### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 17
- 00812
- CV

Appellants , Ahmad Zaatari, Marwa Zaatari, Jennifer Gibson Hebert, Joseph “Mike” Hebert , Lindsay Redwine, Ras Redwine VI, and Tim Klitch // Cross
- Appellants , City of Austin, Texas; St eve Adler, Mayor o f t he City of Austin ; and the Stat e of Texas

v. Appellees , City of Austin, Texas , and Steve Adler, Mayor of t he City of Austin // Cross
- Appellees , Ahmad Zaatari, Marwa Zaatari, Jennifer Gibson Hebert, Joseph “Mike” Hebert , L indsay Redwi ne, Ras Redwine V I, and Tim Klitch

FROM THE 53RD DISTRI CT COURT OF TRAVIS C OUNTY NO. D
- 1
- GN
- 16
- 002620 , THE HONORABLE TIM SULAK, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N
The majority opinion expan d s fundamental

- right s jurisprudence to stri ke down polic y decisions prope rly left to Austin ’s City Co uncil under the ir zoning power
. It s ap proach
leads to a misapp l ication of Retroactivity Clause preced ent , creati ng te n sion with opinions of our sister courts of appeals ; disregards Texas and U. S. h is tory ; and is an atextual expansion o f the Assembly Clause

. I respectfully dissent

.

I. T he R etroac tiv ity Clause

T he T e x as Constitution p rovides that “ [n]o bi l l of attainder, ex post facto law,

retroact ive law, or an y law imp airi ng the obligation of contr acts , shall be made. ” Tex. Con st.

art. I, § 1 6. The Property Owners ’ retroac tivi ty challenge to Section 25

- 2

- 950

— th e ban on

non
- homest e a d short

- term rentals th a t w o uld go into effect in April 20 22

— is a facial2

constitu tional challe nge instead of an as
- app lied on e. The y “ c an not

. . . assert that the [ordinance]
is unconstitutional ‘ as applied ’ because [it] has never been applied to anyone

. ” See Barshop v.
Medina C t

y. U nderground Water Conservation Dist. , 925 S. W.2d 618, 626 (Tex. 199 6). Therefore, they “ must estab lish t hat th e [ordinance], by its terms, always operates unconstitutionally. ” Id.

at 627. And we must interpret the ordinance “ to avoid constitutional inf i rmit ies ” under the Retroactivity C lause. See id. at 629; see also Unio n Carbide Corp. v. Syna tzke , 38 6 S.W. 3d 278, 313, 31 7 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2012 ) (en banc) (Bland, J., dissenting from retroacti vity reasoning) ( “ A court must not hold a legis l ativ e enac tment to be unconsti tutional unless it is
absol utely necessa ry to so hold.

. . . I f a statu tory r eading

. . . sp rings constitutional doubt, and another reasonable interpretation exi sts, then it is not the interpretation that the legislature
inte n ded. ” ), rev ’ d , 438 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2014)

.

“ ‘ Mere retroact ivity is not sufficient to inv alida te a s tat ute.

. . . Most statute s operate to ch an ge existing conditions, and it is not every retroactive law that is

uncons titutional. ’

. . . [N ] ot all ret roac tive legislation is b ad. ” Robinson v. Crown Cork & Sea l
Co. , 3 35 S.W.3d 126 , 1 3 9 (Tex. 2010 ) ( qu oting Texa s Water Rights Comm ’ n v . Wright , 464
S .W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. 1971) ).

In its entire history , the Supreme Court of Texas ha s held a law unconstitutionally

r e troactive only four times. See Tene t Hosps. Ltd. v. Rivera , 445 S.W.3d 6 98, 708 (Tex. 2 014 )

. Th ose four instances involved amendmen ts to statutes o f limitations a nd a n e w choice

- of

- l aw rule that ext inguish ed a mature tort claim. Id. at 708 & n.34 ( citing R obinson , 335 S.W.3d

at 14 8

– 49 ; Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R . & D., Inc. , 12 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Te x. 1999); Wi lson v. Work , 62 S.W.2d 49 0 , 490

– 91 (Tex. 19 33) (per curiam ) ( orig. procee ding ) ; Mellinger v. City of Hous

. , 3 S.W. 249, 254

– 55 ( Tex. 1887 ) ).3 Since 2014 , the Cour t has addressed only two r etroactivity challenge s and has uph eld the challe nged la w bot h tim es
. I n o ne instance , t he Court concluded that “a charter
school ’ s charter is not a vested property right to which the

. . . prohibition on retrospec t ive laws
app l[ies]

. ” See Honors Aca d., Inc. v. Texas Educ. Agen cy , 555 S.W.3 d 54, 68 (Te x. 2018 )

. In

t he ot her, the Court concluded t hat “ a statute authoriz ing property ow ners to petition [the Supreme Court] directly to determine which county is owed the [ ad valorem] taxes ” imposed on the o wners by multiple counties w as “ not const itutionally retroa ctive

. ” See I n re Occidental
Chem. Co rp. , 561 S.W. 3 d 146, 150, 1 62 (Tex. 2018 ) (orig. proceedi ng)

.

