect man naturally by means

of an intermediary organism (“vector’ ‘), such as

a mosquito or tick.63 Military microbiologists

discovered during World War II, however, that

BTW agents can be disseminated through the air,

making it possible to infect large numbers of

people simultaneously. Many microbial pathogens and toxins-even those normally transmitted by vectors or in food-can invade the body

through the lungs, giving rise to foci of infection

or traveling through the bloodstream to other

parts of the body. The key to producing large59 ~Ve~nt of the United Kingdom, ‘‘General Developments Relevant to the BWC,’ in Background Document on New Scientific and

Technological DevelopmentsRelevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling ofBacteriological

(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Third Review Conference of the BWC (Genev& Switzerland), Document No.

BWC/CONF.111/4, Aug. 26, 1991, p. 25.

@ -UOSO1 et al,, eds., Remington’s Pharmuceutica2 Sciences, 15th ed. (Eastou PA: M@ mbl- CO., 1975), P. 1604.

61 A ~c.n iS ~ ~ou~th of a fi~eter.

62 C.V. Chester and G. P. Ziummnaq ‘‘Civil Defense hnplieat.ions Of Biological WMPOIIS,” Journal of Civil De$ense, vol. 17, No, 6,

December 1984, p. 6.

63 me disme v~~r is usually some type of arthropod: mosquitoes ~“t yellow fever and dengue fevw, fleas transmit plague; and ticks

transmit tularernia and Q fever, During 1932-45, the Japan~e BW facility known as Unit 731 set up flea “nurseries” for the production of

135 miUion plague-infested fleas every 4 months. As a delivexy systenA porcelain bombs were developed that could contain about 30,000

infected fleas. See Williams and Wallace, op. cit., footnote 35, p. 27.
Chapter 3–Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation | 95

scale respiratory infections is to generate a

biological “aerosol”: a stable cloud of suspended microscopic droplets, each containing

from one to thousands of bacterial or virus

particles. (Fogs and smokes are examples of

visible aerosols.) Biological aerosols can be

produced with a relatively simple piece of machinery, analogous to a home vaporizer, that

sprays a suspension of microorganisms through

fine nozzles, converting about 85 percent of their

starting material into droplets in the desired size

range.

64 The concentration of organisms in the

starting solution influences the distribution of

organisms among the aerosol particles.65

Aerosol dissemination of many vector-borne

diseases, such as yellow fever, Rocky Mountain

spotted fever, tularemia, and tick-borne encephalitis, can produce atypical infections of the

respiratory tract. Respiratory infection with such

agents bypasses normal protective mechanisms

such as local inflammatory processes and increases the virulence of pathogens that normally

have a low lethality, such as Venezuelan equine

encephalitis (VEE).66 In the case of microbial

pathogens that can be transmitted by different

routes, such as anthrax bacteria, respiratory infection results in by far the most virulent form of the

disease. For example, whereas untreated skin

anthrax is fatal in only about 5 percent of cases,

pulmonary anthrax is fatal in more than 90

percent of cases.67

Freeze-dried toxins can also be disseminated in

the form of an aerosol. Recent studies have shown

that saxitoxin and T-2 trichothecene mycotoxin

are at least 10 times more toxic when administered by aerosol than by intravenous injection.68

Because protein toxins are large organic molecules, however, they are susceptible to environmental stresses such as heat, oxidation, and shear

forces. As a result, attempts to aerosolize toxins

have encountered problems in maintainingg the

stability of the agent before and after dissemination. It is also difficult to formulate protein toxins

capable of penetrating the skin.

The primary challenge in weaponizing BTW

agents for long-range delivery is to keep them

alive long enough to infect enemy troops. The

agent must be capable of withstanding the

physical stresses involved in the dissemination

process without losing activity. Technical hurdles involved in the design of self-dispensing

biological weapons are as follows:

■

the munition or delivery system must generate a cloud of aerosol particles with dimensions that allow them to be inhaled deep into

the lungs of the target personnel;

the agent must be physically stabilized so

that it can survive the process of dissemination long enough to infect the target personnel;

the agent must disseminated slowly to permit

aerosolization while avoiding loss of viability or toxicity; and

the overall size and shape of the aerosol

cloud and the concentration of agent within

it must be reasonably predictable, so that the

dispersion pattern can be matched to the

target.69

These technical hurdles are discussed below.

64 Wton Lcitenberg, “Biological Weapons, ’ Scientist and Citizen, vol. 9, No. 7, August-September 1%7, p. 157.

65 Goodlow and Leonard, op. cit., footnote 58, p. 1*4.

66 World He~~ org~=tiom Hea/~h A~pecr~ ~~C~em”ca/ and Biological Weapons (Geneva: W-lo, 1970), p. 61.

ST ~llcoff, op. cit., footnote 29.

68 Gove~ent of the U. S. S. R., “Selected Scientific and Technological Developments of Relevance to the BW Convention” op. cit.,

footnote 43, p. A lO.

69 stoc~o~ Intemtio~ pe~e Re~em~h Imti~te (SrpRr), The Problem of chemical andBiOIOgical wa~are, VOI. II: CB wt?clpO?lS TOC@I

(Stockholm: Alrnqvist & WikeH, 1973), pp. 72-73.
96 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

EFFECT OF PARTICLE SIZE

The particle size of an aerosol is critical to both

its atmospheric stability and its military effectiveness. Whereas larger particles tend to settle out of

the air, microscopic particles between one and

five microns in diameter form a stable aerosol in

which the particles remain airborne for a long

time. The very low settling velocity of the

particles will by itself keep a biological aerosol

cloud suspended in the air for long periods. Such

a cloud may therefore be transported by the wind

over long distances. Moreover, losses resulting

from fallout and washout are negligible and do

not significantly reduce the concentration of an

aerosol cloud. Particles less than 5 microns in

diameter generally do not collide with smooth

surfaces in their path but are carried over them by

air currents. In contrast, transport over rough

surfaces for distances of more than a kilometer

can result in significant deposition.

Aerosolized BTW agents generally do not

penetrate the skin and thus do not represent a

significant contact hazard; instead, they infect

individuals only if inhaled into the lungs .70

Particle size is also critical for respiratory infection. Almost all particles larger than 5 microns in

diameter are trapped in the phlegm and passages

of the upper respiratory tract, while particles

smaller than 1 micron diameter are exhaled

without being retained in the deep lung tissue.

Only particles between 1 and 5 microns in

diameter are small enough to reach the tiny

terminal air sacs (alveoli) of the lung, bypassing

the body’s natural filtering and defense mechanisms. In one set of experiments on the effect of

particle size on respiratory infection, tularemia

bacteria were administered to guinea pigs as an

aerosol. When the aerosol. particles were 1 micron

in diameter, only 3 bacterial cells per animal were

needed to kill 50 percent of the guinea pigs, but

when the particle size was increased to 7 microns,

the number of bacteria per animal required to kill

half of the guinea pigs rose to 6,500.71

PHYSICAL STABILIZATION

The use of mechanical devices to generate

aerosols from a bulk storage tank places a variety

of mechanical stresses on microorganisms, reducing the number of viable, infectious cells. Relatively few microbial pathogens can meet the

stability requirements of bulk dissemination.72

Those agents best suited for long-range attack can

infect with a small number of microorganisms

and are hardy enough to survive for a fairly long

period floating in the air. Once released, however,

the aerosol cloud “decays” over time as the

microorganisms die as a result of exposure to

oxygen, atmospheric pollutants, sunlight, and

desiccation, resulting in a loss of viability (ability

to survive and multiply) and virulence (ability to

cause disease and injury). A BW agent disseminated into a given environment may also retain its

viability while losing its virulence.73

Decay of an aerosol cloud occurs in two stages.

Initial dissemination is followed by a period of

very rapid cell death during the first several

seconds after the cloud has been released. Indeed,

producing a liquid aerosol by explosive dispersion or passage through a spray device may kill as

many as 95 percent of the microorganisms. This

initial stage is followed by a much slower rate of

decay, so that the aerosol cloud may persist for

long periods of time. A relative humidity of over

70 percent promotes microbial survival.74 Largeparticle clouds are more resistant to the lethal

effects of solar radiation than small-particle

70 Ibid., p. 29.

71 ~j. WiU~ D. Sawy=, “Airborne rnfectiom” Military Medicine, February 1%3, pp. 90-92.

72 SIPRI, VOI. II, op. cit., footnote 69, p. 30.

73 *UP of com~~t ~p~ on ~efic~ ~d Bacteriolo@~ @iolo@@ WqXMM, Chem”cal ati Bacteriological (Biological)

Weapons and the Z2’ecrs of Their /Dossible Use, United Nations Report No. E.69.I.24 (New York NY: Ballantine Books, 1970), p. 13.

74 r)q~ent of the AIIIy, U.S. Army Medical Research md Development CO mman~ op. cit., footnote 5, p. A7-16.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation! 97

clouds, and dry disseminated aerosols are more

resistant than wet aerosols. 75 As the plume

disperses, long-lived particles (e.g., anthrax

spores) may be deposited on the ground, where

they may then adhere to large particles of surface

soil and dust. If the surface is disturbed, either by

the wind or by human activities, the spores can

again be resuspended, potentially causing additional infections.76 The inhalation hazard is much

reduced, however, owing to the large particle size.

TYPES OF AEROSOL ATTACKS

There are two types of aerosol dissemination of

BTW agents. “Area” attack involves releasing

an aerosol cloud upwind and allowing it to drift

over the target area. In contrast, “point” attack

involves projecting the agent in a cannister that

releases the agent immediately over the target.77

Area attack

A BTW weapon designed for area attack would

disseminate its payload as an aerosol cloud

containing a sufficient concentration of viable

microorganisms to infect the targeted personnel

with particles in the 1 to 5 micron size range. The

simplest means of area delivery is with spray

tanks mounted on manned aircraft, unmanned

remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), or cruise

missiles, which can release a large quantity of

agent over a controlled line of flight. A slowflying aircraft such as a crop duster could

discharge a line of agent that, as it travelled

downwind, would reach the ground as a vast,

elongated infective cloud. Such a linear cloud of

agent, known as a ‘‘line source, can cover a

larger area than a cloud released from a single

spot, or ‘‘point source. ’

Air rushing past the spray tank can be used to

force out its contents; alternatively, compressed

air or carbon dioxide may be used to disseminate

the agent. Aerosol generators might also be

operated from offshore ships or submarines parallel to a coastline, producing an invisible cloud of

BTW agents that could be carried by the prevailing winds over key coastal cities or military

bases. 78 The discharge rate must be slow enough

to generate a stable aerosol, yet slow-flying

aircraft and RPVs are extremely vulnerable to air

defenses.

Area attack with a biological aerosol depends

heavily on atmospheric diffusion and wind currents to dilute and spread the agent over the area

being attacked. The most stable atmospheric

conditions occur on cold, clear nights or early in

the morning, when the ground and the layer of air

above it are cooler than the next higher 1ayer of

air. This phenomenon, called an inversion, is

ideal for the delivery of BTW agents because the

stable interface of warm and cold air prevents the

vertical mixing of the cloud and causes it to hug

the ground, keeping the organisms at a low

altitude where they can be inhaled. In contrast,

bright sunlight causes atmospheric turbulence

that breaks up the aerosol cloud, and also contains

ultraviolet rays that kill many microorganisms.

For these reasons, a BTW attack would be most

likely to come at dusk or at night.79

The effectiveness of an area attack also requires detailed knowledge of the prevailing wind

direction and speed. Under favorable wind conditions, an aerosol cloud could contaminate the air

over large areas, but if the wind is erratic or

excessively strong, the agent might fail to reach

the target or might be dissipated too rapidly to be

75 G@ow and bonard, op. cit., footnote 58, p. 184.

76 ~onB~Wige,~n~a/ation HUardfiom Reaero$o/izedBio/ogicalAgent$:A Review, Repod No. ~EC-l_’R~13 (A~rd@nprov@

Ground, MD: Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center, September 1992).

77 SIPRI, vol. II, op. cit., footnote 69, p. 28.

78 W, Seth cm, “The poor Man’s Atomic Bo&?”: Biological Weapons in the Middle East, Washington IDstitute Policy Papers No. 23

(WashingtorL DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), p. 11.

79 ~ester ~d zimme= op. cit., footnote 62, P. 7.
98 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

effective. Assuming the target is nearby, the

attackers will know the wind direction and can

plan the attack at a favorable time. If the target is

deep inside enemy territory, local meteorological

conditions would be harder to assess without

access to current weather data. Nevertheless,

hundreds of airports worldwide broadcast wind

direction, speed, cloud cover, and temperature

every 3 hours according to World Meteorological

Organization guidelines.

A remotely piloted vehicle or subsonic cruise

missile flying at low altitude might reduce such

problems by disseminating the toxic cloud

close to the ground just upwind of the target—

assuming, of course, that the attacker had the

means of knowing which way the wind was

blowing over the target area. In 1960, the U.S.

Army began developing a drone aircraft that

could be used to deliver chemical and biological

weapons. The pilotless plane was designed to

carry 200 pounds of germ agents as far as 115

miles. 80 Even relatively unsophisticated cruise

missiles might be capable of generating linesource aerosols for off-target attacks.81 For this

reason, the simultaneous proliferation of biological weapons and cruise-missile capabilities

may become a major security threat in the

future.

Point attack

A point BTW attack would be performed with

munitions delivered by artillery, rockets, missiles, or aircraft. Although the targeted personnel

would be warned of the attack by the arrival of the

munition, the rapid formation of a concentrated

aerosol (within 15 to 30 seconds) means that

many soldiers would inhale an incapacitating or

lethal dose of agent before they had time to put on

their gas masks properly, assuming they were

available. 82 A point attack that dropped the agent

directly over the targeted personnel would also be

much less dependent on meteorological conditions, although it would require a much higher

payload of munitions per area covered.

MUNITIONS FOR POINT ATTACK

Munitions developed for chemical-warfare agents

are generally unsuited for biological warfare

because of the lower stability of BTW agents and

their susceptibility to environmental factors such

as ultraviolet radiation and air pollution. There

are two basic methods for disseminating BTW

agents from a munition: explosive and pressurized. Whereas explosive dissemination produces

an almost instantaneous build-up of aerosol

concentration over the target, it destroys a large

portion of the infectious agents and tends to

produce drops that are considerably larger than

the optimal droplet size for inhalation.83 I n

contrast, pressurized munitions do not disperse

agent as rapidly as explosive munitions but

provide better control of particle size, are gentler

on the microorganisms, and produce an aerosol

cloud that is visible for a shorter period of time.

One method of pressurized delivery is to force a

liquid suspension of agent through a fine nozzle,

which breaks up the material into droplets of the

appropriate size.

A BTW bomb or warhead may either be

filled with bulk agent or with numerous

self-dispensing cluster-bomb units (CBUs). A

cluster bomb has a casing that breaks open during

delivery to scatter a large number of smaller

submunitions over a wide area. The submunitions

then fall to earth and are triggered to go off at an

altitude of about 15 to 20 feet off the ground. Each

of these bomblets generates a small aerosol cloud;

these multiple point sources are then coalesced by

air currents into a single large cloud. During

World War II, the United States and Great Britain

80 I-k@ op. cit., foo~ote 41, .P. 71.

al ~, op. cit., foomote 78, PP. 1o11.

82 Rowhild, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 76.

83 Ibid., p. 60.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation 199

jointly developed a 500-pound bomb for the

delivery of anthrax spores. Each bomb casing

contained 106 four-pound bomblets designed to

burst in midair, producing dense aerosols of

spores. Twenty of these bomblets could cause a

high fatality rate among humans and livestock

over a one-square-mile area, and British war plans

called for using as many as 40,000 anthrax bombs

against six German cities.84

Nevertheless, the technical difficulty of dispensing submunitions should not be underestimated. Missile delivery would place severe environmental stresses on microbial agents, including

freezing temperatures prevailing at high altitudes

and friction-heating of the missile nosecone

during reentry through the atmosphere, which

could be fatal to microbes without sufficient

insulation. The timing of agent dissemination

would also be critical, since if it occurred at the

wrong altitude, the agent would not form a

militarily effective aerosol. Releasing the agent

too high would cause it to dissipate before it could

be inhaled by the targeted troops; releasing it too

low would merely produce a puddle of toxic

material on the ground. In sum, effective agent

dissemination requires a series of mechanical

steps to work perfectly, and atmospheric conditions to cooperate.

Other problems associated with weaponization

include the hazards of loading munitions with

agent, and corrosion and seepage from filled

munitions. Despite these technical hurdles, however, effective biological munitions have been

developed and deployed in the past. In 1951, the

first anticrop cluster bombs were placed in

production for the U.S. Air Force; each bomblet

contained turkey feathers centaminated with cereal rust spores.85 Also during the 1950s, the

United States developed small, self-dispersing

BTW bomblets for the Honest John missile.86

In conclusion, strategic BTW attacks against

cities might be carried out with relatively simple

off-target delivery systems, such as a spray tank

carried by an aircraft. After dissemination, the

aerosol cloud might behave in unexpected ways

in response to changes in the wind and weather,

potentially boomeranging against the attacker’s

own troops or population.87 More controlled point

attacks with BTW agents for military purposes

would require the use of missiles or bombs,

possibly equipped with cluster munitions, but

such attacks would be technically more difficult

to carry out.

Some analysts contend that the most probable

use of BTW agents would be for covert warfare

against crops, livestock, or human populations for

purposes of economic destabilization. In this

case, relatively small quantities of BTW agents

might be introduced by human saboteurs directly

into the air or water supply of a city or military

installation.

INDICATORS OF BTW AGENT

PRODUCTION

Detection and monitoring of BTW agent production is an extremely challenging task for the

following reasons:

■ All equipment and feedstock materials used

to make BTW agents is dual-use and could

be used for legitimate purposes in the biotechnology or pharmaceutical industries.

■ Utilizing new biotechnologies, production

could take place in facilities that are much

smaller and less conspicuous than in the past,

84 Barton J. Berstein, “Churchill’s Secret Biological Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1987, pp. 4&50.

85 SIPRI, VO1. II, op. cit., footnote 69, p. 160.

86 Rothschild, op. cit., footnote 9, p. 78.

87 h 1942, dtig World War II, special Japanese troops spread diseases such as cholera, typhoi~ plague, ~d ~~~ -.

Subsequently, more than 10,000 Japanese soldiers fell ill after they overran a contamma “ ted are% presuma bly because regular soldiers had not

been informed about the use of biological weapons. Barend ter Haar, The Future of Biological Weapons, The Washington Papers No. 151 (New

York NY: Praeger, 1991), p. 5.
100 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

with no obvious signs to indicate illicit

activity.

■ Legitimate facilities might be diverted to the

production of BTW agents in a relatively

short time.

■ Since microbial agents can be grown in an

advanced fermenter from a few cells to many

kilograms of agent over a period of days or

weeks, it would not be necessary to maintain

large stockpiles (although filled or empty

munitions would need to be stored).

 The extreme potency of BTW agents means

that as little as a few kilograms can be

militarily significant.

■ BTW agents would be hard to distinguish

from naturally occurring pathogens, particularly if the agents are endemic to the affected

area.

 There is an enormous variety of potential

BTW agents, each requiring a specific detection method.88

According to a State Department official, “In

many ways, recent progress in biological technology increases the ease of concealment of illicit

manufacturing plants, particularly for biologically derived chemicals such as toxins. . . . Not

only has the time from basic research to mass

production decreased but the ability to create

agents and toxins with more optimal weapon

potential has increased. Simply put, the potential

for undetected breakout from treaty constraints

has increased significantly.”89 Thus, while the

characteristics of a given facility may be consistent with an offensive BTW program, the odds of

finding a “smoking gun’’ -such as a munition

filled with BTW agent—are quite low.

Despite these difficulties, however, a few

factors constrain the detection problem. Microbial pathogens and toxins of military concern

have relatively few civilian uses in scientific

research and medical therapy, and such applications are generally confined to sophisticated

biomedical research centers not often found in

developing countries. As a result, there are some

production and weaponization signatures that-if

integrated effectively with national intelligence

collection and declarations of activities and

facilities relevant to the Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention-might provide strong circumstantial evidence of a clandestine BTW

program.

| Research and Development Signatures

Many research and development activities

related to BTW agents are inherently ambiguous

in that they can support both defensive and

offensive purposes. It is therefore essential to

evaluate the evidence in the context of a country

overall behavior and the openness and transparency of its nominally defensive program. Telltale

indicators of a BTW program might include the

existence of biological research facilities operated under military control, the large-scale production of vaccines in excess of legitimate

domestic needs, or the purchase of dual-use

biological materials and equipment. Analysts

searching for indicators of foreign BTW activities

should avoid “mirror-imaging’ ‘—the temptation

to judge other countries by U.S. standards. Only

by first understanding a country’s commercial

standards for biological containment and good

manufacturing practice is it possible to identify

anomalies that do not fit this basic profile.90

SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS

The collection and systematic analysis of

scientific and technical information published by

a country of proliferation concern can help to

S6 stwhen S, Morse, ‘‘Strategies for Biological Weapons Verification” Proceedings of the Arms Control and Verification Technology

Conference, Williamsburg, VA, June 1992 (Washingtoxq DC: Defense Nuclear Ageney, in press.)

69 H. Allen Ho~es, “Biolo@c~ WM~ns proliferatio~” Department of Sfate Bufkrin, VO1. 89, JulY 1989, p. 43.

w Graham S. Pearsoq ‘Biological Weapons: ~ British View,’ p=sentation at a Seminar on Biological Weapons in the 1990s, sponsored

by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, Nov. 4, 1992.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation I 101

monitor research trends, identify institutions and

scientists associated with such research activities

(including cooperation with foreign states), and

identify gaps or abrupt halts in open research on

particular topics that may be suggestive of

military censorship. Although such literature

analysis is unlikely to reveal BTW activities that

have been deliberately concealed, it can raise

questions about the capabilities and activities of

various facilities and is useful when combined

with other sources of information. For example,

useful intelligence on Soviet BW activities was

reportedly gleaned from clues picked up in the

Soviet scientific literature. By tracking the award

of academic honors and by noticing obvious gaps

in a series of published papers, Western intelligence analysts could judge which fields of

biological research Soviet military scientists had

entered.91 During the 1970s and ‘80s, for example, the Soviet literature contained a remarkably

large number of publications on toxin research.92

Nevertheless, publication tracking is not a

reliable indicator of a BTW program. First, it

requires the existence of a preliminary scientific

research effort before a country undertakes production of BTW agents. In the past, countries with

offensive BTW programs, such as Japan, Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union,

launched a major scientific research effort in

relevant areas of microbiology before they could

develop biological weapons. Today, however,

much of the basic science is already well understood, and explicit weapon-development programs could be undertaken with relatively little

preliminary research.

Second, because many variables affect scientific productivity and publication rates, publication tracking can only provide a broad indication

of a state’s BTW activities. The scientific culture

in many developing countries does not demand

large numbers of publications, so there will be

fewer to monitor. Finally, the biomedical databases available for tracking (e.g., MEDLINE) do

not have representative numbers of scientific

abstracts from the countries of greatest proliferation concern, particularly for papers not published

in English.93 For this reason, the number of

abstracts in the database dealing with microbial

and toxin agents may not correlate either positively or negatively with a country’s BTW

activities. For all these reasons, publication analysis is an unreliable-although potentially useful—

indicator of BTW activity.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Because of the limited value of technical

collection systems such as satellites for monitoring BTW activities, human intelligence is vital in

this area. For example, Vladimir Pasechnik, a

Russian microbiologist with first-hand knowledge of the Soviet BTW program, defected to

Britain in 1989 while attending a scientific

conference in London and provided extensive

information on Soviet BTW activities that was

unobtainable by other means.94 Human agents

and defectors can also confirm suspicions about

sites and activities based on other sources of

intelligence. Nevertheless, the UNSCOM biological inspections of Iraq have shown that human

intelligence can be unreliable or misleading if the

individual reporting does not have direct knowledge or is unfamiliar with the technical details of

what he is describing.95

91 Harris and Paxman, op. cit., foomote 14, p. 114.

92 David B&r, “~emi~~ ~d Biologic~ w~~e Agen~_AFre~App~~~’ Ja~e’~J~re//~ge~ceReview, VO]. s, ~0, ~, ~a13~ 199s,

p. 44.

w ~licoff, op. cit., foomote 29.

94 Bin Gem, “Defecting Russian Scientist Revealed Biological -~ofis,” The Washington Times, July 4, 1992, p. A4.

95 ~lqhone fitwiw ~~ David H~soll, de- S~hOol of Vete- Medicine, ~~.s@ Swte Un.iversiv, Baton Rouge, ~, Aug. 17,

1992.
102 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

| Weaponization and Testing Signatures

Weaponization involves the determination of

whether a candidate BTW agent is militarily

effective and how it would be used. These

activities have no obvious civilian counterpart,

and hence would be indicative of a clandestine

BTW development program. Signatures associated with the testing of candidate BTW agents

might be easier to detect than agent production

signatures, and inspections focusing on weaponization activities would also be more acceptable to

the biotechnology industry than production monitoring, since they would not compromise trade

secrets.

Examples of weaponization and testing signatures that might be observable with overhead

photography include field tests of aerosol dispersal patterns, tests of effectiveness against large

animals, and the surreptitious burial of dead

animals from weaponization tests .96 Other weaponization signatures would only be visible

during an onsite inspection. For example, specialized aerosol test chambers might be used to

study the behavior of biological aerosols in the

environment or the detonation of BTW munitions. If such a test facility were found in a

nominally civilian vaccine plant, it would be

extremely suspicious. Indeed, the secret Soviet

BW facility at the All-Union Research Institute of

Applied Microbiology in Oblensk reportedly

contained two such test chambers. The “aerosoldissemination test chamber’ consisted of a steel

cube, roughly 50 feet on a side, in which

experimental animals were tethered to the floor

and exposed to BW aerosols released from ceiling

vents. There was also a reinforced ‘‘explosivetest chamber’ in which the detonation of BW

munitions was simulated.97

Although some analysts contend that weaponization could be carried out in enclosed,

unobtrusive facilities, others argue that the

integration of signatures from a variety of

sources would make a militarily significant

weaponization program difficult to hide. Nevertheless, there are a number of potential concealment strategies:

Weaponization studies short of actual field

tests could be performed inside production

facilities.

Open-air testing of BTW weapons would be

difficult to detect if the test grid were

masked, or if there were no distinctive

delivery systems or advance indications of

where to look. In addition, since many BTW

agents are sensitive to sunlight, they would

be tested at night.98

Certain legitimate activities, such as the

dissemination of biopesticides on crops, or

the use of conventional smoke bombs, might

be used as a cover for BTW weaponization

testing.

growing number of countries, for example,

are replacing chemical pesticides with certain

microorganisms that are natural insect-killers.

Although over 100 bacteria, fungi, and viruses

infect insects, only a very few are in commercial

production. The most widely used is Bacillus

thuringiensis, a bacterium that produces a crystalline protein toxic to insects and is applied to crops

as an aerosol from agricultural sprayers.99 Although B. thuringiensis does not have the characteristics of a BW agent and would be a poor

simulant for weaponization studies, field tests

with bacteria more closely resembling BW agents

could be disguised as biopesticide application.

Thus, if biopesticides are already in use in the

96 Rst rmges will Mely be at remote locations. The former Soviet UnioW for example, operated a BTW test site on isolated VO~fideniye Island in the Aral Sea.

97 John Bamy, “P1 arming a Plague?” Newsweek, Feb. 1, 1993, p. 40.

‘3S J~es-s, Engines of Wlzr: Merchants of Death and the New Arms Race (New Yor& NY: Atlantic Monthly press, 1990), P. 221.

99 primrose, op. cit., footnote 42, P. 76+
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation I 103

local agricultural sector, a covert proliferant could

use them to test the open-air dissemination of

microbial aerosols in preparation for germ warfare, and also to justify the acquisition of hardware needed to disperse the agent. Nevertheless,

substantial field tests using grams or kilograms of

micron-sized particles could be detected in samples taken at great distances downwind if the

organism had distinctive DNA sequences and

those doing the detection knew what to look for.

| Production Signatures

Production of BTW agents is nearly impossible

to detect by visual inspection alone, although this

approach may add some useful pieces to the

puzzle.

EXTERNAL VISUAL SIGNATURES

BTW production facilities may sometimes be

detected or monitored with overhead photography, although the evidence is nearly always

ambiguous. For example, the Institute of Microbiology and Virology in the Russian city of

Sverdlovsk, 850 miles east of Moscow, reportedly aroused the suspicions of U.S. intelligence

analysts in the 1970s because of certain characteristics observed by satellite. Photointerpreters

identified tall incinerator stacks, large coldstorage facilities, animal pens, sentries, and

double barbed-wire fences. These features, not

unlike those at the former U.S. offensive BTW

facility at Fort Detrick, suggested that the

Sverdlovsk facility might serve military purposes. 100 In Much 1980, the U.S. Government

attributed a serious outbreak of pulmonary anthrax in Sverdlovsk the previous year to Soviet

BW activities at the microbiology institute. Although Soviet officials denied the allegations at

the time, in May 1992 Russian President Boris

Yeltsin finally admitted that the anthrax epidemic

had been caused by an accident at the military

facility. Russian military spokesmen have insisted, however, that the anthrax work at

Sverdlovsk was “defensive” in nature, and this

question has yet to be resolved.l0l

Recent innovations in biotechnological production technology aimed at increasing productivity, cutting costs, and improving safety have

further blurred distinctions important for verification, such as between a laboratory and a production facility. In the past, large batch fermenters

and refrigerated storage vaults provided signatures of BTW production; today they are being

replaced in advanced industrial countries with

small, continuous-flow fermenters that can produce large quantities of highly infectious materials rapidly in a laboratory-scale facility. Such

advances in production technology have greatly

increased the difficulty of detection by reducing the size of plants needed to produce

militarily significant quantities of BTW agents

and the amount of time needed to break out of

disarmed status. With the new production technologies, a clandestine BTW plant might be more

easily camouflaged, buried underground, or hidden within a larger complex that produces legitimate commercial products.

Still, satellite or aerial photography might help

to monitor sites judged suspicious on the basis of

other sources of intelligence. The following

signatures of BTW agent production might be

detected or monitored with overhead imaging:

“Excessive” secrecy and security surrounding a nominally civilian microbiological

facility, such as a brewery, sugar refinery,

infant-formula plant, or single-cell protein

plant. Telltale security measures might include double or triple fencing, watch towers,

IW Elisa D. Harris, “Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two Cases of Soviet Noncompliance?” International Secun”fy, vol. 11, No. 4, spring

1987, pp. 41-95.

Iol See Milton Leitenberg, “A Return to Sverdlovsk: Allegations of Soviet Activities Related to Biological Weapons,’ Arms Control, vol.

12, No. 2, September 1991 ($mblished April 1992), pp. 161-190; and Milton Leitenberg, “Anthraz in Sverdlovsk: New Pieees to the Puzzle, ”

Arms Control Toa2zy, vol. 22, No. 3, April 1992, pp. 1013.
104 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

and air-defense missile batteries-although

concealment, camouflage, and deception operations are possible.

Elaborate microbiological production facilities inconsistent with the level of sophistication of other, clearly civilian plants.

Facilities for housing large numbers of

primates, horses, rats, mice, rabbits, sheep,

goats, or chickens (for producing eggs),

when such animals are not clearly associated

with vaccine production.

Changes in activity at nominally civilian

production facilities.

PLANT DESIGN AND LAYOUT

Other signatures of BTW production would not

be visible from outside a suspect facility, and thus

could only be detected during an intrusive onsite

inspection. The basic equipment in a BTW

production facility would be much the same as

that in a vaccine plant, including equipment and

materials for microbial fermentation, cell culture,

or egg incubation, followed by harvesting, purification, and lyophilization. Both a vaccine plant

and a BTW production facility would require a

source of pharmaceutical-grade distilled water to

remove bacterial contaminants in tap water that

would interfere with the growth of desired microbial agents. And both types of facilities would

require autoclaves to sterilize the growth media

and decontaminate the equipment after production.

It is also important to evaluate BTW-related

activities in their socioeconomic context. In

developed countries, civilian production facilities

that utilize microorganisms, such as pharmaceutical plants and even breweries, now incorporate

safety and environmental equipment that were

once unique to BTW production facilities. This

fact has made it easier to use commercial production as a cover for illicit military work, although

the presence in a vaccine-production plant of

processes that cannot be justified on technical or

economic grounds may provide indicators of

possible conversion or diversion to BTW production. Nevertheless, a clandestine BTW production

facility could be so small that it could be easily

hidden.

PHYSICAL CONTAINMENT

In developed countries, an important difference

between a vaccine plant and a BTW production

facility may be the level and type of physical

containment measures that are employed. Three

aspects of physical containment might be suggestive of a clandestine BTW program:

First, production of vaccines involves the use

of living, attenuated microbial strains that are

either further weakened to produce a live vaccine

or killed immediately after cultivation. As a

result, stringent containment measures are required only during the initial phase of vaccine

production, which involves the cultivation of

agents before they are attenuated or killed.102

According to one assessment, “Extensive safety

precautions during the whole production cycle for

a vaccine are hardly defensible economically and

would hence be suspect. ’ ’103

A second difference between a vaccine plant

and a BTW production facility is the presence in

the former of costly measures to protect the

purity, sterility, and reproducibility of the products so that they are suitable for human use. Thus,

an indicator of illicit BTW production in a

pharmaceutical facility might be the absence of

measures to purify the product and ensure its

sterility.

Although BTW agents would probably be

cultivated under negative pressure to prevent

dangerous microbes from escaping from the

plant, this would not be a reliable signature

because negative pressure would also be needed

In David L, H~ol~ ~@ El. &ott, ~d Wik C. RI@icIK III, “Medicine in Defense Agtit Biological Wtime,’ yOIUd Of the

American Medical Association, vol. 262, No. 5, Aug. 4, 1989, p. 679.

103 SH, VOI. VI, op. cit., footnote 31, p. 45.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation 1105

in a legitimate pharmaceutical plant that is

producing live, attenuated vaccines. It would also

be possible to reverse the pressurization of a

facility before an inspection by changing the

direction of flow of the faltered air, but only if the

system were engineered for this purpose in

advance. Moreover, governments engaged in the

covert production of BTW agents would probably

not hesitate to cut comers on containment and

worker safety in order to avoid signaling their

intentions.

In addition to the type and level of physical

containment, several other potential signatures of

clandestine BTW production might be detected

during an onsite inspection.l04 The utility of such

signatures is highly controversial, however, and

each one is open to criticism. These signatures

might include:

Bad odors associated with microbial fermentation, since multiplying bacteria produce a

variety of volatile and odiferous gases.

However, odors do not travel far and are

nonspecific.

Seed stocks and cell lines inappropriate for

declared activities such as production of

vaccines or single-cell protein, or in amounts

exceeding immediate research needs. However, such materials would probably not be

declared and could be easily hidden.

Activities related to microorganisms and

toxins that cannot be explained by civilian

needs, such as development of vaccines

against rare, nonindigenous disease agents.

However, such activities could be easily

hidden.

Production capacity greatly in excess of

demand for the plant’s legitimate products,

such as vaccines. However, such excess

capacity would not be required for a BTW

capability.

A discrepancy between a small quantity of

output product (e.g., packaged vials of vaccine) and a large quantity of input materials

(e.g., fermentation media). However, calculation of a precise material balance is probably impossible.

Air compressors, air tanks, or lines for

air-supplied protective suits as a means of

enhancing physical containment. However,

compressors are easily hidden.

Facilities for rapid decontamination and

cleaning of the production line, or evidence

of recent large-scale decontamination operations, fumigation, or removal of materials or

equipment. However, decontamination routinely occurs in pharmaceutical facilities.

Large stockpiles of bleach (sodium hypochlorite or sodium hydroxide) for use as a

decontaminating agent. However, such agents

are also widely used in legitimate commercial facilities.

Specialized equipment for the lyophilization, milling, or microencapsulation of BTW

agents. However, lyophilization machines

are ubiquitous in the pharmaceutical indusW.

Refrigerated storage bunkers, freezers, or

large quantities of liquid nitrogen for storing

stockpiles of live or freeze-dried pathogens.

However, since significant quantities of

biological agents can be grown relatively

quickly, long-term stockpiling of agents in

refrigerated bunkers is unnecessary.

Anomalous transport of microbial products

or wastes off-site. However, microbial waste

can be steam-sterilized.

Incomplete or anomalous plant production

records. However, a proliferant engaged in

illicit production is unlikely to provide such

records voluntarily. Records might also be

1~ F@emtion of herican Scientists, Working Group on Biological and lbxin Weapons Verii3catioQ ‘‘A hgally BiIMI@ ComPl~ce

Regime for the Biological Weapons Convention: Reftiment of Proposed Measures Through Trial Facility Visits,” draft manuscrip~ March

1992, p. 12. See also SIPRI, vol. VI, op. cit., footnote 31, p. 35.
106 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

forged, although it is hard to do so convincingly.

Still, although the indicators listed above

would not necessarily be associated with illicit

production activities, a pattern of them might

arouse suspicions.

BIOCHEMICAL SIGNATURES

BTW agents do not possess a single common

chemical signature, such as the phosphorusmethyl bond characteristic of most nerve agents,

but pathogenic microorganisms can be identified

in minute quantities using sensitive immunological, biochemical, and genetic techniques. (See

box 3-C, pp. 108-109.) Telltale traces of DNA

from virulent strains of bacteria and viruses might

be discovered in samples collected during an

onsite inspection of a suspect site, even after the

facility had undergone decontamination. Such

traces might be indicative of previous research or

production activities at the facility. Fermenters

also generate large quantities of liquid wastes that

might contain unusual metabolic byproducts and

other telltale chemicals even after decontamination treatment.

Nevertheless, the fact that certain toxins and

microbial pathogens have defensive or medical

uses means that it can be difficult to distinguish

legitimate from illicit BTW activities. Toxins

also differ from chemical-warfare agents in that

they do not leave persistent traces in the environment and are easily destroyed by autoclaving with

superheated steam. The extent to which heatneutralized protein toxins could be detected by

immunological methods is unknown. Finally, the

ability of modem analytical techniques to detect

trace amounts of biological organisms could

make legitimate biotechnology facilities reluctant

to submit to such intrusive inspection for fear of

losing proprietary information. Analytical instruments could probably be “blinded,” however, to

detect only the presence or absence of known

BTW agents.

BIOMARKERS

Since the workforce in a BTW production

facility would likely be immunized against the

agents being produced, another approach to

verification would be to determine whether the

blood of workers in a suspect fermentation or

vaccine facility contains antibodies against known

BTW agents. Monitoring of immunization programs would involve taking blood samples from

plant workers for onsite immunological analysis.

Another approach would be to take blood samples

from wild animals (e.g., rodents) in the vicinity of

a suspect facility to detect possible exposure to

unusual infectious agents.

Although most vaccine production plants require all workers to undergo initial and periodic

blood collection and analysis, it would be difficult

to negotiate a verification regime that requires

such intrusive inspections. Furthermore, performing such tests as part of routine onsite inspections

might violate U.S. constitutional protections

against “unreasonable searches and seizures,”

since it would be difficult to protect confidential

medical information unrelated to the purpose of

the inspection. According to one legal scholar,

“No treaty could empower inspectors to conduct

random intrusive body searches for possible

telltale evidence of radiation or biological weapons. “

105 Another analyst argues, however, that

biomedical sampling might be upheld by the

courts on grounds of national security if there

is a clear connection between the objectives of

the regime and the analysis of biochemical

indicators. l06

105 David A, Koplow, “Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions on ‘IYeaty Verification in the United States,” New York

University Luw Review, vol. 66, May 1988, p. 355.

1~ Jq R. S@ckto~ Edward A. Tanzman, and Barry Ke- Harmonizing the Chemical Weapons Convention With the Um”ted States

Constitution (McLeq VA: BDM International, Report No. DNA-TR-91-216, April 1992), p. 59.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation 1107

| Stockpile and Delivery System Signatures

Stockpiling of agent or loading into sprayers,

munitions, or other delivery systems might be

associated with a number of signatures. The

following might be observable by aerial or

satellite photography:

■

■

■

cold storage of bulk BTW agents in refrigerated bunkers or igloos, although small quantities of stored agent would probably not be

detected;

storage depots for BTW-capable munitions

and delivery systems in proximity to possible production facilities; and

heavy trucks for the transport of empty or

filled munitions in the vicinity of a biological production facility.

The remaining signatures could only be detected during an onsite inspection:

inappropriate metal-working equipment or

stock that might be used to fashion munitions;

specialized equipment for filling BTW agents

into munitions and warheads;

breeding of insect vectors, or acquisition of

equipment for disseminating biological agents

and toxins as an aerosol cloud;

munitions or parts thereof for disseminating

BTW agents; and

the training of troops in the tactical use of

BTW agents.

| Weapon Use Signatures

BTW agents might either be used deliberately

or escape accidentally from a secret military

research or production facility, as happened in the

Soviet city of Sverdlovsk. It is therefore important to determine whether an outbreak of infectious disease in an area where it is not endemic is

the result of clandestine biological warfare activities and, if possible, to identify its source. Field

epidemiology can help investigate alleged cases

of biological and toxin warfare.107 Indeed, the

Centers for Disease Control’s Epidemic Intelligence Service was originally founded in 1951 out

of concern that terrorists or foreign intelligence

agencies might launch a covert BTW attack

against the United States.l08

As a first step, all of the likely natural causes of

an epidemic must be investigated and excluded—

a difficult task given the enormous variability of

infectious diseases. Covert attacks aimed at

economic sabotage are most likely to involve

animal or plant pathogens. The best known case

of a suspicious epidemic took place in 1981 in

Cuba, which suffered a severe outbreak of dengue

fever, a mosquito-borne viral illness. Of the

estimated 350,000 people who developed the

disease, approximately 10,000 suffered from

severe (hemorrhagic) symptoms and 158 died, a

mortality rate of 1.6 percent.l09 Cuban President

Fidel Castro blamed the epidemic on covert U.S.

biological warfare, which he alleged was being

run by the Central Intelligence Agency. Epidemiological analysis indicated, however, that the

outbreak was of natural origin. The Cuban

epidemic occurred a few months after a major

outbreak of hemorrhagic dengue fever in Southeast Asia. Epidemiologists determined that Cuban

construction workers building a hotel in Hanoi,

Vietnam, had become infected with the disease.

After returning home to Cuba, they were bitten by

WI Peter B~s, “Epid~c Fie]d hvestigation as Applied to Allegations of Chemierd, Biological, or lbxhl W@ire, ” PO/itiCS andthe Lz~e

Sciences, vol. 11, No. 1, February 1992, pp. 5-22.

1~ Stephen S. Morse, ‘‘Epidemiological Surveillance for Investigating Chemical or Biological Warfare and for Improving Human Heal@’ ‘

Politics and the Life Sciences, vol. 11, No, 1, February 1992, pp. 28-29.

1~ Jay P. Sanford, ‘‘Arbovirus Infections,’ Eugene Braunwald et al., Harrison ’s Principles oflnternal Medicine, 1 Ith ed. (New YoX NY:

McGraw-Hill, 1987), p. 727.
108 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Box 3-C-Biochemical Detection of BTW Agents

Inspections of microbioiogical laboratories or production facilities for indications of BTW activities might

involve the collection and analysis of samples to detect the presence of undeclared pathogens or toxins. Such

samples might include wipes from equipment and air filters or liquid samples from the waste stream or the

environment near the plant Alternatively, air filters might be used to screen large volumes of air inside, or even

at a considerable distance from, a plant.

Immunological techniques. The fastest method for detecting pathogens is to use specic antibodies that have

been Iabelled with a tag of some type, such as a fluorescent molecule or a radioactive atom. Such antibodies would

bind to the pathogen with high specificity, providing nearly unambiguous evidence of its presence. Techniques

for producing large quantities of “monocional” antibodies, all specific to a single marker protein on the surface of

a microorganism, permit the detection and identification of minute quantities of bacterial and viral agents (and

protein toxins) in Mood or environmental samples. Such immunological screening techniques include

radioimmunoassay (RIA) and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). A drawback of such assays is that

they could not identify BTW agents that had been genetically modified to alter their immunological characteristics.

Bioassays. A pathogen or toxin can be detected by measuring its physiological effects on intact organisms

or on isolated cell or enzyme systems. For example, many toxins work by specifically inhibiting the enzyme

acetylcholinesterase involved in nerve transmission, thereby reducing its ability to break down the messenger

chemical acetylcholine. Devices known as ‘biosensors” are under development that use receptor molecules or

enzymes immobilized on the surface of a chip to detect the binding of toxins or viral agents. One biosensor capable

of detecting toxins, developed by engineers at Arthur D. Little, is moving into a manufacturing prototype.1

Genetic analysis. The advent of recombinant-DNA techniques has made it possible to identify minuscule

quantities of microorganisms in complex samples.The first step is to prepare standards by isolating single-strand

DNA sequences from specific microorganisms or synthesizing them chemically and labeling them with a

radioactive isotope or a fluorescent dye. These labeled DNA fragments, known as “DNA probes,” can pair up or

“hybridize” with DNA in a sample if the sample contains DNA from the same microorganism. The advantage of

DNA probes is their unique specificity, which enables them to identify a single type of pathogen even in complex

mixtures.

Because of background noise, it can be difficult to detect probe/target hybrids when only a small number of

microorganisms are present in the sample. This problem was solved in 19$5 with the development of a powerful

new technique known as polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which can amplify a given DNA sequence as much

as 1O8 times. PCR therefore makes it posssible to use DNA probes to identify pathogens present in trace

quantities-as few as tensor hundreds of microorganisms-without having to grow them into larger colonies over

a period of days or weeks. Since PCR reagents are available in kit form, this technique has greatly speeded the

diagnosis of infectious diseases, including potential BW agents such as anthrax bacteria.2 PCR is also useful for

analyzing biological samples in the field or during an onsite inspection of a suspect facility it has even detected

killed bacteria in autoclaved samples?

1 Ri~a~F.Tayl~,~h~D. IJttie Corp., Ciportabie, Real-ThneB iosensorsforChemicai AgentVerifioation,”

presentation at the Chemical Wafxms Convention Vedfioation Teohnoiogy Researoh and Development

Conference, Herndon, VA, Mar. 2-3,1993.

2 ~~~~ of ogf~~, A~~@ fkpcwf to CongraIss on the IWeamh, w-t ~- and ~-ju~t~on

of ttm Chemloa~idogical LWWse Program * the Petfod October 1, 19$0 77nwgh Septemher 30, 7991,

RCS:DD-USDRE(A) 1085, p. 51. See also, M. Carl et al., CIDeteotlon of spores of Bad#us anthrads using the

polymerase chain reaotion;’ Journa/of/nib@ousIXseas~ voi. 185, 1992, pp. 1145-1148.

3 T. ~rry and F. (3annon, W)irgot C3enomio DNA Arnpiifkation From Autooiaved Infeotlws -OOrgankrns

Using PCR T~hnology,” PCR A4ethoo% and A#oatAww, VOL 1,1991, p. 75.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation I 109

Nevertheless, PCR has some limitations. First, it is only suitable for identifying known organisms, since one

must decide in advance which DNA sequences to use as probes. Second, because many pathogenic microbes

(e.g., anthrax bacteria) are ubiquitous in the environment in trace amounts, a probe of sufficient sensitivity may

find “prohibited” DNA everywhere! Third, the accuracy of PCR depends on both the length of the target DNA

sequence and the length of the PCR “primers,” which bind to the target DNA to initiate the amplification process.

As one tests for shorter sequences (e.g., 100 instead of 1,000 DNA base-pairs), the sensitivity of the technique

increases but its specificity declines, since several different microbial species may have identical short DNA

sequences. For this reason, two levels of detection have been proposed, depending on the characteristics of the

DNA probe. The first level would identify the group of pathogenic bacteria to which a suspect agent belongs by

detecting a DNA sequence common to all species in that group; the second level would provide species-specific

identification by using longer DNA probes specific to each microorganism targeted for detection.5

Genetic fingerprinting. Known technically as restriction-fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis, this

technique involves the use of special “restriction” enzymes that cut microbial DNA at specific sites. This treatment

results in a pattern of DNA fragments of different sizes, which can be analyzed by separating the fragments on

a gel. Genetic fingerprinting can also be done with RNA viruses. The result of this technique is a characteristic

pattern of spots on the gel. Since different DNA sequences will result in a different pattern of spots, comparing

such maps will reveal the extent to which two strains of a bacterium or virus differ genetically.

All microbial pathogens can be “fingerprinted” by analyzing their genetic material (DNA or RNA). Since there

are always minor genetic differences among various strains of a pathogenic microorganism, it is very likely that

a laboratory-developed strain is genetically distinct from an indigenous strain. Moreover, an indigenous strain that

has been produced in large quantities is likely to be more genetically homogeneous than the causative agent of

a natural epidemic. For many microbial pathogens, scientists have compiled a library of characterized strains t hat

can be compared with any newly discovered strain. Thus, genetic fingerprinting often provides enough information

to determine the source of a virus and whether it has been modified genetically in the laboratory. Trace amounts

of genetic material can be amplified for further analysis using PCR.

Town analysis. For toxins, analytical techniques for detection and characterization include immunoassay, as

well as analytical chemistry techniques such as combined gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS),

liquid chromatography, and others. Quadruple mass spectrometry is used to analyze protein toxins, as well as

samples dissolved in water.6 Very large biomolecules must be broken down into smaller components for analysis.

To this end, a technique known as pyrolysis mass spectrometry involves heating complex materials in a controlled

manner to generate characteristic chemical signatures that can then be analyzed by a mass spectrometer.7 These

signatures are compared with a large computer database of known chemical spectra to identify the compounds

present Finally, if a pure sample of a protein toxin or peptide bioregulator is available, it may also be possible to

identify it from its amino-acid sequence. Off-site detection of toxins is nearly impossible, however, because they

lack volatility.

4 Moreover, a laboratory might detect a contaminant from past rather than current WO*, SUM as anthrax

spores from earlier samples.

5 BarbaraJ. Mann, De@cfjono~Bb/o@a/ WarfareAgenfs Ush?gl the Po/ymerase Chah? l?eacfion (Research

Triangle Park NC: Battelle Memorial Institute, September 1992), DTIC No. AD-A259391.

6 External Affajrs and International Trade Can-Verification Research Unit, V&lf&NIOn: De@opmnf of

a Porfab/e Trichothecene SensorK7f fortf?e Defecfkm of T-2 f@cofox/n In Human B/oodSampfes (Ottawa: External

Affairs, March 1987).

7 Diane M. Kotras, “New Detection Approaches for Chemical and Biological Defense,” ArmY Resear@,

Development and~cquisltion Bu//etin, January-February 1989, p. 2.
110 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

mosquitoes, which then transmitted the disease to

others. 110

Another suspicious epidemic that still remains

to be explained took place during the civil war in

Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) from 1978 to 1980.

An unprecedented outbreak of cattle anthrax was

almost entirely confined to the Tribal Trust

Lands-the areas then assigned to Rhodesia’s

blacks and accounting for about 17 percent of the

country’s land area. 111 Since cattle were the

primary source of wealth for black farmers, the

epidemic led to the severe impoverishment of the —

ected rural populations. The outbreak of cattle

thrax was accompanied by a secondary human

idemic, which resulted in more than 10,000

infections and 182 human deaths. Since anthrax is

not contagious from one individual to another, the

explosive nature of the human epidemic was

striking: the reported incidence of human anthrax

cases during the 1979-80 period was more than

400 times the average incidence of the previous

29 years. Some epidemiologists believe that the

losing Rhodesian government forces may have

resorted to biological warfare with anthrax against

cattle in order to impoverish the rural black

population, as a desperate tactic in the final

months of the civil war, and that humans were

infected secondary to contact with infected animals or animal products. 112

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Distinguishing natural disease outbreaks from

those produced deliberately requires careful investigation and knowledge of local diseases and

endemic infections. There is at present no generally accepted methodology for investigating the

possible use of BTW agents. But Dr. Jack

Woodall, an epidemiologist with the World

Health Organization in Geneva, has identified a

number of characteristics of a disease outbreak

would suggest it was not of natural origin:113

The appearance of an endemic disease far

outside its established range. A natural

disease outbreak might be distinguished

from a BTW attack by determiningg whether

its source is an agent endemic to the region.

Although jet travel has made it easier for

infectious agents to spread discontinuously

from one continent to another, the progression of an epidemic typically involves gradual spread to contiguous regions or along

transportation routes.

Appearance of a vector-borne disease in the

absence of natural vectors or reservoir

hosts. Plague epidemics, for example, typically begin in rats and are spread to man by

infected fleas. The initial form of the disease

in humans is the bubonic form affecting the

lymph nodes, which later converts into the

more lethal and contagious pneumonic form.

Thus, the sudden appearance of pneumonic

plague in humans (1) in the absence of

infected rats and fleas, and (2) without

precursor cases of the bubonic form, would

be suggestive of a covert BW attack.

Pulmonary disease in the absence of natural

mechanisms for producing high-concentration biological aerosols. Since many infectious diseases do not naturally infect the

lungs, the anomalous appearance of a respi110 q+leph~~e ~tmiew +~ Dy, sc~~ ~te~, ~soci~e Dir@or of tie H~th Scien@s Divisio~ Rockefeller Fourl&itiou New yOr~

NY, Aug. 6, 1992.

111 See J.C.A. Davies, “A Major Epidemic of Anthrax in Zimbabwe, Part l,” Central Afi”can Journal of Medicine, vol. 28, 1982, pp.

291-298; and J.C.A. Davies, “A Major Epidemic of Anthrax in Zimbabwe, Part 2,” Central Afi”can Journal of Medicine, vol. 29, 1983, pp.

8-12.

112 M~lN=, ~ c~~Epimoticin~~~e, 1978-1980: ~etoDeh~mte Spr~d?’ The PSR Q@er/y, vol. 2, No.4, December 1992,

pp. 198-209.

113 Job p. w-, ~ ‘WO 1{~~ ~d Epidemic ~o~tion M a &MiS for v~~tion Activities Under the Biological W~IIS

Convention” S.J. Lundin, cd., Vievvs on Possible Verlj7cation Measures for the Biological Weapons Convention, SIPRI Chemical & Biological

Warfare Studies No. 12 (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 59-70.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation

ratory form of such a disease might be

indicative of a deliberate aerosol attack.

Other human activities than deliberate military attack may generate infectious aerosols,

however. The outbreak of Legionnaires’ Disease at a hotel in Philadelphia, for example,

was traced to a natural microbial contamination

of the building’s air-conditioning system.

Unusual epidemiological patterns that differ

from natural disease outbreaks. A deliberate

BW attack by aerosol dissemination would

infect a large number of exposed individuals

simultaneously, causing a majority of them

to develop symptoms at approximately the

same time. Thus, instead of a gradual rise

from a smaller number of precursor cases,

there would be an “explosive’ outbreak of

disease in many thousands of people.114

While these characteristics are all plausible, the

recent natural outbreak in New Mexico of ‘ ‘Navajo flu, ’ a virulent respiratory illness with

greater than 30 percent mortality, meets nearly all

of the criteria Woodall proposes. Hanta virus,

now known to be the cause of the illness, had

never before been known to occur among humans

in the Western Hemisphere, Whereas all previous

reported cases around the world were hemorrhagic fevers with shock and kidney failure, this

recent outbreak took the form of a respiratory

illness. Finally, the epidemiology of the disease

was extremely unusual and confused investigators for months. This episode points out the

difficulty of distinguishing a highly anomalous

disease outbreak of natural origin from the

111

deliberate or accidental release of biologicalwarfare agents. 115

An important task of epidemiological analysis is to characterize the strains of diseasecausing agents indigenous to the affected area,

thereby making it possible to distinguish preexisting “background” strains from BW agents

introduced from the outside. Even if it could be

ascertained that a disease outbreak was of artificial origin, however, it might still not be clear

who had initiated the attack. It might also be

difficult to collect the necessary data if investigators were denied permission to visit the sites f

Y

;* i t.

the alleged attacks.

&

t

A current problem with depending on epide

ology to detect the use of BTW agents is that such

skills are unlikely to be available in those regions

of the world where biological warfare is most

likely. In order to detect new infectious diseases

such as AIDS before they reach epidemic proportions, the epidemiologist Donald A. Henderson

has proposed the establishment of an international network of research centers to monitor the

emergence and spread of new infectious diseases,

linked to a global rapid-response system.ll6

Beyond its obvious public-health benefits, such a

global surveillance system would make it easier

to distinguish artificially induced epidemics associated with the covert use of BTW agents from

ordinary background noise. ‘‘117 It would thereby

help to deter biological warfare and also to identify

false claims of BW, an important objective.

Table 3-2 summarizes the various potential

signatures associated with BTW development,

114 Nevefieless, tie anthrax epdtmic in the Soviet town of Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in 1979-now recogniz.ed to have ~ntheredt

of an accidental release of anthrax spores from a Soviet military biological facility-was associated with a gradual increase in the number of

cases over a period of several weeks, a pattern that appeared consistent with a natural epidemic. It is lmo~ however, that at low levels of

exposure, anthrax spores ge rminate at different rates in exposed primate hosts, resulting in highly variable incubation periods. Matthew

Meselso~ Harvard University, personal communication 1993.

I Is m~coff, 0p. cit., footnote 29.

1ls Donald A. Henderson, “Surveillance Systems and Intergovernmental Cooperation” Stephen S. Morse, cd., Emerging Viruses (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 283-289. See also Joshua Lederberg et al., Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the

United States (Washingto~ DC: National Academy Press, 1992), pp. 134-137.

1‘7 Mark L. Wheelis, “Strengthening Biological Weapons Control Through Global Epidemiologicat Surveillance, ” Politics and the Lfe

Sciences, vol. 11, No. 2, August 1992, pp. 179-189.
112 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 3-2—Biological Weapon Program Signatures and Concealment

Program stage Signature Detection methods (examples) Concealment methods, comment

Research &

development

-. . . . . . . Scientific and technical publications (presence or absence)

Literature survey and analysis 1. Manage publication activities

2. Use widely available technical

information rather than design

new agents or techniques

Nondeclaration of work with

potential BTW agents or with

pathogen aerosols

Human intelligenoe (humint),

on-site inspections

Conceal undeclared activities

Clandestine

production plant

Security measures Overhead imaging or humint

Humint

Conceal measures, or place plant

within other secure facilities

Large numbers of eggs or

laboratory animals for virus

production

Storage depots for BTWcapable munitions

Use tissue culture rather than

animals for production of viruses

Overhead imaging or humint Conceal depots underground

(although faciiity building would

be visible)

imports of dual-use equipment

(fermenters, lyophilizers, microencaipsulation systems)

Tracking of exports to

suspected proliferants

1. Obtain equipment from multiple

suppliers, or through intermediaries

2. Divert equipment from legitimate civil activities

3. Make equipment indigenously

Converted or

multipurpose

pharmaceutical

plant

Security measures Overhead imaging or humint Conceal measures

Residues of virulent microbial

strains or genetically modified

agents

Sampling of air, water, or soil in

or near suspect plants; together

with various forms of biochemical analysis (e.g., ELISA, bioassay, DNA probes, PCR)

1. Decontaminate production line

wlth bleach or superheated steam

and autoclave cultures

2. Remove wastes for off-site

disposal

3. Claim that BTW agents are

being used for defensive activities

Special safety and containment

measures

Onsite inspection of suspect

plants

1. Sacrifice worker safety

2. Modern biotech plants increasingly have these features

Processes or capacity that cannot be justified on technical or

economic grounds

Seed stocks, cell lines, and

equipment (e.g., microencapsulation) inappropriate for

declared activities

Omission of costly measures

to ensure purity and sterility

of pharmaceuticals or to

inactivate agent to make

vaccine

Facilities for rapid, large-scale

decontamination

Onsite inspection of suspect

plants

Such assessments are highly subjective

Onsite inspection and sampling Claim that material and equipment

is being used for legitimate medical applications, although possibilities may be limited

Onsite inspection Employ measures to simulate pharmaceutical production (costly)

Onsite inspection Use legitimate vaccine production

activities as a cover
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation 113

Program stage Signature Detection methods (examples) Concealment methods, comment

Evidence of immunization to

BTW agents in plant workers

or evidence of infection in people or animals nearby

Blind tests Refuse permission to take blood

sampils

Weaponization and

testing

Uniquely configured arsenals

(e.g. distribution of storage

bunkers)

Overhead imaging Pattern facilities after conventional

arsenals

Cold storage of BTW agents Thermal infrared imagery

Excess electrical capacit y

1. Produce large quantities of agent

shortly before use to minimize

need for storage

2. Mask thermal-infrared emissions

from refrigerators

Specialized equipment for

filling agents into munitions

Onsite inspection Conceal filling operation at some

remote location

BTW testing facilities, such

as small aerosol chambers

Onsite inspection, sampling

and analysis

Carry out tests inside dosed

buildings

Field testing of aerosol

generators and delivery systems

Overhead imaging, onsite

inspection, sampling and

analysis

1. Mask test grid

2. Use legitimate activity such as

biopesticide dissemination as a

cover for illicit activities, although

high security might be a giveaway

Large animals for aerosol testing

Field training of troops

Uniquely configured test facilitiesOverhead imaging 1. Make special features temporary

2. Test on overcast days, at night,

or in absence of overhead imaging systems

Weapon use Anomalous characteristics of a

disease outbreak (e.g., atypical agent, explosive disease

spread, pulmonary disease in

absence of natural respiratory

1. Field epidemiology

2. Genetic fingerprinting of

disease agent

Use a disease agent indigenous to

the area being attacked

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

production, weaponization, and use. Many of

these indicators are nonspecific, since their presence could be associated with other, legitimate

activities. Even so, a pattern of such signatures

would be suggestive of a clandestine BTW program that could then be confirmed by other means.

lar level. Genetic engineering involves identifying regions along the DNA molecules that encode

desirable genetic characteristics and cutting and

splicing these segments of DNA with enzyme

tools to create “recombinant” strains. Since all

living creatures contain DNA, it is also possible

to combine genes across species lines to give an

organism novel traits that do not occur in nature. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC

ENGINEERING

The past two decades have seen revolutionary

advances in the ability to manipulate the genetic

| Novel Agents?

Techniques for the engineering of genes in

characteristics of living organisms at the molecu- bacteria and animal cells, and for the modification
114 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

of proteins, have become widely available. Although advanced genetic-engineering capabilities

are still rare in the developing world, genesplicing “kits” containing the necessary equipment and reagents (e.g., restriction enzymes) can

be easily obtained by mail order, and much of the

necessary know-how is openly published in the

scientific literature. Some analysts have speculated that gene-splicing technologies could be

used to develop ‘second-generation’ BW agents

with greater military utility by making the behavior of these agents in the environment more

predictable. 118 Toxin genes and Virulence factors

might also be transferred from one species of

microorganism to another. According to John

Birkner, a foreign technology analyst for the

Defense Intelligence Agency, “recombinantDNA techniques could open up a large number of

possibilities. Normally harmless, nondiseaseproducing organisms could be modified to become highly toxic and produce effects for which

an opponent has no known treatment. Other

agents, now considered too unstable for storage or

biological warfare applications, could be changed

sufficiently to become effective. ’ ’119

Although it could theoretically add a toxin

gene to a harmless bacterium to render it virulent,

recombinant-DNA technology is unlikely to produce novel pathogens more devastating than the

highly infective and lethal agents that already

exist in nature. The reason is that any attempt to

combine genes from unrelated organisms is likely

to interfere with the highly developed and integrated pattern of genetic traits that give rise to

pathogenic behavior. Since a whole constellation

of genes must work together for a microorganism

to cause disease, altering a few genes with

recombinant-DNA techniques is unlikely to yield

a novel pathogen significantly more deadly than

natural disease agents. 120 It is therefore doubtful

that genetic engineering could result in novel

BW agents with greater potency than naturally occurring agents.

| Increased Controllability of Microbial

Agents

Nevertheless, the genetic modification of standard BTW agents might, however, overcome

specific obstacles that currently limit their military utility. In particular, genetic engineering and

modern biotechnologies can facilitate microbial

production, improve storage and delivery, create

antibiotic resistance, and enhance the controllability of existing pathogens. It is not clear, however, that these modifications would significantly

alter the military utility of BW agents compared

with the numerous already known agents.

SHORTER INCUBATION TIME

Modifying BW agents to act more rapidly

would increase their tactical utility on the battlefield, although this is unlikely to be accomplished

anytime soon.

