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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICK RONALD HOLLEY,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2006 MCE PAN P

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a prisoner confined at the California Medical Facility. He seeks

damages and injunctive relief upon the ground defendants Youngblood, Davis, Aronsen, Veal,

Jones, Moreno and Williams violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) and under the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment by punishing him for refusing to cut his hair as required by the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations' grooming standards and by forcing

him to cut his hair. Defendants have answered the complaint. 

Plaintiff seeks an order barring defendants from punishing him for refusing to cut

his hair and directing all disciplinary sanctions previously imposed for violating the grooming

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policy be lifted. Defendants have filed no opposition.

The purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo

pending a fuller hearing. The cases contain limited discussion of the standards for issuing a

temporary restraining order due to the fact that very few such orders can be appealed prior to the

hearing on a preliminary injunction. It is apparent however, that requests for temporary

restraining orders which are not ex parte and without notice are governed by the same general

standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.

Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.); Los Angeles Unified Sch.

Dist. v. United States Dist. Court, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ferguson, J. dissenting);

Century Time Ltd. v. Interchron Ltd., 729 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In many cases the

emphasis of the court is directed to irreparable harm and the balance of hardships because the

merits of a controversy are often difficult to ascertain and adjudicate on short notice.

The legal principles applicable to a request for injunctive relief are well

established. To prevail, the moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits

and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in the movant’s favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122

F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374,

1376 (9th Cir. 1985). The two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale with the focal

point being the degree of irreparable injury shown. See Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. 

“Under any formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat

of irreparable injury.” Id. In the absence of a significant showing of possible irreparable harm,

the court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success on the merits. See id.

In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any

preliminary injunction “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the

harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

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 A court may take judicial notice of court records. See MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 1

803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

3

It appears plaintiff’s injunctive relief claim under RLUIPA concerning prospective

threat of harm is moot. Effective January 17, 2006, the Office of Administrative Law filed

emergency changes to the prison grooming standards with the Secretary of State. See Cal. Code

Regs tit. 15, § 3000-3210. These standards replaced the former 1997 grooming standards, which

required male inmates to keep their hair short. (See Andreozzi v. Davis, CIV S-02-0796 GEB

CMK P, Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. A). Under the 1

modified grooming regulations, inmates are permitted to wear their hair long and to wear beards

as specified. See Cal. Code Regs tit. 15, § 3062(e). Braids and cornrows are permissible.

See Cal. Code Regs tit. 15, § 3062(g). As an emergency provision, the modified regulations are

subject to a 160 period of public comment before being considered final. (See Andreozzi v.

Davis, CIV S-02-0796, Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. A). 

However, the regulations are now being applied at California State Prisons. See id. Former

restrictions on hair length are no longer in effect. See id. 

In the instant case, plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief under RLUIPA to prevent

prison officials from cutting his hair and/or punishing him for refusing to have his hair cut. His

claim is based on prison policies which, as of January 17, 2006, were drastically modified and no

longer restrict inmate hair length. See Cal. Code Regs tit. 15, § 3000-3210. Plaintiff’s claim

does not fall into the category of claims that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”

See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995). In Dilley, the Ninth Circuit held that

"[t]his exception to the mootness doctrine applies when (1) the challenged action is too short in

duration to be fully litigated prior to its expiration and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that

the injury will occur again." Id. Here, however, the challenged grooming regulations were in

effect for approximately nine years and may have changed as a result of litigation similar to the

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 A state substantially burdens religion when it imposes a "significantly great restriction 2

or onus upon such exercise," or "denies an important benefit because of conduct mandated by

religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to

violate his beliefs." Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995. Forcing a prisoner to choose between his

religion and conforming to prison rules so as to have basic privileges and to remain

disciplinary-free constitutes a substantial burden. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 996.

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instant action. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005). There is no 2

reasonable expectation that prison officials will, in light of the new regulations, discipline

plaintiff for wearing his hair long in accordance with his religious beliefs. Accordingly, the

undersigned finds that, in light of the new grooming regulations, there no longer exists a threat of

irreparable harm, and plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief should be denied. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s March 21, 2005,

September 26, 2005, October 14, 2005, November 3, 2005 and December 28, 2005 motions for

temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction be denied (Docket Nos. 10-1, 10-2, 22,

24, 31, & 38.)

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 23, 2006.

001; holl2006.tro

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