Never has the Court struck down a zoning or property

- use law a s unconsti tutionally retroactive , th ough Texas municipalities ha ve been zonin g and regu lating
prope rty for d eca des.

A. Section 25
- 2
- 950 ( t ype - 2 rentals) is not retroactive
. A statute is not retroactive merely because it is applied in a case arising from
condu c t that existed befor e the statute ’ s enactment or if it “ upsets expectations based in p rior
la w. ” M bogo v. C ity of Dall. , No. 05

- 17

- 00 879

- CV, 2018 WL 3198398, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Dallas June 29, 2018, pe t. denied) (m em
. op.) ( appl ying and quoti ng Landgraf v. USI F i lm
Pr ods. , 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994) )

. This is t rue particu larly in the area of zoning regula t ions, f or , there, “ strong policy ar guments and a demonstrable public need ” s upport municipalities ’ “ f air
and reasona ble termination of nonco nforming property uses. ” Mbogo , 2018 WL 3198398, at * 4 (quoting City of Univ. Par k v. Benners , 485 S. W.2d 77 3, 778 ( Tex. 1972 ) ). The majority opinion assert s that Section 25

- 2

- 950 “does not advance a zoning
interest because both short

- term rentals and o w n er
- occupied homes are re sidential i n nature. ” S ee4

ante at 20

. H o wever, o rdinan ces dif f ere nti at i ng on e typ e of residential property from another are just as much exercises of the zoning power as are ordinances differentiati n g be t ween res id ential
prop ert y and comm ercia l property

. S e e , e.g . , Barr v. City of Sinto n , 295 S.W.3d 287, 289

– 91 , 2 96

– 308 (Tex. 2009 ) ( add ress ing ordinance th at different iated sol el y w ithin “ residential area ”

c ategory and nevertheless t reating it a s zoni n g
- related ) ; S heffield Dev. C o. v. C ity of Glenn Heights , 140 S.W.3d 660 , 674

– 81 (Tex. 20 04) ( treating ordinance tha t r estricted numbe r of

r esidenc es that could be built on undevelo pe d p roperty as zoning ordinance even though it applie d o nly to residentia l property )

.

Se ction 25

- 2

- 95 0 is a zoning ordinance. It is found in the Code of Ordinanc es chap ter titled “ Zon ing. ” See Au s ti n, Tex., Code of Ordinanc es ch. 25

- 2

. The majority opinion ’ s conclusion that Section 25

- 2

- 950 is retroactive therefore cr e ates tension with the Fifth C o urt o f Appeals ’ opinion in Mbog o . In that case , w hen the Cit y of Dall as rezoned a portio n of Ross
Avenu e to prohibit automobile

- related business es from operating there, the rezoning was not

“ retroactive ” even though a n affect e d business owner , who would ha ve to disc ontinue his chosen
bu siness, had been operati ng his automobile

- related busines s in the a rea s ince before t he rezoning. Mbogo , 2018 WL 3198398, at * 1, * 4

. “ T he ordinance did not change any use in the
pro per ty t hereby a ttaching a new le g al conse quen ce or upset any expectations ba sed in prior la w. Rather, it prospectively altered a prop erty owner ’ s fu ture use o f the property by setting a date by which to come into complianc e. ” Id. at * 4 (emphasis added).

So to o here. Bu t the majority opin ion hold s oth erwi se, leap ing from the
fun d am ental right of p roperty ownershi p to what it deem s within the “ fundamental privil eg e [s] of
prop e rty o wnership ”

— “ leas [ing] one ’ s property on a short

- term basis. ” Se e ant e at 22

. Surely the Mbogo business owner ’ s u se of his own pro per ty is no le ss important than a tenant ’ s use of a5

short

- t erm
- rental o wner ’ s property

. But, by ex panding the scope of funda mental property right s to
include a tenant ’ s use of a non
- homestead propert y for a lease term of less than 30 days, the majority opin ion wi eld s fundamental

- rig hts juris prudence in a wa y that cannot comport with
what the Fifth Court of Ap peals he ld in M bo go . And it finds no support in Texas Supreme Court jurispr udence or that of thi s Court ’ s 127 year history.

B. E ven if re troa ctive, Se ction 25
- 2
- 950 ( t ype - 2 rentals ) is not unconstitutionally retroactive

, under Robinson
. E ven if Section 25

- 2

- 950 is retroactive, it is not unconstitutionally so

. R etroactive
laws may still be constitutiona l under the Robinson three

- factor test

. S ee 335 S.W. 3d at 145

– 50

. Under that test, a retroactive l aw is unconstitutionally retroactive only so long as three f actors weigh against the challenged law: (1) “ the nature and st re ngth of the public interest ser ve d by the

statute as e videnced by the Le gi slatur e ’ s f actual findings , ” (2) “ the natu re of the prio r right impaired by the statute, ” and (3) “ the extent of the impairment. ” Id. at 145.