ENVIRONMENTAL STABILITY

Genetic engineering might be able to increase

the ability of microorganisms and toxins to

withstand some of the stresses associated with

storage and dissemination, for example, by inserting complexes of genes for resistance to inactivation by temperature, ultraviolet radiation, drying,

and the shear forces associated with aerosol

formation. Most of these traits are genetically

complex, however, and are not well understood.

INCREASED VIRULENCE

Development of a system for the superexpression of toxin genes has made it possible to

develop recombinant bacterial strains that pro118 fi~d Geisslm, “~plica~o~ of @netic I@ina@ for Chemical and Biological Wti~,” W~r/dAr~~nt.S and Disannanent:

SZPRI Yearbook 1984 (lmdon: lhylor & Francis, 1984), pp. 421451.

119 Job BhkXICX, cit~ in R. J&ffey %n.i~ “The Dark Side of Biotechnology,” Science, vol. 224, June 15, 1984, p. 1215.

In Jom~ B. ~cker, ‘‘Gme: WarS, ” Foreign Policy, No. 57, winter 1984-85, p. 62.
— . . -.

duce 10 to

strains.

ANTIBIOTIC

Inserting

Chapter 3–Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation I 115

100 times more toxin than natural

RESISTANCE

antibiotic-resistance genes into naturally infectious agents can make them resistant to

one or more prophylactic or therapeutic drugs,

rendering such defenses useless. At the same

time, an attacker could immunize his troops

against the modified agent, protecting them

without the need for antibiotics. Reportedly, the

Soviet Union launched a secret program in 1984

to develop a genetically engineered form of

plague that was resistant to antibiotics.121

VACCINE PRODUCTION

Recombinant-DNA techniques make it easier

and safer to produce specific vaccines to match

novel agents, thus enabling the attacker to protect

his own forces while denying a vaccine to the

defender. In the past, the difficulty of producing

effective protective vaccines was a major obstacle

to acquiring an offensive BTW capability. Nevertheless, recombinant vaccines are not always

effective because they represent one or a few

antigens rather than the full set of antigens present

in the actual pathogen.

CONTROLLED PERSISTENCE

Genetic engineering might result in more

controllable BW agents through the manipulation

of genes to program the survival of a bacterial

population released into the environment. For

example, it might be possible to program microorganisms genetically to survive only under a

narrow set of environmental conditions. Alternatively, one might design regulatory sequences

known as ‘‘conditional suicide genes, ’ which

cause a microorganism to die off after a specified

number of cell divisions. 122 By inserting such genes

into pathogens, it might be possible to create a

BW agent that would cause disease for a limited

period of time and then spontaneously die off.

IMMUNOLOGICAL MODIFICATION

By means of gene transfers, it would be

possible to modify the antigenic (antibodyinducing) proteins on the outer surface of a

pathogenic virus or toxin, thereby rendering the

modified agents insensitive to a preexisting host

immunity or to standard vaccines and antitoxins.

(Since most toxin antigens are located on the

scaffolding of the molecule rather than near the

site responsible for its toxic effects, it would be

possible to alter the immunological characteristics of a toxin without changing its biological

activity.) Further, since most diagnostic procedures for BTW agents rely on the detection of

certain surface antigens with antibodies, modifl- ,%” cation of the antigens would make it harder to

detect, identify, and counter the modified agents.

HOST SPECIFICITY

Some analysts have raised the grotesque possibility of making microbial pathogens more discriminate by designing ‘‘ethnic weapons’ that

exploit differences in gene frequency between

populations to selectively incapacitate or kill a

selected ‘‘enemy’ population to a greater extent

than a‘‘&iendly’ population. Yet human populations are not uniform enough to be uniquely

targeted by a given pathogen.123

* * *

These possibilities notwithstanding, the practical obstacles to developing more controllable BW

agents remain enormous. Even if genetic engineering could produce recombinant pathogens

that survived for a predetermined length of

121 Bw, op. cit., foo~ote 97! p- 41”

122 ~qmatow Cohttee for tie ~rd Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, Background Document on NW Scientific and

Technological Developments Relevant to the Convenh”on on the Prohibition of the Development, Production andstockpiling ofBacteriological

(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Document No. BWC/CONF.HI/4, Aug. 26, 1S91, p. 11.

In Novick and Shul~ op. cit., footnote 47, p. 114.
116 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

time in the environment, they would remain

incalculable in their effects, since their dissemination would still rely on wind and weather,

and mutations might change the behavior of a

genetically modified agent after it had been

released. Once released,, living pathogens might

propagate, evolve, and develop ecological relationships with other living things in ways that

cannot be entirely foreseen. Furthermore, genetically engineered pathogens would require extensive trials to verify that they would survive long

enough to infect target personnel after being

disseminated by a weapon system and exposed to

the natural environment, in which most microorganisms are extremely fragile. Thus, testing in

human subjects might be required to give a

military planner confidence in genetically engineered biological agents.

| Modified Toxins and Bioregulators

Another potential threat from the biotechnological revolution is the development of new

toxin-warfare agents. Known protein toxins, such

as botulina1 and ricin, deteriorate in response to

environmental factors such as temperature and

ultraviolet radiation, and thus rapidly lose toxicity after dissemination. Although genetic engineering is unlikely to increase the potency of

naturally available toxins, it might conceivably

be applied to modify the chemical structure of

toxins to:

● increase the stability of toxins so that they

can better be disseminated as an aerosol;

■ alter the antigenic structure of toxin molecules, rendering them insusceptible to existing antitoxins or antibody-based diagnostic

techniques;

develop “chimaeric” toxins (combinations

of two different toxin molecules, such as

ricin and diphtheria toxin) that are more

capable of penetrating and killing target

cells; and

design novel peptide toxins (possibly con- —

sisting only of the biologically active region

of a protein toxin) that are as poisonous as

nerve agents but are small enough to penetrate the filters currently used in masks and

protective garments.l24

BIOREGULATORS

Recombinant-DNA research may also lead to

the development of more effective incapacitants.

With genetic engineering, even the body’s own

natural substances might be utilized as warfare

agents. “Bioregulators’ are small, physiologically active peptides (chains of amino acids

smaller than proteins) that are normally present in

the body in minute quantities and that orchestrate

key physiological and psychological processes.

They are active at very low concentrations and

influence the full spectrum of life processes, both

physiological and mental. Bioregulators govern,

for example, hormone release, control of body

temperature, sleep, mood, consciousness, and

emotions. An important subgroup of the bioregulators are the opioid peptides, which can induce

analgesia and euphoria. Since these naturally

occurring peptides are active in the body in trace

amounts, the application of larger quantities

might induce euphoria, fear, fatigue, paralysis,

hallucinations, or depression, giving them some

potential as nonlethal incapacitating weapons.l25

Bioregulators might be modified chemically to

enhance their physiological activity, stability, or

specificity. For example, the modification of the

peptide hormone LHRH (leutenizing hormone

124 fite~~fis ~d ~tematio~ T~de CaMda, VtiWtionReWh Unit, Novel Toxins and Bioregulators: The Emerging Scientific

and Technological Issues Relating to Verification of the Biological and Tom-n Weapons Convention (Ottawa: External Affairs, September

1991), p. 47.

12S Sw~shNatiO~ ~eme ;Resemch~ti~te, &nefiCEnginee~”ng u~DiOJOgiCuz weupo~, @)ortNo. PB88-210869 ~m~, Swdem

National Defense Research Institute, November 1987; translated for the Office of International Affairs, National THmieal Information Semice,

h’ftIy 1988), p. 58.
Chapter 3-Technical Aspects of Biological Weapon Proliferation I 117

Table 3-3—implications of Genetic Engineering for Biological and Toxin Warfare

Capability Possible now May be possible May be possible

In 5 years In 10 years, If ever

Shorter incubation time x

Temperature stability Xa

UV stability Xb

Drying/aeosol stability x

Antibiotic resistance X c

Controlled persistence x

Immunological modification x c

Host specificity x

Cloning of toxin genes x

More stable toxins x

Novel toxins x

aFor ~rtain Protein toxins

b For bacteria

C In some cases, not all

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

releasing hormone) by substituting a single amino

acid yielded a product 50 times more potent.126

Even so, it would be difficult to disseminate

peptides through the air in a militarily effective

way. The ability of a peptide to diffuse across the

mucosa1 membranes of the respiratory tract depends on its molecular size. Although attempts to

deliver the small peptide hormone ADH (antidiuretic hormone) with a nasal aerosol have been

successful, similar efforts with insulin have failed

because of the molecule’s relatively large size.127

The possible implications of genetic engineering for biological and toxin warfare are summarized in table 3-3. Although the potential for the

misuse of genetic engineering to develop new and

militarily more effective BTW agents currently

appears limited, this emerging threat clearly

deserves to be monitored carefully. Advanced

genetic-engineering capabilities are still rare in

the developing world, but most of the larger

countries in the Middle East already have the

technical capability to selectively breed microbial

strains with enhanced virulence, survivability,

and antibiotic resistance. In According to one

analyst, “If you can identify the gene you want to

move, it is possible to do so. ’ 129

For at least the medium-term, BTW proliferants are likely to produce proven agents such

as anthrax and botulin toxin, rather than

invest large amounts of time and money on

experimentation with genetically engineered

microorganisms. Eventually, however, technologically sophisticated proliferants might try

to modify standard agents to make them more

stable during dissemination or more difficult

to detect or to defend against.

lx Gove~ent of tie United States, op. cit., footnote 44, p. 29.

127 Zficoff, Op. cit., footnote 29.

12E ~~ony H. Cordesu weapons of ~a~~ De~~ctiOn in r~e ~~/e East @ndOn: BrzI.ssey’s ~), 1991), p. 77.

In ~~cot=f, Op. cit., foomote 29.
Technical

Aspects

of

Nuclear

Proliferation 4

A

wide variety of policy tools are available for combating

nuclear proliferation, as described in the OTA Report

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks.l Since these measures depend at least in

part on the technical prospects for monitoring and controlling

nuclear proliferation, this chapter provides background on the

difficulty and the detectability of nuclear weapon production. It

describes the technical requirements for developing a nuclear

weapon, identifying the steps that are the most difficult,

time-consuming, or expensive, as well as those that are most

amenable to external control. It also discusses detectable

‘‘signatures’ associated with each of these steps that might be

used for monitoring or verification purposes.

To evaluate the proliferation risks posed by any particular

country, however, or to determine which policies can most

effectively reduce those risks, the technical hurdles described

in general terms in this chapter must be considered in the

context of the country’s individual situation. In many cases,

nontechnical considerations, rather than technical ones, may

dominate not only whether a country decides to pursue nuclear

weapons but also its likely success in doing so. These factors,

which are highly country-dependent, include:

the ability of a government to organize, manage, and carry

through complex, long-term projects involving a large

scientific and technological infrastructure, and to keep state

secrets;

a country’s foreign business contacts, trade, and supply of

hard currency; and

1 U.S. Congress, C)fflce of ‘Rxhnology ~sessmen~ Proliferation of Weapons of

Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, O’lX-ISC-559 (Washingto~ DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993).

I 119
120 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Uranium route

3

T

Natural uranium

mining and

processing

r ●

Plutonium route

Figure 4-l—Technical Routes to a Nuclear Weapon Capability

—

-—

I___T Design/fabricate

high explosive

(HE) components

or propellants

Delivery vehicle

R&D (aircraft,

missile, or other)

Fabricate

Enrich uranium

–—-—+ to weapon

highly enriched

> uranium into

grade bomb core

+

L

Purchase/steal/

obtain weaponusable

nuclear material

—

Irradiate uranium

L

Reprocess to Fabricate

-->” within reactor

to generate obtain pure + plutonium into I—>

plutonium 12m-_ll-2!zl

Acquire or design/ ?

‘-’w–-

3----------’

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

■ the domestic and international costs of getting caught, including possible diplomatic

isolation and potential loss of trade, of

technology transfer, or of foreign assistance.

Addressing such technical and nontechnical factors on a country-by-country basis, however, is

beyond the scope of this report.

OVERVIEW AND FINDINGS

Manufacturing nuclear weapons, shown schematically in figure 4-1, is a complex and difficult

process. It can be divided into three basic stages.

The first, and most difficult, is the production

of the special nuclear materials-plutonium,

uranium-233, or enriched uranium-235—that

are at the heart of a nuclear warhead. These

materials can sustain nuclear chain reactions that

Weapon assembly

Weapon capability

release tremendous amounts of energy in a short

period of time (see box 4-A for definitions of

various nuclear materials). To manufacture highly

enriched uranium-235 (HEU) for weapons, the

uranium-235 isotope must be separated from the

much more common uranium-238. A number of

techniques can be used to enrich uranium, all of

which to date involve complex and expensive

facilities (see app. 4-B on enrichment technologies). Plutonium for weapons is derived from the

naturally occurring uranium-238 isotope, which

cannot be used directly in a nuclear weapon.

However, irradiating uranium-238 in a nuclear

reactor will convert part of it into plutonium-239,

which can be used in nuclear weapons after it is

separated from the unconverted uranium and

other irradiation byproducts in a step called

chemical reprocessing. Similarly, uranium-233 is
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation I 121

Box 4-A-Glossary of Nuclear Materials

Fertile material-an isotope that can be transformed into a fissile isotope by absorbing a neutron, such as when

irradiated in a nuclear reactor. For instance, U-238 is a fertile (as well as fissionable, see below) material

that tends to absorb slow neutrons, after which it decays into the fissile isotope Pu-239. Thorium-232 can

similarly be transformed into U-233.

Fissile material-an isotope that readily undergoes fission (splits into two or more lighter elements, thereby

releasing energy) after absorbing neutrons of any energy. Fissile materials can undergo self-sustaining

nuclear chain reactions, in which the neutrons released in fission reactions will themselves induce additional

fission reactions (most fissile materials emit two or more additional neutrons, on average, per fission).

Important fissile isotopes are U- 233, U-235 and Pu-239. (Pu-241 is also fissile, but is normally created as

a byproduct of Pu-239 production.)

Fissionable materitial isotope that undergoes fission only after absorbing neutrons above a certain energy. The

most important fissionable material, U-238, emits less than one additional neutron, on average, per fission

reaction; thus, although it can release additional energy when bombarded by neutrons of sufficient energy,

it cannot sustain a nuclear chain reaction.

Highly enriched uranium (HEU)-uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 to 20 percent or more; often refers to

enrichments above 80 percent, which are more useful for nuclear weapons. Uranium enriched to such levels

will normally contain about 1 percent U-234, which is responsible for much of its radioactivity.

Low-enriched uranium (LEU)-uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 to less than 20 percent; often refers to

enrichments of 2 to 5 percent, which are used to fuel t he most common type of commercial power nuclear

reactor (“light-water reactors”).

Mixed oxide fuel (MOX)-nuclear reactor fuel composed of plutonium and natural or low-enriched uranium in oxide

form (U02 and PuO2. The plutonium component plays the role of the fissile U-235 isotope in LEU fuel, thus

reducing the need for uranium enrichment. For instance, MOX fuel with a plutonium concentration of about

3 to 5 percent can substitute for a portion of the low- enriched uranium fuel in most types of nuclear reactor.

(LEU-fueled reactors also make and burn plutonium as they operate, such that by the time LEU fuel is

considered to be “used up,” it contains more plutonium than U-235.)

Natural uranium (Nat-U)-uranium of the isotopic concentration occurring in nature, in which about 0.7 percent

is the isotope U-235, and 99.3 percent is U- 238. It also contains a trace of U-234.

Reactor-grade plutonium (RGPu)-plutonium that contains at least 20 percent of the nonfissile isotopes Pu-240

and Pu-242. RGPu is produced in most power reactors under normal operation, whereby fuel elements

containing U-238 are exposed in the reactor to high neutron fluences for long periods of time (typically a

year to a few years).

Weapon-grade plutonium (WGPu)-plutonium that typically contains 6 percent or less of the isotopes Pu-240 and

Pu-242, isotopes that makes design of nuclear weapons increasingly more difficult. WGPU is created when

U-238 is irradiated in a nuclear reactor for only a short period of time.

Yellowcake-uranium concentrate (with the isotopic ratio of natural uranium), which is produced from uranium ore

through a process called “milling”; consists of about 80 percent U3O8

; may also refer to U3O8 itself.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
122 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass

The Vienna International Center, housing the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

produced by irradiating thorium in reactors (this

path is not shown in figure 4-l). Neither the

production of uranium-233 nor of plutonium

requires enriched uranium.

To make the enriched uranium or plutonium

into a weapon, various additional components

must be added: chemical explosives (or in the

case of gun-type weapons, propellants) to assemble the nuclear material into a super-critical mass

that will sustain an explosive chain reaction;

nonfissile materials to reflect neutrons and tamp

the explosion; electronics to trigger the explosives; a neutron generator to start the nuclear

detonation at an appropriate time; and associated

command, control, and security circuitry (see app.

4-A on nuclear weapon design). In general,

nuclear testing that involves a detonation of

the resulting nuclear explosive device is not

necessary for a competent designer to have

high confidence that a relatively unsophisticated fission weapon will detonate, although

nonnuclear testing of the chemical explosive

system in an implosion-type weapon would be

required. A gun-type weapon made with HEU

Destruction

would not even require chemical-explosive

testing. Nevertheless, nuclear explosive testing

would be much more important for a proliferant seeking to develop either very low-weight

weapons, such as for delivery by missiles of

limited payload, or thermonuclear weapons.

The third stage in developing a nuclear weapon

capability is integrating the weapon with a

delivery system and preparing for its use. Many of

the states seeking nuclear weapons also seem to

be developing ballistic missiles, and all already

have combat aircraft. However, high-tech military systems are not required to deliver nuclear

weapons; other military or civilian vehicles could

also be used.

| International Controls

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

International efforts to control proliferation

have traditionally focused on production of

nuclear weapon materials, since that is the

most difficult and the most visible (short of

nuclear testing) of the processes necessary to

make nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT) requires

non-nuclear-weapon member states to place all

their nuclear materials under safeguards: a system of materials accountancy, containment, and

surveillance administered by the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and supported by

regular onsite inspections at declared facilities.

IAEA safeguards (see app. 4-C) are intended to

detect, and thereby deter, the diversion of such

materials from declared peaceful purposes to

weapons. Under the NPT, safeguards must be

imposed on all nuclear materials possessed by

non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) parties, transferred between NNWS parties, or transferred

from any party to any nonparty.2 The Treaty also

2 The IAEA traditionally does not consider uranium ore or uranium concentrate to be ‘‘nuclear material’ for safeguards purposes until it

is converted into a form suitable for further enrichment (e.g., uranium hexafluoride gas) or for fuel fabrication (e.g., oxide, metal, alloy, or

carbide forms). IAEA safeguards also include an exception allowing declared nuclear material to be removed from safeguards for the purpose

of military nonexplosive use, such as for submarin e-propulsion reactors.
— —

Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation 1123

requires that no equipment ‘‘especially designed

or prepared for the processing, use, or production” of nuclear material shall be transferred by

an NPT member to any nonnuclear-weapon state,

even one not party to the NPT, unless all nuclear

material processed by that equipment is placed

under safeguards. By mandating the adoption of

IAEA safeguards, the NPT is intended to permit

states to pursue peaceful nuclear programs without giving rise to fears of nuclear weapon

development.

Safeguards are important for all nuclear

facilities, but especially for those dealing with

enrichment or reprocessing. Many of the commercial facilities that enrich uranium for use

in power plants, if reconfigured for higher

enrichments, would be able to make highly

enriched uranium for hundreds of weapons or

more per year.

3 Moreover, several countries

reprocess spent fuel from nuclear reactors to

recover the plutonium generated during reactor operation, and even pilot-scale reprocessing plants can produce enough plutonium for

weapons. Civilian nuclear fuel cycles that include the use of plutonium and its attendant

reprocessing facilities could—if not safeguarded,

or if safeguards were violated—be used to produce plutonium for large numbers of weapons.

The type of plutonium produced in commercial

nuclear reactors under normal operation, called

reactor-grade plutonium, is more difficult to make

into a weapon than plutonium produced specifically for weapons.

4 Nevertheless, reactor-grade

plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons

of significant (though probably much less predictable) yield, and any state possessing significant

quantities of separated plutonium should be

considered to have the material needed to fabricate nuclear components for nuclear explosive

devices in a short period of times

IAEA safeguards are designed, and to date

have served, to make it very difficult to divert

‘‘significant quantities’ of nuclear materials

from safeguarded facilities. (The IAEA defines a

‘‘signtilcant quantity’ of fissile material as 8 kg

of plutonium or 25 kg of highly enriched uraniumsee app. 4-C.) Indeed, the construction and

operation of nuclear power reactors and other

commercial facilities so as to divert materials

to a weapon program is neither the easiest nor

the most efficient route to obtain nuclear

weapon materials. Moreover, by using modern

equipment and measurement techniques, safeguards methods have been significantly improved

and in many cases are becoming more automated,

more tamper-resistant, and less intrusive to plant

operation. Commercial-scale bulk-handling facilities such as fuel-fabrication plants, uraniumenrichment plants, and reprocessing facilities,

which process large quantities of nuclear material

in often dilute and easily modifiable aggregate

form rather than in accountable units such as fuel

rods or reactor cores, are more difficult to

safeguard than individual nuclear reactors. However, at present there are no large facilities of this

3 Almost all civilian power reactors use low-enriched umnium (LEU, see box 4-A), but the enrichment facilities that produce LEU might

also be used to produce HEU. Recortf@ring some types of enrichment plants, such as gaseous diffusion plants, from producing LEU to

producing HEU would be extremely time-consuming and virtually impossible to accomplish in a safeguarded facility without detection. On

the other band, reconfiguring gas centrifuge plants could, in theory, be accomplished more easily. Institutional barriers, such as a state’s own

system of control and perceived best interests, must supplement technical ones as deterrents to any such recontlgurat.ion.

4 The states that have been known to or have sought to produce nuclear weapons have made a determined effort to produce weapon-grade

materials specifically for that purpose; no military nuclear weapon program is known to have relied on reactor-grade plutonium.

5 See, for example, J. Carson Mark, Reactor-Grade Plutonium’s Explosive Properties (Washington, DC: Nuclear Control Institute, August

1990).
124 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

type under fulltime IAEA safeguards in countries

of particular proliferation concern.6

Still, IAEA safeguards have fundamental

limitations. First, several suspect nuclear proliferant states are not signatories to the NPT and are

not obligated to place all their nuclear facilities

under safeguards. Second, safeguards cannot

prevent an NPT member from amassing a stockpile of nuclear weapon materials under safeguards, withdrawing from the NPT, and asserting

that its stockpile is no longer subject to safeguards. Third, while the NPT clearly obligates

member states to declare all of their nuclear

facilities and place them under safeguards, it does

not provide a “hunting license” to verify the

absence of undeclared facilities. The IAEA does

have the power to request “special inspections”

at declared or undeclared facilities, should it find

reason to do so, but no such inspections of

undeclared facilities (except in Iraq) have ever

been carried out.7 Therefore, the NPT and the

IAEA have very little ability to forestall the

development of nuclear weapons in states that

are not NPT members, and only limited ability

in NPT member states that are able to develop

a secret nuclear infrastructure outside IAEA

safeguards. Indeed, the covert, indigenous

production of nuclear materials is now most

likely a greater danger than the diversion of

nuclear materials from safeguarded facilities.

Some of the signatures that might reveal such a

covert program are discussed in this chapter.

EXPORT CONTROLS

Export controls constitute the other primary

means (besides IAEA safeguards) by which the

international community can seek to prevent

proliferant states from acquiring the technical

capability to develop nuclear weapons. (Most

other nonproliferation policies address the incentive, and not the capability, to develop nuclear

weapons .8) One form of export controls is imposed by the NPT, which forbids the transfer of

equipment designed to process nuclear materials

unless it is placed under IAEA safeguards. The

NPT also prohibits nuclear-weapon states from

exporting goods or information that would assist

in any way with the development by non-nuclearweapon states of nuclear weapons.

If, despite the NPT, a state were able to import

unsafeguarded nuclear material suitable for

weapons—perhaps from the former Soviet Union

or from a proliferant state already possessing

enrichment or reprocessing facilities-it would

obviate the need to produce its own weapon

material. Such transfers would leapfrog the bulk

of the international technical controls against

proliferation. Transfers of low-enriched uranium

are not nearly so dangerous, since they do not

eliminate a proliferant state’s need to develop

complex enrichment facilities. However, if a

proliferant already has such facilities, feeding

them with LEU rather than natural uranium can

easily more than double their capacity to produce

weapon-grade uranium.

Jolted by India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion’

in 1974, several industrialized countries collec6 Note that only facilities under jid-ritne safeguards are considered here, since those not safeguarded or safeguarded only part of the time

(e.g., when safeguarded fuel is prestmt) cannot be expected to be verifiably free from diversion at other times. (Argentina and hdi% for instance,

have some nuclear facilities under part-time safeguards, and Kazakhstan has a fiel-fabrication plant not yet under safeguards, though it is

moving toward accession to the NPT and thus to full-scope safeguards.) Brazil has a medium-size fuel-fabrication facility under IAEA

safeguards and, with South Africa’s accession to the WT. that country’s enrichment facilities are also being placed under full-scope safeguards.

But neither state is considered a fnst-order proliferation threat at present.

7 The IAEA’s first attempt at requesting such a special inspection was directed at North Korea in early 1993 and was refused. Subsequently,

the IAEA declared North Korea to be in violation of its safeguards agreement and referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council,

which is addressing the issue. As of November 1993, the dispute was still under negotiation.

g Incentives and other policy tmds, such as security guarantees, cooperation and development assistance, regional arms control, and threats

of U.N. or other intenentiom are filtroduced in ch. 3 of the OTA report Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Assessing the Risks,

op. cit., footnote 1.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation | 125

tively decided to impose export controls that

would extend beyond those required by the NPT.

Forming the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975,

these countries initially agreed to exercise restraint on the transfer of any goods or systems

directly applicable to the production of nuclear

weapon materials (e.g., nuclear reactors and

reprocessing equipment for separating plutonium, or systems such as gas centrifuges or

gaseous diffision systems for enriching uranium). 9 As a result, the export of most such

systems today is tightly constrained. Together

with the required imposition of IAEA safeguards, these controls have made it very

difficult for would-be proliferant states to

acquire “turn-key” systems to produce nuclear weapon materials. However, technologies

for some older enrichment methods (e.g., the

calutrons for electromagnetic separation, used by

Iraq) and some components for not-yetcommercialized methods (e.g., lasers useful for

research on some advanced separation techniques) have been more easily obtainable. Moreover, rather than importing complete systems to

produce nuclear materials, some proliferant states

now possess and others are attempting to build

their own equipment, drawing on “dual-use’

technologies such as high-voltage power supplies, high-strength alloys and carbon-fiber products, high-performance ion-exchange resins and

liquid-liquid contacting equipment, precision machine tools, welding equipment, and specialized

furnaces that also have legitimate civil (nonnuclear) applications. Spurred largely by Iraq’s

progress toward nuclear weapons as revealed

after the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the 27

countries of the Nuclear Suppliers Group recently

extended their controls to include a wide array of

‘‘dual-use’ technologies (see app. 4-D), thus

closing many loopholes in previous nuclear

export controls.

Computers are an important class of dual-use

goods, having widespread applications in civil as

well as weapon-related fields. Useful as they may

be for nuclear weapon development, however,

advanced high-performance computers (so-called

‘‘ supercomputers‘‘ in the 1980s) are by no means

necessary for design of first-generation fission

weapons even in the absence of nuclear testing;

placing strict limits on their exports would be of

only secondary importance compared to limiting

technologies for nuclear-materials production.

Computers of lesser capability are more than

adequate for first-time proliferants and are becoming increasingly difficult to control as their

production spreads around the world. However,

advanced computers are relatively more important for proliferants pursuing advanced nuclear

weapons, including thermonuclear ones.

In addition to nuclear materials and weaponrelated technology, expertise is a key ingredient

in making nuclear weapons. Although specific

details remain secret, basic principles of nuclear

weapon design have been widely known for

decades and cannot be controlled. Moreover, the

progress made by successful nuclear proliferants

shows that dedicated research programs can fill in

the engineering details. First-time proliferants

in the 1990s could and probably would build

nuclear weapons considerably smaller and

lighter than the first U.S. weapons. Nevertheless, “weaponizing” a nuclear warhead for reliable missile delivery or long-term shelf-life adds

additional technical difficulties and could significantly increase the research and development

efforts needed to field it. Should they offer their

services, skilled weapon designers from the

acknowledged nuclear powers could significantly

accelerate the progress of a proliferant’s nuclear

program, primarily by steering it away from

unworkable designs. They would also be particularly significant in the fields of isotope-separation

9 Not only are tbcse export controls not mandated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but many countries, particularly developing

states, argue that they violate the NPT obligation upon industrialized states to participate in “the fullest possible exchange of equipment+

materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy’ ~, Article IV, Section 2).
126 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

techniques or plutonium production. Such individuals could fill critical gaps in a proliferant’s

knowledge or experience, adding greatly to the

likelihood that its programs would succeed. They

could also increase the range of sophistication of

designs feasible without testing. Therefore, continuing to protect subtle weapon design details

and preventing experienced weapon-system scientists and engineers from emigrating or selling

their services to proliferant states will be important adjuncts to export-control policy.

| Difficulty and Detectability of Nuclear

Proliferation

Producing nuclear weapon materials indigenously

would require at least a modest technological

infrastructure and hundreds of millions of dollars

to carry out. The costs of a full-scale indigenous

program, however, especially if clandestine and

lacking outside nuclear-weapon expertise, can be

as much as 10 to 50 times higher than for a

program aimed at producing just one or two

bombs and largely carried out in the open or with

outside technical assistance. Prior to the Gulf

War, Iraq spent many billions of dollars-over 20

times the cost of a minimal program-to pursue

multiple uranium-enrichment technologies, to

build complex and sometimes redundant facilities, to keep its program as secret as possible, and

to begin to lay the foundation for a fairly

substantial nuclear capability. Few countries of

proliferation concern could match the resources

that Iraq devoted to its nuclear weapon program.

(Iran probably could, however, if it so chose.)

In the near term, low- and medium-level gas

centrifuge technology may become increasingly attractive to potential proliferants, for

reasons including the availability of information

on early-model centrifuge design, the widespread

use of and possible illicit access to know-how for

more advanced centrifuge technology, and the

relative ease both of hiding centrifuge facilities

and using them to produce highly enriched

uranium (HEU). The more advanced centrifuge

technology, once obtained, could lead to small,

efficient, and relatively inexpensive facilities that

would be particularly difficult to detect remotely.

Because of their small size and potential for

high enrichment in few stages, laser isotope

enrichment techniques could prove to be difficult to detect and control if successfully developed in a clandestine program.l0 Nevertheless,

except in the advanced industrial countries, constructing operational laser-enrichment facilities

will remain very difficult. (Industrial-scale facilities remain difficult even for the advanced countries.) Therefore, it is unlikely for at least another

decade that these technologies would play a

significant role in nuclear programs of developing

countries.

The published data and recent successes in

Japan and France, respectively, with ionexchange and solvent-extraction enrichment

methods relying on conventional chemicalengineering processes, make these techniques

potentially a more serious proliferation concern than they had previously been thought.

Aerodynamic enrichment techniques, which

use carefully designed nozzles or high-speed gas

flows to separate isotopes by mass, have been

successfully developed by Germany and South

Africa. Some aerodynamic techniques require

fairly sophisticated technology to manufacture

precision small-scale components, but are otherwise conceptually straightforward and are

capable of producing HEU.11 If strict controls

are not maintained on these technologies, they

could pose proliferation risks.

Gaseous diffusion technology, developed by

each of the five declared nuclear powers, forms

10 kw e~c~ent tahologi= we precisely tuned laser beams to selectively energize the uranium-235 isotope most useful for nuclem

weapons and separate it from the more common uranium-238 isotope (see app. 4-B on enrichment technologies).

1 I A pnncip~ ~lc~~ in constructing aerodynamic enrichment facilities, however, is obtaining pumps, seals, and comp=sors tit wc

resistant to uranium hexafluoride.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation 127

the basis for much of the world’s current enrichment capacity, but it has proven difficult for other

countries to develop and does not appear to be as

likely to be pursued by proliferant states as some

other methods.

The process of acquiring or constructing the

appropriate facilities and then producing nuclear weapon materials in them provides many

signatures and the greatest opportunity for

detecting a clandestine nuclear weapon program. The development and testing of nuclear

weapon components provide significantly fewer

observable indicators. Assembly and deployment

of a small number of weapons themselves might

similarly not be easily detected, although specialized preparations for aircraft or missile delivery

might be more readily seen. Deploying large

numbers of nuclear weapons, however, might call

for new military doctrine and elaborate training,

security, and support systems, thus increasing the

number of people involved and the possibility

that information about the program might be

leaked. Sufficiently large nuclear tests (possibly

at the kiloton level; certainly at the 10 kt level)

would probably be detectable by various means,

but they are not necessary for fielding firstgeneration fission weapons with reasonably assured yields.

Iraq and South Africa demonstrated that with

enough effort and financial resources, a country

can hide from international view both the size and

specifics of its nuclear weapon program-though

certainly not all evidence of its existence, Iraq, for

example, though party to the NPT, clandestinely

pursued an ambitious program outside of safeguards, while maintaining a massive internal

organization and extensive and carefully developed channels of foreign technical assistance

(many of which have now consequently been

subject to more stringent controls). Therefore,

although technology restrictions can retard

proliferation, and verification procedures and

monitoring technologies can help detect and

thus deter proliferation, the primary barriers

to proliferation of nuclear weapons in the long

term remain institutional rather than technological. A state’s perception of its own security

and national interests, and whether it believes

a nuclear weapon program would serve those

interests or detract from them, play major

roles in the decision process.

ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPON

CAPABILITY

For most of the nuclear age, purchasing or

stealing nuclear weapons has been relatively easy

to dismiss, since the nuclear powers controlled

their weapons very tightly. However, the collapse

of the Soviet Union for the first time has posed

real concerns over the security of nuclear weapons themselves, as well as over weapon materials,

components, design information, related technology, and expertise.12 The following section addresses the potential diversion of Soviet nuclear

weapons; it is followed by a discussion of the

more traditional problem of preventing states

from manufacturing their own nuclear weapons.

| “Loose Nukes” in the Former Soviet

Union

Various unconfirmed reports in the first

months of 1992 in the European press and

elsewhere claimed that Iran had purchased several tactical nuclear warheads or their components from one or more newly independent

Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union.13

12 See, for example, Oleg Bukharin, The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism and the Physical Security of Nuclear Installations and Materials in

the Former Soviet Union, Occasional Paper No. 2 (Monterey, CA: Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Monterey Institute of International

Studies, August 1992).

13 See, for e=mple, Yossef BOdaIISICY, “Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons and Moves to Provide Cover to Syria,” Defense and Foreign

Ajfairs Strategic Policy, February 1992, Special Section, pp. 1-4; and FBLS, WEU-92-054-A, Mar. 19, 1992 (about a report in the Mar. 15,

1992 issue of the German magazine Stern).
128 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Since nuclear artillery shells, short-range rockets,

aerial bombs, and other tactical weapons intended

for battlefield use are readily portable, such

reports are cause for concern. Nevertheless,

senior Russian intelligence officials have claimed

that they know where every one of their weapons

is and that none is missing.14 Furthermore, U.S.

officials have said, without asserting that they

know the whereabouts of every Soviet nuclear

weapon, that they are not aware of any independent evidence corroborating such transfers.15 Past

attempts to purchase nuclear warheads, such as by

Libya from China, have been reported, but never

known to be successful.16

By mid-1992, according to Russian officials

and later supported by CIA director R. James

Woolsey in congressional. testimony,17 all tactical

nuclear weapons had been returned to Russia

from non-Russian republics. However, since the

political situation in Russia is far from settled,

removing nuclear weapons from the other republics to Russia does not resolve questions concerning the weapons’ security. Moreover, strategic

weapons—the higher yield, bulkier weapons

designed for intercontinental missile or bomber

delivery-are still based in three non-Russian

republics (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan),

raising questions over the: ultimate status of these

republics as nuclear or non-nuclear powers.

Even if whole nuclear weapons were transferred to a non-weapon state, it is unlikely in most

circumstances that they could be detonated in

their present form. All strategic and many tactical

weapons in the former Soviet Union are believed

to be configured with “permissive action links”

(PALs) or equivalent controls that preclude their

direct detonation except upon introduction of a

special code.18 However, the level of sophistication of Soviet PALs is not known, and many—

especially early models-may be comparatively

rudimentary, not integral to the weapon, or

entirely absent.l9 Such devices cannot be presumed to delay indefinitely a technically sophisticated individual or team that had prolonged

access to the weapon.

Moreover, a smuggled weapon would constitute a serious danger even if it could not be

detonated. First, disassembly by suitably trained

individuals could provide valuable first-hand

information on its design, materials, and components. Second, the weapon’s nuclear materials

might be recovered for use in another weapon. As

such, transfer of any warhead to any nonweaponstate would be cause for serious concern, even

if its immediate utility as a detonable device

were low.

| Manufacturing Nuclear Weapons

Aspiring proliferants unable to purchase or

steal nuclear weapons, or unwilling to rely on so

limited an arsenal, would have to manufacture

them on their own. The following sections

14 pad W.Judge, t c~ Repul}fics, h Eye on Bombs, Scientists,” Boston Globe, June 23, 1992, p. A14; ~ Mary ~us, ‘ ‘U.S. S*

to Stop Stockpile Leaks,” Boston Clobe, June 24, 1992, p. 22.

1S See, for emple, R. James Woolsey, Dir&tor of cen~~ ~~~igence, &stfiony before the Senaw committe On &WerIIIIEXlti Affairs,

Feb. 24, 1993.

16 ~onad s, sPCtor ~i~ J~Ue~e R. Smi@ Nuc/earA~itions: The spre~ of NuC/ear Weapow, Zgg%lgg(l (Boulder, CO: V/estview

Press, 1990), pp. 175, 178, and references therein.

17 ~~ony of R. James Woolsey, Feb. 24, 1993, op. cit., footnote 15.

18 Km M. cmp~ll et ~,, Sol,iet Nuclear Fission: Conflol Of the Nuclear ArSe~l in a Disintegrating soviet union, CSIA Studies in

International Security, No. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, Haxvard University, November 1991), pp. 13-17.

Although the fmt PALs used on U.S. weapons were simple mechanical combination locks, subsequent designs have become more

sophisticated; many now include disabling devices thac upon attempts at unauthorized intrusio~ can destroy critical warhead components,

rendering the warhead undetonable, Warheads also traditionally include environmental sensing devices, which although more easily bypassed

than intrusion sensors in PALS, enable the warhead to detonate only after it undergoes the proper stockpile-to-target or launch sequence (e.g.,

changing barometric pressure, acceleration, etc.).

19 Ibid., p. 15.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation 129

describe and analyze the various steps required to

produce nuclear weapons, identfying the points

at which international nonproliferation efforts

might have the greatest leverage.

This chapter focuses on covert nuclear weapon

programs. Since 1964, when China detonated its

first nuclear device, no country has openly

advertised developing a nuclear weapon capability, even though several states are suspected of

having mounted nuclear weapon programs since

then.

2o India, a non-NPT state, detonated a

so-called ‘‘peaceful nuclear device’ in 1974, but

denies having a nuclear weapon program. Evidently, international norms against nuclear proliferation (or the reactions of regional adversaries)

have been sufficient to prevent emerging nuclear

powers-even those not members of the NPT—

from advertising their programs too openly .21

A successful proliferant must overcome a

number of technical hurdles. Among them are:

obtaining enough fissile material to form a

super-critical mass for each of its nuclear weapons (thus permitting a chain reaction); arriving at

a weapon design that will bring that mass together

in a tiny fraction of a second, before the heat from

early fissions blows the material apart; and

designing a working device small and light

enough to be carried by a given delivery vehicle.

These hurdles represent threshold requirements:

unless each one is adequately met, one ends up

not with a less powerful weapon, but with a

device that cannot produce any significant nuclear yield at all or cannot be delivered to a given

target. Table 4-1 and figure 4-1 outline the steps

required to produce and deploy nuclear weapons.

Both the figure and the table show the two basic

approaches for acquiring nuclear materials: enriching uranium to highly enriched levels, or

irradiating uranium in a nuclear reactor followed

by reprocessing to separate out the plutonium.22

They also portray the weapon design, fabrication,

and deployment stages.

SOURCES OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

A potential proliferant has three options for

acquiring fissile material needed for a nuclear

weapon: purchase or theft, diversion from

civilian nuclear activities in violation of IAEA

safeguards, or indigenous production in unsafeguarded facilities. Each of these routes is prohibited to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states and to

states that are parties to nuclear-free-zone treaties

such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco; such states are

prohibited from operating unsafeguarded nuclear

facilities. Any unsafeguarded facilities that such

states did operate would presumably be run

covertly. Non-NPT states such as Israel, India,

and Pakistan are under no treaty obligations to

refrain from acquiring, producing, or selling

fissile materials or to place all their nuclear

production facilities under IAEA safeguards (some

come under safeguards when processing safeguarded material supplied by NPT states), but

they might well seek to keep unsafeguarded

activities secret anyway.

Indigenous production of weapon-grade nuclear material requires a large, complex, and

expensive set of specialized facilities, and the

20 Evid~e Of ~ ~~~’~ d~i~ion to “go nucl~” need not ~ -tic, M it WM with the bp&tiOns in kiq fC)~OWiIlg the 1991 Gulf

War, with Mordemii Vuumu’s revelations about Israel’s nuclear program, or with India’s “peaceful” detonation in 1974. Instead, evidence

of a country’s potential intent and capability can unfold slowly over tie. The latter has &en the case with North Korea and@ and before

they opened up their facilities to safeguards, with South Afi@ Argentina, and Brazil. South Africa’s program was subsequently also revealed

in a more dramatic fashion by President F.W. de Kler~ when he announced in March 1993 that South Africa had assembled six nuclear weapons

in the 1980s.

21 my nonwoliferation sw~sw, howev~, WOW that a open nuclear arms race my erupt between ~~~d P~s@k both of which

are “threshold” states considered either to have nuclear weapons or to have the capability to construct them on short notice.

22 ~orim cm &SO be irradiatd in nuclear reactors to produce the fissile isotope uranium-233, which can then be separated for use in nuclear

weapons by chemical reprocessing similar to that for plutonium. However, thorium-based fuel cycle technology has not been developed to the

point where it would present a likely proliferation route.
130 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 4-l-Steps to Produce and Deploy Nuclear Weapons

Acquisition of nuclear weapon materials

■ Mining of uranium-bearing ore

■ Milling to extract uranium concentrate in the form of “yellowcake” (U308) or other uranatesa

● Chemical processing to convert yellowcake into useful compounds (such as U02, UFG, UF4, UCl4)

-Uranium-235 based weapons:

, Enrichment of uranium to high levels of uranium-235 (most often carried out using uranium hexafluoride, UF6,

or other uranium compounds)

 Conversion of enriched uranium product to uranium metal

---Plutonium-based weapons:

 Uranium fuel fabrication in the form of metal or oxide (using alloys, ceramics, zircalloy or aluminum cladding, etc.)

■ Reactor construction and operation (typically requiring a graphite or heavy-water moderatorb, unless enriched

uranium fuel were available)

■ Reprocessing of spent fuel to extract plutonium product

■ Conversion of plutonium product to plutonium metal

Weapon fabrication (plutonium or uranium weapons)

■ Design and fabrication of fissile core

■ Design and fabrication of nonnuclear components (chemical explosives, detonator, fuze, neutron initiator,

reflector, etc.)

 Weapon assembly

Weapon testing and deployment

■ Physics tests (hydrodynamic, hydronuclear, or nuclear—see text)

 Development of delivery system and integration with warhead

 Weapon transport and storage

■ Possible development of doctrine and training for use

a tJ308 can also be pur~~~ On ttw international market; transfers to or from NPT parties with safeguards agreements in force must be reported

to the IAEA, but do not require insloections.

b The moderator in a nu~ear reactor slows down the neutrons produced in fission reactions so that they can more efficiently induce subsequent

fission reactions. Heavy-water and ultra-pure graphite are effective neutron moderators having very low neutron absorption, thus permitting

reactors to operate on natural uranium.

SOURCE: Stephen M. Meyer, The ,Dyrramks of Nmlear Proli~eration, (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 175; and OTA.

relevant facilities therefore represent principal “chokepoints" for controlling nuclear

proliferation. Unless a state succeeded in importing or otherwise acquiring weapon-usable material directly, producing such material in dedicated facilities is likely to cost many times what

it would cost to design and fabricate other nuclear

weapon components. Moreover, the nonnuclear

development work could be funded and carried

out well in advance of the supply of suitable

nuclear materials (as was the case in Iraq), and it

is much harder to monitor and control than

nuclear material production.

This section discusses various sources where

nuclear materials might be stolen or diverted to

weapon use; it is followed by a discussion of

requirements for manufacturing such materials

indigenously.

 Diversion or Theft

Nuclear materials, some of which are relatively

easy to convert into forms directly usable in

nuclear weapons, are stored at and transported

among hundreds of civilian nuclear facilities

around the world. These stockpiles and transfers

inevitably introduce some risk of theft or diversion, depending on the material and the level of its

protection. Theft of weapon-grade nuclear materials would be more serious than that of material
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation 131

requiring substantial additional processing. If a

particular stockpile were poorly safeguarded,

diversion of material might not be detected before

it had already been fabricated into a weapon. Such

a clandestine diversion would probably constitute

a greater danger than the hijacking of a shipment,

which would certainly be noticed and might

trigger military or other action to recover the

stolen material or prevent its being used.

The low-enriched uranium (LEU) that fuels

hundreds of nuclear power reactors worldwide

cannot be used directly to make nuclear weapons.

If used instead of natural uranium as a feedstock

for a proliferant state’s own uranium enrichment

program, however, it can speed up considerably

the production of highly enriched uranium for

weapons. Furthermore, civilian nuclear reactors

convert part of their uranium fuel into plutonium

as they operate. 23 When separated from the

unconsumed uranium fuel and the radioactive

by-products produced during reactor operation—

a step called reprocessing—the plutonium so

obtained can be reused in nuclear reactors.

However, it can also be used to make a weapon.

By the year 2000, hundreds of tonnes of plutonium will have accumulated worldwide in civilian spent fuel, and with current plans, over 100

tomes will have been separated and stored. This

potential coupling between civil nuclear power

and nuclear weapons is a fundamental reason for

the International Atomic Energy Agency’s system of nuclear safeguards (see app. 4-C).24

Due in part to IAEA safeguards, individual

commercial power reactors are neither the

most vulnerable nor the most fruitful sites for

diverting nuclear materials. Several possible

sources of nuclear materials described below pose

greater risks of theft or diversion than do commercial nuclear power reactors. Similarly, facilities

where nuclear materials are handled in bulk

(enrichment, fuel-fabrication, and reprocessing

plants) pose substantially greater diversion risks

than do commercial power reactors, but are

consequently inspected much more often. In any

case, there are no large bulk-handling facilities

under full-time safeguards in countries of current

proliferation concern.25

REACTOR-GRADE PLUTONIUM AND NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

Reactor-grade plutonium recovered from civilian reactors differs from weapon-grade plutonium

in the relative proportions of various plutonium

isotopes (see box 4-B). Reactor-grade plutonium

has a higher rate of spontaneous fission reactions

23 Reactors containing significant amounts of uranium-238 produce plutonium at a rate of about 1 gram per day per megawatt-thermal

(MW(t)) of reactor power, or about 10 kg per year for a 30-MW(t) reactor running 90% of the time. Note that commercial reactors are usually

rated in terms of the electn”caZ power they produce, in units of megawatts-electric (MW(e)), whereas research reactors and

plutonium-production reactors are rated in terms of overalt thermal power, MW(t). Since about two-thirds of the power used to generate

electricity y becomes waste heat, a typicaI Iarge commercial nuclear power plant that generates 1,000 MTV(e) would have a thermal power of

about 3,000 MW(t).

M The 1977 OTA report~uclea~ Pro/ifer4tion and Safeguards, OTA-E-48 (Washington DC: U.S. Government ~tig office, June 1977),

and appendices, vol. 2, parts 1 and 2, discusses the relationship between nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and international safeguards. The

U.S. Department of Energy presented a detailed technical assessment of these relationships in Nuclear Proll~eration and Civilian Nuclear

Power, Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP), DOE/NE-0001/1, vols. 1-9, June 1980. Other

references discussing nuclear safeguards include ‘‘Materials Management in an Internationally Safeguarded Fuels Reprocessing PlanL” Los

Alamos Scientific Laboratory Report IA-8042, vols. I-III (April, 1980); David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical

AppraisaZ (Lmdon: SIPRI, Taylor and Francis, 1985), especially ch. 7 and apps. II and III; Lawrence Scheinm~ The International Atomic

Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order (Washington DC: Resources for the Future, 1987), especially chs. 4 and 5; MEA Btd[en”n, for

example, vol. 32, No. 1 ( 1990); and Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, for example, vol. 20, No. 2 (l?ebruary 1992).

25 India operates reprocessing facilities that are under safeguards only when reprocessing safeguarded tIsanium fuel. This leaves ~di% a

non-NPT state, with the capability to separate plutonium for weapon use with this facility at other times. North Korea’s alleged reprocessing

facility at Yongbyon has been declared to the IAEA but has not yet been fitlly placed under safeguards. Brazil has a medium-sized fuel

fabrication facility under IAEA safeguards, and South Africa’s enrichment facilities have come under safeguards with its accession to the NPT,

but neither state is considered a first-order proliferation threat at present.
132 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

than weapon-grade, generating neutrons that can

initiate the nuclear chain reaction during weapon

detonation sooner than would be optimal. As a

result, using reactor-grade plutonium in a firstgeneration nuclear weapon can significantly reduce both the predictability and the expected

yield of a weapon designed by a proliferant state.

None of the states that have either made

nuclear weapons or attempted to do so appear

to have selected anything but high-quality

plutonium or uranium for their designs. Nevertheless, from a technical perspective, reactorgrade plutonium can be used to make nuclear

weapons (see box 4-B), and any state possessing significant quantities of separated plutonium should be considered to have the material needed to fabricate nuclear components

for nuclear explosive devices in a short period

of time.

REPROCESSING PLANTS AND SEPARATED

PLUTONIUM

Several hundred tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium will likely be recovered from dismantled

U.S. and Russian warheads over the next decade

and stored at facilities in those two countries .26 In

addition to this plutonium, large quantities of

separated plutonium from civilian reactors around

the world continue to accumulate and be stored at

four principal reprocessing sites: La Hague and

Marcoule in France, Sellafield in Britain, and

Chelyabinsk in Russia.27

Reactor-grade plutonium separated from spent

fuel can be used either in a new generation of

civilian reactors designed especially to use plutonium fuel, or in conventional nuclear reactors,

where it can substitute for the uranium-235 in

some portion of the LEU fuel.28 However, unless

the utilization of separated plutonium increases

dramatically, it is almost certain that the current

surplus of over 70 tonnes of stored separated

plutonium will increase by another 100 tonnes by

the year 2000.29 Eventually, most of the foreignowned plutonium at the sites in France and the

U.K. is contractually obliged to be returned to its

countries of origin-most of whom are not

nuclear weapon states30—thus significantly increasing the transport and handling of plutonium

around the world. By the end of the century, an

additional several hundred tonnes of unseparated

plutonium worldwide will also have accumulated

in spent reactor fuel.31

M see U.S. Congess, Office ,Df mhnolo= Assessment Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials, 0~-o-572

(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing CMce, September 1993). Safeguarding the storage and ultimate disposition of nuclear materials

from dismantled weapons in the former Soviet Union is a high U.S. priority and is the subject of intense ongoing discussions with Russia.

27 Smti ~omwci~ ~prme~s~ facilities me ~so opemt~ at ~~.m~ ~ Jap~ ~d TWWM iI.I India, md have opemted ixI the p~t

in the United States (West lhlley, New York), Germany (Karlsruhe), and Belgium @roch6mic-Mel). India is building an additional facility

at Kalpakkam, possibly to begin operation in 1993-94, and Japan is planning to ftish constructing a major reprocessing facility at

Rokkasho-mura by about 2005. Reprocessing facilities for separating Russian military plutonium are located at two additional sites: Tomsk-7

and Krasnoyarsk. See Frans Berkhout et al., “Disposition of Separated Plutonim” Science & Global Security, vol. 3, No. 1, 1992, table 2,

p. 7.

28 pluto~@ for use k convmtio~ nucl~ reactors is usually combined with natural or low-enriched urtim in their oxide forms ~02

and PU02) to make mixed-oxide fuel or MOX. MOX having a plutonium concentration of about 3 to 5Y0 of the uranium concentration can be

used to replace about a third of the fuel rods in some types of conventional light-water reactor. Fast breeder reactors (FIRs) fueled primarily

by plutonium are currently being developed by Japa Ch@ and Kazakhstan. France (which has shut down its Superph4nix breeder reactor)

and the U.K. are no longer as actively involved with breeder development as they had been in the past.

29 ~or t. 1991, abut 120 tomes of civfi~ RGPu had been separated worldwide at the four facilities mentioned, of which 37 tOnneS htid

been recycled in advanced I@id-metal reactors (mostly in demonstration breeder reactors) and another 12 tonnes as MOX fiel for conventional

light water reactors (LWRs). From 1991 through 2000, another 190 tomes are contracted to be separated, primarily at reprocessing plants in

Great Brita.@ France, and Japa.q of which only about 70-80 tonnes are expected to be recycled in reactors.

qo These countries include Belgiuxq Finland, Germany, Italy, Jap~ Netherlands, ~d Switirlmd.

31 Fr~BerJ&ou~ ~toli Di~ov,~oldFeiveso~ Marvin Miller, and Frank von Hippel, ‘ ‘Plutonium: True @iUXiOnhXkty,’ ‘Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 48, No. 9, November 1992, pp. 28-34.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation 133

Box 4-B—Reactor-Grade Plutonium

Plutonium produced in a reactor continues to be exposed to neutrons until the fuel is removed from the

reactor. This prolonged exposure results in the buildup of other plutonium isotopes (atomic numbers 238,240,241,

242) in addition to plutonium-239.1 The even isotopes of plutonium have a high probability of spontaneous fission

and thus neutron emission, plus several other deleterious neutronic effects in weapons. By current U.S. definition,

reactor-grade plutonium contains at least 20 percent even (non-fissile) isotopes, whereas weapon-grade contains

6 percent or less.

Because the non-239 plutonium isotopes are more radioactive and emit more spontaneous neutrons, they

make the design of a plutonium weapon more difficult (virtually lmpossible at high concentrations of Pu-238). The

problems are at least two-fold. From the perspective of bomb performance, if too much plutonium-240 or -242 is

present its spontaneous neutrons have a high probability of starting the chain reaction too soon, thus substantially

reducing the yield. Second, reactor-grade plutonium generates 6 to 10 times more heat per unit mass than does

weapon-grade plutonium,2 and an IAEA significant quantity of RGPu (8 kg) would generate well over 100 watts

of heat.3

Nevertheless, the critical mass of RGPu is only about 25 percent higher than that of weapon grade, and

nuclear explosive devices can be designed that use it.4 Plutonium with a nonfissile concentration (plutonium 240

plus 242) as high as 50 percent-as might be recovered from very high burn-up LEU fuel or MOX fuel-can also

be used to make explosive devices having kiloton yields?

1 Altholigh65 percent of the neutrons captured byplutonium-239 cause ittofission, the retining35perCent

areabsorbedtocreate ptutonium-240. Other higher isotopes are formed simllarty. Reactor-grade plutonium normally

continues to be exposed in a reactor for up to a few years. VWapon-grade plutonium is produced from uranium-238

that Is exposed for only a relatkely short the, possibly on the order of weeks.

2 plubnium recovered from spent LEU or MOX fuel after 10 years of storage generates 14 to 24 W~9-Pu,

whereas weapon-grade plutoniumgenerate sonly 2.4 W/kg-Pu. P/utonlumFue/;% Assessmnt (Paris: OECWNEA,

1989), tables 9,128, as cited in Frans Berkhout, Anatoli Diakov, Harold Feiveson, Helen Hunt, Edwin Lyman, Marvin

Miller, and Frankvon Hippel, “Disposition of Separated Plutonium,” S&me& G/oha/ Secuclty, vol. 3, No. 1,1992,

p. 10.

3 If this rnuch RGPu were left surrounded with high explosive of low thermal conduCtivhy, such as in an

implosion device, it could generate temperatures above 200 “C, depending on the design.

4 See J. Carson Ma~ Reactor-Grade Phdonium’s Explosive Properties (Washington, DC: Ntiear Control

institute, August 1990).

5 Alex DeVo@i, “Fissi[e Materials and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Ann. Rev. ~ud. Paff. *I., vol. 36, P.

108 (table 4), In addition, based on declassified information, Maj. (3en. Edward B. Giller, deputy assistant

administrator for national security for the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, stated in

September 1977that the U.S. detonated anucleardevice in 1962 using low-grade plutonium typlcai of that produced

by dvilian power plants (Robert Gillette, “Impure Plutonium Used In ‘62 A-Test,” &s Angeles ?lnes, Sept. 16,1977,

p. A3), thus providing experhmntal confirmation that such matedal could be used to build an atomic weapon. (Neither

the isotopic composition of the plutonium used nor any yield information was released; at the time, reactorgrade

plutonium was defined to contain greater than 8 percent of the isotopes Pu-240 and Pu-242.) See atso Paul

Leventhal, ‘%Wapons-Usable NudearMaterials: Eliminate Them?” In Dl=t&sSdesonPm/if-tlon, Kathleen C.

Bailey, cd., Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-LR-1 14070-1, June 7,1893, p. 34.
134 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Box 4-C-Japanese Shipments of Separated Plutonium

After two decades of shipping spent fuel to Europe for reprocessing and storage, Japan has now begun a

major program to ship back large quantities of separated plutonium from its LWR spent-fuel. Shoe the United

States originally supplied this fuel, it has the right under the revised 1987 U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation

Agreement to approve or reject the final security plans for the shipments. Current plans call for up to30 or40 tonnes

of separated plutonium to be returned to Japan by the year 2000, using four or five shipments per year.

Since the early 1980s, shipments of plutonium by sea have required extraordinary security arrangements.

Even so, a 1988 Pentagon study stated that ”...even if the most careful precautions are observed, no one could

guarantee the safety of the cargo from a security incident, such as an attack on the vessel by small, fast craft,

especially if armed with modern antiship missiles.”1 However, unless the attackers were able to board the ship

and carry away the plutonium before it sank or before additional security forces arrived or could pursue them, this

may not be a very credible diversion scenario. Similarly, scenarios to commandeer the ship and evade the

inevitable pursuit do not seem very credible. Therefore, at least from a security standpoint, fears over Japanese

shipments of plutonium may be exaggerated. Nevertheless, if such shipments become commonplace, the

potential risk of such an attack may increase.2

1 “Transportation Alternatives for the S&we Transfer of Plutonium from Europe to Japan,” Sea

Transportation Alternatives, U.S. Dept. of Defense, Mar. 7,1988.

z s-, for e~~e, David E. Sartger, “Japan’s Plan to Import Piutonium Arouses Fear that Fuel Could Be

HiJaoked,” /Vew York TOrws, Nov. 25, 1991, p. D8.

—

Except for the few countries with unsafe- material can be shipped in much smaller and

guarded reprocessing facilities (Israel, India, and lighter quantities than can complete weapons, and

possibly North Korea32), obtaining plutonium for

weapon purposes would require its diversion at

the foreign reprocessing facility and subsequent

illegal transfer to the target country, or diversion

from safeguards within the country to which it

had been returned (see box 4-C). Such steps

would be legally risky and perhaps very costly to

attempt in secret, but they remain a possibility.

in forms that (unlike weapons) are not discrete,

countable units. Significant amounts of nuclear

material could conceivably escape without detection by accounting procedures-specially at

bulk-handling facilities. Indeed, numerous allegations that former Soviet weapon materials have

been offered on the black market have already

appeared in the press. 33 So far, the U.S. Centra l

MATERIAL LEAKAGE FROM FORMER SOVIET Intelligence Agency reports that it has not been

REPUBLICS able to verify any transfer of weapon-grade

If security and control of the former Soviet materials in significant quantities, and its director

nuclear weapon establishment breaks down, the has testified that ‘most reports of transfers appear

diversion of nuclear materials maybe more likely to be scams, hoaxes, or exaggerations. ’ Howthan the smuggling of intact weapons. Weapon ever, it is impossible to be certain that all are.34

32 NOW Korm hw su~pend~ its ~Omced ~tention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation ‘1’reaty and is therefore sti bo~d

by its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but has not yet resolved its dispute with the IAEA concerning the conditions of this agreement.

The IAEA has therefore been unable to confirm North Korea’s adherence to safeguards.

33 see, for Cxmple, MiUC Fishe:r, ‘‘Germany Reports a Surge in Nuclear Smuggling Cases,’ Washington Post, Oct. 10, 1992, p. A27.

34 ~s~ony of R. James Wool:;ey, Feb. 24, 1993, op. cit., footnote 15.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation 1135

The reports of nuclear smuggling out of the

former Soviet Union, even though most are

probably hoaxes, illustrate an important new

aspect of the proliferation problem. First, they add

substantial amounts of ‘‘noise’ to the system,

making it more difficult to distinguish real

proliferation threats from false ones. Second, by

their very existence, they demonstrate the willing

complicity of supply-side middlemen with covert

channels in the former Soviet Union, The potential for nuclear smuggling has thus become an

important issue.

In addition to the threat of diversion of

ex-Soviet weapon material from stockpiles that

are nominally under Russian military control,

other material might be available from civil

nuclear facilities within Russia, or from active or

mothballed facilities in other republics.35 As an

NPT nuclear-weapon state, Russia is not subject

to mandatory safeguards at any of its nuclear

facilities, and several of the former Soviet republics have not yet joined the NPT36

The issues presented by Russian plutonium

from dismantled weapons are quite different from

those surrounding Russian weapon HEU. The

United States is negotiating the purchase of 500

tonnes of Russian HEU over the next 20 years for

use in commercial power reactors. (The HEU

would be blended down to LEU in Russia before

the material was transferred.) No comparable

purchases are envisioned for weapon-grade plutonium, making it possible that Russia would

choose to recycle its excess plutonium as MOX in

its own power reactors or to keep as many as

10,000 to 20,000 plutonium pits (the nuclear

weapon cores that contain the fissile material) in

long-term retrievable storage. 37 Both the plutonium and the HEU could conceivably end up in

the wrong hands unless adequate measures are

taken to regulate their transport, storage, and

ultimate disposition. Procedures are required to

minimize and safeguard stockpiles of both plutonium and HEU, to use them in commercial fuel or,

in the case of plutonium, to dispose of it in safe

and acceptable ways, all while taking into account

strong economic pressures and potential political

instability.

HEU FROM RESEARCH REACTORS

Over 100 of the approximately

worldwide research and test reactors

325 total

are fueled

with highly enriched uranium (HEU enriched to

more than 20 percent uranium-235), for which the

total HEU inventory is about 4,000 kg. Most of

this HEU inventory is in the form of 90 to 93

percent uranium-235. Thirty-six HEU-fueled research and test reactors are in the United States,

some 2 dozen are in Russia and other former

Soviet republics, and the remainder are located in

about 34 additional countries. Approximately 40

of these foreign reactors (not including those in

the former Soviet Union) are rated at over 1

MW(t), and many contain several kilograms of

HEU fuel.38

The United States is one of the principal

suppliers of research-reactor fuel, exporting 100

to 150 kg HEU annually. To reduce the proliferation risks posed by HEU reactors, the United

States has developed and tested several types of

compatible high-density LEU fuels that can be

substituted for HEU fuels in research reactors. All

but 3 of the ca. 40 foreign HEU-fueled research

reactors larger than 1 MW(t) could be converted

to LEU fuels developed so far, but only about 10

35 w~lm c. potter, Eve E, cohe,~ and Edward V. Kayulcov, Nuclear Projiles of the Soviet Successor Srutes, Monograph No. I (Monterey,

CA: Program for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of tntemational Studies, May 1993j; and Oleg 13ukharin, The Threat of Nuclear

Terron”sm. . . . op. cit., footnote 12, pp. 4-5.

