[Cite as In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-4186.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

IN RE: A.M., M.M. & C.M. 

 

 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. 

: Hon. Earle E. Wise, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2020 CA 00070 

: 2020 CA 00071 

: 2020 CA 00072 

: OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeals from the Stark County Court 

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case 

Nos. 2018-JCV-00350, 2018-JCV-00351, 

2018-JCV-01009 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 21, 2020 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

BRANDON J. WALTENBAUGH DEAN L. GRASE 

Stark County JFS 700 Courtyard Centre 

402 2nd St. S.E. 116 Cleveland Avenue N.W. 

Canton, OH 44702 Canton, OH 44702 
[Cite as In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-4186.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant E.M. appeals from the March 6, 2020 judgment entry of the Stark 

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating her parental rights and 

granting permanent custody of A.M., M.M., and C.M., to the Stark County Department of 

Job and Family Services (“SCDJFS”). 

Facts & Procedural History

{¶2} E.M. is the mother (“Mother”) of A.M., born on February 9, 2010, M.M., born 

on April 3, 2017, and C.M., born on September 7, 2018. C.M. is the father (“Father”) of 

the children. 

{¶3} On April 9, 2018, SCDJFS filed a complaint of dependency and/or neglect 

with regards to A.M. and M.M. The complaint alleged as follows: SCDJFS became 

involved with the family in January of 2018 when it was reported that A.M. was seen for 

a urinary tract infection; in the midst of the medical assessment, it was disclosed that A.M. 

had been sexually abused by her maternal grandfather and had been allowed to have 

continued contact with him following reports of abuse; there are concerns about untreated 

mental health issues in both parents, compromised judgment by both parents, and lack 

of appropriate supervision of the children; A.M. reported that she, at 7 years old, is 

responsible for cooking dinner; the agency had been involved with the family in 2011 due 

to lack of appropriate supervision when A.M. fell down a flight of stairs in a stroller as an 

infant; the agency was involved in 2016 due to concerns of lack of supervision of A.M.; 

and Mother’s cognitive deficits and impaired judgment appears to be a persistent concern 

for her ability to parent her children appropriately. 
{¶4} On April 10, 2018, Mother stipulated to a finding of probable cause. The 

trial court also appointed Bernard Hunt (“Hunt”) as guardian ad litem for the children. On 

June 21, 2018, Mother stipulated to a finding of dependency for M.M. and a finding of 

abuse for A.M. The trial court approved a case plan, and placed A.M. and M.M. in the 

temporary custody of SCDJFS. 

{¶5} SCDJFS filed a complaint of dependency with regards to C.M. on 

September 10, 2018, three days after she was born. The complaint alleged, in part, that 

SCDJFS had two open and active cases regarding A.M. and C.M. due to concerns 

involving sexual abuse and the parents’ failure/unwillingness to protect the children from 

further abuse. After taking testimony on November 21, 2018, the trial court found C.M. 

to be a dependent child and placed C.M. in the temporary custody of SCDJFS. 

{¶6} SCDJFS filed a motion for permanent custody with regards to A.M. and 

M.M. on November 15, 2019, and C.M. on November 22, 2019. 

{¶7} The trial court held a trial on the motions for permanent custody on February 

25, 2020. Counsel for Father stated that Father did not contest the motion for permanent 

custody and felt it was in the best interest of the children for the motion to be granted. 

{¶8} Amy Craig (“Craig”), a caseworker for SCDJFS, first became involved with 

the family on January 31, 2018. Craig testified that A.M. and M.M. have continuously 

been in agency custody since June 21, 2018. C.M. has continuously been in agency 

custody since November 21, 2018. 

{¶9} Craig testified to the initial allegations that brought the family to SCDJFS. 

While at the emergency room being treated for a urinary tract infection, A.M. reported that 

she was sexually abused by her grandfather, and, after this report, Mother continued to 
allow grandfather to babysit the children. Throughout the case, Mother has been unclear 

as to whether she believes A.M. 

{¶10} Craig testified about Mother’s case plan. Mother was asked to follow 

through with mental health treatment and she has been going to Phoenix Rising. Mother 

completed a parenting assessment through Northeast Behavioral Health and completed 

some recommendations from this assessment, such as attending Goodwill Parenting 

classes and going to joint counseling. 