1. S ection 25

- 2

- 950 serves a strong public interest. Zoning is a sufficientl y st rong public inter est under th e Retr oactivit y Cla use :

“ strong policy arguments a nd a demonstrable public need ” support “ the fa ir and rea so nable
terminati on of nonconforming property uses , ” and “ [m]uni cipa l zoning ordinances requiring the
termination of n onc onforming uses un der reasonab le con ditions are w ithin the scope of the poli ce p ower. ” Benners , 485 S.W.2d at 778, cited in Mbogo , 2018 WL 3198398, at * 6 ; accord
Caruthers v. B oard of Adjus tment of the City of Bunker Hill Vill

. , 290 S.W.2 d 340, 350 ( Tex

. Ap p.

— Galveston 1956 , no writ )

. “ [T] he supreme cour t has not overruled Benners , an d

. . . we are bound to follow supreme court precedent. ” Mbogo , 2018 W L 3198398, at *6.6 More broadly, e fforts to “ safeguard the public safety and welfare ” are sufficiently

s t ron g public interest s under the Ret roa ctivity Claus e. See Barshop , 925 S.W.2d at 6 34; Texas
State Teachers Ass ’ n v. State , 711 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. Ap p.

— Austin 1986, writ ref ’ d n.r.e. ). In addition to zoning, public

- welfare interests as varied as prop ert y - tax relief and test ing teacher

co mpet en ce are suff

iciently strong public interest s under the Clause

. See White Deer Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Martin , No. 07

- 18

- 00193

- CV, 2019 WL 5850378, at *7 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo Nov. 5, 2019, no pet. h. ) (op., designated f or publication) ; Texas State Teache r s Ass ’ n , 711 S.W

. 2 d at 422, 424

– 25. The City of A ustin ’ s stated interests in enacting Section 25

- 2

- 950 ar e within
the wide zone of strong public interests. The City says that short

- term rentals are par t icularly
suscep tible to ov er
- oc cupa ncy , w hich affect s “ fire safety ” and “ overwhel m [ s ] existing wastewat er systems , ” and to tenants ’ “ dum p[i ng] trash in the nei g hborhood ” ; “ engag[ing] in pub lic
urin ation ” and public intoxi cation ; and “ open drug use

. ” The City also h eard compla i nts about illegal pa rkin g, “ noi s e, lou d music, v ulg arity, and other neg at i ve impa c ts of having a ‘ party
ho use ’ ” environment at short

- term rentals

.

T he majority opinion fa ults the City for issuing notices of violation “to li censed
short

- term rentals only t e n times. ” An te at 20

. W hy is ten not e nough? The ma jority opinion questions whethe r the ordinance is necess ary to respond to ten notices o f viola tion, “[b]ut the necessity and ap propriateness of legislation are generally no t matters the judiciary is able t o

assess. ” Robinson , 335 S. W. 3d at 146

. We need not determine whether the law is “ the only, the best, or even a good way ” to achieve the s tated p ublic interest

. See i d. I f the pu blic interest is sufficiently stron g, we need go no further

— t he “ nature and s t re ngth of the public int erest ” i s

enou gh under Robi nson . See id. at 145

. Section 2 5

- 2

- 950 rests on strong , public

- welfare interest s
.7 2. T he r ig ht that S ection 25

- 2

- 950 impairs is narrow

. The strength of a municipality ’ s zoning interest is mi rrored by the wea k ness of property own er s ’ r i ghts in zon ing

- burdened property : “ a n in dividual has no protected property
interest in the continued use of his p roperty for a particular purpose just because such use has commenced or a zoning classification has been made. ” M bo g o , 2018 WL 3198398, at *5 ( citin g
Benn ers , 485 S.W. 2d at 778) ; accord City of La M arque v. Braskey , 216 S.W.3d 861, 863 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied ) ( also citing Ben ners )

. The majority opinion ’ s distinction b etween using property and l easing it is , for th e se pur poses , of n o materi al di fference

. An owner ’ s lease of h is or her property is a use of the property, a nd the ten ant is leasing the property so he or she can use it. In fact, the Assembly C lause portion of the majority opinion
be a r s this out when it c ons iders t he te nan t

- affecting o rdinance to be “ [t]he regulatio n of property

use. ” See ante at 41 ( “ T he regulation of p roperty use is not, in and of itself, a compelling interest. ” ).

But even if the two uses are distinct , it is p o ssible to interpret Sect io n 25

- 2

- 950 as
const i tutional und er this factor

. Under Section 2 5

- 2

- 950 p ropert y owner s may still lease the ir propert y. They must simply lease it for 3 0 days or more or make it their homestead

. Therefore, the right that Section 2 5

- 2

- 950 impairs is na rrow
.

3. S ection 25

- 2

- 950 only lightly impairs the short

- term

- rental righ t beca use of the grace period until 20 22

.

