IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jackson Township Supervisors :

:

v. : No. 1942 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: November 14, 2017

Estate of Catherine Gresh, :

Dennis Gresh, Administrator, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: December 12, 2017

The Estate of Catherine Gresh, Dennis Gresh, Administrator (Gresh),

appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County (trial court) 

that found Gresh in contempt of court and sentenced him to 60 days in county jail, 

which would be Gresh’s second period of confinement in this long-running 

controversy dating to 2011. The trial court’s order stayed the 60-day jail sentence 

to allow Gresh to satisfy several purge conditions and scheduled a subsequent 

hearing to determine if Gresh did so. Upon review, we quash Gresh’s appeal as 

interlocutory.

I. Background

This case was previously before this Court in 2015. See Jackson Twp. 

Supervisors v. Estate of Gresh (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1970 C.D. 2014, filed July 9, 

2015), 2015 WL 5457012 (unreported) (Gresh I). In Gresh I, we explained that 
2

Gresh is the administrator of his mother’s estate, which includes 2.5 acres of land 

(property) in Jackson Township’s (Township) agricultural district.

In 2011, the Township filed a complaint seeking an injunction against 

Gresh for alleged violations of various Township ordinances governing storage and 

disposal of solid waste, prohibitions on maintaining nuisances, and zoning. 

Specifically, the Township alleged the property contains the following offending 

items: business storage or warehousing of equipment; a partially collapsed 

residence; unregistered and uninspected motor vehicles in various states of disrepair; 

scrap metal; lumber; restaurant equipment and other junk; and, a temporary storage 

building. The Township described the property as an unlicensed junkyard and a 

nuisance.

After an evidentiary hearing and a site view, the trial court issued an 

order in August 2011 directing Gresh to comply with the ordinances and remove the 

offending items from the property by October 2011. When Gresh did not comply, 

the Township filed a contempt petition in November 2011. After a hearing, the trial 

court found Gresh in contempt, but it imposed no penalty based on the fact that Gresh 

made some progress to comply. The trial court allowed Gresh to purge himself of 

the contempt by completing his efforts to comply with the trial court’s order.

In late-December 2011, the Township filed a second petition for 

contempt. After an evidentiary hearing in January 2012, the trial court determined 

Gresh did not purge himself of contempt, and it sentenced him to a week in county 

jail. The trial court deferred the sentence pending a view of the property. 
3

Additionally, the trial court ordered Gresh to: properly dispose of certain vehicles 

on the property; move other vehicles 30 feet away from the road; and, provide titles 

and current registrations for the vehicles.

In September 2012, the trial court held a status of contempt hearing to 

determine whether Gresh made any compliance progress. Gresh did not appear. The 

trial court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Authorities apprehended Gresh in 

June 2014. The trial court held a hearing in July 2014, following which Gresh was 

found to have served his sentence imposed in January 2012. Gresh was ordered to 

come into compliance with the trial court’s prior order by July 31, 2014 to avoid 

further contempt proceedings.

In September 2014, the trial court held a contempt hearing. At the 

hearing, counsel for the parties argued their positions. Gresh offered to present 

evidence to show compliance efforts. More particularly, he attempted to show 

registrations for the vehicles on the property, construction of a storage building on 

the property, and a building permit application to construct another storage structure 

on the property. However, the trial court did not receive any sworn testimony or 

evidence. Counsel for the Township disputed full compliance, but attested that 

Gresh made significant progress. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the trial court 

entered a contempt order. Gresh appealed to this Court.

On appeal, in Gresh I, this Court determined that the trial court entered 

its contempt finding after hearing oral argument, without affording Gresh the 

opportunity to testify and present other evidence. Further, the trial court did not 
4

make any factual findings in support of its order or otherwise identify Gresh’s 

contemptuous conduct. We held the trial court abused its discretion by finding Gresh 

in contempt without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Thus, we vacated the trial 

court’s determination of civil contempt and remanded for an evidentiary hearing and 

a decision that contained findings of fact. See Gresh I.

On remand, the trial court held evidentiary hearings in September 2015 

and February 2016. At these hearings, the Township presented evidence that: Gresh 

continued to store unregistered vehicles on the property; Gresh continued to store 

junked vehicles and parts on the property; Gresh stored lawnmowers and other items 

in the open, underneath a tractor-trailer; a refrigerator trailer that Gresh indicated in 

a 2014 conference would be removed was still present and used as storage; permits 

were issued to Gresh to construct storage sheds and fencing; one unapproved shed 

was built too close to the road; a section of fencing was installed along the road; 

items could be seen sticking out above the fence; bottles, cans and other refuse were 

accumulating on the property; and, vehicles (refrigerator trailer, moss covered 

camper, several pickup trucks, and a van) were stored closer to the road than 

permitted by Section 506 of the Township Ordinance. The Township submitted 

photographs to show each of these alleged violations.