{¶11} As to parenting classes, Mother attended parenting classes twice. The first 

time she received a certificate of non-compliance, as it was recommended that she repeat 

the class once she addressed some of her relationship issues and her childhood trauma. 

There were also concerns that Mother did not retain the information provided in class. 

After Mother attended parenting class a second time, there were still concerns, including 

Mother’s inability to protect her children, the fact that her baby-sitting plan was not 

realistic, and treating the children at younger developmental ages than they actually were. 

During Mother’s second parenting class, she received a certificate of attendance, but it 

was not considered a successful completion of the class because of concerns with 

Mother’s goals. 

{¶12} Craig stated that while Mother struggled during visits with engaging all three 

children, overall the visits were okay and were not a major concern. 

{¶13} Craig testified it is the agency’s position that Mother has not made enough 

progress to safely reunify her with the children. Craig believes the agency has exercised 

reasonable efforts to try to assist the family. Craig testified the children deserve 
permanency, there are compelling reasons to grant permanent custody to the agency, 

and the children have all spent in excess of one year in the agency’s custody. 

{¶14} On cross-examination, Craig confirmed the issues with Mother centered 

around the parenting classes. While testing was a part of the concern, there were other 

concerns such as lack of accountability and lack of ability to safely protect the children. 

{¶15} In the best interest portion of the trial, Craig testified the three children are 

placed together at a foster home. They have been in this home for the past two years 

and are bonded to the foster parents. A.M. is in school with an IEP for issues with speech, 

communication, language, and receives intervention with math, reading, and writing. A.M. 

is improving in school and is making positive progress. A.M. had a history of urinary tract 

infections, but is now medication-free and is not having any issues. 

{¶16} M.M. is small for his age, but is otherwise healthy. C.M. is small for her age 

and has some medical issues, but the foster parents are following up with the doctor’s 

recommendations. Mother does have a bond with the children, especially with A.M. 

However, A.M. wants to be safe. 

{¶17} The foster family has indicated a desire to adopt the children. Craig testified 

the children will benefit from adoption and they need permanency. While A.M. loves her 

parents, Craig believes A.M. deserves and needs to be kept safe. Craig does not think 

going home with Mother would be a safe option for A.M. Craig believes it is in the best 

interest of the children for the trial court to grant permanent custody to SCDJFS. 

{¶18} The GAL filed his report and testified at the hearing that it is in the best 

interest of the children if the trial court were to grant permanent custody to SCDJFS. In 

his report, Hunt noted that Mother’s relationship with R.T., a family friend, was not 
productive or helpful to her progress, as she listened to him rather than her attorney or 

the agency employees. Hunt did not see Mother utilizing the skills offered in parenting 

class. In support of his recommendation, Hunt stated the following concerns remain: 

Mother’s relationship with R.T., who attended court hearings and team meetings; her 

failure to complete Goodwill Parenting; Mother’s inability to safely parent the children, as 

she has not shown the ability to manage the children without assistance; and the children 

have health issues beyond the ability of Mother to address. 

{¶19} Dr. Amy Thomas (“Thomas”) of Northeast Behavioral Health completed 

Mother’s parenting evaluation. Mother was functioning within the below-average range 

of intellectual ability, suggesting she would need additional support to explain parenting 

instruction. Mother reported she previously was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Thomas 

stated Mother also presented with dependent personality disorder, manifesting in 

unhealthy relationships. Mother described to Thomas a very unhealthy relationship with 

Father plagued with verbal and physical abuse. Mother reported to Thomas that her 

father was very abusive and she witnessed her father rape her mother. However, Mother 

had questions about A.M.’s abuse allegations. Thomas testified since Mother doubted 

A.M., there were concerns about her willingness to protect A.M. in the future. 

{¶20} Thomas made several recommendations for Mother: continue counseling 

to process her own childhood abuse; remain medication compliant; marital counseling; 

successfully complete Goodwill Parenting; identify an appropriate support system; and, if 

abuse continued with Father, identify another healthy living condition and support 

network. 
{¶21} Thomas testified if Mother was not able to successfully complete parenting 

class, Thomas would be concerned, as she would want to make sure Mother can keep 

the children safe and manage their special needs. Given the special demands presented 

by the children, including autism and their young ages, Thomas felt it was important that 

Mother satisfactorily complete the parenting program to meet their needs. Thomas also 

noted the program was important because it reinforced the importance of having the 

children only supervised by appropriate people so that they would not be exposed to 

violence or subjected to abuse. 