“ [I ]m pair ment of

. . . a right m ay be lessen ed when a statute affords a plaintiff a grace period , ” T

enet H osp ital s , 445 S.W.3 d at 708 , “ or a reason able time to protect his
investment , ” Mbogo , 2018 WL 3198398, at *7

. T he Fifth Court of Ap peals resolved this third
f act or against unconstituti o nal ity becau se , though the business owner “ did not believe that he8

could get a f

air price ” in selli ng his busine ss , “ despite never listing his property on t he market, ”
that did not e quate to an “ abus[e of] legislative power ” by t he city. Id. (emphasis in o riginal).

In contra st here, the majority opinion relies simp ly on “ a los s of income for th e propert y owners
. ” Se e ante at 23

. Th ough no doubt impo rtant, loss of income is not enough
under Robinson

. Loss of investment is the t ouc h stone

. See Mbogo , 2018 WL 3 198398, a t * 7 ; Village of Tiki Island v. Ronquille , 463 S.W.3d 562, 587 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton [1st Dis t.] 2015,

n o pet. ) ( la ck of “ avenue for recoupment ” of “ exis ting investment ” was re levant )

. There is no showing that the Pro per ty Owners cannot recoup their investments in the i r rental properties before April 2022

. Also, even shorter grace periods than thr ee years ha ve been sufficient
els ewhere. S ee Tenet Hosps. , 445 S.W.3d at 708. T ime allowed to mitigate investment loss

ma kes any i mpairment “ slight. ” See Whi te Deer Inde p. Sch. Dist. , 2019 WL 5850378 , at *8. Just because the p roperty owners are no t making as mu ch profi t as the y could with unfettered rights

to short

- term rentals does not mean their property right has been u nco nstitut ionally impa ire d

.

In sum, under Robinson , Se ction 25

- 2

- 950 is not a retroactive law, and, even if it

were, it is c o nstitutional unde r the th ree
- factor test.

II. The Assembly Clause

I also disagree w ith t he majority opinion ’ s hold ing t ha t Se c tion 25

- 2

- 7 9 5

— the ordinance establishing certa in occupancy limits for short

- term rentals

— must withstand heightened due

- pro cess s c ru tiny , i ns tead o f sim ply rati on al

- basis review

. It purports to reach this holding based on the Asse mbly Cla use in the T exas Bill of Ri ght s , which sa ys: “ T he citizens

s h all have the right, in a peaceab le manner, t o a ssemble together for their common good; and9

apply to thos e in vested wi th the powers of government for redress o f gr ievances or other
purpo se s, by pe titi on, add r ess or r emonstr anc e. ” Tex. C onst. a rt

. I, § 27

.

A. The t e

xt - informing history of the Assembly Clause The majority opinion f

o r mulates the r i ghts granted by t he A ssem b l y C lause by importing dictionary definitions of “ assemble, ” “ common, ” and “ good. ” It uses tho se definition s
t o concl ude that the A s sembly C lause protect s cit izen s ’ “ right to physically co ngre gate, in a peaceable m a n ner, for thei r sha r ed welfare o r benefi t. ” A n te at 33

.

“ When identifying fundamental r ights,

. . . an exacting his tori cal and textual analysis ” is re qui red

. In re J.W.T. , 872 S.W.2d 189, 211 (Tex. 1994) (Co r nyn, J., diss enting
from den ial of reh ’ g) ( emphasis added )

. An d when we seek to understand co nstitutional history,

“ it is important to get that history right befor e engagi ng in the complex and sep arate task of judging how such insights might or might not be applied to contemporary legal pro blems

. ” Saul Cornell, “To A s semble Togethe r f or Their Comm on Good ” : History, Ethno graphy, and the
Or iginal Meanings of the Right s of Ass embly and Speech , 84 For dham L . Rev. 915, 93 4 (2015)

.

Historically, Texas is not the o n ly s tate wh ose constitution has a bill of rights like
that o f the U.S. Const it ution. And Te xas ’ s Assembly Clause is not the only one to limi t its state
constitut ional ri ght o f assembly to t he purpo se of fur thering the “common good.” Such la nguage was common in many o f the early state constitutions. Similar language can be found in t he
constituti ons of Pennsylvania (1776), Vermont (1777) , North Carol ina (1776), Mas sachus et ts (1 780), and New Ha mpshire ( 1783)

. See id

. at 931

– 32

. Altho ugh individua ls are t he holders of the righ t to ass emble, its exerc ise is framed as a ci vic enterprise. Id. at 932

. Hence, there is a10

historical d ifference between the right to gather to “inflame pa s sions” a nd th e ri ght to gather to “promote reasoned discourse.” See id.