For his part, Gresh testified: he occasionally lives at the residence on 

the property; he uses the property to store items for a food concession business he 

operates with his daughter who lives in West Virginia; he uses one white trailer in 

that business; and, the refrigerator trailer was not moved in two years since he moved 
5

it further from the road. Gresh provided West Virginia registrations for the 

refrigerator trailer, camper, orange van, red van, and various other vehicles.

Ultimately, the trial court entered an order: finding Gresh in contempt 

for failing to comply with the trial court’s prior orders directing the cleanup of the 

property; setting purge conditions; and, imposing a 60-day jail sentence that was 

stayed to afford Gresh an opportunity to purge the contempt. The trial court’s order 

set forth the following purge conditions:

1) Any items stored on the property must be stored in 

permanent structures. No items may be stored in 

temporary structures such as tents or in mobile structures 

such as tractor-trailers, vans, or other motor vehicles.

2) [Gresh] shall obtain any necessary permits for the 

construction of permanent storage sheds or installation of 

fencing and comply with all applicable building codes.

3) [Gresh] shall remove from the property:

i. The refrigerator tractor-trailer.

ii. Any tractor-trailer, tent, or other temporary 

structure or vehicle being used for storage.

iii. Any vehicle or tractor-trailer that is not regularly 

used including the red van, the orange van, and the 

camper/recreational vehicle. Any vehicles that 

remain must be regularly used, have the registration 

kept with the vehicle for immediate inspection, and 

comply with [Vehicle Code] requirements for 

registration. See, 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 1301, 1303.

iv. All garbage including bottles, cans, and other 

refuse.
6

v. All discarded, abandoned, junked, or wrecked 

vehicles and any parts thereof.

4) [Gresh] shall fully comply with all [Township] 

Ordinances and specifically but not limited to [Township] 

Ordinances Numbers 12 (related to Junkyards), 87 (related 

to Solid Waste), and 118 sections 504 and 506.

Tr. Ct. Order 11/1/16, at 1-2. The trial court also scheduled a hearing for January 

18, 2017 to determine if Gresh purged himself of the contempt.

Gresh appealed to this Court, and the trial court directed him to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, which he did.

The trial court subsequently issued an opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 

1925(a). Before addressing Gresh’s substantive claims, the trial court stated, it had 

to address two procedural issues: (1) whether its finding of contempt constituted

civil or criminal contempt; and, (2) whether the order appealed from was a final, 

appealable order.

Because resolution of the type of contempt was necessary before it 

could be ascertained whether its order was final, the trial court explained, it would 

address that issue first. To that end, the determination of whether a particular order 

contemplates civil or criminal contempt is critical, as each classification confers 

distinct procedural rights on a defendant. Kramer v. Kelly, 401 A.2d 799 (Pa. Super. 

1979). There is nothing inherent to a contemptuous act or refusal to act that classifies 

the act itself as “criminal” or “civil.” Diamond v. Diamond, 715 A.2d 1190, 1194 

(Pa. Super. 1998). The distinction between criminal and civil contempt is rather a 

distinction between two permissible judicial responses to contumacious behavior. 
7

Id. These judicial responses are classified according to the dominant purpose of the 

court. Id.

Thus, if the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority 

of the court and to protect the interests of the general public, it is a proceeding for 

criminal contempt. Knaus v. Knaus, 127 A.2d 669 (Pa. 1956). However, where the 

act of contempt complained of is the refusal to do or refrain from doing some act 

ordered or prohibited primarily for the benefit of a private party, proceedings to 

enforce compliance with the decree of the court are civil in nature. Id. The purpose 

of a civil contempt proceeding is remedial. Id. Judicial sanctions are employed to 

coerce a defendant into compliance with the court’s order, and in some instances, to 

compensate the complainant for losses sustained. Id. Further,

[t]he factors generally said to point to a civil 

contempt are these: (1) Where the complainant is a private 

person as opposed to the government or a governmental 

agency; (2) where the proceeding is entitled in the original 

injunction action and filed as a continuation thereof as 

opposed to a separate and independent action; (3) where 

holding the defendant in contempt affords relief to a 

private party; (4) where the relief requested is primarily 

for the benefit of the complainant; and (5) where the acts 

of contempt complained of are primarily civil in character 

and do not of themselves constitute crimes or conduct by 

the defendant so contumelious that the court is impelled to 

act on its own motion.