{¶22} On cross-examination, Thomas testified she is familiar with the Goodwill 

Parenting program and stated they tailor the program to those with cognitive disabilities 

like Mother. 

{¶23} Kelsey Kiggins (“Kiggins”) is the instructor for the first and second Goodwill 

Parenting sessions that Mother attended. In describing the goals accepted by Goodwill, 

Kiggins stated Mother was unable to explain what many of them meant and thus many of 

her goals were rejected. Kiggins recommended Mother repeat the class because of the 

issues with her goals, along with a lack of understanding of her responsibility in the 

involvement with the agency. At the first session, Mother received a certificate of noncompliance, which means Mother failed to complete a minimal amount of course 

requirements. Kiggins testified that, due to Mother’s lower IQ, there were multiple 

accommodations offered, including receiving assistance with the post-test. During the 

first session, Mother declined any accommodations. After the first session, Kiggins 

recommended that Mother continue with individual counseling, with a focus on 

accountability and determining appropriate caregivers. 
{¶24} Mother did somewhat better during the second class session and utilized 

the offered accommodations. More of her goals were accepted, and her post-test score 

improved. Mother received a certificate of attendance, which means she completed a 

minimal amount of course requirements. Despite the certificate of attendance and 

improvement in the second session, Kiggins did not recommend reunification between 

Mother and her children due to: continued concerns in Mother’s ability to provide her 

children with appropriate caregivers; concerns about her ability to protect the children 

from being exposed to future abuse; and concerns with Mother’s accountability, as she 

gave inconsistent disclosures surrounding events leading up to the involvement with 

SCDJFS. Kiggins testified that Mother continued to present a safety risk to her children. 

{¶25} Kiggins testified Mother initially struggled with being able to supervise all 

three children simultaneously and provide them with appropriate interactions. However, 

Kiggins saw some improvement during the visits. 

{¶26} On cross-examination, Kiggins explained that the ultimate decision as to 

whether someone passes the class is not specifically based on test score and not 

specifically on how many goals they completed, but it based on a combination of all of the 

course requirements, including the test score, application of skills at the visits, program 

goals, the ability to demonstrate insight and apply skills, whether they are applying 

appropriate decision-making skills, and the ability to make positive changes to reduce risk 

for the children. Kiggins does not believe this is a subjective process. 

{¶27} Lela Tournoux (“Tournoux”) is Mother’s best friend. Tournoux has seen 

Mother with her two oldest children and describes her parenting skills as good. Mother 

sometimes babysits Tournoux’s daughter. Cynthia Salmon (“Salmon”) is a friend of 
Mother. Salmon testified she saw Mother with A.M. and Mother’s parenting skills were 

good. 

{¶28} Mother testified that since February 2018, she has been compliant with 

counseling. Mother believes she now understands what she needs to do to take care of 

her children. Given another chance, she believes she can keep her children safe because 

she now knows she should ask for help and use daycare instead of allowing her children 

to be around her father. Mother knows she has made mistakes, but loves her children 

and stated now she can do better. 

{¶29} The trial court issued a judgment entry on March 6, 2020, terminating 

Mother’s parental rights with regards to A.M., M.M., and C.M, and granting permanent 

custody of the children to SCDJFS. Simultaneously, the trial court issued extensive 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. With regards to A.M. and M.M., the trial court 

determined that since they have continuously remained in the custody of SCDJFS from 

June 21, 2018 until the date of the hearing on February 25, 2020, they have been in the 

custody of the agency for a period greater than twelve months of a consecutive twentytwo-month period. 