It is als o important to note that a limitation of the r ight t o ass emble to ma tters involving “ the common good” was initially includ ed i n the U.S. Constitution’s Bill o f Rights.
See Jo h n D. In az u, The F orgotten Free dom of Assembly , 84 Tulane L. Rev. 5 65, 571

– 72 (201 0).
D uring House de bates, t here was mu ch discussion over whethe r the right to assemble should be
limited to matters in volv ing “the common good.” As one repres entative told an o ther , if he “supp osed that the people had a right to cons ult for the common go od” but “could not con sult
unl ess they met for the purp ose ,” he was in fact “contend[ing] for nothi ng.” Id. at 572 (quoting
1 Annals o

f Cong

. 760

– 61 (Joseph Gale s ed., 1834) )

. I n oth er wo rds, t ho ugh there was concern that th e state would interpr et the “commo n good ” limitation t o oppres s minor ity or dissenting polit ic al viewpoints , none d is put ed that the right of assembly was foc used on promoting
open, civic discourse and delibera t ions o n m att ers o f public welf are. Se e Cornell, “To Assemble Togethe r for Their Common Good ” : Histor y, Ethno graphy, and the Or iginal Meani ngs of the Rights of Assembly and Speech , supra at 932 & n.154

. Whil e the language limiti ng the right to

ass emble was in it ial ly retaine d by both the House and the Senate, it ultimately was removed before passage. Inazu , The Fo rgotten Freedom of Assembly , s upra at 57 3 (cit ing S. Journal,
1st Cong., 77 (Sept. 9 , 1789)).

The Texas Constitutio n was established in 1876 with t h i s wea lth of hist or y t o draw u pon. It did not recognize an un fettered right to assemble for w hatever purpose and in
whate ver manner at w ha tever time of day , a s the majority opi nion suggest s
. It instead limited that right to ass emble in two important wa ys: i t m ust be peacea ble, and it m ust be for the
citizens ’ common good

. The majority opinion distinguish es “ thei r common good ” f r om “ the11

commo n good ” but ignores that the assembly right is granted to “ ci tizens ” rather tha n to

“ peop le ” more b roadly. Compare Te x
. Const. art. I, § 27 (assembl y right for “ c itizens ” ), with id. § § 9 ( protecting “ people ” from unrea son able search es and seizures ) , 34 ( gr an ting “ [t]he p eople ”
certain rights t o h un t, fish, and har vest wildlife )

. The draft ers ’ specific u se of “ citizens ” i m p lies a link to p ublic discour se that using “ people ” does not

. 1

H istorically and textually, the Asse m bly Clause assure s Texans the fundamental right to peaceably gather for purposes o f me aningful civic discou rse without fear of retrib ution.
The C lause go es hand in hand w it h freedom of speech ; it en sures that t hose who sp e ak may have
an audience. Th i s is w hy , as the majority opinion recognizes , t h e Supreme Court of the United
States regularly addres ses sp eech and assembly jointly. See I nazu, The Forgott e n Fr eedom of Assembly , supra a t 59 7

.

The City of Austin has pas sed limitations on certain short

- term ren tals that on
their face have nothin g to do with assembling for the common good to participate in civic
discourse

. The City believes it has evidence to s upp or t that short

- ter m rentals giv e rise to

non
- p eaceable assemblies disconnected f rom citizens ’ common good

. The City ’ s restric tions, then, are a s s embly

- neut r al zoning regulations that have a rational basis. To reach a contra ry

1 The majority opinion ’ s response on this point

— that only “ citi zens ” are gran ted the Texas A ssembly Claus e ’ s rights

— introduces another problem

. See ante at 35 n
. 7

. The ma jority opi nion ’ s position must be that t he “ citi zens ” protected by the Texas Consti tution are unlimited

— citiz ens of Texas ; of Oklaho ma ; of Virg inia , like Messrs. Jefferson and H enry in th e m ajo rity opin ion ’ s hy pothetical , see an te a t 39 ; etc. F or i f only T exans are clothed with the Texa s Consti t ution ’ s assembly rights, then Sec tion 25

- 2

- 795 is not unconstitutional in eve ry resp ect as i s required to sustain a f acial constitutional challenge

. T he City of Austin could still const ituti onally apply th e ordinance to short

- term rentals made to non
- hold e rs of Te xas assembly rights

— non
- Texa ns. In this way, t he majo rity opinion ’ s holding reaches beyond what its reasoning supp orts: either it invalid ates Sec tion 25

- 2

- 795 even for people who ha ve not b een s ho wn to be holders of Texas assembly rights , or it at e xtually confl ates the constitution ’ s use of the distinct terms “ citiz ens ” and “ people , ” desp ite the drafters ’ considered c hoice to use th e tw o differe nt terms

.12

conclusion could lead t o a c hallenge to every st atut e or ordi nance regulating conduct that involves people “assembling” together, i ncluding trespass and an ti

- camping statute s
. Instead , such enactments s h ould be susceptible to as sembly c hallenge onl y as enactments targeting

non
- “ c omm on good , ” non
- peace ab le assemb lies

.