Id. at 673.

The trial court stated that consideration of these factors led to a 

conclusion that its order was a finding of civil contempt. The trial court explained 

that, while the action was filed in the name of the municipality to the benefit of all 
8

residents, it was initiated as an original action for injunctive relief, and Gresh’s acts 

of contempt were not criminal in nature. Moreover, it was clear from the record that 

the trial court’s dominant purpose was to coerce Gresh into compliance with the 

prior orders entered here as well as the Township ordinances rather than to vindicate 

the dignity and authority of the court. The trial court stated this conclusion was 

supported by this Court’s decision in Gresh I, which indicted that a prior order of 

contempt here was a finding of civil contempt. See also W. Pittston Borough v. LIW 

Investments, Inc., 119 A.3d 415 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015); Borough of Slatington v. 

Ziegler, 890 A.2d 8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

To sustain a finding of civil contempt, a complainant must prove certain 

distinct elements: (1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree 

that he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act constituting the contemnor’s 

violation was volitional; and, (3) that the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. 

Lachat v. Hinchcliffe, 769 A.2d 481 (Pa. Super. 2001). A person may not be held 

in contempt of court for failing to obey an order that is too vague or that cannot be 

enforced. Id.

When holding a person in civil contempt, a court must undertake: (1) a 

rule to show cause; (2) an answer and hearing; (3) a rule absolute; (4) a hearing on 

the contempt citation; and, (5) an adjudication of contempt. McMahon v. McMahon, 

706 A.2d 350 (Pa. Super. 1998). The procedure need not utilize the above 

nomenclature. Id. The procedure suffices if the contempt order was issued after a 

full hearing at which evidence was presented, so long as the trial court gave the 

contemnor an opportunity to purge himself of the contempt by fulfilling a condition. 
9

Id. The trial court must also set a date for a second hearing before finally 

adjudicating the contempt. Id. In cases of civil contempt, until the trial court 

actually imposes sanctions, an order declaring a party in contempt is interlocutory 

and not appealable. Sargent v. Sargent, 733 A.2d 640, 641 (Pa. Super. 1999).

Here, the trial court stated, its order includes: a finding of contempt; a 

sanction of incarceration for that contempt; an opportunity to purge; and, the 

scheduling of a hearing at which time there would be either a finding that Gresh 

purged the contempt or a final adjudication of contempt resulting in imposition of 

the sanction. The trial court opined that, because this is a case of civil contempt and 

the sanction, while established, was not yet imposed, Gresh’s appeal should be 

quashed as interlocutory.

Generally, an order finding a party in contempt is interlocutory and is 

not appealable unless it imposes sanctions. Wolanin v. Hashagen, 829 A.2d 331 (Pa. 

Super. 2003). An often litigated issue involves conditional sanction orders. Id. Such 

orders impose a sanction, but also include a purge condition, that is, a means of 

avoiding the sanction. Id. Thus,

[w]hen a contempt order that imposes sanctions also 

contains a purge condition, the purge condition does not 

transform a final, appealable order into one that is 

interlocutory. If that were the case, a contemnor in a civil 

contempt action would not be able to appeal the contempt 

order until he/she was incarcerated or had paid the sums 

owing as sanctions for contempt. It seems inappropriate 

and unnecessarily harsh for a contemnor in a civil 

contempt action to undergo incarceration or fulfill another 

sanction before this Court will accept an appeal of a 

contempt order. Rather, we conclude that, for a contempt 

order to be properly appealable, it is only necessary that 
10

the order impose sanctions on the alleged contemnor, and 

no further court order be required before the sanctions take 

effect.

Id. at 332-33 (citation omitted). As such, civil contempt orders imposing sanctions 

generally constitute final, appealable orders unless a further court order is required 

to make the sanctions effective. Rhoades v. Pryce, 874 A.2d 148 (Pa. Super. 2005); 

see also Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that civil contempt 

paired with sanctions constitutes final, appealable order); Diamond; Lachat.