{¶30} The trial court found Craig’s, Thomas’, and Kiggans’ testimony to be 

credible. The trial court stated the biggest concern with Mother is her ability to safely 

parent, as well as concerns about her ability to protect and accept accountability. The 

trial court noted that Mother had absolutely no accountability for her actions which 

resulted in A.M. being abused by maternal grandfather and, even after twenty-two weeks 

of parenting classes, it was still the opinion of Goodwill that Mother could not reunify with 

the children. 
{¶31} The trial court reviewed several exhibits admitted into evidence, including 

Thomas’ evaluations. Pursuant to Thomas’ latest evaluation, Mother would require a 

highly structured approach to parenting skill training. Thomas opined that Mother must 

show she can establish independent housing, identify an appropriate support system, and 

attend Goodwill classes and follow their recommendations. The court found the testimony 

of Kiggans and Mother’s own testimony showed that Mother is not able to retain the 

information provided to her by Goodwill and Mother is not able to ensure the safety of the 

children. Mother detailed to Thomas extensive and almost daily physical abuse of her by 

her father and Mother alleged that her father raped her mother almost daily. Despite 

these past experiences, Mother let her father watch A.M. Thomas summarized her report 

as follows, “[a]t present, Mother’s prognosis is not favorable. This examiner questions 

Mother’s ability to competently raise three young children, including a child who was 

recently diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder, a toddler, and an infant * * * Mother’s 

cognitive deficits, limited support system, and depression can make this task even more 

challenging.” As to her ability to protect her children, Thomas stated in her report that, 

despite Mother’s knowledge of her father’s anger issues and risk of sexual abuse, she 

nevertheless relied on her parents and sister heavily to watch A.M. before school, after 

school, and in the evening. 

{¶32} The trial court also reviewed the report written by Kiggans, noting the 

problems with the first session of the parenting class and stating that while the second 

session was more positive, Goodwill did not recommend reunification based upon 

Mother’s lack of understanding of who would be appropriate caregivers for her children, 

lack of accountability, and lack of her ability to protect the children. The trial court cited a 
portion of Kiggans’ report, “Mother was unable to develop a safe, practical plan to protect 

her children from any abuse in the future and provide them with appropriate caregivers 

as needed.” The trial court also specifically cited the section of Kiggans’ report in which 

Kiggans stated that while Mother demonstrated improvement in some aspects of the 

program, she did not successfully complete the program. Kiggans stated, “there remain 

grave concerns regarding her ability to apply relevant content in her daily life and provide 

her children with protection in the future * * * concerns remain regarding Mother’s ability 

to adapt to and meet her children’s ever changing needs * * * It was also apparent Mother 

viewed her children in the same developmental frame as they were prior to removal.” 

Kiggans concluded, “there are grave concerns regarding Mother’s ability to protect each 

of her children in the future and assist A.M. in the trauma she had already endured.” The 

trial court agreed with the summary set forth by Kiggans in her report. 

{¶33} The trial court found Mother failed to protect A.M. and found it very 

concerning that while Mother acknowledged the agency became involved because of the 

sexual abuse, Mother continued to have doubts about whether this abuse occurred. The 

trial court specifically stated that Thomas was accurate in her assessment of Mother and 

her assessment as to how Mother’s deficits would negatively impact Mother’s ability to 

retain the information provided in the parenting classes. Additionally, the trial court 

agreed with Kiggans’ report and stated that while Mother visits her children and loves 

them, it is not safe to have the children reunite with Mother and nothing further can be 

attempted to assist Mother in regaining custody. 

{¶34} The trial court found the witnesses presented by Mother lacked credibility. 

With regards to Mother’s testimony, the trial court found the testimony “painful to hear,” 
as she “had much difficulty maintaining her focus and made statements which, in reality, 

confirmed the conclusions drawn by Dr. Thomas and Ms. Kiggans.” 

{¶35} The trial court concluded that, notwithstanding reasonable case planning 

and diligent efforts by the agency, Mother has failed to remedy the conditions that caused 

A.M., M.M., and C.M. to be placed and the children cannot be placed with Mother within 

a reasonable time, nor should they be placed with Mother. 

{¶36} The trial court then made findings with regards to the best interest portion 

of the trial. The court found Craig gave credible testimony and stated the guardian ad 

litem recommended permanent custody of A.M., M.M., and C.M. to SCDJFS is in the best 

interest of the children. The trial court found A.M. and M.M. are bonded to Mother, but 

they deserve and need to be kept safe. Thus, the benefit of permanency outweighs any 

harm caused by severing the parental bond. The trial court found it is in the best interest 

of the children for permanent custody to be granted to SCDJFS. 