36 As of Novem&r 1993, only ~efi~ ~e~b~jq Bel~s, Estofi, ~tvia, Li~u~a, Russi~ md UZbekiSm Md joined the ~.

37 See us, confle~~, Office of Te~hnolo~ Assessment, Dismantling the Bo~ a~Managing the Nuclear Materials, op. Cit., fOOtIIOte 26,

38 Milton M. Hoenig, ‘ ‘Eliminating Bomb-Grade Uranium Fuel from Researeh Reaetors,” Nuclear Control Institute, January 1991, p. 3;

and Oleg BukharirL The Threat of Nuclear Terron”sm. . ., op. cit., footnote 12, p. 5.
136 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

(a) During a U.N. inspection in October 1991, IAEA

inspectors examine the bomb damage to the IRT-5000

research reactor at Al-Tuwaitha.

have plans to do so. Only a handful of other

research reactors have been converted so far.

(Reactors operating at less than 1 MW(t) generally have lifetime cores, providing little incentive

to convert. )39

Although all the HEU used in non-nuclearweapon-state reactors is obtained from suppliers

that require it to be placed under IAEA safeguards, a nation or terrorist group would have

little difficulty in recovering HEU metal from

fresh fuel if it were seized from storage at the

reactor site or in transit.40 Even if the fuel were

lightly irradiated, e.g., for a few hours per week at

less than 100 kW (e.g., in a typical university

research reactor), the small quantities of radioactive fission products it would contain would not

prevent recovery of the uranium, especially after

waiting a few days or weeks for the fuel’s activity

to decay to lower levels.41

(b) The Tammuz-2 reactor was also damaged by

coalition bombing during Operation Desert Storm.

Both reactors had been fueled by highly enriched

uranium.

Most research-reactor fuel, however, has been

irradiated for longer than this, making it much

more radioactive and difficult to handle. Theft of

such fuel (though likely to be regarded as a very

serious incident), would also be an unlikely

means of acquiring a nuclear arsenal, since

quantities are limited in any one location and, in

most reactors, are significantly less than what is

needed for a weapon. Although crossing the

nuclear threshold by obtaining material for even

one bomb poses a significant danger, it is not as

serious a threat as assembling a production line

for making nuclear weapons in quantity. For these

reasons, the proliferation concerns involving

diversion or theft of HEU research-reactor fuel

are legitimate, but limited in scale.42

| Indigenous Production of Materials

The alternative to stealing, diverting, or purchasing weapon-grade nuclear materials is manu39 Hoenig, ‘ ‘Elimi.natingBomb-Grade Uranium Fuel. . .,” ibid., p. 3; see also Armando Travelli, “The RERTR Program: A Status Repofi’

Argonne National Laborato~, Oct. 2, 1992,

40 For ~~ce, even before hq was discovered to have a massive nuclear weapon prograrIL there was concern tit it m.@t hve divd

for nuclear weapon use the 12,3 kg of 93% HEU originally supplied by France for its 40 MW(t) Osirak reactor or the 13.6 kg of Soviet-supplied

80!Z0 enriched fuel. (See foomote 5 in box 4-D.)

41 Hoenig, ‘ ‘El iminating Bomb Oracle Uranium Fuel. . ,,” op. cit., foomote 38, p. 3.

42 Res~h reacto~ CaII alSO be used to produce plutonium, however, which is also a concern. see below.
— .-

Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation | 137

facturing them indigenously. Many different approaches to producing nuclear materials are

available, depending on what nuclear materials a

proliferant starts with, what access it has to

dual-use or nuclear-specific technologies, and

what cost it is willing to bear to acquire proscribed technologies on the black market. Various

approaches also place specific demands on a

proliferant’s technology base, infrastructure, and

expertise, and pose different operational difficulties and risks of detection once acquired.

International nonproliferation policies have

made it quite difficult to use turn-key imported

facilities to produce weapon-grade materials. The

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibits NPT

parties from exporting major nuclear facilities—

especially those for uranium enrichment or reprocessing-unless they are placed under IAEA

safeguards. (Those goods requiring the imposition of safeguards have been placed on a multilaterally agreed ‘‘trigger list.”) In April 1992, all

27 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

(NSG) further agreed to require full-scope safeguards-the imposition of IAEA safeguards not

only on the transferred facility but also on all

other nuclear facilities in the recipient country—

as condition of any significant new nuclear

exports to nonweapon states. NSG countries also

adopted stringent licensing and export policies

for a new list of 65 categories of dual-use items

(see app. 4-D). However, several nations experienced in nuclear technology-including Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Ukraine-are not

members of the NSG, though at least Argentina

has stated that it would abide by the original 1977

NSG export guidelines.

Material production could involve obtaining

LEU and enriching it further to produce HEU, or

it could require creating the entire nuclear fuel

cycle indigenously, starting with uranium ore and

ending up with plutonium (see table 4-l).

ACQUISITION OF NATURAL URANIUM

Production of either weapon-grade uranium or

plutonium starts with uranium ore, followed by a

number of processing stages that are described

below. As the materials approach weapon grade,

their processing facilities become more specialized, and international controls on their use and

shipment become more stringent.

Uranium ore, which is commonly mined along

with other mineral-bearing ores and contains only

about 1 part in 500 of uranium, is not subject to

safeguards. Similarly, milling facilities that extract the uranium concentrate known as “yellowcake” (U308

) from ore are not safeguarded. (The

amounts of yellowcake exported or imported by

NPT states having formal safeguards agreements

in force must be reported to the IAEA, but such

transfers are not verified by inspections. In the

past, various countries have reportedly attempted

to acquire yellowcake clandestinely.43) Mining

and milling processes suitable for extracting

uranium concentrate are standard in the mining

industry. Many countries that are or had been of

proliferation concern have large indigenous deposits of uranium-bearing ore and already operate

mines and milling facilities.44

Yellowcake effectively becomes subject to

safeguards inspections only after it is introduced

into a declared conversion plant that produces a

form of uranium suitable for further enrichment

(e.g., uranium hexafluoride) or for fuel fabrication

43 For ~xwple, Israel is ~dely ~fieved to have orchestrated the disappearance h November 1968 of 200 tom of ye~owc*e titwas ~b

shipped from Antwerp to Genoa (Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, op. cit., footnote 16, p. 155). Between 1978 and 1980, Pakistan is believed to

have acquired from Libya quantities of up to 100 tons of yellowcake that Libya had originally purchased from Niger. (John J. FiidQ “West

concerned by Signs of Libyan-Pakistan A-Effort, ” Washington Star, Nov. 25, 1979; and Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, op. cit., footnote 16,

p. 176.) Although Libya had been a member of the NPT since 1975, it was not required to report its imports or exports of yellowcake until it

concluded a formal safeg-wuds agreement with the IAEA in 1980.

44 See Uranium Re~ource~, Pro~uc~on, ~n~ De~~, a Jofit Repofi of tie OE~ Nucle~ Enmgy Agency ~d the ~(P*: OECD,

1986), and other references cited in Spector, IVucZear Ambitions, op. cit., footnote 16.
138 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

(e.g., oxide, metal, alloy, or carbide). Such further

processing typically uses specialized facilities

that would trigger the application of IAEA

safeguards if imported; to evade safeguards at this

stage, a proliferant would have to construct a

clandestine conversion facility with uncontrolled

goods. Doing so would add expense and effort but

would probably not introduce particular roadblocks. 45

PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION AND REPROCESSING

FACILITIES

A key step in pursuing the plutonium route is

obtaining a source of irradiated uranium, either by

diverting spent fuel from a safeguarded reactor or

by irradiating uranium in a dedicated plutoniumproduction reactor. The reactors most commonly

used commercially, called “light-water reactors, ’ are difficult to divert fuel from clandestinely, since their fuel rods are readily accounted

for (if safeguarded), and since shutting such

reactors down for refueling creates an observable

event (even when unsafeguarded). Moreover,

they require enriched uranium to operate, which

is much more difficult to obtain outside of

safeguards than is natural uranium.

Rather than divert fuel from a safeguarded

reactor, a proliferant might build a dedicated

plutonium-production reactor fueled by natural

uranium. The section below discuses costs for

two possibilities: a small (30 MW thermal output)

reactor based on a widely available design that

could produce sufficient plutonium for 1 or 2

weapons per year, and a larger (400 MW thermal)

reactor that could produce some 10 to 20 weaponsworth of plutonium annually. Such production

reactors would be based on reactor technologies

better suited to plutonium production than is the

light-water design, but these alternate technologies typically require specialized materials such

as heavy water or ultra-pure graphite which, if

imported, would trigger the imposition of safeguards.

46 AS is also discussed below, the construction and operation of a nuclear reactor produces a

number of indicators or signatures that might

reveal its existence (see section on monitoring).

The combination of a nuclear reactor and

reprocessing plant offers a potentially less technologically advanced route to weapon-usable

material than many methods of uranium enrichment. Israel and India, for instance, operate

unsafeguarded reactors and reprocessing facilities that, in part, were built indigenously, and

North Korea has built and operated similar

facilities that were initially outside of safeguards.47

Extracting plutonium from spent fuel utilizes

chemical processes that, in theory, have been

within the grasp of most middle industrial powers

for some time (see table 4-2). The principal

difficulties in building a reprocessing plant stem

from the intense radioactivity of the spent fuel to

be reprocessed. Remote-handling equipment, radiation shielding, and other specialized equipment must be built and maintained to protect plant

workers. Although most of the chemicals used in

a reprocessing plant are available commercially,

much of the needed equipment is exportcontrolled, and many countries would be unable

to build such facilities without foreign technical

assistance. Large facilities have notoriously taken

a very long time to construct, and for technical as

45 Fuel fab~~tion and cladding, for example, might be done in a common metalworking shop.

46 Molec~es of heavy water have tieir two hydrogen atoms replaced by deuterium atoms, an isotope of hydrogen hving ~extra nm~n

in the nucleus. Although present in small quantities in naturally occurring water, heavy water is a controlled nuclear-related material once

concentrated. Heavy-water and ultra-pure graphite are effective neutron moderators having very low neutron absorption thus permitting

reactors to operate on natural uranium both materials are on the IAEA “trigger list’ of nuclear goods that cannot be exported by an

NPT-member state without the imposition of safeguards. However, it may be possible to manufacture such graphite indigenously or to obtain

nonreactor-grade graphite commercially that could be used in reactors (possibly after additional puritlcation) without triggering safeguards.

47 SFtor, Nuc/ear A~itions, op. cit., footnote 16, pp. 86, 139, 172 In the 1960s, however, Mia benefited fmm shed U.S. t~hnology

and Israel obtained signitlcant technicaJ assistance from France.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation | 139

Table 4-2—Reprocessing Programs and Capability Outside the Declared Nuclear Weapon States

Capacity

(actual or projected)

Country Reprocessing facility Dates of operation [t HM/yr]a

Safeguards?

Japan Tokai-mura 1981 -present yes

Rokkasho-mura 2005? [800] yes

Germany Karlsruhe 1971-1990 35 yes

Belgium Eurochemic-Mol 1966-1974 30 yes

Israel Dimona 1966? - [50-100]? no

India Trombay 1966-1974; [1983-present]? 30 no

Tarapur 1982-present 100 partly

Kalpakkam 1 993/94 [200]? no

Pakistan Chashma construction ended 1978? [100] NA

Rawalpindi not operating? [5]? no

North Korea Yongbyon [1992]? pilot-scale? [yes]b

Iraq Tuwaitha 1989-1991 (destroyed) lab-scale (violation)

South Africa Pelindaba [1987-?] pilot-scale? yesc

Argentina Ezeiza suspended 1990 [5] partly

Brazil Resende suspended 1980s [3] yes

South Korea NA abandoned 70s NA

Taiwan NA abandoned 70s NA

a Tonnes heavy metal per year. Items in [brackets] or with question marks represent estimates or SUbStanhl unCert~nty, respectively.

b Although North Korea b~ame a member of the NpT in 1985, its safeguar~ agreement with the IAW was not signed until 1992, and the

implementation of this agreement was still under negotiation as of November 1993.

C Prior to South Affi@ls joining the NPT in 1991, this facility was only under safeguar~ when safeguarded fuel was present. SirlCe then, it has COmO

under full-scope safeguards.

SOURCE: Adapted from David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Wbrid /rwentory of P/ufonium and High/y Ervkhed Uranium, 1992

(Oxford: Otiord Universit y Press/Sl PRI, 1993), p. 90; and Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuc/earArnbMons: The Spread of Nuclear

Weapons, 1989-1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).

well as economic and political reasons, even the countries harboring suspect facilities when their

smaller ones are sometimes abandoned before existence is known.

completion. 48 Furthermore, the IAEA and U.N. France, the U. K., and Japan, which each

involvement and the ongoing negotiations with operate commercial reprocessing facilities, are

North Korea aimed at resolving the dispute over not current nuclear proliferation concerns.49

its nuclear facilities have demonstrated the kind France and the U.K. are already nuclear weapon

of pressure that can be brought to bear on states, and Japan, as a non-nuclear-weapon NPT

AS For ~xmple, com~ctlon on a ltige ~pr~essing facility was begun in Pakistan in the late 1970s with French assis~ce, but may have

been abandoned sometime following France’s termination of its involvement in 1978. In 1990, Argentina also indeftitely suspended its work

on building a small reprocessing plant at Ezeiza. See Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, op. cit., footnote 16, pp. 115, 239.

@ ~dia, on tie o~er hand, operates a medium-size reprocessing facility at Tarapur that is not under fU~-titOe MfegUMdS, thus ~owing it

the option of producing weapon materials free of international legal constraints if it so chose. Russia continues to operate three reprocessing

plants, but in the past hm not segregated civilian from military operation. States that once reprocessed civilian spent fuel but have discontinued

doing so include Germany, Belgium, and the United States.
140 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Under IAEA supervision in October 1991, Iraqi

workers pour concrete into glove boxes at Al Tuwaitha

to prevent their future use. Glove boxes are used to

protect workers from radioactive materials such as

plutonium,

member, has all its facilities under full-scope

IAEA safeguards. Even so, material-accountancy at large spent-fuel reprocessing plants

involves inherent uncertainties that are not

necessarily less than an IAEA-defined significant quantity of nuclear material.

In addition, plutonium fuel-fabrication facilities are also now operating in France, the U.K.,

Japan, Belgium, and Germany, and another one

may soon be constructed in Chelyabinsk, Russia.

Plutonium and uranium recycling policies in

these countries, however, are still undergoing

revision and may not be finalized for some years

(see table 4-3).

URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGIES

Table 4-4 compares various enrichment technologies according to several factors that a

proliferant country would have to consider before

choosing to pursue a particular enrichment method.

(See app. 4-B for descriptions of these enrichment

technologies.) In addition to various characteristics of each method, a proliferant’s choice will

depend strongly upon its own technical infrastructure, expertise, and access to foreign technical assistance. For instance, Argentina’s experience in metallurgy was likely an important factor

in its decision to pursue gaseous diffusion, and

Pakistan’s theft of Dutch centrifuge designs was

undoubtable influential in its decision to pursue

that approach.

Table 4-5 concentrates on technical attributes

of each process, comparing various enrichment

techniques in terms of efficiency and separation

factor per stage (and thus the number of stages

required to enrich uranium to, say, 90 percent

U-235). Each stage of an enrichment plant takes

an input source of uranium, or ‘‘ feed,’ and

produces two outputs: one with a greater concentration of uranium-235 than the feed (the “product”), and the other depleted in uranium-235 (the

“tails”). The separation factor indicates how

much enrichment each stage provides. (It is

defined as the ratio of the relative isotopic

abundance of uranium-235 in the product to that

in the tails.) Some approaches, such as electromagnetic separation, achieve very high degrees of

separation per stage, and very few stages are

needed to obtain highly enriched uranium. Others, however, only marginally enrich the product

in each stage, and up to thousands of stages are

needed to obtain HEU.

For enrichment approaches in which each stage

provides only marginal enrichment and thus

many successive stages are required, the stages

are connected into cascades. Each stage (usually

consisting of many individual elements working

in parallel) feeds its product to the stage operating

at the next higher level of enrichment and its tails

to the next lower.

Table 4-5 also gives estimates for the amount

of electricity per unit enrichment capacity required for each approach, with enrichment capac-
.—

Chapter 4-TechnicaI Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation | 141

Table 4-3-Plutonium and Uranium Recycle Policies in Europe and Japan

Reprocessed

Country Plutonium recycle uranium recycle LWR-MOX program

Belgium

France

Germany

Italy

Japan

Netherlands

Russia

Spain

Switzerland

United Kingdom

Yes?

Yes

Yes

No’

Yes

Yesd

Expected

No

Yes

No

Tested with MOX

No

?

No

Yes

No

?

Yes

MOX fabricator. Plans to load two reactors with

MOX, beginning mid- 1990s.

MOX fabricator. First phase (eight reactors) to be

loaded with MOX by 1993.16 reactors to be loaded

by late 1990s,

MOX fabricator. Leader in MOX experience. 18

reactors to be loaded with MOX.b

No operating reactors.

MOX fabricator. Demonstration program (two reactors) planned for 1994-1997. Commercial program

due to start in 1995, rising to 12 LWRs loaded with

MOX by 2003.

MOX R&D at Dodewaard was suspended as of

1992.

Uranium separated from VVER-reactor fuel is recycled in graphite-moderated (RBMK) reactors.

No.

Has loaded two reactors with MOX.

Plans to become a MOX fabricator,

a offi~al FreNh policy is to recycle uranium recovered from rep recessed spent fuel, either by m-enriching It or by using it as the matrix for LWRMOX fuel fabrication. However, the low prlee of natural uranium has meant that the Eleetrieitd de France has shown little practical interest in uranium

recycle.

b AS of 1992, on~ IO re~tors had been awarded licenses to load MOX fuel, and MOX had been loaded at 7 of them.

C A small MOx txt Progrm ~n at Garfgl~no in the 197*. Most ~alian separated plutonium h= been US4 tO fuel France’s fSSt &eeder WSCtOr,

Superph&ix.

d Asmai[ MO)(test Prwrm ran at ~W~rd in the 197& and l~s, Dut& separated pl~onium has ken USed h the Superphenix and Kalkar

fast reactor cares.

SOURCE: Frans Berkhout et al., “Disposition of Separated Plutonium,” Sa”eme & Global Security, vol. 3, No. 1, 1992, p. 14.

ity measured in terms of ‘separative work units, obtain on the open market. Nevertheless, some

or SWUs.50 have escaped these controls, mainly due to lax

Most of the sensitive technologies and compo- enforcement and variability of regulations among

nents used for uranium enrichment fall under supplier countries. For example, security leaks in

strict export controls, both in the United States the URENCO consortium-a uranium enrichand abroad, and are therefore very difficult to ment enterprise established by the British, Germ Sws me=~e tie d~r~ irl en~opy, or COIIVCmWly the increase in order, resulting when a giv~ iSOtOpiC fiture k Spht ~to two

mixtures of greater and lesser CQncedmtions. (Combining two pure substances--say pure uranium-235 and pure uranium-238-results in a

mixture that is more disordered than its original constituents. Reversing that process by separating an isotopic mixture into its constituent parts

therefore increases its order.)

Although the exact formula relating the number of SWUS to the concentration of uranium-235 in the fee~ product, and tails is complicated,

a rough appro ximation for the SWUS needed to produce a given amount of 3% or higher enriched product from natural uranium (with typical

tail depletions of about 0.3Yo) is about 12@200 timca the number of kilograms uranium-235 contained in that product. The low end of this range

applies to fii enrichments from 3 to 5%, the high end for those from 20 to 97Y0 (see Alkm S. Krass et al., Uranium Enn<chrnent and Nuclear

Weapon Prol~eration (London: Taylor& Francis, Ltd., 1983), pp. 96-98, esp. formulas 5.2 and 5.6). For example, producing 1 kg of 3%, 20%,

or 9(YZO enriched product from natural uranium (with 0.3% tails) would require 3.4, 38, and 193 SWUS (and 7.5, 50, and 225 kg of natural

uranium), respectively.
142 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 4-4-Relative Ease of Developing Various Enrichment Technologies for Weapon Programs

Diff Cent Aero Chem EMIS lC/PC AVLIS MLIS LAP

Availability factors:

Technology/know-how widespread + ++ +/- +1- ++ +1-

Components attainable .

Operational factors:

Convertible LEU to HEU

Minimal training required

Uses standard UF6 feed

Low maintenance requirements

Detectability factors:

Small plant size

Short equilibrium time

Low power consumption

Commercially justifiable

Overall proliferation

concern:b

+/- +/- + ++ .

++?

. .

. .

++ +?

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

++

+

--

+

-. +

+

+

.

-. . .

+ +

+1-

+

.-

--

+1- +

+

+

?

+

+

+

?

+

+

+

++

. .

+

--

+1-

?

+

++

+?

?

-

?

+

?

--

--

+/- ++ +/- + + +/- .-

KEY:

+/++ Indicate favorable/very favorable factor from the perspective of a potential proliferant.

-/- indicate unfavorablelvery unfavorable factor.

? indicates insufficient information.

Diff - Gaseous diffusion

Cent = Gas centrifuge

Aero - Aerodynamic methods (Becker nozzle or Helikon processes)

Chem = Chemical exchange (Japanese Asahi or French Chemex processes)

EMIS - Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (e.g., calutrons)

iC - ion Cyclotron Resonance

PC - Plasma Centrifuge

AVLIS - Atomic Vapor Laser Isotopo Separation

MLIS = Molecular Laser Isotope Separation

LAP - kser-Assisted Process (e.g., Chemical Reaction by Isotopic Selective Laser Activation, or CRISLA)

a The ion~xchange resin developed anct used in Japan by the Asahi Chemical Co. is proprietary and would be difficult tO dupiicate, even if -rnples

could be obtained. However, a number of research programs around the world are developing fast equilibrium-time resins that might be useful for

future chemicai enrichment applications. it has also been reported that Ukraine produces an ion-exchange resin simiiarto that used in Japan’s

Asahi process (William C. Potter, Monterey Institute of International Studies, private communication, November 1992).

b overall Proliferation ~ncern shoui,~ be taken only as a very rough indicator, since it is strong/y cOunfrydependant. In arriVing at thk ov-11 mting,

“availability” and “operational” factors were each given twice the weight of the “detectability” factors, but forcx)untrfeswtth an advanced technology

base or skiils suited to a particular technology, the relative weighting might be very different.

SOURCE: AlIan S, Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuc/ear Weapon Proliferation (London: Taylor a Frands, Ltd., 1983), p. 19; Marvin Miller

and George Rathjens, “Advanced Tecl-moiogies and Nuclear Proliferation,“ in Robert H. Bruce, ad., Nuclear Proliferation: South Aaiaandthe Mkk9e

East, Monograph No. 2 (Perth, Australia: Indian Ocean Center for Peace Studies, 1992), pp. 107-123; and OTA (see app. 4-B on enrichment

technologies).
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation 1143

Table 4-5—Efficiency of Uranium Enrichment Technologiesa

Separation factor or No. of stages kW for

enrichment factorb

for 90% HEUCkWh/SWU 4,000 SWU/yr

Gaseous diffusion. . . . . . . . . . . . 1.004-1.0045

Gas centrifuge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2-1 .5d

Aerodynamic

Helikon/UCOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.030

Becker nozzle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.015

Chemical

French Chemex. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.002-1.003

Japanese Asahi. ., . . . . . . . . . , 1.001-1.0013

Electromagnetic b

EMIS (calutron). . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-40

ion cyclotron resonance/

Plasma centrifuge. . . . . . . . . . . - [3-10]

Laser processes

AVLIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - [5-1 5]

MLIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , - [3-1 o?]

LAP (CRISLA). . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~` [1.5]g

3,500-4,000

40-90

540

1100

5,000-8,000’

12,000-1 6,000’

2-3

[4-8]

[a few]

[under 10?]

- [20]

2,500

100-200

4,000

3,600

600

150

20,000 -30,000f

[200-600]

[100-200]

[200-250]

[tens?]

1,200

50-100

2,000

1,800

300

75

10,000-15,000

[100-300]

[50-100]

[100-125]

[low]

a Estimates in [brackets] are uncertain and may not be achievable on an industrial -le.

b For electromagnetic and I=er ~rwe~e~, estimates are for the enn’chmenf factor, not the separation factor. “Separation

factor” is defined as the ratio of the relative (235U-to-2wU) enrichment of the product to that of the tails in any one stage of a

cascade, and is the figure given for diffusion, centrifuge, aerodynamic and chemical processes. “Enrichment factor” is the ratio

of relative enrichment of the product to that of the bed, which is more relevant to processes whose separation per stage is high

enough that a many-stage cascade is not required, and in which the “cut” (the ratio of the total amount of material in the product

to that in the tails) is therefore not as relevant. The separation factor for a given process is always larger than its enrichment

factor, but only slightly larger when the cut is much less than 50’Yo, as it may be in some laser processes.

C Assumes tails with 0.3’%. Z35U COllhlt.

d The given range applies t. m~ern centrifuges and is dependent on their length, rotational speed, and other f=tors. The eafliest

centrifuges operated at subcritical peripheral speeds of 250 m/see and had separation factors of only 1.026. See Manson

Benedict and Thomas H. Pig ford, Nuclear Chemical Engineering, 2nd ed. (New York, NY; McGraw-Hill, 1989), chapter 12.

e For Chemiml Prmesses, a single physi~l item (e.g., an ion exchanger or pulse COIUmn) an ~nt~n tens or hundr~s of

effective “stages, ” so that these large numbers can be misleading.

f This figure is sometimes given as 3,000-4,000 (e.g., see Kr~s et al., below, p. 189), Whkh would app~ onty to significantly

improved calutrons that used multiple beams, permanent magnets, or other refinements. The figure given in the table is based

on U.S. “Alpha” machines used during the Manhattan Project, which produced only about 1/3 gram uranium-235 per machine

per day in about a 200/0 enriched product, and used more than 50 kW per machine to power the electromagnets, pumps, and

ion beams.

9 Estimate from Marvin Miller; derived from prelim inary 1986 data of Isotope Technology, a small west-coast firm promoting the

CRISLA process.

SOURCE: Adapted by OTA from U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power, Report of the

Nonproliferation A/temative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP), “Volume il: Proliferation Resistance,” DOE/NE-0001/2,

June 1980, p. 3-7; AlIan S. Krass et al., Uranium Emichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation (London: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.,

1983), p. 188; and Marvin Miller, “Atomic Vapor Laser isotope Separation,” FY1989 Arms Control Impact Statements,

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1988), p. 142.
144 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

man, and Dutch governments-have contributed

to the proliferation of its centrifuge design

technology.

Some components of very old technologies,

such as electromagnetic isotope separators (EMIS,

also known as “calutrons’ ‘), and of very new

technologies-some of which have still not been

developed to a commercial scale by even the most

advanced industrialized countries-have not been

subject to export controls.51 For example, magnets and beam sources for EMIS, and some lasers

that could be used for laser isotope-separation

techniques, have such widespread commercial

applications that they have not been controlled in

the past.52

Although gaseous diffusion dominated Western commercial enrichment for over three decades, it is now being overtaken by gas centrifuge

technology. Neither technique has yet been used

outside the five acknowledged nuclear powers to

produce HEU on a large scale. However, the

proliferation potential of centrifuges has won

considerable attention both because of Iraq’s

pursuit of the technology before the Gulf War and

because of Pakistan’s success at building its own

modem gas centrifuge plant with the help of

blueprints and purchase orders stolen from the

Dutch factory of the URENCO consortium.53

Detailed information on older centrifuge technology, in fact, is available in published documents.54 However, these comparatively rudimentary designs are at least 25 times less efficient in

terms of energy use and separation capacity than

modem designs, whose manufacturing processes,

design parameters, and operating characteristics

remain classified. Older designs therefore cannot

lead to facilities nearly as compact and efficient

as those using modem technology. However, it is

now becoming known that the former Soviet

Union began developing gas-centrifuge technology on a massive scale in the 1950s and has

advanced to fifth-generation designs. Russia continues to operate four major gas-centrifuge enrichment plants-though since 1987 these have

only produced LEU for reactors—with a total

capacity of about 10 million “separative work

units” (SWUs), about half the world’s total for

this technology .55

Conversion of an existing facility

Large commercial enrichment facilities producing LEU for nuclear power plants, if

reconfigured for higher enrichments, would

51 ~ 1961, fie U*S. dec~ssfi(~ tie te.c~olo~ for el~~~~etic ~d ~rod@c efichment techniques, and for gaseous diffusion

except for its diffusion barriers and pump seals. Germany found little difilculty in sharing the technology it had developed for the Becker nozzle

aerodynamic process with South Ahica, which in turn went on to develop on an industrial scale a different version of the process called Helikoq

or ‘‘stationary-wall” centrifuges. Although designs are also available in the open literature for early gas centrifuges, modern centrifuge

technology remains classifkd both in the U.S. and by the URENCO consortium.

52 Note, however, that the new Nucleu Suppliers Guidelines for dual-use items, once implemented, wi~ tighten export COntrOk on mmy

of these technologies (see app. 4-D).

53 shy= BIU@ Nuclear Rivals in the Mial.ile East (1.ondon: Routledge, 1988), p. 8; James Adams, Engines of War: Merchnts of Death

and the New Arms Race (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990), pp. 200-203; and Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, op. cit., footnote 16,

pp. 90,97. Illicit efforts by proliferant states to obtain goods and technology have continued, as witnessed by the July 7, 1992 conviction in

Philadelphia of Pakistani General ham al-Haq for conspiring to illegally export maraging steel-350 (a materiaJ needed to construct gas

centrifuges).

~ See, for example, Gemot 25ippe, The Development of Short-bowl Ulrracentri@ges, University of Vir= Report No. W-442O-1O1-6OU,

submitted to Physics Branch, division of Research U.S. Atomic Energy Commissio% WashingtorL DC, July 1960, referenced in Krass et al.,

Uranium Enrichment. . . . op. cit., :footnote 50.

55 See Mark Hibbs, NuclearFuc/, Oct. 26, 1992, p. 3; OlegB~“ , The Threat ofNuclear Terrorism. . . . op cit., footnote 12, August 1992,

p. 4; and David Ah@, Frans Berkhou~ and William Walker, World Invento~ of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1992 (Oxford:

Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1993), pp. 54-56. According to these sources, all Russian centrifuge plants employ subcritical, aluminum-rotor

centrifuges with annual throughput believed to be only around 5 SW per machine,
—

Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation I 145

have the enrichment capacity to make HEU for

tens of weapons annually from the same

amount of uranium source material required

each year to fuel just one commercial-size

nuclear power plant. Furthermore, each such

enrichment facility typically supplies fuel for

many tens of power reactors annually.56

If the enrichment technology is capable of

doing so, upgrading 3 percent enriched uranium

to 90 percent enriched uranium requires only

about as much energy and enrichment effort as

was required to enrich the 3 percent uranium in

the first place. Although a cascade to enrich a

small amount of LEU to weapon-grade levels

would require several times as many stages as

an LEU facility, each stage could be built with

many fewer or much smaller elements, and it

would cost only a fraction that of a large

enrichment facility. Therefore, if they could avoid

detection by safeguards (which would be difficult), those few countries already possessing

commercial enrichment facilities could easily

produce substantial amounts of nuclear weapon

material by reconnecting part of a facility to

produce 90 percent enriched material, by secretly

adding additional enrichment stages, or by diverting some 3 percent enriched material to another

(clandestine) facility .57

A covert facility fed by a small amount of

diverted LEU, in theory, could be quite small

and difficult to detect, although safeguards are

designed to detect the diversion of the LEU. (See

the following section.) The difficulty of reconfiguring an existing facility without detection, as

opposed to building a new one, however, depends

upon the type of enrichment technology used.

Converting a large gaseous diffusion or chemicalexchange plant without detection from low to

higher enrichments would be extremely difficult.

Doing so would require either a complex reconnection of cascade elements, the addition of

thousands of additional stages, or the reintroduction of enriched material into the original feed

point. 58 Given the size of commercial facilities, it

could take from months to over a year to

re-establish steady-state plant operation after

such a change, during which the change would

almost certainly be detected.

Centrifuge cascades, on the other hand, can

relatively easily be made to produce higher

enrichments-either by adjusting the feed rates,

by reintroducing higher enriched material into the

feed, or by reconfiguring the cascade itself.59

Since centrifuge-cascade equilibrium times are

on the order of minutes to tens of minutes, such a

change in enrichment levels could be accom56 That a commercial nuclear reactor requires far more fissile material than a nuclear weapon can be seen by comptig tiefi energy ou~uts.

A 1,000 MW(e) nuclear power plant, which generates heat through fission at a rate of about 3,000 MW, releases the energy equivalent of about

60 kilotons of TNT each day.

Alternatively, starting with natural uraniunL less than 5,000 SWUS of enrichment effort are needed to produce an IAEA significant quantity

(25 kg) of highly enriched (90 percent) uranium. In contrast, over 100,OOO SWUS are required to produce the approximately 30 tons of 3%

enriched uranium consumed each year in a large commercial reactor, and commercial enrichment facilities have capacities of millions of SWUS

per year.

57 me On]y non.nuclW.weapon smtes actively involved in commercial enrichment for nuclear power are (SW table 4-7) Jap~ SOU~ ~ca,

and those countries participating in two consortia: URENCO and Eurodif. URENCO, established in 1971 by the U. K., W. Germany, and the

Netherlands, operates several large centrifuge-based enrichment plants, Eurodif, a private commercial collaboration involving France, Italy,

Belgiuu SpairL and Iran that began soon thereafter, operates a large gaseous diffusion plant (10.8 million SWU/yr) at Tncastin in France. (Iran

has been excluded from active participation since the 1979 revolution.)

56 Especi~ly for che~cal-eficdent methods, which employ liquid phases, reeordiguration fOr HEU could also rt@re Smaller ekmenm

to avoid the possibility of criticality accidents.

59 Adju5~g he f~d rates CMI increase the enrichment of tie product uP to some maximum for a given cascade, called the “total reflux’

enrichment level. If normal operation of a given cascade produces 370 enriched product, then operating near total reflux could produce around

12% enrichments. Krass et al., Uranium Enrz’chmenr, . . . op. cit., footnote 50, p. 116. MLIS and the South African Helikon techniques might

also offer advantages for producing HEU, but MLIS is still in the developmental stages, and the Helikon method currently utilizes an inflexible

architecture. (See table 4-4 and table 4-5.)
146 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Part of a gas-centrifuge cascade operated by Japan’s

Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development

Corporation (PNC). As required by the NPT all

of Japan’s nuclear facilities come under IAEA

safeguards and are regularly inspected.

plished much more rapidly than for gaseous

diffusion plants, whose: equilibrium times are

weeks to months.

It is unlikely that operators of existing safeguarded centrifuge facilities would reconfigure or

operate them clandestinely to produce HEU.

Nevertheless, such a reconfiguration or modified

operation is certainly possible and might even

elude detection if them were a several-month

period between safeguards inspections and if the

alteration could somehow be made to look to the

plant’s containment and surveillance system like

routine maintenance. Any such reconfiguration

would require the collusion of many plant operators to keep it secret, however, providing a further

deterrent. 60

Building a dedicated facility

Table 4-6 lists the specialized requirements for

the different enrichment approaches that could be

taken by a potential proliferant who wished to

build a dedicated uranium enrichment facility,

indicating which are currently subject to export

controls. Table 4-7 presents the status of each of

the enrichment approaches in a number of countries. Many states have conducted R&D into a

number of different approaches, with 10 non-nuclear-weapons states apparently having built pilot

plants or production capability utilizing at least

one of these enrichment methods. In India,

Pakistan, and Iraq, those facilities have not been

safeguarded, and in Brazil, Argentina, and South

Africa, they have only recently been placed under

safeguards.

The smallest, most easily hidden enrichment

facilities would be based on energy-efficient

processes that achieved high levels of enrichment

in just a few stages. For example, laser and

possibly plasma separation processes would be

quite valuable to a proliferant state seeking a

covert enrichment facility. However, energy

efficiency and high separation per stage are

usually directly related to technical complexity,

and these advanced techniques will probably

remain relatively inaccessible to developing countries for some time. Despite more than two

decades of development work on these techniques, the most technologically advanced countries in the world have only recently taken laser

separation techniques beyond the laboratoryscale demonstration stage.6l

Aerodynamic methods such as the Becker

Nozzle and Helikon process (see app. 4-B) have

higher separation factors than gaseous diffusion,

enabling them to reach high enrichments with

fewer stages and smaller facilities. With no

moving parts other than the compressors and

pumps, they are operationally less complex than

@ Moreover, u a result of the early 1980s Hexapartite Safeguards Project addressing Stiems fOr centrifuge enrichment fwilitia,

countries operating the principal centrifuge facilities in Europe and Japan have agreed to the principle of limited fkquency unannounced access

(LFUA) as one way of further reducing the possibility of any such reemtlguration. The Hexapartiteproject involved Australia, German Y, Jap~

the Netherlands, the United States, and the United Kingdom, as well as the IAEA and Euratom.

c1 South Africa’s Atomic Enew Corp., Ltd. plans to test a prototype molecular-laser-isotope-separation (MLIS) uranium enrichment-unit

sometime in 1994, Note that this is in contrast to the AVLIS process currently being developed in the U. S., France, and the U.K. France

announced in April 1992 that it had successfully produced 10 grams of low-enriched uranium using laser enrichment.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation | 147

Table 4-6-Special Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Technologies

Feed Material Critical Equipment/Technology”

Gaseous diffusion

Gas centrifuge

Aerodynamic

Chemical

EM IS (calutron)

Ion cyclotron

Plasma centrifuge

AVLIS

MLIS/LAP (CRISLA)

Thermal diffusion

UF6 gas

UF6 gas

4% UF6 plus

96% H2 (mixture)

U compounds

u c l4

b

U metal

U metal

U metal

UF6 gas

liquid UF6

UF6 processing equipment (corrosion-resistant)”; diffusion

barrier”; specialized compressors/pumps/seals*; large

heat exchangers.

All components”: maraging steel (or other high strength-toweight materials); endcaps; rotors; bellows; center post

tubes; specialized ring magnets, magnetic suspension

assemblies, and bottom bearings; scoops; baffles; outer

casing; drive systems such as inverters; desublimers;

high temperature furnaces; UF6 processing equipment

(corrosion-resistant). Also: vacuum/molecular diffusion

pumps.

UF6 processing equipment (corrosion-resistant)”; jet-nozzle

units’ for Becker process, or vortex unit* for Helikon

process (which uses a 2%/98% gas mixture); compressors/pumps/seals (corrosion-resistant)”.

Proprietary ion-exchange resin” and exchange catalysts* (for

Asahi process), or organic solvents and avoidance of

catalytic elements (for Chemex process).

Large electromagnets; high-voltage power equipment; stable,

high-current ion source; collectors; vacuum/molecular

diffusion pumps; UC14 processing equipment; and uranium recycling plant.

Superconducting magnets; large solenoids; ion source; liquid

helium; radiofrequency power supplies.

(Same as ion cyclotron method, but excluding radiofrequency

power supplies)

High-power, pulsed dye laser; copper-vapor laser; vacuum

pump; uranium vaporization equipment (such as electronbeam heater); high-voltage collector power supply; refractory materials.

High-power pulsed C02 laser; CF4, CO, or excimer lasers (16

mm I R and/or UV); UF6carrier-gas mixture; UF6 processing equipment (corrosion-resistant)”.

UF6 processing equipment (corrosion-resistant)”.

a Those items marked with ~terisks (*) have been regulated by export controls for many years. Many of the remaining items

(subject to certain threshold specifications) will come under the new NSG dual-use exportentrol guidelines, once

implemented by NSG countries (see app. 4-D). Note, however, that while such controls may impose signif”kant barriers to

acquisition, they do not make it impossible.

b Higher efficienq liquid metal ion sources might also be us~, see l/.E. Krohn, and G.R. Ringo, “tori Sources of High

Brightness Using Liquid Metal,” App/. F%ys. Letters, vol. 27 (1975), p. 479; and Oswald F. Schuette, “Electromagnetic

Separation of Isotopes,” U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, OTA-E-48

(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1977), app. vol. 2, Part 2-VI*, pp. 93-108,

SOURCE: Adapted by OTA from Sean Tyson, “Uranium Enrichment Technologies: Proliferation Implications,” Eye cm Supp/y

(Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute for International Studies), No. 5, fall 1991, pp. 77-86,
148 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 4-7-Status of Uranium Enrichment Technologies by Countrya

Diff Cent Aerob Chem

c EMIS IC PC LIS AVLIS MLIS LAP

Declared nuclear weapon states:

Us. 3 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1

Russia 3 3 1 2 1

France 3 1 2 1 1

U.K. 3 3 1

China $3 2 1 1

Nonnuclear-weapon states under safeguards with at least pilot-scale enrichment facilities:

Argentina :2 1

Brazil 2 2 1 1

Germany 2 3 2 1

Italy 2 1 1

Japan 1 3 2 1

Netherlands ,-2 3 1

South Africa 1 3

1

1

1 1

1

Countries outside the NPT or otherwise of proliferation concern:

India 2

Iran “ 1 1

Iraq ‘1 1 1 1 2

Israel 1

Pakistan 2

1

1

NPT parties (under safeguards) with only R&D-level enrichment programs:

Australia 1 1 1 1

Belgium I 1

Canada 1

South Korea 1

Romania 1

Spain 1 1

a Entries indi~te the highest level of development achieved by a given country baaed on Urlclaaaified sources. some p-sss m~ have been

discontinued by some countries.

b somh Afrfca has develo@ the }Ielikon aerodynamic process to industrial acale; Garmany, Brazil, and the United States have focused on the

Backer nozzle.

c Japan and Frame have develop~ the Asahi ion~xchange and Chemex solvent-extraction chemical pmoeeaea, reSpeCtiVdy. The Vedf@ of

other countries’ chemical-enrichment research programs are not known.

KEY:

1 = R&D

2- Pilot Plant: facility with enrichment capacity of leas than 100,000 SWU/yr.

3 = Industrial Capability: fadllty with capacity of 100,000 SWU/yr or more.

LIS = Laser isotope separation techniques, general (AVLIS, MLIS, or LAP) (See key to table 4-4 for other abbreviations.)

SOURCE: Adapted by OTAfrom David Aibright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Mbrkf/nvenfory of/Yukm/urn and High/y Enriched Uranium,

7992, (Oxford: Oxford University ProeWSiPRl, 1993); Sean Tyson, “Uranium Enrichment Techndogiea: Prolifemtion Implications,” Eye on Supply

(Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute for International Studies), No. 5, fall 1991, pp. 87-88; Man S. Krasa et al., Umnium Enrfchrnent and Nuc/ear

Weapon Proliferation (London: Taylor & Frands, Ltd., 1983), p. 34.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation ! 149

centrifuges or laser processes.62 Though not as

energy efficient as centrifuges, aerodynamic methods can significantly enhance their production

rates by using low-enriched uranium feed and can

be used to produce very high enrichments.63 They

may therefore be a proliferation concern. However, complex small-scale manufacturing technology is required to fabricate critical aerodynamic components for the Becker nozzle technology, and the Helikon process is proprietary.

Therefore, countries without very sophisticated

technical capabilities would have to import such

components (in violation of export controls).

Although key aspects are proprietary, chemical

separation techniques such as the Japanesedeveloped ion-resin process and the French solvent extraction method are based on conventional

chemical-engineering technology that in general

is available to a great many countries around the

world (see ch. 2). This enrichment approach could

therefore prove difficult to control if the specific

processes and materials involved were reproduced by a proliferant state.

Gaseous diffusion was the primary enrichment

technique used by each of the five acknowledged

nuclear powers. Classification by the United

States of diffusion-barrier and compressor technology thus was not able to prevent its independent development by the other nuclear weapon

states, even as early as the 1950s and 1960s.64

Since then, however, the only other country that

appears to have had some success at developing

gaseous diffusion on its own is Argentina.65 Since

considerable engineering and materials expertise

are required to design barriers and large corrosionresistant compressors, the less-industrially advanced countries would still find it difficult to

construct gaseous diffusion facilities.66 Moreover, diffusion facilities are large and energy

inefficient, making them virtually impossible to

hide from detection on a commercial scale.

FROM NUCLEAR MATERIALS TO NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

| Knowledge and Expertise

Although successfully designing a nuclear

explosive device requires individuals with expertise in metallurgy, chemistry, physics, electronics, and explosives, the required technology dates

back to the 1940s, and the basic concepts of

nuclear bombs have been widely known for some

time. Much of the relevant physics for a workable

design is available in published sources. As the

Iraqis and others have discovered, many unclassified or declassified documents can also be obtained that make designing a weapon considerably easier than it was for the first nuclear powers

(see box 4-D).67 The first gun-type weapon ever

62 me He~O~ ~rweSS ~M @ely developed intem~ly in Souti ~ca titer it pmch~~ rights to the related Becker Nozzle tdlllOIOgy

from Germany. Brazil also invested in the Becker technology in the late 70s. See Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, op. cit., footnote 16, pp. 243,

270.

62 me He~on proce~~ “as lugely developd ~tem~ly in Souti ~ca titer it pmch~~ @ts to tie related Becker Nozzle t~hno]ogy

from Germany. Brazil also invested in the Becker technology in the late 70s. See Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, op. cit., footnote 16, pp. 243,

270.

63 El~@o~Wetic isotope separation also has these three attributes.

64s= ~bfight et al., World Invento~. . I op. cit., footnote 55, pp. 49-66.

65 rbid., pp. 180-181.

66 ~w, for ~wm, r~ofl~y work~ on g=eous diffusion for 6 years before abandoning it in favor of other metiods. Jay C. Davis ~d

David Kay, “Iraq’s Secret Nuclear Weapon Program, ” Physics Toaizy, July 1992, p. 22.

67 For fi~ce,-y ~sic physi~~ Pficlples of nuc]~ w~pom (~ough not tie implosion con~pt) Ue discussed in Robert Serber, The

Los Alamos Primer: First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic Bomb (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1992). Serber’s lectures were

f~st given at Los Alamos at the start of the Manhattan Project in April 1943. Lecture notes were transcribed at the time and then declassiiled

in 1965. The Iraqis legally obtained copies of many such documents from the Wesg such as declassified documents on lithium-6, a material

useful for more advanced nuclear weapons. David Kay, head of several IAEA nuclear inspections in Iraq, private communication, Jan. 8, 1992.
150 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Box 4-D-lraq’s Design Effort and Enrichment Approaches

Before the Gulf War, Iraqi scientists had progressed through several design iterations for a fission weapon

based on an implosion design (one that is much more difficult to develop than the alternative, gun-type

design-see app. 4-A). Still at the early stages of completing a design, they had successfully overcome some but

certainly not all of the obstacles to a workable device.1 Using HEU, a completed device based on the latest Iraqi

design reportedly might have weighed from about a tonne to somewhat more than a tonne.2 The Iraqis also

possessed flash x-ray photography equipment and high-speed streak cameras? both useful in the R&D phase

for studying the timing and compression achieved by a nuclear implosion design.

How close Iraq was to completing a bomb is still open to debate. At the request of the IAEA, a group of nuclear

weapon designers from the United States, Britain, France, and Russia met in April 1992 to assess the progress

of Iraq’s nuclear program prior to the Persian Gulf War, based on documents that had been obtained through

subsequent inspections. These designers reportedly concluded that bottlenecks in the program could have

delayed completion of a working bomb for at least 3 years, assuming Iraq had continued its multifaceted strategy

and design approach.4 However, several experts familiar with the inspections believe that lraq could also probably

1 seepeterzrnnwr~n,’’lmq’s NudearAchlevements: Components, Sources, and Stature,” Congresdonal

Research Sertice report 93-323F, Feb. 18, 1993, pp. 18-22 and esp. app. 4-B, which reprints the A/-Atheer Plant

Progress Fteporttorthe Per/od 7 January 1990t031 May 7990, Annex to the Sixth Inspection Report, U.N. Security

Coundl S/23122, Oct. 8, 1991 (English), app. 4-B, pp. 23-24. Al Atheer was the prlndpal site for weaponization

research, development, and experimentation, similar to some of the roles played by lxM Atamos during the

Manhattan Project. The sixth inspection included the famous incident in which inspectors were detained for 4 days

in a parking lot in downtown Baghdad near Petrochemical-3 (PC-3) headquarters.

2 see, for example, Zimmerman, op. at., footnote 1, p, 19; and Colin Norman, “Iraq’s Bomb Program: A

Smoking Gun Emerges,” Science, vol. 254, Nov. 1, 1991, pp. 644-645.

3 David Kay, head of several IAEA nudearinspections in Iraq, pdvatecommunication, MC. 1,1992. $eeatso

A/-Atheer Plant Progress Report for the Period 1 January 19W to 31 May 1990, op. dt., footnote 2, pp. 23-24.

4 paul l.ewis, “U,N. Experts NOW Say Baghdad Was Far From Making an A-Bomb Before Gulf War,” *W

York T..mes, May 20,1992, p. A6. See also, David Atbright and Mark Hibbs, “Iraq’s Quest for the Nuclear Grail: What

Can We Learn?,” Arms Control Today, vol. 22, No. 6 (Juiy/Aug 1992), p. 7.

designed (the Hiroshima weapon), in fact, was The following section discusses some of the

based on such a sure--fire technique that no

nuclear test was deemed necessary before it was

used in warfare. (See app. 4-A for discussion of

nuclear weapon designs.)

Nevertheless, knowledge must be supplemented

by industrial infrastructure and the resources to

carry a nuclear weapon program to completion.

The technologies for building cars and propellerdriven airplanes date back to early in this century,

but many countries still cannot build them indigenously.

key areas of technical expertise required to

construct weapons once the materials have been

acquired.

COMPUTER SIMULATION AND DESIGN CODES

High-performance computers are not now,

and never were, an essential technology for

designing fairly sophisticated nuclear weapons. Various types of weapon designs were

developed by the United States (as well as

perhaps each of the other declared nuclear powers) without any kind of electronic computer.68

m Witi o~y Vew p~itive Colnputem, tiese designers reportedly studied 1,000 physical prototypes of tie bomb before designing ~eir

fust nuclear weapon. John W. IAwis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 155.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation I 151

have produced a workable device in as little as 6 to 24 months, had they decided to seize foreign-supplied HEU

from under safeguards and focus their efforts on a crash program to produce a device in the shortest possible

amount of time.5

In addition to extensive development of the electromagnetic isotope separation technique (EM IS, also called

calutrons) and preliminary work on centrifuge enrichment technology and materials acquisition,6 Iraq had also

been pursuing chemical enrichment including both the ion-resin process developed by the Japanese and the

liquid-liquid solvent extraction process developed by the French (see app. 4-B). At the time of the Gulf War, most

Western analysts-with the notable exception of the French-believed that the chemical enrichment facility at

Tuwaitha “Building 90” was not yet operable. Subsequent inspections by the IAEA, under auspices of the U.N.

Security Council Resolution 687, found lab-scale experiments in chemical enrichment, but no evidence of success

or any plans for a production plant. Since the French technology is both proprietary and subject to export controls,

the Iraqis reportedly resorted to clever negotiation tactics to garner considerable amounts of design information

on the process, ostensibly with the goal of licensing the technology at some point in the future. Their techniques

reportedly included pressing for more and more technical details during a contract negotiation and then breaking

off discussions just before closing a deal.7

5 In April 1991, Iraq’s inventory of safeguarded highly enriched uranium included Unirradiated fuel in the

amounts of 13.6 kg of Soviet-supplied 80%-enriched HEU plus under 0.5 kg (out of the original 12.3 kg) of

French-supplied 93% HEU; plus partia//y irradiated fuel in the amounts of 3.6 kg of 809’o and 11.8 kg of 93°\0.

Additional 80%-enriched HEU was listed as irradia@d (fissile material would have been difficult to extract quickly

from the irradiated fuel). Johan Molander, U.N. Special Commission, quoted in “Iraq’s Bomb Program: A Smoking

Gun Emerges,” op. cit., footnote 2, p. 254.

6 nese aspects of the Iraqi program have all subsequently been described in SO~ depth in published

articles and reports. See, for example, Zimmerman, “Iraq’s Nuclear Achievements. . .,” op. cit., footnote 1.

7 David Kay, presentation atthe National Institute of Standards and Technology (N IST), Gaithersburg, MD,

May 15, 1992.

Moreover, most of the U.S. nuclear weapons 60); small strategic warheads (1960-65); the

developed through the mid- 1970s were designed

with computers no more capable than a typical

1990 engineering workstation—i.e., 1,000 to

100,000 times less powerful than modem highperformance computers, which now perform well

in excess of 1,000 MFLOPS (million floatingpoint operations per second);69 these weapons

included high-efficiency primaries and the first

thermonuclear weapon (1950-55); smalldiameter primaries and nuclear artillery (1955 -

warhead for the Spartan antiballistic missile

(1965-70); and weapons with tailored outputs

(1970-75). 70 Of course, U.S. designers had the

benefit of an extensive series of nuclear tests,

which allowed them to validate both the weapons

themselves and the computer programs that

helped design them.71

Records obtained during the sixth IAEA inspection in Iraq show that the Iraqis had developed or acquired a number of computer codes for

69 A ~ic~ ‘‘ supercomputer’ of the mid- 1980s, such as the CRAY X-MP, had a speed of about 100 MFLOPS. Jack Worltou Laboratory

Fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratory, “Some Myths about High-Pcrfo rmance Computers and Their Role in the Design of Nuclear

Weapons,” Worlton & Associates, ~chnical Report No. 32, June 22, 1990.

‘lCI U.S. llepment of Energy, “The Need for Supercomputers in Nuclear Weapons Design, ” January 1986 (declassified), as cited in

Worlton, ibid.

71 ~vmc~ Computation] ~wa in tie United States ~s also ~eatly facilitated mifia~fig nuclea weapons (i.e., achieving higher

yield-to-weight ratios) and minimizing the amount of nuclear material they use. Moreover, it has promoted the development of ‘safer’ (less

likely to detomte or disperse plutonium accidentally) and “cleaner” (for example, thermonuclear) weapons, and weapons that are designed

to be reliable after being deployed for several decades.
152 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

use in their nuclear weapon design effort. These

codes, found by IAEA inspectors, had been

running on IBM PS/2 desktop computers;72 such

machines are capable of assisting with the design

of first-generation nuclear weapons.

Since minicomputers, professional workstations, and other advanced computers roughly

double in performance every 1 to 2 years,

many types of computer become available

worldwide not long after they are introduced,

as they fall behind the rapidly advancing

state of the art. Companies not subject to

U.S.-style export controls—for example, in Israel, Brazil, India, and Bulgaria-are now developing and assembling indigenous high-perform

ance computers comparable to or exceeding the

best U.S. computers of just 5 or 6 years ago. A

proliferant could also increase his computational

power without violating export controls by installing accelerator boards for low-end to midrange computers or by dedicating a relatively

high-level machine (which is usually shared by

many users simultaneously) to a single design

effort. 73

Therefore, top-of-the-line computers and numerical codes are certainly not a prerequisite to a

successful nuclear weapon program, though their

import may serve as an indicator of such and

thereby provide valuable intelligence information. Given the utility of widely available

computers to a weapon designer, even very

strict export controls on top-model computers

would probably do little to slow the development of a first-generation weapon program.

Computational power would be relatively more

important for programs pursuing advanced nuclear weapons, including thermonuclear ones.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND WEAPON FABRICATION

Although extensive testing of the implosion

system and other weapon components would

normally be essential before settling on a nuclear

implosion design, nuclear testing (at full or nearly

full yield) would not be required to field fission

weapons, even for a new nuclear proliferant (see

box 4-E). Both “hydrodynamic” tests of implosion characteristics (using a nonfissile core) and

“hydronuclear” tests with extremely low nuclear

yield can be used to lessen the need for full-scale

nuclear tests in determining the adequacy of an

implosion design. 74 Gun-type devices have even

less demanding test requirements. If a proliferant state with competent designers decided in

advance that no nuclear tests were to be

carried out, it could pursue designs for fission

weapons in the absence of those tests that

would have a high probability of producing

significant yields. Testing would be much more

important, however, for a proliferant to develop either very low-weight nuclear weapons

or thermonuclear weapons.

Weapon fabrication would also probably not

present major technical hurdles to a proliferant.

Assembly of a gun-type weapon is relatively

straightforward. Implosion-designs would require

lathes, other machine tools, and possibly isostatic

presses to fabricate explosive lenses and other

components, but there may be several suppliers of

these dual-use items and various ways to import

them. Little of the equipment for final assembly

of a weapon is sufficiently specialized to be easily

controllable by export laws. Some of the machine

tools might be amenable to export monitoring,

however, and may therefore serve as preliminary

indicators of a program (see ‘signatures’ section

below).

~z A1-Atheer plant Pro8ress Report for the Period 1 January 1990 to 31 May 1990, -X to the SiXth @Wtion RCPOIZ U.N. S-V

Council S/23122, Oct. 8,1991 (English), p. 14, reprinted as app. B of Peter Zimme~ ‘@’s Nuclear Achievements: Components, Sources,

and Stature,’ Congressional Research Service report 93-323F, Feb. 18, 1993. See also p. 20 of main text.

73 worltom “some M@ about H.@-PdormIuIw Computers. . .,” op. cit., footnote 69.

74 SW, for e~ple, RoIxrt N. Thorn and Donald R. Westervel$ ‘‘Hydronuclear &lXrimentS,” Los Alamos National Laboratory Report

LA-10902-MS, February, 1987.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation I 153

Box 4-E – Utility of Tests at Various Yields

The decision to test a nuclear weapon must weigh the benefits of validating the design against the risks and

political implications of the test’s being detected. Tests with substantial nuclear yields can provide important

information about a weapon design, but they are likely to be detected. Certain aspects of nuclear bomb design

can be validated even at very low explosive yields. The following TNT-equivalent-ranges illustrate possible uses

for such tests:1

No nuclear yield: With proper diagnostics, scientists can study implosion techniques, compression efficiency,

and neutron initiator performance by substituting nonfissile material for HEU or plutonium.

Less than 1 kilogram (kg) nuclear yield; So-called “hydronuclear tests” at these yieids were carried out by

Los Alamos during the testing moratorium of 1958-1961 to study certain characteristics of nuclear warhead

designs.

1 to a few kilotons (/d): Fission weapons of both gun-type and implosion designs can be tested at full or almost

full yields in this range. in addition, tests involving boosted-fission designs may be carried out within this yield range

(see app. 4-A).

150 kt: The Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 between the U. S., U. K., and former Soviet Union forbids

testing at greater than 150 kt yields. However, advanced nuclear powers can probably design thermonuclear

warheads with up to multimegaton yields without testing above the 150- kt threshold.

Atmospheric tests: Above-ground tests can be used to measure electromagnetic pulse, radiation, blast,

fallout, and cratering phenomena that are much harder, or impossible, to study with underground tests.

if a proliferant state decides not to carry out nuclear tests with appreciable nuclear yields, it could probably

still design reliabie first- generation gun-type or implosion fission weapons with yields similar to the Hiroshima or

Nagasaki bombs, With a small number of tests at yields of a few to 10 kt, it may also make progress toward

developing more compact or efficient weapons, possibly incorporating boosting. Atmospheric tests are highly

visible, but they are not required to verify the basic function of nuclear explosives.

1 See, for example, Ray E. Kidder, “Militarily Significant Nuciear Explosive Yields,” Federation of American

Sa”enfists Pub/ic Merest Reporf, vol. 37, No. 7, September 1985; and Dan Fenstermacher, “T%e Effects of Nuclear

Test-ban Regimes on Third-generation-weapon Innovation,” So”ence & G/oba/ Secudty, vol. 1, Nos. 3-4 (1990), p.

193.

EXPERIENCE FROM CIVILIAN NUCLEAR experience is not unique to the operation of

PROGRAMS reactors--and is neither necessary nor sufficient

The infrastructure and experience gained from

civilian nuclear research and nuclear power

programs would be of substantial benefit to a

nuclear weapon program. Up to a certain point in

developing a civilian nuclear fuel cycle, its

technology is virtually identical to that used for

producing fissile materials for weapons. Relevant

experience would include the ability to handle

radioactive materials, familiarity with chemical

processes for fuel fabrication and with materials

having specific chemical or nuclear properties,

and the design and operation of reactors and

electronic control systems. Although this kind of

to produce a weapon—it would provide a technology base upon which a nuclear weapon program

could draw. Furthermore, the infrastructure

supporting nuclear power generation and its

associated fuel cycle can provide cover for

elements of a weapon program, even in a

country subject to IAEA safeguards.

RECRUITMENT, FOREIGN TRAINING, AND

INDIGENOUS EDUCATION

The principles of nuclear weapons can be

discovered without any prior design experience

by any competent group of theoretical and experi-
154 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

mental physicists and engineers. Although the

specifics of designing, analyzing, testing, and

producing a nuclear explosive device are certainly not taught in graduate schools, nuclear

engineering and physics curricula inevitably provide a basic foundation for work in the area of

nuclear weapon design. Indeed, students from

many countries each year go abroad for instruction in such fields at top universities.

A country wishing to pursue nuclear weapons

can also adopt its design methodology to the

expertise at hand. Given scientists with only

limited confidence in their design ability, such a

state might choose to develop a very conservative

implosion design that was not highly dependent

on the quality of compression, or a gun-type

weapon using HEU that, while bulkier and

requiring more fissile material, would be much

easier to build. First-hand design experience

would be essential only to develop more sophisticated concepts, such as advanced or boosted

fission weapons, high yield-to-weight weapons,

or second-generation (thermonuclear) weapons.

Nevertheless, the assistance of outside experts with specific knowledge of nuclear design

can significantly accelerate a program by

avoiding ‘(dead-ends?’ that could waste valuable time and resources. Countries such as Iran,

North Korea, Algeria, and Libya may well require

a very long time if they were to start up a

Manhattan-Project-like program, without access

to experienced weapon designers. If too much

time or money is required, then the risks of being

discovered by outsiders (or even by internal

political opposition) would increase, and a country may simply decide to abandon its program or

not pursue it in the first place.

At least one case is already known, however, of

one country’s nuclear design information being

used by another country’s nuclear program. Yuli

Khariton, the physicist who led the effort to

develop the first Soviet nuclear weapon, recently

admitted that the Soviets had obtained the design

of the frost U.S. plutonium weapon shortly after it

was used on Nagasaki. He claimed that this

enabled the Soviets to carry out their first nuclear

test 2 years ahead of schedule-in 1949 instead of

1951. He said that it was not until 1951 that they

detonated a device based on their own design.75

There have also been various unconfined reports

of Chinese nuclear design information being used

by Pakistan.76

According to the U.S. State Department, dozens of key Russian scientists would likely be able

to direct critical aspects of a weapon program in

a developing country, and perhaps 1 or 2 thousand

technicians possess highly useful technical

skills.77 Several dozen nuclear scientists from the

former Soviet Union (though probably not weapon

designers) have reported been working in Iran,

with dozens more entering other Middle Eastern

countries. 78 Russian and Western specialists,

however, say that so far they have no hard

evidence that any attempt at recruiting actual

nuclear weapon designers has been successful.79

In any case, the expertise needed to produce

weapon-usable material and to make it into a

deliverable weapon spans a wide range of disciplines and requires the right mix of individuals.

Recruiting any given nuclear weapon specialist

75 Serge sc~emq 1‘1 st Soviet A-Bomb Built from U.S. Data, Russian says, “ New York Times, Jan. 14, 1993, p. A12. Kharitonclaimed

that the design was obtained with the help of spy Klaus Fuchs soon after the U.S. bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August

1945.

m see, for ~xmplc, He~ck f;~~ ‘4A Bomb Ticks in pa.kk~” New York Times Magazine, Mar. 6, 1988, P. 38.

77 1‘Redfiec~g ~e Soviet w~pm Establishment: ~~te~iew wi& Ambassador Rofxrt L. Gallucci$’ Arm control Todu)I, VO1. 22, No.

3, June, 1992, pp. 3-6.

78 ~temiew with David h-vi, director genend of Israel’s Defense Ministry, in Etha.a Bronner, ‘‘Israel Fears a Flow of IAuil Expertise to

the Middle East,” Boston Globe, June 22, 1992, p. Al.

79 pad --Judge, “In Republics, An Eye on Bombs, Scientists,” Boston Globe, June 23, 1992, p. A14.
—.

Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation | 155

could have significant or only marginal utility,

and would depend strongly on the particular

needs of a country at the time.