Here, the trial court explained, its order expressly set an additional 

hearing to determine if Gresh purged himself of the contempt. Alternatively, if 

Gresh failed to purge himself, the sanction would be imposed and a date of 

incarceration determined. The trial court stated the initial order did not include a 

date certain that Gresh would be incarcerated and without a commitment order Gresh 

could not be subject to the sanction of incarceration. The trial court further explained 

the second hearing would determine if Gresh purged the contempt, in which case 

there would be no sanction, or that he failed to purge, in which case a second order 

would be necessary to establish the date he would need to report to the county jail to 

serve his sanction. Thus, the trial court stated, Gresh could not be subject to the

sanction prior to the occurrence of the subsequent hearing and court action. As a 

result, the trial court determined this was an interlocutory appeal that should be 

quashed.
11

Nevertheless, the trial court addressed each of Gresh’s allegations of 

error in the event this Court deemed the trial court’s November 1, 2016 order a final, 

appealable order.1 This matter is now before us for disposition.

II. Discussion

 

1 Specifically, Gresh first asserted the trial court erred in not specifying which conduct he 

engaged in that was contemptuous. In response, the trial court stated, while specific findings were 

not included in the trial court’s order, a review of the record as a whole made clear the basis for 

the finding, i.e., Gresh’s continued failure to comply with the trial court’s prior order and the 

relevant Township ordinances. The trial court further explained the purge conditions were all 

items Gresh was previously ordered to accomplish to comply with the relevant ordinances, and he 

consistently failed to do so.

Given the lengthy history of this case, the repeated property views, accompanied by 

discussions of what needed to be done, the numerous court orders addressing compliance, and the 

numerous hearings, the trial court stated, it would not accept Gresh’s position that he was unaware 

of the basis for the trial court’s finding of contempt. The trial court stated it was clear during the 

more than five years that this matter was before the trial court that Gresh had no desire to comply 

with the trial court’s orders or the Township ordinances. Because the trial court’s order was clear 

as to the basis for its finding of contempt, the trial court rejected Gresh’s assertion.

The trial court next considered Gresh’s contention that the trial court erred in setting purge 

conditions in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Responding to this argument the trial court 

stated, the law is well-established that “[c]ourts possess an inherent power to enforce their orders 

by way of the power of contempt.” Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Cromwell Twp., Huntingdon Cnty., 

32 A.3d 639, 653 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). Further, “[c]ourts have broad discretion in 

fashioning and administering a remedy for civil contempt.” Mulligan v. Piczon, 739 A.2d 605, 

611 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), aff’d, 779 A.2d 1143 (Pa. 2001).

Here, the trial court explained, a review of the purge conditions revealed nothing arbitrary 

or capricious. Each condition is a requirement of local ordinance or state law. Further, each

condition is clear in what it requires and would leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable person 

of the conduct necessary to comply. Also, while certain vehicles were identified only by type or

color, there was no uncertainty as to which vehicles were at issue as the vehicles referenced were 

the only ones of their type on the property.

As to Gresh’s third contention, that the trial court erred in determining the property was 

subject to the Township ordinances when it should be treated as a nonconforming use as it was 

previously used for commercial activity, the trial court explained this issue was not raised at the 

hearings after the remand in Gresh I. As such, Gresh did not preserve this issue. Further, the trial 

court stated, it previously rejected this argument, and Gresh did not timely appeal that decision

.
12

Gresh raises three issues on appeal.2 As a preliminary matter, however, 

the Township argues there is a threshold issue as to whether this Court has 

jurisdiction over Gresh’s appeal.

To that end, the Township points out that on November 1, 2016, the 

trial court issued its order finding Gresh in contempt of prior court orders and 

sentencing him to incarceration, but staying its order for 60 days during which Gresh 

could purge the contempt by carrying out specific actions listed by the trial court. In 

its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court indicated that, as a finding of civil contempt, the 

trial court’s order, which provides Gresh an opportunity to purge himself of the 

contempt, is not final and appealable. See Sargent (premature appeal from finding 

of contempt is interlocutory and appeal must be quashed).

Here, the Township argues, until Gresh exhausted the opportunity to 

purge himself of the contempt, the order declaring him in contempt was interlocutory 

and not appealable. The Township asserts the trial court’s order here includes: a 

finding of contempt; a sanction of incarceration; an opportunity to purge; and, the 

scheduling of a hearing at which time there would be either a finding that Gresh 

purged the contempt or a final adjudication of contempt resulting in imposition of 

the sanction.