T he ma jority opinion also does not give due weight to the phrase “ in a peaceable

manner ” in its an alysis. A s t h e Court of Criminal Appeal s recognized , the Asse mbly Clause

“ specif ically limits i ts pro tection t o ‘ p ea ce abl e assem bly

. ’ ” Fe r gus on v. St ate , 610 S. W.2d 468,
470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)

. 2 Th is matters because the Ci t y relies on evidence of (i) sho rt

- term

ren tal s ’ harms to “ public health, public s afe ty, the general welfa re, and preservation of h is toric

n eig h bo rho o ds ” and (ii) “ concerns
. . . ab out short

- term rental properties that were poorly maintained, that had code violations , and that generated police and fir e reports. ” The C ity says that it uncovered ev i den ce o f ov er
- oc c upa ncy in short

- term rentals, whi c h af fect s “ fire safety ”
and “ overwhel m [ s ] existing wastewater systems. ” It heard compl a ints about short

- term ten a nts ’

“ dum p[i ng] trash in the ne ig hborhood ” ; “ engag[ing] in pub lic urin ation ” ; public intoxi cation ; and “ open drug use, including a t one ren ta l nex t door to a home with a five

- year old child. ”
It h eard complaints about illegal park in g, “ noise, loud music, v ulgarity, and other neg at i ve im pa cts of having a ‘ party ho use ’ ” environment. And even when City cod e personne l have cite d
short

- te rm tenan t s f

o r miscondu ct , the mi sconduct often co ntinues because “ [s ]om e short

- term

2 Inazu , whom the majority o pinion relies o n , recognizes th e peaceabl e ness limitation

. H e des c ribes the First Amendmen t “ te x t handed dow n to us ” as “ convey[ing] a b road n otion of a ssembly in two ways. Firs t, it does n ot limit t he pu rposes of ass emb ly to the common good, thereby impl icit ly allowi ng assembly for pur poses that might be antithetical t o that goo d (although con str ainin g assembly to peaceable means). ” See J ohn D. Inazu , Th e Forgotten Fr eedom of Assembly , 84 Tulane L. Rev. 5 65, 57 6 (2010 )

.13

rental o perator s complete ly ign or e th e c o ncer ns of neighbors, and do not regulate tenant
miscondu ct. ”
All this and more may bear on a n inqu iry into pe aceable assembly for
citizens ’ co m mon good

. B ut the major ity op in ion ne v er undertakes such an inquiry , de spite
th e plain consti tutional text. Inst ead, i t sets up the st r aw man that the City ’ s concerns are limit ed to “ reduc [ing] the likelihood that short

- term rent als would serve as ra uco us ‘ pa rty
houses ’

. . . and

. . . reduc[ing] po ssible strain on neighborhood infr astructu re , ” ove rlooking the City ’ s other p ublic

- hea lth a n d public

- safety concerns. See a n te at 40

. I n doing so, i t considers
Section 25

- 2

- 795 to be me re “ regulation of pro p e rty use

. ” S ee an te at 41

.

Analyz in g peaceablenes s requires a broader view

. The con cept ’ s r ole in T exas jurisprudence sugges t s why. The Cour t of Crimin al Ap peals once struck down as unconst itutional

a statute proscribing “ any collecti on of more than two p icketers eit h er within fi fty feet of any
entrance to picketed p remises or within fif ty feet of each other ” in part beca use th e statute failed
to consider “ th e p eacefulness of the gro up, the l ack of obstruction to the flow of traffic, o r the
level of nois e , if any, gen e rated by t he picketers. ” Olvera v. St ate , 806 S.W. 2d 546, 552 (Tex.
Cri m. App. 1991) ; c

f. De Jonge v. Oreg on , 29 9 U.S. 353, 365 ( 1937) ( “ [C]onsi ste ntly with the
Federal Constitution, peaceable assembly for lawful discussio n can not be ma de a cr ime. ” )

. R ela t edly, driv ing while int oxicated is “a breach of th e peace, ” for purpose s of a w arrantle ss
arrest. See Band

a v. S t a te , 317 S.W.3d 903, 912 n.4 (T ex. App.

— Hous to n [14th Di st.] 2010,

no pet. ). And s o is “ curs[ing] and creat [i ng] a distur banc e ” wh en a peac e o f ficer is i nvestigating a complaint. S ee Johnson v. State , 481 S.W.2d 86 4, 865

– 6 6 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. 1972)

.

L oud no i s e. Obstructi ng infrastructu re. Fl o u ting law enforcement

. P ublic
disturbances. Threats to p ublic safety

. All these may m ake an ass embly non

- p ea ceable and h av e14

nothi ng to do with civic discou rse
. And t he City bel ieve s th at i t has evidence of short

- te rm

ren t als causing all these. To det ermine whether the City i s ri g ht , we should examine what ties
all these examples tog ethe r as breaches of the p eace disconn ec ted f rom th e common good

. The m ajority opinion eschews a full peaceab le n ess or “ common good ” ana ly sis, however, sidestepping what the plain co nsti tutional t ext requires

.