I costs

REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE

To develop nuclear weapons indigenously, a

government must make a serious and long-term

political commitment, must allocate significant

amounts of resources and expertise, and must

construct large facilities. (The required steps are

summarized for uranium- and plutonium-based

weapons in figure 4-1 and table 4-l). Since nuclear

programs can vary tremendously, depending on a

country’s choices about paths, organization, secrecy, and goals, absolute costs are difficult to

estimate. For instance, the path chosen by a

country would strongly depend on its technical

and industrial infrastructure, Moreover, the costs

of developing the special nuclear materials cannot

be directly compared with the costs of commercial enrichment facilities or spent-fuel reprocessing plants for nuclear power reactors, since

facilities to produce only enough material for one

or a few weapons per year can be tens of times

more expensive per unit material processed than

commercial facilities, but hundreds of times

smaller. Steps to keep a program clandestine can

also add considerably to the overall cost.

The Iraqi program, which appears to have been

aimed at a small arsenal rather than a single

weapon, took multiple paths and pursued its goals

under tight secrecy. Starting in 1981, after the

Israeli bombing of the Osirak reactor, Iraq apparently devoted its effort to producing enriched

uranium instead of plutonium and began building

complex research and production facilities (including twin sites for EMIS separation). Such a

program can easily absorb much more money—

perhaps as much as 10 to 50 times more—than

the baseline plutonium-based program described

below, and can run upwards of $10 billion.80 Even

then, it cannot be assured of success or of

remaining secret. If nothing else, Iraq’s program

showed that there is a vast difference in cost

between the cheapest direct route to nuclear

weapons and a clandestine route taken by a

country with little nuclear-weapon relevant experience, but relatively lofty nuclear ambitions.81

WEAPON MATERIALS DOMINATE THE COST

In general, the acquisition of sufficient

quantities of weapon-grade materials presents

not only the greatest technological hurdle, but

also the greatest financial burden to the wouldbe proliferant. In the unlikely case that the

government of a country without prior enrichment or reprocessing capability were to initiate a

nuclear weapon program overtly, it could probably build a small production reactor and reprocessing plant more cheaply than it could produce

equipment to enrich uranium. To remain hidden,

however, a plutonium-based weapon program

may have to take difficult and expensive measures. For instance, a proliferant might be driven to

build a production reactor underground and to try

to disguise its heat emissions to avoid being

detected by infrared surveillance. If a country had

no reason to reprocess spent fuel for commercial

purposes, the discovery of a reprocessing facility

would probably indicate weapons intent, so that

steps might be called for to hide such a facility as

well, or at least to keep it from being inspected.82

go For ~mp~son, tie M~t~Dis~ct project spent $1.9 billion in 1940s dollars (which translates to about $10 billion in 1992 doll~s):

50?Z0 to Oak Ridge for uranium enrichment 20% to Hanford for plutonium production and about 4% to weapon-related R&D at Los Alamos.

See, for example, Zimmerman, op. cit., footnote 72, p. 4.

s I see also ~omas W. Graham, ‘ ‘The Economics of Producing Nuclear Weapons k Nth counties, ’ Strategies for Managing Nuclear

Proliferation: Economic and Political Issues (Lexingtow MA: Lexington Books, 1983), pp. 9-27.

82 For fitmce, Nofi Korea>s cl~ hat tie faclli~ at Yongbyon is for peaceful radiochemis~ rese~h (including sepmation Of plu[OIlhlIIl)

is particularly questionable, since that coun~’s nuclear power industry is still in its infancy and could not be expected to derive benefits from

plutonium recycling anytime soon.
156 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 4-8-Nominal Costs for an Overt Small-Scale Plutonium-Based Weapon Program

(in millions of 1992$)

Capital Costs of Construction:

Uranium Mining Site (55,000 t ore/yr): 1.5-15

Milling Plant (100 t U308

/yr): 8 - 9

Conversion Plant (85 t uranium-metal/yr): 12-14

Fuel Fabrication Plant (85 t natural-uranium-fuel/yr): 6-1 0

30-MWt Production Reactor: 35-100

(Brookhaven-type, air-cooled, graphite moderated, aluminum-dad natural

uranium fuel; lower cost is for “stripped down” facility with Iittle shielding)

PUREX Reprocessing Plant:a 12-36

(85 t heavy metal/yr, very low burn-up fuel, batch processing, recovering about

10 kg plutonium/yr; low estimate is for rudimentary facility with little radiation

shielding)

RDT&E costs for the above facilitles:b 10-30

(10% - 15% of the capital costs)

Start-up costs for the above facilities: 15-45

(20°/0 - 25% of the capital costs)

Design and manufacture of the first nuclear weapons: 20-65

(includes capital costs of the weapon laboratory, RDT&E of the design phase,

and nonnuclear components; 20-25% of the total cost of plutonium production (all

above costs))

Total cost of first plutonium-based weapon: $120-$300 million

a pUR~ ~ta~ for @Monium-umnium rsdox ext~ction process, a ~dely IJS~ meth~ whereby uranium and plutonium are

removed from spent fuel through a series of chemical processes.

b Research, ~velopment, te9ting, and englnedng. This and the “design ad manuf~ture” @sts are b~d on early Btitish and

French nuclear weapon experience. Figures are adjusted to account for assumed cost reductions in RDT&E that resulted from

“international nuclear learning” that took place most rapidly between about 1955 and 1960.

SOURCE: Adapted from Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nudeer Proliferation (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964), pp.

194-203.

A minimum-cost plutonium program

One detailed study has estimated that facilities

sufficient to produce about one nuclear-weapon’s

worth of plutonium per year could be built for as

little as $120 to $300 million (in 1992$), if the

state building it did not try to keep it secret (see

table 4-8).83 This estimate includes the necessary uranium mining and processing facilities, a

small production reactor to produce the plutonium, and a primitive reprocessing plant to

recover it. Since few if any countries are likely to

initiate such a program openly, this number is

unrealistically low, but it can serve as a point of

comparison for more detailed country-specific

assessments.

According to this study, a country that has

deposits of uranium ore could setup mining and

ore processing (called “milling”) facilities that

would be sufficient to fuel a small production

reactor in roughly 2 years, and without major

expense or difficulty. Fuel fabrication, in theory,

could be done in a common metalworking shop,

although typically it has required imported facilities. The production reactor itself could be based

on the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor, a

1955 design that has long been described in

83 St@e~ M. M~e~, TheDy~l~”cs OfNUClearprOliferotiOn (~~go, ~: ufiv. of ~cago FNSS, 1984), pp. lw203. AISO see the ~li~

cost-estimate studies done by the United Nations in 1%8 and by the U.S. Energy Research and Development AdmKu“ ‘stration (ERDA) in 1976,

as discussed in GrahanL ‘‘The Economics of Producing Nuclear Weapons in Nth Countries, ’ op. cit., footnote 81.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation I 157

unclassified U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

documents. It is rated at 30 MW thermal output

and if devoted to plutonium production, could

produce enough for at least one nuclear weapon a

year. (If a state seeking to build such a reactor

could not do so indigenously, it could be forced

to import specialized reactor components such as

ultra-pure graphite. Such imports from an NPT

state would trigger safeguards.)

Data regarding the design, construction, and

operation of reprocessing facilities were also

declassified and distributed through the 1955

Geneva conference on the peaceful uses of atomic

energy. However, despite using chemical processes similar to those in standard industrial

procedures, the reprocessing plant could be the

most difficult step in this approach, due to the

radiological hazard it would pose to plant workers. Nevertheless, radiation risks can be minimized (and the quality of the plutonium for

weapon use improved) by irradiating the fuel to

levels that are extremely low compared to those

attained by commercial reactors—say, a few

hundred megawatt-days per tonne of fuel (MWd/

t), as opposed to 10,000 to 33,000. A small

reprocessing facility could probably be built over

the course of 3 to 4 years.

The total number of competent, experienced

engineers needed over the course of several years

to direct the construction of a Brookhaven-type

graphite-moderated reactor and an associated

reprocessing plant has been estimated to be about

10 to 20, together with a workforce of several

hundred. 84 Cost estimates for the entire program

(adjusted to 1992 dollars), including mining,

milling, and fuel-fabrication facilities, are itemized in table 4-8. Many developing countries with

a modest technical infrastructure could construct

such facilities, and the cost of obtaining the

trained specialists would constitute only a small

fraction of the total weapon-program costs.

Reports in the open literature indicate that two

countries have pursued unsafeguarded production

reactors of approximately the size assumed here,

although their cost data are not known. North

Korea recently declared that one of its two

operating reactors at Yongbyon is rated at 5

MW(e), but many Western analysts believe it is a

30 to 50 MW(t) production reactor.85 Unofficial

reports have alleged that Pakistan may have

begun building a similarly rated (50 MW(t))

reactor in the mid-to-late 1980s.86

A more ambitious program aimed at indigenous construction of a 400-MW(t) production

reactor and 10 to 20 weapons per year would

require either a fairly high level of industrialization or a considerable nuclear technology base

upon which to build. The only known unsafeguarded reactors with roughly this output (outside the five declared nuclear weapon states) are

the five 220-MW(e) heavy -water reactors (HWRs)

operating in India, and possibly Israel’s Dimona

HWR, believed by most to have operated at 40 to

70 MW(t),87 but by some at up to 150 MW(t).88

India has five other indigenous HWRs under

construction, and North Korea has recently declared that is it constructing two power reactors

with approximately this power rating-a graphite

power reactor at Yongbyon rated at 50 MW(e) (in

addition to two smaller reactors already in operation there), which would give it a thermal output

of 150 to 200 MW(t), and a larger reactor at

Taechon projected to have a power rating of 200

u Meyer, ibid.

as See testimony of R. James Woolsey, Feb. 24, 1993, op. cit., footnote 15; and Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, OP. cit., foomote 16 PP. 128+

139.

86 See Sp=tor, Nuclear Ambifions, op. cit., footnote 16, p. 116.

07 fiid., pp. 83-4, 172.

88 “Revealed: The Secrets of Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal, Sunday Times (London), Oct. 5, 1986, p. Al.
158 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

MW(e) (roughly 600 MW(t)) once completed.89

By one estimate, a reactor of several hundred

MW(t) would normally take 5 to 7 years to

complete, would require an overall capital investment in the range $4OO to $1,000 million (1992$),

and would require about 50 to 75 engineers

supported by roughly 150 to 200 technicians for

its design and construction.90 Others estimate that

practical difficulties normally encountered in

constructing such facilities could increase these

figures by up to 100 percent.91

Costs for small-scale uranium enrichment

Costs for a dedicated (and possibly clandestine) enrichment facility are extremely difficult to

estimate, both because the procurement route and

choice of technology are much more uncertain

than for an indigenously built reactor and reprocessing plant, and because experience and openly

published data relevant to enrichment facilities

tend to be associated with very large commercial

plants built for the nuclear power industry. (The

cost can be much cheaper per unit enrichment

capacity for large plants,) Nevertheless, a nominal idea of costs can be derived from smaller

commercial facilities. Excluding research and

development, the total cost for constructing a

centrifuge facility capable of producing 300 kg

HEU per year-12 times the IAEA significant

quantity-might run from $100 to $500 million

(in 1992$).92 A smaller facility to produce about

15 kg of HEU per year based on calutron (EMIS)

technology has been estimated to cost a minimum

of $200 million.93 If a sma11 amount of additional

enrichment capacity-say, enough for 30, rather

than 300, kg of HEU per year-were to be built

by a country already knowledgeable about the

manufacture and operation of centrifuges, the

costs could conceivably be much lower, perhaps

only $2 to $5 million. The costs of building and

operating such a facility in secret at a clandestine

location, however, might increase this figure

substantially.

| Implications of New Materials-Production

Technologies

URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGIES

Although France, Japan, and the United States

have made substantial progress in the last 10 years

developing laser enrichment processes, successfully integrating laser or other advanced technologies into a facility capable of producing kilogramquantities of HEU will probably remain beyond

the reach of the developing countries for some

time. Even in the most technologically advanced

countries, these methods have tended to require a

lengthy development period, and the quantities of

material produced in the early stages has been

very small. In contrast, technologies such as

aerodynamic methods and centrifuges may offer

potential proliferants a more attractive mix of

characteristics. As evidenced by South Africa and

Pakistan, these techniques appear capable of

being developed successfully by countries having

either a substantial technology base or access to

sensitive design data.

89 ~oe Jong SW spoke- for North Korean Mnistry of Atomic Energy Industry, in interview with Leonard S. Spector, May 3, 1992,

Pyongyang, as posted on Nuclear Nonproliferation Network.

90 Meyer, The Dy~~”cs Of Nuclear proliferation, Op. cit., foo~ote 83.

91 G~rge A.IEAou ~Sociate division leader of Z-Division, Lawrence Livermore National Labomtory, private communication Aug. 16,

1993.

92 U.S. CoWess, OffIce of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Prol~eration and Safeguards, op. cit., footnote 24, P. 1*O.

93 @w~d F. Schuette, 4 ‘Electromagnetic Sep~tion of Isotopes, ‘‘ in OTA, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, op. cit., footnote 24, vol.

II, Part 2-VI, p. 105; costs have ken converted to 1992 dollars.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation | 159

TECHNOLOGIES AFFECTING PLUTONIUM FUEL

CYCLES

Plutonium isotopic purification

The longer that reactor fuel containing uranium238 is irradiated in a reactor, the higher will be its

proportion of undesirable isotopes in the plutonium that is created, making it less desirable for

nuclear weapons than pure plutonium-239. (See

app. 4-A and the discussion earlier in this chapter

on the use of reactor-grade plutonium in nuclear

weapon s.) Just as uranium-235 can be separated

from uranium-238 to obtain bomb-grade material,

so can plutonium-239 be separated from these

other plutonium isotopes. Laser isotope separation (LIS) techniques, for instance, although not

originally developed for that purpose, might be

used.94 Plutonium-239, in theory, could also be

‘‘enriched’ using centrifuges, EMIS, or even

gaseous diffusion methods, though developing

conversion facilities to produce the requisite

plutonium compounds would be a major undertaking rife with its own set of problems.

Liquid-metal fast breeder reactors (LMFBRs)

Development of LMFBRs (reactors that are

capable of breeding plutonium at a faster rate than

they consume it) has progressed much less rapidly

than was predicted in the 1970s. The principal

breeder reactor programs have been located in

Japan, France, and the former Soviet Union

(mainly in Kazakhstan) .95 But France suspended

operation of its 1,200-MW(e) production-scale

FBR, called Superphenix, in 1990, and Germany

and the U.K appear to be abandoning their efforts

to develop breeders.

LMFBRs introduce safeguard concerns far

beyond those faced with the light-water reactors (LWRs) most commonly used for power

generation. Whereas reprocessing can be forgone for LWRs, it is integral to a breeder’s fuel

cycle. Fresh LMFBR fuel contains a considerably

larger fraction of plutonium than does even the

plutonium-containing MOX fuel intended for use

in commercial LWRs. (LMFBRs such as Superphenix contain about 5 tonnes of plutonium in

their cores.) Moreover, a considerable amount of

the plutonium produced in an LMFBR under

normal operation will be weapon-grade, whereas

commercial light-water reactors produce much

lower quality (reactor-grade) plutonium unless

shut down and refueled much more frequently

than economical operation would warrant.

Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) fuel cycle

In the future, new plutonium fuel cycles could

also be developed and commercialized. One such

concept, which has been under development by

Argonne National Laboratory in the United States

for many years, is called the Integral Fast Reactor

(IFR), 96 The IFR was originally developed to

reduce the amount of nuclear waste generated by

reactors by “burning” more of the longest lived

radioactive byproducts than can be consumed by

conventional nuclear reactors. The reprocessing

approach used in an IFR fuel cycle would produce

plutonium-containing fuel that is considerably

more radioactive than that resulting from the

traditional PUREX process, thus being less attractive for diversion to a weapon program. To

handle it efficiently, reprocessing would occur at

94 ~ tie 19go~, th~u.s. D~~~ent of Energy’s plans for alaser isotope sepmation facility to be built in I
 included sepWatingplUtOIliUm

isotopes. Although economically unattractive compared with more direct methods of obtaining nuclear weapon materials, the possibility of

using LIS to enrich plutonium has added somewhat to the concern over the Japanese and South African development of pilot I-IS plants.

Although both countries already operate reprocessing facilities and have legitimate needs for enriched uranium for nuclear power, the

purification of separated plutonium would provide an additional path for producing weapon-grade plutonium.

95 Ka~tan’s SSS.MW(’) fmt bre~er @N.350) dates from Soviet effo~ over tie past 10 to 20 yws and is designed to use 20 to 25%

enriched uranium as well as MOX fuel. Potter et al., op. cit., footnote 35, p. 9.

96 ~les E, Till and Yoon I. Chang, ‘‘The Integral Fast Reactor,’ Advances in Nuclear Science and Technology, vol. 20 (1988), pp.

127-154.
160 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

the reactor site itself, in hot cells as close as 100

feet to the reactor.97

The proliferation concerns with the IFR fuel

cycle, as with other fuel cycles involving reprocessing, center on the accountability requirements

to assure nondiversion of nuclear material at any

stage. Since the hot-cell area is small and has

relatively few access points compared to the

PUREX process, it would be more difficult for

subnational groups to divert material from an

IFR. However, because the IFR concept would

require a closed-cycle inert-gas environment involving highly radioactive materials at high

temperatures, effective materials-accountancy may

be difficult to implement. Instead, safeguards will

have to rely much more heavily on containment

and surveillance measures (see app. 4-Con IAEA

safeguards and the civilian nuclear fuel cycle).

Although the prospect of IFRs substituting for

conventional LWRs in the United States or even

for liquid-metal breeder reactors in France or

Japan does not appear to be likely for several

decades, the long-term proliferation and safeguards implications of sharing IFR reactor technology with other countries is yet to be fully

addressed .98

| Weaponization-Going Beyond the

“Physics Package”

MINIATURIZATION

A nuclear device deliverable by aircraft or

missiles at long range must meet certain size and

weight constraints. The bombs used in World War

II, called “Little Boy” and “Fat Man,” each

weighed in excess of 4,000 kg, which would have

made them virtually impossible to deliver by any

ballistic missile deployed in the Third World

today, and problematic for over half these countries’ combat aircraft, including the F-16, Mirage

F-1, MiG-23, -27, and -29. (Chapter 5 discusses

delivery systems suitable for nuclear weapons as

well as chemical or biological weapons, and

provides more detail on the capabilities of aircraft

and missiles available to states of proliferation

concern.)

A nuclear proliferant today could probably

construct a much lighter bomb than the first U.S.

bombs. Many experts believe that even the

500-kg payload limit originally set by the Missile

Technology Control Regime (and since eliminated at the beginning of 1993) may no longer be

appropriate for first-generation nuclear weapons.

U.S. 8-inch and 155-mm nuclear artillery shells

produced in the late 50s and early 60s suggest that

compact and relatively lightweight warheads can

indeed be designed. Although the design of these

warheads drew on the experience gained from

hundreds of nuclear tests, they may still have

relevance to current proliferation concerns for

several reasons. First, explosives technology and

light-weight electronics have advanced dramatically since the 1950s. Second, other forms of

testing, such as “hydronuclear tests” with extremely low nuclear yields (see discussion below)

may allow at least the more technologically

advanced proliferant countries to reduce amounts

of materials in their weapon designs to levels well

below those of the first U.S. weapons. Third, at

least some knowledge of more advanced weapon

designs (even if from three decades ago) maybe

difficult to keep out of the hands of proliferants.

Finally, even straightforward modifications to the

designs of the first U.S. weapons could reduce

their size considerably, albeit with some yield

penalty, with no greater required sophistication.

The mere fact that the United States has built

low-weight nuclear weapons indicates that they

can be built, considerably increasing a proliferant’s motivation to attempt to recreate such a

97 me IFR CaII use mom radiowtive nuclear fuel because it is less sensitive than many Other types of nuclear reaetor to fuel impurities W

absorb neutrons.

98 See, for example, R.G. Wymer et al., ‘‘An Assessment of the Proliferation Potential and International Implications of the Integrtd Fast

Reactor,” prepared by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. for the U.S. Dept. of Energy and the U.S. Dept. of State, May 1992.
—

Chapter 4-TechnicaI Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation I 161

design. Their existence also offers the possibility

that such designs might be stolen, particularly if

the Soviet Union and other nuclear weapon states

have developed low-weight warheads as well.

ANTI-AGING

Unless assembled immediately prior to use,

warheads would have to be storable over some

period of time to be militarily useful. To make

warheads that were reliable after years of storage,

many features might need refinement, including

nondegrading high explosives, purer grades of

plutonium99 or, with weapon designs that use

tritium gas for additional yield, a replaceable

tritium supply. Anticorrosive materials might be

required at various points within the weapon, in

addition to metallurgically stabilized nuclear

material. Some of these refinements might require

substantially more research than what would be

needed for a crude frost-generation weapon.

Frequently recycling the nuclear material, reassembling the weapon, and inspecting the nonnuclear components could ameliorate these problems, but such measures introduce considerable

logistical problems of their own.

REENTRY VEHICLES AND FUZING

As mentioned above, missile delivery would

place constraints on a warhead’s size and weight.

For Scud-type missiles, which do not employ a

separating reentry vehicle, these constraints are

not severe. However, if a narrow cone-shaped

reentry vehicle were deemed necessary to achieve

desirable aerodynamic properties, it would have

to be internally balanced to avoid wobbling or

tumbling. l00 Such reentry vehicles would constrain the configuration of a warhead’s high

explosives and detonators, possibly requiring

a more sophisticated design that a proliferant

might wish to test in order to have high

confidence in its performance.l0l It might also

be desirable to incorporate radar altitude-fuzing,

to avoid the added difficulty of designing weapons to detonate on impact, or salvage fuzing

(detonation upon being attacked by an interceptor) to defeat missile defenses. These features

would likely require flight testing of the reentry

vehicle under realistic conditions before fielding

it and would thus increase a program’s visibility

as well as its technical hurdles.

SIGNATURES OF NUCLEAR

PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES

The IAEA safeguards system provides a means

of monitoring and inspecting peaceful nuclear

activities in a great number of countries. In

addition, however, individual countries may wish

to monitor the potential for other countries to

develop nuclear weapons—both to evaluate and

deal with the security threat that such programs

could pose and to assess the effectiveness of and

possible improvements to nonproliferation policies. Every stage of nuclear weapon development,

from material production to deployment, can

generate signatures that provide some indication

of a weapon program’s existence or status,

although only a few of them point fairly unambiguously to a nuclear weapon program.

This section surveys potential signatures of a

nuclear weapon program without attempting to

fully assess the capability to monitor nuclear

proliferation or verify compliance with the NPT;

such would require evaluating the capability to

observe these signatures, identify them, and piece

99 ~utotim.~l,~Wwatti plutonium isotope, decays into americium-241, which is much more radioactive than plutonium. AS it builds

up within a weapon, that weapon becomes more diflicult to work with and its characteristics can change. Higher grades of plutonium have less

plutonium-241, thus reducing these problems.

100 Mthou@ &e pficip~ r-on titthe Wknowledged nuclear powers have attempted to prevent their missile wmhmds from wb~g or

wobbling during reentry is to attain higher accuracy, a tumbling warhead’s violent motions and potential lack of adequate heat shielding could

also affect reliability.

lo] Testing Wodd alSO be much mom important if a proliferamt were seeking to develop very low-weight warheads to accommo~te limited

payload capacities of certain types of ballistic or cruise missile.
162 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

them together with other sources of information

to arrive at timely conclusions regarding particular states’ activities.

| Materials Acquisition

URANIUM OR PLUTONIUM DIVERSION FROM

SAFEGUARDED FACILITIES

Under the mandate of the NPT, IAEA safeguards focus narrowly on a specific goal-timely

detection of diversion of significant? quantities

of fissile nuclear materials from facilities declared to be peaceful in purpose (see app. 4-C on

safeguards). The detection of such diversion,

or the discovery of unsafeguarded nuclear

facilities in a state that had committed to place

all its facilities under safeguards, would generate strong suspicions of a nuclear weapon

program.

Safeguards primarily operate indirectly, by

verifying that all nuclear materials are accounted

for. (They are supplemented at certain types of

facility by containment and surveillance techniques, which in principle could detect some

types of diversion directly.102) Material accountancy seeks to verify the correctness of a plant’s

own operating records, much as an audit of a

financial institution verifies its bookkeeping.

Over the past 15 years, material accountancy

techniques have improved significantly. Safeguards also make extensive use of automated

equipment for measuring controlled items and for

supporting containment and surveillance techniques.

In addition to evidence of diversion acquired

through material accountancy or containment and

surveillance, certain behaviors might also raise

doubts about a safeguarded country’s intent to

comply with its nonproliferation agreements.

Behaviors detectable through normal safeguards

inspections could include: stalling tactics (e.g.,

unsubstantiated complaints about individual inspectors or repeated exclusion of inspectors with

certain nationalities)103; barring inspectors’ access to certain areas or facilities for suspicious

reasons; having substantial or repeated materialunaccounted-for (MUF)l04; or keeping inconsistent records. If detected by other means, construction of undeclared ‘pilot facilities that appeared

to be destined to contain nuclear material would

also raise suspicions, as would refusal of an IAEA

request for a special inspection at such a facility.

l05

URANIUM ENRICHMENT

If operated on a large enough scale (perhaps 10

bombs-worth per year), an energy-inefficient

enrichment technology such as EMIS or gaseous

diffusion might be detectable by its heat emission.

At Iraq’s A1-Tarmiya facility, for instance, heat

rejection into the air or, as appears to have been

planned, into the Tigris river, might well have

been observable once operation had begun.106

However, at lesser production rates or with more

102 Conbmt ~d ~ei~(:e ~iprnent includes unattended video cameras, motion detectors, closed-ciscuit ~ Systems, ~d vfious

types of seals.

103 Undm IAEA s~e~ds, a CCWIh-y has the right to reject inspectors of whatever rWiOMlities it chooses (Or, for that mtitter, fOr my Other

reason), a right that is regularly exercised. For example, between 1976 and 1981 (the year that Israel attacked the Imq’s Osirak reactor), Iraq

allowed only Soviet and Hungarian nationals to perform safeguards inspections on its territory. ‘lMimony of Roger Richter, fomer IAEA

@tor in ~~! cit~ in J. Aso~tY) K-A. WOlf, E.C. Rivm, Do~sfic Implementation of a Chemical Weapons Treaty, Rand Report

R-3745-ACQ (Santa Monica, CA: MND Corp., C)ct, 1989), p, 55,

10.i ~~~te~.mcomted-for’ is a s~egu~ds term describing differences betweenmeasured ~d expected values fi~tti~ ~~un~cy.

MUF can result from normal measurement or calibration errors, or can indicate a possible diversion of materials.

los See, for ~~ple, George B~ Does the NPTRequire its Non-Nuclear Weapon Pam”es to Pew”t Inspection by the IAEA of Nuclear

Activities That Have Not Been Reported to the IAEA? (Stanford, CA: Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University,

Apti 1992).

106 ~~ony F~~rg, S~engthening I-Safeguard.r: Lessonsfrom Iraq (Stanford, CA: Center fOr kte~tioti s~urity Arms control,

Stanford University, April 1993), p. 21.
.

Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation 1163

efficient technologies (e.g., centrifuges, or EMIS

techniques that employed permanent magnets and

lower beam-voltages), heat signatures would be

less evident. Heat emission is a nonspecific

signature, however, that would be most useful for

monitoring the startup and shutdown patterns of

known facilities; it would have to be combined

with other indicators to determine whether a

given unknown facility were nuclear-related.

A potential sign of a clandestine enrichment or

other nuclear facility could be unexplained special security or military reinforcements around an

industrial site. These arrangements might be

visible from overhead or from the ground.

At close enough range, other signatures would

become observable. For example, even a very

small centrifuge plant might emit detectable

acoustic or radiofrequency noise, and the pulsed

lasers used for laser isotope separation emit

characteristic electromagnetic signals at kilohertz

frequencies that might be detected, Samples of

substances taken from either declared or suspect

facilities could also indicate their potential for

producing weapon materials. For example, UCL4

or other uranium chloride combinations could

indicate EMIS or Chemex enrichment technology, and U F6

, UF4, HF, or uranium metal could

indicate other uranium enrichment techniques

(see app. 4-B).107 Analysis of environmental

samples containing depleted or enriched uranium

in water or soil would also provide very important

signatures.

Patterns of foreign procurement of essential

materials and parts, such as newer highstrength materials or maraging steel (a very

high-tensile-strength steel used to manufacture some types of gas centrifuge), or large iron

electromagnets, high-voltage power supplies,

and large vacuum systems (for EMIS), might

also help to indicate a county’s intentions.

PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION

An indigenous uranium mining industry might

provide early indication of a clandestine uranium

or plutonium-based weapon program and is a sure

indicator of at least the possibility. For the

plutonium path, natural uranium could fuel a

graphite- or heavy-water moderated plutoniumproduction reactor. A sizable research program

involving breeder-reactors or the production of

heavy water or ultra-pure carbon and graphite

products might also be cause for concern, especially if such programs were not easily justifiable

on other accounts.

Small research or power reactors with high

neutron flux and significant amounts of uranium238 in their cores can also be used to produce

plutonium. However, a 40 to 50 MW(t) undeclared reactor (enough to produce plutonium for

at least one bomb per year) should be easily

discernible to overhead infrared sensors, at least

if it is built above ground and located away from

heavy industrial areas (such a location might be

chosen for security and safety reasons anyway). 108 Insections of safeguarded reactors,

especially if carried out at more random intervals,

might detect unnecessary placement of uranium238 in or around the core, augmenting the rate of

plutonium production. Similarly, inspections of

CANDU-style reactors (a heavy-water-moderated reactor that can be refueled online) or of

frequently shut-down LWRs should call attention

to very low-bum-up fuel cycles, from which the

plutonium produced is predominantly plutonium239, the isotope best suited for weapons.

lo7 Note, however, that the specific compounds UClq and UF6 would not likely be found in the atmosphere, Skim they Hct very qticMY ~~

water to form other compounds. The existence of IJFA might also be evidenced by the particular processing equipment required to reduce it

to metallic form.

Im ]f the heat were dischmged into a modest-simd river, a resulting rise in temperature on the order of O. 1“C or more (depending on flow-rate,

mixing, etc.) would be detectable in the far-infrared. Alternatively, heat from the cooling towers might also be detectable. See Fainberg,

~trengrhening IAEA Safeguards, op. cit., footnote 106, p. 21..
164 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

SPENT-FUEL REPROCESSING

In general, the plutonium-production route,

which involves reprocessing of spent reactor-fuel

to extract plutonium, would be easier to detect

than would be a small-scale clandestine uraniumenrichment facility.l09 Plutonium and uranium

from spent fuel (as well as enriched uranium from

research reactor cores), is reclaimed by chopping

up and dissolving the fuel elements in acid,

subjecting the solution to solvent-extraction and

ion-exchange processes, and chemically converting the plutonium and uranium in the resulting

liquids to metallic or oxide forms. Methods for

doing this, including the most common one,

known as PUREX, involve various wellunderstood chemical processes that use characteristic groups of materials.

Detection of these materials, either by environmental sampling or by impactions, could indicate

reprocessing activity. 11O Some chemicals might

also be observed through export monitoring; for

example, high-purity calcium and magnesium,

which are used in the metal-conversion step, are

included in the Nuclear Supplier Group’s new list

of sensitive dual-use items to be subjected to

export controls (see app. 4-D).

Release of noble gases

In addition to the characteristic chemicals used

in the PUREX process, effluents from reprocessing plants will contain telltale radioactive fission

products, including radioactive isotopes of the

noble gases xenon and krypton-especially krypton85—and possibly argon.lll Measurements made

at the U.S. reprocessing facility at the Savannah

River Plant in South Carolina have suggested that

krypton-85 may be detectable, even from small

facilities, at ranges of 10 kilometers or more.112

Isotopic content of plutonium

Analysis of plutonium samples or effluents

from reprocessing could provide further evidence

of weapon intent by revealing the fuel’s irradiation level. For most types of reactor, a very low

fuel-irradiation level would be a strong indicator

of weapon activity. In addition, isotopic correlation techniques-which compare the isotopic

ratios of different samples of plutonium-can

provide sensitive indicators of plutonium production history or material diverted from one facility

to another.113

| Weapon Design and Intent

ACTIVITIES OF SCIENTISTS

The effort required to develop nuclear weapons

can have a significant effect on the movement,

publications, and quests for information of a

country’s leading scientists. Although publications on nuclear materials and reactors would be

expected in connection with legitimate safeguarded activities, a sudden decline in these

publications might be suspicious. Scientists directed to pursue a weapon program might begin

seeking out specialized computer codes (especially adapted to high pressure and high temperature regimes) or attending a greater number of

technical conferences in the areas of optical

instrumentation, reactor-core neutronics, or highexplosives and shock-wave hydrodynamics. They

109 Any -~eWdedex@f:n~tionwi~repr~ess ~by~~nonnuclem-weapon s~tewotid be suspicio~, andreprocessing activity

has traditionally been a cause for c:oncem in any nomuclear-weapon states, whether party to the NPT or not.

110 ~om aci~, O%aniC and inorgdc solvents, and other chemicals are used in the PUREX process, as well M uranium and plutonium

that would be present at each step. !;ee, for example, Richard R. Paternoster, ‘‘Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Indicators and Observable,’ Los

Alarnos National Laboratory, LA-12430-MS/UC-700 (December 1992).

111 Fr~vonHip@ and BarbaraUvi, ‘‘ Controlling Nuclear Weapons at the Source: Verif3cationof a Cutoff in the Production of Plutonium

and Highly EMched Uranium for Nuclear Weapons, ” Kosta Tsipis et al., Arms Control Verification: The Technologies That Make it Possible

(Washington DC: Pergarnon-Brassey ’s, 1986), pp. 351-53.

] 12 mid.

113 ~ex DeVo]pi, Argonne Nal!ional Laboratory, private communicatio~ Dec. 14, 1992.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation | 165

might also begin purchasing large numbers of

declassified documents from foreign weapon

laboratories. (Such documents were indeed found

among those seized in Iraq.) A sudden recall of

trained scientists from other countries would be

another observable, as would attempts to recruit

foreign weapon scientists.114 Sending large numbers of graduate students abroad to study technical fields related to nuclear weapon design might

be associated with a weapon program. However,

such a signature would be very ambiguous, since

at the graduate level, most such fields have

widespread application.

DECLARATIONS OF LEADERS

Public statements by high officials can also

shed light on a nation’s intentions, though they

must be interpreted within a given political

context. For instance, statements from Iraq before

the 1991 Persian Gulf War and from Iran after that

war could be interpreted to indicate a desire for

weapons of mass destruction:

. . . it behooves us to declare clearly that if Israel

attacks and strikes, we will strike powerfully. If it

uses weapons of mass destruction against our

nation, we will use against it the weapons of mass

destruction in our possession.115

Since Israel continues to posses nuclear weapons,

we, the Muslims, must cooperate to produce an

atom bomb, regardless of U.N. attempts to

prevent proliferation. 116

NUCLEAR AND HIGH-EXPLOSIVE TESTlNG117

Implosion physics

Repeated high explosive (HE) tests are generally required before a workable implosion-type

nuclear weapon can be designed.118 Explosive

tests to study either the HE alone or its ability to

propel metal objects would usually require electronic or optical instrumentation. For observers at

close enough range, some indicators of highexplosive testing activity are the following:119

expansion of facilities or personnel at or near

an existing ordnance plant;

purchase or production of explosives more

energetic than pure TNT, such as RDX,

HMX, or PETN, any of which could be

mixed with TNT;

equipment for compacting or melting and

casting HE, perhaps modified from what

would be used at a standard ammunition

loading plant;

alternatively, for different types of explosives, isostatic or hydrostatic presses, weighing many tons and likely remotely controlled

(some antitank shaped-charges are also made

using such presses);

precision, possibly template or computernumerically controlled, two-axis machining

facilities for HE, especially if suited for

machining curved contours and surrounded

by blast-protection shielding;

i 14 RepOm ~ me press ~ve c~ed titw r~enfly ap~~ed to emigre nuclear engineers to return home, ostensibly to work on civil~

applications of nuclear power.

115 speechby saddam Hussein at the opening of the Arabs ummit conference in Baghdad, May 28, 1990, translated in FBIS-NEA, May 29,

1990, p. 5.

116 ha Vice President Ataollah Mohajerani, Oct. 25, 1991, at an Islamic conference in Tehru quoted in George J. Church, “Who Else

will Have the Bomb?” Time, Dec. 16, 1991, p. 47.

117 ~s md the following section draw heavily on material found in paternoster, “Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Indicators and

Observable,’ op. cit., footnote 110.

118 III order to improve tie s~e~ and effectiven~s of the implosio~ multiple experiments would be called for, iIICIUd@ mefiue’ment

of the resulting core density.

119 Paternoster, “Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Indicators and Obsemables,” op. cit., footnote 110, pp. 7-9.
166 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

■ waste and scrap from the above operations,

possibly including effluent waste-water systems involving filters or catch basins; pronounced red coloration in waste water caused

by dissolved TNT; solid scrap periodically

destroyed by burning or detonation; and

■ instrumented firing stations and control bunkers for HE or HE-metal tests using charges

weighing up to hundreds of pounds.120

Test-firing of HE-metal systems containing

uranium would be indicated by the following:

bright streamers radiating from the test

(caused by burning fragments of uranium)

visible to the eye;

local debris or dust that contained uranium;

and

nearby fire-extinguishi.ng equipment, portable radiation monitoring equipment, or permanent air-sampling radiation-monitors.

Since highly dense (but nonfissile) uranium238 is widely used in certain types of antitank

weapon, these indicators could also stem from

advanced nonnuclear munition programs. Therefore, most or all of these could be associated with

conventional munitions production and do not

give unambiguous evidence of nuclear weapon

development. However, spherically symmetric

implosions would be more likely connected with

a nuclear program.

Gun-type weapon development

Gun-type weapons generally require highly

enriched uranium surrounded by neutronreflecting material such as natural uranium, tungsten alloy, or beryllium metal or oxide (ceramic).

A development program might use hundreds of

pounds of beryllium or thousands of pounds of

uranium or tungsten for the neutron reflector

alone. Unusually high importation of some of

these items by certain countries might suggest

weapon-development activity. In addition,

ground cover at the detonation test-site may

be cleared in only one direction, since the

debris from tests-and especially burning

uranium streamers if natural uranium were

used as a mockup for HEU-would be

concentrated in a cone coaxial with the

direction of projectile firing (however, a test

program for nonfissioning shaped charges or

kinetic-energy rounds could also have such

a configuration);

special fast-acting very-high-pressure gauges

might be used to record the pressures in the

gun breech; and

distinct acoustic features might be observable.

NUCLEAR LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS

Observers who had access to suspicious laboratories might detect the following signatures:

Criticality tests—weapon designers using

near-critical fissile assemblies may wish to

measure criticality with closed-circuit television and neutron counters in remotely operated (possibly underground) experiments.

However, experiments can also be performed at the bench-top level, not needing

elaborate equipment, and much of the relevant

data is already available in the open literature.

Moreover, similar facilities are also used for

agricultural and biological neutron-irradiation

research. Any kind of criticality accident at a

suspect site, however, would be a strong

indicator of weapon-design activity, since

other applications would be ununlikely to

work with near-critical assemblies.

Neutron background measurements—for

gun-type devices, neutron-flux measurements

would be required to assure that background

neutron counts were sufficiently low. Such

measurements might be indicated by a room

containing neutron detectors that was shielded

from external sources of neutrons, for examlm ~-n~tjon could involve a few domn high-speed OSCfiOSCOpfX, ti@-@~~~ mirror ‘streak’ cameras; electronic-irnafyxonvexter

or high-speed framin g cameras; and pulsed x-ray generators.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation I 167

ple with water- or polyethylene-filled walls.

Such facilities might also be used to test

neutron initiators.

Development of neutron initiators-neutron

initiators produce a pulse of neutrons to

initiate the nuclear chain reaction at the

optimum moment (see app. 4-A). They use

either alpha-particle-emitting radioactive substances or small particle accelerators containing radioactive tritium gas,121 Therefore,

import or production of alpha-emitting materials, tritium, or the special facilities to

handle them (similar to those used for

spent-fuel reprocessing) could indicate weapon

development. However, small acceleratorbased neutron sources are produced commercially for oil-well logging and laboratory

use, so that they do not necessarily indicate

a weapon program.

Special tests—Since neutron initiation is so

important to the proper detonation of a

nuclear device, tests involving actual HE

with very small (sub-critical) amounts of

nuclear material would likely be carried out

as well. These might be conducted in shallow

underground chambers designed for neutron

shielding. (A series of such tests, called

‘ ‘hydronuclear experiments,’ was conducted

by the United States during the testing

moratorium of 1958 -61.) Some of the surface

equipment associated

also be telling.122

with these tests might

detonation of high explosives. These signs, however, could also indicate conventional military

facilities.

Import patterns of dual-use items might again

provide indicators of intent to fabricate weapons.

During their inspections of weapon facilities in

Iraq, the IAEA found items such as computernumerically controlled (CNC) machinery, twoaxis lathes, vacuum furnaces, and isostatic presses

that had been imported through a vast network of

foreign suppliers and front companies (see box

4-F). Since this equipment has a variety of

industrial and nonnuclear military uses, it would

be very difficult to determine its exact connection

to a nuclear program simply by knowing the

quantities being imported. Nevertheless, if sufficient monitoring could be implemented to detect

and analyze changes or unusual patterns o f

import, or if reliable accounts of these items’

ultimate end-use could be kept, tracking some

subset of duaI-use equipment might provide an

indication of weapon development. The import of

a suite of multiuse items would provide more

important information than that of individual

items.

Effluents and solid waste from a suspected

weapon-fabrication site might include characteristic substances associated with working plutonium metal ‘‘buttons’ into raw shapes before

machining, such as tantalum, magnesium oxide,

aluminum, graphite, calcium fluoride, plutonium,

and plutonium oxide.123

NUCLEAR TESTING

WEAPON FABRICATION

Final assembly of nuclear weapons can take

place at small facilities. Indicators of such facilities could include special security arrangements

and structures designed to handle accidental

Visible signs of nuclear tests

The Integrated Operational Nuclear Detection

System (IONDS) aboard the Global Positioning

System (GPS) satellites is designed to detect the

121 Tritiu, a radioactive isoto~ of hydrogen produced mainly in nuclear reactors dedicated to tbat purpose, is a key element in adv~wd

(boosted or thermonuclear) weapons as well as in accelerator-based neutron initiators. It is not subject to safeguards, however.

In See RoIxfi N. ‘rhom and Donald R. Westervelt, op. cit., footnote 74; and patemOSter, ‘‘Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Indicators and

Observable,” op. cit., footnote 110, pp. 16.

123 John E. Dougherty, ‘‘A Summary of Indicators of Nth Country Weapon Development Programs, ’ Ims Alamos Scientific Laboratory,

Rq)ort LA-6904-MS, January 1978, p. 4.
168 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Box 4-F-lraq’s Attempts to Conceal or Suppress Signatures

AJ&.4 “+

IAEA inspector David Kay talks with Iraqi military

authorities after they deny access to sites at Falluja in

June 1991 in defiance of UN. Security Council

Resolution 687.

Iraq successfully concealed both the size

and level of progress of its nuclear program.1

Four months after the June 1981 bombing by

Israel of Iraq’s Osirak reactor, Jaffar Dhia

Jaffar (deputy minister of industry, head of

reactor physics at Tuwaitha and now beIieved to have been the head of Iraq’s nuclear

weapon program) reportedly convinced Saddam Hussein that remaining in the NPT while

embarking on a clandestine nuclear weapon

program would present no serious difficulties.2 Over the next decade, a nuclear program code-named Petrochemical-3 employed

over 20,000 employees-7,000 of them scientists and engineers--at an estimated cost

of $7 to $10 billion. This program included at

least two major enrichment programs (EMIS

and centrifuges, plus preliminary work with

chemical enrichment), direct foreign technical

assistance, and massive foreign procurementmuch but not all of which fell within the domain

of legal dual-use items. For example, so as

not to arouse suspicion, the calutron program

imported large iron-pole magnets (4.5 meters in diameter) from a European foundry in crude, unfinished form; such

iron forgings were finished to specification in Iraq. The Iraqis obtained the design for buildings at the Ash-Sharqat

nuclear facility that were planned to house calutrons by duplicating the Yugoslav-built Tarmiya site.3

Iraq did indeed have a major petrochemical industry, which helped provide cover for its nuclear-weaponprogram purchases. However, at least three other factors also helped shield its foreign procurement of

nuclear-related dual-use items from drawing too much attention. First, tensions among IAEA member states in the

Middle East following the Israeli bombing of the Osirak reactor made it harder for the IAEA to be as proactive with

respect to Iraq as it might otherwise have been.4 Second, Iraq’s war with Iran could arguably have been placing

heavy demands on certain technologies that needed replenishment through imports. And finally, the United States

1 Mum of the material in this box is based on discussions with David Kay, head of several IAEA nUOlOar

inspections in Iraq oarried out under the auspices of U.N. Resolution 687, and his presentation at the Nationat

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, May 15, 1992.

2 David t(ay, pmsentatkm at NIS~ May 15, 1892, op. dt., footnote 1; from his dhcusslon *th Jaffar *dn9

one of the early IAEA inspections in 1991.

3 Jay c. Davis and David Kay, “Iraq’s Secret Nuolear %pOn pr~ram,” PhYScs T~aY, JUIY 1~2/ ~“

21-27.

4 Osirakwas not yet operating at the tlmeof the attaoh but had already been plaoed under IAEA Safquards,

which would have inoreased in scope onoe the reactor became operational. Furthermore, French teohnlcians had

been present at the reactor since 1978, and were scheduled to remain for years.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation | 169

and other Western nations’ tilt toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war gave Iraq many “green lights” for importing

technologies that might otherwise have caused more concern?

The Iraqis also apparently had some success at foiling western National Technical Means (NTM) of

verification. The Tarmiya site, for instance, which housed the main EMIS facility, had no security fence and no

visible electrical capacity; only later did inspectors discover that it was powered by a 30-kV underground electrical

feed from a 150 MWe substation several kilometers away. Tarmiya was also situated within a large military security

zone, thereby needing no additional perimeter security or military defenses at the site.6 At this same site, the Iraqis

built a multimillion-dollar “chemical wash” facility for recovering uranium from refurbished calutron components.

This facility was reportedly as sophisticated and dean as any in the West, and triple-filtered so as not to release

any trace of effluents into the atmosphere that might have led to its detection once it began operation.

5 For instance, electron-beam welding machines were being imported under the justification of reP~dn9

tanks and jet engines. This explanation was accepted by western countries, despite the utility these machines had

for certain nuclear technologies. A U.S. oompany also reportec9y sold Iraq a sophisticated milling machine without

its export-restricted laser-alignment module, but then suggested that the latter be purchased from the tmmpany’s

German subsidiary, where less-stringent export controls were in effect. David Kay, presentation at NIS~ op. cit.,

footnote 1, May 15, 1992.

6 Thatthg Tarmiyafacility Indeed hwsed a substantial piece of the Iraqi nuclear program W- only ~nfir~d

after the Gulf War in the early summer of 1991, when the movement thereof large saucer-like objects (just prior to

the first IAEAinspection of the site) led to the positive identification of the Iraqi calutron program. cf. Davis and Kay,

“Iraq’s Secret Nuclear VWapons Program,” op. dt., footnote 3, p. 24.

characteristic double flash of light from above- explosive yields above 10 kt in almost any region

ground nuclear tests anywhere in the world. Other

kinds of satellite imagery might also be used to

detect chilling equipment or surface changes

associated with underground tests, possibly even

changes caused by the shock waves from the test

itself. l24

Seismic signatures

If a country chooses to use underground

nuclear explosive tests to further a weapon

program, seismic disturbances would provide

another telling signature. Nuclear tests with

of the world would be very difficult to hide from

existing seismic networks and other national

technical means of verification. 125 Similarly, tests

with yields down to about 1 kt would likely be

detectable if there were a comprehensive worldwide network of seismic stations coordinated for

the task.126

Much work has been done to analyze evasion

techniques and the potential use of seismic waves

to distinguish low-yield nuclear tests from earthquakes and chemical explosions. One evasion

method is called “decoupling,’ whereby explo1~ For ~tam, the locatiom of nuclear explosion under Degelen Mountain in the Soviet Kazakhstan test site have been shown to beckz@

visible through color changes associated with the shock-wave-caused spallation of rocks fkom the mountain above them. William Leith and

David W. SimpsoU “Monitoring Underground Nuclear ‘Rxts, “ in Commercial Observation Satellites and International Secur@, Michael

KrepoL Peter Zimmermiq bonard Spector, and Mary Umberger, MIs., (New York NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 115.

1~ U.S. ConWess, office of nchnolo=~sesment, Seismic Verification ofNuclearTesring Treaties, OTA-ISC-361 (Washington DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, May 1988), p. 13,

lx hid. For instanm, with a system of tens of seismic stations distributed in and around the U.S. and former Soviet UniO14 nUCIm tests in

those countries with no attempt to muffle the seismic signals could be detected and identifkd down to 0.1-0,5 ~ similar coverage in the southern

hemisphere or worldwide would require a corresponding worldwide seismic network. Decoup/edexplosiom, or ones conducted in a large cavity

to reduce the seismic waves they cause, could similarly be detected and identified down to yields of several kt to 10 kt. Also see Prof. Lynn

Sykes, Lament-Doherty Geological Observatory, Columbia University, presentation at the conference sponsored by the IRIS Consortium, The

Prol$eration of Nuclear Weapons and the Role of Underground Testing, Princeton University, Nov. 12, 1992.
170 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

sions are carried out in large underground cavities.127 However, preparations for decoupled tests

might be observed by the amount of excavation

required. 128 Another scheme involves hiding the

signal of a nuclear test in the aftershocks of an

earthquake. However, the seismic signals of

earthquakes are known to differ in detectable

ways from those of nuclear explosions, and

exploiting them might require delaying a test

detonation for weeks or longer, poised to explode

within seconds of a suitable earthquake.129 Successful evasion scenarios for nuclear tests, therefore, appear not to be very credible, especially for

a nation with limited resources or experience in

such areas.

Atmospheric releases from underground tests

Underground nuclear tests, even at sub-kiloton

yields, generate radioactive gases at extremely

high temperatures and pressures. Even under the

best of circumstances, some of the radioactivity

produced by underground explosions may still

escape into the atmosphere through seepage or

especially through controlled purges or ‘‘drillback’ sampling to gather further data about the

explosion. In the worst case, a massive ‘venting’

of the underground test would produce a plume of

gas containing millions of curies of radioactive

debris rising thousands of meters into the air.130

Even if a country has considerable underground

testing experience, massive releases can still

occur; the ‘‘Des Moines’ test at the Nevada Test

Site on June 13, 1962–-a test carried out in a

tunnel about 200 meters into the side of a

mountain-unexpectedly vented such an enormous

cloud of debris (11,000,000 curies) that it reportedly caused a near-panic among test-site workers

who rushed to drive away from a mountain-size

radioactive cloud that formed above the test site

and began blowing toward them.131 Prior to this

test, the United States had already accumulated

experience from several dozen shaft or tunnel

tests carried out at the Nevada Test Site in 1958

and 1961-62. If a clandestine test site in another

country were suspected, and if timely access

could be gained near the site, radioactive products

could be monitored by aerial or ground sampling.

Small amounts of specific gases produced by

underground tests might also be detected at close

range by exploiting their light-scattering properties when illuminated by lasers.

Nuclear-test-site preparation

Regardless of whether a country chooses to test

a nuclear device at full yield or at reduced yields,

a suitable underground site would be highly

desirable. Since underground tests can be contained quite effectively when carried out properly,

test-preparation activities would often be more

observable than would atmospheric releases from

tests themselves. Drilling rigs, sections of one-meterdiameter or larger pipe, mining operations, or

road construction in new remote locations could

all indicate such preparations and could probably

be observed by reconnaissance satellites. (Determining that such activities actually do pertain to

nuclear testing, however, may prove more difficult.) Contacts with foreign firms having experilZ7 me possibility r~~ that d~oupled tests below 1 to 2 kt would not be readily identifiable as nuclear tests, even if they could be

monitored and detected by an enlarged worldwide seismic network. OTA, Seismic Verification oflhdear Testing Treaties, op. cit., footnote

125, p. 14.

lx me &meter of the cavi~ needed to decouple a l-kt detonation in rock for instance, is roughly 40 meters, md it sales u tie onetid

power of the yield, O’IA, Seismic Verification of Nuclear Testing Treaties, op. cit., footnote 125, p. 100.

129 Distinguis~g between e~@~es and nuclear tests depends somewhat on the strength of their SeiSIniC Si@; fOr nuclear teStS Widl

yields below about 1 k~ discrimi.rmtion can become very difficult.

130 u.S. Congms, Office of ‘lkchnoIogy Asses,smen~ The Containment of Underground Nuclear E.@osions, OTA-ISC-414 (wmmo~

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1989), p. 4, 33.

131 J~ Cwotiers, ~lce of Hisl:ory and Historical Records, Lawrence Livermom National Laboratory, presentation at the ~S conference,

Nov. 12, 1992, op. cit., footnote 12!6.
Chapter 4-Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation | 171

Nevada test site location in 1966 prior to an

underground nuclear test, Large drilling equipment,

cranes, heavy electrical cables, and roads could all

provide visual indicators of such a test site.

maintenance, handling, and deployment. Observable might include construction of maximumsecurity storage facilities or operational exercises

reflecting the special requirements for handling

nuclear weapons. Aircraft training runs for delivering nuclear weapons might exhibit unique flight

profiles designed to give the pilot time to escape

the effects of the blast. Military doctrine governing use of nuclear weapons would have to be

developed and integrated into the command

structure of appropriate forces. A greater number

of people might thus learn of the weapons’

existence, adding to the chance that human

sources might reveal it.

The difficulty of producing fissile materials,

however, limits the rate at which a proliferant

could field nuclear weapons. If only a very small

number of weapons were at hand, they might be

ence in large-hole drilling technology (for in- reserved for strategic rather than battlefield use,

stance, through experience with nuclear testing thus reducing the need to conduct military exerprograms in the United States or elsewhere) might cises that anticipated combat in a nuclear environalso be indicators. Electronic data-acquisition ment. Furthermore, the weapons might be stored

systems, which are widely available around the unassembled and their components kept at variworld, would require extensive cabling systems ous locations. They might also be kept under the

suitable for transmitting diagnostic signals and control of a small military or quasi-military unit

might also be visible. outside of the regular military forces. It therefore

might be very difficult to detect a nuclear force

| Deployment, Storage, and Maintenance of still in its infancy solely by relying only on

Nuclear Weapons observable changes in deployment, storage faciliA country interested in possessing not just one ties, or military operations. Materials production

or two but a small arsenal of nuclear weapons would still provide the greatest opportunities for

would have to make preparations for their storage, detecting such a program.
A

nuclear weapon is a device that releases large

amounts of explosive energy through extremely rapidly occurring nuclear reactions.

Nuclear fission reactions occur when a heavy

Appendix 4-A

Components, Design,

and Effects

of Nuclear

atomic nucleus is split into two or more smaller nuclei,

usually as the result of a bombarding neutron but

sometimes occurring spontaneously; fusion occurs

when lightweight nuclei are joined, typically under

conditions of extreme temperature and pressure. Nuclear weapons utilize either fission or a combination of

fission and fusion.

A nuclear explosive device is normally made up of

a core of fissile material that is formed into a

‘‘super-critical mass’ (see below) by chemical high

explosives (HE) or propellants. The HE is exploded by

detonators timed electronically by a “fuzing” system,

which may use altitude sensors or other means of

control. The nuclear chain-reaction is normally started

by an “initiator” that injects a burst of neutrons into

the fissile core at an appropriate moment.l

Fission devices are made with highly enriched

uranium-235 or with plutonium-239, which is proWeapons

duced in nuclear reactors through neutron bombardment of uranium-238,2 Uranium-233, which is produced in reactors fueled by thorium-232, can also be

used to construct a fission device.

In fission weapons, energy is released through an

explosive chain reaction that occurs when neutronbombarded nuclei split and subsequently emit additional neutrons.3 These additional neutrons sustain and

multiply the process in succeeding fission reactions or

‘‘generations. The minimum mass of fissile material

that can sustain a nuclear chain reaction is called a

critical mass and depends on the density, shape, and

type of fissile material, as well as the effectiveness of

any surrounding material (called a reflector or tamper)

at reflecting neutrons back into the fissioning mass.

Critical masses in spherical geometry for weapongrade materials are as follows:4

Uranium-235 Plutonium-239

Bare sphere:. . . . . . . . . . . 56 kg 11 kg

Thick U Tamper. . . . . . . 15 kg 5 @

I At a presentation zt the South Mkicau Embassy, Washington, DC, on July 23, 1993, Waldo Stumpf, chief executive officer of the Atomic

Energy Corporation of South Afi_ica, Ltd., stated that South Africa designed a gun-type weapon using HEU that employed no neutron initiator.

2 Uranium-235 is the only naturally occuning isotope that is “fissile,” “I.e., able to be fissioned by neutrons of any speed, Its concentration

in mtural uranium (most of which is uranium-238) is only about 0.71940.

s The amount of energy ultimately released is given by Einstein’s relation E=m&, where c is the speed of light and m is difference in mass

between the original nucleus and that of alt the pieces into which it is spit.

4 Robert Serbcr, The bsAlamos Primer: First Lectures on How to Build unAtomic Bomb (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1992),

p. 33.

I 173
174 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

The “mushroom cloud” of hot gases and radioactive

debris caused by a nuclear detonation near the ground

can rise upwards of tens of thousands of feet and

spread dangerous radioactive fallout far downwind.

Significant quantities of nuclear materials have been

defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), which is charged with ensuring that these

materials not be diverted from peaceful uses into

weapons (see app. 4-C and table 4C-3 on significant

quantities). These thresholds, which the IAEA considers sufficient for processing into a weapon, are 8 kg of

plutonium (total element) or 25 kg of the isotope

uranium-235 in highly enriched form (uranium containing 20 percent or more of the isotope uraniurn235).5 A first-generation fission weapon developed by

a state without much experience at nuclear weapon

design would most likely have a yield in the range of

1 to 50 kilotons.6

Two basic designs to assemble a supercritical mass

of fissile material are gun-assembly and implosion. In

the gun-assembly technique, a propellant charge propels two or more subcritical masses into a single

supercritical mass inside a high-strength gun-barrellike container. Compared with the implosion approach, this method assembles the masses relatively

slowly and at normal densities; it is practical only with

highly enriched uranium. (If plutonium—even weapongrade-were used in a gun-assembly design, neutrons

released from spontaneous fission of its evennumbered isotopes would likely trigger the nuclear

chain reaction too soon, resulting in a ‘‘fizzle’ of

dramatically reduced yield. See box 4-B on reactorgrade plutonium in main text.)

In the implosion technique, which operates much

more rapidly, a shell of chemical high-explosive

surrounding the nuclear material is designed (for

example, by being detonated nearly simultaneously at

multiple points) to rapidly and uniformly compress the

nuclear material to form a supercritical mass. This

approach will work for both uranium and plutonium

and, unlike the gun-assembly technique, creates higher

than normal densities. Since critical mass decreases

rapidly as density increases (scaling as the inverse

square of the density), the implosion technique can

make do with substantially less nuclear material than

the gun-assembly method.

In both types of designs, a surrounding tamper may

help keep the nuclear material assembled for a longer

time before it blows itself apart, thus increasing the

yield. The tamper often doubles as a neutron reflector.

In a fission weapon, the timing of the initiation of the

chain reaction is important and must be carefully

designed for the weapon to have a predictable yield. A

neutron generator emits a burst of neutrons to initiate

the chain reaction at the proper moment—near the

point of maximum compression in an implosion

design or of full assembly in the gun-barrel design.

Using these approaches, a substantial fraction of a

weapon’s fissile material would probably be blown

s If one could assemble 8 kg of plutonium into a sphere, it would have a diameter of about 9.2 crrL somewhat bigger than a baseball; 25

kg of uranium would have a radius about 1.5 times larger.

b A kiloton (M) is defined as 4.18 x 1012 joules, which is approximately the energy released in the explosion of a thousand tons of TNT.
— —

Appendix 4-A-Components, Design, and Effects of Nuclear Weapons I 175

apart before it fissioned. To fission more of a given

amount of fissile material, a small amount of material

that can undergo fusion, deuterium and tritium (D-T)

gas, can be placed inside the core of a fission device.

Here, just as the fission chain reaction gets underway,

the D-T gas undergoes fusion, releasing an intense

burst of high-energy neutrons (along with a small

amount of fusion energy as well) that fissions the

surrounding material more completely. This approach,

called boosting, is used in most modem nuclear

weapons to maintain their yields while greatly decreasing their overall size and weight.

Fusion (or ‘‘thermonuclear’ weapons derive a

significant amount of their total energy from fusion

reactions. The intense temperatures and pressures

generated by a fission explosion overcome the strong

electrical repulsion that would otherwise keep the

positively charged nuclei of the fusion fuel from

reacting. In general, the x-rays from a fission “primary” heat and compress material surrounding a

“secondary” fusion stage. 7 Such bombs, in theory,

can be designed with arbitrarily large yields: the Soviet

Union once tested a device with a yield of about 59

megatons.

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The massive amounts of energy released by both

fission and fusion explosives generate blast, heat, and

radiation. Blast effects include shock waves, overpressure, and intense winds. Heat is released in the form of

infrared and visible radiation which, for large-yield

weapons detonated under the right conditions, can

cause firestorms in cities well beyond the region of

heavy blast damage.8 Radiation effects include the

prompt bursts of gamma rays and neutrons, the

production of radioactive fission products and, if the

explosion’s fireball touches the ground, significant

amounts of fallout of radioactive materials formed

from or condensed upon soil that is swept up into the

mushroom cloud.9 Taking into account all of these

effects except fallout, the effective lethal radius10 for

a l-kt fission weapon is approximately 0.7 km (area

1.5 km2), for a 20-kt fission weapon 1.8 km (area 10

km2), and for a l-Mt hydrogen bomb 7-13 km (area

150-600 km2

), depending on the occurrence of firestorms.ll

T The secondary usually contains solid lithium-6 deuteride. (Lithium-6 creates tritiurn when bombarded by neutrons produced during the

detonation.) As in fission weapons, the liberated energy is refleeted in the change in total mass during the reaction.

B Willim Daugherty, Barbara Uvi, and Frank von HiP@, “The Consequences of ‘Limited’ Nuclear Attacks on the United States,”

International Security, vol. 10, No, 4, spring 1986, p. 15.

g A nuclear weapon detonated at high altitude can also generate a powerful pulse of radio waves (called “electromagnetic pulse’ ‘), which

can wreak havoc on some types of electronic equipmen$ but would not pose a direct human health risk.

10 Here, .#ec~ive lethal r~ius describes a circular area around ground zero for which the number of p~ple reskhg in the circle (Ushg

uniform population density) is the same as the total number of people that would be killed under normal conditions by the immediate effects

of the explosion. Alternatively, it describes the radius at which the fatality rate, given a typical amount of shielding for an urban ar% is

approximately 50%0.

]] s=, for exmple, Dietrich sc~mer, Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Arms Race (New York ~: Jo~ WdeY & SOIIS* 1984)> P.

47 (figure 2.9).
Appendix 4-B

Enrichment

Technologies

T

his appendix describes several approaches by

which the uranium-235 isotope used in nuclear weapons can be separated from the

more common uranium-238. Enrichment

plants based on these approaches generally consist of

a number of individual stages, each of which takes an

input source of uranium, or “feed,’ and produces two

outputs: one with a greater concentration of uranium235 than the feed (the “product”), and the other

depleted in uranium-235 (the “tails”). The separation

factor indicates how much enrichment each stage

provides. (It is defined as the relative isotopic abundance of uranium-235 of the product divided by that of

the tails.)

Tables 4-4 through 4-7 in the main text summarize

and compare attributes of various enrichment approaches. The descriptions below are illustrative, but

by no means exhaustive, of the isotopic enrichment

methods known to have been supported by substantial

research or development programs. Not included are

many completely different techniques that have been

proposed, some of which have undergone preliminary

research. l

URANIUM AND ITS PROPERTIES

Several different chemical compounds of uranium

are used in enrichment processes, all of which are

difficult to handle. Although calutrons used by the

United States during World War 11 and by Iraq in the

late 1980s utilized UCl4 feed to make ion beams, the

most important feed material for enrichment is UF6

, a

colorless solid at room temperature that sublimes at

56.5 “C. UF6 is used in gaseous diffusion, centrifuge,

aerodynamic, MLIS and, in its liquid state, thermal

diffusion processes. It is highly corrosive to many

metals and generally requires special nickel or aluminum alloys to process it. It also reacts violently with

water and with many organic compounds such as oils

and lubricants, so that handling systems must be

extremely clean and free of leaks. Chemex processes

(see below) normally use simple uranium compounds

in hydrochloric acid solution.

In its elemental form, uranium is a silvery-white

metal which, when finely divided in air, ignites

spontaneously and, when in its atomic vapor state, is

highly corrosive to many materials. AVLIS and

plasma processes use atomic uranium. The ion beam

1 Examples of some of the others can be found in Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation (London:

Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 1983), pp. 171-2, 186-7, and references therein.

I 176
Appendix 4-B–Enrichment Technologies I 177

used in EMIS, though produced from UCI4, is also

elemental uranium.

THERMAL DIFFUSION

The uranium compound UF6 in its liquid state is

subjected to strong temperature differences to separate

the heavier (uranium-238) isotope from the lighter one

(uranium-235). The United States developed this

process before WWII using concentric tubes, cooled

on the outside wall by water and heated on the inside

by steam; in the region between the tubes, the lighter

isotope very slowly tended to concentrate near the

inner wall and rise, whereby it was removed. The

separation factor is no more than about 1.0003, and

only very low enrichments are possible.2 In 1944,

2,100 such tubes-each almost 15 m high-produced

enrichments of only about 0.9 percent uranium-235

(starting from natural uranium with about 0.71 percent

uranium-235) to feed the U.S. calutron program.3

Thermal diffusion is not known to have been used on

any significant scale since World War II.

GASEOUS DIFFUSION

UF6 in its gaseous state is forced through a suitable

porous barrier that preferentially passes the lighter

molecules containing uranium-235, which travel on

average a little faster and diffuse through the barrier

slightly more efficiently. Gaseous diffusion is a proven

technology, but requires an enormous amount of

electricity to operate its pumps and compressors.

Moreover, to produce significant quantities of enriched material, cascades must have thousands of

stages, each stage having many elements or chambers.

A cascade requires up to weeks between start-up and

the point when it first produces appreciable amounts of

enriched uranium (and months or longer to reach

equilibrium). Therefore, ‘batch recycling ‘—the process of reintroducing an enriched product as new feed

stock into a cascade designed to produce LEU from

natural uranium-is a relatively unattractive means of

achieving higher enrichments. The U.S. gaseous diffusion plant at Oak Ridge made only a small contribution

to the uranium enrichment effort during World War II,

but the diffusion technology soon came to dominate

the field.

GAS CENTRIFUGE

Precision high-speed rotors containing UF6 gas spin

within vacuum chambers. Heavier isotopes concentrate preferentially near the rotor’s wall and are made

to convect upwards, where they can be scooped out.

New high-strength lightweight materials, such as

carbon- or glass-fiber bonded with resins allow modem centrifuges to spin at extremely high speeds.4

Cascade equilibrium times are measured in minutes to

tens of minutes. This technology is widely used in

several countries in Europe and in Japan, and has also

been developed in the United States.

Attractive for proliferation in almost every respect

(economical, efficient, widely dispersed proven technology, easily capable of high-enrichment, etc.),

modern centrifuge technology is classified and is

constrained by strict export controls.5 Even so, Japan,

Pakistan, India, and Brazil have each been able to build

gas centrifuge cascades, and Iraq and South Africa had

purchased many components in spite of export controls. All of these have been URENCO-type modern

centrifuges, which are at least 20 times more productive than those designed by Gemot Zippe in the Soviet

Union in the late 1940s. By the late 1950s, the Soviet

Union adopted Zippe’s basic design and went on to

develop centrifuge technology to a production scale.

(In 1942-43 during the Manhattan Project, the United

States also considered using early-design centrifuges,

but rejected them because of mechanical problems.)

2 Separation factor is defined as ratio of the relative (uranium-235 to uranium-238) enrichment of the product stream to that of the tails or

waste stream in any one stage of a cascade.

3 SW Rictid H modes, The Making ~~ the AtOmic B~~ (New York, ~: Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp. 552-4; ~d Manson Benedict

and Thomas H. Pigford, Nuclear Chemical Engineering, 2nd ed. (New York NY: McGraw-Hill, 1989), pp. 498-508. Even this small

enrichment made a useful contribution to the productivity of the calutrons.

4 Alurnin urn and titanium rotors are only strong enough to run at moderate speeds; maraging steel—a particularly strong low-carbon alloy,

typically consisting of at least 10% nickel plus cobalt, molybden~ and other alloying agents-allows moderately high speeds. See Krass et

al., Uranium Enrichment. . . . op. cit., footnote 1, pp. 132.

5 Designs for low speed (subcritical) ahunin urn-alloy centrifuges of the type developed by Gemot Zippe up to 1960, however, are an

exception and are not classified.
178 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

AERODYNAMIC PROCESSES

A carrier-gas and isotope mixture is forced at high

speed through a curved nozzle or vortex, allowing

centrifugal force to concentrate the heavier isotopes

nearer the outer portion of the flow where they can then

be separated by a skimmer. Due to low separation

factor (intermediate between gaseous diffusion and

centrifuges) and high energy consumption, aerodynamic processes are economically not very attractive,

but could be configured in modular cascades in a

relatively small facility for a weapon program.

CHEMICAL EXCHANGE PROCESSES

Low-energy, low-maintenance chemical-exchange

separation methods are based on chemical reactions

that exhibit a slight preference for one uranium isotope

over the other. Two methods known to have been

developed to date are the Japanese Asahi ion-exchange

process, which requires a proprietary resin, and the

French solvent-extraction (Chemex) process. Both use

special chemicals in the liquid state.6 The Asahi

process requires a specific catalyst and is limited by the

mixing times of the reagents and the reticulated resin,

but with the catalyst present the chemical exchange

operates very rapidly. The French process does not

require an exchange catalyst and is limited only by the

mixing dynamics, but it must avoid impurities that can

catalyze unwanted reactions. Because of the very low

separation factor, up to thousands of stages can be

required even to reach LEU; however, since a single

physical item (e.g., an ion exchanger or pulse column)

can contain tens or hundreds of effective “stages,”

these large numbers can be misleading. Both processes

have been put through pilot-plant operations that have

produced the expected enrichments at costs that would

be economical on a commercial scale.7

In part because LEU made with chemical separation

might permit other enrichment approaches to reach

high enrichments more readily than they would if fed

with natural uranium, France has offered to sell its

Chemex process to countries only on the condition that

they not pursue any other enrichment paths.

LASER PROCESSES

These methods include Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope

Separation (AVLIS), Molecular-vapor Laser Isotope

Separation (MLIS), and Laser-Assisted Processes

(LAP) such as “Chemical Reaction by Isotopic

Selective Activation” (CRISLA). All utilize small

differences in the frequencies of light that atoms or

molecules of different isotopic masses will absorb.

Laser processes in general must induce several atomic

or molecular interactions (excitations, ionizations, or

chemical reactions) in succession, requiring several

lasers to act in concert. Laser frequencies must be

tuned very precisely-usually to an accuracy of about

1 part in 1,000,000.8 Maintainin g such precise tuning

at high power levels is one of several key technical

obstacles faced by laser processes.

AVLIS, as developed at the Lawrence Livermore

Laboratory, uses laser radiation to selectively strip an

electron off atoms of uranium-235, but not uraniurn238, in a uranium metal vapor at high temperatures and

low density. MLIS uses tuned laser light analogous to

AVLIS to selectively excite an electron in 235UFG (but

not 238UF molecules and then to remove one fluorine

atom. CRISLA’s inventors claim that they have a

proprietary compound that functions as an intermediary, selectively reacting with laser-excited 235UF6

molecules. (This has not been independently confirmed, however.) Although MLIS and CRISLA

reaction rates are both hindered by unwanted molecular collisions competing with desirable laser-excitation

processes, the CRISLA process may have the added

complexity of needing a particular collisional excitation to win out over the others.

Laser processes are still in development, and tests so

far have been conducted only in the laboratory or in

small pilot-plants. Because of their potential to produce high enrichments in a single step and their low

energy use, they could eventually prove to be very

efficient. Some of the equipment associated with laser

processes is not subject to export controls and could

probably also be developed-at least on a laboratory

scale-by countries such as Israel, India, and Brazil.

b If high enrichment levels are to be produced, great care must be taken to avoid the formation of a critical mass of material anywhere within

the facility. Criticality with liquid and solid-phase methods is much more of a concern than with methods using gaseous forms of uranium.

7 John M. Googin, senior staff consultant Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., private communicatiorq Aug. 11, 1993.

s AVLIS uses pumped dye lasers, MLIS uses C02 infrared lasers and possibly xenon-chloride excimer lasers operating in the ultraviolet

and CRISLA uses CO infrared lasers.
Appendix 4-B–Enrichment Technologies I 179

Laser equipment that could be used for research and

development of laser isotope separation (LIS)

techniques. LIS methods are among several advanced

technologies that may eventually lead to more efficient

ways of enriching uranium.

Nevertheless, the required laser and material-flow

technologies-especially at the scale needed for commercial operation—are highly sophisticated, and their

integration poses a number of very serious difficulties. 9 However, in early 1992 the South African

Atomic Energy Corporation announced that it was

planning to begin operating one unit of a MLIS pilot

enrichment facility in 1994, and a similar pilot-scale

facility is being built in Japan. An AVLIS pilot plant

is also under construction in the U.K.

ELECTROMAGNETIC PROCESSES

This group of technologies includes EMIS (calutrons), ion cyclotron resonance, and plasma centrifuge methods. Although theoretically as capable as

laser processes at producing high enrichments with a

small number of stages, these are — with the exception

of the calutron—still in the experimental stage. All

would require frequent maintenance, since the enriched product accumulates in collectors that can only

be accessed when the system is turned off and partially

disassembled. They also require a precisely controlled

high-voltage vacuum-ion source (now subject to

export controls under the 1992 Nuclear Suppliers

Group dual-use guidelines) and strong, uniform electromagnets. (Ions are atoms with an electron removed,

giving them a positive net electrical charge.) Ions of

different masses are separated by exploiting the

different curvatures of the paths they take when

traveling through magnetic fields. Electromagnetic

methods are also useful for separating plutonium

isotopes, a task otherwise practical only through laser

or centrifuge techniques.10

| Calutrons

Calutrons send high-voltage ions through a halfcircle of rotation in a strong magnetic field inside a

large disk-shaped vacuum chamber. They are very

energy-inefficient, costly, bulky, and require a great

deal of maintenance. Developed and used by the

United States during World War II, their design was

declassified decades ago.

Since higher separation factors require lower beam

densities, up to several hundred calutrons could be

required to produce enough HEU for a single bomb per

year. However, use of even slightly enriched feed

dramatically increases a calutron’s production rate,

thereby reducing the number of units needed. The Iraqi

enrichment program relied primarily on calutrons.

| Ion Cyclotron Resonance

Ion cyclotron resonances techniques rely on the

roughly 1 percent difference in frequency at which ions

of different uranium isotopes orbit in a magnetic field.

This difference allows precisely tuned radio waves to

selectively energize one isotope over the other. The

selected ions will absorb radio energy and orbit in ever

larger spirals, eventually colliding with a downstream

set of collector plates. Other isotopes are not affected,

and most will pass through the gap in the plates. Key

difficulties are that the process requires extremely

9 For instance, between 1973 and 1990, the U.S. Department of Energy invested almost $1 billion in AVLIS developmen~ but produced

only kilogram quantities of 1 YO enriched uranium. In 1990 it had planned to build a 100,000-250,000 SWU/yr pilot plant that might have begun

operation in 1992, but the idea has now been practically abandoned.

10 me Plutoniu isotopes of interest are closer in mass than uranium isotopes and hence harder to sepmte.
o

k

180 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Iraqi electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS)

equipment, here being uncovered by IAEA and United

Nations inspectors, had been hidden in the desert

following the Persian Gulf War.

uniform magnetic fields, usually calling for superconducting magnets, and a suitable electromagnetic signal

or wave. In large machines, producing ions from

metallic uranium can also be problematic. This enrichment process has been demonstrated with modest size

units, but is not projected to become commercially

competitive.

| Plasma Centrifuge Separation

Plasma centrifuge separation, in contrast to ion

cyclotron resonance, requires an ionized gas (or

plasma) to be created that is dense enough to undergo

frequent internal collisions. If injected perpendicular

to a magnetic field, such a plasma will forma ring and

rotate. As the isotopes to to equalize in velocity, the

heavier isotopes will tend to concentrate toward the

outer portion of the ring where they can be removed

(analogous to gas centrifuges). This is probably the

least developed of the electromagnetic methods, and

may use substantially more energy and achieve a lower

enrichment factor than ion cyclotron resonance. It may

also suffer from instabilities and other operational

difficulties.
.

Appendix 4-C

A

s of the end of 1992, there were 424 commercial nuclear power reactors in operation

in 29 countries, producing 330 GW of

electricity (see table 4C-1).1 About 75 percent of these are light-water reactors (LWRs) fueled by

low-enriched uranium (LEU) containing 3 to 4 percent

uranium-235. Most of the remainder are fueled by

natural uranium and are moderated by either heavy

water (CANDU-type reactors) or graphite.2 Some

LWRs in France, Germany, and Switzerland have now

been loaded with mixed plutonium-uranium oxide

(MOX) fuel, which replaces about a third of their cores.

(Japan and Belgium also have plans to fuel LWRs with

MOX.) Several breeder reactors fueled by plutonium

have also been built, but the majority of them have

been shut down in recent years.

The low-enriched or unenriched fuel supplying

almost all of these reactors is not a direct proliferation

Safeguards and

the Civilian

Nuclear

Fuel Cycle

threat. However, all nuclear reactors are theoretical

sources of material for nuclear weapons, since plutonium is produced in reactors fueled by uranium, and

the fresh low-enriched fuel used in LWRs would be

considerably easier than natural uranium to transform

into HEU.3 If not adequately safeguarded, the fuel

cycle and facilities associated with power reactors

provide a number of points from which relevant

materials could be diverted.

So far, no nuclear facilities under full-time IAEA

safeguards are known to have produced fissile

material used in nuclear explosives. The five nuclear

weapon states have each used dedicated facilities to

make weapon materials. The several states thought to

have prepared weapon-usable material outside or in

violation of safeguards commitments have primarily

used either small reactors coupled with unsafeguarded

pilot reprocessing plants (e.g., India, Israel, and North

1 These figures do not include 72 reactors under construction in these plus another three countries, or any research reactor~f which there

are about 325 in over 50 countries. Half of these research reactors are in the five nuclear weapon states. The number of power and research

reactors has remained nearly constant since the middle 1980s, with slightly more reactors having been decommissioned or shut down since

that time than brought online.

2 The moderator in a nuclear reactor S1OWS down the neutrons produced in fission r~tions so that they can more efllciently induce

subsequent fission reactions.

3 Uranium-233 (another weapon-usable material) is produced in reactors that contain thorium, but few reactors based on a thorium fuel-cycle

have ever been built.

I 181
182 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 4C-1-Nuclear Power and Research Reactors Around the World

Power reactors Power reactors

in operation” under construction.

No. units Total MW(e) %electric power No. units Total MW(e) Research reactorsc

Argentina. . . . . . . . . . . .

Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Brazil.. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . .

Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . .

China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cuba. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Czech Republic. . . . . .

Finland. . . . . . . . . . . . .

France. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Germany. . . . . . . . . . . .

Hungary. . . . . . . . . . . .

India, . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Iran. ., . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kazakhstan, . . . . . . . . .

Korea, Rep. of. . . . . . . .

Lithuania. . . . . . . . . . . .

Mexico. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Netherlands. . . . . . . . . .

Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Romania. . . . . . . . . . . .

Russian Federation. . .

South Africa. . . . . . . . .

Slovak Republic. . . . . .

Slovenia . . . . . . . . . . . .

Spain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sweden. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Switzerland. . . . . . . . . .

United Kingdom. . . . . .

Ukraine. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Us.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

7

1

6

21

1 —

4

4

56

21

4

9

—

44

1

9

2

1

2

1 —

28

2

4

1

9

12

5

37

15

109

935

5,484

626

3,538

14,874

288

—

1,632

2,310

57,688

22,559

1,729

1,593

—

34,238

335

7,220

2,760

654

504

125

—

18,893

1,842

1,632

632

7,101

10,002

2,952

12,066

13,020

98,796

19.1 %

59.3%

0.6%

34.00/0

16.4%

NA

—

28.7%

33.3%

72.7%

27.6%

48.4%

1.8%

—

23.8%

NA

47.5940

NA

3.6%

4.9%

0.8%

—

11.8940

5.9%

28.7%

34.6%

35.970

51 .6%

40.0%

20.6%

NA

21.770

1

—

1

—

1

2

2

2

—

5

—

5

2

9

—

3

1

1

692

—

1,245

—

881

1,812

816

1,784

—

7,125

—

—

1,010

2,392

8,125

—

2,550

1,380

654

—

5

18

—

4

—

—

3,155

14,175

—

1,552

—

—

1

6

3

—

1,188

5,700

3,480

5

5

4

1

14

12

0

2

1

20

25

3

6

2

18

3

3

—

4

2

2

2

20

1

2

0

0

2

4

11

2

92

World total:. . . . . . . . . . 424’9

330,918e NA 72 59,716 ~ 326

NA - not available

a Data, which reflect the status as of the end of 1992 as reported by the IAEA, are preliminary and subject to change.

b percentages are for 19!31, except for Russia and Slovenia, where preliminary 1992 data are US4.

C Research re=tors in Operation as of May 1991, Total inciu~s one research reactor in operation under the bmmis.sion of European cOfrlrTIUtli~&,

five in Taiwan, plusthefollowing (in countries that have no power reactors) :Algeria (1 ); Australia (2); Austria (3); Bangladesh (1 ); Chiie (2); Coiombia

(l); Denmark (2); Egypt (l); Estonia (2); Greece (2); Indonesia (3); Iraq (2); Israel (2); Italy (6); Jamaica (1); Latvia (l); Libya (l); Malaysia(l); North

Korea (2); Norway (2); Peru (2); Philippines (1); Poland (3); Portugal (1); Thailand (1); Turkey (2); Uzbekistan (1); Venezuela (1); Vietnam (1); and

Zaire (1).

d Represents the average 1991 value for the Czech and Slovak Republics

e The total includw Ta~an, where six reactors total[ing 4,890 MWe are in operation, amunting for 37.80A of the total electricity generated there

in 1992.

SOURCE: IAEA Bu//etin, vol. 35, No. 1, March 1993 and vol. 33, No. 3, September 1991; and William C, Potter, Nuclear F?ofrles of the Soviet

Successor States (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 1993).
Appendix 4-C-Safeguards and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle I 183

Table 4C-2—Number of Installations Under IAEA Safeguards or Containing

Safeguarded Material as of Dec. 31, 1992

INFCIRC/153b INFClRC/66c

Type of installations

(Corr.) (Rev. 2) In NWSd

Total

Power reactors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Research reactors and critical

assemblies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Conversion plants, . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Fuel fabrication plants. . . . . . . . . . 34

Reprocessing plants. . . . . . . . . . . 5

Enrichment plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Separate storage facilities. . . . . . 36

Other facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

17

22

3

9

1

1

6

4

2

2

0

1

0

1

5

0

201

169

10

44

6

7

47

61

Subtotals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471 63 11 545

Other locations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 32 0 500

Nonnuclear installations. . . . . . . . 0 3 0 3

Totals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939 98 11 1048

a For some types of installation, predominantly reactors and soedled “other locations, ” several installations ~n be

Io=ted at a single site or facility.

b Covering safwuards agreements pursuant to NpT an~or Treaty of Tlatelolco; excludes locations in Iraq.

c &C[uding Installations in n~lear-weapon States; including installations in Taiwan, China.

d Nuclear-weapon States.

SOURCE: IAEA, The Annua/ Report for 7992, GC(XXXVll)/1060 (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy

Agency, July 1993), p. 149.

Korea) or unsafeguarded pilot enrichment plants (e.g.,

Pakistan, South Africa, and Iraq).4

The reason for the apparent preference for

dedicated or unsafeguarded weapon facilities is

straightforward: the construction and operation of

nuclear power reactors and other commercial

facilities so as to divert materials to a weapon

program is neither the easiest nor the most efficient

route to obtain nuclear weapon materials. First,

more than 150 states have joined the NPT as nonnuclearweapon states, which obligates all with nuclear facilities to sign and implement so-called safeguard

agreements with the IAEA to provide assurance of

nondiversion of nuclear materials. (As of Dec. 31,

1992, the IAEA had 188 safeguards agreements in

force with 110 states plus Taiwan.5 See table 4C-2.)

Second, the vast majority of the material in the

commercial nuclear fuel cycle is not directly suitable

4 See, for example, David Fischer and Paul Szasz, .Safeguarding the Atom:A CriticalAppraisal (_I.mdon: SIPRI, Taylor and Francis, 1985),

p. 52; and Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990 (Boulder, CO:

WestView Press, 1990).

S The 45 parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with safeguards in force base their agreements on the IAEA document

INFCIRC/153(Corrccted)--’ ‘The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. ” The 10 non-~ states with safeguards in force base their agreements on INFCIRC/66/

Revision.2 —“The Agency’s Safeguards System” (1965, as provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968). (The term “INFCIRC” comes from

‘‘Infomnation Circular. ’ In additio~ some safeguards were applied in the five nuclear weapons states under voluntary agreements.

Some important non-NPT states have accepted IAEA safeguards (INFCIRC/66) on certain facilities, but rarely do these covcx key nuclw

facilities from a proliferation perspective. In order for the IAEA to determine nondiversion for a State as a whole, it must have all nuclear

materials in a country’s fuel cycle under safeguards, a situation called fill-scope safeguards.
184 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

IAEA Board room showing participants at an

international advisory committee meeting.

Membership in the IAEA since 1957 has grown to

over 100 States.

for weapons and requires difficult additional steps,

such as conversion, further enrichment, or reprocessing, to make it so. For instance, all handling of

commercial spent fuel requires extensive shielding to

protect workers from lethal doses of radioactivity.

Furthermore, reprocessing of that fuel yields reactorgrade plutonium, which is less desirable than other

fissile materials for making weapons. Finally, operating large commercial facilities in the obviously

uneconomic way that would be required to maximize

their ability to produce weapon material-such as with

frequent fuel changes-would draw considerable attention whether safeguarded or not.

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

IAEA safeguards are a system of procedures for

nuclear material accountancy, control, and verification

that are implemented through agreements between the

IAEA and individual countries. These procedures

involve: record-keeping at facilities; reporting requirements for material transfers and inventories; standardized measurements and assays; containment and surveillance methods (using seals, cameras, and other

recording devices); and regular onsite inspections by

the IAEA. The objective of safeguards is the timely

detection of diversion (or verification of nondiversion)

of a significant quantity of nuclear materials from

declared peaceful activities to nuclear explosive purposes (see tables 4C-3 and 4C-4). Except for the

possibility of so-called “special” inspectionswhich had not been used at any undeclared location

prior to the Persian Gulf War—safeguards agreements require only that declared (peaceful) activities be verified as being peaceful, and that the

materials they involve be accounted for; they do not

require verification of the absence of nondeclared

(possibly weapon) activities (though such activities,

if discovered, would be a violation). Furthermore,

even strict adherence to safeguards cannot predict

future intent.

NPT safeguards focus on nuclear materials themselves and not on other facilities that potentially could

Table 4C-3--IAEA Significant Quantities of Nuclear Materials

Material Significant quantity Safeguards apply to?

Direct-use material: Pub

8 kg Total mass of element

U-233 8 kg Total mass of isotope

U (with U-2352 20%) 25 kg Mass of U-235 contained

Indirect-use material: U (with U-235 < 200/0)’ 75 kg Mass of U-235 contained

Thorium 20 tonnes Total mass of element

a PIUS ruIes for mixtures, where appropriate.

b For pl~onium containing less than 8W0 Pu-238.

c lncl~ing natural and depleted u~nium.

SOURCE: /AEA Safeguards G/ossary, 1987 Ecfitiorr, IAEA/SG/lNF/l (Rev. 1), (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic

Energy Agency, December 1987), p. 24.
—

Appendix 4-C-Safeguards and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle I 185

Table 4C-4-Estimated Material Conversion

Time for Finished Plutonium- or

Uranium-Metal Components

Conversion time Beginning material form

Order of days (7-10): Pu, HEU, or U-233 metal

Order of weeks (1-3)a

: PU02

, PU(NO~

3

)4, or other pure

Pu compounds;

HEU or U-233 oxide or other

pure U compounds;

MOX or other nonirradiated pure

mixtures containing Pu and U

(U-233 + U-2352 20%); or

Pu, HEU, and/or U-233 in scrap

or other miscellaneous impure compounds

Order of months (1 -3): Pu, HEU, or U-233 in irradiated

fuel

Order of one year: U containing < 20% U-235 and

U-233; or

Thorium

a This range is notdeterrnined by any single factor, but the pure pU and

U rmmpounds will tend to be at the lower end of the range and the

mixtures and scrap at the higher end.

SOURCE: IAEA Safeguatis Glossary, 1987 Edition, IAWSG/1NF/1

(Rev, 1), (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency,

December 1987), p. 24.

be used to process them.6 Materials are safeguarded at

many stages in the fuel cycle: conversion (where

uranium concentrate or plutonium, if it has been

separated for use in fuel, may be cast into its fluoride,

oxide, metal, alloy, nitride, or carbide forms); enrichment; fuel fabrication; reactor operation; spent-fuel

storage; and reprocessing. The earliest phases of the

fuel cycle, however, are not subject to safeguards.

These phases involve mining the raw uraniumcontaining ore and “milling” it to convert it into

natural-uran“urn concentrate (U3o8

) called yellowcake

(see figure 4C-1).

Few countries operate facilities that represent all

stages of the fuel cycle, and some may have only a

single nuclear research reactor supplied and fueled by

another country. Nevertheless, unsafeguarded facilities could, in theory, be operated clandestinely along

with safeguarded ones at any of these stages. Under

safeguards agreements for non-NPTcountries (INFCIRC/

66), only certain facilities and materials are subject to

safeguards; these states can legally operate other,

undeclared facilities, and process undeclared material

obtained from either their own uranium deposits or

from other non-NPT states, outside of safeguards.

In nonweapon-state NPT parties, however, the

requisite INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements do not

permit any nuclear facilities to be undeclared, even if

they were to use only indigenously produced materials.

Furthermore, in only one circumstance-which has

never occurred-may such a state be permitted to

transfer safeguarded material to a nonsafeguarded

nuclear facility.7

The safeguards process consists of three stages (see

figure 4C-2):

examination by the IAEA of state-provided information, which covers design of facilities, inventories, and receipts for transfers and shipments of

materials;

collection of information by IAEA inspectors,

either to verify material inventories, operating

records, or design information or, in special

circumstances, to clarify unusual findings; and

evaluation by the IAEA of this information for

completeness and accuracy.8

Taking into account each country and facility under

safeguards, the IAEA annually produces a Safeguards

Implementation Report (SIR) that contains qualitative

judgments on whether safeguards goals have been

fulfilled. However, these reports are not made available except to the IAEA Board of Governors and

member governments.

6 Facilities that are built with the express purpose of eventually containing nuclear materials, however, must be declared.

T This exception covers the temporary removal of a declared amount of material from safeguards to a declared (nonnuclear weapon) n“litary

facility, such as for submarine propulsion reactors.

8 See, for example, IAEA Safeguards: An introduction (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1981), p. 19. Any discrepancy of

nuclear materials between the recorded (book) inventory and the physical inventory determined by inspections is called material unaccounted

for (MUF), When MUF exceeds the amount attributable to measurement uncertainties, the possibility of diversion exists and must be resolved,

For an extensive discussion of safeguards concepts and methodologies, see also Fischer and Szasz, Safeguarding rheA tom, op. cit., footnote

4; and Lawrence Sche- The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order (Washi.ngtoq DC: Resourees for the Future,

1987), especially chapters 4 and 5.
186 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 4-Cl-Simplified Flow Diagram of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

E3--”’e--’lEi3ycE3

LEd--------’kersion

!&u

‘:k

LEU

+

(Ox, M, A, C)

NU

DU

Pu

LEU

T

(N)

DU

Fuel

fabrication

I ——

LJ +

? —. ‘ --- nReactor

Spent fuel

{ 1

safeguard’ “’--/’

--

Nuclear material:

y c yellow cake

NU natural uranium

DU depleted uranium

LEU low enriched uranium

HEU high enriched uranium

Pu plutonium

, Spent fuel

Chemical form:

Ox oxide

N nitrate

M metal

A alloy

F hexafluoride

C carbide

SOURCE: IAEA Safeguards: An Introduction, IAE#SG/lNF/3 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1981),

p. 17.

Before Iraq was shown to have violated safeguards,

no safeguards disputes had ever been referred to the

U.N. Security Council. Since then, the possibility of

Security Council action has been raised with respect to

compelling North Korea to allow inspections of two

sites suspected of containing nuclear waste. Despite its

NPT obligations eventually to do so, North Korea also

had still not shut down one of its reactors (as of the

summer of 1993) so as to allow IAEA inspectors to

examine its core. Such inspections are necessary to

determine whether North Korea has ever produced

significant quantities of plutonium.

For reactors and fuel storage areas, material accountancy consists of identifying and counting fuel

rods and assemblies and verifying their composition

using nondestructive assays (NDA). LWR fuel assemblies are enclosed in the reactor vessel in such a way

that the reactor must be shut down to change fuel
Appendix 4C-Safeguards and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle I 187

Figure 4-C2-Verification Activities of IAEA Inspectors or of the

Safeguards Analytical Laboratory

Examination of records

1 4

State’s report

‘L Comparison of records and reports

f h[ f

—

1

2436 I n

Item counting

NDA measurements

El~,u Chemical (destructive)

/ ‘,### analysis

Sample

(NDA=nondestructive assay)

SOURCE: IAEA Safeguards; An /introduction, IAWSG/lNF/3 (Vienna: International Atomic

Energy Agency, 1981), p. 23.
188 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

4 n=

IAEA safeguards inspectors (center) checking fresh

fuel elements at a nuclear power plant. At such

facilities, safeguards focus on item identification and

material accountancy, in part by verifying the records

of plant operators.

elements. This shutdown is time-consuming and

observable and makes the design and implementation

of safeguards for LWRs particularly simple.

CANDU-type heavy-water- moderated naturaluranium reactors, and Soviet RBMK-type graphitemoderated reactors, however, are refueled by inserting

new fuel rods while simultaneously removing old

ones—a process that does not require shutting down

the reactor. Safeguarding such reactors requires much

more frequent inspections as well as specialized

equipment (e.g., automated bundle counters) to inventory the replacement of fuel elements. Furthermore,

since heavy water reactors (HWRs) can be refueled

much more inexpensively and easily than other types

of reactor, fuel can be cycled through them quickly.

Such reactors are therefore better suited than many

others to produce weapon-grade plutonium9 (see box

4-A in main text).

Once plutonium is separated, it represents much

more of a proliferation hazard than when it is bound up

within radioactive spent fuel. If reprocessing is done at

a distant site, or separated plutonium is subsequently

transferred to a MOX fuel-fabrication facility or back

X-ray fluorescence spectrometer, which supports one

of the techniques used by the MEA to analyze samples

taken during nuclear inspections.

to the country of origin, the transport of spent fuel and

especially of separated plutonium represent vulnerable

points in the fuel cycle for diversion or theft.

At “bulk-handling” facilities (such as those for

enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing), samples of material from within material balance areas

must periodically be removed and taken to an IAEA

laboratory to determine their composition. The uncertainties in measurement at large bulk-handling

facilities are necessarily much larger than those

involving the discrete items most often associated

with reactors and their fuel. (Consequently, the

IAEA inspects bulk-handling facilities much more

often, sometimes stationing permanent resident inspectors at these sites. Almost 50 percent of the total

inspection effort is expended at bulk-handling facilities, even though these represent only about 7 percent

of the total number of installations under safeguards. 10)

Technologies for implementing safeguards improved dramatically during the 1980s, and with these

improvements have come greater transparency and

confidence that the international fuel cycle is not being

used to aid proliferation. The IAEA has incorporated

computerized inspection reporting systems and has

improved various methods for taking measurements

and implementing containment and surveillance techg ~ ~~e~d~ Canadim re=h HWR supplied the plutonium for the device India exploded in 1974, and a French-supplied HWR

has been the source of unsafeguardcdplutonium in Israel. Similar but safeguurdedHWRs had been involved in suspect activities in South Korea

and Taiwan before the U.S. persuaded these hvo NPT countries in the 1970s to abandon their reprocessing efforts.

10 V. Schu.richt and J. Larrimore, ‘‘Safeguarding Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,’ MEA BuZletin, vol. 30, No. 1 (1988), p. 11.
. —

Appendix 4-C-Safeguards and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle I 189

niques (see figure 4C-3), including methods for film

processing, verification of seals, and analysis of

gamma spectrometric data. New tamper-resistant surveillance television and recording systems have been

installed in an increasing number of facilities.ll

A number of improvements in IAEA safeguards and

procedures have also been adopted since the 1991

Persian Gulf War. These include establishing earlier

reporting requirements for nuclear plant-design information; taking steps toward more universal reporting

of exports, imports, and inventories of nuclear materials and equipment; reaffirming the right to conduct

special inspections; and accommodating the use of

more diverse sources of information.

Nevertheless, the IAEA safeguards system has

inherent limitations with respect to forestalling potential nuclear weapon programs, some of which are the

following:

it does not cover all states, or even all facilities

and items that could be used by a nuclear weapon

program in those states that are covered (for

example, it makes no attempt to cover research

and development on nonnuclear components of

nuclear weapons);

it does not prohibit states from acquiring stockpiles of weapon-usable material (plutonium and

HEU), or the means to produce them, provided

that stocks and facilities are declared and for

peaceful purposes (the IAEA, in fact, is charged

with assisting member states in the development

of their nuclear fuel cycles);

it suffers from inherent uncertainties at bulkhandling facilities;

its access to sources of information remains

limited;

Two seals, known as COBRA and ARC, used by the

IAEA to provide assurance that containers or other

inspected items have not been tampered with between

inspections.

■ it lacks an effective means of enforcement; and

■ it is subject to diplomatic and political pressures

to treat all states equally, making it difficult to select some as being of particular proliferation

concern or to subject them to closer scrutiny. The

bulk of the IAEA safeguards budget today is spent

on facilities in Japan, Germany, and Canada, which

are not regarded as countries of current proliferation concern.

Policy options to strengthen IAEA safeguards and

other aspects of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

have been discussed in a number of recent articles12 and

will also be addressed in a subsequent OTA report on

nonproliferation policies.

11 o~ti~pment~t~~n~proved over~e l~t d~de ~cludm bundle counters forreactor~t aremfuekxi while dhle, ad V~OUS

equipment for measuring composition and amounts of nuclear material, for example, portable multichannel analyzers, K-edge densitometers,

electromanometers, Cherenkov viewing devices, and neutron coincidence counters.

12 S*, for e~ple, ~~ence SCheinrnaq “Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in a Changing World Order,” Secun’v DiaIogue,

vol. 23, No. 4, 1992, pp. 37-50, and Assuring the Nuclear Non-l%liferafi”on Safeguards System (Washington DC: The Atlantic Council,

October 1992); three articles in Disarmament, vol. XV, No. 2, April 1992: Hans Blix, “IAEA Safeguards: New Challenges, ” pp. 33-46;

Ryukichi Imai, ‘‘NPT Safegumds Today and Tomorrow, ’ pp. 47-57; and Lawrence Sche@ ‘‘Safeguards: New Threats and New

Expectations, ’ pp. 58-76; and David Fischer, Ben Sanders, Lawrence Scheinrnaq and George BumL A New Nuclear Triad: The

Non-Prol~eration of Nuclear Weapons, International Verification and the IAEA, PPNN Study No. 3 (Southampton U.K.: Programme for

Promoting Nuclear Nonproliferatio~ September 1992).
190 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 4-C3-Typical Containment and Surveillance (C/S) Measures Applied by the IAEA

/

—+!- – - -–-–

~“-—

+) I Surveillance

cameras

1-/= .. \

@c

\

I - “ --

I

I

II

—

‘-=’’+J=--JJ I

I

Container

Seal

\

Door

Lorry

3

SOURCE: IAEA %fegumds: An L?trcxiuction, IAWSG/lNF/3 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1981), pp. 24-25,
M

eeting in Warsaw from March 31 to April

3, 1992, the 27 members of the Nuclear

Suppliers Groupl approved a broad new

set of export control guidelines pertaining

to the transfer of nuclear dual-use items. They agreed

that each of the NSG member countries would

implement the guidelines by the end of 19922 and

would adopt a common policy requiring the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of

arty significant new nuclear exports to nonnuclear

weapon states.3 The new guidelines include a technical

Annex specifying 65 categories of nuclear-related

dual-use equipment, materials, and technologies that

are to be controlled, and establish procedures governing their transfer.

GUIDELINES AND LICENSING

PROCEDURES

The new guidelines stipulate the following:

1. Licenses shall be required for the transfer of any

item in the Annex to any destination by any

participating country;

Appendix 4-D

Dual-Use

Export

Controls

2. Transfers shall not be authorized:

if they are for use in a nonnuclear-weapon state

in a nuclear explosive activity (including work

on components or subsystems) or in an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity;

if there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to

such an activity; or

if the transfers are contrary to the objective of

averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

3. In judging whether these conditions are met,

factors that should be taken into account include,

but are not limited to:

an evaluation of the appropriateness of the

end-use and of the material for that end use;

a country’s past compliance history with

safeguards and dual-use tech-transfer obligations;

whether governmental actions, statements and

policies have been supportive of nuclear nonproliferation; and

1 The 27 NSG states were: Australi% Austri& Belgium*; Bulgari~ Canada*; Czech and Slovak Federal Republics*; Denmar Iq Firdan@

France*; Germany*; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy*; Japan*; Luxembourg; Netherlands*; Norway; Poland*; Portugal; Ro~“ ‘ Russia*;

Spa@ Sweden*; Switzerland*; United Kingdom*; and United States.* (Countries with asterisks have been members of the Nuclear Suppliers

Group since it was forrmxi in 1977.)

2 The guidelines are published in IAEA INFCIRCf254/Rev. I/Part 2, Nuclear Related lkr[-Use Trans$ers, July 1992.

3 See, for example, Roland Timerbaev, ‘‘A Major Milestone in Controlling Nuclear Exports, ” Eye on Supply, No. 6, spring 1992, pp. 58-65.

I 191
192 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

■ whether the recipient has been involved in the

past in clandestine or illegal procurement

activities.

4. Before granting a License, a supplier shall be

required to obtain a statement of end-use and

end-use location, as well as a written assurance

that the proposed transfer or any replica thereof

will not be used in any nuclear explosive or

unsafeguarded activity.

5. Supplier states shall be required to cooperate and

consult with each other on licensing procedures,

to report any denials of licenses, and to refrain

from licensing items whose export was previously denied by another supplier state. (Exceptions and re-evaluations are allowed, however,

with appropriate consultation,)

In sum, it is presumed that countries with

insufficient nonproliferation credentials-even if

party to the NPT—will be denied these dual-use

goods.

ITEMS TO BE CONTROLLED

| Industrial Equipment

Combination spin-forming and flow-forming machines

■ 2-axis, that can be fitted with numerical control

units

Numerically controlled machine tools, control units,

and software

■ especially multi-axis ‘‘contour-control’ machining devices

■ except that the precision and capability of these

items must exceed a detailed set of technical

specifications

High-precision (order of 1 micron) dimensional and

contour inspection systems

■ especially those capable of linear-angular inspection of hemishells

Vacuum or controlled-environment induction furnaces

■ operating above 850 “C;

■ except if for semiconductor wafer-processing

Isostatic presses

■ capable of 700 atmospheres pressure with 6-inch

or larger chambers

Robotic equipment (grippers and active tooling for

ends of robot arms)

!5

Portion of a remote manipulator that was destroyed in

Iraq during an IAEA inspection in October 1991. Such

manipulators can be used inside “hot cells” to handle

radioactive material.

| able to safely handle high explosives or operate in

radioactive environments and capable of variable/

Programmable movements

■ except if for applications such as automobile

paint-spraying booths

Vibration test equipment

■ using digital control; 20-2,000 Hz; imparting

forces of50kN(11,250 lbs) or more

Melting and casting furnaces-arc remelt, electron

beam, and plasma

■ generating temperatures above 1,200 degrees C

in vacuum or controlled environments

Materials

Aluminum alloys (of specified strength)

■ in tubes or solid forms having outside diameters

greater than 75 mm
Appendix 4-D-Dual-Use Export Controls 1193

Beryllium metal and alloys

■ except beryllium metal windows for x-ray machines or beryllium oxides specifically designed

as substrates for electronic circuits

Bismuth (of at least 99.99% purity)

Boron or its compounds (isotonically enriched in

boron-10)

Calcium (high purity)

Chlorine trifluoride

Crucibles made of materials resistant to liquid actinide

metals

Carbon or glass “fibrous and filamentary” materials

of high-strength

■ especially when in the form of tubes with 75-400

mm inside diameter

Hafnium and its compounds

Lithium isotonically enriched in lithium-6

■ except lithium-6 incorporated in thermoluminescent dosimeters

Magnesium (high purity)

Maraging steel (of specified strength)

■ except forms in which no linear dimension

exceeds 75 mm

Radium-226

■ except radium contained in medical applicators

Titanium alloys (of specified strength)

■ in tubes or solid forms, with outside diameter

greater than 75 mm

Tungsten and its compounds

■ in amounts greater than 20 kg and having hollow

cylindrical symmetry with inside diameter between 100 mm and 300 mm

■ except parts specifically designed for use as

weights or garoma-ray collimators

Zirconium and its alloys

| except in the form of foil of thickness less than 0.1

| Uranium Isotope Separation Equipment

and Components

Electrolytic cells for fluorine production (capable of

250 g of fluorine per hour)

Centrifuge rotor-fabrication andbellows-forming equipment

Centrifugal multiplane balancing machines (with specific characteristics)

Filament winding machines

Frequency changers (converters) or generators

■ with specific characteristics, and operating from

600-2,000 Hz

■ except if specifically designed for certain types of

motors

Lasers, laser amplifiers, and oscillators

■ copper-vapor and argon-ion lasers with 40 W

average power

■ high-pulse-rate lasers (tunable dye lasers, highpower carbon-dioxide lasers and excimer lasers)

■ except continuous-wave or long-pulse-length

industrial-strength CO2 lasers for cutting and

welding

Mass spectrometers and mass spectrometer ion sources

, especially when lined with materials resistant to

UF6

■ certain exceptions apply, however

Pressure measuring instruments, corrosion-resistant

Valves (special corrosion-resistant types using aluminum or nickel alloy)

Superconducting solenoidal electromagnets

■ high magnetic field (greater than 2 tesla)

■ with inner diameter greater than 300 mm and

highly-uniform magnetic field

■ except if specifically designed for medical nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) imaging systems

Vacuum pumps (of specified size and capacity)

Direct current high-power supplies (100 V, 500 amps;

e.g., for EMIS magnets)

High-voltage direct-current power supplies (20,000 V,

1 amp; e.g., for EMIS ion sources)

Electromagnetic isotope separators (EMIS)

■ with ion sources capable of 50 mA or more

| Heavy-Water Production-Plant-Related

Equipment (other than trigger list items)

Specialized packings for water separation

Specialized pumps for potassium amide/liquid ammonia

Water-hydrogen sulfide exchange tray columns
194 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Hydrogen-cryogenic distillation columns

Ammonia converters or synthesis reactors

| Implosion Systems Development

Equipment

Flash x-ray equipment

■ except if designed for electron microscopy or for

medical purposes

Multistage light-gas guns/high-velocity guns (capable

of 2 km,sec velocities)

Mechanical rotating mirror cameras (with recording

rates above 225,000 fiarnes/see)

Electronic streak and framing cameras and tubes (with

50-ns resolution)

Specialized instrumentation for hydrodynamic experiments

■ velocity interferometers for measuring 1 km/see

in under 10 microseconds

■ pressure transducers for 100 kilobars

| Explosives and Related Equipment

Detonators and multipoint initiation systems

■ electrically driven detonators (e.g., exploding

bridge wires) capable of nearly simultaneous (2,5

microseconds) initiation over an explosive surface greater than 5,000 mm2

Electronic components for firing sets

● switching devices or triggered spark-gaps (e.g.,

gas krytron tubes or vacuum sprytron tubes with

2500 V, 100 A, and delays of less than 10

microseconds)

| capacitors (kilovolt-level, low inductance)

Specialized firing sets and equivalent high-current

pulsers (for controlled detonators)

High explosives relevant to nuclear weapons (e.g.,

HMX, RDX, TATB, HNS, or any explosive with

detonation velocity greater than 8,000 rn/see)

| Nuclear Testing Equipment and

Components

Fast oscilloscopes (with 1 ns sampling or 1 GHz

bandwidth)

Photomultiplier tubes (with large photocathodes and

1 ns time-scales)

Pulse generators (high speed; 0.5 ns rise-times)

| Other

Neutron generator systems (for inducing |

deuterium nuclear reaction)

General nuclear-material and nuclear-reactor

equipment

ritiumrelated

■ remote manipulators (used for radiochemical

separation in “hot cells”)

■ radiation shielding windows (e.g., with lead

glass, 100 mm thick)

| radiation-hardened TV cameras (able to withstand 50,000 grays)

Tritium, tritium compounds, and mixtures (containing

more than 40 Ci of tritium)

Tritium facilities, or plants and components thereof

(including refrigeration units capable of -250 “C)

Platinized carbon catalysts (for isotope exchange to

recover tritium from heavy water, or to produce

heavy water)

Helium-3

■ except devices containing less than 1 g

Alpha-emitting radionuclides or their compounds

(having alpha half-lives between 10 days and 200

years)

■ except devices containing less than 100 mCi of

alpha activity

STRENGTHS OF THE GUIDELINES

A wide range of dual-use technologies and

materials is subject to strict export controls.

Implementation of these controls should create

significant obstacles for a nuclear weapon program attempting to import the specified items.

A large number of countries have pledged to

abide by these guidelines by adopting them into

their own export control laws and have agreed not

to undermine control actions taken by others.

Factors to be taken into account before export

licenses are granted are not limited to a recipient

country’s being party to the NPT; these factors

include past behavior and general compliance

with nonproliferation goals.
POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS OF THE

GUIDELINES

Specific technical qualifiers and thresholds apply

to the majority of controlled items on the list. A

key questions is how effective each threshold is

at determining the equipment’s utility in a lesssophisticated or less-ambitions nuclear-weapon

program -could dual-use items falling just short

of the specifications still be helpful, and if so, how

easily could they be obtained from NSG or

non-NSG countries?

The procedures only require reporting of license

denials. This precludes routine active monitoring

of trade, for example, to look for suspicious

patterns of imports. However, the NSG has

agreed to hold annual consultations for purposes

Appendix 4-D–Dual-Use Export Controls | 195

including discussion on a voluntary basis of

proposed and authorized transfers of these dualuse items.

■ There is no provision for inspecting the end-use

application, although individual countries may

carry out such inspections on their own. (Inspections are periodically carried out, for example, by

the Office of Export Enforcement of the U.S.

Commerce Department.) This is primarily due to

the expense and impracticality, both financial and

political, of devising a comprehensive inspection

regime for dual-use exports. If the guidelines are

applied stringently, however, then export licenses

for suspect proliferants will largely be denied,

reducing the need for end-use inspections.
The

Proliferation

of

I

Delivery

Systems 5

A

country seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction

will probably desire some means to deliver them.

Delivery vehicles may be based on very simple or very

complex technologies. Under the appropriate circumstances, for instance, trucks, small boats, civil aircraft, larger

cargo planes, or ships could be used to deliver or threaten to

deliver at least a few weapons to nearby or more distant targets.

Any organization that can smuggle large quantities of illegal

drugs could probably also deliver weapons of mass destruction

via similar means, and the source of the delivery might not be

known. Such low technology means might be chosen even if

higher technology alternatives existed. If the weapons are

intended for close-in battlefield use, delivery vehicles with

ranges well under 100 km may suffice. Strategic targets in some

regional conflicts are only a few hundred kilometers from a

nation’s borders. (A fixed-direction launch system, such as the

Supergun being developed in Iraq, might also be used in these

circumstances.) Deterrence or retaliation against more distant

countries, however, might require delivery ranges of many

thousands of kilometers.

This chapter focuses on “high end” delivery systems—

ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and combat aircraft-for the

following reasons:

■ simpler systems, such as cars and trucks, boats, civil aircraft,

and artillery systems are not amenable to international

control. No nonproliferation policy could possibly prevent

countries with weapons of mass destruction from utilizing

such vehicles;

, there is a high degree of overlap among the countries

pursuing weapons of mass destruction and those possessing,

developing or seeking to acquire missiles and highly

capable combat aircraft; and

I 197
198 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

modem delivery systems enable a country to

do more damage to a greater number and

variety of targets, with greater reliability, and

potentially at longer range, than do low

technology alternatives. Ballistic and cruise

missiles in particular may have added psychological effects, since they can be harder

to defend against, or even to detect, than

manned aircraft.

Combat aircraft are already widely distributed

around the world. Every country currently suspected of having or seeking weapons of mass

destruction also has military aircraft that could be

adapted to deliver such weapons. This chapter

nevertheless examinesthes the proliferation of advanced aircraft for three reasons:

■

■

■

such a review indicates how and why combat

aircraft are already so widespread and what

capabilities they offer;

states seeking ballistic and cruise missiles do

so in the context of widespread aircraft

proliferation; and

since advanced aircraft have proliferated

more by transfers than by indigenous production, there is the possibility of limiting

the proliferation of still more advanced

systems. 1

Even though owners of weapons of mass

destruction may possess combat aircraft, there are

reasons outlined below why they might prefer to

use missiles. Unlike aircraft, however, ballistic

and cruise missiles are subject to international

supplier controls through the Missile Technology

Control Regime.

This chapter begins with a comparison of the

utilities of these three types of system for

delivering weapons of mass destruction. Subsequent sections discuss the technological factors

affecting the relative ease or difficulty of acquiring each type of capability, either through purchase, co-development, or indigenous design and

production. These sections also indicate the types

of observable indicators, or signatures, that if

detected might reveal attempts to develop, build,

or deploy each system.

SUMMARY

| Effectiveness of Advanced Delivery

Systems

Although combat aircraft, ballistic missiles,

and cruise missiles are not necessary to deliver

weapons of mass destruction, each type of vehicle

is capable of doing so and each has particular

strengths. A state with the resources, ability, and

inclination to acquire delivery systems specifically for use with weapons of mass destruction

has to consider the availability of candidate

systems, the type of weapon to be delivered, the

targets to be struck, and the purposes of planned

attacks or threats of attack. Characteristics affecting the suitability of delivery vehicles to particular missions include range, payload amount and

type, ability to evade or penetrate defenses,

vulnerability to preemptive attack (pre-launch

survivability), cost, and infrastructure requirements.

For delivering a nuclear warhead, the likelihood of successful delivery somewhere in the

vicinity of the target (the combination of prelaunch survivability, reliability, and defense penetration) is more important than factors such as

accuracy, cost, or excess payload capacity. By

this measure, even though missiles are more

likely to penetrate defenses, the reliability of

piloted aircraft may sometimes count for more.

Given their destructive potential, nuclear weapons need not be delivered with great accuracy

(even a demonstration explosion on the proliferant nation’s own territory or in the ocean could

have great effect in some situations); neither

would a nuclear delivery system have to carry

1 Competition in advanced weaponry is part of the context in which some countries seek weapons of mass destruction some analysts believe

that limiting the spread of advancecl combat aircraft is an important goal whether they would play a direct role in the delivery of weapons of

mass destruction or not.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems 1199

payloads much beyond the weight of a single

nuclear weapon.

To the extent that cost matters in delivering a

nuclear weapon, it is probably the total cost of

acquiring a delivery capability-not the cost per

ton of payload—that is relevant. Here, missiles

(ballistic or cruise) have a strong advantage, since

they are generally considerably cheaper than

advanced aircraft.

Aircraft and cruise missiles are better suited

than ballistic missiles to deliver chemical and

biological agents over an extended area. Size of

payload matters in chemical and in typical

large-area biological attacks, since the damage

that can be inflicted depends directly on the

amount of agent that can be delivered.2 In this

respect, the typically larger payload capacity of

manned aircraft would give them a strong advantage over both cruise and ballistic missiles.

Since known biological and chemical weapons

are cheaper to develop than are nuclear weapons,

the cost of their delivery system is a much larger

fraction of the total cost, and hence a more

important criterion, than in the nuclear case. To

attack military targets with chemical weapons,

the cost per ton of delivered payload would

probably be important to the attacker. With their

larger payloads and their reusability, aircraft are

typically cheaper than missiles by this measure.

Depending on how biological weapons were used

(e.g., once for shock value, or repeatedly for

genocide) either the cost of one sortie or the cost

per ton of payload could be more important.

Aircraft have a strong advantage for attacks

against military targets, if the targets are mobile

or located in unknown positions. Ballistic missiles, on the other hand, would have an advantage

if the targets were particularly well defended.

| Availability of Delivery Systems

Unlike weapons of mass destruction, whose

trade is heavily constrained by treaties and

international norms, delivery systems such as

aircraft and short range antiship cruise missiles

are widely traded internationally. The United

States and other Western industrialized countries

have tried to delegitimize the sale of longer range

ballistic and cruise missiles by creating the

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

When formed in 1987, the MTCR was intended to

limit the risks of nuclear proliferation by controlling technology transfers relevant to nuclear

weapon delivery other than by manned aircraft.

To this end, the MTCR established export guidelines that, when adopted by complying nations,

would prohibit them from selling ballistic or

cruise missiles with ranges over 300 km and

payloads over 500 kg to nonmembers.3

The Persian Gulf War and the recent emergence of potential secondary suppliers of missiles

have helped convince a number of additional

countries to participate in the MTCR. Beginning

with seven original members in 1987, the MTCR

has grown to 23 full members, with Argentina and

Hungary now in the process of becoming full

members. Another four countries (China, Israel,

South Africa, and Russia) have agreed to abide by

the MTCR’s export restrictions (see table 5-l).

On January 7, 1993, MTCR member states further

tightened up the export restrictions, agreeing to a

“strong presumption to deny’ transfers of 300-

km ballistic or cruise missiles regardless of their

payload, and of any missiles-regardless of range

2 For attacks on cities, optimally distributed biological agents measuring in the tens of kilograms could theoretically inflict casualties

comparable to a nuclear weapon. If contagious biological agents were used, damage would be less directly related to amount of agent distributed;

however, contagious agents have serious operatioml drawbacks (SW ch. 3). For comparisons of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon

effects, see ch. 2 of U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks,

OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, August 1993).

J As appli~ to missiles or unmann~ aerial vehicles, the MTCR prohibits the transfer of complete sysrem.r, components tit co~d ~ used

to make complete systems, and technology im’olved in the production of components or of complete systems. Each participating nation controls

export of these items through its own national system of export controls, and the controls are coordinated among MTCR members.
200 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 5-1—MTCR Countries

7 original members (1987):

Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,

Japan, United Kingdom, United States

16 additional full members (as of Mar. 25, 1993):

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece,

Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland

Countries that have pledged to abide by MTCR provisions,

but are not full members:

Argentina (pledged May 1991; in process of becoming full

member, March 1993)

China (pledged November 1991)

Hungary (in process of becoming full member, March

1 993)

Israel (agreed October 3, 1991 to abide with MTCR

provisions by the end of 1992; applying for membership, March 1993)

Romania (applying for membership, as of March 1993)

South Africa (has pledged to join, but date unspecified)

Soviet Union/Russia (pledged 1990/June 1991,

respectively)

SOURCE: Adapted from Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and

Trade, press release, Mar. 11, 1993; and Arms Contro/Reporfer, 1993

(Cambridge, MA: Institute for Defmse and Disarmament Studies,

1993), section 706.

or payload—if the seller has reason to believe

they would be destined to carry weapons of mass

destruction.

| Technological Barriers to DeliverySystem Proliferation

According to published sources, ballistic missiles with ranges from 300 to 600 km are already

possessed or being developed by over a dozen

countries outside of the five declared nuclear

powers. In general, the acquisition by additional

countries of more advanced missile technologiesthose allowing ranges in excess of 1,000 km or

accuracies much better than roughly 0.3 per cent

of range-cm be slowed but not stopped by

multilateral export controlls. It is unlikely that any

country (other than China and the former Sovie t

republics that already possess intercontinenta l

ballistic missiles) would pose a direct ballistic

missile threat to the United States within the next

10 years. However, as the Persian Gulf War and

the ongoing nuclear tensions involving North

Korea have emphasized, important U.S. allies and

overseas interests can already be put at risk by

existing missiles in a number of countries.

Cruise missiles or other unmanned aerial vehicles that exceed the MTCR thresholds are not

widespread outside of the United States and the

former Soviet Union, but a number of systems

with ranges of 50 to 200 km are available for

purchase. In addition, technologies for guidance,

propulsion, and airframes have recently made

major advances and are becoming considerably

more accessible to many Third World countries—

particularly with the export of more advanced

short range systems and the spread of aircraft

production technology and co-licensing arrangements. Since very few countries have been able to

develop indigenous aircraft industries capable of

manufacturing jet engines, it should be possible in

principle to control the spread of the most

sophisticated engines and propulsion systems.

However, the highest performance engines are

not required for simple cruise missiles, and

engines with lesser capabilities are becoming

increasingly available on international markets.

The availability of satellite navigation services, such as the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), the Russian Glonass system, and

possible future commercial equivalents, essentially eliminates guidance as a hurdle for

weapon delivery by manned or unmanned

aircraft. GPS receivers are inexpensive and

commercially available. Although exportable models do not operate at sufficiently high altitudes

and speeds to provide much help for guiding

ballistic missiles (and even custom-made receivers operating during the entire boost phase would

have very limited utility for improving ballistic

missile accuracy), such receivers could be used

with manned or unmanned aircraft to provide

unprecedented navigational accuracy anywhere

in the world. Even the least accurate form of GPS

broadcasts would be sufficiently accurate for

aircraft delivery of weapons of mass destruction.
—

Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 201

| Delivery System Signatures and

Monitoring

Most long range delivery system programs are

hard to hide. Test launches of ballistic missiles

can be readily detected, and intermediate and long

range missiles require a lengthy development

period and extensive flight testing at each phase,

making an overall program particularly difficult

to keep secret. Far from being hidden, civil

space-launch programs-which inherently can

provide knowledge useful to a military program—

are usually considered a source of national

prestige and are proudly advertised. In particular,

the two most important aspects of missile capability for weapons of mass destruction-range and

payload-can usually be inferred from monitoring such a space-launch program. (Guidance

technology and accuracy would be more difficult

to determine, but are less important for weapons

of mass destruction.) Nevertheless, once deployed on camouflaged mobile launchers, missiles can be exceedingly difficult to track and

account for.

Since combat aircraft are widely accepted as

integral to the military forces of a great number of

countries, there is no reason to hide their existence. But the act of modifying aircraft to carry

weapons of mass destruction, or trainin g pilots to

deliver such weapons, might be very difficult to

detect without intrusive inspections.

Of the three types of delivery system discussed

in this chapter, development and testing of cruise

missiles will be the hardest to detect. Several

types of civilian-use unmanned aerial vehicles are

also being developed and marketed, and without

actual inspections it will be very difficult to

discern whether such vehicles have been converted to have military capability. Monitoring

delivery systems capable of carrying weapons of

mass destruction will have the most success with

ballistic missiles and highly capable aircraft.

EFFECTIVENESS OF DELlVERY SYSTEMS

The delivery capability required to use weapons of mass destruction varies enormously, depending on the weapon and the mission. A simple,

covert means of delivery, such as smuggling,

could be sufficient for a single nuclear or biological weapon, whereas a great many aircraft would

be required to deliver hundreds of tons of

chemical munitions in a coordinated attack against

defended sites.

The following discussion examines the characteristics that affect the ability of combat aircraft,

cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles to deliver

weapons of mass destruction against relatively

inaccessible targets. 4 These characteristics include range, payload, accuracy, cost, defense

penetration, and reliability. Although a wide

variety of systems have been or could be developed to deliver weapons of mass destruction (see

table 5-2), the delivery systems discussed in this

chapter have unique capabilities and thus pose

particular dangers to potential victims. Unlike

mines or clandestinely placed bombs, they do not

require that the attacker be able to gain direct

access to the target, and they can deliver weapons

in far less time than would be required to smuggle

them to a target. Unlike artillery shells, rockets, or

mortars, they can reach distant military targets

and population centers as well as tactical or

battlefield targets. Unlike torpedoes, they are

suitable for use against land as well as sea targets.

Unlike civil vehicles such as commercial aircraft

or ships, they have some ability to penetrate

defenses.

The choice of delivery system will depend on

the political or military circumstances envisioned

as well as on the systems’ individual capabilities.

In at least one instance of known nuclear proliferation, for instance, delivery-system capabilities

may have been all but irrelevant. In a speech to the

South African parliament in which it was revealed

that South Africa had assembled six nuclear

A Much of tie follotig dis~ssion draws on Stanford University, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Assessing Ballistic

Missile l%f~erarion and Its Control (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, November 1991), pp. 25-56.
202 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 5-2—Actual and Possible Methods of Delivery

— .-

Weapon Nuclear—. Biological Chemical

Aerial bomb \ v v

Bomb submunitions v b’

Aerial spray tank j

v 4

Ballistic missile, nonseparating reentry vehicle J J

J

Ballistic missile, separating reentry vehicle v’ (poss.) (poss,)

Artillery shell /

v J

J

Rocket shell VI ,1 b]

Mortar shell b J

Cruise missile warhead \

(poss ) (poss, )

Mine (land) \ $’

Mine (sea) k

Antialrcraft missile warhead V

Torpedo k

Transportable cIandestine bomb v) (poss, ) (poss )

Actual cases V

Theoretical possibility: (Poss )

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Prolieration of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), p. 50.

weapons in the 1980s, President F.W. de Klerk

said that

The strategy was that if the situation in Southern

Africa were to deteriorate seriously, a confidential indication of the deterrent capability would be

given to one or more of the major powers, for

example the United States, in an attempt to

persuade them to intervene. It was never the

intention to use the devices, and from the outset

the emphasis was on deterrences

Perhaps most importantly, however, choice

of delivery systems will depend on a state’s

ability to develop or acquire, adapt, and

maintain them. These factors are discussed in

detail later in this chapter.

| Range

The importance of a delivery system’s range is

highly specific to the regional context. Seoul,

South Korea, for example, is less than 50 km from

the North Korean border. Major cities and military installations in Israel, Syria, and Jordan are

located within a few hundred kilometers of each

other, putting them within reach not only of each

other’s strike aircraft but also short range ballistic

missiles. 6 Distances between key points in other

pairs of Middle Eastern countries are somewhat

larger; Jerusalem, Israel is about 350 km from the

closest point inside Iraq, with Baghdad, Iraq the

same distance from Saudi Arabian territory.

Tehran, Iran is at least 525 km from the Iraqi

border, which was one of the principal motivaS President F.W. de Kler~ speech on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to a joint session of the South African Parliament March 24, 1993,

as quoted in Arms Control Today, vol. 23, No. 3, Aprit 1993, p. 28.

6 The widely proliferated Scud lmissile, for instance, has a range of 300 km with a payload of about 1,000 kg.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems I 203

Figure 5-l—Range and Payload of Selected Aircraft and Missiles Operated by Potential Proliferants

 =Range, payload, and flight-profile

1’

4

trade off can vary greatly. Su-24

8,000 +

Iran

1

Iraq

7,000 A Ballistic missiles + attack aircraft Syria

I

F-4

Egypt ,+

Iran F-16

Israel +

S. Korea - Israel

Egypt

Pakistan

Mirage F-1 S. Korea

+

Mig-29

+

Iran

Syria

Egypt

Libya

N. Korea

2,000 j

1

Prithvi Scud B

I

Mirage-5 Mirage 2000

1,000 A A . Scud C +

1 [ 1 J

+

India Iran A Iran

1

Syria Egypt Egypt

Egypt N. Kore a India

o —~

Libya

Libya Pakistan

200 N. Korea 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400

Maximum range (km)

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), p. 68

tions for Iraq to extend the range of its Scud-B

missiles to about 600 km during the Iran-Iraq

war.

7 Distances between the Korean peninsula

and Japan, and between the nearest major cities in

India and Pakistan, fall into the 600 to 1,200 km

range. At ranges of a few thousand kilometers,

U.S. allies and out-of-theater powers in Europe

and Asia could be targeted from the Middle East,

South Asia, or elsewhere.

As figure 5-1 shows, most combat aircraft in

countries of proliferation concern have ranges far

exceeding those of most ballistic and cruise

missiles in those same countries. Moreover, the

ranges of some aircraft can be extended by

in-flight refueling. The need for greater geographical reach may also motivate the development or

acquisition of longer range missiles, or the

adaptation of cruise missiles for use from air or

sea-based platforms. (The effective reach of such

cruise missiles would be extended by the range of

their carrier.) A full assessment of the military

utility of cruise missiles must consider their use

in conjunction with aircraft, surface ships, or

submarines.

I Payload Amount and Type

Combat aircraft generally can carry much

greater payload than can either ballistic or cruise

missiles. Combat aircraft available to proliferant

states typically have payload capacities from

7 The Iraqi extended-range Scuds were subsequently able to reach cities in Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War of 1991.
204 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

2,000 to 4,000 kg, ranging all the way to 10,000

kg, whereas missile payloads tend to run from 500

to 1,000 kg (see fig. 5-l.). Cruise missiles available to proliferant nations typically carry much

smaller warheads than do large ballistic missiles,

although there is no reason why larger cruise

missiles could not be developed. Indeed, large

cruise missiles are in some ways easier to build

than smaller ones, albeit also easier to intercept.

Without very sophisticated technology, ballistic missiles are not well suited for delivering

chemical or biological weapons to broad-area

targets. Such targets are most effectively covered

with an aerosol spray delivered at slow speeds and

low altitudes upwind from the target, a delivery

profile much better suited to cruise missiles or

aircraft. Nevertheless, by the 1960s the United

States had developed submunitions for ballistic

missiles that would spread chemical and biological agents more efficiently than would release at

a single impact point.

For nuclear weapon delivery, both ballistic and

cruise missiles have the advantage of not needing

to provide an escape route for the pilot. In general,

high-flying aircraft are more vulnerable to air

defense than low-flying ones. However, delivering nuclear weapons with low-flying aircraft

requires either a pilot willing to sacrifice himself

with his plane, a time-delay fuse, or a lofted

delivery profile in which the bomb is released on

a high, arcing trajectory that provides enough

time for the pilot to fly out of the area.

| Accuracy

Like range and payload, the accuracy with

which a weapon of mass destruction must be

delivered depends on the type of weapon and the

target. Most of the ballistic missiles so far

deployed in countries of proliferation concern

have ranges less than 1,000 km and are unable to

deliver weapons with accuracies much better than

1,000 meters. In the absence of weapons of mass

destruction or large numbers of missiles, ballistic

missiles this inaccurate have little military utility;

they are better suited to wage terror campaigns

against civilian populations or perhaps to badger

large military installations.

It is not yet clear what accuracies will be

achieved by the several countries developing or

having already deployed missiles of greater than

1,000-km range. Depending on the level of

technology, inaccuracies could range from hundreds of meters to many kilometers. Inaccuracies

at the upper end of this range could be enough to

limit the military effectiveness of even some

types of weapons of mass destruction (though

probably not their political impact).

Combat aircraft with sophisticated weapondelivery systems and well trained pilots, on the

other hand, can deliver munitions with accuracies

of 5 to 15 meters, far better than is needed to

deliver weapons of mass destruction to wide-area

targets. Cruise missiles that are guided to their

target on command from a remote operator can

also attain accuracies much better than crude

ballistic missiles. New guidance technologies

make it possible even for autonomously operated

cruise missiles to attain about 100-meter accuracies.

I Costs and Infrastructure Requirements

Since the total expense of producing nuclear

materials and developing and building a nuclear

weapon far exceeds that of any delivery system

described here, it is not likely that cost considerations will play a very important role in selection

of a nuclear delivery system.

Nevertheless, the cost of maintaining a modern

air force could affect a state’s ability to deliver

large-scale chemical attacks, for instance. A

typical estimate for the cost of a single advanced

strike aircraft, including pilot training and several

years of operations and support, but excluding the

infrastructure investment, is $40 million. (The

marginal cost of a Scud or SS-21 ballistic missile,

similarly including operations and support but

excluding launcher and other infrastructure ex-
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems 205

penses, costs only on the order of $1 million.8

) In

addition to their high unit cost, however, advanced strike aircraft require an extensive support

infrastructure including maintenance facilities,

spare parts, and highly trained personnel.

Given that a country has sufficient technical

capability, it could build and maintain cruise

missiles much more cheaply than piloted aircraft.

Cruise missiles need only fly once, and they do

not incur the expense of training pilots, nor the

structural requirements of carrying them along,

keeping them alive, and ensuring their safe return.

Not counting sunk development and production

costs, each additional U.S. Tomahawk sealaunched cruise missile costs about $1.5 million.9

U.S. defense engineers estimate that it should be

possible to build an equivalent missile for less

than $250,000 by substituting low-cost satellite

navigation receivers for the Tomahawk’s sophisticated radar and optical pattern-recognition guidance systems.10

In general, however, cost comparisons of

delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction

are likely to be only marginally important. A

proliferant country will probably make do with

the delivery systems it already has or can most

easily acquire or modify. Prices of deliverysystem acquisition are also difficult to estimate,

since they could vary drastically if systems are

dumped on world markets by hard-currencystarved counties or if effective embargoes are

implemented on sales, so as to drive up prices on

the black market.

| Defense Penetration

The high speed and steep angle at which

ballistic missiles strike a target make them

considerably harder to defend against than either

piloted or unpiloted aircraft. The Patriot system,

originally designed as an antiaircraft weapon,

showed only a limited capability to intercept Scud

missiles during the Persian Gulf War of 1991.11

Furthermore, defending against missile attack

would be considerably harder if missile warheads

were fused to detonate on interception, or if each

warhead dispersed many submunitions before

coming into range of the defense.

Many developing countries possess air-defense

systems capable of destroying traditional (nonstealthy) strike aircraft that attempt to attack

defended sites. The effectiveness of such defenses

would depend strongly on the sophistication and

scale of the attack. Evidence from recent air

engagements indicates that properly equipped

and maintained strike aircraft-operated in conjunction with defense-suppression techniques (e.g.,

electronic countermeasures and attacks on air

defense batteries)-can penetrate sophisticated

defenses with losses of at most a few percent over

the course of a campaign. 12 Although many Third

World air forces would not be able to mount such

a sophisticated and sustained air campaign, those

pursuing weapons of mass destruction, with few

exceptions, each have relatively advanced combat aircraft that might be used with sufficient

effectiveness even against defended areas.

Whether an extensive air campaign would be

necessary would depend on the context. A single

nuclear weapon can destroy a city, and a relatively

g Stanford, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation, op. cit., footnote 4, p. 45.

9 Steve Fetter, ‘‘Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?” lnternarionul Securify,

vol. 16, No, 1, Summer 1991, p. 11.

10 As cited in ibid.

11 Althoughewly claims of Patriot success rates were clearly too Optimistic, the system’s Overall WrfO~ ce against Scud attacks may never

be known exactly. See, for example, Theodore A. Postol, “IMsons of the Gulf War Experience with Patrio~” International Securify, vol. 16,

No. 3, Winter 1991N2, pp. 161-171; and Robert M. Stein and Theodore A. Postol, “Correspondence: Patriot Experience in the Gulf War, ”

lnfernarional Security, vol. 17, No. 1, Summer 1992, pp. 199-240.

12 See, for e~ple, JOhKI R. ~ey> “Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraf~” International Securify, vol. 17, No. 2,

Fall 1992, p. 59.
206 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

small amount of properly delivered biological

agent could kill tens of thousands of people.

Therefore, if a state is willing to tolerate higher

losses of airplanes, pilots, and weapons—and if it

is able to persuade its pilots to fly in spite of those

risks-it may well be able to deliver weapons of

mass destruction by air even against welldefended sites. Of course, this option was apparently not available to Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf

War, since its air force was so mismatched with

that of the coalition forces that its leaders decided

not even to mount a serious aerial counterattack.

Cruise missiles can be effective at attacking

defended targets, relying on their ability to

execute low-altitude, circuitous approaches. They

may also be air-launched and accompanied by

aircraft in a defense-suppression role, making

even short range cruise missiles particularly

suited to attacking defended targets. Even if

cruise missiles were detected, they can fly at

altitudes below the reach of many medium or long

range surface-to-air missiles, leaving only antiaircraft artillery or short range surface-to-air missiles to shoot them down,

| Reliability and Survivability

Since they are single-shot systems, ballistic

and cruise missiles are generally less reliable than

manned aircraft, which are designed with pilot

safety and multiple sorties in mind.13 The types of

redundant systems used to provide safety on

aircraft are harder to provide for ballistic or cruise

missiles, since a missile’s range is more sensitive

to changes in payload. Moreover, aircraft are

generally tested in the design process more

thoroughly than ballistic or cruise missiles, and

more mission-critical systems in an airplane can

be tested prior to use than in a ballistic missile.

(For example, a solid rocket motor cannot be

tested without being used up, and most liquidfueled motors are only designed for a single

fining.) Aircraft also tend! to fail gracefully and

can usually return to base if problems are

encountered.

Nevertheless, a state with a nuclear arsenal of

only a few very expensive weapons may well pay

the price-in cost and performance-of making

its missiles more reliable. (This would likely

involve a substantial engineering effort, precluding use of an “off-the-shelf’ missile designed to

less demanding requirements.) But even a reliable

missile would likely be less forgiving of failure

when it did happen than would an airplane. In the

event an airplane fails to take off successfully, its

weapon and its mission can usually be recovered—

an important consideration in the case of a nuclear

weapon whose completion may have cost a state

a noticeable fraction of its gross national product

for many years. Warheads are less likely to

survive launch failures when mounted on cruise

or ballistic missiles.

The pre-launch survivability of ballistic and

cruise missiles is likely to be higher than that of

airplanes, however, since they are smaller, can

more readily be hidden, and do not need to be

located near runways or landing strips. During

Operation Desert Storm the coalition air forces

pinned down or destroyed much of the Iraqi air

force, but they may not have actually destroyed a

single Scud missile or mobile launcher. Once

located, however, missiles are more vulnerable

than aircraft, which can flee or protect themselves.

| Command and Control

Political leaders may find missiles (certainly

ballistic missiles, but perhaps cruise missiles as

well) to be more ‘‘controllable” than piloted

aircraft in that the infrastructure required to

launch missiles is significantly smaller than that

needed to sustain air operations. Launch orders

need pass through fewer levels of command, and

fewer people are in a position to block them.

Perhaps most fundamentally, an unpiloted missile

13 Reliabfi~ hen is defined as Ihe probability of successful flight given that pre-flight or pre-launch ch=b hve ken pmsd.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems I 207

cannot question its launch order. Groundlaunched cruise missiles could have infrastructures more the size of those for ballistic missiles

than those for piloted aircraft. Although deploying air- or sea-launched cruise missiles would

require the participation of an air force or navy,

with its attendant logistical and command structures, the launching platform could remain out of

range of enemy forces. Thus, its logistical infrastructure might still be considerably less than that

required to penetrate enemy airspace using

manned aircraft.

| Achieving Tactical Surprise

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) can

reach targets a quarter of the way around the globe

in about 30 minutes. Tactical missiles complete

their flight in even less time. Even though

missiles traveling over ranges of a few hundred

kilometers can be detected by early-warning

radars or space-based infrared sensors early in

their flight, they travel so fast that there is still

very little warning of their arrival. Iraqi Scuds

took about seven minutes to reach Israel, traveling at up to eight times the speed of sound, and

the Israelis had about five minutes’ warning of

their arrival.14 Combat aircraft could cover the

same distance in about a half-hour. However,

when hugging the ground over routes that mask

their approach, they could hide from search radars

and arrive on target with about as little warning as

ballistic missiles.15 Cruise missiles in general are

harder to detect than aircraft because they are

smaller, quieter, and operate at lower skin and

engine temperatures. However, to take as much

advantage from terrain masking as some aircraft

can, they would require advanced guidance systems and accurate geographical information for

planning flight routes.

| Target Acquisition

In the absence of remote, near-real-time reconnaissance capabilities, which are beyond the

capabilities of most states, neither ballistic nor

cruise missiles are suitable for use against mobile

targets. Piloted aircraft would be the only available choice for such missions-and even then,

only for some of them. As noted above, for

example, even a determined coalition aircampaign had great difficulty locating and attacking Iraqi Scud launchers. Delivering chemical or

biological weapons against moving military formations would call for pilot judgment, as might

tactical uses of nuclear weapons. Attacking cities

or fixed military bases with any of these weapons,

however, would not demand precise targetacquisition capabilities.

Piloted aircraft have a clear advantage for

military missions in which it is important to

ascertain quickly that the weapon has been

delivered to a target and detonated. Ballistic

missiles do not provide any such indication, nor

do autonomously guided cruise missiles. A cruise

missile that was guided to its target via data link

to a remote operator could send information (e.g.,

video imagery) indicating whether or not it

arrived at its intended target. But this information

would not necessarily indicate whether the warhead detonated, much less whether the target was

destroyed.16

BALLISTIC MISSILES

| Classification of Missiles

A “ballistic missile” is a rocket-powered

delivery vehicle that has some form of guidance

system, that is primarily intended for use against

ground targets, and that travels a large portion of

its flight in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.

Ballistic missile flight profiles are usually de14 Postol, “LESSom of tie Gulf War Experience with Pahioq ” op. cit., footnote 11, pp. 161-171.

15 S[mford, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation, op. Cit., fOOtnOte 4, p. 43.

16 Airc~[ pilots, too, c~hve difficu]tyrnaking accurate bomb damage assessments. Despite its sophisticated reconnaissmce systems, U.S.

bomb damage assessments during the Persian Gulf War were still incomplete and delayed.
ii—

Table 5-3-Space-Launch Vehicles and Ballistic Missiles With Ranges Over 100 km in Non-MTCR Countries

Producing Missile Range Payload Accuracy Fuel/ imported

countryadesignation Statusb[km] [kg] CEP [m] stages Commentc missiiesd

Countries with indigenous missile programs:

Former

Soviet Uniond

China d

SS-21 (Scarab)

Scud-B (SS-1)

s

s

s?

D

s

s

s

T

s

T

T

P

s

T

T

P

s-?

D-?

D?

s

s?

T?

s-?

T

D120

300

450

1,000

240-300

500-900

300?”

300-600

2,500

smali?

?

?

NA

250?

2,500?

Smaii?

NA

NA

NA

NA

?

?

NA

=1 ,~(j

‘?

?

?

?

NA

solid/1

liquid/1

solid/2

solid/l

IiquicVl

solid/2?

solid/2

solid/2

solid/3

liquid

solid-liq/2

NA

solid/4?

solid/4

liq-solid/4

cryo/solid

liquid/1

solid

solid?/3?

liquid/1

liquid/1

liquid/1 ?

solid

solid/2

1976 IOC

1962 Ioc

1990 Ioc?

—

1971 Ioc

w/France; 1973 IOC

w/France; 1990 IOC

—

SLV; w/France; 1988 IOC

1992 IOC?

w/France, FRG; 1989 test

—

SLV; 1980 IOC

SLV; w/France, FRG

SLV

SLV

like Lance; w/lsrael; 1983 IOC

“Sky Horse”; canceled?

SLV

w/USSR, Egypt?

w/China

w/China

w/U. S.; 1978 IOC

.

M-1 1

M-9

DF-3A (CSS-2)

600

2,500-3,000 2,000

Israel Jericho 1

Jericho ii

Jericho IIB

Shavit

480-650

1,500

2,500

2,500/7,500

250-500

650-I,000?

700?

750/150

Lanc e

f

o

India Prithvi

Agni

"ICBM”

SLV-3

ASLV

PSLV

GSLV

150/250

2,500

5,000

4,000

8,000

14,000

1 ,ooo/5oo

1,000

?

100

150-500?

1,000

2,500

Taiwan Ching Feng

hen Ma

name unknown

100-130

950

[950]?

275-400?

500?

?

FROG-P;

Scud-B (via Egypt)

North Korea

(DPRK)

Scud-B

Scud-C

Nodong-1

340

600

1,000

1,000

500-700

1 ,Ooo?

South Korea NHK-1

Korean SSM

name unknown

180

260

[4,000] SLV; development began

1987

(Continued on next page)
Table 5-3-Space-Launch Vehicles and Ballistic Missiles With Ranges Over 100 km in Non-MTCR Countries—(Continued)

Producing Missile Range Payload Accuracy Fuel/ Imported

country. designation Status b

[km] [kg] CEP [m] stages CommenF mlssiles d

Brazil

Argentina

South Africa

Iraq

(before

Gulf War)

Iran

Orbita MB/EE

Avibras SS-300

MB/EE-350

(MB/EE)?-600

MB/EE-1000

SS-looo

IRBM

Sonda 3

Sonda 4

VLS (Avibras)

Alacran

Condor II

Arniston

RSA-4

Fahd 300/600

A1-Husayn

A1-Hijarah/Abbas

Tammuz-1

(A1-Abid)

Mushak-120

D?

TD.?

D-?

D-7

D-?

P?

s

S?

D?

D

DT

D

D

s

s?

D

s

Mushak-200

Scud-B

“Iran-700”

Tondar-68

D

S?

D?

D

150

300

350

600

1,000

1,200

3,000

80

950

[10,000]

200

900

500-1,500

[10,000]

300/600

600

750-900

2,000

120

200

300

700

1,000

500

1,000

500

500

?

?

?

135

160-500?

100-500?

500-1,000? ?

NA

? ?

150-500? 3,000

1 00-300? 3,000

750? ?

500 ?

500 ? ?

1,000 1,000

? 600?

400? ?

solid/1

liquid/1

solid

solid

solid

solid

solid

solid

solid

solid?/4

Solid/1

solid/2

solid

solid/3

solid/1

liquid/1

liquid/1

liquid/3?

solid/1

solid/1

liquid?/1

?

solid

1991 IOC?

suspended; 1991 IOC?;

MB/EE’s in abeyance

—

—

SS-series in abeyance

—

SR; w/FRG

SR; w/FRG, France

SLV; w/FRG

consortium; 1989 test

canceled 1991; SLV plans?

w/lsrael (Jericho 11?); ’89

test SLV; test planned 1996

— FROG-7; Scud-B

modified Scud-B; 1988 IOC

modified Scud-B; 1990 IOC?

SLV?; w/USSR; December

1989test;clustered booster?

w/China; 1990 IOC? Scud-B&C (from DPRK);

w/China M-9 (negotiations);

w/DPRK; 1984 IOC? Nodong-1 (negotiations)

—

w/China

(Continued on next page)

0
Table 5-3-Space-Launch Vehicles and Ballistic Missiles With Ranges Over 100 km in Non-MTCR Countries-(Continued)

Producing Missile Range Payload Accuracy Fuel/

countrya

designation Statusb[km] [kg] CEP [m] stages Commentc

Imported missilesd

Pakistan Hatf II T 300

Hatf Ill D? 600

Suparco s [300]

name unknown P [1 ,200]

Egypt Scud-B D7 300

Scud-100 D

Vector (Badr- D-? <1 ,200”

2000/Condor II)

Libya Ai-Fatah (also D? 450-900

“Otrag/ittisalt”)

Countries that have only imported missiles:

Saudi Arabia: DF-3A (from China, 1987-1988)

500

500-1,000

?

?

1,000

500

450

?

?

NA

NA

1,000

?

750-900?

solici/2?

solid/1 ?

soiid/2?

soiid/3?

Iiquid/1

iiquid/1

solid/2

liquid

w/France, China; 1988 test M-1 1 (under negotiation)

w/China; staiied?

SR; w/France; China?

SLV

—

w/DPRK

w/Argentina Iraq

Syria FROG-7, SS-21, Scud-B (from USSR); Scud-C (from DPRK); M-9 (negotiations with China)

Yemen: FROG-7; SS-21 ; Scud-B

Afghanistan: Scud-B

Algeria: FROG-7; Scud-B?

Cuba: FROG-7

w/FRG?, Brazil?;

possibly in abeyance

FROG-7;

Scud-B

FROG-7; Scud-B; SS217; M-9 (negotiations)

a ~ntri~ listed WWe not full memkrs of the MTCR as of March 1993. (At that time, however, Argentina was becoming a full member.)

b S: in sew~e. T: tmtiW. D: under development. W-/D-: in abeyance/suspendecVabandoned. P: planned.

C 1~: initial owmt~nal ~pability. SLV: sp~~aun~ veh-~e. SR: sounding rocket. NA: not applicable/available.

d ~1 ~~~list~ ~ imP~~wWe ~t~n~ from the former soviet LJnion except Iran’s, which were obtained from North Korea.

e me missilw list~ for China and the former ~~et Union (wfl~h have both pledg~ to abide by the MTCR export provisions but are not full rnernbers) include only those known of susp~ted

to have been exported to other countries.

f U,S. Lanm (1972 [W): lquid-f~l~, 133_km range, 27$kg pa$~d, 150- m CEP, and Can ~rry d~ter muniti~s. WViet FROG-7 (1965 la): ungukfad, solid-fueled, 6&km rSnge,

450-kg paytoad (perhaps 100 km with lighter payload), 400-m CEP.

The following countries are also able to or have already produced the following short-range missiles (under 100 km):

Argentina (Condor 1-95 krrW365 kg, SR?, abandoned?); Brazil (Astros-11/SS-60 artillery rocket); Egypt (Sakr-8-olid, unguided, copy of FROG-7); India (MBRS); Indonesia

(RX-250-2-stage sounding rocket, with France; MAR); Iran (Oghab-so lid, unguided, 40 km; Nazeat-90 krn/150 kg, solid, w“th China); Iraq (Ababil 50/100; Sajil-60 or Brazil’s

Astros41/SS-60 artillery rocket; Laith-90); Israel (MAR-290/350-solid artillery rockets, up to 90 krn/330 kg); South Korea (U.S. Honest Joh ~Iid, unguided, 40 km); Pakistan (Hatf-1,

with France); Taiwan (U.S. Honest John).

SOURCES: W. Seth Carus, Ba//istkMissi/esin Modern Cor?f/ict(New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 85-90; Arms Corrtro/ ?bday, April 1992, pp. 28-29; U.S. Dept. of Defense, Cotict of the Persian

Gu/f War: /%a/@xwtto Congress, Pursuant to Title Vof the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25), A@ 1992, p. 16; John

W. Lewis and Hua Di, ‘f China’s Ballistic Missile Programs,” /nferrrationa/ Security, vol. 17, No. 2,fall 1992, p. 11; Janne Nolan, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International

Security and science, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mar. 3, 1992; Duncan Lennox, ad., Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems (Surrey, U. K.: Jane’s Information Group, 1990), Issues O-7,

1990-Jan. 7, 1992, and Jane’s Defense Weekly, Jan. 11, 1992, p. 50, June 6, 1992, p. 996, and Jan. 23, 1993, p. 18; Aaron Karp, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” 14brki Armaments and

Disarmament: SIPR/ Yearbook 1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991 );and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, WoddMi/itary Expenditures andArms Transfers, 1988/89,

pp. 18-19.

N

o

o
Chapter 5–The Proliferation of Delivery Systems 1211

scribed in terms of three phases: the boost phase,

in which the propulsion system generates thrust;

the midcourse phase, in which the missile coasts

in an arc under the influence of gravity; and the

terminal phase, in which the missile experiences

strong decelerating forces during its descent into

the atmosphere. Missiles with ranges under 300

km remain in the atmosphere for their entire

trajectory (and travel slower than longer range

missiles), thus reducing the abruptness of the

reentry transition. 17 In this chapter, all ranges

refer ‘minimum-energy trajectories, ’ which maximize the range available to a given missile.18

Although unguided rockets, such as the Soviet

FROG-5, the U.S. Honest John, and the Iranian

Oghab rockets, maybe useful in some battlefield

situations, they will not be considered here,

primarily because their ranges are generally much

less than 100 km even with small payloads.

Similarly, rocket-assisted artillery, surface-to-air,

air-to-air, and air-to-surface missiles are not

included in this analysis.

A functional ballistic missile must (i) employ

a propulsion system to provide thrust (ii) have a

guidance and control system to direct its thrust

(iii) carry a useful payload, and (iv) be supported

by some sort of launcher, e.g., a freed gantry, a

mobile truck-mounted erector-launcher, or a silo.

The missile and its payload must be designed to

withstand the mechanical and thermal stresses

involved in launch and final approach to a target.

For missiles with ranges substantially greater

than about 400 km, the final approach involves

reentering the atmosphere from space at very high

speeds, causing intense heating, deceleration, and

the possibility of strong lateral forces. The

difficulty of designing missiles for a given

payload therefore increases dramatically with

range and level of accuracy.

Missiles are characterized in terms of several

key parameters. The most fundamental of these

are the missile’s range and payload, Payload is

defined as the mass of the warhead(s) or other

useful material (not counting the empty booster

canister, for instance) that the missile can deliver

at a given range. Within certain limits, payload

can be traded off against range. (The same is true

for aircraft and cruise missiles.) Accuracy refers

to the likelihood that the payload will be delivered

to within a certain distance of an intended target.

There are both systematic and random contributions to inaccuracy, but in many cases the random

errors are more important. Random errors are

quantified by the Circular Error Probable (CEP),

which defines the radius of a circle on the ground

into which half of a large number of identical

missiles launched along the same intended trajectory would fall.19 Missiles are also characterized

in terms of their number of propulsion stages, or

sequentially firing boosters.

I Status of Missile Proliferation

Table 5-3 illustrates the existing or developing

missile programs in countries that were not full

members of the MTCR as of March 1993, as

reported in public sources. (For China and the

former Soviet Union, only missiles known or

suspected to have been exported to other countries are included.) Since the sources for this

table contain substantial variance and uncer1’7 me limit of the tangible atmosphere OCCUrS at approximately 100 km altitude (below which the lighter and heavier airmokdes ae neafly

uniformly mixed). At 100 km altitude, air density and pressure are roughly one millionth of their values at the Earth’s surface.

18 Shofierrages ~esu]t when ~ssilc~ me launched at angles ei~er closer to tie horizon~ Or closer to tie vticd than the Illklklllm-energy

launch angle. Such trajectories are called ‘‘depressed’ or “lofted.”

19 CEP does not tie into account either launch failures or the systematic errors associated with mis-aiming tie missile in tie fist PIWX,

called the ‘‘bias. ’ The CEP is also a median, rather than a mm it does not predict how@ outside the circle the other half of the missiles

will land. (For instance, some of Iraqi Scuds fired toward Israel during the Persian Gulf War landed quite far from intended targets or in the

Mediterranean Sea.) Furthermore, in practice the expected miss-distance is usually elongated in the downrange directio~ leading to an elliptical

rather than circular error pattern. Therefore, even ignoring the bias, the CEP gives only a rough indication of the likelihood that a missile will

hit an intended target.
212 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 5-4-Ballistic Missile Production Capabilities

Category Description Countries

Advanced Able to design and produce missiles India Israei, and possibly Taiwan

comparable to those produced in the

United States in the mid-1960s (e.g.,

ICBM-range ballistic missiles and spacelaunch vehicles)n

Intermediate Able to reverse-engineer, introduce Brazil, North Korea South Korea,

changes to, and manufacture Scud-ilke and possibly Argentina and South

missiles, and to make solid-propellant Africa

short-range missiles

Incipient some capability to modify existing Scuds, Egypt, Iran, Iraq (before the Perbut little else sian Gulf War), and Pakistan

No indigenous No missile design or manufacturing capa- Afghanistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia,

capability bility, but have imported missiles with Syria, Yemen, and possibly Algeranges above 100 km ria and Cuba

a ~mpara~e ca@uHy, however, refers primarily to the design and assembly capability of large soiid-pmpellant

motors, and does not imply U.S. levels of manufacturing capadty.

SOURCE: Stanford Llniversity, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Assessing Ba//istic Missi/e

Proliferation and /ts C:ontro/(Stanford, CA: Stanford University, November 1991), p. 153.

tainties in reporting the status or specifications

of some missile programs, a range of estimates

is indicated where appropriate.

Table 5-3 shows that 13 non-MTCR countries

(not counting China and the former Soviet Union)

may have indigenous missile-development programs for ballistic missiles exceeding 100 km in

range. Only two of these, however—Israel and

India-have demonstrated capability sufficient

for indigenous design and production of multistage missiles.20 Another six countries have

imported missiles but have virtually no capability

to develop or manufacture them. Most of the

imported missiles have come from the former

Soviet Union-Scud-Bs, FROG-7s, and some

SS-21s—and many of them were obtained more

than a decade ago. More recently, however, China

has exported 2,500-km range DF-3s and possibly

M-9s and M-lls, and North Korea has exported

Scud-Cs. According to one analysis, the 19

countries mentioned above fall roughly into four

categories, which are described in table 5-4.21

Indigenous capability is only one factor affecting missile proliferation. In the past, countries

have been able to enhance their missile capabilities substantially from what they could have done

XI Wwm ~50 hm relatively ad~~ced aerosp~e industrial capability, but its ballistic-missile and space-launch pro-(other ~ work

on satellite vehicles themselves) have largely been on hold for many years.

21 ~ew ~tegorifiom, as we[l as the framework for evaluating indigenous capability, were developed in the Stanford report, Assessing

Ballistic Missile Proliferation, op. cit., footnote4, p. 153. Study methodology for that report included preparing detailed proffles for 17 subject

proliferant countries that surveyed national, geographical, economic, and regime parameters, current conflicts and recent history, military

posture, and the record of ballistic: missile acquisition. See Ballistic Missile Proli$erarion Study Country Profiles, Center for International

Security and Arms Control (CISAC), Stanford University, July 1990 (unpublished). The study participants also examined technical features

of missiles deployed or under development in the subject countries, along with key technologies needed for indigenous production. Many of

the study participants have close ties to missile and aircraft development and production in both private industry and government. Principal

authors (affiliated with CISAC unless indicated otherwise) were John Barker (Graham& James), Michael Ellernan (CISAC and Lockheed),

John Harvey, and Uzi Rubin. Other study participants were: Ronald Beaver, David Bernste@ Hua Di, Phil Farley, IAwis Franklin (CISAC

and TRW, Inc.), Susan Lindheim, Michael McFaul, and William Perry.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 213

on their own by importing missiles or advanced

components, or by participating in joint ventures

(e.g., between Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq to

develop the Condor II missile). However, since

the MTCR has restricted many of the outside

sources of cooperation and assistance on missile

development, indigenous capability has become

more important for most countries of proliferation

concern.

To understand the problem of missile proliferation more fully, trends in these capabilities must

also be taken into account. According to at least

two estimates, most of the countries in the top

three categories of capability could advance upward in the list by about one category during the

next decade, placing Israel, India, Taiwan, South

Korea, Brazil, and possibly North Korea and

South Africa in the “Advanced” category, and

Pakistan, Iran, Argentina, and Egypt in the “Intermediate” category. 22 Assuming continuation of

constraints imposed by U.N. Resolution 687 on

Iraq’s weapon programs, Iraq would be the only

country remaining in the ‘‘Incipient’ category.

If countries are willing to dedicate sufficient

resources to their missile programs, most of

these advances in capability could occur even

under a well-functioning MTCR. MTCR constraints, however, can significantly increase

development costs, helping to convince leaders

that the benefits are not worth the expense. The

ballistic-missile programs in Brazil and South

Africa for instance, may well not advance significantly, in part because of increased costs. (Brazil’s

diminishing export market and the decline in the

threat that South Africa perceives itself to face

may also be playing a large role.) Furthermore,

largely because of diplomatic efforts by the

United States since the 1970s, Taiwan and South

Korea do not appear to be aggressively pursuing

either ballistic-missile or space-launch programs

at the present time, although they would have the

technological capability to do so if they chose.

Even if such advances did take place, a large

gap would remain between the capabilities of

most of these nations and what would be needed

to strike the United States. According to then-CIA

Director Robert Gates, “Only China and the

Commonwealth of Independent States have the

missile capability to reach U.S. territory directly.

We do not expect increased risk to U.S. territory

from the special weapons of other countries-in

a conventional military sense-for at least another decade. . . .’ ’23 Among the handful of countries with both the technological capability and

the resources to develop long range ballistic

missiles over the next decade, few if any would

likely have the intent to target the United States.

| Missile Propulsion Technologies

The engineering fundamentals of rocket propulsion systems are well documented in standard

texts.24 In theory, there are few secrets involved

in basic missile design. In practice, however,

considerable expertise is required to integrate the

various aspects of a ballistic missile into a

militarily useful device.

Two kinds of chemical propulsion technologies—solid and liquid fuel-are widely used in

ballistic missiles. Both rely on b urning a fuel at

high temperatures and expelling the hot combustion gases out the back of the engine. Whereas

aircraft and many cruise missiles use oxygen in

the atmosphere to burn the fuel they carry,

ballistic missiles are unable to do so and must

22 s~ord, Assessing Ballistic Missile Prol.iferution, op. cit., footnote 4, p. 154; and Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat

(Arlington, VA: System Planning Corp., 1992) p. 28, Some reports indicate that Iran may have already moved into the “intermediate” category

with indigenous production or assembly of Scud-B missiles. See, for example, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., ‘ ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third

World—Iran’s Medium Range Missiles, ’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1992, pp. 147-152.

23 ~s~ony of then CIA dirmtor Robert Gates, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Jm. 15, 1992, P. 3.

~ See, for ex~ple, Gmrge P. Sutton and Donald M. Ross, Rocket Propulsion Elements: An Introduction to the Engineering CIf Rockets,

6th edition (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1992).
214 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

carry their own oxidizer.25 In liquid-fueled boosters, the oxidizer is usually kept separate fromthe

fuel and mixed with it only in the final combustion chamber. In solid ‘boosters, the oxidizer is

contained in the propellant mixture. Regardless of

the fuel type, however, ballistic missiles generally reach much higher speeds than other kinds of

delivery vehicles with comparable payloads. Even

100-km range missiles, which remain in the

atmosphere, typically strike their targets at approximately the speed of sound (330 rn/see, or

740 mph), and 1,000-km missile warheads are

only slowed by the atmosphere from 3 km/see to

about 1 km/sec (2,200 mph).26

LIQUID-FUELED PROPULSION

A country that operates chemical processing

facilities would likely also be able to manufacture

fuel and at least crude components for short range

liquid-fueled missiles such as Scuds. Although

many liquid fuels are physically hazardous due to

their corrosive, explosive, carcinogenic, and toxic

properties, several types are already in use by

about a dozen developing countries.27

Liquid-fueled engines more powerful than

those found in Scuds, however, are correspondingly harder to build (figure 5-2 shows a schematic diagram of a liquid-fueled engine). Substantially greater experience is required in the

design and manufacture of their components,

including precision valves, injectors, pumps,

turbines, and combustion chambers-many of

which would call for numerically controlled

machine tools or highly skilled machinists to

fabricate. The added difficulties include: the

design and fabrication of larger components with

Figure 5-2-Schematic Diagram of a

Liquid-Propellant Rocket Engine

Tank pressurization

valve

(nfi Fuel Oxidizer

tank tank

YOxidizer

pump

I

q-y , Turbine

,

, v.Jives \ generator ~

ii‘7! K-\-- - — — >

/

c~>d~ Heat -/ exchanger

LJ

Thrust ‘JJ Exhaust

chamber

I I

duct -—

t

Exhaust

nozzle

SOURCE: George P. Sutton and Donald M. Roes, F&#@ Prupu/sion

Elements, 5th edition (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1986).

Copyright @ 1986 by John Wiiey & Sons, Inc. Reprinted by permission

of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

~ Bwistic ~si.les carry their own oxidizers both to help reach the speeds needed for long range ballistic trajectories and because oxygen

becomes too scarce at high altitudes. Propulsion systems that scoop up external air (called “air breathers’ ’)-except for more sophisticated

technologies, such as high-speed mmjets and scramjekare much more limited in the speeds they can achieve. Note, however, that short range

air-launched cruise missiles, for example, can also be rocket-powered and can be designed to achieve supersonic speeds as well.

26 See Jumgen AI- SDIforEUrOpe.7 Techm”calAspects ofAnti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Defenses, Peace Research Institute Fr_

Research Report 3/1988, Septem&x 1988, pp. 27-28.

z? co~o~y used fuels include hydmzine and unsymmetrical dimethyl hydraz.ine (UDMH), which are burned using the oxidizers nitrogen

tetroxide or inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA). Scuds, for instance, use UDMH and IRFNA. Readily available liquid fuels that can also

be used in rockets include gasoline, kerosene, ethyl alcohol, and liquid ammonia.
Chapter 5–The Proliferation of Delivery Systems I 215

Figure 5-3—Schematic Diagram of a Solid-Propellant Rocket Engine

Motor case Nozzle

I

v /

(“

~~

$

Ignder > Center bore

Propellant grain F

/

\

Stress rellef groove

Flex joint

SOURCE: Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, Assessing Ba//istic A.4issi/e

Proliferation andks Corrfro/(Stanford, CA: Stanford University, November 1991), p. 136. Reprinted by permission of

Stanford University.

tighter tolerances; greater cooling requirements

for engine parts exposed to high-temperature

combustion gases; and more rigorous requirements for combustion stability, in order to avoid

dangerous flow oscillations during thrust.

Moreover, to avoid gross inaccuracies, liquidfueled engines capable of delivering sufficient

thrust to deliver a 500 kg payload more than 1,000

to 1,500 km must employ a much more complex

system of valves, pressurizers, flow-control meters, and actuators than are needed for less

powerful engines, to control and terminate the

thrust precisely. If lesser quality components are

substituted, for example, from (dual-use) chemicalmanufacturing or petrochemical-industry equipment, their poor performance might require development of a post-boost vehicle—a final stage

capable of course corrections-to achieve even

modest (several-kilometer) accuracies.28 This would

present an entirely new set of design problems.

In order to design these larger engines, many

well-trained and experienced combustion scientists, chemical engineers, heat transfer specialists,

and experts in fluid mechanics and mechanical

design would be required, along with a wellfunded, multiyear research and development program. Because of the similarity between some

aircraft and missile components and the types of

machining required to produce or maintain them,

experience with aircraft maintenance facilities

and especially with production, assembly, and

rebuilding of jet engines might be very helpful in

this regard.29

SOLID-FUELED PROPULSION

Although conceptually simpler than liquidfueled missiles and involving almost no moving

parts, solid-fueled missiles require years of practical experience to design and develop successfully, to learn how to manufacture safely, and to

make accurate (figure 5-3 shows a schematic

diagram of a solid-fueled booster). In addition to

the advantage many proliferant countries have by

already possessing liquid-fueled Scuds or their

variants, the technology behind liquid-fueled

engines can more easily be ‘‘reverse engineered’

than can solid-fueled boosters. Taking apart

‘2S For Cxmple, a valve that shut off 0.25 seconds too late at bum-out (when a 1,000-km range mksile might be accelera~g at 100 ~sm2)

would lead to a vcloeity error of 25 m/see and about a 17-km overshoot at the target. (Range is roughly proportional to the bum-out velocity

squared, and bum-out velocity is about 3 Ian/see at 1,00@krn range.)

29 Stanford, AsXe.T.Ting Ballistic Missile Proliferation, op. Cit., footnote 4, p. 135.
216 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

someone else’s solid missiles reveals little about

the processes by which they were put together.

The performance of liquid engines can be studied

in detail by refueling and retesting them on static

test stands, including partial throttle or early

termination of thrust if problems develop during

a test. The performance of solid motors, on the

other hand, is heavily dependent on the way the

solid fuel is cast into the particular missile, and

once fired, it is almost impossible to stop the

burning fuel in the middle of the test. If a solid

motor fails on the test stand, there may be no

recoverable data from which to try and correct the

problem, and it might not even be clear if the

problem was generic to the design or specific to

the missile being tested. Even replicating the

failure mode of such a test can be exceedingly

difficult.30 When launched, solid-fueled motors

also require sophisticated thrust-termination mechanisms or computer-controlled maneuvers to use

up excess propellant while remaining fixed on a

given target; their burning fuel cannot be shut off

simply by closing a valve.31

Since solid-fueled motors can be transported

and stored with the propellant intact, and readied

for launch much more quickly than their liquidfueled counterparts, they offer operational and

tactical advantages over liquid-fueled missiles.

Many solid propellants from the 1950s and 1960s

are well understood both theoretically and practically, and enough has been published about them

to make this information easily available. Once

the practical aspects of manufacturing solidfueled missiles are mastered, far fewer components need be assembled, and production is

consequently more straightforward. Hence, about

a half dozen countries appear to be focusing their

missile development programs primarily on solidfueled technology.

Indigenous manufacture of steel motor cases,

while requiring well-trained metallurgists and a

moderately sophisticated steel treatment facility

for rolling, forming, and welding chambers,

would not present much difficulty for countries

with metallurgical experience from manufacturing ships, oil pipelines, or oil-drilling equipment.32 Very large chambers for intermediate-or

long range missiles would require more sophisticated metal-working capabilities than typically

found in these industries, however, because of the

high temperatures and pressures they would have

to withstand.33

The most challenging aspect of manufacturing

solid-propellant motors involves safely preparing, ing, and casting the entire propellant—

called the “grain”—into the missile case. For

small motors and short range missiles, this is

relatively simple. But as the motor size increases,

preparing and casting a uniformly structured,

well-bonded propellant grain can become problematic.

Preparing the mixture itself is not significantly

harder than other chemical processes involving

explosives. The oxidizer crystals must be ground

to the proper size in a controlled environment and

then carefully analyzed for impurities that could

upset subsequent manufacturing steps or burning

characteristics. The propellant ingredients consist

of relatively dense solid particles suspended in a

much-less dense liquid plastic material called a

“matrix.” To improve their structural, manufacturing, and burning properties, solid-propellant

grains employ mixtures of crystalline oxidizers

and powdered metal fuel in a plastic matrix that

~ C. Robert DieW, senior missile designer (retired), LQckheed Missiles and Space CO., private ~mmUniUtiOq Dec. 8, 1W2.

31 me fonvard thrust of solid-fueled boosters can be cutoff by blowhg out thrust-tti tionports at the top of the booster, but this technique

is relatively sensitive to error. Some missiles, such as the Indian Agni missile and certain space-launch vehicles, employ a combination of solid

and liquid boosters to exploit the relative advantages of each.

32 Stiord, Assessing Ballisti,z Missile Proliferation, op. Cit., footnote 4, p. 135.

33 Some motor ~ses me fa~<:ated out of fiber-re~o~ composi@ ~te~, a tec~ology CWTenfly aVtirible to modtiately ~Vindustrial countries. The United States was employiag woven spun fiberglass in the third stage of the Minuteman II missiles by the early 1%0s.
... .

Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 217

usually contains precise amounts of curing agents,

catalysts, plasticizers, burn-rate modifiers, and

processing aids. These ingredients must be combined in a specially designed large batch mixer to

achieve uniformity of the propellant, a task that

can be likened to producing a uniform mixture of

sand and honey. Mixing is inherently dangerous,

however, since accidents can cause large fries or

explosions; a mixing blade that scrapes any

surface can cause sparks that would ignite the

fuel.

The mixture must then quickly be cast into the

missile case and allowed to harden and cure.

Extreme care must be taken during casting to

ensure proper bonding of the propellant grain to

the case wall and to avoid the formation of cracks

or voids. Such imperfections can expose additional surface areas within the propellant, causing

it to burn erratically or reach the wall prematurely,

resulting in catastrophic failure of the motor. In

addition, the larger the motor, the more susceptible solid propellants are to the formation of cracks

due to repeated changes in temperature.

Proper grain design is also important. Its

hollow cross-sectional shape determines the amount

of surface area burning at any time, thus influencing the rate of burn, the internal pressure, and thus

the motor’s thrust. Design trade-offs must be

made between minimizing the change in chamber

pressure during the burn, on the one hand, and

avoiding excessively rapid acceleration at the end

of the bum when the missile is lightest, on the

other; too much of one or the other would put

undue stress on the missile casing. During boost,

the grain must also withstand extremely high

temperatures, pressures, and stresses of acceleration. As solid motors become larger, their engineering and fabrication therefore become increasingly more difficult.

To verify their integrity and proper structure,

solid motors are inspected after their manufacture

by nondestructive methods such as x-rays, ultraBlades of a highly specialized Iraqi solid-fuel rocket

propellant mixer being destroyed under the authority

of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 during an

inspection in 1992. Such mixers are used to prepare

the fuel before casting it into the missile housing.

sound, and thermal imaging. (The equipment

required for manufacturing a typical advanced

solid motor is given in table 5-5.) Skipping these

inspections would exact a price in terms of lower

reliability.

| Obtaining Missile Technology

PURCHASE

Until the 1980s, the majority of ballistic

missiles sold or traded were related to the original

liquid-fueled Soviet Scud-B, with at least eight

developing countries obtaining Soviet Scuds

directly-Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North

Korea, Syria, and North and South Yemen (which

have since united) .34 Notably, all of the indigenous missile programs in the developing world

that did not receive Scud missiles from the Soviet

Union appear to have primarily (though not

exclusively) pursued solid-fuel technology for

their more advanced programs. These include

Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Israel, South Korea

34 Scverd of thes~s~, Yemeu and possibly Libyt+-also obtained the more accurate @ut shorter We) solid-fueled SS-21. S= @ble

5-3 and sources therein.
218 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 5-5-Typical Equipment for Processing

Composite Solid Propellants

Process Typical equipment

Reducing oxidizer crystal

size and blending

Mixing

Casting

Fabricating fiber-reinforced

cases or nozzles

Inspecting to detect voids

or unbended areas

Transferring components

within the plant

Hammer mills; micropulverizers; fluid energy mills; sieves,

screens, rotary dryers

Automatic 2-or 3-bladed rotary

vertical mixers

Coated mandrels; bells; spouts

Automatic filament-winding machine

X-ray or ultrasound equipment;

thermal imaging; manipulators

Special vehicles or trailers for

semi-finished motors and mixedpropellant slurry

SOURCE: Adapted from Tom Morgan, former group leader for counterproliferation and delivery vehicle systems, Lawrence Uvermore National Laboratory, presentation at SDIO Missile Proliferation Conference, System Planning Corporation, Rosslyn, VA, Apr. 4-10, 1992.

Pakistan, South Africa, and Taiwan. No Soviet

Scud recipients appear to have successfully developed solid-fueled missiles with anywhere near

comparable range to their liquid-fueled missiles,

except possibly Egypt.35

Although the Soviet Union was the main

supplier of ballistic missiles to the Third World,

some secondary suppliers and traders of missiles

and missile technology have emerged.36 These

include: North Korea, which received Sovietbuilt Scuds from Egypt, sold indigenously built

Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs to Iran and Syria, and

appears to be in the process of selling 1,000-km

Nodong I missiles to Iran as well; Libya, which

trans-shipped Soviet-built Scud-Bs to Iran and

North Korea; Israel, which reportedly transferred

Lance missiles to Taiwan and Jericho missile

technology to South Africa; Argentina, Egypt,

and Iraq, who banded together in an unsuccessful

effort to develop the Condor II missile; Brazil,

which in the past has engaged in attempts to

develop and sell missiles to a number of countries, including Libya and Iraq; and China.37

North Korean and Chinese behavior regarding

missile sales have been particularly troubling to

the West, since both have long resisted calls to

exercise restraint. China has maintained that the

sale of missiles does not qualitatively differ from

sales by the West of high-technology jet fighters

to countries in the same regions. Nevertheless, by

the end of 1991 China had agreed in principle to

abide by the provisions of the MTCR and largely

accepted the West’s judgment that both its M-9

and M- 11 missiles exceeded the MTCR’s 300-km/

500-kg threshold.38

Before this apparent change in policy, Chinese

missile sales and technical assistance had added

noticeably to missile capabilities in the Middle

East and elsewhere. In 1988, China sold to Saudi

Arabia about 30 to 50 liquid-fueled 3,000-km

DF-3A missiles (called CSS-2 by the United

States). These missiles have the longest range by

far of any sold to a Third World country.

35 ~ addition to pmducing be solid-fuelti Sakr-80 (a copy of the Soviet FROG-7, an unguided missile with range less w100 km), Egypt

participated in the now-abandoned consortium with Argentina and Iraq to develop the two-stage solid-fueled Condor 1/ missile with

approximately 1,000-km range.

36 ~ tie PMC tie u~t~ s~te:s ~ppli~ ~nce and Honesr.lohn missiles to Israel and South Korea, respectively, but siQce tie 197~ ~

transferred missiles only to NATC) allies, and even these have had signifkant restrictions attached. The 1987 INF Treaty further constrained

both U.S. and Soviet missile transfers. In 1991, Russia pledged to abide by the MTCR guidelines.

37 -Pies ~ ~s ~MWph l~en fimw. Seti tis,Ba/lisdc Missiles in Modern Conflict (New York: meger, 1991), PP. 14.18, ~

21; and Douglas Jehl, “Iran is Reported Ac@ring Missiles,’ New York Times, April 8, 1993, p. A9.

38 me pledge by china to abide by the MTCR was made at the end of 1991 during a trip by then-Secretary of State Jwes A. Btier, ~.

During congressional testimony in February 1992, Baker said tbat China’s pledge was “a very substantial and significant step forward, if they

will adhere to their commitment. If they don’t. . sanctions [on high-sped computers and satellite parts] will go right back on. ” In August

1993, the United States found that China had in fact violated its commitment to observe MTCR constraints, and announced that sanctions-yet

to be deterrnined-would be imposed. (See Stephen A. Holmes, ‘‘U.S. Determines China Violated Pact on Missiles,’ New York Times, Aug.

2s, 1993, p. 1).
. .

Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 219

Although the DF-3’s accuracy is among the worst

in the Middle East (CEP of over 2 km), these

missiles have placed the entire Middle East and

parts of the former Soviet Union within reach of

Saudi Arabia. Chinese technical assistance has

also played a significant role in the missile

programs of North Korea, Iran, Brazil, and

Pakistan.

According to various reports, certain German

firms in the past have also provided technical

assistance to missile programs in Argentina,

Brazil, Egypt, India, Iraq, and Libya, and French

and Italian firms have helped with aspects of

programs in Argentina, Egypt, India, and PakiStan.39

More recently, however, several countries that

had exported missile technology have been curtailing their assistance to foreign missile programs, and some are even becoming members of

the MTCR. For instance, with the demise of its

Condor || missile program, Argentina agreed to

abide by the provisions of the MTCR in May,

1991, as did the Soviet Union one month later. As

of March 1993, Argentina was in the process of

becoming a full member of the MTCR, and Brazil

may be considering joining. Each of these countries has had a history of either supplying missiles

to developing countries or collaborating in missile programs with them. The only state said by

the United States to be exporting MTCR-covered

missiles today is North Korea. However, in light

of China’s reported export of M-11 missile

launchers to Pakistan in 1991 and the more recent

U.S. finding that China has violated its MTCR

commitments, it remains to be seen whether or

how well China will uphold the export constraints

dictated by the MTCR.40

A metal-rolling mill+me example of the type of

multipurpose equipment that can be associated with

ballistic missile production. This and other missilerelated equipment in Iraq were destroyed under U.N.

auspices in 1992.

EXPERTISE REQUIRED FOR INDIGENOUS

DEVELOPMENT

Short range missiles

Reproducing, reverse engineering, modifying,

and launching short range missiles does not

require a particularly complex or expensive

infrastructure. Many countries that would have

great difficulty assembling a well-trained group

of technical, operational, and tactical specialists

needed to field an effective air force could still

deploy a significant missile force.41 (See box

5-A.)

The V-2 missile, designed and used extensively by the Germans during World War II,

provides a baseline against which more sophisticated ballistic missiles can be compared. The V-2

was the frost operational version of a class of

ballistic missiles that led to the Soviet-designed

39 see, for example, CarUS, Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conj7ict op. cit., footnote 37, pp. 22-23.

@ See, for ex~ple, Jim - ‘‘Ctia Said to Sell Pakistan Dangerous New Missiles, ’ Los Angeles Times, Dec. 4, 1992, p. Al; and Ann

Devroy and R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Evidence ‘Suggests’ China Breaks with Arms Pact+” Washington Post, May 18, 1993, p. A9.

41 ~w=d N Lut~~ foreword to CarUS, Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conflict, Op. cit., foomote 37* P. ‘ii.
220 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Box 5-A-Iraq’s Missile Programs

Of those countries that have imported Scud missiles in the past, only North Korea and Iraq appear to have

been successful at modifying and extending their range. North Korea has reportedly done so by a process called

“reverse engineering”: disassembling the missiles, learning how to manufacture or modify their parts, and

manufacturing new missiles.1 Iraq extended the range of its Scuds by taking sections from one missile’s fuel and

oxidizer tanks and splicing them into other missiles. In this way, three missiles were cannibalized to make two

longer range ones.2

By mid-1990, Iraq possessed the Soviet-supplied *d-B missile (300-km range, 1-km CEP) @US two

indigenous variants-the Al-Husayn(600-km range, 3-km CEP) and the Al-Hijarah(75O-km range, unknown CEP,

also called Al-Abbas-ali capable of carrying conventional or chemical warheads. Al-Husayn and Al-Hijarah

missiles, each about two meters Ionger than the original 1 l-meter Scud-Bs, were Iaunched toward targets in Israel

and Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War. From their launcher complexes, these missiles were capable of

reaching Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Israel’s nuclear facility at Dimona in the Negev desert.3

Despite the existence of a missile manufacturing center, however, it is likely that Iraq would still have required

foreign assistance to fabricate precision missile components such as fuel-injector plates, turbo pumps, and

guidance systems.4 Since Iraq is known to have been importing many components and receiving foreign technical

assistance for its missile (as well as other weapon) programs, it is uncertain whether it could have manufactured

even a Scud-type missile completely on its own at the time of the Persian Gulf War.

1 J-s.~rm~z, Jr., c4B~IiwG Ambitions Ascendant: North Korea’s ~iiStic Missile Pro9ram~ is a

Threat to be Reckoned With,” Jw?e’s l%tbnce 14@ek/y, Apr. 10,1993, p. 20-22. Although Egypt and Libya have also

both worked on developing 300 to 700 km one-stage liquid-fueled missiles, and Egypt was invoived in the Contif

//program, nothing isknowntohavebeen fietded so farfromtheseprograms. See, forexampie, Bermudez, “Ballistic

Missile Development in Egypt,” Jane’s /nfe//@n# Rev/ew, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

2 W. ~th Cams and Jo~@ S. Ber~~z Jr., “iraq’s ‘Ai-Husayn’ Missile Programmed,” Jane’s Soviet

/nte//@nce Review, vol. 2, No. 5, May, 1980, p. 205. Uquid-fueled missiles Iendthemselves to this teohnique, since

the engines do not haveto change appreciably to accommodate Iargerarnounts of propellant and Iongerburn-times.

3 U.S.~~ ~fen=, ~~~t ~fthe P~s@ Gu/f War: ~n~~~rf to Congress, Pursuant to Title V of

the Persian Gulf Confllct Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Pub! lcLaw102-25), April

1992, p. 16. Note that many sources cdl the second modification of the Scud-B the A/-Abbas, and claim a range of

900 km. Such a dismpancy could easily be explained by a difference in payload.

4 Tom Morgan, former group leader for counterprollferation and delivery vehicle S@3mS, k~en~

Uvermore Natjonal Laboratory, private communication, Dec. 20,1992.

Scud. Its characteristics are summarized in table more complex. Expertise is therefore a key

5-6.

As missile range increases from under 1,000

km to 2,500 to 5,000 km, there are generally at

least two principal hurdles: manufacturing the

larger propulsion systems needed to achieve the

higher velocities required for longer range, and

designing missiles with more than one stage.42

Ensuring stable fuel combustion and flight characteristics while in the atmosphere also become

ingredient in developing long range missiles—

especially having access to engineers and technicians skilled in the areas of subsystem integration,

testing, and production methods (see table 5-7 for

one estimate of the personnel and time required)

According to one experienced U.S. missile designer, a considerable amount of ‘art” is always

involved, especially for more sophisticated designs. Specifications and documentation can4Z M&tiorMI desi~ problems lue Caused by heating of the missile skirL the internal components, the propelhm~ and the reen@y vehicle m

a result of air friction at higher velocities.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 221

View from the muzzle end (top) of the Iraqi

‘‘supergun,” which Iraq installed and tested at Jabal

Harmayn, some 200 kilometers north of Baghdad.

Using the experience gained from modifying Scuds, Iraq had also built and launched

a prototype of a crude space-launch vehicle

named the Al-Abid, and claimed that it had

developed a 2,000-km range ballistic missile

named Tammuz using similar technology.5

Iraq’s “Project Babylon’’-not a missile itself,

but a program to develop a specialized 1,000

mm-bore launcher or “Supergun’’-was partially impeded by a British customs seizure of

parts and by the murder of Gerald Bull, its

principal designer. The supergun was being

designed to fire guided rockets with conventional, chemical, or possibly nuclear warheads

hundreds of miles.6 A 350-mm research

prototype had been completed and test- fired

from a site about 120 miles north of Baghdad?

5 The prototype missile appeared to have three stages. The first consisted of engines in an indigenously built

airframe (e.g., possibly dustered boosters). The second and third stages used for testing were Inert but were

inoluded for their weight and aerodynamic effects. See, for example, U.S. Dept. of Defense, Conduct of the Persian

Gulf War, op. cit., footnote 3, p. 20.

6 U*SO Dept. of ~fense, ~~~uc~of~~e Per@an Gulf ~r, op. d~, footnote 3, p, n. Note, however, that if

such a missile launcher was intended to use guh%d rookets, nntch of its advantage would be lost (sinoe the

projectile’s ultimate accuracy would still depend on Its onboard guidance system), while it would subjeot the entire

projectiletoextreme acceieratkmsnotexperlenoed innormat mlsslletrajectorles. The’’ Super Gun” may have Indeed

been better suited for placing small payloads into orbit, a task requiring less aoouracythan attacking ground targets.

C. Robert Dietz, senior missile designer (retired), lakheed Missiles and Space Co., private communication, Dec.

8, 1992. See aiso, Brigadier K.A. Timbers, “Iraq: Supergun-A Complex Matter,” Army Qwrtedy and Defense

Journal, vol. 22, April 1992, p. 149.

7 IJ.S. Dept. of Defense, Conduct of the Pers/an Gu/f war, oP. Cit., fOOtnOtO 3, p. 20.

not substitute for first-hand experience in regulations to weapon systems co-produced with

ballistic-missile design and manufacture.43

Nevertheless, foreign expertise in missile development has been widely available in the past.

Countries such as Germany and Italy, even

though members of the MTCR, had not sought

until recently to restrict individual citizens from

assisting with missile projects in developing

countries.44 Germany had not applied its export

a foreign firm, or to dual-use components, technologies, or manufacturing capabilities. Although

recent changes in German export control law now

forbid this type of assistance, the breakup of the

Soviet Union may lead to additional new sources

of expertise.45

Before the advent of the MTCR, other major

powers also engaged in a variety of cooperative

43 C. Robert Die~, senior tissile designer (retired), Imckheed Missiles and Space CO., private COmmunimtio% D=. 8, 1992.

44 u,S. Gene~ ~cou~g O&Ice, U.S. Eflo~~ t. Control the Transfer of Nuclear-capable Missile Technology, Repofl tO &Xl. DeCOnCini

(NSIAD-9(L176, June 1, 1990), p. 17.

45 one ~cident ~ Octoba 1992 fllu~~a~g ~ese potenti~ ris~ involved RUsSi~ au~orities Stopping m RUSSkl el@eerS ad t&hniCiilIls

from departing to North Korea, reportedly to help with the latter’s missile programs.
222 | Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 5-6-Characteristics of the

German V-2 Missile

Range

Warhead

Weight

Maximum altitude

Impact velocity

Propellant

Guidance and control

First tested

World War II usage

240-300 km

1,000 kg high-explosive (conventional) warhead

12,900 kg fully fueled (twice that of

the Scud); 4,000 kg empty

80 km

0.8 km/sec

Bi-propellant liquid-alcohol and

hydrogen peroxide

Gyroscopes for determining direction and velocity;a rotating vanes

at ends of missile fins and rotating heat-resistant vanes in exhaust jet

1942, by Germany

2,000 missiles against Britain, resulting in 1,500 deaths

3,500 total missiles against cities

in England and on the continent

a Experiments were also carried out, but no operational missiles

produced, using radio-ontrolled guidance.

SOURCE: Gregory Kennedy, Vengeance Wapon 2: The V-2 Gu/dad

Missi/e(Washington, DC: The Smithsonian Institute, 1983), pp. 70-73.

efforts to develop Third World missile technology, including:46

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, France

provided sounding-rocket technologies and

granted licensed production rights to India

and Pakistan, in part to subsidize France’s

own space-launch development costs; the

French also assisted with missile-development programs in Argentina, Brazil, and

Indonesia.

In the 1970s, the United States assisted

South Korea in the construction of a NikeHercules surface-to-air missile manufacturing facility, whose product was later modified by the Koreans for surface-to-surface

use. The United States also assisted India and

Brazil in developing their sounding rocket

programs.

In the 1980s, Chinese missile experts travelled to Argentina and Brazil to provide

technical assistance for their missile programs, as well as to promote sales of Chinese

intermediate range missile technologies.

In the past, missile technology has also been

transferred through sales and technical assistance

among secondary suppliers themselves. Examples of such transfers were provided in the

previous section. The foreign training of key

individuals, too, has played a key role in missile

programs. For example, according to William H.

Webster, then Director of the CIA, “In the

mid-1960s, the United States accepted a young

Indian scientist, Dr. Kalam, into a training program at the Wallops Island Rocketry Center. This

scientist returned to India, and, with the knowledge gained from his work on the civilian space

program, Dr. Kalam became the chief designer of

India’s Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles. ”47

Hence, the proliferation of missile expertise

and technology for at least short range systems

was advanced by a variety of paths during the

1980s, helping facilitate its acquisition by several

emerging missile powers. However, with the

advent of the MTCR, many of the mechanisms by

which this technology transfer had occurred have

been constrained. (See box 5-B.)

Reentry vehicles

As ranges increase beyond 1,000 to 2,000 km,

a ballistic-missile warhead must be afforded

greater thermal protection to survive the heat

46 See, for ex~ple, Stiord, ,4ssessing Ballistic Missile Prohferation, Op. Cit., foo~ote 4, pp. 9499.

47 ~~ony of WilliaLU H. Webster, Director of Central Intelligence, in U.S. Senate, committee on Governmental AffairS, Nuclear ati

Missile Prolferation, IOlst Congress, 1st Sessiou May 18, 1989, S. Hrg. 101-562 (Washington DC: U.S. Governrnent Printing Office, 1990),

p. 12.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 223

Table 5-7—Notional Personnel Requirements for Ballistic Missile Development

Design task Personnel/time requirement

Design first-generation liquid-fueled missiles (similar to Scuds)

Develop simple flight-control systems tailored to

a particular missile (for instance, rotating vanes

mounted in the path of the exhaust gas)

Manufacture Scud-like or longer range liquidfueled missiles

Indigenously design, develop, and produce firstgeneration (Scud-like) ballistic missiles from

scratch, starting from only a rudimentary industrial infrastructure

Learn how to manufacture solid-fueled rocket

motors of 1,500-km range or more

Carry out a thorough program of flight testing

Develop and produce a longer range, more

advanced ballistic missile—if a relatively

sophisticated industrial infrastructure were already in place

5 to 10 well-trained and experienced combustion

scientists, chemical engineers, heat transfer

specialists, and experts in fluid mechanics and

mechanical design, in a well-funded, multiyear

research and development program

About 20 mechanical, electrical, and manufacturing engineers and technicians, and about 5 to

10 specialists to develop the guidance computer

and software

30 to 50 experienced machinists and technicians

Total of 300 to 600 well-coordinated and experienced engineers, technicians, and manufacturing personnel

A team of at least 5 to 10 specialists with many

years of propellant-processing experience, to

master the largely empirical mixing and casting

techniques

Roughly 100 or more experienced personnel

and up to a dozen or more tests, plus specialized

instrumentation, radars, data acquisition systems, and test ranges

As few as 3 to 10 missile designers with

hands-on experience could train local specialists

within about 5 to 10 years

SOURCE: Adapted from Stanford University, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Assesshrg Bal/istic

Missi7e Pro/ifemfion and Ifs Control (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, November 1991 ), pp. 135,138, 140-141, 145,

147.

generated by reentry into

general, such protective

reentry vehicle (RV)-is

the atmosphere.48 In smoothly and predictably would be very difficult

packaging-called a for most developing nations and, in any case,

coated with material would require extensive flight testing.49

that gradually burns off and carries away heat in To protect a warhead during its passage

a process called ablation, thereby protecting the through the atmosphere, it is also possible to use

warhead inside. However, asymmetric ablation a blunt reentry vehicle. Manned space capsules

can cause an RV to steer itself far off course. are examples of blunt RVs designed to dissipate

Developing ablatively coated RVs that erode reentry heat and protect astronauts. Blunt RVs

48 ~em is one application us~g a nucIe= W=wn titre@res neither accurate delivery nor a reentry vehicle. A nucl~ w~pon detomted

at high altitude can generate a powerful pulse of radio waves (called ‘‘electromagnetic pulse’ ‘), which can wreak havoc on some types of

electronic equipment. However, this would not pose the kind of direct human health risk normally associated with weapons of mass destruction.