 

2 Gresh first argues the trial court erred in finding him in contempt when it made no findings 

as to exactly what conduct Gresh engaged in to be in contempt of court. He further asserts the trial 

court’s purge conditions were arbitrary and capricious where the conduct ordered to purge the 

alleged contempt was not required by law or was too vague to allow for compliance. Additionally, 

he contends his property is exempt from the ordinances that the Township is attempting to apply 

because the commercial use of the property existed prior to the current ordinances, and, therefore, 

Gresh’s use of the property is a prior nonconforming use.
13

The Township contends that in Wolanin the Superior Court stated, “we 

conclude that, for a contempt order to be properly appealable, it is only necessary 

that the order impose sanctions on the alleged contemnor, and that no further court 

order be required before the sanctions take effect.” Id. at 333. Here, the Township 

argues, the trial court’s order set a further hearing at the end of the 60-day period in 

which Gresh was permitted to purge himself of the contempt. It asserts that, only if 

he failed to purge himself, would the sanction be imposed and a date of incarceration 

set. The Township maintains the trial court’s order did not include a date certain 

that Gresh would be incarcerated and without a commitment order Gresh could not 

be subject to the sanction of incarceration.

The Township further argues that the last paragraph of the trial court’s 

order states: “A hearing shall be held on Wednesday, January 18, 2017, at 1:00 p.m. 

in Courtroom Number 2, Cambria County Courthouse, 200 South Center Street, 

Ebensburg, Pennsylvania, before the Honorable Norman A. Krumenacker, III to 

determine if [Gresh] has purged himself of the contempt.” Reproduced Record 

(R.R.) at 139. Clearly, the Township asserts, this second hearing would determine 

if Gresh purged the contempt, in which case there would be no sanction, or that he 

failed to purge, in which case a second order would be necessary to establish the 

date he would need to report to the county jail to serve his sanction. The Township 

contends the November 1, 2016 order did not make Gresh subject to the sanction.

Gresh offers no response to this argument.
14

“An appeal may be taken only from a final order, unless otherwise 

permitted by rule or statute.” Rhoades, 874 A.2d at 151 (citation omitted); Pa. 

R.A.P. 341(a). The appealability of an order goes directly to the jurisdiction of the 

court asked to review the order. Stahl. Generally, an order finding a party in 

contempt is interlocutory and not appealable unless it imposes sanctions. Id. “An

often litigated issue in this area involves conditional sanction orders.” Id. Such 

orders impose a sanction, but also include a purge condition, that is, a means of 

avoiding the sanction. Id.

When a contempt order that imposes sanctions also 

contains a purge condition, the purge condition does not 

transform a final, appealable order into one that is 

interlocutory. If that were the case, a contemnor in a civil 

contempt action would not be able to appeal the contempt 

order until he/she was incarcerated or had paid the sums 

owing as sanctions for contempt. It seems inappropriate 

and unnecessarily harsh for a contemnor in a civil 

contempt action to undergo incarceration or fulfill another 

sanction before this Court will accept an appeal of a 

contempt order. Rather, we conclude that, for a contempt 

order to be properly appealable, it is only necessary that 

the order impose sanctions on the alleged contemnor, and 

no further court order be required before the sanctions take 

effect.

Id. (quoting Wolanin, 829 A.2d at 332-33 (emphasis in original)). Unless sanctions 

or imprisonment are imposed, an order declaring a party in contempt is interlocutory 

and not appealable. Takosky v. Henning, 906 A.2d 1255 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Recently, the Superior Court stated:

Although this Court has often repeated the refrain that 

sanctions must be imposed before an order is final and 

appealable, an examination of the cases reveals that there 
15

is often more nuance to the cases beyond a mere lack of 

sanctions.

In most of the cases, it is clear that either the order 

did not make a present finding of contempt, or revealed 

that the trial court contemplated further proceedings, 

thereby failing to meet the finality requirement of 

disposing of all claims and all parties. See Takosky, 906 

A.2d at 1255 (holding indirect criminal contempt order 

was not final because order indicated that sentencing 

would be held at a future time, and, therefore, punishment 

phase of matter had not yet been determined); [Sargent] 

(holding order was not final because ‘threatened sanction 

of imprisonment may or may not be imposed in the future 

depending on whether [a]ppellant pays the past due 

support’); Kenis v. Perini Corp., [682 A.2d 845, 848 (Pa. 