B. Texas courts conceive of fundamental rights m uch m ore narrowly
. The majo rity op inion is also o ut of step with Texas “ funda mental right ” precedent

. When litigants plead con stit utional viola t ions of all eged ly fundament al rights, T exas
courts are typically m ore circ umspect than th e majority opi nion is i n d e fining th e sco pe of the rig ht at issue

. B y not gi ving due weight to t he concept s of peaceabl e ness and citiz ens ’ common good in its ho lding t hat “ th e rig h t t o assembl e granted by the Texas Constitut ion is a fun d amental right, ” thereby requiring strict s c r u tiny , the major ity opini on s w eep s too b roadly. S ee a nte at 35

.

It has no limiting principle

. T h e effect of the majority opi nion ’ s view is th a t a ny regulation affecting any activity , anywhere in Texas , is subject to strict

- scrutiny review so long

as m ore th an one p erson i s involve d

. T his view will have exactl y the kind of far

- reaching effects
that the Retroac tivity Clause would have had i f the S upreme Court had not prevented it from being interpreted overly literally. Cf. Robinson , 335 S.W.3d a t 138

– 3 9 ( quot ing Texas Water Rights C omm ’ n , 464 S .W.2d at 648 )

.

C o nside r h ow the ma

jority opinion ’ s sweeping approa ch might undermine o the r

comm on
- sense r esults

. Wh e n a student ’ s parent challeng e d a statute prohibitin g s tudents from participating in extra curri cul a r act ivitie s , no mat ter where the y take place , unl ess the student

ma intain ed a 70% grade aver age , the Supreme Court of Texas considered the right a t issue to15

be “ the r i ght to par ticipate i n e xtr acurricular activities

. ” See Sp ring Branch I.S. D. v. Sta m os , 695 S. W.2d 556, 557

– 6 0 (Tex. 1 985 )

. But what if the C ourt, like the m ajority o pinion here,
couched the right more gener ally as the right “ to ge t t o g ether or congre gate ” ? That would
encompas s e xtr acurricular ac tivities on campus or elsew here

. The Sup rem e Court th en would
hav e a nalyzed t he p arent ’ s challen ge unde r heightened scrutin y. In stead, it d isp osed o f t he challenge on ration al

- basis revie w. See id.

E lsewhere, this C ourt upheld a T ravis C ou nty park rule restric ti ng a ccess to a park
known for n u de s unbathing t o people ove r 1 8 years o ld

. See Central Tex. Nudis ts v. C ounty of
Travi s , N o. 03

- 00

- 000 24

- CV, 20 00 WL 17 84344, at *1, * 4, * 8 (Tex. App.

— Au stin Dec. 7, 2000, pet. denied ) ( not d es ignated for publicati on )

. Nudist p arents who wanted t o br ing th e i r chi ldren to the pa rk chall e nged the rule, but this Co urt held th at the rule di d no t infringe on an y fundame ntal right and d id not “ affect t h e a b ility of the [parents] or other n aturist pa re nts to

a ssociate with t hei r c hildren, but regulat e[d] onl y where such associations ma y occur. ” See i d. at

* 3

– 4 , * 6

. The p arents could not congrega te w ith their childr en anywhe re they pleased

. But , here, th e majo r ity opinion seems to say that ass embly ri gh ts are fun dame ntal no matter where they are exercised

. 3

3 The majority opinion releg ates to a footnote t h e “ privacy rights [that] ar e implicated in [its] ri g ht

- of

- ass embly analysis. ” See a nte at 37 n. 9

. T he majority opinio n do es not divine a d ifference between federal and stat e privacy rights and rel ies on opinion s f rom the S u prem e Court of the Un ite d St at es
. See id. But t he footnote fa ils t o cons ider the si m i la r or di nance upheld in Villag e of Bel le Terre v. Bora as , 416 U.S . 1 (1974). There, t he ordinance

restricted land use to one

- family dwell ings excludin g lodging houses, boardin g houses, fratern ity h ou ses, or multi ple

- dwelling house s. T he word “ family ” as u s ed in th e ordi nance means, “ (o )ne or more persons related by bloo d, a doption, or ma rr iag e, living and cooking together as a single housek eeping unit, e xclusive of household se rvants. A number of pe rsons but not e xceeding two (2) l iv ing and16 The ma jor ity opi nion i s inconsi s t ent w it h “ f un da mental right ” precedent bec ause it couches the right at issue f ar more b roadly than Texas court s t radi tional l y wo uld.