49 s~o~, ASSeSSi~g Balzi$fic ~iSSi/e ~ro/iferarion, op. cit., foo~ote 4, p. 143. ~ical ~te~ ~k ablative nosetips includ e

fiberglass, carbon-phenolic, and carbon-ctubon composites.
224 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Box 5-B-Technology Transfer and the Condor II Program

Although ballistic missiles rely on a number of multiuse technologies, some key technologies have

characteristics uniquely identifiable with missile or space-launch-vehicie development programs. Such items

include the hardware and software used in missile guidance systems,1 special composite materials, largs specially

designed soiid-propellant mixers and casting apparatus, and rocket-motor static test stands. Restricting trade in

the suite of technologies most useful to developing missiles therefore provides some measure of control over

missile proliferation. Nevertheless, control of missile proliferation by restricting trade in certain materials

and technologies is Inherently more difficult than similarly controlling nuclear proliferation, since there

are more potential suppliers of missile technologies and fewer of the relevant technologies are uniquely

military in nature.

The cancellation in 1991 of the Argentina-based Condor ll program, heralded as one of the successes of the

MTCR regime, points broadly to the inherent difficulties involved in developing missiles with longer rangethanthe

Scud. The 1,000-km -stage, solid-fueled Condor // missile, whose development may have been partly

motivated by Argentina’s defeat in the Falklands War, was to have been the product of a consortium between

Argentina and Egypt, with financial assistance from Iraq. Each of the three states had previously developed or

improved the performance of short range missiles such as the Scud, with varying degrees of success. However,

despite attempts to recruit technical assistance and to import goods from a number of firms in Europe and the

United States, the Condor II project ultimately proved unable to acquire many of the technologies needed for a

complete system. in 1988, under pressure from the United States and constrained by the MTCR’s newly imposed

export restrictions, the consortium began to dissolve. By 1990 the program had ground to a standstill in all three

countries.

Egypt’s involvement in the project sheds light on the extent of foreign assistance that was sought. 2 Before

the Condor II project, Egypt had advanced little beyond modifying Scuds and making the 80-km unguided missile

called the Sakr-80. However, in gearing up for the more ambitious Condor //, an organization known as the

CONSEN Group3 arranged on behalf of Egypt for a number of well established European firms to provide key

components:

Messerschmitt-Boeikow-Biohm (MBB) of Germany-guidance systems and general missile technology

MAN of West Germany--wheeled transporter-erector-launchers

Sagem of France -inertial navigation systems

SNIA-BPD of Italy-rocket motors and solid-fuel technology

Additional contractors, such as Bofors of Sweden, and Wegmann of West Germany.

The long list of companies and technologies that Egypt and Argentina attempted to involve in efforts to

advance the levelofthe Coondor II missile in the l980s attests to the complexity of such an undertaking. From 1963

to 1988, an Egyptian by the name of Abdel Kader Helmy (who became a naturalized American citizen in October

1987) conducted on behalf of Egypt an ambitious program to acquire missile-related technology and components

1 For}ns~~, missiieguidance andcont~ requirements are nwch more stringentthan the dmdeposition

and veiodty information avaikbie from widely used airline and shipping navigation systems.

2 M~ of the foiiowing is taken from Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “6aiii8tic ?di88iie ~vdop~ti ~ Egypt”

Jane’s Intell@noe l?e~w, Ootober 199% pp. 456-45S. See also James Adams, Eh@nes of M&: Merchanfs of

Death and the New Arms Race (New Yorlc NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990), pp. 257-267.

3 The two most important oompanies in the CONSEN Group for Egypt% participation in the @*pfO~

were iFAT Corp. Ltd., of Zug, Switzerland (responsive for the finandai aspeots) and CONSEN SAM., Iooated in

Monaco (responsible for contracting). Underthe direction of Egypt% Minister of Defense, an office toooordinatethe

Condor //project was established in Salzburg, Austrial co-iocated with the offices of the CONSEN Group.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 225

illegally from the United States. Helmy and his co-conspirators either exported or intended to export a wide variety

of missile-related items to assist Egypt’s programs for both the Scud and Condor//, including’!

, A fully instrumented test-stand for analyzing rocket motors of up to 20 tons thrust

● Strap-down inertial guidance systems for the Con&//, and software for their optimization

● Fuel-air explosive warheads for the Condor //5

● Carbon-carbon and ceramic-composite materials to be used in Condor // nose cones

● Various chemicals for composite solkf-propellant rocket motors:

18,000 lbs. of militarygrade aluminum powder

11,000 lbs. of the synthetic rubber HTPB (hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene)

500 lbs. of EPON from the Miller-Stephenson Co., used in the aerospace industry for gluing

composite fabrics to surfaces

Epoxy-hardeners from the Hemkel Co.

40 lbs. of MAPO (tris-2-methyl aziridinyl phophine oxide), a soiid-propellant additive, from Arsynco

co.

HMDI (hexamethylene diisocyanate), a curing agent for HTPB

● 21,200 lbs. of maraging steel intended for the motor casing of the first stage and connecting segments

 185 yds. of Rayon-based ablative carbon fabric from the HITCO Co. for heat-shiefds to protect Condor //payload

covers

■ 436 lbs. of MX-4926, an ablative carbon-phenolic fabric from the Fiberite Co., essential for manufacturing the

flexible nozzles the Condor // was to use for maneuverability

 Microwave rocket telemetry antennas from Vega Precision Laboratories

The majority of these efforts failed, however, and Helmy and a number of his collaborators were eventually arrested

in June 1986. The loss of a U.S. conduit for missile technology imposed a staggering blow to the Egyptian

component of the Condor //projct. Within months, both Egypt and Iraq had ended their involvementwith project.

A Bermudez, “Baflistic Missile Development In Egypt,” op. dt, fOOtnOtO a, p. X57.

5 Ap~orattempt in 19S4 by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to imfKN’tOOmpOnOntS for f@-~r exPfoSves ‘ad

been blooked by the U.S. State Department and Customs Servfoe beoausethe parts were on the Munitions Control

List.

were also used with early U.S. ICBMs such as the greater than 300 km, the U.S. Department of

Atlas. Exotic ablative materials are not nearly so Defense classification system provides a useful

important for blunt RVs, since air resistance reference:

quickly decelerates them to speeds slow enough ■

for ordinary materials to withstand the heat

generated during reentry. However, in employing

blunt RVs, accuracy is lost both from self- ■

steering and from atmospheric winds having a

relatively larger effect on a slower moving RV.

Their use could easily result in a loss of several ■

kilometers or more in accuracy.

Long range missiles and ICBMs ■

Although several systems have been developed

for categorizing ballistic missiles with ranges

Short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) have

ranges up to 1,100 km, or 600 nautical miles

(nmi),

Medium range missiles (MRBMs) have

ranges from 1,100 to 2,750 km (600 to 1,500

nmi),

Intermediate range ballistic missiles

(IRBMs) travel from 2,750 to 5,550 km

(1,500 to 3,000 nmi),50 and

Intercontinental range ballistic missiles

(ICBMs) can reach from 5,550 to 14,800km

(3,000 to 8,000 nmi).

~ me bte~~ate rmge NucleaI Fomes (INF) Treaty categorized all surface-t~surface ballistic aud cruise fiSsiles with ~geS be-n

500 and 5,500 km as “Intermediate Range”.
226 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

With nominal payloads of roughly 500 to 1,000

kg, SRBMs are generally single-stage, meaning

that they have a single set of (possibly clustered)

rocket motors that is carried throughout the flight,

even after its fuel is expended.5l Multistage

rockets, in contrast, are powered by successive

sets of rocket motors, each of which is jettisoned

when its fuel burns out. IRBMs and ICBMS are

almost always multistage. 52 MRBMs are an

intermediate case, typically consisting of either

one or two stages.

Making the transition from a short range

ballistic missile capability to being able to design

and produce ICBMs involves a number of substantial technological hurdles. Iraq increased the

range of imported Scuds from 300 km to between

600 and 900 km by cannibalizing and rejoining

sections from different missiles to create longer

ones, while simultaneously reducing the payload.

But such methods would not work to create

ICBMS.

53

Developing accurate and reliable ICBMs—

which would almost always be multistagepresents inherently new and drastically more

complex difficulties than simply extending the

range of Scuds. The following factors make the

engineering and design of long range missiles

difficult. 54

Staging. Proper mating of the stages and

getting them to detach and fire at precisely the

right moment adds considerable complexity to

the design. (Once the missile leaves the atmosphere, the missile can easily begin to tumble at the

stage transition, because aerodynamic forces

cannot be utilized to stabilize it.) Staging also

increases the difficulty in designing the missile’s

flight control systems, while it generally decreases reliability, accuracy, and mobility.

As a partial alternative to staging, strap-on

clusters of boosters can be and have been used to

increase the range, possibly at considerably less

expense than developing larger boosters. However, in addition to stability and reliability problems caused by using boosters not originally

designed to be clustered, the potential increase in

range would remain quite limited. In most cases,

staging would still be required to reach ICBM

ranges.

55

Structure and Materials. To withstand the

large forces caused by their greater launch-weight

and stresses in the atmosphere, longer range

missiles must incorporate stronger materials than

51 ~ genemte enough titto lift ahavy missile, the (fret) Wge must expel prOpdhUlt esat a ~mendo~lY ~hm~~ a %e

and thus heavy motor. But since the motor must be accelerated along with the rest of the missile, its own mass limits the speed it can achieve.

(The same limits apply to strap-on boosters.) Only by abandoning a fret-stage spent motor and then f- a subsequent stage can a missile

easily achieve the velocities necessary for ranges in excess of a few thousand kilometers.

52@ exception is me U.S. Atlas missile, fnt tested in the early 1950s and deployed in the km 1950s, which achieved I0,00@kIu -e

with essentially one stage. Although it generated additional thrust by burning fuel after the iirst-stage-f~ was complete, it did not release

the fust stage motor or housing. Fueled by kerosene and liquid oxygeq the Atlas used such a thin walled canister on its main stage that it could

not reliably support its own we@t in launch position until it had been properly loaded with fuel and pressurized.

~s ~cr~ing tie s~c Of the ficl tanks on a given stage canordy go so far toward increasing amissile’s range, sin~ ti ovendl missile wU@L

including the additional fuel, would at some point become greater than the missile’s thrust thus inhibiting liftoff. Moreover, adding length or

weight can cause undesirable and sometimes unstable flight characteristics by altering the aerodynamic stresses, causing the missile to bend

and flex, and changing the moment of inertia.

54 see *0, ~mLWF, ~s~~ ~~~d, ~d David C. Wright, ‘Third World Missiles Fall Sho~’ Bulletin of the Atomic ~c~endsts, vol.

48, No. 2, March 1992, p. 36.

55 potenti~ probl~with Smp@-tOgc~rbooS~rs include stability of the flight-control syst~ interference between the CXhUSt PIWES,

excess heatgeneratiom and thrust cut-off errors that can lead to large inaccuracies, One analyst has estimated that by strapping togetherA1-Abbus

extended range Scudrnissiles to carry a single 350-kg payload, one could achieve the following ranges: 1 booster-700knu 3 boosters, dropping

fmt two at burn out—1,500 knx 5 boosters, dropping first four at bum out—2,200 lmq 7 boosters, dropping fmt four, then two, at respective

bum outs-5,100 km. James R. Howe, Rockwell International, Space Systems Divisiom “Emerging Long Range Threat to CONUS,” briefii

packeg December 1992. Note that this last example is essentially a three-stage missile, but still does not achieve ICBM ranges.
. - —

Chapter 5–The Proliferation of Delivery Systems I 227

those used in the Scud, usually requiring advanced composites or alloys.

Fuel-fraction. Only about 75 per cent of a

rocket engine’s weight can be propellant if

materials and technologies comparable to those

used in the Soviet Scud missile are employed. The

greater the fuel fraction, the greater the range;

therefore, a low fuel-fraction puts limits on the

range a missile can achieve even if multistage.

(Modern ICBMs achieve up to about 90 per cent

propellant in each stage.)

Reentry vehicles. ICBMs reenter the atmosphere at higher speeds than shorter range missiles,

making it considerably more difficult to protect

their warheads from atmospheric heating.

Accuracy. Longer range missiles typically

have correspondingly longer boost times which,

for the same guidance system, would result in

larger errors in bum-out velocity. These guidance

errors then accumulate over longer flight times,

increasing a missile’s miss-distance. More accurate guidance and control systems are therefore

required.

SPACE-LAUNCH CAPABILITIES AS A ROUTE TO

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Instead of developing ballistic missiles directly

or reverse-engineering short range missiles, a

country might also try to attract foreign assistance

in developing a space-launch capability.56 At

least five nations besides the United States and

the former Soviet Union now have indigenous

space-launch capabilities: China, France (whose

Ariane launchers have been developed and operated in conjunction with the European Space

Agency), Japan, India, and Israel. Brazil and

Pakistan are also developing space-launch or

sounding-rocket programs. Much of the technology used in sounding rockets and space-launch

vehicles is directly applicable to surface-tosurface missiles. Hence, countries such as Brazil,

India, and Pakistan have used civilian programs

and foreign assistance to build expertise needed to

design and build their own military systems.

Israel’s civilian and military programs are also

undoubtable linked; the Shavit space-launch vehicle is widely reported to be a version of the

Jericho II missile. 57 Although the space-launch or

sounding-rocket programs of South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia do not appear to have

progressed significantly in recent years, these

programs have also received foreign technology

assistance.

Some analysts have concluded that there are no

longer any valid economic reasons for new

countries to develop space-launch vehicles, and

hence that the United States should not provide

technical assistance to these programs.58 However, this argument may give too little weight to

the possible prestige value or hopes of technology

transfer that could result from developing a

space-launch capability. It also minimizes the

reluctance nations may have to depend on other

nations for space-launch services. Countries may

also be motivated to develop the capability to

launch satellites for military communications or

reconnaissance-goals that are not civilian but

fall short of developing offensive weapondelivery systems.

Space-launch vehicles differ substantially from

ballistic missiles intended for ground targets in

their requirements for accurate guidance and

reentry technology. Space payloads do not require

reentry vehicles and rarely require extremely

precise orbits, meaning that space-launch vehicles need not have as sophisticated guidance

systems as long range ballistic missiles. Boost56 me ~atc-i~ ~ fi~ ~mwaph is Primtily ~en from CarUS, Ballistic Missiles in Modern COnfliCt, Op. cit., foo~ote 37, PP. 13, ’25.

ST Some ~ysts ~heve t~t tie Sbvit space-la~ch vehicle incorporates technology tit the Israelis could use to bufld ~ I~M (~~

useful weapon payloads and accuracy) with range in excess of 5,000 km. See, for example, Steven E. Gray, “Israeli Missile Capabilities: A

Few Numbers to Think About,” Lawrence Livermore Natioml Laboratory, unpublished memorand~ Oct. 7, 1988.

56 See, for exmple, Brim G. Chow, Emerging National Space-Launch Programs: Economics and safeg~rds, WRePofi ‘o.

R=1179-USDP, January, 1993.
228 Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

phase inaccuracies resulting in errors of tens of

kilometers at apogee may be easily tolerable

when placing a satellite in orbit, but they can be

significant for surface targets even with weapons

of mass destruction. Moreover, space-launch

vehicles are usually launched from specific locations and can take weeks or months, if needed, to

prepare for launch. Ballistic missiles, on the other

hand, are much more useful militarily if they can

be launched on short notice and are not restricted

to freed launch-sites.

Still, ballistic missile technologies such as

large boosters and high-quality guidance systems

could be tested and developed under the guise of

a well-developed space-launch program. A country that has demonstrated the capability to

develop space-launch vehicles should therefore be considered capable of developing ballistic missiles as well.

COSTS OF MISSILE PROGRAMS

Short range missiles, such as Scud-Bs or

SS-21s originally from the former Soviet Union,

cost as little as $1 million apiece to produce.59 At

the other extreme is the Saudi purchase of DF-3

missiles from China, which reportedly cost $2

billion for 30 to 50 missiles and their associated

launchers. 60 Even if the missiles in this purchase

accounted for only half of the total cost, they

would still cost over $20 million apiece. Together

with launchers, this begins to approach the unit

cost of acquiring advanced strike aircraft.

Producing missiles indigenously can also be

extremely expensive. Press reports have indicated

that the Saad-16 missile-development complex

being built in northern Iraq (reportedly with the

help of several West German companies) may

have cost Iraq $200 million.61 Estimates suggest

that it would have cost Argentina $3.2 billion to

develop and produce 400 Condor II missiles, and

development costs alone may have been destined

to exceed $1 billion.62 Without financial assistance from other states, such costs would remain

prohibitive for many of the countries of proliferation concern.

I Weaponization and Deployment

NAVIGATION, GUIDANCE, AND CONTROL

SYSTEMS

As missile range is extended beyond a few

thousand kilometers, the inaccuracies of lesssophisticated missile systems could begin to

exceed several-kilometer CEPS,

63 which could

affect targeting plans even for weapons of mass

destruction. However, for most scenarios involving a proliferant country using or threatening to

use a nuclear weapon, or even a terror attack with

chemical weapons against another country’s territory, it would matter little whether its missiles’

CEPs were measured in meters or kilometers.

Guiding a missile to its target requires knowing

precisely its orientation, position, and velocity—

at least throughout its boost phase-and the

ability to control its thrust to compensate for

unexpected deviations in trajectory. (It also requires knowing precisely the locations of the

launcher and target.) Guidance systems used by

most ballistic missiles rely on inertial navigation

systems to provide boost-phase information. Standard designs consist of gyroscopes, whose spinning components resist change in their orientation

and thus provide a freed reference frame, and

accelerometers, which in principle utilize weights

59 Stiord, Assessing Ballistic Missile proliferation, Op. Cit., fOOtnOte 4, P. 45.

w Ibid., p, 95.

61 See cm, Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conjlict, op. cit., fOOtnOte 37, p. 22.

62 Ibid., p. 64.

63 For emple, tie 2,500-IcxII n~e Chinew cSS-2 (DF-3) missile has a CEP of about 2.5 m and the Iraqi AZ-~O”araMAMas ~ssfle, ~

extended range Scud with a range ofonly 900 km has been estimated to have a CEP of over 3 km (2 to 3 miles). See, for example, World Mi/irary

Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988 (Washington DC: Arms Control and Disarmarn ent Agency, 1989), pp. 18-19.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 229

attached to precisely calibrated springs. Well

before the advent of computers, Germany devised

an inertial guidance system for the V-2 missile

that combined gyroscopes with electrical capacitors and electro-mechanical actuators to send

flight-controI information to the missile fins.

Compact computers, however, are now used in

essentially all modern inertial guidance systems. 64

Adapting inertial navigation systems originally

intended for aircraft or ships for use in missiles is

problematic for several reasons. First, they may

be too heavy or too large. Second, their performance may be degraded by a missile’s high

acceleration. And third, it may be impossible to

align their orientation precisely enough to achieve

the accuracy needed for missile guidance. Similarly, straightforward application of NAVSTAR

Global Positioning System (GPS) information

would be inadequate for keeping a missile oriented precisely enough during boost-phase for

good flight control, and would only be useful if

late boost-phase corrections or a post-boost vehicle were used to correct for any trajectory errors

measured by GPS. (GPS is discussed in more

detail in the cruise missile section below.)

Furthermore, in order to make use of navigation information, the guidance system (which

computes the missile’s position and orientation)

must be connected to the missile’s flight-control

system, which adjusts the missile’s trajectory

during the boost-phase. Accuracies (due to boostphase errors alone) better than about 0.3 per cent

of range65 can only be achieved with modem

computer-controlled guidance packages that incorporate precise knowledge of the missile’s

response-times and steering forces. Precise unUnited Nations Special Commission inspector

examining the tail section of an Iraqi modified Scud

missile, showing its heat-resistant vanes mounted in

the exhaust path and its rotating tail fins.

derstanding of the behavior of flight-control

systems is required to avoid unstable flight

maneuvers and over- or under-steering the missile. Slight flexing of the missile during boost can

also be difficult to compensate for, even with

sophisticated control systems.

Advanced computer algorithms coupled with

extensive flight testing can be very helpful in

understanding and overcoming the biases of

guidance system hardware. Coupling the guidance and flight control systems, however, has

proven to be a major problem for many missile

programs in developing countries, including those

in Argentina and Brazil.66 More advanced flight

control systems relying on gimballed engines for

liquid-fueled motors, or high-temperature flexible joints at the nozzle exit-cones of solid

boosters, would also be difficult for developing

countries to master in the short run.

64 ~ ~ditiom tie utit~ Swtes ~d otier countries with advanced avionics industries have developed fig-laser gyroscopes for We as

guidance systems in both missiles and advanced combat aircraft such as the F-16. These not only provide greater accuracy, but, since they have

far fewer moving parts, can be readied for launch much more quickly than traditional gyroscopes.

65 Expressing a~wacy as a percentage of range is only a very approximate description of the effects Of error factors. Sfice ~ese erro~

contribute indifferent and often nonlinear ways to miss-distances at the target, such percentages are used only for convenience and are not meant

to imply a direct proportional relationship between accuracy and range.

66 See, for ex~pie, Andrew Slade, “Condor Project ti Disarray, ” Jane’s Defense Weekly, Feb. 17, 1990, p. 295.
230 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Moreover, boost-phase guidance errors are

only one contribution to the inaccuracy of ballistic missiles. For all but the shortest range missiles,

the midcourse and reentry phases can contribute

significant and sometimes unpredictable errors,

resulting from:

■

■

reentry vehicles steering off course, in much

the same way that skydivers steer with their

arms and legs (steering and lift forces can be

caused by the RV’s oscillating or tumbling

when it first encounters the atmosphere, or

by unexpected rates of RV ablation);67

barometric pressure and weather over the

target; and

unmodeled anomalies in the earth’s gravitational field.

In sum, accurate and reliable guidance,

control, and reentry-vehicle systems for large,

multistage ballistic missiles require integrating a set of critical technologies that would

appear to be particularly difficult for developing countries to master. To the extent that

reliable delivery of a weapon within several

kilometers of its target matters, these difficulties provide an important barrier to the proliferation of long range missiles in developing

countries. Barring direct purchase, progress

toward long range missiles will come in measured steps at best, and sudden breakthroughs

are unlikely.

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

Most missiles deployed in Third World countries can be launched from mobile wheeled or

tracked vehicles known as transporter-erectorlaunchers (TELs). (Even ICBMs, such as the

Russian single-warhead SS-25 and the U.S.

Peacekeeper, can be put on mobile launchers and

hidden.) Such launchers can be very difficult to

locate and track and can be stored in secure

locations, making them less vulnerable to preemptive attack. Syria reportedly stores its TELs in

specially constructed, fortified tunnels, and Saudi

Arabia may protect its DF-3 missiles by storing

them in a chosen group of bunkers that are based

on a design China uses to protect its strategic

missiles. 68 In the Persian Gulf War, the mobility

of the Scud launchers proved to be much more of

a problem for the allied forces than had been

anticipated. Even with the combined benefits of

massive air superiority, the most advanced reconnaissance and targeting systems available, and

hundreds of sorties flown each night, an extensive

air-power survey carried out for the U.S. Air

Force has found that although a few mobile Scud

launchers may have been destroyed by coalition

aircraft or by special operations forces during the

war, there is no hard evidence that coalition air

attacks destroyed any Iraqi Scud missiles or

mobile launchers.69

Mobility comes at some cost, however. While

it adds flexibility in choosing a launch site, it

could require developing a reprogrammable flightcontrol system to adjust missile trajectories.70

Long range missiles are significantly harder to

make mobile than shorter range ones; many roads,

bridges, and tunnels may not be capable of

handling the weight and size of a long range

missile, and off-road transportation would proba67 Rcen~ enors ~Ve beenreduced in tie united States and other countries with advanced missile programs, however, by extemlve tW@,

computer modeling, use of techniques such as spinning the RV after properly aligning its axis, and using exotic materials to optimize nose-tip

ablation.

68 c~s, Ballistic Missiles in Modern conflict, op. cit., footnote 37, p. 42.

69 Eliot A. Cohen, Guf War Air Power survey (Washington, DC: School of Adv~Ced bte~tional !hdieS, JOkS HOPM U~V., ~~

April 28, 1993), ch. 3, pp. 23,31-32. See also, Julie Bird, “GuifAirsrrikes Left Scuds lmac~” Defense News, vol. 8, No. 19, May 17-23, 1993,

p. 26.

70 Reprogr ammableflight-control systems would not be essential, however, since one could always keep a missile’s rangefmed by restricting

its launch to an arc centered on a fixed target; for liquid-fueled missiles, one could compensate for the differences in range by adjusting the

propellant level before launch.
Chapter 5–The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 231

bly be quite s10W.

71 Nevertheless, any country

with experience in manufacturing large heavyduty vehicles, railroad cars, and construction

equipment such as cranes, should be able to

construct at least primitive mobile launchers for

short range missiles. Therefore, mobile launchers

would not present a major hurdle for an emerging

missile power.

OVERCOMING DEFENSES

To date, the only use of ballistic missile

defenses in wartime occurred during the Persian

Gulf War, in which Patriot defense batteries were

rapidly deployed to Israel and Saudi Arabia to

counter Iraqi Scuds.72 Over the six weeks of the

war, 81 Scuds were reportedly launched by Iraq,

43 of which were targeted on military facilities

and populated areas in Saudi Arabia, with the

remainder against Israeli cities, About 47 Scuds

were engaged by Patriot missiles. Claims made

by the U.S. Army and Raytheon, the manufacturer

of Patriot, over Patriot’s success rate were initially quite optimistic. However, these claims

generated much controversy and have since been

revised downward several times .73

Few if any lessons from the Patriot-Scud

engagements can be applied to the problem of

missile defense in general, since both offensive

and defensive systems will continue to evolve.

Nevertheless, it was instructive that one of the

simplest and indeed lowest technology forms of

“penetration aid” probably played a role in

reducing the effectiveness of Patriot. The Scud

rocket casing, which remained with the warhead

until late in reentry, tended to break up in the

lower atmosphere, creating a much more difficult

target for the Patriot to intercept. According to an

engineer from the Raytheon Company who has

had nearly two decades of involvement with the

Patriot system,

Due to design changes and poor workmanship

when the Scuds were modified, they broke apart

in midair and created the combined effects of

stealth, maneuvering reentry vehicles (RVs),

decoys and fragments, and reduced warhead

vulnerability. All were unanticipated and added

to the difficulty of defeating these TBMs [tactical

ballistic missiles]. The inference of those who

claim that because these TBMs were crude they

were easy to defeat is incorrect.74

Simple measures might therefore be adequate

against a defense system not designed to discriminate decoys, To protect against mid-course

interceptors or associated radars, decoys could be

rather primitive; dispersing bundles of radarreflecting wire known as chaff might suffice.

However, penetrating advanced terminal defenses

might require more realistic decoys having aerodynamic properties similar to those of the warhead. Deploying such decoys would impose

significant weight penalties.

Development work is now vigorously being

carried out in the United States and in Israel on a

variety of improved antitactical ballistic missile

systems (ATBMs), including, for example, nextgeneration Patriots (called the PAC-3), a theater

71 Udess ~eat cue is taken to dampen shocks and vibrations, transporting medium- and long range soZid-propellant missileS may also

damage the fuel graiq resulting in loss of reliability.

72 Several missile-defense systems had previously been deveIoped by the United States and Soviet union (and deployed, ~ the 1atter case),

but all of these had used nuclear warheads, and none had been used in wartime.

73 See, for exmple, U.S. Congess, House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Legislation and Natioti Stity,

Performance of the Patriot Missile in the Persian Gulf War, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Apr. 7, 1992; and U.S. Congress, General

Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Data Does Not E~”st to Conclusively Say How Well Patriot Pe#ormed, NSIAD-92-340

(Washington, D. C.: U.S. General Accounting OffIce, Sept. 22, 19!32). See also Representative John Conyers, Jr., “The Patriot Myth: Caveat

Emptor,” Arms Control Today, vol. 22, No. 9, November 1992, pp. 3-10; Theodore A. Postol, ‘‘Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with

Patriot, ” International Security, vol. 16, No. 3, Winter 1991~2, pp. 119-171; and Robert M. Stein and Theodore A. Postol, “Correspondence:

Patriot Experience in the Gulf War, ” International Security, vol. 17, No. 1, S ummer 1992, pp. 199-240.

74 Robert M. Stein, mger of Advanced Air Defense Programs for the Raytheon Company, ‘‘Patriot ATBM Experience in the Gulf War, ’

article sent to subscribers of Znternarionul Security, Jan. 9, 1992.
232 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

high-altitude area defense interceptor (called

THAAD), and Israeli Arrow interceptors. Although one or more of these systems or others

may eventually provide some level of regional

defense against ballistic missiles carrying conventional weapons, even very small leakage rates

against missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction could have devastating consequences.

The potential effectiveness of defenses against

the latter type of threat is therefore highly

speculative at the present time.

COMMAND, CONTROL, HANDLING, AND SAFETY

REQUIREMENTS

As was stated earlier, the infrastructure required to support a missile capability is smaller than

that needed to sustain an effective air force. During

the Iran-Iraq war, for instance, Iran was unable to

acquire manned combat aircraft, but did manage to

obtain and launch missiles under the control of the

Islamic Revolutionary Guard, a force without a

particularly high level of technical expertise.75

Furthermore, targeting requirements at least for

weapons of mass destruction would not present

much of a problem, since published maps or

commercially available satellite imagery would

probably suffice in most cases.

Without its own reconnaissance aircraft or

satellites, however, a country using missiles to

deliver weapons of mass destruction may not

know whether they landed anywhere near their

intended targets, and might have to rely on news

reports or spies to know the extent of the

destruction it had caused. (For this reason, Israeli

military censors restricted reporting during the

Persian Gulf War about Iraqi Scud strikes in

Israel.) 76

Great care must be taken in transporting liquid

rocket fuel or fielding mobile missiles to avoid

accidents that could lead to explosions. However,

transporting weapons of mass destruction would

also warrant strict safety and security measures,

so that the incremental safety requirements for

handling the missiles would probably not add

significant additional obstacles.

TESTING REQUIREMENTS

Ensuring the reliability of the complex thermodynamic, aerodynamic, and electro-mechanical

systems involved in ballistic missiles requires

extensive testing, both at the subsystem level and

in full-scale tests. The engines can be tested in

specialized static test stands on the ground, but

missile guidance, control, and overall reliability

assessments require flight tests. For instance, it is

reported that after the initial flight test of China’s

frost medium range missile (the 1,200-km, singlestage, liquid-fueled CSS-1) failed in 1962, seventeen ground tests were performed before a series

of three more flight tests (all successful) were

carried out in 1964.77 A thorough program of

flight testing would involve specialized instrumentation, radars, data acquisition systems, and

test ranges. If the intended payload were very

expensive, such as a nuclear weapon, a high level

of reliability would probably be desired, making

short-cuts in missile flight-testing unwise and

unlikely. Still, even well-developed and thoroughly tested missile systems are often still

considered to be only about 80 to 90 per cent

reliable .78

If a missile is to carry and disperse decoys and

other penetration aids to help it overcome defenses, an additional development and testing

75 CmS, Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conjlict, op. Cit., footnote 37, p. 30.

76 See, for example, “Missile Fired at Israel, ’’New York Titnes, Feb. 1, 1991, p. 11. Also, during World War KI, the British used double agents

to carry false information to the Germans about the impact points of V-1 and V-2 missile attacks on Imndon. See David Irving, The Mare’s

Nest (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 250-251.

77 ~llip S. Cla.r~ “Chinese Launch Vehicles-’ Chang Zheng l’, ” Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1991, p. 508.

78 SW us. Con=ess, Office of I&koIoW Assessmen~ Access to Space: The Future of U.S. Space Transpotiation sYs@~,o~-Isc415

(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1990), p. 22.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 233

program might be needed to develop them.

Depending on the sophistication of the defenses,

however, such a program to develop penetration

aids would probably not be nearly as complex as

developing the missiles and reentry vehicles

themselves.

IMPLICATIONS OF GPS AND NEW GUIDANCE

TECHNOLOGIES

One way a country might try to improve

navigational accuracy is through incorporating

Global Positioning System (GPS) data into a

missile’s guidance system (see section on Cruise

Missiles, below, for a discussion of GPS capabilities). However, this presents two inherent difficulties. First, to comply with MTCR guidelines,

GPS receivers for commercial or export sales

must shut themselves down if they compute that

they are traveling faster than 515 m/see or are at

an altitude above 18 km. Since even 300-kmrange Scud missiles reach speeds of more than

1,500 m/see and altitudes around 30 km before

burnout, commercial GPS receivers would be of

little use either in boost-phase or beyond. Nevertheless, if a country could manufacture its own

GPS receivers, or obtain the underlying electronic

processor chips from elsewhere, this part of the

problem could be avoided.

The other problem with using GPS systems for

missile guidance, however, is common to all

missile systems: accurate navigational information must be translated into effective flight

control. GPS could be of great help with rapid and

accurate initialization of the missile’s position

before launch, and to some extent with determining true north, both of which could be important

contributions. But GPS information alone would

probably not help reduce the remaining uncertainty from inertial guidance-system measurements in the missile’s orientation at the moment

of thrust termination, when the missile is moving

and accelerating most rapidly. Even during the

boost phase itself, it is would be technically

complex to transform GPS position and velocity

information via the flight control system into

useful adjustments in the missile trajectory,

especially given the slow rate at which most GPS

receivers update their readings. During boost

phase, therefore, employing GPS data would

probably not be of much help in producing more

accurate missiles.

In theory, a post-boost vehicle could use GPS

navigational data to greater advantage in making

leisurely mid-course corrections outside the atmosphere. But a post-boost vehicle represents an

additional missile stage with its own propellant,

thrusters, and computational power; and it would

pose an additional obstacle for emerging missile

powers.

Terminal guidance, or steering a warhead to a

precise aim point after it has reentered the

atmosphere, has been employed on some advanced U.S. missiles (the Pershing II, for instance), but it would be exceptionally challenging

for an emerging missile power to develop.

In sum, designing and producing reliable and

reasonably accurate ballistic missiles of over

1,000-km range would be difficult but not impossible for many developing states. There may be

increasing numbers of scientists from the former

Soviet Union and elsewhere willing to assist in

these efforts. Without dedicated resources and

some outside technical assistance, however, a

program would be lengthened substantially and

likely encounter frequent setbacks. As missile

range and size are increased, almost all aspects of

missile development (e.g., combustion chambers,

casting of solid propellants, multiple staging,

guidance and control systems, reentry vehicles,

and even transporters) become increasingly complex and technologically demanding. Consequently, achieving accuracy and reliability for

such systems requires more time and expense and

cannot be assumed to follow on the heels of

first-generation missile deployment.

| Monitoring Ballistic Missile Programs

Intelligence capabilities for discovering or

tracking missile transfers have been far from
234 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

perfect. It was reportedly largely by accident that

U.S. intelligence sources discovered the Saudi

purchase of Chinese DF-3 missiles, and then at

least two years after the fact.79 It has also been

reported that the United States was unaware of the

extent to which Iraq had successfully extended

the range of its Scud missiles during the 1988

Iran-Iraq ‘‘War of the Cities.’ ’80

Missile development programs also draw on

many dual-use goods that have legitimate industrial applications, making them difficult to control

and monitor. These include forging, rolling, and

other large metal-working equipment that could

be used in manufacturing large motor cases, as

well as computers and certain types of precision

computer-controlled equipment.81

Nevertheless, production facilities for large

missiles and especially for solid-fueled boosters

might have distinctive characteristics that could

facilitate their identification and monitoring.

These features might be associated with their size

or their capability to withstand accidental detonations. 82 Accidental explosions themselves might

also be possible to monitor. Furthermore, for the

vast majority of developing countries, development of longer range missiles would require that

significant amounts of specialized hardware,

materials, or technical assistance be imported,

thus providing other governments a possible

means to monitor the program’s progress. It is

therefore much more difficult to develop longer

range missiles in secret than it is to secretly

import medium range missiles or extend the range

of short range missiles.

FLIGHT TESTING OF BALLISTIC MISSILES

By their bright exhaust plumes and unique

flight profiles, flight tests of missile systems will

continue to be easily monitored remotely. Static

ground tests might also be visible. Static tests of

individual missile stages and flight-tests at reduced range can partially disguise capabilities

and make it difficult in the early stages of a

program to determine its intent. But the step-wise

progress and extensive test programs required to

develop long range systems provide a lengthy

window for observation.

MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

If a country wanted to convince its neighbors

that it was indeed pursuing space-launch capabilities and not developing ballistic missiles, it might

suggest that other countries inspect its missile

production facilities. A plant that had the manufacturing capacity to turn out only one or two

boosters per year would be less likely to be used

for offensive missile production than one capable

of mass-producing boosters by the dozen. Such a

country might also allow others to inspect its

payloads or observe its space launches at close

range. However, not all countries would allow

such transparency in their space-launch programs. Furthermore, such inspections could only

verify that a given production facility, launch, or

series of launches had a nonthreatening objective;

they could not prove that the capability for

developing a ballistic-missile delivery system

was absent.

Like other delivery systems and weapons of

mass destruction themselves, monitoring ballistic

missiles can be more problematic once they are

deployed than during their development and

production. The best opportunity for monitoring

79 see David Ottaway, ‘‘Saudis Hid Acquisition of Missiles, ” Washington Post, March 29, 1988, p. A13; and Jim_ “U.S. Caught

Napping by Sine-Saudi Missile Deal,” Los Angeles Times, May 4, 1988.

~ CaI-U5, Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conflict, op. cit., footnote 37, P. 62.

81 S@o~, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation, op. cit., fOOt120te 4, P. 6.

82 For Cxmple, tie one-s~ge Chinese DF-3A missile (range of about 3,000 km with a 1,100-kg payload) weighs 65,000 kg; tie U.S. M.X

ICBM (1 1,000 km with 3,800 kg) weighs 90,000 kg. See, for example, The Militay Balance 1988-Z989, (lmndon: International Institute for

Strategic Studies, 1988).
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems I 235

the status of missile programs (other than openly

displayed space-launch systems) is clearly afforded by the development and testing phase.

| Summary—Ballistic Missile Proliferation

According to published sources, ballistic missiles with ranges from 300 to 600 km are already

possessed or being developed by well over a

dozen countries outside of the five declared

nuclear powers. Their spread was greatly facilitated by the export in the 1970s and 1980s of

Scud-B missiles from the Soviet Union. With the

advent of the MTCR and an increasing number of

countries abiding by its constraints on missile

trade, the potential number of non-Third World

suppliers of missiles has declined markedly.

However, at the same time, additional countries

have learned to copy, modify, extend the range of,

and produce their own missiles, and a small

number have developed long range systems—

often in conjunction with space-launch programs

and foreign technical assistance.

In general, the acquisition by developing countries of more advanced missile technologiesthose allowing ranges in excess of 1,000 km or

accuracies much better than roughly 0.3 per cent

of range-can be slowed but not stopped by

multilateral export controls. Those emerging

missile powers that might have the intent to strike

at the United States (e.g., Iran, Iraq, North Korea,

Libya) will not be able to field long range missiles

or ICBMs over the next 10 years, and those that

could develop the capability (e.g., Israel, India,

Taiwan) are not likely to have the intent. It is

therefore unlikely that any country (other than

China and the former Soviet republics that

already possess intercontinental ballistic missiles

or ICBMs) would pose a direct ballistic missile

threat to the United States within the next 10

years.

Nevertheless, given the continuing export

behavior of North Korea and possibly China,

the potential for collaboration between emerging missile powers, and the possibility of

missile experts becoming available from the

former Soviet Union or from financially troubled companies in other non-MTCR countries,

expertise in both short-and long range missile

systems may continue to spread. Countries may

continue to seek ballistic missiles for a number of

reasons, including their prestige, their psychological value as terror weapons, the opportunities

they provide for generating hard currency, technology transfer from space-launch programs, or

even a shortage of trained pilots and infrastructure

to support an air force. These motivations, combined with the fact that designing and manufacturing ballistic missiles in general requires considerably less sophistication than does producing

jet engines for modem combat aircraft, will

continue to make missile technology attractive

for a number of countries of proliferation concern.

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

The potential use of combat aircraft for delivering weapons of mass destruction poses a number

of complex issues. Advanced fighters and strike

aircraft can carry out a wide variety of missions—

e.g., air defense, close air support of ground

troops, and striking targets inside enemy territory—

and are widely accepted as legitimate military

instruments. 83 However, some also provide the

capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction,

a mission not viewed with the same degree of

acceptance. It is difficult or impossible to allow

the former set of capabilities while preventing the

latter, since almost any combat aircraft with an

attachment point for ordnance or for other equipment can be modified to accommodate and

deliver nonconventional weapons. Moreover, many

potential proliferant states either possess or can

buy combat aircraft far superior to available

missiles in terms of payload, accuracy, range, and

other characteristics. In most cases, the range,

83 me I_J.N. Cwer exphcitly recognims the right of a nation to self-defense. Possession of combat aircraft fOr that purpose iS thus not illeg~

under international law.
236 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

accuracy, and payload capabilities of combat

aircraft already possessed by developing countries far exceed those of’ their ballistic or cruise

missiles, and many more countries have aircraft than have missiles.84

The relative numbers and capability of military

aircraft in countries of proliferation concern vary

greatly (see table 5-8). For example, the Israeli air

force, which includes 63 F-15, 209 F-16,95 Kfir

C2/C7, and 112 F-4E aircraft,85 has a vastly

greater capability in wartime for large-scale

ordnance delivery at long range, and in the

presence of hostile defenses, than is possessed by

most developing countries. For some countries,

however, capability is determined more by the

availability of pilots, technicians, or even spare

parts, than it is by numbers of aircraft. The

training given pilots and the doctrine they employ

is also very significant. Although variations in

air-force size, readiness, and even pilot skill

might not matter much for delivering a single

nuclear weapon to an undefended target or a large

city, the overall capability of a proliferant’s air

force could affect its ability to deliver large

quantities of chemical weapons by air, or to

engage in a protracted conventional air war that

might eventually escalate to use of weapons of

mass destruction.

Outside NATO and the former Warsaw Pact,

most nations with large air forces and advanced

combat aircraft also tend to have, or are thought

to have, programs for the development of nuclear,

chemical or biological weapons.86 As can be seen

from table 5-8, 7 of the top 10 non-NATO

nonformer Soviet Bloc countries with the largest

air forces are thought to have active programs in

weapons of mass destruction (those not believed

to have such programs are Japan, Sweden, and

Yugoslavia); of those with the top 25 air forces,

11 have active programs and another four are

thought to have had programs in the 1980s that are

now being reversed. Furthermore, of all the

developing nations believed to be engaged in the

development of weapons of mass destruction,

only one, Myanmar (formerly Burma), has less

than 150 combat aircraft. (Figure 5-4 illustrates

the overlapping nature of programs for the

development of weapons of mass destruction in

various counties.)

| Trade in Weapon-Capable Aircraft

The proliferation of combat aircraft is already

more widespread and intractable than that of

ballistic missiles. Although some dual-use technologies useful in the development of ballistic

missiles are still actively traded, trade in missiles

themselves has always caused concern and has

been subject to multilateral export controls since

the MTCR was established in 1987. Nations are

increasingly willing to take diplomatic or economic measures to contain the spread of ballistic

missiles, forcing commerce in missiles-when it

has taken place-to be carried out clandestinely.

In sharp contrast, most nations with advanced

arms industries actively support the efforts of

their aerospace companies to make international

sales. The international market for fighters, interceptors, and strike aircraft is extremely competitive. In the middle 1980s, for example, when the

U.S. Congress blocked the sale of F-15 fighter

aircraft to Saudi Arabia, the Saudis turned to a

U.K. firm, British Aerospace, and bought more

84 ~S ~yS1s fwu5e5 on combat &raft in countries believed to have programs for developing Wewons Of ms des~ction (o~er*

the five ackuowkdged nuclear powers in the case of nuclear weapons) or that have ballistic missile programs but are not full members of the

MTCR. These countries are ahnost exclusively in the developing world. (See ch. 2 of U.S. Congress, Office of ‘Ikchnology Assessment

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, op. cit., footnote 2, for the methodology used in identifying

mass-destmction weapon programs in these countries.)

as ~tematio~ ~timte for Sti:~tegic Studies, The Military Balance 1992-1993 (Imdon: Massey’s, 1992).

86 D~g tie ~HM over which most of tie aircraft diwuswd in this swtion were acquiret NATO and former Wmsaw Pact s~tes wme

covered by a nuclear umbrella and other security guarantees resulting from their NATO and Soviet Bloc alliances. The close ties these s~dtes

had to superpower allies armed with weapons of mass destruction lessened their own motivations to develop such weapons.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems

Table 5-8-Combat Aircraft and Mass-Destruction Weapon Programs in Non-NATO and

Non-former Warsaw Pact Countries

237

CountryaFGAb Fighter b Bomber Totalb WMD/Mc Example

China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600

North Korea. . . . . . . . . 346

India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400

Israel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Taiwan. ... , . . . . . . . . , 512

Japan. ........,.,.. 94-19 8

Egypt. . . . . . ..,,.,.., 113-149

Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97-237

Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . . . 213-283

South Korea. . . . . . . . . 265

Libya, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126-150

Iraq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . 97-152

Iran. ... , . . . . . . . . . . . 130

South Africa . . . . . . . . . 116-245

Algeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . 110

Switzerland. . . . . . . . . . 87

Brazil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

Singapore . . . . . . . . . . . 107-149

Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Cuba. .......,. . . . . . 20

Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . 16-89

4600

376-387

327

479

302-463

0

280

295-323

214

126

128

238

214

180

102-132

132

14

185

80-123

137

18

38

125

140

66

630

81?

9

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

0

6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5830

814?

736

648

633

512

478

472

451

409

393

371

364

316

284

262

259

242

233

224

218

187

185

160

155

(N)BCM

NBCM

NM

NBCM

BCM

BC

none

CM

none

none

M?

BCM

[NBCM]

M

NBCM

[N]M?

N?M?

M

none

[N]M

none

c

none

[NM]

Q-5(MiG-19)

MiG-29

Mirage-2000

F-15/16

MiG-29

F-5

F-15

F-16

JA-37

MiG-29

F-16

Mirage F-l

F-16

MiG-29

F-15C/D

F-14

Mirage F-l

MiG-23

MiG-23

Mirage Ill

F-5

F-16

Su-17

MiG-29

SuperEntendard

Key: FGA=fighter/ground-attack aircraft

Fighter -combat aircraft optimized for air-to-air mission

Bomber = aircraft optimized for delivering large payloads of bombs at relatively long range, possibly with internal bomb bay, and lacking

air-combat capability

a Countries with less than 150 combat aircraft are not listed. The only such cxruntry that is frequently reported to have a m~~struction wea~n

program is Myanmar (Burma), which is suspected of having chemical warfare capability and is reported to have 12 fighter aircratt.

b Higher numbers include combatepabte trainer aircraft, which are also inciudd in totals.

c WMD/M . wea~n of mass destruction or missile program:

N E frequently reported as having or trying to acquire nuclear weapons

B = frequently reported as having offensive biological warfare program

C - frequently reported as having offensive chemical warfare capability

M - suspected of having or developing ballistic missiles with range of at least 300 km, and not full member of the MTCR as of March 1993

[ ] - Pro9ram in reVerSal or no longer considered a proliferant threat

States are listed here as having nuclear, chemical, and biolog’kal weapon programs if they are commonly citecf in the public literature as having such

programs, as reviewed in ch. 2 of U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Pro/iferafion of Wapons ofhfass Destruction: Assessing the

Risks, OTA4SC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993). See also figure 5-4, drawn from the same source. (Since

China is a nuclear-weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is not considered a “nuclear proliferant” here.) States are listed as

having missiles if they are listed in table 5-3 as havhg indigenous missile programs or imported missiles.

d Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. Based on information drawn from International Institute for strategic Studies, The Mi//!ary Balance

1992-1993 (Imndon: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992).
238 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

s-

;

c

“p

(a) Mirage-2000 (b) Tornado

(c) Kfir (d) F-16

Advanced combat aircraft such as (a) the French Mirage-2000, (b) the Gerrnan/British/Italian Tornado, (c) the

Israeli Kfir, and (d) the U.S. F-16 are operated by a number of countries around the world, some of which are

thought to have programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.

than 100 comparable Tornado IDS aircraft.87 In a Moreover, as developing nations have continfew instances, political or regional considerations ued to purchase advanced combat aircraft, they

have made it difficult for countries to obtain have increasingly demanded transfer or licensing

advanced combat aircraft, but most have been of underlying production technologies as part of

able to do s0.

88

ST The Tornado aircraft includes technology and components developed and manufactured in Brit@ Germany, and Italy. It haS comiderably

less air-combat capability than the F-15.

88 For ex~p]e, IH@an F-14 ticrtit played only a small role in delivering conventional C)r@ce during the hn-hw Wm. lagely ~~use

the United States had cut off spare parts, training, and maintenance support following the Islamic revolution in 1979. On the other hand, even

under the Pressler Amendment, which cut off aid (including military aid) to Pakistan after the President could no longer certify that it did not

possess a nuclear weapon, commercial sales of military equipment supporting that country’s air force appear to have continued. See, for

example, “Shipments to Pakistan Under Investigation,” Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1992, p. Al.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 239

The General Dynamics F-16 fighter, here being

assembled at the U.S. Fort Worth facility, is flown by

17 air forces around the world. Licensed coproduction facilities have been built in Belgium,

Turkey, and the Netherlands.

the transaction.89 These licensed production arrangements help build up and extend the defense

industrial infrastructure of recipient nations. Such

transfers are often accomplished through complicated sales agreements, for example, in which the

recipient nation buys a few copies of an advanced

fighter off-the-shelf, assembles a second batch

under license, and-to the extent that its industrial base can absorb and produce the technologies

and components in question—manufactures the

rest indigenously. In such transfers, highly sophisticated and classified subsystems are often

withheld by the seller or provided in a downgraded version as an assembled component.

Over the past several years, trade in advanced

combat aircraft has been brisk. During 1987-

1992, the 20 developing countries having the

largest air forces ordered a total of over 1,600

aircraft (see table 5-9). Of those aircraft, over

Figure 5-4-Suspected Weapon of

Mass Destruction Programs

Proliferant

nuclear Algeria?

weapon India

program

/

Pakistan

1

\

Myanmar (Burma)

h

\

Vietnam

\ China2I 1

\ /

Chemical Biological

arsenal weapon

(probable or development

possible) ‘(possible)

Shaded area: also has

Scud-type or longer

range ballistic missile

1 Iraqi programs reversed W ‘.N.

2 Chlm IS an aho~edged nuclear-weapon state.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Wbapons of Msss Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISG

559 (Wash., DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), p. 66.

two-thirds were ordered by proliferant nations

that either now possess or are thought to be

developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD),

or were thought to be developing them at the time

of the orders.

As these data suggest, proliferation of WMDcapable aircraft is embedded in the economic

competition among firms of several different

nations. The most common reasons cited in

Europe and the United States to export advanced

combat aircraft are that foreign military sales are

necessary both to maintain existing production

facilities and to fund R&D within the firm for

89 On tie subject of liwmed production of major weapon systems, see U.S. Congress, Office of lkchnology Assessment.+ GZOtilA~ Tr~e,

OTA-ISC-460 (WashingtorL DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1991), pp. 6-9. Selected licensed production agreements in the 1980s

include: U.S. F-16 fighter (to ‘Ihrkey and to South Korea); French—Gaman Alpha Jet (to Egypt); Brazilian EMB-312 llmmo trainer (to Egypt);

Anglo-French Jaguar fighter (to India); Soviet MiG-27 fighter (to India); and U.S. F-5E Tiger-2 fighter (to Taiwan). Selected licensed

production agreements in the 1970s included: French Mirage F- 1 fighter (to South Africa); Soviet MiG-21 fighter (to India); and Soviet MiG-19

fighter (to North Korea). See, for example, SIPRI Yearbook (New York: Oxford University Press, various years).
240 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 5-9-Combat Aircraft Ordered 1987-1992 by Countries of Proliferation Concerna

Countrya Total WMD/Mb No. Type of Aircraft Supplier c Year

Syria

Taiwan

8+ BCM

250 BC

Egypt

South Korea

Libya

Pakistan

123 CM

357 M?

15 BCM

196 NM

China 76 (N)BCM 12

24

40

North Korea 195 NBCM 20

25

150

India 40 NM 15

15

10

Israel 90 NBCM 5

30

30

15

10

7

8

34

6

150

60

42

4

1

20

10

46

24

4

24

12

24

120

20

9

120

15

11

75

60

50

Iraq 52 [NBCM] 36

16

Saudi Arabia 176 M 12

420

60

12

72

Iran 1 30+ NBCM ?

15

?

SU-24 Fencer

SU-27 Flanker

MiG-29

SU-25 Frogfoot

MiG-29

MiG-21 MF

MiG-29

Jaguar

Sea Harrier

F-15D Eagled

F-16C

F-16D

F-1 5A Eagle

F-1 5A Eagle

SU-24 Fencer

MiG-25 Foxhound

Kfir-C7

Kfir-TC7

F-1 6

Mirage 2000-5

F-16C

F-16D

F-1 6D

Mirage-2000

L-39 Albatrosd

F-16C

F-4D Phantom

F-1 6D

F-4E Phantom

RF-4C Phantom

F-4E Phantom

F/A-18 Hornet

Hawkd

RF-4C Phantom

F-1 6C

Su-24 Fencer

F-1 6A

F-7

F-1 6A

Mirage-30

Mirage F-1 C

Mirage F-1 C

F-15C Eagle

Hawk-200

Hawk-1 00

F-15D Eagle

F-15XP

MiG-21 F

EMB-312 Tucanod

MiG-29

USSR

,,

VB

USSR

,,

USSR

11

France/U.K.

U.K.

Us.

,,

,,

,,

,,

USSR

,,

Israel

Israel

Us.

France

Us.

,,

,,

France

Libya

Us.

Us.

t,

,,

#l

,,

,,

U.K.

Us.

,,

USSR

U s .

China

Us.

Australia

France

France

Us.

U.K.

U.K.

U.S.

Us.

E. Germany

Egypt

USSR

1990

1991

1991

1987

1987

1988

1988

1988

1989

1988

1988

1988

1990

1991

1988

1989

1991

1991

1992

1992

1987

1987

1988

1988

1980

1991

1987

1988

1988

1988

1989

1989

1990

1990

1991

1988

1988

1989

1989

1990

1987

1989

1987

1988

1990

1990

1992

1988

1988

1990
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 241

Countrya Total WMD/Mb No. Type of Aircraft SuppIier c Year

South Africa 7 [N]M? 7 PC-7d Switzerland 1989

Algeria ? N?M? ? MiG-29 USSR 1988

Afghanistan o M

Brazil 43 [N]M 11 S2F-1 Canada 1987

23 F-5E Tiger II Us. 1988

3 F-5F Tiger Ild Us. 1988

6 Mirage-3E France 1988

Vietnam o c

Argentina o [NM]

a See notes to Table 5-8 for explanation of countries listed.

b See key to Table 5-8.

c Supplier ~untfles in italics are not the original producers of the aircraft.

d Trainer

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. Based on information from S/PR/ Yearbooks, 1988-92 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, various

years) and selected newspaper reports.

future production. Proponents of combat aircraft

exports also assert that in the absence of exports,

the balance-of-payments deficit would rise and

tens of thousands of domestic aerospace workers

would lose their jobs. Incentives for former Soviet

republics to export military hardware, in the face

of severe economic hardship and shortages of

hard currency, are even stronger.

In addition to reasons of economics and

alliance politics, however, trade in combat aircraft is driven by their utility in a wide range of

military roles, including air defense, close-air

support, reconnaissance, antiship, and tactical

missions. Arms exporters assert that friendly

states require combat aircraft to defend themselves. Such trade is also facilitated by the lack of

any legal restrictions. Since military aerospace is

a multibillion dollar sector in international trade,

it will be extremely difficult to slow proliferation

of combat aircraft. Establishing meaningful limits

would require that major exporting nations adopt

a strict multilateral control regime that did not

recognize the right of participating nations to

make unilateral sales or transfer production technology. Given these economic, political, and

military realities, most analysts believe that a

regime significantly curtailing trade in aircraft is

unlikely to develop anytime soon.90

| Capabilities of Aircraft for Delivering

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Existing aircraft inventories in both advanced

and developing nations, and the diffusion of

production capacity, indicate that most countries

pursuing weapons of mass destruction already

have relatively modem combat aircraft capableafter suitable modification-of delivering them to

a variety of targets. While these states may be less

able to carry out sustained conventional air

combat, their current aircraft inventories are

probably able to deliver weapons of mass destruction, with the possible exceptions of large-scale

chemical weapon delivery (which would require

a large number of missions) or penetrating the

most heavily defended targets. Table 5-10 illustrates some of the capabilities of combat aircraft

that have been exported to or are currently

possessed by proliferant states.

In considering the requirements for effective

delivery of multiple strikes (e.g., for waging

~ Nevertheless, antagonistic nations or alliances of nations could eventually agree among themselves to reduce inventories of com~t

aircraft, as was done through the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.
242 Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Table 5-10-Capabilities of Selected Combat Aircraft

Aircraft designation Payload [kg] Combat Radius~ [km] Generationb Speedc

and country of origin

Brazil

T-27

China

J-8 (Soviet derivative)

J-7 (MiG-21 derivative)

J-6 (MiG-19 derivative)

J-5 (MiG-17 derivative)

H-5 (II-28 derivative)

H-6 (Tu-16 derivative)

Q-5 (MiG-19 derivative)

France

Mirage-2000

Mirage F-1

Mirage-5

Mirage Ill

Super Etendard

France/Germany

Alpha Jet

France/U.K. Jaguar

India

Ajeet (British Gnat derivative)

Israel

Kfir C2/C7

Dagger

South Africa

Impala I/n (Italian Aermacchi MB-326 derivative)

Chettah

Taiwan

AT-3

U.K.

Buccaneer

Sea Harrier

U.K./Germany/Italy

Tornado IDS

Us.

F-16 Falcon

F-15 Eagle

F-1 4 Tomcat

F-4 Phantom

F-5 Tiger

F-104 Starfighter

A-4 Skyhawk

500 460 (est.) 3.5 low

300?

300

500

200 (est.)

1,000

3,000

9,000

1,000

400 (est.)

350 (est.)

250 (est.)

600 (est.)

275 (est.)

1,200 (est.)

600

2

2

1.5

1

1

high

high

reed-hi

medium

medium

1

1.5

medium

high

1,000

3,500

500

907

907

1,500

370 (est.)

425

1,390

1,300

1,200

850 (est.)

high

high

4

3

2.5

2

3

high

high

high

1,100 1,075

4,000 1,408

2.5

3

medium

high

1,000 204 2 medium

1,200 1,186

(see French Mirage-5)

3 high

1,800 130

90 648

(see French Mirage-5)

2.5 low

1,900 900 (est.) 2.5 medium

3,000 900

1,000 370

2

3

medium

medium

6,500 1,390 4 high

1,400 1,200

11,000 1,270 (F-15E)

5,000 805 (est.)

7,250 1,100

730 890

1,500 312 (est.)

4,600 600 (est.)

4

4

4

3

2.5

2

2

high

high

high

high

high

high

medium
—

Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems 243

Aircraft designation

and country of origin Payload [kg] Combat Radius8 [km] Generatlon b Speedc

USSR

MiG-29 Fulcrum

MiG-27 Flogger D

MiG-23 Flogger

MiG-21 Fishbed

SU-25 Frogfoot

SU-24 Fencer

Su-1 7/20/22

SU-7 Fitter

Tu-22/26 Blinder

Tu-16 Badger

1,400

1,000

2,000

2,000

500

4,400

3,000

1,000

1,000

12,000

3,790

475

370

700 (est.)

700

740

250 (est.)

1,050

630

300 (est.)

4,000

3,100

4

3

3

2

3.5

3

2.5

2

3

1

high

high

high

high

medium

high

high

medium

high

medium

a A=um~ un-refueled high-low-high flight profile carrying specified payload. However, Since fuel, payload, range, and SPeed can be trad~ against

one another, range and payload figures are subject to considerable variability.

b Generation designates the following approximate levels of te~hnolqy: 1- 1950s; 2-l~os; 3- 1970S; 4- 1980S. U.S. aircraft of the mid-1970s,

however, receive a rating of generation 4.

c Speed low- subsonic, generally propeller driven; medium - near transonic, to barely supersonic in ideal conditions; high - supersonic capability,

e.g., roughly Mach 1.2 and above

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. Based, in part, on information drawn from Jane’s A// fhe Workf’s Aircratt, 1978-1991 (Surrey, U. K.:

Jane’s Information Group Limited, various years).

large-scale chemical warfare), however, additional factors must be taken into account. First, a

significant number of aircraft possessed by most

developing countries would probably not be

combat-ready. Some may have been disassembled to supply spare parts. Others may be in

warehouses or in need of repair, and some will

likely have crashed,

Second, combat aircraft vary widely in performance and quality in terms of such factors as

reliability, serviceability, logistics, pilot ergonomics, thrust-to-weight ratio, turning radius and

transient maneuver performance, and electronic

countermeasures, Quality factors could affect the

ability of aircraft to carry out certain types of

missions, especially when facing opposing fighterinterceptors or other significant air defenses.91

Moreover, as was demonstrated in Iraq, a superior

air power might quickly become involved and

effectively suppress even one of the larger air

forces deployed in the developing world.

Third, few developing countries have expertise

in mission planning, rapid turn-around, or accurate weapon delivery. Many developing countries

would have difficulty maintaining a skilled core

of pilots who are both able and willing to fly

missions to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

Capabilities for aircraft delivery of weapons at

ranges more than 1,000 to 2,000 km are also very

limited outside the major industrial powers. Long

range delivery might be facilitated by long range

bombers, aerial refueling, aircraft carriers, or

forward bases. But few proliferant countries, if

any, are expected to be able to incorporate these

technologies into their air forces anytime soon.

In sum, any of the countries listed in table 5-8

could probably use their air forces to deliver at

least a single nuclear weapon (if they possessed

one) in a regional context, at ranges between 500

and 1,500 km, and under a wide variety of

conditions. Many could mount a small-scale, but

nevertheless effective biological or perhaps even

91 Mdefe~ capability can also be supplied by other countries. For example, the United States supplied Israel with AWACS covemge ~d

the Pah-iot system during the Persizm Gulf War.
244 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

a chemical strike.92 If additional nations embark

on programs for the development of weapons of

mass destruction, it is likely that many of them

would already have the capability to deliver such

weapons using aircraft. Nevertheless, the ability

of several of these countries’ air forces—like

those of existing proliferants-may be questionable in terms of conducting sustained warfare,

delivering large quantities of chemical weapons,

or maintaining an attack in the event of third-party

intervention.

| Summary–Proliferation of WMD-Capable

Aircraft

Combat aircraft with the range and payload

sufficient to deliver nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, though possibly requiring some

modification, are possessed by almost all countries of proliferation concern. In terms of payloads

deliverable at specified ranges, the capabilities of

air forces of virtually all of these countries far

surpass those of their missiles. Furthermore, there

are no internationally binding restrictions on

aircraft trade, which, in many cases, continues to

be motivated by economic and foreign policy

concerns.