Super. 1996)] (holding order was not final because order 

merely stated that court may hold appellant in contempt 

and impose daily fine in the future if appellant did not hand 

over file as ordered); Genovese [v. Genovese, 550 A.2d 

1021, 1022-23 (Pa. Super. 1988)] (holding order requiring 

appellant to pay child support ‘or be held in contempt’ was 

not final because it did not impose present finding of 

contempt or order a sanction); Rulli v. Dunn, [487 A.2d 

430, 431 (Pa. Super. 1985)] (holding order was not final 

because it ordered appellant to comply with order within 

ten days or face sanctions in the future); McManus v. 

Chubb Grp. of Ins. Companies, [493 A.2d 84, 86 (Pa. 

Super. 1985)] (holding that appellant was ‘not out of 

court’ until ‘threatened sanction’ in the form of dismissal 

of action actually was imposed); Guisler v. Alexander, 

[453 A.2d 4, 4-5 (Pa. Super. 1982)] (holding show-cause 

order was not final because it simply ordered a hearing to 

determine whether a party should be held in contempt); 

Brodsky v. Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., [419 A.2d 

1285, 1286-88 (Pa. Super. 1980)] (holding order was not 

final because chancellor merely threatened to hold party in 

contempt and issue jail time and fine in future if a decree 

was not performed); Cedar Valley Civic Ass’n v. 

Schnabel, [362 A.2d 993, 994 (Pa. Super. 1976)] (holding 

order was not final because term of imprisonment imposed 

after contempt finding was stayed to permit appellant to 
16

post a bond to ensure compliance with court’s previous 

orders).

K.M.G. v. H.M.W., ___ A.3d ___, ___ (Pa. Super., No. 116 WDA 2017, filed 

September 29, 2017), 2017 WL 4339575 at *3.

Here, the trial court’s contempt order states, as relevant (with emphasis 

added):

AND NOW, this 1st day of November 2016, upon 

consideration of the evidence presented at the hearings 

held September 21, 2015, and February 1, 2016, the briefs 

of the parties, the record as a whole in this matter, and the 

laws of the Commonwealth, the Court finds that the 

Defendant, Dennis Gresh, is in contempt of the Court’s 

prior orders and is sentenced to sixty (60) days in the 

Cambria County Jail as a result of this contempt. The 

sentence of incarceration is stayed for sixty (60) days or 

until the next hearing, to allow the Defendant the 

opportunity to purge himself of the contempt.

It is FURTHER ORDERED, DIRECTED, AND 

DECREED that the Defendant may purge himself of this 

contempt by completing the following [purge conditions]:

* * * *

5) A hearing shall be held on Wednesday January 

18, 2017, at 1:00 p.m. in Courtroom Number 2, 

Cambria County Courthouse, 200 South Center 

Street Ebensburg, Pennsylvania, before the 

Honorable Norman A. Krumenacker, III to 

determine if the Defendant has purged himself of 

the contempt.

Tr. Ct. Order, 11/1/16 at 1-2.
17

Because the trial court’s order here did not impose an immediate

sanction, but rather stayed the imposition of the jail sentence for 60 days or until the 

next hearing, and because the trial court scheduled another hearing after the purge 

period, the trial court’s order is interlocutory and not appealable. Indeed, as the trial 

court explained:

Here[,] the order specifically sets an additional 

hearing to determine if Gresh had purged himself of the 

contempt or in the alternative if he failed to purge himself 

the sanction would be imposed and a date of incarceration 

determined. The initial order did not include a date certain 

that Gresh would be incarcerated and without a 

commitment order Gresh could not be subject to the 

sanction of incarceration. The second hearing would 

determine if he had purged, in which case there would be 

no sanction, or he failed to purge, in which case a second 

order would be necessary to establish the date he would 

need to report to the county jail to serve his sanction. 

Thus[,] Gresh could not be subject to the sanction prior to 

this hearing and court action taking place.

Tr. Ct., Slip Op., 1/19/17, at 10.

In short, because the trial court’s order contemplated further 

proceedings prior to the onset of the sanction, if any, and because the trial court’s 

order gave Gresh an opportunity to avoid the sanction by satisfying the purge 

conditions, we quash Gresh’s appeal, which was filed during the purge period, as 

premature.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jackson Township Supervisors :

:

v. : No. 1942 C.D. 2016

:

Estate of Catherine Gresh, :

Dennis Gresh, Administrator, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 12th day of December, 2017, the appeal of the Estate 

of Catherine Gresh, Dennis Gresh, Administrator, is QUASHED.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge