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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

ORONDE C. DANIELS, : No. 1324 MDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Entered July 25, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Criminal Division at No. CP-41-CR-0001672-2011

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 12, 2018

Oronde C. Daniels appeals pro se from the July 25, 2017 order 

denying his petition to return property filed pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 5881 on the basis it was untimely filed.2 After careful 

review, we affirm.

 

1 Rule 588 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(A) A person aggrieved by a search and seizure, 

whether or not executed pursuant to a 

warrant, may move for the return of the 

property on the ground that he or she is 

entitled to lawful possession thereof. Such 

motion shall be filed in the court of common 

pleas for the judicial district in which the 

property was seized.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 588(A). “[B]oth this Court and the Commonwealth Court have 

jurisdiction to decide an appeal involving a motion for the return of property 
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The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

On October 2, [2012], [a]ppellant entered a 

guilty plea to the charges of person not to possess a 

firearm and possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance in exchange for a sentence of 

five to ten years’ incarceration in a state correctional 

institution, and the [trial] court sentenced 

[a]ppellant in accordance with the plea agreement. 

Appellant did not file any post-sentence motion or a 

direct appeal. Therefore, [a]ppellant’s judgment of 

sentence became final on or about November 1, 

2012.

On July 18, 2017, [a]ppellant filed a petition 

for return of property in which he sought the return 

of all the property (or, in the alternative, the 

monetary value thereof plus interest) that the 

Williamsport police seized from him on October 26, 

2011, when the police searched his residence.

On July 25, 2017, the [trial] court entered an 

order denying [a]ppellant’s petition as untimely.

Trial court opinion, 11/16/17 at 1-2.3

 

filed pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 588.” Commonwealth v. Durham, 9 A.3d 

641, 642 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 19 A.3d 1050 (Pa. 2011).

2 The Commonwealth has indicated that it will not be filing a brief in this 

matter and is relying on the reasoning set forth in the trial court’s 

November 16, 2017 Rule 1925(a) opinion.

3 The record reflects that upon stipulation of the parties, the trial court 

entered an order on August 14, 2017 directing that $300 seized from 

appellant be returned to him. (See Stipulated Order, 8/14/17; certified 

record at no. 46.)
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On August 22, 2017, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On 

October 16, 2017, the trial court ordered appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), within 21 days. Appellant timely complied, and the trial 

court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion in support of its July 25, 2017 order on 

November 16, 2017.

Appellant raises only one issue for our review: “Did the [trial] court 

error [sic] and abuse it’s [sic] discretion in denying appellant’s motion for 

return of property?” (Appellant’s brief at v (capitalization omitted)). The 

crux of appellant’s contention is that he had no opportunity to file a formal 

petition to return property during the pendency of the criminal proceedings

and that he “did nothing but follow the Commonwealth’s lead.” (Id. at 4-5,

7.)

Our standard of review of such matters is clear:

The standard of review applied in cases involving 

motions for the return of property is an abuse of 

discretion. In conducting our review, we bear in 

mind that it is the province of the trial court to judge 

the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the 

testimony offered. It is not the duty of an appellate 

court to act as fact-finder, but to determine whether 

there is sufficient evidence in the record to support 

the facts as found by the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 172 A.3d 1162, 1165 (Pa.Super. 2017) 

(citations omitted).
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As recognized by the trial court, our supreme court addressed a similar

situation in Commonwealth v. Allen, 107 A.3d 709 (Pa. 2014). Allen

involved an individual who, nearly eight years after criminal charges against 

him were dismissed, moved for the return of property seized from the 

vehicle he was driving at the time of his arrest. Allen, 107 A.3d at 711. 

The Allen court held that the petitioner’s failure to file a motion for the

return of property during the pendency of the criminal proceedings against 

him or within 30 days following dismissal of the charges resulted in waiver of 

the issue, thereby precluding review of his stand-alone return petition. Id.

at 717-718. In reaching this conclusion, the Allen court stated that, “Rule 

588 does not require a trial as the triggering event for a return motion.” Id.

at 717. “Pursuant to Rule 588 . . . a return motion is timely when it is filed 

by an accused in the trial court while that court retains jurisdiction, which is 

up to thirty days after disposition.” Id.

Here, the record reflects that appellant was sentenced on October 2, 

2012, and did not file any post-sentence motions or a direct appeal to this 

court. As such, under Allen, appellant had until November 1, 2012, to file a 

timely motion for the return of property. Appellant did not file the instant 

petition until July 18, 2017, more than four years past the deadline. Based 

on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 

court in concluding that appellant’s petition was untimely filed and that “[he] 
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waived any entitlement to the return of the property” in question. (Trial 

court opinion, 11/16/17 at 3.)

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 06/12/2018