C. Neither of Texas ’ s high courts have taken t he novel step that the majority opinion takes today
. Fin ally, t he majorit y opi nio n over step s o u r C ourt ’ s role as an interm ediate cou rt by declaring a fu ndamental right to congreg ate without fully a nalyzi n g peaceable ness or the advocacy of a ma tter of pu blic welfar e
. We should instead leave thi s func tion to o ur state ’ s two high court s. Declar in g rights fund a mental, and thus bey ond ord inary de mocratic give

- and

- take , is a weighty matter. See , e. g. , Obe rgefel l v. Hodges , 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604

– 0 6 ( 2 015 ) ( holding that fe deral Due Process and Equal Pr ote c ti on C l au se s forbid d en ying
fundame n tal right t o marry to sa m e
- se x couples and no ting th at that holding places rig ht “ beyond
the rea ch of ma

jori ties and of

ficial s ” )

. Declaring fundamental the right to congregate, witho ut any real qua lifica tion , is a novel and b ig st e p in to thi s wei ghty area because “ [e] c onomi c regula ti ons, inclu d ing zo nin g d ecisio ns , have traditi onally been af forded only rational relatio n

sc ruti ny
. ” Mayh ew v. T

own of Sunnyvale , 964 S.W.2d 922, 939 (Tex. 1998). 4

coo king togeth e r a s a si ngle h ouseke eping unit th ough not related by blood, adopt ion, or marriage s ha ll be deemed to constitute a family. ”

Id. at 2. The Court upheld t he ordinance , holding th at the suit “ invo lv e [ d] no ‘ fundament al ’ right guarante ed by the Con sti tution, s u ch as

. . . th e right of assoc iation

. . . or any rights o f priva cy. ” Id. at 7 (int er nal citations omitted). The majo rity opinion ’ s footn ote does not a ttempt to distinguish Vi llage of Belle Te r r e .

4 The maj ority opi nion considers S ec tion 25

- 2

- 795 t o be a zoning o rdinance be cause , i n h old ing Sec tion 25

- 2

- 795 unconstitutiona l, it re li es on authority instruc ting that “ [w]e must ‘ not assume th at zoning cod e s inherently serve a com pelli ng interest, or that ev ery incremental gain to cit y revenue (in comme rcial zones) , o r increment al reduc tio n o f tr affic (in residential zones),17 The ma jority opin ion recogni zes that ne it h er the Su preme Court of Te xas nor th e Cou rt of Criminal Appeals of Texas has declared an un bound ed right to congregate to be
fundamental

. As n oted above, the Cou rt of Criminal Appeals cons ider s the Assembly Claus e to
be “ sp ecif

ically limit [e d]

. . . to ‘ p e aceable a ssembly

. ’ ” Fe r g us on , 610 S. W.2d at 470

. And history provi des th e importa nt cont ext that peac eab le assemblies are only protected to t h e extent
the y impl i cate the common go od , wh eth er advocating majo rity o r min ority view po ints

.

Beca use the h ig h c our ts ha ve not yet ta ken t h i s s tep , we sho uld refrain from doing so
. Cf. Ex parte Morales , 212 S.W .3d 483, 490

– 93 ( Tex. App.

— Austin 2006, pet

. r e f ’d ) ( refusing to dec lare “adult consensual sexua l ac tivity ” to be fu ndamental right ) ; In re Liv ing
Ctrs. o f Am., I nc. , 10 S.W.3d 1, 6 ( T e x . A pp.

— Hous ton [14 th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceed ing [ mand. denie d ] ) ( re fusing t o decla re “the fair administration of j usti ce ” to be f undame ntal right ).
We should refrain even more be caus e the two interp retations of assembly r ights a dvanced by the majori ty o pin ion

— that “the purposes of assembly ” a re not limited “to the common good ” or to “petitioning the government ”

—have n ot “been re adily acknowledged in legal and polit ical
discourse. ” See Inazu , The Forgotten Freed om of Ass em bly , sup ra at 576

– 77

. In deed, t h e major ity o pinion ’ s view is cal led into question by hundreds of years o f his torical an d legal precede nt.
For these r e asons , I dissent from the maj ority o pinion regarding due process

. I

wo ul d review Sec t io n 25

- 2

- 795 un de r the ration al

- basi s te st beca use i t is a zonin g l aw supported

is compell ing. ” S e e ante at 41 (quo ting Barr v. City of Sinton , 295 S. W.3d 287, 307 (Tex. 2009) ). Barr in vol ved the fun damen t a l right of free exercise of religion, w hich is not at is sue h e re. See 2 9 5 S.W.3d a t 305

– 06

. T he majority opinion does not explain ho w Sec tion 25

- 2

- 7 95 can be a zoning ordinance while Section 25

- 2

- 950 “ doe s not adv ance a z oni ng interest. ” Comp are ante at 20 ( no zonin g interest ) , with an te at 41 ( zon ing )

.18

by the City of Austin ’ s inherent polic e powe r s, is sup ported by a lengthy record , and doe s not imp inge upon any c iti zen ’ s right to peac eably assemble t o advocate fo r the common g o od

.

I woul d af

fi rm t he tri al court ’ s grant o f the City ’ s no
- e v id ence mo tion for summary judgment.

______________________ __________ __________ Ch ari L. Ke ll y, J ustice
Before Chief Jus tice R ose , Jus t ic es Goodwin and Kelly
File d: November 2 7 , 2019