Although the complex set of required technologies and expertise make it extremely difficult for

countries of proliferation concern to design and

manufacture advanced aircraft without external

assistance, licensed production arrangements have

increasingly spread manufacturing technologies

to many parts of the world. Licensed coproduction or assembly of Western or former

Soviet supersonic aircraft is taking place in

China, India, Israel, South Africa, South Korea,

and Taiwan. Developing countries that have

manufactured components or complete subsonic

aircraft with some ground-attack capability include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and an Arab

consortium based in Egypt with the participation

of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab

Emirates.93

Because aircraft and missiles have different

relative strengths-particularly in their ability to

penetrate defenses—the two systems are not fully

interchangeable. 94 Piloted aircraft have significant advantages over other delivery systems in

terms of range, payload, accuracy, reliability,

damage-assessment capability, and dispersal of

chemical or biological agents. They can be used

effectively under most circumstances, usually

even in the presence of significant air defenses .95

On the other hand, the unit price of a ballistic or

cruise missile is considerably less than that of a

piloted airplane, and missile delivery offers both

military and psychological advantages, especially

for a country wishing to deliver a single nuclear

weapon to a heavily defended area.

CRUISE MISSILES AND UNMANNED

AERIAL VEHICLES

The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

Treaty defines a cruise missile as “an unmanned,

self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through

the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight

path,’ and that is intended as a ‘‘weapondelivery” vehicle. Very short range cruise missiles can be rocket-powered, but longer range

ones generally use small jet engines. Unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAV) are usually slower moving

air-breathing platforms (e.g., using jet or propel9Z Mk of sp~ pws can degrade air-force combat readiness, but such degra&tion would not be as important for scenarios involving

delivery of a very small number of nuclear or biological weapons.

93 S=, for ~~ple, MarkL.amb~ ed.,.lune’sA//the World’ sAircraji: 1990-1991 (Sumey, U.K.: Jane’ sInformation Group Limited, 1990);

and James G. Roche, Northrop Corp., ‘‘Tactical Aircraft, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Developing World, ” paper presented

at the US conference Advanced< Weaponty in the Developing World, WashingtorL DC, June 12, 1992.

94 See John R. Harvey, “Regicml Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness,” International

Security, vol. 17, No. 2., Fall 1992, pp. 41-83.

95 For a more de~ed tiysis of air defense, see Arthur Charo, Continental Air Defense: A Neglected Dimension of Strategic Defense

(Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1990).
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems 1245

ler engines) that are associated with reconnaissance, surveillance, target, or harassment missions rather than weapon delivery. (Any aircraft

can theoretically be made into a UAV by incorporating an autopilot, but the term usually refers to

systems initially designed for unmanned operation.) Both cruise missiles and UAVs are treated

here as having potential for delivering weapons of

mass destruction. Although cruise-missile payloads are generally less than those of ballistic

missiles and much less than aircraft, the ability of

some modern cruise missiles to fly at very low

altitudes and slow speeds makes them particularly well suited for delivering chemical and

biological weapons.

| Indigenous Development

In the past, indigenous development of guidance and propulsion systems for long range cruise

missiles presented almost insurmountable barriers for developing countries, In recent years,

however, near-revolutionary advances in satellite

navigation, long-distance communications, composite materials, and light-weight turbojet and

turbofan engines have greatly facilitated cruisemissile development in a growing number of

countries. Developing sophisticated, light-weight

jet-engine technology remains a significant obstacle for most Third World countries, Nevertheless,

crude pulse-jet technology was successfully employed by the Germans in the V-1 “BuzzBomb”

as early as World War II, achieving ranges and

payloads comparable to the V-2 and Scud missiles. 96 Furthermore, although the MTCR guidelines have restricted export since 1987 of complete systems and dedicated components for

systems exceeding the 300 km/500 kg threshold,

relatively sophisticated ready-made components

from (unrestricted) short range antiship cruise

missiles (ASCMs) and UAVs have been readily

available for some time. 97 Trade in these

components-m any of which have civilian utility—

is making the manufacture of longer range

systems considerably easier than in the past.

Indigenous cruise-missile design and production

has therefore become far more difficult to control.

Moreover, cruise missiles and UAVs can be much

smaller than other aircraft, and many of them can

fly at low altitudes and evade radar, thus making

them exceedingly difficult to detect.

As of the beginning of 1993, there were only 11

known cruise missile systems in service that

exceeded the 1987 threshold of 300 km/500 kg,

three in the United States and eight in Russia.98

The U.S. Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM),

Tomahawk, and Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM)

have ranges of 2,500 to 3,000 km when nucleararmed and over 1,000 km when armed with a

conventional payload of 450 kg. Some Russian

cruise missiles have 400 to 600-km ranges with

1,000-kg payload; others have about 3,000 km

range with 300-kg payload. China and India are

believed to have active development programs for

cruise missile with ranges of about 600 km, but

unknown payloads.

A growing number of countries already have

development programs or the ability to manufacture cruise missiles with shorter range than those

described above. The five acknowledged nuclear

powers have all designed and built advanced

jet-powered missiles capable of being further

developed to give ranges in excess of 300 km at

supersonic speeds. Israel, Italy, Japan, Sweden,

and Taiwan have all developed subsonic turbojet96 See ~~ony L. uy, BUZZ Bomb (Boylston, MA: Monogram Aviation Publications, 1977).

97 me new MTm @del~es adopted on J~uary 7, 1993 prohibit the transfer of any ballistic or cruke missik with r~ge over 3~ ~,

regardless of payload, and any such missiles+egardless of range or payload-if the supplier has reason to believe they may be destined to

carry weapons of mass destruction. This would presumably restrict sales by MTCR members of any cruise missiles to suspected proliferant

countries (see figure 5-4).

98 Data in ~s md the following paragraph is from Duncan Lennox, ‘‘Missile Race Continues, ’ Jane’s Dqfence Weekly, Jan. 23, 1993, p.

20.
246 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

powered missiles capable of flying well beyond

300 km. Brazil, Germany, Iraq, and North Korea

also appear to have potential cruise missile

programs developing a variety of systems, most

of shorter range. In addition, Russia exhibited

several cruise missile designs in 1992 that could

be developed for export, or even remanufactured

by other countries to begin programs of their

own.

99

GUIDANCE SYSTEMS

Command guidance

Short range, radio-controlled command guidance systems are relatively simple to design. The

Soviets have used command guidance from

airplanes, and the United States has developed

several such systems. (The Germans also experimented with radio-controlled command guidance

in the V-2 ballistic missile.) Several short range

ASCMs have also been equipped with TV terminal guidance. Such systems include Israel’s

Gabriel II, Taiwan’s version of the same, called

the Hsiung Feng I, and the U.S. Standoff Land

Attack Missile (SLAM). However, the range of a

command-guided system. is limited by that of the

communication link. If a radio link is used, it is

susceptible to j amming. And while launch from

aircraft can extend the effective range of commandguided missiles, an escort aircraft must then

remain within communication range of the missile.

Inertial guidance

Inertial guidance systems are one of the most

mature navigation technologies used in ballistic

and cruise missiles. They use gyroscopes and

accelerometers to determine the missile’s orientation and its motion along a particular heading. All

gyroscopes are subject to drift error, however,

which accumulates guidance inaccuracy over

time. Standard high-quality commercial aircraft

systems, for example, have errors leading to CEPs

on the order of 2 km per hour of flight.l00 (The

MTCR prohibits exporting cruise-missile navigation systems that have accuracies better than 10

km on a 300-km course, unless part of manned

aircraft.) To compensate for the drift error,

systems can utilize externally supplied information to update inertial navigation systems.

TERCOM

Since the 1970s,

using an advanced

the United States has been

guidance system known as

TERCOM (Terrain Contour Matching) for guidance of long range cruise missiles. It operates by

comparing the altitude profile of the ground under

portions of the missile’s flight path with terrain

maps stored in its computer database. TERCOM’s guidance computer makes course corrections based on differences between measured and

expected altitude data. Between updates, the

missile’s flight is usually controlled by an inertial

guidance system.l0l However, since TERCOM

relies on terrain variation, it is useless for

guidance over water, and ill-suited to flat plains

or deserts. Furthermore, because TERCOM requires accurate pre-determined terrain maps

along the approach to a target-usually requiring

advanced satellite techniques to produce—

99 fiid., pp. 19, 21. Note hat IJ.N. StXUI@ Council Resolution 687 prohibits IracI from mfi@g or developing missfies with r~es

exceeding 150 km.

’00 See, for example, ‘‘Sagem !Mfting to Systems Integration to Expand Role as Avionics Supplier,’ Aviation Week & Space Technology,

May 11, 1992, p. 50. Ring-laser and fiber-optic gyroscopes (the latter still under development) are capable of substantially greater accuracy,

but their manufacture is limited to countries with the most advanced electronics industries.

Iol Dews of the TERCOM system are given in John Toomay, ‘“lkchrdcal characteristics, ‘‘ in Richard Betts, cd., Cruise Missiles:

Technology, Strategy, Polirics (Washingto~ DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 36-9. Conventionally-armed versions of the U.S. cruise

missiles have a supplementary terminal guidance system known as Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC), which compares a

visual image of the target with onc stored in the missile’s computer memory.
developing nations have had little means by

which to exploit this technology.102

NAVSTAR Global Positioning System

Provided a target’s coordinates are known in

advance, cruise missiles could use satellite navigation such as GPS (see box 5-C) to fly to a target

by any route desired. Circuitous routes using a

series of waypoints might be chosen, for instance,

to avoid heavily defended areas.

Although the MTCR guidelines prohibit export

of any GPS receivers that operate above 18 km

altitude and 515 rn/see, or those designed or

modified for use in ballistic missiles or cruise

missile with ranges beyond 300 km, many exportable GPS receivers would still be cruise-missile

capable. Moreover, export restrictions do not

apply to GPS receivers for use in aircraft, and the

electronic circuitry required to process GPS

signals would not be difficult for many countries

to duplicate or otherwise obtain.

A number of methods (e.g., differential GPS)

have been developed to improve on the accuracy

of the GPS signal available to civilian users, but

these methods would not be necessary for delivering weapons of mass destruction.103 For attacks

with weapons of mass destruction against secondechelon forces massing behind front lines, or

against ‘‘soft’ civilian targets or population

centers, even the worst-case 100-m accuracy

provided by the degraded commercial signal

would be sufficient to result essentially in a direct

hit.

Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery System | 247

c

yJ

o

n

Enmzmm

,“

The air- or ship-launched U.S. Harpoon antiship

cruise missile was first produced in 1977 and has been

sold to 19 U.S. allies including Egypt, Iran, Pakistan,

South Korea, and Saudi Arabia.

PROPULSION AND AIRFRAME TECHNOLOGY

Cruise-missile propulsion systems, like guidance systems, are also much more widely available than in the past. Unlike combat aircraft,

whose weight and expense mandates large reusable engines, cruise missiles can use much smaller

turbojet or turbofan engines. Such engines are

now manufactured in over 20 countries.104 Despite Russia’s agreeing to abide by the Missile

Technology Control Regime, the former Soviet

Union may be a particularly good source of this

technology, since the republics have yet to setup

102 )7ve~ ifhigh-quall~ Stereographic fiageS ~o~d ~ pwc~ed from commerci~ Satelfite photographic semic~ such as the French SPOT

or U.S. La.ndsat, it is unlikely that sufficient altitude resolution could be obtained for use with TERCOM systems. At most this imagery might

help with terminal guidance if there were distinctive terrain features in the neighborhood of the target and if the cruise missile could be equipped

with a radar altimeter.

IOJ The GPS signal available to commercial users, known as the “Course Acquisition (C/A)” code, contains errors that have been

intentionally introduced to degrade accuracy. Differential GPS uses a receiver whose location is accurately known to calculate these errors.

This information can then be used to correct the positions of other receivers viewing the same GPS satellites. This method can be used to obtain

dramatic improvements even relative to the accuracy available to military users, called the “P-code.” Lee Alexander, “Differential GPS in

Operation Desert Storm, ” GPS World, vol. 3, No. 6, June 1992, p. 37. As suck it could be particularly usefut in aiming ballistic missiks

accurately toward their targets prior to launch if other methods of doing so were not available. Other techniques for improving on the C/A code

have also been developed.

1~ See Mark kbert, cd., Jane’s All the World’s Aircrafi, 1990-91, op. cit., footnote 93. Although small Jet engines me kcoming more

widely available, they are not required; even old propeller-piston engines could be used in some applications.
248 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Box 5-C-Satellite Navigation Systems and GPS

Space-based navigation systems began their development in the United States and former Soviet Union in

the early 1970s, and for a variety of applications can now offer precise navigation services at low cost. The most

developed system is the U.S. NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), which will soon provide accurate

position (latitude, longitude, and altitude)and velocity information to receivers anywhere in thewotid.lhefull GPS

constellation will include 21 satellites plus three spares, and is scheduled to be operational by 1995.1

Using four atomic clocks, each GPS satellite continuously broadcasts its position relative to the center of the

Earth along with the precise time. Using this data a receiver can compute its distance from each of the GPS

satellites it can observe, and therefore its own position by triangulation. Receivers must have access to a minimum

of three simultaneous satellite broadcasts to obtain latitude and longitude information; a fourth satellite is needed

to add altitude information.2GPS offers the advantages of being unlimitedly range, cheaper than TERCOM, and

more accurate than inertial navigation systems by themselves (GPS would normally be combined with an inertial

navigation system).3

To deny use of GPS’s full capabilities to adversaries, GPS satellites broadcast two signals-one intended

for use only by authorized U.S. military receivers, known as P-code (Precision Service), and the other for civilian

users, known as C/A-code (Coarse/Acquisition). P-code offers position information accurate to within

approximately 10 to 15 meters. The accuracy of C/A-code varies depending on how the United States operates

the system, but can be in the neighborhood of 30 to 40 meters. Since even 40 meter accuracy is more than the

United States wants to provide adversaries during a crisis, the C/A signal can be degraded by a technique known

as “Selective Availability,” which introduces intentional errors into the code limiting it to 100-m accuracy.4 Even

so, this would be sufficiently accurate for most purposes involving weapons of mass destruction.

Since navigational data of the quality delivered by GPS has very high commercial value, an extensive market

in GPS receivers has grown to meet commercial demand. Off-the-shelf GPS receivers are available for less than

1 AS of Deoember 1992, 19 satellites were deployed

2 Artur Knoth, “GPSTechnology and ThlrdMAxid Missiles,” h?t6t?Mbn&i/D8bn~ ~edew, vol. 25, May 1W2,

p. 413. One more satetlite signal is required than the number of coordinates sought, sinoe the receiver must also

oalcuiate and remove the effeots of Its own dook error.

3 Forex~ple, the U.S. Defense Department which has developed and mdntalns GPS, Ail methe mtellite

system to supplement missile guidance in the new U.S. Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM), a variant of the

Harpoon anti-sh}pcruise missile, andlnplannedupgrades tothetand-attackversion of the Tomahawksea-launched

wise missiles. See Eric Arnett, “The Most Serious Challenge of the 1990s? Cruise Misstles in the Developing

Mhld,” in W. Thomas Wander and Eric Arnett eds., ?7w Pm/l~nNlon of Advati Waponry: 7iino/ogy,

Mot/vatIons, and!?esponses (Washington, DC: Arnedoan Association for the Advancement of Sofence, 1992). The

Frenoh company Sagemvviiloffer aplug-inupgrade toltslnertlal nsndgation systems to provide navigational updates

from a 12-ohannel GPS moeiver. It will also offer the Integrated GPSAnertlat system for sale. See “Sagem Shifting

to Systems Integration to Expand Role as Avionlos Supplier:’ Atiatlon Mek & Spaoe Tbclmology, May 11,1992,

p. 50; and Clifford Bed, “World In a Box: Air Navigation Leaps Fonnrard,” /ntematbna/Delbm?e Retiew, vol. 25, May

1992, pp. 417-418.

4 Note, however, that the quoted GPS aocurades pertain to the *% oonfidenoe level, m that 1OO-m

“aocuracy” here could translate roughly into a 40 to 50-m CEP (50Y0 confidence level). Sources on emphtcal GPS

signal acouracy include Philip Klass, “lnmarsat Dedston Pushes GPS to Forefront of Civil Nav-Sat Field,” Aviation

Mek & Space 7iino/ogy, Jan. 14, 1991, p. 34; Bruce D. Nordwall, “fllght Tests Highlight New GPS Uses,

Emphasize Need for GPS/Glonass System:’ Aviation Weki!i Space Tsohnology, DeQ 2,1991, pp. 71-73; and Paul

M. Eng, “Who Knows Where You Are? The Satellite Knows:’ Business Wek Feb. 10, 1992, pp. 120-121. To

prevent unauthorized aocesstothe P-code, the GPS system iscapabteof encrypting it produdng what Iscalledthe

Y-code.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 249

$500, and relatively expensive, multichannel sets that provide more frequent updates sell for less than $5,000.5

Receiver prices are likely to continue to drop.

The U.S. Government recognizing the system’s civil application, has promised to provide the C/A-code signal

free of charge for a period of at least 10 years. Commercial users are also exerting considerable pressure on the

U.S. Department of Defense to cease degrading the C/A signaI. This pressure is likely to mount, particularly if GPS

is widely adopted for use in international air-traffic control.6

Two other systems may offer navigational data in the future that can supplement that provided by GPS. The

Soviet Union has begun to deploy a system somewhat comparable to GPS called Glonass (Global Navigation

Satellite System), and the international satellite agency Inmarsat plans to add GPS-like signals to its third

generation of satellites.7 Combining data received from the three systems would allow increased accuracy and

reliability y, including the capability for real-time verification of the integrity of individual satellite signals.8

The Glonass system, which would provide the same accuracy to all users, advertises plus-or-minus 17-m

accuracy 50 per cent of the time, comparable to P-code GPS accuracy.9 However, only about 8 of the first 32

Glonass satellites deployed are still in operation, and given the political situation in Russia, the system’s fate is

uncertain.l0

5 Inevensive singte-channei reodvers, more appropriate for boaters than for drtiaft, must swit*

sequentially among four GPS satellites in order to compute position; muitiohanneireoeivers aiiow reoeption from

more than one sateiiiteat a time, which improves accuracy and update-speed. Receivers with 6 channeis are wideiy

avaiiabie, and 12 channeis can aiso be obtained. See Gordon W@ “Navigation,” &fotorBoaflng & Sa”/ing, voi. 168,

No. 4, October 1991, pp. 65-77; and Jeff Hum, GPS:A Guide to VwNexf Uf//lty(Sunnyvaie, CA: Trimbie Navigation,

1989).

G See phiiip J. Kiass, “FAA Steps Up Program to introduce GPS as instrument Approaoh AM,” Atiation ~e~

& Space Twhnology, Aug. 17, 1992, p. 38.

7 see, for exm~e, Kiass, ‘iinmarsat D~don. “ ““r op. dt., footnote 4, p. 34. One reason for inmarsat’s

dedsion to provide sateiiite navigation is oonoern that the United States may not continue to provide GPS services.

8 Simultaneous access to five broadcasting satellites is suffident to detect whether one of the satellites is

malfunctioning, but six signais are needed to identify which one is in error. When the GPS mnsteiiation is complete,

however, there should be enough satellites at any time in one’s iine-of-sight that this shouid not present a problem.

See Bruce D. Nordwaii, “Fiight Tests Highiight New GPS Uses, Emphasize Need for GPS/Glonass System,”

Aviation VWek & Space TWmo/ogy, Dec. 2, 1991, p. 71.

9 Artur Knoth, 4(GpS Tbchnoiogy and ~ird WWid Missiies,” Op. dt, fOOtnOte 2, P. 414.

10 Kiass, “inmarsat Dedsion. . ,“, op, ~tm, footnote 4, p. 35.

an effective system of export controls.l05 More- hundred kilometers. ASCMs are widely available

over, Ukraine, which holds a substantial fraction and, due to their short range, are generally exempt

of the former Soviet Union’s military aerospace even from the new MTCR restrictions.

industry, l06 has not yet agreed to abide by MTCR Nevertheless, very small, lightweight, and

constraints, Antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) fuel-efficient engines, which are particularly impurchased from Russia or elsewhere could also portant for longer range or stealthy cruise misprovide a proliferant country with engines suita- siles, are still very difficult for proliferant counble to power its own airframes up to perhaps a few tries to acquire.

Ios See, for ex~ple, William C. Potter, “Exports and Experts: Proliferation Risks from the New Commonweal@” Arms Control To&y,

vol. 22, No. 1, July/August 1992, pp. 32-37; and Jeffrey M, LenoroviW “RussiarI Engine Firms Strive to Realign, ’ Aviation Week & Space

Technology, March 30, 1992, pp. 38-9.

106 See, for exmple, Cen-1 Intelligence Agency, Dirmtomte of ~te~gence, “The Defense Industries of the Newly Independent States of

Eurasiq ” OSE 93-10001, January 1993, p. 7.
250 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Airframes are probably the easiest part of

cruise missiles to produce indigenously. Unlike

combat aircraft, cruise missiles need only fly

once, lessening the requirements for fatigueresistant materials. They are also smaller, mostly

subsonic, and need only accelerate modestly, thus

avoiding the need for the type of high-strength or

specialized materials typically found in ballistic

missiles and reentry vehicles.l07 Unless highspeed maneuvers are required, cruise missiles and

UAVs can more easily use light-weight or even

radar-absorbent materials that would not ordinarily stand up to great aerodynamic stresses.108 And

since they require no cockpit or features to protect

a pilot, they can be built much more cheaply and

with smaller radar cross-sections than can piloted

aircraft.

In sum, any country that supports an aerospace industry or has a modest industrial

infrastructure should be able to integrate

commercially available GPS receivers, turbojet engines taken from imported ASCMs, and

indigenously built composite airframes to build

its own cruise missiles. If launched from manned

aircraft, the effective range of such cruise missiles

could be increased substantially. Harder, though,

would be to build cruise missiles with ranges far

exceeding 300 km (carrying 500 to 1,000-kg

payloads) or long range cruise missiles with

low-observable (stealthy) technology.

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

To remain undetected by air defenses, cruise

missiles can be made to fly at very low altitudes,

exploiting the natural radar cover offered by

reflections off trees, buildings, hills and other

features of the terrain.l09 (Other techniques for

increasing the probability of penetrating defenses

include stealth technologies, supersonic speeds,

or high-altitude approaches that might be detected

but not easily engaged by air defense systems.

U.S. and Soviet systems have incorporated a

number of these techniques.) Low flight, however, increases the risks of crashing and sacrifices

fuel efficiency. 110 Look-ahead radars and maneuverability can lessen the risk of crashes, but their

weight will decrease a cruise missile’s range, and

their signal may help defenses locate them. These

also require fairly sophisticated guidance and

control technologies.

Early generation land-attack cruise missiles

were particularly vulnerable to defenses, as demonstrated by the largely unsuccessful attempt by

Egypt to use them against Israel in the Yom

Kippur War of 1973. To saturate air defenses and

increase the probability of key weapons getting

through, a state may therefore wish to accompany

a few cruise missiles carrying weapons of mass

destruction with a large number of decoys. But

such tactics would only be needed when attacking

defended areas. The number of cruise missiles

needed for guaranteed penetration would thus be

highly scenario-dependent.111

The GPS system was designed to operate with

completely passive receivers, obviating the need

to send any signal back to the satellites. Receivers

can therefore operate undetected. However, since

GPS radio signals can be weak even compared

with background noise levels, in theory they can

IW TMS adv~@ge is less s~ientincrui~missiles designed forunderwaterlaunch from sub- es, because the stresses inherent in changing

pressure environments during fli@t require stronger materials.

10S sk Mictiel ~~ge, U~ann~Aircrafi, Brassey’s Air power, vo~u~ ~ @ndon: Bwsey’s Defense Publishem, 1988), p. 121.

lw seew~~ E. D* HOWLPW Can an UnmannedAerial Vehicle Fly?, ~Paper P-7680-RGS (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Graduate

School, October, 1990).

110 me fi-brm~g en~es~s~ ~ most c~se ~ssiles~ction more efflcien~y at tigher altitudes, where the less dense W Educes both

the drag on the airframe and the quantity of fuel necessary for efficient combustion.

111 See, for e~ple, maro, Continental Air fle~ense, Op. Cit., foo~ote 95.
Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems I 251

be jammed, at least for short periods of time.112

(Between GPS updates, or if j ammed, a cruise

missile would have to fly using an inertial

system.) Although all GPS satellites broadcast on

the same frequency, each Glonass satellite broadcasts at its own frequency, and Inmarsat satellites

will provide still more frequencies,113 thus making it difficult to jam the entire future suite of

satellite navigation signals. Furthermore, an incoming cruise missile must be detected ahead of

time in or der for jamming attempts to be activated.

At least for short range missile guidance,

fiber-optic technology may also take on an

increasing role in the future. The United States

and Brazil have developed systems that connect

antitank and antihelicopter missiles to controllers

at distances up to 15 km. These systems use

fiber-optic cables that spin off the end of a reel

when the missile is launched.114 Although optic

cables can transmit signals over hundreds of

kilometers without serious distortion, in practice

these systems would probably be limited to about

100 km or less. 115 At such ranges, much simpler

command-guidance systems are also available.

| Availability of Cruise Missiles and UAVs

No land attack cruise missiles are known to

have been exported by the principal exporters of

cruise missiles (the five acknowledged nuclear

powers and Italy), and there is little reason to

believe that these will be exported in the future.ll6

Furthermore, no potential proliferant state is

publicly known to have developed or acquired

cruise missiles for the purpose of delivering

weapons of mass destruction. Still, acquisition by

such countries cannot be ruled out. Many of the

components and technologies for producing

cruise missiles fall outside of MTCR constraints,

or can be obtained by converting civil systems,

cannibalizing readily available ASCMs, or purchasing cruise missiles from non-MTCR suppliers.

ANTISHIP CRUISE MISSILES

The effectiveness of ASCMs frost gained notoriety in 1967, when Soviet-built Styx antiship

missiles launched by Egypt sank the Israeli

destroyer Eilat. More recently, incidents involving ASCMs drew worldwide attention when

French-built Exocet missiles destroyed the HMS

Sheffield in the 1982 Falklands War and damaged

the USS Stark in 1987 in the Persian Gulf.

Although only 11 countries have designed and

produced ASCMs indigenously, ASCMs can

112 me ablll~ t. jmGps ~i@~ is st~ he subj~t of some de~tc, D~tio~ ~te~ desi~~ to receive GPS signals from above may

be less susceptible to jammin g. Edward R. Harshberger, Long Range Conventional Missiles: Issues for Near-Term Development, RAND Note

N-3328-RGSD (Santa Monic& CA: RAND Graduate School, 1991), p. 105. Furthermore, the nature of the signals broadcast by GPS satellites

should make it possible using special signal-processing techniques to distinguish even ve~ weak broadcasts ffom background noise or from

pOWelfUl J“amming signals, making GPS “a very hardy system.” Jeff Hm GPS: A Guide to the Next Utility (Sunnyvale, CA: Trimble

Navigatio@ 1989), p. 8.

113 philip K~s, ‘ ‘-satD~ision~shes GpS to Forefront of CivflNav-Sat Fiel~ AviatiOn week & Space Technology, J~~ 14,1991,

p. 34.

11.I ~eu.s, NaV ~ ~so exPfien~g ~~ ~-la~ched, fiber opti~y-~idedatiship cruise missiles. ‘ ‘U.S. Navy Tksts Fiber-@tic Data

Links for Air-Launched Weapons,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 12, 1989, pp. 275-8.

115 Hu@es ~epramhtives ~~cat~ ~ a s~taent quoted in “U.S. Navy ‘I&ts Fiber-Optic Data. . .,” ibid., tit a l~km me is ‘e~ tie

limit for these systems. See also Carl White, “Light Fantastic: Fiber Optics: The Core of High-’Ikch Prognuns,” Sea Power, vol. 34, Mar@

1991, p. 28.

116 w.se~ Cms, CmiSe MiSSile prol~era~on in t~c 1990s (was@o% DC: Center for S@ate@c ~d Internationtd StUdieS, 1992), p. 32.
252 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

First produced around 1980, the Chinese Silkworm

liquid-fueled rocket-powered antiship cruise missile

has been exported to Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan,

and is coproduced under license in North Korea.

readily be purchased.117 They have consequently

proliferated even more widely than ballistic

missiles, with over 40 Third World countries now

operating them. 118 Three : systems in Particular

have been widely exported: the Chinese Silkworm

(95 km/510 kg); the Soviet Styx (80 km/500 kg);

and the French Exocet (65 km/165 kg). Other

systems exported to Third World countries include the British Sea Eagle, Israeli Gabriel I/II,

Italian Otomat, and U.S. Harpoon (see table

5-11 ). Of these, the Otomat and Harpoon have the

A remotely piloted vehicle ready for testing at White

Sands Missile Range, NM. This ground-controlled

fixed wing vehicle with a cruising speed of 60 knots is

designed to carry sensors. It is not a weapon system

and is not designed to penetrate defenses. However,

similar vehicles might be adaptable for weapon

purposes, for example, for biological attacks against

undefended targets.

longest ranges, at 180 km and 220 km, respectively, but still fall short of the MTCR threshold.

Many ASCMs rely on active radar or infrared

homing devices for terminal guidance against

ships on the open ocean, which stand out readily

from their surroundings. As such, ASCMs would

not be very useful for land attacks except against

distinctive short range targets. To give ASCMs a

true land-attack capability, their homing systems

would have to be replaced or supplemented by

another type of guidance.ll9

Nevertheless, most ASCMs also use a rudimentary inertial-guidance system to navigate into

the vicinity of a target that would be transferable

I IT The 11 coU~e5 wi~ indigenous cruise-missiles are the five declared nuclear powers phs GWDMUI y, Israe~ Italy, Japan, Norway, and

Sweden. Six other countries either currently manufacture ASCMS based on another country’s design or have their own systems under

development: Brazil, Indi% Iraq, North Korea, South AfiicA and Taiwan. Cams, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s, ibid., pp. 34,

126-133 (table B4); and Duncan Lennox and Arthur Rees, eds., Jane’ sAir-Luunched Weapons (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group, 1990),

Issues 8 and 9.

118 caI-us, Cmise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s, op. cit., footnote 116, p. 34. Even though many ASCMS cost more ti a w~fion

dollars apiece, there has been considerable interest among Third World countries in purchasing ASCMS.

119 The I-Jnited Shtes developed the Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) by replacing the seeker of the Harpoon ASCM witi a television

termirudguidance system. Other countries that would likely be able to replace a traditional ASCM seeker with TV guidance include Israel, Indk

South Africa, Taiwaq and possibly South Korea. Carus, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s, op. cit., footnote 116, p. 131.
.

Chapter 5-The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 253

Table 5-1 l—Selected Cruise Missiles and their Characteristics

Designation Range Payload Comment

[km] [kg]

ASCM Systems not exceeding the 1987 MTCR threshold of 300 k&500 kg:

British Sea Eagle. . . . . . . . . . .

Chinese HY-2. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(Soviet SS-N-2 derivative)

Chinese HY-4. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

French Exocet. . . . . . . . . . . . .

German Kormoran 2. . . . . . . .

Israeli Gabriel Mk-II. . . . . . . . .

Israeli Gabriel Mk-lV. . . . . . . .

Italian Otomat Mk-II. . . . . . . . .

Japanese SSM-1. . . . . . . . . . .

Norwegian Penguin Mk-III. . . .

Soviet SS-N-2C. . . . . . . . . . . .

Soviet AS-5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Swedish RBS-15. . . . . . . . . . .

Taiwanese Hsiung Feng-2. . .

U.S. Harpoon. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

110

95

135

65

55+

40

200

180

150

40+

80

230

70-150

80-180

120-220

230

510

500

165

220

180

1 50+

210

250

120

500

1000

250

75?

220

1985; turbojet; exported to Germany, India

+1980; “Silkworm”; liquid-fuel rocket-powered; exported to Egypt,

Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and co-produced under license in DPRK

late 1980s; turbojet

1979; solid-rocket powered; widely sold; operated by over 25

countries

1993; air-launched, rocket powered; operated only by Germany and

Italy

1976; solid-rocket powered; licensed variants produced in Taiwan

and South Africa; exported to Chile, Ecuador, Kenya Singapore,

Thailand

1993?; turbojet (under development)

1984; turbojet; European consortium; exported to Egypt, Iraq, Kenya,

Libya, Nigeria, Peru, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela

1988; turbojet; land-, ship-, or submarine-launched

1987; solid-rocket powered; exported to Greece, Turkey, Sweden,

and United States

1962; “Styx”; liquid-rocket powered; exported to Algeria, Angola,

Cuba Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, India, North Korea, Libya, Somalia,

Syria, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia; licensed production in Iraq

1966; liquid-rocket powered; “Kelt”; past exports to Egypt and Iraq;

may exceed MTCR limits; land-attack and ASCM capability

1989; turbojet; exported to Finland, and possibly to Yugoslavia

1993?; turbofan?; (pre-production development)

1977; turbojet; air- and sea-launch platforms; sold to 19 U.S. allies

including Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia;

Iand-attack version (SLAM) has shorter range and television terminal

guidance

Selected longer range cruise missiles (restricted from export by MTCR guidelines):

Soviet SS-N-3. . . . . . . . . . . 460 1000 1963; turbojet; “Shaddock”; strategic/anti-ship; launched from land,

surface ships, and surfaced submarines; sold to Syria and Yugoslavia

Soviet AS-6. . . . . . . . . . . . . 560 1000 1973; solid-rocket powered; “Kingfish”; Mach 3.5; land-attack capability; can be nuclear-armed

Soviet SS-N-21. . . . . . . . . 3000 300 1987; turbofan; “Sampson”; nuclear-armed

U.S. Tomahawk. . . . . . . . . 480-1250 450 1983; turbofan; HE warhead; 2500-km range with 300-kg payload

U.S. ACM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3000 ? 1992; nuclear-armed; stealthy; air-launched

SOURCE: W.Seth Carus, Cruise Missile Proh’femtion in the 19WM (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992); Jane’s

A/rLaunched Weapons, Issue 09, and Jane’s Strategk Weapons Systems, Issue 07 (Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 1992); and

James G. Roche, Northrop Corp., “Tactical Aircraft, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Developing World, ” paper presented at the AAAS

conference Advanced Weaponry in the Developing World, Washington, DC, June 12, 1992.
254 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

to other platforms and missions. Systems such as

the Israeli Gabriel II, which has been exported to

several Third World countries (see table 5-1 1),

use TV-terminal guidance and can therefore be

used against land targets. Furthermore, typical

ASCM payloads of 100 to 500 kg (sufficient for

many types of high-explosive armor-piercing

warheads) would be sufficient to carry biological

agents or modest amounts of chemical agent.

Soviet export models and some ASCMs copied

by other countries have payloads of 500 to as

much as 1,000 kg, which may be sufficient to

carry proliferant nuclear warheads. 120

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

An alternative to developing or modifying

cruise missiles would be to purchase commercially available unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Modern over-land UAVs are used in a wide

variety of roles around the world, and could be

purchased under the guise of surveillance for

fighting drug trafficking,, forest fires, or illegal

immigration. A state could then disassemble them

for parts or mod@ them for weapon-delivery .121

UAVs or “target drones” could also be made

from expendable auto-piloted aircraft programmed

for one-way missions.

UAVs offer many of the characteristics of

cruise missiles.122 However, most of them do not

have suitable payload or range to be useful for

carrying weapons of mass destruction. For instance, many are intended for short range reconnaissance missions, carrying sensor-payloads of

20 to 40 kg to ranges of less than 100 km.123

Others are designed as target or harassment

drones or for long endurance flight, but with

payloads well under 100 kg. Nevertheless, longer

range systems able to carry several hundred

kilograms to ranges of several hundred kilometers

have been designed in recent years by a number

of companies.124

One example is the Teledyne-Ryan Model 350,

built under contract in the United States as a

surveillance platform. This UAV has a wingspan

and length of only 3.2 m and 5 m, respectively,

making it hard for enemy air defenses to detect .l25

Its turbojet engine can achieve speeds of Mach 0.9

and carry a 146-kg payload to a range of 1,500 km

and back. It is based on an earlier model (Model

324, or “Scarab”) sold to the Egyptian armed

forces in 1988 for reconnaissance purposes.126

Although the Scarab can carry 113 kg to a range

of 1,000 km and back, it could not carry payloads

exceeding the 500 kg MTCR threshold without

substantial redesign and in-field modification. Its

In Bo~ tie Ufited Stites and tie former Soviet Union have produced nuc/ear-armed ASCMS for their own fkds, but each ~now

committed to removing them.

121 me most sucWss~ ~m~t use of UAVs by developing countries was in the 1982 Israeli action against Syrian fdr defenses k tie Bek

Wiley in Ubanon. There, Israeli- ttnd U.S.-designed UAVS were used for both reconnaissance and harassment. UAVS caused Syrian SAM

air-defense batteries to trigger their fire control radar, leaving the SAMS open to Israeli anti-radiation missiles without exposing Israeli aircraft

to the air defenses. The Syrians lost 19 out of 20 SAM batteries and 86 combat aircraft while Israel lost one combat aircraft. Sir Michael

Armitage, Unmanned Aircraji, Bras.rey’s Air Power, Volume 3, op. cit., footnote 108, pp. 854.

122 For x, in fact, some UAVS are speciflcal.ly designed to mimic the characteristics of cruise missiles. Don Flamm, “Defense

‘Ikchnology: Unmann MI Aerial Vehicles,” Asian Defense Journal, Augus4 1991, p. 27.

IZ see, for ~-pie, E.R. Hoot[In ~d Kenne~ Munso~ eds., Jane’s Battlefield Surveillance Systems, 3rd edition, ~99~-92 (SurreY, ~:

Jane’s Information Group, 1991).

IM Stefa&is@eyner, “Chumnt Developments in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,’ ‘ArtiInternutional, vol. 14, October/November, 1990,

pp. 78-80.

1~ ~cti~ data for tie Model 350 is taken from Jane’ sBattl@ieid Surveillance Systems, op. cit., footnote 123, p. 229; ~d Gekenheyner,

‘‘Current Developments in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” op. cit., footnote 124, pp. 80-3.

lx me swab is btit almost en~ely of low rdw-cmw-Wtion Kwlw-e~xy composites and can be progrfimmtxl for long range @dance

using a satellite navigation system and up to 100 waypoints. Don Flamm, ‘Defense ‘lkd.nology: Unmann ed Aerial Vehicles,’ op. cit., footnote

122, p. 28.
Chapter 5–The Proliferation of Delivery Systems | 255

export to Egypt was only approved by the United

States subject to a U.S.-Egypt bilateral agreement

restricting its use to reconnaissance within Egypt,

forbidding modification, and giving the United

States the right to inspect the inventory on short

notice. 127

Other examples of UAVs that could be given

ground-attack capabilities include indigenously

produced target drones or small RPVs built by

Argentina, India, Iran, and Iraq. 128 Many of these

have payloads well under 100 kg, however.

| Monitoring Cruise Missile Acquisition

Given the number of options available for their

acquisition, cruise missiles will be extremely

difficult to monitor in the developing world.

Some cruise-missile related technologies-for

example, GPS receivers—have so many legitimate uses that commercial sales receive little

notice. Even UAV systems that require export

notification or licensing have both civilian and

military uses completely unrelated to the delivery

of weapons of mass destruction, and whose

promotion may well be in the interest of the

exporting nation.

Indigenous production or cannibalization of

ASCMs to acquire cruise missiles would be

difficult to detect.129 Although flight tests would

certainly be required, cruise missiles have few

readily identifiable inflight observables; they

expel only modest amounts of heat and remain

well within the atmosphere. Low-flying cruise

missiles are difficult to detect even in wartime,

when airspace is carefully monitored, illustrating

the difficulty of detecting covert tests. The

proliferation of at least short range cruise missiles

could therefore prove to be an intractable problem

over the next decade or so. Fortunately, longer

range land-attack systems are not yet available to

proliferant countries and are still amenable to

some measure of control through the MTCR.

127 ~jor Paticlc lvfichclso~ Egypt country director, OffIce of the Secretary of DefeIISe, private cOmmunimtiOU Jme 2, 1993.

‘~ Roche, “Tactical Aircraft. . .,” op. cit., footnote 93, p. 11.

129 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, A40niron”ng Limits on Sea-LuunchedCruise Missiles, OTA-ISC-5 13

(Washington+ DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1992), pp. 11,21.
Index

Accuracy of delivery systems, 211

Acetylcholinesterase

biomarker technique, 68-69

inhibition test, 61, 108

ACM. See Advanced Cruise Missile

Active monitoring, 65-68

Ad Hoc Group of Government Experts, 75

Advanced Cruise Missile, 245

Aerodynamic enrichment processes, 6, 126, 178

Aerosols

description, 33

effect of particle size, 96

physical stabilization, 96-97

technical hurdles involved in BW dissemination, 95

types of attacks, 97-99

Air Launched Cruise Missile, 245

Air-sampling systems, 65-66

Aircraft. See Combat aircraft

Airframe technology, 247, 249-250

ALCM. See Air Launched Cruise Missile

Alkylation, 26,27,44-45,56

American Type Culture Collection, 84

Anthrax, 78-79,84,88,92,93

Antiagglomerants, 33

Antiship cruise missiles

availability, 251-254

propulsion technology, 249-250

 Antitactical ballistic missile systems, 231

Area aerosol attacks, 97-98

Argentina, 224-225

Argonne National Laboratory, 159

Arrow interceptors, 232

Artillery shells, 34

Asahi ion-exchange process, 178

ASCMs. See Antiship cruise missiles

ATBMs. See Antitactical ballistic missile systems

ATCC. See American Type Culture Collection

Atmospheric nuclear tests, 153

Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation, 178-179

Australia Group, 29-31

AVLIS. See Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation

Bacillus thuringiensis, 93-94, 102

Bacteria

description, 77-79

production of bacterial agents, 87-89

Ballistic missiles

classification, 207, 211

controI systems, 228-230

monitoring, 233-235

obtaining technology, 217-228

propulsion technologies, 213-217

status of proliferation, 208-213

summary, 235

weaponization and deployment, 228-233

Batch recycling, 177

Bayer, 55

Becker nozzle process, 146-149

BIGEYE spray bomb, 34

Binary CW agent production, 57-58

Binary CW munitions, 34-35

Bioassays, 61, 108

Biochemical signatures for BTW agents, 106, 108-109

Biological and toxin weapons

acquiring capability, 82-86

agents for military use, 76-82

implications of new technology, 10-11

indicators of agent production, 99-113

integration with delivery systems, 94-99

large-scale production, 8-9,86-93

military implications of genetic engineering, 113-117

monitoring production, 9-10

I 257
258 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

overview, 71-73

stabilization of agents, 93-94

summary, 73-76

technical hurdles for program, 2-3

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 10,72,74-75

Biomarkers, 50,68-69, 106

Bioregulators, 116-117

Biosafety Level, 91-92

Biosensors, 61, 108

BL. See Biosafety Level

Black-market proliferation, 4

Blood agents, 18

Boosting, 175

Botulinal toxin, 80

Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor, 156-157

Brucellosis, 80,88

BTW. See Biological and toxin weapons

Bulk-handling facilities, 188

Bunkers

BTW agent storage, 105, 107

CW agent storage, 50-51

Bursting CW munitions, 34

Bush administration, 74-75

BWC. See Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

C/A-code. See Coarse/Acquisition

Calutrons, 144, 179

Camouflage, concealment, and deception, 41, 44, 52-53,

64-65, 102, 112-113, 168-169

CANDU-type reactors, 188

Carbamates, 28

Carriers for CW agents, 32

Cascades, 140, 145

CBUs. See Cluster-bomb units

CC&D. See Camouflage, concealment, and deception

Centers for Disease Control, 107

Centrifuge technology, 126, 177

CEP. See Circular Error Probable

Chemex process, 178

Chemical additives

biological and toxin agents, 93-94

chemical weapon agents, 32-33

Chemical exchange enrichment processes, 126, 178

chemical Reaction by Isotopic Selective Activation, 178

chemical warfare. See chemical weapons

Chemical weapon signatures

biomarkers, 68-69

near-site monitoring techniques, 65-68

onsite inspection techniques, 48-49, 60-65

overview of techniques for detection and analysis, 59-60

remote monitoring techniques, 65-68

chemical weapons

acquisition, 18-21

alternative proliferation pathways, 17-18,53-58

chemical additives, 32-33

clandestine production, 49-50

cluster bombs, 35

containment, 31-32

filling operations, 33

implications of new technology, 27-28

indicators of proliferation activities, 16-17, 36-53

missile delivery systems, 35-36

monitoring proliferation, 7-8

munitions design, 33-35

nerve agents, 23-27

overview, 15-16

precursor chemicals, 28-31

production, 6-7

sulfur mustard, 21-23

summary, 16-18

technical hurdles for program, 2-3

waste treatment, 31-32

Chemical Weapons Convention, 15,28,37,59

Chimaeric toxins, 116

China, 218-219,232,252-253

Choking agents, 18

Circular Error Probable, 211

Civilian nuclear research programs, 153. See also Nuclear

fuel cycle

Clean rooms, 92

cloning, 90

Clostridium botulinum toxin, 80

Cluster-bomb units, 98-99

Cluster bombs, 35

Cluster warheads, 36

Coarse/Acquisition code, 248-249

Combat aircraft

in countries of proliferation concern, 235-237

for delivering weapons of mass destruction, 241-244

proliferations summary, 244

trade in weapon-capable aircraft, 236, 238-241

Command guidance, 246

Commercial plant conversion to CW production, 54-57

Computer simulation of nuclear weapons, 125, 150-152

Concealment. See Camouflage, concealment, and deception

Condor II program, 224-225

CONSEN Group, 224

Containment measures

biological and toxic agents, 91-93, 104-106

chemical weapon agents, 31-32

Cooperative monitoring regime for CW, 37

Corrosion-resistant materials, 26,4546

Country tabulations

ballistic missile production capabilities, 212

ballistic missile programs, 208-210

combat aircraft capabilities, 242-243

combat aircraft inventories, 237

combat aircraft orders, 240-241

cruise missile and ASCM programs, 253

enrichment capabilities, 148

MTCR participants, 200

nuclear reactors in, 182

plutonium and uranium recycling policies, 141

of proliferation concern, 239

reprocessing capabilities, 139
Index I 259

CRISLA. See Chemical Reaction by Isotopic Selective

Activation

Critical mass, 5, 173

Criticality tests, 166

Cruise missiles

availability, 251-254

chemical weapon delivery system, 36

defined, 244

indigenous development, 245-251

monitoring acquisition, 255

Cuba, 107

CW. See Chemical weapons

CWC. See Chemical Weapons Convention

Cyanation, 25

Deception strategies for CW production, 64-65

Decoupled nuclear tests, 169-170

Dedicated CW production facilities, 54

Deep underground wells, 48

Defectors, 38

Defense Intelligence Agency, 114

Defense penetration, 205-206

Delivery systems

availability, 199-200

ballistic missiles, 207-235

barriers to proliferation, 12

chemical weapons, 35-36

combat aircraft, 235-244

cruise missiles, 244-255

effectiveness, 198-199, 201-207

monitoring, 12-13, 201, 233-234, 255

overview, 11-12, 197-198

signatures, 107, 201

summary, 198-202

technological barriers to proliferation, 200

unmanned aerial vehicles, 244-255

Designer decontamination, 64

DIAL. See Differential absorption lidar

Diatoms, 68

Differential absorption lidar, 67

Dimethyl methylphosphonate, 29,55, 62-64

Distillation, 26

Diversion of nuclear materials, 4, 130-131, 135, 183-190

DMMP. See Dimethyl methylphosphonate

DNA adducts, 69

Dual-use export controls (nuclear)

guidelines, 191-192

items to be controlled, 192-194

potential limitations of the guidelines, 195

strengths of the guidelines, 194

Dual-use materials

biological and toxic agents, 84-86

chemicals, 29

Dusty mustard, 32

Economic dislocations, 40

Effluent analysis, 49

Egypt, 224-225,254-255

Electromagnetic isotope separators, 144

Electromagnetic enrichment processes, 179-180

Electron-capture detector, 61

ELISA. See Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay

EMIS, See Electromagnetic isotope separators

Enrichment technologies

aerodynamic processes, 126, 178

chemical exchange processes, 126, 178

description, 126-127, 140-149, 177-180

electromagnetic processes, 179-180

gas centrifuge, 126, 177

gaseous diffusion, 126-127, 177

implications of new technologies, 158

laser processes, 126, 178-179

properties of uranium, 176-177

thermal diffusion, 177

Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, 61

Epidemic Intelligence Service, 107

Epidemiological analysis, 110-113

Explosive munitions for BTW delivery, 98

Export controls. See Australia Group, Dual-use export

controls

External signatures

biological and toxin weapons, 103-104

chemical weapons, 38-44

False positives, 62-64

Filling operations, 33

Finland, 59

Fission devices, 173

Flame photometric detector, 61

Former Soviet Union

anthrax outbreak, 103

biological weapon program, 72

chemical weapon program, 21, 24, 27, 31-32, 35

cruise missiles, 252-253

Glonass, 200,249

nuclear material leakage, 134-135

potential diversion of nuclear weapons, 127-128

signatures of biological warfare, 101

use of U.S. nuclear design information, 154

Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy, 67

France, 132, 139-141, 151, 158-159, 178,222,248,251-253

Freeze-drying, 93

Freezing-point depressants, 32

FTTR. See Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy

Fuel fraction, 227

Fugitive emissions from CW plants, 65-66

Fungi, 80

Fusion weapons, 122, 175

Fuzing, 161

G-series nerve agents, 23-24

GA. See Tabun

Gas centrifuge technologies, 6, 177

Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, 60-62

Gaseous diffusion technologies, 126-127, 177

GB. See Sarin
260 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

GC/MS. See Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry

GD. See Soman

Genetic analysis, 108

Genetic engineering

increasing controllability of microbial agents, 114-117

modified toxins and bioregulators, 116-117

possibility of novel BTW agents, 113-114

Genetic fingerprinting, 109

Germany, 24,25,219-222,229,245

Global Navigation Satellite System, 200,251

Global Positioning System, 167,200,229, 233,247-251

Glonass. See Global Navigation Satellite System

GPS, See Global Positioning System

Guidance systems, 228-230,233,246

Gun-type nuclear weapons, 166, 174

H. See Sulfur mustard

Hanta virus, 111

Hastelloy, 45

HC1. See Hydrochloric acid

HE testing. See High explosive testing

Helikon process, 146-149

HEU. See Highly enriched uranium

HF. See Hydrogen fluoride

High explosive testing, 165-166

High-performance liquid chromatography, 61

Highly enriched uranium, 1351-136. See also Uranium

Hollow-fiber technology, 89-90

HPLC. See High-performance liquid chromatography

Human intelligence

biological and toxin weapons, 101

chemical weapons, 38

Hydrochloric acid, 25-26

Hydrodynamic tests, 152

Hydrogen fluoride, 25-26

Hydronuclear tests, 152, 153

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBMs. See Intercontinental ballistic missiles

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, 50

IFR. See Integral fast reactor

Imhausen-Chemie, 42,43

Immunological techniques, 108

Implosion physics, 165-166

India

missile expertise, 222

unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, 157

Inertial guidance, 246

INF Treaty, See Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

INFCIRC/153 and /66 safeguards agreements, 183, 185

Inmarsat, 249

Integral fast reactor, 159-160

Integrated Operational Nuclear Detection System, 167, 169

Integrative monitoring, 65-68

Intercontinental ballistic missiles, 207, 225-227

Intermediate range ballistic missiles, 225-226

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 244

Internal production signatures, 44-49

International Atomic Energy Agency

safeguards, 4, 122-124, 184-190

significant quantities of nuclear material, 174, 184

Ion cyclotron resonance, 179-180

Ion-exchange enrichment, 126, 142-143, 147-148, 178

IONDS. See Integrated Operational Nuclear Detection

System

Iran-Iraq War. See Iraq, use of chemical weapons

Iraq

attempts to conceal nuclear signatures, 168-169

back-integration, 31

binary munitions, 35

containment of biological weapons, 92

cost of nuclear weapon research, 155

missile programs, 220-221

nuclear design efforts, 150-151

sarin production, 26

statements of nuclear intention, 165

uranium production, 4

use of chemical weapons, 15, 16, 21, 34

IRBMs, See Intermediate range ballistic missiles

Israel, 157,252-253

Italy, 252-253

Japan

Asahi ion-exchange process, 178

biological weapon development in WW II, 88,92

plutonium and uranium recycle policies, 141

shipments of separated plutonium, 134

Japan Steel Works, 42

Karl Kolb firm, 47

LAP. See Laser-Assisted Processes

Laser-Assisted Processes, 178

Laser-based sensing techniques, 67

Laser isotope separation, 6, 126, 178-179

Laser spectroscopy, 49, See also Remote spectroscopy

LEU. See Low-enriched uranium

Libya, 42-44

Lidar, 67

Light-water reactors, 138, 159

Liquid-fueled propulsion, 214-215

Liquid-metal fast breeder reactors, 159

LIS, See Laser isotope separation

LMFBRs. See Liquid-metal fast breeder reactors

Long range missiles, 225-227

Low-enriched uranium, 131

LWRs. See Light-water reactors

Lyophilization, 93

Mass spectrometry, 60-61, 109

Material accountancy, 162

Material-unaccounted-for, 162

Materials balance, 39

Medium range ballistic missiles, 225-226

Microbial agents, military implications, 114-116

Microencapsulation, 94
——-——

Index | 261

Middle East, 218-219

Missile delivery systems. See Ballistic missiles; Cruise

missiles, Delivery systems

Missile Technology Control Regime, 5, 11, 12, 199-200

MLIS. See Molecular-vapor Laser Isotope Separation

MLRS. See Multiple Launch Rocket System

Modified toxins, 116

Molecular-vapor Laser Isotope Separation, 142-143, 147-

148, 178-179

MRBMs. See Medium range ballistic missiles

MTCR. See Missile Technology Control Regime

MUF. See Material-unaccounted-for

Multiple Launch Rocket System, 34

Multipurpose chemical plants, 56-57

Munitions

biological and toxic agents, 98-99

chemical weapons agents, 33-35

storage, 50-51

Mustard gas. See Sulfur mustard

Mycotoxins, 81

National Technical Means, 169

Navigation systems, 228-230

NAVSTAR. See Global Positioning System

NDA. See Nondestructive assays

NDE. See Nondestructive evaluation methods

Near-site monitoring techniques, 49,65-68

Nerve agents

costs of production, 27

description, 18, 23-24

production, 24-26

technical hurdles, 26-27

Neutron background measurements, 166-167

Neutron initiators, 167

NMR. See Nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy

NNWS. See Non-nuclear-weapon state parties

Noble gases release, 164

Non-nuclear-weapon state parties, 122

Noncooperative monitoring regime for CW, 37

Nondestructive assays of nuclear materials, 186

Nondestructive evaluation methods of CW munitions, 50-51

Nonprotein toxins

description, 81-82

production of, 90-91

North Korea

development of production reactor, 157

IAEA inspections, 186

missile sales, 218

Scud missiles, 220

Noske-Haeser, 46

Novel agents, 113-114

NPT. See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSG. See Nuclear Suppliers Group

NTM. See National Technical Means

Nuclear fuel cycle

civilian nuclear research program, 153

IAEA safeguards, 184-190

number of installations under IAEA safeguards, 183

power and research reactors around the world, 181, 182

Nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, 61

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 5, 122-124, 137, 185

Nuclear Suppliers Group, 125, 191

Nuclear testing, 122, 152-153, 167, 169-171

Nuclear weapon proliferation

acquiring nuclear weapon capability, 120, 127-130

components and design of weapons, 173-175

country-dependent factors, 119-120

difficulty and detectability, 126-127

effects of nuclear weapons, 175

glossary of nuclear materials, 121

implications of different technologies, 6

international controls, 122-126, 191-195

material production, 3-4

monitoring, 5-6

from nuclear materials to nuclear weapons, 149-161

signatures of proliferation activities, 161-171

sources of nuclear materials, 129-149

stages involved in manufacturing nuclear weapons, 120,

122

technical barriers, 2-3, 5

Onsite inspection techniques for CW, 60-65

Optical detection systems for CW, 66-68

P-code. See Precision Service

Pakistan, 157

PALS. See Permissive action links

Passive monitoring for CW, 65-68

Patriot missiles, 231

Payload

capacities, 203-204, 208-210

defined, 211

PCR. See Polymerase chain reaction

Penetrant chemicals, 28

Permissive action links, 128

Petrochemical-3, 168

Phosphorus-methyl bond, 62

Phosphorus oxychloride, 29

Physical containment of BTW agents, 104-106

PINS. See Portable Isotope Neutron Spectroscopy

Plant conversion to CW production, 54-57

Plant design for BTW production, 104

Plasma centrifuge separation, 180

Plutonium

estimated material conversion time for components, 185

integral fast reactor fuel cycle, 159-160

isotopic purification, 159

liquid-metal fast breeder reactors, 159

materials acquisition, 162, 163

minimum-cost program, 156-158

production, 3-4, 138

reactor-grade, 131-132, 133

recycling policies, 141

reprocessing facilities, 138-140

weapon-grade, 132, 134

Point aerosol attacks for BTW, 98-99
262 I Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction

Pollution-control equipment, 46-47

Polymerase chain reaction, 108-109

Portable Isotope Neutron Spectroscopy for CW detection,

50-51

Precision Service, 248

Precursors, chemical weapons, 28-31

Preparatory Commission for CWC, 59

Pressurized BTW munitions, 98

Production process equipment, chemical weapons, 44-45

Production signatures

biological and toxin weapons, 103-106, 112-113

chemical weapons, 38-49, 52-53

nuclear weapons, 162-164, 167

Proliferation indicators

biological and toxin agents, 99-113

chemical weapons, 16-17, 36-37

CW weaponization and testing signatures, 51-53

detecting clandestine CW production, 49-50

external CW production signatures, 38-44

internal CW production signatures, 44-49

nuclear weapons, 161-171

research and development signatures, 37-38

storage of agents and munitions, 50-51

Propulsion technologies, 213-217, 247,249-250

Protein toxins

description, 80-81

production of, 90-91

Pugwash, 39

Raman spectroscopy, 6 7

Range of delivery systems, 2012-203,208-210,242-243, 253

Raytheon Company, 231

RBMK-type reactors, 188

Reactor-grade plutonium, 131-132, 133

Real-time monitoring for CW production, 65-68

Reentry vehicles, 161,222-22,3,225

Remote monitoring techniques for CW production, 65-68

Remotely piloted vehicles, 36, 252,255

Reprocessing, 131-133, 138-140, 164

Research and development

biological and toxin weapon signatures, 100-101

chemical weapons production, 37-38

Restriction-fragment length polymorphism, 109

Reverse engineering for ballistic missiles, 220

RFLP. See Restriction-fragment length polymorphism

RGPu. See Reactor-grade plutonium

Rhodesia, 110

Ricin, 80-81

Rickettsiae

description, 79

production of, 89-90

RPVs. See Remotely piloted vehicles

Russia. See Former Soviet Union

RV. See Reentry vehicles

Safeguards Implementation Report, 185

Safety equipment for CW production, 46-47

SAR. See Synthetic-aperture radar

Sarin, 25-26

Saxitoxin, 81

Scarab unmanned aerial vehicle, 254-255

Scientific publications tracking

biological and toxin weapons, 100-101

chemical weapon production, 37-38

nuclear weapon design, 164-165

Scud missiles

export of, 208-210, 212

Iraq, 206,220-221

Patriot defense, 231

SEB. See Staphylococcus enterotoxin B

Second Review Conference for BWC, 74

Seismic signature, 169-170

Self reference, 262

Separated plutonium

Japanese shipments, 134

and reprocessing plants, 132, 134

Separation factor, 140, 143, 176

Separative work units, 141

Short range ballistic missiles, 219-222,224-226

Signatures, See Chemical signatures, Production signatures,

Proliferation indicators, Seismic signatures, Testing

signatures, Visual signatures

Significant quantities of nuclear material, 174, 184

Silica gels, 68

Single-purpose chemical plants, 55-56

SIR. See Safeguards Implementation Report

SLAM. See Standoff Land Attack Missile

Solid-fueled propulsion, 215-218

Solvent-extraction enrichment process, 126, 178

Soman, 25-26

Sorbent materials, 68

South Africa, 201-202

South African Atomic Energy Corporation, 179

Soviet Union. See Former Soviet Union

Space-launch vehicles, 227-228

Spent-fuel reprocessing. See Reprocessing

Sprays, 33

SRBMs. See Short range ballistic missiles

Stabilizers, 32

Stack emissions from CW plants, 65-66

Staging for ballistic missiles, 226

Standoff Land Attack Missile, 246

Staphylococcus enterotoxin B, 80

Storage bunkers. See Bunkers

Sulfur mustard

dusty mustard, 32

production, 21-23

SWUs. See Separative work units

Synthetic-aperture radar, 41

Tabun, 24-25

Tactical ballistic missiles, 231

Tamper, 173, 174

Target drones, 254-255

TBMs. See Tactical ballistic missiles

Teledyne-Ryan Model 350,254
Index I 263

TELs. See Transporter-erector-launchers

TERCOM. See Terrain Contour Matching

Terrain Contour Matching, 246-247

Testing signatures

biological and toxin weapons, 102-103

chemical munitions, 51-53

nuclear weapons, 165-167, 169-171

THAAD. See Theater high-altitude area defense interceptor

Theater high-altitude area defense interceptor, 231-232

Thermal diffusion, 177

Thermonuclear weapons, 122, 175

Thickeners, 32

Thiodiglycol, 22-23

Third Review Conference for the BWC, 74

Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 153

Tomahawk cruise missiles, 205

Toxin agents. See Biological and toxin weapons, Toxins

Toxins

analysis, 109

description, 80-82

genetically engineered, 116

production of, 90-91

Transporter-erector-launchers, 230

Treaty of Tlatelolco, 129

Trichothecene mycotoxins, 81

Tularemia, 77-78

UAVs. See Unmanned aerial vehicles

U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, 151

Underground nuclear tests, 170. See also Nuclear testing

United Kingdom

biological weapon activities, 88,98-99

chemical weapon activities, 24

delivery system activities, 252-253

nucleari weapon material activities, 139-140

United States

biological weapon activities, 73, 77,80,88,98-99, 101

chemical weapon activities, 18, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 34,

35-36,57

delivery system activities, 35-36, 98-99, 222, 231-232,

252-253

nuclear weapon or weapon material activities, 135,

150-151, 170

Unmanned aerial vehicles

availability, 254-255

description, 244-245

indigenous development, 245-251

Uranium

acquisition, 137-138

costs for small-scale enrichment facility, 158

enrichment technologies, 140-149, 177-180

estimated material conversion time for components, 185

implications of new enrichment technologies, 158

materials acquisition signatures, 162-163

production, 3-4

properties of, 176-177

recycling policies, 141

special requirements for enrichment technologies, 147

status of enrichment technologies by country, 148

URENCO consortium, 141, 144

U.S. Army MedicaI Research Institute of Chemical Defense,

68

U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 134

U.S.S.R. See Former Soviet Union

V-2 missile, 219-220,222

V-series nerve agents, 24

VEREX. See Verification experts group for the B WC

Verification experts group for the BWC, 75

Vesicants, See also Sulfur mustard

description, 18

Victor Meyer-Clarke Process, 22

Viruses

description, 79-80

production of viral agents, 89-90

Visual signatures

biological and toxin weapons, 103-104

chemical weapons production, 40-44

nuclear weapon development, 166, 167, 169

testing of chemical munitions, 51

VX, 26

Waste disposal, 47-48

Waste lagoons, 47

Waste treatment, 31-32

Weapon-grade plutonium, 132, 134

Weaponization

chemical weapons agents, 32-36

delivery systems, 228-230

nuclear devices, 160-161

signatures, 51-53, 102-103

World Health Organization, 110

World War II

anthrax cluster bombs, 98-99

pathogenic bacteria research, 88

Yellowcake, 137

Yellow rain, 81-82

Zeolites, 68