{¶37} Mother appeals the March 6, 2020 judgment entry of the Stark County Court 

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and assigns the following as error: 

{¶38} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PERMANENT CUSTODY 

TO THE STARK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES (SCDJFS) 

AS THE RELIANCE UPON THE APPELLANT’S RESULTS IN THE GOODWILL 

PARENTING SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAM VIOLATES THE APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO 

DUE PROCESS AND “FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS” UNDER THE 5TH AND 14TH 

AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.” 
Permanent Custody

{¶39} “[T]he right to raise a child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re 

Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 

U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). An award of permanent custody must 

be based on clear and convincing evidence. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). 

{¶40} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence “which will provide in the 

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” 

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954). “Where the degree of proof 

required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine 

the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy 

the requisite degree of proof.” Id. at 477. If some competent, credible evidence going to 

all the essential elements of the case supports the trial court’s judgment, an appellate 

court must affirm the judgment and not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. 

C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978). 

{¶41} Issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to 

the evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. Seasons Coal v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 

77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). Deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is 

“crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evidence in the parties’ 

demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 

Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). 

{¶42} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the guidelines a trial court must follow when 

deciding a motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates the trial court 
schedule a hearing and provide notice upon the filing of a motion for permanent custody 

of a child by a public children services agency. 

{¶43} Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414(B) authorizes the juvenile court to 

grant permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court 

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant 

permanent custody to the agency, and that any of the following apply: (a) the child is not 

abandoned or orphaned, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents 

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents; (b) the child is 

abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who are able 

to take permanent custody; or (d) the child has been in the temporary custody of one or 

more public children services agencies or private child placement agencies for twelve or 

more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 

1999. 

{¶44} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial 

court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, a trial court 

will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding 

the best interest of the child. 

I. 

{¶45} In her assignment of error, Mother argues the trial court committed error in 

its determination that, notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by 

the agency, Mother has failed to remedy the conditions that caused A.M., M.M., and C.M. 
to be placed and the children cannot be placed with Mother within a reasonable time, nor 

should they be placed with Mother. 

{¶46} We first note the trial court determined, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), 

that A.M. and M.M. have been in the temporary custody of the agency for a period of time 

in excess of twelve of the prior twenty-two consecutive months. Craig testified that A.M. 

and M.M. have continuously been in agency custody since June 21, 2018. Thus, A.M. 

and M.M. have been in the custody of the agency for more than twelve out of the last 

twenty-two months. 

{¶47} As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are 

alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion 

for permanent custody. In re Daltoni, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2007 AP 0041, 2007-

Ohio-5805. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to 

support the grant of permanent custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA00118, 

2008-Ohio-5458. 

{¶48} Because Mother has not challenged the twelve of twenty-two-month finding 

as to A.M. and M.M., we would not need to address the merits of this assignment of error. 

However, as to C.M. and even if we consider Mother’s argument with regards to A.M. and 

M.M., the trial court did not err in determining the children cannot be placed with Mother 

at this time or within a reasonable period of time. Under R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court 

must consider all relevant evidence before making this determination. The trial court is 

required to enter such a finding if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

one or more of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exist with 

respect to each of the child’s parents. 
{¶49} Mother argues she was denied her right to “fundamental fairness” under the 

Due Process Clause because SCDJFS delegated the determination of her constitutional 

right to a relationship with her children to a non-judicial entity, the Goodwill Parenting 

Program. 

{¶50} In support of her argument, Mother cites Price v. Nixon, 2nd Dist. Clark No. 

2010-CA-058, 2010-Ohio-2430. However, we find Price is not analogous to the instant 

case and is thus unpersuasive. In Price, the Second District Court of Appeals held that 

the trial court failed to afford the appellant due process because the trial court did not 

provide the appellant with notice of the possibility that it could award custody to a nonparent, nor did the court provide the appellant with an opportunity to cross-examine 

witnesses on such an award. Id. In this case, both SCDJFS, through its motion for 

permanent custody, and the trial court during the hearing, provided appellant clear notice 

of the possibility that it could grant permanent custody to SCDJFS. Additionally, the trial 

court provided appellant with the opportunity to cross-examine all of SCDJFS’ witnesses. 

{¶51} We disagree with Mother’s contention that the trial court improperly 

delegated the decision as to whether her parental rights should be terminated to the 

Goodwill Parenting Program. In its judgment entry, the trial court issued extensive 

findings of fact and applied them to detailed conclusions of law in order to complete the 

analysis pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B). The trial court, rather than those at Goodwill 

Parenting, made the legal determination pursuant to the relevant statutes as to whether 

there was clear and convincing evidence to grant permanent custody to SCDJFS. 

Further, the trial court did not solely consider or rely on the testimony and reports of 

Kiggans. In addition to the testimony and report of Kiggans, the trial court also considered 
all of the relevant evidence, and cited to the testimony of Craig, the testimony/report of 

Thomas, and the recommendation of the guardian ad litem, in support of its decision. The 

failure to complete the parenting class was just one of several reasons on which the court 

based its decision. 

{¶52} Mother asserts that Kiggans’ testimony is not credible and thus the trial 

court erred in relying on her testimony to determine the children cannot and should not 

be placed with Mother within a reasonable period of time. Mother cites to Kiggans’ 

relatively short time at Goodwill and the fact that Kiggans believes the passing or failing 

of Goodwill Parenting is not a subjective process. However, issues relating to the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence are primarily for the 

trier of fact. Seasons Coal v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). 

During her testimony, Kiggans detailed her education, her qualifications, her job 

description, and how she collaborates and receives feedback from her supervisor. 

Additionally, Kiggans detailed how the ultimate decision of whether someone passes the 

parenting class is made and testified to a combination of the course requirements, 

including test scores, application of skills, program goals, the ability to demonstrate insight 

and apply skills, making appropriate decisions, and reducing the risk to the children. 

Counsel for appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine Kiggans. We find the trial 

court did not commit error in relying on Kiggans’ testimony. 

{¶53} Further, even if the trial court did commit error in relying on her testimony, 

the trial court considered all of the relevant evidence, and relied on the testimony, 

evidence, and recommendations presented and made by other witnesses, including 
Thomas, Craig, and Hunt, to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard pursuant 

to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and Under R.C. 2151.414(E). 

{¶54} Finally, Mother contends that if she had attained successful completion of 

the parenting skills class, she would have completed her case plan and would have been 

allowed to reunify with her children. We disagree. The trial court considered other 

evidence, such the testimony and recommendations of Craig, Thomas, Hunt, and the 

testimony of Mother herself, in its decision. As this Court has held, the successful 

completion of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. In the Matter of 

A.H., 5th Dist. Richland No. 18CA96, 2019-Ohio-1509. While it may be in Mother’s best 

interest to complete the case plan, this is only one factor for the trial court to consider. Id. 

Where a parent has participated in his or her case plan and completed most or all of the 

plan requirements, a trial court may still properly determine that such parent has not 

substantially remedied the problems leading to agency involvement. Id. That is the 

determination the trial court made in the instant case. 

{¶55} A review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the children 

cannot be placed with Mother within a reasonable time. At the time of the hearing, both 

A.M. and M.M. had been in the agency’s custody for almost two years. Despite Mother’s 

substantial compliance with the case plan and the fact that she loves her children very 

much, significant concerns remain with her ability to care for the children and the same 

problems that led to the initial removal remain in existence. Craig testified that Mother 

has not made enough progress to safely reunify her children after several years. She 

further testified the children deserve permanency. Hunt testified that several concerns 

remain, including Mother’s relationship with R.T. and Mother’s inability to safely parent 
the children, as she has not shown the ability to manage the children without assistance. 

Thomas stated in her testimony and in her report that she questioned Mother’s ability to 

raise three young children and was concerned about Mother’s ability to protect her 

children in the future. Kiggans testified that she did not recommend reunification between 

Mother and the children because Mother lacked the ability to protect and provide for the 

children. 

{¶56} We find there is competent and credible evidence to support the trial court’s 

finding that the children cannot be placed with Mother within a reasonable amount of time 

and should not be placed with Mother. This determination by the trial court did not violate 

Mother’s right to Due Process or “fundamental fairness.” 

{¶57} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

granting permanent custody of A.M., M.M., and C.M. to SCDJFS. 
{¶58} Mother’s assignment of error is overruled and the March 6, 2020 judgment 

entry of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. 

By Gwin, J., 

Hoffman, P.J., and 

Wise, Earle, J., concur